The Press.
London, England, 1856-12-06 00:00:00

1154

that while an aristocratic Government is
generally favorable to amicable relations with
foreign States, and a peaceful policy, the
desire of a democracy, equally ignorant and
contentious, always tends towards foreign
embroilment and destructive wars. Is Eng-
lish good sense a reality, or but a naive ?

THE LEADERSHIP OF THE HOUSE

OF LORDS.
DOMESTIC difficulties of various kinds thicken
round the Cabinet. It is believed that the
state of Lord GRANVILLE.S health will not
enable the Ministry to maintain its present
arrangements about the Leadership of the
House of Lords. What is to be done in the
retirement of Lord GRANVILLE, if it should
occur, does not seem clear. The post could
scarcely be assigned to Earl GREY, as the
Ministry would then become essentially
changed in its main features, and the Premier
would find himself in awkward relations with
his Leader of the Lords. We do not suppose
that Lord JOHN RUSSELL thinks so despond-
ingly of his place before the country, that he
would consent to go up to the House of
Peers, in order to serve the convenience of
Lord PALMERSTON.

It is rumoured in some quarters that Lord
CARLISLE will exchange places with Lord
GRANVILLE. But if the latter Noble Lord has
not strength sufficient for the House of Lords,
it is certain that the Viceroyalty of Ireland
would be too wearisome for him, with its tire-
some pageantry and perpetual worry. As for
Lord CARLISLE becoming an efficient Par-
liamentary leader, it would be absurd to expect
such a result at this period of his life. He has
neither the ready logic, nor the knowledge of
social detail, required for such a position. He
can harangue a popular audience, or he can
lecture a literary society, or say graceful things
to a meeting of " ladies" in a style of faded
gallantry, but he cannot grapple with a vigor-
ous debate, nor can he unravel an intricate
argument. Lord CARLISLE is modest, and
jaunty, and sentimental, in the manner of the
stage father in a five-act comedy of the Morton
school. But it would be ridiculous to suppose
that his Lordship could undertake to lead the
Peers in such debates on foreign policy as are
not unlikely to occur in the coming session.
If Lord CLARENDON were ten years younger,
and if he were not hampered by the business
of the Foreign-office, the Ministry might find
in him a leader for the House of Lords. let,
even under most favorable circumstances,
Lord CLARENDON'S excessive moroseness, and
his constitutional timidity, together with his
want of social weight amongst " the families,"
would considerably detract from his influence
as a Leader of the Upper House.

THE DUTIES OF AN OPPOSITION.
" CAN any man in England tell what the pro•
" sent Opposition represents?" and " Has it
" any definite objects ?" Those questions were
asked with much conceited assurance by a
Radical organ on last Thursday. Inquiries
made in that spirit at such a peculiar time, in
an age of transition, are at once ridiculous and
rash; for an intelligent Conservative has only
to reply with a retort, and can any one tell—
" What definite policy does the Palmerston
" Cabinet represent?" or "What is it that the
"4Liberal party seek ?" or "Which are its leaders
" —the PREMIER, Or Lord JOHN RUSSELL, or the
" Stafford-house Whigs, or the ' Economists,'
"or Mr. Lofty,' or Mr. ROBERT LOWE ?" In
the present discordant and incoherent state of
the Liberal connection, as confessed by its
champions and organs, the literary Radical's
queries might have been spared.
But we shall not reply with a to quoque. We
are perfectly ready to justify the course of the
present Opposition under the extremely pecu-
liar circumstances of the present time. Yet
let us first examine the state of things acknow-
ledged by the " Liberals" themselves. On last

THE PRESS.

Sunday a remarkable article appeared in a
weekly journal, well known for its extensive
circulation and its consistent support of demo-
cratic principles. It was headed " Public
Spirit," and its authorship was scarcely dis-
guised. It might just u well, for any secrecy,
have been signed with the triple initials of
4he most sparkling rhetorician who declaimed
from the Anti-Corn-Law-League platform. It
was an essay of the true Oldham manufacture,
and its admissions on feats are so remarkable
that we shall enumerate some of them.

