The Press.
London, England, 1856-10-11 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

of mistakes, but Mr. nussell had to write on
the moment, and from his passing impression.
A historian has to examine both sides ; he
must weigh characters, facts, timz, places, and
disturbing causes. It would really be absurd
to look for those profound qualities from any
writer in such circumstances. We therefore
offer no detraction from Mr. Rußsell's talents,
in saying that we receive all his statements
without the faith which his extravagant ad-
mirers claim for him.

In short, we give it as our opinion, that in
picturesque views of the progress of events
Mr. Russell succeeded with ability and wonder-
ful facility. But in political views, and in
sound estimate of passing men and things, we
believe that Mr. Russell would find his equals
and superiors in the profession to which he is
an unquestionable ornament. His style was
formed on an oratorical model, which gives
commanding effect with the crowd, but pro-
vokes the criticism of the few. We are con-
stantly reminded of the style of Mr. Macaulay
and General Napier, though he is not a mere
imitator of those distinguished writers, with
whom he possesses a prima-facie resemblance.
Like them, he is to be read and praised for his
powerful expression, his wealth of diction, and
his resonant rhetoric. But, like them, he is
partial in his statement of facts, and he has
no repose of manner ; like them, h• stimu-
lates the reader until his vivacity becomes
monotonous ; and, like them, he is rarely dis-
criminative in judging characters. Napier's
" Peninsular War" has become one of the
classics of the language, but few persons, if
any, give faith to that brilliant composer's
characterisation of individuals. Neither Lord
Castlereagh, nor Mr. Canning, nor the Mar-
quis Wellesley, received anything like justice
from General Napier. He did not make
sufficient allowance for the difficulties with
which the statesmen of that day had to con-
tend—as the necessity of procuring specie, the
factiousness of the Whigs in opposition, and
the immense burdens which the long conti-
nuance of the war threw on the country. But
Napier always did justice to the achievements
of the army, and never attempted to make
those invidious distinctions between officers
and men which make so unpleasing a feature
in the compositions of Mr. Russell. Never
before had a single individual such opportu-
nity of influencing the public mind. His let-
ters, through the circulation of the Times, were
universally and eagerly read, and credit was
given him for a desire to speak the whole
truth and nothing but the truth. It was not
supposed that, accompanying the army and
sharing their perils, he would take advantage
of his position to depreciate the merits of the
superior officers, and even to expose them to
ridicule. Whether this tone was adopted to
gratify the malignity which is always eager
to find victims to expiate disappointment, or to
please the democratic spirit which, envious of
all distinction of ranks, would degrade them
to its own level, the effect was the same. Mr.
Russell had a noble opportunity of telling
the British public some wholesome truths.
He might have taken a fair and dispassionate
view of the action of the superior officers of
the army, and, surveying the extreme diffi-
culties of their position, might have shown
that more was expected from them than it was
possible for them to perform. It was an
easier course to make them personally re-
sponsible for all the disasters of the war,
though the result has shown that those dis-
asters were almost or altogether inseparable
from the circumstances in which they were
placed. Their difficulties were immeasurably
augmented by the tire of criticism kept up
against them. Even the grave was no shelter
from calumny ; Lord Raglan was hunted be-
yond it. The credit of a newspaper was be-
lieved to be bound up with his continued de-
famation ; and in this volume, every line of it
written after Lord Raglan's death. his conduct
is frequently sneered at, though the circum-
stances which have come to light since his
death tend greatly to raise our opinion of his
moral courage and firmness of purpose, and
to show that he had grand military qualities.
In a chapter of connecting narrative, written
very lately we presume, Mr. Russell, speaking
of the appointment of General Simpson to be
commander-in-chief, says that "ho was desti-

975

" tute of those acquirements and personal
" characteristics which in Lord Raglan
" compensated for a certain apathy and
" marble calmness which admirers extolled as
" virtues." Mr. Russell takes every opportunity
of attributing every disaster which occurred
to the incapacity of the commanders. On the
Bth August, 1855, when an attack was contem-
plated, ho wrote :

