The Press.
London, England, 1856-08-23 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONGRESS
OF PARIS.
Mn. MARCY, in a despatch to the Count de Sartiges
(28th July, 1856), has put forth the views of the
United States' Government upon "the declaration
concerning maritime law" adopted on the 16th
April by the plenipotentiaries then assembled at
Paris.*

The second and third principles set forth in the
declaration Mr. Marcy considers identical with certain
propositions submitted two years since by the Presi-
dent to the maritime nations of Europe. The fourth
he considers a mere reiteration of an acknowledged
fact. To these three propositions the Government
of the United States is disposed to agree. To the
first principle, "the abolition of privateering," Mr.
Marcy objects, and enters at length into the question
of the right of a belligerent to employ privateers,
which he considers " a well-settled principle of in-
ternational law ":

The right to resort to privateers (he observes) is as
clear as the right to use public armed ships, and as incon-
testable as any other right appertaining to belligerents
The policy of that law has been occasionally questioned,
not, however, by the best authorities; but the law itself
has been universally admitted, and most nations have not
hesitated to avail themselves of it; it is as well sustained
by practice and public opinion as any other to be found in
the maritime code.
He quotes numerous authorities upon the subject
of letters of marque in support of this view,
but, presuming that the strong desire to ameliorate
the severe usages of war, by exempting private pro.
perty from hostile seizure, was the chief inducement
which led to "the declaration" by the Congress at
Paris, that " privateering is, and remains, abolished,"
declares that to this principle of exempting private
property upon the ocean, as well as upon the land,
applied without restriction, the President yields a
most ready and willing assent, and in support of this
view quotes a passage from the Message of Decem-
4, 1854:—
The proposition to enter into engagements to forgo a resort
to privateers, in case this country should be forced into a war
with a great naval power, is not entitled to more favorable con-
sideration than would be a proposition to agree not to accept
the services of volunteers for operations on land. When the
honour or rights of our country require it to assume a hostile
attitude, it confidently relies upon the patriotism of its citizens,
not ordinarily devoted to the military profession, to augment
the army and navy, so as to make them fully adlguate to the
emergency which calls them into action. The prßposal to sur-
render the right to employ volunteers is professedly founded
upon the principle that private property of unoffending non-
combatants, though enemies, should be exempt from the ravages
of war; but the proposed surrender goes but little way in cat ry-
ing out that principle, which equally requires that such private
property should not be seized or molested by national ships of
war. Should the leading powers of Europe concur in proposing,
as a rule of international law, to exempt private property, upon
the ocean, from seizure by public armed cruisers as well as by
privateers, the United States will readily meet them upon that
broad ground.
Mr. Marcy then proceeds :

If the principle of capturing private property on the
ocean, and condemning it as prize of war, be given up,
that property would, and of right ought to be, as secure
from molestation by public armed vessels as by privateers ;
but if that principle be adhered to, it would be worse than
useless to attempt to confine the exercise of the right of
capture to any particular description of the public force of
the belligerents.
He then shows the importance of privateers to a
maritime nation without a large standing navy, and
remarks upon the danger of such a nation agreeing
to the proposition of the Congress, and specially
alludes to the state of the question at issue, as affect-
ing England and America :
It certainly ought not to excite the least surprise that
strong naval powers should be willing to forego the prac-
tice, comparatively useless to them, of employing priva-
teers, upon condition that weaker powers agree to part with
their most effective means of defending their maritime
rights. It is, in the opinion of this Government. to he

• (Translation.)
ANNEX TO Parrrocni. No. 23.—Di:cum:mos.
(Extract.)
That the plenipotentiaries assembled in Congress at Paris
cannot better respond to the intentions by which their Govern-
ments are animated than by seeking to introduce into interna-
tional relations fixed principles in this respect.
The above•mentioned plenipotentiaries, being duly authorised,
resolved to concert among themselves as to the means of attain-
ing this object, and having come to au agreement, have adopted
the following solemn declaration:-
1. l'rivateering is, and remains, abolished ;
2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception
of contraband of war;

3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are
not liable to capture under enemy's Bag.
4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effective, that is
to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access
to the coast of the enemy.
(Translation.)
PROTOCOL NO. 114.—SITTINo OF APRIL 16, 1836.
(Extract.)
(in the proposition of Count Walewski, and recognising that
it is for the general interest to maintain the indd.isibility of the
four principles in the declaration signed this day, the plenipo'
tentiaries agree that the powers which shall have required, or
which shall have acceded to it, cannot hereafter enter into any
arrangement in regard to the application of the right of neutrals
in time of war, which does not at the same time rest on the four
principles which are the object of the said declaration.
Upon an observation made by the plenipotentiaries of Russia,
the Congress admits that, as the present resolution cannot have
any retroactive effect, it cannot invalidate antecedent convention.

