The Press.
London, England, 1856-02-23 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY, FEBRUARY 23, 1850.

IT is not often that the minds of men are so
composed as to estimate at their just worth
and no more the events with which they are
brought face to face. There is a disposition
sometimes to exaggerate, sometimes to exte-
nuate their importance. Very trivial occur-
rences have been attended with great pomp,
and have served to excite the hopes or fears
of powerful communities ; while the most
momentous transactions on record have been
gone through . in a spirit of carelessness or
buffoonery. It would be otherwise were re-
sults more fully open to our view than the tan-
gled skein of human affairs permits. If it be
true of individual life that each act is the
parent of so long a train of consequences as
that no ohe can possibly foresee the end, how
much more true must it he of those large
political arrangements which affect the dead-
nies of States and the whole current of the
world's fortunes ?

We are in the midst of a grave political
epoch. England is called on to bear a leading
part in Conferences which have for their
object a new definition and settlement of
European power. Much must depend ou her
sagacity, her firmness, her moderation. On
the eve of her action, it is well to glance for a
moment at the past and the future, that we
may the better understand the attitude which
is most consistent with her true policy, and
comports best with her dignity.
The War arose from a division among the
great Powers of Europe. This is so obvious
that the statement is a truism. The division
was, however, less sudden than it seemed. It
was occasioned by a variety of causes, among
which a prominent place must be assigned to
the restless and uncertain action of our
Foreign-office. When, through the growth of
Russian power in the South, and the decay of
Turkish influence, that question of the inde-
pendence of the Black Sea which had, at
different periods in the last century, engaged
the attention of statesmen, became ripe for solu-
tion, the Courts of Europe could not be united
into an authoritative tribunal for its adjustment,
This disunion was the element on which the late
Emperor NICHOLAS mainly relied for success in
his designs. It was openly avowed by him in
his conversation with Sir HAMILTON SEYMOUR ;
it was sufficiently apparent in the general
course of his policy, and in the pains he took
to secure first the adhesion, and afterwards
the neutrality, of Austria.
Had Russia known, in the first instance,
that she would have to contend, not with
France and England alone, but with Austria
and Prussia also, it is certain that she would
never have dared an appeal to arms. It has
been one of the main objects of the Western
Alliance,—with some. diversity of sentiment
and action, but still with a strong bias to the
principle,—to restore to the Courts of Europe
that concord which, with rare exceptions, has

existed on all European questions for the last
forty years ; and the wisdom of that course
has been justified by events.
An opposite policy would have arrayed
against us at the present moment the three
great Northern Powers. with America ready to
throw her weight into their scale. France and
England might still have been victorious in
the contest, but no one can doubt that the
strife would have assumed much mightier
proportions, would have endured for a longer
period, and would have taxed the resources
and endurance of this country and of our
great Ally to the utmost.
As it was the disunicn of Europe which
tempted the late Czar to dare the fortune of
war, it is the growing strength of the Alliance
which.has compelled the present Czar to close
it. On this point we are not left to conjecture.
In a recent Circular of the Russian Govern-
ment it is expressly stated that the Emperor
accepted terms of Peace because he saw that
the coalition against him was extending its
range and' influence. If for coalition, in this
case, we read European concord, we are fur-
nished with a key to the actuating motives of
that change which has come over the spirit of
Russian policy.
'Whenever the tranquillity of Europe is next
disturbed, it will be owing to the same cause
that has led to the present War. The perma-
. nenee of Peace must depend on the. union
subsisting among the proponderating States
of Europe ; and whatever tends to weaken or
dissolve that union must tend in an • equal
degree to produce disorder and conflict.
It rests with the Paris Congress to deter-
mine whether the Peace which we believe to
be at hand shall be an armed truce or at last-
ing settlement. If Russia only desires repose
for a time—if she looks forward to a day when
under more .favorable auspices she may be
enabled to pursue the policy on which she has
steadily acted for the last century and a half—
it must he her first object to prevent that
union which would oppose the firmest barrier
to her designs. To sever Germany from the
other Courts at this juncture would immensely
increase her influence, and would pave the
way for a northern Confederacy at a future
date. We could not serve her object better
than by throwing Prussia into her arms; and
if that Power do not take her place in the
councils of Europe, she can expect political
importance only by drawing closer the bonds
which unite her to the Court of St. Pe-
tersburg.
We cannot, in this matter, separate the
Prussian Court from the Prussian people. If
we alienate the Government, we alienate the
nation Whatever power it possesses from
natural causes—from its position, resources.
population, and character—cannot be lost or
even neutralised by diplomatic arrangements.
Its substantial strength will exist, whether we
determine to recognise it or not. Practically
the only question is, whether that strength
shall be enlisted on our side, or handed over
without reserve to our adversary? If, through
any of those paltry motives which are never
suffered to interfere with great principles of
policy but to degrade them, Prussia is ex-
cluded from the Paris Congress, the settlement
will lose all the weight which would be de-
rived from the co operation of the great Ger-
man body, and the diplomacy of Russia will
achieve a triumph sufficient to recompense
her for all her disasters in the field. Her
position was skilfully taken. If Prussia were

admitted, a concession would be made to Rus-
sian influence ; if excluded, an accession
would be given to Russian strength. An inti-
mate political alliance would thenceforth be
inevitable between the two Powers, and all
Germany would be brought into their league,
or submitted to their influence.

The difficulty would be best met by frank
statesmanship. A recognition of the right of
Prussia to take part in the Congress, as the
representative of German interests, would
detach Germany from Russia, would wean her
people from the notion that the Allies have
any selfish aims in view apart from the gene-
ral welfare of Europe, and would engage them
heartily in support of that one great object.
To exclude Germany from a Congress intended
primarily fur the limitation of Russian power,
is to forfeit one of the best securities we can
have for the security and permanence of the
Treaty contemplated.
Why should there be this jealousy of a
State whose neutrality arose, not fram inte-
rests opposed to those of the belligerent
Powers, or from separate aggressive designs,
but from the peculiarity of its position, and
its friendly relations with both sides? The
questions to be discussed are of European, or
more tharrEuropean, magnitude: The tido o.'
civilisation ha 4 flowed froin East to West.
' There is no reason 'why it should not turn
The Countries bordering the Black Sea present
a fruitful field for European enterprise ; and it
is desirable that the great Powers of Europe
should unite to concert the terms by which
the internal security and commercial freedom
of those countries. can be best secured.