The Press.
London, England, 1854-02-25 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

172

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RUSSIA AND TURKEY.
The adjourned debate on the Eastern question
was reopened on Monday night by Mr. COBDEN. The
house, he argued, was assuming the responsibility of
interference, and was engaging in war to support
Turkey. He accordingly wished to show them what
Turkey was, and proceeded to argue at great length
that the Governmont of that country was effete, her
policy barbarous, her vitality expiring, and her treat-
ment of her Christian subjects bigoted and cruel.
The Christians formed a majority in her Europe an
provinces, and looked with hope and expectation to
the prospects of change held forth, doubtless for
sinister purposes, by the Russian Emperor. That
English ministers and ambassadors bad believed in
the necessity of similar changes, and bad spoken
and acted on the conviction that the Ottoman em-
pire could not long survive if the treatment of its
Christian inhabitants were not ameliorated, otherwise
they saw no possible check or stay to the develop-
ment of what Lord Clarendon called, in a despatch
to Lord Stratford de Redcliffe within the last year,
the " elements of internal dissolution " ever present
in its constitution. The wrongs of the Christians in
Turkey were indeed extreme. If unredressed they
threatened inevitable revolution ; and certainly ren-
dered it our duty to insist on guarantees that the
Christian was to be better treated before we inter
fared to secure the predominance of the Mahome-
tans. The Sultan had already appealed to Mahome-
tan fanaticism, and Mr. Cobden trusted that English
soldiers would not be arrayed on the same side, or
employed to coerce one section of his subjects in the
interests of the other. Comparing the value of the
respective countries, commercially speaking, he com-
puted that the imports from Russia averaged twelve
millions, while those from Turkey were barely three.
Russia, in fact, stood second among the foreign
counts es with whom we transacted business. But
England, it was said, was arming to protect Western
Europe from the Czar. Why, Western Europe—
Belgians, Danes, Prussians, Austrians, Swedes, and
Norwegians—comprised eighty millions of popula-
tion, of whom 700,000 were under arms, and yet
never attempted to defend themselves. They were
also avowedly or practically neutral; and yet they
stood nearest to the danger. But, by an irrational de-
velopment of what was called John Bullism, England
was to send her troops to a distant seat of war to
fight the battles of other nations, who would only
repay her sacrifices by suspecting that she was
prompted by selfish motives. The policy as now ex-
hibited was indeed a " mad" policy. He saw no-
thing to object against the terms of the Vienna note,
and thought they might be still made the basis of
negotiation.
Lord J. MANNERS corroborated Mr. Cobden's argu-
ment that Turkey did not deserve protection.. He
urged, in reply to Lord John Russell on the previous
Friday, that the symptoms of Russian aggression
had assumed an aspect demanding active treatment
long before the time when the British Ministry
seemed aware of the necessity for action. From first
to last Lord Clarendon had believed the professions
of Russia, and disbelieved the facts which showed
incessantly how futile those professions were. Con-
cluding a minute dissection of the various proceed-
ings and pretexts on all sides during the controversy,
the noble lord urged :

" The main question really in hand now was, what were
the objects which the Government contemplated in enter-
ing upon this tremendous struggle. The First Lord of the
Admiralty, indeed, had propounded that members should
either place full and implicit reliance on the Government
and its conduct of the matter, or bring the question to a
test by a direct motion of no confidence; and the noble
member for the city of London had in like manner re-
quired from the house unhesitating and complete confi-
dence. There was no doubt that, were the right hon. gen-
tleman and the noble lord on the Opposition benches, they
would not hesitate to try a motion of no confidence ; but
those who actually occupied the Opposition benches
deemed it their duty to the country in this momentous
crisis to take no step that might embarrass the proceedings
of the Government, but rather to support them in any mea-
sures which they should, on their ministerial responsibi-
lity, declare to be requisite for the vigorous prosecution of
the war, with a view to its just, safe, and honourable con-
clusion. (Hear, hear.) Unlimited confidence in the
clearsightedness, straightforwardness, firmness, or courage
of Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon there was, pro-
bably, not one man in a hundred in that house prepared to
concede ; but the house, he believed, without exception,
was prepared to give them men and to vote them money,
and to furnish them with all aid for bringing this struggle
to the issue which the country and Parliament contem-
plated. (Hear, hear.) It was generally announced on the
other side of the house that the honour and independence
of Turkey were to be maintained; but it was essential that
there should be some understanding of a far more specific
nature as to what was meant by this announcement.
(Hear, hear.) What store Lord Clarendon set by the in-
dependence of Turkey the house had the me xna of appre-
ciating in the blue book. Let the Ministry be assured
that the people and Parliament of England would never
permit any policy ' be pursued towards Turkey which

