The Press.
London, England, 1857-02-07 00:00:00

surer prospect of prolonged tranquillity. I thought
when our Minister quitted Naples, and there was
evidently no prospect of ulterior measures, that the
period of tranquillity had arrived—that the Italian
difficulty, which the noble lord had created, he would
himself settle—that he would take his usual course,
and allow the matter to run on without result—that,
like the Rhine, it would never reach the ocean, but
finish in a mudbank. (A laugh.) Generally the
noble lord extricates us from the difficulties which
he himself creates, and that is his great claim to
public approbation. Everybody feels that in our
foreign relations there is an immense difficulty,
therefore they say the noble lord ought to be at the
head of the Government, because he is the telly man
who can bring us out ; but they do not pursue the
investigation a little further, or they would invariably
find that the noble lord is always the creator of those
difficulties from which he extricates us. (Laughter.)
One would have thought that at the end of the
summer we might hope to enjoy the blessings of
peace, that the Government would have taken advan-
tage of the recess to prepare those measures which
the country has been looking for, and that they
would have occupied themselves in reducing our
military establishments, which had imposed so great
a burden upon the country during a struggle which
it had conducted with so much vigour and spirit,
and the fruits of which vigour and spirit it had a
right to expect to be allowed now to enjoy. To my
great surprise 1 awoke one morning and found that
we had never had a peace, only an armed truce ;
that we were about to be involved in a great war, on
a great scale, under circumstances of great disadvan-
tage, without that generous and disinterested ally to
whom I thought we were bound by every feeling of
gratitude. (Hear, hear.) When Parliament was
prorogued I left the usual place of our meeting with
the idea that the French alliance was the great
foundation of oar policy. I remember the noble
lord, on the occasion of my making some observa-
tions of no great importance upon external affairs,
complained that I did not put the alliance with
France in that prominent position in which I was
bound to place it. (Hear, hear.) But I found in
September that we bad never had a real peace, only
an armed truce ; that we were again going to war
with Russia, that we were going to war without our
ally, that we had to encounter at the same time
Russian duplicity and French perfidy, and that we
were on the verge of a contest of a very alarming
character. (Hear.) It was still more striking, be-
cause I bad the impression that Russia had given up
the contest, being exhausted both in men and money,
and having made up her mind not to continue a
policy which she was convinced must lead to the
same ruinous result. But I found there was again
a difficulty. There was again another Russian diffi-
culty.
It is not necessary that I should enter into details
with which every gentleman is perfectly familiar; I
will only say, for myself, that I wish there should be
no misconception as to what I considered, and what
the majority of the house considered, were the legi-
timate objects of the late war with Russia. When
that question was first discussed, in 1554, I said I
thought no peace could be satisfactory to this country
in which the independence of the Black Sea and the
freedom of the Danube were not secured. (Hear,
hear.) Those subjects were not then so familiarly
known as they are at present ; but two years after-
wards, when the wildest notions were entertained on
the subject of the war arid the terms of peace—
when we were told that nothing short of the dismem-
berment of empires, the destruction of thrones, and
the change of dynasties would be satisfactory, I took
the liberty, though I supported the war as a politic
and proper measure, of laying down far more
moderate terms on which peace might an:l ought to
be secured. Those terms involved the two great
points, the independence ot the Black Sea anti the
freedom ot the Danube ; and I say frankly and fairly
to the noble lord that if he found in the month of
September, whatever the cause or the means, that
the country was deprived of one of the prime objects
for which they had made such enormous and costly
sacrifices of life and treasure, it was his duty, even at
the risk of another war, to attain those objects.
(Cheers.) I do not see how he could have faced this
house, or how he c.iulti have raced the country, if,
after announcing that he had negotiated peace and
attained those objects, he had had to communicate
that one of the most important was lost to us.
(Hear, hear.) I give the noble lord full credit for
that feeling. But the question then arises, who
placed this great point in jeopardy ? (Hear, hear.)
Why were we about to lose the fruits which we so
richly deserved ? 1 hear a great deal about Russian
maps and Russian duplicity. I hear a great deal
about French maps and French perfidy, but I hear
nothing of English maps and English knowledge of
the subject. (Cheers.) We know very well—no
one denies it now—that this town of Bolgratt was, as
far as the letter of the treaty was concerned, left in
the possession of Russia. Never mind what was the
spirit of the treaty. So far as England was con-