The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1871-02-25 00:00:00

IS LONDON FORTIFIED AGAINST
AN INVASION ?

Or this sul j:ct, whiah ie one of not only local but
national intir:st, The Tilll°B has the following leader:—

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Om item of Mr. Cardwell's Eitinittee is Lir surveys of de-
feueive positions round London, and between London end
the covt. Simuch was due to public impatience, if not to
the necessity of the case ; for London cannot see her next
sister beaieged and 'alma by a store and angry foe without
an awakening of mi,glvinge for her own safety. It is
obvious, indeed, at the first eight, that In almost every cam
dition and circumstance that might be named the case of
London is the very contrary of that of Paris ; and Viet,
even were it admitted that the fortifications of girls hove
prnved a real service to the capital or the nation, it
would not follow that London should also be fortified. lota
remarkable that, often as London has had r aeon to dread
Invasion, and of ten as great military authorities hate iunded
the alaim and told London to take care of herself, the result
ha, uniformly been contend to the further fortldcation of
our porta and arsenals and of onr Goads, Some hundred
Martell° towers /cid the remain. of earthworks at a few
points of vantage en the "great Kent road," are the only
memorials of panics which certWnly were not without foun-
dation.

Bit the tortillcation of London Ins always been found,
not exactly an luiposaible problem, but one without a Unite
and actual soldtion. It would be emy euru4h to construct
any number of Forts shout London, very dillicult to be taken,
If defended, and consequently giving at least a long respite
to the Mistropullo, but while the engineering question can he
brought within reasonable compass, it is not so with the
practical considerations. No sooner are engineers set to
work on the problem than they llnd it rapidly growing on
their hands, till it ends In the contradiction that the coast is
the true line of defence. The elaborate design lately
made for a contfunous line of earihworks and in-
trenched camps stretching front the lied way to Reading,
and bending nottiliward so as to take in Leith-hill, if it Can
be proved neceaeary to the proposition, is conclusive against
it. We shall never do that If, too, we minnow a plan
which shall somewhat improve upon the defences of Part',
that will involve twenty Fortrestel, and a good deal mme, to
begin with besides na that comma tor. Ou the other hand,
▪ Fortress here and there will be aatronahold, as arsenal, and
posaibly the nucleus of as; stem of works, but may easits prove
no deft floe to Vie Metropolia. What we have really to cm -
eider and to make the very turning points of the wle le qui 5.
lion is, gist, what an enemy is Lk, ly to do; and, then, what
we can do on the supposed emergency.
10 is imagined that, under aorne most exceptionally favour-
able circumstances, an enemy could land, in stew hum, an
army of 100,00 men, ready for immediate colon, and by
forced marches reach touldou in two or three days. It In
taken for granted that London coull not defend itself for an
hour, and that we should have to pay an enormous ransom,
besides making peace on bad teems Every jeer seems to
remove something from the abs lute impossibility of such an
event, and, therefore, it hec Aims us to speak of, it I umbly.
For example, ineani, iri nolads, and the electric wire have
greatly altered the problem which Napoleon tr.ed to
work out seventy yeam ago. But if we have to Lirenset
our delence, let us al-o fora^aai the attack. Whet we
desire to see is the plan of such an iliVaSlOn us is
here suppoaed. Let us nave the ports of embarcation, the
men, horst a, and material, the trait to be employed for their
conveyance and protection; the probable time required ter
pregaratka, eanbarcation, passage, and dlsembarcation. Let
seat least, be assured that such an itiValion is wi.hin the
range of possibilities, at ti capable of hell% accomplished to
one or two tides. We have been told to suppose one own
fleets mimed or out of the way; the elements to be adverse
and the stars fighting ag..l lit on; anti, above all, we are re-
minded that there are no limits to &Biel stupidity or to
euch, American, or German cleverness. Let all this be
taken into accouet, and let us see by anticliation the event
we have to provide against.

