The Press.
London, England, 1854-12-16 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

of every country in Europe, that, if not impregnable, the
attempt was of a most difficult nature; but they did feel
that the independence and integrity of Turkey was a
mere joke so long as that fortress was deemed impreima-
ble. . . . And they (the Government) did think
that, with the assistance of the French, those two forces,
acting in co-operation, could achieve all that it was pos-
sible for men to accomplish.
Lord John Russell on the 27th of October observed—
Immediately after the siege of Silistria was raised it
became a question both with the Government at home and
with the generals, what should be done on the shores of
the Black Sea.
I should have thought that even before the raising
of the siege of Silistria it had Keen considered what
should be done next, supposing the siege to be raised.
It appears, however, that only in the event of the
siege of Silistria being raised did the Government
determine what to do next. (Hear.) The noble
lord continues,—
The Government at home thought the time was come
to occupy the Crimea and capture Sebastopol. The in-
structions of the Governments of England and Francis
were received at Varna about the middle of July; a meet-
ing of the generals of the allied forces took place, and the
expedition was resolved upon.
Thus, by the confession of two noble lords, one in
this and one in the other House of Parliament, it '
was the Government at home, notwithstanding the
representations made by generals of high distinction
of the almost insuperable difficulties of an attack
upon Sebastopol, who urged on the commanders of
the allied forces the necessity of making the attempt.
It was not the act of the generals in command of the
army, but it was urged upon them by the Govern-
ment at home, and, being so urged, it became
doubly the duty of the Government at home to see
that no single circumstance was omitted, and no
provision neglected, which was calculated to contri
bute to the success of the war. (" Hear, hear," and
cheers.)
Well, my lords, what steps were taken? What
steps were taken from the middle of June, when you
received intelligence of the raising of the siege of
Silistria, and when you began to consider " what
next?" What steps were taken to reinforce your
army of 25,000 men? What were the extensive
operations which you in your wisdom determined
upon? I believe that reinforcements were sent out
of something like 5,000 men, and from that time till
after the battle of Inkermann—l don't mean to say
that driblets here and there may not have gone out
—but from that time till after the battle of Inker-
mann, when the 46th arrived in the field, the army,
which was originally composed of from 25,000 to
30,000 men, was left without reinforcements. (Hear,
hear.) The battle of Inkermann was fought by not
more than 8,000 out of from 14,000 to 15,000 British
bayonets, which was all the force then left in the
Crimea. (Hear, hear.) In calling attention, then,
to the course which Government pursued, I cannot
refrain from saying that they took steps in the dark
without calculating the consequences of their actions,
and without making provision to secure success.
(Hear.) I have now to mention a subject which,
perhaps, I ought to have mentioned before. Her
Majesty's Government sent out these troops originally
to Varna, and I must ask your lordships' permission
to read to you a statement from an eye-witness, a
gallant friend of mine, well known to your lordships,
but whose name I am not permitted to mention at
present, who was anxious that in the discussion this
day justice should be done to the merits of the
army, and no undue reproaches cast upon them.
My gallant friend says:—
I have no idea what line you intend to pursue, but I do
hope that there is to be no reproach of delay at Scutari or
Varna. From too close an economy we had given up all
those necessary appendages for a field army without which
it can neither take care of itself nor move against the
enemy. We had regiments, and very good ones, but no-
thing else. No commissariat, no staff corps, no waggon
train, no medical establishment for the field. All this,
and, still more important, a transport system fbr cavalry
and artillery, bad to be formed and organised in a country
affording absolutely nothing to help you; and I protest,
when I look back on the work done in the organisation of
the army at Scutari and Varna, I am enre that nothing but
the spirit and zeal of English officers could have carried it
out. The chief blundering was in the shipment of stores
without method or order, by which no one knew where to
find them. One day I had 100 men searching the Turkish
Custom-house for missing tent•poles, which were found
after eight hours' labour.
What was the consequence of all this ? That the
army was incapable of movement, that it was detained
in inaction, amid the pestiferous atmosphere of Varna,
and there, "night by night," says my correspon-
dent,
Those dreadful graves, fifty or sixty feet long, were dug
of an evening on the hill near Varna for the poor fellows
sere to die in the night.
Surely these are circumstances which raise to the
highest pitch the indomitable courage and energies
of the men.
It might be necessary, my lords, that when the
army marched to the banks of the Alma, or even when
it marched from Alma to Balaklava and Inkermann,

