The Press.
London, England, 1856-05-17 00:00:00

THI PRtgS.

the Mamelon and the Selinghinsk and Volhynia redoubts.
The men were intimidated by their losses inside the work,
and on the very day of the assault it was occupied by a
regiment which had never been inside it before, and who
were quite perplexed by the traverses and interior works
when the French entered it, so that they could not form
or make any effectual resistance. " But under any circum-
stances." added my informant, " the fire of your batteries
had attained a great ascendancy. We were expecting a
number of mortars and cohorns, some of which a:Aually
arrived at Perekop on the Mth of September, and if we had
received them in time your victory would have been a
bloody one, as we should have established fifty mortars
against your trenches."—lb.

Desertions from the allied camp they say were
very frequent, and a painful story was told of the
fate of one deserter :

A sergeant of Zonaves, the sergeant tailor of the regi-
ment, deserted to the Russians, and set up at Simferopol,
where he found abundant custom at great profit. He
found means to send a letter to the corporal tailor of the
regiment, informing hint of his good fortune, and advising
him to come and join his comrade as speedily as possible.
The corporal listened to the tempter, and started oft at
night to cross the Tschernaya. In order to make sore of
his way, he was obliged to hide himself till the dawn, and
with the first light of day he rose from his bed among the
rushes. and ran towards the enemy's sentries. A quick-
eyed chasseur spied the Zonave as he fled across the open,
and fired with such accuracy that the unfortunate wretch
fell to the ground with a broken thig 1. In that state he
lay on the neutral ground, between the riflemen, for two
long days. ll' he tried to crawl towards the French the
Russian riflemen opened fire on him ; if he turned towards
the enemy the enjans perdus, his countrymen, sent their
balls around him. It is not known how lung the miserable
being endured this agony—the raging thirst, the frost by
night, the son by day,—nor can it be ascertained whether
he died from his wound, or if his death was accelerated by
some merciful bullet; bat when the armistice was signed
his body was found in a hollow in the ground, where he
had rolled for shelter ; and even the discovery of a con-
siderable sum of money which he had stolen did not recon-
cile his comrades to the specta !le. They were moved to
tears as they deposited the weatherbeatern oorpse which
had known such dreadful sufferings in the grave.—lb.
Of the smallest success of the Russians, had the
campaign continued, this correspondent does not
believe. His description of the Russian army is
lamentable :

The impression left on the mind of every person who
has made the little tour which our party has just accom-
plished must be, and is universally, as far as I know. that
the resources of Russia in men were reduced to the lowest
ebb in the course of this war, and that she would have been
utterly unable to maintain an army in the Crimea, or to
continue in possession of it, had we made an aggressive
movement with all our forces from Thew-Lisle or Eupatoria,
or even left her in an attitude of watchfulness along the
extended line from the north able of Sebastopol to Simfe-
ropol I was assured, on authority beyond
question. that for two whole days this winter the troops at
Mackenzie were left without food, in consequence of the
state of the roads.

Speaking of the Russian army in the interior, the
correspondent says :

You do not see regular soldiers in any nambeis till you
enter the typhus•haunted streets of Simferopol, or wade
through the mud of Brktchi•Serai; and even here the
miserable, jaded, utterly spiritless, ill-clad, ill-fed, and
broken down militiaman seems to be in the proportion of
two to one to the soldiers of the line.
THE NEIGHBOURHOOD OF THE CAMP.

Many tours have of course been lately made ;
indeed Simferopol and its neighbourhood have
never before been so thoroughly ransacked. The
beauties of the famous I'horos Pass between Baidar
and Aloupka are declared not to have been ex-
aggerated :

