The Press.
London, England, 1856-05-17 00:00:00

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ings which have provoked it. The main justi-
fication of war is, that it tends to dispel such
feelings ; and it does but very partially fulfil
its ends when it leaves them subsisting in
full force.
Even more than the restoration of concord
was hoped from the Paris Conferences. It
was imagined that some settlement of Italy
might have been devised which would free
that country equally from the repressive force
of foreign military occupation, and from the
danger of revolutionary outbreak. It was
thought that the inconveniences which had
been proved to result from the last great
European settlement might have been rectified
at the Paris Congress. Though the settle-
ment of 1814-15 was not free from serious
defects, it had this merit,—that it placed the
peace of Europe on a firm basis. But the
Peace of 1856 has raised questions of the
greatest delicacy and importance only to leave
them unsettled.

rouse yet more strongly indignant suspicions
in the mind of the Russian Court.

There is another country which must feel
more aggrieved by this treaty than Russia
itself. Sardinia has declined to become a
party to the treaty. Now that the War has
ended, her interests on the Italian ques-
tion are antagonistic to those of Austria. She
looks to France and England for support;
and she finds that those Powers are closely
bound to Austria by a public treaty, and
by secret engagements. The feeling of a
common wrong appears to be drawing Russia
and Sardinia together. The one State se( a
that it is distrusted, and the other that it is

INDON, SATURDAY, MAY 17, 1856.

THE circumstances which have come to light
since the signature of the Treaty of Peace on
the 30th of March are not of a nature to
justify the hopes of those who anticipated
from that event a permanent settlement of
Europe. In the articles of Peace originally
propounded, the bases of such a settlement
had been laid down, but there has, from some
cause or other, been wanting the spirit or the
skill to take advantage of the opportunity for
effecting a complete pacification of the East,
and for removing causes of discontent and dis-
turbance in Europe. Those who desired a
solid Peace, and who were most anxious that
it should be accompanied by the removal of
all causes of misunderstanding, and the re-
storation of frank and cordial intercourse,
have the most reason to be disappointed with
the result. We have peace, but not peace of
that kind which having finally ended a quarrel
makes friends of foes. For our own part, we
desired less a peace of which we could be
proud, than a peace with which we could be
content ; but we have neither.
The persons who were opposed to the con-
clusion of the War at the present time, and
who held that the contest was not ripe for
settlement, may point to the existing state of
affairs in justification of their opinion. They
may say that war which usually clears the
political atmosphere has failed to do so in this
instance; that Europe still remains unsettled ;
that the attitude of the contending Powers is
jealous and mistrustful ; and that Russia is
preparing for new combats on the very shores
of that sea which it was one of the main
objects of the War to pacifieate. There is
suffie:ent truth in these representations to
cause uneasiness. Rarely have the politics of
Europe been more confused and complicated
than at the present moment, and never has it
been more difficult to discover a key to the
action of our Foreign-office. But this con-
fusion, so far as England is concerned, has
arisen, not because the War was concluded in-
opportunely, but because Lord PALMERSTON'S
Government has failed to act on any straight-
forward and intelligible system of policy.
Had it designed to disgust the people with
foreign politics, it could not have done so
more effectually than by the crooked course it
has pursued.
It was not irrational to suppose that the
Powers represented at the Paris Conferences
would come to a complete and cordial under-
standing when the terms of Peace had been
arranged. Without such understanding, a.
treaty of peace can never be more than a sus-
pension of hostilities. More than signatures
and seals are required to give a treaty validity.
'These are but the outward signs of that prin-
ciple of amity which the treaty is supposed
to embody ; and if the spirit be wanting, no
great confidence can be felt in the forms.
Mistrust should cease when arms are laid
down. When the fight is over, it is equally
unjust and impolitic to retain the hostile feel-

