The Press.
London, England, 1854-12-02 00:00:00

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success hereafter, he could yield only as the
conquered Monarch of a young, a mighty, and
an ambitious empire, which has never yet
accepted defeat as a basis of pacification.
The Opposition will, we conceive, be en-
titled to ask, and the country to learn, by
what unfortunate combination of circum-
stances it is, that the golden opportunity
which presented itself of seizing an advantage
from which peace might fairly have been ex
pected to result, has been so totally lost,—and
how it is that, for the last eighteen months at
least, every act of a Government warmly ex-
pressing its desire for peace, has only led to
new complications, and involved us more
inextricably in war. Every pound saved in
the outfit of the Crimea expedition iu the
first instance may cost us hundreds or thou-
sands, and for every man the Ministry stinted
to send forth then, the necessity may be laid
on us of furnishing a battalion.
One consideration alluded to by a corre-
spondent in this journal last week is not to be
passed over. If we overlook the impolicy of
sending out an insufficient force for so great
an enterprise, what is to be thought of its in.
humanity ? British troops are not to be con-
quered, but they are to he slain ; and to ex •
pose them to such fearful odds as they have
lately had to contend against, is to command
them to sacrifice their lives for no better object
than to prove their heroism.
There are some practical points upon which
we conceive the country is fairly entitled to
explanation from the Government, as, while
they remain unexplained, it is impossible to
place the slightest reliance in the discretion
or ability of the members of Administration.
And, in the first place, how came it that the
purpose of the expedition wan distinctly an
nounced several weeks before it was in a con-
dition to sail ? It would be easy to show, from
the practice and express declarations of the
latest and greatest masters in the art of war,
NAPOLEON and WELLINGTON, that they esteemed
secrecy as to the destination of their arms the
most essential requisite to success. But we
do not press this point; we urge only that ex-
planation should be given of the agency by
which a public print is placed in possession of
those important decisions of the Cabinet which
it is for the interest of the public should
remain strictly secret. In cases like this one,
to give information to the public is to give it
to the enemy. Should it be alleged, as it has
been, that the failure of the expedition is duo
to the reserve of Russia on the strength and
movements of its armies, what a reproach is
cast upon the giddy imprudence of a Cabinet
which openly boasts of its intentions long be
fore it is prepared to carry them into effect !
If this system is to continue, no member of
the Cabinet will consider silence on its deli-
berations a part of his duties, and there will
be a race which shall first gain discreditable
notoriety by making them public.
Next, the country is surely entitled to know
why the work of reinforcing our army in ear-
nest has been delayed until winter has set in.
Our troops will not only now depart under every
disadvantage, and with exposure to the casual-
ties of storm and wreck. but will arrive at the
Crimea at a season when, in all probability,
the active operations of warfare must perforce
be suspended, and will have to remain cooped
up on hostile ground throughout the try-
ing months of winter. It cannot be pretended
that the Government were ignorant of the diffi-
culties to be encountered after Alma. What is

