The Press.
London, England, 1855-12-29 00:00:00

have probably been discussed and decided

on.

The Allies have opened the negotiation.

It is for Russia to continue it, and we now

wait her action.

The German papers, quite as likely to be
well-informed on the purpose of Count ESTER-
EAzy's mission as our own, altogether repu-
diate the idea that he is the bearer of a kind

of ultimatum requiring for answer a mere Yes
or No. Modern diplomacy does not work by
such simple and severe forms. It is ridicu-
lous to suppose that the Minister of the Aus-
trian Court will proceed like an old Roman
ambassador—will intimate that Peace or War

depends on a shake of his coat-tail, and stand
with a door-handle in his grasp until the final
- word determines him to quit the Council-
chamber, or to take a chair by the fire. His
mission is much more likely to be the com-
mencement of a negotiation than its end.
Speculating on probabilities, it does not
appear likely that Russia will churlishly
reject advances made in a spirit of concilia-
tion ; nor is it likely that she will unreservedly
bind herself to conditions, whatever they may
be, which must admit of much modification in
detail. We apprehend it to be more likely
that she will propose discussion of them with
the view of coming to an arrangement which
shall be mutually satisfactory to all the par-
ties concerned.
The question of the time is, in what spirit
shall we be prepared to receive such a sugges-
tion? If we believed that there was any real
meaning in all the clamour and abuse we have
heard launched against Russia, we should
deem it impossible that any such arrangement
could be made. But we make large allowance
for the necessities of journalism, and for the
thoughtlessness and irresponsibility of popu-
lar oratory. We are satisfied that if any one
three months ago had predicted that before
the end of the year the Allies would he pro-
posing terms of Peace to Russia, and through
the mediation of the Austrian Court—Lord
PALMERSTON, the author of the Melbourne
war-harangue, being atthe head of our Govern
ment—the prophecy would have been received
with a shout of derision. We respect the
proverb, —II n'est que le premier pas qui mite.
The first step has been taken, the next will be
comparatively easy.
In fact, unless this preliminary to negotiation
be the most hollow, and in its essence the
most false, that was over attempted in the
affairs of great nations, and when great inte-
rests were at stake, we must be prepared to
follow it out, and accept its consequences
with sincerity. We must abandon all idea of
dictating terms to Russia, and of treating her
as a conquered nation dependent on our
mercy. Such a tone might be appropriate if

definition of the boundary lines between her
empire and that of Turkey. While principles
essential to the settlement of the Eastern
Question are adhered to, no good purpose can
be gained by positively insisting on particular
details. In international differences, the ends
of pacific settlement are commonly to be at-
tained in a variety of ways ; and to absolutely
insist on the adoption of one way is to oppose
unnecessary obstacles to the realisation of the
object desired. The suaviter in mode may be
judiciously exercised, while the fortiter in re is
adhered to. It is not our aim to humiliate
Russia by insisting on petty points which she
is unwilling or unable to concede, but to gain
by some kind of arrangement or other those
ends which we know are essential to the in-
tegrity of the Turkish territory, and indispen-
sable to the safety and liberties of Europe.
The War was undertaken in the view of all
statesmen, not to conquer Russia, but to
restrain her. It cannot end until this purpose
of restraint be achieved. No one can survey
the history of the last century, and doubt that
the policy of Russia has been uniformly ag-
gressive ; but her success has been less owing
to her inherent strength than to the weakness
of her adversaries, and to the absence of any
powerful, organised, and systematic opposi-
tion to her designs. The effect of such oppo-
sition has now to be tried. The object of the
Allies is to raise up barriers to her progress.
If Russia is disposed, through the stress laid
upon her, to assist in the work, shall we refuse
her co-operation? We hold that a Peace must
be more secure which she herself willingly
takes part in bringing to a conclusion, than a
Peace to which she submits as matter of ne-
cessity for a time, but is resolved to break on
the first opportunity.
In the mediation of neutral States, we must
confess that we have little faith. Often a
narrow view of their position and interest
leads them to desire a prolongation of the
War which they ostentatiously profess their
anxiety to close. In any great quarrel their
positive influence must be small, and neither
party might be willing to believe in their sin-
cerity or candour. When the belligerents are
mighty, as in the present case, they alone
can be judges in their quarrel, and can have
weight to compose it. Mediators can do little
more than smooth a way for their meeting,
and soften the pride and asperity which keep
them apart. It is from a direct and honest
negotiation between the Allies and Russia
that we must rationally expect a settlement
to result.
The proposal of a Congress, which has been
set forth in Paris with a great show of au.
thority, does not appear applicable to present
circumstances. Such an assembly, however
well-intended, must be vain when the belli-
gerents themselves can some to no terms, and
must degenerate into a mere obstructive for-
mula when principles of agreement are set,
tied, and details alone have to be arranged.
Such an expedient is not suited to the English
temper; nor do we think it possible that the

