The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1886-05-15 00:00:00

TEE DEFENCE OF LONDON AND OF

ENGLAND.

Major-General Sir Andrew Clark, Inspector-
General of Fortifications, presided on Friday after-
noon at a meeting of the Royal United Service Insti-
tute, Whitehall-yard, when the first part of a paper
on the abcve subject was read by Major H. Elsdale,
R.E., dealing particularly with "The Security of
London against a Coup-de-Main.' The second part
of the paper, treating of the successive stages of
the defence, will be considered at a subsequent
meeting. Major Elsclale said that the capture of
London by an enemy meant that the enemy had
grasped England firmly by the throat, and could
force his own terms upon her wherever British
interests were at stake all over the world. It
meant our empire of the sea destroyed, our enor-
mous mercantile marine sailing under other nags,
and the course of trade diverted into other channels,
never to return. It meant an enormous war indem-
nity to be paid, a largely diminished revenue from
which to pay it, and the country weighed down by a
crashing load of taxation. It meant a bankrupt
exchequer, pauperism and crime rampant everywhere
in our midst, and England hopelessly degraded
to the rank of a third or fourth rate Power. Like
Carthage of old we had built up a vast and highly
artificial edifice, based not upon broad acres of
fertile soil, but upon maritime superiority and com-
mercial success. Its centre of gravity was in London.
When London fell would not the whole fabric
be likely to go with it, like a child's palace of cards
when the foundation story is upset? So Carthage
fell and her wide dominions fell with her. The
defence of London was then of supreme importance
to the -whole British Empire. It was said that
the Navy was to defend U 3, but let them ask any
well-informed naval officer whether he thinks the navy
had ever been in this generation, or was likely to be in
the immediate future, strong encugh to protect our
vast commerce all over the world, to ersure the safety
of our food supply, to meet and beat any possible
enemy's ships on the high seas, as well as to guard our
shores from a landing and our unprotected commercial
harbours from the enemy's cruisers, besides securing
its own as yet unprotected coaling stations abroad.
Because the Government was not prepared to give the
£4,000,000, or thereabouts required for fortifying
London thoroughly and properly, were they to sit down
and fold their hands and do nothing, without asking for
the much more moderate sum necessary for prcviding
our field army with a strong reserve position to occupy
or to fall back upon for the defence of our capital?
Could not such a strong defensive position be forthwith
established at a very moderate cost, and afterwards
strengthened and reinforced by permanent works to
any required extent whenever the money might be
forthcoming for the purpose? Most undoubtedly
(said tha gallant major) he thought it could, and he
devoted this first part of the paper to an examination
of the question. The defence of London against a
cAtp-de-main was, he contended, a separate and very
distinct question from that of permanently fortifying
it in a regular way, and a matter, in itself of more
urgency and importance. Indeed, he considered it to
be of great national moment. After going into
details of his proposals at great length, the gallant
officer, summing up his general idea, said it was that
we must, before and beyond everything else, seek to
establish and maintain a decisive superiority of fire
of every kind throughout the fight as our guiding
star. It led, he said, to the occupation of a position
forming part of a continuous circle of defence round
London, because In no other way could we make sure
of having on the spot at the right time the necessary
array of guns and ammunition required for such a
superiority. It led to the armament of this position
with a special local force of guns of position and
machine guns to give a decisive preponderence of fire
in the two critical and all-important periods of the
artillery duel and the enemy's close infantry attack.
It led to the establishing now in peace of good per-
manent magazines at moderate intervals all round
the position, to be filled with the necessary ammuni-
tion and stores. In no other way, amid the turmoil
and confusion of such a crisis, and viewing the im-
mense pressure certain to fall on our got a department,
could we make quite sure that the large supply of
heavy ammunition which woulci be necessary would
then be on the spot. It led to the storage in these
magazines of a large reserve small-arm ammunition
supply, so as to ensure that in a practical and des-
perate struggle our troops would never fail of an
abundant supply of amunition. It led to the open-
ing up of good communications to enable these guns
and this large supply of ammunition to be moved as
required from point to point of our extended position
with rapidity and certainty. He should give our
troops not less than*soo rounds a man, and sweep the
ground in front with a storm of bullets from the time
the enemy was within extreme range of the rifle. In
conclusion, Major Elsdale urged his hearers to note
that the idea which underlays all the proposals was
that of dealing with this great question of the defence
of our metropolis on the principle of soluitur ant-
ba.'ando. Only let them make a beginning, a fair
start on a well-considered and comprehensive plan,
and the difficulties would vanish one by one,
and the whole question tend to work itself
out to a satisfactory conclusion. Let them
suppose for a moment that the expenditure of such a
modest sum as had been advocated, under a million
sterling, were approved of. The careful study of the
ground all round London, and the laying down of a
definite and authoritative scheme of defence which its
due expenditure would involve, would alone be of the
utmost value. With such advantages as he suggested
FO strong a defensive position would be established
that no enemy could afford to run the tremendous
risk of attacking it with such force as he could run
acioss the Channel for a sudden attempt. But if,
abandoning the idea of a coup-de-main, a more lei-
surely and deliberate attack was to be made with
much larger forces, and with a much greater concen-
tration of guns, material, and appliances, then the
conditions were still all in our favour.
A discussion followed.