The Express.
London, England, 1852-04-06 00:00:00

3

rwars. Sir George Napier had stated that he thought it a
great folly for a great comitry like England to be easily
provoked into a Kaffir war 6 that he had declined, for the
sake of a few head of cattle, to incur the cams, of a Kaffir
war; and he had proposed, instead of going to war, to pay,
in certain special eases, compensation out of the public
purse to persons who had suffered from Kaffir depredations.
With regard to this policy, he (Sir W. Molerwortb) must
mention a fact well deserving of attention : namely, that the
intiesst of one-fifth of the sum which • year of
Begs war would cost would more than cover the
amigo annual loss from Kaffir depredations. (Hear,
hem.) For Sir George Jilapier had stated that doting
elle filz year. of his ifeeelecneet the Gunn sainal lees
free Isar depredations had as exceeded 8,0001. e year.
(Hear, hear.) The asermittes know that a Kaffir war. now
Nem ideal 1,000.0001. • year. He (Sir W. Moiesworth)
found tbaidee
_statements of Sir George Napier were con-
Sneed by 11111d•I returns ; he toned that OR the average of
the sea yeses from 11117 to 1843, the average number of
hams lest wan 190 a year, and of oxen about 900; . their
eolith at shut 101. earth for horses and about 31.185. a heed
for OM* WORM be lees then 6,0001. a year. Therefore the
earn of on year of Kaffir war would 060f0 than cover the
loos trees • solitary and • half of Kaffir depredations.
(Hear, hear.) This was a somewhat mercantile view of
the question, but he
.(Sir W. Molesworth) thought it a
seasilde cue,. For the six years of Sir George Napier's go-
vernment there had been no Kaffir war. Sir George Na-
pier was an. old soldier. He knew tinfoils and can of war.
He would not rashly engage in it. Ile thought that nei-
ther the honour nor the dignity of Great Britain required it
to treat savage tribes as civilised nations, nor to engage in re-
gular war with Kaffirs, u with an European community, for
violation of treaties and for offences against the law of nations.
The present war would be more expensive than the last
one, for we bad now in South Africa half as many troops
again as we had in the war of 1846. The present war had
been produced, partly by causes similar to those which had
produced former Kaffir wars, partly by three special
causes. Those causes had been, Ist. The conduct of Sir
Hany Smith in making himself, u 1,1817, the Mkori Mkalu,
or great chief of British Kaffraria. 2nd. The frontier
policy of Sir Harry Smith, which had consisted is per-
petual acid vexatious* interference with the affairs of the
Kafßn, and in a continual and gelling_ attempt to destroy
the authority'
of their chiefs. 3rd. The ignorance of Sir
'leery Smith of the feelings which the Kaffir* entertained
towards him and his frontier policy. Ile (Sir W. Moles-
worth) had proved these positions at length last year. Ile
would not do so again, for they had not been contradicted,
and in fact they bud been admitted in the last de-
spatches of Lord Grey. Ile thieleht that Sir Harry
Smith ought never to have been appointed governor of the
Cape, and ought to have been recalled long ago. (Hear.)
He spoke only of the civil proceedings of Sir Harry Smith.
He did not feel competent to pronounce a decided opinion
upon the military proceedings of Sir 11. Smith ; lie must,
however, say that he could not discover any essential differ-
ence between thew tactics and those for which Sir Harry
Smith had acquired great renown in the Kaffir war of 1835.
(Hear, hear.) Those tactics had been to starve the Kslfirs
Into submission by invading their fastnesses and sweeping
off their cattle. For the euccees of these tactics it was in-
dispensable to prevent the Kaffirs from simultaneously in-
vading our colony, and sweeping off the cattle of the cola
nists. For thaw purposes two armies were indispensable,
namely, an invading army and a protecting army. Of ono
of these armies Sir Harry Smith had been deprived by the
discontent of the Dutch and the disaffection of the hoiten-
tots. (Hear, hear.) Therefore, when Sir Harry Smith
invaded the !esteems of the Kaffir' and swept
off their cattle,Kaffir' the Ka turned our flank,
invaded the colon
y, and carried off the cattle of
the colonists ; and when Sir Harry Smith returned from
the fastnesses of the Kaffirs, bringing along with him their
cattle, the Kaffirs returned to their fastnesses, bringing
along with them the cattle of the colonists. Therefore, fur
the ill success of Sir H. Smith's tactics, those persons were
chiefly to blame who had produced discontent amongst the
Dutch and disaffection amongst the Hottentots. Into the
canoes of that discontent and disaffection lie would not in-
quire at present. He must say that, when he considered
the position of our gallant troops in South Africa, in the
midst of • populatiou one-half of whom were hostile, and
the other half were in about equal proportions, discontented,
disaffected, and doubtful—when he considered that those
troops had not suffered one positive defeat, had not lost one
singlet:envoy, but had accomplished many gallant feats of
some, he thought that they deserved great credit fur them-
mbue and reflected credit upon their veteran commander,
whim health had been worn out in the service of
IMs country. The peculiar bush of South Africa was
unlike anything in any other part of the globe. It was
more difficult to destroy or penetrate than the densest
thickets of the tropics. It consisted of various thorny suc-
culent plants of genera which must be well known to many
lhon. gentlemen; for instance, of plants of the aloe, justly
called fain by botanists; of plants of the semis, also ap-
propriately termed horrid' ; of plants of various kinds of
111 phorbia, some with tall columnal stems, beset with for-
midable spines, others resembling prickly clubs, others like
' vegetating pincushions ; others, when cut, pouring forth
an acrid milky poison, which, coming in contact with the
human skin, produced virulent ulcers. An European
[could not make one single step in this bush without cutting
hie way, except in the paths made by wild
bouts. But the Baffin, with wonderful dexterity
sad agility crept through, the bottom of the bush like
makes- and other reptiles, and none but Hottentots could
follow them. To destroy this bush, it must be cut down by
the hand of man • and it must be kept down, or it would
soon spring up again. To cut it down an army of labourers
would be required ; whilst doing so, an army would be re-
quired to protect the labourers; and, when done, the ground
would be so sterile and arid, that it could not be applied to
any useful purposes. (Hear, hear.) Therefore he thought
ieprobable that the bush of South Africa never would nor
never could be destroyed, and would continuo to afford
hiding-places for Kaffir" as long as Males should exist.
