The Press.
London, England, 1854-04-22 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

APRIL 22, 1854.

ittratiut.

Bunnah. Letters and Papers written in
1852-53. By Major-General Henry Godwin.
London : Bosworth.
Tins posthumous vindication of General God-
win affords another warning against the preci-
pitancy of contemporary criticism, and the
occasional unfairness of partisan journalists.
Wisely said Lord Ellenborough in the Lords,
that of all men those employed in naval and
military service are the most sensitive. The
cause is easy to find. Their profession in-
volves no perpetual conflict of antagonistic
opinion, and does not, therefore, harden them
against calumny and misrepresentation. In
their unreasoning simplicity they are apt to
expect from the baser sort of political oppo-
nents that justice which they would themselves
show. They can allow for prejudice, and par-
don ignorance ; but they are unaware how
skilfully prejudice can assume the mask of
impartiality, and an ignorant critic display the
technicalities of military knowledge. In a free
country things must be so ; yet it is hard that
men of sensitive feelings—and such feelings
are often united with the utmost physical cou-
rage—should have the annoyance of foolish
censure superadded to the load of responsibi-
lity and the labours of a campaign. Two great
men—Marlborough and Washington—have
left it on record how they felt these things. Even
Wellington, though with his peculiar stoicism
he affected to despise anonymous attacks,
suffered more than the public knew from them.
Our rule in this matter is simple—to hope the
best, and predict the best, of military opera-
tions pending, content to believe that there
may be causes either for action or delay,
which to the public are not, nor ought to be,
known.
In the memorial before us, which is partly
eked out from the writer's private letters,
General Godwin refutes one by one the
calumnies against him.
It was said that the Burmese expedition of '52
had been delayed on account of the length of
time he took to reach Calcutta from Umbiallah,
where he had been quartered. The general
replies that he travelled day and night, and
the dates prove it. His departure was Feb. 21,
his arrival March 2—nine days for more than
1,000 miles, over Indian roads.
It was alleged that at his first interview
with the Governor-General "he debated and
"hesitated." This also is circumstantially
denied, and the real facts stated
It is true that certain parts of the proposed plan were
not in accordance with my views, and I stated my objec-
tions firmly and honestly. These were, that if the pro-
posed operations were to be the commencement of extended
ones in that country, we were beginning at the wrong sea-
son, as the rains would come on in May ; that if it was
only proposed to go and destroy what we might, we should
not influence the Government of Ave, as it possessed no
pablic establishments ; that what we should destroy would
soon be put up again; that by leaving the country, and re-
turning again in case the first demonstration failed to pro-
duce the desired results, we should have to do all over again
in October; and that such a proceeding would greatly in-
crease the expense, as well as destroy the unity and dignity
of our proceedings.
To this succinct and lucid summary Lord Dal-
housie replied by talking about " public opi-
nion" and the necessity of taking some strong
measure. All readers of Napier 's history re-
member how sharp and stern was the Duke's
reproof of one who, writing firm England,
counselled him to fight a battle, whether it
led to any result or no, for that "public opi-
nion" at home required that something should
be done. There is a difference between the
Duke of Wellington and Lord Dalhousie !
Of course the Governor-General's opinion
prevailed, and General Godwin was despatched
accordingly, with orders which, to our humble
apprehension, seem the most injudicious that
could well have been given. He was t
o cap-
ture Rangoon ; occupy it ; pass the rainy and
hot seasons there, taking his chance of pesti-
lence; advance to Prome if time allowed, but
no farther. Thus all the exposure, not to
mention the cost, of a campaign was to be
undergone, without other gain than that of a
seaport which could always be had when
wanted. General Godwin uniformly held to
Bahoon that no thorough subjugation of
urmcould occur unless Ava were occu•

pied; the Duke of Wellington, as we now
know, thought the same ; experience seems
likely to prove them right; but "public opi-
nion" and Lord Dalhousie decided the other
way. It is justice to the Calcutta authorities
to say that everything seems to have been
done for the expeditionary army that prudence
could suggest :