The scene which bursts upon the eye on emerging from
the arch is one of the finest I have ever witnessed—indeed,
I am not sure that it is not the most beautiful and grand
that I have ever seen. Yon find yourself standing in a
narrow road on the left hand of which a sheer slab of rock
rises to the height of 600 or 701 feet above you—its sur-
face rent with fissures, here and there dotted by stunted
firs, which cling like weeds to its surface, diversified with
all the tints for which volcanic rocks are remarkable. At
the base of this cliff, which stretches further than the sight
can trace it, is a ragged fringe of mighty boulders, of frag-
ments of mountains tossed down in the wildest confusion
amid the straggling brushwood. On your "ight, nearly
1,000 feet below you, is the sea, washing the narrow selvage
of land which tumbles down from beneath your feet in
waves of verdure, covered with thick groves and dotted
with rocks, so rapidly that the dark blue waters, which
are really nearly a mile distant, seem to be only a few
hundred yards from the road. This narrow shelving strip
of land, formed of the debris of the mount.an•chain above
it, which lies beneath the cliff and de ends to the sea,
extends along the coast from Phoros to Demur Kapn, or
the Iron Gate, widening as it runs eastward, and losing its
distinctive character completely ere it reaches Aloushta, in
consequence of the great wall of cliff on the left hand
receding rapidly inland and northwards from the point
opposite Yalta. The length of this strip is thirty miles. It
is nearly a mile broad at Phoros, and thence it gradually
expands, till, at Aloupka, it attains a breadth of nearly
three miles, and at Yalta it is five miles from the sea to the
base of the cliff. The road winds for many miles along the
foot of these stupendous crags, but there is a lower road
to be reached by zigzags, which leads to the villas situated
in the lovely valleys by the coast. This strip of shelving

~~.,....

land is of the most varied formation. It is tossed about
into hill and dale, and is seamel with shady ravines and
deep woody dells, which are watercourses in winter. As
it is quite sheltered by the cliff from northerly winds. and
is exposed to the fell power of the sun, the climate here is
beautifully mild until the heats of summer begin, and the
land produces in great perfection art astonishing variety of
vegetable productions.—lb.
The Cossacks are, of course, very plentiful—never
having lost more than " one " iu each engagement.
They must present a curious appearance :

They wore heavy curved swords, without guards to the
}undies, in large sheaths of wood covered with leather.
Their heads were covered with sheepskin cape, the top
being formed of red cloth, and slightly conical in shape.
Their coats were like those of the infantry of the line—
long garments of grey cloth, fastened by a strap at the
back, and their trousers were tucked into their boots, more
Maiecovilornm. Each man had a long carbine slung over
his shoulder, and I was rather surprised to observe that
they had percussion locks. Thi4 armament was com-
pleted by a long and very light lance. The edges of their
swords were as sharp as razors—their knee points were
equally keen. Their hair was closely cut, and they had
th whiskerless cheek, the beardless chin, and the
mnstaehioed lip of " the regulation." Their horses were
barely fourteen hands high, and were high in the bone and
low in the flesh, but their speed and endurance are un-
deniable. The Cossack rides high above his horse—he
sits in the hollow of a saddle which looks like two pillows
of black leather, at such a height that his heels are against
the horse's flank, and when the animal trots his rider's
head is thrown forward over the shoulder, so that a right
line let fall from his head would be in advance of his toes
by some inches. The manes of the Cossack horses are
very long, and their tails often sweep the ground. We
soon found they were very quick walkers, and got over the
ground with rapidity and ease.—Times cor., April 25.

NAPOLEON 111. ON THE CRIMEAN

CAIIIPA IG N.

THE following are the outlines of a plan of campaign
drawn by Napoleon 111., and transmitted to General
Canrobert when the Emperor abandoned his original
design of commanding the army in person. The
extract is made from the second volume of the Baron
deßazancourt's " Memoirs of the Crimean Expe-

dition," just published in Paris :

THE EMPEROR TO GENERAL CANRORERT,

CHIEF OF THE AP.= OF THE EAST.

