The Express.
London, England, 1855-07-28 00:00:00

MAZZINI ON THE WAR.

[ln the following eloquent letter there are many
important general truths, and many (u appears to us) errors
of detail. We submit it to those who tea listen to all
opinions and judge for themselves.]

July, 1855.

My dear Friend,—You ask me why I do not e:Press my
opinions on the war. I feel disheartened. You seem to me
to be fighting Me Ajar in the dark : only he was praying
for light—you have it shining on you from every side, and
shut your eyes resolutely against it. You have been re-
peatedly warned. Men who do not claim any superior in.
sight or power of genius, but who from their position, from
the studies and events of a whole life, are entitled to know
something of continental political matters, told you from the
beginning of the contest that Austria would
your battles ; that her only aim was to take possession of
the Principalities ; that by your obstinately punning the
flying phantom of an alliance with her you were not only
degrading your cause and losing all the sympathies of the
good and brave throughout Europe, but fettering your in-
tellect, cramping your schemes, and turning the policy of
your war from the only ground upon which you could
rationally hope for victory, to a wild chase of impossibilities.
All this has been subsequently christened into PACTS. BUD,
you remain inert, impusive, unshaken, bent on the same
identical track—plunging deeper and deeper into a dark,
hopeless region of dreams and deceptions ; whilst a
angle set of will would lead you back to the
wide, my, bright path, on which honour and victory
must bless each step of yours. I see brave dude, stablest
to redeem a whole fallen nation ; noble powers of action
and endurance, displayed by your unknown demi-gods, your
soldien, and officers, in the Crimea ; but for what purpose
and with what hope ? I bow before the quiet silent
devotedness with which your nation accepts all the saorifiose
inequable from a war, and I feel proud of loving and
being loved in your own country ; bat such devotion ought
not to be in vain; and as far as I can see, it is so. Owing
to the policy which leads the war, your are fighting for an
impossibility. _ _

The thoughtZunless indeed all practical lease has for-
saken your nation, mat be by this time, after nine months
of efforts and deceptioas, living and restless within many
souls; still, none dares to give utterance to it. You are in
your parliament floating between one party aware of the
difficulty of your position, but drawing from that knowledge
a policy of cows:dies, and another, fully alive to the
supreme necessity of not withdrawing from the contest
before a decisive victory, bat neither understanding, nor
wanting to understand, how victory can be reached; peace
at any cost, even of honour, and war for war's sake ; the
three words uttered by kir.liosbuck remaining unsupported,
1 'cholas, a threatening prophecy to be remembered when it
will be too late. Your administrative reform societies are'

the Venetian-rat Story roads was to strengthen the mobilises
go...sunset which bad been proelainted at Wale*. And
how could a 'overeaten', beat set an the creation of as
Italian nation, bat en the formation of a Piedmonts',
kingdom et the North, raise a war of sationalitias 1 Thu,
all the truly drowsier operations being excluded, the
emancipating war food itself forcedly narrowed down to
the regular siege of the fortresses. The Piedmontese army
lingered before Mantua and Verona until a scorching sun,
disease, irregularity of commiesariat supplies, end the de-
moralising discouragement always attending troops kept in
comparative immobility, pointed out to • freely reinforced
easy an opportunity for overpowering it. A wrong
policy bad destroyed all the chances of the war. Such
must be the cue in every war. Its method reels mainly on
the policy which rules the councils of the nation—such is,
and most strikingly, in you own.
Had the policy of your government been a liberal one,
yen would be now firmly established In the heart of your
enemy's load, backed by the insurrection of a whole brave
nation, and with a powerful germ of disorganisation,
through desertion and revolt, at work in the adverse army.
A stroke of energy at the serviced a principle would have
givanyou miles on every point of Europe; and no despotic
power would dare or be able to support Russia against you.
We Gould pledge our word for that.
By your declaring yourselves hostile to anyl national
movement—by your Courting during sixteen months the
vilest of the despotic powers, Austria—by your renouncing
every moral aim, every noble aspiration, ter a paltry and
hateful programme of expediency and status quo, you have
deprived yourselves of the sympathies of all the good and
brave throughout Europe—you have prevented • Polish
rising—you have lost the alliance of Sweden—you have
allowed free epees and security to all German intrigues
against you; and renouncing all freedom of action, all free
choice of places, means, and military plans, you have, like
Charles Albert, in 1848, narrowed the war to a siege, on •
spot which will be, I fear, henceforward named " the grave
of England's honour and England's sons." The grave of
England's honour and England's sons : the Crimea, at this
period, can be bat this.

