The Press.
London, England, 1856-07-12 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

so we may reasonably conclude it is with
the mind, and that it can know no bonds
like those which ignorance imposes. Know-
ledge is not necessarily power, nor, if it were,
does it follow that power would be of itself a
good. But knowledge is life—spiritual life ;
and in proportion as it expands the faculties
of the soul, does it seem probable that the
will becomes more truly free ; for it can be free
only in the sense of being able to perceive and
to pursue what is right in itself. The will is
not free, but is in bondage, which of its own
choice prefers evil to good.
Of all forms of free-will, or of all courses
which the will has power of itself to pursue,
the most undoubted seems to be its capacity
of raising itself to God. Its spiritual freedom
is certainly not independent of all conditions,
but its movements in the spiritual sphere are
more free than we can imagine possible in any
other. The mind must be informed before it
can be religious ; but when the information—
by which we understand the convictions which
right teaching inspires—has been given, the
will is, if we suppose it free in any sense, abso-
lutely free by its own internal principle of
movement, of soaring upwards. Nor does it
seem improbable that the germ of freedom
with which man was originally endowed is
capable of indefinite expansion, and that it is
being greatly nourished by the action of the
Christian communities of our day.
On some collateral points Mr. Solly's inqui-
ries are of much value. He refuses to attach
more than "historical importance" to the
difficulty which has been experienced in recon-
ciling the free-will of man to the foreknow-
ledge of God. Yet a difficulty which Locke
professed himself utterly unable to explain,
demands respectful consideration for its own
sake. In this treatise the case is put:—

When a future time arrives I may be perfectly free
to choose between the actions A or B, the only difference
being that if I perform B, God will have foreknown B in-
stead of A.
I may have perfectly liberty to perform A or B.
If I shall perform A, God foreknows A ; if B, He fore-
knows B.

Like most of the metaphysicians of our day,
Mr. Solly is not deficient in the imaginative
faculty, and, lo show the possibility of recon-
ciling Divine foreknowledge with human free-
will, he asks us to consider a conversation
which a friend of his once had with a native
of the Island of Typhlia. The passage is
long, but will not bear abridgment :

The friend in question had been wrecked on the
above•mentioned island, and on reaching the shore
and recovering his senses, was astonished to find that
the country was inhabited by a race of men entirely
destitute of the sense of vision, but in other respects like
the rest of mankind. Before he came among them they
had never met with a man who could see, and had of
course no conception of what sight was. After a residence
in the island of some years, he succeeded in acquiring a
perfect knowledge of the language spoken there. The
Typhlians have their philosophers, like the rest of the
world, and on one occasion my friend had the following
conversation with one of their first scientific men :

Typhlian. have not been very well lately, and I
think a good long walk would do me good. Are you dis-
posed to join me ?
Englishman. I shall have much pleasure in doing so.
Typh. Where shall we go ?
Engl. As you talk of a long walk, I propose that we
explore the conical hill on the other side of the forest. It
must be several thousand feet high, and the rocks near its
base assume very wild and romantic forms.
Typh (with evident aetonishment). A. conical hill ! I
know of no such place, and had no idea that you had ever
been even as far as to this side of the forest. When
have you visited this hill, that you seem to know so much
about it ?

Engl. I have never been there in my life.
Typh. Who then told you that we should find such a
hill ?

Engl. Nobody.
Typh. You speak in riddles I You propose that we
should walk to a hill which you have never yet visited, and
the very existence of which nn one has ever hinted to you!
How can you know that we shall come to such a place as
you describe ?

Engl. Trust yourself to my guidance, and I will con-
vince you that there is such a bill. But it will be two or
three hours at least before we reach it.

Typh. You English must be very remarkable people.
You seem to have a most extraordinary knowledge of what
we are going to experience in the future. The other day
you cautioned me to be on my guard, as I should probably
stumble over a stone. A minute afterwards I did stumble,
and yet the stone was on my side, and I am sure you could
not have touched it. Neither had you ever walked in that
direction before. Can you explain to me this miraculous
faculty of foreknowledge ?. .

