The Press.
London, England, 1854-06-03 00:00:00

JUNE 3, 1854.

Niftratart.

Locke's Philosophical Works. Tw•o volumes.
Vol. I. Bohn's Standard Library. London:

Bohn.
THOUOH we do not agree with Mr. St. John,
the editor of this new edition of Locke, that
there is any danger of the author getting out
of date through his works not being kept be-
fore the public, we are yet very glad to receive
his writings in so cheap and compact a shape.
The editor is of opinion that philosophy is to
be regarded rather as an art than as a science,
and that, therefore, little improvement is to
be expected on the system of a great original
master. We cannot quite agree with him. It
is only rational to suppose that our knowledge
of the human faculties may increase with dis
cussion and experience, and that the errors
and shortcomings of one mind in so vast a
branch of intellectual inquiry may be corrected
and supplied by the light thrown on it by
subsequent investigators.
From the dawn of philosophy it has been
disputed whether the ideas which occupy
the mind are innate or acquired, whether they
are impressed on it at creation and are de-
veloped by circumstances, or whether they are
wholly derived from experience, being received
through the organs of sense. Strange to say,
the two great schools into which philosophy
thus diverged at its commencement subsist to
this day ; and while the system of Locke, in
its main features, is generally received in
England, it finds a most able, eloquent, and
refined opponent in M. Cousin in France.
Our habits of thought and feeling are so
connected with our individual consciousness—
they so mainly make up what we are accus-
tomed to call ourselves—that it is little wonder
Locke's doctrine of acquired ideas should, on
the publication of his great essay, have been
looked on as a novelty and have encountered
much opposition. Though certainly as old as
Aristotle, no one before had ever worked it out
into a complete system. It is not only the
leading principle of Locke's philosophy, but it
is the entire foundation on which he built up
what he terms his "uniform and consistent
"edifice." What he calls Reflection only plays a
secondary part in arranging and combining
the impressions of sense ; and, on the whole,
his work is calculated to give the impression
that the mind is formed by the information
communicated to it from the external world.
Such phrases as " tabula rasa " and " a sheet
of white paper" suppose that the mind is
not only of itself blank but passive, and tend
to make us overlook its wonderful organisation
and its active capacity.
Sharp and logical as Locke's intellect was,
he erred in not penetrating deep enough. He
began with the first story of metaphysical
inquiry instead of the basement. It is the in-
formation of the mind which he invites us first
to consider, and not the nature of the mind
itself. His essay assumes that ideas which
at best do but furnish or stimulate our mental
capacity are more than the capacity they ini-
Ulster to. As reasonably might an anatomist
pretend to explain human structure by show-
ing how food is converted into chyle and blood,
muscle, bone, and nerve. We admit the im-
portance of meat and drink to sustain life, but
we deny that they explain the 'mystery of life,
or that the taking them into our mouth will
in any degree tend to explain the wonders of
our structure.

It is only by considering the mind—anterior
to the information of sense—as an original
capacity, variously endowed by its Creator,
and far superior to all his other works, that
we can form any just estimate of its true cha-
racter. It is doubtless inactive until set in
motion by its appointed ministers, the senses ;
but, beautifully as they are constituted, they
are but its instruments—mere portals to the
temple. A steam-engine is motionless until
water is put into the boiler and fuel into the
grate ; but who, in considering the beautiful
and complicated workmanship, would set the
water and the fuel above the mechanism?
Neither does Locke, while combating the
doctrine of innate ideas, take sufficient
note of what may be called organic ideas. We
are willing to allow that the mind, marvel-

THE PRESS.

lously as it is endowed, and beautifully as it
is fitted for action, cannot act until it receives
impressions from the outward world ; but
those impressions will always produce effects
in some degree similar, and may thus be said
to constitute natural ideas, or ideas in con-
formity with our mental and physical structure.
This will not be disputed in regard to the
grosser objects of sense. Some tastes are
pleasant, some offensive—so with respect to
smells and sounds. Less perceptibly, some
colours, hues, and shades of light please the
eye, while others offend it ; and if, from these
simple principles, we ascend higher, we alkali
find that we are furnished with original prin-
ciples or ideas to which all our skill in art and
wisdom in morals must be referred.

In parts of his work Locke seems to sup
pose that humanity is wholly at the mercy of
mere accidents of its condition. Custom, he
says, is more than nature ; a notion which
will not bear examination, as it is difficult to
conceive any custom which had not some
natural groundwork in the first instance. The
range of our faculties is, indeed, very wide.
By the training which he receives man may
rise to the virtue of an angel, or sink to the
malevolence of a fiend : but in each case the
character will be founded on qualities which
he possesses in common with his fellow-men.
Those customs among individuals or nations
which we are inclined to regard as most un-
natural do but arise from certain principles of
our nature being kept in restraint or carried
to excess.
Whether ceitain ideas are innate in the
mind or natural to it—whether they are ante-
cedent to experience, or inevitably come with
experience—is of no great consequence to
genuine philosophy. Locke's argument often
savours more of scholastic subtilty than of
true wisdom. He vehemently denies, for
example, that the idea of God is innate, but
admits that it is an idea " naturally deducible
" from every part of our knowledge." The
Indian who

