The Express.
London, England, 1864-02-08 00:00:00

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LONDON, MONDAY, FEBRUARY 8.

Those who sympathise with Denmark in her re-
sistance to the most wanton act of aggression that
has disturbed the general peace since the year
1815, will learn with more regret than surprise
that the Danes have been already obliged to
abandon their long line of defence in Sleswig.
That such a step would ultimately prove inevitable
was of course obvious from the first to all familiar
with the ground, it being clearly impossible for the
small Danish army to hold so extensive a
range of works for any length of time against
the united forces of the German Powers.
The Danish line of defence, including the waters
of the Scblei and the Treene, which complete their
system of works on either side, is 25 miles in
length, the purely land defences which connect
these waters constituting at least half of the entire
line. These central land defences include the
famous Dannewerke and the forts connecting it
with the town of Sleswig, and this line alone, ex-
clusive of the works beyond Sleswig to-
wards Missunde, is twelve miles and a
half long. At the lowest computation it
would require at least fifty thousand troop to
man these extensive works, while the Danish
Commander had probably, at the outside, not
much above half this number at his disposal. On
the other hand, the number of German troops
despatched to Sleswig is estimated at between
seventy and eighty thousand. Under these cir-
cumstances it is sufficiently clear that if the Danes
received no assistance they could not expect to hold
their position for any long time after the whole of
the German troops had been brought up. Still it
seemed not impossible, especially after the gallant
repulse of the Prussians at Missunde, that they might
single-handed successfully resist the further pro-
gress of the invaders for a week at least. This
expectation has not been realized by the
event. After a week's successful resistance to
eveig direct attack, the Danish Commander has
judged it expedient to evacuate the Dannewerke,
abandon the defence of Sleawig and Miasunde, acd
withdraw his troops to the snore ^olt::::t line of
. . .
Cast defences beyond Flensburg. We do not yet
know all the circumstances that led to this deci-
sion, but the immediate cause appears to have been
the rapid concentration of the Prussians at a point
on the Schlei beyond the extreme left of the
Danish line, and the inability of the Danes to
prevent their crossing the firth at that point. The
passage was effected in the midst of a snowstorm
on Friday night, or rather early on Saturday
morning ; the first brigade of Prussian troop
crossing over in fishing-boats, and the rest on a
pontoon bridge rapidly thrown across the stream
between Arnie and Cappeln, nearly ten miles
east of Mimed.. The Prussians having by this
movement turned the left flank of the Danish
position, it was certainly highly expedient,
or rather absolutely necessary, to abandon the
whole line at once. Had the Danish Commander
retained his position a day longer the tactics of his
powerful opponents might indeed have proved par-
tially successful, fur he would almost certainly have
been placed between two fires, and thus have ex-
posed his small army to the imminent risk of cap-
ture or annihilation. For aim& ..aneously with the
movement of the Prussians on the extreme left, the
Austrians bad advanced to the attack of Sleswt,
the centre of the Danish position. The Austrians
took possession of Fabrdorf, an outpost in front of
Sleswig, on Friday, and were preparing to attack
the town in force on Saturday. The Dansh
Commander, accordingly, de:ermined to evacuate
Sleswig and abandon the whole line without
further delay. The movement of the Danish troop-
commenced at midnight on Friday, but they were
less successful in their retreat then in their brie'
defence. The Austrians from Sissy*, under
General G ABLENZ, pursued them, and overtaking
them at Oversee, about seven miles from Flens-
burg, inflicted on them what the German accounts
represent to have been a damaging defeat. The
Danes resisted desperately, and it is plain made their
aggressors pay dearly for their advantage ; hut the
odds were too great for them, and the fate of their
gallant army is a subject for much anxiety.
Great dissatisfaction, we learn, exists at Copen-
hagen, at the retreat of the army. This is as
natural as it is unreasonable. But in such a conflict
the su pre me duty of the Danish Commander-in-Chief
was to preserve his small but gallant army from all
needless risk of serious loss, and above all not to
expose it in any way to the chance of capture or
destruction by an enemy so immensely superior
in numbers. By withdrawing after • week's
successful resistance from a position that had be-
come unsafe, he displayed, it need hardly be
said, the truest patriotism, the truest valour.
So far the immediate cause of the Danish retreat is
intelligible enough, but had there been any naval
force at the mouth of the Scblei, any Danish gun-
boats in the river to dispute the passage of the
Prussians, it seems not improbable that the Danes
might still have held their position and have re-
sisted the progress of the invader for some days at
all events, if not for some weeks longer.
The actual result, however, is not in the least
surprising. After many rumours, if not actual
promises, of assistance from various quarters, when
the crisis came the Danes found themselves alone,
a nation of less than three millions pitted
single-handed against the military resources of
• people numbering more than forty millions.
The question of immediate interest now is as to
the effect of this retrograde movement on the
Sleswig campaign. There can be little doubt that