The care and provision which has been made to enable
us to meet the rains is, I msy say, parental. There are to
be bakehouses ; a constant supply of fresh meat ; hospitals
at Amherst to relieve me, to which the sick are to be car-
ried round. The only difficulty I ever felt respecting the
occupation of Rangoon at the setting in of the rains was, as to
cover for the men. But hundreds of skeleton houses are
now, and for some time have been, making at Moulmein ;
so that, contrary to my first impression, I have great hopes
that, if we cannot go on,we shall be able to hold the ground
we shall have taken, without the losses we met with before
from exposure and bad food.

The grounds of Lord Dalhousie's decision
to begin a campaign at the very worst time of
year appear to us as unsatisfactory as the re-
sult. He calculated on the Burmese being
overawed by the simple occupation of Ran•
goon. No persuasion appears to have con-
vinced him that this calculation was unsound.
The events of the war, briefly recapitulated
in this pamphlet, are well known in England.
On March 26, '52, the expedition left Calcutta ;
landed on the 2nd of April; stormed the Great
Pagoda and carried the town on the 12th-
15th of same month ; and there, as agreed
on, suspended its operations. The Burmese,
as General Godwin anticipated, left the cli-
mate to fight their battles. No communication
reached him from Ava. There were doubtless
many native courtiers to remind the Monarch
of Sir Archibald Campbell's invasion, where
75 per cent. of his whole force died more by
disease than the sword. The season was
trying, the heat terrible ; Government ex-
pressed satisfaction at what had been done,
but already the people began to murmur,
though Bassein, by a renewal of exertions, was
taken in the middle of May, and Pegue in
June. In July the Governor-General came,
inspected the Rangoon garrison, and approved
its state. On the charge of keeping his force
inactive there during the rains General God-
win's defence is complete. In the first place,
he had orders to do so ; that alone ought to
suffice ; hut those orders coincided with his
own judgment :
The responsibility of maintaining an effective force, and
the risk of using a non-effective one, were mine ; and why
was I required to break up froth Rangoon? Why was I
to abandon all these advantages which had answered so
well, as the returns will show, and go and take up an idle
position in the most pestilential swamp that is to be found
in the country, where I should have no cover for the men,
and that, too, in the midst of the rains? Why change
the soldiers from wholesome food, and excellent health,
to put them on salt rations and biscuit? This was to
be done for no earthly advantage ; at the mere sugges-
tion of a few weak-minded, or interested, ill-informed,
and irresponsible persons ; and simply because a few
steamers had found their way up to a wonderful place
called Prime. _

Of this last-named place the importance
was absurdly exaggerated at home. Except
as a depot and base of further operations it
was useless. Being farther from Calcutta and
the coast, its occupation could only increase
the cost of supplies. As a swamp, without
cover for troops, to have held it during the
sickly season (or rather during the most sickly
where none are salubrious) would have been
a wanton waste of lives. Even in October,
when the advance was made, and the town
captured, the invaders came almost too soon :
This is a sickly place, from the swamps which surround
it, and the mortality has been very serious among the
European troops. I knew that it would be so, and pointed
out the objections to an occupation during this wet season.
We were full early, and it is quite bad enough as it
is; but, knowing what I did, I should have been unfit to
command had I been moved by hints, or ignorant, imper-
tinent observations, or the gabbling abuse of newspaper
editors.
And elsewhere the writer says, "That swamp,
" Prome, has already cost me many men in
" hospital. . . . . It is a most direful and
" unhealthy place." "Our mortality is griev-
" ous . . we have cholera here already, and
" other bad forms of disease." This was
written Feb. 7, '53. If the troops suffered in
cool weather, what would they have done bad
the advance taken place in summer, as pre-
sumptuous ignorance was perpetually urging
should be done ?
It is obvious that in the course of last year,
some months after Lord Dalhousie's visit,

