The Express.
London, England, 1855-07-23 00:00:00

OUR ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

(FROM OUR SPECIAL C0Rtta0......._
CAMP BEFORE SEBASTOPOL, JULY 10.
I have to report little more than the continuance
of the same stand-still state of things that discou-
raged every one when I last wrote. 'fo be sure, the
same resultless and fitful snatches of cannonading
are
le
up. by day, with variations of mus-
ketry night ; and having stated this, I
have le little untold. We hammer away, spar
medically, at the everlasting Redan, which returns
quite as good ma it gets; or help our neighbours, the
French, by practising on the equally retributive
Malakhoff—in either case without making the smallest
measure of headway towards the Russian Troy be-
yond. As the moon, however, has now reached her last
quarter, the garrison takes increasing advantage of
the darkness to attempt nightly mischief against
both our own and the French lines. Oa the night
before last, rather a brisk affair took place between
the latter and a strong party of the enemy, who
sallied from the Malakhoff to essay the dorm-
Lion of the French approaches towards that
redoubt. It will be remembered that ens
allies, goon after their own and our Want ea tie
niemorable 18th, commenced gasp from the ilastaisa
to its vit-a-vis the Malakhoff. As this work hubris
prosecuted with more or less success every night, it
has at present penetrated over half the distance be-
tween the two redoubt', and at its further extremity
is within some three hundred and fifty yards of the
Russian embrasures. To stop its further advance,
therefore, the enemy made a strong sortie on Sunday
night, but atter a sharp fight were driven back into
their own works with considerable less : the attempt
was repeated soon after, but was again repulsed after
another determined draggle. Daring this second
scuffle occurred another grand illustration of what
an untravelled Milesian would call that" most beauti-
ful" system of blundering, in which there seems to be
an understood rivalry between our allies and our-
selves. Atter the affair of the 18th, I may remark,
our artillerymen in the twenty-one gun and other
neighbouring batteries had received orders to train
their guns at night on the approaches to the Quarries
on the one hand and on the space between the
Mamelon and Malakhoff on the other—in thin last

was without the smallest arrangement for signals
with the French. Accordingly, on Sunday night,
when a strong force of French deployed out from the
Mamelon to support those who were already
engaged in repelling the enemy, our twenty-one
gun battery opened fire on them, and kept
tt up most effectively till a breathless messenger
arrived to give notice of the murderous mistake.
The well-timed blander, I learn, afforded the enemy
moat valuable aid, and had it been much longer
continued would have resulted in the repulse of oar
allies and the destruction of their hard-worked sap.
That such an error could arise is about equally the
fault of ourselves and the sufferers; for the arrange-
ment of some system of signals to distinguish a
friendly from a hostile party on ground on which it
was mutually understood that our guns should be
prepared to play at night seems so much a matter of
course, that the rawest recruit that ever joined a
marching regiment would have thought of it as a
first step in the plan. With such generalship what
armies could succeed ?
In mentioning in my last letter the immediately
recent death of an artillery officer in the trenches I
made the error of giving the name of Campbell in-
stead of Gordon. The latter officer had only come
out a short time ago with horses from England, and
after the delivery of his stud should have at once,
returned home, but, wishing to have an experimental
idea of trench-work, he succeeded in obtaining per-,
mission to take the temporary management of a bat-
tery. This he held during the last bombardment
and up till the night of his death, the very day fol-
lowing which he was to have embarked at Balaklava
for a passage home. The poor fellow, it will be re.
membered, had just been relieved, and was on the
point of leaving the battery when a shell struck him
dead: he was a nephew of Colonel Gordon, of the
Engineers. My mistake in the name, however, was
trivial when compared with the very many which
I see in the papers brought by yesterday's
mail, containing the telegraphic returns of
the killed and wounded from the attack of
the 18th. Whose the fault is, I know not; but the
pain which must have been occasioned to many an
anxious family must have been great, by the publica-
tion as "killed," of the names of several officers
who never received a scratch. I sin glad, however,
to ale in the same papers a second despatch about
the capture of the Quarries, supplying the very gross
omissions noticed in my last letter. Slovenliness
seems to have pervaded every act and document
that emanated from head-quarters during the late
regime ; and if the new commander's present attack
of gout is to be of frequent occurence, we can
hardly hope for much improvement in this respect.
It lamina to be seen how the new military sem-
tsey—Colonel Stevenson, of the Guards—will 00k
pars with his predecessor, who, at all events, was
generally popular, and bore the name of being a
hard-working man.

(FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT LATE ON THE
DANUBE.)

As things stand at present, suppose a large body of
Russians takes up a position so as to threaten the
English, General Simpson, instead of taking imme-
diate measures to attack them with the whole avail-
able force of the allies, sits down and writes a despatch,
of which four copies are made, each of which is seat
by an aide-de-camp to one of the other generals, who
may not be at home. In this at least three or four
hours are consumed. At last answers come in from
all sides, suggesting a conference ; aides-de-camp
again fly about to arrange the hour. Early in the
morning most likely won't do ; somebody would like
to breakfast first. The others are too polite to object,
lend by the time the conference is over, the Russians
have been reinforced or have fortified hemselves or
have attacked some small body in force, and caused

enormous loss of life.
The case I have now put would apply to any
operation whatever. Four commanders-in-chief is a
synonyme for blunders and confusion. I believe they
are even more dangerous than correspondents, whom
many of the old fogies here, as well a. at home, be-
lieve to be mainly instrumental in retarding the cap-
ture of t3ebastopol, as well as in preventing an ad-
vance upon Simpheropol, and would like to know
how it was that there was no evidence offered before
the parliamentary committee of inquiry as to the part
"the gentlemen of the press" out here took in pre-
venting the construction of the road last winter
from Balaklava to the camp, the distribution of
good tents, the supply of ground coffee, the
landing of boots, shoes, and sheepskin coats,
the fortification of the heights of Inkermann
before the battle, and in raising the great storm of the
14th of November. There are some people, too, I
have no doubt, who attribute the inaction of the
Turks at Eupatoria to my presence and that of the
gentleman who represents the Times. Had we but
withdrawn the Turks would have rushed over the
country like a flood, taken Simpheropol, cut off Ment-
chikoff's head, made Gortchakoff prisoner, and the
bends would by this time be playing their favourite
air, "La Donna e Mobile," around the big fountain
in tie garden of the summer palace at Baktchi-Serai,
which would now be Omer Pacha's head-quarters.
However, I cannot persuade myself that those who
decry us in this way believe the half of what they
say. I believe they are generally more knave than
fool : they know very well that all the disasters of
this war have been caused by the incapacity of stub-
born, mulish men, who showed their folly in thinking
themselves wise; that though there are humbugs in
all professions, the greatest humbugs in existence are
military humbugs, and that our losses and mis-
fortunes have been mainly owing to the fact
that at the commencement of a war we generally
choose those who fill the principal posts from that
happily small class of the army ; and their detesta-
tion of the press is due to the same feeling—a human
and pardonable one certainly—that causes a " gentle-
manly looking young man" who has got drunk over
night and been disorderly. in the streets., to dislike
the presence of reporters in the police court.