"Bees God in clouds and hears Him in the wind "
believes in Deity, because the laws of his
being compel him so to believe. The earliest
lesson of our sense is to instruct us in the
relation of effect to cause. The savage sees
that he is able to fell a tree by blows of his
axe, and to burn it by means of fire. When
he witnesses, therefore, the ravages of a storm
and the stroke of lightning, he instantly refers
those effects to a superior power, and cannot
avoid doing so. In the rudest as well as in the
most civilised states of life we are surrounded
with evidences of design and government which
impel us to recognise and worship the Ruler
of the world. Those ideas which the mind
has a predisposition to receive may, in some
sense, be said to be innate, as the instinct
of a bee is innate, though, were it deprived of
its senses, we do not suppose that it would
build cells or collect honey.
The passionless nature of Locke, while
qualifying him for abstract reasoning, ill-
adapted him to take a survey of the compound
nature of man. His philosophy is wanting in
fervour and faith. His view of the mind is
highly ingenious and symmetrical, but, in en-
deavouring to account for its action and
growth on purely rationalistic principles, he
loses sight of its divine construction and en-
dowments, of its infinite faculties and god
like apprehension. By attempting to define
its qualities with mathematical precision, he
seems more anxious to tie it to the earth than
to connect it with heaven. For this reason
we are inclined to doubt whether his writings
are well-adapted to the present day. They
are, however, admirably calculated to stimu-
late thought, and may yet serve as a stock
whereon to graft fairer and better fruits than
they of themselves are capable of bearing.
This edition appears carefully produced,
and in the notes are given passages from
eminent metaphysical writers confirming or
questioning the leading principles of Locke's
system.

The Friends, and other Poems. By Warwick
Beechwood. London : Longmans.
THE pseudonyme on the titlepage of this little
volume is suggestive of high thoughts and
pleasant hours. We scarcely expected on

519

opening it to be taken into a forensic atmo-
sphere, and to be reminded at every page of
Themis rather than the Muses. The author's
object was, he says, to
Win back some sunbeams from the days gone by,
To brighten hopes too weak, and ills too nigh.
And in his preface he disarms criticism by
telling us, iu plain prose, that his work
" claims no merit beyond that of having given
" employment to a few idle hours of the au-
" thor." As he is evidently a barrister, we are
happy thus to be assured that he has but " a
" few idle hours," and his present performance
shows that he has abundant mental resources
for enjoying books and the world. Susceptible
to moral beauty, and with some perception of
graphic effect, he is essentially a moralist in
looking upon life and nature, and he is better
suited for a thoughtful essay in prose than for
a tuneful exercise in verse. His thoughts are
too merely obvious, and his illustrations are
often trite. Trying to excite himself into
poetry, when he describes his imaginary Lady
Edit, he says:—
I knew to lift my eyes
To Lady Eda with a glance of love
Was madness ; yet I felt to gaze and love not
Was scarcely human. Heaven had gifted her
With beauty and benign intelligence,
As two most mighty spells which she should wield
Unconscious of their power. She was so fair,
No eye that lighted on her face had rest
Till there it glanced again.
There is something of emotional vivacity in
this utterance. But how insipid is the conti-
nuation :

Not Venus' self,
As shadowed forth in marble by the hand
Of Phidias, that divine artificer !
Phidias and Venus, like the phcenix and
the upas tree, should be shunned by young
poets. There is much truth of feeling in the
passage where the author glances back on the
immature imaginings and crude philosophy of
early manhood. Many of us must echo the
feelings here expressed :
Sweet were those days of manhood's early prime,
When all looked fresh, and grand, and wonderful
To eyes yet beaming with delight and joy !
Then doubt first rose, a presence in our hearts :
Then came the thirst fur knowledge, then we first
Darted inquiring eyes around the world.
And heard with troubled ears its changeful cry,
The sports of childhood, all our boyish mirth

Had passed away ; and with them too had gone
That faith which hangs on others' solemn lips
With confidence implicit. Dark forebodings
That what men taught might be with error tinged,
That what they clung to with such jealousy,
And with such angry passion dogmatised,
Might yet be found delusion or deceit,
Perplexed our anxious minds. How eagerly
We panted then to seek the realms of Thought I
Perhaps the best passages in the volume
are the sketches of the characters and fates
of two eminent lawyers who toiled unto death.
We had occasion lately to allude to one of
these—the admired and lamented Follett.
The present author supplies us with a vivid
sketch of the great advocate :
His mind,
Capacious and profound as the wide sea,
Could condescend to humblest toil and learn
The pleader's craft, and make its subtleties
More subtle by his teaching. Eloquence,
When eloquence was fitting, he displayed;
And ever on his lips dwelt, like a charm,
Winning persuasion not to be denied.
How soft and rich the modulated tones
Of his sonorous voice ! how elegant
The graceful motion of his hand ! How bright
The piercing flashes of his searching eyes,
Themselves unsearchable ! No artifice
To him unknown ; nor did he always deem
Such aid superfluous. All the armoury
Of rhetoric and reasoning was his own :
He swayed their weapons with a master's hand.
And he says, with much pathos :
One monitor
Alone he had, who in his quiet home
Lived like a saint with vigils and with prayers,
And trembling at prosperity too great,
Whispered in his averted ear, Refrain !
But ere ho heeded came that messenger
Whose call must be obeyed, and summoned hence
To Death's dread court the now exhausted man.
No vain solicitude could save, no skill
Help him who helped so many : he is gone!
The Temple holds his venerated dust ;
And distant generations yet may gain
instruction and a warning, when they view
The mournful monument of Follett's fame.
Warwick Beechwood does not concur with
the late Justice Talfourd in thinking that
Follett had " a rayless grave." We are much