The Press.
London, England, 1855-10-27 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY, OCTOBER 27, 1855.

IN many of the speeches lately deliver3d on
the War, a hope is expressed that the action of
the country may be unanimous, and that the
evils of the contest in which we are engaged
may not be aggravated by divided councils.
In this hope we concur. Hitherto all parties
have agreed in the justice of the War, and,
after a certain point, in its necessity. When
the forces of the Czar were arrayed for the
invasion of the Turkish empire there was no
longer any question—except perhaps in Lord
ABERDEEN'S Cabinet—as to the course which
this country should pursue. Hence our na
tional resources were placed—absolutely with-
out limit—at the disposal of the Government.
It could not ask enough. Money, men, arma-
ments, supplies of every kind, were pressed
upon it, with an agreement and eagerness to
which there is no parallel. This devotion has
not been without its reward. In spite of un-
accountable mismanagement and unpardon-
able delays, our forces have grown. Our
Transport Service has assumed colossal pro-
portions, and our magnificent fleets in the
Baltic and the Euxine have shown to the
world that on the seas England maintains her
unquestionable supremacy.
But it is vain to expect that this unanimity
will last, if the objects for which the War was
undertaken are changed—if after having re-
pelled and chastised the aggression of Russia
we are now to enter on a new war for her dis-
memberment. It is probable that the Cabinet
which issued the Declaration of War had never
definitely settled the purposes for which it
was to be waged ; but the Declaration itself
subsists, and there we find it expressly stated
that her Majesty was compelled "to come
" forward in defence of an ally whose territory
" is invaded, and whose dignity and indepen-
" dente are assailed." Among those who
concurred in the war there might have been
some who had ulterior views, and hoped it
would lead to European convulsion ; but we
are justified in stating that by the Conservative
party, the War was demanded for the t ettle-
ment of the Eastern Question by defining the
position of Russia in the South, and by se-
curing the Independence of the Black Sea.
If those great objects—which, notwithstanding
partial obscurations, the statesmen and people
of this country have never lost sight of since
Russia pushed her frontier to the Euxine—can
now be attained, the war ought naturally to
cease; and a great party will assuredly grow
up amongst us adverse to the prosecution
of hostilities for aims which are either un-
defined, or which are chimerical or pernicious.
Absolute security for the objects we pro-
pose must be impossible. In policy—dealing
with the future and with contingencies
so numerous as to defy all calculation—there
is no error so great as to endeavour to attain
complete certainty on points to which a degree
of uncertainty must inevitably attach. By
endeavouring to absolutely guard ourselves
from one danger, we open the door to another.

No lesson stands out more plainly in history
than this —that nations should be con-
tent with a fair and moderate security against
the dangers they apprehend, and never at-
tempt to push too far advantages obtained
over an enemy. There is usually in all wars
some point at which the very security which
is desired turns into peril ; or at which resist-
ance is enabled to rally, and to meet attack
with advantage.
The War is too wide a question for the con-
test of Parties. It is more likely to absorb
them. Matters which concern the peace of
the world, and will largely influence the future
destinies of England, must not be discussed
in a party spirit. That different views may
conscientiously be taken of the policy to be
pursued is admitted, but those views must,
from the gravity of the circumstances, be
formed irrespective of the motives which in-
fluence politicians in ordinary times.
Still less can it be tolerated that Class Views
shall prevail in the consideration of this
subject. Whether war has a tendency to raise
or to lower prices is not to be taken into
account. If it be necessary to continue the
war, all difficulties which it involves must be
met. But if no such necessity exists, War
Interests must not for a moment be suffered
to raise their voico in favour of its con-
tinuance.
Those who hold that the present time is
favorable for a satisfactory settlement of the
Eastern Question are met by the strong objec-
tion that our adversary does not appear to
think so. The weight of this difficulty is not
to be depreciated. We recognise it in its
fullest extent. Yet, after the concessions
which Russia has already made, and after the
defeats which her arms have sustained, we
believe that she must acknowledge the force
of circumstances, and that nothing can be
wanting to cause her to make pacific advances
but the conviction that they will be fairly
received by the Allies.
Even if we set aside all ideas of justice and
principle—if we look upon policy only as we
do upon chess—Russia cannot fail to perceive
that she is playing, and must, as long as the
war lasts, play a losing game. The fact is,
that the alliance of the Western Powers is too
strong for her to cope with. She would not be
a match for either France or England singly.
Attacked by both, she is certain to be defeated
wherever she is assailable. What need is there
of a thousand trials to decide a principle when
one suffices?
It is the part of political wisdom to estimate
forces, and to yield when resistance would not
only be impracticable but disastrous. The
French Revolution of 1848 was in many
respects an improvement on its predecessors.
Instead of sanguinary struggles in the streets,
the parties of Order and of Revolution assem-
bled open places, where their numbers
could be seen. The minority withdrew, and
the majority dictated the law. Why may not
the same kind of action prevail when nations
are hostile to each other? In Homer the
balance of Jove decided the battle before it
began, or while it was in suspense. Heroes
withdrew from the field in mid-fight when
they recognised his will. Is Russia
so destitute of political foresight that she
cannot look up, mark the poise of the beam,
and yield herself to a destiny she has not
power to resist ?
In this country the War party is divided
into two classes. There is a section loud in

tongue, but weak in influence, which would
carry on the war to extremity, from a belief
that it will insure the triumph of Democracy
all over the world, or that the destruction of
Russia is necessary to the progress of civilisa-
tion. The other class, more moderate, would
continue the War because they think its pro-
gress has not hitherto been quite satisfactory,
and that it has not gone quite far enough.
They plead for ono more campaign as a child
whose appetite is but partially cloyed pleads
for some tempting but dangerous luxury.
This well-meaning class is at the present
moment the most difficult to deal with. They
do not understand that in the affairs of na-
tions as of men there is a tide which once lost
does not return, and that to wait by the shore
while it is flowing is to miss the golden
opportunity afforded by the mercies of Pro-
vidence.

At this time Russia is humbled but not
conquered. The demands'of the Allies would
naturally be confined to those objects essen-
tial to the limitation or definition of Russian
power in the South, because they would not
be entitled to ask for more. But if the " One
further Campaign " so gently pleaded fur takes
place, the positions of the belligerents might
be so greatly changed as to afford no room for
that Settlement which is now desirable.
If we prosecute hostilities for the com-
plete possession of the Crimea, what shall
we gain but a new element added to the diffi•
culties which already beset the Eastern
Question ?
Even more than the fall of Sebastopol, the
achievements of the allied fleets in the Sea of
Azoff, and, more recently, in the Liman of the
Dnieper, must convince the Court of St. Pe-
tersburg that the Allies have the power of
enforcing terms which are indispensable to
a settlement of the Eastern Question. The
choice for Russia indeed is, whether she will
accept such conditions as are essential to the
future peace of Europe and the freedom of its
commerce, or abandon the fruits of a century
of progress by withdrawing from the seaboard
of the E'txine, that she may concentrate her
strength where it will be comparatively safe
from attack.
The language held by THE PRESS when Lord
ABERDEEN'S Cabinet debated whether Russia
should be resisted, and when organs of the
Government told us that Turkey was not
worth an effort to save, it holds still. War is
not the greatest of evils, but Peace is the
greatest of blessings. We desire it on terms
which calm and impartial judgments shall
recognise as wise and magnanimous. But if
the War must proceed—if it is necessary to
our honour or our safety, to our rank in
Europe, or the fidelity of our alliances—it is
not the Conservative party which will shrink
from its prosecution.