The Press.
London, England, 1856-02-16 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

The infantry, deprived of almost all the fourth division,
which had been expected, but which bad not arrived, only
consisted of twenty-seven disposable bamilions, and they
had not marched, and were wanting in cohesion. All the
rest, personnel end materiel, were detained at sea by
northern winds.

The English army, on its part, was not in a
better condition. And so delay was inevitable.
But this was not understood by the Turks,
who grumbled; and, on the other hand,—
Lord Raglan had entered into arrangements with his
Government without foreseeing or suspecting what
happened. He had made promises, given dates, and the
Opposition, calendar in hand, complained that what he had
promised was not fulfilled.

His lordship was, besides, it is added, pestered
by his generals (pousse rar lea qfficiera genenzux)
to " do something."
In the hope of silencing this dissatisfaction,
it was determined, instead of following out
the original plan, to send about 6,000 English
and the same number of French to Varna,
under Sir George Brown and General Canro-
bert. But the hope was a vain one :

The situation of the English general became more diffi-
cult and delicate from day to day in presence of the recom-
mendations and complaints that were made to him. It is
so easy for people to excite others to act when they have
not the responsibility of events!
The English Ambassador, public opinion, the exagge-
rated idea which was generally entertained of the position
of the allied armies, though they had only just disembarked
on Ottoman soil, all contributed to urge him on to the
execution of the first combinations, which consisted' in
concentrating the troops, whatever they were, at Varna, to
extend them towards Schumia to assist Omer Paella, and
to relieve Silistria, if it were possible.
But though the English general had the whole of his
forces at Scutari, though he disposed of a veritable fleet of
transports, the constitution of his army was far from being
complete.
However, after further hesitations and delays,
the whole armies, which had become com-
plete, were sent to Varna. But then a new
disappointment occurred—the Russians raised
the siege of Silistria

" The Russians cheat me by running away," cried the
Marshal, with profound bitterness, which he took no pains
to disguise He was overwhelmed. He felt
the inaction that would weigh on his troops concentrated
at Varna. The value of a first clmbat, a first victory,
would have been inestimable, and the opportunity of meet•
ing the Russians in such favorable conditions could not
present itself again for a long time to come. The more he
thought of the position in which he was placed by this un-
expected event, the more he was overwhelmed. His
health, which was only supported by a perpetual fever of
activity, visibly suffered most cruelly. " I shall never re-
cover from the blow which the disgraceful retreat of the
Russians," he wrote, " has been to me. I had them in my
grasp, and should have infallibly beaten them and thrown
them into the Danube. We have now, again, fallen into
uncertainty. I know not where they are, what they are
doing, what they mean to do
The whole army felt the same cruel impressions, the
same profound discouragement.

In spite, however, of the discontent caused
by the somewhat piteous figure of the allies at
Varna having no enenty to attack, we read
that—
The most perfect understanding prevailed between the
two armies—the commanders-in•chief of one and the
other were received with acclamations. Whenever the
Marshal passed along the English lines the soldiers
brandished their arms and raised frantic hurrahs. The
mots d'ordre were—union and sympathy. It seemed that
in order to cast a thicker veil over the past the two nations
desired to unite more closely. " Lord Raglan and my-
self," wrote the Marshal, " give the example." And,
again :—" I am on such excellent terms of mutual confi-
dence with him, that I am certain to be in accord with
him on all points touching the common situation."
The English troops were magnificent in appearance;
their bearing was irreproachable ; they manoeuvred with
rare precision, but with that reflecting and slow calm
which is the stamp of the nation, and which is to be found
in the soldiers as well as in the officers. The ensemble was
remarkable in every respect; the discipline severe; the
manner in which the officers commanded was sharp and
haughty ; but never were the chiefs to be seen in a passion
with their men. What a strange contrast with the bearing
of our troops ! with their dashing easy gait, their martial
and energetic air, the impetuosity which is stamped on all
their faces! On lo3king at our soldiers we feel that
ardour and impatience run through all their veins, and we
can understand that in the hour of combat the unforeseen
may at an instant arise from a difficult situation. In the
English army, on the contrary, impassibility seems a
duty ; the officer in command knows at a glance what
each one of his soldiers can do, and that not one will fail
him. But, on the other hand, not one by a sudden in-
spiration will exceed what was expected from him.
Time passed on at Varna, and a terrible
visitation came—the cholera. And not only
did the awful malady break out amongst the
troops, but those which came from Malta and
from France brought it with them. The
armies were disgusted with their inaction and
alarmed at the cholera, and the Marshal was

