The Express.
London, England, 1855-04-25 00:00:00

THE EXPRESS, WEDNESDAY EVENING, APRIL 25, 1855.

See WMHaestpmei you wrote giving a sketch of the
COW iIaWN7 samPsign is the Crimes communicated
Harding*, or did you ask Lord Harding* fur a
Mahn opinion on the matter?—That despatch was shown
ifse to Lord Herdioge, and, of worm, Lord Harding.,
be bad seen any reason to object to it, would have coos.
mesicated it to me ; but I do not In any way hold Lord
Herdiage responsible for anything. contained in that
demotes or in other dispatches.
Lotion state to the committee when Lord Hardinge's
... bility began, and where it ended, and how far Isis
Ip is responsible (sr anythiog that Imppensd daring
the campaign?—That is really so wide and so general a
question that it is imp-stible for me to answer it. It you
will put a specific question as to whether he was responsible
foe any.particular matter, I shall be happy to answer it.
The government coosider themselves responsible for all
military movements ?—Certainly.
Tree Commander-in-Chief is not, you mean to say, re-
sponsible for anything that has taken place in the Crimea
and elsewhere with regard to the movement of troops—
such, for instance, as the advance of troops from Scutari to
Versa, and the subsequent expedition to the Crimea ?
No, mrteanly not. The Commander-in-Chief is not resten-
sible for that.
Is be responsible for the clothing for the troops, their pro-
visioning for the winter, and the treatment of the sick and
wounded P—He is responsible for the ordinary clothing, bat
that comes within hie province et all times. Sometimes the
peculiar circumstances of the ens render it incumbent on
him to undertake the general supervision of the clothing,
rod I recommended ti the Commander-in-Chief, and he
adopted the recommendation, that a third suit of clothing
shoo d be supplied to the troops without any distinction.
The Chairman—Then if any failure took place in the
supply of winter clothing the responsibility of that failure
did not fall on the Commander-In-Chief P—No, certainly
net, assuming that there was a failure. It wm in the pro-
ving of the Commander-in-Chief to supply winter clothing
when it was required.
Was the Commander-in-Chief officially informed that
the army was to winter in the Crimea ?—He was kept in-
formed of every change of circumstance, and be was there-
fere as well aware es tee government of the necessity of the
troops wintering in the Crimea when the necessity for it
grace. As I intimated yesterday, there was no absolute
Insolation taken that the troops ahead winter in the
Crimes.
But having Information that it was the duty of the Com-
mander-in-Chief to see that the army was properly provided
with winter clothing, besides the ordinary winter clothing,
can you inform the committee why it was not done am
not able to answer that question accurately. I know what
was done. It was • camper as. It was an extraordinary
case ; and assuming it was obvious that the troops would
Lave to winter in the Crimea, I took upon myself to com-
municate with the Secretary-at-War and the Commander-
in-Chief to order such an additional amount of warm cloth-
ing in August as I thought would be required.
Do you not thick th the line of demarcation between
the Minister of Wm and the Consenanderin-Cbief is very
vague and indefinite 7—ln some respects undoubtedly vague
end Inconvenient.
Could not some change be made ?—Yes. There are many
alterations is the whole of the war departments desirable,
but I have been consulted by the present government
on the subject.
What SW the extent of your power over the ordnance T
I considered my power to be complete, so far as every order
given by me cculd not of course be disobeyed; but of my
power of control, arising from a knowledge of what was
going on, I am by no means prepared to speak. Lord Raglan
had been Master-General of the Ordnance midi his de-
parture for the But. It was mot absolutely necessary to re-
tain that'll's*, but Sir H. D.Ross was appointed in his pleas.
I suppose Lord Raglan did not receive his pay P—l be-
lieve so; but I had nothing to do with the finance of the
army. Sir H. D. Roes was appointed, and of course say
person appointed to the Ordnance ought to be acquainted
wi'h artillery taotiee. I believe the whole arrangements of
the Ordnance department are in coons of revision. I re-
presented while in office the state of the Ordnance to be
uosatisfectory, but I am not aware whether any changes
have been made, though I believe some are in contempla-
tion.
