The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1875-06-12 00:00:00

LIABILITY OF CARRIERS.

In the Court of Exchequer the cause of " Thompson v. the
Royal Mail Steam Packet Company" has been heard, and
was originally an action brought against the company to
recover the value of a certain box or chest which was lost
during a voyage from England to a port in America, owing,
as alleged, to the negligence of the defendants' servants. It
was tried by the Lord Chief Baron in London about the end
of last year, and resulted in a nonsuit. Subsequently the
Hon. A. Thesiger, Q C., on behalf of the plaintiff, obtained a
rule nisi, to set aside the non-suit, and to have a verdict
entered for the plaintiff for the am,unt claimed—£79l4s. 9d.
—The arguments on both sides were brought to a conclusion
on Friday.

--- -
The plaintiff was a passenger from Southampton to
Colon in the defendants steamship Elbe. One of the
conditions printed on the face of the ticket, which the
plaintiff signed, was that the company would not be
answerable for loss, damage, or detention of baggage,
under any circumstances. Another .further condition
was that the company should be at liberty to land any
passenger suffering from any infectious disease. The
box in question was placed in the hold and labelled
"Colon." Some days after the Elbe sailed the plain-
tiff was taken ill with typhoid fever, anti was landed
at Kingston, Jamaica, insensible. His box was also
landed on the wharf by the defendants, but the
plaintiff never heard or saw anything of it afterwards.
Mr. Ledgard contended that the defendants were
exempted by the special contract contained in the
_A_clani*kiag thab 4120 dcfciadaut. WCIII uvt,
eum-
mon carriers, yet, if the special exemptions did not
apply, under the circumstances the defendants would
be subject to the liabilities of common carriers. If the
Court were of opinion that the loss did not occur under
the circumstances provided for by the contract, then,
having regard to the various circumstances of stopping
the vessel at an intermediate port, the facts showed
that the defendants had used reasonable care to insure
the plaintiff getting his luggage. There was no evi-
dence of negligence, because, under the circumstances,
sufficient would have been done even if the plain-
tiff and his luggage had been merely deposited upon
the wharf. The case was governed by that of " Taub-
man v. the Pacific Steamship Company." On the au-
thority of that case there was a loss within the mean-
ing of the contract; and, even admitting wilful
default or misfeasance, the negligence of the defend-
ant's did' not operate to take the case out of the con-
tract. The facts did not show that any new duty or
obligation was, in point of law, imposed upon the de-
fendants, as contended for by the plaintiff in moving
for the rule.

The Court said it lay on the plaintiff to distinguish
the case from "Taubman v. the Pacific Steamship
Company."
_ _

Mr. thesiger urged that some obligation to act
reasonably attached when the company landed or de-
hveref:l a passenger. Suppose an extreme case—a
lunatic or dead passenger; some obligation would also
attach to act reasonably towards his luggage. Here
the box was placed on a wharf, without any one on
earth to look after it. The conditions of immunity in
the ticket applied to the circumstances of the voyage,
and ceased when the voyage terminated—that is, when
the passenger was put on shore. This the company
were,clearly entitled to do. Nothing was said in the
contract about luggage being put on shore with a pas-
senger, consequently the company were bound to take
care of it. tinder the condition for sick persons, it
would be reasonable to land luggage with a passenger.
In such a ease there was an obligation to land both
Passenger and luggage in a reasonable way, and not to
throw the latter on a wharf.

The Lord Chief Baron said it was high time that
the question should be settled on the authority of the
highest Court of resort. The words were clear; no
doubt could exist as to their meaning. The contract
was to convey the passenger and his luggage from port
to port, with the stipulation that. the company would
not be responsible for loss of goous under any circum-
stances. After reviewing the facts, his Lordship said,
Putting aside the authorities, the compiny were not
liable under any circumstances. This Court could not
make them so. Cases might have been decided when
Wilful negligence made the company liable, in spite of
the exceptions. He would not say there was not some
degree of negligence in this case. Whether or not, he
would not hold the company liable without the authority
of the House of Lords that such stipulations were wholly
void.

Baron Bramwell concurred. The case was governed
by "Taubman v. the Pacific Steamship Company."
He did not approach the question wholly unpreju-
diced, as he thought the companies had been some-
what unfairly treated. If he appeared to disagree
with the House of Lords, he did so with the greatest
respect for that tribunal, whose decisions had always
commanded the highest respect from him. The con-
tract must be construed strictly. They were asked to
say that people could not make their own bargains;
the Courts must make them for them. Cases had
arisen when legislation was necessary to protect the
poorer and more ignorant classess, as, for in-
stance, the Truck Act. Steamboat companies
and passengers were rational beings. If these
were improper engagements, they would not be
entered into. It would be hard to prohibit such
agreements. The companies had to protect them-
selves against bad servants and false claims, though
perhaps, the stipulations were too stringent for honest
cases. If these stipulations pressed hardly on the
public, companies would soon be started to insure the
safety of luggage on special terms. These would
attract all the traffic. The companies with a liber-
ality which any one who had travelled much abroad
would appreciate, did not higgle for a few pounds'
weight, but were willing to carry any amount of
personal luggage within reason. It would be most
mischievous to upset the conditions of carriage. It
was said that a new obligation arose, but that was an
obligation arising out of the old contract. It made
no difference that the clause relating to illness came
after the luggage clause. The words were too plain to
admit of doubt. The rule must be discharged.
Baron Cleasby concurred. The judgments on the
cases were not uniform. The Court had to deal with
the effect of exceptions. The plaintiff's case was that
when the obligation was particular the exception was
removed. In a variety of cases where particular care
should be taken, general exceptions would not be
applicable. It was not made out that any new duties
arose so as to make the company liable, only a con-
tingency was contemplated. There was nothing ia this
case analogous to deviation. Some care might have
been necessary, but a special obligation did not arise.
Rule discharged.