The Press.
London, England, 1855-04-28 00:00:00

OUR MILITARY STATE.

THE military position of England at this time
is a subject fur serious consideration. Our
forces are manifestly inadequate to the
struggle in which we have engaged. We
have gone to war with Russia, the greatest
military Power in the world, in order to
prevent her from becoming greater ; because
her further increase would be fatal to
the liberties of Europe. She threatens to
absorb Turkey, to encircle Austria, to reduce
to vassalage Denmark, Sweden, and Prussia,
and to force the Continent to a league against
England and France. Jn the East she me-
naces Persia, aims at the occupation of Asia
Minor, and looks forward to the attack of our
Indian empire. It is necessary to check her
encroachments and reduce her strength. We
have undertaken her humiliation. We have
pledged ourselves to destroy her fleets, to raze
her fortresses, to diminish her resources, and
to render her harmless for the future.
It was a fearful task at the commencement
of the war; it is more so now. The peace
establishment of Russia was 600,000 men,
while we had only 102,000. The dispropor-
tion has immensely increased. Levy after
levy has been made until her army has almost
doubled its numbers. Since the death of
NLCROLAS she has called into existence a fresh
force of 150,000 men. Every day she adds to
her strength, expands her dimensions, and
becomes more colossal.

What have we done ? Diminutive as our
forces were, are they not less diminutive in com-
parison now? Have we made up for our pre-
vious apathy by our present exertions ? Have
we compensated for the smallness of our per-
manent establishment by the vastness of our
additions ? Have we raised fresh armies for
the field, and organised an immense reserve
at home ? Have we held out inducements to
procure an unlimited supply of recruits, and
to attract the flower of the population to our
ranks ? We fear not. Our energy has been
so small, our augmentations so ill-conceived
and so miserably carried out, that we almost
seem to have stood still. We fixed our
standard low, but even of it we have miser-
ably fallen short. We asked last spring for an
increase of 40,000 men, and this year we de-
manded 36,000 more. Together we ought to
have had 76,000 additional British troops.
We have obtained only 49,000. And these are
not mature and hardy men, but boys who have
not attained their full strength, and are quite
unfit for the hardships of a campaign Little
as we have effected, we have already exhausted
our resources. Nor is the Militia in a better
state. Instead of 122,000 rank and file, it
scarcely numbers 50,000. Instead of well-
disciplined men, ready to volunteer and capa-
ble of the duties of active service, it is com-
posed of raw recruits. All the best men have
been sent home, and the regiments are in a
state of disorganisation. We cannot maintain
our expeditionary army at its full strength, and
Lord RAGLAN is crippled by want of men.
It is true that we have an ally, whose re-
sources have been developed with greater
energy. But are we to rely for victory on
him ? Shall we not take our due share in the
conflict ? How will it consort with the dig-
nity of England to bear an insignificant part
in the conduct of the war, attendants of
triumphs not our own ? Will such an in-
feriority be honourable? Will it be safe?
Our weakness was not unavoidable. Due
foresight and energy would have placed us in
a far better position. In I Hl3 we had 750,000
men in arms, when our population was little
more than half its present r Why -
we now so lamentably behini is
want of men, for the nat

populous. It is not want
nation was never so enth)
want of resources, for the
wealthy, or so bountiful.
with the nation, but with
want is a want of capacity,
lected the warnings of 18t
sided over the plans of

WM

t number. Why are
kindhand? It is not
cation was never so
tt of spirit, for the
;husiastic. It is not
nation was never so
The fault is not
h the rulers. The
y. Incapacity neg-
-353 ; incapacity pre-
' 1854; incapacity

T• ' r

devised an expedition without a commis
sariat—a campaign without means of trans-
port ; incapacity despatched an inadequate
force to atte►npt the capture of Sebastopol;
incapacity provided no support at Malta, and
prepared no army of reserve at home; in•
capacity forgot the winter clothing, furnished
insufficient medical attendance, and made the
hospitals charnel-houses of woe; incapacity
caused the disbanding of the most valuable
part of the Militia at the moment when their
services were of the most urgent importance ;
incapacity still presides over our councils,
damps our energies, disorganises our forces,
and leaves us to drift on in increasing help
lessness, while our enemy growa every day
more formidable, and our position becomes
more fraught with danger.