The Press.
London, England, 1858-12-18 00:00:00

THE PRESS, DECEMBER 18, 1858.

n India would be viewed in a very different light
from the same conduct in England. Nor was the
observation confined to them; it was "to any
English gentleman." Lord STANLEY'S words
mean no more than what is perfectly true gene-
rally—that every Englishman in India is viewed
as representing his native country; that the
Indians will judge of England by what they see
Englishmen to be ; that there, as one of " the
conquering race " among a people of another
race, an Englishman will be " the observed of all
observers; " and that therefore to an Englishman
in India there is, strictly speaking, no such thing
as "private life." Every action of his, even in his
most private capacity, will have its moral effect in
disposing favourably towards us, or otherwise,
the minds of the natives. Hence Lord STANLEY
sought to stimulate these young men to act on
all occasions in a manner befitting their mother
country, by warning them that they must not
think that it will excuse licentious or insolent
and contemptuous conduct towards the natives, to
say that such and such things were done in their
private capacity as men, and not in their official, as
officers of the Queen. What advice could have
been more suitable, or more just and true? And
yet even in this some have detected a sinister
design I

Our readers will bear us witness that we have
never put ourselves forward to defend Lord
STANLEY when his language has been justly
open to exception. But we should both abandon
our own claim to common sense, and be guilty of
great injustice to him, if we were to put such a
construction as the one we have mentioned upon
the address of his to which we have referred. That
address might be lacking in the graver elements
of religious counsel, but, viewed simply as the
advice of a statesman to a number of young men
whu were going out to India to fill certain offices
on behalf of the State, nothing could have been
more appropriate or excellent. Well would it be
for the reputation of England if all Englishmen
in India would act upon it. Lord STANLEY is not
a man to say more than he means; he is rather
one of those says what he means, and means
what he says, and who never affects a pious
regard which he does not feel, nor a conscientious
scrupulousness which he thinks unnecessary. In
this respect he puts to shame many of our pre-
tenders to religious zeal, who only show their
zeal for what is right by the perpetual discovery
in others of what is wrong.

There can be no doubt that the conduct of
Englishmen in India, and especially of the Go-
vernment officials, who have thought to excuse
their flagrant violations of moral propriety
by pleading their freedom in their individual
capacity, has done more to prejudice the natives
of India against us than all the acts of Govern-
ment put together. Far removed from all the
restraints of public opinion in England, and the
pure influences of home, they have permitted to
themselves a licence of conduct which has
discredited their country, though it has per-
haps brought little direct disgrace upon them-
selves. It is quite time that there should
be a check put upon this; the honour
and even the safety of our empire is at
stake in it. Every Englishman who goes out to
India now in any official capacity should be
strongly and awfully impressed with the mighty,
far-spreading responsibility of his every act. Every
young man especially should be bridled with
self-respect. The creation, in short, of a sound
and healthy public opinion, as we call it at home,
is now necessary in India, to act as a check upon
those who are not the subjects of any higher re-
straints, if we would recover and preserve the
respect of the native population. It is evidently
this at which Lord STANLEY aims. Religious
obligations he leaves to the religious. lie knows
well enough, what every one must know, that
young men in general are more susceptible of
being moved to do what is right by an appeal to
their honour or self-respect, or respect for their
country, than by arguments derived from reli-
gion. If only outward moral propriety of con-
duct, and a respectful bearing towards the natives,
can be secured henceforth in all our Indian offi-
cials, a great point will be gained. For we may
rest assured that the natives of India will never
have any real respect for us till we have first
shown that we have a respect for ourselves.
When we discover this, then shall we make the
happy discovery how to govern them.

gurtspontentt.

INDIAN MILITARY ORGANIZATION.
TO THE EDITOR OF " THE PRESS."

