The Press.
London, England, 1855-11-17 00:00:00

THE EMPEROR'S SPEECH.

The " Exposition " of Paris was closed on Thnrs•-
day with the most imposing ceremonies. The de-

corations of the building, and the general arrange
meats of the ceremony, were unusually picturesque.
The Imperial Court, accompanied by squadrons of
the Cent.-Gardes and Cuirassiers, left the Tuileries
at noon for the Exposition, where the Emperor
and Empress were received by Prince Napoleon,
the Imperial and Foreign Commissioners, and con-
ducted to the throne in the centre of the transept,
his Royal Highness the Duke of Cambridge being
seated on the right of the Empress. After a short
interval, Prince Napoleon advanced and read the
report of the Commission, to which the Emperor,
rising, in a clear and audible tone, replied as
follows:
" MESSIEURS,

"The Exhibition which is about to close offers to
the world a grand spectacle ; that is to say, whilst a
serious war is being carried on, every quarter of the,
universe has united in Paris the most distinguished
men of art, science, and industry, there to exhibit
their productions. By such union, under similar
circumstances, such a result is due, I am induced to
believe, to the general conviction that the present
war threatened only those who provoked it, that it
was pursued in the interest of all, and that Europe,
far from seeing any danger from the future, would
rather find an assurance for independence and secu-
rity. Nevertheless, in sight of so many marvels
placed before us, the first impression is a desire for
Peace—Peace alone, in ',truth, can develop still
further these remarkable products of human intelli-
gence. You should, therefore, each of you, desire as
I do, that this Peace should be prompt and durable ;
but to be durable, it should clearly resolve the ques.
tion from which the war emanated. In brief,
Europe must pronounce herself, for without the
influence of universal opinion, the communications
(lettres) between the great powers only threaten to
be prolonged ; whilst, on the contrary, if Europe
decide to declare who is right and who is wrong, it
will be a great step towards a solution. In the
present state of civilisation to which we have arrived,
the success of the armies, however brilliant they
may be, are only transitory. It is decidedly public
opinion which always carries the last victory. Each
of us, then, who believes that the progress of agri-
culture, industry, and commerce of a nation contri-
butes to the welfare of every other nation, and that
the more reciprocal interchanges are multiplied the
more national prejudices will be effaced, inform your
brother citizens on returning to your homes, that
France has no jealousy against any people—that she
has sjinpathy for all who desire, like herself, the
triumph of right and justice. Tell them that if they
wish for peace, they must at least make vows for or
against us; for hi the midst of a grave guropeau

THE PRESS.

conflict, indifference is a false calculation, and
silence an error. As for us, who are allies for the
triumph of a grand cause, let us forge arms with-
out suspending our manufactures—without para-
lysing trade—let us be as great in the arts of peace
as in the arts of war. Let us be strong in union,
and let us put our trust in God in order to triumph
over the difficulties of the day and the chances of
the future."
At the conclusion of his address, his Majesty, who
was enthusiastically cheered, descended from the
throne and distributed the prize medals when the
ceremony was concluded and the imperial cortege
returned to the Tuileries.

