The Press.
London, England, 1855-10-27 00:00:00

LORD ELLESMERE ON THE WAR.

IaRD ELLESMERE delivered a lengthened lecture on
t re war at the Literary Institution of WORSLEY, near
Manchester, on Monday last,. It was attended by
several of the noble earl's own family, and by many
of the influential residents in the neighbourhood.
For the benefit ot the institution, Is. each was charged
far admission. The noble earl commenced by
Binding to the attention he had paid to the subject,
sad then passed on to the war in its origin:—
I must, however, to some extent touch upon the political
question in respect to the origin of the war, and express
ply belief that there never was a wur more essentially
national. There have been many i ware in this bad
world of ours which have depended ou the will of kings, of
individual statesmen, or perhaps kings' favourites and
kings' mistresses. The time has been when a woman of
b id character at Versailles could set the world in arms by
i itrigues with the Ministers of the Crown ; and I have
lived in times myself when a man, by the vast power that
he had attained by the lustre of his former achievements
and his great talents, could, contrary to the advice of all
who surrounded him, contrary to the advice of his most
faithful and wore competent counsellors, launch the whole
power of France and half the rest of Europe in an enter-
prise which proved the destruction of that power. I am
eluding to Napoleon's former enterprise against Russia,
undertaken at the individual will of Napoleon, after all his
best advisers had counselled him against it. Now this has
been, in my opinion, emphatically a war of the people.
Next he glanced at the reasons which had rendered
the war so popular :
It is very usual when people are unanimous in favour of
great sacrifices and great struggles that they should be
influenced either by fear or by revenge. By the expression
" fear," I mean the anticipation of urgent and great danger
if they do not themselves strike a blow that shall prevent
the necessity of a more serious war hereafter. By " re-
venge," I mean retaliation for former insults and former
injuries. Now, certainly neither of these influences had
any great effect in bringing about the present struggle.
The oldest inhabitant of this country could not recollect
any great or flagrant injury received from Russia, and I
think there was no fear of immediate or urgent danger
from Russia to any of us. lam old enough to remember
a time, soon after I was born, when, in 1803, Bonaparte
WAS daily expected to arrive in this country, and invade
on. coasts. There was then—l won't say fear, because we
prepared to meet him with 500,000 bayonets—but there
wis an apprehension of immediate peril which roused the
whole country to arms, and I believe the nursery-maids,
with whom I was then in near connection at the time, ex.
pected Bonaparte and his staff some day to walk up three
pairs of stairs into the nursery. (Cheers and laughter.)
That has not been the case with this war. I believe in the
early stages of the present war, if you had polled the town
of Manchester, for instance, the artisans to a man would
have been in favour of its maintenance, but they did not
e cpect, certainly, any immediate appearance of the Cossacks
in this neighbourhood. (Laughter.) Now, what is the
mason of all this? In my opinion, it is a war partly of
sentiment and partly of instinct of future danger; and I
believe that sentiment is a sound one, and that instinct a
wise one.

He dwelt on this view at some length, and stated
that this war would probably have broken out forty
years ago, at the Congress of Vienna, but for the
sudden return of Napoleon
One of the most daring, dexterous, and rapid instances
of diplomacy on record was th ,t between Castlereagh, on
his own authority, Prince Ta leyrand, and Prince Met-
ternich—between England, Fr ,nce, and Austria—against
the power and designs of upon Poland, and, pro-
bably, upon Constantinople, which was interrupted by the
return► of Bonaparte from Elba; and it is curious that
Bonaparte found the record of it in the Foreign-office
on his return, and his first endeavour to break Russia
away from us was by making her acquainted with it.
Russia, however, did not break off the alliance, but the
Emperor retained his original enmity against Lord Castle-
reagh.
Discriminating between the principle on which the
war was undertaken, and the manner in which it was
commenced, he approved the one, but condemned
the other :

I think we acted with deliberation and wisdom in enter-
ing upon the war, but I am bound to say that we entered
upon it with considerable ignorance, some levity, and more
b muffing than the circumstances altogether justified. Men,
b )th in high and low places, talked of " a short and deoi-
ve war." Now, I think that those who anticipated a
short and decisive struggle with Russia must have blinded
themselves to very many features of the relative position
of the Western powers and Russia. I think they were
rerfectly right in not being alarmed by the numbers of the.
Russian army as stated on paper. . . • • .
think we were right in supposing Russia altogether
weak for purposes of distant aggression; but I think we
overlooked her notorious power of prolonging a strictly
ditensive war, and the advantage she derives from her un-
smiailability, from the difficulty of striking a blow at the
Inart—the difficulty experienced by Charles XII. and
Napoleon, who made the greatest attempts to do so.
He noticed the numerous fortresses erected by
Russia in different parts of the world, but drew a
distinction between the pacific nature of the Russian
people, and the warlike character of the Russian
Government :

Russia Proper is not a warlike nation, and the Russians
themselves hate not the turn for war. I am not now
■ )eaking of the Cossacks and Tartars—people who live on
korsebeek, and may be included in her dominiatie; but

