The Express.
London, England, 1855-04-12 00:00:00

THE VISIT OF THE EMPEROR AND EMPRE

OF THE FRENCH.

The Emperor and Empress of the French will
arrive at Wiadeor, by the; Great Western Railway, at six
o'clo.k next Monday evening. They will be received by a
guard of honour composid of the 94th Regiment, a com-
pany of the Foot Guards, and a detachment from the Ride

Brigade.
The Mayor of Windior (lola Clode, Esq.) will be in
attendance, with the Castle Mantels, to conduct the Emperor
sad Bawer to her Majesty's waiting•room, and afterwards
to the apartments prepared for them at the Castle.
. .

There will be state dinners at Windsor Cutlet on every
eveniog alter the Emperor Napoleon's arrival; and subset•
quest to the investiture of his Imperial Majesty with the
Order of the Garter, on Wednesday, a magniflosat benquast
will be given, at which the Ale of the aristocracy will be
present. There will also be a review of the whole of the
household troops.
The Dean of Windsor, who is brother to Lord Cowley,
the British ambassador at Paris, ham placed his residence in
the eloistets at the envies of a portion of the Emperor's
suite.

The preparations at the Cutle are by no means complete,
no leer than 300 workmen being still engaged.

DUBLIN, WZDNZSDLY.
His ExosEmmy the Earl of Carlisle, Lord
Lieutenant, arrived at Kiogstown to-day, at two
o'clock. Arrived in Dublin, he proceeded in state to
the Castle, loudly cheered by the people.

His Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridgs loans
Loaders, at lleoday, he Whither Castle, when ha will re-
sin a gnat of her hiLajway until the following Thursday.

Min BurdettCoutis in returned to town, from
Suffolk. Miss Coatis is mooted to okit Pais la %Monroe
of • tow weeks.

Arrangements are in progress for the erection of a
aew char& is the Westminster/cad, a few ye:dean of the
Roman Catholic Cathedra.

Ordinations for Trinity Sunday, June 3, are an-
*mod by the Archbishop of York, the Bishops of Enter,
Ripon, Peterborough, Ch,chaster, Lie/afield, Ely, Oxford,
Cheater, Liamln, Salisbury, and Bath and Wells. The
Bishop of Winchester holds his neat ordination on the fifth
&today after Trinity, July 8. The Archbishop of Canter-
bury at Xielasehnes.
The Xing of Prmsda is said to have written
letter to the Beeperer of Russia, urging Mee to send Count
Neeeeirede la person to snake pose', if possible, and warn-
ing hist dant, if the attainment of swam should be pre-
voided by eauseemary obstacles wt up by the Cabinet of
St. Petersburg, then all Germany would, no doubt, side
with Austria sad the Western Powers ; and that Prussia,
goortist by her Gersten friends, would find herself in an
ectseeaely difficult position.
A requisition ham been presented to the Mayor of
Portsmouth, to all s spasial manias of the town mum%
"to take into cos siduities the seat desirable snows to
be adopted *Jo homer to her Majesty's ally his Imperial
Majesty the Emperor Napoleon 111., oa his intended visit
to t►is eseatry." _

The Post believes it to he probable that when the
Newspaper Stamp Duties Bill IMMO on ler a emend reading
Gs Monday warmth dams' will be reposed by the Govern-
ment conferring wpm newspaper proprietors a oopyright,
momeatily of brief duration, in all articles of original
esesposition published by them
The Scam/raw of yesterday eyes that the hills
toted Edinburgh are atilt revered with Moir. The winter
wheats show a Marked improvement within the laid few
days. The wheat pint always askew** greatest progress
is spring when the ground dry. The sppearanes now
monied, although eft flattering, is so far satisfactory that'
the dreaded thinnfirg of plints by the frost is very limited,
bet so field exhibits any luxuriance, sad Au are jaw.
The government emigrathin ship Octavio left
Sostlmmptes Doh yesterday with 360 emigres% for Ads-1
leadiAletralts.

OFFICI4,I EXPLANATIONS
OF
THE EASTERN EXPEDITION.

