The Express.
London, England, 1864-04-12 00:00:00

THE EXPRESS, TUESPAY - EVENING, APRIL 12, 1864.

eight of the min the arable earl opposite (Lord Derby)
declared that it was the banns of the government to have
• policy of their owe, and not to meek one from perhainest,
and in that doctrine he fully concurred. It was no hard-
ship but an immense advantage to • government to be
called upon to discus, these questions before parliament,
and his noble friend (Lord Russell) lied always courted
rather than deprecated discussion on subject. of public in-
terest. The present diocesans wee about to take place under
very peculiar °Ornamenting. It was brought forward on the
eve of the assembling of a confereuce. the object of which
was to endeavour to restore peace to the north of Europe,
and it would be inexcusable for the government to appear as
partisans, or to say one word which would lessen the chances
of the restoration of peace, and there were many parts of
, the subject on which they were bound to be silent, or at all
' events so proceed with considerable caution. With respect to
the motion before their lordships, lie attributed the author-
shipot the first resolution to his noble friend near him (Earl
Gre))); the second resolution, which related to the guarantee
d 1720, was evidently that which the noble lord (Laid
Stratheden) desired to pens upon the house. With respect
•to the speech and the motion of the noble lord, he felt
quite unable to follow him in the greater part
of the arguments which he had used, and for
I this reason, that they referred to the future, and to
the manner in which the conference was to he
comducted. He considered that it was the duty of the go-
vernment to avoid any discussion en the future, and to con-
fine the discussion to the peat. The second resolution
; asserted that which was not the fact, because the guarantee
of 1720 was not a guarantee of the Duchy of Slenrig ;
it was • guarantee only of that part of Sleeting
which was held by the then sovereign of Denmark.
• His noble friend had not given a fair representation of the
state of the case, but his noble friend wished for more de-
eded action. What was meant by more decided action ?
What his noble friend meant to ask, although he did not
say so, was why we had not taken part in the war. (Hear.)
His noble friend mid that if they did this thing and the
other thing they would have prevented the war. Bat it
was equally open to the government to say that if they had
adopted a different course they most have increased the
I bloodshed and misery of the war. (Hear.) What 'the
government were bound to show was this, that they bad
adopted some definite line of policy which they were able to
stead by and to justify before the people of this country.
He submitted that the government had • ready
newer to the charge made, that they might
have prevented the war, or that not having prevented
it they ought to have taken pen in it.
He must protest against the charge that prima fiscie there
was any use against the government fur not having pre-
vented the war. We had • great position in Europe. The
noble lord smiled. He meant that the couotry,under what-
ever government, had • great position io Europa, not merely
from their material power, but from the impression that
prevailed that on the continent they had no selfish interest
to promote. Our interests were of a commercial character,
and as regarded these they were bound up with the pros-
perity of the whold world. It was not true that they were
the general arbiters of quarrels amongst continental nations.
There might be wars of the greatest possible iojostice in
their character, and yet no bosh fide case might be 01114111
against the English government for not being
able to prevent it. Take the Italian war, for
example. The liberal party were not then io office.
The noble earl opposite (Shamesbury) did everything in his
power to prevent that war taking place. No minister could
have acted more earnestly and faithfully for that purpose.
His hand was never off the electric telegraph wire. His
messages to Vienna, Paris, and Turin jostled one another.
Not only did be exercise all his influence in deprecation and
remonstrance, but the noble earl at the head of the govern-
ment, in a very powerful speech, very nearly tbreatened
the power of England in one war broke out. Noble lords
would remember the intimation in that remarkable speech,
that if England wee to be neutral it would be • position of
armed oeutrality, and the statement that England had in-
terests in the Adriatic which she was bound to defend. The
declaration was received with cheers on both sides of the
house. Yet what was the effect of that declaration? Why it
ended in nothing. The war took place. but he heard
that the noble lord felt any humiliation at having failed to
prevent that war. However glad of the result of that war,
yet so far as international questions were concerned, he felt
bound to say that there was not the slightest possible
grounds for it. if there was any ease against the govern.
meat in regard to the preseot war, it must seise out of
their special position and obligations in respect to the belli-
gerent parties. If that were so, they must look to the do-
raiment'. Now, what were these documents! The noble
lord said the obligations of England were mainly to be found
iu the guarantee of 1720. He entirely denied that peopasi-
tion. Our position in reference to this questioo was not tolbe
found in that document, but is the treaty of 1852. That
treaty in the first piece was not a treaty of guarantee, but •
treaty of recognition. In the second plan it was not a
treaty signed by England alone, or even principally. It was
• treaty in which we were cosignitanes with the other
great powers of Europe and some of the smaller powers.
Theta was a passage in the preamble which referred to a
question of policy and not of obligation—that the existence,
the integrity, and indepeudeues of Denmark were
to the balance of power in Europe. To that deela:nl:B2
the other great powers of Europe were co-eignitaries. The
principle on which we take our stand is, I maintain, correct
—namely, that whatever the duties and obligation of
England arising out of this treaty, they wen duties and
obligations which were exactly parallel with those of the
other great powers, and that we had no interests and duties
apart from tbon of the other powers. The policy on which
the gavernruent acted was to rally the other great powers
to defence of the treaty and not to advance in front but
along with them. He asked the house whether they could
say conscientiously that the government failed in their duty ?
(" Yea.") His noblefriend said "Yea," He defied him to
the proof of it. He would show, by a reference to the
documents, that his noble friend (Earl Rumen) did all he
possibly could to rally the powers of Europe to maintain the
treaty. When his noble friend first heard of the intention
of the German Diet to take action, not only in regard to
Holstein but Sleewig, he on the 25th of March, 18b2, at a
time when there was little public attention directed
to the subject, transmitted a despatch to the great
powers calling their attention to the importance of
the resolution of the German Diet, and soliciting
joint action. That communication was made to the two
great nos-German powers, France nil Russia ; it expressed
• hope that formal intimation would he given to the German
Diet of the gravity of the step they had taken. He was
sorry to say that this attempt failed, because the courts of
Rorie and France infused to commit themselves to such •
proceeding. But it was demonstrable from this despatch
that the prawn state of things was not midair to any want
of vigilance on the pert of his noble friend. Then the King
of Denmark died in November, upon which the question of
succession arose. It was mainly owing to the exertions of
his noble friend that the treaty of 101 l was recognised &el
applicable to this question. There was a marked in-
dication on the part of these powers that they
were about to retreat from their position, and to mall':
in question the whole principle of the treaty of 1852.