THE PRESS.

the inhabitants of the solid empire of Russia are very
averse to military service, and 1 think, if left to them-
selves, by their own consent the Emperor would not gain
a single military volunteer among them, if the system of
enlistment were the same as in England. But a nation
to be military need not be warlike in its own native ten-
dencies. If you were to ask me which wax the most war-
like nation in the world, I should say the United States of
America. They have many thousand mike of frontier,
and they have next to no army at all ; hut they have a
large population, accustomed to the use of arms, and ready
to volunteer in any military expedition ; and when the
invasion of Mexico was projected—which was rather a
buccaneering sort of an expedition—they advertised for
men, and an army of 20.0(K) was forthcoming in a fort-
night. That is what I call a warlike nation. But if you
advertised in Russia you would find no such eagerness ;
the population there are pressed into the service, put in
chains if necessary, made soldiers of, and in the course of
two years' drilling they become the soldiers we have had
to deal with at Sebastopol—very serious foes to encounter,
obedient and docile to their officers, endowed with great
passive courage, and ready to din at any time at the post
which is assigned to them.
The noble earl then noticed the chief features of the
war—eulogised the gallantry of our troops and the
devotion of our officers, deprecated the attacks which
had been made on our commanders, and paid a high
tribute to the merits of Lord Raglan, whose unpre-
tending habits led careless observers to suppose that
he was less active than he was in reality. In
" taking stock," he estimated the loss of the Russians
at 300,000 men, and noticed the recent successes at
the mouth of the Dnieper. In conclusion, he thought
peace was not practicable at present:—

The position of the Russian army I am unable to esti-
mate, but R must be one of serious peril ; but I should de-
ceive you if I said I believed that at present the losses of
Russia are sufficient to induce her to accede to the terms
of peace which ought to be agreed to by the allies ; and,
until that consummation be attained, I trust this country
will persevere, and not hold out any encouragement to
Russia to prolong the contest by affording her the spectacle
of divided councils at home. (Cheers.) I have no wish
to see what is termed the humiliation of Russia. I think
we are talking too loudly for our own position and pro-
spects in asking the humiliation or degradation of Russia.
I hope peace may be effected on terms of such perpetuity
as human transactions admit of, but it may possibly only
be achieved by the result of further considerable efforts in
the field, and I look forward to those efforts in the hope
that our cause, which I fully and firmly believe to be a
righteous one, will prosper under the continuance of that
blessing of Providence which, I think, we have experienced
hitherto, and I conclude by saying, " St. George for Eng-
land, and God defend the right!" (Loud cheers.)
The lecture occupied nearly two hours of rapid
delivery.

LORD 121-amilY, at a friendly society at WORKSOP
last. week, took occasion to notice what he justly
termed the " absurd rumour" of a coalition lately
propagated :
The suggested coalition was'that of Lord J. Russell, Mr.
Bright, Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Disraeli. Now, he should
be very sorry if Lord J. Russell had entered tnto the sort
of coalition in question, though he was not in a position to
answer for him, or for Mr. Gladstone. Mr. Bright, as a
member of the peace society, might very fairly be supposed
to desire that an end should be put to the war. For his
friend, Mr. Disraeli, however, he thought he could answer
more explicitly. As the leader of the Conservative party
in this country, and as one who must, therefore, consult
the feelings of those who acted with him, Mr. Disraeli—
ho thought he could undertake to say they might depend
upon it—would never consent to any terms of accommoda-
tion with Russia which would not be likely to lead to an
honourable and a lasting peace. They all knew the " dodges"
played by parties. This rumour of a coalition might be one,
but he believed such a coalition to be utterly impossible.
He thought they would find this opinion fully confirmed by
the result. He believed they would find that, for the sake
of place and power, Mr. Disraeli would never endeavour to
lead his party contrary to what he believed to be the feel-
ings of the people"of England at the present moment. At the
same time they must recollect they had not gone to war to
annihilate Russia—for who would think of going to war
to annihilate an enormous empire like that ? They went
to war to protect a weak power against a strong one ; and
depend upon it they had read a severe lesson to Russia.
At STOKE EDITH, Lord WILLIAM GRAHAM ex,
pressed his fear that another campaign must be gone
through before peace would be practicable:—

With respect to the scarcity of labourers, of which so
many complaints had been made, he reminded them of the
drain made by the war, observing that it was the ►tout
hearts and strong arms of our peasantry which conquered
at Alma and Inkerrnann, and finally triumphed over the
power of Russia at Sebastopol. (Cheers.) He feared
fora time this drain would continue, for, although we had
captured this stronghold of Russia, and had destroyed her
az sensis and fleets, another campaign would probably ensue
bat) re peace could be established. He was one of those
who thought that the war might have been prevented at
the outset, but was now of opinion that it should be prose•
cute I with the utmost energy, so that the world might are
*tether Russian despotism or British freedom was to guide
the destinies of Europe.

THE BISHOP OF LONDON has been severely inchs-
poled during the week. His lordship is confined to
his mu at Fulham Palace.