The Press.
London, England, 1853-10-08 00:00:00

Czar at t)lu►iitz that. '•his t ioVerllaleat would
" particularly guard against na►king any l►ledge
" of material support to► the Sultan ►n case he
should declare war against Russia." But the
Meets wen', at all events, present, if not with
acknowledged hostile intent: and the Czar lu►s
otli•red ter►us, though not under aeknowledged

pressure.
Of these respective movements of the Porte
for war, and of the Czar for peons., both may
be sincere, and yet at this stage WOE may be
imminent. lf, on the other hand, the Czar's
predisposition fior an arrangement is avowed
in the same sense us his acceptance of the
Vienna note, war must not only be imminent
hut unavoidable. If, again, the Czar is sin-
cerely desirous for peace, he can only attain it
by withdrawing from his position. Prince
IliFxscelrot is explanation of the grounds of his
refusal of the modifications of the Vienna note
required by the Porto has plaeed his Majesty
in this humiliating alternative—either he must
consent to receive a declomition of the mean-
ing of the ‘'iennot note entirely contradictory
to his own interpretations and that of the
Porte, or he must submit to accept a fresh
document framed studiously to exclude the
proteetorate which he elaimed over the sub-
jects of the Porte through the medium of
Prince Mnssemsows. In either event he 1111Dit
submit to the humiliation of a withdrawal
from the terms defined by his diplomatic,
agent, and must admit peace as a personal
confutation and reproach.
The inference from this is not only patent
but conclusive as to the policy which our
own Cabinet has pursued. If the Czar re-
cedes in the face of a threatened resolve, and
recedes under the lash of shame and vexation,
he would not have stolvaneed had that resolve
been notified at an earlier date, with English
candour, English consistency, and English
courage. The first defeat which Lord ANKK-
uEEN sustained in his own Cabinet is said to
have been its resolve to empower Lord STRAT-
FORD to 1411111111011 the English fleet as soon as
ho thought posTer. If this be true, his first
defeat has been the means of his first and
only, though as yet contingent, success. if
the peace of Europe is still to be preserved,
it is only maintainable in derision of feminine
tremors which invited for a time the Cossack's
threats; and thus Lord AnzausEs may °Main
a respite, to leis country's and his own benefit,
though in spite of himself.
His organs may be premature in offering any
reflections upon this paagible issue. But at all
events the " moral" which they venture to
deduce from this eompromising story is de-
signedly remote. The peace of Europe im-
perilled—the Funds at 110—the operations of
commerce paralysed—the Balance of Power
vilwating spasmodienlly—the approximation
of hostile armies, and the threatened resurrer-
tion of revolutionary impulses in the interests of
peace—all these coincident s—this complexity
of hazards, requires some account, and the
explanation is found solely in the ambition of
the Czar. The encouragements to his ambi-
tion are studiously ignored ; but, as divided
councils produce opposite explanations, we
are told in that organ of one of the Ministers
which we have already quoted, that " the truth
" is, that, believing that France and England
" would not art together or firmly in opposi•
" tion, the Entneror of Busoos seized upon
" what he imagined to be a good opportunity
" for footifying his ambition ; ' and we add to