The Press.
London, England, 1857-05-16 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

" ble "—and that during the action he re-
ceived no instruction or communication from
head-quarters. Seeing that General Kmety
commanded at those points where the brunt
of the battle fell, if the above statement be
true, General Williams's account of the matter
is just as incorrect as if one should describe
the battle of Inkermann without mentioning
the Guards. As far as Colonel Lake is con-
cerned, the dispute between them rests
precisely where it did. We find nothing
in the colonel's narrative at all incon-
sistent with General Kmety's. The
actions attributed to General Williams are of
the most commonplace character, and he is
certainly the least prominent figure on the
scene. Still, the colonel does what ho can
for him. His position was at the English
Tabias, on the hills opposite to General Kmety.
When one of the posts was hard pressed,
General Williams with " great promptitude
" and decision" ordered up the reserve. Such
was his duty, no doubt, but it is nothing very
wonderful; we might as well say of a pedes-
trian that, when overtaken by the rain, he
with great promptitude and decision unfurled
his umbrella.

Relief was expected by the beleaguered for-
tress from two quarters—from Mini Pacha at
Erzeroum, and from Omer Pacha in the
Crimea. The departure of the latter was long
delayed by the allied commanders, at whose
special interference wo do not care to inquire.
As soon, however, as he could arrive at Con-
stantinople, Lord Staatford do Redcliffe and
the Turkish War Minister, Fuad Pacha, both
became converts to his plan. This was op-
posed by Lord Clarendon, and also, says
Colonel Lake, by General Vivian, who advised
that the proposed succour should be sent by
way of Erzeroum and Trebizonde. We have
always held that Omer Pacha was in the
right. The following extract from Fund
Paella's despatch to Lord Clarendon places
this matter, we think, in the clearest light :

It would be superfluous to say how strongly the Sublime
Porte sees the necessity of saving Kars, and, in Raving
Kars, of freeing Anatolia. Now the only way of effecting
this is, to carry out the proposed movement from Redout
Kaleh. In fact, to save Kars, a force is required at least
equal to the besieging army. Now if we must send such
a force in the direction of Trebizonde, seeing that the
roads are extremely bad, this force, with its artillery and
munitions complete, would hardly reach Erzeroum in
three or four months, and in that interval the Russians
would have done all that they had to do. Therefore this
plan can produce no good effect.
If a small force were sent, it could neither relieve Kars
nor defend Erzeroum. It is certain, then, that it is not
possible to relieve Kars by way of Trebizonde.
The road which leads straight from Redout Kaleh to
Kutais is perfectly level and easy. The goodness of the
road is favourable to the transport of artillery and muni-
tions, and the march of a large army by this road will be
rapid and free from difficulty.
Independently of this, as this army will be in the rear
of the Russian army, and will march straight on Tiflis,
which is the very soul of the Russians in the Caucasus, as
soon as it has advanced a little, the Russians will evidently
be obliged to abandon Kars, and fly to the defence of Tiflis
and Suram, and withdraw from Kars.
His Highness the Sirdar Ekrem and all the officers of
the Porte, are unanimously of opinion that there is no
other plan of saving Asia but this, and there is no doubt
that the military officers of the high allied Powers will be
of the same opinion on this subject.
As to the insalubrity of the neighbourhood of Redout
Kaleh. That place will not be the permanent abode of
the army. As the march of the troops will be hurried,
they will make a very short stay there ; and moreover an
army which is animated by a desire of saving its country
will show itself determined to overcome all obstacles, and
to brave all dangers. Therefore the observation on the
insalubrity of the place cannot offer any obstacle to the
prosecution of the plan.
The survey which has been made of the coasts with a
view to bases of operation, is favourable in every respect to
the plan in question; that is to say, there have been found,
at some hours' distance from the coast, very convenient
positions with respect to climate for pitching a camp.

