The Press.
London, England, 1857-08-01 00:00:00

THE PRE SS, AuGust 1, 1857.

taut of the two expeditions. It is only in that manner
you can embrace and command your empire, and the means
announced are not adequate to a demonstration of that
kind, and it could not be done unless the noble lord takes
much bolder steps than he seems inclined at present to
adopt. I think he ought to call out the militia—not only
call them out, but embody them ; and I do not understand,
unless the noble lord does this, how lie can maintain the
war with effect. Besides, it is of the utmost importance to
establish in this country a powerful and ample reserve.
(Hear, hear.) How can that be done unless you not only
call out but embody the militia? The noble lord said the
other night, in reply to some observations of mine, that he
saw no use in calling out the militia, except to make that
a means of recruiting the regular army. No doubt it is a
high privilege and a noble duty for the militia to recruit
the ranks of the regular army, but I cannot agree that it is
the first duty of the militia. Their first duty is to defend
our hearths, and I do not see, not caring to allude to the
present state of Europe, but simply regarding the alarming
condition of Asia, what steps can be taken for the proper
maintenance of our national defences unless the militia be
called out and embodied, and the noble lord comes down to
the house to ask for ample means to prosecute the war in
which we have embarked.

I have made these observations as to force, and I should
not have ventured to make any criticism upon the acts of
the Government upon this subject if I had been able to
agree with them as to the causes of the disturbance. Ilut
to my mind that is not all that we ought to look to. Even
if we do vindicate our authority with complete success—
if we do revenge the insult we have received—if we rebuild
the power that has been destroyed, it appears to me that
we have still a very great and responsible task before us,
for it is impossible, even in the moment of action, to drive
from our consideration not merely the future of India, but
also the present condition and feeling of the great mass of
the population. We may poor our legions and our fleets
up the rivers and through the provinces of India. We may
be successful, but to my mind we should add to that
success and doubly strengthen our force—and I am pre-
pared, for one, to give any support to her Majesty's Govern-
ment which they may require for that purpose—( Hear,
hear)—if at the same time we should say to India that
supposes she is aggrieved and outraged—to India perhaps
despairing of pardon, " Although we will assert with the
highest hand our authority —although we will not rest
until our unquestioned supremacy and predominance are
acknowledged, from the Punjaub to Cape Comorin—it is
not merely as avengers that we appear." I think that the
great body of the population of that country ought to know
that there is for them a future hope. 1 think we ought to
temper justice with mercy—justice the most severe with
mercy the most indulgent. ( Hear, hear.)

But how are you to do that? What step are you pre-
oared to take ? How are you going, let me ask, to govern
India, when, as I have heard, it has been circulated on the
highest authority that the native army in Bengal no longer
exists? Has the house well considered the consequences
of so easily saving that as the native army of Bengal has
no longer any existence we should substitute it by English
regiments? I do not wish to view the question as a ques-
tion of finance. This country is in that condition at the
present moment which will not permit us to dwell upon
such considerations. But, suppose you had 100,000 or
200,000 Englishmen in India, could you govern India
with such men ? You might as well talk of governing
India with a House of Commons. (A laugh.) NVhy, the
supposition that you are to have an army of Europeans to
govern Tndia assumes a complete revolution, both in your
external policy and in your internal administration.
(Cheers.) How are you to invade kingdoms like Pegu,
how are you to conquer countries like the Punjaub, with
men of English constitution ? How could they journey
through those burning deserts and perform those actions
which now are with facility performed by the native troops ?
You could not do it. Look at the position of the English
regiments in India. We have been obliged to guard them
up to the moment of those battles which they have been
called upon to fight, and which they have invariably
won. Well, then, whet is to be Mill of your foreign
policy? It no longer exists. You must entirely
change all your relations with the States conterminous
with your Indian empire. But look at your internal ad-
ministration. Can you levy your revenues with English
troops ? (Herr, hear.) Are English troops to be put at
every outpost? Are they to escort the money from your
treasuries? Are they to perform all those duties which now
are with facility performed by those whose nature and
organisation adapt them to live and work in that country?
I: is totally impossible that you can ever govern
100,000,000 of men merely by European agency. (Hear.)
You must meet that difficulty boldly and completely.
Well, then, the course which I recommend is this :—You
must at once, whether you have received news of success
or of some defeat, tell the people of India that the rela-
tions between them and their ruler and sovereign Queen
Victoria shall be drawn nearer. (Loud cheers.) You
must act upon the opinion of India on that subject imme•
diately ; and you can only act upon the opinion of Eastern
nations through their imagination. (Hear, hear.) You
ought to have a royal commission sent by the Queen from
this country to India immediately to inquire into the
grievances of the various classes of that population.
( Cheers.) You ought to have a royal proclamation to the
people of India, declaring that the Queen of England is
not a sovereign who will countenance the violation of
treaties—(cheers)—that the Queen of England is not a
sovereign who will disturb the settlement of property—
( Hear, hear)—that the Queen of England is a sovereign
who will respect their laws, their usages, their customs,
and, above all, their religion. (Hear, hear.) Do this,
and do this not in a corner, but in a mode and manner
which will attract universal attention and excite the
general hope of Hindostan, and you will do as much as all
your fleets and armies can achieve. (Hear, hear.) But
to do this you must act with vigour. You must send to

