The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1875-07-31 00:00:00

TRIAL FOR MURDER.

At the Maidstone Assizes last week, George Blampied, a
man of middle age, described as a shipwright, was indicted
for the wilful murder of James Catt, at Chatham, on the 16th
of April last.
Mr. F. J. Smith and Mr. Barrow were for the prosecution;
Mr. Glyn, at the request of the learned Judge, defended the
prisoner.—The case is thus reported in The Times
The two men had been for some time employed in
the mastbouse at the dockyard, Chatham. A few
months before the shocking occurrence they had had
a altercation ; but since they had been apparently on
good terms. On the day mentioned they were at work
together on the same mast, about 6ft. from each other,
and the prisoner was using an adze. Just before the
act of homicide the prisoner went twice to the fore-
man for directions as to his work, and seemed quite
cool and sensible. Suddenly those who were near the
two men heard the sound as of a blow, and heard the
deceased man cry out, "Oh! oh I" One of the work-
men ran to the spot and found Catt lying down and the
prisoner standing close tohim with the adze in his hand;
and another witness who came up saw the prisoner
move from the deceased. This witness cried out, "He
has killed Jemmy." On which the prisoner said,
"No, he has killed himself ; " and afterwards he added
that Catt had taken up his adze and killed himself.
But, from the nature of the wounds inflicted, it ap-
peared that this was impossible the wounds being at
the back of the head, and one Of them of such depth
that it had actually cleft the skull. The prisoner was
quite cool and collected, and helped to remove the
poor man to the surgery, where, however, he died in a
few minutes. The prisoner went to the police office
and said he had to report that Catt had taken his adze
and had struck himself with it severely. He was
then charged with having killed the man' and said he
was innocent. There was no doubt that he had com-
mitted the act. The defence set up on his behalf was
insanity, and he had certainly been in a lunatic
asylum for some time, but be had,been three years ago
discharged as cured, and had been in the service of the
Government in the dockyard at Chatham, to all ap-
pearance perfectly in the possession of his senses.
The prisoner, when called upon to plead, pleaded
"Not guilty "with every appearance of sanity.
A shipwright, who was working with two others not
far off in the same masthouse, stated that he had
known the prisoner 14 or 15 years, but more intimately
for the eight or nine months previous to the fatal oc-
currence. The prisoner, he. said, had come to him for
directions as to his work about half -past two, and thero
was nothing then in his aspect or demeanour at all un-
usual. The two men, he said, bad worked together
eight or nine months, and, so far as was known, were
on good terms. At the time of the dreadful occurrence
the witness and two other men were from 301 t. to 601 t.
from the prisoner and the deceased, and on hearing the
sound of the blow and going up to the spot, he
sa'w the prisoner standing with his adze in his hand.
Witness was frightened and went back to get assist-
ance, and on his returning to the spot the prisoner,
who had then put the adze down, said that Catt had
taken his (the prisoner's) adze and killed himself with
it. The two men at the time were working within 6ft.
of each other, and as the adze is 2ft. or 31t. long the
prisoner would only have to take a step in advance
with his arm extended to bring it down on the head of
the deceased. The prisoner just after the act was
quite calm and collected,. and there was nothing, the
witnesses aidy,trau. tqa his pea 27,91.
The ectOAT ladVs ideTita he` Orisonir C:ECiiae
to him and said he had something to report, and went
on to say, "I have been employed in the madhouse,
and when I turned round James Catt, who was em-
ployed with me, took hold of my adze and struek him-
self on the head with it, seriously injuring himself."
The inspector said. "He's dead then?" To which
the prisoner replied, " No ; I don't know about that."

