The Press.
London, England, 1854-12-16 00:00:00

Regarding the recruiting service, he observed:—

With regard to voluntary enlistment, it has been
practically found hitherto, and it is now more especially
evident, that men in this country are more anxious
to enlist when success has been somewhat retarded,
when increased energy appears to be necessary, and
not when all is proceeding with every probability
of being brought to an early and successful issue.
This theory, if theory it be, has been completely established
by the experience of the last few months. At the first de-
claration of war recruits came forward freely; but they soon
relaxed, and during the summer month they were few in-
deed in number—so much so as to cause very considerable
anxiety on the part of the Government. But as soon as it
appeared evident that the siege of Sebastopol was likely to
beorotracted, and that the undertaking was one of greater
hazard and difficulty than had been supposed —from that
moment, when the energy of the people was aroused, the
zeal and readiness of the young men of the country to
enlist also increased, and week by week it has been pro-
gressing, until last week, I believe, we more than doubled
the number of any previous week since the commencement
of the war, and enrolled six or seven fold the number which
we had the power of recruiting some five or six weeks ago.
Hear, hear.)
Concluding with a reference to the glorious conduct
of the army and our allies, he stated:—
About a fortnight or three weeks ago I received her
Majesty's command to convey to Lord Raglan her inten-
tion to confer the order of the Bath on General Canrobert,
and to convey that determination either to the ambassador
of the Emperor of the French, or to the Emperor himself,
and that has been delayed because it was not felt that the
compliment would be complete to him if not offered at the
same time as our own soldiers. (Hear.)
Earl GREY considered the vindication offered on
behalf of the Government altogether insufficient, and
concurred with Lord Derby in believing that one
great and fatal error had run through the whole of

THE PRESS.

their proceedings, in that everything bad been done
too late. _ _ _

The Duke of ARGYLL reproduced a few of the War
Minister's arguments in defence of the Ministerial
capacity.
The Earl of HARDWICKE believed that the outcome
of the debate was this. Ministers confessed that at
the beginning they had not been prepared to carry
on the war properly, but had since become alive to
the magnitude of the struggle to which the country
was committed, and better experienced in the means
for prosecuting it vigorously. He vindicated the
honour of the navy, and declared that he " wholly
absolved Sir Charles Napier from anything like
misconduct or neglect."
The Earl of CARLISLE was convinced that the
Ministry would show all possible energy in conduct-
ing the war, being sure that the popular spirit was
so roused that only under such conditions could they
remain Ministers.
The PREMIER spoke a few words in magnification
of the enterprise undertaken against Sebastopol, and
explained the grounds that justified his expectations
of its success.
The address was then agreed to, and the house
adjourned at twelve o'clock.

