The Press.
London, England, 1855-01-06 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

ties, as an unfordable river. It is a maxim in
war that a fortified town so divided is stronger
than any other, inasmuch as the investing
forces on the two Sides cannot give or receive
mutual assistnnae. To invest such a place
completely requires double the strength whiob
'Would be otherwise necessary. And even the
ordinary military rules require that the be-
sieging army should he at least three times as
hometotil as the garrison, and should, in
addition, bd supported by a separate covering
force, to prevent relief, and protect the opera-
tions.
A complete investment of Sebastopol was
therefore seen by the allied generals to be li
impracticable. The place, naturally strong,
was capable of receiving great additional
defences ; enormous stores were known to
have been deposited in its magazines and
arsenals ; the guns and gunners of the fleet
which it protected were likewise available for
the defence. Under such circumstances,
considering also the time of year and weak-
ness of the allied force, the undertaking of
the siege was on several accounts a mistake.
On the lauding of the expedition, the diffi-
cnities of our position were perceived. It had
been intended to attack from the north side,
and in pursuance of that plan the battle of
Alma was fought a brilliant exploit, but
barren of result, and by which the army was
numerically enfeebled. The northern attack
offered many advantages ; it cut off the enemy's
communication with Perekop : it thereby
isolated the fortress, and as that side of the
harbour commands the other, its capture
would probably be decisive. When, from
proved want of force to attack both faces at
once, and from the impossibility of finding,
except on the southern coast, a proper place
for the debarkation of heavy artillery and
stores, the flank march towards Balaklava was
decided upon, a third error was committed ;
not however imputable to the allied generals
as a fault, but resulting from their absolute
inability with the numbers at their command
to comply with the requirements of the mili-
tary art.
Let us now examine the resources of the
besiegers, and the present prospects of the
siege. The fleet may be put out of question
as a part of the attacking force. As a diversion,
in the event of a land attack, it may do good
service; it keeps the Russian ships from
coming out, and it supplies men to work the
guns en shore; beyond this it can accomplish
nothing. If vessels are to succeed against
stone walls, it can be only by coming to very
close quarters, which at Sebastopol is im-
possible, from want of deep water in shore.
The sunken Russian ships, and the configura-
tion of the coast, prevent the batteries from
being turned, enfiladed, or attacked in rear.
The garrison is able at any moment to com-
municate with the army of observation with-
out the walls. Reinforcements can pass from
the one to the other. It is in the power of
the Russian generals, with but little delay,
to concentrate nearly their whole strength
either for attack on the allied camp or for the
defence of the town against an assault. It is
probable that each of these two armies
separately is at least equal in numerical
strength to the Anglo-French forces—ex-
,Auding the Turks from the calculation. The
road to Perekop is unimpeded, except by
weather. Severe cold, accompanied with snow,
while it increases the sufferings of our troops,
will facilitate the arrival of Russian rein-
forcements. Thht these will not be wanting
may be conjectureu from the fact that Odessa,
a place of infinitely small importance in com-
parison, is now defended by little less than
50,000 mer.

On the other hand, the besieging army is
spread over an extent of twelve miles ; for two
mouths the trenches have been opened ; the
ground is rocky and unfavourable ; and it is not
yet known whether, from the nature of the
soil, approaches can be carried up to the walls.
If not, the assaulting force is unprotected, ex-
posed to a converging fire, and, even in the
event of success, must incur the most frightful
loss In any case, the carrying of the south
side of Sebastopol neither causes the place to
fall nor the garrison to capitulate. After re-
sisting to the utmost, Prince MENSCHTEOFF may

SATURDAY,

cross the harbour and hold the northern for-
tresses against a second siege. If he does so, it
is supposed that the artillery of these fortresses,
occupying a comtnandieg position, can render
the southern, or captured part of the town,
untenable. Or, he may destroy the whole,
Ihin the army already in the field, and, with
e aid of as many more troops as can be
brought up from Perekop, hold his own against
a force whidh, under auy circumstances, must
have suffered enormously in so long a siege.

The opinion of the Russian generals as
regards their own position is indicated by the
frequency of their sorties. In these sorties
they lose, on the lowest average, four or five
men to every one of ours. The fact is patent,
and it would be absurd to suppose them igno-
rant of it. Yet they continue this unequal ex-
change, apparently aware that, from the faci-
lity with which their losses can be made good,
and the difficulty of repairing ours, the ulti-
mate and real, though not the apparent,
advantage remains with them. They thus
gain the additional benefit of harassing the
allies, and increasing the loss caused by
excessive fatigue and consequent disease. As
their troops work and fight by relays, they do
not suffer similarly.

