The Press.
London, England, 1854-12-23 00:00:00

THE PitESS.

tion of the national interests. (Cheers.) He would not
go into the question how far such a doctrine was admissible,
but what he would say was, " If you are sincere, if you are
in earnest in your principles, now is the time to show
them. You have made mistakes ; your own organs in the
press say so; your friends have been saying so in private
for several months. It is not matter of dispute. Perse-
vere, and you will, I believe, raise a feeling ultimately fatal
to your own tenure of power, and at this moment most
dangerous to the community. But retract, admit for once
that you are wrong, in the frankness and honesty of atone-
ment—and we can forget the folly of the design." (Cheers.)
After a few words from Sir J. FITZGERALD in sup-
port of the bill,

Lord PALMERSTON declared that he found it impos-
sible to reconcile the professions of anxiety to prose-
cute the war with vigour, lavished by the Opposition,
with their present antagonism to the very first mea-
sure which the Government bad introduced for that
purpose. Antiquated and obsolete arguments had
been furbished up against a proposition which after
all presented merely a copy of numerous precedents
established in former conflicts. Other nations em.
ployed foreign soldiers, and England might with the
greater justice follow their example, inasmuch as she
did not, like them, maintain a large standing army
in time of peace, nor employ the compulsory agency
of the conscription to recruit her military force. Our
voluntary system doubtless produced in the end
better soldiers, but the production required time, and
the Government, having to compete with all other
industrial employment when bidding for labour,
found every augmentation of the army a slow and
gradual process. The measure he contended had
been misrepresented as being simply a mechanism
for adding 10,000 men to the Crimean army. But
in reality the only limit to the number would be the
money voted for their maintenance by Parliament.
To the accusation that the Government wrapped
themselves in mystery and would not tell where they
designed to obtain foreign levies, he replied, that any
negotiations for enlisting recruits abroad, entered
into without the sanction of Parliament, would really
have been, what the measure itself had been untruly
termed, altogether unconstitutional. By their memo-
rable gallantry the army before Sebastopol had
deserved every mark of honour and regard ; and, as
a part of what was due to them, they should receive
support from every quarter whence we could find the
possibility of obtaining it. Any neglect on this point
would prove an unworthy abandonment of their duty
by the Government or the Legislature :
We had engaged in a great war, with a great power, for
great objects—(cheers)—and it is not becoming this
country—it is not suited either to the interests of this
country or to the honour of this country, that we should
end that war by a small and insignificant result. (Cheers.)
To obtain the result that would be adequate to the im-
portance and attitude of the contest—to obtain a result
that would be in conformity with the interests and feelings
of the country requires a great force. (Cheers.) Do not
let the house deceive itself in that respect. It is not by
small detachments and insignificant forces. (Loud cheers
from the Opposition.) I hope that cheer will be followed by
a vote, and that it will be a vote in conformity with that
cheer. (Loud cheers on the Ministerial benches.) I say,
then, that the results which alone will be befitting the cir-
cumstances in which this country is placed require great
and continued efforts. (Hear, hear.) We are making
these efforts at home ; we have sent out to our brave
army in the East every reinforcement which the national
reserve affords. (Hear, hear.) The nation is our reserve,
and we shall send out every reinforcement which that
noble reserve, the British nation, may afford us—(cheers )
in sufficient numbers and sufficient condition to be useful
and effectual in the field. But in a case of this sort every
method is necessary to increase our force, and every addi-
tion that can be made to it will be valuable. Then it is
the duty of the Government to ask of Parliament if they
will at once give to them the power of making that in-
crease ; and I should be sorry indeed, in the condition in
which the country stands, and the circumstances in which
we are now placed, if the Government had shrunk from
asking from Parliament, on their responsibility, such
means as they think would enable them to add additional
vigour and effect to the operations of the war ; and sorry
as I should be to belong to the Government who had ab-
stained from doing that, I confess I should be still more
sorry to find myself one of a majority of Parliament who
had refused, under those circumstances, to carry out the
very principles which they advocate. (Loud cheers from the
Ministerial benches.)
Mr. DISRAEIA vindicated the party with whom he
acted from the charge of inconsistency. They fully
concurred in the desire to prosecute the war effec-
tually, but opposed the present measure because they
believed it in no way calculated to advance that ob-
jeut. On the other hand, he found the conduct of
the Government inconsistent, in that they pleaded
urgency and the gravity of the contest in defence of
their bill, while they made no proportionate exer-
tions to develop our home res3urces in order to meet
the exigency. On all previous occasions, he re-
marked, our foreign recruits had been raised among
allied nations or in countries which we were actually
defending at the time against a common enemy, and
in no sense deserved the name of mercenaries:—
The whole argument of the noble lord (J. Russell) to-
night has been founded upon this fallacy—that we were
objecting to the measure before the house because we had