1203

it should carry with it a small amount of baggage. It
would hardly be possible to carry with it any super-
fluities, but certainly it ought to have had medical
supplies and comforts for the hospitals at Varna and
Scutari. If such advances as have been made were

to be attempted, these supplies ought to have been
at hand. The Government had ample means of
taking them, and every arrangement ought to have
been made to secure them. At one time it was

denied that there was any want of medical attendance ;
we were told that there was a larger proportion of

medical officers than ever had been known upon any
previous expedition sent out by this country. I re-
member seeing two or three columns occupied in one
of the newspapers full of particulars as to the amount
of stores, and when public charity and sympathy
came forward with otters of assistance—of stores of

all descriptions, linen, rags, and other appliances for
the wounded—they were told that there was abun-
dance of everything, that there was no want of sup-
plies, that there was abundance both of medicines and
of medical officers. .

Well, a lady has been sent out under the sanction
of the Government—a lady to whose heroism and
that of her companions it is impossible for language
to do justice—(cheers)—who, giving up all the com-
forts and luxuries of life, devoted themselves with
noble self-devotion to the mitigation of suffering and
to the supervision of those overcrowded hospitals.
What was the account contained in the very first
demand made by these ladies sent out under the
sanction of Government? Why, it was an ardent,
an almost importunate request to the British public
to send out that which the Government said was
already supplied in profusion; and this was accom-
panied by the statement that in one day eleven men
had sunk from exhaustion, in consequence of not
having a bottle of wine to restore them, (Heat,
hear.) Now, this is a subject in regard to which, I
say, a heavy responsibility devolves upon the Govern-
ment. (Hear.) I cannot tell how far these charges
are correct, but I know they are in every man's
mouth ; and I felt, consequently, that it was my
duty as a peer of Parliament, and as one deeply
interested in the welfare of the brave men whom
we have sent out to fight our battles, to comment
upon what is generally said ; and I therefore ask
the Government not only to deny, but to disprove
these statements, if disprove them they can. (Hear,
hear.)
Well, then, you have lately sent out—" too late,"
again !—(Hear, hear)—you sent out on the 15th of
October, for the first time, a supply of winter cloth-
ing for the troops, who were absolutely in rags and
about to encounter the horrors of a Crimean winter.
On the 15th of October you sent out to Balaklava an
abundant supply of winter clothes. You embarked
them on board a magnificent vessel, how manned
and commanded, I ask the noble duke to explain
You sent out also large stores of ammunition, toge-
ther with this supply of warm winter clothing, as
well as medicines and medical comforts. The medi-
cal stores ought to have been landed at Scutari, but
when the vessel arrived there it was found that all
these stores, although first directed to Scutari, were
deposited in the hold beneath piles of ammunition
and shot, so that it was impossible to get at theta
without discharging and unloading the whole of the
ammunition and general stores. (Hear, hear.) Ul-
timately the vessel went on to Balaklava. At Bala-
klava Bay, if I am not misinformed, this vessel, after
losing two of her anchors, was for seven days allowed
to drag outside, although having on board a cargo of
inestimable value—in money value, I believe, some-
thing like half a million, but, of a value at that ma.
ment net. to be measured by money. (Hear, hear.)
Yes, I am told—but I can hardly believe it—that for
seven days that vessel was dragging in thirty-fathom
water in the open sea outside the roads of Balaklava
—that she was not taken inside ; and the conse-
quence was the loss of that vessel, of her cargo, am-
munition, warm clothing, and medical stores.
(Hear, hear.)
And now there is another question I wish to ask
the noble earl and her Majesty's Government. I
should be sorry to cast any unjust or undeserved
stigma upon those who are no longer living to be
made responsible to the country ; but I am told (and
I have it on authority which I believe to be valid)
that representations had been made to the First
Lord of the Admiralty to the effect that the com-
mander of the ship to which I am referring, the
Prince, to which you were intrustmg such a priceless
cargo, was wholly incompetent to take such a trust,
and had proved himself so incompetent upon his
voyage to the Baltic, that, in the opinion of a dis-
tinguished officer, if that vessel were sent out under
the command of that captain she would be lost upon
her voyage. Moreover, I am told that the officer
whose opinion was thus expressed was asked if he
would commit this statement to writing; that he did
so; that that statement was handed to the First Lord
of the Admiralty, and, notwithstanding such a state-
ment was received on such an authority, this vessel,
purchased by the Government, was not sent out
under the command of an officer in her Majesty's

