The Press.
London, England, 1855-09-15 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

Mr. Thompson considers (i. 209) that the
being of God is not susceptible of mathe-
matical proof, and he enters into a long
argument on the " objective and subjective '
to show why such proof cannot be had. Our
knowledge of God, he asserts, must be estab-
lished " on the unavoidable cognition of our
" own being" (1. 231). Some sentences on the
soul's knowledge of itself will indicate the
style of the author's reasoning, and show also
the difficulty which any person must have in
following him:—

It [the soull has no immediate apperception of itself
as an objective being, but is under the natural necessity
of refering the phenomena of thought, will, affection,
to a real cause, and is thus led to know itself as a real
being. . .

Thus, through the casual principle of the reason, the
subjective consciousness furnishes decisive proof of some
objective existence. The same primary experience, which
delivers to the mind the phenomena of self-consciousness,
teaches it to refer them to an existing soul, and to acknow-
ledge its existence to he something which is manifested by
thought, but does not consist in thought; something, on
the contrary, which is prior to thought and the cause of
it..—i. 240, 2.41.
Some persons may take this to be profound
reflection. We have our own opinion on the
matter. There is no folly equal to that of
accumulating words to confirm the verbal
difficulties which seem invented for no other
purpose than to obscure thought.
Mr. Thompson gives a prominent place to
free will in his definition of the soul's attri-
butes. He thinks there are " reasons of the
" strongest kind for believing that man is
" really free and able to originate from him-
" self" 268). In the limited conditions of
the soul's knowledge, as regards time, space,
and causality, the author finds an argument
favorable to the incomprehensibility of the
Divine Nature. The following paragraphs are
convincing, though not new. After stating the
objection, What do we mean by a Being supe-
rior to relations of time? the author replies :

Without doubt the conception can have but anegative value.
We may say that He is a Being who does not endure, but
is; but this can mean no more than that His existence is
such that it cannot possibly fall under the conditions of
human experience. We mean that a Being exists, the
manner of whose existence cannot be included within the
limits of human knowledge. To deny the possibility of
such a Being is to make our faculties the measure of all
possibility. Thus the principles of reason. on whiclr man
is dependent for his most elementary knowledges of him-
self and of an external world, demonstrate the existence of
an incomprehensible Being.
But what do we gain, the atheist will demand, by this
notion of an Incomprehensible? We gain this; that be-
sides finding a basis for the other arguments of theism, we
avoid the absurdity which lies on the opposite side of the
question. And this is our only possible escape. In the
indefinite extension of time every thing is comprehensible.
Duration is a perfectly intelligible notion ; we can conceive
it to be extended without limit, and can see it to be impos-
sible that it can ever complete an eternity.
The question of the origin of nature is one which we
cannot possibly evade. It forces itself upon the reason,
and presently involves it in a dilemma. But it is not, as
is commonly thought, a dilemma of opposite incompre-
hensibles, but between an incomprehensible and an
absurdity ; between a conclusion above reason and one
contrary to it. We cannot but shrink from the absurdity,
the incomprehensibility is no more than was to be ex-
pected.—i. 281, 282.
In the " proofs" adduced of the Divine exist-
ence drawn from the life of the soul there are
many instructive and striking passages. The
eighth chapter (1.343-390), on "The Revelation
of God in the Aspirations of the Soul," strikes
us as one of the best in the work. It is dis
tinguished by impressive thought and a high
order of ratiocinative eloquence.
The second volume is devoted to the mani-
festation of the Divine character in nature and
in revelation, and is, on the whole, more prac-
tical in its tone than the first volume, though
the German metaphysical element still largely
pervades it. The author tells us that, in con-
formity with an opinion of the judges of the
treatise that " the physical part of the argu-
" ment had been too much overlooked," he
has made considerable additions to that por-
tion of his essay which bears on physical
evidences. But it is still so meagre, and so
little in accordance with the general scope of
the work, that we doubt the prudence of the
additions. In one remarkable passage of the
first volume, indeed, the author expressly
assigns a reason why the argument from
design or final causes cannot be satis-
factory :
Vain would be all the efforts of human thought if, to
pass from nature up to nature's God, it were necessary to
pass through all the phenomena, and all the (chains of

887

causes, both discovered and concealed; to trace the design
and providence of the Creator through all the proce saes of
creation, and so, by displaying its wonderful unities, at
length, after a long and patient journey, to arrive at the
point of dependence. There would then be force in the
objection of atheism :—" In the presence of so many mys-
teries and marvels, which art or science cannot unravel,
which philosophy cannot explain, it seems to me an im-
mense endowment, when a man can say with confidence—
I look through nature and beyond nature up to nature's
God. The presumption of the thing repels me." "We
are very far from the time," says Humboldt, " even sup-
posing it possible that it should ever arrive, when a reason-
able hope could be conceived of reducing all that is per-
ceived by the senses to the unity of a sing e principle."
The case were indeed hopeless, if this were the only
course to reach the foundation of natural theology.
Geology and astronomy discover the extent, in time and
apace, of the field to be traversed ; and man might well
sit down in hopeless despondence before the impossible
task.—i. 209, 270.

The few proofs selected from the physical
world (ii. 4-82) are chiefly drawn from astro-
nomy, that boundless field of nature which
Paley thought was not the best fitted for
bringing home to the mind of man conviction
of the fatherly presence of Deity, though
well suited for showing the immensity of His
power. In treating of the Divine attributes
considerable space is devoted to a considers•
ti'u of the much-vexed question of the source
of evil, which Mr. Thompson is disposed to
think is inseparable from that freedom and
originative power which he claims for the will.
The fourth and last book of the essay (ii. 155
to end) is devoted to the scriptural revela-
tion of the Divine character, with answers to
the objections of modern deism.
From this brief sketch of the general pur-
port of Mr. Thompson's essay, it will be seen
that the metaphysical element greatly pre-
ponderates in it. If, as the author implies,
the argument from design has partially failed,
we do not sea how the argument from our
moral constitution is to expect a better fate.
There are at least as many contradictions in
the nature of man as in the physical world—
the mind is not less difficult to comprehend
than the body—and if the question is irresis-
tibly suggested to the intellect of who created
its faculties, the same question must be asked
regarding the senses which minister to and
form the intellect and the corporeal functions
which fulfil its will.

