The Press.
London, England, 1855-03-10 00:00:00

gether out of the question that England should go to war
in defence of the Sultan, and that an Austrian alliance for
maintaining the independence of Turkey was not advisable,
the Emperor Nicholas informed Count Lieven of the grati-
fication which the study of that speech had given him, and
declared that Lord Palmerston mast be regarded as one of
the greatest of English orators.
On the conclusion of the war between
Turkey and Russia (1829), Lord Palmerston was
of opinion that Turkey should have been in
duced " to make timely concessions to the just
" demands [of Russia] to avoid a contest which
" must end in her humiliation."—February 5,
1830.
Early in his career as Foreign Minister he
Wended Russia from the charge of being the
aggressor in her wars with Persia and
Turkey :

reality to counteract " the privileged frontier of
Rues's in the Black Sea," as stated in the third,
and only important, condition of the four
points, that our army is now encamped before
Sebastopol. When the secret article of the
above treaty—closing the straits of the Dar-
danelles—became known, France and England
protested against it, sent a squadron to en-
force their remonstrances, and declared that
they would consider the treaty as if it had
never been made. To this Russia replied
that she would consider the protest as if never
made. The squadion did nothing. Let us hear
on this point Lord Palmerston's apologist,
the author of " Foreign Policy" :
It was in vain that we blustered after the treaty of
Unkiar Skelcssi had come to light. It was in vain that
we at last set to work to get ships ready for sea, and, in
concert with France, sent them to the seen cf action. It
was in vain that after Count Orloff had triumphed, and
the Russian forces had quitted Constantinople, taking the
treaty away with them, that an English fleet sailed to the
Dardanelles, from the Dardanelles went to Smyrna, and
from Smyrna returned to Malta. Oar economical re-
formers had been gratified. Our Ministers had been
praised for their carefulness of the public money. We
had saved two millions. We had lost Turkey. England
could ,only send a state paper when Russia sent line-of-
battle ships.
The blame of this economical imprudence must princi•
pally fall on the Ministers. It is no excuse that they
yielded to the wishes of their supporters, or even to a
majority in the House of Commons.
But Lord Palmerston, as Foreign Secretary, '
was surely most to blame. And if it be admit-
ted that he committed so grave an error, what
becomes of the sagacity and vigour which are
sometimes claimed for him? Instead of armed
action to repel the menace of Russia, Lord
Durham, our ambassador to St. Petersburg,
was sent to his post, vie. the Black Sea, in a
British man-of-war, to force the passage of the
Dardanelles. But this project was carried out
in the spirit of a timid trickster. We quote
again from the pages of " Foreign Policy" :
Lord Palmerston tried the experiment again when the
Earl of Durham was proceeding to Russia. He took the
route of the Black Sea. He was received with great
courtesy by the Sultan, but found that the prohibition
was still resolutely enforced. A Russian man-of war, with
her colours proudly flaunting in the breeze, saluted the
vessel which carried the English ambassador, and which
had not a single gun on her decks to return the courtesy.
All the artillery of the English ship had been landed at
the Dardanelles, or had been stowed away in the hold.
The virtue of submission on the one side, and the vice of
arrogance on the other, could scarcely be carried further.
But beneath even this depth there was a lower deep.
When the Earl of Durham approached Odessa, not a shot
was fired in honour of the presence of the English am-
bassador. On his remonstrating, the governor atfinneel
that it was all amistake ; but such omissions never happen
by mistake. It was one of those petty insults which the
sovereign of a great empire seems to dehght in offering.
Such repeated indignities as England re-
ceived at this time would in any other age have inevitably
masa war.
These are the admissions of Lord Palmers-
ton's panegyrist. The mischief of the treaty
had been sufficiently demonstrated. The su-
premacy of the Black Sea was secured to
Russia. But luckily there was a chance of
escape from the consequences of this treaty
without actual war. The act was to last only
eight years, and one would have thought that
it would have been the aim of an English
statesman to have guarded against its renewal.
Lord Palmerston thought otherwise. By the
treaty of 1841, the obnoxious article was not
only renewed but made perpetual. In his de-
fence Lord Palmerston said that the treaty of
Unkiar Skelessi was virtually abrogated, as
Turkey was now placed under the protection
of the five powers, but the fact remained
that four powers out of the five were excluded
from the Black Sea, which was given up to
that fifth power, the natural enemy of Turkey.
The present war is a practical commentary on
the wisdom of that treaty of 1841, which Lord
Palmerston took so active a part in negotiat-
ing.
Our space warns us for the present to end,
but we purpose returning to the subject.