What control had your grace as Minister of War over
Admiral Dundee ?-1 had no control whatever over Admi-
ral Dundu.
Tian supposing there was a joint operation between the
army and the fleet, the fleet would be under the complete
control of the Admiralty ?—Yes. I should say, in expla-
nation of my answer of " so control whatever," that the
duties of Secretary of War as connected with the navy went
no farther than this, that, at the commencement of the war,
and on the determination of the government of any new
operations, instructions are issued by the Secretary at War
to the Admiralty in the shape of a general outline, but
leaving the details the Seen of the navy net being re-
sponsible to the Secretary at War. The instructions of the
Minister of War to the Admiralty would be carried out
without further reference, those instructions being
virtually decided on by the Cabinet in Council, and in con.
Segueing of the despatch I wrote to Lord Raglan, Sir J.
Graham wrote a similar one to Admiral Dundee.
Was there any blockade in force is the Black Sea 7—No.
Under whose department was the blockade—the Secre-
tary-at-Wares the Admiralty t—The Admiralty.
Suppose the non-enforcement of the bloekede iaterfered
with the operations of the army, would it have been the
duty of the Minister of War to have remonstrated with the
Admiralty ?—Yee, of course ; but we assume in all these
molten that there is a co operation between them, and not
a dismeition on the parted the First Lord of the Admiralty
to see tbe atm thwarting the operations of the army under
the more immediate direction of the Minister of War.
Was • blockade kept up until lately have already
said I am aware it was not.
Mr. Drummond—Were not orders sent out that the Hag-
fish navy should act in all matters of blockade in concert
milli the French navy ?—There were.
Was not the French navy altogether under the French
general P—l think dot.
Was not the French navy wader the consmander-in-chid
of the army ?—Unless I am greatly mistaken, not.
Lord Seymour—Were the masons for there being no
blockade in the Black flea political, or did it arise from
other circumstances ?—lt was entirely from political cir-
cumstances.
Yost grace has stated that there was no bleated' In
the Sleek Sea, although it was stated in the Beam if QM
mons test there was a blockade P—Orders had been Mewed
to institute • blockade in the Black Ilea was, I tblabo She
statement in the House of Commons.
And your grace believes that the cirtmostanee of the
blockade not being put in form arose from political ea SS
Said ciremastanets 7—Entirely.
Hew did the non-failliment of the eider to blockade
orbs 7—To answer that would be to enter into a varieVof
maven comested with the arrangemenb between the Er.
Mk fleet and the French fleet, and the sesammimilem
tween the heads of both fleets with the anbeneder at Ow
atantinople, tad other matters, which. if Ere leallane
think it desirable to obtain, they may sleek hen one of the
meant ministers of the mows, to whom It might be MOW
Meat, but not for me, to assurer the question.
The Chainasn—The object :was to ascertain whether the
Admiralty had anything to do with the dote minder
The government were principally reqemadde. The 11141111
were to institute a blockade. The indlidee OM NON
were partly of a political character, sad MOO Mt embeeled
with any disagreements between the Admiralty sad the
government, which I hardly think it right mkt. into.;
Mr. Layard—Were any reasons sent to yes from the But
which were smoldered satisfactory to the gameimeat fee
sot enforcing
all
blockade P—ltessoas went mile but that,
they were I. all respects eatirely 'satisfactory I mud say,
and again I really would rather not say why I .raider they',
wen not satisfactory. They would sot apply merely to those
departments
into which the hon. member might wish to
inquire.
How far did Lord Raglan exercise as independent com-
mand in the Best ?—lndependent of whom ?
Of theigovernment at home. Was, I mean, all that re-
lated to the eissiideo:apletely under the control of Lord
Region P—lard Raglan was, of course, responsible to the
goweemmteda MI et to the sommand of the government
at home.
