The Press.
London, England, 1855-09-08 00:00:00

Battle of Inkermann, and in his reflections
upon the subject asserts that the Russians
had they chosen to renew the attack, as they
ought to have done, might have annihi-
lated us. This is a peculiarly interesting por-
tion of his book, because the present relative
position of affairs is very similar to that after
Inkermann, except that we now possess all
those advantages of numbers and position
which Menschikoff then held :
The allies were saved, but at what price? Well might
they exclaim with Pyrrhus, " Another such a victory, and
our doom is sealed !' If the allied commanders bore in
mind that this victory had hung merely on a frail thread,
that Prince Menschikoff with his numerical superiority
could far more easily bear the losses than themselves, and
might in a few days renew his attack upon their position,
while their promised reinforcements were still part at sea
and part in the quiet garrisons of France and England ;
if they considered that winter was at hand without the
necessary preparations for it having been made ; and if,
notwithstanding all these disheartening facts, they did not
despair as to the final issue of their enterprise, but still
persisted in the continuation of the siege, then it is diffi-
cult to say whether their courage is more to be admired
or their want of foresight to be deplored.

That under such circumstances the allied armies were
not annihilated is owing neither to the sagacity of their
Governments nor to the capacity of their commanders,
but solely to the inactivity of their enemy.
The more the allies needed repose after the battle of
Inkermann, the more was it the interest of the Russians
not to grant it, but as soon as possible to return to a
second and decisive blow. In spite of their considerable
losses, the Russians had still sufficient forces left to carry
out their object Menschikoff could not possibly have
overlooked the fact that the winter offered the most favor.
able chances against the allies. And if he still allowed
that opportunity to escape, it must be set down either to
his want of judgment and resolution, or to peculiar
reasons emanating from the conferences at Viena, and the
prospects of peace naturally connected with them. It is
also possible Menschikoff had received orders from St.
Petersburg to desist from farther attacks upon the be-
siegers, in order not to urge on France and England to
a 'me desperate step, and thus kindle a war of Cabinets,
heretofore purely local, into a general struggle of nations
and of principles.

Upon the ultimate result of the siege his
02inion appears well-founded, in spite of the
oo igratulations of our press :

Everything betokens a most determined defence on the
part of the Russians. According to their prisoners, the
larger works of Sebastopol have as yet scarcely suffered,
and the allies themselves May see from their camps thou•
sands of Russians actively employed in strengthening
their defences, and constructing new ones behind them.
Moreover, the command of the attacked fronts is intrusted
to the most expert and resolute officers, who will doubtless
strain every nerve to dispute the advance inch by inch.
Yet we do not deny that the allies may not obtain a partial
success, for example, against the bastions and numerous
batteries crowning the hills in front of Karabelnia. If
they can secure a firm footing upon one of those com-
manding points, the fate of that part of Sebastopol would
soon be decided ; for the arsenal and the barracks could
not offer any serious resistance, and the besieged would be
compelled to retire into Fort Paul, at the entrance of the
military harbour. But then the sole advantage gained
would be an insight into one part of the port ; the allies
would still have to clear a way into the city proper, and
meanwhile the Russian vessels could always find sufficient
shelter against their projectiles in some corner of the
great bay. Supposing, however, that the allies should, in
the end, and at the cost of half their army, obtain posses-
sion of the south side of Sebastopol, what then ? A mo-
ment's consideration of this vital question will not be out
of place here. The allies, when once masters of the town,
have two alternatives--either to content themselves with
what they have done, and order a re.embarkation of their
troops, or to decide upon a continuation of operations.
In the first case, the success of the enterprise would only
be partial, for if the vessels were sunk, the dockyards,
arsenals, forts, the whole city, everything destroyed on the
south side, the northern fortifications would still stand
unconquered, and from their commanding heights look
disdainfully upon the departing squadron : in the latter
case, the first thing naturally suggested to us is, whether
it would not be more reasonable for the allies to desist
from expending the flower of their armies in the Crimea,
and to select another sphere of action, where gain and loss
might be balanced more proportionately, and the object of
the war, as well as its ultimate issue, be really brought
within their grasp'?

GeneralKltpka's view, on the whole, is not
promising : he looks at Asia, and sees Moura-
vieff with a strong force besieging Kars ; he
glances at the Danube, and finds the Turkish
army of 1853 to exist no more; he turns to
Sebastopol, " and even that has dwindled down
" to an attack on one of its fronts, thanks to the
" marvellous plan of operations which the allied
" commanders brought with them ready cut and
" dried to the scat of war." Without entering
into this very gloomy view of affairs, we cannot
yet credit that Russia is so near exhaustion as
is generally believed, and that the balance of
loss and gain is so much in our favour as to
induce a hope that Russia must speedily
collapse. The concluding chapters of the