The Press.
London, England, 1855-10-13 00:00:00

FRENCH VIEW OF THE ASSAULT ON THE
REDAN.

A LETTER from Professor Aytonn, dated from Paris,
Oct. 1, first published in an Edinburgh paper, has
been copied into some London journals and been
much canvassed, as it gives the French military
view of tie Bntish assault on the Redan. This
view is, that there was no chance of the assault suc-
ceeding, so far as regarded the capture and retention
of the work, but that the assault did succeed in the
object intended,—viz., to effect a diversion of the
Russian force, and prevent it from being concen-
trated against the French at the Malakoff. Some
expressions in the letter have epigrammatic point, as
that General Simpson thought bis "young recruits
good food enough for powder."
Professor Ay toun first speaks of the feeling he
found prevalent in Paris as to the gallantry of our
soldiers, and of his agreeable surprise on discovering
that his numerous acquaintances in Paris, from their

general comprehension of strategic plans, frankly
admitted that the British troops, by their attack on
the Medan, contributed as much to the success of the
day as the capture of the Malakoff by the French.
He then gives the " almost universal opinion of
Frenchmen as to the action ":

The Malakoff was the key of Sebastopol. When that
was taken the town was ours. It was, therefore, necessary
that every effort should be directed to this end, and that
everything else should be subordinate to the capture of
that fort. But, in order to reduce the Malakoff, it was
absolutely necessary to make diversions in other places;
because, if the Malakoff was attacked alone, the whole
Russian army would be concentrated for its defence, and
all the men the allies could bring against it would not be
sufficient to secure its capture
On the Bth of September the approaches to the Malakoff
were quite sufficiently close to warrant the assault. The
French were at less than twenty-five yards from the forti-
fication ; nearly every gun was silenced, the walls around
the fort had been nearly levelled by the play of the artillery,
a nd the French had nothing to do but to walk into the
i ortification, fighting their way, of course, but without the
necessity of an escalade.
But the Great Redan was not in any way prepared for
an assault. The English trenches were at inure than two
hundred yards' distance from the walls. The batteries of
the fort, both in front and in flank, were in full activity ;
and the taking and retention of the Redan under these cir-
cumstances was physically impossible, supposing the
Russians comported themselves with their usual obstinacy
and courage.
Such was the state of things on the Bth of September.
The allied generals thought that the propitious moment
was arrived for taking Sebastopol. General Pelissier said
to General Simpson, '' I can easily, from the position I
occupy, take the Malakoff, but the difficulty is to hold it
before I can bi ing my reserves and artillery into action,
and prepare it for defence. If I surprise the Russians,
which I hope to do, and take the fort by a coup de main,
they will return in such force that the small number of
men who mount to the assault will be overwhelmed and
driven back as on the 18th of June. Ido not expect that
the Redan can be taken by you. You are not in a condi-
tion to du so; but it is absolutely necessary that a diversion
should be made in our favour after our first success, to
give us time to breathe, and to bring up our artillery and
reserves. All I ask for this is one hour, and I will uuder-
take to keep possession of the Malakoff. Make your
assault, and girt us, if possible, that length of respite.
Throw away as few men as possible, but engage the Rus-
sians fur at least an hour, and Sebastopol is ours." Such
is the conversation supposed to have taken place betwixt
Pelissier and Simpson ; and I am informed upon good
authority that private letters from French officers in the
Crimea fully confirm that the purport of what 1 have stated
was really said by General Pelissier.
Such was the plan adopted. It was exactly in accord:
&nos with the tactics of the great Napoleon, who was in the
habit of sacrificing a certain number of men in order to
secure the object in view. Napoleon was in the habit of
saying to a colonel of a regiment, without mincing the
matter, " Allez vous faire tuer, vous et votre regiment,"
when he sent a devoted corps to the attack of a redoubt or
a position which there was not the slightest chance of
taking, and that in order to facilitate the successof another
part of the army. And the corps of General de Salles, who
attacked the Central Bastion, and was repulsed, was placed
in the same position as the English, except that the work
it had to do was not quite so desperate. This is the real
state of the case fully admitted at Paris, but which, of
course, could not be openly declared in the despatches,
although it is hinted at sufficiently clear to military men
in the report of General Niel. The devoted band which
attacked the Redan, as well as the French under De Salles,
were in a manner sacrificed to the success of the great
object in view, the retention of the Malakoff. They were
the forlorn hope—" les enfans perdus "—of the allied
armies. This the blundering correspondent of the Times
has not had the sagacity to discover, and he has expressed
himself as if the sole object of the English bad been to take
the Redan. Nor has the Times itself, with all its thunder-
ing articles against General Simpson, seen clearer.
The explanation which I have just given, and which is
recognised by everybody in Paris, is the real one, and clears
up the apparently inexplicable conduct of General Simpson.
Why, it is said, did not he send reinforcements? Because
he knew that no reinforcement which the English army
could have sent could have secured the capture of the fort,
and would have been an additional and useless loss of life.
His object was merely to occupy a great portion of the
Russian army for a certain time, and to give Pelissier
time to fortify himself in the Malakoff, in order to be able
to resist the tremendous attack of the BUBBiall army to re-