If a witme states that he made repreeentatioss le Leal
Mites with regard to the ceganisation of the embalms,
sad Lewd Regina mid he wee wsidat fee homelless
from is yes sessile, *see was wisest seem he
kb as ambience eeepe —That depends en the
dieseasmise of the ease. There are instances in which •
esemesdes4weidel of the easy would be justified in tak-
m Iskeeelf nation that were at variance with the views
IR lithesome/met at home.
Leta Law" is his evidence, says that he premed Is
"pude, is the Crimes daring the time of granite seed as
netbelesee mph end that Lord Seel's, when tee
oil it wee ender the eossideration of the go em
meet. Now had Lord Raglan the power of nob
a veep without referring to the grimmest 11:1=11-1Im
• to kis remessibills,

I
think I cannot claim exemption, but whatever was dons
by other departments, however ill-organised or ill•arrsogrd,
they wire all connected with the war department. If Sir
C. Trevelyae, in Cominimariat affairs, had rcfosed to earn
out my orders, I must have applied to the Cabinet ; and if the
Cabinet had decided in Sir C. Trsvelyan's favour, I should
have resigned ; or If it had derided against Sir C Trevelyao,
he would have done the same. Until the 22nd December lest
the Commiseariat was under the control of the Treasury, but
its separation tram that department was a measure that bad
long been mooted,
and he (the Duke) was of opinion that the
Commissariat, like other departments, ought to be under a
separate head and jurisdiction. The head clerk (his grace
continued to Fay), woo wee the head clerk at the time that
it was at the Treasury, had at this moment the immediate
working superinueadence of the Commiseariat. He was re•
moved, with his whole establishment, from the Treasury to
the War Office, when he is under the same roof, end under
I the immediate superintendence of the minister. When this
' expedition was undertaken he (witness) did not furnish Sir
Charles Trevelyan with any information. He was bound to
say, indeed, that Sir Charles rather furnished him with e
good deal of information which he had obtained from Sir
John brNeill end others, with whom he had been in com-
mudeation. lie had every teuon to suppose that Lord
Resin and every general of division in the Crimea had
interpreters in their envier. He had also every reason
to believe that the army at some period of its stay in
Bulgaria was in a position to advance to Sdistris. It n con-
trary opinion had been expressed by individual officers com-
manding parts of the crruy he should doubt that they were
In a position to speak with authority on the subject
Lord Raglan never expressed inch an opinion to the War
Department, and his lordship, he conceived, was in a better
portion for knowing all the facts than any individual officer.
By Mr. Roebuck—The Commissary-Cleceral was also better
informed than any officer could be es to the ability of the
army to advance, for he was entirely responsible at that time
for the land transport of the army, and therefore was the
person who would necessarily know more than any other of
the force at his dieposal for that purpose. Without reason
he (witness) was astonished to beer that Captain Writtesley
had stated before the committee that " the army left England
destitute of all its most important 'cession's.
By General Peel—The Commissary 0 1 only rep tied
the elate of his department to the general cuineanding-ise
chief, and to his superiors at home. Captain Wrottesley
could have had no information which could entitle him to
speak on that sudect. Two siege trains were ordered to be
prepared before Lord Raglan left this country. The first
siege train was sent out somewhere about the time when the
troops moved from Scutari to Varna. The second siege train
was sent out and arrived before the expedition sailed to the
Crimea. Both these siege trains were iatended fur the
gene-al service of the army in whdever operation it might
be engs‘ed. but undoubtedly with the ultimate view to that
gnat operation which was contemplated from the first.
He could not saypusitively whether Lord Raglan was con-
stilted on the subject of the transport for the siege train,
but he knew that his lordship was consulted on all such
matters so long.'s he was in England. The Commissariat
at that time was answerable for the land transport.
By Mr. Roebuck—lt was certainly the intention to move
the army up to &Hattie, but the °cession never ann.
The army was at oue time in a state to advance into the
interior of Bulgaria, but not in that complete state is
which it would have been after two or three months of pre-
' partition.
