The Press.
London, England, 1855-07-07 00:00:00

THE FRENCH ATTACK.

Details of the operations of our allies on this day,
of which the British despatches contain but a very
imperfect account,, are furnished in the official
report from General Pelissier, published in Wednes-
days Moniteur. The following are the most impor
tant passages :

Before Sebastopol, June 22.
Since the capture of the external works on the 7th of
June I had rapidly made every arrangement to make
them the basis of our attack against the enceint itself of
the iKarabelnia. We armed them with powerful ar-
tillery ; the Russian communications and places d'armes
were turned to our own use; the ground plan of attack
studied in detail; the allied armies had their respective
tasks allotted to them. The English were to storm the
great Itedan, and we were to carry the Malakoff Tower,
the redan of the Careening Bay, and the intrenchments
which cover that extremity of the faubourg. It is super-
fluous to point out what would have been the result of
such an operation if it had succeeded. Since our last
successes the attitude of the enemy and the enthusiasm
of our troops promised victory. There was no time to be
lost.

In concert with Lord Raglan, on the 17th we poured a
crushing fire into Sebastopol, especially into the works we
intended storming. At an early hour the enemy ceased
replying from the Malakoff and from the Itedan. It is
probable they were economising their batterits and fire,
and that they did not suffer so much from the effects of out
artillery as we were led to presume.
However that may be, the superiority of our guns con-
firmed us in our plan for making an assault on the 18th,
and on the night before we made all the necessary arrange-
ments for a general movement on the morrow.
Three divisions were to take part in the combat—the
divisions of Mayran and Brunet, of the 2nd corps; the
division d'Autemarre of the Ist. The division of the
Imperial Guard formed the reserve. Mayran's division
had the right attack, and was to carry the intrenchments
which extend from the battery of the point to the redan of
Careening Bay. Brunet's division was to turn the Mala-
koff on the right. D'Autemarre's division was to manoeuvre
on the left to carry that important work.
General Mayran's task was a difficult one. His first
brigade, commanded by Colonel Saurin, of the 3rd
Zouaves, was to advance from the ravine of Careening
Bay as far as the aqueduct, to creep along the left hill
side of the ravine, avoiding as much as possible the fire of
the enemy's lines, and to turn the battery of the point by
the gorge.
The second brigade, commanded by General de Failly,
was to make an attempt on the right of the redan of
Careening Bay. They were provided with everything ne-
cessary to scale the works. All these troops were ready at
their post at an early hour.
I selected the Lancaster Battery for my post, from
which I was to give the signal by star rockets for the
general advance. Notwithstanding great difficulties of
ground, notwithstanding the obstacles accumulated by the
enemy, and although the Russians, evidently informed of
our plans, were on their guard and ready to repel an
attack, I am inclined to think that if the attack could have
been general and instantaneous on the whole extent of the
line—if there had been a simultaneous action and ensemble
in the efforts of our brave troops—the object would have
been achieved. Unhappily, it was not so, and an incon-
ceivable fatality caused us to fail.
I was still at more than 1,000 metres from the place
whence I was to give the signal when a violent fire of mus-
ketry, intermixed with grape, apprised me that the combat
had commenced seriously on the right. In fact, a little
before three a.m. General Mayran fancied he recognised my
signal in a shell with a blazing fuse sent up from the Bran•
cion Redoubt. It was in vain that he was informed of his
mistake.

This brave and unfortunate general gave the order for
the attack. The Saurin and De Failly columns imme•
diatelv rushed forward ; the first rush was magnificent, but
scarcely were these heads of columns in march when a
shower of balls and grape was poured in upon them. This
crushing fire came not only from the works which we
wished to carry, hut also from the enemy'ssteamers, which
came up at full steam and manoeuvred with great skill and
effect. We, however, caused them some damage. This
prodigious fire stopped the efforts of our troops. It became
impossible far our soldiers to advance, but not a man
retired one step; it was at this moment that General
Mayran, already hit in two places, was knocked down by a
grapeshot, and was compelled to resign the command of
his division.