TURKISH CAMP, 111 LT 10.
The night before last, though I had gone to bed
with the firm conviction that we were about to pass the
summer on the top of this hill, I was roused from a
loud sleep by the hum of voices, the neighing of
Mosses, and the screaming of ungreased araba wheels,
and the rattling of arms. On going out into the
moonlight I found the Turks once more packing up
and going away; battalion after battalion were
buckling on their knapsacks and marching down
the hill, and disappearing in the haze on the
Wallas plain. lat once came to the conclusion
that either "the Russians were coming," or the Os-
manlis were resuming once more the nomade habits
of their ancestors, and were commencing to roam
about over the country in search of fresh grass and
spring wells. The former of these suppositions I
speedily abandoned, as, with the exception of the
usual "distant random gun" from Sebastopol, every-
thing elsewhere was quiet, the English cavalry. in the
Yarani valley were snoring, the artillery in the
plain were doing likewise; neither drum nor
trumpet were giving out notes of alarm. The
Turks and the Turks only were animated
by desire for nocturnal perambulation. Now,
on four separate occasions within the last
month these sudden movements of theirs have caused
me to turn out and spend a good part of the night in
striking my tent and packing my traps, and a good
part of the next day in pitching the Seater sud un-
packing the latter—little amusements which were
generally varied by the pursuit of a runaway horse,
or a hunt for water, er the breaking down of the bag-
gage oart, and rendered piquant by hunger and a hot
sun. And it always happened, moreover,
that these movements took place on the morn-
ing of " poet day," so that by the time
we got settled down again, had ferretted
oat all sorts of necessaries from impossible corners,
in inscrutable saddle-bags—what with sleepiness,
hanger, fatigue,heat, and the periodical settlement of
about forty thousand ferocious Crimean flies upon
various parts of the physiognomy—the enlightening
of the British public by means of a letter in your
columns, became a task of no ordinary difficulty. We
were more than once tempted to refrain from honour-
ing the march with our presence, and to remain be-
hind until our work was done, but hitherto prudence
made this step objectionable, from the fact that we
were liable to be interrupted by the presence
of Cossacks, who are not, as far as I know, lovers of
literature, nor yet admirers of persons engaged in its
pursuits. In the present instance, however this dan-
ger does not exist. Here on this hill we can afford
to smile at the Czar of all the Remiss, and the eight
regiments of Uralski Cossack', who are said to be
passing the summer in the hill beyond Tchorgoun.
We have, therefore, allowed Omer Pacha and the
whole army to proceed to the valley above Camera,
where they are encamped close to the shore,
and whither, it is said, they have removed
in order that the chief may enjoy sea bath-
ing, without accompanying them. I propose
following them se soon as the rat is
The troops have taken eight days' provisions, andliere.-
lieu the movement has been made more as a pLeonos
trip than with any military object. The Ore sew ,
drone of cavalry are still in the valley of Balder, and

f
Oalatz that the fears which had been eneart rim-7
"7
a large body of French cavalry have now gone florin is about 2fr. 60c) The same letter
thither also. We all left it with regret, and would the corn merchants at Vienna had leased
n I
fain return ; anywhere out of eight of these horrible,
bare, chalky hills, with their blinding white glare; a blockade of the Danube were unfounded; 111,c4
out of sight of the monstrous, malodorous camp that the lo.wness of the water formed an obstacle lebutoe3.
covers them, in which the lives of Englishmen and portation.
Frenchmen are being wasted day by day for nothing;
anywhere out of sight of these hideous stony ravines,
in which brackish streams dribble down half water
enough for some thousands of hideous Norman horses ;
anywhere, where there are no pyramids of empty beer
bottles, no empty meat cases, no old clothes, no stable
manure, no dead horses covering the soil—anywhere,
out of hearing of these eternal minute guns that
mark the slow and weary progress of this sickening
siege, signalised as it is at every step by folly
and incapacity, bloodshed and heroism. You don't
know, is England, because all the correspondents
or amateurs that ever pat pen to paper cannot
give you an idea of the disgust, weariness, and
despair of those who have paned the last year
of their lives before Sebastopol, trotting from the
camp to the trenches and back again, and lying 24
hours at the time in the former, assailed by shot and
shell, and flies, bad odours, and dust, without shelter
or power of resistance, and their number day by day
so diminished that day by day each survivor feels more
strongly that his chances of ever coming out of it
safe are small indeed; and all this because two, or
three, or four generals, with "long experience," with
their professional education, with their stare and
crosses, sabres and uniform, rank and commissions, with
150,000 men waiting bat their nod to rush on death,
though they know they are doing no good, do not
know how to do anything better. If there be one
truth more than another impressing itself upon men's
minds here, it is that although experience and edu-
cation may make good officers, good generals—like
poets—are born, and can never be made. I believe
nothing pleases the Russians better than that the
allies should go on breaking their heads against
Sebastopol; it is in the open field they dread us;
it is in the open field they can be dreetroyed.
But no one here, at least of the chiefs,
knows how to take the open field ; they would
all like to be informed by an early post
how they are to scale the height' that surround Mac-
kenzie's Farm, so as to attack the Russians that are
encamped on the plateau. This is the very thing
which it is their business to find out. From Sebas-
topol there is no retreat. The armies cannot be
re.embarked here, even if they would. There are not
sufficient transports for this enormous force and its
materiel : and if there were, the operation would be
impossible in the face of a large Russian army.
The only movement practicable is forward: there
are very few now whe are not convinced
that by the means at present used the place
will never be taken. Talking yesterday with a
distinguished Piedmontese officer, whose opinions on
military matters possess more real value than those
of any man I know, he said he would, were he in
chief command, put on board the ships as much of
the stores as possible, the rest he would destroy ; he
would spike the siege guns, raise the siege, pack eight
days' provisions on the men's backs, on the mules,
and in waggons, issue a general order informing the
army that there was nothing for it but to conquer or
die, and march straight on Baktchi-Serai. There or
thereabouts the Russians would doubtless give
battle, would certainly be beaten—fall beck
towards Perekop, leaving the communication with
the sea open to the allies once more. Sebastopol
might then be really beleaguered on every side, and
would soon be reduced by mere lapse of time to the
last extremity. Any general who does this will cer-
tainly reap a harvest of glory. But for this there
must be only one general in chief. Operations in
the field on a grand scale with four independent
commanders are impossible. "Too many cooks spoil
the broth," says an old, vulgar, and excellent pro-
verb, and certainly our goose out here has been
cooked in a curious manner.