By General Peel—Omer Praha had the complete control
over the whole supphes of carts, horses, and everything
• else in that country. Mr. Filder could not procure any
portion of than supplies until Omer Pasha issued his edict.
Then it was that Mr. Filder had great numbers of arabes
placed at his disrosal, and that the army was in a position
to advance ; but, the siege of !When* having been raised,
the whole aspect of affairs was changed.
By H. Roebuck—The army was not in a position to
advance to Silistria until a short time before the siege was
raised.
By Mr. Layard—The first statement he received from
Lord Raglan as to the deficiency is the land transport woe
a mere casual one, and was made in order to explain other
things to which witness had called his lordship's attention.
That must have been quite the end of September. He
(witness) had certainly received, in the way many others
had received, information as to cavalry horses, each worth
from 601. to 701., being devoted to purposes in the Crimea
for which small ponies of the value of 51. would have been
adequate, but he had received no official information on the
subject. The last statement he received from Mr. Fader
was that the Conaminariatpionee he had in the Crimea very
little exceeded 400. At the lime Mr. Fader made that state-
ment he was responsible to the War Department; previous
to that he was responsible to the Treasury. When the land
transport became so reduced, no stops were taken to send
out horses from this notary. That was quite impossible
under the circumstances, and he (whom) organised a sepa-
rate and independent transport cups on a military system,
which he placed under the direction of Colonel ld'ffiurdo.
Before that period no attempt was made to organise a trans.
port service in England.
By General Peel—Lord Raglan certainly had himself the
power to supply any want of transport horses, without re-
ference to him (witness) ; though if such a want existed it
was his lordship's duty to have informed him of it. With
Respect to the ambulance corps that was • novelty in England.
At his request it was organised by Dr. Guthrie, Dr. Smith,
and Colonel Tulloch. Some difference arose as to whether
certain ambulance waggons recommended by Dr. Guthrie,
or ambulance carts recommended by Dr. Smith, should be
preferred, and witness suggested that some of both should be
nun and tried. It became necessary to consider who should
be placed in charge of the ambulant* corps. Both Lord
Raglan and Lord Harding. objected to take from the army
for that service any great number of tightiog men, and
eventually the prevailing opinion was that it would be de-
sirable to employ pensioners in the management of the am-
bulance corps, though Dr. Smith was of opinion that their
employment in that capacity would be an evil. It was true
that about 40 of the petitioners on landing in the Crimea
bad brought some scandal on the body by getting drunk,
but the offences they committed against decorum were not
greeter than the average of the whole army. Nor were they
old men, as had been said, for only two of them were above
50 years of age. At one time, when the state of the
reads precluded our sick and wounded, then very
numerous, teing carried down to Belinda,* on wheel
carriages, the French lent us a number of their ambulance
mules, across which panniers of a massive description were
hang for that purpose. Those panniers were an excellent
invention, and witness had some of the same sort con-
structed in France for the English army, and also others
of a lighter description, but on the same mad, in this
Mr.counßy M.
r. Layard—Of course if remits could have bean
thrown into the Crimea, in small bodies, as the regular
soldiers fell sick, the army wohld have been strengthened ;
but that would not have prevented the sick's.' recurring, •
because it turned out that the men who came fresh Into the
Crimea were the most liable to be attacked with siclumen
The overwork arose from the men being iacommessusts
with the extent of our lines before flebestepoL The
government had co power to form a reserve wail they had a
sufficient number of recruits to mad. The recruits did net
come in adequate ambers, and that iron from an sawn-
lingnese to enlist.
General Peel—Was not the real fact this—that you sent
too large a portion atlas amp out in the first instance ?
The Lake of Newcastle-11M is a question which must
always be a matter of opinion.
General Peel—By sending out a Litter number of men
than are supported by a proper reserve do you not entail on
these man &greater amount of work than they would other-
wise have to discharge ?
The Duke of Newcastle—No doubt of it ; but at the
same time you mast take into account the difficulties
with which you have tit contend, and the necessities of the
out.
