The Press.
London, England, 1854-12-02 00:00:00

DECEMBER 2, 1854.

all fairness of antagonism, we deem it right
to remind the Government that this is pos-
sible. As we have already said, nothing will
be refused to the Administration—except con-
fidence. But a Ministry of clerks must not
be surprised if an assembly of English gentle-
men should deal with them in the fashion
usual in the case of culpable or suspected
subordinates, and demand a full explanation
of every act to which a suspicion of inis-
Management attaches.

REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE CRIMEA
ArloTuna week has elapsed without bringing
any cheering intelligence from the seat of war.
The organs of the Government daily demand
reinforcements with increasing energy. "If
" our brave army is to be saved from annihi-
" lation—if our kinsmen are ever to return to
" their country—no delay can be permitted.
" At whatever cost, these succours must be sent.
" Fifty thousand men are not more than the
" emergency demands." Such is the language
with which for two or three weeks we have been
familiar. While we admit the necessity, we
think the public has a right to demand whence
it arises.

" England," we are now told, "is not a
military power. " If so, England should not
engage in military enterprises, and should
adapt its language and its policy to its con-
dition. If, however, the occasion was, indeed,
such as to justify a change of policy, our pre-
parations should have been on a scale propor-
tionate to the emergency. Our Ministers
should fairly have met the difficulty and ex-
plained it to the public, not in newspapers
which they may disavow, but in their places
in either House of Parliament. They should
have calculated the probable amount of cost,
warned us of the pecuniary sacrifices all
classes would be called on to make, and at
once announced that the immediate levy of
fifty thousand men was but tin instalment of
the demands which would be speedily made
on the resources of the country. We know
not what understanding had been arrived at
with France, but an increase of the army such
as the CHANCEI.LOR of the EXCHEQUER demanded,
amounting to five thousand rank and file, to
wage war on the Russian empire, was futile
and derisive.
Unless the allied army had amounted to the
strength of one hundred thousand men, with
suitable reserves at some convenient seaport
in the Levant, it was presumption and
madness to undertake the siege of Sebas-
topol. Every officer in either army
whose judgment was of value deplored the
determination and deprecated the risk. Not
only were they aware of the insufficiency of
the force, but the season they well knew was
far too advanced. The Cabinet itself, indeed,
had its misgivings, and we believe we are
justified in stating that a mandate revoking
the order to advance arrived at Varna too late
to be obeyed.
So far as our generals are concerned the
leap teas not made in the dark. They leapt
with their eyes open. We know not if our
Ministers were perversely blind or obstinately
incredulous, but they hat ample warning of
the danger—they cannot plead this ignorance.
It is with the Cabinet, then, that the blame
remains, and the cause will be found in
its faulty construction. United by no prin-
ciple, acting with no unity of purpose, and
relying wholly upon adventitious support
for its existence, the Ministers are compelled
to adopt popular prejudices and to flatter
popular delusions. In the absence of a fixed
and definite policy they submit their judgment
to the dictation of the Ministerial press, and
falsely suppose that the suggestions of vanity
or self-interest are the outpourings of public
feeling.
A heavy responsibility nevertheless attaches
itself to that organ of public opinion which
has so arrogantly transgressed its legiti-
mate bounds, so wantonly encroached on the
functions of Government. In its haste to
proclaim its triumph, vanity got the better of
reason and discretion, and the projected expe-