1204

service, but was sent out under the command of that
very commander of whom this character had been
given to the First Lord of the Admiralty. (Hear.)
Ido not state this as a fact within my own know-
ledge ; but I ask the noble duke (of Newcastle) if
it be so? and if so, I ask whether, for the loss of that
vessel—of her precious cargo, and her crew of 150
men—her Majesty's Govemment are not deeply
responsible? (Hear, hear.) But whether the facts
on this point are, or are not, such as they have been
represented to me, why was this vessel, with such a
cargo, permitted so long to drive outside the bay?
Why was she not, at any risk and at any incon-
venience, taken into Balaklava, by which this casualty,
and the lamentable loss we have sustained through
it, would have been prevented. (Hear.)
Now, my lords, in making these comments T hope and
feel that I have made them with no desire to embarrass the
Government, but for the purpose of affording the Govern-
ment an opportunity, if possible, of repudiating and re-
futing them ; and, if they cannot, of strongly urging upon
the Government to avoid such acts for the future. But
when I charge them with an utter unconsciousness of what
they were about to do, there cannot be a stronger proof of
the justice of that charge than the very circumstances
under which we are meeting this day. Parliament stood
prorogued until the 14th of November. On the 10th or
1 lth—l am not certain as to the exact day—a Privy Coun-
cil was summoned for the purpose of further proroguing
Parliament, and a further prorogation accordingly took
place from the 14th of November to the 14th of December,
without being accompanied by the words, " then to meet
for the discharge of business. It was thus perfectly clear,
then, that on the 10th of November the Government had
not the slightest inkling as to the actual meeting of Parlia-
ment on the 14th. I admit it is perfectly competent for
the Government, upon any unforeseen emergency, to call
Parliament together at an earlier period than that to which
it is prorogued, but in this case, from the terms of the
notice officially issued, there was a general understanding
that there would be a further prorogation, and that mem-
bers of both houses would be enabled to form their engage-
ments accordingly, without inconvenience. Well, but on
the 20th of November a change came o'er the spirit of the
dream of the Government, and that which they evidently
considered unnecessary on the 10th they deemed so urgent
and pressing on the 20th that they immediately summoned
Parliament together—not on the day to which it had been
prorogued, but two days earlier. There was, therefore, in
the opinion of the Government, not an hour to be lost.
Now, what was the sudden exigency which had arisen in
those ten days—what had occurred in the interval to make
the meeting of Parliament expedient on the 20th of No-
vember which did not make it equally expedient on the
10th? Undoubtedly, in the meantime the news of the
battle of Inkermann had arrived. But am Ito be told
that a provision which was so urgent that the period to
which Parliament had been prorogued must be anticipated
in order to meet it—which was of such importance and
pressing urgency that Parliament must be called
hastily together in order to provide for it—am I to
be told that the necessity of such a provision was
simply occasioned by a battle in which, undoubtedly,
you lost a large numerical proportion of your
men, but which is yet not to be compared with
many engagements of modem times? (Hear, hear.) If
you calculated that you were going to take, to keep, and to
raze Sebastopol without any addition to that small force,
was it only on the 20th of November, and notpreviously to
that day, that it came into your heads that it was possible
and advisable to take measures for increasing the effec-
tive strength of your army ? ("Bear " and cheers.) Your
lordships must remember that the Government have not
yet condescended to inform us in what manner it is in-
tended to strengthen the army, or what they mean to do to
meet the emergency. We have been told, indeed, by the
organs of the Government that they have money in abun-
dance—(a laugh)—and don't stand in need of a loan :
and it is also hinted that it is intended to take powers to
enable a portion of the militia of this country to volunteer
for foreign service, and occupy the places of some of our
foreign garrisons. Now, if that is the case, did not the
necessity for that measure exist, and was it not foreseen,
before the 20th of November? or was it that, after estab-
lishing a Ministry, of War in the middle of June, you and
the rest of his colleagues threw upon him all the responsi-
bility and labour of the war, scattered yourselves all over
the country, never taking into consideration the pressing
military emergencies of the country until you met in
November ? ("Hear," and Opposition cheers.) At all
events, upon the face of the case, I cannot but think that
the Government stand convicted of a want of due care and
forethought up to a very late period, as exemplified in the
time to which they had prorogued Parliament and the
sudden reflection which led them to desire an earlier meet-
ing. (Hear, hear.)
My lords, I have spoken of the gallant services of the
army in the Crimea ; and gallantly have they been sup-
ported—more especially on shore—by the sister service.
I, however, observe no reference in her Majesty's Speech
to the success achieved by our arms in the Baltic—(a
laugh)—or to the great progress made by our exertions
there towards arriving at an honourable and successful
issue of this great struggle. Now, I should be sorry to
say a single word of disparagement of the gallant men
whom we sent out there, but, certainly, never did a mighty
force—one of the most powerful armaments which this
country has ever sent forth—sent, too, with no little
amount of self-laudation—accomplish so little. (Hear).
Your lordships will all remember a certain Reform dinner,
at which much was said of the mighty deeds to be done
by a Reform admirr.!—(" Hear," and laughter)—and at
which very considerable powers were given to the admiral
to proclaim war—(renaved laughter)—and, when it was
proclaimed, it was rather boastfully done. Your lordships