By lilb.Layard—The government bad no power to seta.
Min reserves at the cominenement of the war, except to
the extent of between 6,000 and 7 000, which wittier
established, and these were sent to the Crimea at the ,in.
stance of Lord Hardinge, to strengthen Lord Raglan's
force. Various suggestions were made by within both to
Lord Raglan and to Lord Stratford, and partially carried
out, an the raising of a Turkish eontingent, prior to
the emanation on that subject. From the very first
he (entities) made various attempts to obtain from the
ur Tkish government a orinaidi contingent both of,
cavalry and infantry. Before Lord Raglan left this country'
witness suggested to him the desirability of raising a light
cavalry corps in Turkey, to be ofileend by *born from the
Indian army, and also from the Bsglish army. Lord Raglan
afterwards found the project impractisable, from the in-
ferior character of the hones of the country, and their
inability to cope with the Russian cavalry. Attempts
were also made to organise a number of the bight-bunks
into a *lnsley corps under Colonel Batson, and five or
Mx other English officers, but those also failed, from appro.
beasion on the part of the English and French allure as
to the character of the bashi-basouks. There was a gene.
tel impression in the army that mach a eavalrynrps would
be likely to lead to more evil "aapad. He Menses)

celled his attention to the circumstance of a number of
Tartan, who were the friends of the Allies, havirg been
confined at Scutari in the same part of the hospital as the
Rotten prisoners there, and he (witness) immediately took
steps to have these Tartar prisoners released, who, it wee
obvious, could only have horn Co detained ender some
misapprehension. He might Dave heart it suggested, but
he hardly imagined eueh great culpability on the part of
any department in England, as steeling quantities of the
stores that were ordered to be sent out to the army in
the East. He hoard that large quantities of the stores that
were ordered to be seat out to the East were still detained in
England. He made instant irqUiries on the subject, and
he Wel Wiled that they were stores made up of the gifts of
private individuals eau not government 'torus, and that
they ware waiting until means of transdort could be found
for them. He had never been able to find that any govern-
ment stores which had been ordered out to the East were
still lying in this country.

(His Genoa, at the request of Mr. Leyard, stated in some
,detail, the circumstances ander which the two Under-Seem
taries-at-War had been appointed.)
By General Peel—The defects in the trenching toAs were
at an early period brouwit under his notice in a private letter,
and be lxked upon that u so very important a matter that
he immediately wrote to the Ordnance department, desiring
to have a therough investigatton of it. They reported to
him in a manner which he thought was unsatisfactory, and
be sent their report to Lord Region, and asked him whether
there was any truth in it. Lord Raglan instituted inquiries,
and wrote him (witness) to say that many of the tools were
ea very inferior character. By means of a second inquiry,
instituted at his request by the Ordnance authorities, it was
band out that the objectionable tools had been made at the
eatporta depots, and were of a very antiquated description.
(A. laugh) He then intimated to the Orduaree that the
transaction was a very reprehensible our, and hoped that
there would be no repetition of it. Seiious complaints'
having been made of the state of the harbour at Bslaklava
he applied to the Customs, and got together about forty
men from that establishment of various grades and sent
them out to Selektive under the supervision of an expe-
rienced chief officer, with the view of assisting to restore
order in the harbour. He &leo sent out a number of iron
warehouses. Lord Seaton had been quoted as disap-
ptoving of the expedition to Sebastopol, which (it was
further said) was undertaken in spits of the remonstrances
of Lord Raglan. He (witness) wished to say he never re-
ceived any remonstraace from Lord Raglan on the subject.
On the contrary, his lordship gave his hearty approval of
the matter. Again, Lord Seaton never tendered to him any
opinion upon the expedition until the beginning of Septem-
ber, when be met his lordship at the camp at Bculogne.
Oa that occasion witness explained to his lordship every-
thing that had bees done in the matter, to which his lord-
'No gave his entire assent. It had been also stated that he
(witness) said, ii the House of Lards, that there was no
miiitary Aker in London whose opinion was worth having.
