The Press.
London, England, 1856-10-18 00:00:00

Yes. They assert that we have an interest in
fermenting troubles in order that we may
hear part in them. We must do something it
is said. The something may turn out well or
ill. Consequences are nothing in comparison
to the necessity for action.
This plea would be intelligible from an in-
veterate busybody intent on' meddling with
everybody's affairs while neglecting his own ;
or we could understand it from a habitual
participator in Irish rows,: never so happy as
when he got a cracked crown and his pockets
tni•ned inside out. But is it a sound principle
of policy for a great nation to act on ?
There is not one reason urged to justify
interference in Naples which has not pre-
viously been urged to justify interference in
Spain. We can, as regards that country, test
the wisdom of the principle by results. Is it
possible to survey the present condition of
Spain with any feeling of satisfaction? What
part does British influence now play in the
councils of Madrid ?

It is not pretended that the Government of
Lord PALMERSTON is prepared to take any de-
cided line towards Naples, without the aid of
France. But if it be true, as is said, that
France is not unwilling to take advantage of
any opportunity for extending her influence
in the Italian peninsula, and even fur annex-
ing a portion of the country, may not our
policy lead directly to the result which it
should be our aim to avoid ?

It is the Cabinet of St. James which, in-
stead of deprecating intervention, points the
way to it, and is urgent 'for the adoption of
measures which, if productive of the results
desired, would convulse the Italian peninsula,
and render its occupation by foreign forces
inevitable. We see and we acknowledge the
peril of French or Austrian intervention, yet
we urge the French Government to join us in
a course which, by directly violating the prin-
ciple of the national sovereignty of Naples,
would justify intervention in all time to come.
More prudent and sagacious, the Emperor
of the FRENCH declines to accede to the soli-
citations of our Government. He acts as a
drag on the impetuosity of our Foreign-office.
Great Britain is exhibited in the humiliating
position of being anxious to take an activ.s
part against the Government of the Two
Sicilies, yet restrained by superior influence
from effecting her will.
The necessity for action, so much vaunted,
ought surely not to preclude attention to con-
sequences ; and, conceding that Lord PAL-
MERSTON'S Administration had its way, that
the French and English Legations were with-
drawn from Naples, that the allied fleets en-
tered the bay of the capital, what good conse-
quences could be expected to result from the
demonstration ? It would undoubtedly be an
invitation to insurrection, and the first result
of our interference would be a sanguinary
struggle in the kingdom we profess our inten-
tion to assist. Knowing of what materials
the Neapolitan population is composed, could
we rationally hope that a well-ordered system
of Administration could spring from either
civil war or foreign occupation ? Is it more
probable that a harsher despotism would
rise on the ruins of the existing system?
If our Government must be active, has it
not more profitable fields for the exercise of
its ingenuity than this state of the Italian
peninsula, with which we can, from the oppo-
sition of race and religion, have but slight
sympathy ? Undoubtedly England never can