The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1881-03-05 00:00:00

A CONVICTION QUASHED.

The cause of "Richardson v. Saunders" has been he ta
the High Court of Chancery, before Mr. Justice Lindley and
Mr. Justice Lopes.—We take the following repoxt of the car;
from The Times :

This was an appeal (heard February 25) from a
bench of magistrates in Leicestershire, for 'inflicting a
penalty of ss. on the appellant, or LP-Liefault of pay-
ment imprisonment for five dap, for breach of an
order in not causing his cbil:ti to attend at a Board
school.

It appeared from the case that the appellant, acting
under the order, did in fact send his child to the
school, but did not send the school fees, and, in conse-
quence, the child was refused admission. The appel-
lant was on tbxee occasions requested to attend before
the School Board to obtain remission of the fees if he
was so entitled, but on each occasion he refused. At
the same time, it wa.s admitted that the appellant at
the time was out of work. The question for the Court
was whether, in these circumstances, the appellant
had been rightly convicted.

Mr. Hensman appeared for the appellant; Mr.
Douglas Walker fur the respondent.
The argument for the appellant put shortly was
this, that the appellant had in fact been convicted,
not for not obeying the order, for he did cause his
child to attend, but for not paying the fees, and,
therefore, he had been punished for an offence which
he was not charged with having committed. For the
respondent, On the other hand, it was contended that
the Appellant had been punished, not for any breach
of a by-law under the Education Act of 1870, as sug-
gested, but for a breach of the obligations on parents
required by the Education Act of 1876. It was the
duty cf the appellant to have paid the fees in ad-
vance. Failing his ability to do that he ought to
have applied either to the School Board for remission
or to the Board of Guardians, who, on being satisfied
of the appellant's poverty, might have paid the fees
for himt
Mr. Justice Lindley, in giving judgment, said the
ease wiapf importance. It did not appear under what
authorlTT the attendance-order had been made, but the
vestion that arose upon it was the proper construc-
tion to be placed upon the word "attend." At first
sight it seemed quite plain that the appellant had
Gwetuuhitgarehhadians. It seemed quite clear though,
tmhse
mind under
nbduetr
the
edosueebttie;twohnieeh time
passed deha tr appellant might have obtained the fees
on consideration, that this section did not apply, and
that, having due regard to the different sections of the
Acts the appellant had sufficiently complied with the
order. The word "attend must be taken to mean
"send to school, "and if this meaning had the effect of
creating difficulties about payment of fees, which was
likely enough, that was an omission to be remedied
elsewhere.
Mr. Justice Lopes concurred. In point of fact,
the Court were asked to. say that "attend" was
not to be taken in its ordinary sense, but as mean-
ing "attend with fees in your hand." Certainly
in a case like this, which was really a criminal case it
was impossible to import any such words into the
statute. Attend meant "send to school" and nothing
more. The conviction, therefore, would be quashed,
and with costs.
fvildmmes complied
dl
tti