The Press.
London, England, 1855-09-29 00:00:00

THE WEEK.

WAR seems to have a life of its own, and to possess a kind of inherent
activity which rolls it on its course and shapes its destiny. When once
it has broken out with fury it defies control. The humane look on
with grief, the wise with wonder, the populace with acclaim at the
sparkles which mark its destructive progress, while the general result
is, that it is left to burn itself out for lack of fuel to consume, or want
of wind to fan its flame Its necessities precede council, and hence it
is difficult to murk points in its progress when the decisions of
Cabinets influenced its course, though we may be able to observe its
leaps from point to point, and its turnings from one direction to
another.

One such leap and one such turning are observable this week. A
year ago, if any politician had been asked what the allied expedition
would do when the Russian fleet was totally destroyed and Sebastopol
reduced to ruins, the unhesitating answer would have been that the
force would quit the Crimea, having fulfilled the object for which it
was despatched. The probability that it would do so declined as the
enterprise increased in magnitude ; but up to the present week there
was a chance that this decision might be taken. For some days after
the intelligence of the fall of Sebastopol was known to the French
Government, warlike preparations were discontinued, the embarka-
tion of shells and ammunition ceased, and, as we learn by the tele-
graphic message forwarded by the Sebastopol correspondent of the
Times this week, an impression prevailed in the camp that the works
of Sebastopol would be completely destroyed and the docks filled up—
measures which would be taken only on the supposition that the
Allies did not intend to retain their conquest. But all doubt on that
head is now dispelled. The shipments to the Crimea are renewed
with increased vigour, experienced workmen are being despatched to
render Sebastopol habitable, winter clothing is sent out for the troops,
and a design for the conquest of the Crimea is succeeding the design
for the conquest of Sebastopol.
It is doubtful whether the Allies have yet made any forward
movement. As we foresaw, the enormity of their losses has paralysed
their action for a time ; considerable reinforcements have certainly
been sent to Eupatoria, and it is probable that the Russian communi-
cations will be threatened from this point, though it is scarcely pro-
bable that offensive operations on a great scale will be undertaken
this season. The war in the Crimea is likely to prove a war of positions,
in which the movements on each side must be made with caution.

We do not yet learn what progress has been made by the Allies in
occupying Sebastopol. But on the north side the Russians have dis-
played their wonted industry in fortifying their position and arming
batteries. They have already opened fire upon the town; and we
imagine that it will be impossible for the Allies to occupy it in force,
or make use of its buildings for the shelter of their troops, or avail
themselves of its magnificent harbour for their ships, until the enemy
can be driven from their position. Our fleet appears to be still
inactive.

How long the enemy will hold their ground to the north must
depend partly on the facility they have for bringing up supplies, and
partly'on the vigour of the demonstration made against them by the
Allies. Prince GORTSCHAKOFF, by the admission of his enemies, has
proved himself a most able general—there is no parallel in warfare
to his successful evacuation of Sebastopol, considering the enormous
force opposed to him, and his immense losses on the day as he
retreated in the night. He will not hazard the safety of his army or
of a part of it by holding the northern side longer than he considers it
tenable ; but how long it may prove tenable is a question we are
entirely without grounds for deciding at present.

The narratives which have been given to the public of the terrible
contest on the Bth so fully detail every circumstance connected with
the bloody struggle throughout, and with the repulse which fell to
our lot before the Redan, that there is little room left for remark.

The attack commenced a few minutes before noon on the Bth. On
the previous night the French had silently collected about 30,000 men
in their spacious approaches about the Mamelon, and re-inforced by
5,000 Sardinians, their assaulting columns and reserves were both
weighty, powerful, and at hand. Just before 12 o'clock the bombard-
ment ceased for a few moments—the French troops, with a loud
cheer, dashed from their intrenchments, crossed their twenty-five
yards of separation, and in ten minutes were in the Malakoff. A
surprise—a faint struggle—and the work was won It had to be
retained. At the moment that the tricolour waved on the Malakoff
three attacks were simultaneously pressed against the Great Redan
by ourselves, and against the Little Redan and the Bastion du Centre
on the town side by the French. All these attacks failed. The Little
Redan was attacked in immense force by the French, but the terrible en-
filading fire of the Russians rendered it impossible for the assailants to
hold their ground. The attack on the Bastion Centrale failed altogether,
for they never there got a footing at all within the work ; while the
result of our own attack upon the Great Redan is told at length in our
other columns. Of these three attacks, that against the Great Redan
was the most serious—it was intended to be an equivalent to the attack
against the Malakoff; and, from the tremendous tire which our batteries
had so successfully directed against its defences, it did not offer so
many obstacles to success as the Little Redan or Bustion Centrals,
kvhich, comparatively speaking, were unimpaired works. Hence; it is