The Press.
London, England, 1856-07-26 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

nucleus adapted for a large or small force, in which ten
men, perfectly safe themselves, may command a radius of
two or three hundred yards by the fire of musketry, and
with a gun six hundred yards, so that within that area a
large camp may be covered and protected during the ab-
sence of the principal part of the force on patrol.
Every experienced soldier knows how difficult it is to
force regular troops out of a churchyard or similar inclo-
sure, even when there is no provision for flanking fire ; but
there is no reason why the wall of the inclosure should not
be so constructed as to afford that advantage.
I have ulterior views in the construction of these posts,
and in the selection of their sites ; I anticipate they may
hereafter become villages, and in the centre of a village
constructed of huts all one storey high, and roofed with
thatch or slight materials, one tower, two storeys high,
or other defensible stone building, placed in the centre
and with a fiat roof, will enable a few men effectually to
command and protect it.

In cases of panic, if the defensible posts be detached
and scattered all round the circumference, as is generally
the case in this country in old forts, as Fort Beaufort for
example, or the more modern construction of Fort Hare,
and no central rallying-point exists, the people as well as
the garrison know not where to go. Now, if the rallying-
point be in the centre, and such as I have described as
desirable, the detachments and mob will rally to it, and
the voice of the commander will have power to direct and
detach the requisite forces in the right directions, retaining
a reserve, whilst the women and children would be safe
within the inclosure, and under the protection of the
central tower till the storm had blown over.

It is obvious, therefore, that this system is applicable
equally to military posts under existing circumstances, and
to villages, especially military villages ; and had there been
this precaution iu Woburn and other military villages at
the opening of this war, with a proper orgaiiisation for
watch and ward, the massacre that took place in them
would not have occurred.

That this measure is warranted by experience, and that
there is nothing new in it, is evinced by the ancient church
towers, and other towers which remain from the remote
period of history in our own country, when a civilised race
planted themselves in small numbers in the midst of
savages, and ultimately supplanted or subdued them.

One principal object of these towers was—
To be a demonstration to the warlike, troublesome, and
restless tribe of Gaikas that the Amatola country, their
stronghold, is not again to be abandoned as soon as
marched through, as heretofore; and that no hopes re•
main to them of ever being allowed to recover it, and
feed their herds in the fertile pastures which its valleys
and hill tops afford.

Towards the end of November, 1852, peace
was restored throughout the colony, and Sir
George Cathcart had leisure to mature the
plans he had originated to provide for its per-
manent tranquillity. The "military villages "
above mentioned were an important feature in
his design, but it was not so easy to determine
who should garrison them. British military
pensioners were, in Sir George's opinion,
owing "to their intemperate and idle habits,
" and a natural carelessness and contempt of
" danger, unfit to be placed with safety in an
" Alpine district." Ordinary settlers " could
" not be brought together in compact coinmu-
" nitres, or rendered amenable to the control
" and restraints essential to their own in-
" terests.' The Fingoes, again, would be un-
able to maintain themselves against the supe-
rior race of the Kaffirs ; and Sir George
ultimately came to the conclusion that " two
" Swiss rifle regiments of 700, or I should say
" 1,000 men each," would afford the best means
of carrying his design into effect. The whole
despatch in which this question is discussed
evinces the wide foresight and fertile genius of
the writer, and proves him to have possessed a
portion of that rarer talent by which empires
are consolidated as well as conquered. All the
farms in the newly gained territory were also to
be let out on a species of feudal tenure, every
holder of sa Crown allotment being bound to
keep a serviceable gun, and to provide when
required one armed and mounted man for
every thousand acres he possessed. Indepen-
dent of the practical utility of such a measure,
we see that in these borders farmers would
become the germ of a class of landed gentry,
devoted to British interests, and destined,
perhaps, to lay the foundation of a solid and
flourishing South African empire.
A third expedient on which Sir George
seems to have relied for ultimate defence of
the colony was the Cape Mounted Police,
composed of colonists themselves, and to be
paid out of the colonial revenue. By these
various means Sir George calculated on being
able very materially to lightea the expenses
which would fall upon this country in any
future Kaffir insurrection, and at the same
time to diminish very considerably the chance
of their recurrence.