The Express.
London, England, 1855-08-24 00:00:00

(Stamped id. Additional.) [TWOPENCE.

at a greater distance, was rather hasty in giving an
opinion that eight or ten sail of the line would lay it
in rains in two hours.

There was not time to find a passage through the
reeks, to enable us to see the western feu, at the
northern end of which a line•ofbattls ship was placed
to corer the entrance by Lsngholm, and another at
hand to support her. In my former report I agreed
with Captam Washington that the fleet could lay in
Miolo Roads in the summer. It is now more

cult, as batteries have been built on the south point of
Sundhamn, but they could be destroyed.

I wrote to the Admiralty to say, if Bweaborg was
attacked by a fleet alone, they would approach from
the south in one line, raked by 160 guns ; one or two of
the leading ships would anchor and occupy the batte-
ries at Bak-Holmen, the next would pass on, fire a
broadside into the three.deoker, and anchor clear of
her broadside against the south-west angle of Gus-
tavus' Sword; she would be followed by the next,
pouring a broadside into the three-decker, and anchor
ahead of her leader, and so on in miecession as close
as the ships could lay. By this time the three-decker
would probably be soak, aad the whole western face
of Bweaborg engaged.

A email squadron would be required to anchor
south of Langholm. They would have to contend
against it, and two or three line-of-battle ships, and
what gun' were in Helsiegfors.
AU the passim should be buoyed, and small
steamers stationed in the narrowest and most dan-
'eras channels. The large steamers should be under
weigh in various directions, to assist ships in difa-
otitis@ ; and a reserved squadron ready to take the
place of disabled ships.
Whether this attack would succeed or not, it is
impossible to say, for we must calculate on ships
being set on fire by red-hot shot and shells, of which
there would be abundance; and whether successful or
not, it is evident the ships would be in no condition
to meet the Russian fleet afterwards; and if the
attack was made at this season of the year, when
you cannot depend on the weather for two hours, I
do not know how many would be lost. I begged
their lordships not to suppose for a moment that
Sweaborg could not be attacked, for I thought it
could, but it must be with caution and judgment.
I went on to say that I had little to add to the
report I sent to Sir James Graham, a copy of which
I sent to the Admiralty, and a oopy of which I send
to you, sir.*
Since that report an attack has become easier; we
have now Lancaster gone—every ship in the fleet
should be furnished with them; 13-inch mortars
should be placed on Langholm Island and Vargo
Rocks. The French occupied one of these positions;
five mortars were damaged, two burst. Why the
English did not occupy another island is not stated.
Again, gun-boats, carrying Lancaster guns, should
be added to the fleet; they should be placed at
different points, at proper distances from the fortifi-
cations, well furnished with shot, shells, and rockets,
and a bombardment commenced, and continued till