I confess I cannot understand the silent, obstinate apathy
with which your press, your meetings, your parliamentary
men, are witnessing the sacrifice of thousands, without ever
dreaming of asking themselves : Can victory—a decisive and
pezmanent one—be obtained there ? I shudder when I read
such words as those with which Lord Palmerston coolly
assures the House of Commons that all louse will be met
by new supplies of men. You had better decree at once
that the youth of England shall be periodically decimated,
fgr no other purpose that that of gratifying the military
ignorance of Louis Napoleon, and withdrawing every source
of alarm from the Austrian government.

A Crimean expedition could in ao cue, I believe, lead by
itself to a decisive success or to honourable terms of peace.
Odessa, if you wanted to act from the Black Sea, was the
point for you. Still, had you chosen the favourable moment
and worked with adequate insane—had you lauded at once
100,000 men somewhere above Sebastopol, and marched to
Perekop, whilst your fleet would have got possession of the
Straits of Kertch, Cape of Bazantip, and other points on the
Su of Asoff, the Crimea might have been yours, and you
would have then fallen back on Sebastopol—than deprived
of all its communications with the continent. It was no
doubt an important deed. But now, what is your hope ?
What is your aim in systematically sacrificing your best
men under the walls of a town which, in all probability,
you will not take, and which if taken cannot give you what
you want?

It is high time for you, I think, to look earneatly into
the matter, and to see that England's Jonas, which England
may need at a not very distant period, for her own protec-
tion against allies—are not lost in a hopeless contest.
Cast a glauce back on the war. You thought in the be-
ginning—and it was the first fatal mistake—that you would
frighten the Czar out of the contest, with some 60,000 or
60,000 men placed at Constantinople, Gallipoli, or Adria-
nople. When you began to perceive that a real earnest war
was unavoidable, you turned to the Danube: there was
your natural basis for offensive operations. Austria—it is
now an established fact—forbade your acting there. Yon
bowed to Austria, dismissed Vie thought at once, and gave
up to Austria—the second fatal mistake—the Principalities.
Forbidden the Danube, and not wanting to arouse,
through Poland, the dreaded question of the nationalitea,
you decided upon adopting the Bonapartist scheme of a
Crimean expedition. Yon landed, with troops, material,
and knowledge of the localities and of the enemy's forces
utterly unequal to the object, near Sebutopel. You
wanted to try the north, but found unforeseen and almost
insurmountable obstacles, and through the most dangerous
flank-march possible, you turn to the south. Yon could not,
for want of troops, invest the place ; you did not dream of
preventing the accumulation of military stores and victuals
which were coming from the interior of Russia and Siberia,
down the Volga and the Don, through Rostof and Kutch,
to Sebutopel. But you simply established youreslies there,
trusting to chance, and despising• the enemy—and there
you still are. Since then you have been in imminent
danger—averted only through want of boldness in the
Russian leaders, and heroic valour in your soldiers, at In-
kermann and Balaklava—of being driven back to the sea.
Since then, you have lost the hops of an active alliance with
Austria, lost the confidence of Europe, lost a considerable
amonnnt of money, loot (I speak of England alone) some
20,000 men; and won—some counter-approaching outposts
erected since your arrival.
This is the summary of the put : now for the future.
Sebastopol,—the besieged southern part is as strong
as ever—the Reagan army I. the Crimea more
strong than ever; and, owing to the conduct
of Austria, numerous fresh reinforcements are coming
from the interior of Russia. Yon cannot dream of
starving the enemy; your expedition to the Sea of Azoff
has come five or BM months too late; military storm and
provisions equal to the wants of many months were already
accumulated in Sebastopol. And, the military road of the
Shivagb, the road across the isthmus, the road leading from
Simpheropol to Sebastopol, through Baktchiserai, the road
from the same town to the northern part of the beseiged
place, are all in the bands of the R••—ians. You must then
take the town by force. Row many men will you have to
lose in getting possession of the Malakhoff, of the Reale,
and of the first line of defence ? Row many in conquering