In the Commons, the speeches moving and second-
ing the Address were delivered by Mr. H. HERBERT
and the Hon. E. T. LEVESON GOWER.
Sir R. PEEL defended the course pursued by the
Government, and complained of the attacks made
upon our allies by M. Kossuth, which he appealed to
Lord Palmerston to find some means of stopping.
Mr. S. HERBERT entered upon an elaborate
defence of the Government, contending that every
thing possible had been done in concert with our ally
the Emperor of the French. In reply to the charge
that the Government had no policy or plan in the
war, he asserted that there was a plan, the first object
of which was the defence of Constantinople, the
second to defend the Balkan, and the third to
give a severe blow to the power of Russia in the
Black Sea. The right hon. gentleman then entered
into detailed statements similar to those made by
the Duke of Newcastle in the Upper House, and
contended that, if the reinforcements were insuffi-
cient, it was owing to the policy adopted by Parlia-
ment for some years back to keep down to the very
lowest point the military resources of the country.
Notwithstanding this, the total army sent to Lord
Raglan, including those now ready to embark and
those on their way, amounted to no less than 54,730,
a larger British army than had ever been sent to any
part of the world. It had been asked why they had
gone to Sebastopol? The reason was because it was
the fortress upon which the Russian power in the
Black Sea depended, and if not taken now it would
be hopeless to expect success hereafter. He also
observed that our losses in the operations in the
East had been greatly exaggerated. By the last
returns he had received our actual losses were :
By disease, including 150 who died of their wounds,
2,783 ; and 1,350 killed in battle ; making a total of
4,130. However severe this loss might be, it was by
no means so great as had been supposed.
Sir J. PAKINGTON had no serious objection to the
Address, nor to the speeches by which it was intro-
duced, and trusted her Majesty would meet with the
support of every party in that house in obtaining all
the requisite means for carrying on the war with
energy and vigour. Speaking in the name of the
great Conservative party, he could say that so far
from objecting to the increase of the army demanded,
their only disappointment was that the demand had
been so long delayed. The fact appeared to be that
within the last month the Government had awakened
as from a dream, and was now, indeed, putting forth
energies which should long since have been called
into action. It was only lately that they appeared to
be conscious of the difficulties of the struggle upon
which they had entered. The house was not in fault
if the war had been conducted inefficiently:—
In the last session of Parliament. whatever demands the
Government made were freely and liberally granted, and
the noble lord opposite, on more than one occasion,frankly
admitted the spirit in which they were met. It was, there-
fore, not from any want of support from that house that
the army was not sooner augmented. ( Hear, hear.) But
he believed he might trace what he called the crippled
state of our military armaments mainly to the financial
arrangements of the Government during the past session,
and to that attempt announced on the part of the Chan-
cellor of the Exchequer—to the principle of which he and
his friends took no exception, but of the impossibility of
which they warned him—that in so great a struggle they
were to pay for the expenses of the war entirely from the
revenue of the year. (Hear, hear.)
Sir. J. Pakington then adverted to the paragraphs in
the Royal Speech speaking of the conduct of the
British army in the East and of its French allies.
On these topics he enlarged in fervent language, and
dwelt particularly upon the loss which the house had
suffered by the death of one of its most respected
members, Colonel Blair, and the severe illness of
another, the gallant General Sir De Lacy Evans.
He then proceeded to review the successive clauses

