The Press.
London, England, 1857-06-20 00:00:00

(Second Notice.)

M. DE CASSAGNAC, after mentioning the gross
insult to the Prince President from General
Changarnier, quoted in .our last, proceeds to
record the principal events that subsequently
occurred. These events were,—the adoption
by the Assembly of the bill for restricting the
suffrage, which " for one week" established
concord between the President and the Par-
liament; the ungracious manner in which the
Assembly increased from 24.000/. to 120,0001.
sterling the allowance to the President for the
expenses of receptions ; the squabbles between
the Assembly and the newspapers that sup-
ported the Presidential cause; the visits of
the Prince President to and his speeches at
Lyons, Strasburg, Cherbourg. and Caen; the
commencement of the breach between General
Changarnier and the Prince President; the
famous review at Satory, which created so
much sensation, and which had no small in-
fluence on the fate of the Republic and the
" re-establishment of the Empire " ; the ab-
surd affair of the " Society of the 10th Decem-
ber," in which it was gravely alleged that
partisans of the Prince had deliberately
planned the assassination of the President of
the Assembly and of General Changarnier ;
the Prince's solemn appeal to the Assembly in
his Message of the 12th November, 18)0, to
aid hint in removing the public disquietude ;
the demonstration made by the Assembly in
support of General Changarnier, whom it re-
garded as its instrument in the designs it
contemplated for upsetting the Constitution ;
the dismissal by the Prince of that general
from the command of the Army of Paris—a
measure accomplished with really astonishing
firmness, but at the same tune accompanied
with the greatest moderation ; the wrath of
the Assembly at that dismissal, and the de-
monstrations on the part of that body to which
it led ; the insolent rejection by the Assembly
of a new dotation for the President, rendered
necessary by the extraordinary expenses to
which ho was subjected; the dissensions in
the Assembly on the proposal to remove the
exile of the Orleans family; the petitioning of
the Councils-General and of the people fur
the revision of the Constitution—a petitioning
which proved the desire to keep the Prince
President at the head of the Government and
to get rid of the republican form ; the debate on
and refusal of the revision by the Parliament;
and the proposal of the President to repeal the
law which restricted universal suffrage. On
all these subjects—and on the changes of
Ministry which the President deemed it
advisable to effect, the threatened impeach-
ments of the President, &c.—M. Granior• do
Cassagnac gives full, but not too prolix, details,
and on not a few he throws a new light.
We must content ourselves with stating that
the upshot of the whole was a profound and
irreconeileable dissension between the Legis-
lature and the Prince President, and the con•
sequent necessity of the Assembly deposing
the President, or the President getting rid of
the Assembly. As to both or either of them
waiting quietly until the expiration of the
period for which they wore elected, and allow-
ing a new Assembly and a new President to
be chosen in their room, it was nut to be
thought of ; for the Red Republicans and the
Socialists were prepared, the moment they re.

SATURDAY,

tired, to seize the supreme power by force of
arms, and the triumph of those terrible fac-
tions would have plunged France into anarchy.
Besides, it is not right to speak of the Assem-
bly as a collective body, for it was rent by
internal discord, and the parties constituting it
thirsted for each other's destruction. These are
truths too well known to all students of con-
temporary history to requiredemonstration--
especially well known are they to such of our
readers as happened to be in France, and par-
ticularly in Paris, at the end of 1851. Tho
Prince, then, on the one hand, and the Assem-
bly and the parties in the Assembly on the
other, were forced to contemplate the execu-
tion of a coup•d'etat. M. de Cassagnac
says :
These insensate conflicts led to an abyss ; and such was
the state of dissolution to which all parliamentary forces
had fallen, that history almost knows not on whom legis-
lative responsibility devolves. The selfish parties, and the
turbulent even, of the Assembly, who prepared the way for
extreme measures, by rendering them every day more
necessary, were in the highest degree conscious of the
perils they excited. The principal of them were even
seized with terrors as great as they were imaginary. As if
they had thought that a coup•d'etat was justified by their
violence, they believed that one was about to break out
immediately. In the night of the 13th of November about
one hundred deputies, Orleanist and Legitimist, remained
permanently in the Assembly ; and a group of five or six,
conducted by M. Haze, one of the Questors, explored with
precaution the vicinity of the Elysee (the Prince's resi-
dence ), frightening benighted passers-by with their
mysterious aspect, and the dim light of their lanterns.

