The Press.
London, England, 1854-01-07 00:00:00

UIMMIMMI

SATURDAY,

exercised on their behalf, and for their benefit. Cense
quently, it becomes a vital point that the mechanism of.
the elective process should be such as to allow all parties
and opinions to be fairly represented in the House of Com-
MOUS.
In the more simple political constitutions first decribed,
all parties are necessarily fairly represented, because they
are all permitted to be present, and to act for themselves.
But in our representative system, as will appear hereafter,
it may possibly happen that even a large minority may be
wholly excluded, either in the case of a single constituency,
or in that of the House of Commons itself. And a minority
thus excluded are manifestly placed in a much worse position
than if merely outvoted in an assembly at which they have
the right of being present. The right of being heard, of discus-
sing, objecting, explaining, protesting, is taken away from
them, not on one question only, but on all questions; not
on a single administrative act, but on questions of perma-
nent legislation.
It is as if the majority in a simple democratic republic
wore to use their powers as a majority to disfranchise a
minority, and exclude them altogether from the National
Legislative Assembly.
There can be no question as to the reality
and extent of this evil: the sole possible doubt
regards the nature of the remedy. Again w•e
quote our author :
Let us consider the various modes in which the votes of
electors may be taken. The whole body of electors may
vote as one constituency for the whole of the members of
the representative body, and they may vote on different
principles.
In the first place, on the system which has been called
collective voting, each elector may vote for the whole num-
ber of representatives ; in our own case, for instance, might
have 656 votes.
It is clear that on this system a simple majority may re.
turn the whole of the representatives ; and a minority of
nearly one-half the electors may be excluded from all
share in the Legislature.
Nay, further, it has been shown, in an able article in the
Edinburgh Review, that even a small minority may nearly
monopolise the representation.
The reviewer is considering the instance of Franco,
where this system is used in their plan of departmental

voting :
" If France were one constituency for the election of
representatives, as it is for the election of a presi-
lent, and each elector had to vote for 750 represen-
iatives, it is probable that a single list would prevail almost
without alteration. We will suppose the country divided
into Legitimists, Orleanists,Bonapartists, and Republicans,
in the following proportions :—four-thirteenths Republicans,
sud three-thirteenths belonging to each of the other dello-

xiinations.
" Under such circumstances the Republican party,
Mough scarcely exceeding one-fourth of the whole popu.
lotion, would return nearly the whole Assembly. If such
In the effect of the collective system when fully carried out,
such must be its tendency when partially adopted.
" And it must be admitted to be most mischievous both
is the successful and to the unsuccessful party; impelling
one to acts of insolent oppression, and driving the other
towards disaffection and revolution."
A remarkable instance of the effect of this
kind of voting was furnished by America in
the election of President Pierce. That gentle-
man was returned by a majority of twenty-
nine out of thirty-one States, his rival's party
Icing thus to all appearance annihilated. Yet
the actual numbers voting for each candidate
were, for Pierce, 1,600,000 ; for Scott, 1,380,000 ;
a difference of not one-sixth. Really, the
defeated candidate had five-sixths as many
rotes as his opponent; apparently, to one con-
sidering only the prima facie aspect of the
return, he was beaten by fourteen to one. Yet
the American system of voting is lauded as
the perfection of fairness.
Two other modes of voting remain for con-
sideration. The first may be designated as
the " Single Vote," that by which each elector
shall be allowed to vote only for one repre-
sentative. The tendency of this is precisely
the reverse of that first named. llt secures
the representation of all parties, however small.
It gives every section a fair hearing in the
Legislature
If we suppose the country to be divided between two
parties, the smaller, being, for example, one-third of the
whole, if that minority were to restrict their list of candi-
dates to one-third of the number to be elected, and were to
distribute their votes equally amongst them, might thus
secure the return of their list of candidates. If, again, we
suppose the country to be divided into an almost indefinite
, number of parties, this mode of voting would in like man-
ner give a proportionate share of representation to each.
For instance, any party or opinion in this couniry which
' could number one-six-hundredth-and-fifty-sixth part of the
I electors amongst its supporters might by combination re-
turn one member and have one voice in the Legislature.
But this result is attainable only through
the medium of a complicated and cautious
machinery. It requires the union of the whole
country in a single constituency, a plan which,
by excluding personal knowledge and local
influences, would practically rest all power in
the hands of political clubs or committees,
organised for the express purpose of selecting