The Press.
London, England, 1855-02-03 00:00:00

98

individual reputations, or calculations of the
few votes which they command.
Undoubtedly the Derby party is in a con-
siderable minority in the House of Commons ;
and while a chance remains that an Admi-
nistration can be constituted likely to command
the support of the miljtfHty, oprinAite as AS
elements of which it if cOthposed inttt be, afid
widely as its objects AM dpinidttis may differ,
his Lordship ants jtisely in declining, to
assume the ,pow ilifts of flillYornmdtti. A miall*
rity can only conduct the '.business of thd
country by the forbearance of its opponents,
or of that class known as independent mem-
bers ; and tho result of the experiment of
'lB6l shows ho* little that forbeftiti- hoe 6an 110
relied on, with the House of Commons con-
stituted as it is at present. Should it, be
found that no other Administration is possi-
ble, the Legislature would be bound to refrain
from any active opposition, and Lord Derby
would be in a position to carry whatever mea-
sures he deemed essential for rescuing the
country from its difficulties, and carrying it
triumphantly through the contest in which
it is engaged.
In the temporary failure of Lord DERBY to
effect such an arrangement as would insure
the Ministry he might form a majority in the
Commons, we see no ground for discourage-
ment. The Conservative party remains united,
and in this union consists its virtue and its
strength. If it suffers itself on any pretence to be
divided, its power is gone, and the only solid
security left us for the honest, legitimate, and
effective working of our constitutional system
will be lost. The party must by this time
perceive its deficiencies. It has not appealed
to the country with sufficient boldness, nor
been nearly so active as it ought to have been
in organising its forces and in testing the
opinion of constituencies. It is not true that
" the battle of the Constitution is to be fought
"in the Registration Courts," though the
registration demands much more attention
than the party has given to it; but it is true
that the battle is to be fought on the hustings.
The contest in the Legislature comes too lat.::
votes, not reasons, then bear sway. With
forty or fifty mere supporters in the Com-
mons, Lord DERBY'S task would have been an
easy one, and if his party really hopes to bear
an active part in the Government of the
nation, it must shake off its lethargy, ask
itself how it is that for so many years past it
has been playing a losing game, and resolve
to devote itself heartily to the work of in-
creasing by every constitutional means, its
influence in the country, and its strength in
the Legislature. Public spirit is the first, the
second, the third requisite necessary to
convert what, at worst, is just now but a check
into a certain victory. The present policy
of the party is, strict reserve ou the political
combinations which may be attempted, and the
disinterested support of measures by what-
ever men proposed, which are necessary to
rescue the army from the miserable state in
which it is plunged, and restore the country
to the high position it ought to hold as a great
European Power, and, in spite of all that
may he said to the contrary, a great military
nation.

THE PROSPECTIVE CABINET.

WHATEVER the composition of the new
Ministry, it cannot fail to receive a fair trial
from Parliament. A two years' anarchy which
has plunged England in war, and lowered the
prestige of our national name, leads all men to
echo the joint decimation of Lord DERBY and
Lord ABERDEEN, " that the one need of the
" moment is a sixong Government." Such a
Government was, indeed, promised in Decem-
ber, 's2—with what results of performance the
vote of Monday shows. The Coalition, in
truth, never coalesced. An under-current of
intrigue pervaded its whole existence, and
neutralised what energy it might otherwise
THlLYbritheaSeed. The disclosures of the last
•ve only made public a state of
, ; .11,, previously known to exist.
• • • JoHN, though with unseemly
.-o.lr.
aip. • .
1.

;Bt-avas.44a7v

THE PRESS.

alacrity, should have hastened to leap out
of the sinking boat. Pledges broken, appoint-
ments jobbed, diplomacy blundered, war
mismanaged—such is, in four sentences, the
history of Lord AnsilbtEN's Administration.
HA ucoessore take Office with at least op.
pd thrill may haps, do better, AK
by no *, ll)ili cart ey do worse.
jr,r
Let
~ howe Pr, d litany, and in the spirit
t
Of i t, _ al 101 l rs-Of examine their chazea
Of
. mouP 11101111MAille Lo►d PALMS
for • : reasurf, 10Pd Crazy for the War
Department ; it is thtitight probable that Lord
CLARENDON will retalh th 6 Foreign-office, while
Mr. GrLADirrosit remains at the Exchequer. Of
tlie66 fiiiir leldlirig Ministers three are mem-
bers of the condemned Cabinet of last week;
and be it remembered that the censure of the
House of Commons implicates not one official
alone, but all those colleagues whose opinions
were, or ought to have been, recorded on his
plans. A Ministry, as such, is one and indi-
visible. Even a blunder purely depart-
mental affects, pro tanto, the entire body.
How much more, then, the conduct of
a European war, not a single step in
which should have been taken without
the concurrence of every member of the Cabi-
net? We advance herein no new doctrine;
we simply recal attention to one which has at
no tithe been disputed. A mercantile) firm
becomes insolvent; is its credit restored by
the junior partner becoming the head, and
vice versa? Yet this is the arrangement which
according to most of our contemporaries is to
wipe out the stain of a parliamentary cots
demnation more emphatic than any in the
history of two hundred years! Lord PALMERS-
TON, Lord CLARENDON, Mr. GL►DSTONE, are to
tell their constituents and the country, " It is
" true the expedition was sent out totally un-
" prepared for war ; that we despatched it to
" Malta without an idea of its going further;
" that we allowed it to be decimated by pesti-
" lence at Varna, and sacrificed in a winter
" campaign before Sebastopol. It is true that
" the military system was faulty, and we did
" not attempt to mend it; that huts, clothes,
" stores, were wanted, and that we made no
" effort, to supply them. But for all this we
" are not to blame ; it was the Duke of NEW-
" CASTLE'S department ; he alone is responsi
" ble ; in courtesy to a colleague, we were
" obliged to let him do what he pleased ; and,
" having done so, we were equally, of course,
" bound to shield him from inquiry. Give us
" another army. Let us have the confidence of
" Parliament, and we are ready to try again."
Is this the apology that Lord PALMERSTON in-
tends to put forward ? If it be, a more un-
constitutional procedure was never palliated
by a feebler pretext. If not, let him find a
better, and we shall he ready to consider it
fairly.
But it is not merely on the score of its
antecedents that the prospective Cabinet
appears in danger. That the Conservative
party will support it so long as it prosecutes
the war with vigour we cannot doubt. But
the members of that party must he more or
less than men if they forget that but for Lord
PALMERSTON'S refusal to unite with Lord
DERBY—a refusal founded on no alleged differ-
ence of opinion, but solely on considerations
of personal ambition—a Conservative Govern-
ment might have been formed, which would
have obtained their implicit confidence and
cordial support. The friends of Lord DERBY
number 260 votes in the Commons, and with-
out their aid no Government can be secure.
Next in importance to these are the followers
of Lord Joss RUSSELL, variously estimated at
from 100 to 120 votes. They will, in any
doubtful case, stand by their leader. Now,
among Lord Smiles many good qualities, a
philosophical contempt of power cannot be
counted, and (to speak plainly) it is impossible
to doubt the purpose of his late resignation.
He has broken with the Coalition—the parting
was not so amicable as to invite a reunion, and
his present object is to stand aloof, gather his
forces, and reconstruct the Whig party on its
old basis, with some infusion of modern Libe-
ralism. He will of course promise Lord PAL
MERSTON "an independent support," (a phrase
of political diplomacy, generally understood
to mean " support that cannot be depended
upon") nor will he attempt prematurely to

