The Press.
London, England, 1854-03-04 00:00:00

REFORM OF THE COMMON LAW.

A bill designed to amend the forms of procedure
and trials at common law was introduced by the
Lou]) CHANCELLOR in the House of Peers on
Monday. After passing in review the labours of
preceding commissions, and eulogising the acts of
1851 and 1852, which had been attended, in his
opinion, with as favourable results and as little dis-
appointment as could reasonably have been expected,
he adverted to the report of the last commission,
and the bill which he proposed to found upon it.
The former bill, he remarked, dealt with the pre-
liminaries of suits; he now proposed to deal with the
trials themselves:—

" His first proposition might appear somewhat startling,
as it involved a modification in the principle of trial by
jury. When both plaintiff and defendant agreed to the
step, the commissioners proposed to remit the trial to the
unassisted judge. Considering that all interference with
the jury system should be introduced with great caution,
he could only assent to adopt this proposal so far as to
dispense with the juries in certain definite classes of suits
and with the assent of the judge. The example of the
county courts, he argued, was not parallel; small cases
differed materially from large ones. He proposed that
questions of account should, without coming before a jury,
be at once submitted to an accountant, or referred to a
county court judge. The Lord Chancellor then explained
the improvements he wished to effect in the jury itself.
He proposed to abolish the distinction between special
and common juries—the qualification for the latter being
somewhat raised, and the two amalgamated. The mixture
of different classes in the same jury would, he thought, be
advantageous in bringing varied experience to bear upon
the case. At present the plaintiff, when the defendant
called no witnesses, was debarred the right of reply. Often
in a just cause the plaintiff might state facts not borne
out by the evidence, and which he ought to be allowed to
explain. He proposed, accordingly, to give plaintiff the
right to a second speech after the close of his evidence,
according, of course, a similar privilege to the defendant.
The rule for calling attesting witnesses to prove docu-
ments would be abolished except in certain cases. He did
not intend to interfere with the regulation as to unanimity
of the jury, believing that regulation necessary for the fair
discussion of the case, but he would discharge them if
they could not agree upon a verdict after a reasonable
time, say twelve hours, and allow a new trial either at
once or at the next assizes, according to the wish of the
parties. He would also allow the jury, for the future, the
enjoyment of fire and reasonable refreshment. He
recommended that all persons entertaining conscientious
scruples against taking an oath might, with the consent of
the judge, be permitted to substitute an affirmation, citing
cues where, under the actual law, justice had failed
through the want of evidence from witnesses who refused
to be sworn on account of scruples of conscience. Never-
theless, he thought that, in ordinary cases, the imposition
of an oath was a strong preventive to falsehood. When
deeds were insufficiently stamped, he proposed to allow
them to be put in evidence upon payment at once, to some
appointed officer of the court, of the deficient amount of
stamp duty and something more. It was, he contended, a
great object to allow each case to be comeeted in one
court, and he therefore proposed to empower courts of
common law to issue injunctions in cases which had been
laid before them. It had been suggested that the courts of
law and equity should be fused together. He admitted
that, if legislation were now to commence de novo, no dis-
tinction should have been introduced, but it was now
closely interwoven with our legal system, was productive
of no practical mischief, and the advantages of alteration
would not counterbalance its inconveniences. The
principles of both should be assimilated, so that suitors
at common law might obtain the protection of equity.
With this view, he proposed that what were called
equitable defences ' might be pleaded in bar to an action
at common law."

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After explaining soms of the working details of his
bill, the Lord Chancellor concluded by moving that
it be read a first time.
Lord CrairsELL pointed out several details in
the bill which would require great consideration,
but gave it a ge:reral approval. He expressed his
satisfaction that it was not proposed to take away the
trial by jury, though he admitted there were cases
in which a single judge would be sufficient. He
approved, however, of all the improvements proposed
to be introduced into the mode of trial by jury, and
particularly of the discretion given to the judge in
cases where witnesses had conscientious objections to
Vie taking of an oath.
Lord BROUGHAM announced his satisfaction with the
measure, and mentioned that, without any concert,
but solely from a consideration of principles, the
commissioners and himself had arrived at the same
conclusions. The bill was a step in the right direc-
tion, which, before their lordships had done, he
hoped would be converted into a stride.
The bill was read a first time and ordered for a
second reading, the Lord Chancellor intimating
that it would then be referred to a select committee.