The Press.
London, England, 1855-01-13 00:00:00

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No. 89.—Voi. 111.

LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 13, 1855.

PRICE SIXPENCE.

Vrtss.

Prince GORTSCRAKOFF as the definition of the
points of pacification previously laid down, no
mention whatever was made of Sebastopol.
If proof of this be required, it may be found in
the ready acceptance by the Emperor of the
terms proposed. It does not admit of an
instant's doubt that any proposal involving a
hint of the surrender or dismantling of Sebas-
topol would have been promptly and decisively
rejected at St. Petersburg. The truth appears
to be that the definition was expressed in
extremely vague terms, that it might contain
nothing to which Russia could justly take
exception. This policy is intelligible as re-
gards Count Buoi., who is most anxious to
avoid committing Austria to war, and as
regards Lord WESTMORELAND, who represents
the pacific intentions of his Cabinet, but that it
should have been assented to by M. BORQUENEY,
in opposition to the views of his Court, is a
circumstance which, in the absence of all
explanation, we do not profess to understand.
Our Government, according to its organs,
meditates a policy at once treacherous and
desperate. A. military advantage is to be
gained under cover of pacific negotiation.
The reduction of Sebastopol was always in-
cluded in its intentions, but cannot be men-
tioned in any negotiations now pending, as
" our diplomatists cannot stipulate for more
" than our arms have conquered." We are
told that while negotiations for peace are
going on, the war must be prosecuted with
" increased vigour and promptitude ;" and the
reason given is, that some decisive success of
the allied forces may be obtained against
Sebastopol before the pacific negotiations
at Vienna can be known there. "When
" that result of the campaign is achieved,
" it would be a fortunate event for the world if
" this contest should cease." This peace
and war programme, whether stamped with
the authority of Government or nut, fur-
nishes the only intelligible explanation of
their conduct at the present moment. They
intend peace upon the same terms as were
laid down in August last, previous to the
invasion of the Crimea, and they hope for
some success at Sebastopol which will enable
them to withdraw our forces, under pretence
that the purpose of the expedition has been
fulfilled.
But how, if the grand assault should be de-
layed, or should be repulsed, or should prove
only partially successful, would the negotia
tions in that case be protracted or postponed,
to suit the events of the war? What would
Russia say to such tricksy proceedings? Wlitt,
would be thought of them by the whole civi-
lised world? Falsehood in pacific negotiation
is of all kinds of falsehood the most detest-
able, as it tends to destroy the only means by
which wars can ever be terminated. When
such negotiation is entered on, it should be
with distinct views and honest purpose. If
ideas prevail on one side or the other, that
ulterior ends may be gained, while terms
are being discussed, the negotiation degene-
rates into a trick, and diplomacy is brought
into contempt. If any real bond fide negotia-
tion is desired with Russia it must he brought
about by plain language and straightforward
aims, not by crooked courses and sinister
designs. If the allies had frankly stated the
only conditions they could accept, the answer
of Russia, Yes or No, would have decided the
question of peace or war. But the pretended
definition of the diplomatists at Vienna has
left the real and material points at issue