"Where is he?" asked the inspector. "At the sur-
gery" said the prisoner, adding, "He was a good
mate, a good workman, and a good fellow." The in-
spector proceeded to write down the man's statement,
and read it over to him, and he said it was correct.
The prisoner was soon afterwards charged with
murder, and said, "I didn't do it; he did it himself.'
The surgeon who attends the dockyard stated that ill
April, 1874, the prisoner had been under hiq care for a
fevedays for swimming of the head, and again for a few
days in October suffering from melancholia. But this
witness said he knew nothing of insanity, and had not
studied the subject.
The surgeon of the police at Chatham, who saw the
prisoner in custody the day after the occurrence and
conversed with him, stated that he sok- d him, "Do
you know what you are here for ?" and he said he had
"knocked his mate on the head, and the stupid fellow
fell down dead." " Then you killed him?" said the
surgeon, to which the man replied, "I knocked him on
the head, and he fell down dead." This witness stated
in December, 1868, he had signed the certificate for the
removal of the prisoner to Barming Lunatic Asylum
as a lunatic, where he remained until December, 1872,
when he was discharged as cured. The witness said he
agreed with Dr. Taylor that impulsive mania might
come on and go off suddenly, and leave the person quite
cool just afterwards.
The learned Judge observed that every impulse, of
course, was sudden, or it would not be an impulse.
The witness went on to say that "swimming "in the
head might be the effect of the impulse, and that if the
man had been suffering from melancholia the swimming
in the head might be a symptom of an attack.
Mr. Joy, the medical attendant of the gaol, stated
that since the prisoner had been there he had had
frequent opportunities of seeing him, and had conversed
with him constantly, and was of opinion that he was of
unsound mind, being, he said, mad on the subject of
religion. In cross-examination he said the man had
expressed strange opinions on the subject of religion;
and, in answer to the learned Judge, said be considered
him of unsound mind on those subjects. He thought,
he said, that it was a sudden act—an act committed
from a sudden impulse.
The learned Judge: Do you think that he knew,
when he struck that blow with the adze, that it was
likely to kill the man.
The doctor said no doubt he knew that; but he
believed the act was uncontrollable.
The learned Judge said that would not do.
The prisoner's counsel said it was laid down on high
authority that it was so, referring to Dr. Taylor's work
on "Medical Jurisprudence ; " but
The learned Judge said though Dr. Taylor was a
high medical authority, he was not a lawyer, and was
no legal authority at all.
The medical witness said he believed the impulse to
do the act was "uncontrollable."
The learned Judge: What do you mean by that?
Suppose a person takes it into his head to steal some-
thing, is that an "uncontrollable impulse ? "
The Witness: No
The learned Judge Why? In fact, he has not
controlled himself, and in that sense the impulse was
uncontrollable.
The witness said the man had been previously in a
lunatic asylum, but
The learned Judge observed that he did not see how
this affected the question. The man, he said, may be
mad. I assume that he is so in the medical sense of
the term, but the question here is, whether he is so
mad as to be absolved from the consequences of what
he has done. He is not soabsolved, though he is mad,
if he was not so mad as not to know what he was doing,
or not to know that he was doing wrong.
The medical attendant of the Lunatic Asylum at
Barming, from which the prisoner was discharged in
1872, stated that his grandfather was insane and also
one of his sisters, and that when he was received there
in 1868 he was suffering from melancholia caused by
religious delusions. But he was diszharged as cured,
and was believed to be cured, and the certificate of his
discharge was absolute and unqualified.
Upon this evidence the counsel for the prosecution
suggested that the prisoner f from some previous grudge,
the cause of which was unknown, had yielded to a
sudden impulse to murder his mate, and .that all the
circtusistance of the act, especially his denial of it,
were consistent with perfect sanity, and, indeed, indi- 1
cated a perfect consciousness of guilt. If the man had
been mad he would have avowed the act, and give some
insane reason for it, instead of which, however, he had
denied it, until on reflection he had seen that it was
useless to do so.
The prisoner's counsel, on the other hand, urged that
the medical evidence and the previous history of the
prisoner substantiated the defence, on the ground of 1
insanity, and he loudly and boldly declared that it
was quite clear that the man was insane at the time he
committed the act, and was not responsible for it. He I
agreed that to make out the defence it must be shown 1
that the man did not know the nature of the act he
committed; but he urged that this was manifest, from 1
the nature of the act Itself, and the absence of cause or
motive. It was quite possible that immediately after
the act he might have been sane, for perhaps the shock
of the act itself might bring him to his senses. More-
over (it was urged), the very coolness of the man just
after committing such a shocking act was itself the
strongest proof of insanity.
The learned Judge, in summing up the case to the
jury, said the prisoner's counsel had done his duty,
and now they had to do theirs. They were not entitled
to follow their own opinions, and say what ought to be
the law, but simply to answer the questions proposed
to them. The first question put to them was, whether
the prisoner struck the blow; and if so, he told them,
as matter of law, that he was prima. facie guilty
of murder. If dais were so, then it was for the
prisoner to satisfy them, not that it was doubtful
whether he was mad, not even that he was mad,
but that he was so mad as not to know the nature of
the act he committed—that is, that he did not know
what he did, or that he did not know it was wrong.
As to the medical evidence, he declared advisedly
that it was not enough to show that a man was mad, or
had what medical men called an "uncontrollable
impulse," for, even assuming this, the law did not
absolve him from the consequences of his act. If he
knew what he was doing, and if he knew that it was
wrong, then he was responsible for it. That had been
declared to the House of Lords by the Judges of Eng-
land many years ago, and by the law so declared Judges
and juries were equally bound. The House of Lords
propounded these questions to the Judges :
"What is the law respecting alleged crimes committed by
persons afflicted with insane delusion in respect of one or
more particular subjects or persons; as, for instance, where
at the time of the commission of the alleged crime the
accused knew he was acting contrary to law, but did the act
complained of with a view, under the influence of insane
delusion, or redressing or revenging some supposed grievance
or injury?"
In answer to which question the Judges answered as
follows : -