the second line ?
Suppose you do gain possession of the whole town how
are you to keep it under the fire of the northern forte ?
The ground there is much higher than on the southern
side. The octagon fortress, called the Sievarna, the key of
Sebastopol, **cording to Sir Howard Douglas, commands
town, bay, and docks. Its height protects it from the fire
of your ships, its shores are precipitous. You most therefore
attack it by land, thus finding yourself after nine months' of
exertions end sacrifices, just before the obstacle from which
you shrank at the beginning. How much time, how mach
English blood will be required to overtime's it ? Can yon
feel sanguine after the experiments on the south ? •
And, then ? The Russian forces outside Sebastopol ?
Thinner in number; exhausted by victories which would
undoubtedly prove like those of Pyrrhus, you will then
have to begin the true war, the Crimean campaign.
There are Russian forces, strong enough now, and which will
be stronger still in a short while, on the right, at the two
extremities of the Tchernaya ; Russian forces on the Belbek,
Russian forces in the proximity of Eupatoria ; Russian forces,
under Wrangel, liontresor, Bellegarde, in the interior. Be.
tweenthose and through the steppes which from Sinapheropol
up to the Isthmus spread Over all the Crimea you will have
to fight your way to Perekop. Oa the steppes, no tress, no
shrubs; against the intense heat and the intense cold an
Invading army is defenceless : no resting shelter—the Crimea
is mere than thinly inhabited; tea thousand English
equate miles and tenanted by some 200,000 inhabitants,
and the few scattered villages of the interior, will be burnt
►y the Russians. Water is there very scares and saturated
with salt. The winter sweeps the desolate land with over-
whelming snow-storms : the warm seam softens through
the melting of the snows the ground to such an extent that
the artillery will sink through it. No road tracks—the
bridges on the ravines not strong, and easily destroyed.
These difficulties you will say must work against the Rus-
sians, too; yes, only the Russians are at home, they are used
to them ; you are not ; you must conquer, they have only
to defend; every step in advance will leave yen further from
your basis of operations, from your supplies ; every step
backwards brings them nearer to their own.

systematically shunning the vital question, apparently
aiming at nothing elm but at teaching people how to do
cleverly the wrong thing. Tour press, active, far-sighted,
bold, sometimes fierce, and when combined, all powerful
esseiralsg details and all second rats matter, is silent about
the peallent--" Can Russia be conquered through the Cri-
mea!" Still that is the question. It is good end brave to
Maio for one's own flag ; but it is sad, unutterably sad aid
edipalin so bid the best die • fruitless death, when more
1111111 be achieved. Martyrdom is in certain times and air-
Meleisaces the meted duty of the weak; the strong are
lewd to conquer.
Om you conquer, without • radical change in your actual
peaty ? It is my deep conviction that you cannot.
To believe that the success of • war rests on a ground of
mere organisation and military-detail skill—that the direr&
kg policy has nothing to do with it—that, when yen have
emmarative perfection of mechanical arrangements and
Wirer, yogi have °cogitated the most of favourable chasms,
It es immense mistake. I have witnessed in 1848, in Lam
hardy, the tepid, progressive, unavoidable destruction of a
•ertain triumph through • single fatal stroke of policy.
There, on a land where a national movement had
denly taken place and swept the territory, the fatness'
strepted, of all foes, from the Alps to the seas a &kg
stepped forward, with regular battalions, maw, sod
mouton twice opal to • oonguered, disheartens,. ism•
tensed enemy, but with • different aim—the sipmadlea-
mint of the House of Savoy, and with • asetrehleal
tradition eatirely antagonistic to the spirit and temilimm ei
the movement There was valour in the army, devotedness
in the edifiers ; and a whole population glowing with enthu-
siasm wee booking the Piedmont**, regiments. The plan
was obvious. The thirty thousand Austrian soldiers who
had fled to Verona and Matta could never reconquer
alone the lost (fogad. To prevent their being reinforced
was the problem to be solved ; and the solution was Cu,.
To arm the population sad tell them—protect your houses ;
to leave behind the fortresses ; to march to the Alps and
establish there, on the points where the military roads
link Italy with the Austrian empire, two camps of
some twenty-eve theism* soldiers each ; to bombard Trieste,
from whence the Austrian, were drawing all their supplies ;
M sense with an appeal to the Illatr-Illyrian nationalities all
*sadism Dalmatian Nest at the Adriatic—was *doubtful,
'keep vhasy. But Trieste wee forbidden by diplomacy;
the Tyiel, I de sot know by what old absurd rights of the
German Osabiersey i to arm tie population MO out of
the question; for • people who tights its own battles la • I
very &arms thews to *fag zombi* ; ea protest