being done now might have been done with
far better effect then. AVhy the delay? Was
the Ministerial mind taken as the measure of
the mind of the country, and was it supposed
that nothing but the last extremity of danger,
nothing but the imminent peril of the remnant
of our army being driven from the heights of
Balaklava into the ocean, could induce this
great—we speak in truth, not in flattery—this
generous and magnanimous nation to recog-
nise the necessity of exceeding Mr. GLAD-
STONE'S estimate ?
Again, it was evident from the moment
that the difficulties of the enterprise became
known—and no one could be so fully aware of
them as her Majesty's Government—that our
troops must winter in the Crimea ; yet not
until winter has actually set in, with unusual
severity, was there a thought of provi-
ding our soldiers with shelter and clothing.
The wooden houses which have just been
ordered to be built can hardly arrive be-
fore Christmas ; and we hear of no means
being taken for supplying the troops with
sufficient fuel, which most necessary article
we know cannot be obtained in the Crimea,
and the want of which, by the latest accounts,
was severely felt. If these obvious duties
were neglected at a time when there was
ample leisure for preparation, we can hardly
expect that they will be ade►luately performed
now, when the whole energies of our rulers
are absorbed with matters of even greater
moment. NELsoN said once that the secret of
all his success in life consisted in his ever
being half an hour before his time. It is the dir.
tinctive characteristic of our Ministers that in
all which concerns the safety of our army,
and the success of our enterprises, they are
months too late. Totally destitute of fore-
thought, they acknowledge the necessity of
providing against evils only when their pre-
sence is felt with irrestible force.
Other objects will demand the serious con-
sideration of Parliament. When Austria took
possession of the Principalities by virtue of a
treaty with the Porte, which our Ministers
acknowledged they were cognisant of, it was
supposed that that Power must have relations
with France and England which would gra-
dually bring her into close alliance with their
policy But it is now found that she was
permitted to occupy the Danubian provinces
without stipulations of any kind, and that she
is endeavouring to turn the advantages of her
position to purely selfish ends. Should this
have been allowed? Was it politic to allow
Austria to gain the position she ardently de-
sired without forcing her to declare her ulti-
mate intentions ?

LONDON, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 2, 1854.

THE time is near at hand when the country
will expect a temperate but clear and firm
expression of its sentiments from the voice
of the Opposition in Parliament. We per
fectly admit the truth that an Opposition has
responsibilities,—it has also duties, and it
grieviously fails to perform them, when it
omits to take account of governmental errors
most adverse to the interests and most dan-
gerous to the safety of the country.
Since the Parliament was prorogued, the
most important event of the last forty years
has occurred. An expedition has been sent
forth for the capture of the great military and
naval stronghold of Russia in her southern
territory. Through causes yet unexplained,
that expedition has proved too weak for its
object, and has been unsupported by any
reserve. The country expected that a deci-
sive blow would be rapidly and successfully
struck, which by convincing our enemy of the
great superiority of the allies—not only by sea,
but on the mainland, when they chose to
concentrate their forces for attack—would
induce him to desist from a contest which he
must feel to be hopeless, and willingly accept
terms of peace which would require from him
no greater sacrifices than sufficient securities
against further aggression. That was the hope
entertained, and had the expedition been of
sufficient force to achieve its object, our
moderate expectations might possibly have
been fulfilled.

But, because it was resolved to confine the
war within the narrow limits of petty capaci-
ties and economical theories, the expedition
was sent forth in insufficient numbers, imper-
fectly equipped, and without that reserve of
strength which would have enabled it, without
rashness, to act with daring vigour. The cau
Lion of WELLINGTON has been practised by
Lord RAGLAN, but he has never had the com-
mand of a force which could have enabled
him to emulate the nobler part of WELLING-
TON'S genius, and strike his foe with the cele-
rity and force of lightning. instead of being
able to prove his superiority in the field against
the Russians, he has been compelled to fortify
himself from their attack. Whatever may be
the issue of this expedition, the results ex-
pected from it three months back can never
be realised. On the favourable supposition
that in the end, after a vast expenditure of
life, we prove completely successful, the con-
test must be embittered by the very continu-
ance of this deadly strife, and a quarrel, essen-
tially diplomatic in the first instance, will be
changed into a war of national hatred. The
Emperor NICHOLAS might, without humilia-
tion, have yielded to the surprise of an over-
whelming force, but, on the supposition of our

We are admitting the produce of our enemy
without let or hindrance, and thus supplying
him with financial means to indefinitely pro-
long the war. Is Parliament prepared to
sanction a continuance of this system?
We are much mistaken if the country, in its
present temper, would submit to any display
of factious temper either in Parliament or out
of it. But it requires fairly to be informed of
the principles on which the war is to be con-
ducted ; and it demands an assurance of
vigour, capacity, and earnestness on the part
of those entrusted witlt the powers—at this
time practically unlimited—of Government. It
cannot afford to overlook vital errors in tho
past, as only from the known conduct of the
Administration can a judgment be formed on
its fitness to deal with tho great emergency
which has arisen.