The Press.
London, England, 1854-11-25 00:00:00

INADEQUACY OF OUR FORCES IN THE
CRIMEA.

Sir,—Whatever may be the issue of the present
struggle before Sebastopol, whatever may be the suc-
cess of the allied armies, there is one moral to be de-
rived from the Russian campaign, which should be
indelibly impressed on the public mind ; I mean the
cruelty of undertaking great enterprises with scanty
means. I am not now speaking of the rashness of
such a policy, but merely of its cruelty, and, I may
add, its improvidence.
If Government chooses to put forth only half the
strength i which according to ordinary calculations
would be sufficient to attain their object, if ten men
are employed to do the work of twenty, the result
will be, even in the case of success, that we shall
laboriously achieve, with the loss of four out of ten,
what might have been safely and quickly accom-
plished with the loss of two, or perhaps one, out of
twenty.
It is now easy to see that if Sebastopol had been
properly invested—which it never has been—no re.
inforcements could have been introduced, and it
would have fallen long ago. Had an adequate force
been displayed, the Russian general would not have
been stung by the disgrace of inaction nor roused by
the hope of success to the desperate energy he has
displayed since the defeat of Alma. Our men would
not have been compelled to bear fatigues almost be.
yond endurance, and to expose themselves with a
recklessness almost beyond belief.
Those among us who undervalued the active and
passive courage of the enemy must indeed acknow-
ledge their error. But the qualities of our own men
it was impossible to overrate. All that was expected
of them, and far more, they have performed ; and they
have displayed the steadiness of Sparta of old, and
the stubborn endurance of Rome, united to the
daring of mediaeval chivalry. But by their very suc-
cesses the conclusion I wish to point to is brought
out more vividly and distinctly. If we are coolly to
calculate on the moral qualities of our troops and
their allies, and choose to derive from their heroism
the results which (humanly speaking) might be en-
sured by a proper proportion between the means em-
ployed and the end desired, our victory can only be
obtained by an immense sacrifice of those heroes
whom we so greatly overtask.
I am far from accusiag the country of want of
sympathy with our brave army; on the contrary, in
all classes may be observed the warmest admiration
of their valour, and the deepest commiseration for
their sufferings and losses. It is because the public
mind is thus warmed and elevated by generous sym-
pathy that it will the more readily acknowledge the
error that has been committed. To make war on a
military monarchy with little more than a peace es-
tablishment, is an attempt to save the pockets of the
country at the expense of the blood of its defenders
—an attempt as futile as it it is inhuman. Every
soldier who falls in the Crimea (let the oldest calcu-
lator that ever presided over the Exchequer take his
pen and compute) represents a large sum to the
public, and the losses of an inadequate force will in
mere s. d. exceed the cost of one competent to
achieve the objects of its mission. C.

LORD ABERDEEN ON THE VICISSITUDES
OF WARFARE.
TO THE EDITOR OP "THE PRESS."
Sir,—" I think it not improbable that many of
those who are most eager for war, you may, perhaps,
find easily discouraged by those vicissitudes to which
a state of warfare is proverbially liable."
These words are singularly remarkable, as coming
from the Earl of Aberdeen, upon an occasion when
he may be said to have directly addressed himself to
the people of England in his capacity of First Minis-
ter of the Crown. As usual, there is mz.re here than
ambiguity—there is a double motive and a double
meaning. The motive is to show the wisdom of past
procrastination and " timides avis," and to deal a blow,
" par-dessous main," at opponents ; and the meaning,
when closely analysed, is apologetic for self, on the
plea of pacific Platonism, and accusatory of antago-
nists for presumptive cowardice.
Unless in the university of Aberdeen the language
of England have another and alien signification, the
words, "Those who are most eager for war," must
mean those who, like the Emperor Napoleon 111.,
were not disposed to give credit to "the word of a gen-
tleman " from the Emperor of Russia. Lord Aberdeen
did believe the word of an imperial gentleman. He
judged wrongly. The Emperor Napoleon and Lord

Palmerston did not believe the word of an imperial
gentleman. They judged rightly. And here it would
become pertinent to inquire by what moral standard
does the Earl of Aberdeen gauge the character of
others ? He was deceived, or he was not deceived,
by his imperial friend. The facts reduce the forfei
ture of imperial faith to an anastomotic sense. Let it
be admitted hypothetically that Lord Aberdeen was
deceived. Then how did he construe the corres-
pondence of the Czar with him, and him alone, which
took place long before " the word of a gentleman"
had been given ? With the future policy of the Czar,
personally divulged to him in confidence, how could
he place reliance upon " the word of a gentleman "
in subsequent denial of a fact avowed secretly, but
avowed directly to the very Lord Aberdeen him-
self? Folly or " antiquated imbecility," as his
hack colleague has described his conduct, cannot be
urged as a valid excuse. The lamentable exposure of
the express and intimate knowledge of the precon-
certed design of the Czar bars such ignoble defence.
The dilemma of Lord Aberdeen is the outrage of
plain dealing. Aye, more ! Much more !
We now come to the words "easily discouraged by
those vicissitudes" of war. Discarding Gaelic pen-
phrasis, this would mean—this does mean, in simple
parlance—that those who were loud in their demand
for straightforward and prompt antagonism to an in-
sidious toe now shrink from the consequences of a
first onslaught, and in craven turpitude would cry out
for peace at any price. These memorable words
imply that such desire does not spring from the just
hope of a pacific reward, but from a pitiful fear of
punishment. And here it may be well again to ask by
what moral standard does Lord Aberdeen gauge the
character of others? Was Lord Aberdeen again
alluding to the PRESS? Have you, sir, ever taunted
the Premier with being bold overmuch? Have you not
from the first declared that war was imminent from
the very insincerity and vacillation of the Premier?
That such war, looking at the magnitude of results,
would be long and lasting? Who are discouraged?
The English? Who are sore afraid? rhe Irish ? Who
are weary of their arms, and would go to rest? The
Scotch ? Speak up, my Lord Aberdeen, that our
French allies may hear who in this country belong to
the party of "timides avis " and faint hearts.
From this foul aspersion we appeal to the loyalty
of our Napoleonic allies for justice. It is not agree-
able to national dignity, it is not consonant to the
dictates of high honour, that the Minister of Eng •
land, in-his official capacity at the festive board of the
most distinguished corporation in the world, in the
capital of this kingdom, should broadly state to the
ambassadors of the nations of the earth there assem-
bled, and in hearing of the eager spies of a sturdy
belligerent, that timidity dwelt in the heart of Eng-
land. Behold the answer—Alma and Inkermann.
Your very obedient servant,
Jebel Taif, Nov. 16, 1851. C. A. H.

ettitsiastical.