a prejudice against Englishmen fighting by the side of
foreigners. But that fallacy of the noble lord is very
trilling when compared with the gross, and I may say
dangerous, error which pervaded the rest of his argument.
He imputes to us that we object to our soldiers fighting by
the side of foreigners; our objection is simply to see them
fighting by the side of foreigners who are condottieri and
mercenaries, but we have no objection to their fighting by
the side of foreigners who are allies. We admire the con.
queror of Blenheim and Ramillies just as much as if the
whole of his troops had been English. (Hear.) But
throughout the whole of his speech the noble lord argued
just as if there was no such nation as the French nation--
( Hear, hear.)—just as if there was no such army as the
French army—( cheers )—and as if that intimate alliance
between the English and French troops, and that cordial
friendship between the generals, to which he adverted so
gracefully but a few evenings ago, were, in fact, dreams
which he had forgotten immediately after the night on
which he proposed the thanks of this house to the French
and English armies. (Hear, hear.) If it be true, as the
noble lord says, that there is on the part of a large
portion of this house—that is, of gentlemen who sit on
this side of the house—and in the country generally,
a great prejudice against Englishmen fighting by the side of
foreigners, how can the noble lord account for the not
merely cordial sympathy and appreciation, but the absolute
enthusiasm with which the English and French alliance is
now viewed, not only iu this house, but in the country ?
The noble lord says that hon. gentlemen must not think
because we have despatched 04,000 men already to the
seat of war that that force is sufficient to resist the power
of this great Emperor of Russia. lam glad to hear that
we have been able in the first year of the war to send out
so many men, but I must remind the house that we did
not send out these 54,000 men to carry on a single-handed
contest with the Emperor of Russia. We sent them out
to be companions in arms and comrades in glory of our
great and gallant ally—(cheer.)—who was, we were always
told, and whom we always believed to be, a first-rate
military power. (Hear.) Surely the noble lord when be
was calculating our resources to resist the Emperor of
Russia—to use a word not very classical or elegant, but
very commonly used of late—ignored the existence of the
French nation and army, and he somewhat forgot that we
possessed a most powerful military ally. (Hear.) 1 main-
tain that the noble lord, in taking that view of the case,
misrepresented the spirit of this measure, and conveyed to
the house and the country a totally false and fallacious view
of the position which we occupy with regard to the resources
at our disposal fur carrying on this war. (Hear.)
Mr. Disraeli went on to remark that the single
parallel to the present proposition to be discovered
in English history was traced in that disgraceful
chapter which related how the subjects of the
Elector of Hesse were bought and sold for service in
North America. Adverting to the precedents cited
so copiously from the records of former wars, he
contended that experience showed the almost utter
uselessness of mercenary troops in the field, and
read extracts from despatches proving how the
Duke of Wellington objected to increase his army by
the addition of men who had no attachment to the
cause for which they were fighting except the pay :