VIEWS AND OBJECTS OF THE WAR PARTY
As it is of some importance to discover what are
the precise views of that party amongst us which
clamours so loudly for the prosecution of the war,
irrespective of the objects for which the war was
commenced, we have read with some attention the
elaborate articles on War Politics which have ap-
peared in some of our leading reviews. Here, if
anywhere, we might expect to gain the information
we seek. The writers, it is to be assumed, must
have studied their subject; they have time to ma-
ture their ideas ; and they have ample space at com-
mand for their expression. Let us hear what they
have to say.
We take up our old friend Blackwood first, as he
promises to satisfy us on the very point we are
anxious about—What are we fighting for? This is
a question often asked, and Blackwood volunteers a
satisfactory reply to it. There is some difficulty in
getting to the marrow of the article, as the writer
is a master of the ejaculatory style. Such sentences
as " England awake! it is now or never!" are of
frequent occurrence. " Who can refute a sneer ?"
asked PALEY. Who can reply to an ejaculation ? say
we. What answer can be given to an " Alas !" a
" Gracious Powers !" or a " Great Heaven !" The
writer shows that in 1791 apprehensions were enter-
tained of the designs of Russia upon Constantinople.
Well, the danger has been long foreseen, and at last
it has been met; but are we necessarily to continue
the war after the cause for it has ceased? Is not a
peace which shall secure Turkey—and no other is
thought of—better than a war which must waste her.
Every one must have heard the rolling laugh which
follows a jest in a theatre. The quick-witted take it
first, laugh, and follow the dialogue ; the merriment
spreads, and at last there is a roar from some thick-
skulled fellow who catches the past joke just as other
people are laughing at a new one. Some of our war ad-
vocates are as slow of comprehension. They apprehend
thenecessity of war when quicker intellects perceive
that the necessity for it has passed. The article in
Blackwood should have been published exactly two
years and a half ago. It would then have been in
season.

But what are we fighting for? That is really the
qnestion,—not what should have been done in 1700
or 1791. " There is no mystery in the matter," says
Blackwood. " The answer is simple," we are
told:—

Russian influence overrides many of the Courts of Ger.
many, and hinders the national sympathies and desires
from finding an echo in the breasts of their rulers.
Strike, we again say; at the military strength of Russia,
—strike firmly and unsparingly. With every blow her far-
spread influence will ebb back from the face of Europe,—
the fetters, not less potent because moral, will fall from
many a State, and each people will have an opportunity of
developing its powers and institutions in its own way. That
is what we are fighting for.

This is at least intelligible. We are to fight the
battles of people who are unwilling to fight for them-
selves. We are to shed freely the blood of our coun-
trymen, and to burden our industry for ever, that
" the Teuton races of Central Europe," as the writer
elsewhere says, may have an opportunity of develop-
ing their institutions in their own way. Would it not
be fair to say to these Teuton nations—lf you desire
liberty, you must win it for yourselves? Our expe-
rience of the action of that liberty which is thrust
upon a people is not very favorable. It is probable
that when the Teuton States appreciate liberty and
desire to possess it, they will find out a way to obtain
it for themselves. It is worth remembering that the
express object for which Blackwood declares we are
fighting, is to forward some undefined political move-
ment in Central Europe. If this be true, can national
Quixotism go further, or can a severer satire he pro-
nounced on the war party? England—practical,
hard-working England—is to heedlessly ruin herself
that she may induce the much•smoking, beer-loving
Teutons to consider the question of political
liberty.
Another war advocate in the North British Review,

while strongly of opinion that this weir should be a
war for the freedom and reconstitution of Europe,
can see his way only to two points—that Russia should
be driven from her Transcaucasian provinces, and
that tie Grimesho4ld be permanently wrested from