Engl. I saw the stone lying in your path.
Typh. That is to say you knew it would be there and
that I should run up against it, for sight and seeing are

SATURDAY,

evidently the English words for foreknowing. Rut in
what manner did you attain this knowledge ?
Engl. I was immediately conscious of it by my sense
of sight.
Typh (musing). Sense of sight! What words aro
these! You allow that you did not touch it, and yet you
knew it would be there. Sense of sight ! Yes, it must be
so. The sense of sight is evidently a faculty of foreknow-
ledge. You English have extraordinary reasoning powers,
and by your knowledge of the laws of nature you were able
to conclude from something you trod upon as a cause,
that I must tread apon the stone directly after as an effect.
We Typhlians can also reason in a similar manner. When
I pass through my garden•gate, I know that I shall feel
the door of my house soon after. But then I have often
been there, whereas you had never walked in that direction
before, and yet you could foretell the stone. Ah, I ant
afraid our natural science falls far short of yours ; you evi-
dently reason from cause to effect.
Engl. No, that was not the way in which I became
aware of the stone. I did not reason about it at all,
but knew at once that you would stumble against it with•
out ever having known of the existence of the stone till a
minute before. _ _

Typh. Excuse me, but that is absurd. You may be
gifted with other faculties than myself, but all knowledge
must have an object. Now when you spoke, there was no
object. No—l am sure that you foretell events by reason-
ing on the laws of nature you have observed. You
must know, perhaps, that after walking over so much
grass and so much sand, one must come to such a sort of
stone. But as to any immediate faculty by which yon can
foreknow such an event—the thing is absurd—it is a con-
tradiction.

The reader will easily perceive the conclusion I would
draw from the above dialogue. A future event is no im-
mediate object of human faculties, but who shall say that
it is no object of the Divine ? To say that a future event
is no object for any conceivable faculty, because it is no
object for us, is to judge of a Divine faculty of prescience
from our knowledge of other faculties. Now this is as
absurd as the judgment of the Typhlian, who concluded
that there was no object for any faculty, because none was
presented to his sense of touch. It is true, we must not
invent faculties for God at pleasure. But there are
reasons of a moral and religious character for believing
that God possesses the attribute of foreknowledge, there
are also reasons for believing in man's freedom, and the
intuition of space suggests by analogy a way of reconciling
the seeming contradiction between them. Hence I arrive
at what appears to me an irresistible conclusion, namely,
that God looks through time as we look through space,
and that for the Divine mind all that has been, is, or ever
shall be, is an ever-present fact.

It is in passages like these that the author
skirts the bounds of human thought, and by
ingenious analogy enables us to faintly appre-
hend higher faculties than our own. Such
suggestion—inspiring humility while prompt-
ing aspiration—belongs to the teaching of the
best kind of philosophy.
In what Mr Solly says concerning the in-
tuitive ideas, or knowledge, of the mind we do
not agree, for reasons which we have before
stated. We do not believe that the mind is
endowed with such ideas, though it is endowed
with a capacity for acquiring them. We be-
lieve that the constitution of the mind deter-
mines it to certain conclusions when evidence
is laid before it, but we do not believe that
the conclusions are independent of the evi-
dence. The truths of mathematical science
are arrived at in much the same manner as
other truths. The conclusion that two straight
lines cannot inclose space, is arrived at by
the same process of the understanding as that
the whole is greater than a part, and that three
are more than two. If pressed with the quet--
tion—why the mind must conclude thus, and
cannot possibly conclude otherwise, the only
answer that can be given is, because the mind
has a certain constitution or laws, which com-
pel it so to conclude. We believe that a
capacity for acquiring elementary truths is inhe-
rent in the mind, but not that the truths them •
selves are inherent. We believe that the mind
is governed by the general laws of its consti-
tution, and must act in accordance with those
laws; but only as that constitution and those
laws are brought into action can any kind of
knowledge be acquired, or any kind of conclu-
sions be formed. We recognise in the mind a
great power or capacity, but in the senses we
recognise the agents which alone can set that
power in motion, and supply it with materials
for activity.
We have been greatly pleased with Mr.
Solly's acuteness. His subject is a solemn
one, and far too profound for human intellect
to fathom ; but it is not wholly profitless to
be made to comprehend that there are mys-
teries which transcend our knowledge, as scope
is thus left for faith in the higher intelligence
which we feel to exist in the very efforts we
make to apprehend it.

