The Press.
London, England, 1856-07-19 00:00:00

TIIE PRESS.

I remember, sir, very long ago, having the honour of an
interview in the Isle of Elba with the First Napoleon.
The Emperor talked much of the States of Italy, and
agreed in the observation which I had made that there
was no union among them, and no likelihood of any effec-
tual resistance by them to their oppressors ; but when I
asked him why Austria was so unpopular in Italy, he
replied that it was because she governed, not with the
sword (that was probably not a reflection which that
great man would make), but that she had no other means
of governing except by the " stick." I believe, sir, that
that is the secret of the whole disfavour with which Aus-
tria is viewed in Italy. Taking this to be the fact, T say
that you have a means ready to your hands for rousing the
feelings of the Italian people, and that if we and the
Emperor of the French once declare that we shall not
allow the States of the Pope to be occupied by Austria
beyond a certain fixed date, the attainment of their cva•
cuation will be a matter of comparative ease. One thing,
indeed, I have heard, and it is a mere whisper, a sur-
mise—namely, that the Government of the Emperor of
the French, which agreed with us so much at Paris that
its Minister for Foreign Affairs took the initiative, is not
prepared at present to protest any further against the
foreign occupation of Italy. I, for one, sir, cannot
believe—l think it is impossible to believe—that a
sovereign who was so faithful an ally to this country—who
during the late war proved himself so ready to aid us, and to
act in every way as became a monarch true to his engage-
ments, would ever lead the King of Sardinia to rely on his
support, and then allow that hope to be disappointed. The
matter to which I allude may be one of some time—it may
require the adaptation of the various means to the end in
view. It is for her Majesty's Government to carry on
communications on this subject. They have the time
before them in which to do so; but this I will say, I can-
not but think that, if having done, and having proclaimed
so much we are contented with the refusal of all that we
propose—if we sit down quietly without obtaining any
improvement in the condition of Italy, it will be to us a
ground of everlasting reproach.
_ _

Lord Byron had said that the cause of Italian free-
dom was the very " poetry of politics." He believed
that it was the poetry of politics and a very practical
question as well. It was one on which our credit and
character depended, and that before Parliament
separated the Government should make some defi-
nite declaration as to the steps they intended to
pursue.

Lord PALMERSTON said, Lord John Russell wished
to know what were the intentions of her Majesty's
Government with respect to the occupation of the
Roman States by foreign troops—whether they
meant to let the matter drop altogether, or what
steps they proposed to take. He thought the house
would feel that when her Majesty's Government, in
conjunction with that of the Emperor of the French,
were engaged in official representations, with a view
of obtaining the cessation of this abnormal occupa-
tion, it was not an occasional disappointment which
should induce them to desist from endeavouring to
accomplish the object, and that it would be unbe-
coming in them to state what steps they might think
it right to take ; but he had no hesitation in saying
that he did not abandon the hope that the object of the
two Governments would be ultimately accomplished.
With respect to Rome, if the Pope would only put
in force the limited reforms promised in his Motu
proprio of '49, which professed to establish an
Elective Municipal Council on an extended franchise,
a Council of State, and a Council of Finance, he
believed that foreign occupation would he no longer
necessary. With regard to Naples, the representa-
tions of France and England had not hitherto been
attended with any successful result. But as with
Rome so with Naples,—ber Majesty's Government
did not despair. Beyond that he could say nothing.
Regarding Sardinia, he gave full assent to every
I view expressed by Lord John Russell :

My noble friend had said that the fact of the King of
Sardinia having so nobly and gallantly associated himself
with France and England in the war which has just been
brought to a close has given him a right, a moral right, to
the support and protection of those countries should any
danger assail him, not brought about by provocation on his
own part. I think he is too well advised to give such
provocation; and, therefore, if ever he should be in circum-
stances of danger, the Governments of England and
France would be bound by every tie of honour, as repre-
senting theae two great nations, to assist him to the utmost
of their power. I am satisfied, however, that the know-
ledge of such ties existing between Sardinia and England
and France will of itself be sufficient to prevent Sardinia,
if not from being threatened—and I believe it will never
be more than threatened—at least from being assailed

with such dangers as will render it necessary for us to
interpose in order to repel them.