159

in despair. What was to be done? Where
was a blow against the Russians to be struck ?
People, to be sure, talked of the Crimea, and
the Marshal himself had always had his eye on
Sebastopol ; but the preliminary reconnais-
sances were not effected, and the means of
getting the armies there did not exist. At
this stage the Marshal received orders from
home not to go to the Danube, but to keep his
army ready to be removed by the fleet ; Lord
Raglan, on his part, received pressing instruc-
tions to prepare for a movement on the Crimea.
The Marshal was afterwards left at liberty by
his Government to do what he thought best,
but Lord Raglan had positive orders

to take good care not to enter the Dobrudscha, and to
pursue the Russians beyond the Dannbo ; to reserve all his
troops and all his resources lbr an expedition h. the Crimea
and for a siege of Sebastopol; not to abandon that all-im-
portant enterprise until after having acquired a reasonable
conviction of the evident disproportion between the forces
of defence and those of the attack, a disproportion, how-
ever, which could not fail to increase if the expedition were
not sent off immediately. An Ottoman corps, commanded
by French and English officers, was to be charged to seize
Perekop, and to close the isthmus against the enemy, or to
make a diversion in Circassia by seizing Anapa and Soukoum
Kale, the only positions which the Russians had kept on
that coast.

Even after Lord Raglan had received these
orders, the French Government was far from
pressing Marshal St. Arnaud to go to the
Crimea, unless he were perfectly convinced of
success:

The English Government, it will be seen, was very de-
cided on the expedition to the Crimea and on the question
of the siege of Sebastopol ; the French Government was
more reserved, and lett more latitude to the general in-
chief lt was not then, as has been said, the
adventurous obstinacy of the Marshal, and his personal
desire to be able to send home some glorious bulletins,
which caused the expedition to the Crimea to be decided on.
It is important not to confound the decision with the
execution, which are two :pings essentially distinct.

Still the cholera continued to rage, and
amongst its victims were General the Duke
d'Elchingen and General Carluccia, two young
and distinguished officers. Every day, too, it
became worse, and, in the language c,f the
author, cried to the generals, " Act !" About
this time,—
Lord Raglan communicated to the Marshal a despatch
which he had received from his Government, and which
was explicit, pressing, such. in a word, that (as the Mar•
shal wrote to the Minister of the War) his lordship consi-
dered it almost as an order to attack Sebastopol.

It was accordingly resolved that the generals and admi-
rals in chief should hold a council, and one took place on
the Ittith of July. In consequence of the despatches they
had received, and the pressure of public opinion as ex-
pressed by the newspapers of London, the English chiefs
voted positively for the expedition.

Marshal St. Arnaud made no objection, and
preparations were commenced ; but he saw
great difficulties in the way, and wrote:—

The capture of Sebastopol and the Crimea is more ad-
vantageous to England than to France; but to disembark
in the Crimea and to besiege Sebastopol is en entire cam-
paign, and not a coup•de•main : it requires immense
means, and we ought to be sure of success Sup-
posing that we disembark, and we can almost always dis-
embark, we should require more than a month's siege to
take Sebastopol, which is perfectly defended. In the
meantime the Russians would receive reinforcements,
and I should have two or three battles to fight. It is easy
to say " Take Perekop and shut up the passage," but it
would be necessary to take troops to Perekop, and when
there they could not disembark owing to the water being
too shallow for large vessels, and besides Perekop is a pes-
tilential place Nevertheless, in spite of all
difficulties and obstacles, and of the want of means and
time, Sebastopol pleases me so much that I shall not heal.
tate to go there if there be a chance of success, and I am
preparing for the expedition.
And still the cholera raged—and it made
terrible havoc amongst the large body of
French troops sent into the Dobrudscha. And
then another disaster came,—the awful fire at
Varna. And then, to crown all, the cholera
broko out in the fleets and laid hundreds of
brave fellows low :

The admirals, in consternation, asked themselves if,
under these circumstances, it would not be madness to
undertake the adventurous expedition of the Crimea.
Doubts gained ground amongst others. But the French
Generabin-Chief remained almost alone unchangeable in
his resolution. Ftoin that moment he seemed, so to
speak, to have personified the campaign ; he assumed all
the responsibility of it by his energetic determination to
act, and by bis refusal to listen to any opinions opposed to
it, because, though perhaps prudent, they came too late
Our allies, who had at first demanded the expedition
hesitated in presence of the chances opposed to it whit
accumulated every day, and by the difficulties created b
unforeseen events. Awl if the chiefs did not make a
open and decided opposition, they at least did not disguise
their apprehensions,