despised.
Yet Lord PALMERSTON and Lord CLAREN-
DON still affect to be the champions of
Italian liberty. The hopes of the Constitu-
tionalists are encouraged. Who knows ?
something may yet turn up in their favour.
The disgraceful game of the last five-and-
twenty years is still to be played. Italy must
watch for a favorable opportunity for insur-
rection; and, when the opportunity comes,
must submit. to have its hopes and efforts
quenched in blood, while the English Govern-
ment looks on, sympathises, and leaves the in-
surgents to the vengeance they have provoked.
This perfidious policy has been the source of
grievous calamity to Italy. Sardinia has once
been sacrificed to it ;—is she again to be its
victim ? What can be more cruel than to
flatter the Italian people with expectations of
support, only to disappoint them in the hour
of trial—to excite their enthusiasm merely to
keep alive a popular cry in this country, or to
barb a diplomatic insult,?
To estrange States—to foment jealousies—
to keep open old sores—to prepare new com-
plications—to keep Europe armed, suspicious,
and disturbed,—these are the legitimate la-
bours which Lord PALMERSTON'S Administra-
tion seems to think devolves on it as the
natural consequence of Peace. It requires a
different and more honest policy to make
Peace bear its natural fruits of reconciliation,—

The preparations Russia is making for a cam-
paign in the Caucasus are unhappily notorious.
That Power cannot be blamed for taking ad-
vantage of the opportunity afforded by the
concentration of her military force in the
south for the achievement of a conquest
she has been attempting for more than a
century past. But it is not less unfortunate
for Russia than for Western Europe that
such a temptation has been left in her path.
Be it granted that the Circassians had done
nothing to deserve our protection, yet it is
evident that had provision been made for
the neutralisation of their coast, Russia would
and must have abandoned all thought of sub-
duing the Caucasus by arms. A great end
would then have been gained. There would
have been no necessity for upholding the mili-
tary system of the late Czar The whole empire
of Russia would have been at peace, and her Go-
vernment would have been free to commence
anew career. No better service could have been
done the Court of St. Petersburg than to have
insisted on a condition which would have re-
duced its armies to inactivity, and which it
could have accepted without humiliation. We
cannot believe that the people of this country
will feel confidence in the security of peace
while war is being waged, and immense Rus-
sian armies are collected, in the immediate
vicinity of the Asiatic frontier of Turkey.

goodwill, and milder forms of government.

CAUTION TO CONSERVATIVES.

WITH the conclusion of the war the country
must return to the narrower, but not less
weighty, interests of domestic politics. Ques-
tions which disappeared for a time will regain
importance ; and the relations of Conserva-
tives and Liberals towards each other, and
also to the public opinion of the country, must
again be studied. The Whigs and Radicals
already are preparing to assume their favorite
position of aggression against the Constitu-
tion. As yet, they have not shown from what
quarter they intend to open their fire ; but
there is no doubt that they feel the cessation
of the war has taken away from them a

Our policy is not likely to induce Russia to
lay aside her arms, or to heed those murmur-
ings which we are persuaded will soon arise
here at a renewal of the Caucasian war. When
the Treaty of the 30th of March was signed,
Russia must have supposed that she re-
entered into relations of amity with her late
antagonists, and became a trusted member of
the European family. She could not have
anticipated that fifteen days later a separate
treaty would be signed between England,
France, and Austria, guaranteeing the in-
tegrity of the Ottoman empire. If it be true
that the Court of St. Petersburg first learnt
the existence of this treaty from its publica-
tion in our newspapers, we need not wonder
at the warmth of the remonstrances it has ad-
dressed to the English Government.
The effect of this treaty must be to isolate
Russia—to show her that no confidence is
placed in her professions—and to proclaim,
immediately after she has signed a Treaty of
Peace, that a new alliance is necessa►y to pre-
vent her breaking it. Behind this transaction
there are secret circumstances calculated to

standing excuse for their mismanagement and
jobbery. At present, but only for a brief time,
there is a lull. We must be prepared to hear
before long of some further revolutionary pro-
jects, speciously recor
of " reforms." We
we see of the temr

tded under the name

are 4
r of

A

the community is
perilous changes ii
One of the most
mentioned in the

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