The Press.
London, England, 1858-05-22 00:00:00

THE PRESS, MAY 22, 1858.

caulay's criticism may be likely to mislead the
Professor's remarks will be serviceable. But
there was a great deal more to be made out of the
subject than this. Had our author taken up the
topic by itself, and made it the basis of an essay
on " Correctness in Poetry" generally, he would
have done yeoman's service to the cause of modern
literature. What ifford did for the Della Cruscans,
what Jeffrey did, to excess, for the " Lakers," what
Lord Macaulay did for the author of " Satan," that
it is high time some equally popular pen per-
formed for the Spasmodics. fo rescue the true
canons of taste from the mass of verbiage under
which critics of the romantic school have buried
them, would have been a task worthy of the Pro-
fessor of Latin Literature in the University of
Oxford. An essay upon Pope from the point of view
we have indicated would have afforded an excellent
opportunity of doing so ; and none who observe
the moderation and the elegance which is wasted
on the present essay can fail to regret that the
same idea did not occur to Mr. Conington.
With regard to the absolute position of Pope as
a poet, no inquiries can be of any value at the
present day which do not refer largely to the
character of the age in which he wrote. All
poets are more affected by their age than their
age is by them ; but Pope was peculiarly so.
Some of his highest gifts were literally bent
backwards by it. Where nature prompted him
to soar, circumstances compelled him to stoop.
The imagination which flashed out in that noble
conclusion of the " Dunciad " was forced to un-
congenial work in the "Essay on Dian," and
compelled to find relief in mock heroics.
The Spirit of utility seized upon him, pressed
him into her service, and ultimately turned him
out one of her most effective soldiers. But his
native fire would break out at times, and with
sufficient heat to convince us that though the
poetry of Pope must be ranked in the second
class, the poet himself belonged to the first.
Lord Robert Cecil's paper on Parliamentary
Reform is short, but greatly to the point. It
is simply a criticism on the different schools of
Reformers at the present time, which he makes
three in number, the Educational, the Demo-
cratic, and the Symmetrical. The essay through-
out is purely of a negative character ; and
though the objections to each theory are stated
with great precision, the noble author does not
attempt to offer any counter-suggestions of his
own. All, however, that he has undertaken to
do he has done well; and in the present state of
public opinion to point out the dangers which lie
in our path is a more useful action than to excite
the people by new and imposing schemes to set
those dangers at defiance.
Before, however, we give any further account
of this essay, we would beg his lordship to con-
sider whether any good is really likely to result
from such language as he has employed in his
two introductory pages ; e.g.:—

In politics, at least, the old antithesis of principle and
expediency is absolutely forgotten : expediency is the only
principle to which sincere allegiance is paid
The only principle upon which, in the present day, any
thinking politician really acts, is " the greatest happiness
of the greatest number."

Now, we must maintain that the antithesis be-
tween principle and expediency is one that can
never be forgotten, either in politics or anything
else ; not, at least, until the antithesis between
science and empiricism, between the law and the
instance, between sufficient and insufficient in-
duction, is forgotten likewise. While, in the next
place, what but the ultimate benefit of the
human race was ever supposed to be the end of any
principles whatever ? The only difference of
opinion relates to the mode of securing it. Some
people would produce that happiness by giving
the populace every toy they cry for. Others
believe that certain restraints upon them arc
likely to produce more happiness in the long
run. Some think the many should govern the
few; others that the few should govern the many.
But all agree that it is the welfare of the many
that is the ultimate end of either system.
To proceed to particulars, we may say briefly
that his lordship's objections to the educational
franchise are as sensible and practical as his
appreciation of its theoretic propriety is candid
and generous. Still, when he says,—

It is hardly necessary to dwell upon the still deeper
objection which the number of persons excluded raises to
any scheme limiting the intellectual or educational consti-
tuencies to the professions. The professions may be
highly intellectual, but they do not contain a tithe of the
intellect of the t;cuntry. To intrust to theta the office of

487

representing it would neither do justice to it, nor be fair to
the far greater number whose claim to such a privilege is
equally good—

he leaves out of consideration the test of a
University degree. We do not mean that we are
in favour of such a test, but only that this part
of his lordship's essay would have been more
complete had he adverted to it. One defect which
has struck him in the working of our geographi-
cal constituencies is curious:—