The following is the greater portion of the article
Id the Moniteur, referred to in the telegraphic de-
spatch which appeared in yesterday's Express :

To know the truth, when it concerns the honour,
security, and power of the State, is the incontestable
right of a great country like Franoe. To speak it,
when silence is not imposed by patriotism for the

public weal, is the sacred duty of a strong govern-
ment like that of the Emperor. The Eastern expe-
dition, its causes, its object, the military operations
prepared for sustaining it, the diplomatic negotiations
entered upon for obviating or terminating it, are now
facts that are matters of discussion pending their
transition to the page of history. In order that these
facts may be usefully discussed and seriously judged,

we are now about to state them in their most scrupu-
lous exactitude. Such a course appears to as to be
both frank and useful. Public opinion is prompt
to take alarm and prone to error in the midst of
emotions and events such as those of which it now

feels every day the reaction. The best mode of re-
assuring it is by enlightening it.
In what manner was the Eastern Expedition con-
ceived P What are the expectations and the data that
dictated its plan ? What are the causes that modi-
fied it ? Why was the Anglo-French army landed
in the Crimea instead et acting on the Danube and
making a campaign in Bessarabia ? How must we
explain the long resistance of the besieged in pre-
sence of the ardour and heroism of the besiegers ?
Such are the pointa we wish to examine is the first
part of this work. We shall bring to this examina-
tion only ..ome certain facts, authentic documents, and
truths of military science and military history.

The imperious and decisive circumstances that com-
manded France to draw the sword after a peace of
forty years are present to the minds of all persons.
Russia, unable to obtain the admission of her supre-
macy over Turkey by the terror of her protocols, had
endeavoured to impose it by force. She had violated
treaties, invaded a territory, disdained and threatened
Europe. Her armies were occupying the Principali-
ties, were advancing on the Danube, and had even
marked out the halting places of a victorious march on
the Balkans. The admirable spirit of the Turkish na-
tion was not sufficient to thwart this plan. Russia found
an unexpected obstacle, it is true, in the heroic devo-
tion of a people which she had thought fallen, and
whose resistance made her remember that it had
conquered Peter the Great. But the struggle was
an unequal one. The whole world, breathless and
excited, awaited the issue with anxiety. Germany,
uncertain between her habits engendered by the
Holy Alliance and the counsels tendered by her

own dignity, did not know yet whether she ought
to submit any longer to the arrogance of that do-
mination which weighed upon her, or finally reject it.
It was from the West that the signal of resistance
went forth. France and England, loyally united,

did not hesitate to send their fleets and armies to
the East to defend there the integrity of the Otto-
man empire, the respect due to treaties, the equili-
brium of Europe, and the cause of civilisation.
The exalted will which presides over the govern-
ment of our country, and which had resolved on this
war as essential to its honour, after having vainly
endeavoured to prevent it by honourable conciliation,
then traced out instructions fer the illustrious
marshal, in whose hands the sword of France was
about to be placed. In those instructions, bearing
the date of April 12, 1854 we read the following
pashages:

