The Express.
London, England, 1855-07-05 00:00:00

OUR ARMY IN THE CRIMEA.

(FROM OUR SPECLAL
[The following letter from " Oar Special Correspondent "
was received too late for pnblicatlos yesterday; and, with
the letters of "A Special Correspondent" and "Oar
Disables Corespondent," given yesterday, completes oar
series of coasenioatioas frost the Crimea to the 23rd alt.].
CAMP ABOVE SEBASTOPOL, Joss 23.
Nothing of importance has occurred in the siege
operations since the assault of the 18th. That event,
with all its exciting incidents, the wild rush of its
attack, the murderous fire from the enemy's guns,
and the heavy loss it entailed on us, has been upper-
most in every man's thoughts. It would be idle to
attempt to conceal the fact, that a feeling of depres-
sion has been generated far and wide by the result.
Not that this feeling has arisen out of the failure
itself—that is only a temporary matter : the despon-
dency has been caved by the circumstances with
which it was attended. The want of due precaution,
proceeding either from unwarrantable confidence or
wrong information, and the irreparable sacrifice of
life which followed in consequence : these are the
sources of the general sadness. What affliction it will
cause in England! has been in every one's mouth—
just at the tame, too, when having gained the whole
seaboard of the Crimea, with our armies in the high-
est perfeotion, people at home must have been looking
for news of some glorious ashievement pointing to a
probable termination of the great undertaking.
Had it been an ordinary failure, had the plan of the
assault been well conceived and as well carried out,
the obstacles considered and provided for, the want
of moons would have been more tolerable, for every
assault must be attended with a certain amount of
risk and uncertainty of issue ; but, as far as can be
ascertained by those not in the secrets of authority,
neither the feasibility of the operation had bees
sufficiently weighed in its details nor was the best
opportunity for its execution selected.
According to report the plan originally spud
upon between the allied commanders was that the
fire of the batteries should open at daylight, more
especially against the intended points of attack, and
that after three or four hours' bombardment—after a

