The Press.
London, England, 1857-02-07 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

experience and authority he could contrive to
bring things to the most critical point, and yet
to evade the explosion. The noble lord cer-
tainly understands Europe thoroughly well. He
ought to do so. I am satisfied that if he had
gone to Paris to negotiate the treaty of peace,
Bolgrad would not have been given to Russia.
The noble lord thoroughly understands the interests
of Europe, because he has had more experience with
regard to them than most men. He therefore
thinks that with the hand of a master he
can always raise a European difficulty, foster it
until the right moment, and then evade its conse-
quences. But the noble lord seems to have for-
gotten that aspiring votaries and enthusiastic pupils
are not sufficient to insure success; and just when
the noble lord was winding up his account in antici-
pation of the meeting of Parliament, just when he
had written his four paragraphs respecting the
American, the Italian, the Bolgrad, and the Swiss
difficulties, just when he was thinking that he might
come to Parliament and receive the laurel crowns so
lavishly bestowed on him by those people who feel
convinced that if it were not for him we should be
invaded to-morrow, and have our commerce
destroyed, and perhaps our throats cut by those
unknown enemies in Europe who seem dying to
found banks and construct railroads—(a laugh)—
just when the noble lord may have been saying to
himself—" Unparalleled as has been my fortune, un-
rivalled as has been my success, I think I really
have outdone myself ; even the blunder of a Claren.
don under my magic touch has excited the enthu-
siasm of a devoted people—(a laugh)—and that
which in former days would have destroyed a
Government, that which would have for ever
stamped a negotiator as the most incapable man ever
intrusted with a great office, I have made the basis
of a claim to the gratitude and an appeal to the
patriotism of England. I have extracted the flower
safety from this nettle, danger. I may now meet
Parliament with confidence. They may ask me
what is my domestic programme? What lam going
to do about parliamentary reform ? I will refer
them to a late noble colleague of mine. (Great
laughter.) They may ask me what lam going to do
about administrative reform? I will answer in the
words of Richard 11. (I am indebted to the noble
lord for the quotation), 'What ! do you want an
administrative reformer? I am an administrative
reformer!"—(laughter)—just at. that moment when
the noble lord would have had no difficulty in evading
any disagreeable inquiry he finds that unfortunately
Canton is blazing and Persia is invaded. (Cheers.)
It seems to me that we have now arrived at a point
at which we must ask ourselves whether it is not
our duty to inquire into the cause of this perpetually
recurring system of difficulties. (Hear, hear.) We
now have the Persian difficulty and the Chinese diffi-
culty—two difficulties which, as it could he easy to
show, have not been occasioned by local circum-
stances of such a commanding character as to justify
an appeal to arms, but have rather happened in con-
sequence of a predetermined policy at home, the
consequence of which policy is that, after a year of
peace, we are called upon again to forget the first
function of a House of Commons, again to neglect
the consideration of our domestic condition, and

again to forbear making any effort to diminish the
burdens of the people. (Cheers.) I confess that I
was somewhat surprised when I heard of the Persian
war. I thought it was our interest to maintain the
existence of Persia, and even if Persia committed
any act of folly to view it with forbearance. Our
policy respecting Persia has hitherto been to treat
her as a vast, poor, weak country that ought to be
supported as a barrier between us and the other
European power which has predominance in that
part of Asia. That policy has always been pursued,
and, little as the people of England care for external
politics, I believe they have understood it, because
they look jealously at anything which may bring us
near to Russia. But destroy Persia from apprehen.
sion of Russia, and the consequence is that you are
nose to nose with Russia—(Hear, hear)—and that
collision which might not have happened for years
is precipitated by your policy. That is the view
which any sensible man would take of a war with
Persia.

