The Press.
London, England, 1857-12-19 00:00:00

Living upon gun-bullocks and horses does not look
as if the garrison were well found, and the allusion
by " Civilian" to horses would appear to be correct,
when taken in connection with the remark of the
officer who writes on the Rth or October, that if sup-
plies, and with supplies of course he includes fodder,
do not arrive " soon, we must turn out all our horses."
That expression, too, is peculiar, for it shows the
feeling then prevalent in the garrison, that the
horses must be " turned out" if relief does not soon
arrive. Does it not, therefore, when we find three
weeks afterwards these horses not " turned out," but
cut up and eaten, argue a failing supply of provision ?
Possibly the writer on the Bth of October never con-
templated being shut up in Lucknow for three more
weeks without relief. On the whole, therefore, we
are not inclined to put perfect reliance on the letter
of Lieutenant Moorsom ; for the facts of the gar-
rison being " put on rations" (and this expression
is clearly used by the writer of the soli of October
with reference to low rations), of the horses
not having been turned out, of the " cold
water and chupatties " of the officer of
the filth, and all coupled with the " despe-
rate fighting " known to have occurred on
the 18th or 19th October, would look omi-
nous. Why should Outram and Havelock, with
forces so reduced, unless pressed for provisions
hazard a day's street fighting in the city of Lucknow
except it was to cut their way through to Alumbagh,
where they safely surmised lay a large convoy
cf provision ? A correspondent of the Harkin., after
reporting the fight of the 19th October, at Lucknow,
says :

The object of the attack was to get possession of the
city, and to effect a junction with the force at Alumbagh.
The losses, however, being too great, we only succeeded
in taking a small portion of the city towards the Balee
Guard. Outram was now unable to take the offensive,
and the Alumbagh forces cannot come to their succour
until they are at least 4,00) strong. No provisions, and
no fodder for the cattle.

But the question is settled ere this ; and so let us
turn to the more pleasant features of the affair, and
contemplate the preparations for the relief of Luck-
now. Colonel Ilope Grant, in command of Colonel
Greathed's column, reported to be 3,500 strcng, after a
rapid march of nine days from Agra, crossed the
Ganges from Cawnpore on the 30th of October, with
1R guns, and arrived at Alumbagh on 3rd November.
They took with them 2,500 camels and 500 carts,
with supplies for Lucknow. On the same day, Sir
Colin Campbell arrived at Cawnpore from Calcutta.
Sir Colin remained there till the 9th, when he crossed
the Ganges for Alumbagh, where Grant's column was
understood to be awaiting his arrival. "We do not
know," writes one correspondent, "what number of
troops he took with him in person" :

Indeed, the fact of his crossing into Oude is as vet only
known from Sir Robert Hamilton's brief telegram to Lord
Elphinstone from Madras alluded to above ; but what with
the 53rd, the remaining wing of the 93rd, and artillery, he
may have added to the brigadier's column no fewer than
1.500 men, raising the amount of the reinforcements to
5,000, with a numerous artillery. At Alumbagh itself he
would find, perhaps, 1,000 effectives, with large supplies
of provisions and of ammunition conveyed thither shortly
before by Major Burnston and 500 men. At the head of
ao compact and well equipped a force, Sir Colin would
doubtless proceed at once against the enemy.
All these statements regarding the amount of force
actually at Sir Colin's command are vague and
general ; "he may have added," and "he
would find, perhaps," are not the expressions
of a writer confident in his statements. All
that we know is that, in the first week of No•
vember, the European reinforcements were leaving
Calcutta at the rate only of 2,500 men per month.
The Calcutta troops Sir Colin Campbell will have
under his command must have left Calcutta in Sep-
tember, when the transport, bad as it was in Novem-
ber, was fifty per cent. worse ; and from this we may
infer that, in the intervening six weeks between the
advance of Havelock, on 20th September, and the
departure from Cawnpore of Sir Colin Campbell, the
greatest number of men which reached Cawn-
pore did not much exceed 2,000. Out of these Sir
Colin has mainly to provide for the defence of
Cawnnore against the contingency of an attack from
the Gwalior rebels, not many miles off, and in force ;
and it is, therefore, highly probable that he took not
more than 809 or 1,600 men with him when he crossed
the Ganges on the 9th November. With these he will
join at Alumbagh a force of some 4,500 men, which
will give him in all between 5,000 and 0,000 men to
effect the relief of Lucknow—that is to say, assuming
that he leaves no force at Alumbagh ; but in all pro-
bability he would leave there from 250 to 500 men.
to be fed with detachments from Cawnpore. On the
other hand, there are at least 1,000 eff•ctive men
in the Residency, and Havelock and Outram will,
no doubt, endeavour to co operate with Sir Colin—
so that between 0,000 and 7,000 men would be avail•
able for further operations in the middle of Novem-
ber—assuming, of course, that Sir Colin reaches the
Residency without any heavy loss.