The Press.
London, England, 1855-05-12 00:00:00

440

would have tried the weak, but they would
have invigorated the strong. Difficulties
would have established a more practical sys-
tem and more thorough efficiency in the in-
ternal system of the corps ; but the inglorious
losses of the Militia have had a contrary
result. The efficient men have disappeared
in a mass, and the raw recruits alone have
stayed. Discipline and organisation have
been for a time at an end. Esprit de cusps has
suffered a temporary annihilation. The
Militia has been plunged into a state of
chaos, out of which time alone can enable it
completely to emerge. Such is the state of a
force which ought at this moment to be
almost fit for active service. To the nation it
is humiliating, but to the culpable Minister it
is in the highest degree discreditable.

OUR INDIAN ARMY.
A CONSIDERABLE personal advantage has been
conferred on the Indian army by the late order
granting the officers of it the rank and prece-
dence indicated by their commissions in her
Majesty's dominions and elsewhere, instead
of in India only, as their commissions run ;
but, as Lord ELLENBORMIOR justly observed in
the House of Lords, this will prove of little
benefit to the State, unless their services be
more freely employed in connection with the
present war than they have been hitherto•
Some of the juniors of the Indian army have,
to be sure, gone out to Constantinople as bri-
gade majors to Lord WILLIAM PAITLET, and in
the Land Transport Corps, and others have taken
service in the Turkish Contingent ; but this
is a division in which the element of jobbing
was too rife at the outset to warrant our ex-
pecting it to increase or even to sustain ado
quately the Indian array's ancient fame. Had
we seen such names as those of Sir Huon
WHEELER, and GRANT, and HANDsCoMBE,
and JACK, and MAYNE, and LUMSDEN, figuring
in its list of officers, we should have augured
well of it ; but, from some cause or other, the
flower of the service who were at home would
not embark in it, and nothing, we conscien-
tiously believe, can be expected from it but
utter failure. By-the-bye, we forgot that
Lord PArimunE appointed an unknown cousin
of his as aide-decamp in it—rerhaps that
may, in the minds of some, redeem it.
But it is not in a military capacity only, or
even chiefly, that we should expect advantage
to be derived from the employment of Indian
officers in connection with the present war.
The fact is, that many of them have served
nearly all their lives in a civil capacity, and it
is in that capacity that we would suggest
their being engaged. The first want of an
artily is a good intelligence department, with
ramifications extending throughout the whole
circle of country which the operations extend
to, or are affected by or affect ; and that it
would seem Lord RAGLAN'S army has not at
present. To any one who has ever been en
gaged in war it is needless to say that without
such aid the operations of an army resemble
at best but buffettings in the dark ; while with
it every blow must tell, for with it every blow
is struck with a knowledge of the exact effects

that must come of it if successful, and of the
precise amount of dependence one can place
on the chance of making one's intentions good.
It is, in fact, the business of this department
to furnish the General commanding with every
possible information regarding the opposing
forces, the terms they stand on with the people
of the country, their intentions, their stores,

and their sources of supply of food, ammuni
tion, transport, and forage, together with de-
tails regarding wells, roads, and water-courses,
and generally all that may relate to their com-
munications and ability for carrying on the
war to a successful issue. It is also the busi-
ness of the department to furnish him with
similar information as regards ourselves. In
fact, the officer politically attached to the
General should be a perfect compendium of
all the knowledge regarding the country that
the General may require, and which such
officer will have little difficulty in picking up
if he is only allowed a sufficient sum for

THE PRESS.

secret-service money, and perfectly under-
stands his business.
Now, for the appointment of chief of such
an office in an eastern country, a well-selected
Indian officer would be peculiarly fitted.
There are many in the Company's service who
have performed similar service in India, in
Scinde, and in Affghanistan ; and who would,
under proper encouragement from the War-
office, have no objection to proceed to Sebas-
topol and renew their old occupation there.
A chief agent of this kind, with five or six
assistants, would, we have no doubt, very soon
throw that light on matters in and around
Sebastopol, and the neighbouring provinces,
for which, it would appear, we have been, so
far, groping in vain ; and they would thus
enable Lord .R►GLAN to see at a glance what
he could do, and what he could not do, at any
present or future moment. Such officer should
not, as in India, have any control whatever over
the General, for that would be to introduce
the vicious part of a system which is in other
respects most admirable. It is only, indeed,
by the adoption of it that those nice combina-
tions and masterly decisions as to the moment
for attack or changing ground can be adopted
which give war its brilliancy and establish a
General's strategetic fame. In this respect
there is no army in the world that is better
served than the Russian, and to the expert-
ness of their officers in this branch of their
duty they owe far more than they do to their
admitted bravery in the field. It is by the
formation of such a department only, and the
placing it in fitting hands, that Russian inge
nuity can be met and foiied. It is by such
means alone that Lord RAGLAN can be put in
a position to do that justice to his army and
to himself which we yet hope that he will
do eventually if only adequately supplied with
the necessary means from home.