The Press.
London, England, 1858-01-23 00:00:00

THE

from India this week, detailed and telegraphic,

The intelligence __
throws very little light upon the real position of affairs. We have no
published details of the defeat we experienced at Cawnpore, and
reticence on the part of the Government here is no longer a virtue.
The reputation of a deservedly popular officer is at stake, and
if the details of the operations before and at Cawnpore on the
26th, 27th, 28th, and 29th of November are in the hands of the
Government, to withhold them is not generous towards General
WINDHAM, while it is obviously unjust towards Sir COLIN CAMPBELL.
The general tenor of all letssrs received from India is that our army is
inadequate and our transport inefficient, while the real struggle for
supremacy is only now commencing. In fact, it seems to be the im-
pression of every thoughtful mind that matters have arrived at a most
serious point, and that the future of India has yet to be decided in the
field. This is not encouraging, after eight months' hard fighting ; but
this view would appear to be fully borne out by facts Despite his
victory over the Gwalior Conting3nt, it is more than probable that Sir
Como CAMPBELL has been compelled to abandon Cawnpore as well as
Lucknow from sheer inability to hold either position in the face of the
increasing numbers of the enemy, and to fall back upon Futtehpore,
and from thence to Allahabadi as the most secure base for his opera-
tions. In that case we may assume that Sir JAMES OUTRAM
would abandon Alumbagh, and form a junction with Sir Como at
Futtehpore. What effect such a retrograde movement will have upon
Rohilcund generally, and particularly upon the neighbourhood of
Delhi, is a subject for grave consideration. Our garrison at Delhi has
been weakened to an unsafe degree by these repeated detachments to
Agra and Cawnpore ; and by the last accounts we had only 300
European and not more than 500 native troops to hold the city. The
neighbourhood is filled with a hostile population ; and although we
have a few hundred men at Meerut, we must not calculate upon
holding the district in subjection with such inadequate forces, when
intelligence, judiciously exaggerated and sedulously propagated, of our
having abandoned Lucknow and Cawnpore arrives to fan the
smouldering embers of hatred once more into a flame of insurrection.
Neither can we any longer count upon receiving further aid from Sir
Jona Lawazsca. In point of fact the Punjaub now requires aid, imme-
diate aid, and the want of which may add materially to our troubles,
if not our disasters, in India. The country cannot too seriously reflect
that we are now engaged in a war which will heavily tax our resources.
In both men and money matters are serious. From the treatment
Lord Palmetto inflicted upon the army after the conclusion of the
Russian war, the service is no longer popular, and our finances are not
flourishing. We certainly have contrived in this crisis, and under the pre-
sent Government, to unite physical with administrative deficiency, and
to grow weaker and worse by the same action. We are obliged to call in
the aid of our good allies the French to conduct our campaign in
China, we cannot obtain sufficient recruits to meet the demands of
our army, and before Parliament has long met the question which
comes most home to every man's business and bosom—increased
taxation—will, in all probability, be brought prominently before the
nation. The whole of this lamentable state of things may be traced
to natimple want of foresight. With the moat ordinary precaution this
rebellion in India could have been nipped in the bud. We are told
by Ministers that no documents are in existence which indicate in
any manner the probability of an outbreak of India. We speak
advisedly when we say that at this moment there is in existence an
official letter of a date long previous to the actual outbreak, in which
the following remarkable passage occurs :
Mahomedan emissaries from the coast of India are at work among the Moors of
Ceylon. Now it is not to be lost sight of that a vast religious and Mahomedan move-
ment is in progress in India from east to west--from Calcutta to the Punjaub; and it
is not improbable that a diversion may be sought by thus rousing the Moors of Ceylon
to revolt, to prevent the co-operation of troops from the coast, or vioe
This is one, in all probability, of many warnings the Government had
at their disposal ; but they took no heed. They never watched or
sought to fathom the progress of that " religious movement" so saga-
ciously detected ; but they plunged into a Persian war, the step of all
others, politically and physically, certain to rouse the smouldering
Indian insurrection. That they have got us into our present difficulties
no one can deny. That they can extricate us few would be bold
enough to assert.

The speech of the Emperor NAPOLEON is a frank exposition of that
foreign and domestic policy which has certainly won for France a
highly satisfactory position in Europe. In his unreserved declaration
that the Empire is an enemy to every abstract theory, and that in his
hands it shall be a power capable of control, we recognise that sagacity
to maintain those institutions best suited to
ty of France and the happiness of her people.
short have done so much for his country as the
The recent atrocious attempt against his life will
to every impartial mind in France. The con-
of the Imperial Speech are remarkable for the
ce with which the attempt of the 14th is treated.
all allusion to the development of this dark con-
. but it is impossible that the serious question
permitted to remain in its present unsatisfactory

to give and the will
secure the prosperity
Few men in time so sb
Emperor NAPOLKON.
bring home this truth
eluding paragraphs of
courageous confidence
The Emperor avoids al
spiracy against him ;
involved can be pert
position.
11111 MINI,