He agreed also that it would be desirable to encou-
rage those Soveratgns of Italy whose territories are
either free, like those of the Grand Duke of Tuscany,
or occupied, like those of Parma, and who wish either
to retain or regain their independence; and that it
would be the duty of settled Governments, like those
of England and France, who object in general to
these occupations, to encourage those sovereigns in
maintaining their independence. In conclusion,
Lord Palmerston said he could not consent to the
production of the papers which related to corre-
spondence still going on.

SATURDAY,

Mr. DISRAELI said :

The noble lord the member for London has called our
attention to a subject of the greatest interest and im-
portance; but of Italy it may be said that it must either
be considered in a poetical or practical point of view. ire
doubt there is no gentleman in this house who does not
feel the greatest sympathy with Italy and the fortunes of
the Italians. When we remember how much we owe to
that country, that in ancient times it gave us our laws,
and in modern times our arts, it is totally impossible that
its condition can ever be a subject without lively interest
to the House of Commons. ( Hear hear.) But that is the
poetry of politics, as the noble lord has reminded us :And I
cannot think, notwithstanding the high authority he quoted
on the subject of poetry, that the house t) night will feel,
on a discussion that may involve immediate consequeneesof
the utmost importance to the people of this country, that
we should indulge merely in the poetry of politics on
the one hand, or of satisfaction on the other, with that
vague explanation which we have just heard from the
lips of the First Minister. ( Hear hear.)
The noble lord the member for the city of London
compensated us for dwelling on the poetry of the ques-
tion, and in a very businesslike manner, becoming the
importance of the subject, reminded us of what occured at
the recent conference at Paris, and of the important State
papers to which, at that conference, the plenipotentiary of
England had affixed his signature. The noble lord intro-
&aced the question to us with business details which the
house clearly understood, and made us feel that, by the con-
duct of the English Minister at I'aris, this country had
entered into engagements, according to the version and
interpretation of the noble lord, which had placed this
country in a position of grave responsibility.
I cannot understand from the observations of the
Minister who has just sat down that her Majesty's Minis-
ters have done, or are intending to do, anything which
could have justified those protocols or the position which
the plenipotentiary of this country assumed on that occa-
sion. ( Hear hear.) If all that the Ministry have done or
intend to do are merely these routine representations to
which the noble lord has just referred, and which he has
promised, it does not appear to me that, at a conference
called to settle questions of a very different character, it
was necessary, or expedient, or politic, to have introduced
the question of Italy as it was introduced at Paris—( Hear)
—to have drawn up and signed these protocols, if all that hes
been done, or is to be done, is, in fact, merely that diplo-
matic action which, as I humbly conceive, might have taken
place without so much ceremony, and without having, as
the noble lord the member for London said, roused the
passions of the population of Italy. ( Hear.)
I want to know what is the deduction we are to draw
from the inquiries of one member of this house, who has
been First Minister of the country, and from the answer
of another member of this house, who is the First Minister
now, on a question that is indeed truly described as one
interesting and important from its social character, but
one in the treatment of which are involved urgent, perhaps
immediate, consequences to the people of this country—
to the state of their industry and the state of their com-
merce, the question of peace and war, and all the most
vital subjects that can possibly engage the attention of
this house or the consideration of statesmen. _