As if this situation were not grave enough,
certain parties in the Assembly conceived and
acted on the mad project of investing the
Assembly with the command of the military
force—that is to say, depriving the Prince
President of it, though it was solemnly placed
in his hands by the Constitution. This mea-
sure, which was a coup-d'etat of itself, was
vigorously resisted by the President and his
Ministers, and it gave rise to a scene of fright-
ful tumult in the Assembly. After a debate
which could scarcely be heard from the noise
and excitement, General St. Arnaud, Minister
of War, made the frank declaration, in answer
to a question put to him, that he had ordered
to be removed from the barracks in which they
had been stuck up copies of a decree of the
1 lth May, 184 S, requiring colonels of regiments
to obey the orders of the Assembly :

The Assembly, on hearing this language, so firm and
resolute, and at the same time so faithful to the principles
at stake, assumed all at once a revolutionary aspect. The
most vehement, the most rabid cries were exchanged be-
tween the different benches in the midst of the general
tumult. Everything seemed again put in question. The
Left hesitated, in spite of the resolutions it had announced,
and the Royalist deputies were seen in the midst of the
Montagnards, apparently endeavouring to draw them into
a universal coalition. A large group of Conservatives,
faithful to the policy of the President, approached in
terror the Ministerial bench, urging that after such an
incident, and after the avowal of the Minister of War, it
would be very difficult to vote with the Cabinet. "Do
what you will, gentlemen," firmly replied M. de Thorigny,
Minister of the Interior; " we are ready for everything!"
On hearing these words, which were spoken with calm-
ness, the representatives exchanged glances ; and, certain
not to place their courage at the service of a timid Govern-
ment, they went to vote resolutely.
The gravest incidents all at once gave an almost sinister
character to the end of the debate. General Changarnier,
approaching the Commissary of Police of the Assembly,
who was placed near the tribune, addressed to him a few
words, which were generally believed to bf. an order to
prepare to close the outer doors of the Palace. A coup de
theatre was visibly in preparation. At the same time,
vehement menaces were made from the different benches
against the Ministers. " Arrest them all ! Arrest them all,
at once !" was the cry. M. de Morny, who had a part to
play near the person of the President in case the Assembly
should have displayed violence, left before the division.
General de Saint Arnaud on his part, seeing the revolu-
tionary character of the situaticn, whispered in the ear
of M. de Thurigny, " Suppose I leave ?" " Yes—go,"
replied the Minister of the Interior, " we will remain hero
till the end."
General de Saint Arnaud immediately left, after having
addressed a significant glance to General Megrim',
Commander-in-Chief of the Army of Paris, who was
seated with M. de Manpas, prefect of police, in one of the
tribunes. As he arrived at the door, he laughingly said to
a colleague who expressed surprise at seeing him leave
before the division, " They are making too much noise,
and I must seek for the guard !" And he went as he said.
At the same moment an officer of the 49th Regiment of
the Line went to the tribune in which General Magnan
was, and, tapping him on the shoulder, said, " Leave
quickly, for orders have been given to arrest you! " The
general rose at once, followed by M. de Maupas ; and both
proceeded to the headquarters of the Army of Paris at the
I aileriea. The Minister of War had arrived there before
them, to make the last arrangements; and they went to
the Elysee for their final orders.
The result of the vote was totally unexpected ; the,
proposition of the (Nesters was rejected by a majority of

JUNE 20, 1857.

more than a hundred votes ! It was then a quarter to
eight o'clock. M. liouher (one of the Ministers) an-
nounced the vote at the Palace of the Elysee, where the
decision of the Assembly was waited for sword in hand.
The unexpected result, however, put an end to all the
preparations for resistance. " Perhaps it is better that it
should be so! " replied the Prince ; and his physiognomy
immediately resumed its customary serenity.