should, by the creation of a protectorate, ostensibly of a
friendly character, merely cloak that interference with the
internal affairs of Turkey which this warwas sanctioned by
the people of England to prevent on the part of Russia; by
which the chains that had eaten almost to the heart's core
of Turkey, and which the suicidal policy of Russia herself
had removed, should be rivetted round the neck of Turkey
once more by the hands of pretended friendship. (Hear,
hear.) Early in the struggle, before the victory of Olte-
nitza, it had been said by the veteran diplomatist, Lord
Ponsonby, that ' what he feared for Turkey was, not the
arms of Russia, but the diplomacy of England.' Let the
Government be perfectly assured that any diplomacy on
their part which should in the least degree tend to fulfil
this fear would be indignantly repudiated by the entire
British nation."

Mr. HORSMAN also commented upon Mr. Cobden's
speech, arguing that the question concerned us
chiefly on the side of Russia, whose aggression we
had to resist. He denounced the stealthy ambition,
the long-meditated crimes, the ferocity, inhumanity,
and hypocrisy of the Russian Emperor, and con-
trasted the condition of that country with the present
state of the Ottoman empire. Passing on to the
home Government and the blue books, he admitted
(what, he remarked, even Lord J. Russell had not
denied) that the British Ministry had been deceived,
but declared that he did not, nevertheless, intend
to withdraw from them his confidence, and argued
that they had shown a wise discretion under very
perplexing circumstances.
Mr. H. DRUMMOND had learned that the Ministry
were going to war, but could not imagine from what
side or class they anticipated support. The manu-
facturers were equally ready to prepare arms for the
enemy as for our own troops • the taxpayers would
speedily discover that every additionall burden must
ultimately fall upon industry ; and the Opposition,
though ready to pass votes which were sure to bring
the Government into a mess, would infallibly turn
every event to account for the purpose of dislodging
a Ministry whose members would then in their turn
begin playing the same game against their successors.
Upon England, he argued, the result of the contest
could be only disastrous. There was nothing for us
but hard blows to get and heavy bills to pay. Mr.
Drummond then referred to the primary cause of
the dispute, the question of the " Holy Places" • and
contended that the war, instead of being waged, as
was pretended, on behalf of the balance of power,
was, in reality, a religious war, whose origin he traced
to the Pope. He thought it would have been better
for us to stand aloof from such a contest. If we
must strike our enemy, our blow should he at the
heart; and the hon. memberindicated Poland as the
vital point in the case of Russia.
Mr. I. BUTT denied that the war could be termed
religious; but complained that the Ministry bad
neither declared their intentions nor seemed inclined
to support Turkey without reserve.
Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT remarked that the Govern-
ment were placed between two fires, being assailed
from many quarters and upon many pleas, but
noticed that no party of opponents dared to challenge
a direct vote from the house. The negotiations into
which they had entered were intricate and the
despatches voluminous, and much special pleading
was expended in drawing charges against the
Ministry from them. He, however, boldly declared
that the event as it now stood was more favourable
to England than any that could have resulted from
the adoption of any of the numerous alternatives
suggested on different hands. The Secretary-at-War
then remarked upon the importance of the interests
at stake in the controversy, and eulogised the spirit
displayed by the nation in entering into it.
Mr. DISRAELI reminded the house that pre-
vious wars had been much prolonged and rendered
far more critical by the mastery maintained as to
their causes and objects. Tie perils of the last great
war were much enhanced by the state of ignorance in
which the people were kept by the Ministry of the
time, and their passions dangerously inflamed by the
appeals to that popular ignorance made for the sake
of obtaining support towardscarrying on the contest.
Some time later, about twenty-five years ago, there
was a war between Russia and Turkey, in which
France and England took port against Turkey, the
public in both countries being allowed to know little
or nothing about the quarrel which resulted in weak
ening the Ottoman empire ty the heavy loss s-
tained at Navarino, and was indirectly the cause of
the existing perplexities. Mr. Disraeli, therefore, laid
down the principle that whenever war seemed immi-
nent the Government were especially bcund to main-
tain no reserve which could prudentl3 be dispensed
with. He dissented from the doctrine of Sir James
Graham that they should not potter over blue books,
that the past was beyond caitrol, and all their in-
terest should be centered in the future. The past
and future were bound together by links which could
not be dissevered ; and, as from the blue books only
could the past conduct of the Government be learnt,
they were entitled to scrutinise those records for the
purpose of discovering the cause of the pending
hostilities as leading up to ti'o further and serious
whether the worth the

