The Press.
London, England, 1858-12-04 00:00:00

LONDON, SATUR I >AY DECEMBER 4, 1858. STAMPED ....SIXPENCE.
UNSTAMPED..FIVEPENCE.

object. To deprive a man of any possession con-
veys a notion of hardship ; not to confer a privi-
lege conveys no notion of hardship ; all persons
cannot have the same or even equal privileges :
it is inconsistent with the essence of social life.

at our command, to discuss at length this impor-
tant question ; but it is an absurdity, of which
those who undertake to guide public opinion
ought to be ashamed, to pretend to dispose of a
great question of policy by a flippant interroga-
tion, and seek to impose upon their readers the
foolish notion that they have asked a question
which their opponents are unable to answer.
This is just a specimen of the way in which the
advocates of manhood suffrage would betray
that manhood suffrage to its ruin—viz., by prac-
tising on the credulity of their admirers.
" IVhy should votes be unprotected front cor-
rupt influences ?"
For a very simple reason. Because it is
impossible to protect them from it. It is per-
fectly obvious at what this question aims—viz.,
the Ballot—but here is just one of the gross fal-
lacies by which advocates of this stamp venture
to delude their supporters. They assume as un-
deniable that which men of sense and fairness
deny. They assume that the voter would be
protected from corrupt influence by the Ballot—
and, of course, there is something very fascinating
in the idea of protecting a voter from such in-
fluence—but, amongst many objections which we
entertain- to the Ballot, we entertain this one in
particular, that it would not protect a voter from
being corruptly influenced, for a man's motive
for voting is just as likely to be a corrupt one if
given in secrecy as it is if given openly. The
secrecy may in some cases enable hint to lie and
to break his promise, without injury to himself
but the one thing that secrecy is utterly inca-
pable of doing is either to supply pure motives
or to destroy influences whether corrupt or un-
corrupt.
We have now replied to the questions of our
contemporary, and we must be allowed to say
that we conceive, first, that our contemporary will
not venture to take notice of our answers;
secondly, that he will repeat his questions with
the affirmation that no one has yet been prepared
to answer them; and lastly, that he will not
follow our ready example in venturing to reply
to the questions which we have put forth, on
the eve of the Birmingham meeting, but which
remain to this day unnoticed and unanswered.

Let us, however, put the question in its logical
form, lest it should be said we are dealing with
the words when we ought to deal with the spirit.
Why should a man paying ten shillings less rent
than his neighbour not possess the privilege of
voting ? We reply, because it is not for the well-
being of the State that ail persons who pay rent
should have a vote ; for, if it be asserted that there
is no good reason why he should not, then the
consequence that follows is, that all the payers of
rent must have votes—a principle which is equally
applicable to those who pay rent for a week as for
a year. In this case then, as in the last, it is ne-
cessary to put a limit ; and, as in that case, where
that limit should be fixed is a totally distinct
question from whether there should be no limits
at all. _ _ _

" 'Why should three hundred electors in
one part of the country have as much political
power as thirty thousand in another ?"
Now, if we were to ask the converse of this
question viz., Why should thirty thousand
electors in one part of the country have as mach
political power as three hundred in another ?
the answer would be pretty much the same to
both. Both questions look equally imposing, and
are really equally puzzling, until it is first settled
on what principles the answer is to be founded.
They might both be answered by another question.
Why should they not? It is as reasonable to
require an answer to this last question as to either
of the first two. But the truth is, before either
can be answered, it must first be determined
whether number is, or is not, to be the one
single element on which the election of Members
of Parliament is to be founded. If it be decided
that property, education, and all other interests
are to be excluded, then we frankly admit that
no satisfactory reason can be assigned why three
hundred electors in one part of the country '
should return as many members as thirty
thousand in another ; no more than. any satisfac-
tory reason could be given why twenty-nine
thousand electors should return as many as thirty
thousand. But we must say to those who ask
this .question: this exclusive doctrine of numbers
maylindeed be a very sound one, but it is one
unknown to this country, and before it is intro-
duced, we have a fair right to require some argu-
' ments in its favour, and some examples, of its
success. At all events, until this is done,
questions founded upon it are not to be palmed
off as unanswerable, or as being such as the
opponents of this species of Reform are unable
to meet.
" Why should Parliaments last seven yeFs,?"
This question implies very great ignorance on
the part of the inquirer. Has he in the course of
his political reading never fallen on any argtipients
—arguments at least a century old—in favour of
septennial Parliaments ? We do not, of course,
moan to deny that there are no arguments to' be
found in favour of triennial or annual Parlia-
ments, or that some may think that the arguments
in support of the shorter duration may not pre-
ponderate over those in favour of the other two.
But our interrogator puts his questions as if no
possible reasons ever had been, or ever- could be,.
adduced to show that septennial Parliaments are
more likely to conduct the affairs or the nation
with wisdom than those of shorter dUriition. It
would be hopeless to attempt, in the short space

[Wm A SUPPLEMENT, GRATIS.

INDIRECT INFLUENCES.
" Tux Head of the Church," says Cardinal W In-
MAN in his "Recollections of the last Four Popes,"
"is not the spiritual ruler of one kingdom. His
" headship extends over an entire world,
" spiritually indeed, yet sensibly and effica-
" ciously : kingdoms and republics are equally
"comprised in it." This is the theory of the
Power of which Cardinal WisEmAx is the repre-
sentative in England. According to this theory
all Temporal Princes are subject to the Pope,
as Vicegerents on earth of " the KING of Kings."
The right of this Supremacy to claim obedience
at the hands of all Princes, Governments, and
nations, is nowise affected by differences of re1f.(15.. .---1,.'
gious belief. The most Protestant Princes, ate " 1!1:;
nations are as much subjects of the Pope &Olio Ai R . ,
most " Catholic." The only difference betiveed i--
them is, that whereas the latter are " faittigd 7., toil
_.
subjects, the former are subjects in a state c
hellion. Neither political changes, nor lap
tune, no, not even the recognition by the
himself of any Dynasty. or Government op
to the Papal claim of universal dominion,

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