The Press.
London, England, 1855-11-17 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

a year chooses to spend three or four thousand
of it in some utterly unproductive work, as in
digging canals and filling them up again, he
will obviously have less to spend ou more
useful works. That is our case at present.
Our war expenditure is proceeding at the rate
of some sixty millions per annum. That ex-
penditure is utterly unproductive, it is taken
from the aggregate of our gross income as a
nation, and, being so taken, must leave a less
amount for all commercial and industrial en-
terprises. Capital naturally becomes scarce,
or comparatively scarce—there is an increased
demand for accommodation—the rate of dis-
count rises—and, effect being mistaken for
cause, an increased issue of notes is demanded
to meet an evil which can only be remedied
by increased economy in expenditure.
High prices are very little caused by the
war. At all events, there is a natural action
proceeding which has a tendency to raise
them, quite apart from the war. But scarcity
of capital is a natural and inevitable result of
that drain upon the country which the war
necessitates We doubt the possibility uf re-
lieving it by artificial means, without (pro-
ducing in the end much greater evils than
itself. The inevitable accompaniment of war,
it must be borne as one, though not the
greatest of its distresses.

WEST INDIAN SQUADRON.
THE reinforcement of our squadron in the
West Indies is a proceeding that must rest

upon one of two assumptions—either that the

Americans are afraid of us, or that we are
afraid of the Americans. Either we think, on
the one hand, that their warlike propensities
are at once to be cowed by a demonstration of
vigour on our part; or that they, on the other,
are sufficiently powerful and rapacious to
justify our constant apprehensions of the
wildest freaks of ambition Upon either
hypothesis it is not difficult, we think, to
show the impolicy of our present behaviour.
Let us take the latter supposition first. Let
us concede that the notion of a filibustering
expedition against Ireland has really some
existence other than in the crazy brains of a
few poor Ribbon exiles. Let us admit that
the American mouth is already watering for
our share of the limes and sugar-canes. What
better handle for hostilities could we give
them than the course we are now adopting?
If a bull betrays an inclination to run at us,
we dont shake a red pocket-handkerchief in
his face. Let our strength be in quietness and
confidence, not in outward bravado, com-
bined with inward misgivings.
But if, on the other hand, the common-sense
view of this question is the true one ; if there
is about as much chance of an American inva-
sion of Ireland, as of a Chinese invasion of
America; if, so far from being just now the
stronger party, our Transatlantic brethren do
really feel some sort of alarm and annoyance
at the presence of so large a British force in
their neighbourhood,—what is likely to be the
consequence? It does not, we think, require
much sagacity to foresee it. If—they will
reason—the slightest diplomatic difference
with Great Britain is to lead to such results
as these; if we cannot have a paltry dispute
about fisheries, or recruits, or what not, but it
is straightway to be settled by a three•dccker ;
if the roar of a 32-pounder is the ultimate
answer we are always to expect on these occa-
sions—why, we must have 32-pounders and
three-deckers ourselves—•that is all. Simply,
we mean that this blustering propensity, this
elvis Romanus sum business, will not pay when
applied to the United States. We may attri-
bute to its citizens what faults we please, but
they are an eminently practical people; and if
they once find that their principle of running
the risk of loss to escape the expense of in-
surance is a failure, we may be certain they
will not commit it twice. It is possible, then,
that our practice of intimidation, or what we
call assuming a firm attitude, may bring about
a consummation we shall some day have to
deplore, and lead to the creation of a power
ful United States navy.

10817

Besides, we must remember that another
class of feelings is engaged in this matter.
No man forgives one who is continually expo-
sing his weaknesses ; and national vanity is just
as much a fact as individual vanity. There are
some foolish traditions, too, about the last war
which render the Americans more sensitive than
ever to the reproach of our maritime superiority;
and what they may be driven to do under
pressure of these various motives it is not diffi-
cult ta conjecture. We should be the last to im-
pugn any conduct which sprang from the single•
minded desire to maintain the honour of our
flag. But our honour is rather compromised
than vindicated by these unfortunate squabbles.
This unseemly haste to parade our resources
can have but a poor effect in the eyes of
Europe; while to the continuance of our amity
with the United States it is positively most
perilous. The greatest calamity that could
befal this country would be an American
Navarino. Yet, dogged obstinacy on the one
side, and irritated conceit on the other, might
lead to such a result before the combatants
well knew what they were doing. They will
have much to answer for who contribute to
such a catastrophe.