SATURDAY,

her dominion. As to the first point, it is of little
practical importance, and we sincerely hope that
General WILLIAMS and OMER Pam& may satisfac-
torily settle it without need of assistance from the
Allies. The Crimea is a more important point. We
have to obtain possession of it first, and then we have
to consider what is to be done with it :
The Crimea, then, must never again be in Russian
hands. But what are we to do with it? Only one thing
can be done. It must not be given to Turkey, for we can
have no security that she would be able to keep it against
Russian arms, or diplomacy, or gold. Moreover, she
governs so ill, that it would be questionable morality to
give one additional square mile over to her imbecile rule.
It must not be assigned either to France or England. or to
any first-rate power, because this would be a danger to
Turkey only second to that arising from Russian occupa.
tion, and because its possession would give an inadmissible
predominance in those seas to any great nation. It must
be in the hands of some power which cannot use it ansWs—
which no one fears—which has and can have no sinister or
dangerous designs. Sardinia is such a power. She will
hold the Crimea in trust for the peace and interest
of Europe. Assign it to her under the guarantee of a
general European treaty; fortify for her the two great
roads which connect it with Russia, assist her for a dean
of years with a subsidy equal to the expenses in which the pus.
session will involve hen—and the " Eastern Question" will
be settled in the most effective, enduring, and economical
mode possible. Sardinia would be able to maintain the
Crimea against a coup de main; against a deliberate and
prolonged war, she would be backed by the common forces
of all the parties to the general treaty of the pacification.
According to this, then, we are to continue the war
for an indefinite period, that the Crimea may be
given to a power which "no one fears." How is it
to be supposed that Sardinia, even with the aid of an
English subsidy, could permanently hold the Crimea
against the might of the Russian empire? Is it
likely that peace would be more durable—which is
the great point—with the Crimea in the hands of
Sardinia, as a barrier to Russia, than with such a
barrier to her advance as the Turkish empire, guaran-
teed by the Western powers, would form ? The idta
that the Crimea alone could be wrested from
Southern Russia is a delusion. The peninsula mutt
belong to the power which holds the mainland, or to
one or other of the great maritime powers of the
West. And what, then, would become of Turkish
independence?
A writer in the British Quarterly Review is so en-
thusiastic in favour of war that he lauds its advan-
tages, and insists that it is necessary to the vigorous
life of nations. He reads history backwards. He
supposes that nations have perished through love of
peace, when the true lesson is all the other way,—
nations having usually perished or fallen through
excessive ambition and continual strife. In the
opinion of this writer, the great object of the war
should neither be to stimulate the Teuton races, nor
to give the Crimea to the Sardinians, but to recon-
stitute Poland. When we have effected so much,
we shall be at liberty to settle with the German
powers.
It is, strange to say, in the last number of the
Edinburgh Review that we find the most moderate
views on the policy of the war put forth. The saga-
cious writer supposes that, practically, the objects of
the war have been attained :

As far as this country and France are concerned, the
capture of Sebastopol and the destruction of the Russian
Black Sea fleet accomplish the most prominent and im-
mediate objects of the war. Of the four principles laid
down in the past negotiations as the indispensable con-
ditions of peace, some are partially and some effectually
attained

One of the fundamental conditions and securities of
that alliance [the French] has been the moderation of its
object, and the disinterested character of the war. . . .
When we hear extravagant pretensions raised—when we
are told that the power of Russia is to be annihilated, her
territory dismembered, the oppressed nationalities of
Eastern Europe roused to insurrection, and the war pro-
longed with unrelenting fury fur objects which formed no
part of the original designs of the allied powers—we
answer that none of these exaggerated views are to be
found in those treaties of alliance on which we mainly rest
the success of our cause ; and that to endeavour to engraft
on our present successes schemes of conquest, or exten-
sive changes in the territorial condition of Europe, would
be to place that alliance in jeopardy, and in fact to begin
another war for objects of a far more questionable cha-
racter,

These sentiments will not be new to the readers of
THE Passe. We quote them for the sake of the
agreeable contrast they present to the wild and dis-
cordant views of the war party.
Is the nation willing to trust itself to the guidance
of that party, with Lord PALDIERSTON at its head'
This is a question so pressing, that the solution of it
cannot long be delayed.
On one side we have a party committed to extreme
and extravagant views for the positive extension of
hostilities, the objects being of a character with which
England has no national concern, and on the other
a party which, in the emphatic words of the Emperor
NAPOLEON, seeks a " durable peace "j by "clearly
" resolving the question from which the war ems-
" nated." The progress of events will merge all
politicians into those two parties alone—and they
irl4 be eseeutially Democratic and Conservative.

NOVEMBER ~17, 1855.

Sittraturt.