through the Liman of the Dnieper against
UN naval arsenal of the Crimes, Nioolsieff. They forge.
Otebakow and Hilboroun, planed opposite each other at
two sad a half miles distance, and forbidding the entrance
of the Lagoon ; they forget that every place on the shares
mast have been by this time fortified by the Ruti.
dans ; they forget that Nholateff is now the Nib"
where a reserve army of some thirty thousand Russians
is formed. They will suggest an attack upon Akermas;
and Ovidioplis on the Dniester: they forget that thole
you would be faced by the &wahine, and threatened ea
your flank by the Austrian army. Can you trust the
Austrian army ? They will hint at a bold attempt agsiii4
Perekop. How—by sea ?On the Asoff Bea it Is protoned
by the Eihivagh; on the Black Bea your men•ot war cannot
oast anchor except at the distance of 20 miles. By lead?
You must first fight, and conquer the campaign I spots
some bees bank. Unless you want to find yourselves pet.
sonars between the forces coming from the interior of Re}
lie sad those manoeuvring in the interior of the Crimea, yes
must destroy Wrangel and Bellegards. With what fortes?
Yon have now, after all usual deductions made—and Turks
end Piedmonts,e included-150,000 active men in the
Crimes: probably less, certainly not more. Some 40,000,
almost without cavalry, are at Hopson.. How many of
the rest will you leave to push on the siege ? How many
te guard Kamiesch and Balaklava ?

No! Unless you raise the siege; unless you apply your
energies to the only vulnerable point of Ituuia—Poland;
unless you radically change the policy ruling the war, you
can do nothing bat systematically and periodically perish in
fruitless attempts before Sebastopol. Russia is there ow
too strong for yen.

Will your government ever spontaneously adopt 'change
of policy t Never. Tin men who had not one word to say
in the name of England's honour when the Czar in 1818.9
invaded the Principalities and crushed Hungary, because
his object was then to check liberty and national move-
ments—the men who plotted with Louis Napoleon for re•
storing the Pope " under an improved form of govern-
ment" at Rome—the men who can, during sixteen months,
exhaust every form of servile complacency towards such •
power as Austria, and, scorned, do not dare a threatening
word—can ally themselves with despotic usurpers—thy
never will say to • nation, Rise ! Their policy lies between
the despatch of the 23rd of March, 1853, in which Lord
Clarendon declares that her Majesty's government is anxious
to avert the risk of any advantage being given to the
European revolutionists, and the speeches of Lord Palmer.
ston, branding the liberty of Poland as a dream, the future
rising of Hungary uan untoward lamentable event. They
may break their pledge with Sicily ; they will never break
that which binds them to continental absolutism. But
that you, English citizens, who worship freedom and revere
morality—you who have no pledge except to England's
honour and safety—you who all to a man waved your
hats at Poland's glorious rising and proclaimed its
overthrow a crime—you who's brothers and sous
are dying, the victims of a wrong policy, in the Crimea,
w►ilst in Podolia and Lithuania they could conquer—yes,
the flee and able, by a single resolute act of will, by • sud-
den energetic collective manifestation to compel, can sit
quietly witnessing the slow, useless work of destruction, and
trust your fates to men who, thanks to their policy and to
Austria, are besieging, after nine menthe of operations,
an outer work, is more than I can explain to myself or
other.. Every man who has • son, a brother, or a friend
in the East ought to walk with a map of the Crimea
on his breast and a flag with the name of Poland
inscribed, from place to place, from park to park,
front cottage to cottage, and preach and explain, until
hundreds of thousands should peacefully but sternly
signify their will. Change of policy. Down with Austria.
Let Poland's rising be helped. And then you ought to
kneel and thank God most humbly for having placed the
easy accomplishment of a great act of justice on the very
path which leads to English safety and success.