FRANCE.

(PROM OUR OWN CORRESPONDENT.)
PARIS, SUNDAY EVENING
The Debuts has received from Vienna an anal,„,.
of a note from M. de Nesselrode to M. de Buol, d'."
July 5, which goes farther than anything
mod
that hei
yet seen the light to prove the existence of that
" secret understanding" between Austria and koipe
to which circumstances have long pointed, butirhish
oho Western governments were lamentably slow to
suspect. Immediately alter the dissolution of the
Conferences M. de Buol addressed to Count Valentino
Esterhazy, the Austrian Plenipotentiary at N. Peters.
burg, a series of despatches, informing him,
dOwp to
the minutest particulars, of what passed at Meuse
in the closing sitting of June 4, authotiou,—
him at the same time to furnish M. de NeseeiroZ
with copies. These despatches, although of a coo&
dential nature, were, it must in justice to the Atutaim
government be said, communicated to the Cabinets of
Paris and London. The note of M. de Nesselrods,
above alluded to, was addressed to Print* Gorteltake4
the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, for the informs,
don of the Austrian minister, and about the 12thcd
July the Prince and M. de Buol had a conference os,
I the subject. The following is what the bebats by
learnt of the contents of the note:
M. de Nesselrode follows step by step, and is all thti,
details, the despatches and notes of the Austrian Chaucer
and approves of them all without reserve. M. de Hui
having token great credit for the course pentad by An.
tria from the beginning of the quarrel, M. de Nessende
outdoes him in praise, and holds up the conduct of Austin
as a model of wisdom and foresight. M. de Buolhar4
cor.flded to Count Esterhazy his regrets that the prop?".
tions which he had at one time hoped to Indere the
Western Powers to accept, had been broken off, X
de Nesselrode expresses his sympathy with M. Is
Buol's regrets, and shares his hopes that negotiation sty
soon be resumed. M. de Buol csonot done plus
more ardently than M. de Nesselrode does, and M. de Nall,
rode deplores equally with M. de Buol the us:tonneau Et
ferences which can only have occurred in comparators*
us tccauntable misunderstanding. According to
Nes•elrede, the last propositions of Austria offer.° a rey
acceptable solution, and Russia would scarcely ha%
asked even fir a trivial modification of them. TN
moment that Russia oru to treat directly with Turkey
her dignity was untouched, and she might, viten
any wound to her honour, have made almost oil
the concession. indicated by Austria. Austria desires too,
copy the Pt imipalitim. So much the better for everybody,
Russia is even more anxious than Austria can be for tea
dependence of Turkey. If the Court of St. Petereburgln
shewn itself facile in regard to the two flat poise, if it ka
made no serious objection to the arrangements 'limiest)
the Principalities and the free navigation of the Dana
the Court of Vienna knows perfectly well that it war, sign
all things, out of consideration for Austria; and if tis
third point was not settled as easily as the two tint, ty
Court of Vienna will admit that it was not the nth
of the Court of St. Petersburg. M. de Ncsaelrode mike*
following reflection which he submits to the instinctivere
perience of M. de Buol. One day when the plea:apses
dories assembled at Vienna, they found them,elres obligst
to suspend their deliberations on the third point, beau
some of tnem were waiting for..further instructions; it ns
proposed by one of their number to pass on to the diens
soon of the fourth. The majority opposed this. And why?
The real motive was not then disclosed, but no one coin,
be ignorant of it. Every one was persuaded that it Toni
be even more difficult to come to an undentudne
on the fourth point than on the third. It en
foreseen that the Turkish plenipotentiaries would °fret II
inflexible matinee to whatever the European poems*
propose to assure to the different religious communion Os
enjoyment of their privileges; and that unless nolne
were done to the Porte in the interest of civilieatios,the
negotiations must have been broken off upon that point h
was desired to avoid this, and therefore it was that the pia.
potentiaries separated upon a Russian question. Ina.
elusion, M. de Nesaelrode renews his protestations SOU
the intention imputed to Russia of making war upon A*
tria. Such a war, it is declared, is impossible. The Ruin
armies have been, and may be again, at the service of A.
tria. They will never fight against her. To assure 11.6
Buol of this, the Russian Chancellor employs the mot ss
lemn expressions—expressions such as bind in the maga
nanner the honour and conscience of men.