Histoire du Consulat et de r Empire. Vol. XII.
By M. Thiers. Paris : Paulin.
[Second Notice.)
M. Timm, in the introduction to the twelfth
volume of his history (reviewed in THE PRESS
of the 3d inst.) assured his readers, it will be re-
membered, that he takes immense pains to aster
tarn the real truth about every event narrated
by him : but we were obliged to hint, from what
we personally knew of his manner of collecting
his facts, that this was only true with respect
to French sources of information, seeing that
he rarely, if ever, has recourse to those which
England and Germany present. A careful
perusal of this volume will convince the
reader that our hint was fully called for; for
it will show that an exclusively French view
is taken of all the great events recorded—that
an exclusively French judgment is passed on
them—and that exclusively French measure
is meted out to the distinguished mon en-
gaged in them. Thus, the impracticable
continental blockade which Napoleon estab-
lished, in the vain hope of ruining England, is
gravely asserted to have been justified (p. 39)
by the conduct of the English themselves ;
the violence and oppression with which Na-
poleon enforced the blockade fine, im-
prisonment, death, the seizure and destruc-
tion of private property, the capture of neutral
ships, the confiscation of neutral territories,
the tyrannising over neutral States—are repre-
sented (p. 43) to have been excusable; and
the blockade is throughout treated as a great
political combination, infallibly destined, if
persisted in, to cause the ruin of Great
Britain, though all the world knows by this
time that, even if it could have been rigorously
executed—which was impossible, inasmuch as
English ships commanded every shore —it
weighed far more oppressively on France than on
us, and, as she was less rich than we, and had
wars everywhere to maintain, it would have re-
duced her to utter beggary long before it could
have ruined us. As to the French prejudice
with which M. Thiers passes judgment, it will
be sufficient to say that he represents the deNas
tation of Portuguese towns and fields by the
English—to prevent them from affording sup-
plies to the French—in the most odious light
possible, and yet speaks very tenderly indeed
of much more atrocious things done by the
French in Spain and Portugal; he sees
" harshness" and "cold selfishness " in the
refusal of Wellington to incur the risk of
having the English army destroyed by going
to the rescue of Ciudad Rodrigo, besieged by
the French, when the retention of the place
was of no advantage to the carrying out of his
plans, and yet, when General Suehet, in the
siege of Lerida, showered shot and shell on
the civil population—men, women, and child-
ren cooped up in the citadel—all that the soft-
hearted M. Thiers can say was, that " it was a
" terrible scene, but impossible to avoid."
With regard to the manner in which he appre-
ciates the merits of persons, it is so peculiarly
French that, whilst he sees all kinds of excel-
lence in every French general employed any-
where, it is only in a few of their adversaries
that he can discover any at all; and, though
obliged to speak respectfully of the transcen-
dent qualities of Wellington, he takes care to
dwell maliciously on any mistake or oversight
of which he may have been guilty, and, by
artfully exaggerating the difficulties with
which Ma ssena, the French commander, had
to contend, and being nearly altogether silent
on those which beset Wellington, he contrives
to create the impression that the palm of
military superiority belongs to the former, and
even cast a shade over the most glorious
exploits of the latter. In a word, he has
misnamed his book—instead of calling it
"A. History," he should call it a " French
History of the Consulate and the Empire."
Nor is his inveterate Frenchism the sole
ground of complaint we have against M.
Thiers: in many places he uses a tone of flip-
pancy which is unbecoming the gravity of the
historian. Thus (p. 105) lie says of Mr.
Perceval that "he was obstinately bent on
" pursuing the war with the blind fury of a
" Tory"—au expression which is singularly

THE PRESS.