But Austria I Prussia! Leave krusaia to her own people;
Austria to Hungary and to ourselves. As sue as Austria
will n firs a single gun for you against Russia, not a single
Austrian gun will be fired against you while we live. The
question of the nationalities is amounting to a general war.
What of that? Will not the nationalities fight their own
battles Only those battles will be yours too. With
Poland, Hungary, and Italy up, the Cur cannot dream of
marching to Constantinople.
Out of the road I point depend upon it there is no decisive
victory nor honourable peace possible for you. In a letter
which I addressed to the chairman of the Society of the
Friends of Italy, on the god of Much, I said, "Your
policy is absolutely wrong and immoral, therefore you can-
not and will not conquer." I maintain my ground. War
is for me the greatest of crimes, whenever it is not waged
for the benefit of mankind, for the sake of a great truth to
enthrone, or of a great lie to entomb. Yours is not such a war.
It shrinks from the proclaiming of a principle. It equally
aims at curtailing despotic encroachments from the north,
and strengthening despotism in the centre of Europe. It
declares that Turkey has a right to independence, whilst its
policy and tactics sr* calculated so as to prevent any other
country from asserting itself independent. I believe in
Ood, and in a providential scheme ; and consequently I do
not believe in triumph crowning a war grounded on expe-
diency, temporary self-interest, and antagonism to European
rights and liberty.

Citarism is a principle—the principle of unbounded autho-
rity ; it is only a principle—that of universal liberty—that
can conquer it.—Yours faithfully,
JOSEPH MAZZINI.

The Marquis and Marchioness of Westminster and
family are on the eve of leaving town for their seat in Dor-
setahire.
Viscountess Palmerston has an assembly, this
evening, at the Premier's residence on Carlton-house Ter-
race.
Lord Lyndhurst leaves town early in the ensuing
week, accompanied by Lady Lyndhurst and the Hon. Miss
Copley, for Dieppe, where the noble and learned lord makes
a brief sijour previous to proceeding to Paris. The noble
and learned lord will afterwards go on a tour in Germany.
Amongst the guests who have been sojourning
during the week at Lonsdsle Castle with the Earl ot Loa-
dale are—Lord Wynford, Lord Demers, the Hon. Colonel