In much relying on any argument drawn
from out mental constitution in support of
natural theology there is always this danger,
that failure in any one link of the chain may •
destroy the whole structure. There are many
sound philosophers who will be disposed to
dispute some of Mr. Thompson's most im-
portant positions; and if those positions can
be successfully resisted, or even if they fail to
command general assent, his whole argument
rests on a base of sand. At best it is evident
that the influence of his thought must neces-
sarily be confined to those lew persons who
have a taste for metaphysical disputation, and
leisure to study its refinements. More unsatis-
factory aliment for the intellect of ordinaly
men cannot be imagined than the elaborate
criticism we find here on the metaphysical
systems which for the last two centuries have
kept mental philosophy in a state of perpetual
fluctuation.

Mr. Thompson's own ideas are certainly not
clear on some fundamental points of philoso-
phy. We cannot make out from him whether
he believes the mind to be endowed with
innate ideas or not. He rejects the axiom on
which the system of Locke is founded, that
" Nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit
" in sensu "—even with the qualification
of Leibnitz, " except the intellect itself"
—yet that principle has been recognised
by most sound philosophers ; and he lays
much greater stress on original ideas of con-
science and duty than metaphysicians are
commonly inclined to accord to them.
The defect of Locke, as we have previously
observed in this Journal, was that he did not
dilate with sufficient force and distinctness
on the original constitution of the mind, as a
great capacity or power. He was right in sup-
posing it to be set in motion by the senses,
and in its being informed by them solely, but
he does appear occasionally to confound the
information received by the mind through the
medium of the senses, and the activity thence
imparted to its faculties with the mind itself.
As Mr. Thompson says, the image of a tabula

rasa is very defective. The paper on which
we write is passive, but the mind is not pas-
sive ; it is active from the instant that impres-
sions are received by it. Nor is Mr. Thompson's
own image of the mind resembling pulp suffi-
ciently expressive of its active character. It
is rather a most complicated and wonderful
machine—a steam-engine for example—which
remains inactive until fuel be supplied to it ;
or it is a seed which contains in itself the
germ of tree or flower, but requires elemental
influences to nourish its growth and develop
its powers.
That principle of adaptation and depen-
dence which we observe in the physical world—
as, to take the most familiar instance, the
adaptation of the earth to the atmosphere and
the sun—prevails in the relation of mind to
sense and mutter. Apart from them—with all
its exquisite construction—it is dead ; but this
fact surely should not blind us to the variety
and beauty of its original endowments.
Take the case of the eye. Without light it
has no perception—it can discern nothing.
But with the aid of light the objects of the
outward world are disclosed to it. What could
he more irrational than to assert., on the one
hand, that light constituted the eye, or on
the other, that the eye, apart from light,
had any innate conceptions of form and
colour? The organism of the eye is per-
feet, though no light called its functions into
exercise ; but without light it remains as
though it existed not. For the eye substitute
the mind, and for light the senses, with the
instruction they are capable of imparting, and
the analogy is as close as can be desired.
If this view be correct, all the notions en-
tertained concerning innate ideas of the mind
must be discarded. We believe that the doc-
trine has arisen from philosophers mistaking
the laws of the mind, acting on the percep
tions of experience, for innate and original
ideas of the mind. To return to the image of
the eye : when quickened and informed by
light it acts according to laws naturally re-
sulting from its constitution. It perceives
forms and colours in such manner as its
organism prescribes, and it cannot help so
perceiving them. In like manner the mind is
subject to laws resulting from its constitution
which it must obey ; and hence—the informa-
tion it receives from the senses acting on it in
a manner more or less uniform—there has
arisen the doctrine of innate ideas. As rea-
sonably might we speak of an innate sense
of colour because all eyes agree that the
fields are green and the sky is blue, as of innate
ideas because all men are agreed on certain
mental points.
Causality is one of the laws of the mind. It
cannot help reasoning from effect to cause.
The savage who, returning to his village, finds
that it has been burnt to the ground in his
absence, is constrained to look for traces of the
agency 1)3 which it has been destroyed, and
soon determines, by the signs he discovers,
whether the work has been occasioned by an
enemy, and, if so, by what tribe. In his re-
searches he acts according to laws of reason,
which are fundamentally the same among all
races of mankind. But suppose that he ob-
serves his village swept away by a hurricane,
or some lofty tree shivered by lightning—
must he not in that case also reason on the
agency by which the devastation has been
effected ? In this.way the belief in a Supreme
Being is forced on the understanding through
the action of its natural laws working on ex-
perience ; but it is surely erroneous to con-
found such convictions with innate ideas.
In one respect the analogy between the eye
and the mind ceases. The eye is affected only
to a small extent by the nature of its exercise.
If constantly directed to iistant objects it be-
comes far-sighted ; if to very near objects,
then near-sighted. The influence of external
circumstances, and of habits of thought on the
mind, is much greater. Such influence may
constitute all tho difference between a Howard
and a Robespierre.
There are numerous other points in Mr.
Thompson's essay which call for criticism, and
particularly his remarks on the origin of evil,
but we must refrain. His fundamental con-
ceptions of the mind, on the truth of which all
must depend in metaphysical reasoning, are
not remarkable for either originality or depth.