The Press.
London, England, 1856-10-04 00:00:00

To these objections Lord STANLEY replied :

1. The writer assumes that a Maine Law will be called
fur by public opinion acting with irresistible force, and
states that the object of the alliance is to create such
public opinion. But if a net majority of the British
people be disposed to put an end to the use of intoxica•
ting drinks, they have the remedy in their own hands.
There is in that case no need of legislative interposition.
Of what avail is it to compel men to abstain from doing
that which, by the hypothesis, they are not inclined to do?
.t and 3. The writer endeavours to draw a distinction
between the desire fur strong drink and that for other sen•
anal gratifications, contending that the former alone grows
with indulgence. I have always understood that the ditll
culty of combating any bad habit increases with the length
of time during which such habit is persisted in. If this
be so (and it is the universal experience of mankind) the
phenomena indicated must be referred, ■ot to an excel>.
tional, bat to a general law. The parallel drawn from the
purchase of bread or calico is not applicable. To prove
the writer's case, it ought to have been shown that other
passions besides that of intemperance may be habitually
gratified without thereby becoming stronger—a conclusion
which the whole history of man refutes.
Nil contend that a Maine Law, if passed, would be evaded
to such an extent as to render it practically inoperative—
that is to say, I contend that even supposing • majority
in the Legislature, backed by one out of doors, were to
pass such a law, the minority in every class would still he
strong enough to support law-breakers, against what would
be regarded by its opponents as a tyrannical interference
with freedom of private action. It, indeed, the nation

were unanimous, this would not be the case; but then; u
I have urged before, no law would be needed. I quite ad-
mit that a great deal of the existing habit is the result of
temptation. The labourer has in general no club, no
place of social enjoyment except the public-house, which
he cannot enter without asking for liquor, though his
chief inducement to go there may be the love of good com-
pany, rather than of drink. This is an evil ; but it is an
evil which society can remedy without the help of the law.
Already in many places working-men's clubs have been,
formed, where the labourer may enjoy a good fire, society
newspapers, his cup of coffee, &c., on payment of a small
annual or monthly subscription. Such institutions are
.the most practical means of promoting temperance, and
deserve all possible encouragement.

4. T have spoken of the necessity of raising 20,000,0001.
additional by direct taxation as a serious objection to the
immediate and total suppression of the liquor traffic. I
readily concede that the community, and, in the end, the
revenue, would gain by the saving of the fifty, sixty, or
seventy millions now spent in drink; but this saving,
even if effected, would not prevent a serious deficiency,
which would extend over several years. There would be
a redaction in poor rates, police, and prison expenses.
together with an increase in the consumption of tea and
sugar ; but all these together would not make up the
deficiency, and a severe temporary pressure must at least
• is
5 and 6. I have nothing to add to my former observa-
t•ons under these heads.
7. Great discrepancies of opinion prevail with regard to
Ire Maine Law in America. This, at least, is certain—
that in a country where population is so scattered, and
the Executive so weak as in the United States, the en-
forcing of the law, if it be enforced, must depend wholly
on the support afforded it by the people ; that is to say,
if operative, it is operative because it represents the
public will, not because it is the law of the land. But in
that case the popular will would have been equally effec-
tive without the agency of law, which is the proposition I
am endeavouring to defend.
S. " Moral force is not enough for the world as it is."
Not enough! The writer means to put down moral evil.
Do the supporters of a Maine Law forget that this, their
maxim, might be fitly inscribed on the doors of the Inqui-
sition ? They regard intemperance (very justly) as s social
evil. Earnest Roman Catholics regard heresy as a social
aril. They are prepared to snppress intemperance. The
governments of Italy are equally prepared (if the feelings
of the nations allowed them) forcibly to suppress heresy.
Where is the difference ? Unless the functions of the
State 1w strictly limited and defined—unless the legal rule
rolenli non fit injuria be carried out consistently to its
logical results—unless the prevention of violence and the
administration of justice be acknowledged as the sole
legitimate objects of internal administration—l see no
security against an indefinite continuance of the bitterest
and most degrading contests under which the human race
has ever suffered—the contests of sect against sect for
religions supremacy, where the possession of such supre-
macy confers the right of persecuting the vanquished
party. The writer's argument is, " Because this or that
praztice is wrong, and because moral force is not sufficient
to put it down, therefore the State should do so." Wrong
in whose judgment? In that of the majority. But taking
the existing state of opinion throughout the British islands,
it is probable that a majority of their inhabitants regard
habitual absence from public worship as morally wrong.
Nevertheless it is certain that a large minority of our peo-
ple do thus habitually absent themselves from public wor-
ship. Moral force has not succeeded in this instance.
Are you prepared to try the effect of penal legislation, and,
as in early ages, to make church-going compulsory ? To
draw a distinction between the cases is impossible. For
though all rational men condemn intemperance, yet total
abstinence is not regarded as a duty by more than a small
portion of the people, while attendance on religious rites
is regarded as a duty by the majority of all classes. If,
therefore, you seek to enforce by law a practice which only
a few, comparatively speaking, consider binding upon
them, how can you evade the duty of similarly enforcing
a practice which most persons consider binding upon
them? It may be argued that to in►erfere is expedient in
one case and inexpedient in the other. I deny the expe-
diency in either; but be that as it may, I am not prepared
to hold my personal freedom of action on so uncertain a
tenure as this—that society, on the whole, thinks it more
advisable not to coerce me. The principle of individual
independence, of personal liberty of action, permitted
wherever it does not come into collison with the personal
liberty of others, is at once the result and the guarantee
of modern civilisation. Encroach upon it, under whatever
idea of benefiting mankind, and you will find that com•
pnlsion has produced resistance—that the best feelings of
men are enlisted in support of their worst vices—that in-
temperance has gained defenders in those who would
otherwise have been foremost to denounce it—and that you
will have given to bigotry, political and religious, a prece-
dent of which it will not be slow to avail itself.