sufficient effect had been produced on the enemy's
work', and all his spare troops had been removed to
a distance from the immediate scene of action—the
assault should be suddenly, at a given signal, insti-
bitted. At a late hour, however, in the evening of
the 17th instant, General relisier sent to Lord
Raglan to say that reasons of a very urgent nature
would compel him to assault at daylight, and
that he trusted the British troops would
be ready to do the same on their side.
This was assented to, it being understood
that the Redan was not to be attacked by the Eng-
lish until the Malakhoff hill had been gained by
the French. Two reasons are put forward to so-
count for this change of plan. One is, that the
French attacking force was so numerous that after
daylight it would necessarily be exposed to the
enemy from want of sufficient cover in the trenches
and works about the Mamelon Vert ; the other,
that General Folksier had received notice of an in-
tended attack on the part. of the Russians, and that
he was anxious to anticipate it. The alteration al-
luded to was not known generally in camp. When,
therefore, the musketry fire opened just at break
of day in front of the Mamelon, it was attributed to a
sortie from the Russians ; and when the French
were seen going up towards the Malakhoff works,
it was supposed that, having repulsed the sortie,
they were induced to follow up the advantage and
carry on the attack in turn against the Russian
bulwarks in front. Such was the opinion among
the French troops, who were, equally with the
English, under the impression that the assault was
not intended to be made till 7 or 8 o'clock. But
it is now said to be a matter of doubt whether
the Russians made any sortie at all, whether the first
fire was not from the Russian advanced sentries
when they perceived the French troops, who had
taken the initiative, coming up the hill. In either
case the influence on what followed woald be much
the same, whether the French advanced in come-
, , quence of following up a sortie of the enemy, or
spontaneously according to a predetermined plan.
The preliminary bombardment was set aside.
There seems to be no doubt that, in spite of the
ebgfire from the batteries and ships, thi fire of
crowds of Russian riflemen above and the
onetent explosion of mines beneath, some of the
French troops were for a few minutes actually within
the enemy's works; not merely within the mud
battery on the right, but within the bastion immedi-
ately in front of the Round Tower ruin. This it
was, perhaps, which induced the general entrusted
with the command of the important operations
against the Redan to give the signal for the assault.
It was immediately acted upon by Colonel Yea, com-
manding the troops of the Light Division, who were
to attack the left face of the Redan ; the troops
of the Fourth Division, who formed the storming
column under Sir John Campbell against the right
face, followed shortly afterwards. It is said that the
column of the Second Division destined to attack the
salient angle, not expecting the assault at that hour,
did not perceive the signal until after the hopeless-
nese of the attempt had been decided, but, whatever
the cause, this column did not attack. Had the troops
done so, it could have only added to the loss of
life, and in no way to the probability of a favour-
able issue. The events which on the instant followed
the first appearance off our troops in the open ground
fa front of our trenches, exposed at once the in-
superable difficulties they had to encounter. A battery
of au guns in a hollow between the Redan and
Malakhoff Tower was placed in such a position as to
be able to sweep the sloping ascent in front of the
Roden over which the troops were compelled
to pus to reach the work. No attempt
had been made by our artillery to silence
this battery : amid the efforts made to subdue
the guns of the larger works, this small
work had been overlooked. This is the more extra-
ordinary, as it had been employed by the enemy to a
considerable extent when the Quarry works were
taken, and subsequently against the working parties
engaged in extending them. Then the Russians
had not got the exact range, and many of the dis-
charges of shot whistled past over head, bat now
they had profited by their experience, and every shot
told with deadly effect. The earth was seamed up
by the unceasing flanking volleys which these guns
sent across the Roden hill. From time to time the
dust scattered in the air as they tore up the ground
was so great, that the soldiers could not see the
Italian before them. It is asserted that Colonel Yea
at first starting perceived the slaughter that must
ensue if the assault were persevered in, and its
inevitable result, and that he took steps to
arrest it at coos He called for a bugler,
with the intention of sounding to retire, but
no bugler was at hand. In a few minute.
too many of the troops were over the parapets
and in advance to attempt to put off the attack.
Colonel Yea fell just before reaching the &battle. He
was hit in two plum, and his death must have been
instantaneous. The abattia was found to. be quite
perfect: it had evidently been repaired and
strengthened the night before. The timber used in
its formation was very strong, was not only sank in
the ground, but was also pegged down, so as farther
to prevent its being dragged up; the projecting
branches were pointed, and every opening between
the forks and stems, through which there was a
chance dumping, had been sedulously stopped. The
Russians had been heard during the night working
near the Roden, and the circumstance was reported
to the proper authorities ; from the sounds, as of
driving es, it was supposed they were construct-
ing i • ' within the work. Captain Shamir,
of the 34th ~ was killed while attempting to
make an opening in the &battle by hackng the
palisades with his sword. Of the few men who
reached the abatis, some attempted, by lying down,
to seek shelter from the fire until reinforcements
arrived. But it wee plainly seen that to send rein-
forcements was only to send more men to destruction.
The Malakhcif works had not been carried. The
ditch 'O2l the Redan wee deep and broad—there was
no trace ol a breenb, every embrasure of the Rehm
had its gun pouring town a deadly discharge of
the parapets were crowded with the Rumen=
men two and three dsq, the teen told off for carrying
the ladders had boss-Mod or wounded, and the
heavy Mb= thesseshies were scattered in all direc-
tions. Two ellessol laskans, Captain Jesse and
Limiter estentveetwith Am two ahem were killed,
and Liolowit awry womb; Ise wathiwg two

I

mained but to give up the attempt. Sir Jo—
beuplln,
earwhloy,
oCnoelonbodelyYtoptea, 11:der,alsowisadetrratio:i
the storming column, and the supports which hod
n
head when approaching the abattie in front of the
right face of the Redan, and killed on the spot, Tu
ground wu strewed with the dead and woundedoe.7
gamy of the latter, unable to gain shelter, were
struck where they had fallen by the fire -"I
the
rocs
Redan and flanking works.
On the left, the troops of the Third Division ode
Brigadier General Eyre, who were to attack, to teet.
art with the French, the Garden Batteries, bed
'awned towards the Cemetery near the 41 tg
South Harbour. This oemetery, which is on the unk....
aide of the Harbour Ravine, just where the Vim;
soff road bends round to ascend along the left shoe
of the port, is at the foot of the hill, on the his
ground of which the ruins of the theatre and othe
buildings stand, and a little way beyond, towsids the
town, the Garden batteries. Our men met with et&
siderable opposition at the cemetery. The Ruth*
riflemen from above, and some fieldpiece. loaded with
grape, continued to pour down a destructive fire,
after the cemetery had been cleared of the mos
General Eyre was leaning against a small obelitit:
when a round shot struck it, and the frsf.
ments of stone so severely injured him that he het
to leave. Subsequently, after his wounds trete
desseed4the general returned to take command of the
operations. Several houses beyond the w.,
were taken possession of, but the French had at
moved on the left, and it was therefore impossible
advance against the batteries. The French hsdist4
moved because they saw that the Roden was set
gained; and even could the Garden Batteries pose
been carried, they could not have been held without
the fire of the Barrack Batteries and Redan bliss
first silenced. General Eyre could not withdraw his
force, for on all sides they would now be exposed to a
galling fire, and he wu compelled therefore, notwith.
standing the enemy wu throwing down shell on the
houses of which they kept possession, to wait anti
ds:knees arrived to cover his retreat. The loss ese
very severe ; one regiment, the 18th Royal hid',
lost considerably over two hundred men in killed sot
wounded. After night had fallen, the troops vacated
this position—a fact of which the Russians did not
appear to be aware, for they took no steps to seam
lit. The next day, when the dead were being batted,
mound,, under Major Chapman, °Nerved th
gro and at night large working parties woes.*
to throw up the necessary cover, and to connect it
with the French advanced works on the left, and cm
works on the Greenhill attack. This position vow
remains in our possession.
The houses seized by our men had been previously
occupied, and were well furnished. Various articles
of female apparel were scattered about. The garden
were full of fruit-trees, and the yards abounded ia
poultry. Being a suburb, as it were, and in a shel-
tered position, these dwellings had escaped the de.
dentition which had been inflicted on the buildings
on the summit of the hill.