During January in this year ha noble friend made several
different attempts' to enure the more active co-operation of
the two great non-German powers, Russia and France, in
deprecation of the proceedings then about to take pine. I
Then representations were made on the sth, 10th, and 19th
of January, and the replies of the 19th and :10th of January
gave the rename of France for not co-operating with us.
He admitted that the government of France had the right
to retain in their owe heads the issues of war or peace.
Bat he mast sae that if the non-German powers had co-
' operated with Lis noble friend, the dangers of war would
have been obviated. But if we had taken more
" decided action," as my noble friend terms it, and
' made is • casus belli if the Germans massed the Eider, we
would have stood alooe without an ally on our aide. He
need not detain the house by showing that such a course
of policy would have been inexpedient. (Hear, hear.)
With respect to the assumption that this more "dedded
action" would have prevented war, he most remind the
house that they were not dealing merely with goverment.
alone, but with forces which took their rise in the revolu-
tionary passion of the time. (Hear, hear) They were in
fact dealing with two fanatical democracies, and these were
fans which were not so acessoble to reason. If they bad
committed themselves to such an alternative as this
they could not have averted war, bat would have
been forced to join in it, and would thereby
, have increased that bloodshed which all deplored,
So long as France and England acted together, it warn a
tenant's for the pesent Europe. But if they once began
to take separate action, there were tendencies which might
impel them more and more into opposite directions. He
would be guilty of great affectation if he said be apprehended
any danger to the government from the motion of his
noble friend. The aspect of the benches opposite showed
that the noble earl did not mean to give • very active and
warm support to the 'notice, or if be did Ostend to give it
his support, it was evident that his forces had been routed
by the entry of Garibaldi. (A laugh.) Bat whatever
might be the opinion as to the conduct of the govern
meat, he hoped that all would join in deprecating
the needless and lamentable waste of life which was
going on. (Hear.) He believed that every object of the
war might have been obtained by diplomacy. During the
last ten years there had been three great wars—the war
with Russia, in which we had ourselves been engaged, the
Italian war, and the war in the United States. In all of
these wars great issue, at all events were involved. But in
the present war in the north of Europe he believed that
the rights of Germany, the local liberties of Sin-
! wig- Hoetein, and the integrity of the Danish
'monarchy, might all be attained without the
shedding of blood. He should not like to say one word is
disparagement of Denmark. The Mon were a gallant
nation, and they were now fighting against overwhelming
odds. (Hear, hear.) But at the same time, those who reed
the diplomatic documents might doubt whether Germany
had not some joist ground of oomplaict against Denmark,
with regard to the common constitution for the whole
monarchy, and the local liberties which were guaran-
teed to the people of the doehies. Bat it was
equally demonstrable that promises which had been
made by Germany had not been fulfilled. He (the
Earl of Derby) would not repeat what had been done.
if there were diplomatic engagements they were equally
lauding on all parties. Now, he bad selected three distinct
promisee to Denmark, all of which had been more or leas
violated. The drat promise made to Denmark was this—
and it went to the whole root of the matter. The promise
was that the whole theory of Sleswig-ilolatainion should
be entirely abandoned ; in other words, that the theory that
Sleswig should be connected with Holstein, and Holstein
should remain pert of Germany, should be wboll=
doped. lie would ask, had German!, sad ell the
powers abided by that promise? Had not this theory of
Mewls beast waked day by day as • parysleal mess

spinet everything Denmark held dear to itself, sod had it cot
been themes, of most of the difficulties which had occurred?
The seined promise to which he would refer bed been made
by the Pamperer of Austria. It was to this effect—that the
Austrian government would mover allow Federal power to
be exeraised in Holstein in any meaner in which it might
not be exercised equally in every other part of the Confede-
ration. Now her Majesty's government had admitted the
legal right of the German Diet to put in execution into
Holstein. They could not deny it ; but he would ask the
German powers whether, in the circumstances Roder which
that execution took place, they had faithfully adhered to i
the promise held out by them words? That execution
took place for the purpose of securing to the
people of Slaw* certain local privileges and ,
tights. But were thee, not in other parts of the
Genf edemtion constitutional rights which had been violated, ,
without execution having been followed? sad did the
German Diet exercise their power in respect of that viola-
tion? Why should they act against the Duke of Sleewig is I
• way in which they did not act against the King of Primula?
Whilst they were thus acting unequally they were not eel!'
breaking their promise, but they were violating every prin-
ciple of the Federal constitution. The object of a federation
was the mutual detours of its members • but if the power '
of the majority was always to be brought to bear against
the weaker minority, then Federal execution would become
• mere instru meet of anarchy. Were they not setting spinet
themselves a most dangerous precedeut by putting into force
against the weaker members of the Confederation powers
which they did not exercise against the steamer ? The third
promise was kdistioct repudiation of any right or competence
whatever of the German Confederation in Sleswig. The
German Diet has sow asserted its competence, and they de•
sired to go into the conference, not as partisans of cue side
or the other, but impartially. Her Majesty's government
desired nothing more than to preserve peace to Europe,
no doubt compatibly with the local rights of the two
duchies, and consistently, if possible, with the integrity and
maintenance of the Danish monarchy. They had no
interest but to see the balance of power maintained, and the
rights of all the parties preserved. Them had been the
objects of the governspent in times past, for which they
avoided and deprecated war, which he believed had merited
the approbation of the country, and which he trusted would
obtain their support is future.