375

something had gone wrong at home. "There
"is an evident wish," writes the general in
February, "to see things in an unfair light."
" No man can gain any credit by serving a
" Government which lays itself open to receive
" private communications." "I am going on
" with people who never approach me with
" advice, but who are listened to elsewhere."
It is just to remark that these complaints
seem to apply rather to Calcutta than to the
Board of Control. "My position " (in March,
'53) "with respect to the Governor-General
" has been not so much of the nature of a dif-
" ference as that I have held my own." . . .
" When a force is in the field, all must be sub-

" servient to the man who commands." Many
passages of a similar tendency occur, proving
that Lord Dalhousie's one great failing—his
jealous and arbitrary monopoly of power—
interfered with the freedom of the commander,
and injudiciously restricted operations. Why
will a man personally so able refuse to see
ability in any one except himself? " Either
" do the work yourself, or let me," is the rea-
sonable remonstrance of a soldier so controlled.
We should not judge thus on an ex parte state-
ment were this a single case; but Sir Charles
Napier, and all who have served under the
present Viceroy, tell the same tale, wherefore
we cannot wholly disbelieve it, even were proof
wanting. It is much to General Godwin's
credit that he appears to have overlooked his
annoyances, and that a cordial reconciliation
subsequently ensued.
In April, '53, the negotiations began ; and
here again a blunder occurred. Terms of
peace had in fact been arranged, but these
were so badly drawn that the Burmese com-
missioners objected to sign them, as including
a cession of territory 100 miles beyond what
was intended. The negotiation failed ; two
months' delay became inevitable ; and it was
June before the arrangements actually in force
were conic to. How long they may last no
man knows. General Godwin, from first to
last, maintained that to produce any effectual
result you must strike at the capital. "To
" find peace for Pegue," he repeats again and
again, "you must go to Ava." He said so in
the spring of '52; he repeated it in the autumn
of '53 ; yet on him, his age, his vacillation, im-
becility, and so forth, was charged the laches
of a continuance in quarters when to advance
would have been sounder policy. Such is
political justice !
On a calm review of the whole war, wo see
sufficient reason to believe that it was badly
managed, not by the general, but by his imme-
diate chief in India. Retrospective criticism
is easy; yet no case seems made out for the
occupation of Rangoon during the summer,
which did not intimidate the Burmese, nor for
the refusal of leave to advance on Ava, which
would have done so effectually. We do not
believe that the present peace, if peace it is,
will last long; and, should it fail, the cause
will be our reluctance to use to the utmost
those military advantages which we possessed.
It is allowed on all hands that a force like that
of Godwin might have landed at Rangoon in
October, marched straight up the country, and
imposed terms at Ava, before the next hot
weather set in. A treaty so enforced would
not only have been honourable, it would pro-
bably have been durable as well.
No one who knew General Godwin could
have shared in the foolish belief of his physical
incapacity to command. We knew him not long
ago, before his appointment to Burmah, and
can vouch that, while his courtesy and amiable
qualities were everywhere appreciated, by few
men in the prime of life could his personal
activity have been exceeded. Great tempe-
rance, a light compact frame, cheerful spirits,
and a constant habit of exercise had left him
at past sixty years as fresh and buoyant as the
youngest of his aides de-camp. lie had not,
like Sir Charier Napier, those striking quali-
ties which excite the enthusiasm of armies ;
the two men did not stand on the same level
of greatness, nor would Godwin have claimed
for himself any higher fame than that of a sen-
sible and practised soldier; but all who served
with him will bear ready witness to the ame-
nity of his manners, the constancy of his tem-
per, the sound sense which he showed in act
and deed, and the kind heart which won him
love alike from officers and privates. If, as was

wanted. General uroawin
his opinion that no thorough subjugation of It is obvious that in the course of last year, an a aeea, ana we Jona neart W WWI Ti %Au
Burmah could occur unless Ava were occu• some months after Lord Dalhousie s visit, I love alike from officers and privates. It; as was
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