The returns of our losses show a less amount of
casualties among the men that it was feared would
be given ; bat still the number returned is above
fourteen hundred. The loss in killed and wounded
among officers is greater than was anticipated, being
eighty-three. The wind rose after the engagement
had taken place, and toward noon almost amounted
to a gale. Dense clouds of dust were swept by, and
several of the wounded seized this opportunity to get
back to our trenches without being seen by the
enemy.
Among those who miraculously escaped was Lint..
Colonel Lysons of the 23rd Regiment. He had been
originally selected to lead the attacking column el
the Light Division, but late at night preceding the
attack, this officer was placed in command of the
supporting party, and Captain Owilt, of the 34th
Regiment, was appointed to head the assault. The
supporta, however, moved almost at the same time es
the attacking column, and Colonel Lysons was one of
the first and few who reached the Omni& He
escaped with a wound of the knee, fortunately not at
a serious character. Out of twelve officers of the
34th Regiment who went up with the four hundred
men selected to make the assault, only two escaped
altogether.
Early in the afternoon of the 19th instant a flag
of truce was hoisted from our works, but was not
replied to by the Russians. It remained an hour, and
was then struck. Shortly afterwards a white flag
appeared on Fort Constantine, and a communication
took place by boats. It is presumed that the ar-
rangements of the truce were then settled, for at 4
o'clock the white flag again appeared on all the works
in front of which the dead were lying. A chain of
cavalry was drawn across the ground in rear of
the British position, to prevent any from
going to the front who were not on duty
in burying or conveying the dead to camp.
Parades were ordered in the several Divisions, to
prevent the soldiers leaving the camp. Several per.
sons however, who had gone on advance previous to
the arrival of the cavalry, went to the front, and had
an opportunity of examining the ground where the
contest had taken place. The Russians threw out a
line of sentries immediately in front of their works,
a precaution which was not adopted on our side, bat
was not necessary, as none of the enemyadvancedbr
yond a certain limit, which appeared to be settled to
be neutral ground. Oar dead lad not been stripped;
their arms and accoutrements had alone been taken

from them. The bodies of Sir John Fainibell and
Colonel Yea were found a short way from the abattis.
The body of Lieutenant Graves, Royal Engineers,
most gallant young officer, was also
discovered at the
very front. The Engineers suffered severely. Captain
Jesse, who wu killed, had only arrived three days in
the Crimea. Lieutenant Murray, who was doing
duty as captain, has since died from the effect of his
wounds.

During the armistice a series of rank mines, similar
to those in front of the Malakhoff Tower and Redo,
were discovered in front of the old Russian rifle pit
which was taken at the same time with the Quin,
works. The mines had been placed by the enemy in
front of this pit, between it and the end of one of the
boyans of our old advanced work. These mines were
taken up and removed without injury to anyone.
Away from the immediate scene of the siege opea
rations the most important event has been the advance
of the Sardinians, together with about 400 of our 10th
Hussars from Tchorgoun towards Lhutor Mackenzie.
They are now about four miles and a half in advance,
near &village marked in the maps Chulin. Mackenzie's
Farm is said to be very strongly fortified.
Several of our general officers are on the sick list
Major-General Estoourt has been seized by a dan-
gvrons attack of cholera. Lieutenant-General Brown
has also been confined to his house by illness. Major-
Generals Codrington and Pennefather have bees
compelled to leave camp from the same mule. Captain
Savage, Royal Artillery, died yesterday, after a veil
short illness, from cholera.