1205

of her Majesty's Speech, and with great distinctness
and force urged those charges against the Ministry,
of vacillation, delay, and want of foresight, which
were dwelt on by Lord Derby in the other house.
On the want of sufficient reinforcements, and of a
reserve, he spoke with great power :
From the time that the army sat down before Sebas-
topol, it was left there —numbers falling daily in the
trenches, besides the loss experienced in the battle of
Baliddava--decimated by disease and sutfering from
change of climate and exposure to cold and fatigue, with-
out any reinforcements whatever, except some few draughts
which were sent out to various regiments from time to
time, but which in the aggregate made no serious addition
to the army until the day that the .10th Regiment landed.
Under these circumstances that gallant band of men
dwindled away day by day, until on the sth of November
they were attacked at Inkennann by the Russian forces.
What was the actual force with which we had fought at
Inkermann ? '27,000 men were landed originally in the
Crimea, 3,000 men were landed a few days afterwards, but
on the sth of November—on the day of Inkermann—had
they 20,000 men present? Had they 18,000, or even
15,000 men, along the whole position from Balsklava to the
heights before the town? lie believed not; but this at
least was certain, that the men who resisted the Russian
army did not exceed 8,000 men. (Cheers.) We ought to
thank God that the British forces were not destroyed at
lnkermann. ( Hear.) But it was not to the credit of the
British Government that there should have been only 8,000
men to resist the Russian force. (Hear, hear.) The valour
of our soldiers—and, as the Royal speech said, history
hardly recorded such a struggle as that—alone saved us;
and it was, indeed, little less than marvellous—it was only
by the mercy of God, in fact—that that gallant band had
been able to withstand the power of the Russian forces.
(Hear, hear.) Their valour was, indeed, such as to claim
the highest credit. It, was no common valour; it was not
the mere courage of wan fighting against man ; but it was
an enduring, indomitable courage rarely witnessed that
enabled this band of heroes, hour after hour, to struggle
against those heavy masses of Russians that were hurled
upon them. 'Twas nothing less than miraculous that we
were now able to congratulate ourselves upon their victory,
instead of having to mourn over the loss of our whole force.
(Hear, hear.) But how was it that there were only 8,000
men left to sustain this conflict? This, indeed, was a grave
matter for explanation. Ilia firm persuasion was that, if
the Government had shown a proper degree of foresight, if
they had been up to their own undertaking, if they had
formed proper reserves for the army, if they had taken
means to fill up the vacancies which occurred, and to keep
up the army even to its original number of .27,(00 men, no
battle of lnkermann would ever have been fought. (Hear,
hear.) To parody a trite phrase well known in the sister
country, " England's weakness was Russia's opportunity."
The Russians had gathered together all their reinforce.
ments, they had learnt the weakness of the British army.
and, brave as they knew the British soldiers to be, they had
hoped to overpower them, and it was under this feeling
that the attack was made. (Hear.) This he firmly believed
they never would have done had we been there in that
strength which common prudence and foresight would have
told us we ought to have been. But what had been the suf-
ferings of our men since that time'? They had Leen on those
bleak heights under canvas in the worst weather, the ground
impassable around them, exposed unprotected to the severity
of the climate, and to the fury of that awful hurricane
which had been so fatal to our shipping. But why was it
so? By the improvidence of her Majesty's Ministers.
(Hear, hear.) He thought he had a right to ask the Govern-
ment to explain why this was so. The House of Commons
had found them with supplies and furnished them with
the means of sending forth this great army, and it had a
right to ask why the Government had left this army un-
cared for to perish of cold, exhaustion, and even of hunger?
( Hear, hear.)
The right hon. baronet concluded :
They would be abandoning their duty if they did not
call upon the Government to explain these things. They
had a right to call for an explanation, not only in the name
of the people of this country, but also in the name of the
army which was undergoing these sufferings. If the Go-
vernment would give a satisfactory explanation, if they
would show that hereafter the House of Commons might
rely, not only on their good intentions—which he had
never doubted—hut also on their exercising that prudence
and foresight which hitherto had not been manifested,
they would have nothing to fear from the Conservative
party. ( Hear, hear.) Hon. gentlemen on that side of the
house were not the Whigs of 1703—(rheers)—nor were
they the Coalitionists of 1853. (Loud cheers.) They de-
sired nothing but the honour of their Sovereign and the
welfare of their country. If the Government asked for
supplies they should have them granted with no niggard
hand; if they asked for parliamentary support, they should
be met with no factious spirit ; but if this concession were
made on the one hand, this condition must be made on
the other—that the war should be conducted with vigour,
wisdom, and foresight greater than that which bad hitherto
been displayed. For this explanation, therefore, he asked,
and the Government was bound, in duty to the country, to
give it. He asked them what was to be their future course,
and by their answer it must be judged whether the House
of Commons would be justified in supporting them, and
whether the people could be satisfied that the future con-
duct of public affairs should rest in the hands of the ex-
isting Administration. (Hear, hear.)
Mr. LAvARD commenced by acknowledging the re-
luctance and sense of responsibilty with which he
undertook to criticise the conduct of the war, and
then reverted to the subject of home mistakes and
blunders :
He had last year warned them of the calamities which
were sure to attend the line of policy adopted by the Ge-