If the attack really is to be made, heaven grant that
this time no blunders may be committed, and that the
blood of this gallant army may not again be fruitlessly
poured by mistakes and mismanagement.
This was written six weeks after Lord
Raglan's death, and the inference of course
is, that the army had been sacrificed to his
incapacity. Mr. Russell frequently asserts
that the allies might have taken Sebastopol
immediately after the battle of the Alma, and
in the letter from which we have quoted above
he descants on this supposition :

A time there was, some ten months ago, when Sebas-
topol might have been ours on easier terms and in better
condition. . . . It is bootless to recur to past blunders
and omissions However, if grievous errors
have been committed, let us hope that they will in future
be avoided.

In opposition to his own counsel, Mr. Russell
does perpetually recur to what he deems to
have been " past blunders and omissions,"
and " grievous errors." The operation which
he supposes ought to have taken place—a
dash on Sebastopol after the Alma—might
possibly have been successful, but, if re-
pulsed, it might have resulted in the total
annihilation of the army. The allied com-
manders were ignorant of the defences of the
place, and of the forces it contained. There
is no reason for civilians, even on the dictum
of so great a personage as " Our own Corre-
spondent," to doubt the conclusion of the
allied commanders, that the risk of such a pro-
ceeding would be too great, and that it could
not he justified by any rules of military art.
It is remarkable that Mr. Russell, after con-
tinually stigmatising military prudence as
" fogeyism, red-tapery, Horseguardism, rou-
" tine," and other strong expressions, comes
to this notable conclusion :
Perhaps on no occasion has the neglect of the course of
regular practice Leen so severely punished, even although in
the end the object has been gained, as in the siege of
Sebastopol. It is the first instance on record in which
such a place has been taken by the mere fire of artillery ;
for it is admitted by the Russians that even if the
assault on the Malakoff had been repelled, they must
have abandoned a place exposed at every nook, and
chink, and cranny, to such a fire that the very heavens
seemed to rain shot and shell upon them.

Yet. Mr. Russell was continually urging a
departure from "regular practice," and to the
last it is his main charge against Lord
Raglan's memory that he would adhere to
regular practice in spite of civilian lights and
newspaper criticism. " Our own Correspon-
dent" does not inform us whether the artillery
fire by which at last Sebastopol was conquered
was in accordance with his ideas of " regular
practice." If it was, what becomes of all his
previous strictures? if it was not, yet the
result shows that it was the surest of all
means for subduing the place. We believe
that Mr. Russell was not very sure of his own
meaning in the above paragraph. He is even
now probably in doubt whether the measures
taken for the reduction of Sebastopol were the
very best or the very worst that could have
been adopted.

At the commencement of that fearful fire
(Gortschakoffs feu denfer) opened on the sth
of September which resulted in overpowering
the defence of Sebastopol, " Our own Corre-
spondent" was severe at what he termed " the
" evident want of unanimity " between the
allied generals, because the English fire was
not opened at the same time as that of the
French :

It is not known why this evident want of unanimity
existed, and why we did not open fire with the same vigour
and rapidity as the French. General Pelissier was at our
head-quarters yesterday, and had an interview with General
Simpson, and it is not unlikely that the French com-
mander, finding that we were not quite prepared to open
fire with effect, with his characteristic impetuosity, rs-

solved on doing so himself, and to rely upon his own
numerous and heavy ordnance and abundance of ammuni-
tion. lamby no means prepared to say that we were not
ready to open on the day agreed upon, nor do I in-
sinuate that there waa the smallest want of unanimity be-
tween the generals, but it is a fact that we had not the
guns and ammunition required for opening a three days.
fire of intensity, and that if we had plenty of a certain

..~

976

sort of materiel and missiles, the requisite quantity of those
of a different, but useful description, was wanting.

