The Press.
London, England, 1855-05-05 00:00:00

THE PRESS.

in the War-office, that the whole business of
the department is breaking down under the
continually accumulating weight of arrear,
through the inability *I Lord PANMURE, and
the 'rude attempts tiMently made to reform
and .cralielidate the Wak of different office*.

THE oitINIEA.
IT is MOW silt months since the fire upon
Sebastopol was sttspettded by the battle of
Inkermann. Since *et time the efforts of
the allies have been directed unceasingly to
the preparations for its renewal. Siege-trains
of unprecedented magnitude have been
brought up, fresh batteries have been con-
structed, and continued labour has been ex-
pended in the conveyance of shot and shell.
The bombardment was acknowledged to be
the great operation of the siege, the only means
by which we could hope to destroy the
defences of the Russians, and to gain posses
sion of the town. In the public mind hope
was kept alive by constant accounts of the
progress of the wcrk, and patience was ex
haustod by the repeated announcement of
its completion. At last, on the 9th of April,
the mighty conflict was resumed, and the fire
of 354 guns opened upon the town.
The effect has been very great. So far as
the detailed accounts extend the allied
artillery has maintained a decided superiority.
The loss of the Russian troops has been
greater than our own. Their guns have been
overmatched and silenced in every quarter.
On the 16th ult. the Mamelon had discon-
tinued its fire and become almost useless ; the
batteries round the Malakoff Tower had been
very much damaged ; and the Redan was
" more like a ridge of rubbish than a row of
" embrasures" ; the Barrack Battery had also
suffered seriously. By the springing of three
mines and the incessant fire of the French

the Flagstaff Battery had been cut to pieces ;
nine-tenth,' of its guns were hors de combat;
and a very few more (lays were expected to
complete its destruction. The map of Sebas-
topol will show the importance of these advan-
tages. Later news has arrived by telegraph,
and announces fresh successes. On the 19th
the English took by assault two of the ambus
cades under the Mamelon, and the Russians
had abandoned the batteries of Careening Bay.
So far nothing could ba more satisfactory than
the progress of the attack.
At the same time we receive intelligence of
a startling nature, by the authentic channel
of the Government telegraph, and of ten days'
later date. It announces that on the 28th the
bombardment was suspended for a few days
for the arrival of reinforcements. Not a
syllable about any reverse. What is the reaom
of the delay ? Why not advance to the
assault? To discontinue the fire is to sur
render the advantages that have been gained;
it is to allow the Russians to repair their bat
teries, and remount their guns. It is to
sacrifice the effects of an eleven days' bom-
bardment. The sternest necessity can alone
justify such a step. The telegraph is re-
peated,
and we learn that the Russian army
upon the Belbeck has been reinforced by two
divisions, and that Lord RAGLAN inquires
anxiously for the Sardinian Contingent.
Turning to the accounts from Malta we find
that, some days before, Lord RAGLAN had sent
orders for the immediate despatch of all the
available troops. Looking at the earlier re-
ports from the Crimea, we see that there were
rumours of the arrival of 60,000 Russians
from Simferopol, and stating that their army
in the field numbered 100,000 men. We draw
the conclusion that the bombardment has
been suspended in consequence of the for-
midable demonstration on the part of the
Russians, and that the allied Generals are
tally unable, without large reinfor
risk

SATURDAY,

Tartars were expected to amount to 50,000
more. To carry on a siege their united
strength ought to be very superior to that of
the enemy. In the preselli instance the ne-
cessity wit inereuseil by the immense extent
of the ellied works, and tke isolation of the
large body of troops at Eupatoria. It was
well known that Russia fwd immense corps
at het disposalb and womb, pour them down
with Out fittermissioti; rid that she had
actually detached a et:* siderable force from
Bessarabia. An attempt to raise the siege by
the sudden appearance of a relieving army is
no novelty in war. In the present case it
might be reekoned a certainty.
What have our Ministers done? Have they
acted like men who foresaw and wished to
guard against the emergency ? In that case
they would have strained every nerve to bring
up reinforcements. They would have landed
every disposable man at Balaklava They
would have drained the Mediterranean gar-
risons. They would have hastened on the
Sardinian Contingent. They would have
timed the arrivals so that alt would have been
ready to support the assault. But they have
done just the reverse. The first division of
the Sardinian army was to sail on the 24th,
and would reach the camp, at the earliest, a
week or so after the assault could take place.
Ten thousand British troops were to join
Lord RAGLAN ; but far the largest portion is
yet unembarked.
It is a peculiarity of the late and present
Governments that they always fail their
Generals just at the crisis of success. Alma
was won and the flank march achieved, and
Sebastopol lay open to a coup de main. It
could not be attempted for want of a reserve.
The bombardment went on, and everything
was arranged for the assault, when Inkerniann
pointed out the weakness of our force, and
our hopes were again disappointed by wait
of troops. Condemned, in consequence, to a
winters inaction, and to privations of every
kind, by incredible exertions our army opened
ont a third opportunity of conquest. A third
time it has been thrown away.

RESPONSIBILITY OF THE DUKE OF
NEWCASTLE.
THE attempt of the Duke of NEWCASTLE to
divest himself of responsibility for the
Crimean horrors is one of the most audacious
experiments on public patience that has yet
been made. His Grace's theory upon official
responsibility is at least a novelty. When
referring to certain neglects of the Commis-
sariat, the Duke of NEWCASTLE said that
" responsibility was moral and official ; " and
he continued, " Morally responsible I was not,
" but officially. as Minister of War, I was;" and
this nice distinction, suggested by some
Peelite casuist, runs through the whole of
his Grace's evidence before the Committee of
Inquiry !
But we can admit of no nice pleas .of this
kind when trying the reputation of a public
character for enormous misfortunes, griev-
ously increased by an infatuated ambition. •A
gentleman is asked " Can you drive fourda•
" hand ?" and he flippantly answers—" Only
" give me the whip and reins, and then form
•' your judgment." He confidently mounts
the box, is in a fidget at the start, loses all his
nerve, upsets the coach, kills half the com-
pany, while escaping himself only with a
sprained ancle. He then candidly expresses
his regret, begs to remind folk that he never
drove before, hints that he is ready to pay the
deodands to the surviving friends, but scouts
the idea that he is morally culpable, when he
perilled the lives and limbs of his fellow-
creatures. This is carrying nice distinctions
thi would he