THE PRESS.

cannot have forgotten that order of the day—that signal
which was given in language, perhaps, not so concise as
that of Nelson, nor quite in the same spirit. lam sure
you recollect the injunction to every man on board the
fleet to sharpen his cutlass and prepare for immediate
action—to give a good account of the Russian fleets if
they happened to meet them, and if they slunk in their
harbours they were to be pulled out by main force. lam
not about to depreciate the conduct of our fleet. On the
part of individual officers an opportunity was afforded for
the exhibition of great skill and seamanship and of great
valour. But as far as all the results of war go--of all that
most expensive and most formidable fleet—those results
are literally nil. You crumbled down a half finished for-
tress which you were not able to occupy, and now one by
one your ships are dropping home from the scene of their
labours, but not of their exploits. Now, I need not say
that I am not a naval man, and so far, perhaps, do not
speak with much authority—(" Hear, hear," from the Minis-
terial benches)—but I apprehend that the Government
ought to have known the strength of Cronstadt—ought to
have been aware of the peculiar characteristics of the
Baltic, and the peculiar strength possessed by the Rus-
sians for the defence of their forces there. What did the
Government do? Why, they sent out a fleet of such
superior power that it would have been an act of madness
on the part of the Russian fleet to come out and meet
them in the open sea: and at the same time they sent out
a fleet the vessels comprising which, in consequence of
their magnitude, were of such a draught of water that it
was absolutely impossible, looking at the depth of water in
the Russian strongholds, that they and the enemy's ships
could come into conflict. ("Hear," and a laugh.) The
consequence of this was, that Sir C. Napier was condemned
to an ignominious inaction which is only paralleled by
that old story which many of your lordships, no doubt, re•
member

" Lord Chatham, with his sword undrawn,
Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;
Sir Richard, longing to be at 'em,
Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham."

