The Press.
London, England, 1856-04-26 00:00:00

THE FALL OF KARS.

LET us frankly say, that as politicians we wish
that Mr WHITESIDE'S motion on the fall of
Kars could have been further postponed. We
doubt whether the House of Commons is just
yet in a temper to discuss it fairly ; we doubt
whether it is prepared to deal honestly with
the issue which the motion will raise. But
apart from, and superior to, all such consi-
derations, is the fact that Parliament could
not without dereliction of duty avoid con-
sidering whether Lord PALIIEItSTON'S Adminis-
tration be responsible for a disaster which
has unquestionably lowered the name and
fame of England in the East, and exercised an
adverse influence on the peace negotiations.
Least of all could the Opposition consent to
longer put off a debate which the people
expect with impatience, and which it is the
especial province of the Opposition to bring
forward.
We have no knowledge of the manner in
which Mr. WitrrEstnE proposes to deal with
his subject. He is well fitted to do it justice.
With splendid oratorical power, he possesses a
searching and analytical mind. For our own
part, we hope that he will bring out with all
possible breadth and distinctness what we
take to be the main question at issue,—Was
our Administration , -
that direct interferei.
have enabled General

against the enemy ?
Of the power posse
tion to exercise such
no doubt. Kars fe

supplies. \Vill all
during the whole a;
necessary supplies

by this country to
There was not on

WILLIAMS, day after

I justified in refraining from
•ence which wou . -- . : *nly
3ral WiLualt is . • ....4--s V
9 V. 4 A 1'7:: .., ..r.
ssessed bYci. s izitat -• 1%,..:
ch interfe*nlr.lo ca •• r,
fell eventiCti oie4lpint..., 4:
iy one prlta*Ctb- •0 ;
;pring and. &f 1
~
I could n inavis
'' Cr
to the TEki • -sTeprAtOri r,
....
io of those w: • •. ' :- ' •
fter day, with is A iii-ally

710•••^'''!'"
•
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386

increasing force, which our Administration
could not easily have supplied. It. could have
sent arms, it could have sent stores, it could
have sent clothing, it could have sent money
—it could even have arranged with the Turkish
Government to send men. The question of
the relief of Kars was a questios of money.
A certain expenditure would eeititinly have
preserved it from the enemy. Our Adminis-
tration would afftird Ills. direct itattolitance
any way whatever, and for want of such
assistance, Kars fell. Lord CLARENDON was
warned over and over again, that dependence
could not be placed on the Turkish Govern-
ment; he acknowledges himself his repeated
disappointment of effectual aid from that
quarter. In the spring of last year it became
matter of absolute certainty, that Kars must
fall without direct aid from this country ; yet
it does not appear that a single cargo of stores
for the use of the garrison, or a single shilling
to relieve the men suffering in health and
spirits from two years' arrears of pay, was ever
forwarded from England. All was to he done
by Turkey, though experience had conclusively
established that Turkey had not means or
energy to support the contest alone.
Had the question came before Parliament in
the spring of last year whether a grant should be
made for the relief of Kars, we do not doubt
that it would have been voted without opposi-
tion. Ministers were in possession of all the
information which would have justified them
in asking a supply for that express purpose.
They had the reports of General WILLIAMS;
they were alive to the immense importance of
holding Kars to keep the Russian army in
check; they had insisted on the defence of the
fortress being substantially intrusted to Bri-
tish officers ; but they declined to adopt those
measures by which it was evident the safety
of the place could alone be insured.
It is for this laxity, this neglect, this in-
difference, or by whatever other name it may
be called, that the Administration is now re-
sponsible. Knowing what we do of the resourc s
of England—knowing how slight aid directly
sent from this country would have raised the
spirits and augmented the resources of the
Kars garrison, it will be impossible to main-
tain for an instant that this country could
have done nothing. Why it did nothing—
why the Administration closed its hand at the
moment when it should have been opened
widely—is the question that has to be an-
swered. Kars could have been saved, and was
not By refusing all aid, we have effected
some paltry saving—a mere drop in the ocean
of our expenditure—and we have lost honour
and reputation throughout the, East,and given
our foe the advantage of declaring that the war
his been closed on equal terms. Russia re-
stores Kars and the territory won in Asia, in
exchange for all the conquests of the Allies on
the seaboard of the Euxine.
Though Kars did not fall till the end of No-
vemberlast, its fate was in reality determined by
Lord CLARENDON and Lord PANMIIRE full a year
ago. It was on the sth of March, 1855, that Ge-
neral WILLIAMS addressed to Lord CLARENDON
a despatch, stating that it would be impos-
sible for the Turkish army to hold its ground
against an advance of the Russian force. He
expressed to the Turkish commander his
strong opinion that the " Allies would not
" leave them without material assistance to
" bear the brunt of such an attack." Ignorant
at that time, as he wrote, " of the combina-
" tions contemplated by the Allies for the de
" fence of this important frontier," he could
only say that if they had to rely on the unaided
services of Turkish troops, he could not esti-
mate the " prompt reinforcements required
" vii Trebizond, under 15,000 infantry, 3,000
" cavalry, and 2,000 artillery (barely enough to
" man all the guns at our command in these
" regions.")
This despatch was received at the Foreign
office on the 28th of March. Then was the
time to consider what efficient measures
should be taken to comply with the require-
ments of " Her Majesty's Commissioner."
Had the reinforcements he demanded been
promptly forwarded, Kars could never have
been invested by the army of MODRAVIEFF;
its communications with Erzeroum and the
coast could not have been intercepted ; and
even if the Russian army had escaped a de-

THE PRESS.

feat, Kars would certainly havo been in a con-
dition to resist all the efforts made for its
capture.
The case against the Ministers might, in-
deed, be advantageously narrowed to this
single point. Was it, or was it not, their part
to have provided General WILLIAMS with the
amount of rejig qrcet-gent ho demanded ? Cal
it be contenika tbstilg force of 20,000,nj
eoud g lrit Iml/4 *4, boq during tented
spring and stunm&•; ftid W.ve been landed at
Trebizond?
To excuse the Adraitdstration, it must be
held either that it was not expedient to de-
spatch such a force, or that the
meat knew not where to look for it. Either
Kars was not worth an effort to preserve, of it
was impossible to spare a Turkish corps of
20,000 men to save it.

