The Press.
London, England, 1857-11-28 00:00:00

PRESS, NOVEMBER 28, 1857.

despatches from General Van Cortlandt, and de-
spatches from Sir Henry Havelock and Colonel
Eyre. Much of their interest is anticipated by the
electric telegraph, but still, if we wish really to ascer-
tain the nature of the warfare in which we are now
engaged in India, these official despatches will not
prove uninteresting. Besides,it is always interesting
to read the account given by the principal actor in
the events related. Passing over the earlier opera-
tions before Delhi, and the attacks of the rebels upon
our position, we arrive at the battle of Nujuffghur,
which affords us a curious illustration of the axiom
that may be received regarding Indian warfare—viz.,
that while in the open 100 natives will fly before ten
Europeans, under cover ten natives will defy 100
Europeans. The battle of Nujuffghur, it will be
remembered, took place under the following circum-
stances :—The rebels in Delhi having received in-
telligence of the advance of our Beige train, deter-
mined to cut it off; with this view a powerful force
left Delhi for the village of Baprowla, in the rear of
our position. General Nicholson was at once de-
tached, with some 2,000 men and sixteen guns, to
open the war. He found the rebels in a strong
position in front of the town of Nujuffghur, and after
a hasty reconnaissance at once attacked them. After
a few rounds of artillery, he formed up and carried
the entire position at the point of' the bayonet, with
" scarcely any numerical loss, captured thirteen guns,
and forced the enemy to a full retreat ":
The enemy's guns were now all in our possession, and I
supposed the conflict at an end, when it was reported to
me that a few men had concealed themselves in the little
village of Nuglee, which was at this time a few hundred
yards in rear of our line.
He immediately sent orders to Lieutenant Lumsden,
who was nearly abreast of the village, to drive them
out; but, though few in number, " they bad remained
so long that our troops were on all sides of them ;
and seeing no line of retreat open, they fought with
extreme desperation." Lieutenant Lumsden was
killed, and the Punjaub infantry becoming discom-
posed, the 61st Queen's Regiment was pushed up to
their support, and then, only after a desperate resis-
tance, and the loss to us of many men and two
gallant officers, were these " few men " driven out
from under cover and the village captured.

General Van Cortlandt describes his various
operations with mush minuteness of detail, espe-
cially useful as exhibiting to us the difference be-
tween the matchlockmen and the rebel sepoy. The
" matchlockmen," who abound in Oude and form a
sort of free-lance corumanity in every village
throughout the northern and north-west portions of
Inda, are very courageous and desperate fighters.
Here is an instance of their tenacity when attacked
by General Van Cortlandt at Khyracka:—

The embankments of both villages were taken possession
of at once; the enemy, though fighting bravely, were driven
back into the villages ; they fought from house to house,
and fired from every available cover, and in many instances
our men had to remove the roofs of the houses to enable
them to get at those of the enemy who were firing on us
from the interior. Some of the houses, too, were fired to
drive them out. Twine the men from the left village made
a rush into that on the right, and were fired into with
canister, from the artillery under Lieut. Walcott, with good
effect, several being killed. There was a good deal of hand-
to-hand hard fighting, but after the lapse of about two hours
from the first shot being fired, we had gained possession of
both portions of the village.
It is this village and street work which is the real
battle in India, and shows the sagacity of " the
Duke" when he pronounced as his opinion upon
Indian warfare, that, if it could be avoided, you
should never attack a native army, except when on
the march.

General Havelock's despatches are singularly plain.
A simple relation of facts is all that he gives, and
indeed they do not require the colouring of vivid
description or eloquent effort. He does justice to
the courage and obstinacy of the rebels at Busheerut-
punge, Onao, and Bithoor. At Bithoor, which it
will be remembered he attacked on his first retreat
to Cawnpore on the 17th of August, he says the
position of the enemy was "one of the strongest" he
had ever seen, but the attack was short, sharp, and
decisive :

The plain, densely covered with thicket and flanked by
villages, has two streams flowing through it, not fordable
by troops of any arm, and only to be crossed by two narrow
bridges, the furthest of which was protected by an intrench-
ment armed with artillery. The road takes a turn after
passing the second bridge, which protects the defenders
from direct fire, and behind are the narrow streets and
brick houses of Ilithoor. I must do the mutineers the
justice to pronounce that they fought obstinately; other-
wise they could not for a whole hour have held their own,
even with such advantages of ground, against my powerful
artillery fire. The streams prevented my turning them,
and my troops were received, in assaulting the position,
by a heavy rifle and musketry fire from the rifle and bat-
talion companies engaged ; but, after a severe struggle,
the enemy were driven back, their guns captured, and
infantry chased off the field, in full retreat towards Seoraj-
pore. Had I possessed cavalry, not u rebel or mutineer
could have reached that place alive; as it is, they shall not
long remain there unmolested.