Now, having given some attention to the circumstances
which led to these two wars, 1 am bound to say that Russia
was the aggressor in neither of them ; and although the
result of the Persian war was an aggrandisement of her
power, it was not a result of her own seeking, So strongly
did the British Government of the day feel this td be the
case, that although we had a treaty with Persia which
bound us to give her succour in case of war with Russia,
that succour was not given, for we contended we had a
right to judge of the causes of the war, and that as Persia
was the aggressor she had no title to our assistance. Again,
in the Turkish war, Russia was not the aggressor.
These passages are important as showing
the sentiments of Lord Palmerston at the
time, and how totally they were opposed to the
real interests of England and the actual facts
of the period. Of all statesmen of his day,
Lord Palmerston has unquestionably done
roost to forward the aggressive designs of
Russia, and to foment her pride. A few
months after he became Foreign Minister the
Porte applied for the assistance of England
against Mehemet Ali, pointing out the danger
of Russian interference should England
refuse. England did refuse, and Russia did
interfere, Turkey paying the penalty in the
shape of the treaty of Unkiar Skelessi. It
was by Lord Palmerston's positive refusal of
assistance to Turkey that she was thrown into
the arms of Russia.
The first application made by the Porte for
assistance through her agent, Mr. Maurojanni,
having failed, Namik Pacha was sent with
greater powers. He offered to defray the ex-
pense of a naval force, and he promised, more-
over, the grant of certain commercial privileges
to British subjects in Turkey. His mission
was also unsuccessful, and the Porte was then
constrained to accept the aid of Russia, for
which she paid so dearly. After Russia had
gained her object, England came forward to
afford her " moral support" to Turkey. We
give Lord Palmerston's own statement of the
transaction :
His Majesty's Government did not comply l
with the d
ae-
mand of the Sultan for naval assistance, yete mor
assistance of England was afforded, and the communica-
tions made by the British Government to the Pacha of
Egypt, and to Ibrahim Pacha, commanding in Asia Minor,
did materially contribute to bring about that arrangement
between the Sultan and the Pacha by which that war was
terminated.—House of Commons, 17th March, 1834.
Why, then, it may be asked, did not Eng-
land afford her moral assistance earlier? Why
was Russia allowed to extort the treaty of
Unkiar Skelessi from Turkey, which converted
the Black Sea into a Russian lake ? Why did
England reject the offer of commercial privi-
les made by the Sultan? Let Lord Palmers-
tonge answer I On the 11th of July, 1833, he

said :
No doubt if England bad thought fit to interfere the
progress of the invading army would have been setopped,
and the Russian troops would not have been called in.
He further said, in allusion to the partition
of Turkey :
We have a double security ; in the first place, in the
good faith of the Emperor of Russia, and secondly in the
doubt I entertain whether it enters into the policyWe of
Russia at present to accomplish this object. .
. .
have interests in common with Russia. . . . We wish
to be on friendly terms with Russia, because the conse-
quences of war may be nearly as disastrous to the con-
queror as to the unsuccessful power.
At a later period, in 1810, he said :
OxfJ. W. Parker
ord Essays. Contributed
the University. London by Members
It is impossible for any Government to have acted with
more honour and good faith in any matter than the Russian
of :
Government has acted with the other powers in respect to
Turkey. I feel bound to say this from a thorough know- and Son.
ledge of the facts of the case. It is not just to impute to dissent een remarked that if a man inclined to
that power that her present conduct has any tendency what•
and radicalism was sent to Oxford he
crer inimical to the integrity of the Turkish empire. would be converted into a Tory and high-
To the treaty of Uukiar Skelessi may be churchman within a few weeks. As datetrg-
lirectly referred the present war. It is in hold of Toryism, Oxford has of been