undignified, and which is besides inexact as
regards Mr. Perceval, and libellous as regards
the Tories. Thus, also (p. 240), after deserib
ing the victory of the French over the Spaniards
at Ocana, he cries, "The only thing wanting to
" this triumph was that it should have been
" gained over the English !"—an exclamation
called for, unjustifiable, and impertinent. Again,
in places innumerable, he not only describes
matters with a strong French bias, but has the
bad taste to prate constantly of " defeat.
ing the English," "driving the English into
the sea," and doing this, that, and the other to
the English—a style of language unsuitable
for history, and absolutely ludicrous when it
is remembered that it was the English who
defeated the invincible French over and over
again. Nor does he hold the balance fair even
between the different French personages of
hi 3 history : showing, for example, a marked de-
sire to exalt or excuse Massena, and an
equally strong one to disparage Soult; and
why he disparages Soult, be it said en passant,
no one who is acquainted with the politics of
Louis Philippe's reign requires to be told.
Lastly, we find more errors than are excusable
in a book which it has taken fifteen years to
write. Mr. Perceval. for instance, is constantly
called M. de Perceval ; the English people are
described (p. 20) as "having accustomed
" themselves no longer to regard (ne plus re-
" garden Hanover as English "—as if they ever
had so considered it ; the Anglo-Portuguese
forces in the lines of Torres Vedras are some
times set down at 80,000, sometimes at 70,000,
and the English alone sometimes at 30,000 and
at others at 20,000; and there is equal loose-
ness of assertion as regards the forces of Mas-
sena acting against them.
But, in spite of all its faults, the " History
of M. Thiers is a wonderful production, and
perhaps no man now living could send forth one
like it. The most complicated inatters—as, for
instance, the continental blockade—are ex-
plained with the greatest clearness; the most
arid, as those of finance, with charming sim-
plicity and grace, united apparently to the
strictest exactness of figures. The descrip-
tions of battles and sieges are astonishing in
every respect—technical, yet perfectly compre-
hensible to the non-military reader—brief iu
space, yet full of detail—vivid, but not exag-
gerated : the plans of the generals, the acci-
dents of the ground, the commencement and
progress of the affair, the main incidents in it,
the fierce final struggle, the grand result, the
exultation of the victors, the rage of the van-
quished—all are recorded with extraordinary
fidelity and power. The other and even worse
horrors of war—towns and villages slicked, vine-
yards destroyed, corn-fields ravaged, the most
charming districts of the earth turned into
howling wildernesses, and thousands of God's
creatures, men, women, and children, sent forth
to hunger and to die—these horrible spectacles
are evoked in all their horrible reality, but
without any straining after effect, or any de
scent into bombast. The veil that hung over
much of the policy of the Imperial soldier
who is the hero of the book is stripped away,
and full light is thrown on many circumstances
which ha% e heretofore been more or less a
mystery or au enigma. The blind and fatal
ambition of Napoleon—his absolute tyranny—
his many faults both of policy and conduct—
his violent character—the fear with which he
was regarded, even by those who approached
him nearest and were dearest to him—all these
are exposed with as much severity as could be
expected from a historian who worships him
as a demigod. The qualities and defects of
his brothers, his generals and Ministers, and
creatures—the distrust which his later policy
excited in the wisest of his followers—the
intrigues with which, in spite of his immense
and awful power, he was surrounded, and at
times even thwarted—and the various events
which began to prepare the way for, or to fore-
shadow, his downfal—all these are touched on,
indicated, and developed with a master hind.
The style in which M. Thiers writes is too well
known to need description : with the greatest
apparent simplicity, it displays the greatest
literary art—it is at once clear, unaffected,
sparkling, and eloquent.
In such a book the. reader will readily be-
lieve that we have scored very many passages
for translation. Our space, however, forbids us

1099

from doing more than taking two brief ones.
The first is about Wellington, in the early part
of 1810 :