Consequently he deemed it impossible to put a stop to Kaffir
wars by destroying theirjfastnesses and making roads.
He was afraid that the present Kaffir war was not at an end.
He believed, however, that the commencement of the ter-
mination had begun. It was a meet important question,
what should be done to prevent the recurrence of similar
wan ? He should not discuss that question at present, ex-
cept to repeat a warning which he had given to the house
four years ago, namely, that if our preseat South African
policy should be adhered to, there would be a Kaffir war at
the end of every four or five years, unless, indeed, we were
to attempt to prevent a Kale war by keeping a large mili-
tary faros permanently stationed in South Africa. He
thought that under the present system at least 7,000 British
troops would be required to be permanently stationed in
South Africa to preserve peace and order within the British
dominions ; for instance, 4,000 men on the eastern frontier
of the colony of the Cape, 1,000 in Natal, 1,000
in Orange territory, and 1,000 for a garrison
sad reserved force at Cape Town. Those 7,000 men
would oast in effective military expenditure probably half a
mOlica a year on the average of years. (Hear, hear.) This
:4
cot
an e rtnvegant estimate. For the seven years
1360, our effective military expenditure on account
at
IF Africa had amounted to 3,334,0001., or about
400 a year ; and the average number of British troops
is th Africa during that period was 4,800. There could
be little doubt that, under the present system, the military
szpasditare of this country on account of South Africa, for
the next period ef 'even years—namely, that ending 1857
would be greater than that for the period ending 1860—
Weans' the present war we a more formidable one than
that of )846 and 1817 ; because Natal and the Orange
eq • tee which had been acquiredein the former period,
were beginning to become expensive, and because
there could be no doubt that, immediately after
the termination of the last war, Sir H. Smith, with a view
to iste=y, bad made • too large reduction in the mill.
in South Arrests. If sea were determined
:ZUNI to our present South African policy, we mast make
up ear Wads to pay annually about 61. a head for the de-
feats el tamp European colonist in South Africa, or about
half A ilitilli4r. (Hear, hear.) In his opinion •
to be made in our system of South
clanliFieest gtiiiiihtiorasgisvned'°Urs'ee colonists
coSonrrit
over their loud affairs. We ought as aeon after the termi-
nation of the present war as circumstances would permit,
to require those colonists to take upon themselves the de •
fence of their frontier against the native races ; and finally
to reduce the military force in South Africa to be main-
tained at the expense of this country to • garrisen at Cape
Town, with a proportionate reduction in our military ex-
petuliture. He would choose another opportunity for dis-
cussing
_thenequestions. (Cheers.)
Mr. HUME wished to know over what period the vote
extended.
The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said it was
the estimate of expenditure for the Keith. war up to the
present time, or rather up to the 26th of March. Of future
prospects it was impossible then to form any estimate, but
be traded that, when the next snail arrived, he should have
materials for doing 60.
Mr. GLADSTONE said he was anxious to advert for a
new moments to what had just fallen from the right hon.
gentleman. He hoped the committee would not infer from
it that the vote now proposed, 480,0001., together with the
veto of 300,0001. taken last year, represented anything like
the total expenditure of the Kaffir war. On the contrary,
these votes represented only the extra expenditure
of the war, or rather only a part of the extra expendi-
ture. (Hear, bear.) If they wanted to get at the truth
t4t must ehargo the war with the whole expense of the
. . eidablialumint in South Africa. The figures were
wont part of the evil, though frightful and almost
The tales of frontier policy at the Cape, and
ili7"--lemes which had been brought upon this country an
Rannation with it, would be regarded by future generations
es about fabulous. It would appear extraordinary in
Man times that a country like this should have gone, as
it ware, a hunting in the utmost limits of tile earth to find
• moss of squandering the lives and treasure pf its sub-
t(hear), for no conceivable purpose, and so as to
E them
d
e of the opportunity of learning those lessons
ef cm, of self-reliance, and of independence, which
alone could be the basis of their social greatness, mid which
alone could secure the duration or the utility of their con-
nexion with the sweet land. lie should not follow the hon.
gentleman through his luminous address. There was, in-
deed, in it ample scope for arithmetical comnarisons which
.might serve to bring out the popular mind In reference to
the enormous absurdities of the course which had been per-
used. For instance, the house Wei told that the govern.
mart of South Africa cost this country more per head
than the government of Great Britain sad Ireland.
WeU, now, to look at the matter in another aspect, what
were the provizees which they had to , defend? What
was the European population, the contiguity of which
to the Kaffir population was the immediate source of
all our quartets? 6,600 was the satin white popula-
tion of the provinces of Albert and Victoria, together with
the territories of linked& to
transport the whole of
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