_ . .
Lowther, M.P., Colonel Challoner, Professor Shilling, C ilo-
nel Maberly, the Rev. H. Lowther, Mr. Mechi, dto. &c.
A public meeting is to take place at St. Martin's
Hall, on Wednesday, in favour of the employment of •
Polish Legion as the most effectual auxiliaries for carrying
on the war, and the rem, ation of Poland as the only means
for securing a durable peace. Sir Do Lacy Evans, M.P., is
to take the chair.
In a letter to the Council of the Society of Arts,
H.R.H. Prince Albert suggests the propriety of their
visiting the Paris Exhibition, accompanied by the associated
ins:itutions.
The eighteenth annual meeting of the Yorkshire
Agricultural Society will be held at Mallon, daring the
ensuing week.
Earl Fitzhardinge, lord lieutenant of Gloucester-
shire, has appointed his brother, the Hon. Augustus
Berkeley, to the office of Clerk of the Peace.
Intelligence has just reached London of the almost
total loss of the Soo collection of antiquities which the
agents of the French government have been employed for
some years is bringing together, from the various ruins of
Assyria and Babylonia, for deposit in the Museum of the
Louvre.
Madlle. Cruvelli's approaching retreat from the
opera stage into married life, is formally announced in the
muical journals of Paris.
Letters from the East Indies mention that Miss
Catherine Hayes has departed from Calcutta for Australia,
where her popularity is described se being almost without
limit, and her gains beyond all precedent.
Government, we (Athecteum) understand, is seri-
ously engaged with the question of a New National Gallery.
Ministers feel that the present mode of exhibiting the
national pictures—at Windsor, Hampton Court, the British
Museum, the National Gallery, and Marlborough How—
-lis eminently unsatisfactory. Plans are before them for the
consolidation of these galleries.
Signor Verdi has been in London, with a view of
arranging for the production of his "Les Veprea" at the
Royal Italian Opera next season, and for the publication of

At the end of the Crimean steppes lies your objective &...- ".
point, Barshop. The Russians have been all this while for- —"*--
allying it. Then should you conquer it and Busk not
Oas would say that the man who first planned the The Atheneum says that the Trustees of the
yield, three hundred miles of new steppes • • • British Yemen have decided on applying to the Treseury
for a special grant, in order to enable them to publish all
Bikassa expedition wanted to solve this problem: how to the most saleable Cuneiform inscriptions which have been
ink in an apparently plausible enterprise the best Wed of
discovered during the course of the recent excavations in
Nalliand, and make he defenceless for a time of ay.& Assyria and Babylonia.
Bah are your prospects. How many thoulair7„ of cm, A complimentary address from the Attorneys and
bra many ciliate of pounds are you disposA tc eagal,„k7.: Solicitors of North Wales has been presented to Chief
\ aisle passible, not probable realisatioa 1 'r- `' Justice Jervis by a deputation of solicitors to the Leong
resgis who are wanting deliberate" Judge, at his lodgings tn Castle-square, Carnarvon. The
to blind themselves address was signed, with very few exceptions, by all the
MS mod, will talk to you 04 a probable operatic& i soliaiton in the di Northern Cosatite of Wales.

lIARYLEBONE ELECTION.
THIS DAY.