_,

1206

vernment. Into that topic he had no wish to enter. He
had no desire to criticise the conduct of the Government or
to enter into details, and if his right hon. friend had not
raised some questions of detail in which he felt bound to
follow him he would not have ventured to do so. The
Government from the commencement seemed to believe
that war was impossible, and unfortunately they placed
themselves in the hands of Austria. Hence those negotia-
tions at Vienna of which so much has been said. The first
step after the declaration of war was to send troops to
Malta, but they failed in securing any correct information as
to the condition and prospects of the Turkish army. It was
no doubt true that Sir J. Burgoyne was employed in the
spring to report on this subject, but the report he made was
not borne out by the results. Nevertheless, the only thing
done was to intrench the army at Gallipoli. The army
afterwards went to Varna, though he had warned his right
hon. friend that the undertaking was a most dangerous one,
the climate of Varna being so unhealthy. His right hon.
friend, however, took out of that Pandora box before him,
from which seemed to issue every kind of deception, papers
to show that Varna was most healthy, and that our troops
were never in better condition. Why, while he was yet
speaking, the Angel of Death was hovering over our army.
(Hear, hear.) The expedition to Varna did not and could
not succeed. Then they resolved, on finding there was a
great pressure from without, to send the troops to Sebasto-
pol. What was the object of sending these troops to the
Crimea? Either they expected to take Sebastopol by a coup
de main, or by a regular siege. He would not enter upon
the military question, but, supposing it had been possible
to take the fortress by a coup de main, and they had done
so, were they hereafter to abandon the Crimea? If so,
what would have been the effect of taking Sebastopol ?
If, on the other hand, they retained it either after
a coup de main or a regular siege, they would have
had to support the army there throughout the winter.
Now, in what circumstances did the army go to the Crimea?
It was sent without a reserve, without a single depot, and
without any basis of operations. It was entirely dependent
for supplies on this country. There was in this great neg-
lect, for to his certain knowledge, they had been warned
previously that no supplies could be hoped for from Varna.
Sinope was suggested as a place where they might obtain
provisions for the army, but no such thing was thought of ;
and he must say nothing could be more culpable than the
way in which the army was placed in the Crimea, without
any preparation. (Hear, hear.)
He estimated the prospective force on both sides
thus :

He was afraid the Government were not sufficiently alive
to the immensity of the conflict in which we were engaged,
for it seemed as though their policy up to this time had
only been to provide for the emergencies of the moment.
(Hear, hear.) The Russians would shortly have 200,000
men in the Crimea. (A voice,—" Oh P') The hon. member
might cry " Oh," but only last session he had been told
that it was impossible for the Russians to bring up rein.
forcements at all—( Hear, hear)—and in the Crimea we had
been acting on that very idea, reckoning on the Austrian
alliance, which was to prevent reinforcements being
brought up; and yet, in ono fatal night, they had found
100,000 men upon their flank. (Hear, hear.) Last session
he had been laughed at for saying that the Russians could
have 100,000 men in the Crimea, but, if they would reckon
up the account, they would find that nearer 150,000 had
been arrayed against us. At Inkermann, according to
Lord Raglan, 60,00() men attacked us, and of these not a
single regiment had fought against us at Alma. The
40,000 men of Alma, and the 60,000 of Inkermann made
100,000 • Liprandi's division, which, with l)annenberg's
corps, had been pushed down from Wallachia, was 25,000
more, at tho same time 10,000 men made a sortie from
Sebastopol on the left of the French position, and all .the
batteries of Sebastopol were playing on the allies. So that
the reckoning, on the whole, came nearer to 150,000 men
than to 100,000. What was there, then, to prevent them
bringing down 200,000 men into the Crimea? We had
withdrawn our fleet from the Baltic, and there was nothing
to prevent the Czar from sending down the Guard into
Poland to release the troops which were stationed there.
It was all very well to say that armies could not be moved
when the roads were bad and the country impassable.
Under ordinary circumstances it might be so ; but when
the Emperor had everything he possessed at stake it was
not likely that he would relax in his exertions. (Hear,
hear.)

