The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1881-05-21 00:00:00

BIZERTA AND OUR MEDITERRANEAN
POSITION.
(Prom the Pall Mall Gazette.)

Let it be granted, in the language of the Postulates,
that the only feeling excited in England by the recent
proceedings of the French in Tunis is one of sincere
and disinterested regret that a civilized nation should
annex the territory of a neighbour, or remove his
landmarks to improve the scientific aspect of a
frontier. It may not be very wrong to assume that
these proceedings have occasioned among us wore
chagrin than jealousy. All this being admitted, it
may nevertheless be of interest to inquire how
our position has been effected by them. Any-
thing occurring on the flank of the great maritime
highway which connects this country with the East
must have a certain concern for us; and whether it
be occasioned by a cynical disregard of international
morality, or by an over-scrupulous observance of the
public law of the civilized world, we can hardly be
expected to allow it to pass without notice or exami-
nation. The condition and environment of a road in
the traffic upon which we are interested to the
extent of something like a hundred millions
annually are matters about which we cannot well
repress a desire to obtain information. When with
these are associated not improbably the future, and un-
questionably the strategic value of our most important
and most costly transmarine naval stations, eagerness to
see how we really stand is certainly excusable. It is
reported from Paris this morning that M. St. Hilaire,
in a pretty long and rather elaborate Note, declares
that France has no intention of incurring at Bizerta
the 150,000,000 francs of expenses which the improve-
ment of that port would necessitate. We may well
hope that this laudable resolution will be adhered to.
Butjthere is no harm in considering what would be the
effect on our position if it should ever chance to be
departed from.
The Meditteranean in reality consists of two great
inland seas of unequal area. The smaller of these
extends from the Straits of Gibraltar to Cape Bon,
and the other from the narrow waters south of Sicily
to the Levant. At the entrance to the first we hold
the fortress of Gibraltar, at the entrance to the
latter that of Malta. The questions for us to con-
sider are : Will the value of these strong places be
affected by the suggested acquisition by a naval State
of the first rank of an additional site for an arsenal of
admitted excellence? and, if so, to what degree?
Bizerta undoubtedly lies close to the great route from
the Atlantic to the Suez Canal. Its possessors, when
it has become the second Toulon we are warned it
is to be, would have indisputable facilities for troubling
that important highway. But if it has great naval
advantages it is not without its drawbacks. First of
all, its maintenance means a division of forces, a con-
dition of questionable benefit when the greatest navy
in the world would have to be reckoned with.
Secondly, its very snugness tells against it in one im-
portant particular; having only a single, narrow exit
it can be easily blockaded by an enemy of anything
like superior naval strength. The locking up
of a strong detachment of the French fleet in
the " Venice of Barbary " as Admiral Smyth
called Bizerta—would materially lessen the work
of the hostile navy elsewhere. Gibraltar should
be able to contemplate Toulon with increased com-
placency when half the aggressive power of the
latter place had become immeshed in the land-locked
African inlet. It is evidently too soon as yet to
forget the lesson of the Bay of Aboukir. But
Bizerta is nearer to Malta than Gibraltar, nearer to
it in fact than any considerable naval station yet
created. Still if the creation of great naval arsenals
is to be the new order of the day, if a rivalry in
founding dockyards is to follow the keen competi-
tion in raising immense armies and building huge
armour-clads in which the European Powers have so
long indulged, Malta has a much nearer neighbour in
Syracuse. That neighbour has Castellamare and Naples
not far behind it, and Spezia is at least as well
placed for its support as is Toulon for that of Bizerta.
More than this, the owner of Syracuse and Naples and
Spezia has an island on the other side of Malta, and
not much more than a hundred miles from it, which
is perhaps as capable of being made an efficient
naval station as Cyprus. It is certainly more
easily defensible, and a small expenditure would pro-
bably make its port as safe and convenient as the "New
Mole" at our own Gibraltar. Malta, with a large war
garrison and the crews of a great fleet to feed, would
be more than ever dependent on Sicily and Tunis for
supplies. Is there any probability now that both will be
in the same or even in allied hands? The fact is, Malta
may in almost any possible case count upon unex-
pected support. With a foe at Bizerta, its
nearer neighbours are pretty sure to be friendly ;
with the latter hostile, Tunis should be open
to it for supplies. Suppose they had all
been in the same hands, the work of supplying it
would have become more arduous than that of defend-
ing it against actual attack. The Gibraltar position
has evidently not been " turned," unless the scattering
of a force hardly capable when compact of masking it
has performed that operation. Malta remains as good
a base for a fleet as it ever was. Looking to proba-
bilities, it sh9uld be an even better one ; it will
scarcely be exposed to the dangers of hostility from
neighbours on both sides of it. The malevolent
neutrality of both its nearest sources of supply is not
more likely.