The Express.
London, England, 1855-08-23 00:00:00

LONDON, THURSDAY, AUGUST 23.

Six days ego a couple of lines published by Lord
Faunas stirred up the public to expect most impoe-
taut news from Sebas'opol. " General Putman
and r—General Sixreoll was made to say—" have
desided to open the fire from the English and French
batteries at dawn to-morrow (Friday) morning."
And hors official information sticks fast. Sines
Friday last the public has heard nothing more
from Lord Patnivas about the matter. Jea-
lously retaining the means of instant com-
munication with the Crimea in its own
hands, the Government leaves the nation uoinformed
of that which Englishmen most want to know, and,
by its silence, aids those who take a perverse or
malevolent pleasure in circulating false report..
A short note, inserted in yesterdiy's
bur, accounts for the disappointment in a
manner rather sufficient than satisfactory. We
are told that there was an "error in
a former despatch "—General Siursox's, of course,
is referred to—which " led to the belief that another
bombardment had commented. This is not the
we." The official writer then intimates that the
firs opened, or to be opened—for on this point
he is not very explicit—was a cannonade auxiliary
to engineering operations, and not a general bom-
bardment preparatury to an assault. The distinction
refers chiefly to the object and intention of the fire:
that the cannonade was duly opened on the 17th
Prince GORTCILMOYY has already informed us.

The trenches and batteries are not completed, but
the services of the artillery—it is suggested, rather
than stated—are still required " to facilitate the
works of approach directed against the general sys-
tem of the Malakhoff defences."

The preparations for the grand attack are not then
so forward as has been generally supposed, or the
generals may have reconsidered their sufficiency, and,
resolved to increase their extent. However this may
be, the public will not complain if, by postponing the
great bombardment a few days, the Generals can
acquire a more complete guarantee of its final success.
In the number of casualties in the trenches the,
respective commanders have a strong incentive to
perfect the preparations for the attack as speedily as
possible, but it is wiser to bear a daily loss for a little
while longer than to omit any precaution, or sacrifice
any chance which may conduce to a successful result.
The positive intelligence transmitted direct from
the Crimes is of a nature to heighten the hopes of
the Allies, while it justifies the caution of their Ge-
nerals. Advices from the north of Sebastopol, re-
ceived through Germany, show that to make up the
Soros commanded by Prince GORTCITAXOI7 on the
16th, it was necessary to take regiments from the
garrison of the fortress. The Russian plan of attack,
as sketched in letters dated a weed before its execs'.
tico, involved a simultaneous sortie from the bastions,
so as to detain the reserves of the Allies before Sebas-
topol at the moment they were needed on the Tcher-
nays. There must have been some reason for rejostiag
this scheme, which was at any rate more rational than
that actually adopted : none seems so probable as a
deficiency of troops. The accounts before-mentioned
state thattheindefatigable Tot LEBEri, unable longer to
take a personal share in the defence, has advised that a
larger number of soldiers than hitherto should be
kept on the south side of Sebastopol, instead of rely-
ing upon drafts from the north. Accordingly, im-
mense excavations, thirty-five feet in depth, have
been formed behind the bastions, in which it is hoped
that large bodies of troops may be safely kept,
so es to be in readiness to repel au assault. We can
hardly suppose that the General would adopt an ar-
rangement is itself full of inconvenience, unless he
foresaw that the communications between the two
aides of the bay might be endangered front the bat-
teries of the besiegers.
If the Generals are making sure their ground in the
field, their reports are equally solid. In our columns
yesterday we gave a despatch from General Poulain,
relating to the battle of the Tchernaya. It is the
fourth of a series, each of which has shown that in
those which preceded, our success was underrated.
The day after the battle, the French General an-
nounced that the Eagan had lost 2,500 killed : it is
pond that the number is above 3,300. The prisoners,
he like saaaner, are more numerous than was at first
supposed. This moderation and candour stand out in
wettest both with Prince GOETCHAKOIIeII amusing
attempt to represent oar allies as checkmated on the
16th, and General Da Bicao's concealment of the loss
initiated in the bombardment of Bweaborg.