It specifies the total subsidence of all agi-
tations, and the existence of popular apathy
on politics. " The Working Classes" have
given up the pursuit of the " Five Points," and
" Chartism," like FEARGUS O'CONNOR, is ex-
tinct. "We cannot say that we are surprised
"at this tendency to--" What? Is it to
" Progressive Reform," or " Americanism?"
Not so. " This tendency to reaction" is what
does not astonish the democratic journalist.
" So much has been achieved that the ex-
" haustion of surfeit was likely to follow." It
proceeds to analyse the spirit of the Liberal
party in the following extraordinary style.
" The veteran patriots think that not much
" remains to be done, and younger politicians
" are puzzled to indicate the next move. The
" people are now rather put on their mettle to
" prove what are abuses." And much more
follows in the same strain, which might have
come from a Conservative pen, so strongly does
it testify to the fact that " Liberalism" of the
strong political sort has been found by expe-
rience to have been impracticable, un-English,
unconstitutional, and, in the long run, un-
popular.
But the Radical writer, though painting the
decay of " Liberalism," omits to state the real
cause why Radical principles failed to do mis-
chief. Its INSTITUTIONS saved England from
the impulsive violence and revolutionary reck-
lessness of the Radicals, and to the Conserva-
tives belongs the glory of having defended
and maintained the institutions of the coun-
try Was not there a terrific cry against the
" House of Lords," encouraged by the " Re-
form Club"? Was not the " Church" assailed,
and was not a prespoterous influence accorded
to the " Irish vote ? Were net the " Liberal
Whigs" obliged to fall back on Conservative
aid in putting down " Chartism " and " Young
Irelandism" ? What else but its "Institu-
tions," proudly defended by the Conservative
host, rescued England from an anarchy simi-
lar to what exists now in America ? And upon
" American Democracy," in its workings, let
us hear the truthful admissions of the eloquent
and able Parliamentary Radical. "It is the
" curse of the United States that her most
" thoughtful and worthiest citizens, disgusted
" with the vile knavery of trading politicians,
" and the cunning ruffianism of stump oratory,
" retire into private life." Why, this style
sounds and reads like the staple of Conserva-
tives speeches and " articles ' for the last
twenty years !
It then criticises the state of the " Liberal "
mind in England. " The rod of empire is
resigned into waiters on Providence. Parlia-
ment is left entirely to trading politicians,
who seek a vote simply to extort a place, and
who abandon the business of the nation the
moment they can get other business with
out it." This is what THE PRESS has
often told the public. We have frequently
counted up the number of " birds of passage ."
who flutter behind the Whig Ministers ? Are
not the colonies crammed with ex-Radical
M.P's. who " found a place and lost a consti-
tuency " ? Has not BENJAMIN HALL, the idol
of the unwashed, become a placeman and a
baronet, and a courtier? Is not HswEs of
Lambeth a placeman, and a " Sir "? And is
not Mr. RALPH OSBORNE salaried, and, still
greater wonder, is he not silenced ?
The Radical continues. " The Coalition of
" Lord ABERDEEN contributed to the confusion
" of names and principles; the explosion of
" Lord JOHN RUSSELL disgusted everybody ;
" Lord PALMERSTON has thickened the haze
" into a fog, and the omnium gatherum of his
" Cabinet has made confusion worse con-
" founded." And this picture of affairs brings
us to the point at which we may state our own
views of the duties devolving upon an Oppo-
sition. Upon such a state of things in the

SATURDAY,

Liberal party, as described by one of its own
Parliamentary speakers and best known poli-
tical writers, it would be extremely impolitic
to raise an Opposition " cry." It is only when
a party is thoroughly exhausted and worn out
that " a cry " can serve to raise its drooping
energies. Great statesmen, when in opposi-
tion, have rarely committed themselves to " a
cry." It was the egregious fault of CHARLES
Fox to be perpetually raising "a cry," and Fox,
during his protracted career, did not spend two
years in power. The Duke of WELLINGTON never
sanctioned " a cry " in opposition to CANNING
in 1827, or to the Melbourne Whigs at a later
period. When Lord DERBY and Sir R. PEEL
led the old Conservative Opposition, from
1835 to 1841, they raised no "ory"—a fact
which is recorded in the professional meta-
phor, " Before I prescribe I must be regularly
" called in."

For, let it be observed that in the working
of our English Parliamentary system the onus
of action lies clearly on the Government. The
Cabinet has, or ought to have, the knowledge
requisite for legislation on pressing questions,
or for the adoption of a course of public
policy. It is for Ministers to propose, and for
those on the left of the Speaker's chair to say
whether " the country " should adopt the
measures of the " Ministry." That this must
be the case is evident even from the name of
" Opposition." If it was for the " Outs " to
offer a digested series of measures, their party
should then be called " The Proposition"
rather than the " Opposition." Both Whig
and Tory publicists and practical politicians
must agree on this general principle.
An Opposition should, it strikes us, prepare
itself for office by careful consideration of all
those principles and measures which demand
settlement; but it by no means follows that it
should play into the hands of a Ministry by
committing itself to particular " cries " which
an existing Cabinet may at once take out of its
hands. The primary duties of an Opposition
are to watch and to check, and to give evidences
of its ability to treat large public questions in
a. patriotic and satisfactory manner. Its affairs
should be so conducted, and its combinations
so cautiously harmonised, that its chiefs
should be prepared to take office whenever
the Sovereign or the country feel the necessity
of a change.

