The Press.
London, England, 1854-05-13 00:00:00

THE LAST BUDGET.

THE debate on the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHE-
QUER'S last financial statement is fixed for
Monday, and will probably extend over several
evenings. Whatever turn it may take, we
have no idea that there will be any attempt to
weaken the hands of the Executive. The
Government is secure from that kind of oppo-
sition .which would tend to impede its action
or stint its means for carrying on the war with
all possible vigour. The new estimates have
been voted with great unanimity, and Parlia-
ment, no doubt, will be equally willing to grant
funds to defray their cost. There is no dispo-
sition to shrink from any necessary increase of
fixation, provided it be fairly adjusted; but
Mr. GLADSTONE must not suppose that he will
be quietly allowed to make the necessities of
his exchequer a cloak for the gratification of
his private animosities and party spleen, or
that he will be suffered to tamper as he pleases
with the national finances. The experience
we have had of his crotchets is not of a nature
to inspire that confidence in his wisdom which
he has still the audacity to demand. An
attempt will probably be made to save him

By his own account he has been an unlucky
man—but another term, in 111 C HE LI Eif a opinion,
for an imprudent one. His schemes ought to
have been all successful, instead of all failing.
Like most ingenious persons of his class, he
has plenty of reasons to show why his expec-
tations were disappointed. Men and nature con
spired against him. Prince ME NSCHIKOFF went
to Constantinople early last year, and there was a
wet seed-time. The Opposition were to blame
for not foreseeing the consequences of his pro-
jects better than himself, and for not restrain-
ing him from carrying them into effect.
Capitalists were wrong for studying their own
interest intsead of his convenience. The
Bank was perverse for chargitig him interest
on deficiency bills ; and the system of public
accounts was thoroughly vicious for not show
ing a larger balance .in the
,exchequer than
actually existed. More than one-half of
his speech was, occupied with this queru-
lous talk, which proved nothing except his
ignorance of the business of his depart-
ment. Is it a novel practice for Government
to have funds at the Bank on quarter-day
to pay the public dividends? Or is it a
thing unprecedented for capitalists to make
the best use they can of their money?
While the principle is boastingly proclaimed
that the expenses Of the war shall be wholly
met by increased taxation, it is violated 'by
the proposal of a loan for six millions, in ad-
dition to the increased issue of 1,750,0001. of
Exchequer Bills, 'previously voted. It may
reasonably be asked how, if we cannot make
our income keep pace with our expenditure at
the commencement of the 'war, we shall be
able to do so as it advances ? Is it not pro-
bable that hereafter, as sow, we shall be called
on to vote increased estimates before the
revenue to defray. their cost can be imposed
and collected ? But, whatever may be thought
of the practicability of adhering to this prin-
ciple, it is indispensably necessary, even to
its fair trial, that we should start clear, and
that no engagements should be entered into
to pay back the money we now borrow
within so limited a period as four years.
The creation of Mr. GLADSTONE'S new form
of security is defended on the ground that it
resembles Exchequer Bills, which are found
equally convenient both to the Government
and the public. But, if analogous to the Ex-
chequer Bill, what is its advantage over it?
A security payable at four years must bear a
higher rate of interest than a security payable
at a shorter period ; and, so far, this new
exchequer instrument is less advantageous to
the public than the old one. If it be ad-
mitted that only a certain amount of the bills
will float in the market at a reasonable rate of
interest, we have still to learn what advantage
these Exchequer Bonds possess over funded
debt, and particularly over that form of it
which consists in terminable annuities.

That single reason which might possibly
render these bonds acceptable to individuals
makes them dangerous to the exchequer. We
mean their fixed date of payment. Our un-
funded debt requires at present careful ma
nagement : its pressure is often found ex-
tremely inconvenient, and at such times its
reduction is sure to entail a serious loss on
the country. What says Mr. GLADSTONE him-
self on this point?—

There are only two occasions—namely, in the hears
1839 and 1841—on which you have funded Exchequer
Bills since the peace in which you have not entailed by
that funding a permanent burden of from 41. to 51. for
every 1001. of Exchequer Bills upon yourselves and upon
posterity. Those two occasions, as I have said, were 1839
and 1841. They were not, indeed, so disadvantageous as
the other occasions, the rate in 1839 being 31. Os. percent.
upon 4,000,0001. funded,and, in 1841, 31. 7s. I Id. per cent.
upon 8,544,0001. funded. But even these were high rates
with reference to the rate of interest which you pay upon
Exchequer Bills in easy times, and they have entailed a
very considerable addition to the capital of the public debt
of the country.
These facts afford a sound argument for
keeping the unfunded debt within d tie bounds ;
but how do they justify the creation of a new
kind of unfunded debt which may prove
greatly more unmanageable than that which
we possess ? Who can say what our financial
condition may be in 1858? Is it wise abso-
lutely to burden that year with the payment of
our need of 1864 ? The principle of this
stipulation is so very objectionable, so likely
to prove inconvenient to the public ser-
vice, and injurious to public credit, that
we hope the Legislature will never be
brought to sanction it. We cannot con-
ceive any form of security more likely to
introduce confusion into our national accounts,
and increase their complexity. The amount
sought to be created, though insignificant
as a portion of our debt, is yet large enough
to produce great inconvenience should it fall
due at an adverse time.
•The additional taxes proposed might have
passed without question but for the obvious
injustice of one of them. Mr. GLADSTONE is
introducing a new and most dangerous prin-
ciple in politics, by using finance as a party
weapon, and employing it to load his political
opponents with an undue share of the public
burdens. Taxation, sufficiently grievous at all
times, becomes intolerable when it is felt to
be partial and unjust. It was with Mr. GLAD-
STONE a sufficient reason to increase the malt
duty that Mr. DISRAELI had proposed its
reduction. He must show his zeal for the
party he has joined by striking a blow at that
which he has left. The sensation which his
announcement excited in the House showed
how accurately he had calculated his power to
wound. The venom of his project may find
favour in the sight of the most unscrupulous
of his allies, but must sink his character in
general estimation, while it proves him to be
wholly unfit fin• the office he fills.
The reasons he alleged for loading this par-
ticular article with additional duty were
scarcely specious Tobacco was not to be
touched because it produced five millions, and
it was wise to " let well alone." The tea
duties must not be interfered with because
the trade with China might be extended; but
neither the very large amount already pro-
duced by the malt duty—upwards of five
millions—nor the interest of the British
grower was thought worth consideration.
When he stated that the malt and beer duties
taken together constituted in former times a hea-
vier amount of duty than he now proposed to
levy, he omitted to notice that the beer duty was
never paid by that large class of persons who,
particularly in rural districts, brewed for them-
selves, and supplied their labourers from their
store.

To attempt to raise between seven and eight
millions from this commodity alone may, per-
haps, push taxation to that oppressive point
at which it ceases to be productive. It is
a much larger sum than we raise from any single