The Press.
London, England, 1855-07-07 00:00:00

THE EFFECT OF THE REPULSE.

ALTHOUGH the repulse of the 18th has in no way
dishea►tened the allies, yet the position of our army
in the Crimea is highly critical, and demands watch-
fulness on the part of the nation. We are surrounded
by dangers, and cannot be certain that we have dis-
covered the way to success. A few weeks ago the

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victories in the Sea of Azoff, the evacsation of Cir
cassia, and the storming of the Mamelon, threw a
delusive light over our military operations. The
conquest was imagined to half adcomplished ; the
enemy to be disheartened; and his fortifications
unable to resist our onset. We had only
to choose the moment for the capture. Such
opinions were general in England and almost
universal among out troops before Sebastopol.
It was in vain to point out that these achievements
were but the preliminaries, that we had only cut off
part of the sources of supply, and carried some of
the outworks of the fortress,—while the real struggle
was still to come, and there was no reason for
believing that it would be an easy one. Nothing
could exceed the confidence which was felt in the
camp, or the ardour with which the assault was
looked for at home. But the disaster of the 18th
has forced upon us a sense of our difficulties.
The attack, though ill-conducted, was yet well
planned and extensive. Twenty-five thousand
French were accumulated upon four different points
of attack against the fortifications which extend
from Careening Bay to the outskirts of the Redan ;
five thousand English were ready to be launched in
three columns against the Redan, and two thousand
more against the vicinity of the Barrack Battery ;
while an advance was made by OMEn PACHA and the
Sardinian troops to threaten the communications
with Baktchi-Serai. The attack began prematurely
on the left, and was taken up in succession from left
to right, each division coming into action almost at
the moment when its next neighbour had been re-
pulsed. We were fairly beaten in detail, and forced
to draw off to our own lines, after a bloody and fruitless
struggle.
Of all the movements that against the Barrack
Battery was alone successful, and had it been fol-
lowed up with vigour the results might have been
different—so says the camp. In reviewing the
causes of our defeat we must admit that the skill
and resources of the Russians had been underrated.
Their artillery was thought to be dismounted, and
their troops unable to stand before the allies. We
were not prepared for the dense masses that lined
the ramparts, the guns remounted, the fresh
batteries unmasked, or the steamers that were
brought up with so much precision to sweep the
ground with their terrible broadsides of grape and
canister. Success had been imagined certain, but it
proved to have been almost impossible.
Let us consider the position of the Russians. They
occupy the whole of the centre of the Crimea,
communicating by two routes with the Continent,
the one being the military road over the
Siwash, and the other that through Perekop,
and they possess two roads from Simfero-
po to Sebastopol, one passing through Bakchi-Serai,
and the other making a circuit to the north of
Sebastopol. These lines of communication are
almost unassailable. In the south they are defended
against an invading army by impassable mountain
defiles, fortified with the utmost art, and in the
north they are protected by the want of water and
the poisonous exhalations which surround both
Perekop and the shores of the Putrid Sea. Upon
these roads the greatest activity prevails; they are
crowded with advancing troops and convoys of ammu-
nition and provisions. The anticipations of failure
in the supplies do not appear likely at present to be
realised. At the same time Sebastopol itself is well
fortified, and its troops are animated with the most
fanatical courage.
The Allies have an army of 200.000 men encamped
npon an unhealthy plateau, and pushing its recon-
naissances a considerable distance into the hill-
country. Unprovided with sufficient means of land
transport, they cannot undertake any extensive ope
rations in the interior. The alternative is to
press forward with their main strength the attack
upon the town. Of provisions there is no
lack, but loss must be apprehended from the
ravages of disease, counterbalancing the rein-
forcements from home. New batteries, bombard-
ment, diversions, land assaults—such is the re-
curring round of operations to which our forces
seem destined, until one after another every position
is won, and the enemy driven across the harbour.
But who can tell how long or how short a time will
elapse before this consummation? The telegraph
may announce the news to-morrow, or winter may
find our troops still dragging out a laborious ex-
istence on the heights.
Such a state of things requires constant careful-
ness, not only on the part of a Cabinet, but from the
country. One error of the Administration at home
may produce incalculable results, and retard for years
the conclusion of an honourable peace. We have to
deal with a Government that is scarcely competent
for its duties, that forms no enlarged views, that car-
ries out its plans without energy ; a Government that
has already shifted from a peace policy to a war
policy, and may without a moment's warning change
bsck again.

THE PRESS.

THE BALTIC CAMPAIGN.

WHAT is our Baltic fleet going to do this year ?
Two months have rapidly passed away, and we have
done nothing; two months more will close the navi•
gation of those seas, and are we to do nothing?
The one thing needful for attack has for the last
twelve months been commonly understood, to be
small vessels with heavy guns, but our Admiralty
have hitherto appeared to concentrate the whole of