The Press.
London, England, 1855-03-24 00:00:00

THE WEEK.

THE public mind of England at the present moment is in an eminent
degree expectant. It waits upon events, and there is that kind of
vacillation or uncertainty universally felt which, though representing
a calm approaching to stagnation, is often the precursor of a startling
change in human affairs, and of the most violent convulsion. We wait
for intelligence of pacific negotiation from Vienna, and we wait for news
of hostile movements in the Crimea ; for some indication of Ministerial
policy, and for some decisive disclosures from the Committee of In-
quiry. We wait for the budget, to know whether new taxes are to be
imposed, or a loan to be raised. We wait to know what will be done
with respect to the Newspaper Stamp Bill—what course the Peelites
mean to pursue—what chance there is of the Radicals accepting Sir
JAMES GRAHAM'S proffered leadership. We wait for the sailing of the
Baltic fleet. We wait, after nearly two years of uncertainty, for some
plain declaration of the sentiments of Austria ; and, after many
announcements which have alternately excited and disappointed
expectation, we wait to know the decision of the Emperor of the
FRENCH regarding his projected visit to the'Crimea. Emperors, kings,
senates, statesmen, diplomatists, generals, admirals, armies, fleets, the
season itself, all seem in such a kind of dead lock as burlesque has
represented in the Critic ; and an audience of nations waits the
moment and the word which are to break this inaction and give a new
aspect to the affairs of Europe.

The Congress at Vienna must have been instituted with some
expectation that an arrangement of the Eastern question might result
from it, yet, though it has now been sitting for more than a week, we
are still in the dark as to what turn the negotiations may take, or
whether there is so much as a reasonable hope of peace resulting from
them. The delay in the proceedings is remarkable. It was on the 28th
November last that Prince GORTSCHAKOFF addressed a note to Count
Buoi„ declaring that the Emperor NICHOLAS accepted the Four Points
as a basis of negotiation. Just one month later, viz., on the 28th
December, a Conference was held at Vienna by the representatives of
England, France, Russia, and Austria, to define the interpretation to be
put upon the conditions by the Courts of England, Paris, and Vienna.
That interpretation was embodied in a protocol. Prince GORTSCHAYOFF
obtained a fortnight's delay to consult his master the Emperor, and on
the 6th January he received an order to accept, without reserve, the
protocol embodying the interpretation, as a basis for pacific nego-
tiation.

It was then decided that a European Congress should assemble
at Vienna, and the commencement of February was named as the
probable time of its meeting. Delays intervened, and, finally, it was
not until the 15th inst. that the Congress met. The proceedings were
then opened by M. DE Bum.. The Russian Plenipotentiaries many
accepted the Four Points, and the interpretation put upon them.
The Congress then adjourned until Saturday, the 17th inst., and it
was supposed would not meet again until the following Wednesday.
What has been done at these Conferences has been kept profoundly
secret, letters from Vienna stating that no particulars have been
allowed to transpire.

Apart from diplomatic reserve, it is, however, now well established
that Russia has offered to make important concessions. Besides those
involved in the first, second, and fourth points, she will limit her navy
in the Black Sea to a certain number of ships, and will allow the
construction of a fortress on the Asiatic shore of the Black Sea to
counterbalance the fortress of Sebastopol. An armed port is in itself
only defensive. It protects points of territory, but cannot without the
aid of an adequate fleet be turned to purposes of aggression. Sebas-
topol itself, with the wide expanse of the Euxine around it, commands
nothing but the two or three miles of water within range of its guns.
It is menacing only when it shelters a powerful fleet. Its ships are
its aggressive force, and without them, however powerful for purposes
of defence, it is utterly powerless for means of attack. Will these con-
cessions, now offered with all apparent frankness and good faith by
Russia, be deemed satisfactory?

What more can be asked? Perhaps the dismantling of Sebas•
topol. But would it then be said that no fortress should be main-
tained by Russia on the Rhores of the Euxine for the protection of her
territory ? The rupture of pacific negotiations plainly rests with that
party which demands unreasonable conditions. Between the extremest
terms which the allies on the basis of the Four Points could demand
and the concessions which Russia is prepared to make the difference
is not great. Russia without a fleet in the Black Sea is as much de-
rived of aggressive power as if Sebastopol did not exist as an armed
port. The whole question is now confessedly brought within a narrow
compass. Whether the " Four Points" give sufficient security for the
independence of Turkey and the peace of Europe. whether they pro
vide adequate barriers against the aggression of Russia, and whether
they visit that power with the penalties due to an unnecessary nip-
of the of the world, may be open to question. But ad-
established, it would be difficult or
the concessions Russia is prepared to
them. Austria, as the mediating Power in
balance in her hands, and her known
to doubt what opinion she will pron Junco
on the maintenance by Russia of Sebas-
from the concessions that Power is pre-

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