"Assuming that your Lordships' inquires are confined to
those persons who labour under such partial delusion only,
and are not in other respects insane, we are of opinion that
notwithstanding the party accused did the act eomplained of
with a view, under the influence of insane delusion, of redres-
sing or revenging some supposed grievance or injury, or of
producing some public benfit, he is nevertheless punishable
according to the nature of the crime committed if lie knew
at the time of committing such crime that he was
acting contrary to law, by which expression we under-
stand your Lordships to mean the law of the land.
Your Lordships are pleased to inquire of us, secondly, what
are the proper questions to be submitted to the jury
when a person alleged to be afflicted with insane delusions
respecting one or more particular subjects or persons is
charged with a crime (murder for example), and insanity
is set up as a defence? And, thirdly, in what terms ought
the question to be left to the jury as to the prisoner's state
of mind at the time when the act was committed? And as
these two questions appear to us to be more conveniently
answered together, we have to submit our opinion to be
that the jury ought to be told in all cases that every man
is presumed to be sane and to possess a sufficient degree of
reason to be responsible for his crimes until the contrary
be proved to their satisfaction, and that to establish a
defence on the grounds of insanity it must be clearly proved
• that at the time of the committing of the act the party
accused was labouring under such a defect of reason from dis-
ease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not
know he was doing what was wrong. The mode of putting
the latter part of the question to the jury on these occasions
has generally been whether the accused at the time of doing
the act knew the difference between right and wrong, which
mode, though rarely, it ever, leading to any mistake with
the jury, is not, as we conceive, so accurate when put
centrally and in the abstract, as when put with reference
to the party's knowledge of right or wrong in respect
to the very act with which he is charged. It the question
were to be put as to the knowledge of the accused
solely and exclusively with reference to the law of
the land, it might tend to confound the jury by in-
ducing them to believe that an actual knowledge of
the law of the land was essential in order to lead
to a conviction; whereas, the law is administered upon the
principle than every one must be taken conclusively to know
it without proof that he does know it. If the accused
was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do,
and if that act was at the same time contrary to the law of
the land, he is punishable, and the usual course, therefore,
had been to leave the question to the jury whether the party
accused had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was
doing an act that was wrong; and this course we think is
correct, accompanied with such observations and explana-
tions as the circumstances of each particular case may
require.
That is, the Judges laid down distinctly that, even
although the act was done under the influence of delu-
sions, with the idea of doing a public benefit, still if
the person knew it was contrary to law he would be
.
criminally responsible for the act he had committed.
The jury must be satisfied that at the time of the act
the prisoner was under such delusion as not to know the
nature of the act he was doing, or not to know that it
was wrong. Then, did the prisoner in this case kill
the deceased, and did he know he was killing him, and
did he know that it was wrong or contrary to law to do
it? If the prisoner did the act knowing that he was
killing the man, and knowing that it was wrong to do
so, then he was criminally responsible for his act.
It had been urged that there was no motive, and
that it was a sudden impulse, as no doubt it was;
but if that were sufficient to establish the defence then
the less cause there was for a murder the more excuse
there was for it. Again, it was urged that the man
was cool just after the act, and that therefore he was
mad, though that surely depended on the state of his
nerves; for if they were strong then be would be cool
and collected. If the defence was not fully established,
then the jury were bound to reject it. It could not
be seriously disputed that the prisoner struck the
blow, and it could not have been accidental, as the
men were six feet apart. Nor was it possible that (as
the prisoner suggested) the deceased could have done
it himself, as it was at the back of the head, and broke
the bead almost to pieces. The other men were from
30ft. to 60f I. off, and there was no one who could have
done the act but the prisoner, who was found with the
adze in his hand. It was impossible, then, to doubt
that the prisoner committed the act.,--and then he was
clearly guilty of murder, unless the defence was esta-
blished. But the defence required it to be shown that the
man did not know the nature of the act he committed,'
or that he did not know that it was wrong—i. e., that
he did not know he was killing a man, or that he did
not know it was wrong to do so. No doubt the man
was in a sense insane; that is, he was probably under
t 4 :
~,4114qcnce of delusion, and tio .doubt the act waist)
sudden, aild there was no apparent motive for it; but
all this fell far short of the defence set up. He
had been for two or three years working at his
business, like other men, and as to the "swimming in
the head," why, it had nothing to do with insanity,
and might have. been merely a symptom of the
stomach being out of order. The man had been for
two or three years practioally sane, and treated as

