The Press.
London, England, 1856-05-03 00:00:00

THE MILITIA.

WHEN it is said that the British are not a war-
like people, all that can be meant is that they
love not war for its own Bake ; as we verily
believe certain other nations do. When war
comes we fight with a tenacity and daring which
have always rendered us victorious in the end
wherever we have had a fair field. But these
very virtues aro not without a serious draw-
back. This reliance on our personal qualities
has rendered us rather too contemptuous of
the drudgery of warfare. We will leave
to other nations their science, organi cation,
and vast military materiel ; we have that
within us wo think can afford to dispense
with all this toilsome preparation. Has it not
always been so? Why should we be wiser or
uo. se than our ancestors? That these are the
sentiments of two-thirds of our country-
men, modified, perhaps, but not materially
weakened by recent events, we make no
manner of doubt ; and when these are fortified
by the opinions of the economic school, who
object to armaments on grounds both con-
scientious and pecuniary, it behoves us to con-
sider in what way our late sad experience may
be made most practically available. We sup-
pose, indeed, if it were clearly understood that
our choice lay between these two alternatives
—either to maintain a costly and extensive
military system in full working order, or to be
liable at any time to the same melancholy
disasters which have recently befallen us—
even the Manchester gentlemen would scarcely
hesitate between them. But the English
people have a kind of instinctive belief that
such is not the case. They are influenced by
a variety of feelings, all, however, tending to
the same conclusion. Some think if another
war broke out we should have better generals;
some that we should have fairer play ' • others,
again, that wars will grow less and less fre-
quent, and that we really need give ourselves
no concern about the matter. Now, as we
think it is not safe to rely upon either of these
suppositions, while at the same time we see
clearly enough that the country will not
tolerate any permanent augmentation of our
military force, it may be worth while to inquire
whether there be any method of improving our
efficiency without violating the traditional
prejudices of the nation.
If we regard the late campaign purely from
a soldier's point of view, we shall doubtless
consider our repulse at the Redan as the most
serious misfortune of the war. How is it that
the conquerors of Alma and Inkermann, where
the Russians confesserlv put forward their
best troops, were twice 'beaten back by the
dispirited and war worn garrison of Sebas-
topol? The answer is, that between the regi-
ments who fought in the first named actions,
and the brave but unsuccessful assailants of the
Redan, there was a wide difference, a. difference
which, in the case of a nation maintaining so
small a standing army as ours, must inevitably
happen at the commencement of every war.
Our few trained soldiers are killed off before we
have any more ready to take their place.
Many of the troops engaged on the 18th of
June and 7th of September were ignorant of
the management of their rifles ; and what a
vast amount of rawness this single fact im-
plies, our readers can easily understand.
This, then, is the one point to which we must
address ourselves. Our system should be so