And here we may remark the error into which
Ministers seem to have fallen—one not unna-
tural in civilians planning an expedition, yet
which their military advisers should have
corrected. They have reasoned as if the supe-
rior quality of British troops could make up for
deficiencies of numbers. Now, this is true in a
battle, or wherever actual fighting is the work
to be done ; but it does not apply either to a
siege or a campaign. One man may beat back
three if they are afraid and he is not; but one
man, however zealous and stout, will find it
impossible to do the labour of three for any
length of time. The fallacy, once stated in
words, is patent ; yet it seems to have per-
vaded the whole of the allied counsels.

We pass over the painful query of late so
much discussed—" How aro the soldiers to be
" fed and housed during the winter ?" Our
arguments are not based upon, though they
may be incidentally confirmed by, the existence
of administrative incompetency in camp or
Cabinet. We condemn, nut a plan imperfectly
carried out, but one originally faulty. Assume
that the expenditure of life in the allied
Crimean army is no greater than the exigencies
of a siege and campaign require. Assume
that the said army is kept up to--even raised
somewhat above—the numbers of the original
expedition at the time of landing. Assume
that fresh men, fresh horses, fresh artillery,
are sent out in time and in number to make
the attacking force what it was meant to be
when it left England. More than this neither
Government nor the civilian public generally
appear to contemplate. Still we maintain,
unless the military art be a fable, and the
lessons of experience simply delusive, the
attack on Sebastopol will fail if not under-
taken on a scale far more extensive, and con-
ducted on principles wholly different. Let
Eupatoria, instead of Balaklava, be selected as
the base of operations , let the north side, not
the south, be attacked in the first instance;
let the relieving, or observing, army be driven
out of the Crimea, or at least to such a dis-
tance as to render its presence harmless.
When this is effected (and to do it will require
nearer 200,000 than 100,000 men) Sebastopol
may be regularly invested, and will then obey
the action of those laws which render the fall
of besieged places after a certain time inevita-
ble. As yet there has been an expedition,
there has been fighting, there has been glory
and loss of life ; but there has been neither a
campaign nor a siege.

THE QUEEN'S AUTOGRAPH LETTER.
HER MAJESTY'S amiable solicitude respecting
" her beloved troops," as gracefully expressed
in her letter to Mrs. HERBERT, will gladden
many a gallant heart in the Crimea. Civilians
respect and admire their Sovereign with con-
stitutional loyalty; but soldiers have some-
thing chivalrous in their enthusiasm for their
Monarch. It is for the " Queen and country

JANUARY 6, 1855.

that they fight and bleed, and the Throne is
environed in their eyes with splendid illusions.
It is well, therefore, to have Monarchy per-
sonified to them in the presence of a generous
Queen who "night and day," thinks of those
" noble fellows."

We can readily believe that many a wearied
soldier, worn with pain and privation, would
be stimulated into cheerfulness on hearing a
soft womanly voice read aloud those simple
and touching words that came from her Ma-
jesty's heart. Sympathy has magical effect
upon those who are suffering. The sturdiest
of us cannot do altogether without it even in
our season of prosperity, and in darker hours
it cheers with cordial efficacy. The smile of
kindness then beams with almost heavenly
sweetness, and feeling solicitude from the
august wearer of the Royal diadem will irra-
diate the gloomy wards at Scutari and Bala-
klava.
It is remarkable that her Majesty says that
"she hears fur details of the wounded." Such
being the case, it proves her Majesty's thought-
fulness and genuine amiability in resolving
that the whole of the painful facts should be
communicated. It was to be expected that
those who have so shamefully neglected
making arrangements for the casualties of a
campaign should be reluctant to expose some
of the consequences of their carelessness be •
fore their Royal Mistress. We are glad,
therefore, that our suffering heroes should,
under such circumstances, have an autograph
letter from their Sovereign to assure them of
her hearty personal sympathy. It will console
many for the blunders of incapable officials,
who have trifled with the lives of " those poor,
" noble, wounded, and sick men," to whom her
Majesty alludes with such pathos. They will
rejoice to know that the Queen feels affec-
tionately for those who have fought so bravely
and suffered so severely for the honour of her
flag.

COMMON SENSE ON THE CABINET.