When I first listened to the observations of the noble
lord I thought he was about to counsel action of the most
decisive and energetic character. The noble lord said it
was the duty of this country not to abandon the affairs of
Italy. He laid down that position with the utmost pre-
cision. Now, I can hardly suppose that the noble lord,
by declaring that it was the duty of this country not to
abandon the affairs of Italy, could, after all that has oc-
curred on the subject, have confined his meaning merely
to the communication of a note from a Minister to the
Court of Naples or of Turin. ( Hear, hear.) The noble
lord, indeed, stated there were circumstances which might
demand the most decided conduct on the part of this
country. He said, if Austria, for example, required the sup-
pression of the liberty of the press on the pai t of Piedmont,
then there is no step which be should not be prepared
to take on such an occasion. (Hear.) But, strange 1^
say, the only formal proposition tha" I find in the papers
upon which the noble lord founded all his observations—
that for repressing the liberty of the press—does not
emanate from the Austrian plenipotentiary, but from the
representative of our great ally, the Emperor of the
French, by whose &A and whose aid alone these magni-
ficent visions of Italian regeneration are to be realised.
Now, sir, if I look to the papers to which the noble
lord has referred, I find language of a very precise elm-
racte• upon the subject of interference. The house will
recollect that when the protocols of the conferences at
Paris were first laid on the table, it appeared that upon
the Bth of April it was Count Walewski, the French Secre-
tary of State for Foreign Affairs, who, when the treaty
was signed for the settlement of the Eastern question, and
when all those points were arranged which had given
rise to the conferences, introduced in a formal manner to
the consideration of the plenipotentiaries questions which
had no immediate reference to the principal cause of
their assembling. The house will recollect that, so far
as the protocols would show us when they were laid on
Our table, the responsibility of that introduction, which
many thought not very adroit, rested with the French
Minister. But there were subsequent papers placed on
the table of the house which threw considerable light
upon this point, and proved that it was not Count Walew-
ski who really was the cause of the subject being brought
forward. It was upon the Bth of April that Count Wales,-
ski, after the settlement of the main question, said:—

It was desirable that the plenipotentiaries, before they sepa-
rated, should interchange their ideas on different subjects
which required to be settled, and which it might be advanta-
geous to take up in order to prevent fresh complications.
Then Count Walewaki went on with that remarkable
exposition—fresh, I am sure, in the memory of every

JULY 19, 1856.