SATURDAY, ,

risk; secondly, whether the preparations making for
the encounter were adequate to the occasion :

" First of all, I want the house and the country to
understand the cause of this war, for after the speech of
the noble lord the member for London on Friday last it
would be affectation any longer to suppose that we are not
virttially at war. (Cheers.) And since then we have had
an authoritative statement that the last effort at negotia-
tion has failed. (H,ar, hear.) I shall endeavour,then, to
ascertain what has been the cause of this war. It will
then be for the house to decide whether the object of the
war is an adequate one, and, if it be, whether the means
which the Government propose are capable of accomplish-
ing it. It is the duty of the Commons to consider the
papers which are upon the table ; and as we are about to
embark in a struggle which must beyond all doubt cripple
the industry of the country—which must burden the peo •
plc—which must retard that progress that we so frequently
hear vaunted iu this house, it is desirable that as clear a
perception as possible should prevail, not only in this
house but throughout the land, of the reason why we ate
going to war, and of vihat we purpose to accomplish. (Rear,
hear.)"

The avowed object of our hostilities against Russia
was to preserve the independence of Turkey. How
was this assailed? Russia it was allowed had no in-
tention of forcibly conquering Turkey, but it was
evident that by policy and indirect means, and by
exercising an influence over the Greek population of
the Ottoman empire, numbering twelve millions, she
would obtain all the authority that would result from
her possession of Constantinople itself. This de
sign was almost avowed in a despatch of Count Nes-
selrode in January, 1853. The policy of Russia had
been clear and transparent; there was to be a diplo-
matic movement to increase her influence over the
Greek population in Turkey, peaceably, by the
friendly exertions of the English Ministers at Pare
and Constantinople. Her mode of action was
throughout consistent and reiterated. It con-
sisted in stretching the terms of some existing treaty
so as to make them cover a wider meaning than they
were originally intended to convey, and then by di-
plomatic manoeuvrings obtain the assent of Turkey
and the other powers of Europe to the new interpre-
tation. This bad been done with regard to the treaty
of Kainardji, and in the early stages of the present
dispute the same design had been manifested to a
degree which, if it did not deserve the name of fraudu-
lent, should at all events have kept prudent men upon
their guard. This was the question—how have the
Ministry, past and present, dealt with the diffi-
culty ?