JULY 12, 1856,

A liiBtory of the Christian Church during the
Reformation. By Charles Hardwick, M.A.
Cambridge : Macmillan and Co.
Ma. HARDWICK has contrived to impart some
degree of freshness to this rather timeworn
topic. His matter is well condensed; his
style is easy and natural; and the arrange-
ment excellent. He writes, too, from genuine
and independent sources, and has perfectly
distinct and well-matured views of his own.
Thus, though his work is short, it partakes in
no respect of the character of a compilation.
It is original without aiming at novelty, and
simple and terse without lacking dignity. It
is a kind of writing of which at the present
day we see too little.
Mr. Hardwick divides the whole body of
Reformers into three great schools—the
Saxon, the Swiss, and the English—Luther
being the head of the first, and Zuinglius of
the second. He points out the countries in
which each predominated, and deduces the
results of the schism thus occasioned in the
Protestant body with great care. His account
of the origin and progress of the Jesuits is
laudably impartial, the more so as Mr. Hard-
wick is evidently a divine who entertains
very fervent convictions on theological ques-
tions, which he has on this occasion subordi-
nated to historical candour. When we speak
of his convictions we do not mean that he is
prominently of the Evangelical school. He is,
indeed, anything but that. He belongs to
that sober, old-fashioned class of clergy who
were known as high churchmen some fifty
years ago.
His moderation is especially conspicuous in
his account of the English Reformation ; and
in tracing the causes as well as consequences
of that event he constantly gives us reason to
admire his practical and substantial turn of
mind. We can safely recommend this
History of the Reformation" to all those
readers who wish to have a lucid and succinct
narrative laid before them without any effort
either to inflame their passions or to entrap
their judgment.

PERIODICAL

ONE of the most prominent articles in the West
minster Review is that on "Hereditary Influence."
The author's great point is, that there is no such
thing as species, and that no qualities are trans
mitted from sire to son but those of the individual.
This, however, at first sight would seem to be some-
thing very like a quibble; for it is an aggregate of
individuals that constitutes tha species, and though
there may be a certain variety among the individuals,
if there is nevertheless—as the author has not dis-
provel—a certain over-ruling similarity, we do not
see what step is gained by the view here put forward.
The essay on " Ministerial Responsibility " is a
singular mixture of right and wrong. Thus, the
entire tone of criticism on M. de Montalembert's
account of the Administrative Reformers is charac-
terised by the bitterest malignity against the aristo-
cratic classes; in order to justify which the writer
descends to a contradiction of what we should have
thought was a notorious matter of fact. Alluding to
the passage in which M. de Montalembert speaks of
the dangerous increase of public functionaries, he
says:—

" Fatal slide," indeed ; but the impulse down the
treacherous incline has been given from above and not
from below. It is not fair to represent the immoderate
pursuit of public office and place as emerging spon-
taneously from the masses by reason of their improved educa-
tion ; and he can have observed but little the conduct of
the two great political factions of the country when they
have been respectively in possession of the power of the
Government, who has any, the least faith in an appeal to
our " statesmen" to check this growing evil. It is an evil
of their own fostering; it is the method by which Whigs
and Tories alike have discovered that the " Queen's Govern-
ment can alone be carried on." The centralisation of the
patronage of an immense number of places in the hands
of the Government of the day, or which is the same thing,
looked at from another point of view, the ramification of
the Government influence over the whole country, must
necessarily be corrupting.

. _
Nothing can be more untrue. It has been the mad
outcry of middle-class pretenders to politics that they
bad no sufficient share in the good things of Govern-
ment, which has led to the evil complained of. On
the other hand, we think the following remarks worth
consideration : they are thoroughly respectful to his
Royal Highness, and merely allude to a possible, and
we hope remote, difficulty:—
The constitutional position of the illustrious person re-
ferred to is that of a Privy Councillor, and no other ; and
by the practice of the Constitution, those members only of
the Council who actually bear office actually advise. If