The Press.
London, England, 1854-08-19 00:00:00

Alla-138T 19,185.4. THE PRESS.

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN.

Tin military performances of 1854 may doubtless
present an inglorious blank to the historians of Eng-
land and France. Months of time and millions of
money have been spent in preparations ; the sinews
of every department connected with war, or its
etathriel by land or sea, appear, at all events, to have
been strained to the utmost. There has been no
lack of spirit among our soldiers or seamen, of libe-
rality on the part of Parliament, or of loyal sympathy
in the cause for which we are supposed to be fighting
among the public at large. But, with all this effort
and all these agencies, our governing powers have
not yet succeeded even in getting an armed force
"into position." The weeks are growing few during
which it will this year be possible for anything to be
done in the way of active hostilities, but still we can-
not. learn that the armies—or the fleets either—
have arrived at the points where they can even at-
tempt to do anything worthy of their numbers, their
valour, or their antecedent renown.
Not, however, to follow this melancholy theme, let
us turn to a more inspiriting side of the year's his-
tory. If, on our part, the war has progressed to its
present stage without producing a single achieve-
ment,
if it has proved negatively discreditable to our
leaders or the Government which instructs and
shackles them, it is some consolation to reflect that
our Russian enemy has fared worse—that the results
of the campaign on his side have been actively disas-
trous. Now that the Russian army has finally
evacuated Wallachia, we may indeed ask what object
it was intended to obtain on the right bank of the
Danube, and what the result of its operations has
been, except to lose 20,000 men by pestilence or
battle ; to devastate the Danubian provinces ; to de-
velop the warlike spirit of Turkey in an unexpected
degree ; to summon an an Anglo-French force into
the Euxine and upon the Danube ; and to commit
Russia to all the contingencies of a war which is daily
becoming more serious ?
The Russians crossed the Pruth in July lastbear.
They had already established themselves in force
upon the banks of the Danube, when the Porte, in
September, took the bold step of declaring war.
Eleven months of actual hostilities have, therefore,
already elapsed, and during this interval the Russians
have had plenty of time for striking a great blow,
even before the approach of the combined auxiliaries,
who did not arrive near the scene of warfare until
June last. It was not, indeed, possible for them to
repeat the campaign of Diebitsch, in 1829, by march-
ing from Varna to the Gulf of Bourgas, because the
allied fleets kept the Russian squadron blockaded in
Sebastopol; still there should have been found a plan,
a goal, or, as strategists say, an "objective point,"
for the campaign. Now, throughout all the Russian
movements during the eleven months, there is
nothing to be discovered approaching to a definite and
consecutive plan of operations.
It appears that at first and during some consider-
able time the Russian generals were endeavouring
to operate upon their extreme right, with the intention
of crossing the Danube at Widdin, and marching
upon Sophia, in order to turn the line of the Balkans.
For this purpose they fomented an insurrection in
Servia against the Porte, and directed the great mass
of their forces upon the left flank of the Turks. As
for provisions, they were brought down the Danube
from Hungary or Servia, and thence conveyed by
land carriage from Bulgrade towards Nissa or Sophia.
The plan, no doubt, would have required two armies
to carry it out effectually ; one for cffensive opera-
tions, the other to besiege or blockade the
Turkish fortresses on the Danube. Nevertheless, it
was not only formed, but persevered in to some ex
tent, as was evidenced by the masses of troops con-
centrated at Bucharest and at Crajova, in Little Wal-
lachia, points which in the six campaigns that oc-
curred between 1808 and 1829 had played only
secondary parts, and been garrisoned by little more
than a few troops, comprising in all some four or five
thousand men. In the campaign of 1853 4 the
same district was occupied by two entire army corps.
The Turks had, however, fortified Kalafat upon
the Wallachian lank of the Danube. Instead of at-
tacking this place promptly, and forcing its garrison
to retreat across the river before the works were com-
pleted, the Russians, by some unaccountable procras-
tination, afforded them time to surround this small
town with formidable fortifications, which afterwards
resisted all their attempts to capture it. The Turks
possessed no other fortress on the left bank, but it
was considered too important to be left in the rear of
the Russian line of operations, and the first-formed
plan of campaign was accordingly abandoned.
Thenceforward the Russians appear to have had
no other system than that of occupying the whole
r ine of the Danube, without pushing their operations
across that river. Meanwhile, the Ottoman army
had become organised with a rapidity truly wonder-
ful: the tactics of European warfare had at last
taken root among its forces. The regular troops ri-
valled those of Western nations in closeness of order
and obedience to command ; and the irregulars, though
almost undisciplined, were useful skirmishers, after

the model of the Cossacks. Their leaders, well aware
that they were not sufficiently skilful in strategy to
give battle in the open field, confined themselves to
defensive operations and to fighting behind walls.
But there is an immense difference between an inert
defence and an active defence, with offensive sallies.
These last the Turks have incessantly renewed at
. .