(Loud laughter.) So stood Sir Charles, and so stood the
Russian admiral. Both were, no doubt, longing to engage,
but, somehow, from the nature of things, it was impossible
they should come to blows. This is another instance in
which the Government will be fairly charged with having
condemned to ignominious inactivity one of the finest fleets
sent out from this country, and this from neglecting the
most ordinsry precautions which the exigency of the
service required. Other persons communicated with the
Government on this subject, pointed out the shallowness of
the water, the necessity of employing vessels of a small
draught of water, and calculated to carry guns of a heavy
calibre; but the Government took no notice, or only
said, " Pooh! pooh! What do they know about it? "
(Hear, hear.) Their views were altogether neglected,
until again it was too late ; and when it was too late, and
a whole year had been lost, then the very vessels which
ought to have been constructed at first were begun to be
built. Thus the expenses and opportunities of one year
were altogether thrown away, and we are, so far as the
Baltic is concerned, in the exact position in which we were
before. (Hear, hear.)
Now, I repeat that I allude to all this, not for the pur-
pose of discouraging those gallant men who, whether in
the Baltic or elsewhere, have done their best to maintain
the honour of our flag; but if we are to come to a sue-
cesful issue of this great and serious war—if we are to
look to conquering an honourable peace—we must strike
decided blows. I say " conquering" an honourable peace,
because I feel assured that without conquering a peace you
will not obtain it. (Hear.) Depend upon it, knowing as
we do the resources of the Russian empire, and knowing
the character of the great man who rules it (for he is
a great man, although now employing his vast resources
for unworthy purposes), you will gain no peace unless
you conquer it. (Hear.) You must obtain by your arms
such advantages and such a superiority as to force the
Emperor to submit to your terms of peace ; but if you do
not achieve some great successes you may have a pro-
longed, a sanguinary, and possibly a disastrous war, but
an honourable and a successful peace you cannot have.
(Hear, hear.)
There is only one more passage in her Majesty's Speech
to which I consider myself compelled to refer. Her
Majesty announces with satisfaction that she has concluded
a treaty, in conjunction with the Emperor of the French,
with Austria, from which she anticipates " important ad-
vantages to the common cause." My lords, I confess that
this is a paragraph which creates some considerable doubt
in my mind. (Heal.) There can be no doubt that, if, for
the prosecution of the general cause of the war, we have
thrown upon our side, instead of being in a very doubtful
neutrality, the great military resources of Austria, the
hearty co-operation of Austria in the war will be of the
greatest importance, and of signal benefit to the powers
already allied. (Hear, hear.) But, looking to the course
which Austria has hitherto pursued, I must be pardoned if
I hesitate to express my satisfaction at such a treaty having
been formed until I, in common with your lordships, am
made acquainted with the nature of the stipulations and
conditions of that treaty, the engagements into which
Austria has entered, and those by which we are are mutually
bound to Austria. Ido not deny that we ought to make
every allowance for the position of Austria. She is ex-
posed to peculiar dangers; and if she has been playing a
not very dignified game, it must be owned that she has been
playing it with considerable dexterity up to the present
time. She may now feel it her interest and safety to throw
off that doubtful mask which she has hitherto worn,
and throw herself frankly into the arms of the
allies, and join in a sincere confederacy with the
Western powers. tip to the present moment, however,
although it was a favourite text with her Majesty's
Government that negotiations were protracted in
order to secure the immense advantages of the co-operation
of Austria and Prussia, I have yet to learn what practical