But there is a different view of the question. The
case of the Government is that we are not really at
war witn Persia, but with Russia in the disguise of
Persia—Russia with a long black Persian cap upon
her. It is said that we are struggling with a foe
who, having been destroyed and disabled from pur-
suing his long•cherished policy in the Black Sea—
who having been so exhausted that he did not
attempt to conceal his exhaustion, but was ready to
agree to any terms in order to obtain peace—bad yet
treasured up untold gold and raised armies from
mysterious provinces in order to invade our great
Indian empire. I well remember the invasion of
Affghanistan and the documents which were placed
on the table respecting it. I can only now say that
if we have papers laid before us respecting the Persian
war, as we were promised by the hon. mover of the

151

Address, although not in the Speech, I shall examine
them with considerable suspicion and scrutiny, and if
they do not contain all the information which they ought
to contain I shall move that they be referred to a select
committee for the purpose of obtaining further in-
formation. (Hear.) And if it turns out, as I
believe it will, that Russia has been more anxious
that there should be peace between Persia and
England than England has that there should be war
between herself and Russia--if turns out that from
the very first moment the peace of Paris was signed
there have bean no means of conciliation which
Russia has not used to obtain a result absolutely
necessary to her existence in her present crippled
state in that part of the world, and used to such as
extent as even to counsel the Sovereign of Persia to
yield that great prize, so long coveted, the city of
Herat, I should then be tempted to believe that by •
some unfortunate policy, which I shall not chars.-
tense, it has been deemed a matter of great expe-
diency that that third campaign in the Crimea--the

non-occurrence of which I have often heard deplored
by politicians of the noble lord's school—should take
place in this Persia which we have now invaded.
(Hear, hear.) If that should be the case, I wish the
house well to consider the course the noble lord now
pursues—the position in which he places this coon.,
try, and the effect which all this may have on ono
resources, on our commerce, and on that situation
we hold in the world. (Hear, hear.) From what I
read in the public prints—for on this point I have no
other means of information—l think it possible that •
the Persian difficulty may be settled, but settled by •
the influence and agency of that very power against
which every means are used in this country to excite
the passions of the people, and to convey to thesis
the impression that Russia is the cause of war, in-
stead of being from the first desirous to prevent it.
(Hear, hear.)

There remains the Chinese difficulty, whiels,•
unfortunately, is not settled. I shall not trouble the
house with more than one observation on that affair,
because I apprehend that all these are questions
which must be decided on their own merits ; and I
am alluding to them now to show the necessary con-
sequences of such a policy. The question of China,
however, appears to be in the same category as that.
of Persia; and I cannot resist the conviction, that
what has taken place in China has not been in con-
sequence of the alleged pretext, but is, in fact, in
consequence of instructions received from home some
considerable time ago. (Hear, hear.) If that be
the case, I think the time has arrived when this
house would not be doinu its duty unless it
earnestly considered whether it has any means for
checking and controlling a system which, if pursued,
will be one, in my mind, fatal to the interests of this
country. (Cheers.) Are we always to have in time•
of peace difficulties in our foreign relations' (Hear,
hear.) No doubt we shall have, with the disposition
of the noble lord, a very good chance of finding our-
selves in that situation, for he has at his command
those resources which a generous and spirited people
intrusted to him fcr objects of a very different
nature.

There is a great complaint at the present moment
of the burden of taxation and of one peculiar tax.
That peculiar tax is intimately connected with the
circumstances to which I havecalled the attention of
the house to-night after a long separation, comment-
ing on events only which have occurred in the
interval. We must all admit that nothing is more
natural than that the people of this country should
object to war taxation in time of peace ; but then I
am told that it is necessary to endure war taxation in
time of peace because our foreign relations are in
a state of such excitement, difficulty, and peril. My
answer to that is, that these are the very circum-
stances which make me hesitate as to the propriety
of the condition in which our finances are placed. If
we were really in times of profound peace, and that
certain sacrifices were necessary to be made in order
to clear us from the consequences of the old struggle
(though I believe that the old struggle was prosecuted
with a needless expenditure and a lavish and
extravagant spirit to be deprecated), I could under.
stand that the course which ought to be taken under
these circumstances would be of this kind—l could
move for a finance committee, and the expenditure of
the country could be submitted to its scrutiny ; I
could then have these allegations of extravagant and
lavish misuse of the public funds examined into. 1
could ascertain by such means what are the necessary
wants of the country, and with that information we
might be enabled to take the course which circum-
stances justified. But when a war taxation in time
of peace is concurrent with a constant state of semi-
war—when a time of peace consists in preparation for
war, of fitting out expeditions, of sending fleets to
different quarters of the globe—then I am obliged to
consider whether this war taxation is not required
for circumstances and objects far different from those
which a time of peace justifies and requires. (Hear,
hear.) I think the expenditure of the country ought
to be reduced. (Hear, hear.) I should like to know
what the cost to the country has been of the blunder

