The Press.
London, England, 1858-01-16 00:00:00

THE PRESS, JANUARY 16, 1858.

may be the rooting out of their nest of iniquity, whether it be in
London or Paris. Both the Emperor and Empress NAPOLEON have
won the esteem of England ; and on this occasion, represented by
Lord COWLEY, we were not backwards in offering our sincere oongratu.
lations to their Imperial Majesties upon their happy escape.

At length we are enabled to unravel the tangled skein of tele
graphic misstatements. We learn positively that Sir COLIN CAMPBELL
has abandoned Lucknow, and that he has not got 12,000 men under
his command. Those are two important facts corkveyed to us by tiro
letters frotn India; and they are the most important, for they must
materially influence the conduct of the campaign. We speak of the
"campaign," for it must be clear to the perception even of Lord JOHN
RUSSELL that this is a great war in which we aro engaged—that we are
at war with Oude, and that the war, if waged a l'outrance, will neither
be rapidly nor easily concluded. A retreat, therefore, from an advanced
position in the enemy's territory, and the entire abandonment of that
territory, is not to be regarded lightly. It is an open confession of our
own weakness and of our enemy's superiority, and among Asiatics such
an acknowledgment is not without danger. That a retreat was inevitable
was clear the moment the real amount of Sir COLIN CAMPBELL'S force
was known. That curse of every operation from Delhi to Lucknow,
inadequate force, attended Sir COLIN CAMPBELL. Ho took with hi►n
4,000 men to open a campaign for which 40,000 would not have been
too many, and, after effecting his primary object, he very wisely pre-
ferred being out of a territory swarming with the enemy, than shut up
in Lucknow, and depending upon the energy of Lord CANNING for
relief. But how discreditable to us, as a nation excelling in all the
applications of science to the art of war—how discreditable to us is it
that after eight months' preparation we should prove unable to con-
centrate on any given spot in India 5,000 European troops from Eng-
land ! Let us conceive, for a moment, the effect of 5,000 British
troops concentrated at Cawnpore in October. It is impossible to
overrate the enormous advantages which would have accrued to us if
any steps had been taken in time to insure such a happy result. But
reflection is useless. The Ministers denied the gravity of the crisis ;
they refused to take a single step in advance, and an insurrection,
which might have been quelled cheaply in three months, will now
take as many years to suppress, and will cost us millions
of money and torrents of blood. As to the general tenor of the
intelligence by this mail being satisfactory, down to the latest
despatch it is eminently unsatisfactory. With the exception of the
single fact that Sir COLIN CAMPBELL continues well, and that the heroes
of Lucknow have been brought off in safety, we are disposed to think
matters are assuming a very serious aspect. In the first place, very
grave doubts are felt about the security of the Punjaub. Sir JOHN
LAWRENCE has sent the most earnest requests to Bombay for a couple
of brigades and guns if they can be spared. At Delhi we have a very
small force ; and we have yet to learn the effect of the retreat from
Lucknow. Between Delhi and Agra communication is once more
unsafe; and indeed from Delhi to Cawnpoie the whole country is
infested with rebels. At Cawnpore we hold our own, but from
thence to Allahabad the rebels are once more swarming ; and it is
quite possible, if the Oude rebels make a push for Benares and the
outlying districts, that Cawnpore may have to be given lip, and the
head-quarters of the army moved down to Allahabad. The whole line
of country from Delhi to Calcutta swarms with rebels, who attack our
reinforcements, harass our convoys, and keep alive that spirit of
plunder which is ever such a stimulant to the disaffected. This,
therefore, can scarcely be regarded as a satisfactory state of affairs
after eight months' effort to quiet the country. With respect to General
WINDHAM'S conduct, we are not disposed to join in that hue and cry
with which a certain portion of the British public run down an unlucky
general. We know nothing of the official details ; but we apprehend
that when everything is known, it will be found that General WINDHAM,
completely outflanked by a numerous enemy with a heavy artillery,
was compelled to retreat to preserve his communication with Sir COLIN
and to hold Cawnpore. As to General WINDHAM having in the first
instance been deliberately guilty of disobedience to the orders of the
Commander-in-Chief, we must wait for better evidence before we accept
the statement. General WINDHAM'S retreat is only another illustra-
tion of the position we maintain, that the characteristic of all our
operations has been inadequate force. He had too few men to
encounter such a powerful and well-disciplined army as the Gwalior
rebels. Let us take heed that this does not occur again.

What is the cause that recruits come in so slowly? We have
lowered the standard, we have by every means in our power—from
the pulpit and front the forum—appealed to tho patriotism of our
countrymen, and yot the class from which our best recruits aro ob-
tained have not responded to the call. They have dwindled down to
800 a week, and our supply to India falls short of the demand by
nearly 500 a month. We cannot accuse them of want of love to their
country, after the noble manner in which they came forward during
the late war; we cannot believe that they listened unmoved to the
tales of the atrocities committed by tho mutineers in India. We fear