The Express.
London, England, 1855-01-16 00:00:00

OUR WAR DEPARTMENT.

Tat information from the allied camp before
Sebastopol, respecting the condition and achieve-
ments of the besieging army, is ample and accurate.
But the reports relating to the Russian forces from
that quarter are singularly incorrect. Nothing
appears to be known in the French or English camps
of the numbers of the enemy opposed to them, or of
the generals by whom they are commanded. This
might psis without notice in the great body of the
soldiery (officers and privates), and the hangere-on
of the camp; but it is certain that the Commander
in-Chief has been left almost as entirely in the dark
on these heads as the youngest drummer-boy
in his army. On the morning of the .6th
of November Lord RAGLAN was entirely unac-
quainted with the tremendous effort by which the
Russian division, whose arrival encouraged MENT.
canton, to attack the position of Inkermann, had
been brought up from the north. Yet the dialocation
at Russian troops by which this movement was
effected was the common talk of the diplomatic
circles in Berlin—and some other German courts—
almost as soon as it began to be made. That MEET-
calion had written a vaunting letter to the Ea-
PlllOll, as early as the 25th of October, stating that
he had now as strong a force as he desired, and that
in ten or twelve days he would compel the Allies to
re-embark under every disadvantage, wu known at
Berlin early enough to have admitted of the in-
telligence being transmitted to Lord RAOLAN,
by telegraph and express, in sufficient time to
put him upon his guard. Why was this not done by
Lord BLOOMFIELD ? It is the duty of our imbues-
dors at foreign courts to communicate all important
news to each other. If this information had been
despatched to Lord STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE, there
can be no doubt that it would have immediately been
forwarded to the Crimea. Did Lord BLOOMFIELD

keep the Foreign Secretary in ignorance as well as
our Minister at Constantinople, and the Cora-
mander-in-Chief of the Crimean Army ? Or did the
Duke of NEWCASTLE, after he had received the in.
formation from the Foreign-office, coolly wait till
the coarse of time should declare the results of the
Hunan movement', without even attempting to
forewarn Lord ItiotAs of what was impending ?
The blame of the omission rests between the Minister
of War, the Foreign Secretary, and our Ambeasador
at Berlin. One or all of them must have been guilty
of a gross neglect of duty.
In truth our Ministers, who are more especially
charged with the management of the war, and our
collective diplomacy, seem to give themselves won-
drous little trouble about this same army that we
have in the Crimea. We do not mean to recur at
present to the extent to which the care of providing
orenforts and even necessaries for the army has been
kit to non-official and individual enterprise; we
speak of the utter and wanton neglect of the most
common precaution' to keep our Commanders in
the Crimea informed of the number and nature
of the forces opposed to them. What was known
at Berlin of the movements of the Rusin
army prior to the surprise of Inkermann was known
at Vienna, and Lord WESTMORELAND appears to
have been as dilatory in forwarding the information
to heed-quarters as Lord Bwomnr.Ln. Again, our
♦mbasador at Constantinople is (or ought to be) in
constant communication with our connlar and other
agents in Turkey and on • the Black 846. Ham any
attempt been made to turn the sources of information

to which those gentlemen have access to account in
the way of procuring information respecting the
movements of Russian troupe? Divisions of armies
cannot be marched across extensive tracts of country
with the same secresy u a few bales of silks or chests
of tea are smuggled. The process of collecting
stores of provisions and the means of thin-

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