The nomination of eindidetee to fill the Tenney
emidegaid by the appointment of Sir B. Hall to the cattiest
chief Cemetimioner of Works took pleas to-day, at the
bows, to Park-erescent, Portland-place. Mr. GIS.
TOOL'S°, the retuning officer of the borough, mile&
The usual preliminary formalities having been gees
tbfOlifiho
Dr. imam proposed, and IMr. S. STOCKTON issedsie
the aomfmation of Sir B. Hall.
No other candidate being proposed, the retaining edam
declared, amidst loud cheers, Sir Benjamin Hal WWI*
sleeted.
Sir B. HALL than addressed the electors to the following
effect:—" I cannot sufficiently thank you for the kind
Manor Is which lon have returned me to-day--fee the
lath time—u your representative in parliament The
total absence of all opposition, and Se Smaralsela
which I have received from all patties in the lemelligi. NW
Ins se is the belief that I was right in scoop*. lin are
which I have just relinquished ; and dories the dwelt laili
it I was &gabled to promote your interests bilk win* int
political,. (Hear, hear) Now, gentlemen, I esamalisl
epos these hustings without, to some extent, advertise*
the pest. The last time I had the pleasure of bolas
here was in the month of August, just eleven
maths ago, when I was proposed by one wbs
asked ate to allow him to do so, because he
believed it would b • the last act of his political ezleaseee
and that prophecy has unhappily been fulfilled. Awl I
my, gentlemen, that I refer to the late Mr. Jae* Ilemire
(Hear, bear.) At that time also there stood Sae the erne
with whdm I had long been associated in the reggemetatien
al the bonegh : who was dear to me as • friend. mad who
was respected as a representative by all who had the plea-
salisfactrim of knowing him. I allude to the late
lamented Lord Dudley Stout. (Hear, bear.) He too
has been taken from us. Now, gentlemen, I will, with your
permission, touch upoa two or three topics which have
already been alluded to by gentlemen who proceeded me,
sad I will also state to you the general views which I eater-
lea upon some of the points which attract public attention.
(Hear, hear.) la the mouth of August last I was invited
to take high *See ander the Crown, sod I did not hesitate
for one moment as to the course that I should
panne, because I believed, although I bad sever
been is once before, I might still be of use to my
fellow-countrymen. I took that office at the time cf great
musty, of some danger, and of great difficulty. I did aot
hesitate to encounter the danger; but, in doing so, I believe
I did what every 10111 i in my position ought to have
stone. (Cheers.) If my career has been successful
le that office, 1 hope it will be some guarantee
to you that I shall not fail—at any rate I will
endeavour to pursue the um* course—in the higher
office which, by the favour of the sovereign, I now
hold. (Hear, hear.) The gentlemen who moved and
seconded me have been kind enough to allude in glowing
terms to the course which I have taken la reference to a
great public measure, having regard to the interest of the
metropolis. I was determined, so soon as we were rid
of the epidemic which ravaged the restropolis last year,
to turn my attention to the state of this great city, and I
was quite sure that steles there was some sweeping end
radical change in the mutilation of many of the local bouds
of this metropolis, that It would be utterly hopeless that the
affairs of the metropolis could be well conducted. (Hear,
lieu.) I had two courses to pursue—one wee to bring in
a measure less liberal in chaiecter ; the other to
bring In a large and liberal measure, which could
only encounter the opposition of interested parties.
Had I taken the first of these alternatives, I should have
been open to au opposition composed of two ingredients
viz., the opposition of those who are anxious for a large
end liberal reform, besides the opposition of the interested
parties. I preferred taking the latter course, prepared
to meet the resistance of interested parties, knowing that I
was perfectly hardened against their attacks, so long as I
was doing my duty to the public. (Hear, hear.) I car-
ried that measure through the House of Commons. It has
pared a secoad reading in the Howse of Lord% and I have
every reason to believe that it will pass through all the stages
of the legislature unimpaired in its provisions. (Hear, beam)
Now, gentlemen, just let us see in what position the public
will stand when that measure shell have received the Royal
assent. We shall do away with irrespouible aerate*
sionen ; we shall do away with self-elected boards; and we
shall get rid of alboot of harpies, such as collectors and sur-
veyors, who hitherto have fattened upon the taxes they
have taken from the public. We shall give those municipal
Institutions to the various districts of the metropolis which
have been so long desired without the paraphernalia of
mayors and common-councilmen. This is a great work to
achieve in eleven months, during which time I have been a
Minister of Health; and you may rely upon it I
shall not relax my exertions on behalf of the public in
the higher office which I have now the honour
to hold. At the same time, gentlemen, it is due to my
noble friend at the head of the government to say that had
