The Press.
London, England, 1855-09-08 00:00:00

THE BALTIC CAMPAIGN.

Tax operations of the Baltic fleet are con-
cluded for the season, the campaign of '55 is
over, and it is probable that in a short time
Admiral DUNDAS and his liners will return to
England. In summing up the operations of
the fleet, it is impossible to avoid expressing
the utter disappointment felt by all classes at
the futile and frivolous result of the campaign.
With an enormous fleet, with a vast profu-
sion of means, and with the whole expe-
rience of '54, both the Admiralty and their
Admiral have contrived to achieve, in a four
months' cruise, at best but one partial success.
The triumphs of the year comprise the soli-
tary bombardment of an arsenal, the burn-
ing of a few balks of timber, and the cap-
ture of a dozen or two small trading vessels.
It may be that the Home Government are se-
riously to blame for neither supplying mortar-
vessels in time, nor for providing the neces-
sary reserves of artillery and ammunition.
But in the management of the campaign,
and particularly with regard to the attack
on Sweaborg, we had a right to expect
from Admiral DUNDAS successes more propor-
tionate to the vast force at his disposal. It is
now no longer doubted nor denied that the
conduct of Admiral DUNDAS was reprehen-
sible to a degree, in personally keeping out
of the fire during the bombardment, and in
declining on the second day to attack the for-
tress. The honour of the service and of the
country imperatively demand a searching in-
quiry into conduct so unbecoming a British
Admiral. Of all faults in a commander the
least excusable is timidity. There may have
been circumstances which rendered neces-
sary such excessive caution. If so, for the
honour of the fleet, and for the sake of his own
reputation, such circumstances must be made
known, or never again can Admiral DUNDAS
rehoist his flag.
With regard to Sweaborg, the Gallant Ad-
miral observes in his despatches that "no
" attack was contemplated against the fortifi
" cations of the place." But, in the name of
common sense, for what purpose was he placed
in command of that vast fleet, if not to destroy
every link of that chain of fortifications stretched
by Russia along the shores of Finland and the
Baltic? The preliminary bombardment, he as-
serts, destroyed buildings, burnt stores, blew up
arsenals, and committed every havoc. If such
were his impression, it was clearly his duty
to have brought up the body of the fleet lying
idle out of range, and at least to have at-
tempted, if not to have achieved, the complete
destruction of the fortress. But his sole ob•
ject was, it appears, like that of his name-
s ike in the Black Sea, to keep with his liners
out of fire. It is not even stated that to inspect
operations he once during the action shifted
his flag. Like NELSON'S commanders at Copen-
hagen, Admiral DUNDAS lay off out of range

THE PRESS.

during the bombardment. When the work
was half done, he retired to Nargen.
This is, we believe, about the first time—
and we hope it may be the last—in the naval
history of our country that a British admiral
was ever known to retire with an uninjured
fleet from before an attacked but compara-
tively uninjured enemy. What would have
been thought of such conduct by JERVIS,
NELSON, SIDNEY SMITH, EXMOUTH, or any of
the heroic men whose glories yet shed lustre
upon our country ? Would they have believed
in it? Was this the conduct of NELSON at
Copenhagen ? Of SYDNEY SMITH ill Egypt ?
Of COCHRANE at Martinique? Of EXMOUTH at
Algiers ? In the present day the dread of
stone walls and granite batteries sits like a
nightmare upon the minds of some of our
naval commanders-in-chief. Their main objcet
appears to be triumph without risk. Danger
is deemed an ample plea for inaction. Their
attempts at engagements and apologies for
victories seem intended more for the instruc-
tion of our enemies than for the destruction
of their strongholds. We correct their errors
rather than punish their enmity, for we
neither complete what we have undertaken,
nor follow up any advantage we have gained.
Sir CHARLES NAPIER last year was dismissed
from his command because he had done less
than it was believed his means enabled him to
do, but can it he permitted Admiral DUNDAS to
retain his flag in the face of the dilatory, inde-
cisive, and paltry results of his campaign ?
The past summer was the period for decisive
measures and bold action, even on so easy
an opportunity as Sweaborg. The applica
Lion of means to an end does not appear to
have engaged the attention of Admiral DUNDAS.
But we must have more decisive and imme
diate results from the tremendous forces we
place at the disposal of our Admirals, or we
must have some satisfactory reason afforded us
why those results were not obtained. The
nation would readily forgive a daring error,
but it will never pardon timid indecision.
We say with great pain, but very delibe-
rately, that it is impossible longer to intrust
our fleets to tho command of men who seem
to look more to the shut of the enemy than
to the honour of our arms and their own
reputation. Discretion is an excellent virtue
in a commander when combined with more
active and enterprising qualities ; but a com-
mander all discretion, and nothing else, must
needs cut a ridiculous figure. If the present
system is to last we shall need a new nomen-
clature for our navy, and for such names as the
Daring, Fury, Terrible, and Bulldog, must sub-
stitute the milder terms of the Discretion, the
Caution, the Prudence, and the Cur. We do
not want commanders so oppressed by a sense
of their responsibility as to shrink from that
noble daring without which nothing great iu
war can be achieved.

