The Press.
London, England, 1858-02-20 00:00:00

THE PRESS, FFBRUARY 20,

that I know of, and so far as I know merits none. We
are the enemies of a single man and of his adherent., and
that man has exercised his influence over the French army
to overthrow the throne of the King, in order to subjugate
France, and to resuscitate fur all of us the days of mis-
fortune which we believed we had escaped from. We are
at war with him because we all feel that we cannot be at
peace.
It is a misfortune for France that she should become
the theatre of the war which this man necessitates, an I of
which he is the cause and the object. But it must not be
believed that this war is directed against her. On the
contrary, the King of France, whom you desire to see
restored to the throne and to serve, is the ally of all
Europe in this conflict—in which he also is, as I believe,
the ►rue representative of the sentiments and wishes of
the nation.
The situation in which we are about to bind ourselves
cannot then be called a state of war against France, but
in reality a war on the part of all Europe, including
France, against Bonaparte and against his army—the bad
conduct of which will be the cause of the misfortunes
which are about to happen and which we all deplore.
But, though I regard the state in which we are all about
to be placed in a point of view different to that in which
you have regarded it, I am not certain that I should not
act for the moment as you propose to do. I was not at
Paris when the misfortune which we all regret happened.
I do not know all the details of it, and I cannot judge it
exactly. I am, however, disposed to believe that the cause
of the evil was that the King was not, and never had been,
master of the army which was called his; and that, in
spite of the best precautions, the same events would have
happened a little sooner or a little later, with very little
difference in their details.

But a man like you, knowing public business and
capable of judging it, may have reason to complain, if his
counsels be neglected in a moment of crisis, and especially
if the misfortunes which he foresaw have come to pass ;
and disgust on his part, and his retirement, ought to be
expected as the natural consequence of a want of regard
for his counsels. But I will add that, for the present, Ido
not see that, the King has the means of employing you
in a manner becoming your rank or your talents, or which
gives you the f icility of rendering those services to your
country of which you are capable.
But, although I admit with you that you do well to
retire for the moment, I advise you very strongly not to
do it for a long time.
When the allies shall enter France, France cannot re-
main neutral between them anti Bonaparte and his army.
Everything causes it to be believed that the sound part of
the nation will range itself under the flag of the King on
the side of good principles; and if this hope be accom-
plished, and a great effort be made, that will be the
moment at which a man like you should put himself
forward, to raise, organise, form, and command the French
army which should place and maintain the King on his
throne.

Notwithstanding,then, the demand that I have addressed
to the King of the Netherlands to allow your Excellency
to go into Holland, I counsel you not to leave Aix-la-Cha-
pelle, and not to announce your intention of retiring,
until you shall have positive news as to what may occur in
France after the entrance of the allies. —I have the honour
to be, Marshal, your very faithful servant,
WELLINGTON.
On this letter•, M. Rapetti makes these re-
marks :
We do not possess the letter which Marshal Marmont
wrote to the Duke of Wellington, but from the latter's
reply we can make some conjectures as to what it was.
The Duke of Wellington, in according that an " honest
man " does not fight against his own country, endeavouts
to prove that the European coalition was not making war
against France, and that consequently a Frenchman
could follow that coalition without tearing to fail in what
was due to himself and his country. Marshal Marmont
must consequently have written to the Duke of Wellington
to express scruples and repugnances which were very
honourable, and which the Duke attempts to appease and
deceive by ingenious sophisms.
But why choose a hostile general, leading an army
against France, to make known to her that s Frenchman
may feel scruples in marching against his country with its
enemies? " We are not enemies," the Duke of Welling.
ton hastens to say; and such an assurance was to be
expected.
Astonished himself at being taken for the confidant and
judge of such delicate sentiments, the Duke of Welling-
ton, like an able man, suspects, under cover of the corn-
munication addressed to him, a secret proposition which
it is desired to make him understand without expressing
it too freely ; and that is, that Marshal Marmont asks his
intervention in obtaining from King Louis XVIII. an im-
portant command in the operations which are being pre-
pared against France. The Duke of Wellington believes
the more in this indirect demand from the fact that
Marshal Marmont complains in his letter of the small
account that was taken of him during the first
Restoration. His advice was then disregarded ; faults of
which he hod vainly foreseen and predicted the results
were committed ; but, as he cannot reconcile himself to the
idea of bearing arms against his country, as he believes it
useless to remain attached to a cause which will not accept
his services, and as he cannot remain inactive at the age
of forty-three, he desires to take service under some
Government not at war with France—perhaps in :he
colonial possessions of England, perhaps in India. Such
is probably the subject of his letter, and it is on that he
asks for the counsels of the Duke of Wellington. But the
Duke is not the dupe of this ambitious despair. All that
he sees is that Marshal Marmont entertains a violent de-
sire to be employed by King Louis XVIII. and by the
allies in accordance with his own idea of the high military
talents he possesses and the political intelligence he