The Express.
London, England, 1855-03-26 00:00:00

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LONDON, MONDAY, MARCH 26.

IS SEBASTOPOL TO BE DISMANTLED ?

Ire was whispered on Friday—it was confidently
minted on Saturday—that the Allies Ito longer intend
to insist upon the dismantling of SebastopoL It was
said that Mishit refused to support such a demand
on the part of the Western Powers ; that the English
Ministers. otter a brief lemur, gas. uP the Point
and that, lastly, the Pamperer of the ?,WICK con-
sented to a complete seamed= of the Crimea, Sebas-
topol being lettatanding. The credit given to these
statemeuts, by amonetery potentates, was vouched for
by their large °parttime in the French and English
Funds. For ear own part, we confess that we cannot
believe the report, with the words used by the Eng-
lish PlMipatentiary at Vienna, when he point.d to
Sebastopol. last Jane, as a permanent menace to Con-
stantinople, fresh in our memory, and with the
knowledge of how much the heart of the French
Farms is set upon the capture of that fortress, and
what a deep stake be has in the successful imm of the
attempt. Oar faith in the weakness and inseasequeses
of statesmen is tolerably strong, but the call to believe
that the French and English Governments will ham
Sebastopol standing, after all that has been said and
done, tries it rather too severely.
Mr. DltillAltat especial organ in the press has put
forth a laboured piece of &pedal pleading to prove
that there woald be no danger in sparing Sebas-
topol. SoMeient guarantees for the stability of the
Ottoman Empire, the free navigation of the
Euzine, and the pesos and independence of Europa,
may be had, according to the DISILLILI organ, with-
out the dismantling of SebtatopoL "An armed port
is in itself only defensive." " Sebastopol Is menacing
only when it shelters a powerful fleet." "Russia
without a fleet in the Black Elea is as much deprived
of aggressive power as if Sebastopol did not exist as
an armed port." "Russia will limit her navy in the
Black Sea to a certain number of ships, and will
allow the coastruction of a fortress on the Asiatic
shore of the Black Sea to counterbalance the tennis
_ _

of Sebastopol." This is the sum and substance of
what the Disraelites have to iv in support of the
proposal to leave Sebastopol intact in the hands of
the Casa. It deserves attention as an indieatioa of
the terms upon which a DMIT-DISIAILI Cabinet
would be ready to make peace with Russia.
For no other reason do these arguments deserve a
second thought. It is admitted that Sebastopol, with
• powerful fleet sheltered in its remesse, would
gravely menace the free navigation of the Black Sea,
sad the security of Constantinople. And bow long,
as Europe be certain that it will Dot shelter
mach a Beet whilst its map bristle with
bastions and artillery P 8, Russia will limit
her navy in the Black Bee That is, Ram is
will yield to the pressure of the moment, and promise
to do so ; but she will immediately set to work to
beild ships in anticipation of the moment
when any dissensions between the Western
Powers may admit of her producing them in the
Euzine with better prospects of success. At Ni.

solaieff—where the Russian men-of-war for the
Eosins are built—no consuls of foreign powers are
allowed to establish themselves. Its arsenals and
dockyards are closed against the inspection of stran-
gers. A more numerous fleet than Russia his ever
yet had in the Eosins may be prepared there, and
not a whisper of the matter be heard in Europe. From
Nicolaieff to the sea the river is tortuous in its
course, and full of shallows and sand-banks ; the
ships of war, when built, have to be floated
down by the aid of what are called " se-
stela." The reaches of the river areoprotected
by forts and batteries. The new navy would
be inaccessible in its dockyards, even though
its existence were discovered; and Sebastopol
—strengthened as it doubtless will be if left in the
possession of Russia—would afford the fleet a secure
asylum as soon as an opportunity was obtained of
getting it safely into the waters of the Black Sea.
Sebastopol is of no use to Russia except as a
ground of vantage whence she may at any meesset
assail Constantinople; and the obstinacy with
which the Russian Government clings to its posse►
sion shows that the designs of Pena and CATTIER=
against Turkey are not yet relinquished. But the
most extraordinary part of this precious argumssls.
tion relates to the "setoff" which Russia is repre-
sented as willing to concede to the Allies. Russia
"will allow the construction of a fortress on the
Asiatic shore of the Black Sea to counterbalance the
fortress of SebastopoL" We have heard of this
before, and we believe that Russia would rejoice to
see such a fortress reared and garrisoned by the
Western Powers—because it would beds* *et decided
step towards the partition of Tw.key. The trap is too
obvious to deceive any oae but a statesman of the
Fakreddin school.

There can be no security for the free navigation I
of the Black Sea, and the development of the com-
merce of the surrounding regions, so long as Russia
is left in pomssaica of the Crimea. The position of
the Muscovite Government in Sebastopol is exactly
analogous to that of the Highland caterans of the
first half of last century among the natural
fastnesses around Loch Hattie,. Until practicable
roads were carried through that region—after the re-
bellion of '46—the marauders who occupied these
strongholds were • perpetual thorn in the sides of
the industrious lowlanders. They watched the mo-
ment for a successful foray, and levied black-
mail with impunity, confident that even if a
force greater than they could resist were brought
against them, they could fall back upon the
inaccessible regions babied until the storm blew

over. In like manner, se long as Russia Can ex-
clude foreigners from the Crimea and adjoining
steppes, she can intermit the levying of black-
mail in the Famine and bee forays in the lauds
of the SULTAN when Scraps aisn in arms to sap-
gena them, and resume her spolistions wiles pease
is restored. The forts which crown the wage and
cover the windings and melts of the harbour of
Sebastopol mast be dismantled, end the Crimea ren-
dered awesaible to the nations of &rope, or thew
will be no lasting security for peaceable traders in
Use Black Bea.

While salit weighty remiss san be adduced for the
dismantling of Sebastopol, a s a sise pa non of peace,
we esaaot believe that it is in the ooatemplation of
the Western Powers to desist from insisting on that
condition. The report that they are so disposed has
possibly had Its origin in an imperfect mount of an
opinion, attributed to the Emperor of the PUNCH,
that Sebastopol is too etrose to be taken by moult ;
sad that its ndoetion mast be ae:omPlislod, she'. the
Artesian armies have bee. driven mei of the Crime,
ino the more tedious proem of e wide bloskads.—,
Deily Niue.