If this analysis be correct, and it is believed tote
so, it may serve (as the Debate very justly observe)
to explain the general tone of M. de Buol's last eta
menication to the Frankfort Diet. In that docamen
—a memorandum not formally laid before the DU
as a body, bat communicated to all its members-4
is known that M. de Buol stoutly maintains the Foe
Points, and says that Austria will support them vitt
all her power, as indispensable conditions of pesa
This declaration I have before pointed oats
wholly conflicting with the intentions of the
Western Powers, as represented by Lord Ch.
rendon to the House of Lords. Thus se
come to this ugly point, that Austria in
publicly pledged herself to uphold, and if need le
enforce conditions which Russia now says she a
ready to accept, but which France and Eaglard
have in the most solemn manner pronounced wheLy
unacceptable.
There appeared a short time ago a mysteriou
Prussian note to Austria, on tho subject of the
negotiations with the Diet, the substance of which iv
pretty nearly this, "Let us confine ourselves to sd•
witting that the policy followed by both of es hs
been very useful, and let us have no &gems
explanations." Only a part of M. de Baca
memorandum for the Diet has been hitherto re.
Ilished, but the Debate now says it has received
from Frankfort intelligence that the conclusions
come to are as follow :

The Cabinets of Berlin and Vienna have come to se sr-
derstanding, and. the Cabinets of Dresden, Munich, sod
Stuttgardt have succeeded in inducing them to egree eter
the hues of a resolution which will be proposed by towns
consent to the Diet. According to this project, the Bo
will declare-1. That it thanks Austria for 10
communications, and also for its persevering
forts for the re-establishment of peace. 2. Thu
the actual situation does not impose upon the Germane
Confederation any necessity to enter into new W
gagementa, or to enlarge those contracted by the realms
of July 24 and Dee. 9, 1854. And 3. That in the income
the re•eatablishment of peace, snd, in order to msinteiotsd
I fortify the union of Germany, it is necessary that eerie'
manic Confederation, without sharing its reserved Mundt
and persisting in that attitude, should provisionally mar
tale the putting on a war footing of the federal contiassu
es resolved on Feb. 8, 1855.