The Press.
London, England, 1855-02-03 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

nvaded ; and all must be aware that the once
splendid, and now, alas ! squalid and perishing
hosts of England and of France are encamped
isolated on the bleak hills of the Crimea.
Where are the gallant bands under the prophet-
warrior SOHAMYL? where are the Tartar warriors,
groaning, as we were told, under Russian des
potism,—rising in insurrection to assist us ?
The following statement will show but too
faithfully to what to attribute the isolated
position of our armies in the Crimea, without
friend or ally to make a diversion in their

favour.
When the allied fleets were preparing
to leave the Bosphorus in March last, the
authorities of the Turkish squadron re-
quested the allied Admirals that they
might be allowed to co-operate with them
in the Euxine. This request one would
have thought would have been cheerfully
acceded to, but it was curtly refused ;
and, to render co-operation impossible, the
mutual recognition signals, %reed upon be-
tween the French and English Admirals, were
purposely withheld from the Turkish Admiral,
although at a subsequent period the necessity
of rescinding such a degrading and disgraceful
resolution became inevitable. Imagining that
the refusal might proceed from the risk of
collision, if the Euxine was navigated by a
very numerous fleet, a plan was drawn up
and submitted to the Admirals for a series of
operations in the lack Sea, to exercise the
crews, attack the Russian forts on the Cir-
cassian coast, and assist the Circassians by
opening a communication with them, and sup-
plying them with arms and ammunition.
This plan was altogether discountenanced
by the allied commanders. 'they proposed
that a steam squadron of their own should
tisit the Circassian coast, and that meanwhile
the Turkish fleet should remain inactive.
On the sth of May Sir EDMUND LYONS left
the allied fleets with a steam squadron
for the coast of Circassia, and on the fol-
lowing day the Turco-Egyptian fleet, which
had been fitted and supplied expressly with a
view to the Circassian expedition, left the
Bosphorus with instructions to join the allied
Admirals in the first instance. This squadron
consisted of one three-decker, seven two-
deckers, two heavy frigates, four steam-
frigates, with some steam-corvettes, corvettes,
and brigs, in all twenty-one sail, with stores
and munitions of war of all kinds, and Circas-
sians of high and low degree for the coast of
Circassia. On arriving in the latitude of
Varna, and communicating with the town, a
letter was received from Admiral bminAs
stating it as the opinion of Admiral HAMELIN
and himself that the squadron should not
proceed to Circassia, but should cruise off
the coasts of Bulgaria and Rou►nelia until
the return of Admiral LYONS. and the arrival
of the allied squadrons at Varna, expected
about the 20th of May.
The commander of the Turkish Squadron
sent a superior officer to the allied Admirals to
remonstrate against the course indicated. He
was furnished with a memorandum setting
forth the weakness of the Turkish army in Asia,
and the expediency of supporting the Circas-
sian tribes in an attack on the Russian flank
or rear. For this purpose the fleet contained
a complete battery of field-pieces, with artillery
officers, large stores of ammunition, 400 cases
of muskets, 2,000 pistols, tents, axes, cutlasses,
soup-kettles, and all other requisites for opera-
tions in the field. With these supplies, aided
by 4,000 regular troops, and some Euro-
pean officers, it was supposed that the Circas-
sians would be able to act offensively against the
enemy. But the only effect of the representa-
tions made to Admiral DIINDAS vas to excite
his anger that his previous instructions should
be disputed, and he again wrote to Vice
Admiral ACHMEt DACHA directing that the
Turkish commander should conform to his
previous order.
The fleet accordingly remained inactive,
and when on the 20th of May the allied
squadrons sailed past it on their way to
Baltschick, the honours paid them by the
Turkish Admiral received not the slightest
acknowledgment. The slight was acutely felt,
as the Turks are peculiarly susceptible in all
matters relating to the interchange of
eourteey.

SATURDAY,

On the 24th of May the French steamer
Mogculor arrived with news of the squadron of
Sir E. LYONS. He had opened communica-
tions with the Circassian coast and landed
some Turkish soldiers at Redoubt Kale to act
against Anapa, then being evacuated by the
Russians. The allied Admirals thought this
proceeding should be vigorously followed up,
and sending forthwith for ACHMET PACK*,
they ordered him to tranship the Circassians
and munitions of war in the Turkish fleet to
the Banspareil, British steamer, and to two
Turkish steamers, and despatch them to the
Circassian coast that evening. The Pacha re-
monstrated against this haste ; with more
time the steamers of the fleet might take
the line•of-battle ships in tow ; he showed
that it was impossible to remove the muni-
tions stowed in fourteen ships as quickly as de-
sired, and petitioned for twenty-four hours delay.
He was not listened to. The transhipment was
effected in three hours' time, between eight
and eleven at night, with unavoidable con-
fusion and personal distress to the Circas-
sians, and with much damage to the stores.
Half the ammunition had to be left behind,
and as it was the Turkish steamers were
greatly overcrowded, and the powder in
danger of being ignited by the careless habits
of the Turks.
In this way the expedition fitted out with
so much care dwindled down into a mere
consignment of goods. When the steamers
reached the Circassian coast the officers who
landed at Soukhoum Kale found no plan of
action prepared for them, and remained only
to smoke their pipes, while the field-pieces,
ammunition, arms, &c., were hastily piled up
on the coast, and would probably have to be
destroyed to save them from falling into the
enemy's hands. The Turkish commanders
still hoped that their fleet would be allowed to
sail for the Circassian coast, but ou the return
of the steamers this hope was finally dis-
pelled. The Turkish squadron was ordered to
remain at Varna, and to this day has accom
plished nothing, though, had the expedition
been employed as originally intended, it
might have kuaterially damaged the position
of the Russians in Asia Minor. That the
Tartars are rife for revolt against their oppres
sore, the Russians, may be inferred from the
strange scene which was witnessed at Sebas-
topol in the autumn of 1850, when two Turkish
ships-of-war were despatched to that port,
under the advice of the distinguished British
officer who has succeeded Sir BALDWIN
WALKER as adviser to the Porte in her naval
affairs. On that occasion many thousand
Tartars from various parts of the Crimea
flocked down to the shore and visited the
ships, and some of the aged among them
scarcely refrained from tears on finding them-
selves once again upon a Turkish deck. What
Russia has not had the audacity to ask for,
Admiral DUN DAs has had the simplicity
to insist upon, viz., the exclusion of the
Turkish fleet from that sea where alone it
could give umbrage to Russia.
This bare statement of facts is sufficient
to show the little consideration with which
the allied Admirals, and Admiral DuNDAS in
particular, treated the Turkish fleet. Pro-
perly encouraged and supported, this et-
pedition might have gone far to restore the
prestige of the Turkish navy in the Euxinc,
by showing its flag flying in triumph on coasts
from which it had long been practically ex-
pelled. The crews would have gained confi-
dence and experience—a material point, as the
catastrophe of Sinope must be attri-
buted to the reluctance of the comman-
der to put to sea in bad weather; and,
with the troops, supplies, and Circassians
on board the fleet, the forts of Soukhoum
Kale and Redoubt Kale might have been
occupied, and a basis secured for further ope-
rations. It was most unlikely that the Russian
fleet would have ventured out of Sebastopol;
but even had it done so no damage which the
Turkish squadron could have sustained by en-
gaging with the enemy could possibly have in-
jured it so greatly as the disorganisation
caused by Admiral DUNDAS'S orders. From
his conduct it would really seem that he had
from the first formed a deliberate design of
keeping the Turkish navy inactive, and of dts
grading it by every means in his power.

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