The Press.
London, England, 1855-04-14 00:00:00

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LONDON, SATURDAY, APRIL 14, 1855.

POSTSCRIPT.

THE CRIMEAN EXPEDITION.

THE official vindication of the late campaign, written
under the promptings, if not by the hand, of the
Emperor Napoleon, appeared at great length in the
Paris Moniteur on Wednesday last. The following
extracts comprise the passages of chief interest in
this elaborateland carefully prepared pike justificatif.
The writer begins by briefly recapitulating the cir-
cumstances under which the Western Powers deter-
mined to send an armed force to resist the aggressions
of Russia upon the Ottoman territory, and then
proceeds to recapitulate the "instructions" given to
Marshal St. Arnaud when he was first entrusted
with the chief command of the expeditionary army,
and which were dated, it appears, on April 12,
1854 :
In placing you, marshal, at the head of a French army,
about to fight at more than six hundred leagues from its
native land, my it recommendation is to bestow the
greatest care on the health of the troops, to spare them as
much as possible, and not to come to an engagement un-
less you have made sure of twothirds at least of the fa-
vorable chances.
The peninsula of Gallipoli has been selected as the
chief place of debarcation, because it is intended to be, as
a strategical point, the basis of our operations—that is to
say, the place dal-Ines, where we can place our depots, am-
bulances, and provisions, and whence we can easily ad-
vance or re-embark. That will not prevent you on your
arrival from stationing, if ytni deem it advisable, one or
two divisions in the barracks either to the west of Con-
stantinople or else at Scutari.
So long as you are not in the presence of the enemy the
dislocation of your forces will be of small moment, and
the presence of your troops at Constantinople may produce
a good moral effect ; but if, by chance, after advancing on
the Balkans, you should be constrained to beat a retreat, it
would he far more advantageous to regain the coast of
Gallipoli than that of Constantinople, for the Russians
would never venture from Adrianople to Constantinople,
leaving as they would on their right a choice army of
60,000 men. If, nevertheless, there should be a wish to
fortify the line of Karassu in front of Constantinople. it
should only be done with the intention of allowing it to hi
defended by the Turks alone, since, I repeat it, our posi-
tion will be more independent, more formidable, by being

on the flanks of the Russian army, than by being blocked

up in the peninsula of Thrace. -
This first point established, and the Anglo• French army
once united on the shores of the Sea of Marmora, you will
have to come to an understanding with Omer Pacha and
Lord Raglan respecting the adoption of one of the three
following plans :-1. Either to march and meet the Rus-
sians on the Balkans. 2. Or to sieze the Crimea. 3. Or
to land, say at Odessa, or at any other spot on the Russian
coast of the Black Sea.
In the first case, Yarns seems to me the important point
for occupation. The infantry might go to it by sea, and the
cavalry more easily perhaps by land. In no case ought
the army ever to remove too far from the Black Sea, in
order that it may have its communications constantly open

with the fleet.
In the second case, the one concerning the occupation of
the Crimea, it is necessary above all things to be sure of
the landing•place, in order that the disembarkation may be
effected at a distance from the enemy, and that this place
may be capable of being fortified quickly, so that it may
serve as a support in case of a retreat.
The capture of Sebastopol ought not to be attempted,
unless you are provided with at least half a battering train
and a great many sacks of earth. When you approach
that place, do not neglect to seize Balaklava, a small port
situate four leagues to the south of Sebastopol, and by
means of which communication may be easily kept up
with the fleet during the continuance of the siege.
In the third case, that in which an enterprise should be
resolved on in concert with the admirals against Odessa.
• • • • • • •