gentleman who hears me—in which he showed that Greece
was iu what is called an " abnormal state," that the Roman
Legations were also in an " abnormal " condition, and that
the affairs of Naples were not aonormal but " exceptional."
(A ►augh). Now, when those papers were placed on the
table, many gentlemen, while wondering at the indiscretion
colutilitted by Count Walewski, must have felt that a
Minister of experience and high character could never have
i 'traduced at a conference for the settlement of terms of
peace with Russia questions of this vast importance,
without having previously communicated with his col-
leagues, and felt the pulse of the representatives of the
different Courts. That was the conclusion which everybody
must have drawn from the protocols of the conferences;
but a short time afterwards papers were laid on our table,
which completely exhibited the cause of this conduct on
the part of the French Minister, and the means by which
the attention of the Congress was directed to these ex•
traneous and extraordinary subjects. It then appeared
that on the 27th of March, ten days before the exposition
of Count Waleweki, the plenipotentiaries of Sardinia
placed in the hands of Lord Clarendon a memorandum
which, if it be anything, is an act of impeachment against
Austria and Austrian rule in Italy, which proposes secu-
larisation, the Code Napoleon and other remedies, and
which in spirit was the basis of the observations that Lord
Clarendon made on the Bth of April. Therefore it is quite
clear that there was an understanding among the plenipo-
tentiaries in Paris that at their meeting on the Bth of April
all these extraneous questions, including that of Italy, were
to be brought forward, that the movement came from
Piedmont, and that in the memorandum of the '27th of
March may be found the motive spring of all that has oc•
• irred.
Now, to proceed a step further, what are the engage-
ments, as the nob e lord the member for the City interprets
them, what are the representations—which with the laxest
interpretation of the words we might call them—of Lord
Clarendon? Our Foreign Secretary agrees that the state
of Greece is " abnormal ;" he agrees that the condition of
the Roman States also is " abnormal;" but, as regards the
Neapolitan Government,
He is' of opinion that it must doubtless be admitted in prin-
ciple that no Government has the right to interfere in the
internal affairs of other States, but lie considers there are cases
in which the exception to this rule becomes equally a right and
a duty. The Neapolitan Government seems to him to have con-
ferred this right and to have imposed this duty upon Europe.
Now, I ask the house whether that is language that could
have been used , or ought to have been used, without having
some foregone conclusion as to the policy of which it was
to be the indication? ( Hear, hear). Though I may not
agree with the noble lord the member for the City that the
language of a protocol 01 this character is an engagement
which may bind us with the formality of a treaty, still it is
impossible to read it without feeling that we have a right
to expect from the noble lord at the head of the Govern-
nn.nt, without revealing the secrets of Cabinets or the
mysteries of States, some explanation of the declara-
tions of the English plenipotentiary more satisfactory
than those phrases with which the noble lord has
favoured us to-night, and to which I confess I am at
a loss to annex any other meaning than that which I
had the misfortune, years ago, to attach to the state-
ments of the noble lord with respect to the affairs of
Italy.
The noble lord has explained to the house what is
the nature of the exceptional character of the Neapo-
litan Government, and why there should be a departure,
in the case of Naples, from that golden rule of non-inter-
ference to which I trust the house will adhere, or which
is will never quit without the most urgent necessity.
(" Hear, hear," from Mr. Bowyer.) The noble lord said
tie position of Naples was remarkable, because, if the
Government were to conduct itself so as to give rise
to any revolutionary movement in the country, the
armed forces of a great military power Austria
were at hand, " and you may depend upon it," added the
noble lord, " Austria would occupy Naples, thus producing
a state of things that would not only endanger the peace of
Europe, but might bring about calamities which it is diffi-
cult to measure or foresee." But when the noble lord de-
fends himself from the charge of doing nothing to mitigate
the evils which, according to him, render the state of
Naples so exceptional, and which require our interference,
he intimates that, though England and France may not
succeed—have not succeeded—in any way in obtaining
that mitigation of Neapolitan rule which he thinks so ne-
cessary, yet some other influence, not less powerful, and
wince will be received in a tar more friendly spirit by the
Neapolitan Government, may be brought into requisition
with more suc:ess. The house clearly understood the
noble lord to mean the mediation of Austria. It was the
action of Austria upon Naples that, according to the noble
lord, was to induce the Neapolitan Government to cease
from its ill doing and to adopt that remedial course which
siemed so expedient. But how extremely inconsistent is
it to hold Austria up to us as the power which, by its
beneficent interference with Naples, is to put an end to the
iniquitous rule which you deplore, and at the same time to
say that, in the event of any revolutionary movement in
Naples, Austria will occupy the kingdom in order to
uphold the very misrule to mitigate which Austrian
mediation, according ►o your own account, is now the only
means to which you can resort? (Hear, hear.) Sir, I
cannot have much hope that the influence of Austria
will be ot• the nature which the noble• lord supposes, if, as
we are assured at the same time by the noble lord, we
have reason to anticipate and fear Austrian invasion in
order to support the misgovernment which Austrian me•
dianyn is to mitigate and remove. (Hear, hear.) But,
sir, in what way, viewing this question practically, are we
to put en end to the occupation of Italian States by foreign
powers ?
The noble lord who began the debate confined the
whole of his observations to the Austrian occupation of
part of the Roman States. The noble lord must have felt
the extreme awkwardness of his position, because when ho

THE PRESS.

