The Press.
London, England, 1857-02-07 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

believed to be their lawful Government. Misguided
they undoubtedly were—erroneous their views may
have been—un ortunate they certainly have been.
Their efforts were put down ; but I never yet heard
any man throw a doubt ou the sense of allegiance
and loyalty by which they were guided. Whatever
their misfortunes and errors may have been, this is
not the country in which to speak lightly of allegiance
and loyalty. (Hem,: beam) I certainly did enter-
tains' hope that thiaimatterwas not only in course of
being isetaled, buhnhat. itenctually bad been settlelii
natisfactorily, atrial •regget.-to find from the Rood I
(speech tine. that isinot ttincase. I may be permitted
to say a feet worrier with nregard to the claim of the e
Xing cK,PVlessie, beaannentewas at a period when I
was connected with tb*,Gereagament that that pro
col was signed in Londeseepon which it is said the
King of Prussia now fort tidal claim.
I must beg your lordships to look back for a single
moment at what was then the condition of Europe.
France was then in a most unquiet state. The
famous words "L'Empire c'est la pais" had not then
been uttered ; indeed, the empire did not then exist.
The public mind in France was greatly agitated.
Piedmont, Switzerland, and Belgium were looking
with great alarm to the solution of the questions
then pending. France was making demands upon
them inconsistent with their national honour and in-
dependence, and the state of affairs was altogether
exceedingly critical. 1 shall ever consider it a great
satisfaction that the Government with which I was
connected by their good offices and by the moderation
of the parties concerned were instrumental in settling
this question in a manner not compromising to the
independence and honour of Switzerland, and at the
same time satisfactory to the just demands of France.
But precisely at that time we were called upon by
the King of Prussia not to take any active steps on
his behalf, nor to enforce the right which he claimed,
but to recognise the existence de jure of certain
rights, not very well defined, and perhaps not very
easily reconcileable with the subsequent relations of
Neufchatel. Your lordships will observe that these
rights were confirmed to the King of Prussia—or
rather to the Prince of Neufchatel (for Prussia as a
kingdom has nothing to do with the question ; it
only effects the interests of the Prince of Neufchatel,
who happens to be King of Prussia also) by the
treaties of 1815, which it was of the utmost impor-
tance at that time to the peace of Europe to preserve
from initingement. They were the treaties, too, by
which the independence and neutrality of Switzer-
land were guaranteed. The arrangement her Majesty's
Government made with the King of Prussia was
that the great powers of Europe on the one part
should admit the existence of the rights which he
claimed, while he entered into an engagement not to
disturb the peace of Europe by any attempt to enforce
those rights, Lut to place himself in the hands of
the great powers, and to leave them to settle the
question. I cannot conceive an arrangement, not
only more harmless in itself as involving no ulterior
consequences, but more likely to attain, first, the
immediate preservation of the peace of Europe. and,
next, the ultimate settlement of this question. Ido
not blame the Governments which have succeeded
for not having taken any steps to come to a solution
of this matter. I think, indeed, when they were
dealing with the affairs of other countries at a con-
ference, it would not have been unreasonable to take
this into consideration among other causes which

were likely to disturb the peace of Europe. (Hear,
hear.) They did not do so. and some misguided
men, misguided in their loyalty, rose for the purpose
of enforcing the rights of the Prince of Neufchatel.
They were immediately put down by the determined
spirit of the Swiss people, and their acts were not
unnaturally treated by the Swiss Confederation as
acts of hostility to their Government. Under these
circumstances the King of Prussia threatened to en-
force his nghts unless these persons were at once
dismi,sed without punishment, and, indeed, without
trial. To have done this without any further under-
standing would have been for the Swiss Confedera-
tion to make an admission which it was impossible
for them to make—(Hear)—and consequently the
only step was to have recourse to the mediation of
the other powers of Europe.

According to diplomatic etiquette I believe it
would have been right that England, having been
the power by whose mediation the protocol of IK:2
was signed, should have taken the initiative on this
occasion, and that a conference should have been
held at London. But the King of Prussia, it ap
pears, bad placed himself unreservedly in the hands
of the Emperor of the French, and a proposition was
made by his Majesty to the Swiss Confederation.
which was ultimately acceded to by them. For
myself, I have gathered a very distinct impression
that Switzerland was on the point of accepting the
mediation, or rather the settlement, offered on the
part of France, when the representations made to
her by the British Government induced her to
change her intention. And if I am correct in the
assumption—and I must adhere to it until it is con-

SATURDAY,

tradicted—that the Swiss were encouraged in standing
out and in refusing the arbitration of France by her
Alejesty's Ministers, I must say that, although 1 may
rejoice that endeavours are being made by our Go-
vernment, in concert with our august ally, to bring
about a settlement of the matters in dispute, yet I
cannot help feeling that if our Government had not
interfered ;with the efforts of our august ally this
vexed question would have been much earlier ad-
justed. (Hear, hear.)

