The Press.
London, England, 1855-10-20 00:00:00

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No. 129.—V0L. 111.

LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1855. UNSTAMP STAM ... SIXPENCE.
PED
IV ED..FEPENCE.

Cke tress.

For these reasons we resist those wild
appeals which would give to the war a new
character, stimulate revengeful and implacable
sentiments, and render terms of accommoda-
tion impracticable. The definite objects to
be achieved ought never to be lost sight of;
nor should we cease to connect the idea of
peace with their realisation. We are totally
opposed to either a " war of principles," or a
war of dismemberment. We cannot afford to
waste our strength in any such enterprise.
The country would have cause to curse the
hour in which it was undertaken, and all
follies of past time would seem acts of wisdom
in comparison with the madness which en-
gaged in such desperate and chimerical
designs.
The main objects of the war are still, as
they were, to secure the Integrity of the
Turkish Empire, the Freedom of the Danube,
and the Independence of the Black Sea. The
reduction of Russia is not essential to these
objects. . They are to be attained by arrange-
ment. When they have become settled prin-
ciples of European policy, all Europe will have
an interest in maintaining them. The same
means which have prevented France frorri
extending her empire to the Rhine, and from
absorbing the Low Countries, will surely be
efficient to restrain the encroachment of
Russia. Unfortunately, the limit of her terri-
tory to the South has never yet been arranged
in concert with other Powers of Europe. This
defect has now to be rectified ; and it would
add to the security of any future peace, could
some plan he devised at the same time of
defining her frontier to the East.
It is entirely foreign to the purposes of the
war to interfere with her internal government,
to check the development of her resources, or
to impede the development of her prosperity.
If her great advantages of territory and popu
lation be well employed, they will be advan-
tages to the whole world. Let her frankly
come forward (abjuring all intent of future
aggression) to take part in arrangements
which will define her position in the South,
and remove all pretexts for future quarrel, and
she will find, we venture to say, a party in this
country sufficiently strong to overrule the
senseless clamour for a war of extremity, and
to support terms which, as far as human skill
and prudence may provide, would insure
to the Allies an advantageous and lasting
peace.
Such a peace could not be otherwise than
humiliating to Russia. The terms she has
already acceded to at the Vienna Conference
were humiliating. But have not other great
nations recognised the force of circumstances,
and signed treaties which bore on their face
an acknowledgment of defeat, but which in no
degree prevented those Powers from again
becoming great and glorious England was
humiliated by the peace which she concluded
with France, recognising the independence of
her American colonies ; and France was
humiliated by the treaty of 1815. But where
is their humiliation now, and where the
jealousy they have so often entertained of each
other's power?
The attack of Russia on Turkey was grossly
aggressive. It has been beaten back and
severely chastised. With the removal of the
causes of war the war itself should cease.
Some period there must always be in every
war when peace is felt to be practicable, or
wars would he eternal. Has not such a period
now arrived? Sebastopol has fallen the

Euxine fleet has been destroyed—the coasts
of Russia, both in the Black Sea and in the
Baltic, have been ravaged almost unresistingly
by the allied navies—and the powerlessness
of Russian arms for aggressive warfare has
been decisively established. It is remarkable
that up to this time Turkish troops alone
have sufficed to heat back the aggressive
movements of her foe. On the Danube, at
Silistria, and now at Kars, the Russian forces
have had their most desperate efforts deci-
sively defeated by Ottoman troops. Can it be
doubted that, firmly allied to the Powers of
Europe, and backed with their support, Turkey
would maintain her ground against any future
attack of Russia, should she ever again be
so ill-advised as to make the attempt?
Can Russia, after what has passed, doubt
the firmness and power of the Allies—their
resolution to succeed in their objects—or the
good faith which unites them? From first to
last the war has been for her only a series of
severe defeats, for the Allies a series of
glorious successes, in which their constancy
has surpassed even their valour. What better
ground of pacification can future campaigns,
however bloody and expensive, give than
exists at the present moment?
It is evident that members of the Democratic
party in this country perceive the probability
of peace, and arc making desperate efforts to
avert it. They are mistaken as to the extent of
their influence, though aided by those war
interests which are rapidly growing up and
thriving on the profuse expenditure of the
Government. The country understands that
it has, and can have, nothing to gain from tho
war but a satisfactory settlement of the
Eastern question ; and should such settle-
ment become practicable, we do not for a mo-
ment doubt what the choice of the nation will
be when the question comes fairly before it
of CONSERVATIVE PEACE Or DEMOCRATIC WAR.

LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 20, 1855.

Thosz persons who suppose that discussion
on tho Policy of the War is out of place at the
present time, take a very short-sighted view of
the question. It is true that for the present
we must be content to carry on hostilities
with our utmost strength, to attack the enemy
on every vulnerable point, to make him feel
as severely as possible the calamities of war,
and convince him by dreadful experience that
those calamities will gather round him thicker,
and deepen in intensity, as hostilities con-
tinue. But for what purpose is all this ?
Shall we make war for the sake of war, or for
the sake of peace ? If our aim be conquest,
or the annihilation of our foe, it might be
wise to pursue our end irrespective of every
other consideration ; but if our aim be a solid
and satisfactory Peace, it can never be amiss
to discuss the terms on which it may be con-
cluded.

There are two ways in which we may sup-
pose that public opinion in this country will
directly influence the character and duration
of the war. It will act in the first place on
the temper of the Russian people and the
policy of its Government ; and in the second
place it will influence the conduct of our
Administration almost to the extent of pre-
scribing the course it shall pursue.
We cannot force Russia to a pacific dis-
position, but we can avoid embittering the
contest by heaping contumelious epithets
upon her, and by declaring that we will be
satisfied with nothing short of her destruc-
tion. Our arm will not be the less strong
because our head is cool, nor our will the less
firm because we see distinctly the objects we
contend for.
If Russia understands that conciliatory ad-
vances on her side will be met with insulting
triumph or churlish rejection, it is very un-
likely that she will be induced to make them.
It will be difficult, if not impossible, to strike
at her heart. When we have ravaged her
coasts, and occupied some points of her
territory, she will yet retain enormous power
of resistance. Taunts will be met by taunts,
and defiance by defiance. It is only by de-
fining the objects of the war, and by showing
that we desire, not the annihilation of our
enemy, but conditions essential to the peace
and prosperity of all nations, that we can
expect Russia to come forward and frankly
accept terms which would fulfil those con-
ditions. We cannot invite, but is it necessary
to repel her? Shall our political attitude be
moderate or furious—temperate or frenzied ?
Still more direct is the influence which
opinion must exercise on our own Govern-
ment. The national will is not to be resisted;
when fairly expressed, it must dictate the
policy to be pursued. No peace will be
possible if the word be unacceptable to the
country, and if the Minister believes that he can
strengthen his position by identifying himself
with a reckless prosecution of hostilities.