The Press.
London, England, 1855-03-31 00:00:00

LORD PALMERSTON AND THE

MILITIA.

IN a war like the present, undertaken with
small military resources against a great mili-
tary power, the Militia is of the utmost im-
portance. It affords the only means of raising
an army of reserve, and of procuring the
necessary supplies of men for the troops on
active service. The duty of a statesman is to
develop it to the utmost. He ought to embody
it as early as possible, to complete its num-
bers to the highest complement, and to bring
it into a state of the most perfect discipline
and efficiency. That this has been neglected
is apparent to every one, and the consequences
are seen in the want of reinforcements for the
Crimean army, and the weakness which ex-
poses us to the ridicule of Europe.

During the whole period when the develop-
ment should have taken place the Militia was
in the hands of Lord PALMERSTON. From the
first stage of enrolment in December, 1852,
down to the end of January last it was under
his charge. Ho directed every step that was
taken. Parliament assented with the utmost
alacrity to every measure that he proposed.
The amplest power was given, and everything
was left to his discretion. How this unlimited
authority was used, and into what state the
Militia has been brought, we now proceed to
inquire. Four points demand our especial
attention :

Ist. The English Militia was embodied too
late. As our only reserve, it should have been
called out the moment we resolved on the
Eastern expedition. In the days of Prrr its
embodiment was the preliminary of war. War
was declared against France on the Ist of
February, 1793. The Militia of England had
been embodied on the Ist of December, 1792.
War was declared on the 18th of May,
1803. The Militia of the United Kingdom
had been called out on the 10th of March pre
ceding. But what did Lord PALMERSTON do?
The Russian Ambassador left London on the
Bth of February, 1854; British troops em-
barked for Malta on the 22nd ; the warlike
banquet to Sir C. NAPIER was on the 7th of
March ; and war was declared on the 25th.
Yet then no step was taken respecting the
Militia. It was not till the Ist of May that
Lord PALMERSTON introduced a bill to give
power for their embodiment, and intimated
his intention of calling out 15,000 men. He
says that he could not embody them earlier,
because the bill of 1852 did not give the ne-
cessary power. But he had only to ask
for such power. Parliament would have
passed an act in February as readily as in May.
2nd. The embodiment was too slow. Fifteen
thousand men was the number asked, but it
was November before they were all embodied.
The first two regiments were embodied on the
13th of May. Only thirteen regiments had
been embodied on the Ist of August; four
more were called out before the Ist of Sep-
tember; and in the ensuing month another
was added to the list. On the Ist of Novem-
ber the whole number of embodied regiments
was eighteen, and their total strength 13,500
men. The news of Inkermann produced a

change. In December thirty-seven fresh re-
giments were called up. But why was this
call not made before ? Why were eighteen
regiments the sole produce of tho first nine
months of the war?

3rd. The ScCtch and Irish Militias were
totally neglected. On the Bth of February, in
the first fortnight of the session of 1854, Lord
PALMERSTON pledged himself to organise these
forces. On the 10th of August, two days
before the close of the session, the bills were
passed. Even then they were not acted on
with energy. It was December before the
Irish regiments began to be enrolled. They
are still but half filled up. The Scotch regi-
ments are even in worse plight. Men and
clothing are alike deficient.
4th. There is a flaw in the obligation of the
men to serve. The men enlisted under the
act of 1862 were only liable to embodied service
in case of invasion. The act of last May com-
pelled them to serve in every ease of war. The
terms of service were changed without their
consent. A pledge was given that faith should
be kept. But it was disregarded. Under the
compulsory power, without taking any pre-
cautions for re-enlistment, and in spite of
wide-spread discontent, Lord PALMERSTON em-
bodied sixty-five English militia regiments.
What was the consequence? So flagrant a
breach of faith could not be passed over. It
was brought ender the notice of Parliament,
and Lord PALMERSTON was compelled to an-
nounce that the men should be re-enlisted,
and that those who were unwilling to serve
should he allowed to return home. Probably
one-half will return. The embodied militia
is 44,000 strong, only one-third of its proper
complement. The blunder may cost us 22,000.
What is the result? We ought to have
138,000 embodied militiamen. We can only
count upon 22,000; and this at a time of
unparalled public need ! The English Militia
has been mismanaged, the Scotch Militia has
been mismanaged, and the Irish Militia has
been mismanaged. The mismanagement could
hardly be more complete. Had we been asked
a year ago how the Militia could be made the
least serviceable for the purposes of the war,
we should have answered thus :—Embody it
at late as possible. Let the embodiment be
as slow as possible. Don't begin till May or
June, and don't call out any number of regi-
ments until December. Don't pass the Scotch
or Irish Militia acts till the last day of the
session. Don't begin to organise the new
force until Christmas. And, when public in-
dignation and calamity have compelled you to
raise a force of thirty of forty thousand men,
let some flaw appear in their enlistment ; some
breach of faith which may compel you to allow
one-half of them to return to their homes.
So, by you want of foresight, your want of
energy, and your blundering incapacity, shall
you render the Militia useless, waste millions
of money, and cripple the nation in the prose-
cution of the war. Has not all this been
done?