" In placing you, marshal, at the head of a French
army, about to fight at more than sir hundred
leagues from its native land, my first recommenda-
tion to you is to bestow the greatest care on the
health of the troops, to spare them as much as pos-
sible, and not to come to an engagement unless you
have made sure of two-thirds at least of the favour-
able chances.
"The peninsula of Gallipoli has been selected as
the chief place of debarcation, because it is intended
to be, as a strategical point, the basis of oar opera-
tions—that is to say, the 'place d'armet,' where we
can place our depots, ambulances, and provisions,
and whence we can easily advance or re-embark.
That will not prevent you on your arrival from sta-
tioning, if you deem it advisable, one or two divisions
in the barracks either to the west of Constantinople
or else at Scutari.
" So long as you are not in the presence
of the enemy, the dislocation of your forces will be of
small moment, and the presence of your troops at
Constantinople may produce a good moral effect; but
if, by chance, after advancing on the Balkans, you
should be constrained to beat a retreat, it would be
far more advantageous to regain the coast of Gallipoli
Ithan that of Constantinople, for the Russians would
never venture from Adrianople to Constantinople,
leaving as they would on their right a choice army of
60,000 men. If nevertheless there should be a wish
Ito fortify the line of Kaman in front of Constanti-
nople, it should only be done with the intention of
lailowing it to be defended by the Turks alone, since,
I repeat it, our position will be more independent,
more formidable, by being on the flanks of the Rus-
sian army, than by being blocked up in the peninsula
of Threes.
" This first point established and the Anglo-Frets&
army once united on the shores of the Sea of Mar-
mon, you will have to come to an understanding
with Omer Pasha and Lord Raglan respecting the
adoptioa at one of the. three following plans : I.
Either to march and meet the Russians on the Bal-
kans. 2. Or to sieze the Crimea. 3. Or to land, say
at Odessa, or at any other spot on the :Russian coast
of the Black Sea.
" In the first case, Varna seems to me the important
point for occupation. The infantry might go to it
by sea, and the cavalry more easily perhaps by land.
In no ease ought the army ever to remove
too far from the Black Sea, in order that it may have
its communications constantly open with the fleet.
"In the second case, the one concerning the occu-
pation of the Crimes, it is necessary above all things
to be sure of the landing place, in order that the die-
embarkation may be affected at a distance from the
enemy, and that this place may be capable of being
fortified quickly, so that it may serve as a support in
ease of a retreat.
" The capture of Sebastopol ought not to be
attempted, unless you are provided with at least half
a battering train and a great many sacks of earth.
When you approach that place, do not neglect. to
seize Balaklava, a small poet situate four lapse to
the south of Sebastopol, and by means of which cent-
municstion may be easily kept up with the fleet dur-
ing the continuance of the siege.
"In the third case, that in which an enterprise
should be revolved on in concert with the admirals
•
against Odessa. • •
"In every case my principal advice is, never to
grids your army, but always to march with all your
troops suited ; for a compact mass of 40,000 men is
always an imposing force; broken, it is worth no-

thisg.
4, If, however, you are obliged to divide your army,
maks arrangements for reuniting it on sons spot in
24 hours.
^lf on the march it forms several columns,

upon a point of reunion sufficiently distant from the
enemy to prevent any column being attacked singly.
If you repulse the Russians, proceed no farther
than the Danube, unless the Austrians join in the
movement.
"As a general rule, every movement ought to he
concerted with the Commander-in-Chief of the Eng-
lish army. It is only on certain exceptional occa.
sions, u when the safety of the army is concerned,
that you should act on your own sole decision.

Marshal, I have full confidence in you; I apt
convinced that you will remain faithful to these in.
atructions, and that you will bring fresh glory to oat
Eagles."

Thus, as we see by this extract from the Emperor's
instructions to Marshal St. Arnaud, Gallipoli bid
been chosen as the place of debarkation of the Anglo.
French army. We must urge the important omit,
derations which led to this choice.

The first principle in a maritime war is to az
upon a point of assembling which is protected from
the attacks of the enemy, easily defended, easy ci
access for disembarking and provisioning the troop%
which will allow the army to move in advance or
fall back upon its base of operations, if forced to do
so, and which, in case of defeat, shall afford a sheltie
and refuge to the fleets.

The peninsula of Gallipoli satisfied admirably thus
conditions for a well-conducted naval war. Situated

at the entrance of the Dardanelles, it was easily pm,
visioned through the Sea of Marmon and tbs
Thracian Gulf. A weighty reason, drawn front the
respective situations of the Russian and Turkish
anthem, made it necessary to possess this place.
The Russians, by crossing the Danube at Routs.
°hook, by advancing on Adrianople, and by leaving
the Turkish forts, and even Constantinople on their
left, would be able to precede us there, and to clop
the retreat of our ships engaged in the Black Bw.

