The Press.
London, England, 1854-12-16 00:00:00

tt,6 Alf).

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1202

Now, my lords, having touched upon those ques-
tions mentioned in the Royal Speech which have no
reference to the war, I proceed to that much more
important and all-engrossing topic to which the
greater portion of the Speech from the Throne is de-
voted ; and, in the first place, I must be permitted to
express my cordial concurrence in the language
which is now in the Speech with regard to the hearty
and efficient co-operation of the brave troops of our
ally the Emperor of the French, and in the hope
which her Majesty entertains, as well as in the con-
viction which she expresses, that common dangers,
common perils, common glories, and common inte-
rests may cement more strongly the alliance which
happily subsists between the two countries. (Loud
cheers.) My satisfaction at this recognition on the
part of 'her Majesty is increased by the knowledge
that that recognition is approved by Ministers, who
not very long ago entertained very different views.
(" Hear, hear," and a lough.) I rejoice to think that
that passage in her Majesty's Speech has been con-
curred in by the right hon. baronet the First Lord of
the Admiralty and by the President of the Board of
Control. (" Hear, hear," and laughter.) I rejoice
also that the noble earl at the head of the Govern-
ment can feel and can acknowledge that there is a
great and important advantage to be derived from an
intimate alliance between this country and France,
although the destiny of France may not be swayed by
the house of Orleans. ( Hear, hear.)
The Royal Speech refers to the gallant and cordial
co-operation and the entire harmony which have
prevailed between the troops of our ally and those of
our own army, as well as to their heroic achievements.
Private and public accounts concur in showing us
that two nations, which for many years had been ac-
customed to regard one another with feelings of
enmity, have not only laid aside altogether those
feelings of enmity, but, side by side, are rivals in
glory and brothers in arms on fields similar to those
where they formerly encountered one another es foes.
breast to breast and hand to hand. As upon those
occasions former experience led each to respect the
valour of the other, so present experience leads them
to regard each other as brothers in arms, engaged in
a rivalry without jealousy in the accomplishment of
a common object, each doing honour to the courage
and bravery of the other, and animated by a common
feeling of glory. Words must fail to express the
debt of gratitude which this country owes to those
gallant and devoted men—( Loud cheers)—but doubt-
less comfort and satisfaction will be carried to many
a gallant heart when the assembled Parliament of
England record their admiration of the deeds and
their gratitude for the services of our gallant troops.
My lords, when I remember that, of that numeri-
cally small army which was sent out from this coun-
try a few months ago, probably not one in 100 of the
privates, and probably not one in ten of the officers,
had ever before heard a shot fired in anger; when I
remember that they went forth, at the first outset of
their campaign, to pine away in inaction, and that
their ranks were thinned by disease—morally depress-
ing, if anything could depress their indomitable cou-
rage ; when I remember that an army composed of
such materials, so weakened, so dispirited, was led to
invade the dominions of a powerful enemy—having
carried with them nothing but what was absolutely
necessary for their march, and hardly sufficient for
their equipment and provision ; when I remember
that such a body of men, under such circumstances,
found themselves in front of a force numerically su-
perior, intrenched upon heights, fortified with all
the skill and all the power which the might of Russia
could supply, and fortified upon ground the natural
difficulties of which were such as to impede even an
active man in the ascent, although not checked by
the enemy ; when I remember that these heights
were bristling with batteries, from which shot and
shell were poured, which mowed down the ranks of
our men as they ascended that glorious but blood-
stained hill; when I remember that, in the face of
numbers not inferior to their own, against all the
difficulties of position, against all the opposition of
the most powerful artillery, they advanced, weakened
in numbers, falling by scores, but the survivors closing
their ranks and pressing forward with indomitable
courage ; when, under these circumstances, hand to
hand, that body of men who had never before heard
a shot fired repulsed a veteran army from a position
so fortified, from which it had been the boast of
Russia that no army could dislodge them in less than
three weeks, while this great success was achieved by
our raw army in the course of three hours; when we
remember that, within a fortnight afterwards, the
position of our men being changed, they being the
besieged instead of the besiegers, they were assailed
by an army seven times their number; when we re-
collect that our troops were called to the conflict
from successive and continuous labour at the in-
trenchments, suffering from cold, from privation,
from hunger, in some cases from all but nakedness;
when we remember that they were placed under the
disadvantage of a surprise in the darkness of a foggy
morning; when I find that these men, who won the
heights of Alma in the course of three hours from a

