The Press.
London, England, 1857-02-21 00:00:00

THE BUDGET.

AT the commencement of a great debate,
which will probably be attended by impor-
tant consequences, some moments may be
not unprofitably spent in considering what is
the real question at issue, and what are the
general circumstances of our financial con-
dition.

Previous to the Russian war in 1854, the
administration of our national finances, under
successive Governments, had been on de
whole very careful and prudent. The year
1833 marked an epoch when our expenditure
reached its lowest point. Twenty years of
peace had made the country confident ; thei
was no apprehension of war, and our annul
services suffered from neglect. From that
date a reaction slowly commenced ; the differ-
ence with France in 1840, and the assistance
rendered to the Porte against Egypt, roused
the public to a perception of danger. Year by
year the army and navy estimates were in-
creased, till, for the year 1853-4, when a
rupture with Russia seemed probable, they
attained greater proportions than they hod
done since the settlement of Europe in 1815,
and in point of expense rose to about half as
much again as they had been twenty years
previously, in 1833. This increase had, how-
ever, only taken place concurrently with a
considerable development of national wealth.
It was therefore natural, and though a feeling
of dissatisfaction had grown up against it, as
we see by reference to the journals of tl,e
House of Commons, that feeling never pei -
waded any huge portion of the public.
With the d•ar there came unlimited and
most extravagant expenditure. The experi-
ment of conducting mighty hostilities econo-
mically was tried and failed. The national
pursestrings were opened wide ; and it is not
surprising that when the total expenditure
rose to something near double its ordinary
amount, that grants for civil purposes should
have escaped with less scrutiny than they
would have done in more peaceful times.
The first year after the war was regarded as
a year of war expenditure; the CHANCELLOR of
the EXCHEQUER'S Budget was not disputed,
and he both retained the war taxes and raised
what loans ho considered necessary to meet
the extraordinary expenses of the year.
With the commencement of the financial
year 1837-8 a new leaf has to he turned over in
the national ledger. We may return to the
ordinary income and expenditure that pre-
vailed previous to the war, save only as respects
the increased charges necessitated by the
ear, or we may decide on a totally different
scale of establishments, and a totally different
scheme of finance.

In the year 1853 a financial scheme—in the
nature of a Compact or Settlement—was pro
pounde,d, intended to provide in its general
features for the next seven years, or at least to
be binding for the seven years as regarded
reduction and repeal of eert.;., -
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170

As a people we are peculiarly jealous of
public credit. We know that it is wealth, and
character, and power, and we consent to make
any sacrifices rather than suffer our good faith
to be impeached.
The Compact made in 1853 might have been
impolitic. It was to some extent unusual.
Financial provisions extending over any con-
siderable period of time must be liable to dis-
turbing influences from unforeseen events,
and hence they ought to be sanctioned with
great reserve. But once sanctioned, every
possible effort should be made to keep them.
There is no reason why faith should not be
kept with taxpayers as well as with creditors—
with the whole body of the nation as well as
with a class of it. If, in this instance, it is
held that the two years' Russian war, besides
the increased taxation imposed for the last
three years, and besides adding forty millions
to the National Debt, has entailed such in-
creased expenditure as to render compliance
with the Compact of 1853 impossible, then it
would be the duty of the CHANCELLOR of the
EXCHEQUER to fairly state the fact, and to sub-
mit a bonii•fido scheme of taxation and
expenditure fur the consideration of the
Legislature.
Lord PALMERSTON'S Chancellor of the Ex-
chequer takes neither course. He, indeed,
pretends to respect the Settlement of 1853,
but he submits a scheme of expenditure
totally inconsistent with it. His Budget is
essentially dishonest. It seeks, like the
fraudulent accounts of failing speculators, to
" make things pleasant " for the present by
accumulating enormous difficulties for the
future. Let us see how the facts stand.