sane, and even though he were under the influence
of religious delusions, that was far from showing
such insanity as was required to establish the defence.
It was said there was no motive—i.. e., no known
cause—and that was true; but, in truth, there never
could be an adequate cause for a murder. Then, as to
the circumstances of the act. There were none which
indical,ed iesaeity in the sense which was necessary.
When he found the men coming up to him he put the
adze down and said, "He has taken my adze and
killed himself." Did that show that he was not con-
scious of the nature of the act, or that he was not con-
scious that it was wrong? Did itnot rather show that
he was quite conscious of it, and sought to avoid his
liability for it? Then the prisoner went and made a
statement to the inspector, which was quite coherent;
but was it true? Was it not the sort of an account
which a man would give who sought to avoid the con-
sequences of his act, rather than the incoherent account
which would be given of it by a man who did not know
' what he had been doing? Was there evidence of in-
sanity in the sense which had been explained to the
jury? No doubt the man had been insane, and might
have been so at this time, and it would be better to as-
sume that at this time he was of unsound mind. But
the question was not whether he was of unsound
mind, but whether he was so insane as not to know
the nature of the act he committed—that is, that he
did not know that he was killing a man, or that he did
not.know he was doing wrong in killing a man. If the
jury were satisfied of this, then they would acquit the
prisoner on the ground of insanity; otherwise they
were bound to find him guilty of murder. Their re-
sponsibility, he reminded them, was limited to the
true and faithful discharge of their own duty, which
was to answer truly as to the facts. The ultimate
responsibility as to the fate of the man would rest
with others, who would, no doubt, discharge their
duty as faithfully as the jury discharged theirs. But
their duty was clear and simple; and it was simply to
find their verdict with reference to the truth of the
case and the effect of the evidence.

The jury retired to consider their verdict, and after
being absent for about a quarter of an hour they re-
turned into Court with a verdict of "Guilty, but not
accountable for his acts."

The Clerk of Assize : That is, you acquit him on
the ground of insanity?
The jury: Yes.
The learned Judge: Insanity in the sense I have
explained to you?
The jury: Yes. -•-, - M...* ./.0;i1.31:1.1 • ,)'

The prisoner was then ordered to be detained during
Her Majesty's pleasure.

NEW READING OF AN OLD RHYME.
(Written under St. Swithin's Wet Blanket.)
Dirty days have September, piorry-z
April, June, and November,
And from February until May
• •!.. The rain it raineth every day. 4 101.,,,1j0zn,
All the rest have thirty-one,liirg O'Y
Without a single gleam of sun; A.
And if any should have thirty-two,
7 I They'd be dull and dirty too.—Punch.