April 28, 1854.
The fire which has been opened against the place will
by this time have been successful or unsuccessful. In
either case, it is absolutely necessary to leave the defensive
position in which the army has found itself during the last
six months. To this end, in agreement with the English
Government, I should have divided the troops into three
armies, one of siege and two of operations.
The first army would guard Karniesch and blockade the
garrison of Sebastopol. The second would operate at a
short distance from Flalaklava, and in case of need take
possession of the Mackenzie heights. The third army
would effect a &version.• _ _

If, as think, the Russians have 35,000 men in Sebes..
topol, 15,000 to the north of Enpatoria, and 70,000 between
Simferopol, the Belheck, and the Tschernaya, 60,000 good
troops would suffice to destroy all the Russian army, which
might be taken in reverse before it had time to concentrate
all its forces. And even should it succeed in concentrating
them, we should be able to meet it with equal numbers ;
for we must never lose sight of that great principle in war,
that, if a diversion be effected at a certain distance from
one's base of operation, the troops effecting the diversion
must be numerous enough to resist those of the enemy,
who can concentrate all his efforts in opposition.
All this being well considered, I should have advanced
40,000 men from the army of Sebastopol into the valley of
Haider, and, supported by Lord Raglan, would have occu-
pied from Skelia to the bridge of Tonle and Tchorgoun,
the four roads which cross the Tschernaya. We shonld
thus have as many tiled de pont, menacing the lett of the
Russian position on the Mackenzie heights.
After these movements, I should leave Lord Raglan
master of all the positions on the left of the Tschernaya
from Skelia to Tchorgoun. I should combine, in rear of
the English lines. the 40,000 men of the active army with
the cavalry, and the means of transport at my disposal, and
posting scouts on the cliff, I should await the arrival of my
corps d'armee of reserve, which, coming from Constanti-
nople, would receive orders to reconnoitre the Pharos
headland.f What would then be our position with respect
to the Russians?
The movement upon Haider, in giving ns the passage of
the Tachernaya, would have menaced their left, and caused
them to think our intention was to dislodge them trom the
hont of the heights of Inkermann and Mackenzie. The
enemy thus would be held in check, and their attention be
attracted to Inkermann and Perekop. Our positions would
be excellent, my plans unknown, and if anything happened
to derange them, nothing would be compeismised.
But supposing that nothing interfered with the general
plan, it would be followed out in the manner following.

• 1. The siege army, composed of 30,000 French soldiers and
30,000 Turks, not reckoning 10.000 non•efectives. 2nd. The
first army of operation under Lord Raglan, 25,000 English,
15,000 Piedmontese, 5,000 French, and 10,000 Turks. Brd.
Second army of operation, 40,000 French from the army of Sebas-
topol, and 24,000 French composing the army of reserve at Con-
stantinople.
4. 2. The active army would be thus organised:—General Can-
robert. commendrr•in-chief first corps d'arnibe; General Ban-
quet, four divisions of infantry, one of light cavalry. Two oorps
d'armee, General Jean d'Augely, two divibious of infantry, one
division of the guard, one of heavy cavalry. General Palisade,
would continue oorninand of the siege army.