There was in that a great danger which the foresiglit
of the allied governments provided against and pm.
vented. Another consideration prescribed the pts.
vions occupation of Gallipoli. At the period the ex.

pedition wee about to leave, that is to say in April,
1854, inquiries were anxiously made whether oir
_ .

military forms would arrive in time to cover Cab
stantinople. A defensive war then appeared mods
more likely than an offensive one. What was ea.
dangered and indeed already violated —was
the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and
that was what we were about to defers*
and reconquer. Had the Turks lost a single
battle on the Danube, the Russians would have been
able to reach the Balkan in three days' march, and
would have had the road to Constantinople open to
them. The occupation of Gallipoli entirely covered
that capital. The two allied governments were tally
alive to the fact that even hid a Russian army
entered Adrianople, it would not have been able to -
advance upon Constantinople, leaving an army of
sixty thousand Engli.h and French on its right
flank; and this foresight is to be found in the instruo.
tions of the Emperor.
Thus, in every respect, and in anticipation of
nearly all casualties, the peninsula of Gallipoli
was admirably selected as the place of debarkation,
and the base of operations. From this point we were
able to protect the Turkish capital, and to control
the movements of our fleet; we advanced without
exposing our flanks, and we kept up our communica-
tion with Toulon and Marseilles.
But the Anglo-French army had hardly arrived at
Gallipoli when the scene began to be changed.
Although the Russian scouts had been seen in sight
of Varna, the heroic defence of Siistria had broken
the onward impulse of Prince Gortchakoff. The
struggle, instead of being removed into the centre of
the Turkish empire, was kept up on the Danube, with
various changes of fortune. The generals in chief
of the expedition were then under the impression
that they should be able to arrive in time at the scene
of action, perhaps in time to save Silistria, but in any
case in time to join the Turkish army, and hold the
Balkan against the Russians, having, as it were, the
two wings of their array protected by the fortresses
of Shawl' and Varna. This plan was as bold as it
was prudent.

The wisdom of it was, moreover, pointed out by
existing circumstances, and by the imminence of the
danger. In fret, if the Russians had taken &list*
the fall of which was announced as inevitable in the
reports of Omer Pacha, the fate of the Ottoman En-
pine might have depended upon the issue of nee
general engagement.
The French and English armies were bound to
foresee and prepare for this. There was their post,
because there perhaps would be the denouement of
the strife, and the final decision of fate.
These apprehensions were falsified by events. TM
courage of the Turkish army, and the presence of
the allies, sufficed to force the Russians to rain the
siege, and withdraw to the other side of the Duds.
Every time that the enemy retreats there is a greet •
temptation for the army before whom he retires; it
is the temptation of pursuit. But when pursuit may
endanger an army, there is more glory in ha*
than in advancing. The love of glory should uonr
lead to that which wisdom forbids. What could the
Anglo-French army have done by entangling itself
in a country laid waste, with its communicationscat
off, furrowed by large water-courses, and infested by
pestilent disorders? It is not victory that it would
have sought, but destruction without contest, ad
death without compensation.
It has been said that after the retreat of the Rus•
sans we might to have acted upon the Danube esi
entered into Bessarabia. Let us put the matter a
the most straightforward manner passible. Withal
the co-operation (concours) of Austria, our army cold
not advance upon the Danube without incurring tie
risk of a most fatal catastrophe. We must not forget
that our base of operations was the sea. Losing
.tbs
we risked everything and compromised everyfhleF
Military science and common sense both entered
their protest against undertaking operations with
60,000 Anglo-French and 60,000 Turks in as
unhealthy and impracticable country, Wing
no means of transport, without any mien"
of artillery or organised parks—no depots of eat-
ables or munitions at Shumla, Varna, or Sffistrm
All these resources, indispensable at the commas*
ment of a campaign, cannot be improvised in a ksr
days, when those who have the management of
are eight hundred leagues distant from their country
Theme resources might have failed us completely. We
should have found otweelves in front of an army et
200,000 men waiting for us on their own ground; 01
else retreating before us, trying to entrap us into a
still more dangerous position, giving us no ethic
alternative than that of a most disadvantagene
battle or an impossible retreat. A simple fe•
connaimanoe of two days in the Dobrudscha
which cost as more than a most murderous combat,
is a proof of what we have advanced. Generals-in.
chief, who, ignorant of the dangers attending such
an undertaking, should have allowed themselves to
be drawn into the commission of such an irreparable
fault would, we have no hesitation in saying, have
endangered the responsibility of their command.
Again we repeat it, a campaign beyond the Danube
and on the Pruth is not possible without them-open'
tion of Austria. Now, a government does not make
war when it desires it, unless forced to do so by is•
controvertible circumstances. It takes care to
maks war only whoa it fa Cable so to 49.