The Press.
London, England, 1858-06-19 00:00:00

THE MILITIA.

Tux people of this country, we think, rather like
to be frightened. The pleasing excitement of a
gentle panic is never wholly unwelcome to them.
What a ghost story is to a schoolboy, rumours of
wars are to the British public—a thing which
they cannot make up their minds either to
believe or to disbelieve—an idea at which they
shudder, but which, nevertheless, has a strange
fascination for them—which they pore over, like
the aforesaid stripling over the " Mysteries of
Udolpho," till they are frightened at their own
shadows; yet, at the same time, would scarcely
sacrifice the stimulant thus afforded to the imagi-
nation to be rid of all the terrors that dog them.
Now, nothing is further from our purpose than
to encourage this morbid appetite. All that we
propose to say on the subject now before us is

irrespective of the circumstances of the moment.
We have said the same thing whenever the
same question has arisen during the last two
years. And the justice of our remarks has been
only strengthened, and not caused, by the war
in China, the rebellion in India, and our diffi-
culties with the kingdom of Naples.
It would seem incredible, did we not know it
to be the case, that any man of sense should
have supposed that, with the fall of Sebastopol,
Europe would return into precisely the same
state that she was in before the Russian war.
So great a convulsion as that by which a forty-
years peace was broken up, could not fail to
leave disturbance behind it, even when the
storm was over. The swell and heave of the
ocean does not subside at once with the gale
that caused it. A war at once so short and
so vigorous as that which was two years ago
concluded leaves behind a large residuum in the
shape of unsettled minds and unsatisfied pro-
jects. And even had the Indian outbreak not
taken place, it is our firm conviction that no
English Minister would have been doing his
duty who neglected to provide for a permanent
reinforcement of our military re sources.
Under present circumstances there cannot, of
course, be two opinions on the subject. But we
have penned the above observations from a sin-
cere hope that the Commission alluded to by
Lord IIARDINGE on Monday last will conduct its
inquiries without exclusive reference to the
existing tax upon our energies. A commission
to inquire into the best method of utilizing our
Militia force is a step in the right direction, and
a fresh evidence of the practical and energetic

character of Lord DERBY'S Administration. We
are certain that the statement of Lord HARDINGE
will give universal satisfaction to the country.
But we must repeat our conviction that the
labours of the Commission will be only half as
fruitful as they might be, if they do not lead in
the direction of some perm anent settlement re-
specting this useful and truly national arm of our
def ences. An emergency has elicited the Com-
mission, but the work they have to do is inde-
pendent of emergencies. And from the tone of

581

the various speakers last Monday, we may con-
clude that the House of Lords in the main saw
the question in the same light.
The principal point to which Noble Lords
directed their attention on that occasion was
whether the Militia should be regarded as a
reserve force or as a nursery of recruits for the
Line. Those who, like Lord GREY, seem to object
to this iiirce altogether strive to reduce its
advocates to the following dilemma. If the
Militia, they would say, is to be a reserve force,
it interferes with the regular army; if a recruit-
ing establishment, it is more costly than the
ordinary system. Now, in the first of these
statements there appears to be a double miscon-
ception. In the first place, few men go into the
Militia who would, in its absence, have gone into
the Line, and, consequently, the men so enlisted
are so much clear gain to our military strength.
In the second place, the Militia, be it remem-
bered, is as serviceable as the regular army.
There is no practical difference between a regi-
ment of the Line and a regiment of Militia that
has been embodied for two or three years. The
one are as good soldiers as the other. And, con-
sequently, all we have to inquire is simply this,
whether we get more or less men in the aggregate
by calling out the Militia ; and not to which arm
of the service recruits will most readily betake
themselves, which is a trivial question in com-
parison. "Could any one," said Lord GREY,
tell him why, looking at the great armed force
" that we maintained during the Spanish war,
" and considering the great increase in our popu-
" lotion, in the two years of the last war we were
" only able to add to our army the contemptible
" number of 37,000 ? This was mainly owing to
" the Militia, which was kept up at 65,000 men."
Now, how many of those 65,000 men would
have gone into the army if the Militia had not
been there? We suspect uncommonly few.
Lord Lyrri.EroN hit the right nail upon the
head when he said,—

" With regard to the statement that men were
not got for the army fast enough, the reason was
to be found in the fact that in the army they
were not paid enough, were not made comfortable
enough, and had no sufficient prospect of a pro-
vision tbr their old age."
The lower orders in this country are now a
great deal better off than they were during the
Peninsular war. And there are few young men
indeed who cannot do better for themselves than
anything which the service offers. Under these
circumstances the Militia had a twofold use.
From its temporary character it induced a certain
class of men to give the profession of arms a
trial who could not have been induced other-
wise; while a certain per-centage of them,
owing to their gradual initiation, were persuaded
to adopt it for good, and join the regular army.
Such, too, seems to be the opinion of his Royal
Highness the Commander-in-Chief :
" He thought it might be made useful for both
the objects to which it had been turned. By
good regulation he believed that Militia regi-
ments might be kept complete for the purposes
of the defence of the country, and yet afford
valuable assistance in recruiting the ranks of the
regular army."
The fact is, there are two ways of recruiting
the regular army. Individuals or companies
may be taken from Militia regiments and incor-
porated with regiments of the Line, or entire
regiments of the former may undertake the work
of the latter. When Gibraltar and the Mediter-
ranean can he garrisoned by Militia regiments in
the highest state of efficiency, it is idle to talk of
the Militia interfering with the regulars. It
might just as well be said that the police force
interferes with them—and so to some extent it
does ; or that railways interfere with them—and
no doubt to some extent they do; or any other
modern means of obtaining a livelihood unknown
to the poor man of fifty years ago. The question
is, what work can the Militia do—either on
actual service, or as a means of softening down
the more unpopular features of the military pro-
fession at the threshold? If experience is favour-
able to them on these two points, it would be
almost as reasonable to complain that the Line
interfered with them as that they interfered with
the Line.