The Press.
London, England, 1856-11-08 00:00:00

OMER PACHA AND SIR W. WILLIAMS

COLONEL SIMMONS' late aide-decamp to Omer
Paella, has this week written to the Times with re-
ference to the following passage in Colonel Lake's
" Kars and Our Captivity." It is an extract from a
private letter written by Major-General Sir W. Wil-
liams from Kars, and dated the 31st of October,
1855:

Rumours of the operations of Omer Pacha also reached
us, and I hope he is at least acting like a brave and resolute
man ; if he does not I will mark him with my ink in spite
of his great reputation. Batoum is but four days from
Kars, and six for the march of troops, but if he operates
manfully in any direction I shall be content.

Colonel Simmons upon this makes the pithy remark,
that no such road—by which troops can march in
six or more days from Batoum to Kars—is in
existence at all !
The distance is indeed no more than 105 miles as the
crow flies, and Omer Pacha had reason to believe that there
was a mule track, or rather mountaineer's path, but he
knew that it had to cross a chain of mountains near 10,000
feet in height, and, at the season to which his expedition
had been delayed, covered with snow, and through the
gorges of wh.ch, as he was informed, not even a mule
could carry his load with any safety. This route has since
been explored by a British officer, whose report, it is said,
fully coutirins the opinion of Omer Pacha and those whose
advice was taken on the subject of his Asiatic expedition,
which, allow me to add, he undertook "like a brave and
resolute man," undeterred by the obstacles and delays
thrown in his way, aui removed in great measure by his
zeal and energy, and hoping against hops to rescue his
Sovereign's forces from the fatal position in which they
were placed by the strategy of others. Omer Pacha's
opinion, however, be it right or wrong, was based upon the
best information accessible to him, and upon which, being
personally unacquainted with the country, he could place
reliance. If any authentic or positive information had been
received from General Wilitans with respect to the route
by Batoum, it would have immediately set at rest the
much debated question as to the point from which the
relief of Kars should be attempted; but it appears his
knowledge of this route must have been derived subse-
quently to the commencement of the blockade of Kars, for
on the 15th of August, 1555 (p. 170 in Colonel Lake's
book), after stating that an army could march from Bedout
Kitleli to Tiflis, he expresses a hope that a demonstration
will be made in his favour in that direction. I make no
reference to other allusions to Omer Pacha in the pub-
lished letters of Sir W. Williams. They are principally
rumours brought into a blockaded camp by the country
people, which official despatches since published have
shown to be false, although I cannot help thinking that
their reproduction and publication cannot fail to misdirect
the judgment of the public, which is not thoroughly con-
versant with all the facts. Deprecating, as all must do,
the animosity which controversy may raise between those
who have fought on the same side, and although the ink-
marks have as yet left Omer Pacha's reputation undamaged,
which may lead to the supposition that upon more mature
reflection Sir NV. Williams sees no cause for the execution
of his threat, I have merely come forward, in the interest
of history and of Omer Pacha, to correct publicly an error
which may hereafter lead to some conftision.
General Williams replied to Colonel Simmons'
letter in yesterday's Times. Sir Wm. Williams does
not consider it worth while discussing how far Omer
Pacha could have penetrated towards Kars from
Batoum, but expresses a clear opinion—
That the moment he ceased to operate, as, in my humble
opinion, " a brave and resolute man " should have done—
that is, towards Kars and the centre of Gor.ria--our fate
was sealed; and the instant that General Mouravieff heard
he had chosen the remote port of Souchum Kaleh the Rus-
sian general felt himself relieved from his disquietude,
and made up his mind to hut his army, and thus insure
the capture of Kars by famine. This opinion is fully sup-
ported by that of General Mouravieff himself, expressed
to the and to my aide de•camp with characteristic frank-
ness. The able and veteran General laughed and said—
"As soon as I found Omer niche at Souchuni-Kaleli I
had no doubt of the result of the campaign ;" adding, "
was much obliged to Omer Pacha for going in that direc-
tion."

With respect to the question of the value of defending
Kars at all, Sir Wm. Williams observes, in con-
clusion :

I and those who served with me, hold to our view,
namely, that by keeping the Russian army occu•
pied before Kars, only twenty miles from their own
frontier, till the snows of winter provented their
taking a single step in advance, even after the

SATURDAY,

blunders of Omer Pacha and the imbecility of Mini
Pacha bad put that fortress into the possesion of the
enemy, we had fulfilled a wise purpose, and saved Asia
Minor from being overrun, as also the allies from the dire
necessity of sending English and French troops from
Sebastopol to !te rescue.