the wooden buildings, of which there are many, were
set on fire, and an evident impression made on the
fortress—the ships should then close up and finish the
work.
How long this would take I could not say, but I
was quite certain the fortress would be laid in ruins,
and, most probably, an entrance opened to the ships.
I have said nothing about troops, but there is no
doubt they could be usefully employed.
It will be seen by what I have written and by
Admiral Dundee's despatch, had my plan been fol-
lowed up to the letter, Sweaborg would have been
annihilated.
It appears the Allies had only 43 gun and mortar-
boats, and many mortars have been disabled. They
oi.ght at least to have had 100. Sir James Graham,
in a letter to me, said 200.
Had that number been there, the bombardment
would have been continued by means of reliefs, as
men are relieved in the trenches. The mortars
would have had time to cool, and the bombardment
continued till not one stone was left on another, and
an opening made for the ships to go in and finish
the work.
Instead of that, the Admiralty do not seem to have
foreseen that mortars could not stand for ever, though
they must have had reports from Sebastopol, and thus
an operation, which appears to have been managed
with greet judgment, has only met with partial suc-
cess, for Admiral Dundee in his report admits the
sea defences were little injured.
We appear to have suffk red little or nothing either
in men or ships, and had Admiral Dundee's means
been greater, he might have continued the bombard-
ment as long as the weather remained fine, and the
fleets, iostead of returning to Nargen, might have
been at anchor in Sweaborg.
The first year there might have been some excuse
for the Admiralty not having means, but none the
second.
They received my report early enough, and if
there was not time to build gun and mortar boats,
there were plenty of vessels in the river fit to be
converted, and plenty of money in the Exchequer—
they had only to ask, and the whole country would'
have given it by acclamation. Instead of building '
gun and mortar boats, they built a parcel of iron
floating batteries, which could hardly swim, and if
they could, they would have been useless, for had
they been placed within 400 yards of Sweaborg they
would have been annihilated, and at 800 yards they
would have done no harm.
The first experiment on iron coat the country a 1
million ; and where are they ? The second expert-1
ment not much less than half a million ; and they
have not yet left our ports, and probably never will.
When will the country be tired of giving money to
incapable men ?
The Min;sters have been driven to reform the War
Department—when will they think of reforming
the Admiralty ? Till they do, the people's money
will be thrown away.
The Admiralty do not seem to hare contemplated
the effect of a bombardment, though I told them,
upwards of a year ago, what would happen ; and if
tbey had read history they would have known that
Martinique was taken by mortars—there were notl
easements for all the garrison, nor were there at
Sweaborg.
Admiral Dundee says it formed no part of his plan
to attempt a general attack by the ships on the de-
Imam and has operations were confined to such des-
truction of the fortress and arsenal as could be accom-
plished by mortars. Had Admiral Dundee been
furnished with sufficient means he would have con-
templated an attack on the defences, and assembled
the whole of his fleet, ready to take advantage of the
'terror and confusion occasioned by the gun and mor-
tar boats; the heat of the conflagration alone
would have kept the garrison from the guns, and the
fleet would have been in Sweaborg, and the whole of
the fortifications, islands and all, blown to the devil ;
instead of that, the wooden buildings and magazines
are destroyed, and the work will have to be begun
again next year.
Admiral Dundee confirms my report last year about
the intricacy of the navigation. He says, " the in-
tricate nature of the ground, from rocks awash and
reefs under water, rendered it difficult to select posi-
tions for the mortar vowels at proper range ;" yet
Admiral Dundee was one of the board who censured
me for not attacking Sweaborg (though I bad not one
gunboat or mortar vessel) last winter, amongst rocks
awash and reefs under water,when it now appears he
could hardly place a gunboat; and this after having
a whole summer for examining it.
He has found out it is not easy to introduce large
ships into the intricacies of Sweaborg. But I do not
blame hint for the manner I was treated—Sir James
Graham is alone responsible, for he had the impu-
dence to tell the Sebastopol Committee that if his
colleagues did not do as they were g
others
desired they should
no longer be members of his board; and he told them
further, that he had the right of turnin' pi-

Tate letters into public ones, and they had no right
to use his. Sir James Graham will find that I, for
one, will not obey his dictum. Sir James ought to be
cautious how he tampers with letters.
Sir James Graham wu one of the Ministers who
sent a British army to Sebastopol in the middle of
last September, without means of moving, without
food, proper tents, or clothing, and without hospitals,
to pass a dreary winter and pariah; and he was the
Minister who wanted me to take a British fleet, in the
end of October, to perish amongst the rocks of Swea-
borg, and, to their shame, got two naval officers to
put their names to the insulting letter he wrote me;
and these men still remain in the Admiralty, and that
is the way the navy of this country is managed.
The two summers in the Baltic will be a lesson to
them. They are in possess•on of my. plans of attack-
ing Cronstadt, and I dare say are in possession of
Admiral Dundses • and Sir James Graham and his
two coadjutors had better go neztsnmmer and carry
them into execution.

In a subsequent communication I shall prove my
charge against the Admiralty of having perverted my
letters; and . .. . .

I rentals, Sir, your obedient servant,
CHAS. NAPIER.