The Home Secretary has stated that the greatest com-
manders, the Emperor Napoleon amongst others, had had
recourse to this method of sustaining their military
strength, and had always approved of the expedient. Now,
I will quote on this subject the opinion of a leader not
second even to the first Napoleon—that of the Duke of
Wellington. (Cheers.) Here is a passage from a letter
of the Duke of Wellington to the Earl of Liverpool, dated
January 19th, 1811, which shows the value of those troops
who do not join our standard from sympathy of political
character or political conviction. The Duke of Welling-
ton says :
I am sorry to give you bad accounts of the Brunswick Legion.
They continue to desert in large numbers, and on the night
before last fourteen deserted to go to the enemy. Eleven were
caught, one shot whilst making the attempt, and only two got
off. (Hear, hear.)
Again, on the 2.3 rd of April of the same year, the duke
writes to General Graham, afterwards Lord Lynedoch :
I attribute the disposition of all foreign troops to desert from
our armies to the regularity of system and the strictness of
discipline which characterises it, and which must be upheld in
order to keep a British army in the field in a state of efficiency,
and their desertion is frequently very Inconvenient as affording
to the enemy the only information which he can acquire. Under
these circuinstani.es 1 am not desirous of increasing the num-
ber of torcign troops serving with thisarmy. (Hear, hear.)
In June of the same year I find the duke writing to Lord
Liverpool
Since the commencement of the siege of Badaj oz, fifty-two men
of the Chasseurs Britanniques have deserted, though we had
with the army only a selection of that corps tee, who are suspec-
ted, being left at Lisbon. (" Hear, hear," and laughter.)
1 am sure the house will excuse me fur reading these
powerful passages from a work as to which, upon a subject
like this, every one wishes his memory to be refreshed ; it
is equivalent to having the advantage of the advice and
counsel of the Duke of Wellington in the present debate,
and therefore perhaps the house will allow me to read
another letter of the duke to General Craufurd, in the year
1812 :

In regard to General Ross's complaints of the inclination of
Wetter)lle's regiment to desert, all general officers who have
foreign troops under their command have the same cause to com-
plain. In the part of the arm under my command called British,
there are between 13,M y)
and 7,000 of them who desert whenever
they can get an opportunity. (Hear, hear.)
Observe, these are the free lances who were spoken of.
As regards the German Legion, 1 can only say I wish to
speak of it with all that honour it deserves, and which it
has earned in so many passages of our history. I will say
nothing of all those brethren in arms who served us really
because the interests of their country were bound up with

DECEMBER 23, 1854.

those of our own—who were the subjects of the same so-
vereign, or of sovereigns for whose cause we fought, and
who, I believe, behaved throughout the great war that
ended in 1815 with admirable courage, intelligence, and
discipline. I confine myself entirely to those free lances,
those miserable mercenaries, those condottieri who were
engaged in the cheapest market, who had no political con-
victions or unison of sentiments to animate them in the
cause, who were purchased by the power that paid them
most, and whose achievements are immortalised in the
passages I have read to you. As I have taken 1811 and
1812, I may be allowed to read an extract from a despatch
in 1813. The duke writes to General Campbell at Ali-
cant :

