The Press.
London, England, 1855-09-15 00:00:00

PROSPECTS OF THE WAR.

LET the fall of Sebastopol bo celebrated
with all honours befitting so great an
event—with boasting, bell-ringing, and bon-
fires, and, more suitably, with worship and
thanksgiving—and then let us inquire into
its practical import, and endeavour to ascer-
tain what are likely to be its effects on the
war, firstly as regards the military, and
secondly the political condition.
It will certainly relieve the toils of the
allied armies, diminish their loss of life,
animate their spirits, and give them the re-
pose they so much need from the harassing
duties of the siege. The accumulated material
which the Russian Commander was forced to
abandon in his hasty retreat (described in the
brief despatch of PELIBSIER as of great ac-
count), will be a clear loss to the enemy and
gain to us. It is very doubtful whether
Prince GORTSCHAICOFF will attempt to hold the
northern forts. The position, though of great
value for the defence of the town from an
attack on the north, can be of little worth for
its own sake now that the town is abandoned.
To hold it would require a considerable force,
which would by so much weaken his strength,
while the communication of the garrison with
the main army would be in danger of being
cut off as soon as the Allies commenced
operations against the forts. It appears

This shows that preparations for an evacu-
ation were actively carried on for a week, at
least, previous to the successful attack of the
French on the Malakoff Tower ; and, read by
the light of this knowledge, the movement of
the Russians has more the appearance of a
preconcerted plan than of a hasty retreat, con-
sequent on an unexpected success. Goals•
CHAKOFF seems to have contemplated the
evacuation of the town as soon as he per-
ceived that the Allies had concentrated
against it a decisive superiority of fire and of
numbers.

On the supposition that the enemy will
now concentrate their forces in their Tacher-
naya position, still holding the northern por-
tion of the Crimea, it appears extremely pro.
blematical whether any active operations will
be attempted against them during the present
season. The Allies have sustained great
losses. Both the French and English armies
will require reorganisation. The places of
the experienced officers who have fallen can-
not be easily filled. We know by experience
that a force which has sustainei severe loss
in action requires time to repair gaps before
its efficiency can be restored. Ten weeks
elapsed between the unsuccessful assault on the
18th June and the successful attack on the Ist
September, though the positions remained the
same. Now, the whole plan of operations will
have to be reconsidered and rearranged. In the
last battle the enemy probe,' suffer

severer loss than wissu
In killed and wounded

down at from 1,200 to

whose attacking colum.
heavier, had probably seven
men struck down. It

sides, that the enemy
months engaged in fortifying

wobably did not suffer a
sustained by the
......* ~
I
ed our loss .4. 41,:r,-
1,500; but .. ~, - i
ins were dou • f P.: -- -, ..•'
seven or eight
is to be corpirli Zit "C (iliii t ch
y have bee ;mod 1/4.° o• 11,
lifying the pei r "4ko ° ',,.441:
t..... ..e.N1A1111,24' ...•
1.••• ~.
•iir, . 'l/2. •
. .

870

occupy on the Tschernaya, and that only a
month back they considered themselves suffi-
ciently strong to attack the French and Sar-
dinians encamped against theni. With the
retreat of the Russians from the northern for p,.
the whole of the soutlrprn portion of the
Crimea will be in the thralls or under the coin-
mand of the Allies. Another camjaign will
probably be required to expel ttte Russians
from the north. The report thti timer*
PELISSIER had telegraphed to his Government
to know what terms he should grant to the
enemy on their offering to capitulate, was most
likely born of that excessive presumption
which captured Sebastopol a twelvemonth
ago on the faith of the story of a wandering
Tatar.
We are yet some way from the conquest of
the Crimea ; but that conquest, though com-
plete, would not end the war. Victory, it is
admitted in theory, is valuable only as it tends
to simplifly complications, and to bring belli-
gerents nearer to agreement on terms of peace.
But practically it acts in much the same
manner as success at a gaming-table. It
stimulates cupidity on one side, and desire of
reparation on the other, so that the game goes
on until it ceases from exhaustion on one side
or lassitude on both.
The fall of Sebastopol seems little favorable
to pacific prospects. The notion of " material
guarantees " is likely to find more favour than
formerly, now that we have in our hands the
finest port in the Black Sea, and that the whole
Crimea appears fairly within our grasp. A
joint occupation of the peninsula by the
French and English would be popular at pre-
sent, to whatever complications it might even-
tually lead. Not merely obscure writers in
journals, but leading personages in the land—
so rapidly does the passion of acquisition
grow—now speak plainly of banishing the
Russian flag for ever from the Crimea. There
is nothing in the past history or present tem-
per of the Russian Court to lead us to suppose
that it would ever submit to humiliating terms
of peace while any power of resistance re-
mained. The loss of the Crimea would be to
Russia the loss of a distant military colony,
but would not sensibly impair her strength.
If the decision be taken to weaken her by
territorial deprivation, we may rely on it that
she will take a great deal of beating, and that
this war will take rank with the most obsti-
nate of times past. Statesmen are losing, if
they have not lost, all control of the situation.
The progress of events tends to discredit mode-
rate councils, and to render terms of agree-
ment impracticable. The future, therefore, is
not encouraging. We have to look forward
to the continuance of a war conducted without
definite aim, which will each year demand
from us new sacrifices and add enormously to
our burdens.

THE GALLANT SLAIN.

Ttre records of the assault on the Redan show
a grievous, but unavoidable, amount of casual-
ties. Twenty-six officers killed, and one
hundred and thirteen wounded, is a serious
amount of suffering to our comparatively
small army. What anguish will be carried to
many a home in England at the news of the
husband, brother, or son being amongst those
" killed," or " dangerously " or " severely"
wounded ! But with the sorrow they must
mingle the cheering sentiment that their dear
kinsfolk have gloriously bled for Queen and
country. They have upheld Old England's
fame, and their families may be proud of
their martial exploits and sufferings in a noble

cause.
In all armies it happens that some parti-
cular division, like the " fighting fifth" of Sir
THOMAS PICTON in the Peninsula, will signalise
itself beyond others. Accident sometimes
gives it a more forward position, and some-
times the character of particular regiments
contributes to this result. We believe that all

our brave fellows were equally ready and
anxious to do their duty, and were equally
covetous of glory. But in the last, as in the
early struggles of the Crimea, the Second and
• • _