assured the house of his confidence that, with the aid of
our great ally, Austrian occupation might be terminated in
the Roman States, he must have remembered that
another part of the same States was occupied by the
troops of that very august ally by whose co-operation we
were to pat an end to the occupation of the Legations by
Austria. ( Hear, hear.) The noble lord touched very lightly
—or, rather, did not touch at all—upon the fact that the
capital of the Roman States is occupied by French troops
—Hear, hear )—though he must be aware that nothing
cau be more irrational than to address violent representa-
tions to Austria in order to terminate the occupation of the
Legations by Austrian troops unless, at the same time, our
ally is prepared to take steps by which the occupation of
the Roman metropolis itself by French troops shall cease.
I know that this question has been settled by Count
Cavour in a very ingenious manner ; he iusistslupon it, as
a first condition, that Austria should quit the Legations,
and that the French army should quit Rome, but should
remain in the Legations until everything is settled.
Now, I ask what is die use of doing what. the noble lord
has done to•night—what is the use—to employ his own
language—of" rousing the passions" of Italy, unless we
have a practical object before us, and unless the opinion of
Parliament can support the policy of the Minister?
Never is this house justified in entering into discussions
upon external policy unless we are prepared to impugn
the conduct pursued by the Minister as injurious to the
country ; or unless we can, by the expression of our
opinion, support the Minister in a policy which will be
beneficial to the country and to Europe.
So far as the theoretical part of the question goes, so far
as sympathy for Italy goes, so far as the poetry of politics
is concerned—there being but one feeling in this house--
I want to know, when we turn to the practical question,
what the motion of the noble lord will do, or what any-
thing we can say will do, to support the policy of the
Ministry? Why, sir, what is the policy of the Ministry?
(Cheers.) It is the very point which throughout this
whole discussion has been mysteriously withheld from us.
(Hear, hear.) I don't expect the noble lord to tell us the
means by which the Cabinet is to fulfil his policy ; but we
ought to kncw from the noble lord what are his general
opinions on the subject of the occupation of Italy by foreign
troops, and whether he is prepared to take steps to put an
end to that occupation or not ?
Now, sir, there are two modes in which we can deal
with this question, and as they are both practical modes, I
will, with the permission of the house, and with as much
brevity as I can command, slightly advert to them. We
can go to war with Austria, no doubt; we can send a fleet
to the Bay of Naples or to the Bay of Genoa ; with the con-
sent of our great ally, we can send a French army to some
part of Italy ; and we may embark in a great struggle, the
object of which will be entirely to change the phase of
Italian life, to subvert its Government, to emancipate—
according to our views—its people, and to effect a great
revolution, which may, perhaps, be accomplished after one
of those long wars like the Punic war, or the thirty years'
war, or the French Revolution, or after one of those
struggles which always occur when such immense conse-
quences are aimed at and attained. On that policy I will
not presume to give an opinion, because I feel that it is a
subject which would require a discussion worthy of its im-
portance in this house before we embarked on it. I will
make only one remark with regard to it, and I say, if that
be the policy of the Government of this country, they
are bound frankly to announce it. ( Loud cries of " Hear,
hear.") They are bound to submit such a policy to the
consideration of Parliament, and, if sanctioned and ratified
by Parliament, the people of this country will, at least,
have the satisfaction of knowing that they have not been
drawn into a great struggle, without being aware of it, and
their minds will be prepared—as the mind of a nation
ought to be prepared—for so great a struggle and so great
a stake, by those discussions in the house of their repre-
sentatives which will direct their attention to the great
issue before them. By this means they will be enabled to
brace their energies to the occasion, and they will have
no grounds for accusing the Queen's Ministers or their
own representatives of having embarked in a conflict of
such difficulty and duration without fair advice and warn-
ing. ( Hear, hear.) I think all hon. gentlemen will agree
that if that be the policy of the. Ministry—that if they are
prepared to go to war to emancipate Italy from Austrian
rule, they are at least bound frankly to explain their policy,
to appeal to Parliament, and to take the verdict of the
country upon its expediency.