SATURDAY)

gather the pear which, as he thinks, is ripening
for him; but his alliance (like that of Austria)
will be little better than an armed neutrality.
Other sources of pppesition or weakness
may be Ante brititly Milted , The course of
Mr. Bitiont and hi 4 friehtts is obvious; and
this linttinh, though amall numerically, has
provdttdelf active atid d rous in debate.
The mini Ciitholipa of. land look with
distrilikt oil One iNho ft* Or late been bidding,
Itomeilliat Ostentati r for the post of
ProteM*nt champion; ignorant and noisy
clamourei tff army reform expect the whole
military system of England to be reconstructed
in three months, exaggerated anticipations
which must end In proportionate disappoint-
ment; and the public at large, while dwelling
on the rhetorical and diplomatic performanhds
of their favourite, forget the inevitable effect
which the lapse of years must produce upon
the most vivacious intellect. We speak of
Lord PALmateron in no unfriendly spirit.
We should be ashamed to denounce his policy
in the terms employed by Mr. GLADSTONZ in
1850 ; but, while doing justice to his diplo-
matic dexterity and to his resources as a
debater, we must avow our belief that he is,
in this year, 1855, neither the man he was,
nor the man whom his admirers take him to
be. It is one thing to administer a depart-
ment, another to govern an empire; and, even
in his best days, Lord PALMKRSTON has never
baen more than a departmental Minister. He
now undertakes the Premiership in his 71st
year. With growing infirmities, with an over-
rated reputation, with a Cabinet which the
House of Commons has already censured,
with every continental Government his
enemy, and without a. parliamentary follow-
ing, he stands pledged to reconcile parties, to
disarm factions, to rescue an army, to form an
European league, and to conduct a gigantic
war. We watch the experiment with hopes
indeed for its success, but with au omnious
forboding of failure.

LORD GREY.
THE Minister designated for the War Depart.
went, we are given to' understand, is Lord
GREY. A few words, therefore, on the ante-
cedents of this statesman may not be misplaced.
That his intellectual powers are considerable
no candid critic will deny. His turn of mind
is logical ; his habits are businesslike ; he has
even some pretension to enlarged views; and,
though nature denied the gifts of au orator,
early training and long practice in the Com-
mons have made him more than respectable
as a debater. It may also be pleaded on his
behalf that, on the whole, his career as a par-
tisan has been marked by fewer changes of
colleagues than that of many living statesmen.
Why, then, has this career, extending over a
quarter of a century, been up to the present
time a signal failure ? Talent was not want-
ing, nor yet opportunity; for the son of a
Prime Minister, the hereditary successor to
the leadership of the Whig party, invested
with the dignity of an illustrious position and
an historical name, had surely a field ample
enough to gratify a more than ordinary ambi-
tion. But Lord GREY, well versed as he is in
the theory of politics, has always evinced a
singular inaptitude for the management
ble of
men. As a subordinate, even the placa
Lord RIPON had to complain of his im -
vrac
ticable and domineering temper. Admitted
to Lord MELBOURNE'S Cabinet, his constantly
, repeated threats of resignation Were first the
annoyance, then the amusement, of his coll.
leagues • and finally provoked a rebuff which!
we doubt not, is still well remembered by its
object. In the winter of 1845, on the proffered
resignation of Sir R. Pm., it was mainly the
personal antipathy of Lord Gat, to serve as a
colleague of Lord PALMERSTON that prevented
the formation of a Whig Cabinet. Hitherto
he had only shown himself unable to obey—it
remained that he should be proved unfit to
govern.
Accordingly, the five years of his colonial
administration, from '46 to '52, were marked,
almost withcut an interval, by abortive