The popular idea is, that class representation would
produce class legislation. The truth is exactly the reverse.
The ides seems to be that by distributing a class in frag-
mentary portions among a number of constituencies you
neutralize its power, and make it harmless by dilution;
just as has been sometimes done with a mutinous regiment.
But, in point of fact, it is this very distribution which
gives it such an enormous power of obstruction. Few
members in these days hold their seats with such certainty
as to be able to disregard the wishes of any tolerably influ-
ential section of their constituents. The section may be a
small one, but it may be strung enough to turn a close
election ; and therefore its behests must be obeyed. A
small section thus wields the power of the whole consti-
tuency ; much in the way in which, some six or seven
years ago, the Irish members tried to wield the power of
the English Government. No one can have watched the
utter impotence of Parliament to raise its hand against the
attorneys or the licensed victuallers, or the extreme diffi-
culty with which even so small a body as the ecclesiastical
lawyers have been dealt with, without perceiving how
eflectively these tactics operate. Now, if any such class
had a number of members proportioned to its importance
wholly given over to it, and were debarred from auy other
suffrage, their power in the House of Commons would be
limited to that number of members. Whereas, now they
command, or at least greatly influence, the vote of every
member, of whose constituency some of them form a part ;
and from this position it is impossible to dislodge them,
until some popular ferment arouses the inert mass of the
electors to overbear the active and interested few.

The observation is acute. Yet it must be re-
membered, on the other hand, that the power
thus wielded by minorities may perhaps be their
only safeguard against far more serious wrongs
than any which they at present inflict. We fear
that any one of the classes mentioned by Lord
Robert, if possessed of no more influence m Par-
liament than resulted from the number of mem-
bers that could be accorded them, would meet
with little forbearance from their natural enemy,
the public. Just as, according to Lord Robert,
it is only the indirect influence which they exer-
cise at elections that saves " the upper ten thou-
sand " from immediate spoliation.
This last remark conducts us naturally to the
school of Democratic Reformers. The essayist
notices five arguments usually adduced by the
disciples of this school—which are, Ist, the sic
min sic jubeo of the people ; 2nd, the supposed
indissoluble connection between an extension
of the suffrage and Liberal principles ; 3rd, the
idea that it would put a stop to the abuse of
patronage; 4th, the position, that taxation im-
plies representation; sth, the greater loyalty and
contentment of a people who are admitted to a
large share in the Government. To each of
these arguments his lordship replies with skill
As we have not space to quote him upon each,
we shall offer a specimen of his answers to the
third and fourth of these positions:—

How will favouritism be arrested by the transfer of
power from one class to another? The causes of it are
the human frailty which makes men prefer the welldoing
of their relatives to the public weal, joined to the necessity,
it may almost be said, under which the Minister of a
representative Government lies of bartering patronage for
votes. Are men more pure from these frailties in propor-
tion as they descend in the grade of society ? Would the
selection of our rulers from the poorer instead of the
wealthier section of the population secure us a distribution
of patronage on the score of merit alone ? I imagine that
a very slight acquaintance with parochial affairs would
convince a fair inquirer that a preference for the interests
of their friends whom they do know, over those of the
public whom they do not know, is not confined to aria.
tocrats. It is, however, undoubtedly true that, if corrupt
appointments are to continue to exist, it is not fair that
they should exist for the benefit of any single class, and
that the poorer classes would certainly share iu their
fruits if a large transfer of political power was made to
them. Perhaps this is Vie view taken by the Administra-
tive Reformers ; and the real definition of Administrative
Reform is a fairer distribution of the spoils of corruption;
and in that case they certainly are right in pressing for
an extension of the suffrage. But, otherwise, the connec-
tion in their minds between the two is utterly mysterious.
It can only be classed among the baneful delusions with
respect to Reform which used to prevail thirty years ago,
when so many of the working classes were led to look
upon it as a panacea for commercial, manufacturing, and
agricultural distress, and every other conceivable evil to
which the body politic is liable.
Again : _ _

Generalities are vague and hazy. Let us confine our
attention to one particular section pt the electorate of
England, and see how, in that selected constituency, the
eaisting system [succeeds in niakint3 representation coesteu


