The Press.
London, England, 1855-03-31 00:00:00

THE POLISH QUESTION.

MR. PHINN'S resolution on the affairs of Poland
received from Parliament exactly the treat-
ment which it deserved—patient attention to a
vigorous and instructive speech by the mover—
silence and neglect, approaching contempt,
for the idle and unpractical motion. We say
unpractical, not merely with reference to the
particular time selected. Everyone knows
that the reconstitution of the Polish kingdom
is not a topic which could be submitted, with
any prospect of success, to the Conference
now holding at Vienna. In fact, the assump-
tion on which Mr. PHINN's argument rested
was the prospective failure of existing nego-
tiations ; un assumption certainly premature,
and, we incline to hope, unfounded. But,
granting that the war continues, what can be
done—what ought to be done—for Poland ?
To solve the problem here proposed, one of
two conditions must first be assumed. Either
we are to break with Austria entirely—a new
phase of ihe European difficulty, and one
which most Englishmen would be loth to con-
template—or the consent of Austria to the
restoration is taken for granted—a hypothesis
on which only the most sanguine of reformers
can speculate with confidence. No empire
has ever voluntarily reduced its territories,
except under the extremest pressure of neces
sity. National pride forbids it—the feelings
of the people revolt against it—no Govern-
ment is strong enough, even in a despotic
country, to defy a popular sentiment so deep-
rooted, and so universal—least of all is a
young, warlike, and aspiring monarch likely
to submit to the dismemberment of his do
minions, solely out of motives of policy, and
without being pressed upon by any compelling
force. " But," it is argued. " the fear of
" Russian aggression will induce Austria to
" concur in even greater sacrifices, if by so
" doing she may set up a barrier against
" attack from the eastward." But what has
Austria to be afraid of ? She does not stand
alone. As against Russian invasion, the
jealousy of England, of France, and, in a less
degree, of Prussia also, effectually secure her.
All the great Powers have an interest in
keeping the map of Europe intact ; nor do
Austrian and Russian notions of government
differ so widely as to render a quarrel probable,
except on the ground of territorial aggression.
Nor is this all. The principle of nationality,
as a basis of independence, lies at the root of
the Polish question. That principle is one
which Austria more than any other Power is
interested in combating. Applied to Poland,
it will be pleaded on behalf of Hungary and
Lombardy—pleaded with logical justice, and
supported by the weight of a practical and
recent precedent. The consent, therefore, of
Austria to restore her share of Poland is not
within the sphere of reasonable political cal-
culation ; but if her Polish provinces be
retained, how can she in common prudence
agree to the setting up of a Polish empire at
her very doom—an empire of which the first
object and desire must he the recovery of its
ancient limits, and the restored freedom of all
its former subjects? The same arguments, it
is needless to observe, apply to Prussia. It
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