In every case my principal advice is, never to divide
your army, but always to march with all your troops
united ; for a compact mass of 40,000 men is always an
imposing force ; broken, it is worth nothing.
If, however, you are bliged to divide your army, make
arrangements for reuniting it on some spot in twenty-four
hours.
If on the march it forms several columns, fix upon a
point of reunion sufficiently distant from the enemy to
prevent any column being attacked singly.
If you repulse the Russians, proceed no farther than
the Danube, unless the Austrians join in the movement.
As a general rule, every movement ought to be concerted
with the Commander-in-Chief of the English army. It is
only on certain exceptional occasions, as when the safety
of the army is concerned, that you should act on your own
sole decision.
Marshal, f have full confidence in you ; I am convinced
that you will remain faithful to these instructions, and
that you will bring fresh glory to our Eagles.
After referring to the glorious battle of Alma, and
assigning the flank march to Balaklava to an "in-
stinct and self-preservation which never deceives,"
the writer embarks into a technical description of
the enormous difficulties which attended the siege
of Sebastopol under the circumstances and by the
forces employed on that perilous service. Compa-
rison was also drawn with some other memorable
sieges recorded in history.
The article concludes with a panegyric upon the
leaders and the troops :
We might multiply examples, but the foregoing will
suffice to show that the Anglo-French army in the Crimea
has performed there all that was to be expected from its
courage and the ability of its chiefs. It has not only ex-
hibited constancy and firmness in the midst of sufferings
and perils—by adding the glory of Inkermann to that of
Alma it has raised still higher the honour of our arms.
We ought to hope that the end of its noble efforts will be
attained; but unanimous opinion already acknowledges,

and history will one day repeat, that it has merited the ad-
miration and the gratitude of the world.
In a future paper the writer promises to treat
"with the same precision and impartiality " concern-
ing the negotiations, their various phases, their rea-
sons, and their aims.
The successive movement of the allied armies are
then detailed and justified. After the retreat of the
Russians from Silistria the invasion of the Crimea
was undertaken as the preferable alternative to doing
nothing. The motives and prospects of that enter-
prise were these :
An expedition against Sebastopol might probably hasten
the catastrophe of the war. Such an expedition had a
determinate end. It might possibly put into the hands of
the allies a province and a fortress, which could be used
as a guarantee and a means of exchange in the event of
negotiation for peace.
In the practical execution of the undertaking the
Commander-in-Chief, however, " unfortunately" de-
parted from the instructions, or rather advice, he had
received. As thus :
The expedition having been made the subject of deli-
beration at Paris and London, Marshal St. Arnaud re-
ceived—not instructions which could not be transmitted
through such long distances of space, but hints or advice
of the following nature :
He will make himself thoroughly acquainted with the
nature and amount of the Russian forces in the Crimea ;
find out whether those forces are too formidable ; and land
in a spot which may serve as a basis for future operations.
The best place seems to be Theodosia, called Kaffa now.
This spot, however, is objectionable, as being forty
leagues from Sebastopol: but it offers great advan-
tages. In the first place, the bay is large and safe.
The ships of the squadron are there in perfect safety,
and the same remark applies to the barques which bring
supplies to the army. In the next place, our army,
once established on the spot, may use it as a proper
base of operations. If we occupy the extreme east of
the Crimea, we can repel all the reinforcements coming by
the way of the Sea of Azoff and the Caucasus. We make
our way onward towards the centre of the country. at the
same time that we have its resources at our command
We take possession of Simferopol, the strategical centre
of the peninsula, and have the road open to Sebastopol, on
which probably there will be a great battle. In the event
of this being against us, we may retreat upon Kars, and
nothing is compromised. If it is in our favour. we eau
besiege Sebastopol, and by investing it completely we shall
compel it to surrender in a tolerably short interval.
Unluckily this advice was not taken. Whether
the generals in-chief had not sufficient troops to
undertake this long journey in the Crimea, or whe-
ther they expected a speedier result from a bold and
unexpected coup de main, they resolved, as it is now
well known, to land at some few leagues distant from
Sebastopol.

Advices from Madrid of the Vith inst. affirm that
some disturbances had broken out in that city, but
which were soon suppressed by the military autho-
rities. Fifteen of the ringleaders were arrested.
The differences between the Spanish Minister of the
Interior and Lord Howden, the English Ambassador,
respecting the molestation by the Roman Catholic
authorities of a Protestant clergyman at Seville in
the private discharge of his duties, have not been
adjusted.