For the service of the ensuing year, the
CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER will re-
ceive the produce of one half-year's income
tax of 18d. in the pound. This will yield
4,500,0001. more than the uniform rate of 7d.
That is to say, for the service of the year
1857-8, the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER
reckons to receive from the income tax
11,500,0001., equivalent ton rate of lltd. in the
pound, instead of 7,000,0001, equivalent to a
rate of 7d. in the pound.
For the two following years, 1858-9 and
1959.60, he proposes the rate shall be 7d., and
there will therefore be received in each year
from income tax a less sum by 4,500,0001.
than in the year now ensuing. He further pro-
poses reductions in the duties on tea and sugar,
which will reduce the revenue by an amount
of 500,000/. more. The total decline, as com-
pared with the ensuing year, will be, therefore,
6,000,000/.

On the other side of the account the CHAN-
CELLOR of the EXCHEQUER shows that the liabi-
lities to be met in the year 1858 9 and 1859-60
will be 1,250,0001. more than in the year
1857-8, as the sinking fund for loans raised
during the late war will only then come into
full operation.
It is incontestable, therefore, by his own
statement, that while the revenue for 1858.9,
and for 1859-60, will be five millions less than
for 1857-8, the charge on the revenue will be
1,250,0001. more. How is it possible that this
deficit of 6,250,0001. can be met?
It must be met by a considerable reduction
of expenditure, or by a large augmentation of
taxation. If by the former mode, why is the
work of reduction delayed? if by the latter,
why is the truth attempted to be concealed
from the public?

The whole financial statement of the
CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER proceeded on
the supposition that the increase of expen-
diture he announced would be permanent.
Thus, in the civil estimates, the charges for
county courts, for constabulary, for the com-
mencement of new Government offices, and for
other items of a like character, cannot cease
with the ensuing year. In the military and
naval estimates, the items of increase are not
less distinctly of a permanent nature; two new
corps are to be maintained,—a hospital train
and a land transport service. It would mani-
festly be absurd to maintain these services for
a year, and then to drop them. The increase
in the naval estitgates is partly accounted for
by the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER, on the
ground that steamships are more expensive
than sailing ships. But aro we to abandon our
*team navy in Cyan from the present dsto?

THE PRESS.

The House of Commons owes it as a solemn
duty to the public and to its own character, to
take care that it is nut entrapped into a
sanction of establishments which it does not
desire to see permanently maintained. It
ought to deal fairly with the country. Com-
posed as it is of shrewd, practical, experienced
men, very conversant with business, and
accustomed to check accounts, and balance
ledgers, it must know that the increased ex-
penditure proposed by the Government cannot
be met in future years without increased
taxation.

It is an insult to common sense to say that
the financial scheme of the Government is
intended for the ensuing year alone, and that
the CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER has done
enough when he has shown that the revenue
on which he calculates will defray the pro-
posed expenditure. He has deprived himself
of that plea by the arrangements which he pro-
poses for future years, and particularly by
proposing to limit the income tax to a lower
rate than that which he will himself receive
fin• the present year. If his scheme of expen-
diture be honest, if he believes it necessary
for the service of the country, he should, to
meet that expenditure, propose an income tax
of Is. in the pound, at least, for the next three
years.
In what a humiliating position will the
Legislature be placed should it sanction estab-
lishments which it will be impossible for the
scale of taxation it fixes to defray ! If this
financial scheme is affirmed, the inevitable
result will be future embarrassment. The
vote which sanctions it will be a vote to cause
deficiency in ensuing years. The House of
Commons will, in respect of foresight and
principle, place itself on a par with those
swindling companies which mislead the public
by promising advantages they know can never
be realised.

We think it impossible that the House can
lend itself to a proceeding so dainnatory of its
character, and so surd of ultimate detection
and punishment. The country is not entitled
to expect impossibilities at the hands of its
representatives, but it is entitled to expect
from them fair dealing. It has a right to know
what the general features of its financial con-
dition are likely to be in future. It throws
discredit on our representative system to
make promises to the people from year to
year of remissions of taxation which it is never
intended to fulfil. What scorn and contempt
do members cast on their constituents when
they act on the principle that they are not to
be trusted with the facts of their financial
state! If it is necessary that after the episode
of the two years' war our permanent expendi-
ture shall be increased by six or seven or eight
millions, let the truth be plainly told. The
Government may be assured that by such a
course it would stand infinitely higher in
public estimation than by attempting to gain
a sanction to such expenditure by false pre•
tenees. The House has to vindicate its cha-
racter, as an assembly of honourable and clear-
sighted men, from the insult thrown on it by
this delusive financial scheme.