Earl GREY said it was remarkable that while this country
was acting as the self-constituted friend of Denmark, the
strongest point of all in her case, that which entirely de-
prived Germany of all colour of pretence for in-
sisting on the repeal of the law, at all events with-
out allowing ample time for that repeal to be
constitutionally effected, was, so far as he was swarm never
outs alluded to. His noble friend (Lord Wodshouee) who
was sent on • special mission to Berlin and Denmark, in his
conversations with M. Bismarck alluded to the im-
portant deepatch of Sir Augustus Paget of the 18th of No-
vember. and he (Earl Grey) could not find any trace of his
noble friend's (Earl Russell) having availed himself of that
despatch in his arguments on behalf of Denmark. We. it
fair that we should have acted this part of the candid friend
towards Denceark,gi v ing up the beet part of berme, forcingos
her had edema, and when she was subjected to an aggreamon
which we considered iniquitous declining to give her any sup-
port, and not moving a finger in her defence (Hear.) Would
it not have been far better to have abstained from interferiog,
and thus imitate the wise and dignified conduct of Prunes,
whom minister, when congratulatiog the King of
Denmark on his accession, told him frankly that
France did not mean to go to war, and that she had
so advice to give except that Denmark should act
in • conciliatory manner? He (Earl Grey) thought that
this country had been lowered in the eyes of the
civilised world, by going to the very verge of threats, when
there was no intention of carrying them out. (Hear.)
The strongest perible language had been used by her Ma-
jesty's government on this subject ; and the Prime
Minister distinctly said in the last leellioo of parliament,
that if Denmark should be attacked by Germany, she
would not find herself alone. (Hear, hear.) Might not
this country have required of Germany that no hostile
operations should be commenced until the good office, of
friendly powers had been fairly tried? He was quite aware
that we mold not have held that lingua(' without being
prepared for action? We nivat,ot course, have bete prepared
it • necessity for it bed arisen to send a British force to the
Eider to assist the Danes in der/mhos their territory. But
he utterly denied that that cam would have been likely to
°scar. For Germany to have commenced war against us
would have been an Set of positive insanity. All that would
have been necessary would have been to makeGermsny clearly
anderstaod that if she attempted to cross the Danish fros-
tier she would find that frontier defended by Eoglish troops.
There would have been no difficulty in defending that frontier.
It was a frontier of lees than 50 miles, strong by nature,
and defended by powerful fortificatioos ; and though the
Dame would not be able to man those fortifications them-
selves, no great force on our part would have been neces-
sary to enable them to defend them. Nor would England
have been alone in the matter • for even if no other great
power had joined her, Sweden was prepared to do
so. He was persuaded that • force such at Eft=
Denmark, and Sweden could have easily •
would have been amply sufficient to defend the frontier
of Sleswig rimiest any force that Germany could have
employed. The scene of operations was within two days
steam of the Vienne ; and our interference would have
been easy compared with that which was undertaken by
Mr. Canning in 1825, when, under similar circumstances, •
threatened aggression of Spain on Portugal was prevented
by the sending, ate very brief notice, of &British expedition
to the latter country. The statesmen of Austria would have
reflected before they sent a larger pert of their army
thee was sufficient to oppose Denmark alone to so great
a distance from their own dominions to attack • British
force on the Eider. They would have reflected, in fact,
that the first shot fired against an English soldier would
mecemarily be the signal for the appearance of • British
fleet in the Adriatic ; they would have remembered that
the population of Venetia was as one man diatom to
rise and throw off the yoke of this new champion
of the principal of nationalities. (Hear, bear.)
They would have remembered that the army of
Italy consisted now of :300,000 men, impatient to be
allowed toadvauce to the assistance of their fellow-country-
men in Venetia; they would farther have remembered that
Galicia was in a state of siege, that Hungary was disoom
tested, and that Austrian fisatices were in seek • state that
the first notion of war with England would be equivalent
to a declaration of national bankruptcy. (Hear, hear.) He
firmly believed that prudence would ham prevailed, and
that they would not have been guilty of a measure eo con-
trary to common man 44 the oommencing an ag-
pesition obviously unjust, and in direct viola-
tion of the understanding of the Powers in
1856. And if Austria would not have acted thus,
it was pretty certain that Prussia would not
have done so single-banded. Prussia also, both from her
internal and =Weal situation, had an obvious interest in
preventing snob • coolest, would hardly have restored,
under such circumstances, to send an army to demand for
the people of Ste, wig those constitutiocal rights which she
refused to her own people. But he would go farther sod
say that, notwithstanding the language used by the French
minister at Copenhagen, he believed Frame would have
joined England to forbidding an appeal to arms
if she bed been properly applied to for that purpose.
Bat after expressing such an opinion on the conduct of the
German powers, he must my that he was not such a
partisan of Denmark as to state that in this protracted
turret the wrong was entirely upon the side of the
Germs powers. Far from it, for he thought that if Den-
mark had since 1832 governed the duchies in • more conci-
liatory spirit, there would have bees no pretence for the
present war. (Hear, hear.) He was, however, of opinion
that if Denmark was wrong on some points, he German
powers were wrong on many others, and it was clear that
if there were faults on both sides, it was the more
nerismary that the good offices of • friendly power should
be called in to deal with them. (Hear, hear.) But the
correspoodeoce between Lord Cowley nd M. Drouyn de
Idiom wee, so far as the sold, lord was coocerned, charm-
teristic of her Majesty's government, for no difficulties
whatever were anticipated or provided for. But he (Earl
Grey) thought it was the greatest object of • statesman's
life to anticipate difficulties, and to never make • move
without fully considering how it might affect the other side.
The more he read the cornispoodee se the more he felt surprised
at his noble friend opposite, that if he had fully determined
to abstain from resorting to strong measures, he did not
socceer give up the kind of language which was to be found
in the papers. (Hear, hear.) Ti do the Prussian govern-
ment justice, they concealed nothing from her Majesty's
government, and they did not expect that say measures
would be taken to stop them in their course of action.
M. Bismarck did not disguise in the lent that • peaceable
settlement of the questioos be'did not desire, but a settle-
meet of them by force. Bat to return to the conduct of
her Majesty's governmeot. He (Earl Grey) had shown that
his nobL friend opposite did sot make any proposal which
the government of France could accept—be would not say
that under certain circumstance* material &sultanas should
be afforded to Denmark, bat the language used was vague
and undefined. Ga the 19th January last, Lord Cowley was
instracted to make another application to M. Dream de
Limy's for the co-operation of France, but when he was
asked if his government would go further, the reply was as
before. He (Earl Grey) concurred with IL broom de
Lhuys in etatiog that the arrangements of 1852 were so
essentially had that it would not be worth while teenier upon
• great war to emforoe them. But the governemats of France
and England ought to have stopped this war. They
ought to have said that this was a case for •
compromise, and that some other arrangement might be
oome to. (Hear. bear.) He was convinced that the present
state of affairs was one of great danger to Europe. The
war had been begun in bad faith, and it bad been carded
on in a bed spirit. (Hear, bear.) The conduct of the
Germaipowers was extraordinary, for at first they said it
was not war at all, and Austria even said that it was in the
imterest of Denmark that she entered Rpm the occu-
pation of the duchies, and then because Denmark
had resisted, the German authorities had removed
the arms of Denmark and all the officials of
I the Daniell crown, and had in some cease subjected
them to personal violence. They had in fast made war
against the dead, and had committed mat unheard-of and
wanton outrages against the people attached to Denmark.