799

seriously apprehended that if the use of privateers be &tan.
doped, the dominion over the seas will be rendered to
those powers which adopt the policy and have the means
of keeping up large navies. The one which has a decided
naval superiority would be potentially the mistress of the
ocean, and by the abolition of privateering that domination
-would be more firmly secured. Such a power engaged in
a war with a nation inferior in naval strength would have
nothing to do for the security and protection of its com-
merce but to look after the ships of the regular navy of its
enemy. These might be held in check by one-half, or less,
of its naval force, and the other might sweep the com-
merce of its enemy from the ocean. Nor would the inju-
rious effects of a vast naval superiority to weaker States
be much diminished if that superiority was shared among
three or four great powers. It is unquesticnably the inte-
rest of such weaker States to discountenance and resist a
measure which fosters the growth of regular naval estab-
lishments.
In discussing the effect of the proposed measure—the
abolition of privsteering—a reference to the existing con-
dition of nations is almost unavoidable. An instance will
at once present itself in regard to two nations where the
commerce of each is about equal, and about equally wide-
spread over the world. As commercial powers there is
great disparity between them. The regular navy of one
vastly exceeds that of the other. In case of war between
them, only an inconsiderable part of the navy of the one
would be required to prevent that of the other from being
used for defence or aggression, while the remainder would
be devoted to the unembarrassed employment of destroying
the commerce of the weaker in naval strength. The fatal
consequencesof this great inequality of naval force between
two such belligerents would be in part remedied by the use
of privateers ; in that case, while either might assail the
commerce of the other in every sea, they would be obliged
to distribute and employ their respective navies in the
work of protection. This state.nent only illustrates what
would be the case, with some modification, in every war
where there may be considerable disparity in the naval
strength of the belligerents.
Finally, Mr. Marcy makes a strcng appeal in fa-
vour of the exclusion of private property from seizure,
and proposes the addition to the first proposition
of the following words :
And that the private property of the subjects or citizens
of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from
seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent,
except it be contraband.
And observes :
The amendment is commended by so many powerful
considerations, and the principle which calls for it has so
long had the emphatic sanction of all enlightened nations
in military operations on land, that the President is re-
luctant to believe it will meet with any serious opposition.
Without the proposed modification of the first principle
he cannot convince himself that it would be wise or safe
to change the existing law in regard to the right of
privateering.
If the amendment should not be adopted, it will be
proper for the United States to have some understanding
in regard to the treatment of their privateers when they
shall have occasion to visit the ports of those powers
which are or may become parties to the declaration of the
Congress of Paris. The United States will, upon the
ground of right and comity, claim far them the same con-
sideration to which they are entitled, and which was ex-
tended to them, under the law of nations, before the at-
tempted modification of it by that Congress.
Mr. Marcy concludes with a remark upon the
position of neutrals in relation to the law of
contraband trade and the right of search by bellige-
rents :

Nations which preserve the relations of pence should
not be injuriously affected in their commercial intercom se
by those which chose to involve themselv, s in war,
provided the citizens of such peaceful natitns do not
compromise their character as neutrals by a direct inter-
ference with the military operations of the belligerents.
The laws of siege and blockade, it is believed, afford all the
remedies against neutrals that the parties to the war can
justly claim. Those laws interdict all trade with the he.
sieged or blockaded places. A further interference with the
ordimtry pursuits of neutrals, in nowise to blame for an
existing state of hostilities, is contrary to the obvious dic•
tates of justice. If this view of the subject could be
adopted, and practically observed by all civilised nations,
the right )f search, which has been the source of so much
annoyance and of at, many injuries to neutral commerce,
would be restricted to such cases only as justified a sus-
picion of an attempt to trade with places actually in a state
of siege or blockade.

Stn CHARLES NAPIER, during his late visit to St.
Petersburg, was treated with much condescension
by the Grand Duke Constantine, and was invited to
a naval review, but he departed suddenly on the re-
ceipt of letters from England. Many characteristic
anecdotes are told of him, especially as to the way
in which he parried some good-humoured jests re-
specting his celebrated boast about the capture of
Cronstadt—a boast which, by the way, he never
made. It is said that when an illustrious personage
asked him, " Why he didn't come in to Cronstadt ?"
the retort courteous of the old " Salt" was, " Why
didn't you come out?" On another day he visited a
Greek convent, where he was introduced as " Mr.
Napier." One of the young lady pupils, hearing
the name, timidly inquired whether be was any re-
lative of the terrible admiral who was to have taken
Cronstadt, and his answer was, " No relation at all,
miss, I am the man himself."