That is to say, the relieving force must be
either a small one or a large one. If a small
one, it would be useless to a garrison that
was only blockaded, and worse than
useless to a garrison that was already
starving. If a large one, sufficient to
drive away the Russians, or a convoy of
provisions were sent, it was impossible for
them to arrive in time by the Trebizonde
route. The only chance was to make such a
demonstration against the Russian rear as
would alarm them for their communications.
It was just possible that the rainy season
might be a little later than usual, and, rather
than do nothing, Omer Pacha resolved to

attempt it. How gallantly he persevered to
the last moment is known to all the world.
Lord Clarendon's objections to the Mingrelian
campaign were remarkable:—
It would be in the greatest degree imprudent to throw
on an unwholesome coast, without means of land trans-
port, without any certainty of provisions, without an
assured communication with the rear, without an accurate
knowledge of the country to be traversed, or the strength
of the enemy to be encountered, and with the
probability of a hostile population, 40,000 men, hurriedly
collected from various quarters, imperfectly disciplined,
doubtfully armed and equipped, and as yet unorganised.
and to expose them at once to all the hazards and difficul-
ties of a campaign against a Russian army. They would
fall ill between lledout Kaleh and Kutais, and be
defeated between Kutais and Tiflis. Moreover, the frag
ments to be united for the purpose of composing this
army are so scattered about, that the crisis, if it is to take
place, would be over long before it could reach the scene
of action.

The result was that the Turkish army in this
campaign had so few sick as to surprise even
those who are acquainted with the hardihood
of Ottoman troops, and that in their first
and only pitched battle with the Russiane
they gained a memorable victory. Crcesus
was told that if he crossed the Halys he
would destroy a great po‘ser. We should
recommend this Downing-street oracle to
imitate the ambiguity of his Delphic prede-
cessor when next he is consulted upon mili-
tary undertakings. As it was, however, ac-
cording to a writer in the United Service
Magazine, " while thousands of baggage-
" animals were eating their heads off, a fort-
" night was wasted on the Sieva for want of a
" few of them, which fortnight would have
" placed the Turks in Kutais."
In regard to Salim Pacha, the whole ques-
tion depends upon the number of troops
which he had with him in Erzeroum. If he
had, as he alleged, only six thousand, it would
have been madness both to have marched
upon Kars, and to have left Erzeroum
garrisoned, with only a fraction of that number.
What is the evidence upon this subject?
Colonel Lake says :--

At the very time when he stated that his available force
only arn3unted to between five and six thousand men, it
was well known to the British officers at Erzeroutn, from
private information which they obtained, that the returns
furnished to the Porte showed the number to be upwards
of fourteen thousand, and there was good reason for
believing that a still wider discrepancy existed with regard
to the horses. Pay and rations were no doubt charged to
the Turkish Government according to the higher number,
while the lower was put forward as an excuse fur inactivity
and want of energy.

But the colonel forgets that he has all along
been telling us that these returns are never to
be trusted, and are always greatly exaggerated.
Selim Pacha's own evidence, then, is worthless
either way. On the other hand, we have our-
selves been informed by officers of rank in
Asia that his available force never exceeded
eight thousand men.
We may say, in conclusion, that the present
work only confirms our two previous impres-
sions—first, that Kars should never have been
held at all; and, secondly, that the only way
to have retrieved this blunder was to have
allowed Omer Pacha to quit the Crimea some
three months earlier than lie did. But we are
grateful to Colonel Lake for giving us a
succinct account of operations in which these
very mistakes were but the means of shedding
fresh lustre on the name of Englishmen, and
adding another to the list of English achieve.
ments which shall rank hereafter with the
melancholy glories of Corunna.

Ballads and Songs. By David Mallet. A New
Edition. With Notes and Illustrations,
and a Memoir of the Author, by Frederick
Dinsdale, Esq., LL.D., F.S.A. London :
Bell and Daldy.
A FRENCHMAN once made a boot extremely
small and excruciatingly tight. He was asked
why he had produced such a diminutive piece
of goods, and he answered that he had made it
in a fit of enthusiasm. We think of the story
in observing the waste of typographical deco-
ration applied to the honour of one of the
smallest of our minor poets. The volume is a
curiosity of misapplied elegance and expense.
It is printed on the best paper ; it has some
choice engravings, executed with the highest
finish ; it has facsimiles of the autographs of
obscure individuals ; the n2usical arrangement