The Press.
London, England, 1855-11-17 00:00:00

THE WEEK.

THE speech of the French Emperor at the close of the Exposition is
the great event of this week. Louis NAPOLEON never before uttered
words which will be so eagerly scanned by Europe. The tone of this
graceful and dignified address will be critically contrasted with the
war-to-the-knife bluster of our Premier at the Mansion-house banquet.
With the French Emperor the war is undertaken for a definite
principle, and wholly discountenanced for any other purpose than
the attainment of those objects for which hostilities were
commenced. " Peace," said his Majesty, "to be durable,
" must clearly resolve the question from which the war emanated."
This view coincides remarkably with the opinions which
have been put forth in THE PRESS. In the speech of Louis NAPo
LEON the object and limit of the war are clearly defined, and the prin-
ciples of peace as clearly laid down. On his own desire for peace the
Emperor laid marked emphasis,—" You should desire each of yon, as
" I do, that this peace should be prompt and durable." It is most
unlikely that the Emperor would have spoken these words if he had
not been convinced that peace was not only desirable but practicable
and if he had not received convincing proofs of the desire of Russia to
terminate the contest, and to make every concession which can
reasonably be desired for the prompt and lasting settlement of the
Eastern question.

As the campaign for 1855, both in the Baltic and Black Sea, is over, it
becomes a question of no little importance, assuming the war to con-

inue, to consider the preparations necessary to enable us to resume
the contest with a chance of attaining some more unequivocal success
than has yet fallen to our arms To what purpose, therefore, can the
energies of the country be most profitably directed between this time
and the opening of the next campaign? Of course our army in the
East should be duly cared for and strengthened, and our Euxine

fleet he kept in an efficient state, to continue the system of warfare
which has proved so injurious to the enemy. But it is not in the
South that we can now hope to strike a decisive blow against Russia.
Should she be resolutely bent on maintaining the contest, we must
strike nearer her heart before we can hope to break her power and
her pride.
Cronstadt is the grand point to be attacked. Of all the enemy's
defences, that is the one on the impregnability of which he counts
most securely. It is the gate of his capital, the stoutest bulwark of
his empire. When we reflect on the incredible preparation and toil
it cost NAPOLEON with his grand army to penetrate to Moscow, and
consider the ease with which the allied fleets can reach Cronstadt, the
only obstacle to an advance on St. Petersburg, we must acknowledge
that no effort would be too great to reduce this famous fortress.
The only question is, whether with all our naval strength and resources
we are equal to its attack. The failure of the two Baltic campaigns
already tried, counts for nothing, as the allies had not the description
of force which would have enabled them to attack with advantage.
Next year, with greater energy on the part of our Executive, the result
may be very different.
The experiment lately tried with the floating batteries in the Kin-

burn expedition has been encouraging. The French batteries seem to
have answered admirably, and it will be our own fault if wo do not
profit by the inventive ingenuity of our Allies.
At Sweaborg our gunboats proved their efficacy. The only fault

was that there were not more of them, and that extra mortars were not

kept in reserve to replace those worn out by the firing. Knowing how
destructive was the fire of fifteen of these active and stinging vessels,
we can imagine what consternation would be caused to the defenders
of a fortress by the concentrated fire of a hundred of them.
The principle of the floating batteries is similar. They are de-
signed, like the mortar•boats, to present as small a mirk to the enem y
as possible, while carrying guns of the heaviest calibre to assail the
enemy's works. But, in addition, they are made shot and bomb proof
From their size, structure, and capability of continual motion they will
be difficult to hit, but even if hit, will throw off the missile which strikes
against them.
It is to this new arm iu conjunction with the gun boats that we
must look for success in any serious attack upon the Baltic fortresses.
It seems to be admitted that our screw liners and frigates are
machines too costly and too easily susceptible of injury to be risked
against stone walls with the improvements which have made battery
firing so much more destructive than formerly. The work must be
done by less pretending engines of destruction, and the floating
batteries seem to possess every requisite for the purpose
Would it be possible to build and equip a hundred of these vessels
against next summer? With our immense resources it would seem so•