The Government, he declared, were carrying on the
war upon perfectly novel and mistaken principles :
The Government had decided on carrying on the war on
three new principles, the greatest economy, the strictest
humanity, and the greatest publicity. (Hear, hear.) The
greatest economy principle was to do everything upon the
small scale at the greatest expense, and in this way the
least possible had been done for the most money. (Hear,
hear.) Of the greatest humanity principle they had an
example in the clemency extended to Odessa. Then there
was the great publicity principle. And though he did not
wish to say one word against the press—for it was owing
to the press that many deficiencies and abuses, such as
those which existed in the medical supplies, had been
pointed out and remedied—yet if the public were deter-
mined to carry on the war on these new principles, they
must be prepared for terrible losses, which would inevitably
be the result.
Of the spirit with which officers and men alike
endured pain and hardship he cited many in-
stances :

The sense of duty among our troops was something ex•
traordinary. One who had lost both his legs in action
asked what was likely to be his fate, and when told that it
was in the hands of God, he said, " Well, if I die I shall
die happy; if I live I shall be proud of what has been said
of me." What had been done by the officers of the
Guards 7' These men were lauded in the Crimea without

T H E

any means of transport, and many of them had remained
till this day with the same clothes on their backs as they
had on when they first landed. The sufferings of the

officers were incalculable. Out of seventy-six hours some
of them only passed four hours in sleep, and they went
about night and day, in the wet and cold, with little or
nothing to eat. Iu fact, their hardships were unparalleled;
and yet they were all borne patiently and without ostenta-
tion, because their conduct was never mentioned—it was
only inspired by a sense of duty.
Mr. Layard concluded by reiterating his call upon
the Ministry to take some bold and definite line of
policy:—

Let the Government, then, adopt some policy, and let
them tell the house what their polity was. He entreated
the noble lord the President of the Council, by the name
he bore as the great leader of the Liberal party in this
country, to endeavour to induce her Majesty's Government
to adopt a policy which, perhaps, might not reconcile the
conflicting opinions of a coalition Ministry, but which, at
all events, would be more in consonance with the true
position and the important interest of this mighty em•
pire. (Cheers).
Colonel DUNNE, after expressing surprise that no
one on the Ministerial side had risen to answer the
powerful speezh of the hon. gentleman who had
just sat down, entered into some professional criti-
cism on the mode in which the operations had been
conducted, and expressed his conviction that in
almost every instance the Ministerial measures had
been carried out two months too late.