There is another practical mode by which you may pro-
ceed to attain your object. I remember that at the end of
the session of 1848 it was my fate, as it has been the fate
of the noble lord to-night, to bring before the consideration
of Parliament the question of interference in Italy. I have
in my mind a perfect recollection of the events which took
place in 1847 and 1848, and although the noble lord may
not condescend to profit by the experience of that adven-
ture, I confess myself that the consequences were so sad,
and have been so opposed in my opinion to the progress of
Italy and to the amelioration of the condition of Italian
society, that I tremble lest he should embark in a like
enterprise again, and lest we should reap from that con-
duct the same bitter and desolating fruits.
This leads me to the second practical means by which
you may attempt to emancipate—as it is termed—ltaly.
You may have diplomatic communications—you may have
what you had in 1847—first friendly advice, and afterwards
what are called " admonitions " to the ruling powers ; and
I have not the slightest doubt that, without declaring war
and without the active cooperation of fleets and armies,
you may thus set a great portion of Italy in flames, and
may reap consequences which we may all have deeply to
deplore. (Hear.) I will try for a moment to trace what
would be your diplomatic action under that second system
upon Naples. But before Ido that, there is one observa-
tion which 1 cannot help impressing on the house.

. .
The state of Naples is declared by Lord Clarendon to be
so exceptional as even to justify the violation of the golden

67,

rule of foreign policy, viz., non-intervention. Now, it
would be very desirable to have before us, on authority,
some description by the Government of what the state of
Naples ia. ( Hear, hear.) I will, for the moment, assume
that all those tales which have reached us of ruthless and
savage imprisonment are perfectly authentic ; but if
authentic, in all probability they are in a great degree the
consequence of the panic-stricken councils of a small
sovereign surrounded by jealousies and difficulties fo-
mented often and encouraged by foreign powers. I will
admit all we hear to be perfectly authentic—the ruthless
imprisonments, and the cruel and even sanguinary
punishments. Well, I remember a few years ago, when
there were alleged against Austria the same horrible
stories of the imprisonment of citizens—the flower of the
worth of Italy—in distant fortresses. (Hear, hear.) Who
has not heard of the names of men in the highest walks
of literature and science who have been the inmates of
Austrian dungeons? I don't know whet were the parti-
cular causes which induced those imprisonments. If I
enter into that, I enter into the internal administration of
the country, and the principle of non-intervention in
foreign countries is much endangered ; but I want to know
what there is in the state of Naples more exceptional than
there is in the case of Austria ; and if the cruel imprison-
ment of citizens by a sovereign is considered so excep-
tional a thing as to permit the violation of the cardinal
principle of our diplomacy, why do we not violate it in the
instance of Austria? ( Hear.) Why when we hear of
those dreadful banishments to Siberia with which hon.
gentlemen are so familiar do we not consider that an ex-
ceptional case ; and what other difference is there between
Naples, and Austria, and Russia than this—that Naples is
a weak power and the others are very powerful ones? I
would impress upon the house, therefore, that it should be
very cautious upon this head!
Now, let us see what will be the action of the second
practical course in the case of Naples if we pursue it. We
determine not to go to open war to emancipate Italy ; but
still the condition of Naples is so intolerable as to warrant
interference, though not in a military form. Then, sir,
we have an admonition—England and France publish an
admonitory note to the King of Naples, and, perhaps, an
English fleet rides in the Bay of Naples. Everybody knows