On this fearful state of things M. do
Cassagnac remarks :
There was not a man of sound mind who had not long
entertained two convictions : the first was that France
could not remain in the situation in which she was with-
out perishing; the second that it was impossible to save
her by constitutional means. The President of the lle-
public was literally besieged, especially at this moment,
by combinations proposed by the most important men of
the monarchical parties, all of which resolved themselves
in various forms into a violation of the Constitution and a
coup•d'etat.

In verity, these monarchists were right—
nothing but a coup-d'etat was possible—nay,
one could not have been avoided if peuple
would. But still the Prince President was
anxious not to be obliged to make one
alone :

Faithful to his oath, as jealous as ever of the title of an
honest man, the President of the Republic felt repng•
nauce to any combination which should not give him the
free, spontaneous cooperation of a legal majority. if
the Assembly would have consented either to revise the
Constitution, or to make an appeal to the people, the
Prince would never have accepted or sought fur other
means.

And y et—
The time visibly approached—the moment was not far
off when the necessity of saving the country would im-
pose itself in an irresistible and fatal manner. The
preparations of demagogy were imminent in France and
Europe, and the eye of the Government watched that
intensive, violent, and subversive society which had
formed itself in the midst of the country. It was almost
publicly established and organised, with its governmental
committees, its orders of the day, its finances, its soldiers,
its arsenals, its powder-magazines. Each of us could
elbow it as we walked along, see its projects, listen to its
menaces, and feel its muskets close to our breasts. It
publicly divided our houses and fields amongst its ad-
herents, and in its songs named the heads that were to be
struck off.

On the other hand, society found danger even in the
great bodies charged to conduct and defend it. Thus the
legislative power, dissolved by anarchical passions, was no
longer for the Executive Government—a counsel, but an
adversary—a support, but an obstacle—a help, but an
enemy. It did not moderate the Government—it led it
astray; it did not limit it—it encroached on its powers ;
it did not restrain it—it suppressed it. The press, too—
that useful intermediary between the Government and the
people, destined to second the former and instruct the
latter, and to place at the service of both the study and
the counsels of intelligence and patriotism—was a prey to
the general confusion. It no longer instructed public
opinion—it misled it; it no longer supported the Govern-
ment—it undermined it ; it no logger restrained society
—it excited and rendered it furious; it was no longer an
instrument of progress and civilisation, but an agent of
anarchy and civil war.
The spectacle of these accumulated dangers made a
profound impression on the mind of the President of the
Republic, and matured every day his resolution to save
society. He had said in one of his speeches, " France
shall not perish in my hands!" and if legality refused
him its means, he was obliged at the last moment to re-
sign himself to the employment of others.
We now arrive at that part of the book
which is most important in an historical point
of view—namely, that which details the pro-
positions for coups-detat actually made by the
chiefs of certain parties. It is well known,
indeed, that thosel personages, owing to the
war of annihilation waged between different
political sections, considered the overthrow of
the Constitution indispensable for the sal-
vation of France, though they differed as to
the best means of effecting it, and as to the
consequences it was to be made to produce ;
but our author is the first who has given
authentic accounts, derived evide•atly from the
highest authority, of what they really pro-
posed. He says :
The necessity of a coup-d'etat, accomplished under one
form or another, was recognised by all those who desired
to see order and good government seriously re established
in France. That it was possible to attain this object, by
the means set forth in the Constitution, no one believed.
Unanimous as to the necessity of escaping by an energetic
and decisive measure from the bonds of legality, politi-
cians only varied on the character of the measure, and on
the means of accomplishing it. It was thus that, during
three years of the Presidency of Prince Louis Napoleon,
the most important men of the party of Order imagined,
suggested, offered, with a view to a restoration of the
Government, schemes differing on several points, but
agreeing as to the result, which was in definitive the
violation of the Constitution At the
head of these men were General Changarnier, M. Tillers,
Count Mole, M. de Mortewart, M. de Montaleniliert, anti
M. de Falloax.