The skill of the rebels, too, in the use of their arms
is remarkable as a test of their efficiency at least,
and as a proof of good training.
The Arrah misfortune is so well known that we
need enter into no detailed account of this disaster.
Major-General Lloyd expresses the following opinion
as to the causes of that lamentable affair:—

- -
lat. To the men commencing the land journey without
previously taking food, which evidently much impaired
their efficiency during the harassing circumstances in
which they were placed.
2nd. From the late commanding officer of the de-
tachment, when in the immediate vicinity of the mutt.
veers, and with the knowledge that his movements were
watched, pushing on in the dark, against the strong
representation of the second in command and others
of the party, and thus allowing himself to be entrapped in
an ambuscade, the effects of which quite disheartened and
demoralised the troops, and, combined with their physical
exhaustion, led to a complete rout, defying the endea-
vours of the officers to restore order in progress back to
the ghat.

Several other despatches relating to details of
minor importance are also published. As to the
general conclusions to be drawn from these de-
spatches, while they exhibit the fatal effects a want
of cavalry has upon the operations of a general, they
show unmistakeably our superimity in artillery and
infantry over the rebels. But, at the same time,
they point out to us that our enemy is not to be
despised—that he is active—that, in certain situa-
tions, he displays the highest and most determined
courage—and, more than either, he is numerous„
and abundantly supplied with arms, ammunition
and stores.

OUR INDIAN ARMY.
TO THE EDITOR O 1 "THE PRESS."

Sir,—There appears to be a strong feeling on the
part of mans persons that, after what has occurred
and is occurring in India, the natives on the Bengal
side are no longer to be trusted, and that hereafter
our soldiers must be Europeans.
As a substitute for the native army, " Indophilus "
would introduce a native police throughout the country;
but, as the Times very justly observes, " Such a body of
men must of course receive some organisation, and of
course, also, considering the expeditions on which
they will often be despatched, they must carry arms,
&c. (to This, however, being admitted, we zon-
fess we do not discover where the great change would
be eff-cted, except in name, &a. . .It appears
to us they will be sepoys in all but title."

There can be no doubt of the truth of the remark
of the Times, and it may be added that they would
not be so efficient as the sepoys, as there would be
few officers to control them.

The number of European troops in India was cer-
tainly not sufficient for such a crisis as is now (we
may hope) passing away. But we cannot hold India
without the aid of native troops. There are duties
to be performed which must be done by native
soldiers. If none of the natives on the Bengal side
of India are to be trusted, where will Europeans of
any rank who reside in Bengal obtain domestic
servants, who have every facility for poiaonina or in
some other way murdering their masters ? A gentle-
man generally keeps six, eight, or more servants; and
when things settle down, and something like peace is
restored, such servants will be employed, Mussul-
mans and Hindoos, without any apprehension on the
part of the master of being murdered.
Whenever a reorganisation of the Bengal army,
or that of the other Presidencies, takes place, it should
be a settled rule that no native shall ever be an
artilleryman ; neither should any native be permitted
to enter the laboratories, or be instructed in pre-
paring the composition for fusees, percussion caps,
portfires, carcases, &c., in making or cutting fusees,
or in preparing any ordnance ammunition. Such
duties are always performed under cover. Europeans
may therefore safely be employed without detriment
to their health. The Europeans who serve the
guns, should ride on the horses that drag the
carriage. Syces (native grooms) always accompany
the horses. Thera should be a detail of gun
Lascars attached to every troop and company, to
clean the guns and carriages, to assist in packing
and unpacking ammunition, also to perform other
duties from which it is desirable to relieve the
European soldier. These Lascars should be armed
with a sword in cantonments, but in the field each
man should have a pistol. Natives should Lot be
instructed in mining; they know too much of it
already. The Sappers and Miners should all be
Europeans.
The greater part of the cavalry have mutinied, and
it is advocated that henceforth there shall not be
any native cavalry. There are certain duties in this
branch of the service which must be taken by
natives, such as rear-guards, detached duties, the
duty of sentry in exposed places : there are other