I (Hear, bear.) Thom powers had compelled the inhabitants
of the country to support their troops, sad they had levied
large contributions not only of food, bated money, and they
had enforced their demands by arresting some of the pee-
-1 cipal inkahltamte, sod by the threats of 'booties them.
(Hear, hear.) Nothing could more mark the spirit
in which. the ' war had been anted on by the
Pruasians Ihas tho amount he had reed in the
newspapers of a Danish force having captured Rome
Prussian cevalry, and became they could not avenge them-
allies on the Danish tome, they turned spin lb. people of 1

the district in which the affair took pleas, and laid waste
their property. (blear, hear.) Was that, he wield oak,
the way is which honourable war should be carried on, even
if it wens jest and neesuary war! (Hear, hear.) Then it
appeared that the Prussians had, to mown the whole, bom-
barded the tows of Souderborg, without any intimatioo of i
DO doing. (Haar.) His noble freed Earl Shaftesbury had
denounced that transaction in the terms it deserved, and hal
lEan Grey) entirely concurred with bite that it was an
atrocious piece et cruelty indicted upon an unarmed popula-
tion. (Hear, bear.) Theo, what was now going on ? Why, i
Austria wu to recd • fleet into the North sees, and
if that ehoakl be allowed the joist powers would have •
superiority en water as well as upon laid. Would that his
allowed, and were the Beets of Austria sad Prussia to be
permitted to Mulately destroy the) fleet of Denmark! To
what extent was the war to be allowed to be continneel
How much longer would Europe sod England allow thei
Guinea plain to use the supericinty which they possessed I
far the dismemberment, and it might be the destruction, of
Denmark? A very little use of moderation, but of great
firmness. in the first instance, might have prevented all
these evils, bat now there would be more difficulties to en-
, counter, seeing that the passions of the people on both sides
bad been aroused. (Hear, bear.) Re was afraid that the
coarse which had been pursued would forma precedent for '
the future, but he would not refer to it further than to
letate that it seemed to him that the danger to the peon of
Europe had been unalterably enhanced by this war.
(Hear, hear.) Was it for • great nation like
England to allow a suspicion to arise on the
continent that she would not assist in the main-
terrines of the rights lied honour of other nations
if it were likely to provoke hostilities in which she would
have to bear a part! He was afraid that that war the
opinion which was felt on the continent, and it had been
increased by this correspondence, following so closely that in
regard to Poland last year. (Rear, hear.) It was felt
I that this country would not go to war; that she
! would rather submit to any indignity than be provoked to
draw the sword. That wee the character which Eoglitod
had obtained on the continent of Europe, and it was one
which he was sorry to remark upon. (Hear, hear.)
Our minister at Berlin had reported for the
consideration of her Majesty's government that printed
papers had been circulated by the Prussian government io
the provinces near Kiel, din which it was distinctly asserted
that England had used threats to prevent certain measures
being adopted by the Prussian government, and that the
threats had fallen to the ground. (Hear, Leer.) Now could
oath things take place without creating further dangers! He
would only add that he could not concur to the mooed part
of the resolution, and that he hoped it would be withdrawn.
Earl RUSSELL—My lords, my noble friends at least
entitled to the same puree which he his bestowed upon the
Prussian government, viz., that of being candid, because to-
night he has arraigned her Majesty's government, not for
not having prevented a war, but for not having themselves
joined io a war. (Hear, bear.) The reel substance of the
arraignment of my noble friend is that we are now at peace,
and that we have preserved this country from entering
nue • war. My noble friend has gone into the
details of some of the papers but he has °sly re-
ferred to those which suited his own purpose,
and which he believed militated meet against the govern-
ment. My noble friend said he would not eater upon the
vexed questions relating to Sleswig and Holstein, but with.
eut referring to thaw questions it would be difficult to see
why there was any war going ou at all. It has been my
task to attend to these questions, and if in 1862, when
made certain proposals for an arrangement of these
deputes, they had been agreed to, I think the
peace of Europe would not in this respect have
been disturbed for the next half century. I always
considered that this war • very serious matter, which unless
satisfactorily disposed of in time might lead to deplorable
eventualities. In looking at the history of this question it
seemed to me that the arrangements of 18:31 made between
Prussia and Austria on the one side, and Denmark on the
other, were most unfortunate and complicated &trans-
mute. They gave not only to Austria and Prussia but to
the powers of Germany either the right, or at all event/
the pretext, for interference in the automat and domestic
concerns of the duchies, which could not but lead, unless
there was the greatest good temper and the greatest wish
for conciliation on both sides, to discussions of • most
angry kind, and finally to the breaking out of war. That,
my lords, has been the history of these trans-
actions for the last 10 years. For my own part, considering
carefully this subject, I will say that, with regard to this
matter, as with regard to other matters of great importance
in which this country is involved, I have felt it to be my
duty, holding the post of Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, to divest my mind of all partisaaship, and to endea-
vour to look at the question between the power. that are
enemies to esch other with • fair and impartial mind, to as
if possible to form • clear and just judgment with respect to
these matters. Nothing, Ithiek, can be more discreditable
to an English statesman than to rush at once into • strong
decision, either ow the one side on on the other, without a
careful investigation of all the bearings of the subject. Now
with regard to this treaty, the Danish government promised
in 1831 that it would keep Sleswig very much as • separate
state ; that it should have separate provincial states Incite
own affairs, • representative body ; that it should have •
minister, and that its administration should be conducted
solely in Sluing. It was very difficult to keep to all those
engagements. Denmark had entered into them la • marmot I
of necessity when foreign troopsoccupied • part of her moil.