152

of Lord Clarendon in the Conference at Paris,
necessitating the keeping of a great fleet in the
Black Sea, and other measures of the kind. (" Hear,"
and a laugh.) It could be ascertained—and the
information would be very instructive--what have
been the consequences of the want of a good
geographical knowledge on the part of a principal
negotiator. (Renewed laught-r.) But our position
is wry different from that which justifies a finance
committee in time of peace for war taxation. We
have war taxation, and though it is a time of peace,
we have war objects and ends aimed at, which only
war can approve. k Hear, hear.) In my opinion
the time has arrived when it would be well to curb
and control the power of the Minister to pursue that
policy which I have touched on tonight, and which
I believe to be dangerous to the interests of this
country. (Hear, hear.)
Bat we have before us a question far graver than
the question whether we shall intrust to the present
Government a certain additional number of millions
sterling arising from the income tax. The agitation
of that point has led to the agitation of other points
of far greater and more enduring importance. The
very tax from which this extraordinary supply is
drawn—the principles on which it is founded, the
consequences of its provisions on our industry and
property—all these are topics of controversy which
we thought settled in 1853, and now, I observe, are
reopened. (Hear, hear.) This is a very danger.
ous condition, and ought to be gravely considered.
(Hear, hear.) Whether there should be adifference
in the rate of assessment between permanent and
precarious incomes,—whether there should be ex-
emptions in levying the income tax, and to what
degree those exceptions should mount,—these are
questions we thought had been settled for ever; and
no one can deny that it would be a great advantage
to the country that they should be settled for ever.
Remember the peculiar circumstances under which
the right bon. gentleman the member for Oxford
University introduced the act of 1853 to our notice.
We are too apt to forget these circumstances in the
hurry of public life, and when the interval has been
occupied by events so exciting as those created by
the late war. When the right hon. gentlemen intro-
duced his measure in 1853, not as a transitory or
insulated financial measure standing by itself, for it
was a most considerable pelt of the financial scheme
which he brought forward,—remember in what
position he was placed. There were two parties in
this house who held opinicns on the measure he was
about to introduce, each sufficiently powerful greatly
to embarrass the passage of a measure, but who, if
they had united their forces, could have detested any
Ministry. The first party consisted of those who
thought there ought to be a difference in the

assessment between precarious and permanent in-
comes, and those who thought there could not be
any satisfactory solution of the question. It was
then said by the Government that that was a ques-
tion which had been argued and reargued over and
over again ; and "whatever may be my views," the
right hon. gentleman said, " I will bring forward a
measure which will terminate this method of taxation
for ever, except under circumstances which will
justify any anomaly in taxation—namely, when the
country should be engaged in a great struggle." The
opposition which was felt in many quarters in this
house to the propositions of the right lion. gentle.
man was silenced by the terms which he offered ;
and I consider that a compact was entered
into between the supporters of that opposition and
the right hon. gentleman on that occasion. (Hear,
hear.) And so far as I was concerned I offered as
little opposition to the proposition of the right hon.
gentleman as was possible. But there was also
another party in this house—a very powerful party,
representing very different ideas, and whose interest
and honour ought ever to be dear to the House of
Commons. Those who are the possessors of real
property were placed in a very peculiar position by
the financial proposif on of the Minister of that day.
A part of his scheme was to impose a succession
duty upon real property. I do not wish at this
moment to enter into a discussion of the merits or
demerits of that measure ; but I will at once admit
that he brought forward his measure fairly, and was
ever ready to defend it, and I am sure that if it
should be necessary he will be ready to vindicate his
course to those who on this side may impugn it.
But allow me to say that his proposition as to suc-
cession duty was intimately connected with the
settlement of the income tax. (Hear, hear.) Some
of the provisions of his measure respecting the suc-
cession duty were defeated, and some were carried
by a narrow majority. But they were carried by
gentlemen on the Ministerial side of the house
deeply intere'ted in real property, who did not ap•
prove of his measure, but who took it as part of a
;eneral scheme, accepting his declaration that the
income tax was to terminate in 1860. That was the
equivalent and consideration upon which they sup-
ported the succession duty. (Hear, hear.) Now,
if the scheme of the right hon. gentleman had not
been disturbed by the war two years ago we should