The leis another poiatiwhich I trust is on the eve
Of satisfacteer solution; SI mean our differences with
the rthteddStates in award to Central America.
Beyonel.theehonourablaieengagements that we have
underteitensitowardaicertaisiledian tribes we have
few inteerstepeculiarirourown to maintain in that
quarter eCthe globe. It is, however, a matter of im-
portance to a great commerciallpeople like this, and
also to the world at large, that the neutrality of the
line of communication across the Isthmus o' Panama
should be faithfully preserved. Our only interest
in that respect is that the route may not be placed
in the hands of a power capable of exercising a con-
trolling influence over our commerce, and I shall
view any sacrifice of the islands and territory which
we may make in that region—provided they are in-
trusted to a power adequate to prevent these front'
becoming the resort of lawless and disreputable cha-
racters, but still not adequate to exercise a con-
trolling influence there to the prejudice of our inte-
rests—as fully compensated for by the attainment of
the other objects involved in such a general arrange-
ment. But I wish to know in what position we shall
stand in the possible, though perhaps tot very pro.
bable, event of the Senate of the United States .
refusing to ratify the treaty. In that case shall we
not have surrendered Ruatan and the adjacent terri-
tory without securing a guarantee on the part of the
United States for the neutrality of the passage screw
the isthmus? I hope we shall be told that the two
engagements stand and fall together—that we shall
not be bound by the one treaty without having the
equivalent advantage of the other—that the two will,
in tact, form part of one general arrangement, to the
whole of which the United States will be equally
pledged with ourselves. (Hear, hear.)

Let me turn now for a moment to the other topics
of difficulty which crowd upon us in this Speech, and
which I am afraid will continue to crowd upon us as
long as the noble viscount (Pa►merston) remains st
the head of our affairs ; because, admitting, as I do,
the extraordinary• adroitness with which the noble
viscount comes out of the dilemmas in which he
places our foreign policy, I cannot help imagining
that this very faculty of adroitness in getting out of
difficulties tempts its possessor to launch us into the
worst complications as frequently as possible, in
order that he may have more opportunities for the
exercise of his matchless skill in extricating the
country from them again. (Laughter.) Whether
the noble viscount is at the head of our foreign
affairs or at the head of our Government, we are be-
coming perpetually embroiled, first with one power,
and then with another—not, indeed, that his
system lands us in great wars, but in what are
termed diplomatic "difficulties," from wbich ww
always emerge with more or less of discredit and
disadvantage.

It has been much the fashion to talk of the du-
plicity of Russia in the late transactions. Are we
quite sure, my lords, that our own conduct on all
occasions has been perfectly straightforward—(Hear
hear)—can we say that we have held the same
language to different nations, or that we have kept
the spirit as well as the letter of the prumises we
have made and the expectations we have excited?
Are we quite certain that we have not obtained
valuable support from a warlike and, if not a power-
ful, at ail events a brave and noble people, by en-
couraging them to expect our interference, if not by
action, at least by moral persuasion, for the improve-
ment of their position in relation to the other States
of Italy ? Have we not given them ground to look
for our active aid in relieving them from a continual
menace hanging over their heads, in securing their
independence, and in enabling them to retrench those
expenses which press so heavily on their finances?
Are we quite sure that after we had reaped the ad-
vantage of their co operation we made a return to
them at the final close of the Pans Conferences, in the
shape of such au amount of assistance and material
support as our words and acts had led them to
calculate upon? My lords, I greatly doubt it.
( Hear, bear.) I have not forgotten the language of
Vie Sardinian Commissioner when he referred, and
referred in terms of some bitterness, to the hopes
which his country had conceived, and which it had
been induced to cherish, from the conduct of the
British Government. I have not forgotten the
evasive answer (I use the word in no offensive sense)
which the noble earl opposite, after an interval of six
short weeks, was compelled to give in reply to the
remonstrance of the Sardinian Minister. It is true.
my lords, that at the Paris Conferences we kept the
word of promise to the ear, but broke it to the hope .