that country the men who are most entitled to such office,
and who shall appear in Hindostan and demand
possession in the Queen's name. if that be done simul-
taneously with the arrival of your forces you may depend
upon it that your military advances will be precipitated,
and I believe your ultimate success will be insured. (Hear,
hear.)
Sir, no one can be more sensible than myself that I
have inost imperfectly treated this great question. I may
be asked why, with these convictions, I have ended these
observations only with a motion for papers. It may be
said that if the views of the Government and those that I
have expressed appear to be so contrary, " Why don't you
assert your opinions in a resolution, and call upon Perna-
went to sanction it ? " (Hear, hear.) I will state the
reason why I have not taken that course. I thought that
it was of very great importance that at this emergency the
Parliament of England should not shrink from entering
into a discussion upon this question. It appeared to mu
that if were to return to our counties in silence we should
have abdicated our functions—(loud cheers)—and lest all
claim on the confidence of the people. It is at these
momenta that we who are the great council of the nation
should stand forward to be the guides and gusrdiana of
the people of this country. The opinions of the Govern-
ment upon it have not been expressed in such a decided
manne►—they have not been adopted so long that I can
despair to find that their minds will rise with the occasion,
and that they will embrace a more vigorous and larger
policy than they have hitherto seemed to intimate or re-
commend. I cannot renounce the hope that even the dis-
cussion of this night, after others may perhaps have been
listened to more competent than myself, may elicit from
the Government a declaration which may carry some hope
and confidence to the people. If they should take that
course, see in what a position we should then be placed.
A united Parliament and a strong Government are two
circumstances most necessary in the difficult position in
which we are placed. (Cheers.) That is a consideration
that has influenced my mind. It is not that I myself on
this or on any other subject ou which I might recommend a
policy would shrink from responsibility; but I wish to
show to Europe and to Asia that it is not the desire of a
Parliament to overthrow a Ministry to save an empire.
( Cheers.) I trust, therefore, that this discussion will at
least elicit such a declaration of policy on the part of• the
Government that the only duty of the House of Commons
in future will be to support it with cordial sincerity. If
they do not take that course—if they adopt insufficient
means, and public disaster occur—deep will he their re-
sponsibility. We shall meet again perhaps sooner than
this house expects ; and if they neglect their duty to their
country, 1, for one, will not shrink from responsibility. I
will then appeal with confidence to an indignant people
and to a determined Parliament, and I will ask them with
united energies to save an endangered empire. (Great
cheering.) Sir, I beg to move that there be laid before
this house : —I. Copy of any minute or despatch
addressed to the Governor General of India by his Ex-
cellency the Commander-in• Chief, the late Major-General
the Hon, G. Anson, dated on or about March, 1856, rela-
tive to the state of the Bengal army. 2. Copy of a report
on the organisation of the Bengal army, drawn up by the
late Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Napier, and trans-
mitted to his Grace the Duke of Wellington, K.G.

Mr. VERNON SMITH said Mr. Disraeli had repre-
sented the mutiny as a national revolt, but he had
adduced na evidence to show that it was owing to
national discontent. No native prince had been con-
cerned in it, and there was not a shadow of evidence
of any conspiracy among the native princes. The
system pursued by Lord Dalhousie in regard to
adoption might be right or wrong, and before that
question was decided the law of succession in each
State must be inquired into ; but this subject had no
connection whatever with the revolt. With regard to
the distnrbanee of property, there had been a com-
mission to inquire into enam lands, some of which
had been acquired by fraud and corruption, and this
may have created a good deal of discontent among
certain classes. It was impossible not to lament
that such a disturbing oration should have been
made. Mr. Smith denied that "warning " had been
given ; and, with regard to the papers moved for, one
was not in existence, and the other did not apply to
the case, and its production could not consequently
be of any use. As to the causes of the outbreak, it
was altogether premature to pass any opinion. Mr.
Smith deprecated the idea of superseding Lord
Canning; but mentioned that the Government had
intimated to him that, if he thought a commission of
civil or of military officers would be useful, under
existing circumstances, such a commission would be
granted. If the house had no confidence in the
Government of India, either at home or in the
East, they should strike at it directly and at once ;
but if they had confidence, they would then allow the
Government to act upon their own judgment and
responsibility.
Sir ERSKINE PERRY expressed a general concur-
rence in the views expressed by Mr. Disraeli. Ha
believed the revolt to be national rather than military,
and that Lord Dalhousie's "annexation" policy was
the exciting cause.
Mr. WHITESIDE quoted the recorded opinions of
Sir Charles Napier, and other eminent authorities,
to show that as much had been said and predicted of
the unsatisfactory state of the Bengal army as ought
to have aroused the suspicions of the Government of