- - - -
IF the proposition were true that a free
country experiences more difficulty in war
than a despotism, it ought to be a necessary
consequence that constitutional kingdoms
should exercise extraordinary care in the
Ministers selected for a military crisis. We
believe it to be an error, that nations with
liberties are unequal to the sustained conduct
of foreign wars. The brightest passages in
ancient and modern annals attest the con-
trary; but we are safe in affirming that, as in
the case of every other human possession, there
are certain disadvantages in free institutions
necessarily more apparent in times when reso-
lute counsels should be followed by decisive
deeds, and when no official pretext should be
given for vacillation or delay.
At such a time, in a free kingdom, it should
be the part of sagacious and patriotic states-
manship to take the most careful means for
employing the energies specially appropriate
to each office. A Cabinet divided in itself is
a Ministerial anachronism in a period when
vigorous national action is demanded. Bold
hearts, clear heads, untiring energy, and com-
plete union are then paramount necessities, '
unless it were desired to give the advocates of
despotism an opportunity of mocking at the
delays and diversity of design supposed to be
inseparable from the enjoyment of popular
liberty.
Now, let us apply these views to a practical
examination of the aptitude of the present
Cabinet. Our Ministry is composed of two
sections, with hostile antecedents and conflict-
ing principles of policy. On the balance of
power in Europe, on political progression in
England, on the French alliance, on our rela-
tion to the German Powers, and even on
American affairs, the chief persons in the Ad-
ministration entertain opinions entirely irre-
concilable with each other. Nor is there that
social harmony, that friendly sympathy be-
tween them which ought to be found at the
present time. Illustration in detail of this
notorious defect in the Ministry might be in-

THE PRESS.

vidious, but it is not needed. Hansard passim
supplies dreary evidence on that point, while
the hesitation and ambiguity of the last year's
policy furnish lamentable corroboration of the
divided counsels in Downing-street.
Then as to the general aptitude of our pre-
sent rulers for carrying the country through a
trying war let it not he forgotten that the
Cabinet was constructed for effecting civil
reforms. It professed to be a Ministry for
adjudicating on plausible social schemes. But,
instead of times of peaceful internal change,
the Coalition has to encounter difficulties, not
merely English, but. European in their extent.
The Ministry which has truckled to the
Vatican attempts to overthrow the Kremlin.
The requisites of 1855 are not of the kind
boasted of in the first days of 1863. It is not
to a Peace Cabinet that we are to look for that
sturdy resolve and strenuous energy impera-
tively demanded during a momentous crisis.
Turning from the general inaptitude of our
present Cabinet for the conduct of war, we are
compelled to say that, with some exceptions,
our Ministers are not physically equal to their
toils at such a time. Plodding energy was
never the merit of the Leader of the House of
Commons, and the state of his health was
assigned by his friends amongst the reasons
why Lord JOHN RUSSELL had no leading office
in the Cabinet. Is our Prime Minister a
statesman who can electrify the Senate, inspirit
a wavering public, awe the enemies, and cheer
the Mends of England ? Lord PALMERSTON,
whose energy and dashing versatility no one
will dispute, is appointed to carry on a war
against smoking chimneys' and parochial
nuisances. He has sunk into a mere parish
reformer, and is a very different character from
that HECTOR who held forth to patriots from the
suburbs whom he took into his special confi-
dence. His former part'of Foreign Secretary
is given to the Earl of CLARENDON, whose
jaded appearance and flurried features were
(as we have hgard) painful to behold during
his recent examination by his quondam subor-
dinate, Mr. BIRCH. Finance, figures, consols,
loans, taxes, Exchequer Bonds, dividends, the
Share Market, all dance in mazy confusion
before the Ministerial financier, Mr. GLAD-
STONE. Ingenious on his legs, and plausible
on paper, we have never denied the talents
or disparaged the personal pretensions of the
Right Honourable Gentlemen. But, eloquent,
adroit, and subtle though he be, MV*GLAD‘
BTONE is confessedly deficient in the towering
qualities which give a man' strong personal
ascendancy over others. He is more calcu-
lated to shine as an orator than to succeed as
a statesman; with his command of style,
thought, and erudition, he might be brilliant
in polemical literature, but his love of intri-
cacy, and his ambiguity of political creed, will
ever be barriers to his taking a first-rate
rank in political leadership.
Yet these are the five principal persons in a
War Ministry, when Energy, Energy, Energy,
is demanded brthe crisis. The immediate
conduct of the war is consigned to the inex-
perienced Duke of NEWCASTLE, and to the
elegantly sentimental Mr. SIDNEY HERBERT.
Surely it bi to this department that the cry of
" Head, Head, Head,' should be directed.
The Duke of NawcasTLE has been for nearly
twenty years in Parliament, and he has never
displayed one quality befitting the first
rank of administrative power. Neither his
intellect nor previous experience qualify
him for the office of War Minister for England.
As for the apprentice statesmen of the Cabi-
net, the Duke of ARGYLL and Sir WILLIAM
Moutswoarn, their special aptitude is for
Scotch theology and literary Radicalism. In
politics they have neither followers nor in-
fluence.
To conclude : these considerations show that
the evils attributed to the Cabinets of free
countries in a time of war are actually
exaggerated in the constitution of the present
divided Ministry, in which there has been an
entire neglect of that appropriate official apti-
tude for each department required at this
grave crisis. Without any reference either to
Peelites or to Whigs, we say that a Coalition
of discordant parties and heterogenous ma-
terials cannot carry England triumphantly
through a terrible struggle. War demands
unity, and in Downing-street discord.

