The Press.
London, England, 1855-12-22 00:00:00

1220

correspondent of a London journal he had to write
home in great haste, not only his first impressions of
what he saw (usually n;rost truthful and striking in
their effect), but such details as he was able
hurriedly to collect, and such speculations as circum-
stances at the moment seemed to warrant. Rather
than reprint what was necessarily imperfect, the
author bas consulted all safe authorities on the cam-
paign, and has checked his own personal information
by them. In this way he has been able to construct
a complete narrative of the siege, and to give the
reader assurance of its fidelity. His narrative is
much more modest than that of Mr. Russell; he
does not revel to the same extent in description; but,
whenever facts have to be treated, or when distinct
pictures have to be presented to the eye, he exhibits
great judgment, with close attention to reality. In
Colonel Hamley's book we had an account of the
campaign by a skilful and keen-sighted soldier; here
we Lave a civilian's view of it; and it is remarkable
how nearly they agree in substance while widely
different in style and particulars. To make his
narrative more complete, Mr. Woods has included
an account of the siege of Silistria, and has been
favored with permission by an uncle of Major
Butler to publish the diary which that most gallant
officer kept of the events of the siege. This
chronicle, written in a soldier-like style, will be read
with deep interest, as it gives a far better notion of
the spirit of this famous siege than can be gathered
from any source that has fallen under our view. Mr.
Woods has also been allowed access to the correspon-
dence and papers of the late Captain Christie. Wo
can but lightly glance at a few points in this valuable
narrative. To commence with Varna, it is shown
how impossible it was for the British army to move
towards Silistria. For transport 13,000 horses would
have been required—there were but 1,200. The
means of transport would but have sufficed for one
English division. From the first it would seem that
little good was to be expected from the Bashi-
Bazouks. In July, 1854, Mr. Woods noted the
ruffianly character of these scoundrels
A more ragged, wild, ungovernable-looking set it would be
impossible to imagine. As I gazed upon their mostly keen,
cruel features, and dark, swarthy countenances, upon every
lineament of which was stamped defiant villany, I could
not help feeling a deep pang of regret that England should
ever draw her sword in any cause which assembled toge-
ther and enlisted the services of such a band of reckless
miscreants. They seemed the scum and offecourings of
all nations in those parts of the world, and were just the
hordes which only a war like the present could bring toge-
ther, like vultures to their prey.
The conduct of this villainous horde has fully justi-
fied Mr. Woods' anticipations. They have taken
advantages of the success of the allies at Kertch and
elsewhere to commit the most horrible atrocities. In
war they are but cowardly assassins—in peace mere
bandits. The landing of the allies in the Crimea,
and their proceedings until they reached Balaklava,
are vividly chronicled in these pages. The defeat of
the Russians at Alma was complete. The troops
were seized with panic. "The enemy fled from the
" field, and this was the only battle we fought in
" which they did so. Had our cavalry been at
" hand nothing could have saved the great bulk of the
Russian army from being taken prisoners, with all
" their guns "—a statement which suggests strong
doubts of the prudence of the allies marching with-
out their cavalry. The effect of the Minie ball on
the enemy was fearful. "It struck and tore all
" before it; the balls had come out through the top
" of the skull, rending the bone as if done by a
" hatchet." The contrast between the treatment of
the French and English wounded was painful.
After the battle, " before dark not a single wounded
" Frenchman remained upon the field" ; but, "not
" more than 200 or 300 of the English were moved
" from the spots where they fell during the night
" which followed the battle. The rest had not a soul
" to soothe their agony, or mitigate their sufferings
"by so much as a dank of cold water. 'I his was
" not the case on the night of the 20th only, but
" during the day of the and night of the 21st."
Humanity shrinks from the cruel scene the pen of
Mr. Woods describes. The warlike stores accumu-
lated at Sebastopol have been urged to show that
Russia must have long meditated some great aggres-
sive movement ; but Mr. Woods states that, " con-
" sidering the enormous extent and importance of
" Sebastopol, it was very ill provided with powder
" when the allies sat down before the place. Even
" with all the stores landed by the ships the total
" amount actually in the place was under 1,000 tons,
" not more than enough for ten days' sharp firing."
Several circumstances are adduced to support this
statement, and it is certain that the siege must have
been a short affair, but for the vigorous exertions
made to throw warlike stores into the town as well as
to erect defences and obtain reinforcements of men.
Mr. Woods brings down his narrative to the fall of
Sebastopol, and makes the loss of the British army,
from the commencement of the campaign in 1854 to
the close of the siege, to be 14,340 officers and men
actually dead. The number invalided amounted to
15,813, "Of the twenty-six generals who left