The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1868-12-26 00:00:00

SHALL WE CEDE GIBRALTAR?

An amusing canard has been recently thoited to the effect
that General Prim, iii order to secure his elevation to the
Spanish throne, was determined to attempt the possession
of Gibraltar by a coup-de-main. As an approach by land
would be out of the question, it is supposed the attack
would be made by the whole naval force of Sionn. Hut
Admiral they, wriling to the Times from licrley-010 flumes,
suggests a more peaceable way of settling the difficulty, and
we have much pleasure in re-printing his letter, witch pa so
replete with common sense:—

In a letter published by one of your contemporaries
Wednesday last on the subject of the cession of
Gibralter there is the following paragraph:—
- •

It is proposed in some or the Spanish papers that we should
restore Gibraltar to Spain, and receive Ceuta by equivalent
The absurdity of the proposition to too palpable to call for
commeilt. -

So far from considering this proposal an absurdity,
it is now many years since I first advocated this solu-
tion of a difficult question, and I have written to mem-
bers 4,f both the last and present Governments to urge
its adoption. I was for ten years Captain of the Port
of Gibraltar, and do not, therefore, address you without
at least haring had a good opportunity of forming an
opinion; and while on the spot I brought my view of
the case under the consideration of the late Admirals
Sir Charles Napier and Sir R. Thindas, both of whom
entirely concurred with me. I have never heard
any reason given against the exchange, except the old
stock arguments of its being a loss to our prestiw
and that the country would not consent to it. Has
the country ever regretted giving up Corfu?
But, to take up as little of your space as possible, I
will in a few lines give my principal reasons.
Admitting, as I do, that some port at the entrance
of the Mediterranean is a necessity, I maintain that
Ceuta might be really made a harbour of refit, coaling,
and refuge—not one of which conditions does Gibraltar
fulfil in a time of war with Spain, the only safe
anchorage for merchant vessels being completely com-
manded from innumerable points of the Spanish
coast. It never was considered so, even in the wars
at the commencement of the century, and, with modern
artillery, not a house on the Rock would be out of easy
range. The "Gibraltar Shield," of which we heard so
much lately, is very suggestive of insecurity and

expense.
Such is the case in the event of war with Spain.
But even in peace time the Bay is so exposed to
gales from the S.W., and, in spite sd the shelter of
the Rock, so subject to flurries and white squalls in
an easterly gale, as to be at all times a most insecure
anchorage. For coaling purposes for merchant
steamers, there is no wharfage—only cool bulks, often
totally unavailable. For men-of-war there is limited
accommodation at a mole recently constructed. One
small and inconvenient point of access only is open
for commerce at the Waterport. The larger steamers
now seldom touch at Gibraltar if they can avoid it.
The cessioo to Spain will not prevent wind-bound
vessels anchoring in the Bay during peace; in time
of war, as I said before, not one cou'd do so. Ceuta
is better suited for our purposes, the African shore
being the most frequented in passing the Straits.
With the area surrounding it now possessed by Spain,
it might be made almost impregnable, but with the
Moors as neighbours and a command of the sea its
attack would be very improbable.
My proposal, therefore, is to express our willingness
to make this exchange, under some such conditions
as the following :—That a certain number of years
should be allowed us to form a harbour to the south-
ward of Ceuta by a breakwater similar to that at Port-
land, for which there is every facility, and then to cede
Gibraltar intact, with all its fortifications, in return
for a proportion of the expense at Ceuta being paid by
Spain. Other details appertaining to orivate property
and inatiirie/ f war I need not enter into.
In conclusion, I would express my firm conviction
that while the exchange would be most advantageous
to Spain, it would also be the best bargain for Eng-
land; and if so, why, in the name of COMIIIOII sense,
keep up a rankling sore for the sake of a vain prestige
which after all is more nominal than real, especially
when any one at all conversant with the immense pro-
gress made by Spain in the last thirty years, in spite sd
bad Governments, must feel certain that, sooner or
later, she will resume her proper position in Europe!
To put the case fairly before the country—what
would the inhabitants of Weymouth say, or, indeed,
all England, if the Spanish ensign were to be hoisted
and the morning and evening gun to be fired by
Spaniards from a fortress on the Bill of Portland and
commanding that Bay?

