The Press.
London, England, 1855-02-17 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

Quartermaster General's department in the
Crimea.
The Army List fir the current month gives
us the names the Kicers responsible fur
that .departmen . "moo are as follows
1 . .
r
(hear usrelf .—Major-Gen. Aires.
Aide- • um .--Pqii . Mint H. C. Jervoisii,
Assis
‘ot Q iterom, r-General.—Lieut.-Col.
Hon. A. ordoW.
De
ve f Major Weptibt-
1
Brether. I; Von. A. Hardingi;
Brevet Majors J. liao ett; W. Santrey, C. J.
Woodford, K. Macken 0.
Here are nine names in this most important
department, and only two—those of the sons
of the Earl of ABERDEEN and viscount HAR-
DINGE—beIong to " aristocracy." The head of
the department (General AIREY) does not
belong to any noble or patrician stock; and it
might be invidious to inquire how closely con-
nected with the middle classes are some of the
other names in that list. Whether that cue.
partroeut were mismanaged or not, it is plain
that " aristocracy " cannot be held responsible
as the cause of its blunders.
lu that instance we see the value of inquiry.
It at once exposes the fallacy of a factitious
" cry." Well, we want investigation for the
sole purpose of coming at the facts by evidence,
as in the case of the West Indian Committee,
worked so incomparably by the lamented Lord
GEORGE BENTINCS. Does any one suppose
that if " Lord GEORGE " were now alive he,
with the help of a committee, would allow
himself to be baffled in ascertaining who were
the official culprits responsible for the calami-
ties of our army? Now, the War-office stands
where it did six months ago ; its correspon-
dence is on the ale, its clerks at their desks ;
its minutes duly registered, and the late
managers of that office have not left the coun-
try. They are on the spot still, and must
know what they did, and what they did not.
That is the very thing at which we can arrive
by a committee, and only by a committee.

THE POSITION OF LORD DERBY.
NEVER, during his brilliant career, did Lord
DERBY occupy so remarkable a position as at
the present time. The acknowledged chief of
the most numerous, and the most principled,
party in the State, the Conservative leader
has recently signalised himself by a rare act of
self-denying patriotism. Rather than risk the
public weal, by exposing her Majesty's coun-
sels to another change of Ministers, Lord
DERBY, with manly firmness, put aside the
temptation of forming any Cabinet of
whose stability he could not be thoroughly
convinced. He lost office, but he has gained
in fame. He relinquished his hold upon
authority only to rise superior to his rivals,
and to gather fresh moral force for that great
object which he is destined to achieve—the
consolidation of the Conservative party.
That Lord DERBY has risen decidedly in re-
puation we have not the least doubt. A firm
Government was, in Lord DERBY'S opinion, the
first requisite of the country. The pride and
pomp of lofty station—the pleasure of being
the Minister at the head of the powerful Con-
servative connection the gratification of
directly serving his SOVEREIGN, and obliging
the faithful political friends who are proud to
marshal under his command—all these per-
sonal objects he resolved to forego, rather
than cast any air of doubt or insecurity over
the public counsels of England. And we
know that by doing so, in the estimation not
only of impartial observers, 'but of avowed
opponents, Lord DERBY has won the guerdon
of a patriot. Amidst the terrible wreck of
public reputations that has occurred recently,
it is gratifying to feel that our Conservative
chief comes unscathed from the ordeal.
But in acting like a patriot and true states•
man, we are convinced that before long it will
be seen that Lord DERBY has sagaciously con-
sulted the true and enduring interest of
the powerful connection which owns him as
its chief. We are aware that some persons
have thought that Lord DERBY should have
taken office the tendered him. Honourably
anxious for success of their party, they

SATURDAY,

have been too precipitate in their calculations.
It is with political as with military campaigns.
There are victories only the forerunners of
inevitabl4 .reti.o4;*ltt are transient
trium2hs e c opr cursors of disaster.
A stuism u, like " gre general, must be
eireuX6po in his rve f the difficulties
betoro liiio;an4 he st n anticipate a
.4
ob-
stacle
gal 116 a kik
g l s em while in his
Rowel.. es in iiii. chair, and philoso-
pherilizs elusion, M.h ord to be retrospec-
tively Wft, but statesmen have to act, and it
is impossible to proceed with energy and
surety unless the leaders of a party look be-
fore and around them. Nor must we forget
that as transient gains in war often herald
lasting losses, so apparent retreats are often
followed by marches to victory. More than
once it has been shown that the Oppoaitiou
benches are a Torres Vedras, where a wise leader
husbanding the strength of his forces can
calmly anticipate the certainty of his anta-
gonists being compelled to strike their camp.

THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA.
THE army estimates just laid before the House
of Commons show that Government contem-
plates a considerable addition to our military
strength. The army is to be augmented by
50,000 men, at an increased charge of upwards
of six millions and a half of money.
We can only express our hope that,
in proposing these estimates, the Govern-
ment are at last awake to the crisis which
is impending over our army, and that they
have resolved to organise us large a force
as the recruiting powers of the country will
allow. But it would be unwise to shut our
eyes to the extreme difficulty there will be in
carrying out this or any adequate scheme.
The effort has been too long postponed. It
requires great preparation, and many pre-
liminary steps which have been neglected.
It is impossible to improvise an army.
Where can we get the men? The ordinary
rate of recruiting will not supply them. It is
only sufficient to fill up the gaps caused by
our losses before Sebastopol. The Militia
cannot furnish them. One hundred and
eleven regiments are now embodied, and only
muster 43,000 bayonets. If every man of
them volunteered, and they were converted by
a stroke of the pen into troops of tlie line,
they would scarcely suffice for the increase
proposed.
But the men must be obtained. It is no
use folding our hands and looking on, wile
our army wages an unequal contest with the
countless legions of the Czar. This or some
similar plan must be brought forward, and
must not be allowed to remain a nullity, a
mere plan on paper. It will not do to
announce at the beginning of the session of
1856 that the augmentation has been only half
carried out for want of men.
It is not for us to show how the end may be
accomplished. Government, with their know-
ledge of the recruiting service and the condi-
tion of the country, are best able to devise
inducements which shall have the required
effect upon our population. But there are one
or two things which the common sense of
every man will suggest, and which we may
take the liberty of stating. In the first place
the bounty, as at present given, is absurd.
In
regiments of the line five shillings only is paid
down, the rest is given in pay and necessaries.
Men are on their guard against the delusive
offer. They understand how little of the money
will ever be intrusted to their own spending.
A large part of the bounty ought to he paid
down on enlistment. With men in that class
of life a few pounds in cash is irresistible.
But while we endeavour to attract new
recruits we must husband and make the most
of those we already possess. The problem is
to produce the largest possible number of
soldiers available against the Czar. It is no
use taking 10,000 of our best militiamen and
shutting them up in Mediterranean fortresses,
with a proviso that under no possible cir-
cumstances shall they be sent on active
service. They will be worse than useless ;
they will be in the way. Troops destined
for the war ought to be sent as near it as
possible. Reserves ought to be accumulated