The Press.
London, England, 1855-04-07 00:00:00

"OUR GOVERNMENT OFFICES."

A PAMPHLET has reached us under the above
title, the practical character and general good
sense of which entitle it to fuller notice than
such publications usually receive at our hands.
We propose, first to analyse, then to comment
upon, its contents.
The writer deals with the actual state of the
Civil Service, rather than with that which it
may assume under altered regulations, or
different conditions of society. He argues
that reform is wanted now—that war will not
wait—time fails to train up a new class of
clerks. The existing service contains good
raw material ill worked up ; its higher mem-
bers are gentlemen, and the number of edu-
cated officials whom it includes insures a
large field of selection. The system is more
in fault than the men. The best aro not
brought forward—there is a vast amount of
latent ability wasted, because unknown.
The practical defects, according to the
author, are as follows:
First—a want of unity; defective intercom-
munication between the various offices. One
department may contain more men of talent
than it can find employment for, while another
has not a single member who can be ranked
under that category ; yet no transfer is pos-
sible. The state of things (if we may add an
*illustration of our own) resembles that of the
inland provinces of India, where from want of
roads grain may be rotting uselessly in one

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place, while in the adjoining district, a few
miles off, there is scarcity amounting to
famine. A system of habitual exchange is
suggested; as also the classification of civil
servants in such manner as to facilitate this
arrangement. No means, however, are sug-
gested of accomplishing the classification hero
described, the difficulty of which the writer
appears somewhat to underrate. It is inti-
mated that the precedence of civil servants in
the general service might be kept distinct
from their departmental precedence, just as
military officers have regimental rank, as dis-
tinguished from rank in the army.
The second fault noted is that of irrespon-
sibility. No chief of a public office is practi-
cally answerable for its efficiency. He " reigns,
" but does not govern." He directs the ad-
ministration of his department, but exorcises
little superintendence over its working. Nor
has he the requisite power to reward or punish.
Special services, performed by juniors or
subordinates, pass unnoticed; neglect of duty,
unless more than usually gross, remains un-
censured. Between a mere reprimand, which
is felt very differently by different persons,
and a total dismissal from the service, in-
volving the delinquent in utter ruin, no im-
mediate penalty exists. Doubtless the autho-
rity to inflict such is vested in the superior
officer ; but there are scarcely any precedents
for its exercise, and few men will accept the
ungracious task of creating such. The rewards
recommended for adoption are :—(l) Mention
in a minute by the head of a department, to
be recorded in the office books, analogous to
the system of noticing the military services of
officers in despatches by a Commander-in-
Chief, or divisional general. (2) Special
recommendation to the Treasury for promo-
tion, or increase of salary ; such extraordinary
promotion to be either to a higher rank in the
same department, or to a higher branch of the
service.

The corresponding punishments proposed
are—removal to an inferior department, or to
inferior work in the same department—stop-
page of pay, entire, or partial—loss of official
station, a minute of censure, to be duly re-
corded and preserved—lastly, removal from
the service, with or without pension ; the
latter punishment only to be inflicted in
extreme cases, involving moral delinquency.
As a check on the exercise of these powers,
annual reports are suggested from each office to
the Treasury, showing the amount of work done,
the number of persons employed, of letters
received and answered, the cost of working
the department, the regulations in force, &c.
it may be left for consideration whether
these reports should be made public.
Another, and perhaps more important
amendment projected is the establishment of
a civil court of appeal. Mr. GLADSTONE'S
despotic doctrines on this subject, as set forth
in the Kennedy case, will not soon be forgotten
by those who heard them. On the other hand,
it is unreasonable that the House of Commons
should be required to listen to the trumpery
grievance of every clerk who may think him-
self removed without just cause. But if abso-
lute authority can neither be suffered to exist
unchecked, nor yet effectually checked by the
parliamentary power, what remedy except a
separate, an impartial, and an independent
tribunal ?
Responsibility, publicity, and the right to
open trial, are thus the three points on which
our author lays stress. He aims at amending
the Civil Service in its working rather than in
the selection of its component parts. He
would leave the power of first appointments as
at present, subject only to an examination
test, which might exclude the inefficient. He
would have these appointments made out for
the Civil Service generally, thus facilitating
subsequent interchange between the depart-
ments. If the competitive system is to be in-
troduced at all, he would modify it by allow-
ing the Minister to name more than one
candidate—say three to each vacancy—among
whom the best should be picked out by means
of examination. But he lays less stress on
these first appointments than on the subse-
quent distribution of promotion, believing that
it is in the want of rewards for merit, rather
than of men calculated to obtain these re-
wards, that the true defect of the service lies.