FEBRUARY 7, 1857

We introduced some vague unmeaning words about
the foreign occupation of the Papal States being an
"abnormal state of things" and a serious evil. We
pledged ourselves to those illusory words, but did we
take the slightest step, or press our ally France to
take the slightest step, towards putting an end to
this serious and abnormal state of affairs ? I am
well aware that Austria objected to the introduction
into the conferences of any matter alien to their im-
mediate object. And I ask, has Austria no reason
for entertaining diminished confidence in us in con-
sequence of the equivocal course we have pursued?

I have always thought that, while it was no part of
our business either to interfere between Austria and
her Italian subjects, or to seek to disturb her in her
possessions, at the same time it was not for us to go
out of our way to strengthen her position in the
Italian peninsula. On the contrary, a rigid good
faith requires us to abstain from all kinds of such
intermeddling: but I ask the noble earl opposite
whether Austria has not by the acts of her allies, in
the course of these negotiations, obtained a greater
security than ever for the maintenance of her Italian
territories? I greatly doubt whether the noble earl
can answer that question in the negative. But, my
lords, what did we do? Abstaining from entering
into such arrangements as might satisfy the just
expectations of Piedmont, we yet embarked on a
policy of interference with the internal government
of the kingdom of the two Sicilies, based on the pre-
text of a regard for the peace of Europe. What had
the state of the kingdom of the two Sicilies to do
with the peace of Europe ? You say, indeed, that
the condition of Naples threatened to disturb the
general tranquillity which had just been restored.
But will the noble earl rise up on the part of the
Government and gravely tell this assembly that her
Majesty's Ministers had the slightest apprehension
that the course of conduct adopted by the King of
Naples towards his own subjects would occasion the
smallest chance of any disturbance of the peace of
Europe? (Hear, hear.) It is all very well to talk
of the danger of Austrian interference, and of the
danger of French interference, but the noble earl
knows that there was nothing to fear from any con-
flict of opinion between France and Austria on this
point. 'Die plea of any such danger was a mere
plea, without any substance in it. Your interference
with Naples was partly dictated by a sense of the
necessity for adhering to the declarations you had
previously made, and by that mischievous spirit of
meddling to which the noble viscount at the head of
the Government is so strongly addicted. But what
were your demands upon the King of Naples ? If
you are on amicable and intimate terms with any
sovereign you might no doubt take the liberty to
represent to him in a friendly manner that he is not
pursuing a system of internal administration in his
own dominions which you think calculated to advance
his own interests. But were our relations with
Naples based upon so close and equal a footing as to
justify such an interference? Observe, my lords,
that I am not supporting the tyrannical measures of
the King's Government ; I am not defending him ;
lam not defending the state of things at Naples or in
the Papal States, made infinitely worse in the latter
case by the occupation of foreign troops ; neither do I
look with satisfaction upon the position of constitu-
tional government in Spain. But what have we to do
with Spain? what have we to do with Rome? or with
Naples? 0-fear, Lear.) If En2lish subjects suffer
from the acts of any of these States. you are indeed
bound to interfere and defend them; but, as between
a sovereign and his own subjects, I say that, accor-
ding to every principle of international law, remon-
strance is going to the utmost limit to which you
have a right to go, and the breaking off of friendly
relations because a monarch refuses to accept your
advice as to the management of his kingdom cannot
be defended by any persons in the slightest degree
acquainted with the principles of international law.
On what ground, then, did you withdraw your am-
bassadors ? lam not to be told that in attacking
this policy I am attacking that of the Emperor of
the French. I have the profoundest respect for the
Emperor of the French ; I especially admire the
scrupulous fidelity with which he has observed his
engagements with this country, and for the desire
he has unitormly shown to maintain inviolate
the friendly relations between the two nations.
(Hear, hear.) lam not going too far even when
I say that at this moment be is, perhaps, the
only firm friend you have in Europe, but I think
the Emperor of the French, acting as he does
in concert with the Government of this country,
is very likely to fall into error, and that be
has done so in this case. What have you done?
You make a demand upon the King of Naples. He
answers in a manlier which you may, if you choose,
consider offensive ; but he only bids you to attend to
your own business. (A laugh.) Whereupon you say,
" If you don't mean to govern y..ur country as we wish
it to be governed, and to follow our advice in a rr atter
in which we have no earthly excuse for tendering
advice, we will withdraw our Ministers." Now, on
this subject, just recollect the language which for

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