----
Sir,—Public attention has just been called to the
new organization of the Commissariat Department
at home, but no mention seems to have been made
of the steps lately taken by Government for the
supply of military and other stores for India. At a
time when everything relating to our empire in Hin-
dostan is of great national interest, the following
reflections on the supply of military and other stores
for India may prove not uninteresting to military men.
It appears that the Insoector.General of Military
Stores has not only (with the sanction of the Council
for India) to make the necessary arrangements, by
entering into contracts, to comply with indents and
requisitions sent to England by the several arsenals
and departments, military, naval, and civil, and, after
examining the stores, to transmit them to their des-
tinations, but bas, further, to examine and report
on these indents and requisitions, stating his opinion
as to the necessity and manner of complying with
such demands, and also from time to time suggest
the forwarding to India specimens of any improve.
menta in arms and machinery, equipment or scien-
tific inventions, which may be made at home, so as
to enable the various branches of the service in the
Last to be kept up in the greatest state of efficiency.
It seems, therefore, to be absolutely necessary, in
the first place, to consider the present and probable
futurd state and requirements of our military, naval,
and civil establishments in the East.

Her Majesty's military forces in India are at pre
sent divided into throe armies, under separate corn
menders, and with distinct staff, rte. A commander-
n-chief, nominally, is over the whole, but, from
various causes, this, at least till lately, has merely
been an office arrangement, the real power remaining
with the local commanders. Each of these armies
consists of troops of the royal army of Great Britain,
of British local regiments, and of regular and irre-
gular native troops officered by British officers—the
three last constituted the armies of the East India
Company.
he iate great mutiny of the Bengal native troops,
which were joined by the tawalior Contingent and
many local corps, has scarcely been crushed, so that
the present state of the army in India must only be
considered as exceptional. What the eventual re-
organization of the native army will be is not yet
determined on, but I think it may be safely laid down
that the artillery service will in future be exclusively
intrusted to Europeans, and also that as soon as
tranquillity is restored the whole of the Royal Artil
tery and Engineers will be recalled home, where they
are much required. It is also probable that the
Local British Regiments in India will be increased
in numbers, which will enable several of the royal
infantry corps to leave India and save expense. To
enable us to examine the subject, let us assume that
the present military divisions will be substantially
maintained. We will then have to consider the
military stores, (rte., required to be sent to the
arsenals and deparunents in Bengal, Madras, and
Bombay.
A sojourn of several years in India had long ago
convinced me of what, I trust, the late mutiny and
rebellion in Bengal has clearly demonstrated to all
thinking men—viz., that our tenure of Hindostan is
.airely a military one, and that if we wish to retain
possession of that rich country we must make every-
thing subservient to the efficiency of our military
power. By the transfer of the late East India
Company's armies to the Crown, thus making the
officers and troops of the three Presidencies
dependent for all rewards and honours on the
sovereign, the old jealousy which existed between
the Royal and Company's officers will, I am per-
suaded, be removed ; and as her Majesty's military
'orces iu India are for the future, however sub-
divided, to form one service, I trust that the sense-
'ess assumption of superiority by the officers of the
Bengal. Presidency over those of Madras and
Bombay, and which seems to have only been based
m thE. fact that they were numerically more itn•
portant than their brethren in arms, will disappear.
I allude to this feeling, as I am persuaded it has
acted prejudic'ally to the service in keeping the
three armies with their arsenals and depots too
separate and distinct. I shall now only mention
one instance of this exclusive feeling ; the troops
and arsenals which have been stationed or been
established in the Punjaub since that country was
conquered in 1846 have been drawn from the
Bengal Presidency. As a glance at the map will
-how, this province is accessible from the south,
through Sinde (which is garrisoned by Bombay
trool.s), by means of the nt.vigable river Indus, and
its five upper branches or feeders. The convenient
harbour of Kurachee on the seacoast, with Govern.
went river steamers plying regularly as far as Buker,