THE PRESS.

He then goes on to tell us that General
Changarnier was the first to conceive the idea,
not only of a coup-d'etat, but of re-establishing
the Empire. This the general did, so far back as
the 29th January, 1849, a day on which the
Red Republicans had planned a grand outbreak,
but which they were prevented from creating
by the vastness of his military preparations.
Ho then, it seems, recommended the re-estab-
lishment of the Empire, but the President did
not think such a measure opportune, and the
general was vexed :
The Commander•in•Chief of the Army of Paris did not
disguise the regret which the moderation of the Prince
caused him, and the day after, he said in his apartments
in the Tuileries, in the midst of his officers, " The Presi-
dent has lost a fine opportunity ! He is wrong, for he will
perhaps never have such another one :"

M. Thiers' plan was to prolong the powers
of the President for ten years, and it, too, dates
from l 84) :
He formally expressed to his friends the necessity and
propriety of prolonging by ten years the duration of the
Presidency. "1t will cause," said he, taking the arm of
one of them," a terrible journJe in Paris, but it is just and
indispensable, and I am resolved on it!"
Count de Mole went much farther—and our
readers will notice that M. de Cassagnac states
that a most sagacious and distinguished
statesman of England, whom they hold in
peculiar veneration, shared his opinion :

In 1850 he was impressed with the necessity of re
establishing Imperial institutions. He spoke of it, not'
only to his friends in his own house, but to his colleagues
in the Sall. des Conferences. When the Socialist elections
of Paris of the I(th March, 1850, had cast a dark veil on
the future, Count Mole hesitated not on the remedy neces-
sary for such great evils. "We must reestablish the
Empire," said he ; " that alone can rescue us from this dis-
order. I have," he added, "iu my pocket a letter from
Lord Lyndhurst which expresses the same opinion ; as
for myself, it has long been mine."

In September, 18M, the Count summoned a
meeting of the chiefs of the monarchical
parties at his chateau of Champlatreux, and a
coup-d'etat was the subject of discussion:—

The basis of the arrangement discussed was the re-elec.
tion of the President of the Republic, the establishment
of two Chambers, and energetic measures against
Socialism. Nevertheless no precise form of execution was
decided on; and when the scheme was submitted to the
President of the Republic, he could not, though appre-
ciating the motives which had dictated it, pay much atten-
tion to it on account of its vagueness.

