The Press.
London, England, 1858-06-05 00:00:00

THE PRESS, JUNE 5,1858.

days, has been the vote to which it suddenly and
unexpectedly came, in spite of Lord l'ALmFits-
TON and Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT'S remonstrances.

for bringing the whole government of the army
under the control of the House of Commons !

Admitting to the fullest extent the many ad-
vantages of " unity " as opposed to " duality "
of administration, there are still objections of the
gravest character to an absolute junction
of the two offices of Secretary for War at.d
Commander-in-Chief. These objections are
of a twofold kind, constitutional and prac-
tical, and there was not enough of stress placed
upon the first of these. We must remember
that in organizing an army for any country, the
habits of the people, the taste of society, and
the traditions of the State, cannot be overlooked.
What might do in Prussia would not succeed in
England; for with us the problem is to bring
our military system into harmony with the com-
plex state of our advanced society, and our per-
fectly free people. The Crown, the Lords, and
the Commons have their respective claims to
consideration ; and these cannot be disregarded
when so delicate a topic as the practical command
of the army is before us. If Captain VIVIAN'S
motion could be finally carried, Parliament
would have sanctioned the creation of a giganti c
official, who would be intrusted with an amount of
authority both dangerous and unconstitutional.
He would be a Secretary of State, and virtually a
Commander-in-Chief ; the promotions in the
army, the distribution of forces, and the fiscal
expenditure of the whole military department
would be subordinated to him, and there could be
no appeal from his decisions, except to Parliament
itself, which, as Lord PALMERSTON truly ob-
served, is not competent to manage purely ad-
ministrative business.

Let us suppose the plan adopted, and we might
well recoil from the official Frankenstein that we
should have made. The Lord Chancellor is the
highest officer in the law, but his decisions are
subject to be overruled by the Law Lords on
appeal ; the Prime Minister's policy is checked
by the Members of his Cabinet, and the Home
Secretary in many cases cannot act without the
approving co-operation of the Attorney-Gene-
ral ; but let the functions of the Commander-
in-Chief and Secretary of State for War be
united in one person, and there will be no offi-
cial, or department, competent to check his
action. The House of Commons alone will be
great enough to call him to account, and the
enormous evil of politico-military discussions will
result from the creation of a military autocrat,
for the vastness of whose power there will be
neither precedent nor analogy in the other depart-
ments of the State. These circumstances, and

the conclusions suggested by them, were not suffi-
ciently weighed by the House on Tuesday.
There are other objections even of a weightier
character. It is by means of the army alone that
the political liberties of the country can be endan-
gered. The navy has no power of crushing
opinion, or making and unmaking dynasties.
There are no instances in history of the navy of a
country overbearing its liberties, though there may
be cases in which double-dealing admirals might
compromise the national honout. " Admiral
"RUSSELL," writes Mr. HALLANI, "though com-
"pelled to win the battle of La Hogue against
"his will, took care to render his splendid vic-
tory as little advantageous as possible." (Con-
stitutional History, William III.) The danger
thus indicated is the utmost we have to fear
from a navy, but it is very different in the case
of an army. Upon this subject the plainest words
are best, and we are not prepared to submit to
the command of the army being given to a purely
political personage, engaged in canvassing con-
stituencies, and interested in the rise and fall of
"party." It has been affirmed by political
philosophers that our boasted constitutional
system could never coexist with a vast standing
army like those of continental nations. They
have reasoned that the immense patronage,
prestige, and power concentrated in swaying so
large a force, would depress and overbalance the

531

popular departments of the State; and there is
great reason in that view. A huge standing
army would be an anti-constitutional excrescence;
and would not a prodigious officer of State, with
a train of Parliamentary followers, and with
political obligations to fulfil, choosing the
generals of the army, and deciding also on the
number of its officers and men—would not, we ask,
such a colossal administration be also essen-
tially unconstitutional ? Would he not in his
official autocracy be a sort of rival Sovereign ?
The Duke of WELLLNGToN once objected to
becoming Prime Minister, on the ground avowed
by him, that, "on account of his long con-
" nection with the army, such a post as
" Prime Minister being given to him would
"be liable to popular objections." Almost
in spite of himself his Grace did become a Prime
Minister, and the very thing that his instinctive
common sense predicted came to pass. His
unpopularity in 1829 and 1830 was largely
augmented by his apparent possession of an
autocracy. Are we, then, prepared to create a
State official who shall monopolize the prestige of
Court, the authority of military command, the
influence of Parliamentary pre-eminence, and the
power of enormous patronage ?
So much for the constitutional objections ; but
there are practical ones of not less importance.
We must not be deceived by words on such a
matter, and to be led away by " unity " would
be as ridiculous as if we were to copy the perverts
from Protestantism who were fascinated by the

fictitious "unity "of Rome. If we made " unity"
our test on this question, we might be carried to
such lengths as to think that we should attain to
greater " unity " if we got rid of an independent
Parliament, a free press, and the right of public
assemblage. Let us not try to get too much out
of the mere phrase of " unity."

