The Press.
London, England, 1855-01-27 00:00:00

THE CAPITAL CHARGES AGAINST
THE CABINET.

WHEN the glory of an ancient country is at stake,
and the fate of its only army is trembling in
the balance, it becomes the duty of every public
writer to look closely to the grounds upon
which he impeaches an Administration of fail-

ing in its duty. Fully sensible of the gravity
of the task, and thoroughly penetrated with
the solemnity of the present crisis, we shall
proceed to state four capital charges against
the existing Cabinet, which no audacity can
gainsay, and no ingenuity refute.
1. In proving the truth of the first serious
charge against the Cabinet, we have the unin-
tentional assistance of the War Minister him-
self. The Duke of NEWCASTLE boastfully
confessed in the House of Peers " that
" from the first the Government had resolved
"on the expedition to the Crimea." The fact
is beyond dispute, and out of it arises the
question, pregnant with the greatest import,
" How happens it that Ministers did not im-
" mediately embody the Militia ?" The reserve
for a British army can be procured only from
the Militia, and let our readers mark the
criminal neglect of the Ministry. Oh the
6th of February, 1854, Lord PALMERSTOPt told
the House of Commons that the Militia would
be organised in Scotland and Ireland. Febru-
ary closed, and time was pressing. On the
28th of March war was declared, and the month
closed without the least hint of preparations
for embodying a reserve. April passed away,
and still no measures were taken ; and it was
not until Midsummer that Parliament was
asked for the necessary powers. Yet the
Ministers, if they had the least reflection, must
have known that every spare man would be
wanted. For as the line regiments were
transported to the East, their places in Ireland
had to be filled by the English Militia. The
country, therefore, would be left defenceless;
and yet with this fact before them they never
until the last moment took means for raising
the Militia either in Scotland or Ireland. In
fact, they never took thought upon a reserve
at all, or upon the absolute necessity of con•
stantly adding to the army in the field.
And upon this grave charge it is worth
remarking that, if Ministers had calculated
upon the necessity of a reserve, they might,
by proper organisation, have disciplined and
officered a formidable auxiliary force of Turks
of a far superior kind to those which the
Sultan sent to the Crimea. We know what
invaluable assistance was found in the Portu-
guese, when Field-Marshal BERESFORD reduced
them into discipline ; and the exploits of the
Turks, when well trained and led, shows what
they might be made. But, as the necessity of
" a reserve" never entered into the heads of
the Ministry, so it is not.to be wondered at that
they overlooked the valuable aid which, with
forethought, they might have procured from
a British organisation of Turkish troops.
2. Entering upon the war in this reckless
fashion, they then committed a second grave
error, for which it is obvious that they alone,
and not the military authorities, must be held
entirely accountable. The responsibility of
the original resolution to invade the Crimea
was clearly Ministerial, and not military.
The Duke of NEWCASTLE has confessed as
much, and it is upon the Cabinet that must
rest the weight of having had no proper know-
ledge of the prodigious resources of Sebastopol.
The ignorance of the Government upon this
point seems to have been wonderful. They
had various resources at their command for
obtaining ample information upon the strength
of Sebastopol. France had no extensive com-
merce with the Black Sea ; and, with the aid of
our diplomatic body throughout Europe, aided
by our mercantile and consular sources, and

74

other means (which we shall not particularise),
a British Cabinet ought not to have made
such an absurd " leap in the dark" as assailing
Sebastopol with a foie of seventy thousand
u irt
English, French, and T ks.
On this point we slit* ire that Ifinistatilt
were pressed strongly. at metnl! did till)?
take for obtaining Wiottderige tor the actual
state of Sebastopol ? Would they produce to
Parliament any etridisetial IIihOWIES *lSt t
were alive to the necessity of learning who
provision Russia had made against their ex-
pedition ? These are questions that touch the
cabinet in a mortal part; for assuredly, if
they sent an army to tkib thoeet of Ws I
Crimea without seeking for exact knowledge
of the renowned fortress, they must be con-
demned by all reasonable men. One might
have supposed that the peculiar talents on
which the Duke of NEWCASTLE prides himself
might have profitably employed some of the
secret service money in obtaining evidence.
But it seems, as Lord DERBY truly said, that
"Ministers never considered the greatness of
" the undertaking upon which they were en-
" tering." If that were the sole charge against
them it would be enough to insure their con-
demnation.
But, thirdly, as the Duke of NEWCASTLB has
confessed that the expedition to Sebastopol
had been intended from the first, it is a charge
of the first magnitude against the Ministry
that it never made the least provision for our
troops wintering in the Crimea. They never
inquired whether it hailed, rained, or snowed
there. To the very last they left the men up
to December in the clothes which most of the
regiments had worn for nearly a twelvemonth.
Apart from any consideration of the climate
itself it would have been bud enough to have
allowed the troops in any campaign to remain
so long without new coats, boots, and linen.
But when they were sent to the Crimea it was
a cruel oversight not to have abundant warm
under-clothing for them. But against a win-
ter in the Crimea the Ministers had made no
provision. Here, again, we must say that
the charge is enough to insure their con
demnation. Whether Sebastopol stood as firm
as Gibraltar, or whether it was blown to frag-
ments, in either case a winter campaign was a
positive certainty. From not having provided
against it have arisen all the horrors, the
mere narration of which has drawn scalding
tears from many eyes, and blanched the cheeks
of the boldest amongst men. 111-clad, un-
housed, half-fed, perishing on Crimean hills,
our wasted army is victimised with slow but
deadly certainty, because the winter season
had been left out of the almanac used by the
" proper authorities " in Downing-street.
We say, fourthly, that the resolution to
" spare Odessa " was an error of the greatest
magnitude. This stupid blunder has entailed
upon us costly sacrifices, while giving the
Czar the command of resources which we
should have intercepted. It is from the
granaries at Odessa that the Russian armies
have been supplied. It was a military as well
as a commercial depot of Russia, but the
Ministry " did not like to interfere with corn-
" merce, ' and the enemy was allowed to avail
himself of its vast advantages. Our troops
are in the country of the foe; they are in a
land of strangers, and amidst hostile races.
But it is for the Russians that the Cabinet
Ministers reserve all their sympathy. They
cannot bear to think of crippling the com-
merce of the enemy. They could have
stopped his supplies in all directions, but
the notion of Russians on quarter rations
-agonised our Cabinet. It was only for their
own countrymen that the Ministers contrived
hardships.
These four charges-1. No reserve ;2. The
" leap in the dark " blunder ; 3. Want of pro-
viding against a winter campaign in the
Crimea ; 4. The " spare Odessa ' fallacy—are
enough to blast the character and insure the
downfall of any Cabinet. We make these
charges against them in plain words, and we
say that any Ministers who have so egregiously
shown their incapacity for carrying on a war
ought to be dismissed without delay. Of their
subordinate blunders the enumeration would
be too prolix for our columns. Nor (after the
excellent articles in the Quarterly Review) is it
necessary that we should catalogue the pro-