The Times has a leader on the subject, in which they
ly
. . .

Spain has certainly enough on her hands already. without
any additional trouble; and even if we were disposed to
surrender the Rack, it can hardly be said that there exists a
Spanish Govermnent to receive it. The temper, however, of
the age does undoubtedly incline to the considerathin of su.di
questions with a liberality formerly unknown, and English-
men rail now hear it asked, without emotion, whether the
retvntion ill Qihraltar represent, in point of fact, a national
loss or a national gain. The Spaniards would naturally like
to recover the place • we, as naturally, should he disposed to
keep it. Those, at least, would be the first impressions on
the subject ; but they might possibly be succeeded on one
aide, at any rate, by different views after a little considera-
tion.
-

Gibraltar does beyond all question represent not enly
British prowess. lint Brii ish power. We not only conquered
this famous fortress upwards of a century and a half ago, hut
we have held it against all comers ever since the story of
Its seiues enters prominently into our annals and its garrison
expresses at this moment with singular force the military
strength of the Empire. Moreovet, we are two/ informed
that a port at the entrance of the Mediterranean is nothing
less than a neca,sity for us. Some harbour or other
we must needs have at that spot for refuge, refitting,
and c' OMR allil if that is the case, awl Gibraltar is onrs
already, why not retain it as an indispensable retreat and a
monument of 'dory at the same time:, True, the estab ish-
inept on the Rock involves is considerable charge; lad so
would any other establishment which might be substituted
for it. If we are compelled to provide ourselves with a port
of our own at the entrance of the Nlediterraneen, we must
necessarily occupy some m,int on foreign territory, and be
Prepared to defend it. Better, therefore bear the ills we
have, and pre4erve our prestir unimpaired, than attempt
to change our burden at a clear cost to the national pride, it
not with some worse liability
-

Those, we may suppose, would be the arguments on our
own side of the question ; nor is it altogether easy to answer
them. We are asked, as if conclusively, "Han the country
ever regretted giving up Corfu ?" Well, if we must reply
a nit a pia " Yes "or .• No," we say, "Certainly not ;" and
yet that cession has not been with ut a certain ill effect
upon ourselves, while it clearly did no good whatever to those
who clamoured for it and obtained it. We have, in a certain
degree, been the worse for the surrender ; Oreeie, incontest-
ably, has been none the better. Probably the circumstance
Is almost forgotten, but it really did appear in the early
Fenian trials that Mr. Jame. Stephens and his immediate
accomplices had argued frim the cession of Corfu to the
cession of Ireland. They thought they could make them-
selves quite RS great a nuisance as the Greeks, EVA then, they
said, England will be glad to throw op the conntry tor peace
and quietness, "as she did the lonian Islands " Those
speculations, expressed in those very words, actually served
to encourage the Fenian conspirators; and if we were now to
proceed to one surrender after another, every cession might
he made an argument for a fresh demand, till we had nothing
left to yield.
On the other hand, it may fairly be urged that we are strong
enough, and should be wine enough, to entertain any such
question on its own merits, without much regard to the con-
tingencies indicated shove. If our cession of the lonian
I elands dtd delude the ',ennuis into imagining that we should
be ready to cede Ireland on a 'initial provocation, the ile.
hlliioll, after all, only damaged its own victims, sv,tholit ever
endangering for a moment the integrity of the E•cpire. It
Wa% sound policy to give up Undo, and we certainly do not
regret the surrender, notwithstanding the foolish ex-
pectations that wore built upon it. Similarly, if it
should appeer sound policy to give up Gibralter, we can
very well afford to do so, and confront the consequences
if any people should misinterpret the aut How-
ever, if tile Spaniards do really attach asp great impor-
tance to this question, they may gather front these aro-
meats what a pawnor Parliament might be likely to think of
the matter. We have our '• susceptihilitiea" as well as they,
and we are by no means et prepared to abate any rational
pretensions or to surrender ally historical trophies without
good reason and equivalent at'vatitage. On the other hand,
we are ceasing to think that the prosperity of the Empire is
bound up with even the smallest of its possessions', we can
understand that a foreign settlement may represent rather a
loss than a gain, and we are more disposed than formerly to
balance the claims of others against our own.