I will not now in these times of her distress point oat in
detail where, I think, her promises were not fulfilled. They
will be found in the papers on your lordships table. Ger-
many on her aide took • most unfair advantage of what
was done by Denmark, and on every occasion she put for-
ward propuitions which it would have been impossible for
Denmark to accede to, because they would in fact have
made • German majority at the very seat of the govern-
ment, and thus have destroyed not nominally the integrity
but really the independence of Denmark. (Hear, hear.)
Well, my lords, that being the unfortunate state of affairs,
neither party having been all the time in the right, and
neither party, I think, being able to say that she was
free from all blame, the dispute wart on until on
the first of October last year Germany resolved on
Federal execution. In her decree for Federal execution,
according to the opinion of her Majesty's government, Ger-
many went far beyoed what she had • right to claim. But
whatever may have been the difficulties on that subject they
were aggravated tenfold upon the occesiou of the death of
the late king. It might have been supposed by those who
were favourable to German pretensions that the late king
having been governed by councillors who entertained
Danish principles, and having himself • great love of his
country, his judgment would have been prejudiced upon the
subject; but the new king was not liable to any
suspicion of that kind, and I am persuaded, eves
to this moment, that if Gummy load temperately
urged the claims of the German subjects of the
King of Denmark to certain privileges and rights which
Denmark had weed to give, the King of Denmark would
have so regulated the provisions for the government of his
provinces, that all real gronods of complaint would have
been done away with. But the conduct of Germany was
very different. And I confess it appears to me, as my noble
friend who has just spoken has argued, that there was •
wish in some of the states of Germany to auk • quarrel
rather than • conciliatory aim. We wished above all to
prevent war in Europe, and it was our object so to counsel
both as to come to some conciliatory end. My
noble friend finds fault with the &dun we gave
to Denmark to abolish the constitution, but as the engage-
meet of Dennerk had been, se I have just stated, that
Sleswig should have • separate constitution, sod should
not pert with that constitution unless with the consent of
their own States, it appeared to us upon study and exami-
nation, that it was inemaistent with the engagements that
Denmark bad made to Germany. My noble friend Lord
Wodehonas, who proceeded to Copenhagen. and who had
no prejudices against Denmark, came, on examination, to
the same conclusion, and urged it sa his own opinion as
well as the opinion of the government which he repro-
sensed upon the government of Denmark. Surely it was our
part to say in our oomniunitations with foreign poweratbat
our opinion was that Denmark was in the right. We
could hardly go to Prussia and Austria and say, Denmark is
quite in the wrong, but we beg you not to insist on your
claims. Therefore to enable us to make due representa-
tions to Germany, we proposed that the constitution should
be abolished. My noble friend found great fault with our
making representations without our being at once ready to
follow them up with hostilities. If you have a question of
honour. -where your honour has bees attacked, and you
make rePtuentationat and those representations are not
listened to—you must defend your honour. If you have great
interests which you wish to put forward, and those interests
are entirely neglected, you must defend your interests. Bat
where you are only seeking peace between two other powers
- where you are actuated only by a beeevoleut desire to
maintain peace in Europe, and to allow each sett to pre-
serve its own sovereign rights, I cannot think that there is
any humiliation in that—indeed, I think that there is satis-
faction in thinking that we have urged, over sod
over again, by friendly advice, that peace should
be preserved, and that these powers should not
go to war. (Cheers.) Well, my lords, in viewing
this subject it appean to me that noises we were to make
ourselves atom the defenders of the liberties of Europe ;
unless we were to take a course that none of the great states-
men who have adopted • European policy for England would
have advocated, we were boned is • question of European
policy to obtain allies. Now the allies to whom we nate.
rally looked-were Frame and Russia. lam now maintain.
isg that it would have been nonsense for the government of
this country to commit itself to hostilities without having
the assistance of the other powers of Europe. My noble
friend reed • part of the correspondence which we
have carried ou with the other powers, and he read op to
the sth of Jaauary,when be found that Lord Cowley, having
been asked by M. Drouyn de Lhuys what mom war pro-
posed besides • conference, was unable to answer, and said
it was not necessary then to consider more than that
proposition. Bat as soon et we hued that the French
government desired to know what it was that her Majesty's
government proposed to do, I immediately wrote a despatch
cativeyieg the intentions of her Majesty's government, and
I afterwards wrote a rimilee,dematch to Russia. What I
said in effect was this—There is a project evidently con-
ceived in Germany for depriving Denmark of the States of and the Darby of Sleswig. Supposing this project
to be persisted is, will you (France) wee with us is reeling
material assistance to Denmark ; will you (Russia) agree
with us in giving material meatuses to Noma*? That
wee the very thing that my noble friend reproaches us for
nct dbing. If he had had the podium and the patience
to reed • few pages farther, he would have seen that
despatch.

Earl GREY—I expressly mentioned that despatch. It
was an appliaatioa no ma, that it mild liars had no an.
urn but that whirl it :mind.

Earl RUSSELL—Here are the words. We asked for " the
concert and co-operation of France, Russia, and Sweden, in
order to give the necessary material sonatina, to Danmark
in the resistance of such demands." That is what my noble
friend calla vague. True, we did not specify the number of
ships or of troops we proposed to give, but we proposed to
gin " material assistitoce." It appears to me that nothing
can be more clear than the proposal made by her
Majesty's government ; and certainly the French
government considered it clear, for is the first plan,
M. Drouvu de Lhtirs spoke at great leoghth to Lord Cowley
upon the subject, sad what he said was approved by the
Emperor, and the answer will be found in the papers on the
table. Well, my noble friend supposes • most extraordi-
nary supposition ; he says that if instead of asking France
whether she would assist us is preventing the dismember-
ment of Denmark we had asked her to assist us in opposing
Austrian and Prussian troops entering Sleswig, Emu*
would probably have agreed with us. He sup-
poses that France would not have agreed to
prevent • dismemberment but would have foe..