This requirement of General WILLIAMS
came before the Cabinet, and the Cabinet de-
cided that it was not to be complied with.
The short notes between the Foreign-office and
the War-office on this point are the most im-
portant part of the Blue Book. The despatch
of General WILLIAMS was forwarded from the
Foreign-office to the War•oipice with this
note :

No. 175.
LORD WODEHOUSE TO MR. PEEL.

Foreign-office, March 29, 1855.
Sir,-1 am directed by the Earl of Clarendon to trans•
mit to you to be laid before the Secretary of State for the
War Department, copy of a despatch from Brigadier.
General Williams, respecting the reinforcements required
for the Turkish army at Kars. I am, iStc.,
(Signed) WODEHOUSE.
This communication seems to have been
under consideration for fourteen days, as the
answer to it from the War-office does not bear
date till April 12th :

No. 184.
MR. PEEL TO LORD WODEHOUSE.

War Department, April 12, 1855.
My Lord,—Having laid before Panmure your letter of
the 29th ultimo, with the copy therein inclosed of a
despatch from Brigadier-General Williams, relative to the
amount of reinforcements which he considers are required
for the Turkish army in Asia, I am directed to request you
will state to the Earl of Clarendon that Lord Panmure is
of opinion that it will be desirable to urge upon the Porte
the importance of their paying attention to these require.
ments whenever the more pressing need of the services of the
Ottoman troops elsewhere shall have ceased ; and, if Lord
Clarendon should concur with his lordship that it is expe-
dient to adopt this course, I am to request that you will
move his lordship to send instructions to her Majesty's
Ambassador at Constantinople accordingly.—l am, &c.,
(Signed) FREDERICK PEEL.
The substance of this communication was
duly forwarded by Lord CLARENDON to the
British Ambassador at Constantinople :

No. 181.

THE EARL OF

TO LORD STRATFORD DE REDCLIFFE.

Foreign-office, April 13, 1855.
My Lord,—l communicated to tne Secretary of State
for the War Department a copy of General Williams'
despatch of the sth of March, which will have passed
through your Excellency's hands, and in which General
Williams calls attention to the reinforcements required by
the Turkish army in Asia; and I now inclose a copy of
a letter from the War Department from 'vhich you will
percei-.. that her Majesty's Government consider it desirable
that your Excellency should urge upon the Porte the im-
portance of their paying attention to the requirements men-
tioned by General Williams, whenever the snore pressing need
of the services of the Ottoman troops elsewhere shall have
ceasq.—l am, dce.,
(Signed) CLARENDON.
To allege in the face of these official notes
that the fall of Kars was due to Lord STRAT-
FORD DE REDCLIFFE, or to any other persons,
than to the chief members of her Majesty's
Administration, is the part of a creature too
foolish even for faction. Lord STRATFORD has
much to answer for; his case demands sepa-
rate consideration. But the refusal of those
reinforcements which would assuredly have
saved Kars was the act of Lord PALMERSTON'S
Cabinet alone. There are the unimpeachable
documents which prove the case against
them. There stands the demand of General
WILLIAMS, which, if complied with, would have
saved Kars; and there stand the notes which,
refusing the demand, lost it.

In wlYat quarter did there exist " more press-
" ing need for the services of the Ottoman
" troops ?" There was a considerable Turkish
army in Bulgaria, where there was no proba-
bility of the enemy appearing ; and there was
a yet more considerable army in the Crimea,
whose only service was to garrison Eupatoria.
To say that from these, and other quarters, a

SATURDAY,

corps of •0,000 men could not have been col•
lected for the reinforcement of the Asian
army, is to make an assertion notoriously in.
consistent with facts.

Three months later, when the danger be-
came more pressing, the Turkish authorities
showed how easily double the force required
by cleneral WILLIA4s csohl be assembled.
itiktritil Lord Cutpxoos! hil bi despatch of July 13,
objeOed ios the expedition, but pro-
posal Aoliiing hiatie f. An army of relief
was only' decided on when relief was imprac-
ticable. Before Sebastopol fell, it was dis-
covered that a Turkish army for service in
Ala goon be oared, but the thttee• WU
made too late. There was nothing, save the
objection of her Majesty's Government, to
prevent the despatch of those troops in April,
which landed on the coast of Asia. in September.
Lord CLARENDON and Lord PANMURE, who had
deemed it impossible to spare 20,000 Turkish
troops for service in Asia when Kars could
have been preserved, discovered that 40,000
or 50,000 could be spared and transported
when relief was impracticable.
This is the case against the Administration.
The main points, we think, are-
1. That her Majesty's Government afforded
no direct assistance to Kars, though such
assistance was practicable, and would have
been of the greatest service.
2. That they absolutely forbade the Turkish
Government to send to the army in Asia
those reinforcements which General Wa.LiAms
declared were absolutely necessary, and which
the result showed the Turkish Government
was in a condition to collect and to land on the
Asian coast.

Was there not wan of energy and foresight
here? And how can it be disputed in the face
of that evidence which the Government have
themselves placed upon the table of the
House, that the fall of Kars must mainly be
laid to their charge ?