All this was the work of a moment, and General Mayran
was already carried off the field of battle when I sent up
the signal from the Lancaster Battery. The other troops
then advanced to support the premature movement of the
right division. That valiant division, for n moment discon-
certed by the loss of its general, promptly rallied at the
voice of General de Failly. The troops engaged, supported
by the second battalion of the 95th of the line and by a
battalion of the Voltiguers of the Guard, under the orders
of the brave Colonel Boudville, hold a footing in a bend of
the ground where the general places them, and boldly
maintain their position there. Informed, however, of this
position, which might become critical, I ordered General
Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely to send four battalions of
the Voltiguers of the Guard, taken from the general reserve,
to the support of that division.
The attack on the centre had not a better fate. General
Brunet had not yet completed alt his arrangements when
the signal-rockets were fired. The whole of the right was
already prematurely engaged fur more than twenty to
twenty-five minutes. The troops, nevertheless, resolutely
advanced, but their valour was of no avail against the well-
sustained fire of the Russians, and against unforeseen ob-
stacles. At the very outset General Brunet fell, mortally
wounded by a ball in the chest. The flag of the 91st was

SATIJItDAYI

cut in two by a ball, but it is needless to add that its frag-
manta were brought lack by that gallant regiment.
To the left General d'Autemarre could not go into ac-
tion before Brunet's division, nor could he explain the
hasty fusillade he heard in the direction of Careening Bay;
but at the signal agreed upon for the attack he threw for-
ward with impetuosity the sth Chasseurs-i-Pied and the
Ist battalion of the 19th of the line, which, following the
ridge of the Karabelnia Ravine, arrived at the intrench-
ment which connects it with the Malakoff Tower, filled the
intrenchment, and entered into the enceint itself. The
uppers of the Engineers were already placing the scaling-
ladders for the remainder of the 19th and 26th Regiments,
who were hurrying up by order of General d'Autemarre to
follow his gallant column. For an instant we believed in
success—our eagles were planted on the Russian works.
Unhappily that hope was promptly dispelled. Our allies
had met with such obstacles in their attack on the Grand
Roden, they had been received with such a fearful shower
of grape, that, despite their well-known tenacity, they had
already been obliged to beat a retreat. Such was the
spirit of our troops that, despite this circumstance, they
would have pushed on and charged down upon the enemy,
but the want of simultaneity in the attack of oar divisions
permitted the Russians to fall upon us with their reserves,
and with the artillery of the Great Redati, and the enemy
did not lose a moment in advancing all the other reserves
of the Karabelnia against our brave Chassems-11-Pied.
Before so imposing a force Commandant Gamier, of the
sth battalion, already struck by five balls, endeavoured, but
in vain, to maintain the conquered ground. Compelled to
give way to numbers he recrossed the intrenchments.
General Niol came up to support his brigade, reinforced
by the 30th of the line ; a new offensive movement was
attempted to assure the success of the new effort, and on a
message from General d'Autemarre to the effect that his
reserve was reduced to the 74th of the line, 1 sent him
the regiment of Zouaves of the Guard ; but on the arrival
of those hardy veterans of our African campaigns, as the
movement had no longer any desirable ensemble for so vigo-
rous a blow, with a single division without support either
on the right or on the left, and cut up by the artillery of
the Roden, the attack upcn which had been relinquished
by our allies, I at once saw that all chance of success was
over. Another Obit would only have led to useless blood-
shed. It was half-past eight o'clock, and I ordered a
general retreat to the trenches. This movement was car-
ried out proudly, and with order and coolness, without the
enemy following us on any point. A portion of the Russian
trenches remained even occupied by some of our men, who
evacuated them gradually, without the enemy daring to
turn their advantage to account against them.
Our losses have been great. We took care at the very
commencement of the action to carry off most di' our
wounded ; but a certain number of those glorious dead re-
mained lying on the glacis or in the ditches of the place.
The last duties were rendered to them the following day.
We had 37 officers killed and 17 taken prisoners; 1,544
non-commissioned officers and privates killed or missing.
On the evening of the 18th 96 officers and 1,644 men went
to the ambulances. These losses have not shaken either
the ardour or the confidence of these valiant divisions.
They only ask to make the enemy pay dearly for this day's
work. The hope and the will to conquer are in every
heart, and all count upon it that in the next struggle for-
tune will not play false to valour.
PELISSIER.