The Press.
London, England, 1857-10-17 00:00:00

WHAT HAVE MINISTERS DONE ?

IT is not surprising that the great contest in
which this country is engaged in India should
rouse and engross the attention of the people.
As each succeeding mail tells us of bloody and
renewed struggles between the heroic fo•.v and
rebel swarms, and week after week passes
by without bringing the welcome announce
ment of the arrival or near approach of those
heavily-freighted transports from England, it is
impossible to suppress the reflection that, after
all, we have not done all that we ought to
have done towards the succour of our country-
men—and that, iu point of fact, our Government
have not acted upon this grave occasion with
that energy and vigour the crisis demanded,
and the country had a right to expect.
We are not going to enter upon the question as
to whether in the earlier stages of this insurrec-
tion Ministers conducted themselves upon the
principles of common sense. Their expressed
opinions upon India, which we have already
quoted (PRESS, October 3) and need not re-
peat, rendered it plain that from one false step
they then drifted into another, until they were
reduced to a situation so unhappy that, while
they could not relinquish their own opinions
without contempt, they could no longer have
maintained them without ruin. This is a
point we need not reopen ; but what we wish to
discover is, whether, w►th the great means at
their command, with the wealth of a rich
nation and the valour of a brave people willing
to support theta in every enterprise, deter-
mination and judgment can be discerned in
their ultimate actions ; and whether they have
exhibited a fertility of expedient and a depth
of resource equal to the necessities and beyond
the hopes of the country. It is true that the
dili Bence Ministers have employed, and the
vigour they have displayed, in despatching an
army of relief, is daily dunned into us by the
Ministerial hurdygurdies, and that the subject
is the constant topic of Ministerial boast and
triumph; but these particular advantages

would seem to be balanced by particular evils,
if, without regarding the description, we
examine the substance. In the way,
then, of affording speedy succour to our
struggling troops in Wia—for its value
depended upon its prompt application--what
has been really Bono between May and
October? That is the main question to bo
considered.
In our last issue we published a carefully com-
piled and accurate return of the forces de-
spatched within the above period from England,
including as in India the brigade originally sent
out to China, and this return proved that Govern.
ment had taken exactly four months to embark
an army of 26,825 men ! Without passing any
opinion upon this force as a force equal to
the emergency, and with every desire to extend
to the Government in their suppression of the
insurrection a liberal interpretation of their
position in May, we must confess that we fail
here to discern any remarkable display of
vigour or expedition. The men were mostly
brigaded in camp, transports were numerous
and ready, stores were plentiful., and yet,
with every advantage in their favour, the Go-
vernment, in a moment of the gravest na-
tional apprehension and peril, can do no
more thin despatch in four months a
force, that four weeks were sufficient to em-
bark. Comparisons, though seldom satis-
factory, often help us to a just conclusion;
and we think that if we recall in mo-
ments of national peril the conduct of former
Ministers within this century, we shall
be better able to determine what praise is
due to the " vigorous operations" of the
present Ministry. " Vigorous operations !"
Why, the very term " stinks " in the nostrils of
the'people of England, amid the steam of that
innocent blood wafting from India. It is in
India alone that vigorous operations may be
looked for, whether they be in the advance of a
Havelock or in the butchery by a Nana Sahib.
The Ministers, if they cannot equal HAVELOCK
in his activity, promise us to rival the rebels
in their ferocity.
But, of all the glorious triumphs of HAVE-
LOCK, is there one for which the Government
can claim the remotest credit? •Cawnpore has
been recaptured by a skill and courage which
has baffled overwhelming numbers, Lucknow
has been miraculously preserved, Delhi held
in check, and the Punjaub overawed; but are
these successes, positive or negiatve, attri-
butable to any efforts by the Government at
home? There is not a single victory, a single
gallant repulse of the enemy, a single heroic
defence of desperate struggle, a single step in
the whole campaign, which can in any
way be attributed to the support their
energy had provided for those heroes now
four months nobly struggling against a terrible
peril. Between the flashy arrogance of one
Minister, the stupid confidence of another,
and the musty pedantry of a third, we need
not be surprised at this result. It has not
been for want of time that stout arms from
England have not assisted our brethren in
India, but they have been prevented by the
accumulated aggravations of folly, and by
the lamentable blunders of a " bold and re-
solute " Ministry.
Who that has studied in detail tho
features of this insurrection can doubt
now what would have been the effect upon
the fortunes of the war if in June and
July a few thousand men had been
thrown into India overland? And We
maintain that the means even so early
in the year were at the ready and com-
plete command of the Government. An frilly
need not have been sent, but a division, a
brigade, a few hundred men, would have
proved sufficient, if fed by repeated detach-
ments. Their arrival would have impressed
the natives with the promptitude of our
action and the readiness of our means; and we
do not hesitate to say that it would so far
have influenced events as to have preserved
the security of Central and Southern India,
have restored confidence to the well-dis-
posed, have confirmed the waverers to our
cause, have checked revolt, perhaps have
saved Cawnpore, but most certainly have laid