SATURDAY,

result, what benefit we have derived, and what co-operation
7--
we have had either from Austria, or still less from Prussia,
(Hear, hear.) With regard to the first of these powers, e
appears to have been doubtfully neutral, and the other
doubtfully, or rather practically, hostile ; and looking to the
part which Austria has played throughout this cam-
paign, I am not at all sure that she has not been in
a
great measure the cause of your want of success in the
Crimea, and of the lamentable loss of life there. After the
success achieved by the Turkish arms at Silistria, Austria
volunteered her intervention, but when the siege of Silistria
was raised—when the Russian army was in full retreat--
when Omer Paths, at the head of a triumphant army, might
have found occupation for a large portion of the forces of
the Czar's army—at that moment Austria came in with her
intervention, concluded a treaty with Turkey, the effect of
which treaty was to give her the occupation and control of
the principalities, to cover, in point of fact, the Russian
retreat, to prevent the Turkish advance, to produce the
demoralisation of that hitherto successful army, and set at
liberty the whole of those forces which the Russians had
concentrated in Bessarabia. The Czar was thus enabled
to throw these forces upon our troops, which were already
outnumbered by the troops they were besieging, and this
fresh reinforcement, raising the armies opposed to them to
four, five, and six times their numbers, was poured upon
them mainly, as it appears to me, in consequence of the
intervention of Austria. (Hear.)
Well, when I consider that this has been the effect of the
intervention of Austria, I may be permitted to doubt the
effect of the advantages of the treaty which we are told has
been entered into—at all events, until the termsofthat
treaty are before us. (Hear, hear.) w e may possibly
have entered into what, for anything I know, may be ex-
ceedingly inconvenient engagements—engagements which
we may find it very difficult to carry out. I know not
what are the stipulations which have been made, but I am
sure that her Majesty's Government will feet—and it is the
only point in which I shall attempt to state an objection,
not to the Address itself, but only to the terms of the Ad-
dress—that it is unreasonable to call upon this house to
express their satisfaction at a treaty the contents of which
we known only to her Majesty's advisers, who may, in-
deed, fairly express their own sentiments on the subject,
but who must feel it impossible to call upon us to do so,
inasmuch as, for good or evil, we know not one single sen-
tence of what it contains. (Hear, hear.) I feel quite
confident that, having made this suggestion, the Ministry
will look upon it as so reasonable that they will consent to
modify so far the terms of the Address as not to call upon
the House of Lords to express satisfaction at the conclu-
sion of a treaty of which they know nothing, but couch the
Address in the ordinary form, and declare the gratification
of your lordships that her Majesty should have concluded
this treaty with satisfaction to herself. (Hear.) Ido not
move this in the form of an amendment, but am quite cer-
tain the Government will themselves see the reasonable-
ness of making such an alteration as will relieve us from
all difficulty whatever with regard to the unanimous adop-
tion of this Address. (Hear, hear.)
My lords, I feel it to be of deep importance for the
prosecution of this war that we should have nut only, as
we have, the cordial, deliberate, steady, reflecting sanction
of the people of this country, but also that we should have
the opinion of Parliament expressed in the most unmistake-
able terms ; that no questions of difference as to the mode
in which the war has been or may be conducted should in-
terfere with the unanimous declaration of Parliament that
we will give to her Majesty every support in our power;
that the world at large may see the spectacle of a great
nation sinking all political animosities, all party conten-
tion—uniting, heart and hand, with all he means at their
disposal, with all the influence they can exercise among
their fellow-countrymen, to prosecute the war, and—even
although they may not entertain confidence in those who ,
have the management of that war—giving them to the full
extent all the support they can require ; and I think I am
speaking the sentiments of the country, as I am that of
my own friends, when I say that, so far from grudging
them any supplies, any support which is necessary for the
successful prosecution of this great and important war, it
will be the country which will urge forward the Ministers
to spare no pains, to omit no exertion, to make every sacri-
fice and every effort for the purpose of securing a just and
honourable peace, in consequence of a successful and
vigorously prosecuted war. (Loud cheers.) And to those
gallant men who are at the present moment, under circum-
stances of considerable difficulty, gallantly fighting the
battles of their country, who have now to a certain
extent been reinforced, and who have exhibited in-
domitable perseverence and a noble courage under all the
circumstacces of difficulty and discouragement to which
they have been exposed—to them I would say, yet a little
more patience, a little more courage, a little more perse-
verance ; the end is not yet, but the end is approaching; the
eyes of the country are upon you; and the wilted hearts of
your countrymen are with you; their sympathies are with
you in your unparalleled exertions; men, women, and
children are collecting stores to alleviate your distress, to
minister to your comfort, and to assuage your suffering.;
fresh reinforcements are at hand, and your unflinching
courage and perseverance during your obstinate resistance
shall serve as a model to them, exciting them to emulate
your glory, and prove themselves worthy of being your
fellow-soldiers. Go on, I would say, in the gallant course
which you have commenced, and believe that the hearts
of your countrymen are with
you, that many a to ar h
been shed for those who have fallen in their country's ser-
vice, and that when you return from this expedition, which,
as
with all its difficulties, with all its glories, and with all its
labours, must and will be successful,
because your example
will inspire others, you will be known, and honoured as
the men who have brought peace to Europe, and main-
tained untarnished the honour of the British flag, who
will have defended the weak from the power of the op-
pressor, and who will deserve and will receive the blessings
of England and the world. (Loud cheers.)