what the consequence of that would be. The instant that
the discontented portion of the population of that kingdom
find that Naples has lost the good offices of the great
Western powers, that process takes place which the noble
lord has referred to—bands of the Italian population are
roused. They will reason thus. They know well, when
their own sovereign is lectured by England and France
and an English fleet is in the offing, that if they rise, and
rise successfully against their sovereign, Austria dare not
interfere. I deny the proposition of the noble lord, that
an insurrection in Naples is a necessary prelude to an
Austrian occupation. If England and France arouse the
passions of the Italian population by proclamations and by
lecturing the King of Naples, and if an English fleet is in
the bay, Austria will not occupy Naples.
The noble lord who introduced this question seems to
think that there is no eontest going on in Italy but between
worn-out dynasties, and some intelligent and well-educated
persons of the superior classes, who desire his great specific
for all its evils—constitutional government. I do not think
this is a true view of Italy. (Hear, hear.) There is in
Italy a power which we seldom mention in this house,
but without considering and understanding which we shall
never rightly comprehend the position of Italy—l mean the
secret societies. (Hear, hear.) The secret societies do not
care for constitutional government. (Hear, hear.) They
do not want existing society ameliorated, they want it
changed ; and the objects of that change can neither be
obtained nor secured by those enlightened institutions to
which the noble lord refers. We know something more of
these societies than we did. Since INS we have had
means of obtaining a knowledge of their numbers, organi-
sation, principles, and objects, and without some consider-
ation of these it would be absolutely impossible for us to
form a conception of what would be the consequence of our
interference in the affairs of Italy.
It is useless to deny, because it is impossible to conceal,
that a great part of Europe—the whole of Italy and France
and a great part of Germany, to say nothing of other
countries—is covered with a network of these secret
societies, just as the superficies of the earth is now heirg
covered with railroads. And what are their objects ?
They do not attempt to conceal them. They do not want
constitutional government; they do not want ameliorated
institutions; they do not want provincial councils nor the
recording of votes ; they want to change the tenure of land,
to drive out the present owners of land, and to put an end
to ecclesiastical establishments. Some of them may go
farther. Do you think that, with their complete organises
tion, when Austria cannot interfere to occupy the kingdom
of Naples, when the King is lectured on his throne by the
Western powers, and when, as the noble lord says, the
feelings of the people are roused, these societies will be
quiet? (Hear.) We know what they did before. Their
energy end their organisation carried everything before
them.
I am told that a British Minister has boasted—and a
very unwise boast it was—that by holding out his hand he
could raise a revolution in Italy to-morrow . I believe it
is not impossible, with the means at his disposal, that he
might. What would happen ? You would have a republic
formed on extreme principles, and there may be many in-
telligent and well-meaning persons—l do not say in this
house—who would say, " And what then ?" Nothing can
be worse," they would say, " than the present state of Italy ;
let us try a Red Republic, or even a republic of a sti 1
more fiery colour." But the question of Italian politics is
not of that simple character. Rome is not far distant
from Naples. The passage from Naples to the States of
the Church is not difficult. You may have triumvirs again
established in Rome ; the Pope may again be forced to
flee ; and my hon. friend behind me ( Mr. Spooner) may
say, "So much the better "-----(laughter)—and clot a