Mn. DISRAELI said
participate in the surprise expressed by the hon. mem-
ber that none of her Majesty's Ministers have thought it
necessary to reply to the speech of the hon. member for
Aylesbury. He is not a supporter of this side of the house.
He does not sit upon these benches, and he somewhat
ostentatiously informed the Lord President that he was
peculiarly attached to him. (.4 laugh.) I have no wish
to tamper with the allegiance which the member for Ayles-
bury owes to the Lord President, but on the subject be-
fore the consideration of the house I have given him that
respectful attention due to every gentleman who is master
of the subject on which he addresses the house—(Hear)—
I could not also forget in the individual instance of the
member for Aylesbury that a man of genius addressed the
house, and remembering that he has come from the scene
of those memorable actions which now fill the minds and
touch the hearts of the people of this country, and that he
has risen to make serious charges against the Ministry,
the fact that he has not been answered by the Government
is not a circumstance which the hon. member need con-
sider as one which will depreciate him in the public esti-
mate. ( Hear, hear.) So far as I can judge of the for-
tunes of a human being—so far as I can form an opinion
upon the course of human life—l think the member for
Aylesbury will be remembered when the great portion of
the existing Cabinet will be forgotten. (Laughter.)
I did not expect, sir—and I witnessed with regret the
necessity—that I should have again felt it my duty on the
present opening of Parliament to vindicate the freedom
of discussion. (Hear, hear.) Remembering the position
of this country, remembering what has occurred since we
last met, remembering that the fate of this empire is per-
haps at stake, remembering the thrilling events that have
happened, remembering that the people of this country
expect, if not redress for their grievances, yet some sym-
pathy with their deep emotion—l was surprised to find
that the Government should have advised the Sovereign
to assemble Parliament, and should have given instruc-
tions to their followers that discussion should not only not
be encouraged but resisted. (Cheers from the Opposition.)
That they should have attempted to conduct affairs—that
they should have attempted to govern this country—with-
out unnecessarily appealing to the sense of the House of
Commons, I cam easily comprehend. Their difficulties are
great—their embarrassments are increasing. They might
have thought that time and fortune might have so miti-
gated their position, that two months later they might
have appealed. with more advantage, but having felt it
their duty or necessity to take this step, I was surprised
that an hon. gentleman who seconded the Address, and the
brother of a Cabinet Minister, should have impressed
on the house the expediency of its silence. (Hear, hear.)
But this is not all. We have had the luxury of one Cabi-
net Minister on this memorable opening of Parliament,
and while hg has chiefly filled his speech with a vindica-
tion of his dwn office, which had been only partially at-
tacked, he favoured us with the discreet admonition that
the loyalty and discretion of the House of Commons would
be beat proved by not at the present moment expressing
opinions in the face of an anxious country ; to say no-
thing, sir, of an absent army, which must, I think, under
all its difficulties, under all its sufferings, under all its
deeds of heroic achievement, have been sustained by the
conviction that when the representatives of the people of
England assembled they would have expressed their sym-
pathy with their sufferings, and perhaps have criticised a
Ministry, who, in their opinion, had not done their duty
to relieve them. (Cheers from the Opposition.) It may
be clever in the Lord President to be silent, and the other
taciturn secretaries of state who surround him, but I
doubt whether that silence is a proof of respect for public
feeling, and whether a sense of duty ought to have im-
pelled them to restrict that frank expression of opinion
which is the soul of the House of Commons. (Cheers
from the Opposition.)
Sir, my hon. friend the member for Droitwich has to
night taken a course which will be appreciated by the
country ; and had this debate terminated with the answer
to his speech I should have been content to be silent, for
I think that he has indicated the course which it be-
comes a Conservative Opposition to pursue. I am
totally at a lose to comprehend how right honourable
$ gentlemen can bring themselves to such a pitch of