THE PRESS.

numerically superior army, resisted the assault of an
army seven times stronger than themselves, and for
eight hours maintained the unequal contest, some-
times even without ammunition, our troops on those
bloodstained heights being reinforced and supported
by a portion of their gallant allies ; whenl remember
these deeds of arms—ay, and even the unfortunate
but astounding charge made by our gallant cavalry
—I say that no words can do justice to the merits of
such brave and heroic soldiers. (Cheers.) I say that
when we read the history of that campaign—when we
read it, not as politicians, but as men and as English
men—(cheers)—there cannot be a heart that does
not throb with honest and generous pride that these
much-enduring, all-daring, all-achieving men were
our countrymen—(renewed cheers)—that they were
British subjects like ourselves—(loud cheers)—and
there is hardly an eye from which a tear will not
spring unbidden when we reflect that so many of
them are numbered with the dead. (Hear.) But I
will only dwell upon that portion of the subject
which relates to the glory which that gallant army
achieved ; I will not dwell upon the sacrifices they
have made, or the sufferings they have endured.
Their country will remember them. Their country
will know how to value those who still remain; and,
whatever may be the honours and rewards by which
this country can show its gratitude to those who, in
such unequalled circumstances and under such
serious difficulties, maintained, upheld, increased the
glories of the British flag, those honours and those
rewards will certainly be granted with no niggard
hand —(loud cheers)—but with universal approba-
tion, and with the cordial consent of a grateful
country. ("Hear," and loud cheers.)
While I am speaking of honours to be conferred
upon our own gallant officers and men, I know not
whether I am going beyond the limits of parliamen-
tary license, and trenching upon that which is the
prerogative of the Crown, if, when, at the head of
the army of our allies, there is a general who has
acted with ours in the most cordial and uninter-
rupted harmony, by whose advice we have benefitted,
by whose assistance we have largely profittecl—l know
not whether I am making a suggestion which I ought
not to make, when I say I am satisfied that nothing
could be more grateful to the feelings of the British
army and of the country at large—nothing, I think,
would be more due to the gallantry and cordiality
with which the whole of the French forces have
supported ours throughout this great contest than—
if it were possible—to confer upon General Canro-
bert some mark of military honour. ("Hear, hear,"
and cheers.)
I have now attempted to do justice to my own
feelings with regard to the merits of this gallant
army, and with regard to the sacrifioes and priva-
tions which it has had to contend with. I wish, my
lords, that I could here close the observations I have
to make, and I hope it may not be considered incon-
sistent with the determination with which I started
of endeavouring not to disturb the unanimity of
your lordships, when I say that it will be necessary
for me to comment to a certain extent upon what
appears to have been some of the shortcomings of
the Government in the mode in which they have
conducted the war. My object, however, is not so
much to revert to the past, as to insure attention for
the future. lam deeply sensible, my lords, of the
responsibility attaching to every man who upon this
subject utters an opinion, and I am most especially
anxious that not a word should fall from me which
might savour of exaggeration with respect to our
apparent losses and the difficulties which our army
has had to overcome. lam also anxious that not a
word should fall from me which could give the
slightest encouragement to that powerful adversary
against whom we are at war, and against whom we
ere determined to contend to the utmost of our power,
even to our last man. (Hear, hear.) Nor do I
intend to cavil at those minor details in which a
better and more effective arrangement might have
been made, though I must be permitted to say that
when her Majesty's Government, in order to insure
the more effectual carrying on of the war, received
the assistance of an additional Secretary of State,
relieved from the charge of any other department,
and charged alone with the superintendence of the
war, we might have expected that greater attention
would have been paid to these minor details, that
there would have been less omissions, and that
better provisions would have been made for carrying
on the war than in any former war in which this
country has ever been engaged. ("Hear," and
cheers.) But, my lords, lam well aware that there
must be omissions in carrying on any service of so
extensive a character, and I am not disposed to cavil
at minor details, or to enter into discussion upon this
or that matter in which I think abetter arrangement
might have been made.
My complaint against the Government is this—
that they have from the commencement, and before
the commencement of war, lived, as it were, from
hand tomouth—(Hear, hear)—that they never anti•
cipated in due time the contingencies of the struggle
in which they were about to engage, that they never

