The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1875-08-07 00:00:00

THE TITLE OF "REVEREND."

At the Arches' Court on Saturday, the Dean of Arches (the
Rieht lion. Sir Robert Phillimore) delivered judgment in the
suit of " Keet v. Smith and others." Ile said
"This is an appeal from the Consistory Court of
Lincoln. The subject of the appeal is the refusal of
that Court to grant a faculty for the erection of a
tombstone, containing the following inscription :

'ln loving menc•ory of Annie Augusta Kea, the younger
daughter of the Rev. 11. Keet, Wesleyan minister, who died
at Owston Ferry, the 11th of May, 1874, aged seven years
and nine months. Safe sheltered from the storms of lie.'
It appeared that the inscription 'Wesleyan minister
was not objected to by the incumbent, and was allowed
by the Court. The prefix ' Reverend ' was objected to
by the incumbent and disallowed by the Court. I
must express regret that the petitioner should not
have been content with the description Wesleyan
minister. It is, strictly speaking, his accurate de-
scription, as 'George Edward Smith, clerk or vicar,'
would be, strictly speaking, the accurate description of
the incumbent. The aspect of the question in this Court
is slightly varied from that which it assumed in the
Court below. The Chancellor of Lincoln declined tc
allow the issue of a citation to the incumbent calling
upon him to show cause why the faculty prayed should
not be granted. In this Court, however, that citation
has, according to its usual practice, already issued, and
has been served upon the incumbent, and he has not
appeared in answer to the citation, but he has not
withdrawn his opposition to it. The law as to the
rights of the incumbent and parishioners with respect
to gravestones in churchyards is often but partially
understood and carelessly stated. I will endeavour
to lay itdown correctly. The churchyard is the free-
hold of the incumbent, subject to the right of the
parishioner or stranger happening to die in the parish
to simple interment, but to no more. Indeed, the
incumbent has the right to pasture animals which do
not injure the bodies interred in the churchyard, and
every gravestone, of course, interferes with that
pasture. The incumbent for this, as well as for
other more important reasons, has a prima, facie
right to prohibit altogether the placing of any
gravestone, or to permit it upon proper con-
ditions, such as those which relate to the size
and character of the stone, the legality or propriety of
the inscription upon it, or the payment of a proper fee.
Usage, indeed, has much favoured the placing of such
stones, and, as a general rule, the incumbent permits
them, while the exercise of his right of refusal has be-
come, or perhaps always was, subject to the control of
the Ordinary. None of my predecessors was, I think,
better acquainted with the mixed law and practice of
the Ecclesiastical Courts in cases of this description
than Sir Herbert Jenner Fust. In the important
case of 'Breeks v. Woolfrey ' (Curteis's Reports '
880), he drew a clear distinction between the ,
general right of the incumbent to refuse per-
mission to place a gravestone and his right to refuse
such permission on the ground that the inscription
upon it was contrary to law; and while upon
the latter special ground he overruled the refusal
of the incumbent, he was careful to show no inter-
ference with the right of the incumbent to refuse,
according to the general law, his consent. And here
1 should observe that the two legal positions—
namely, that simple interment is a matter of right,
and the placing of a gravestone a matter of permission
—are in no way effected by the fact to which I
have referred, and which is unfortunately, too true,
that inscriptions of an improper, ludicrous, and
heathen character are to be found in some of our
churches and churchyards. Such a fact only proves
the culpable indifference and carelessness in this respect
of those who had the control of the church and church-
yard at the period when the censurable inscriptions
were allowed; not that there was no power in the
clergyman or the /Ordinary to refuse them. The
notion that an incumbent is bound to permit an
inscription at variance with religion, morality, or pro-
priety is entirely erroneous, and not the less mischievous
because the law holds that tombstones once lawfully
erected become in a sense the property of those who
erected them. ('Spooner v. Brewattr,' 3 Bingham's
Reports,' 139.) Passing, then. from the consideration
of the rights of the incumbent and parishioners, I ap-
proach the examination of the law with respect to the
power and authority of the Ordinary, to whom appli-
cation for a faculty must be made. With respect to
the grant or refusal of a faculty two distinct consider-
ations occur—first, is the object lawful? secondly, is
it expedient? If the former question be answered in
the negative the second, of course, need not be enter-
tained ' • but if the former question be answered in the
affirmative, it may, nevertheless, well be that, hav-
ing regard to circumstances, the ordinary may
think the grant of the faculty inexpedient, and
on that ground alone refuse it. It is a mistake,
therefore, to suppose that when the petitioner for
a faculty has shown that the object for which he
requires it is not illegal he is necessarily entitled to it.
The industry of counsel has brought to the attention
of the Court a considerable number and variety of in-
stances in which the epithet ' Reverend ' has been ap-
plied, both by authors generally and occasionally by
miters of epitaphs, to distinguish persons of the laity
not in Holy Orders, and sometimes to remarkable
women. What is the argument built upon this his-
torical fact? It can only be that the title is one which
is not peculiar to the ministers of any religions body,
and which cannot be claimed by any such ministers as
their speeial designation. The Judge, the statesman,
the officer in the Army or Navy, any ordinary gentle-
man, indeed, gentlewoman, might upon this hypo-
thesis claim to have this prefix to their name,
and nobody would be injured thereby. Rut is
this really and honestly the ground upon which,
the petitioner rests his claim? Is it not obvious that
in the present case the title 'Reverend' is not