ass stance to prevent Austrian traps from entering
Sleewig. A more extravagant supposition—one more wild
and unfounded—l never heard made by any speaker in this
or the other house of parliament. The answer of Russia
was not so plain or distinct, but the result was as clear that
she wished to preserve her liberty, sod wished to know
exactly what the proposition of England was, but that she
did not feel at the present boor that her resources or views
of policy would justify her in giving material assirianos to
Denmark. Well, the question comes to this—that which
my noble friend never pot or considered—that England,
France, Russia, and Sweden having made • treaty by
which they did not guarantee, or agree to guarantee,
the integrity of the Danish monarchy, although they agreed
to respect it—whether we alone without Frame or Russia
shoukl take upon ourselves the burden of supporting Des.
mark. Now observe our object was to maintain the balance
of power, to maintain the peace of Europe, but the balance
of power and the peace of Europe are of as serious conse-
quence to France and Russia as they are to England. There-
fore it was not our business, it was not our interest for Eng-
land to undertake alone that defence, sod when I came
to hear my noble friend explain the manner in which
this should be done, 1 was sail more impressed with the
anger of the alternative course which he thinks weought to
pursue. In the lira place my noble friend thinks we amid
have sent in January a fleet to the Baltic. It is impossible
to .end • fleet to the Baltic before March. My noble
friend says we had other means, because Venetia was
panting to go to war, Galicia was disturbed, and Hungary
was discontented. Now, only consider what the state of
Germany was. It was in • state of violent enthusiasm ;
and the Germans were bent upon having Siegel, sad
Holstein separated from Denmark, not caring much perhaps
about the Duke of Augustenberg, but putting him up as •
prince who would serve their aspirations. Austria and
Prussia in fact, afraid of altogether thwarting the wishes
of Germany, executed them in • way which they thought
would be more conducive to peace and order to Ger-
many—while they made Denmark suffer in their
attacks. We should have had on one side Ger-
many—carrying Prussia at least along with her if not
Austria—invading Denmark; we must have been there in
order to defend it. We should have had Venetia making
war in the Adriatic ; we should have had the people of
Hosiery delighted to see that England was at war with
Germany, and revolutionary outbreaks coming under
English auspices, and all this disturbance in Europe—all this
pare' war, was to be undertaken in the name of pesos,
and in order to preserve Sleswig. Well, my lords, not the
least consideration in all this matter is that France evi-
dently had taken *different view from ours. While we
were considering the integrity of Denmark, France was con-
sidering the Interests of nationalities and what should be
done for the people of Slaw* and Holstein. I make no
complaint of neon having tikes that view, but it opens
another danger to as, namely, that while we were sup-
porting Denmark, and supporting hers whether right or
wrong, in those thdop that she maintained, France might
have taken an opposite view, and the two countries, whose
acting together is so important for the peace of Europe,
might have been brought into collision—having in reality
no
interests that were rival, but on the contrary, the ut-
most interest in remaining at peace. I can only rejoice the
more that we have not thrown the firebrand into Europe
and have not caused the extensive isonfiagration which my
noble friend has pointed out. (Heir, hear.) Now, my lords,
it is necessary to consider a little what has been
effected by our representations, which gentlemen at their
ease hold so cheap. They have produced this effect, that
oo the 31st of January, before they went into Sleswig,
these powers that bad been constantly hinting and suggest-
ing that the maintenance of the coestitution of November
had dissolved the treaty of 1852, and set those powers at
liberty to take any course they liked, all those powers
folding that language on the 31st of January in-
ormed Enema!, Frame, and Russia that they
held to the treaty of 1852, and respected the
integrity of Denmark. That was a very great point
gained. (Haar, hear.) It appears to me that if instead of the
total dismemberment of Denmark we can now go ioto ono
reran with the other powers, except the Coofederatioa,
clearly bound to respect that treaty, we have made a great
step since the month of January. I own when I heard the
language used in London—and, still more, that used In
was afraid that Prussia and the German powers
would &abut that the tram of 1852 was an end. It is
by the finanime and modsystioa at our language that we
have obtained from them that avowal respecting the treaty.
My noble fraud has compared the position we were in in
January with the events which took place in 1026. Well,
there is a very great difference betimes the powers of
Germany in 186 and in 1863. Austria. Prussia, sad the
whole of Germany, with their 44 millions of people, are
very different powers from the power of Spain. Bat be-
sides this, England was bound by treaty to defend Porta-
, gal, and Mr. Canine appealed to that treaty, sad said
very justly that the honour of England required that we
should send troops there, and that where the English standard
stood [resign invasion should not come. (Hear, hear.)
With regard to Spain, I recollect Mr. Canning shying, " I
am told we must have war sooner or later : it that be the
case I my later." The Dale lord says just the reverse. He
says " we must have war sooner or late[ : if that be so I Say
sooner." I say with Mr. Canning "later," and I am quite
content to abide by that. I do not know that it would be
right for me, as we are to have a conforeme on the subject,
to actor into this martian more at large. But I believe it
ought to Le the object of England to maintain peas, to
modify extreme pretensions if possible, and to abets the
animosities that exist between different natives; that, I
believe, is the right position for England Sometime, and the
object which she should endeavour to attain. If that be en
I must not begin by laying too severe blame on the different
parties to this war. (Hear.) I entirely agree with much
that has been said by the noble lord with respect to the con-
dom of Austria and Prussia. We ban already declared our
opinion oo this matter in despatches, and tur noble fraud
at the head of the government has declared that it was an
"iniquitous aggression, " and that the resistance of Den-
mark was justified by the conduct of Austria and Prussia.
I do not know that anything stronger than this could have
been said by my noble triad. With regard to this whole sub-
ject, I must consider our own interests, which are spread
over the whole fans of the globe. The danger is that other
wan may spring out of this, that our commerce may be in-
tercepted by privateers sailing under any name or flag, and
scouring the ocean in order to destroy our commons. (Hear.)
It may be • low and unworthy consideration in the eyes et
my noble friend, but when 1 reflect on the magnificent ex-
position made the other night by my right boo. friend the
Chancellor of the Exchequer of the athatio• of this country,
I am not inclined to hazard and imperil that situation with-
oat • clear case of honour, or of great and mighty interests
to all for our intervention. We must also consider that
by the side of that exposition of our flourishing trod*, of the
improvement of our finances, there remains the feet which
was stated then, sod must be stated every year, that
there is more than 26,000,0001. of interest on debt to pay—
that 26,000,000/. having been almost entirely caused by
war—the greater portion of it be the two last wars is which
this country w engaged. In 1764 the interest of our debt
was 4,600,0001. It is now 26,200,000/. May we not be
fairly unwilling and cautious before we add to that debt?
