The Press.
London, England, 1854-09-09 00:00:00

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quickly followed by tidings of the event it
communicated. On the Cabinet alone rests
the responsibility of giving to the enemy 11111
notice of its intentions, and of perilling by
so much the safety of the expedition, or, at
least, of diminishing its chalice of success.
Lord ABERDEEN, in this instance, must not
hope to make a clerk in the Foreign-office his
scapegoat. The secret must have come di-
rectly through his Cabinet, and the nation is
entitled to know by what malignant influence
it is that its interests are thus betrayed, and
that, as if by a settled scheme of policy, the
great Power with which we are at war is con-
stantly afforded time and opportunity to an-
ticipate our action, and given timely warn-
ing of our hostile purposes.
It cannot' be pretended that' in this case
there was any good end to be answered by
publicity. The expedition was not like a
scheme of reform, which must rest its hopes
of success on the excitement it occasions. and
the popular clamour which can be raised in
its favour by the publication of its details.
All the idle flourish on the force of the allied
armies and fleets, and the triumph to be anti-
cipated from their attack, could have no
other result than to make our Government
ridiculous, by showing that it was unable to
keep its counsel. The intention should have been
made known only by the act itself. The most
decisive blows are struck, more especially in
the case of sieges, when an enemy is unpre-
pared for them ; but here a resolve is no sooner
taken than it is shouted forth in a fit of giddy
rapture to prove that the Ministry is not so
weak and incapable as had been supposed. If
this system is to be continued, sealed instruc-
tions and private despatches must become a
farce, and the Cabinet may as •well admit re-
porters to its councils, that all the world may
be made acquainted with its debates and de-
cisions. . .
We repose absolute confidence in the gal-
lantry and skill of our coinnianclers and in
the bravery of their forces. We know that,
under all circumstances, they will do their
duty. The question is, not of their efficiency,
but of the policy of Government in suffering
the 11-t4 sea on for , opepttions 'to slip away
while our forces remained inactive, and in
pompously announcing the particulars of an
expedition weeks before it was intended to
sail. Those weeks have materially changed
the relative. strength of the belligerent parties.
The expeditionary force has been wofully re
duced, both! in strength and numbers, by
disease, while that collected for the deferke
of Sebastopol must have been largely rein-
forced. Be the issue what it may, th chances
of Russia are now as favourable as her best
friends could wish ; nor could her interests
have been better served than by the long
delay and emphatic warnings which have been
afforded her to complete her preparations.
In one other respect she has been still more
indebted to our policy. Admitting that the
delay in the departure of the Crimea expedi-
tion was inevitable, was that a reason why our
forces should have remained wholly inactive?
A corps of 10,000 or 20,000 men might have
been conveyed with great facility from
Varna to the Asiatic coast, and, by forming a
junction with the Turkish army, would have
overmatched the Russians, and have entirely
changed the fortunes of the war in that quarter
of the world. The correspondent of a Ministe-
rial journal, whose letters supply the most
authentic details of the lamentable defeats