the foundation for the restoration of tran-
quillity over the plains of Bengal, without the
introduction of that dangerous Sikh and
Ghoorka element, since so helplessly em-
ployed.
Our inaction during those months lost
us many valuable lives, and will yet cost
us millions of treasure, and torrents of blood.
To the native mind, ignorant of our resources,
we appeared to be torpid from despair. The
slothful, dilatory conduct of our Government
gave that strength and apparent stability to
the rebels' causo, which, rendering them
daring and ferocious, drenched India in
Christian blood, and produced atrocities at
which the world will shudder to the end
of time.
But her Majesty's Ministers enjoyed as great
a natural antipathy to promptitude and de-
cision as they expresled contempt for saga-
city and foresight. They would not see
the difference between the riot of a populace
and the convulsion of a kingdom. They
would not use the Isthmus of Suez for the
transport of their troops. " It is attended," said
Lord PatmEasToN, " with too much trouble,
" inconvenience, and expense." They would not
increase the permanent strength of the country
so as to enable her to preserve her reputation
unsullied. "I do not think "—we again quote
Lord PALMERSTON (July 18, speech, House of
Commons)—" I do not think that the services
" of the Militia are at all required, and I (do)
" think it would be a very unadvisable pro-
" ceeding to call them out." They would not
employ steam vessels in preference to sailing
tubs for the transport of their troops by way
of the Cape. "It is quite a mistake," said Sir
CHARLES WOOD (July 18th), alluding to the
employment of steamers for the rapid trans-
port of troops, " to suppose that steamers are
" preferable to sailing vessels." No, they
would do none of these things. That vast
application of science to the purposes of war,
whether we regard it at the I sthmus of Suez
or in the hulls of our ships, and which has
distinguished us above the nations of the
world, was useless to us at a moment pregnant
with peril. The Government declined its
employment : they preferred depending on
the winds to save an empire.
This, then, is what they have done for the
succour of those struggling demigods in India.
They hare violated every principle of pru-
dence and policy by first stamping their mea-
sures with the vice of inadequacy, and then
by persevering from day to day, and from
month to month, in trusting to the " despe
rate die " whose successes could win for us
only a barren though glorious safety, and
whose failure in a single cast may over-
whelm us with a terrible misfortune.

LORD CARLISLE AND HISS
CHANCELLOR.
THE recent letter of Lord Chancellor BRADY
to the Marquis of LONDONDERRY is a very re-
markable document. Regarded as the pre-
lude to a new system, the inauguration of a
new policy, it possesses an importance and an
interest which cart scarcely be exaggerated.
In one point of view, especially, it appears to
us that the decree of the Irish Government
deserves the strongest censure. It has been
decided at Dublin Castle that no one con-
nected with an Orange association is capable
of exercising magisterial functions. For the
future such persons are to be rigidly excluded
from the Commission of the Peace, as dan-
gerous
members of society, fomenting discord
and encouraging illegality. This is in sub-
stance the last of the many notable edicts with
which Lord CARLISLE has illustrated his Vice-
regal career.
The first aspect in which we are led to
consider this measure is the particular time
chosen for its adoption. Of all periods that
could have been selected, the present was
the most impolitic and inopportune. Had
the course now determined upon become im-
peratively necessary—had its wisdom been
admitted and its justice acknowledged by