The Press.
London, England, 1854-02-18 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

verdict of the country would differ from that of the
noble marquis. lie proceeded to dilate on tho diffi-
culties by which the question had been all along
surrounded, and to regret the tone in which it was
now introduced to the house, tending a: it did to
create disunion at a moment when all the strength
was required that perfect union alone could impart
to their councils. The charges against the Ministry,
he complained, were formed after the event, and were
based upon a comparison of their conduct at one time,
with the fuller knowledge acquired at another and
later period. Justice demanded a different course.
The acts of the Ministry should be judged by their
contemporary information; and their policy estimated,
not by its results, but by the circumstances of the
moment which it was designed to meet. In this light
the noble earl reviewed the whole question in all its
details, contending that in every turn of the contro-
versy their decisions had been well advised, as he as-
sured the house they were well intentioned. When
mistaken, he argued that the mistake was excusable,
if not 4 natural ; and, if they failed of success, the
failure was not to be attributed to any lack of effort
or of skill in diplomacy. The question had been
asked whether we were at peace or war. It was one
very difficult to answer distinctly. War was not yet
declared, yet it could not be said that we were at
peace. We were, in fact, in a sort of intermediate
state, where the desire for peace was as great as
ever, 'but where the hopes of maintaining it were
dwindling away and the country drifting towards
war. Defending the course of the Government at
the point where it had been most impugned by Lord
Clanricarde, the Foreign Secretary thus explained
their quiescence at the moment of the first entry of
Prince Menschikoff into Constantinople :
" My noble friend seems to think that the mission of
Prince Menschikoff to Constantinople was, in itself,
sufficient to have created alarm in the minds of her
Majesty's Government, and that they ought to have acted
upon that apprehension. Now, what are the facts? As
soon as information reached us on the subjeCt of Prince
lienschikoffs mission, we immediately demanded of the
Russian Government, without a moment's delay—we
asked in distinct and explicit terms—what were the real
objects of that mission ? To that inquiry we received a
most distinct and explicit answer. My noble friend has
stated, and stated with truth, that there are, of course,
certain communications that pass between the two
Governments which cannot properly be made public—
which cannot be imparted to the house at this moment.
But I am free to observe, that, fully concurring in the
remark of my noble friend; these communications were far
stronger in repudiation of aggressive intention on the part
of Russia than any of those which we have thought it our
duty to publish. Indeed, I may say, they placed the ques-
tion upon grounds which it was then impossible to doubt,
and I should as soon have dreamed of doubting any of your
lordships who ruse in his place in this house and affirmed
a fact upon his honour, as I could doubt these assurances
of Russia. From the assurances we received, therefore, my
lords, it was impossible not to credit the honourable inten-
tions of Russia."
With regard to the future he confessed that the
terms in which the Porte and the Czar respectively
expressed their willingness to negotiate resembled
parallel lines that could never meet. All the
negotiations must consequently be considered at
a close, and, though war was not declared, there was
nothing that stood between the country and that
ultima ratio. We had, however, excellent allies.
With respect to France, the accordance of the Govern-
ments had been always complete. Austria and
Prussia '1 recent acts had manifested their entire
independence of Russian influence ; and with them
it rested, not perhaps to avert war, but at all events
to shorten the duration of hostilities. In conclusion,
he expressed his conviction that the people of
England would appreciate, now that they had the
means of arriving at all the facts, the efforts which
the Government had made to preserve peace, and was
satisfied they would cheerfully bear whatever sacri-
fices might be necessary to bring the contest to a
speedy and honourable issue.
The Earl of ELLESMERE hoped that the diplomatic
agents would not be allowed, as in times past, to
cripple the energies of officers entrusted with the
command of the military and naval forces.
The Earl of MmarEseunv trusted that the Foreign
Secretary would in justice admit that neither in the
past nor present session bad he pressed for any pa-
pers whose publication was likely to prove injurious
to the pnblic service. Looking through the docu-
ments now presented, however, he found several that
might have been promulgated not merely ha• mlessly
but with advantage to the country and credit to the
Government long since. Proceeding to compare and
analyse the successive despatches, Lord Malmesbury
drew from them two conclusions. First, that at the
beginning Russia had been deceived by the British
Ministry as to their intentions, insomuch that Prince
Menschikoff acted in Constantinople under the im-
pression that England would not oppose, and might
even assist, his demands. To the Czar at the same
period reason was given for suppposing that France
and England could never come into perfect accord-
ance. Secondly, he concluded that the tenor of the
despatches and the course of events ought to have