SATURDAY,

feeling.
that they can rise and protest against the c •
eal opinion of a member of Parliament on the conductn-
cri-
tical
the affairs of the country. I had last year to refer to
this; there was not an occasion on which the Government
brought forward measures, in every one of which they were
ultimately defeated, when gentlemen on these benches ex-
pressed a criticism that they were not challenged to re-
pose a vote of want of confidence in the Government; as
they had been challenged to-night by the Seeretary-at-War,
if they had. not faith in the Government, not to trouble the
untotrYth—eir(
house with factious criticisms—not to echo here what,
bpuerthtoapste,smat
thyeb:ptileonopoinf. ithoneohfothusee was faruseethtiner)th—e.
Ministry. I had occasion last year to notice the unconsti-
tutional course so freely adopted by these gentlemen. I
had occasion to show then that such a course struck at the
root of public discussions and public freedom. (Hear.)
I held that it was a privilege of members of this hones
freely to canvass the conduct of Government, without being
forced to incur the responsibility of asking the House of
Commons to sanction a change of Ministry. In we
had a Ministry carrying on a war—we had an Opposition
supporting the measures of the war; and when Mr. Wynd-
ham canvassed the policy of the Government—and he was
no mean authority, and eminently qualified from his offi-
cial experience to speak on such a subject—Mr. Wyndham
said that he trusted that the unanimity of the nation on the
subject of the policy of the war would not for a moment be
mistaken for a unanimity of sentiment as to the conduct
of the war. So spoke Mr. Wyndham, and he was followed
by eminent members of the house, and no one impugned
their privilege so to address the house ; or, when they cri.
ticised the conduct of the Government, told them to refrain
from such remarks, and to test the question by a vote of
want of confidence in the Ministry. Yet this repartee of
last session has been brought forward again by the Secre-
tary-at-War. Sir, I protest against these opinions. I see
their object, and know what their consequence will be. It
will stop debate, it will degrade the character of the house,
and put an end to discussion, which is the soul of truth,
and without which this house can never exist. ( Cheers.)
But an hon. baronet who bears an honoured name also
rose early and unexpectedly in the debate, and made a re-
markable observation. Indulging, as I thought, in a mis-
apprehension to which I am surprised his acute mind
could be liable, the hon. baronet referred to a speech which
I had felt it my duty to make last year, in which I said, in
speaking of the causes of the present war, that no captious
criticism respecting the conduct of the war would ever, I
hoped, be heard from us, and so seemed to think that he
had established a case of inconsistency against my right
hon, friend in the course we are now pursuing. I think I
then said, representing the feelings of my friends around
me, that no future Wellesley, on the banks of the Danube,
should ever complain, whatever other difficulties he might
have to encounter, of the obstacles offered to him by an
English Opposition. (Hear, hear.) I need hardly say
that observation referred to the military conduct of the
war. I meant to say, and I think my meaning was under-
stood by the house, that we had neither the presumption
nor the wish to criticise the conduct of naval and military
commanders—that we would place in them that unlimited
confidence which we were sure the country was prepared
to place in men who had been selected by the responsible
counsellors of her Majesty ; and that, whatever might be
the fate of their operations, they should not look back with
feelings of bitterness to the factious criticism of political
parties as having prevented or retarded that success to
which their genius and their labours might have entitled
them. But surely the hon. baronet the member for Tam-
worth would not lay down for a moment that it is not the
duty of the House of Commons carefully to scan, and se-
verely even to criticise, the military expeditions conceived,
and planned, and matured in the Cabinet of the Sovereign I
The hon. gentleman will not, 1 suppose, for a moment.
maintain that Walcheren expeditions are not to be criti-
cised, that conventions of Onus or Sarratoga are to be
passed by a humble House of Commons in subdued
silence? 'Why are we a House of Commons? What chance
have w e of commanding the confidence of the people as
being the sacred depositories of the national sentiment, if,
when national disasters occur, no echo to the feeling of the
people is to be found in this house ? If here, of all places,
we are to be met by a Minister who says, " If you disap-
prove of what has occurred, notwithstanding the emergency,
notwithstanding the difficulties in which the Sovereign and
the nation are placed, we call upon you to put your opinion
to the test, whether or not there shall be a sudden change
of the Ministers of the Crown." I am sure that gentlemen,
on whichever side they may sit, will see upon reflection
that these are principles tot) dangerous to public liberty to
be encouraged, and that we must not for a moment sanc-
tion the appeal of a Government that, upon their measures,
whether successful or unsuccessful—however they may
have been conceived, whatever may have been their objects
or their consequences—it is the duty of the House of
.Com-
mons, from a feeling of patriotism, to be silent, or to incur
the responsibility of administration. Why, suppose. that
the House of Commons were silent—suppose that.m. this
probably brief session we had abstained from all criticism
upon what has occurred and is occurring--suppose that
we had met and adjourned, having passed those necessary
and formal measures which the Lord President has
ready to propose to our notice should we pre-
vent discussion ?—should we prevent the expression
of dissatisfaction and discontent in the country?
You would have a dissatisfied people out of doors, who,
feeling that they could not give a constitutional expression
to their sentiments, would have recourse to agitation--
more inconvenient, I should have thought, to a Minister
than the discussion of public questions in this house, where
observations are at least conceived in the spirit of patriotism
and expressed in the language of gentlemen.
Having adverted to this remarkable expression on the
part of the Government of a principle so unfavourable to
public discussion, let me recal the house to consideration
of our actual condition. I want to divest the subject o