The Express.
London, England, 1855-04-12 00:00:00

Austria was sot ready at the asomeat. Break-

Jai with Reese she wanted to be sere of Ger-
many with its 600,000 men in arms. Her dignity,
low interest, the =ample of the Western Powers,
excited her to astion—her prudence warned her to
wait and arrange the composition of her military
forces and her political alliances before =emitting
herself to the straggle.

But what could the emaciated generals do at Varna
after the retreat of the Remiss army P Could they
remnant in a state of infetivity which would have
brought on discouragement, and by which the prestige
of our flag would have inevitably suffered? Such an
attitude was forbidden to our generals, both by mili-
tary honour and political interest. Having once taken
a position on the great theatre, there was no retreat ;
something most be done; oar soldiers must have a
goal to strive to reach ; our enemies most have some-
thing to fear. Europe must feel the ambitious desire
of following us, while it would be our duty to give
bar the opportunity of honouring us and admiring
ee. Thos then we oome to the question of operating
upon the Crimea.
An expedition against Sebaropol might probably
hasten the catastrophe of the war. Such an expe-
dition had a determinate end. It might possibly put
into the hands of the allies a province and a fortress,
which could be used as a guarantee and a means of
exchange in the event of negotiation for peace.
Deeply influenced by these considerations, the gene-
rals in commend of the forces deliberated upon the
plan, but delayed for a time to pot it into execution
(orrstorent I' execution).
However, the expedition having been made the
subject of deliberation at Paris and London, and
treated at last as • fact. Marshal St. Arnaud re-
ceived—not instructions which could not be true-
milted through such long distances of space, bat
hints or advice of the following nature:
"He will make himself thoroughly acquainted
with the nature and amount of the Russian farces in
the Crimea; find out whether those farces are
too formidable; and laud in a spot which may
serve se a basis for future operations. The best
place seems to be Theodosia, called Kaffa now. This
spot, however, is objectionable, as being forty
leagues from Sebastopol; but it offers great advantages.
In the lint laser, the bay is large and safe. The
ships of the squadron are there in perfect safety, and
the same remark applies to the barques which bring
sapplies to the army. In the next place, our army,
coos established on the spot, may use it as a proper
bass of operations. If we occupy the extreme east of
the Crimes, we can repel all the reinforcements
coming by the way of the Sea of Azoff and the Cau-
casus. We make our way onward towards the centre
of the country, at the same time that we have its re-
sources at our command. We take possession of
Simpheropol, the strategical centre of the peninsula,
and have the road open to Sebastopol, on which pro-
bably there will be a great battle. In the event of
this being against us, we may retreat upon Kaffa,
and nothing is compromised. If it is in oar favour,
we can besiege Sebastopol, and by investing it nom-
pletly we shall compel it to surrender in a tolerably
short interval."

Unluckily this advice war• not taken. Whether
the generale-in-chief had not sufficient troops to
undertake this long journey in the Crimea, or whether
they expected a speedier result from a bold and unex-
pected coup de main, they resolved, as it is now well
known, to land at some few leagues distant from
SebastopoL The glorious battle of the Alma seemed
to prove that they were right. But in the moment of
victory they saw clearly enough that without a port
they could have no base of operations. Influenced
by that irresistible instinct of preservation which
never deceives those who listen to it, they directed
their course to Balaklava, on the south of Sebastopol.
It was clear, too, that the army could not live in the
enemy's country without being in direct communica-
tion with the fleet.

But the consequence of retreating towards the
mouth was to give up the northern heights—in other
words, to abandon the ides of investing the fortifica-
tion. The Anglo-French army, in fact, was not suf-
ficiently numerous to invest the place completely. It
was necessary to limit our operations to the southern
portion of the town. To accomplish this, the Eng-
lish took possession of the harbour of Balaklava ; the
French, looking for &point appui for the purpose of
disembarking their stores and ammunition, found
very providentially the port of Kamieech. The
soldiers, who ass generally right, called this " Provi-
dence Port."

Sebastopol, it is well known, is not surrounded
with walls and earthworks. It is rather a great for-
tified camp, omtaining generally an army of from
15 to 20 thousand men, protected at the commence-
ment of the siege-works by numerous batteries, and
more especially by the Russian fleet, which, skilfully
stationed in the inner harbour, had its batteries di-
rected upon every avenue by which the allies could
approach the place.
At this period—that is to say, when the Anglo-
French army arrived before Sebastopol, perhaps it
was practicable to attempt an assault, but still each
an enterprise would have been somewhat adventu-
rous, inasmuch as the allied forces bad not sufficient
artillery to silence that of the enemy. Doubtless,
nothing was impossible to an Anglo-French army,
composed of generals and soldiers such as thee who
for the last six months have manifested their chum-
ter in the perils, fatigues, and sufferings of this loop
siege, bat nothing abort of success could have justified
a mop so andesiose. The responsibility of command
impinge predate* before all things, end prudent* pre-
scribed to the geseraki-in-ohief not to deliver the
assault with an army of 80,000 men at most, placed
on a rock, wanting artillery, ammunition, reserves—
not having its rear secured by entrenchments is ease
of a check, and having no reap bat its ships. That
would have been to risk the fortune and the fate of
the expedition, and nothing should be hazarded at a
distance of 800 leagues from one's own country.
The coup de main, which the generals thought
possible after the battle of the Alma, steeped them,
and it only remained to proceed with the siege after
the raise of the military art. At the very owe-
mesessent of this difficult enterprise the Reseleas
took two measures, very efficacious for themselves
mad vary regrettable for as. The first wee the
deal* mateament of Prince Mentchikoff, who,
lerload of data. limit up in Sebastopol, marched
trade Illembsnevel, afterwards took the field, and
kept up his asoonwaisollin with the fortress; the
smog was the bee vowhidoa to sink most of the
ships of war, a measure which enabled the enemy to
render the pert iamesseible to our fleets, and to
acquire for the detente of the place has Ave to six
hundred guns the set at liberty, together with their
ammunition, and to employ their seams as gunen
at the batteries. This, although the pas of the
town at the Ant presented a formidable wiped, new
batteries were raised, as it by easbastaant, and
our heble siege artillery could not extinguish the
AN of the besieged.
From this moment it beams apparent to all that
Sebastopol would not be takes until after a keg
straggle, that the aid of powerful robissmosis
would be required, and that possibly suidwoss
battles might have to be fosght. This shoat's was
a oarless one. The generale-in-chief easlssiglabilit
with that calmness which exalts a showier to Ile
level of deo Rost dilisalt respondbilitios. This is a