I not received his insistence, both while he was at the
Home-office, and afterwards when he became Primo Mi-
nister, it would have been utterly impossible for me
to have carried the meanie for the better local
manetement of the metropolis. Lord Palmerston rendered
me able and continuous assistance ; and to him, therefore,
ea much as any one, is due the credit of this large measure
of social reform. (Hear, bear.) Gentlemen there is only
one other other subject I have to touch upon, and that is
the war. I mut say a few words upon the conduct of the'wer.
We have heard a great deal of late—many expressions of
opinion against Lord Palmerston in relation to the conduct
of the war. I remember the time wren he was neither Home
Secretary nor Prime Minister, but when he was Secretary
of State for Foreign Affairs; and then these gentlemen who
sit on the opposition benches to him said, " As long as Lord
Palmerston continued Secretary of State for Fareiga Affein,
se long shall we be embroiled with oar allies." They were
sayin* then, "Thu noble lord is pushing us into was ; ' bat
sow that he has an opportunity of carrying on war with
vigour and determination, which I know it is his
Intention to de, those patience who sit opposite to him
declare he is not sufficiently determined in the prosecution
of this great struggle. (Heir, hear) Now let me ask you,
gentlemen—and pray give me a fair and candid answer—
" What has happened since Lord Palmerston became First
Minister of the Crown in relation to the conduct of the war
that will show any want of vigilance on hie part.
er any weakness of character, or any want of decision. I
have watched his career from the fleet moment he became
Vint Lord of the Treasury down to the present period, and
I declare, snoet conscientiously, that I carnet find any ono
point on which he is to be blamed in regard to the mate-
rial prosecution of the war. (Hear, hear.) Gentlemen,
let me draw your attention to facts, because I
knew what I am saying, as strictly true, I be-
line when a man is acting honestly, when he is
Warms, upright, and honest is his intestine in relation
to this great question, it is my duty to him as a friend, as
well as a public man, not to shrink from stating what my
operas are in the matter. Let us glance at the events
which have occurred since:Lord Aberdeen's government was
about to break up. What was the cry at that time?
Why, that Lord Palatenton ought to be war minister.
He was virtually eppotated war minister, but he never re-
mind the seals of office; becalm within • eseT few week'
afterwards he was made prime pithiest i and let its oce-
ans say what they will, I defy them to gdat eat lIIIi yiegle
butane where the noble lord has shown laiediew el cha-
racter ia relatioe to the war. (Hear.) (badman, I will give
yea reasons fee what I state. Too, no doubt, have read the
deepatthes widish bear the same of Lord Clarendon, sad if
you have read those despatches, you mast be well aware
that they never could have been sent forth from the
Foreiga.office without first receiving the sanction of the
Fust Lord of the Treasury. Well, then, is there anything
to those despatehes which shows indecision of character ?
Is then anything fa them which shows other than a strong
determination to carry out what is the will of the people at
this moment. (Hsu, hear) But there is another public
document which has been issued within the last two or
three days, which been me out ia what I am saying. I
refer to the instructions which were given to Lord Jobe
Hutson when he went to Viesam There is nothin
them which shows indecision an the part of Levi
Palmerston is relation to the war. (Hear, hear.)
Gentlessee I have stated this in justification of
myself, bases* in my address I stabs that I would not join
any vvernmeut, or continue is any government, that was
not prepared to carry on the war with vigour. (Chem.)
Bat 1 went further in that address, and I said, owl I eWI
say, that no government ought to receive the Molliesee W
the public which will ant be prepared to carry as die ear
with vigour. (Cheers.) For, gentlemea, we have great poises
atlases now is regard to the civilisation of Bence ; for them
sMet we us bataiag ; amil I believe, however tardy it 11111
be, we Me ti be esiareslal. (Chess). I via nig
erg Ste Meal sire apes Ale pink and that is simply Is
was lea, gentlemen, Ilea Lord Palmermea bea beast
• sidle* sea is retitle* M the sosduet of Si verotakk
* lie le determined le easy ea with the *twit *par, Isla
i a elk, taid, eel beeesable peace bee bees elialasiL (Lind
t. oboes) Oae ward woe, gentlemen, awl mIM sapid Se
i spell, and 1 shall have ism It is Mg awn filit• U
pee ago, when 1 wee a geeing sea, that I one ant iges
...se besting% lam Ikea told that it might be eery mil
air we le emend for sees; but it was utterly ingemble
li
ft pt sub a bald apes tke amiss et tide esasilasafg
ea le amble as ft Asp my sem be sow Tie
um Slog was tell we alma I leek It sae
NM le be utterly ispieilie fir a new sea
is eater le eseseed, but I bare enwoodod Is both.(Chars)
OWN boo mew at the esemeasmag et atyefieMeegL
peer wappopi. Ton Wil PIM soupcon ia se, atm
meadegesi apes% tbet idthettO I aseievaleil
data I bare biases held, Sail Now Yin
Wpm Wwa, aw Wasatilapials at lava Timm.