Sir Arthur Wellesley had acquired over the British
Government, and even over the British public, great
credit by his recent operations. Since the retreat, au
hasty, and which might have been so disastrous, of
General Moore, the English trembled inoessantly at the
idea of seeing their soldiers precipitated into the sea, and
it was not without fear that they left them in Portugal.
However, on seeing their new general, Arthur Wellesley,
so far from being expelled from the Peninsula, expel on
the contrary Marshal Soult from Portugal, then dare to go
by the Tagus to Talavera to give battle at the gatea of
Madrid, and retire afterwards quietly into listratuadurs
before the Freucharmies united, they began to regain con-
fidence, and to accumulate on Arthur Wellesley the un-
exampled honours which have as much honoured that
general as the nation which showed him so much grati-
tude. They had just awarded him the title of Lord
Wellington, with large pecuniary recompenses, and, in
order to render everything easier for him, had sent his
brother Henry to the Central Junta of Seville as Ambassa-
dor of Great Britain. His other brother, the Marquis
Wellesley, was Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. No
one then could be more highly esteemed or more strongly
supported than he was in England. Nevertheless, the
services already rendered to his country, and the great
reputation which lie had begun to acquire, did not preserve
him from the attacks of the Opposition, which wished for
peace, nor from the objections of the Government, which
was iu constant dread of a disaster. The British Govern-
ment accordingly kept at the mouth of the Tagus, at great
expense, an immense fleet of transports, iu order to be
always ready to receive the army if it were beaten. The
peace between France and Austria increased its apprehen-
sions, thinking it possible for Napoleon soon to send his
best army and his best general, that is to say himself,
into the Peninsula ; and at this idea all England trembled
with dismay for Lord Wellington and his army.
In the increased alarm produced by the peace with
Austria the people tormented the Cabinet, and the
Cabinet tormented Lord Wellington by the expression of
continual terror. It supplicated him to be prudent, bat
far from supplying means in proportion to the danger, it
accorded them with a certain degree of parsimony, from
the fear of encouraging his► to remain in the Peninsula.
Lord Wellington felt keenly these vexations, for men with
hearts capable of surmounting great perils have frequently
only the appearance of want of feeling—they dominate
themselves without feeling less than others the
agony of difficult situations. The unhelped general
suffered, but was not yet sufficiently powerful to
dare to make known what he felt either to the British
Cabinet or Parliament. He endured his vexations,
and replied with modesty to his chiefs when he was otteu
tempted to do ctherwiae. With rare penetration he had
judged the march of events in the Peuinsula better than
Napoleon himself, not that he had an intellect equal to
his—far from it—but because he was on tle spot, and be
was not misled by any of the illusions which Napoleon,
engaged in a bad path, took pleasure in melting for him-
self. He had appreciated the force of resistance which
national hatreds, climate, and distance opposed to the
French, the exhausted state of their forces on arriving at
the bottom of the Peninsula, the negligent character of
their operations under the direction of divided generals,
the improbability of the arrival of Napoleon on such a
distant theatre of war, and, lastly, the disagreement of
Napoleon and Joseph—a disagreement which proved that
the excessive exactions of Napoleon began to exceed even the
zeal of his own brothers : and lie entertained the convic-
tion, which nothing had been able to shake, that the vast
scaffolding of grandeur was undermined in all parts ; that
no doubt Napoleon might possess himself of the greatest
part of the Peninsula, but that he could not conquer
certain extreme points, such as Gibraltar, Cadiz, and
Lisbon, which were protected by distance and the sea ;
that if England from these extreme points continued to
excite and support the hatred of the Portuguese and
Spaniards, the conflict would incessantly continue, and so
exhaust the forces of the empire ; that Europe sooner or
later would revolt against the yoke of Napoleon ; and that
the latter would then only be able to oppose him by armies
half destroyed by an interminable and horrid war. This
opinion, which honours in the highest degree the military
and political judgment of Lord Wellington, had become
with him a fixed idea, and he had persevered therein with
a correctness of judgment and a firmness of character
worthy of being admired.
The second extract we make is a pleasing

one:—
Massena spent himself several days in reconnoitring the
formidable position of the English at Torres Vedrss. One
day, the 16th October, he was under one of the enemy's
batteries, and proceeded to examine it by means of a py-
glass placed on the low wall of a garden. The English
officers perceived the illustrious Marshal very distinctly,
and felt for him a sentiment worthy of civilised notions
when they are reduced to the misfortune of making war
on each other. They might by tiring from all their pieces
have killed the Staff of the Marshal, and probably him
also. They, however, only fired one shot to warn him of
his peril, and they aimed it so well that it knocked down
the wall on which his glass rested. Massena understood
the courteous warning, saluted the battery, and, getting on
tohis horse, went out of the range of the English guns.
The description which M. Thiers gives of
the famous lines of Torres Vedras is a very
remarkable one, and is calculated, in our
opinion, to enhance immensely the military
renown of Wellington, es peeinlly on the Con-
tinent. But we must retain it for a future