There is one of those wan—the American war—which no
man in these days will defend. The other of these wan
the father of my noble friend (Earl Grev) most eloquently
appalled as unjust and USDISSIMary. *blither these wars
were justified or not, the cost sad burden of them have been
immerse. While that is no reason why we should desert any
came or abandon any friend whom we are under obligations
to support, they are reasons why we should pursue pacific
alum I imams, for my own part, that while I have the
authority and adopt the policy of the great men to whom I
have referred, who held that the balance of power ought
to be maintained, I likewise agree with them when they
courted alliances to support that balance of power, and in
thinking that the destruction of one of the states of Europe
is not only • great outrage, but • peril to the independenos
of all the other states. But at the same time I think that ,
• policy the least hostile we can make it, and the least
disposed to make a quarrel where it can be avoided. is the I
polity which ought to be pursued by this country. I can-
not therefore agree with my noble friend's motion, which
says. "that in the opinion of this house, if the demand made
by Denmark for mediation, according to the principles laid
down in the protocol of Paris, had teen more decidedly
supported by her liejesty's government, the bloodshed and
the other evils occasioned by the war in Denmark
might have been prevented." Now, I do not
believe that that is the opinion of this hones,
but at all emote 1 shall feel it to be my duty
to oppose that Fart of the motion. And with regard to
the other part of the motion, that "such steps ought to
be taken as may conviuce the powers of Europe"—it is
unnecessary to take steps to canine them that we adhere I
to the treaties. The treaty of 1720 is indeed one which
has been disputed by men of great learning. We are not
called on to assert its validity. But with regard to the
treaty of 1852, it is our object to maintain it and to have
it recognised by the powers of Europe, sad I think that
will be the result of the conference. With regard to the
policy of France I shall say this one word, that we were not
ready last year to adopt the course proposed by Frame
the sending of an identical note to Russia—and next
te concert masons in can Roads did not agree to our
proposal. We were tether satisfied with the words pro
posed by Austria, which would leave on Russia the re-
spousitility of her refusal. We did not think it wise to go
to war in the cause of Poland. We therefore informed
Franc, of our deterrnioetioo. France has great sympathy
with Poland, the French people hare great sympathy with
the Poles. Besides there is the tie of religion which makes
a close orsonexion between Frame and Poland. Again,
with regard to Denmark we bare a pat feel-
ing for her gallant people-0 maritime
1=1)
like *Malys', and massing ths saw Therefore while France sympathies@ mete with Maud, the

sympathies of England were more with Denmark, and while
sitll'ith.seelmr:egro.fanf sussdoec
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rk os
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ought to go together, and not leave on us aloes
that great task. Other matters have been alluded to.
My noble friend alluded to the Austrian fleet going to the
Baltic. That is a question on which her Majesty's govern-
ment have made representations to the government of
Austria. At present the government havr promised that
they have no intention of sending their fleet into the Baltic.
They are about to send their fleet into the North
Sea to protect Carmen commerce, which is eery
extensive. That is a legitimate object. But England
is quite free to act in such PASS, ad while we will
not act without its being absolutely oeceisary, and while I
am fully conscious of the power of England, yet we do not
wish to hurry into war without necessity, and for my own
part, think a pacific policy is our true policy. (Hear, bear.)
The Earl of DERBY said that with regard to • question
which involved the policy and the conduct of her Majesty's
government, he regretted that the noble baron had not
given longer notice of his intention to bring it forward, and
he was confirmed in that opinion by the state of the
house. He apprehended it warn not the intention of the
noble baron to ask the house to pronounce any opinion
on the motion, sod that his object was rather to trona
his own individual opinion, and to enable other members to
express theirs also, on the conduct and policy of the govern-
, meet with reference to the voluminous papers on the table.
That being the case, the wording of the motion was of
minor consideration, and in the few words he should address
to the house be should not confine himself to the terns, of
the motion, but to a consideration of the state of affairs
es it now presented itself. He went through the dreary
waste of thou papers—he plodded through them with
the greatest possible patience. He went through
the greater part of the 800 and odd pages
of the correspondence which had taken place on
this single subject in the coarse of last year, and he
could assure the noble duke that the least accusation he
made against the noble earl (Russell) was any want of dili-
gence, because be perceived that the noble earl ie the
course of last year, exclusive of his other duties, wrote 170
despatches upon the subject of Denmark and Germany ; aid
although be might not be struck with admiration at the
style of them despatched sent, which were C1141a,...
tensed by what he considered the most forcible feeble.
ness, yet be must ray that be was struck with ad.
mimtion and astonishment at the persevering industry
with which the noble earl bad gone spinning day by
day and thread by thread this particular cobweb—
spina ing, spinning, spinning, but at the same time not uniting
the slightest progress towards the accomplishment of the
web by which to catch a single diplomatic fiy. (Laughter.) He
bad no peat fault to find with the tone or character of the
noble earl's speech, and he had oo wish to increase the di
Deities of the position in which her Majesty's government
and Europe were placed. He concurred entirely in what the
noble earl said, that the policy of the country ought to be
essentially a peaceful one, in order to avoid the horrors of
war. But be thought the noble earl bad bawl that policy
on the lowed and humblest grounds when he based it oft
commercial considerations. There were higher cossiderationa
than the flourishing state of the exchequer which should im-
press theru with the horrors of war. There were greater evils
than war—the sacrifice of the honour of the country or the
abandonment of the interest, of a friend. (Hear.) But the
question was, what was a warlike policy? Was the policy
which the government pursued likely more to aggravate
the danger or to remove from them the evils of war ? He
WAS afraid the course pursued by the government was more
likely to lead io the end to serious complications. and to
the general disturbance of the peace of Europe, than if
they bad taken, in the first instance, a more decided, straight-
forward, and determined course. It was impossible before.
band to determine whether one entree or the other would
produce this or that effect. It was open to the noble earl to say
that if he had adopted • more decided policy, the danger to
the general peace of Europe would be greater; but, on the
other hand. it was open to others to Ely that by adopting
more decided tone, there would have been lass danger of
war. But what was to be deprecated was the holding out
numerous threats, remonstruces, sad representations to
lunge countries, and at the same time conveying to those
foreign countries the„impression from which they concluded
that they might safely set at defiance the threats, repre-
sentations, and remonstranoes of this country, because they
knew that we would afford no material aid. (Hear,
bear.) lie was fully alive to what was stated by
the noble duke, that in this matter they bad
not alone nebulae and momenta to ideal with,
but other forces which were less under control and the in.
