The Express.
London, England, 1855-08-29 00:00:00

ZONDON, WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 29.

OMER PACHA, it appears, with twenty-five picked
battalions, has already embarked for Asia. Although
it is somewhat difficult to ascertain the precise condi-
tion of the armies now operating in the neir,;hbour•
hood of Bars and Erzeroum, there are some things
sufficiently obvious. It is obvious, for ins'Anoe, that
the condition of the Turkish forces under General
WILLIAMS dens not permit that officer 'co take active
measures against the coney; but it is at the same
time obvious that Ham is in no immediate danger of
being taken by a covpde-main ; and although the
lavalide Runs makes much of General Mouttevarr's
marches and countermarches, the results achieved by
that officer seem by no means commensurate with
his ceaseless setivity, or his eagerness to inflict a
blow upon the Turkish army in his front. Indeed,
on comparing the paltry successes of the Russian
commanders with the anxiety of the Russian
Government to noise them abroad, we cannot bat
feel grave suspicions that the manner in which
their military operations are now being eon-
ducted in Asia is only another illustration of
that bold subtlety and unflinching °Ultima,
which characterise Thasaian policy throughout the
world. This assuming of offensive movemests
may be but an attempt to conceal weakness
by the show of strength, to distract the attention of
the Allies now concentrated upon Sebastopol, to
loosen the fatal vigour of their grasp upon that
fortress, or perhaps to sow discord in the councils et
the Allied Generals. Most certain it is that
the Russians are not so formidable as they would
have us believe; and, indeed, the mere fact that the
only line of communication of the Russian army is
Georgia with Russia Proper—that the only road by
which that army can ensure a safe retreat or obtain
supplies of men or provisions—is by Baku and the
Caspian, sufficiently proves that the Ruseisa
army of Asia is not invulnerable. Wherefore,
then, should Comae PACHA be despatched to Asia?
Unquestionably, as a general rule, there is nothing
which more coaclosively demonstrates the weakness
of military judgment than a scheme of petty operations,
each directed upon different parts of an enemy's ter-
ritory, and none of them leading to a decisive result.
It was not thus that NAPOLEON, concentrating
200,000 men, drove Sir JOHN MOORE into the sea, or
in five days annihilated the Austrian armies at
Eckmahl. But circumstances vary ; and according
to the present plans of the Allies, they have a super-
fluity of strength before Sebastopol. For whether
we regard the 200,000 men now besieging the
southern side of that fortress, or the time and the
labour already expended, it is certain that the Allied
Generals have determined—whether rightly or
wrongly we do not say—to make one more assault
upon the Malakhoff. Upon this exploit they have
set their hearts. Either from the want of water,
the want of means of transport, or the difficulties of
the country, all attempts to bring the Russians to
action in the open field have for the present been
abasdoned. And although, perhaps, it might seem
possible that a moving column of some 20,000 light
troops, with a proportionate force of light cavalry,
operating from Eupatoria as a base, might do some-
thing to harass the enemy, to intercept his supplies,
and to endanger his communications, still it seems
that even this diversion is deemed useless or imprac-
ticable. The sole object at present of the allied
armies is the capture of the Malakhoff Tower with as
little collateral aid as possible, either by cutting off sup-
plies or by threatening the enemy's communications.
Such, then, being their plan, the only danger to be
apprehended by the Allies is an attack in flank.
But their flank is amply secured. Along the whole
line in that direction runs the Tchernaya, which
must be crossed on rafts, and which has been skil-
fully strengthened by imposing earthworks and bat
Write in position ; indeed, since the sanguinary con-
flict of the 16th, in which the Russians appear to
have lost some 6,000 men, it is by no means probable
that the enemy will again venture upon a similar
attack. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that the
troops of England, France, and Sardinia, now
amounting to some 200,000 men, are amply sufficient
to defend the allied lines and to deliver the assault
of the Malakhoff. Indeed, if they are not sufficient,
the departure of OMER PACHA with 25,000 men must
be looked upon as an act of mere infatuation. But
if they are sufficient, it is clear that the continued
presence of the Puha before Sebastopol must not
only be useless, but probably demoralising to his
soldiers, and calculated to engender disputes
and recriminations amongst the allied generals.

Such, probably, are some of the reasons which led to
Oars PACHA being despatched to Asia—and, under
the circumstances, we must admit they are not without
force. It would be premature to indulge in any
@immolations as to the scheme of the operations about
to be undertaken by OYES -PACHA. But we feel
confident, on looking back on the career of this dis-
tinguished man, that he would never have undertaken
this new enterprise—he would never have imperilled
the reputation which he has so gallantly won—had
he not felt satisfied that the objects which be pro-
posed to himself could be adequately accomplished.
The excellence of Dina PACHA seems to consist in
his singularly accurate appreciation of the ma-
terials with which he has to work. Pre-eminent for
far-seeing confidence and military wisdom, be per-
ceives precisely the object to be attained, and the best
mode in which the means at his disposal will permit
him to attain it. The statesmen of Western Europe
have not yet forgotten the fear and perplexity which
possessed them when they heard that the Russians
had crossed the Prath and were descending upon
Constantinople. That Turkish troops should resist
the armies of the CZAR was deemed a chimera. But
Om= Pears, with true genies, caught the spirit of
the crisis, and turned the very contempt in which he
and his troops were held to his own advantage. He
discerned the nature of his materials, and took his mea-
sures accordingly. Knowing the Turkish soldier to be
tractable and brave if treated with justice—obstinate,
listless, and cowardly, if treated with neglect—Omni
PACHA steadfastly set his face against the peculation
of inferior officers, and insisted on every soldier being
properly fed and clothed. Perceiving the.exoellenos
of the Turkish soldier to consist in power of patient
labour and cool passive resistance, he raised the
enormous earthworks of Kalafat to retard the Russian
advance, and to inspire his own troops with confi-
dence, by accustoming them to the presence of the
enemy. Having thus gradually improved the
morels of his army, be pushed some battalions amuse
the Danube at Oltesitss, and, aided by a powerful
fire of artillery, repelled the attack of the Russians.
Thenceforth, in the eyes of Europe, the Turk peered
for an admirable soldier. The reputation of Omu