That statement was placarded in the streets of London. He
never made such a statement. What he said was simply
this, thee belaboured under great disadvantages in this re-
spect, that of the military °faun holding official appoint-
ments in this country .nly one remained in London to whom
he could a refer'for advice—namely, Lerd Hardinge. That
he (witness) considers() a great disadvantage, because be
thought a number of good military heads should be kept in
the metropolis for consultation and conference.
By Mr. Roebuck—lle never received any suggestion upon
any subject from any military officer to which he did not
give the most scrupulous attention, whether he adopted it
or not. He should not have thought of quoting Lord Bea-
ton's opinion is favour of the expedition, but for its having
been quoted the other way.
By Oen. Peel—He was surprised to find General Sir Da
Lacy Evans stating before the committee that the govern-
ment at home appeared to have sent out the expedition as
if they thought Sebastopol could be taken without firing a
gun. So far tram that being the case, or anything like it,
he might mention that many officers of the Guards, who re-
turned home from the But on being promoted, before the
' expedition to the Crimea, were extremely surprised at the
extensive preparations which were making in this country
for fighting. He thought the militia was oae important
' means of recruiting the army ; but he was ,not sure that it
was now or at any time intended that the militia should
constitute the principal reserve. lie had aothing to do with
the calling out of the militia, except as an iodividual member
I of the cabinet; but he was of opinion from the very first
that the raising and directing the militia should be placed
r under the control of the Secretary for War, and he trusted
yet to see it transferred to the department of the Secretary
' for War. _ _

Lord Seymour asked witness if be was aware that Dr.
Guthrie had said recently, at a meeting of the Royal Col-
lege of Surgeons—" if her Majesty's government, by which'
term I include everybody concerned, fr.,m the highest to
the lowest, had been pleased to adopt the suggestions 1
offered in February, 1834, the hospitals might have been
in the same state in the Bosphorus as they were in 1814 on
the Garonne, when they were as perfect as men could make
them t" . . .

.His Grace replied he was set aware Dr. Guthrie bad made
any bitch statement, or that his suggestions had not been
carried out to a very great extent. Two of Dr. Guthrie's
meet important suggestiths were adopted, and adopted by his
(witness's) positive fist. One bad reference to the ambu-
lance waggths, which at his (witness's) request had been
tried in the East, and tad signally failed. His second suit-
geation was the appointment of a third assistant-surgeon to
every regiment. Dr. Smith objected to that, sod said the
only way was to increase the staff surgeons. He (witness)
went moot carefully into the question, end he saw so much
reason and truth in both suggestions, that he determined on
adopting them both, which was accordingly done. He was
aware that Dr. Smith objected to the employment of pen-
sioners for the ambulance seeps; and If Dr. Smith was, as
he said, overruled oa that point, he must have been over-
ruled by these gentlemen with whom witnesa_put him in
communication on the subject, Including Lord Raglan and
Lord Ilarainge. Witness racame Secretary for War on the
12to of June last. la that capacity he recsived no power
but such as he had from the very first. He had not a deli-
.ciency of power, but • deficiency of means. In order to
enable any Secretary of State for War satisfactofily to him.
self and the public to carry oat his duties there must be
very material changes in all the war departments.
By Mr. Roebuck—He had said that he did not consider
there was a want of power in the Secretary for War so
musk as the want et means. In short, the tools with which
be had to work were something like the tstrenchiog tools,
not of the very best quality.
Mr. Roebuck—You were hampered by your subordinates?
The Dike of Newcastle—l was. I am bound to say,
however, that everybody under me evinced the greatest
cordiality towards me, and made the greatest efforts to do
their duty. Ido not attach blame to any individual, but I
think the system is bad. I am satisfied that everybody
under me did the very best in his power.
The committee then adjourned until to-morrow (this day),
at twelve o'clock, when the Duke of Newcastle will main
' submit himself for farther examination.