"I want to know, with that object expressed, with those
means detailed. and with that diplomacy to deal with, how
her Majesty's Ministers encountered such a combination ?
It is unnecessary for me to touch on the question of the
Holy Places. That was, in_fact, virtually, soon settled at
Constantinople. Even Count Nesselrode, at a very early
period of these negotiations, expresses his surprise and
satisfaction, and states his acknowledgment of the conci-
liatory spirit of France. Nor should I have dwelt upon it
for a moment had not the noble lord said that the Govern-
ment of Lord Derby was responsible for this question.
Now, whatever may have been the faults of Lord Derby's
Government, they need not look back with regret or shame
to their share in the negotiations upon this Eastern ques •
tion. (Hear, hear.) The question was not, indeed,
settled formally when we left office, but it was the stre-
nuous and effectual exertions of Lord Malmesbury that
brought the French Government to a right tone in viewing
that question ; and I believe that had it not been for the
preliminary steps we took the avowal by France of her
wise, and I may say magnanimous, course at Constanti-
nople would never have taken place. ( Hear, hear.) But
the question of the Holy Places Count Nesselrode admits
was satisfactorily settled, and he even expresses surprise at
the conciliatory tone and spirit of France. Yet all this
time the forces of Russia are accumulating on the frontiers,
and all this time Count Nesselrode is telling you that his
Government will ask an equivalent for the privileges
which the Greek Church has lost at Jerusalem, but the
settlement of which his Government had resolved not to
disturb. Even the mission of Prince Menachikoff at this
time is mentioned, though vaguely, by Sir H. Seymour,
who tells, however, that its object is 'to obtain an equiva-
lent for any privileges lost by the Greeks.' After this it
appears that the Emperor would insist that the promise
made to him in favour of the Greek Church should be fill-
Sled.' The noble lord feels very deeply on this question
as to the conduct of Russia. It is not that he is over
by the responsibility of a minister who has advised
his Sovereign to go to war, but he feels so acutely the con•
duct of Russia that on more than one occasion in these
discussions he has indulged in the language of invective,
both towards the Russian Minister and towards his master.
(Hear, hear.) We were told the other night that the con-
duct of Count Nesselrode was fraudulent. Now, that is a
very strong expression. (Hear, hear.) It is easy to cheer,
but Count Nesselrode for nearly fifty years has sustained a
great reputation, and is supposed to be one who has ad-
ministered affairs with great moderation, with great wis-
dom, and, under circumstances of great difficulty, no doubt
with great success. (Hear, hear.) But his conduct is
described as fraudulent, and the conduct of the Emperor,
we were told, was the conduct of a butcher, or, at least,
that he had given orders for a work of butchery. (Hear,
hear.) Let the house mark that. But at present we have
to deal with Count Nesselrode, whose conduct has been
described as fraudulent. The noble lord told us nothing
could be more unsatisfactory than the course pursued
by Count Nesselrode, who kept saying that his imperial
- Church •

aliescoivnegnnugp tne cause of tnedpneenrianinugs
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ent tbnfednignlintriwbneula assured
neeer
tostiolistieesmas by Count
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that,oti
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permit any policy to be pursued towards Turkey which questions—first, whether the object was worth the master would ask an equivalent to the Greek Church ;

FEBRUARY 25, 1854,

that he was constantly repeating that his master, the
Emperor, was determined to have some equivalent, or that
some arrangement should be made compensatory to the
Greeks for the privileges they had relinquished ; bat that
Count NesselrMe never told us what he wanted. (Hear,

hear.) Wicked Count Nesselrode! (Laughter.) Fraudu-
lent duplicity of Russian statesmen 1 (Laughter.) But
does it not occur to the house, though it might not have
occurred to the noble lord, that if he wanted to know