Monica of mem. Them were democratic intereate and re-
volutionary parties, who were acting not upon reason but
their passions. These parties had, in big opinion, too much
influence on both sides. The revolutionary parties were
anxious to create disturbances throughout Europe for selfish
and revolutionary soda. They exercised great intlu-
ewe on the minor states of Germany. The minor
states placed themselves at the head of the demo-
natio movement, and were fomenting and encouraging
principles which were froneht with great duper to theenael vas.
Primus mid Austria might defy Mete revolutionary parties.
But Prussia, as they knew, was actuated by ambition.
by views of aggrandisement and the desire for the acquisi-
tion of naval harbours. There was gnat jealousy of
Austria, while Austria, on the other band, was *Enid that
if Prussia was allowed to take the lead she would have a
predominant influence in Germany. Thus the revolutionary
party acted on the smaller tt•tee ; the smaller Metes, in
their turn. acted on the mutual jealousy of Austria and
Prone ; and this was the circumstance that really consti-
tuted the great permanent danger to the peace of Europa.
(Hear.) He did sot quarrel with the way in which the sold.
earl spoke of the quarrel between Germany sad Denmark,
and be would not enter into the question of fileurig-
Holstein, which the noble lord had slated very fairly. He
believed there was faults on both aides, and the *obis earl
was quite right in not throwing the weight of his iodueoce
into either scale. Denmark would be placed by the coedi-
ting which the wee called on to fulfil in a stated permanent
paralysis with regard to her tetanal agency. The argu-
ment ab ioconvenieoti applied in her case with greet force.
Whet could be more absurd Una a monarchy divided into
four party—one of them having a population of
about 1,500,000, and the other three about 500,0. or
• little more—each division fermis' part of one monarchy,
and the legislation of the whole dependent on the anent of
each separate portion. If Holstein or even Luneburg
refused He meant to a law pawed by the other three
divisions of the monarchy, that law was to be of no effect,
not alone in that division of the monarchy which refused its
aunt to it, but for the other three divisions which gave its
assent to it. (Hear, bear.) Holstein. m • fief of Germany
could, under such a constitution, absolutely prohibit the
whole legislation of Denmark. Denmark would be at the
feet of Holstein, and Holstein at the feet of Usrmaoy.
(Hear, hear.) He could DOA see bow a complication of that
kind wm to be settled by armaments. It was rather
to be accomplished by the arbitration of friendly powers.
He (the Earl of Derby) would not repeat what had been
said with regard to the pressure which had been placed upon
Denmark to comply with certain requisitions, and the ab-
volute impossibility which there was of Denmark complying
with them. He tMught that course was an utterly unite-
tifiable one. But it was sot so moth the danger of Den-
mark to which he wished to draw attention as to thimourse
which her Majesty's government had pursued for premetiag
that danger, and the way they had interfered for the
purpose of maintaining thou pacific principles which the
noble earl advocated so strongly. Looking into the
papers, he found that to every country her Ma-
jesty's government bad addressed successively repre-
sentation', remoostrances, threats. They had gone
to the verge of declarieg that noncompliance with their
requirements would be the grouad of war—for they had
tiormnes the
eu may length expect our if you youriaactaid'u'Llesr, our
hieerugg/e—s.
they had gone to the verge of saying that norpooruphanos
would be followed by was—because they had virtually said,
"If you do not listen to our remonstrances you cannot
expect say madames from us." (Haar, beer.) Bat would
it not have been much more fair, more candid to have
said, " We advise you to do so and so, but you must take
the responsibility on yourselves. Yon may expect our
moral support, but not any material amisneee." He
(the Earl of Derby) perfectly speed that we were not bound
to protect sad maintain the ialepity of Denmark. We had no
right to take upon themselves the teak of maintaining the
integrity of that country. But we ought not to have told
Denmark that we intended to support her. We ought not
to have mid that if an invasion of Denmark took place
Denmark should not stand alum (Cheers.) That, was a
distinct pledge given by the Prime Minister in his place in
parliament. (Hear, hear.) Prom the moment that that
decimetres was made the Danes said—and it was a high
proof of their courage—" No matter what the odds are
against us, no matter that Germuy has forte millions to
our two millions, we will persevere." But they thought
they had • further right to say—" We know the power of
England, we have the pledge of the Prime Minister
that that power will be exerted in our defence
in cage of the imagon of our country ; the
honour of England is happily inviolate-{bear, Marl—
mid we are confident that it will be pseeervd not•roished."
(Hear, bear ) But he oottkl ware the noble lord that other
powers entertained views of our government much more
unfavourable than those of Denmark. On the :Het of
August, 1863, the noble earl wrote to say that if the Ger.
man Pewees persevered in carrying out the Federal execu-
tion now, they +mild do so against the advise of her
Majesty's government, end they most be " responsible for
the 00OSACMODOOS whatever they might be." They meant
absolutely nothing. It was a mere button fulmee of
the noble earl, and what was the reply ? That
the matter was in the hands of the Confederation,
and that Austria and Prussia would not further interfere.
(Hear, bear.) The seat application was one which made
use of a strainer expeemin still. It was addressed to the
Diet ; in the course of it the noble earl declared that her
Majesty's government " would not see with indifference
the military occupation of Holstein. Every owe knew that
in diplomatic language the phrase " would not view with
indifference" meat that the occupation would be followed
by meat serious consequences, and that, at least, it would
lead to action ou our part. Bet egetainly the German Diet did
view that phrase with the greatest indifference. They said
they were not In acoodition to take any Stllos from the com-
manantioo of her Majeetregoverument ; and they requested
that their reply might be communicated to bar Majesty's
minister. What was to be expected from this except that
the sable earl should go ce to ray that her Majesty's go-
vermoset had emu to the emeelosios sot to make any
further propesals, but that they mush leave to her Majorty's
government As responsibility of provoking a general war in