The Press.
London, England, 1855-10-13 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

take the fort, to which he was sure to be exposed in the .1
afterpart of the day. Another question is also put by the
Times correspondents—" Why did not General Simpson
send his best troops to the assault ?" Because (the answer
is evident) he wished to preserve his best soldiers for an
attack which really would succeed, and thought the young
recruits fit enough food for powder. Such is war !
The success which amended this policy is then

insisted on :
While the English troops were devoting themselves in
the manner 1 have described, the French in the Malakoff
were comparatively free from attack, for the great assaults
of the Russians to retake the fortifications only commenced
about half-past two. Pelissier had then double the time
of respite he asked from General Simpson, and daring
this interval the French had made the most of their time.
The approaches on the French side were levelled so as to
allow the entrance of artillery and the rapid advance of the
reserves. A number of field-pieces by this means were
brought up and placed in battery, and the Imperial Guard
were entered for the defence, in addition to the troops
employed in the assault. The cannon of the Russians
were turned against the enemy, and the place in a manner
fortified against the Russians themselves. After this, as
Pelissier said, the Malakoff was secure, and could nut be
retaken. It is true, after the Russians had finally re-
pulsed the English, but not till then, they returned to the
assault of the French in the Malakoff, and they brought
their whole army to this operation But it was too late.
This attack was desperate and courageous in the extreme ;
but they failed, after immense slaughter on their part as
well as that of the French. Such, however, was the des-
perate and powerful nature of their attack that all the
French with whom 1 have conversed admit, with the
greatest frankness, that had the assault of the Russians
been made immediately after the first French success,
before they had time to fortify themselves, the French
would have been certain to have been driven out of the
Malakoff, and the affair would have ended as it did on the
16th of June. The French are, therefore, right in saying
that the English, by their heroic resistance in the Redan,
are entitled to as much credit and honour for the final re-
duction of Sebastopol as are those who were employed
directly in the capture of the Malakoff.
This view, the candid reader may think, breaks down
on the point of reinforcements not being sent to the
troops engaged. General Simpson expressly states
that reinforcements could not be sent, "owing to the
crowded state of the trenches," and if the attack on
the Redan was essential to the capture of the Mala-
koff, it would seem that the attack ought to have been
vigorously maintained, so long as it was expedient
that it should last. It is doubtful whether General

Simpson—one of the plainest and simplest officers
that ever lived—was nearly so crafty as he is here sup -
posed to be. An amusing tale published some years
ago, under the title of "Adventures of General Sir
Frizzle Pumpkin," was directed to show that a man may
be regarded as a hero and have all sorts of honours
showered on him, greatly to his own astonishment,
through misconception of his character and acts;
and something of a like error would be committed in
attributing to General Simpson the subtle calcula-
tions of Frederick 11. or the great Napoleon. How-
ever correct, therefore, Professor Aytoun may be in
his main view, most persons will be inclined to think
that he has attempted to prove too much.