India and led to precautionary measures being taken.
In fact, the Indian authorities had left India to the
chapter of accidents.
Lord J. RUSSELL said he had no wish that the
house should enter upon this discussion, and, in
presence of what had been rightly termed an awful
calamity, he could not conceive anything less tending
to the advantage of this country or of India than
such a discussion, if it was to end either in a vote of
tenure or a transfer of India to the Crown. Neither
of these measures was proposed in the motion, which
was only for the production of papers. Mr. Disraeli,
he observed, had never ventured to say that the
great mass of the people of India had suffered under
oppression. It appeared to him that we had :trusted
rather too much to Indian troops, and troops of one
particular kind, and have had too large an army. lie
thought that 50,000 Europeans and 100,000 natives
would aff9rd a far better security than our present
force. The first matter, however, upon which the
Howie of Commons ought to pronounce an opinion
was that the Government ought to be supported; he
thought the house ought not to separate without
expressing such opinion, and he accordingly moved
by way of amendment an address to her Majesty, to
assure her Majesty that. they will support her Ma-
jesty in any efforts necessary to suppress the dis-
turbances in India and in any measures required for
the establishment of tranquillity.
Mr. MANGLES dwelt upon the universal good
feeling of the princes, landholders, and people of
India. In the Punjaub, he said, the population were
with us to a man. He denied that the Indian Govern-
ment had been warned of the state of the Bengal
army, and characterised the mutiny as an exhibition
of frantic fanaticism on the part of the sepoys.
Mr. LIDDELL observed that the amendment was
incongruous with the motion, and inquired of the
Chair whether it was not competent to the house,
without negativing the amendment, to agree to the
original motion calling for information.
No reply was given by the Speaker, and
Mr. AYRTON moved that the debate be adjourned;
but this motion was negatived, upon a division, by
203 to 79.
Mr. DISRAELI replied

I do not know what frantic fanaticism is, but when I
listened to the chairman the other night I remember the
hon. member who fills that mysterious and responsible
office rising and telling us that his mission was to convert
the whole of India to Christianity. (A laugh, and " Hear,
hear.") I say that was frantic fanaticism. (Cheers.)
Recommend me to this candid avowal of the Chairman of
the East India Company, then, when our East Indian
empire is in a state of emergency. (Cheers.)
I now come to the answer of the right hon. gentleman
the President of the Board of Control, which amounts to
this—" You say we have had warnings of the state of the
native army." I therefore expected that the right hon.
gentleman would have adverted to those features of Indian
society, history, and life, which I placed before the house,
and the importance of which I endeavoured to trace. But
the right hon. gentleman almost passed these circumstances
without notice. He treated them as old stories. But it
a because they have been heard before—because they are
old storir— --Ruse they are permanent and enduring
`-at I • • • - •

causes of misrule—that f brought them before the house.
( Hear, bear.) If they had been the accidents of yesterday
they would not. have produced the events that have startled
the most powerful country of the world. But the great
defence of the right hon. gentleman to the comprehensive
view I endeavoured to take was a technical, red-tape,
Treasury, worn out, and old-used argument. (A laugh.)
The right hon. gentleman eats, " I will prove that we had
no warnings. I will prove that we, the Government of
Great Britain, that I, the Minister of India, was more com-
pletely ignorant of the state of India than you imagine."
The right hon. gentleman spoke with all the simplicity
that Mr. Hastings said was peculiar to Indian potentates.
I thought it quite possible that the right hon. gentleman
had no information on the subject, but with goodnatured
irony I gave him credit for some. (A laugh.) At one
time, indeed, I thought it possible that with this double
Government—with this Cerberus to watch over the affairs
of India, with the Government at Calcutta, the Govern-
ment at Leadenhall-street, the Government in Cannon row,
and all the complicated contrivances of this vast machine—
I thought it possible that the right hon. gentleman might
succeed in obtaining a glimpse of light and some slight
fragment of information. But I did not think it right to
assume that in these events which have alarmed a country
and endangered an empire there had been in official
quarters the gross ignorance which appears to have pre.
veiled upon these subjects. (Cheers.) The right hon.
gentleman denies that he knew anything, and protests his
ignorance with a plaintiveness that is irresistible, and a
pathos that I yield to without further struggle and argument
with a Minister who, so far as India is concerned, would
lead us to believe that his Government is the moat purely
ignorant Government, and also the most incapable (because
there are some who believe that capability does not depend
upon knowledge)—the most uninformed and most ignorant
Government that ever presumed to influence the destinies
of that country. ( Loud cheers.)
He was told that this debate was of no use. The noble
lord the member for the city of London, who was not a
stormy petrel, but like a halcyon brooding on the water—
(laughter)—when the Government was in difficulties,
produced a soothing calm. The noble lord did not see
the use of the debate. But had not he ( Mr. Disraeli)
suggested something which might be useful—namely, a
aDß!►Aiiejop to 19uire into the affairs 9f India? and Is,