462

As soon as the fleet carrying the 25,000 men of the army
of reserve was sighted, orders would be signalled to it to
convey them to Aloushta, at a place on the coast previously
selected for a disembarkation. Three thousand men would
be in readiness to disembark the first, and would establish
themselves three leagues from Aloushta, beyond the defile
of Ayen. The remainder of the troops would remain on
board until cavalry brought intelligence of the occupation
of the defile. The report on this head being favorable, the
advance guard would take up a good position beyond the
defile, and, having intrenched itself, await there the army.
The remainder of the 25,000 men would then disembark
on the Aloushta coast, while, on their side, the 40,000 men
assembled at Baidar would receive orders to pass along
the high road which borders the sea by Yalta. In three
days (two days, that is, after the disembarkation at
Aloushta) the 40000 men from Balder would unite with
the 25,000 under the walls of Simferopol. This town
would be taken possession of, and a sufficient garrison left
there, or a good position would be taken up on the road
leading thereto, thus covering the rear of our army.
One of two things would now happen. Either the Rus-
sian army before Sebastopol would abandon that formidable
position to attack our army, advancing from the side of
Baktchi-Serai (and in this case the first army of operation,
under the orders of Lord Raglan, would press hard upon
it, and possess itself of the position of Inkermaun), or else
the Russians would await in their lines the advent of the
army from Simferopol. In this case the latter, advancing
from Baktchi•Serai on Sebastopol (resting its left upon
the mountains), would effect a junction with the army of
Marshal Raglan, which, advancing from Baidar upon Aloat,
would repulse the enemy's forces, and drive them iuto
Sebastopol or into the sea.
This plan, in my view, has immense advantages.
First, the army, as far as Simferopol (which is only nine
leagues from Aloushta), would always be in communica-
tion with the sea; it would traverse an exceedingly
healthy country, where there is the best waters in the
Crimea; its rear would always be protected ; it would
occupy hilly districts, where our deficiency in cavalry
would be less felt; lastly, it would come suddenly on the
Russian line of operations and cut off their provisions,
probably also seizing their reserve artillery. If the Ayen
defile, which would be indispensable to the success of the
plan, were so fortified that it could not be taken, the re-
connoitring party of 3,000 men which was sent to seize it
would immediately re-embark ; the army of reserve would
disembark at Balaklava, and the meditated diversion at
Simferopol would be made by way of Baidar, but under
much leas advantageous circumstances. As to the march
of the 40,00:1 men from Baidar to Aloushta, I believe it
might be effected without danger, since the army would be
protected by mountains, all but impassable, and the Rus-
sians would be at a disunce. Our army might be accom-
panied throughout almost the whole length of the coast
road by steamers, to take up the sick.t
If, on the contrary, a diversion from Eupatoria were
proposed, my opinion is that nothing would be more
dangerous, nothing more opposed to the rules of war and
the counsels of prudence. By operating from Eupatoria
you would place yourself in au unhealthy region, open and
almost destitute of water, a territory where the Russian
cavalry, which is very numerous, would have every chance
of success ; you would undertake a march of six leagues
before an enemy, who might come either from the north or
the south, fall on your columns, and completely cut off
your retreat. No natural obstacle offers itself to support
your wings. To march from Eupatoria to Simferopol you
must drag after you all the victuals and all the munitions
of the troops, for, when once the army had left Eupatoria,
the 15,000 Russians who surround it to-day, and who are
for the most part cavalry, would harass its rear, and hinder
the arrival of all kinds of convoys. If it were opposed at
Simferopol, and if the Russian army during this time
should, by a change of front, place itself a cheval on the
road which it has traverses, your army would be either
annihilated or famished. Besides, it is an absolute prin-
ciple that a flank march is only possible when distant from
the enemy, and protected by the natural features of the
country. . _

An -army operating from Eupatoria or Simferopol
would have neither line of operations, nor secure
flanking, nor retreat, nor favorable field of battle, nor
means of provisioning itself. In addition to which, in
place of being compact. composed of soldiers of the same
nation, commanded by a single chief, it would be f.)rined
in a great measure of Turks; and as these must be atilt('
with other troops, there would be neither unity, security,
nor absolute confidence.

If, instead of marching on Simferopol, the army from
Eupatoria should march direct on Sebastopol, it would
have to recommence under unfavorable circumstances
the campaign which we began when we disembarked in
the Crimea. It must carry the formidable positions of
the Alma, the Katscha, and the Belbeck. This enterprise
is out of the question, for it would be disastrous. Hence
the necessity of leaving at Eupatoria only that number of
Turks deemed indispensable for the defence of the place.

Such is the plan which I should execute at the head of
the brave troops which you have hitherto commanded;
and it is with the profoundest grief that the most serious
interests command my continued presence in Europe.
The Baron de Bazancourt then gives the reasons
why the Imperial plan of the campaign was not fol
lowed out. First, was the want of a generalissimo
holding the supreme command :

: On the other hand, the Minister of War would have collected
at Constantinople rations of meat, ammunition &c., in the most
portable form, co that the soldiers might march with the least
possible encumbrance. still carrying with them a supply for eight
days, besides a shirt an 1 a capofr. The corps-d'arm be of reserve
woull carry in the steamers rations for 60,000 men for eight
days. The waggons, which would follow the army from Balder,
would carry an equal quantity, so that the 60,000 men would be
provisioned for sixteen days certain. Besides, once at Simfero.
pol. the waggons might victual the army from Atonable.