The Express.
London, England, 1863-07-07 00:00:00

LYCZUSI.

Terra aviarits. A SUDI:iiAfiACIL Menne. Shore and
andetleoenb MI Neared* and Mrs. Lee.—AaJ THE DUKE'S
MOTTO. Neeoa Feebler. Shore. Jordan, and
Asysecald ; Mess C. Leclerc% IL Terry, and Slew .

BRITANICIA.

YRI EVESINS, ]HE—WISHING GLEN: or Spirits of the
Departed I introdudog THE GHOST, with Professor Peppers
adaptation of Mr. Direke's Soectral &other,
Comrade and Mr. C. Woodman.—And PAVED WITH GOLD.

HIGH WATER AT LONDON BRIDGE.
MN DAT Wandas. EL Es._ Mermen. 6h. ARIL
ENWORROW—IIeraIm. .Aftersobs. 7b. 390.

LONDON, TUESDAY, JULY 7.

Loan NAAS has rendered a real public ser-
vice in calling the attention of Parliament
to our position and prospects in China—a
subject of the gravest moment, which has not
yet attracted the notice it deserves in the
House of Commons or out of doors. In a tempe-
rate and well-considered speech he last night
reviewed the whole course of our procedure in
China since the opening of our trade with that
Empire thirty years ago, dwelling with special
detail and emphasis on the events of the last
three years, during which period our policy there
has undergone so marked and unfortunate a change.
This revolution has, however, been brought about
so gradually, by steps so slight and apparently
inconsiderable, one movement in advance leading
almost imperceptibly to another, that it is only
when they are brought into a focus and exhibited
in their combined results that the real magnitude
and momentous character of the change can be
appreciated or understood. One of the most
serious practical evils, therefore, connected with
such a revolution in our policy on the other side
of the globe is, that when at length adequately
known here, it is either already accomplished or
too far advanced to be easily arrested. In its moat
critical stager it is to a great extent removed from
the effective control of Parliament and public
opinion in the mother country. This is pre-emi-
nently true of our recent policy in China. The
English public is hardly yet aware of our altered
position in that vast Empire, and it may be
questioned whether even the Government is fully
alive to its importance. Questions relating to par-
ticular events have been now and then asked, and
desultory debates have sometimes followed. But
there has been no responsible exposition of our
new policy in its principles and probable results.
Lord Nora' statement raises the whole question,
and will thus do good service in helping to bring it
fully before the view of Parliament and the
public.

The revolution in our policy which has unhap-
pily taken place during the short space of three
years may be explained in a few words. At the
close of the last Chinese war, in the autumn of
1860, our policy was formally decided to be one
of strict neutrality and non-intervention. A civil
warldistracted the Empire, but we bad nothing to
do with the struggle, and wisely decided not to
interfere in any shape. The domestic politics and
internal conflicts of the country were no concern
of ours. We were there simply as traders, and so
long as our commerce was not interrupted or our
trade stipulations violated we had no ground of
complaint against either party in the civil conflict.
We traded with both, and both were equally
anxious to keep up a good understanding with us.
Two of the most important silk and tea
districts were in the bands of the Tao-
pings, but our imports from those districts,
instead of diminishing, largely increased every
year. Sbanghae was in the possession of the Im-
perialists, and Ningpo in the hands of their oppo-
nents ; but our trade with both parties went on
without interruption or disturbance.

Our position now is completely changed. We
have openly abandoned the policy of neutrality,
and taken part in the most active and decided
manner with the Imperialists. The proofs of
this were rapidly multiplied during the last year, and
are now sufficiently abundant, in fact altogether
overwhelming. We attacked the Taepingsat Ningpo
without provocation, and drove them out of the
place at the point of the sword, without even a
decent pretext for interference. The handing over
of this port to the Imperialists inaugurated a policy
of aggressive intervention that has since been
actively pursued. We have organized a consider-
able military and naval force intended to co-operate
with the Imperialists against the Taepinge, and these
forces have already been actively engaged in this
hostile service. On land there is the Anglo-
Chinese Contingent, commanded by British officers,
and at sea the Anglo-Chinese fleet under the com-
mand of ;Captain SHERARD OSBORN ; and these
combined forces are, it is said, to be speedily em-
ployed in a much larger enterprise than any yet
attempted. They are to be directed against the
City of Nankin, the stronghold and headquarters
of the Taepinga. We are intervening, however, not
only as allies of the Imperialists in the civil conflict
which divides the country, but as a department of

the Executive in the government et the Empire.
Mr. LAY is inspector-general of Chinese customs,
and • revenue amounting to nearly four millions
is collected at the Chinese ports by foreign
functionaries superintended by • British inspector.
In other words, we are gradually taking an active
part in the civil and military affairs of the Chinese
Empire, assuming as it were unconsciously moat
eerie= responsibility in connexion with its wen
and government, instituting in fact • British pro-
tectorate over the population of that vast territory.
A revolution of this sort, even in its earlier
stages, is quite serious enough to deserve the most
earnest consideration of Parliament and the
country. It ought to be explained without delay
what we are really about in China, and what we
intend to do there. The Government has
never yet given any clear explanation of
its policy and intentions, or evinced in-
deed any adequate sense of the altered position
it has assumed in relation to the Chinese Govern-
ment and people. It will never do to rush heed-
lessly as partisans and allies into the quarrels and
confusions of an enormous, but at the same time
• hopelessly weak and distracted Empire. If we
allowed ourselves to do this, we should become
virtually responsible for the internal peace and
good government of four hundred millions of
human beings. Now although we undoubtedly
have, as a people, an enormous faculty for
government, and possess individually sufficient
energy and enterprise to carry our talents to any
corner of the earth where they may be wanted,
still we have, in our collective capacity as • nation
and a government, quite enough to do already
without attempting to assume such new and vast
responsibilities on the other side of the globe.
If individual Englishmen like to go and assume
• portion of this responsibility for themselves,
we see no reason why they should not go out and
take office under the Manchou Government.
Prince KUNO, as a fast friend of the English con-
nexion, will no doubt be very glad of their assis-
tance. We not only possess • rare faculty for
organization and effective rule, but produce •
supply of this power in excess of the
home demand. It is the very power which
the Chinese Government and people want
above all things, and we have no wish to prevent
the supply meeting the demand. But then this
liberty should arise from the state of the law, and
not be given in • form which, like an Order in
Council, makes the British Government
• party to the act. It should be
clearly understood that all Englishmen who go
out and take service under the Emperor of Cttrua
do so on their own responsibility. We cannot
pretend to administer the Government of that
Empire, and the sooner we make the Imperial
Government understand this, the better both for
ourselves and for it. The course we have re-
cently embarked in is one where success or failure
would be about equally disastrous. Our true
wisdom is to return as speedily as possible to
our position as traders, and resume our old policy
of neutrality and non-intervention.