In November, 1851, some of the leading men
of the Assembly—M. de Montalembert, M.
Daru, M. Fould, M. Quentin-Bauchart, and
others—held a meeting, at which they dis-
cussed a coup-d'etat, consisting of the re-elec-
tion of the President, the establishment of
two Chambers, &c. M. de Montalembert, the
Duke de Mouthy, and the Duke de Mortemart,
in the name -of a number of representatives,
proposed to the President a coup-d'etat con-
sisting of an " appeal to the people." Another
group of representatives—headed by M. F.
Barrot, M. Le Verrier (the astronomer), M.
Dumas (the eminent chemist), and others—
proposed a coup.d'etat consisting in " an ap-
" peal to the people," the prolongation of the
President's term of office, and two Chambers.
M. de Falloux, nn the very day preceding the coup
detat of the Prince President, proposed one to
that illustrious personage :
M. de Falloux, unlike M. Berryer, did not share all the
illusiona that were entertained as to the prestige of the
Assembly. M. Berryer saitl, on the Ist of December—
" The l'rince will never dare to do anything against the
Chamber; the chiefs of the army are not on his side, and
if he were to try to make the troops attack this Assembly
he would not find four men and a corporal to obey him !"
But M. de Falloux, on the contrary, believed in the ap-
proaching eventuality of a coup-d'etat, as also in its neces-
sity and success. He, however, supposed that it was neces-
sary to give the Assembly the patronage, the initiative,
and the direction of it. He caused the Prince to be told
on the evening of the Ist December that, if he would
attempts coup-d'e tat with the majority, he offered for his
own part to ascend the tribune to strike the first blows
and to appeal to his political friends. As logical and
practical as he is resolute, M. de Falloux added that he
would follow the Prince to the end, even to the length of
employing force, if the Montagne carried resistance so
far. In return for this offer of co-operation, M. de !Falloux
demanded the composition of a Ministry formed of all the
eminent men of the majority, which should take the en-
gagement before entering office to prohng the powers of
the President of the Republic.
The Prince remarked that it was rather late for such
combinations . . . but he said to M. de Heeckeren. who
was the intermediary employed by M. de Fallon:, " I am
enchanted with the good news you bring me. I am, how-
ever, occupied at this moment. Come to see me to-morrow
morning at ten o'clock, and we will talk the matter over !"
The next day the coup-d'etat of the President was struck,
nud I. do 4egykeren west t 9 We Elpiie, not to discuss

the proposition of M. de Fallon; bat to thank the Prince
for having saved France !

Thus, even supposing that the situation of
the country had not imperatively called on the
Prince to make a coup-d'etat, he would have
been justified in doing so by the number that
were planned by the majority. But it may be
asked, why did ho not associate the majority
in his coup•d'etat? Our author answers the
question :

Because none of their plans responded to the wishes or
the wants of France. If the Legislative Assembly, sincerely
united to the Executive Government, and rejecting the
schemes and rivalities of the cld political parties, had con-
sented either toan appeal to the people to modify the Con-
stitution, or to a concert with the President of the Repub-
lic, so as to pass without a catastrophe through the dreaded
crisis of 1852, the energetic and supreme measure of the
2nd December, 1ti.51, would not have taken place. It was
therefore solely the salvation of society which influenced
the Prince in his determinations.

To have suddenly re-established the Empire in 1810 or
1850—when the spirit of the Assemblies had not deprived
the Executive Government of all reasonable hope of ca
operation, when the revision of the Constitution had not
been refused to 3,000,00 petitioners and 80 Councils.
General, when the proposition of the Questors had not
menaced the Elect of the People with a coup•de•main and
France with a Convention—would have assuredly responded
to the expectation of the immense majority of the country,
but it would have been prematurely to adopt violent mea
sures, before having exhausted those of a pacific nature.
To have addressed an Appeal to the People in the
name and with the co-operation of several men who were,
no doubt, important and honest, but who were divided on
fundamental principles of doctrine, and smitten with
various governmental combinations; to engage with them,
with their opinions and theirpreferences, at least in a certain
measure; to hind in advance, by anticipated engagements,
the form which the country in the free disposition of itself
might give to institutions; would have been to restrain the
spontaneity of the popular wishes, and imprudently
embarrass the future with the reserves of the past.
Such were the constant principles of the President of
the Republic and his fidelity to his sworn word, that any
encroachment on legality which he might resolve on
making must necessarily present the double character—
first, of being imperatively commanded by public safety ;
and next, of rendering the French people the complete and
absolute disposal of their own destinies.
It was for these reasons, as just as they were dis-
interested, that the President cf the Republic refused any
decisive measure before being reduced to it by the most
evident and the most urgent necessity; and it was for the
same reasons that, though touched by the patriotic designs
conceived towards the end of November by neatly two
hundred representatives, he did not think it advan-
tageous to the country to associate himself in them, and
to carry them out.
We must reserve to another number the
relations of M. de Cassagnttc concerning the
manner in which the coup-d'etat was executed,
and the circumstances by which it was
accompanied.