The Express.
London, England, 1855-01-11 00:00:00

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RUSSIAN

ARMY.

(From the Constilueienueel.)
The battles of the Alma and Inkermano, and the
siege cf Sebestop A, have enabled us to study the RUIIIIIII
army employed in the Crimea. Although this army is
partly composed of troops from the Daaube and the Cau•
cases, it is clumsy, not easily handled, and manoeuvres
badly in presence of an enterprising enemy. Its generals
always place it for bivouack, as ia the field of battle,
in great masses, and they do not know how to deploy it
after an a tack, nor when to make it resist in a thin
line. The Russian infantry is very badly armed. Same
companies only have carbines made at Liege; the mus•
kets, only recently transformed, badly kept, and with
butt-ends in white wood, do not last long in a campaign.
This infantry will never attain the level of the French
infantry, which is really the first in the world for
making war in woody or hilly count/ire, where the
general-in-chief I a great deal to the initiative of the
soldiers and to the chiefs of corps and battalions. In
the defensive, the preference mist be given to the English
infantry, who, under the fire of the enemy, rest immovable
as a rampart. In a level and exposed country our infantry
will have to modify its manner of combatting, and to re-
sume its old one. This consists in employing compact or
thin order (&pais on mince), bat it can only be employed with
intelligent and experienced troops. Its auperiority in arms
and intelligence will, however, always give to our infantry
the advantage over the Russian infantry, which will
always lose half its value when obliged to change its place
rapidly. On the Alma, entire Russian battalions took to
flight, in surprise at the Zotiaves' way of fighting, they
having advanced on them in large bodies, deployed, haling
taken advantage of all the accidents of the ground to shelter
themselves and to rally, and having made against the masses
a terrible use of the peculiar arms confided to their skill.
At Inkermana, in the upper part of the battle field, and
on the line of the English, the Russian infantry
bravely attacked the enemy, but did not know how to
deploy its masses so as to bring more muskets Into play, and
when the French attacked their left flank entire battalions
tid not know how to change their position. The first tanks
bravely resisted, but the following ranks fired in presenting
arms. Surprised afterwards by the sharp attack of the
Chalmers d'Afriqae, masses of men, instead of effecting
their retreat by the crests of the hills, descended slowly to
the lower parts of the ground and the ravines, where they
allowed themselves to be crushed almost without defence by
from 1,000 to 1,200 French. The English have so well
understood the advantages which troops would have in
I attacking either artillery or masses of infantry, ia woody or
Hilly countries, whilst preserving the order deployed by the
first line, that at Inkermana they did not employ the order
I in columns, which caused them to lose so great a number
of men on the Alma. On the Alma, the Russian cavalry
was worse than timid, not a charge did it attempt. At
Inkermann, the nature of the ground prevented it from
taking part in the affair. At Balaklava, it did not dare to
await the charge of two squadrons of Chasseurs d'Afriqae.
The famous Cossacks have, in fact, never attempted, oven
in the plain, to carry off our advanced posts, or the
marauders who pass our lines; but it is said that this
cavalry is but little esteemed, even in Russia. As a set off
to this, the Russians really possess a great superiority both
ov. r the French and the English, and especially over the
French, in their artillery. The Emperor Nicholas, in, no
doubt, the expectation of a war against all the nations of
the south of Europe, occupied himself a good deal with
that arm, which has made great progress since the wars
at the beginning of the century. The cannon are of a large
calibre, the carriages and caissons well mode and easily
oved ; the artillerymen are brave and accustomed to their
service ; the officers know perfectly well how to choose offen-
sive and defensive positions; they occupy them with bold-
ness, hold them a long time, and know how to leave them
without leaving their guns. You will now understand why
we are still before the walls of Sebastopol, and why that
place would coat us to much blood if we were to snake an
assault before its unextisguished batteries. But we hope
that the town will der in consequence of the difficulty
it is under of obtaining supplies of provisions, or that we
shall obtain its keys by giving a grand battle to the army in
the field. The stores of ammunition in Sebastopol are in-
exhanstible, and as the investment is not complete, the gar-
rison can be relieved and increased every cloy. Without
being initiated ia the secrets of the generals-in-chief, every-
thing causes us to believe that they are wailing the arrival
of the reinforcements which are on their way, in order to

resume the attacks which, so to speak, have bees suspended
sincu the day ut the battle of lattermost. We shall have
in the French and English trenches at least 300 pieces,
Iwhich will open their fire, and it is more than probable
that in the meantime the army of observation will destroy
in a battle the noel= army in the field.