SATURDAY,

considered the greatness of the undertaking upon
which they were entering, and that they never made
adequate and timely provision to meet, not the con-
tingent exigencies of the day, but those exigencies
which the fortune of war rendered inevitable. (Hear,
hear.) One of the first maxims of war is to leave is;
little as possible to chance—to be prepared against
every possible contingency, and to make those pre-
parations—extravagant if you will, but certainly on
such a scale as to prevent anything going wrong---tinm
having the effect of deranging the whole plan. I
cannot but entertain a doubt, however, knowing the
unwillingness and reluctance with which her Ma.
jesty's Government permitted themselves to be
dragged into the war—l cannot but entertain a doubt
whether they had among thein any statesman capa-
ble and disposed to take a sufficiently comprehensive
view of the great and important interests involved in
this war, and of its mighty consequences and require-
ments, or that, if there was such a man, he was not
able to impress the reflections of his own mind upon
those of his colleagues. From the very first to the
very last, there has been apparent in the course
pursued by her Majesty's Government a want of pre-
vious preparation—a total want of prescience; and
they have appeared to live from day to day providing
for each successive exigency after it arose, and not
before it arose. (Hear, hear.) " Too late" have
,been the fatal words applicable to the whole conduct
of her Majesty's Government in the course of the
war. (Hear, hear.) We were " too late" in our
declaration of war. (Hear, hear.) We were " too
late" in deciding that the passage of the Pruth was
a calms belli in the first instance. We were " too
late " in sending our troops to the Black Sea, and
we were too complaisant to the Emperor of Russia,
who thanked us for refusing to act in concert with
our French allies and send a fleet into the Black Sea
at a time when the French thought it desirable. Our
co-operation then would have been of immense im-
portance, and our non-compliance extorted thanks
from the Emperor of Russia as neutralising to a
great extent the action of our allies. We were " too
late," my lords, in declaring the war, we were " too
late" in entering the Black Sea, and we allowed the
massacre of Sinope to take place. (Hear, hear.) At
that time the Turks were under the pledge of pro-
tection from this country, but in the teeth of a power-
ful armament Sinope was taken and destroyed ; the
Turkish fleet was destroyed in its own waters, and we
were standing idly by, not at Sinope, but in the Black
Sea; and, for the purpose of co-operation, were either
powerless or unwilling to interfere in time. (Hear.)

And, my lords, when we did go to war, what was
the course pursued by her Majesty's Government?
It was thought flt—l know not for what reason—but
it was thought fit, in the year 1854, to bring forward
a financial budget at an unusual period, the 6th of
March. On the 6th of March the financial budget
was brought forward, and, though war was not de-
clared until the 27th or 28th of March, it was pro-
posed to take an increase of something like 10,000
men in the army, and I think a small increase was to
be taken in the navy. And what was the calculation
the Chancellor of the Exchequer made for the pro-
bable additional expense to be incurred in conse-
quence of the war ? The calculation was 1,250,0004
being an expense of 501. for th transport of 25,000
troops. And where' To meet the Russians? To
defend Constantinople? No ; but to Malta and back
again. ("Hear," and a laugh.) This was the de-
claration of the Chancellor of the Exchequer—
namely, that the intention of the British Government
was to ask Parliament for the means only of sending
25,000 men to Malta and back again, and for such an
object the income tax was to be doubled for half a
year. These were the provisions made upon the Bth
of March, in reference to which, when proposed in
the House of Commons, it was said—" When Russia
sees these preparations she will, indeed, be aware of
the energy and determination, the vigour and decision
with which this country is about to carry on the war."
(" Hear, hear," and a laugh.) Why, my lords,
when the Emperor of Russia read that declaration,
he could but come i o one conclusion, either
that the British Government were gulling Paha-
ment and imposing upon British credulity, or that
they were not really in earnest. ("Hear," and
cheers.) These 25,000 men might go to Malta and back
again ; but as to interfering with any of the military
operations of Russia that was impossible. Now, my
lords, what was the force that was sent out' One
remembers—and remembers with mingled feelings
of satisfaction and regret—the mustering of those
gallant men—the elite of the British army, from.
25,000 to 30,000 strong, who were sent from this
country, and with regard to whom the Govern-
ment took the greatest possible credit for the un-
paralleled exertions they had made in sending out in
the course of se short a time—namely, in the months
of March, April, and May, and to the beginning of
June—so numerous a force. Ido not deny the exer-
tions of the Government, and I do not deny that
during those three months the utmost activity pre-
vailed in every department ; but is the sending o!it
of an army of 30,000 men from a country like this

DECEMBER 16, 1854.