DECEMBER 16, 1854.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE began by confessing to
the committal of very serious blunders :
I am not about to make what might be called an out-
and-out defence of the policy of the Government, or of the
administration of the department to which I have the
honour to belong. lam far too sensible of my own short-
comings, and of the difficulties of administration, to be
prepared to say that everything that has been done has
been done in the best possible way, or that no mistakes
have occurred, or that, if we were now to begin again, on
the 28th of March, with the knowledge and experience we
have acquired, the same things exactly would be done in
the same manner; but, on the contrary, I can say that
some things not done then would now be done, and some
things done then would now be omitted.
He then embarked upon an explanation of the
Ministerial policy and a defence of their conduct,
touching in the course of his speech upon a variety
of points, and recapitulating a great multiplicity of
details. Respecting military operations, the invasion
of the Crimea had not been rashly underte.ken:—

From the very first the invasion of the Crimea was con-
templated, and I only wish that it were consistent with my
duty to lay before your lordships the despatches between
Lord Raglan and myself with reference to the conduct of
this war; but this is not a fitting time for the production
of such documents, and if I were to produce them it would
be dangerous for the public service ; but the production of
these documents would prove that which I now ask you to
believe on my authority, that on the very day on which in-
structions were first given to Lord Raglan instructions
were also given in a separate despatch to make inquiry
with reference to the reduction of Sebastopol, the forces in
the Crimea, the means of invasion, and the best mode of
carrying it out; and when the noble earl says that the
orders for the invasion of the Crimea were given in
spite of the opinion (of the generals, I deny that they
were given in spite of the opinion of any general at all,
but that, on the contrary, as far as any military opinions
were received, they were in favour of undertaking the expe-
dition.

On the head of preparations and supplies the Duke
of Newcastle dilated at great length, enumerating the
precise quantities of ammunition, provision, clothes,
huts, medical stores, and every other mentionable
article of equipment or subsistence; but he admitted
having largely miscalculated the enemy's strength
and capabilities :
That events have turned out differently from what was
contemplated in more respects than one I have already
admitted. Undoubtedly, we did not expect the Russian
power in reinforcing troops before Sebastopol would be so
great. We did not doubt her military power. We were
aware of that ; but undoubtedly we did not expect that an
army could be moved from Odessa to Sebastopol with the
marvellous rapidity with which that movement was effected ;
and, probably, some of your lordships will be surprised to
hear that, through the extraordinary efforts of the Russian
Government, through the means they were able to com-
mand of an unlimited number of cars and cattle, that march
was effected at such a rapid rate that on one day a march
of forty-two miles was actually effected. We did not cal-
culate on the powers of the Russian Government to send
reinforcements to Sebastopol in time for the battle of
Inkermann, and I believe that there are few in this country
—few in any other country—who did expect it. (Hear,
hear.) I can only say that we did not form our opinions
on any haphazard or guesswork, but we took the best
opinions we were able to obtain in this country—of those
who could inform ns as to the capabilities of the Russian
forces and the character of the country they would have to
traverse.