LORD PANMURE'S LOSS OF KARS.
As we anticipated, the fall of Kars has raised
stern indignation in tho most opposite quar-
ters. Ardent promoters of the war are indig-
nant at a great opportunity having been
thrown away, while, on the other hand, persons
not zealous iu the present contest aro astc-
nished that such negligencos should have
taken place under a Ministry which makes
pretensions to a war of extremities. The great
length of time given to our War-office for
repairing the blunder adds to the serious cha-
racter of its " supineness." Its want of energy
seems almost incredible. Unfortunately, tho
forced surrender of the brave WILLIAMS and
his associates is an historical event.
The old stock excuse cannot be made—" Wo
" acted in concert with our brave allies, and
" they have been in fault just as much as our-
" selves." The plea would be worthless. It
could not be based on truth, and even if it
were, common sense would scout its reception.
A similar plea was not accepted twelve months
since when the country imperiously demanded
why the precipitate descent on the Crimea
had been made : nor even in the Parliamentary
discussion of the strategies of the campaign
was such a futile excuse allowed. It would be
strange, indeed, if such a mode of defending
blunders had been accepted by Parliament and
the public. The responsibility of Ministers
would in that case have become a mere
delusion.
In the present instance, however, there
cannot be the faintest grounds for asserting
that the non-relief of General WILLIAMS is also
to be debited to our French allies. Let it bo
remembered that the British Cabinet took
personal cognisance of the defence of Kars ;
for there is a most important distinction be-
tween the action of our Cabinet in the Tram-
caucasian provinces of Russia► and between
its joint operation with French and Sardinian
forces in defending Wallachia and Bulgaria.
There were no French or Sardinians employed
at Kars. But there was an English staff there
in correspondence with both the Foreign and
War Offices of England. What Englishmen
could accomplish of Turkish

troops was
Silistria. Oui
our clubs and
popularity of
the war ; and
personal frieni
ance with Maj
and THOMPSON,
of General
reverses.
Yet that is
first repulsed

plish at the head of Turkish
shown at Kars as well as at
Lr shop-windows, an, ,••(; n; _a
d family circle, ~.•• o.•:;•-• • I.e '
WILLIAMS as one • • 4.4
many of our re.- •
'lds exulting ove • • 3.1 -10
ijor LAxx and C: • • . .• LI
)N, the distingu . • ts. 3
WiLusids in 4•
•• • • .r'•
• vi
etz
not all. When Gal ';4l • -
, -
the Russians from - • s

1230

of jubilant sounds issued from the War-office.
The despatches of General WILLIAMS were
prominently printed at full length in the organs
of the Cabinet. Credit was taken for the
" sagacious foresight of the Premier," and
" the practical capacity of Lord PANmuna."
The vigour of the Administration Was bouted
of, and there were some indirect rebukes to
those who had hinted that the expedition at
Kars had been neglected.
Either the baste of the Cabinet and 00
organs were trub or false on that occasion as
to the practical cognisance of the affairs of
General WimaAms : if false, there was a scan-
dalous gasconnade on the part of Ministers ;
if true, their assumed superintendence, vaunted
of at that time, cannot now be denied. From
this dilemma of responsibility ingenuity would
vainly try to exculpate the Cabinet.
We cannot suppose that the audacity of
partisanship, or the unscrupulous habits of
official asseveration, would rashly attempt in
the face of facts to deny the responsibility of
our War-office. Surely, it requires not the
industry of historical research to ascertain
the patent facts of the last year's campaign in
Asia Minor. The character and extent of the
British assistance was not concealed either
from friend or foe, from the Allies or from the
Russians. Firstly, the Turkish army in Ana-
tolia was to be re-disciplined and organised
under English auspices, on a better system of
military arrangement. As time would be
necessary for accomplishing that object, it
would be desirable to interpose a powerful
obstacle to the march of the Russians in the
field—hence it was resolved, not without good
sense as to the design, that (secondly) the
frontier town of Kars should be occupied and
defended.

But in war, though plan is of importance,
execution is nearly everything. The most
brilliant conceptions of a Marlborough or a
Turenne are mere chimeras, unless carried out
with corresponding energy. Louis XIV. was
himself an admirable War Minister for his
glorious Marshals in the field. Our own
MARLBOROUGH was aided by most able English
statesmen, let Mr. MACAULAY blacken their
moral characters as he will. A Wolfe would
be almost worthless, if there was no Chatham
in the Cabinet. NAPOLEON conquering Italy
proclaimed CARNOT as the " organiser of vic-
tory ;" and WELLINGTON would never for the
second time have been sent out to the Penin-
sula, hut for the repeated pressure of CASTLE-
REAGH on his colleagues. " The Duke " himself
is the witness to the truth of the latter fact.
But if we are to judge of Lord PANEL:IAN'S
talent for war by his neglect of Kars, though
the eventuality was obvious to every eye, it is
not too much to say that " supineness" like
his Lordship's would have blasted the laurels
of the most consummate Generals that ever
fought. Observe how the chain of personal
responsibility is coiled around Lord PANMURE
in this case. He came into office on the
cl,wntitll of the Duke of NEWCASTLE. In pre-
'ions years his Lordship had official expe-
rience of the War Department, and it was
hoped that with the personal recollections and
suggestions of the Premier the country
would find an able Minister in Lord PAN-
MORE.

The Duke of NEWCASTLE left when things
ware at the worst. Lord PANMURE came in
with fine weather in the Crimea, and the
dawning consciousness of the popular mind
- that war was a more serious affair than a
young and inexperienced generation believed.
The purse of the nation was opened, and a
reign of profuseness followed a routine of
stint, parsimony, and traditional terror of
" Joe Hume." The public had bought their
experience dearly. Lord PANMURE was in
office simultaneously with the revolution of
the public mind, and his Lordship was lucky
in taking office after and not before the first
scenes of the war. In point of fact, Lord PAN-
MURE was never subjected to the same grave
ordeal as the Duke of NEWCASTLE. The nation
was ready to do anything, and pay bills to any
• mount.

But the campaign in Asia Miror was pre-
cisely the undertaking for which Lord PAN-
MIME made himself responsible. The design
of the campaign was approved of at home ; it
was made a Btitish of ; the English officers