an achievement to be looked upon with national
pride? Ido no:, deny the activity which prevailed
during two or three months, but why was not that
activity anticipated by two or three months ? (Hear,
hear.) What did you do ? You sent out from 25,000
to 30,000 men, and having done that you held your
hands and said, " We have done all that is necessary."
Yon exhausted every available means to send out
these 25,000 or 30,000 men, and you then had to depend
upon a raw militia and to your recruiting power for
making a slight increase to the army. And when you
sent out these men in conjunction with the French
army did you suppose that neither disease, nor the
sword, nor casualties would have the slightest im-
pression upon that small force of 25,000 ? (Hear,
hear.) If so, where were your Mediterranean garri-
sons? Why were they not increased beyond their
ordinary and very insufficient strength? And where
was your second army of reserve ? Hear, hear.)
Where were your reinforcements' You had them
not. You had nothing in the shape of an army of
reserve except the reserves you had in England,
which were unavailable in case of disaster, and con-
sequently you launched forth your army to depend
upon its own resources without sufficient provision
being made for them, or due foresight exercised
upon the part of the British Government. ("Hear,
hear," and cheers.)
Perhaps it may be said that the object for which
the troops were sent out was the defence of Con-
stantinople and the support of the army of Omer
Pacha, in preventing the Russians from penetrating
further into the principalities. Setting aside the
very subordinate condition in which that hypothesis
places the British army, I say that, from the first,
that was not the declaration of the British Govern-
ment of the intention and object of the war. Nor
was it possible for the war to be limited to such an
object. I remember that on the 19th of June, in
answer to my noble and learned friend, who is not
now in his place (Lord Lyndhurst), the noble earl
opposite declared, as he had declared before, that
the object of the war was not merely to afford pro-
tection to Constantinople, but to settle at once and
for ever that question of Russian supremacy which
had been growing in importance for years, not to say
centuries—which had been forced upon us, and
which was to be settled once and for ever. (Hear,
hear.) That was the declaration made by the noble
earl on the 19th of June, and it was made in almost
similar terms on the 31st of March, the day on
which the Queen's message announcing the declara-
tion of war was delivered. It may be said that when
the principalities were relieved from Russian inva-
sion the whole course of the campaign was altered—
that, in fact, the allies assumed the offensive, and
gave up the defensive. I can understand that argu-
ment, but I don't admit it, because I consider that
before the siege of Silistria was raised you were
bound to ulterior objects, to attain which a force of
25,000 men was entirely inadequate. (Hear.) But
when the siege of Silistria was raised, what had you
to say ? The siege of Silistria was raised about the
23rd of June, the Turkish troops had been victorious,
and by their own unassisted efforts had repelled the
invaders, who, from strategical reasons had retraced
their steps and withdrew from the principalities.
Then, my lords, some alteration of your course fol-
lowed upon that altered state of affairs, and indeed
we have from the declaration of the Government them-
selves, an intimation that towards the middle of July
the expedition to the Crimea was decided upon. The
President of the Council on the 24th of July made a
most remarkable statement in the House of Commons,
in which he declared that there could be no hope of a
just and honourable peace so long as Russia was
permitted to hold the menacing position she occupied
in Sebastopol. (Hear, hear.) I remember that
when a noble and learned friend of mine referred to
the conduct of the war and to an expedition to the
Crimea, the noble earl at the head of her Majesty's
Government reproached him as indiscreet, observing
that he was only affording the Emperor of Russia an
opportunity of fortifying and strengthening the works
of Sebastopol. I don't think the Emperor of Russia
required any such warning. On the contrary, he
seems to have been much more alive to the
exigencies of the case than her Majesty's Govern-
ment, and for years he seems to have been incessantly
labouring in fortifying Sebastopol, and rendering it
as impregnable as possible.
Well, my lords, on the '24th of July, Lord John
Russell, in the other House of Parliament announced
that Russia could no longer be permitted to hold her
menacing position in the Crimea, and we knew, from
the explanations that took place at that period, that
an expedition to the Crimea had been decided upon.
And decided upon by whom ? It was decided upon
by the Government at home. I have here a state-
ment made by the noble earl opposite (Earl Gran-
ville) to the Staffordshire yeomanry, at the beginning
of October. He said :
Government did not conceal from themselves the great
responsibility of their urging on the commanders of both
services an attack upon Sebastopol ; they were not ignorant
of the opinion entertained by many distinguished officers