sive kith taxation--setting aside, as I have said, the case of
those who are excluded from the franchise. Let the con-
stituency be somewhere in the metropolis—say Finsbury
or the Tower Hamlets. There is a great capitalist who
possesses an enormous revenue—say of 200,0001. a year—
and pays taxes in proportion. It would not be difficult,
apprehend, to append several names to this description.
This capitalist possesses a single vote for each representa-
tive of his borough ; he can possess no more. He is sur-
rounded by twenty or five and-twenty thousand ten•pound
householders; any one of these possesses as much in-
fluence in the councils of the nation as he does ; auy two
of them, though they be publicans not making 501. a year
between them, are more powerful than he is. Setting
aside the measures which originate in our religious dis-
putes, Parliament exists almost exclusively for the purpose
of regulating taxation and guarding property, as any one
may see by turning to the statute-book of any single ses-
sion. And yet 501. may possess more influence in Parlia-
ment than 200,0001. It may be proposed to abolish
Customs and Excise, and to exempt a large section of the
smaller incomes from direct taxation. Of course the capi-
talist would resist such an attempt to lay the burden of
the national expenditure on himself and his wealthy fel-
lows, but he would be outvoted and overborne by the
grocer and the publican next door. Or it might happen
that the country was cursed with a wasteful or a warlike
Minister, and all the capitalists in the City might groan
in concert over a commerce stifled by some punctilious
quarrel, and their own enormous payments to the Exche-
quer squandered in costly armaments; but they would be
outvoted and overborne by thousands of ten-pounders,
who, with little to lose whatever might chance, and few
taxes to damp their vicarious courage, would merrily throw
up their caps for " a vigorous and energetic prosecution
of the war.' And this superiority of two men with 501. to
one man with 200,0001. is not confined to any single
category of wealth.
'rhe landholder and the manufacturer, though disturb-
ing causes to which I shall presently advert have
secured to their wealth its due consideration in the Legis-
lature, are, according to the theory of the Constitution, as
much in the hands of the poor ten-pounders as the
capitalist or the merchant. The poor voters are numerous,
the rich voters are few ; and the few voters are absolutely
and entirely at the mercy of the many. On the other hand,
a very large proportion of the taxes—it is impossible to tell
how large—is levied frrm the rich. Therefore, as the
theory stands, it is the poor man who levies the taxes and
spends the taxes, while to the rich man is reserved only
the privilege of paying. It is poverty that settles how
property shall be bled. The State is a joint stock com-
pany to all intents and purposes. It is the combination of
a vast number of men for well-defined objects—the preser-
vation of life and property. But it has this monstrous and
unheard-of peculiarity, that it is a joint-stock company in
which the shareholders vote, not by shares, but by heads.
True, that every one has invested, so to speak, his life in
the concern, and that the lives of all are equal ; but, over
and above this, every one has invested hie property, and
properties are not equal ; and the legislation, to carry on
which the votes are given, is almost entirely concerned
with the security and rights of property. That the share-
holders should vote by numbers, and not by their share in
the concern, is a principle which any man of business
would at once dismiss as iniquitous and absurd. No
joint-stock company could adopt it without an absolute
certainty of failure. And yet it is the principle on which
the existing theory of the Constitution proposes to raise
equitably r revenue of sixty-four millions, and to guard the
property of the richest nation in the world.
Lord Robert Cecil's argument against the school
of " Symmetrical Reformers "—the men, namely,
who ground their demand for Reform on the
anomalies of our present system—is, that at pre-
sent one anomaly counteracts another, and that
to remove one without removing all would
destroy the equipoise which does confessedly exist
now. For instance :

That an inhabitant of the obecnre town of Thetford
should in reality be the most powerful voter in England
—that he should alone be more powerful titan eighty-two
Manchester voters, or eighty-four Liverpool voters, or one
hundred and twenty-nine Tower Hamlets voters—is. no
doubt, very startling But it will not be hard to
point to anomalies and changes in the other direction
which are quite as glaring, and which, to say the least,
fully rectify the balance. The most notable of these are of
two kinds—those which affect the relative positions of
counties and towns, and those which affect the relative
position of the wealthy and the poor.

Lord Robert then proceeds to give that mon-
strous disproportion between the town and county
representatives with which all readers of THE
Pt{Kas are familiar, and afterwards proceeds as
follows:

Ilitt the political defencelessness to which property is
reduced by the uniform suffrage is a far greeter anomaly,
and one that more than outweighs any advantage that
property may derive from the irrcAulnrities of the franchise.
Property is very unequally divided in this country : those
who are in easy circumstances are comparatively few ;
those whose struggle for a livelihood is close and constant,
are the large majority. Many legislative questions, but,
above all, that of taxation, give frequent opportunities for
one class to ease itself by the spoliation of the other. As
the needy are ever the readiest for plunder, and the rich
are the most tempting victims, it should have been the
special care of the law to protect the rich from the
inroads of the needy. Nor would snail a protection be
a reflection upon the poorer classes any more than the
institution of a police. The law has no right to leave
open the path to crime, in the generous confidence that