•
The following, if not meant to be depre-
ciatory of our artillery, reads as if it were
written with that intention :
Although there are some complaints of deficiency in the
engineering department, I have never hoard it said that
our artillery, so long as the supplies of powder, shot, and
guns lasted, were not ready to meet any enemy. It un•
fortunately happens at this juncture that General Jones,
who has always displayed great energy in directing the
siege•works, is unwell. In fact, he cannot go out, on
account of a severe attack of rheumatism, which almost
cripples him.
_

As the day wore on, the English batteries
opened, and proved the unreasonableness of
those desponding doubts which!Mr. Russell had
indulged in. We have spoken of his descriptive
talents. The following is a good specimen:—
From twelve to five o'clock p.m. the firing was slack;
the French then resumed their cannonade with the same
astounding vigour as at dawn and at ten o'clock, and never
ceased their volleys of shot and shell against the place
till half past seven, when darkness set in, whereupon all
the mortars and heavy guns, English as well as French,
opened with shell against the whole line of defences. A
description of this scene is impossible. There was not
one instance in which the shells did not whistle through
the air ; not a moment in which the sky was not seamed
by their fiery curves or illuminated by their explosion.
Our practice was beyond all praise. Every shell burst as
it ought, and the lines of the Russian earthworks of the
Redan, Malakoff, and of all their batteries were rendered
plainly visible by the constant light of the innumerable
explosions. The Russians scarcely attempted a reply. At
five o'clock it was observed that a frigate in the second line,
near the north side, was smoking, and as it grew darker
flames were seen to issue from her sides. Men and
officers rushed to the front, in the greatest delight and
excitement, and as night came on, the whole vessel was
enveloped in one grand blaze from stem to stern. The
delight of the crowd on Catlicart's-hill was intense. " Well,
this indeed is a sight ! to see one of those confounded
ships touched at last !"
The armament of our batteries was tremen-
dous :

We threw 12,721 bombs into the town as compared with
2,743 in tho first bombardment; and wo fired 89,540 shct
against the place as compared with 19,879 on the same
date.

It was by this firo that Sebastopol was won,
and the evacuation by Gortschakoff would
probably not have been delayed, though the
assault of the Bth of September had not been
decided on. In homely phrase, the place had
become too hot to hold him. Mr. Russell, in
spite of his prejudices against aristocratic
command, is compelled to do justice to the
heroism of the officers concerned in the attack
on the Redan. We find many such eapres•
sions as—" The officers fell on all sides,
" singled out as a mark for the enemy by their
" courage The officers, with the
" noblest devotion, aided Colonel Windham,
" and became the special marks for the
" enemy's riflemen." Yet some pages further
on (p. 218) " the officers of the Guards " are as
a body held up to obloquy because in certain
cases leave of absence was granted on ac-
count of " urgent private affairs."
The description of the three British generals
on the day of the assault has become famous,
and was seized by our lively neighbours across
the Channel as an admirable subject for cari-
cature :

It was, as I have said, a bitter cold day, and a stranger
would have been astonished at the aspect of the British
generals as they viewed the assault. The Commander-in-
Chief, General Simpson, eat in the trench, with his nose
and eyes just facing the cold and dust, and a great-coat
drawn up about his head to protect him against both.
General Jones wore a red nightcap, and reclined on a
litter, muffled up in clothes, and Sir Richard Airev, the
Quartermaster-General, had a white pocket-handkerchief
tied over his cap and ears, and fastened under his neck,
which detracted somewhat from a martial and belligerent
aspect.

The writer subsequently justified his descrip-
tion by asserting that it was ridiculous to
expect

" Distinguished officers " to be always in fall uniform—
in cocked hats, epaulettes, orders, and jackboots, shouting
" Fallow me !" to their legions, or taking snuff d la Go-
mersall and Napoleon in extreme military arises in front
of their battalions.

But it is the animus of the description which
is offensive. The design was evidently to
expose the commanders to contempt, and to
represent them as appropriate representatives
of " foeeyisrn." The appointment of General
Simpson was universally regarded in this
country as a very improper one, but no ono
ever doubted his personal courage, or thought
it becoming that he should be coarsely carica-
tured.