The Press.
London, England, 1855-09-29 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

in the great affairs of Europe, or listened to
with that indulgent silence employed towards
the remonstrances of *child, or the complaints
of some unibrtunate bankrupt. The only
great career apened to an Italian is the ecele-
siastical; an there only because he Itta
attain a position in a Church influencing an
respeeted by p great portion of the huma
race. A carolinal, or a monsignors, passai
current from north to south; but what is the
position of a Modenese or Parmesan envoy, if
such exist, at the Courts of Paris or St. Pe-
tersburg? The Minister of an Italian em-
pire would rank with the Metternichs and
Talleyrands of Europe. His policy would be
that of confidence and power, not of supplica
tion and dependence.
Thus have we endeavoured to trace broadly
the distinctive wishes of parties as existing
generally in the Italian Peninsula. On
some future occasion we may point out the
views and opinions of each separate na-
tion, and the proportion in which prevail
laudable ambitions and bad propensities. In
revolving, however, the plans and designs of
Italian politicians, we can find no statesman
like measure, no marks of a mind calculated
to lay out the landmarks of a great nation.
Let us hope that our remarks may prove sug-
gestive, and that some line may be struck out
which, without infringing on existing rights, or
on the straight course of justice, may give to a
fine and noble hearted people that social
position and political importance originally
assigned by nature, and alone capable of
drawing out the good qualities of mankind.

INSUFFICIENCY OF THE BRITISH

ARMY.

THERE are some vital points connected with
our military position at the present moment,
which demand prompt consideration. Sup-
posing that the present war is to continue for
any prolonged term, it will be impossible to
flinch from examining the question " whether
" the British army is sufficiently large in num-
" hers ?" In point of fact, we have been only like
a right wing, a mere section, of the allied
armies, and such a position is utterly unworthy
of a puissant empire, whose sails whiten every
sea, and whose language is heard wherever civi-
lisation reaches. Besides, it is most dangerous
to trust the national honour to an insufficient
number of troops. The British name may be
seriously discredited by the paucity of its
supporters, though it could never be dis-
graced by pusillanimity. It is vain to expect
that handfuls of men can perform marvellous
exploits. New soldiers cannot achieve the
results of veterans ; in war, as in other pur-
suits, age and experience must tell.

But far more serious than these con-
siderations is the fact that in the pre-
sent campaign, while there is a struggle
in the front with Russia, there is a contest
in the flank with the French. The war cor-
respondents of the Daily News and of the
Morning Advertiser have touched on some fea-
tures of this generous rivalry; and it will
never answer for the English people to be
outstripped by their allies. The early glories
of the campaign were common to both armies,
but the victory of the Tschernaya belonged to
the French and Sardinians. The storming of
the Malakoff, the key of Sebastopol, was
French, and at a previous period the
seizure of the ouvrages blancs, and of " The
Cemetery " (most important parts), was in-
cluded in their share of the work. We need
not here detail particulars; but the fact is
that from first to last our troops were never
numerous enough to compete on a fair level
with the hosts of our French allies.

We are told, however, to recollect the supe-
rior might of the British navy; but unfortu-
nately it does not seem that the war now

SATURDAY,

raging can be decided by maritime supe-
riority. We must fight for our share of the
glory, nos under broad pennants, but under
the regimental colours of our line regiments.
And the question remain!, whether we have
even half enough of these regiments?

We cero.inly have not, !supposing that this
war Is to lOst. We have Only men enough to
prove the bravery, bat not to represent the
might of the British islanders. We cannot
suppose that the democracy of England, which
has chiefly cried for the war, desires that it
should be estimated in history as a " French
war." There is every danger of such being
the case, unless we totally change the present
system. Our recruiting, our bounties, our
militia, our efficiency, and our mode of promo-
tion, must be entirely altered, if it be intended
that the British army in the field is to be
worthy of a country without any superior in
the world.

But then comes another grave consideration
—"Whether the people of England are pre-
" pared for such great changes." If we double
our army, our taxes must be raised in equal
proportions, and there must be further pres-
sure on our commercial resources. The spirit
of our Executive would soon be altered by a
vast preponderating influence being given to
the Ministry of the day. Besides, there would
mill remain the question as to what definite
aim was before us in such a vast contest?
These various views point to the seriousness
of the eventuality before us.

For it is vain to suppose that England could
afford to be outshone by the French arms. Our
national spirit is still too high to submit to
being surpassed by our allies, or conquered by
our foes. But many think that our fame
would be in jeopardy if we were to have a
repetition of such scenes as have occurred
during the siege. The retreat from the ltedan
has been felt more on account of the previous
affair of the " 18th of June,"—a date of histo-
rical military celebrity in the annals of
Europe.
We say, therefore, in conclusion, that the
whole eventualities before us must receive
more grave consideration than has yet been
given to them. The losses to which we here
allude has no reference to the policy of peace
or war. It only indicates the necessity of our
making great changes in our whole military
system, if the peace of Europe shall continue
to be disturbed.