1229

and, I believe, to Mooltan, and with the notorious
fact that a large trade by native boats is actually
carried on by this line, would lead one to expect that
the supplies of the army, whether arms, ammunition,
or European recruits, would have been forwarded
direct from England by this route, especially as the
Bombay troops in Sinde received theirs by this way ;
but till the late outbreak such has not been the
case—the exclusive or jealous feeling or the execu-
tive officers had made them prefer drawing all their
stores from the great arsenals in Upper India,
which had to be transmitted at a much greater
expense from Calcutta up the country, partly by land
and partly by water carriage. The excuses of this
expensive folly were at times ludicrous : variety of
pattern in the two armies, complication of accounts,
interference with distinct heads of departments,
were amongst the reasons assigned ; as if all did not
belong to the same service, and should not have
been actuated by the same zeal for the general
welfare. This system has existed in many other
parts of India : thus the small arsenal of Mhow,
near Indere, was alternately supplied from C.leutta
and Bombay, according as the troops stationed there
were drawn from either of these Presidencies—a
thousand miles of inland carriage, more or less, being
deemed of less importance than the maintenance
of an exclusive system. In the same way I ant
persuaded that many of the Madras stations could
with advantage and economy draw their supplies
from the west instead of the east coast of the
peninsula. It is therefore to be hoped that under
the new order of things these points will be carefully
attended to. But let us now assume that the
military forces stationed along the valley of the
Ganges and Jumna, with Central India as far south
as Gwalior and Nagpore, with the provinces of Arakan
and Moulmein to the east, and Umbels, Kurnal, Delhi,
and Jeypoor to the west, and having to the north the
Himalayas, are to draw their military scores and
European recruits from Calcutta ; the eastern side of
the peninsula, with China, the Straits, and perhaps
part of Ceylon, from Madras; and the west coast,
with Sinde, the Punjaub, and Malwa, as well as Aden,
from Bombay, Kurachee, and Mangalore. The exact
numbers of the British and native troops must
depend on events and contingencies which it will be
useless here to go into, but with respect to the prin-
cipal fortified arsenals we may, I think, assume them
to be as follows :

I. BENGAL.—Fort William (Calcutta), Dacca,
Araks!), lltuapore, Allahabad, Agra, Dehii, Nagpoue,
Cuttuch.

11. Bo3ll3lY.—Bombay Castle, Belgawn, Man galore,
Ahmednuggur, Ahmedabad, Kerachie (Sinde),
Moultan (Punjanb), Lahore (Punjaub), Rotas
(Punjaub), Peahawur (Punjaub).
In. MADRAS.—Fort St. George, Bangalore, Hyder-
abad, Jaulna, Trinchinopoli, the Straits, China.
Them are the great arsenals and depots, but there
are several smaller ones—in fact there must he one
at each of the European camps. In my opinion too
little attention has been paid to fortified posts in
India as well as to forts among the coasts : tho
chances of having to contend with an active enemy
attacking our rich trading ports by sea seem to be
quite forgotten ; even at the three Presidencies, where
vast sums have been expended in fortifications, it is
very doubtful whether they could stand a few
hours against a coup de main. The most important
means of defence have been sacrificed to the comfort
or convenience of individuals. This is also the case
at nearly all inland station 4, especially in the Bengal
Presidency ; the detached houses or bungalows of
the officers are built in large (compounds) or
gardens, and occupy so much space that ►n the event
of an outbreak it is impossible to afford protection
to such extensive cantonments. The result is that the
European troops are obliged to be concentrated near
the arsenal or depot and the other buildings, and in
many late instances the officers and their families
have to be left to their fate, their property being burnt
and plundered by the rabble from their own military
bazaars. However disagreeable and inconvenient it
may be to individuals, a id especially to ladies, this
system should never be allowed again ; we have had
a lesson which should convince us that false security
entails the most disastrous consequences. Again, the
gun-carriage manufactories and powder works are so
stationed that the destruction or capture of one of
these great establishments would para.yze the efforts
of a great part of the army ; these works should, I
think, be more divided, and fixed in places capable of
defence, and protected by Europeans. I think that
all officers who have served in India will acknow.
ledge the necessity of concentrating the European
troops in camps, to which, as I have stated above,
must be attached fortified posts to contain their
arsenals and depots. Fortunately at nearly every
station there exists old native forts which, with a
little alteration, are quite susceptible of resisting,
with a very small garrison, the attack of any native
force. The old Mahomedan forts have the repu-
tation of being very unhealthy for Europeans, but
this is really more from neglect of eve
precaution than from their real position.

the repu-
peans, but
y sanitary
If vegeta.