every opportunity and with extraordinary spirit.
During the winter of 1853-4 they encountered the ene •
my in frequent skirmishes, and have never relaxed
to the present moment in the system of perpetual,
though partial, assaults. Often have they contested
the possession of different small islands in the Da-
nube between Rutschuk and Giurgevo. At one time
the intelligence of such engagements reached us by
almost every post, and some of them were sufficiently
important to be described in magniloquent bulletins
by the Russians. Ultimately, however, in spite of
boasting, the invader was almost reduced to a nega-
tive course of action, fortifying himself in Bucharest
and Giurgevo without attempting further progress.
The war then presented the singular spectacle of two
opposing armies both acting strictly on the defensive.
The initiative of all the offensive movements was
almost invariably taken by the Turks. Among the
numerous battles which they have subsequently
fought, the most important were those of Oltenitza,
Citate, and Karakal. At Oltenitza they accomplished
a daring passage of the Danube in the face of the
enemy, and maintained themselves for a fortnight in
field entrenchments upon the left bank, retiring only
upon the approach of formidable Russian masses, but
without disorder,and prudently avoiding to compromise
the only Ottoman army in a general engagement. At
Citate, the garrison of Kalafat, in a vigorous and well-
executed sortie, overwhelmed the besieging division
of the Russian army. At Karakal, upon the Aluta,
in Little Wallachia, a corps of Russian cavalry was
also discomfited with the loss of all its artillery. Still
more recently the Turks took the offensive at Giur-
gevo, on July 7 captured that town, and fought a hot
battle which did much honour to their military prow-
ess. No doubt the Russians have on their side ob-
tained advantages in many partial engagements, but
they have obtained no result at all proportional to
their boasted superiority in discipline, in strategy, or
in the manoeuvring with artillery and cavalry.
Once more the Russians seem to have changed
their plan of campaign, and adopted one which is at-
tributed to the Emperor Nicholas himself, who com-
manded in person in the campaign of 1828, and
which Prince Paskiewitch was now instructed to
carry out. He began by contracting the front of the
army, which had previously been extended along a
line of eighty leagues, from Kalafat to the Lower
Danube. Little Wallachia was then abandoned, and
the forces concentrated upon the left, so as to occupy
the Dobrudscha as far as Trejan's Wall, with the
view of undertaking the siege of Silistria, according
to the programme received from St. Petersburg. It is,
however, not easy to assign the precise motive for at-
tempting this siege. By taking Silistria the Rus-
sians might, doubtless, have obtained a good tite-du-
pont upon the Danube; but any chance of turning it
to account for the invasion of Turkey, as in 1829,
was utterly frustrated from the moment that the al-
lies had commenced their disembarkation at Galli-
poli. It appears, therefore, that Silistria was besieged
merely to make an impression upon the European
public, and to prevent the long campaign from ter-
minating without the performance of some striking
achievement. But the garrison of the fortress de-
fended themselves with heroic constancy for thirty-
nine days. Every assault of the besiegers was baffled,
—even against the advanced earthwork of Arab Ta-
bia, where no less than four set attacks were de-
feated among the ruins of the entrenchments, which
had been nearly obliterated by two mines and the fire
of thirty pieces of cannon. Omer Pacha prudently
remained during this siege in an attitude of observa•
tion at Schumla, watching the progress of events, in
readiness to act, but relying with justice on the ob-
stinate courage of the defenders. The Anglo-French
army at this time began to arrive at Varna, where
50,000 men were soon assembled, with fresh rein-
forcements expected or received almost daily. Pre-
sently Marshal Pa-liewitch, being wounded, resigned
the command, and the Russian army retreated with
much precipitation from Silistria. The commenced
evacuation of Wallachia, the sudden and purposeless
return of the Russians upon the line of the Danube,
and the renewal of the retrograde movements are
events of very recent occurrence. A few days since
Bucharest was quitted, after a useless and costly oc-
cupation of a whole year. Thus, at the close of a
most menacing invasion and an enormous develop-
ment of force upon the Danube, the Russian Cabinet
is now reduced to keep the defensive on its own ter-
ritory, where great events seem on the eve of accom-
plishment.

A PLEAURE TRIP to the Baltic has been set on foot
by a Glasgow speculator. A steamer will be dis-
patched from Glasgow about the 25th inst., will call
at Copenhagen, Stockholm, and the station of the
fleet, returning in three weeks.

to operate upon their extreme right, with
of crossing the Danube at Widdin, a
upon Sophia, in order to turn the line of
For this purpose they fomented an ii
Servia against the Porte, and directed ti
of their forces upon the left flank of th
for provisions, they were brought dowi
from Hungary or Servia, and thence
land carriage from Bulgrade towards Ni
The plan, no doubt, would have requir
to carry it out effectually ; one for cli
tions, the other to besiege or 1
Turkish fortresses on the Danube. N
was not only formed, but persevered ii
tent, as was evidenced by the masses I
centrated at Bucharest and at Crajova,
lachia, points which in the six campa
curred between 1808 and 1829 hat
secondary parts, and been garrisoned
than a few troops, comprising in all sor
thousand men. In the campaign a
same district was occupied by two enti:
The Turks had, however, fortified
the Wallachian Sank of the Danube.
tacking this place promptly, and forcii
to retreat across the river before the WI
pleted, the Russians, by some unaccoui
tination, afforded them time to surrou
town with formidable fortifications, wh
resisted all their attempts to capture it
possessed no other fortress on the left
was considered too important to be left
the Russian line of operations, and th
plan of campaign was accordingly abai
Thenceforward the Russians appeal
no other system than that of occupy
line of the Danube, without pushing tl
across that river. Meanwhile, the
had become organised with a rapidity
ful : the tactics of European warfar
taken root among its forces. The regi
valled those of Western nations in clo:
and obedience to command ; and the int
almost undisciplined, were useful ski