The Press.
London, England, 1855-11-03 00:00:00

LONDON, SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 3, 1855.

WE are not aware that any Conservative
statesmen have expressed opinions on the
general policy of the war adverse to those
which have appeared in this Journal. At the
provincial meetings lately held, they have
spoken with some reserve, but with great

temper and moderation. They have said
distinctly, that they supported the War,—not
for purposes of revenge or conquest, but for
the conclusion of an honourable and lasting
peace. Nothing can be more satisfactory than
this.

Our views of the general conditions of a

peace which would be certainly honourable
and probably lasting have been frankly stated

in this Journal. From the practical vigour of
the English mind, we have a right to expect
that on so vast a question as this it will not
be content with generalities, nor shrink
from plainly declaring its objects. If the
legitimate aims of the War are to define the
position of Russia in the South—and guard
the line by the firmest and strongest barrier
that the circumstancs will admit of—to give ab-
solute freedom to the commerce of the Danube
and independence to the Black Sea—to bind
Russia, in concert with the Western allience,
to a solemn treaty by which the integrity of
the Turkish territory shall be recognised,
settled, guaranteed, and admitted into the code
of European policy as an established principle
for nations to uphold and statesmen never
to lose sight of—if these intelligible, practica-
ble objects should form the foundation of the
"lasting and honourable peace " which all
parties in this country say they desire, then
the present juncture appears more favorable
to earnest, bonii-fide, pacific negotiation than
any likely to ensue for years to come.
It will certainly be otherwise should the
next campaign open to expel the Russians
from the Crimea. From that period a new
aspect would be given to the contest. No
peace would stand a chance of being perma-
nent which separated the Crimea from
Southern Russia. It would be nothing better
than a truce, and of the hollowest kind. Yet,
after another year of such battles, losses, and
slaughter as the last, incurred solely to obtain
possession of the Crimea, would it be pos-
sible for France and England to treat on the
terms of restoring their dearly-won conquest
to their foe ? The Crimea is too large for a
fortress, too small for a kingdom: to the East,
the West, and the North the land is all
Russian, and it never would be safe from a
sudden descent of that Power, unless an
enormous army to garrison it was constantly
maintained. Too much or too little would be
done by conquering the Crimea alone. It
would be necessary to reduce Russian power in
the South much farther, or suffer her to occupy
the Crimea again.
This conclusion will not be startling to
those who believe that we are hut at the
commencement of the War, and who hope
that it will be prosecuted to the dismember-

ment of Russia or her utter overthrow ; buc
to men who hoped that it might be limited to
the politic objects we have indicated, it must
be a source of the most serious reflection,-ae
opening a prospect of lengthened hostilities.
This is not a reason that we should hold
our hand, if the hostile course be the only one
consistent with a wise and magnanimous po-
licy. But it is a reason which should induce us
never to protract it beyond the hour when a fair
settlement becomes practicable, and never to
be misled by the sophistries of mere sentiment,
or by the warmth of those honester passions
which war rouses in the hearts of the great
body of the people, and constitute what has
been well called a " wild kind of justice."
There can be no fear that the military
reputation of the Allies would suffer by a
peace which withdrew their forces from the
Crimea. The notion that supposes the capa-
city of States for war to be diminished with
the amplest development of their commerce
is a fallacy. Many of the most heroic States
of antiquity were commercial. The merchant
princes of the middle ages left their ledgers
for the council chamber to decide the fate of
distant kingdoms, and dictate the policy of
Europe. For ages the men of Flanders united
the characters of the warrior and the trader.
The States of Italy were most powerful in arms
when they were most prosperous in commerce.
The small kingdom of Portugal, in her days of
commercial greatness, invaded Africa with a
powerful force, and firmly established her
power in India by her arms. When commer-
cial States have declined, it has been not
through exclusive devotion to pacific pursuits,
or the inroads of luxury, but through their
own wanton aggressions, the absence of
moderation and prudence in their Govern-
ments, or the rash resolves of the people to
engage in enterprises beyond their strength.
Whenever the tsocieties of the modern
world are broken up, it will probably be
through the influence of analogous causes,
facilitated by the establishment among them of
the principle of the Funded Debt. This
resource gives vastly increased power to their
action for a time, but is in itself full of
peril. Some States have already exhausted
it, and are confessedly bankrupt ; others are
pressed by the weight of their acquisitions :
the finances of Austria are hopelessly em
barrassed ; the public debt of France has been
largely increased by her Algerine conquests;
while our Indian possessions are becoming a
positive drain on our Exchequer.
It cannot be our policy to push the War to
extremity against Russia, though we may be
compelled to do so. The great question is,
whether peace be now practicable? If Russia
should decide for war at all hazards, the next
campaign will not be for the possession of the
Crimea alone. Those who now deplore the
necessity for the contest, would be no parties
to half measures for its prosecution, or to
timid counsels on its policy. If compelled to
drive Russia back from the Crimea, we must
drive her back from the Danube also, from
the whole sea-board of the Euxine, and, at
whatever cost and sacrifice to ourselves,
strip her of a century of progress, and put
forth all our resources to erect an impassable
barrier to the re-acquisition of the noble
empire in the South won from her. The title
of the Sword is supreme. If Russia challenges
its issue, she must accept its arbitrement.
Because the golden hour for adjustment
is not yet gone—because the Policy of the

War is not yet changed, though it is changinr,
we admonish the visionaries who misrepresent
the contest as one for the predominance of
Opinion and the overthrow of Despotic Go-
vernment, of the mischief they are effecting
by their absurd jargon. But we scarcely
imagine it possible that any honourable
opening for veace will be lost through the
fanatical feeling raised by this democratic
clamour, or that it will be rated at more than
its due. _ _

The Conservative party, hopeful for the
fortunes of their country, confident of its
might, proud of its glories, jealous of its re-
putation, will not stay their hands from any
work, how arduous soever, which they find
to be necessary. What France has done in
Algeria—what England in America, in Indio,
and in Australia—may be repeated in the pro-
vinces now known as Southern Russia. The
Allies are equal to this work, though a genera-
tion of warfare should be required to effect it.
And should a spirit of moderation animate
their councils until it be no longer possible to
be retained, the justice of the mortal strife in
which they finally close with their foe will 1 e
more clearly vindicated to the world, and
animate the two most valiant, enterprising,
• and ingenious races of the earth to unflinch-
ingly pursue (their collossal work, and cheer-
fully bear all the sacrifices it must entuil
on them. _ _ _

Conscious of the magnitude of those sacri-
fices, aware of the perils that must beset the
path even of success, desiring no conquests
for the Allies, having little faith in any new
distribution of Continental power, we should
rejoice to perceive a probability of the other
alternative being adopted. The next few
months must decide. A great opportunity
is open to the statesmen of Europe. How will
they use it ?