The Express.
London, England, 1863-07-15 00:00:00

kUUTA NNIA.

EvQolo,let Aetol iuß''''''' GLEN, with THE
GREAT GHOST LIVIA:T.- Singing by Mewls. Plimpton,
Woodman, and itandalL - THE 111 v E GI LIFE, Its Workers
and Its Drones.—And KAY DUDLEY.

HIGH WATIR AT LONDON BELDAM
Tin DAT Morning. lb. 45m..... Attorsoso. 2b. to.
T04102.b0W-42022204. I+, 23. • .A 1222.225. 2b. 42ga.

LONDON, TVEDNESDAY, JULY 16.

LORD Pammaaros and the one hundred and
fifty-two who voted with him on the Spithead Forte
question last Monday are either very sanguine or
very heedless men. Science in this age is rely
daring and hopeful, but her aspirations and her
promises are outstripped by the undertakings of
the PREMIZE and his tail. She does not tell us
positively that she can make iron do what iron has
never yet done ; but Lord Patmeasros does not
hesitate to give such an assurance. She does not
profess that when she has succeeded in one
effort she can to a certainty do exactly
twice as much with equal ease ; but Lord
PALMERSTON has no such modesty. For though
Sir Witusat Aamaraorio and Mr. WHITWOETR
have been for half-a-dozen years labouring to give
ns a gun which shall be strong enough to
bear in service a repetition of the enor-
mous charges with which on one or two
trials they have produced wonderful results, but
under which the guns have always speedily burst,
yet Lord PALMERSTON bids us have no doubt on
the matter, but spend our millions in building
forts, in the full assurance that the guns will be
perfect when the forts are ready. And though
even these disabled guns have never yet been tried
at a range of more than 800 yards, still Lord
Palau:Knott tells us it is quite certain that they
will do every bit as well at 1,000 yards, and that
there is no shadow of doubt that they will be
equally effective at 2,500 yards, the real range
they are required to cover. And so firm is the
PREMIER in this scientific prophecy, that he is
actually going to stake the defence of England
and the protection of her arsenals upon the chance
of its coming true. Such boldness, if the question
were one of mere speculative science, would be
simply amusing, but applied to the safety of our
honour and interests it is startlingly full of peril.
For thus stands the case. These Spithead forts
are built avowedly to enable a small number of
ships to make head against a large number.
Avowedly, therefore, our future policy, if war
breaks out, will be to retain at Portsmouth a force
which but for the forts would be overpowered.
Therefore, our safety is to consist in the ability of
our ships to keep the enemy within practicable
range of the forts. But can an inferior apadron
compel a superior to fight where the inferior thinks
fit f Suppose all our own vessels d-awn up M
line between the forts, by what power are they to
prevent the enemy from passing if he does not
choose to stop A commander with a superior
force on our aide could effect this by the good old
fashion of laying his own ships alongside the
enemy's, firing till he was disabled, or boarding.
But with an inferior force he could not lay
his ships alongside the enemy, could not hold him
in his grasp, could not board, could not stop him if
he chose to steam ahead. All the inferior force
can do is to do what the forts are intended for,
fire a broadside at the enemy as he passes. But
was ship of war, even of wood, ever yet
sunk by one broadside? Or can we ex-
pect that ships of war, now they are
built of iron and in numerous water-tight com-
partments, will be sunk by a single broadside from
an inferior force, coupled with a single salvo of
300 pounders (supposing them ever to be • con-
structed) from forts blinded by smoke, three-
quarters of a mile away? Let us only remember
that the Federal fleet at Charleston, badly plated
as it was, stood salvos at that range for half an
hour, and afterwards sailed away with the loss of
but one vessel and not a single life. They were
stopped, it is true, but not by the forts nor the
guns; they were stopped because they had not
sufficient motive power to break through some
slight material obstructions, which confessedly will
not be available at Spithead. Then if neither
our inferior force of ships, nor our forts are able to
prevent a powerful enemy from running up
till he is a mile and a half from the forte, and
in the position most convenient for his
purpose, what are our ships and forts to do?
The forts must in that case be content to
play at long bowls, and try what they can do at
ranges never yet attempted in war. The ships can
follow, but, es hwuthesi, they are iuferior in force
to the enemy, and unable of themselves to engage
him. So what Lord PALMEasTum is doing is this :
he is encouraging us to keep up a fleet unable to
defend us, by the promise that be will in a few
years succeed in making a gun which neither Sir
WIG ARMSTRONG nor Mr. WHITWORTH has yet
succeeded in making.

We are told, indeed, that there is danger in re-
lying on the most powerful fleet, because it may
be despatched on foreign service. The answer ia,

that we ought to have a fleet, if Government did
its duty, sufficient for both foreign and home ser-
vice in any contingency. But if there is anything
in the objection it will apply more strongly to our
position after we have the forts than if we
had them not. The Defence Commission
has not recommended for floating defence mere
harbour hulks, but vessels capable of good
service in the Channel or in an enemy's
porta. In this they are obviously right, because
such vessels will in any place and on any service be
the moat efficient. But supposing such a force to
be established, the question is whether it is more
likely to be dangerously weakened by being de-
tached to other service if we have the forts or if
we have not the forts. In the latter case a
minister would feel the full responsibility of leav-
ing Portsmouth undefended. But in the former
cue he would be able to cite the authority of a
popular Prime Minister of the last generation, who
built the forts expressly that they might afford
support to a weak fleet, and who promised that
they should be armed with a gun that would make
them formidable at the required range. Such an
answer would undoubtedly excuse a minister
while the forts are permitted to stand. But it
certainly would not pravent half-a-dozen iron-clads
from watching their opportunity, and after the
Portsmouth fleet had been reduced by detach-
ments to two or three, running past both forts and
fleet, and at their leisure and in their own place
pitching shells into the dockyard.
Again, however, we have been told that we are
not to be wholly dependent on either ships or sea
forts, but are to have mortar batteries on shore to
bombard the enemy's fleet. We are *afar from dis-
puting the efficacy of such a fire as we are from
disputing the possibility of the 300-pounders. But
our objection in both cases is the same—it it
perilling all upon an untried contingency. Has
there been one experiment to ascertain what these
shells will do against iron-clads, with decks a foot
th'elt of solid timber and lined with irch iron ?
All experiments hitherto have gone to prove that
cast-iron shells shiver without exploding against
an iron target, and as there would be no diffi-
culty in putting the iron lining of the
deck on the outside, there is very strong
reason to defer our confidence in mortar fire
until the experiment has been tried. But
Government experiments always stop short of
the point at which they would be of service.
There are plenty of places at which a 2,500 yards
range can be got, if it exists not at Shoeburyress,
for trial of guns and mortars in something like
the same circumstances as those in which they are
to be fitted up for our national defences. What
can be thought of the Minister who fails to try
such experiments, while cramming us with pro.
mines as to what he is going to do if we will trust
everything to him ?