exactly and precisely what Count Nesselrode meant he
should not have waited for Count Nesselrode to tell him,
but that he should have asked the question of Count Nes-
selrode? ( Ileur,hear.) The great complaint of the noble
lord as to the conduct of Count Nesselrode, and which he
has described as fraudulent, is, that he perpetually went
on harping about the determination of the Emperor of
Russia to obtain some compensation for the Greek Church
for the privileges which it had lost. But why could the
noble lord not find the information he wanted? Why is
Sir Hamilton Seymour at St. Petersburg, if he is not to
ask for the information that is desired? (Hear.) Why
all the envoys to Russia, the ambassadors, the ministers,
and all
if
distracted and protracted councils in Downing-
street, fthe upshot of all these envoys and ambassadors
and ministers, and all those deliberations is, that the noble
lord has to come to us, with the country in a state of war—
that war being occasioned apparently by the intentions of
the Emperor of Russia—and is forced to complain to us
that the Emperor of Russia never told them what he wanted
—the noble lord confessing by the very observation that
he never asked ? (Hear.) 1 say that at this stage of the pro-
ceedings—here is the gist of the matter—he ought to have
said to Russia, ' The affair of the rival Churches is settled—
an affair in which we never interfered—why is there still
this demonstration of forces on the frontier ? You say you
want an equivalent to the Greek Church for the privileges
you have lost. Define what you want, expressly and expli-
citly, but do not continue to make demonstrations when
the point for which they can only be needed is already
settled. If you go on insisting that you require equivalents
and compensations, why do you not define what you deem
an equivalent, or what you deem a compensation ? Then
we tell you that you cannot count on that which you have
declared to be the great means of obtaining the peaceful
attainment of your object—viz., the friendly offices of her
Majesty's Government at Paris and Constantinople.'
(Hear, hear.)"
Mr. Disraeli proceeded to exonerate Lord John
Russell from much of the responsibility subsequently
incurred. A readjustment of the Administration
took place, Lord Clarendon became Foreign Secre-
tary, and a marked change of tone immediately
followed, indicating the presence of an unmistakable
bias towards Russia. Pursuing his review of the
Ministerial conduct, as shown by comparing their
successive state papers with their contemporary acts
and more recent language, he contended that, while
threatening symptoms and warnings of danger came
from every quarter, they had written to Sir H.
Seymour that " there was no danger of peace being
disturbed ; " that although they since complained of
the aggression of Russia, at the time they attributed
the perils of Turkey to " the unwise and reckless
maladministration of the Sultan himself," and that,
while denouncing Russian interference and ambition,
they had themselves endeavoured to interfere in the
internal government of Turkey, and at the same
time counselled the Porte to a disgraceful submis-
sion. These proceedings extended over seven
months, and involved a series of inconsistencies
whose origin it was important to ascertain :
" What is the motive that influenced the Government
during these seven months of negotiation? My Lord
Clarendon, in one of his letters, has talked of alternatives,
and I shall now offer an alternative—either the Govern-
ment were influenced by a degree of confidence which
assumed a morbid character of credulity, or they were
influenced by connivance—l mean a policy that it was
better in their opinion—the opinion of the Secretary of
State, and of the Prime Minister, which received the
compliments of the Eniperor of Russia—that it was better
on the whole that the inevitable dissolution of the Turkish
empire should take place by the indirect means of foreign
interference, under such peculiar circumstances, than that
England and France should go to war to maintain what is
called the integrity or independence of the Porte.
(Hear, hear.) Now, sir, this is a question it is most
important to decide. Was it credulity, or was it con•
nivance ? On ascertaining that point depends our also
ascertaining what is the object of this war. If their con-
duct has been prompted by credulity they may carry on a
war with success and spirit. The fact that they have been
deceived we have upon the word of an Emperor. It is a
lamentable circumstance, but it is an accident to which
generous minds may be liable, and the very fact that they
may be deceived may animate them to exertions with the
view of vindicating their conduct in history. If the con-
duct of her Majesty's Government during the last seven
months has been influenced by credulity, it is possible
Ton may have a war—a long and a severe war; but it will
be a war carried on for great objects, and may end in great
public benefit. (Cheers.) Let us for a moment con-
template the results of the other alternative. If it has been.
suggested by connivance, you may have a war ; hut it
l
be a war such as will be carried on by connivance—a timo-
rous war, a vacillatingwar--awar with no results, or rather
with the exact results which were originally intended.
(Laughter.) It will not be the war that will place Russia
in that position which we think necessary for the security
of Europe and of our country, but it will be a war which
will end in transactions similar to the Menschikoff note,
or the arrangement of the Vienna Conference. Now,
these are two results very opposite and very different. One,
I believe, is welcome to the people ; the other so entirely