The Press.
London, England, 1854-09-23 00:00:00

894

different way : the instructions he has given me oblige me
to press you to take a decisive line of action.' Well, I
apprise you that my conscience will not permit me to be
silent respecting so grave a circumstance, and I shall in-
form the Emperor, my master. He will not follow you in
the path you wish to lead him in ; he will not follow you,
because he will not be able ; and your sovereign, believe
me, will end by finding himself isolated in the midst of

Europe.' -
A few days after this conversation, that was much
alluded to in every Court of Germany, the Emperor of
Austria wrote an autograph letter to the Emperor Nicholas
(June, ISM), in which he said to him, ' that he relied on
him for everything necessary to be done at Constantinople ;
that he approved beforehand of everything ' • and that he
should be prepared for everything.' This for M. de
Meyendorff was a great but an ephemeral triumph,
soon to be followed by a mighty fall. In fact, a reserved
despatch was shortly after received at Berlin and London,
wherein M. de Buol expressly declared that if the Emperor
Nicholas made war on Turkey Austria would not second
him. Nay, more, M. de Buol, while defining and limiting
the neutrality of Austria, held up to view the cases iu
which that neutrality would cease. This was the fruit of
Prince Metternich's inspirations. M. de Meyendorff was
consequently mistaken, and his error of judgment was
shown still more by the daily course of events. Count
Orloff's mission struck the first blow. It has been often
asked what was the object of this mission. The Russian
envoy was charged to make direct and personal representa-
tions to the Emperor Francis Joseph respecting some of
his ministers and to advise their dismissal ; the Emperor
Nicholas conceived that he had reason in particular
to complain of M. de Buol, to whom he attributed old
feelings of rancour. M. de Buol had filled at St. Peters-
burg the office of Minister from the Emperor of Austria.
The story goes that on presenting to the Emperor Nicholas
the letters that accredited him to his Court, he uttered a
speech in which he said ' sent by his Government ; '
' charged by his Government.' The Emperor unceremo-
niously interrupted him with, Speak of the Emperor, your
master, sir; I only know him, and do not know what your
Government is.'
" Count Orloff failed ; but he learned from the mouth of
Prince Metternich himself that M. de Meyendorff had
been warned in time, and that, if he had so desired, he could
have informed his Emperor, who would then perhaps have
not 83 imprudently engaged himself. This was all the
enemies of M. de Meyendorf wanted, and his recal was
from that instant resolved on. Prince Gortachakoff, his
successor, belongs to the Russian party ; the German party
of St. Petersburg has been beaten in the person of M. de

Ilteyendorff.
" What has happened to this diplomatist is an example
that lends its support to a thesis we have often heard main-
. ained, to the effect that, when affairs become aggravated,
twhen Cabinets engage in serious discussions likely to end
in a rupture or a simple suspension of diplomatic relations,
when they go so far as to contradict each other, to watch
each other, because they have interests opposed or different,
those agents that have long resided at Vienna, Paris, or
London are enfeebled by their habits and by the secret
influence exercised over their intelligence and dispositions,
by the circle they have lived in, and the society they have
kept. If M. de Meyendorff had been less intimate with
the society of Vienna, if he had not been lured along by his
family alliance with M. de Buol, he would have taken
counsel of himself alone, he would have been more clear-
sighted and more unbiassed, and probably he would have
seen more correctly."

EUPATORIA.
THE following is the description of a place scarcely
known the day before yesterday, but now of celebrity
all over the world :—Eupatoria is a town of consider-
able trade, containing 12,1100 inhabitants, and the
possession of such a port is, in many respects, prefer-
able to that of a hastily fortified camp on an unin-
habited point of the coast. It is true that the
harbour is ill protected from the weather, but it is not
less sheltered than any other part of the Bay of
Kalamita; while facilities must have been found for
landing heavy stores at (a mercantile seaport which
could not have been counted upon at other places
which have been supposed favourable for disembarks-
tion. The alleged unhealthiness of Eupatoria is not
very important, since the generals could have no
desire to remain there ; and, indeed, a telegrapic
despatch states that the army immediately com-
menced its march upon Sebastopol. The distance of
the landing place from the chief point of attack may
be thought to be a more serious objection ; but there
may have been reason for believing that time would
be saved by adopting a route which, as measured in
miles, is comparatively long and circuitous. From
the Katcha River to Fort Constantine is less than ten
miles, while from Eupatoria to the later point is more
than fifty ; but it may have been considered next to
impossible to transport heavy artillery and ammuni-
tion from the former position into a practicable road,
whereas one of the principal roads of the Crimea con-
nects Eupatoria with Simferopol, and anotherjoins the
last-named town with Sebastopol. Following these
lines of communication, the distance from the place
where the allied army has landed to its ultimate des-
tination cannot be less than 100 miles ; but, unless a
conveniently-practicable route exists in the neighbour-
hood of the coast, a march of even this length may
have been deemed, on the whole, the easiest and most
expeditious. It is probable, also, that the adoption
of this course will secure the troops against their
most formidable difficulty—the want of water. For
about the first twenty miles the line of march appears