The Press.
London, England, 1855-09-08 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

Croix " the present King of Prussia clings with that
obstinacy with which weak minds impose upon the
many and induce the unreflecting to accept as moral
determination. This doggedness is nothing else
than the debility and the despair of mental incompe-
tency. The King is personally amiable, facile, and
incapable of self-guidance; therefore leaning, for-
merly, upon his brother-in-law the late Czar Nicholas
for support, the latter placed " Fritz " in the hands
of the '' Parti de la Croix," and presented the lead-
ing-strings to the chiefs, with a caution to look atter
their royal associate. The more prominent of the
Royal and Russian partisans are—M. le Professeur
Stahl, Counts Arnim de Ifoitendorf, Stolberg, and
Bismarck Shonhausen; AIM. Gerlach, Klerz Retsow,
Niebuhr, Westphalen , General Schiller, and General
Gerlach. To evidence the spirit and the principles
that animate the "de la Croix" faction, it may be
recounted that M. de Niebuhr, in conversing on the
war and the " pertes meurtrieres" of the allies in
the Crimea, remarked," C'est bien—c'est fort bien—
&est une bonne et keureuse fontanelle. Encore
quelques coups, et ils sont sars, et voila l'Allemagne
maitre du champ." This quiet assumption of the
certainty of England and France becoming nationally
enfeebled by their Crimean losses, so as to be de-
pendent upon the mercy of Germany, who would
presume to hold the balance of European power,
exemplifies, in its rude preposterousness, the mo-
tives that actuate the King and his friends. M.
Niebuhr continues to say :—" By insisting on neu
trality we have saved our money, preserved our
troops, and are ready, when the Western powers are
sufficiently weakened, to take a position which an
army of 680,000 men cannot fail to maintain; and
in these views, in these intentions, we act in concert
with Austria." This relation is a fact; and this
course of policy is adopted and worked out with the
most persevering obstinacy. M. de Manteuffell—a
renegade from liberalism in the act, but unchanged
in opinion—consents for the sake of place to be the
instrument of the Russian faction.

The liberal and patriotic party of Prussia proper
looks to England, as its primary and legitimate ally,
as a sterling defence against Russian encroachment
and Russian supremacy, and for self-independence
would consolidate the German element, for purposes
intrinsically and nationally German. In order the
more perfectly to obtain this end, the Pi usso-patriots
would relieve Germany from that extraneous pres-
sure with which the non German kingdoms and
principalities of Austria unfairly bear down upon the
national councils of the confederated kingdom. The
success of this exclusively German policy can only
be secured at the expense of Austria, whose internal
weakness has permitted the introduction of a Rus-
sian element through the venality of the reigning
princes. Both against the Russianised princes and
Austrian dominance the Prussian proper association
has embodied itself to operate with vigour, and the
army, the old nobility, and the people are firm in
their adherence. It was owing to their exertions
and power—it was in acknowledgment of the
nationality of their principles, that the Imperial
Crown was offered to the King of Prussia, and it
was through the instrumentality of Russian intrigue
exercised through the " parti de la Croix " that it
was rejected. Germany wanted a strong support to
counteract the effects of the failing decrepitude of
Austria.

The principal leaders of this patriotic anti-Rus-
sian and pro Anglian party are the Conte de Furs-
tenberg Stanheim, M. de Bunsen, Von Usedom, De
Wincke, Bothmann Hollweg, Bonin, General d'Ause-
weld, and Willisen, &c. The Conte de Fiirstenberg,
one of the largest, if not the largest, proprietors on
the Rhine, sought an interview at the continence-
ment of the war with the King of Prussia, and plainly
declared that if the King decided upon hiding with
Russia against France and England, the Rhenish
provinces would be irrevocably lost. Thus it is that,
men should speak and act. It is amongst the mem-
bers of this patriotic " bund " that are to be found
the bitter opponents of Lord Palmerston. They will
never condone, they will ever remember the conduct,
of their King and of the English Minister in the
Danish war of succession. Prussia had encouraged,
declared, and fought for the Holsteiners, and when
the Germans were on the eve of success, the King,
urged by Lord Palmerston, traitorously succumbed
to Russian power. The batik was for the indepen-
dence of the Baltic. It was lost.
To this eminently enlightened and patriotic body
of men belongs the Prince of Prussia. Gifted with
a clear perception, of large views, and thoroughly
comprehending in its vast extent the principle of the
present war, he is prepared to assert at any cost the
integral independence of Prussia, free from any re-
straint, and to maintain the reality of a confederated
Germany. The old nobility, the Prussian army, and
the Prussian people are with him to a man. The
prince is sincere and loyal in his regard for England.
Without wishing for an undue and l'russian prepon
derance in the councils of Germany, without any
desire for an extension of territory, he is anxious for
cous9liclotiott and *op of efclitsiveti Qergieki9