The Express.
London, England, 1855-10-09 00:00:00

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LONDON, TUESDAY, OCTOBER 9.

Al length it mess clear, both from the reports of
Prises GORTCHAROPP and hoe the accounts which
have reached u from the Aided armies, that neither is
the Rudest army retirinx, nor are the Allied ems-
menders content with the tall of the tows of Sebas-
topol as the crowning expioit of the campaign of
18611. As yet, therefor*, neither the gratuitous ad-
vise of the peremptory and prophetic nines, nor the
dill/silty of provisioning the &mien army in the
Crimea, has had the effect of driving the Russians
to Perekop. Neither has Prier* GORTCEAROPT
shown any signs of retiring—nor, indeed, do we be-
lieve that he will show any signs of retiring until, by
the operations of the Allies, he is compelled to take
that course. The truth is, as we pointed out some
time ago, the Russians have everything to
pin by delay. If they can only maintain their
present position for two months, they will be in a
much better situation for the purpose of conducting
negotiations than if they were now to evacuate the
peninsula. Exasperated as the Russian army
and the Russian people must be by the
fail of Sebastopol—and that such exasperation
is dreaded, the &peaces manifesto and Prince
GORTCHAKOTeII order of the day are proofs too signi-
ficant to be disregarded—it is obvious enough that
the effect of a voluntary retreat might be such u
seriously to endanger the life er even the dynasty of
the present EMPEROR. Assuredly it is far no slight
cause that an Absolute Monarch condescends to de-
fend himself before his subjeOts in a public mani-
festo. _ _

Bat whilst the perils of Russia ars great, and the
necessity of puttiog on a bold front is of vital import-
ance to the empire, the neosesity under which the
Allied Governments are placed of pushing on the war
with relentless ♦igour becomes every day, if posai-
ble, more imperative. And, indeed, it appears,
if we may judge from the information which has
reached us, that energetic measures have already
been taken to carry this policy into effect. Although
at first some doubt seems to have arisen as to whether
the military movements communicated by telegraph
were correctly represented, and although some of the
public journals seem at a loss to understand their
purport, still we think the general scheme of opera-
tions is sufficiently obvious—founded as it certainly

hp upon well known strategical principles.
The Russian army, amounting to probably not less
than 150,000 men, occupies the forts on the northern
side of Bebeatopol, and a line to the eastward of some
25 miles in length, extending along the precipitous
heights of Mackenzie to Altodor,and thence meth-east.
ward to Albat, on the Upper Belbek. Along thisenor-
mously strong ridge, strengthened by field works
gnd a numerous artillery, the Russian main army is
posted ; but in front the Russian commander has
thrown forward strong outposts towards the
Tchernsys and the Valley of Balder, to give timely
warning of the movements of the enemy. Besides
this main army, and a division in the neighbourhood
of Hertch of some 14,000 men, there is another
division watching the Allies, towards Eupatoria, of
probably 20,000 men. On the other hand, the Allies
have determined upon a plan which they are now
endeavouring to carry into effect, namely, to
threaten the Russian commu■iations with Pere-

hop and the Tchongar road. These roads,
which fall laic the great road to flimphero-
polo are, it is well known, the only roads
by which the Russians are supplied with provisions,
or by which,in case of necessity, the armycan retreat.
In furtherance of their object, the Allies have already
transported some 30,000 men to Bupateria, who will
be reinforced from time to time until a cope crarmis
is collected there sufficiently strong to take the field.
Indeed, according to the latest accounts, a cavalry
affair has already taken place between the French,
under Gamma D'ALtomvuxr., and the Russians,
under General Honer, in which the former appear
to have been victorious. The object in thus taking
the field must of worse be to intercept the reinforce-
ments, to cot off the convoys of provisions, and in
short to starve the main Russian army. In this
way the Allied generals hope, no doubt, to compel the
Russian commander to assume the initiative, and
in fact to put him under the necessity of attacking
the Allied army in the position which its commander
may select as most advantageous. But whilst the
Allies are concentrating their forces about Eupa
toris, in order to occupy the attention of the
Russian commander, it was requisite that their
army on the Tchernaya should advance its outposts
so as to threaten the Russians occupying the
Mackenzie plateau and the Upper Belbek. So long
as the main body of the Russian troops occupies this
line it is by no means probable that any attempt
will be made to force it, for whether we estimate its
strength from private letters, from the best maps,
or from the photographic representations of Mr.
FENTON, it seems a position little less than impreg-
nable. Unless, therefore, the Russian Hai is greatly
weakened, the Allies will probably content them-
selves by merely threatening it by the display
of such au imposing force as will demand the pre-
sence of the Ruffian army in their strong position
along those heights. Accordingly, we learn from St.
Petersburg that the Allies have pushed forward a de-
tachment of some 30,000 men as close as possible to
the Russian outposts, that they are making daily neon-
Saillallollo, and indeed that they have already had a
successful affair with the enemy at Urkusta t and it
is even said that the pass through the mountains has
been forced. It thus appears that the Allied armies
are engaged in a double movement, we on the north
and the other on the south of Prises Goarataxoro,
each dependent on the other; and the grounds
upon which the scheme of operations proceeds are
obvious.
It is of coarse necessary for the Russian general
to keep his line of battle along the heights unbroken
—for once pierced, the Russian army is lost. At the
same time it is essential for him to keep his comma-
nioatioas open with Perekop, and therefore it is ins-
possible he can endure a corps crartnie in his rear.
His position, therefore, is obviously full of peril ;
though at the same time that of the Allies is not
without peril also. The peril to the Allies is, lest the
Prince, detaching 80,000 or 100,000 men, should sud-
denly fall on the Allied corps at Espatoria, and anni-
hilate it. In this way the Prince may, from time to
time, attack the divisions of the Allied ow
separately, and thus second in repeating
the exploit which has immortalised the
great NsrotioN—when, abandoning the siege of
Mantua, he destroyed the Austrian divisions
la succession. To carry such a scheme into effect
requires certainly a consammate general, of a genius