cardinal may be left in Rome. What w.ll be the conse-
quences of that? The two great Catholic powers of
Europe—France, whose Emperor bouts in these proto-
cols of being the eldest son of the Church—that ally with
whose beneficent co-operation Italy is to be emancipated—
and Austria will pour her legions over the whole peninsula.
You will have to withdraw the British fleet ; your admoni-
tions will be thrown into the mud (as they deserve) ; and
your efforts to free Italy from the occupation of foreign
troops will terminate by rendering the thraldom a thousand
times more severe, and by aggravating the miseries of the
unfortunate people whose passions yon have fired, and
whose feelings you have this night commenced to rouse.
But is that all the evil? If the movement which com-
menced at the Conferences of Paris is to be followed up;
if the protocols are to be succeeded by speeches of the
noble lord the member for London while Parliament is
sitting, and by admonition and written lectures by our
foreign Ministers and by our representatives abroad during
the autumn, in all probability you will again have Italy in
flames, and you will again crush that progress which has
been always going ou in time of peace, and when we meet
again we may find the position of the peninsula infinitely
worse. But do not suppose that that is the whole of the
evil. What I have said I consider—so far as the future
can be certain—to be the certain consequences of the
policy which you are pursuing. What lam now going to
refer to are merely possible results, but they are results of
so terrible a character that it is my duty to refer to them,
though I do so with reserve and some feeling of awe.
The secret societies are not confined to Italy, as I have
ventured to remind the house. They are at this moment
more numerous, more active, and in a higher state of
organisation in France than in any other State of Europe.
If Italy be in flumes, if the Italian secret societies be
successful, do you think that it will have no effect on the
French societies? They are of course always in a state
of excitement and ready to act upon every occasion. Par-
liament and the country have confidence, and have justly
confidence, in the character of the great prince who now
rules France. He is a man of rare sagacity, he has been
schooled in adversity, and he is a man who is at this
moment at the head of a numerous and triumphant army
devoted to him. You may therefore allow Parliament to
be prorogued with little fear as to the consequences to
France of the system in which you are now about to en-
gage in Italy. But we all remember another great prince
who sat upon the French throne, whose sagacity during
his reign was also proverbial, who was never mentioned in
this house but in terms of panegyric on both sides of the
house, who also had been schooled in adversity, and who
was also seconded by an army which he and his princes
had themselves formed, which was fresh and flushed with
victory, and which was lead by great generals devoted to
him and eager to prove their devotion by the assertion of
his rights and the maintenance of his throne. But that
great prince fell suddenly, and he fell solely and en-
tirely by the action of the secret societies. That I ap-
prehend is a fact which no man acquainted with the
events of 1848 will deny. No doubt that terrible cata-
strophe was assisted by a great misfortune which then
occurred to France. In 1847, when a member of the
British Cabinet (whose career I have commemorated in
this house already) was sent to give advice and counsel to
the Italian princes, there happened to be a season of un-
exampled want in Europe, and especially in France. At
no time within the following year were the means of sus-
tenance and of employing labour so deficient. What is
the condition of France at this moment? A terrible
visitation has fallen upon that country. The charity of
more than one nation and the admirable measures adopted
by the ruler of France co mitigate the consequences of
that visitation may enable the next season to be passed
without that misery which fell upon the country in 1848.
But the prospect, in a material point of view, is very grave,
and if you commence another campaign of Liberalism—
the expression of sympathy without being prepared to
support it by acts—a policy convenient for a Minister or •
public man who wishes to make a political demonstration,
is:- to an ambitious monarch who wishes to increase his
t rritories, but one which a wise Parliament will hesitate
t, sanction with its ratification—if you once embark in
t'tis scheme of raising the passions of the Italian popula.
t on, as the best means of ameliorating their coalition and
mitigating the political evils of their country; and if the
consequences of that policy should be concurrent with a
period of great agricultural distress in France, it will re-
qu►re all the sagacity of the most sagacious prince and all
the resources of his army (however numerous and how-
ever victorious) to guard against the danger; and fortu-
nate will it be for France and fur Europe if they escape
the moat fatal results.
I have touched upon these points because this is no
holiday question. We are now in the very lees of the ses-
sion, and this may probably be the last day on which there
will be assembled so large a number of members as were
present when the noble lord Lord J. Russell) addressed
the house. The noble lord has to-night commenced a
course which, if not watched with vigilance and care, may
involve the country in proceedings the consequences of
which it Is difficult to foresee. I certainly find en-
couragement. in the language of the First Minister. Not-
withstanding the proud protocol of the Conferences of
l'aris ; notwithstanding this despatch if the 27th of March
from M. Cavour, which must have been delivered behind
the scenes, and which appears in the papers as a speech of
Lord Clarendon ; notwithstanding all the details of the
protocols, it appears to be the calm, the well con-
sidered. and the solid determination of her Majesty's
Ministers to do nothing. I believe that the noble
lord, profiting by the past ( Hear, hear) remem-
bering his experience of the years 1847 and 1848, has
made up his mind not again to be seduced into a position
so difficult and so dangerous as that which he then en-
countered. I will also say that I have such confidence in
the wisdom of the Emperor of the French that I feel per-
suaded that, as maids the strain of Italy, he is of the same