The Express.
London, England, 1855-02-28 00:00:00

THE CONDITIONS OF ARMY REFORM,

ii-oftici

A KIND of lb. ____...uouneement of the inten-
tions with which the Emperor of the FRENCII pro-
ceeds to the East, has been published in the Con-
atitutionnel. It is remarkable for various reasons—.
for none more than the secondary importance it tacitly
attributes to England in the great Oriental struggle.
The writer—M. AMEDEE DE CESENA—intimates that
the impending spring campaign is now noiverially
spoken of as " the war of the three Emperors ;" pry.
phecies that this war will give to Europe a durable
and solid peace ;" announces that " with a new im-
pulse, France shall be seen everywhere with her fleets
and armies ;" and proclaims th .t " this glorious
role which France has taken in the Eastern
question guarantees to her an immense ascendant in
her future position in the world." England is only
spoken of incidentally, and as of subordinate iss.
portance along with Turkey and Sardinia. A
reference to the letter from our New York corre-
spondent, which we publish to-day, will show that
England, in consequence of the gross mismanagement
of the war in the Baltic and Black Seae, is habitually
spoken of in terms not less disparaging in Anieries.
All this is necessarily mortifying to Englishmen;
and yet, looking to the no-results of oar efforts
in the Baltic and the Euxine, it is no more
than was to be expected. A much greater expec.
diture has probably been incurred by England for
the pet:mention of the war, than by France and
Turkey together. Taking our fleets and army in
combination, the force we have fitted out is fully
equal to that equipped by France. And yet all the
exertions and sacrifices of the nation have been
neutralised by official incompetency, and England
gains credit for co more than for playing the part of
a subordinate—and not very efficient—auxiliary M
the Eastern war. The false position in which Eq.
land has been placed by Administrative imbe-
cility is not only mortifying—it ie dangerous. The
security of our commerce on every sea—the
immunity of our land from invasion—the
exemption of our colonies and dependencies
from attempts to sew dissension between them sod
the central empire by foreign intrigue—has been in
a great measure owing to the conviction of England's
strength that has everywhere prevailid. The safety
of the empire demands a vigorous effort to place our.
selves right in the eyes of the world.

The sources of our miserable failure in the war are
more remote than the twaddling incapacity of the
ABERDEEN Cabinet. A striking illustration of this
truth is presented in a sketch of the history of the
late 63rd Regiment, by a correspondent, which ap-
peared in our columns on Monday last. That able
and instructive paper traces the history of the
" decline and fall" of that gallant regiment,
from the 13th of September, 1846, when it
mustered 1,000 strong—all hardy veterans--at
Secunderabad, till a wretched remnant of 30 men left
Balaklas a after the battle of Inkermann. The
wretched system under which its moral and physical
force has been extinguished is laid bare in unezagge.
rated, alai therefore reliable language. The demo-
ralisatiOn of the veterans who re-engaged after their
term of service was expired, in consequence of the
means adopted to induce them to volunteer; the
filling up of the vacancies in the ranks with raw
recruits, picked up anywhere or anyhow; the
neglect of any adequate provision for training
the new levies, and accustoming them to disci-
phew ; the scattering of the regiment in small
detachments over the country, so that men and
officers had no opportunity of learning to act toge-
ther as a regiment, or even as companies ; the neg.
lect of any precautions to preserve the health of the
men ; all had produced their pernicious fruits in the
ounderland riots, and other deplorable incidents, even
before the regiment was sent to the East. Not
Varna—not the Crimea alone have effaced a whole
regiment from the muster-roll of the English army.
The work was begun in India in the autumn of 1346,
and may be said to have been systematically carried

on till the winter of 1854. No have no desire
to extenuate the offences of the late contemptible
Government ; but, with such an example be-
fore our eyes, truth compels us to declare
that the stain which has come over our

arms is the result not of their bungling
alone, but of a long and obstinate persistence in army
mismanagement under numerous successive Govern.
menta. The evil has not originated, as some would
persuade us, in the parsimony of the Parliament or
the people. Our army has cost us, one year with
another, more than suffices other Governments to
keep on foot, in a state of efficiency, armaments of
more than double its force. The evil does not origi-
nate in the meddling or tampering of Parliament with
our military operations, for the servants of the
Crown have had absolute and uncontrolled sway
over the army. The evil springs from a deep-
rooted and ancient vicious system of army or•
ganisation and administration. There is no
. _

redemption for the national honour—there is no
security for the peace, integrity, and independence of
the empire, except in an army reform commensurate
in respect of boldness and extent to the gross and
inveterate abuses which have to be eradicated.

One thing the nation will require to be on its guard
against when this reform is undertaken. Many in.
valuable lessons may be gained from foreign soldiers
of experience and distinction ; but it must always be
kept in mind that their experience is of armies
which are under the exclusive control of absolute

Governments, and which are in general the tilling
and unscrupulous instruments of their prince eves
when opposed to the people. The views and sentiments
thus instilled into the best of foreign soldiers have
a pernicious effect upon them, even when their sym-
pathies are with the people. Whenever they have
sided with the people in popular struggles, and be-
_ _

come abettors of revolutions, they have ended by at-
tempting to arrogate to themeelvee the power they have
wrested from the Sovereign. More them the soldier of
any other country (except perhapi the United States)
the English soldier retains the character of citizen.
Accustomed to a sense of subordination to the whole
three branches of the Legislature by the annual re-
newal of the Mutiny Bill—accustomed to act at
home under the command of civil magistrates,
even in the most trying emergencies—the English
soldier is ever kept in mind of his tree
relation to the State. No dreams of a wild
irregnlated ambition haunt his mind. Nothing must
be done that can in the slightest degree weaken or
undermine this reverence of the English soldier for
the constitution and the law. And to this end all
attempts to render the military authorities more in-
dependent of Parliamentary interference and control
must be strenuously resisted. The Minister of War
must remain in the same relation to Parliament se
any other minister. To promote army reform no
change in this respect is required. Our system of
army administration is defective and radically vicious+
not because the representatives of the people hare
' interfered too much, but because they have interfered
too little.
The first condition of an effective reform of the
army is, that it should be placed completely under
the control of Ministers responsible to Parliament.
At present the military authorities are not mutes
of the army. The peculiar position of the officem
confers upon them a virtual or quasi independence..
Their commissions are in a great measure their Pre'