GROWTH OF WAR PASSIONS AND
INTERESTS.
(Front a Correspondt t.)
The obstacles to a Peace during war-time
are of two kinds, external and internal—the
latter continually tending to increase in mag-
nitude, while the former more frequently
diminish, or even disappear, as the struggle
goes on. I doubt if there be on record, in the
history of modern Europe, a single instance in
which two nations having once come to blows,
be the cause of quarrel what it might, have
ceased fighting when the original dispute was
definitively settled. Wars have a tendency to
perpetuate themselves, partly and principally
because of the passions they arouse, partly
also because under them interests spring up
which are destroyed or injured by their
cessation.
I say " partly because of the passions they
arouse." Not much space need be wasted on the
proof of so obvious a proposition. But it is
worth while to note that the circumstances of
our time and country are peculiarly, even ex-
ceptionally, favorable to the cultivation of an
aggressive disposition on the part of those
who do not, or cannot, take a personal part of
the operations of war. The checks which
nature assigns to the exhibition of a combative
spirit between citizens of different countries
are various, the chief being—(l) Risk of
liability to personal service ; (2) Risk of life
or property by invasion; (3) Risk of loss,
even amounting to ruin, by that pressure on
the national finances which war creates. Of
these checks no one operates on the English
citizen of 1865. He cannot be impressed or
seized by a conscription ; nobody talks
seriously of reviving the ballot, even for
militia purposes ; our naval superiority saves
him from the apprehension of a Russian
landing ; and the fact that modern war is
to a great extent carried on by loans, both
conceals and delays (alas ! it does not avert)
the pecuniary pressure which would other-
wise be felt. The patriotic, self-satisfied,
but not farsighted class who shout for " Pal-
merston and the war," and treat an advocate
for negotiation as next door to a traitor, are, in
fact, fighting Russia with the lives of other
men, and at the expense of posterity. I grant
that this state of affairs is inevitable—still. is it
safe? If law could be had gratis, should not
we all be litigants? Does not impunity, under
any circumstances, tend to make men reck-
less ? And, these things being so, is there
not at least a primd facie presumption that the
tendency of the national mind will bo rather
too much against, than too much in favour
of, a reasonable settlement of diplomatic
disputes ?
But it is not only combativeness which is
gratified by the continuance of hostilities;
curiosity and love of excitement are inotii es
less apparent on the surface, but fully
ai
strong. We live in a state of high civilisation,
where the division of labour, bodily awl

V

1088

mental, has been carried to the utmost pitch.
Life is not less busy, but it is less varied,
more monotonous, than at any earlier period.
Hence a craving among the poor and unedu-
cated for material stimulants ; among their
superiors for intellectual novelty. This mor-
bid desire to hear something new—the old
Athenian complaint—is not confined to Eng-
land. France exhibits the same symptoms in
a more aggravated shape. In America the
disease reaches a pitch of which we can form
little idea, and breaks out in divers absurdi-
ties, which reach us here only in a faint and
occasional echo. In this country the curiosity
I speak of usually finds exercise on subjects
of home policy, and diverts itself with the
intrigues of politicians, the ventilation of new
social questions, lawsuits, murders, spirit
rapping, or table-turning. Had the corn-law
controversy been still alive in 1853, I think it
probable that we should have had no war.
Hungary, in 1849, furnished as fair a subject
for intervention as Turkey now; yet no inter-
vention came. Wily ? Because parties in
Parliament were fighting fiercely, and the
public was not in search of a new cry.
Do not let me be so far misunderstood as to
have it supposed that I accuse any one of
knowingly seeking to protract a state of war
for the sake of the pleasure he finds in read-
ing about battles. That crime against humanity
is too grave to be lightly imputed. But
affirm that upon vast masses of men in all
ranks of life, suffering under the tedium of an
unvaried and eventless existence, the war acts
pleasurably as a mental stimulant; they look
to the letters of Mr. Russell or Mr. Wood
as to a periodical enjoyment; and thus, uncon-
sciously to themselves, they are brought to
think with reluctance of the moment when
this new habitual excitement shall disappear.
I blame no person for an involuntary, and
probably inevitable, tendency ; I only assert
its existence.

Next, I come to the " interests which spring
up during war, and suffer by the return of
peace." These need, for the most part, only to
be named. It is certain that the Executive
is stronger, less hampered by Parliamentary
interference, and has more patronage at its
disposal, while hostilities are going on. The
public, intent on watching the struggle, cares
not one farthing for ordinary questions of
internal administration ; and does not show
its usual merciless alacrity in hunting down
any Minister who may have got his Depart-
ment into a scrape. Nobody expects for the
session of 1856 such a programme of measures
as inaugurated that of 1853. It'SirW. Codring-
t al can only keep the Crimean army in health,
and if Lord Palmerston will only talk loud
enough and long enough about "vigorous pro-
secution of the war," he may save himself the
trouble of attempting any one reform. India,
the Colonies, Ireland, need none of them hope
to attract the notice of Parliament; and so the
representative of each will enjoy a respite.
Even the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who
is usually teased to take off one-half the taxes,
and alter the other half, finds no trouble now.
Nothing is expected of him ; he may ask and
have ; all parties agree that a war must not be
starved. Of course this state of things makes
Downing-street an Elysium. Here is interest
the first. Next come the various Parliamentary
parties; and how is it with them? I except
at once the manufacturing interest, to which
war is synonymous with loss; and I allow
that there are on all sides many M.P.'s whose
political position remains unaffected by the
state of affairs abroad. But the Whigs,
threatened by Lord John with the loss of
their rotten boroughs, may be reasonably glad
of anything that staves off that menaced
catastrophe. Of Conservatives, again, there
are not a few who, really thinking that legis-
lation of late years has gone too fast and too
far, and looking not to the future, rejoice to
find that precipitate action succeeded by an
interval of repose. The more extreme Radi-
cals see their way to revolutionary change at
home through the distress which war creates,
and that disturbance which is certain to follow
distress when protracted and severe. They
have in view a double object—the demolition
of Russia, and the subversion of established
arrangements here, by one and the same pro-
swim We hays thus three parties concerned