All London lately witnessed with emotion
Mr. STANFIELD'S fine picture of the Victory,
off Gibraltar, bearing the dead body of NELSON.
The shattered ship told of the deadly strife
which won the heru's triumph. Thathull was a
spectacle for Englishmen to look on with
swelling hearts, if with tearful eyes. It is with
other feelings that we shall regard the polished
sides of the returning Baltic ships. The con-
trast will be as great as between the senti-
ment felt for DUN DAS living and NELSON dead.
We repeat, we have no desire to judge the
Admiral unheard. His conduct may admit of
satisfactory explanation, but at present our
public cannot understand what is the essen-
tial difference between the guns of Sweaborg
and the guns of Copenhagen and Algiers.
They are impatient to learn whether that
marked contrast between the naval tactics of
the last and the present war is to be attri-
buted to a change in the relative value of the
forces employed altogether favorable to the
foe, or to the increased caution of our Ad-
mirals. This is a question to be submitted
to the decision of a court-martial.

INSURRECTION IN RAJMAHAL.
THE late papers from India bring an account
of an insurrection in Rajmahal As far as
could be seen, it was of a local character, and
not likely to spread, though risings of this

847

kind are never without danger, because ono
never can be certain to what extent they may
be carried. It is the misfortune of the Indian
Government that the selfish policy it has
adopted of late has completely isolated us,
and that, in furtherance of a grasping system,
it has sacrificed all hold on the natives' in-

terests or affection. Excepting the people at
the three Presidencies, we have scarcely a real
friend throughout the length and breadth of
Hindoostan; and the consequence is that
every attempt against us is viewed with a
secret sympathy by those who, under a better
system, woull be the foremost both openly
and covertly to uphold our rule. The de-
pendent princes, the great nobles, the large
landholders, and the hereditary cultivators,
would in India, as in every other part of the
British empire, be the firmest supporters of
law and order, if we would only allow them an
interest in the country concurrent with,
though subordinate to, our own. But when
the mass of the cultivators are treated in the
mode which the Madras Torture Commission
displays, and when the princes, nobility, and
large landholders see nothing in prospect
but the confiscation of their estates as soon
as opportunity serves, it is not to be expected
that their wishes can be with us, from whom
they have nothing to hope, and all to fear.
To rule a country on the principle of absorb-
ing all property in land, and leaving no inter-
mediate orders between the sovereign and
the serf, is to stake our all on the hazard of a
military ascendancy, which mutiny may at
any time undermine, or an adverse campaign,
or a successful revolt, destroy. Lord METCALFE
most truly said that we must lay our founda-
tions deeper iu the soil of India, if we would
give to our sovereignty a more lasting cha-
racter than that of the conquerors who swept
over it before us. To lay such foundations
were an easy matter in the hands of any
Government possessed of a proper estimate of
the position and feelings of the people of
Hindoostan ; but that is clearly not the case
with those who sway its destinies at present.
The causes of the outbreak in Rajmahal are
variously stated ; some of the papers attri-
buting it to fiscal extortions, some to the ill-
treatment or abduction of female relatives by
men employed on the neighbouring railway,
and some to requisitions for forced labour to
all unusual extent. Whatever the causes may
have been, we trust that the India Board will
not fail to cause a searching inquiry into them
to be made. The public safety requires that
risings of this kind shall be pat down with
summary vigour, but public justice also de-
mands that those shall not escape who by
their misconduct may have given birth to
them. The most effectual check on abuse of
authority is the knowledge that it will not be
allowed to pass by unpunished, because the
sufferers have, on their side, been hurried by
revengeful passions into the perpetration of
atrocious crimes which that very abuse of
authority may have urged them to commit.
It is not, however, impossible that the fault
in this instance may lie rather with the system
than with any judicial officer or officers who
administered it. In the event of the outbreak
having been caused by requisitions for forced
labour, this would more especially be the case,
for under the present system a magistrate has
no help for himself, but is compelled to send
forth his pressgangs whenever an authorised
application for forced labour is made. And
no matter how urgent the business of the
cultivator may be at his homestead, or in his
fields, he is dragged miles and miles away,
often to his utter ruin, to make roads or to
carry the baggage of officials or the stores of
armies, and that on a pittance arbitrarily fixed
by the Government, and which, after all, is
rarely if ever paid. The following description
of a viceregal progress, given by Sir WILLIAM
NAPIER in his pamphlet headed " Wellington
and Napier," as taken from an Indian raper,
affords a fair account of the manner in which
the peasantry of India have been dealt with
by the highest Indian official, the Governor-
General, and one on whom the duty of pre-
venting injustice to the peasantry must be
deemed peculiarly imperative :