Sir, I have received your letter of the 12th, regarding the
conduct of the second Italian regiment. I entirely concur in
all the measures you have adopted, and I applaud the decision
and firmness ofyour conduct. The foreign troops are so much
addicted to desertion that they are very unfit for our army, of
which they necessarily form too large a proportion to the native
troops. (Hear, hear.) The evil is aggravated by the practice
which prevails of enlisting prisoners, although deserters are
nearly as bad. The consequence is, therefore, that a foreign
regiment cannot be placed in a situation in which the soldiers
Can desert, that they do not go off in numbers, and in the Penni.
Rola they carry to the enemy the only intelligence which he can
procure. With this knowledge I seldom, if ever, use the foreign
Britiah troops ou the duty of outposts, and whatever you may
determine regarding the 2nd Italian regiment, I recommend the
same practice to your consideration. (Hear.)
In more recent days the right hon. gentleman re
marked that the danger averted at the battle of Inker-
mann was attributed by a French semi.official journal to
the information given to the enemy by a deserter
from the French Foreign Legion. After elucidating
the special demerits of the proposition, Mr. Disraeli
adverted to the principles on which it was based, and
the course adopted by the Opposition in regard
to it :
Under the present circumstances I think that, irrespec-
tively of all other considerations, looking merely to the
details, I can prove that the measure the Government is
proposing is one that will be fruitless and barren of the
results which it desires from it. Let us look at the policy
of the measure. Here we are engaged in a war which even
the highest authority now calls a great war. You, the
Ministers, omit no opportunity now of dwelling upon the
magnitude of the peril, and of the greatness of the
resources of the enemy with whom you are contending.
The country watches with anxiety the conduct of your army
3,000 miles from home. There is a solemn conviction in
the public mind that this is a crisis in the struggle be-
tween the Western powers and Russia. Parliament is
suddenly called together—so suddenly that, even at the
last moment, Ministers, as it were, changed their minds.
The attention of the whole of Europe is attracted to the
events of this important assembly, especially when it as
sembles under circumstances so remarkable. It is an-
nounced that we are assembled together in order that her
Majesty's Ministers might communicate to the Council of
the nation for its adoption and sanction those great mea-
sures which the Government thinks adequate for the exi-
gencies of the time. The noble lord the Home Secretary
has taunted this side of the house with always pressing on
the Governmentto take measures equal to the exigencies of
the moment, and, when the first measure is proposed in that
view, that they cavil at and criticise it. That was not a
generous taunt on the part of the noble lord—(Hear)—gene-
rosity may not be much valued in the House of Commons,
though I hope truth may long linger among us; but 1 ven-
ture to say that the taunt is not just, for the Government
has received no obstacle whatever in the conduct of the war
from the Opposition. (clear, hear.) There has not been
a vote proposed by them which has not been cheerfully
acceded to them. Tho Ministers might have had any
amount of money or of men—(hear, hear)—for merely ask-
ing for it. They know they might count upon us for a
cordial, sincere, and earnest support of their policy, and I
say, sir, they received it. (Hear, hear.) It is not, there-
fore, just on the part of the Secretary of State to rise now,
and having entirely failed in defending a measure which
I am bound to say I am not surprised that he failed to
defend—for even his talents must be sometimes baffled—
he was not justified in attempting to cover his retreat by
casting reproaches in the faces of the people of England
and of the Opposition. ( Hear, hear.) The noble lord
has attempted to convey that he and his colleagues have
experienced from us a factious opposition; that we have
cavilled at their policy, taunted them into action, and at
the moment when they demand our support we refused
it. It is a notorious fact—and no misrepresentation can
disguise it from the people of this country—that, instead
of takingadvantage of the difficulties of the Government as
Oppositions before now have done—(Hear, hear)—instead
of throwing obstacles in their way, we have said from the
first, " Act with frankness and firmness, and you may
count on the same support from us that you would expect
from the adherents you most trust." From that line we
have never deviated. (Hear, hear.) I say then, under
these circumstances, I can conceive nothing more im-
politic than a Minister coming down to Parliament, not
asking to embody the national force, or for very large
votes, or for the grant of a great number of men, or for any
other measure which shows a consciousness that they are
embarked in an almost internecine struggle ; but they
come forward with one only measure, which I have shown
from the records of experience to be of so imperfect and
paltry a character. (Ile ar, hear.)
Utterly repugnant to public feeling throughout the
country, what, he inquired, would be the effect of the

measure abroad:— -
I want to know what influence it will have on European
Cabinets and public opinion abroad ? I read to-day in an
organ which exercises great influence in Europe, not un-
friendly to the Western powers, I believe, though it takes
moderate and mitigated view of these important transac-
tions—a great continental anthoritl—l read an article en