MILITARY AND NAVAL ESTABLISH-
MENTS.
IN connection with the Budget is a question
requiring from the Legislature the fullest and
calmest consideration. It is whether, in con-
sequence of the late war, any considerable
addition shall be made to our naval and mili-
tary establishments. Lord PALNIERSTON has
placed the affirmative of this question in the
most favourable light when he said that he
proposed to " utilise the experience gained
" during the war." The whole subject must
be discussed in the debate now proceeding in
the House of Commons, as it lies at the root
of a scheme of national finance; but we hope
that so grave a matter may be viewed and
treated free from the indignation which the
illusory financial proposals of the Government
are sure to excite.

On the general principle that this country
must maintain armed services of sufficient

SATURDAY,

strength to guard it from any sudden attack,
and to form a nucleus capable of prodigious
expansion in time of war, there can be no dis-
pute among reasonable men. Recent events
have occasioned such a change in public sen-
timent that the arguments of the old Peace
party are not likely to be listened to with
much favour. Wo regard it as settled that the
country will decide on maintaining such armed
establishments as shall secure it from the
danger which would otherwise threaten it in
the event of any sudden outbreak of hosti•
litics. What the amount of those establish-
ments shall be is the point for consideration.
It is not unimportant to recollect that, while
for the twenty years previous to the Russian
war our naval and military services were
gradually increased, circumstances occurred
which tended to lessen our necessity for any
considerable standing army for domestic or
for colonial use. The police force, which
has been gradually extending since its
first establishment, is now spreading over
the whole country, and may be relied on
to suppress any of those social disturb-
ances which, occasionally occurring in
past times, required the presence of troops in
different parts of the country. We may hope,
besides, that the course of society tends to the
eradication of that turbulent spirit which
formerly made particular localities dangerous.
When Ireland was the " great difficulty " of
successive Governments, whether Whig or
Tory, the presence of a considerable and
efficient army was required to maintain the
public peace. Thanks to the decline of
" agitation," troops arc as little required for
the preservation of order in Ireland as in any
other part of the United Kingdom.
The principle that our colonies shall be
taught to mainly rely on themselves for a pro-
tective force has been so far acted on as to
render fewer troops necessary in our colonial
possessions than were formerly maintained
there.

These three changes place a much larger
force at the disposal of the Executive for
foreign service, or for any unexpected contin-
gency, than it could formerly command. In
their effect they probably equal an addition to
our army of 50,000 men. The extension of our
Indian empire requires that a larger body of
European troops should be permanently
stationed there, but the expense of such addi-
tion is defrayed from the revenues of India,
and the total effective strength of our army is
thus increased without any addition to our
military estimates.
For our own part, we strongly doubt the
expediency of any expensive addition to
our armed services over the ordinary estab-
lishments previous to 1854. It is a mistake to
speak cf such increase as necessary that war
may not find us unprepared. Let war come
when it may, it must find us unprepared.
When war does come, a necessity is laid upon
the nation to put forth all its resources. Its
life is at stake ; it has to battle for existence ;
and no effort can be too great, no sacrifice too
costly, to enable it to emerge from the contest
with honour and success. In peace, on the
contrary, its armaments should be essentially
defensive—they should be directed to secure
the country from the possibility of being
suddenly taken at a disadvantage, and not to
the prospect of tluowing an invading army on
a tbreign territory.
Services that are not used for a number of
years must inevitably fall into decay. To be
vital they must be active. When maintained
without that real practical employment which
calls forth all their energies, and compels
them to adopt late improvements and new
fashions, they must degenerate. The pre•
tence of being always ready for war is
a delusion and a snare. The countries which
act on that principle are found least prepared
for war when the time for mortal and pro-
tracted strife arrives. A pugilist who was
always in training would never be able to fight;
the constitution cannot support the perpetual
wear• and tear. And countries are much more
debilitated than strengthened by the weight
of immense armaments.

We think it should be the policy of this
country while maintaining an efficient force
for all purposes of defence, and for the service
of our extended empire, to engage the nations