PUBLIC MONIES.—THE EXCHEQUER.
WE have stated that it was the clearly ex-
pressed opinion of tho Commissioners of
1831 that all public monies, without exception,
should be paid, in the first instance, into the
Exchequer; that the Act of 1834 fell short of
the Commissioners' recommendation in making
no such provision; and that, notwithstanding
Mr. GLADSTONE'S Act of 1854, at the present
time nearly two millions and a half of the
public revenue is expended without any con-
trol previously, either on the part of the
House of Commons or the Exchequer.
We propose now to show from the evidence
of last session that the control of the Exche-
quer, as regards public monies, is, in other
respects, incomplete and defective.
The 11th clause of the Exchequer Act, 4th
Wm. IV. c. 15, enacts that whenever a sum
shall have been granted to the Crown by Act
of Parliament or vote of the House of Com-
mons for any specified branch of the public
service, and ways and means shall likewise
have been granted for making good the same,
it shall be lawful for the Crown, by Royal
order, under the sign-manual, to authorise
and require the Comptroller of the Exchequer
to place at the Bank of England, to the credit
of the public accountant to the Crown, in the
respective branch of service, the amount so
granted ; and that the Comptroller shall satisfy
himself that such order is in conformity with
the grant of Parliament.
We pass over, we were going to say, the
absurdity of this system of Royal orders. It
may sound very fine, that her Majesty should
be called upon by sign manual to authorise
the issue of every sum voted to her Majesty by
the House of Commons. It occasions pro-
bably, or rather it dud occasion, a good deal of

DECEMBER 6, 1856.

trouble to her Majesty, without, as far as we
can see, subservinc: any purpose of practical
utility or check; and so onerous and useless
did it appear that the provisions of the Act
of Parliament are now virtually evaded, and
one Royal order substituted for fifty or sixty.
Mr. ANDERSON states upon this subject, in
reply to question 1,002 :

. -
As to the miscellaneous services, it was formerly the
practice, up to the last year, to have a separate order for
each separate vote, but the number of votes was so much
increased last year that we did not like to place before the
Queen 200 or 300 Royal orders to sign at once, and we
placed the whole of each class in one Royal order, so that
the Queen had to sign once instead of fifty or sixty times.
And in reply to question 1,004, " Could you
" see any further security in multiplying the
" Royal orders?" he says :

None at all ; if the Crown granted one Royal order for
the whole of the Civil Services it would do equally well.
It ig a formal authority, but it is no check.

By the clause, however, in the Exchequer
Act which we have quoted, it was intended, no
doubt, that the Exchequer rhould exercise a
control, not only over the Treasury, but even
over the Royal order under sign-manual ; and
such control has been not unfrequently exer-
cised. Lord MONTEAOLE states, in reply to
question 801, that in 1841, on the change of
Government, upwards of 100 Royal orders
and Treasury warrants were sent to him signed
by her Majesty, upon which he declined act-
ing, considering their legality questionable.
With the jealousy which becomes a ‘Vhig
official, for the grandeur, dignity, and power
of his office, even over the Crown itself, his
Lordship exultingly exclaims, " Here are up-
" wards of 100 Royal orders and warrants,
" which were all set aside by one stroke of the
" pen ;" and he adds that he was justified in
his objection by the law officers of the Crown.
The control of the Exchequer, therefore, must
be considered as a cogent one ; but its defect
(and which really renders it nugatory) consists
in this,—that it is only applicable and avail-
able as regards the granting a credit to the
public officer whose function it is to pay, and
that the control, or power of following out the
payment, ceases the very moment the credit
is given. This, as we have observed, renders
the control perfectly nugatory. Mr. ANDER-
SON, the able and experienced clerk in the
financial department of the Treasury, explains
this very distinctly. As regards the Exche-
quer, he states (1357) :

They merely issue the money to be appropriated ; they
know nothing of it after it has left them.
Again (1360) :

When a vote is passed, a Royal order is obtained for the
gross amount, and the Treasury warrant is sent to the
Exchequer with the Royal order. All the legal forms are
then complete. If the Treasury choose to order him to
issue on the following day the whole amount of that vote,
he has no discretion, he must obey.

And in reply to the next question, addressed
to him by Sir JAMES GRAHAM (1361), he
says :

T think it (the Exchequer check' is a delusion, and I
think it objectionable that delusions should be continued.
If there is a real check in it, or it can be strengthened and
amended, let it he done ; but I can see no way in which
you can strengthen that check at all. It only introduces
an additional operation for every issue which materially
retards and embarrasses the proper course of public
business.

Sit FRANCIS BARING asks (1578) :

Sir Charles Trevelyan states in his memorandum, " The
Paymaster• General and the Paymaster of Civil Services
habitually use money belonging to one head of service in
making advances for other services in the ordinary trans•
actions of the daily business of their respective depart•
ments." Is that a correct statement?

Mr. ANDERSON answers, " Quite correct."
Mr. HENLEY asks (1815) :

The issue of an Exchequer credit by the Comptroller
of the Exchequer is the placing of a distinct sum of money
from the one general account of the Exchequer at the
Bank of England under a particular name, which you call
Exchequer credits, out of the control of the Comptroller of
the Exchequer into the control of the Paymaster, who
deals with it as he thinks fit? Yes.
We could easily multiply evidence upon this
point if it were necessary, but what we have
above quoted is sufficient to prove that the
control of the Exchequer is nominal, not real.
The Exchequer (as we are told, 1037, 1848) may
refuse to sanction an issue of more than
20,000,0001. for the army, supposing that to be
the sum voted ; but the Exchequer, having
sanctioned the issue of the 20,000,000/ for the
army, it cannot check or prevent the Paymas-