On this subject we must recollect that when
there is a natural division of duties there might
be a separation of offices. The Commander-in-
Chief should direct the army, the Secretary of
State for War should organize it ; one must con-
sider the army in its internal, the other in its
national relations; the discipline and the state of
the several regiments, and the character of their
officers, should be closely attended to by the
first ; the expenditure of the whole army, its
clothing, barracks, education of children, &c.,
may fairly fall within the province of the second ;
the Commander-in-Chief should act in the name
of the Crown, and the Secretary of War should
supply the Crown with the proper resources for
warfare and for the maintenance of the military
force. The action of the army should be spe-
cially within the control of the Commander-in-
Chief, and its special composition should be
looked after by the other.

People still, however, may cry for more con-
solidation than has yet taken place; but such
objectors are not familiar with all that has been
done. It is no argument, because offices were
divided too much in other times, that therefore
we should go to the other extreme and create a
military autocrat. Lord PALMERSTON'S state-
ment as to what the War Department formerly
was, cannot be denied :

"It was quite true that formerly we had the
Commander-in-Chief, who controlled the disci-
pline of the Line; the Master-General of the
Ordnance, who was charged with that of the
Artillery and Engineers ; the Secretary at War,
who was at the head of the accountant branch of
the army ; the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, who was also Secretary of State for all
the great arrangements of war ; the Treasury,
which controlled the Commissariat; and the Ord-
nance, which had an office of account separate
from that of the Secretary at War."
But that is not the present state of things, and
we do not think that Captain VIVIAN'S motion
was decided on the merits of the existing system.
Let us recollect what was done in 1855. Lord
PALMERSTON observed, and with truth :

"In the year 1855 we put the whole discipline
of the army, including the Engineers and Artil-
lery, under one head, the Commander-in-Chief;
the office of Secretary of State for War was
separated from that of Secretary for the Colonies;
that of the Secretary at War was merged in the
office of Secretary of State for War, who had
transferred to him the Commissariat and the
entire management of the Militia, and acquired

532

the superintendence of all the civil departments
connected with the supply of the army."
So that there must he, sooner or later, some
caution not to carry the line of "unity" too far.
The maladministration of the Crimean war

should not be entirely charged upon the official
system then in existence. There was then, also,
a Ministerial "duality" in the form of a " Coa-
lition" Cabinet ; the Duke of NEWCASTLE was
an inexperienced administrator, and, from various
motives, the Whig portion of the Cabinet did
not supervise their Peelite colleagues. Under
such circumstances, with the best official system,
the war might have been mismanaged ; and we
do not forget that, even at the turning-point of
the descent upon the Crimea, there were no
Cabinet Councils held. There were political
and "party" faults at that time, as Well as a
bad system which has now been exploded.
It is impossible to scan the names in the divi-
sion on Tuesday without seeing that the over-
whelming majority of weighty opinions was op-
posed to Captain VIVIAN'S motion. Going down
the list, we find the names of the present and the
late leader of the House of Commons, along with
Opposition members of experience like Sir F.
BARING, General CODRINGTON, Sir R. FERGUS-
RON, Sir J. GRAHAM, Sir W. HAYTER, Mr.
SIDNEY HERBERT, Sir H. VERNEY, besides
many eminent Ministerlalists. There were re-
spectable gentlemen in the majority, but the
weight of experience and knowledge was clearly
with the minority. We have no doubt that, on
a future occasion, the house of Commons would
be ready, if needful, to reconsider its premature
decision, for it must be plain to men of all parties
that such " unity" as Captain VIVIAN seeks for
in the War-office would be at once derogatory
to the Crown and dangerous to the Constitution ;
and hence we observe with pleasure, that the
CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER has announced,
that, looking at the numbers present—little ex-
ceeding 200—and at the smallness of the ma-
jority—two votes—the Government does not
intend to ground any action whatever, upon that
hasty and unexpected decision.