The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1887-04-23 00:00:00

AFGHANISTAN.

TIME was when Afghanistan was spoken of
as the "buffer state," and, truth to tell, as
such it is regarded still by the majority of
ordinary English-folk. By the "buffer
state "—we would make it clear at the outset
to any who may require elucidation we
le re mean the tract of territory which inter-
venes between our great Indian Empire and
the country of the Czar. The " masses" in
our islands do not place implicit trust in the
integrity of Russia; but, broadly, prefer to
think of the Great Power of Eastern Europe
and West Asia as a country afflicted with
land-hunger, and whose government needs
constant watching,
_lest, by fair means or
foul, they should mov e out beyond their
rightful border-line. Russian diplomacy is
of the wiliest; Russian determination the
the most unwavering and relentless; Russian
craA and cunning of the most accomplished
character. Such is the general impression
produced here upon the great public by the
coarse of history, and so it is that the
"Russian bear" has come to be a byword,
invoking at once caution and strong hostility.
So it is, too, that all things concerning
Afghanistan have been elevated to a point
of interest and importance beyond their in-
tegral &serf. Thus we in Britain have
entered into the Ameer's plans and proposals;
have looked sagerly on with the desire to
assist him toZsound and solid government
when he has had trouble with rebellious
tribes; have shown ourselves in watchful
array when Muscovi e duplicity or covetous-
ness have seemed likely, if let alone, to
engalph Afghanistan in the depths of their
scheming and most ruinous plans, aimed
always, under whatever disguise, at the goal
of Russian aggrandisement. Our friendly
regard for Afghanistan has, in short, arisen
from the most stable of all sources fellow-
feeling born of mutuality or identity of in-
terest. It would not do for us to allow
Russia to- obtain undue ascendancy over the
domain of the Arneer, or the plottings of all
the corrupt agencies at work within the
realm of the Czar would be brought to the
very doorway of our Empire in the East, and
we should not feel safe for one moment from
Russian invasion. Directly the ruling pas-
sion of Russia the covetous yearning for
expanded rule got the upper hand in the
country, all the myriad military horde at the
command of the Emperor would be at liberty
to sweep at once into India, and bear down
before its weight of massed strength, col-
lected from every post of contiguous Russia,
the comparatively few imperial garrisons
manned by native troops, backed up by what
is. after all, but a handful of British soldiers.
This is the danger which we in England
have seen ahead, and which we immediately
assured ourselves must at every hazard be
guarded against. In consequence the affairs
of Afghanistan have had their attention in
Parliament, at the Horse Guards, and in the
councils of the Indian Viceroy, and have
also assumed very considerable importance
in the eyes of newspaper readers. The recent
reports from the Ameer's country of risings
of the people and internal trouble, have
naturally, in consequence, commanded pain-
ful interest, though the cablegrams purport-
ing to convey intelligence of Afghan affairs
has been at times contradictory and some-
what inexplicit. 'The latest message pur-
ports to afford information of an encounter
in which the Ameer's troops were very
seriously worsted. One has to take these
telegraphed acceunts yrano salis, and
°lrefully compare them with each other, and
so endeavour to cons!-ruct a narrative which
has the semblance of probability. The native
Afghans are, unfortneately, not taught to
regard truth as an indispensable virtue, and
the Ameer's lieutenants and sub-governors
are of the suspicious Eastern sort, prone to
treasure up many secrets, and not at all open
or communicative. In speaking of the tur-
bulent Ghilzais, the 1 .yal supporters of
Abtlnrahman would not be likely to credit
them with any superfluity of good qualities,
wteild industriously endeavour to exaggerate
any enormity of %Odell they might have been
uilty, and would ;:cent to underrate and
discount the velue of any chance victory
they had inaneged to obtain over the Ameer's
forces. Thus a great deal of allowance has
to be made its reading the reports of risings
in Afghanistan ; and, the more so, because
the rebellions tribes themselves are also in-
dustriously circulating, through the agency
of any opportune travel ier, fvlse and garbled
accounts of their own doings, gr:atty over-
stating th .ir influence and achievements.
Thus, we at.c asked to believe, in a very
recent despacli, that Abdurahman himself
is either dead or a fugitive. This startling
statement, it is to be hoped, has no founda-
tion of Let, but we cannot doubt that of late
the Ghilzais have le ii very active and bel
ligerent, that map v of t he chiefs of the ncrths
eastern portion of Afghanistan have corn-
lined to revolt against the Ameer's authority,
and that one of the Generals attached to the
suling party have met a most serious reverse
in battle in the neighbourhood of Ghunzi.
All this is established beyond doubt through
sources of information in India, and it would
be wrong to attempt to overlook the feet
that our ally Abdurahman is placed in a
riosi ton of difficulty, if not of danger. Ent
!I matters had come to their alleged arlous
pass vi ith him, if he had really been at ti e
mercy of rebel hordes, there can he hut little
doubt that we should have had hii 1
colon red intelligence thcrcarent from RUES,H.
has not, however, transmitted
ga3l4

"terrible tidings frOixt Atgliarilii-in, so we
prefer to adhere to the conclusion that the
Ameer is stoutly holding his own against th-
malcontents. and endeavouring, meanwhile.
to infuse grcater liberality into the rules of
the land over which he reign. We believe
him to bc a capable chieftain, quite able to
manage tie affairs of his country, if left
alone; and would not, therefore, advocate
interference being, made by Anglo-India in
any Afghan matters, but would simply de-
r:l2lnd that, ourselves abstaining from meddl-
ing, Russia should be interdicted from plac-
ing its finger in Afghanistan pie. This
understanding that non-intervention should
be the rule, should be extended to go be-
yond actual hostility and military movement,
and include the prohibition of the sending
or employment of secret agents for the fer-
mentation of Afghan troubles, a very im-
portant stipulation in the case of a country
like Russia. Abdurahman is a man who
would govern with integrity if all his sub-
jects would allow him so to do, and he has
at his command the requisite force to enable
him to coerce the unwilling to righteous
ways. The Afghan army consists of over
seventy thousand well drilled men, with good
equipment of artillery and smaller weapons,
and the regular troops are ably officered and
under discipline. Against these the turbu-
lent tribesmen have not much chance of per-
manent success, and the malcontents may be
reduced ere long to the observance of order,
if outside influences are withheld. Our
policy, we hold, is that of endeavouring to
complete the establishment of the " buffer-
state " on a firm basis, by encouraging the
Ameer in his efforts at good and sound gov-
evnment. This may best be done, at this
juncture, by non-intervention and moral
support, and a firm attitude of resistence of
Russian intrigue.