There are, oddly enough, too many old and
feeble, as well as too many young and inex-
perienced politicians in our Cabinet. Some
ought to be superannuated as too senile, and
others should be sent to school as too raw, for
their posts. The common sense of English-
men must see that the present Cabinet is not
constructed for drawing forth in full power
the exhaustless resources of this mighty
empire.

IMPOSITIONS BY THE INDIA-HOUS
ON THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.
ONZ of the greatest difficulties which th.'
reformers of Indian abuses, have to encounter
in Parliament arises from the plan invariably
adopted by the East India Directors who are
members of that body. No matter what the
charge, or however clearly made out to the
comprehension of the public in general—no
matter how obvious the necessity of the
Legislature's interference to the world at
large—the case is invariably met with a flak
denial of the facts on which the motion inf,
based—a denial to the truth of which they do
not hesitate to pledge their words in th
most solemn manner. Of course in most in
stances this terminates the discussion in the
favour; for there are few members of Peril .
ment who have any very extensive knowled
or Indian affairs, and there are fewer still w
are acquainted with the country personally ;
and therefore when men who have spent the
best part of their lives there deliberate
pledge their words on a question of fact con.
fleeted with it, an assembly of Gentlemen
naturally inclined to yield. It may be felt
some, to be sure, that all is not right, and
these the denials may not be held to be ea
factory; still they will hardly venture to ex.-
press the feeling, and the adverse motion is
generally lost.
This has been the invariable game of the
India-house hitherto—a game played so far
with tolerable success—but in proportion to
the confidence placed iu any body or indivi-
dual is the indignation felt when it becomes
clear that such confidence has been abused ;
and we shall be very much surprised if, after
the disclosures made in the late Indian jour-
nes establishing the fact of the frequent use
of torture by the East India Company's ser-
vants, the credulity of Parliament be again
speculated on by Last India Directors with I
effect.
It will be fresh in the recollection of our '
readers that during the last session a motion
was made in reference to the laud revenue of
Madras in which it was stated by those sup-
porting it that torture was often resorted to in
the collection of the impost, and it was added
that in magisterial cases in India the use of
torture to extract confessions from accused
persons was not uncommon. On this, Sir
JAMES HOOO and a brother-Director, men who
had both held office for years in India, got up
and solemnly assured the House that of their
own knowledge the statement was utterly de-
void of truth, and that such a thing as torture
by the servants of the Government' in India
was entirely unheard of. Their word
taken, the motion was negatived, and so
the India-house triumphed. Nay, more, Lo
HARRIS, the lately-appointed Governor et
Madras, a nobleman new to India, and who, tor
give him his due, appears to be infinitely ton
honest for the connection he is now associated,
with, was so far imposed on'by the disclaim.
ers as actually to appoint a torture commission
of inquiry—not, as his manifesto on the subject
shows, that he believed in the practice, but in,
order to give a weight to the denials of Lila
Directors, which their simple word might b*
held as wanting. " Save me from my friends,
is an old adage, and the result of this :
has shown that Sir JAmire HOOO and
Directors have infinite reason " saver
" from our Governor, Lord
dependently of the evidence
the inquiry has brought
able letters to the editors of the
Indian papers, all incontestibly -
every one connected with
known well enough

iii'

nt nuence.
vo To conclude: these considerations show that order to give a weight to tne uemais vi ...‘,
3t- the evils attributed to the Cabinets of free Directors, which their simple word might be
411
of countries in a time of war are actually held as wanting. " Save me from my friends,"
in exaggerated in the constitution of the present is an old adage, and the result of this inquiry
la- divided Ministry, in which there has been an has shown that Sir JAMIts HOOO and the
on entire neglect of that appropriate official apti- Directors have infinite reason to say " save us
.d- tilde for each department required at this " from our Governor, Lord HARRIS"; for, in
hi
re- grave crisis. Without any reference either to dependently of the evidence officially taken,
iat Peelites or to Whigs, we say that a Coalition the inquiry has brought forth innumer-
... ,
)e- of discordant parties and heterogenous MS- able letters to the editors of the different
he terials cannot carry England triumphantly Indian papers, all incentestibly proving what ,
his through a terrible struggle. War demands every one connected
before—that to ith India must have .
in- unity, and in Downing-street there is discord. known well enough
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