exactly where it found them. The definition
will need a definition. The acceptance of the
Emperor NICHOLAS will have no consequence,
and Austria will still maintain her neutrality
while endeavouring to find a solid basis for
negotiation amid the shifting quicksands of
Russian intrigue and the uncertainty and
vacillation of the British Cabinet.
The new year, which was to open with
great diplomatic and military successes—
with an Austrian alliance, and the capture of
Sebastopol—only discloses gloomier prospects
than we have yet known. Lord JOHN Rus-
SELL's forebodings of disagreement with
Austria, when the conditions to be imposed on
the Czar came to be really defined, seem
likely to be realised. There is an essential
incompatibility between the views of the
French and Austrian Courts on those condi-
tions which it NI ill not be much longer pos-
sible for diplomatic strategy to conceal. The
silence of the Moniteur on the proceedings at
Vienna is in itself significant, but the toile of
the French Government is more significant
still. The Emperor NAPOLEON feels that the
safety of his throne depends on his bringing
the war to a triumphant conclusion. He will
he no party to an arrangement intended to
spare the Czar, and save him from the just
consequences of his aggressive policy. He
will listen to no terms of peace that do not
reduce the moral and material power of
Russia, and confine her empire within limits
compatible with the independence of other
States and the liberties of Europe. His deci-
sive attitude and energetic measures, his
address to the Imperial Guard, the continued
reinforcements sent to the Crimea, the loan
of twenty millions now being raised to meet
the expenses of the war, contrast singularly
with the feebleness of our policy and conduct.
While Lord ABERDEEN'S Cabinet amuses itself
with arrangements for a new Vienna Con-
gress, " about the Ist of February," as the
only important matter to be thought of,
the Duke of NEWCASTLE'S administration of
the War-office is rapidly helping on the de-
struction of our army. The question now is
not of its diminution, but of its total loss. Its
waste of life and disorganisation proceed far
too rapidly to be repaired. The country may
be incredulous as to the extent of the dis-
aster ; Lord RAGLAN will to the last endeavour
to keep his force together. But we greatly fear,
unless some decisive change should immedi-
ately take place, that the day is not distant
when it will be announced that the British
army in the Crimea has, for all effective pur-
poses, ceased to exist.

LONDON, SATURDAY, JANUARY 13, 1864.

THE Emperor NICHOLAS has promptly replied
to the proposals of the Vienna Conference.
According to the published accounts, a tele-
graphic message has been received from him at
Vienna, accepting the interpretation placed
on the four points by the Ministers of the
allied Powers, and authorising Prince GORTS-
CHAEOFE to negotiate a treaty of peace on the
terms laid down.

Hence it would seem, on the surface, that no
obstacle exists to the speedy or immediate
cessation of hostilities. This would be true
if the interpretation of the four points had

embodied the whole meaning and real purposes
of the allies. But it did no such thing. As if
this diplomatic proceeding were intended for
no other end than to excite delusion and raise
false hopes, the most material points at issue
were altogether avoided. In the opinion of
the public there is one great difficulty in the
way of pacification concerning which no expla-
nation has been offered, and that is—Sebas•

topol.
For the last four months the operations
against that place have been watched with
intense anxiety. They have entailed on us
terrible losses. The flower of the finest army
ever sent from our shores has been sacrificed
in mere preliminary approaches and combats,
while the work itself still remains to be done.
Constantly victorious, our troops have suffered
all the extremity and wretchedness of a be-
leaguered force. Short of utter and disgraceful
discomfiture, the expedition hag' fared as badly
as the best friend of Russia and worst enemy
of England, either in the Cabinet or out of it,
could desire. With all the reinforcements
sent out, we are assured that the effective
strength of our army on Christmas day was
only the same as on the sth November before
the battle of Inkermann, while the daily drain
from sickness and exhaustion continues to be
appalling. Still the heart of our people does not
fail them. They know that it is the management
of the war alone which is to blame. Whatever
may be the faults of our character, faint-
heartedness is not among them. Difficulties
do not appal us. We are not accustomed to turn
away from a work we have once put our hand
to, and in proportion to the blood this enter-
prise has coat us is the passionate desire of
the country that it shall not be shed in vain.
The Ministerial journals have constantly
held that no pacification would be possible
which did not include in some way or other
the demolition of Sebastopol. To raze the
fortifications of that stronghold was declared
to be one of the great objects of the war. For
this purpose the expedition to the Crimea was
undertaken ; and whatever may be the wishes
or intentions of our Government, that of France
is resolved never to sheathe the sword until
the objects for which it was drawn are com-
pletely accomplished.
We adhere to our statement of last week,
that in the memoradum drawn up by the
Conference at Vienna, and communicated to

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITIA.
THE policy of the Government towards the
Militia has been a policy of discouragement.
It is felt throughout the service that not only
have they been left without reward but their
just claims have been disregarded, and in the
measures that have been adopted they have
not been generously treated.
The circumstances under which they were
called out were peculiar. They were enlisted
under the act of 1852, and were liable for
permanent service only in the case of invasion.
By the act of last May their liability was ex-
tended to every time of war The new
responsibility was declined by none. Regis