lilt be replied that It is impossible to anticipate dear/in,
part'cularly in a time when the art of war and its appliances
are in a state of revolution, we must njoin that tined
defences have their epeclal dangers, and, ludeed, their
certatu evil. Of course they are nuisance., eyesores, and
positive inconveniences, but they are alto morally mis-
chievous. The thought of defence has an inevltahle tendency
to preclude the thought of ells-me ; immobility takes the
place of mobility, and the engineer letters the strategist.
We need only look to tee spirit in which Fortifications
have lately been proposed to see the dangerous lame' lathy of
the semi-military mind. Forts, it Is norned, and,
indeed, .accepted wish thankfulness, would require to be
manned at once—that Is, to have the men respectively
attached to therm With a few more Militia and Velum-
teen than it has already under arms, the Metropolis c mid
supply for every Fort a reglinent which ought to have to
h.d-quarters, barracks, and practislog grounds comfortably
In the rear of each Fort. Now, this is the very than; we
have most to beware of. The men aro to follow the
material and to be tied to the material, Instead of the
material being made subservient to the men. Oar natural
advantage is an unessatlable position; cur national want,
an Arley ; and it Is here proposed to give ems attention to
what e e have at the cot of that which we have not
and want very much We want an Army, and, in order to
Its belog an Army at all, we want to take our pretence of an
Army, to bring It under elm eystem and command, and to
mobihse it. they certainly would be found our first
necessity if we heard of ace speditton about to emits -h from
Bouloghe. But here we have a proposition for separating our
militia and Volunteets, or rather for keeping them still sepa-
rate, force from force, and regiment from regiment, for attach-
los them to c-rtain localities, for asaigulug to them certain
services and Cu lea og a local and purely defensive character.
They are e'l to he placed betted ramparts. aud lastru,ted
how to ce.e.td positioas in which all will be done that money
can do for their security, comfort, and succea. history tells
of the old men. the invalids, and the mere oung.t ere being
left to guard the rammer:a, and noo this is the post to be
habitually taken by the entire Metropolitans retterva By all
ordinary calcultit •tin the Metropolis ought to turn out at
least 50,00 J me, sufficiently trained to arms to take their
place in toe at once in the case of invasion; aye, to
be found In tae face of an enemy attempting to land. The
project w , refer to tells them that their place is to be
ensconced In Forts upon a circumference of sixty miles round
this Metropolis. Grant that the Forts woad c ,ntribute
strength, they certainly wonld foster a dangerous confidence
to our utterly immovable Volunteers and partially movable
Mill is, and in our mere handful of Regular soldure. It
must always be remembered that a Fortification commits
and Compromises its defenders, but, on the contrary, sets the
enemy at liberty. The garrison is tied to its earthworks, its
masonry, and heavy guns, and cannot be where men are
wanted. Eves should the enemy never approach, there it
Mist rennin to defend its defences. On the contrary, an
Army can usually give a Fortress a wide berth and go
where it pleases, at least where it can supply itself
and stop the eoem)'s supplies. Thus within a few days
or even hours, of our Metropalis are a good many places
where sri Invader mid at least establish himself, make te-
e aisitlons, and obtain the sinews of war. Should any foreign
rower really contemplate an invasion, or think it a remote pos-
sibility, he could obtain a plan of the Fortilications at the coat
of a few shillings, and practise the beat heads of kb s Army or
his Military Colleges tu essays for thelr reduction at the least
cost of men and time. We should be committed to the line
of defence, but not the assailant to the line of attack; and
our works would be at once a challenge arid a trial of in-
genuity. The Continental rowers do their best to conceal
their Fortifications, and se:m.lly leave the site blank in
their authorized maps. We could not do this, even were it
of any use.

But, of course, it Is impossible to deny that we may some
day have to defend the Metropolis. When our nautical
engineers tell us they h*ve no doubt of being able to carry
a whole railway train—indeed, two, OLIO above the other—
/across the Channel in a few minutes over the in •ur, we must
not be deaf to the warnings of change. Uureadiners Is the
old vice of the Saxon. Ha is unready beeause he Eras his
Ideas and his preparations. Be is unready also in not pre-
paring at all. Supposing it to be wise to provide for the For.
Lineation of London in order to make the beat of our "seden-
tary " reserve and economize our movable forces,
anti supposing it possible also to arrive at souse los% msatme
of the Fortifications required, there arises the question
as to the construction, when, and with what degree
of complete/sum. Perhaps a consumed: e is the tight
notate. A few commanding ',Ants might be secured
now, and completely fortified. The intermediate
petits rn'ght be left to that day of grace which we
certainly shall have Lefore there is actual danger. It cm
ho no rashness to assume that we shall have a good many
months' notice of the 100,000 men fated to establish a footing
on our shores. Not only politics, but shipbuilding itself, will
have to develope themselves; and tne mere building, collect-
ing, End organizing will tato time. It must also be done
before the eyes of the whola world.
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But, If any iltra Is done, by all means let us beware of that
reliance In stationary defences a hlch has evidently done
berm across the Channel. With a stronglyifortilled Metro
polls, and a triple line of lint, second, and third class
Fortresses between France and Germany, the Pooch have
induhed In a fatal @malty—fatal because it has beet
auxiliary to so unbounded ambition and f IC 3PIIITO mitt die,
vanity. Paris has ',revalued much on her Inv ulneraule
h, and, as Paris Is the heart of France, France has boon
presumptuous because Faris felt secure. ILIs security has
certainly led to a greet nigh LI of military preparation, for had
the French batter understood that everything depeuihd
on the Army In the held they would have kept It more
eMident and ready for action. it has contributed not only
to the audacity, but also to the power of that populace which
behind ramparts manned by respectable citizens terrbles,

-weakens, and—Oierthrows regular Go4nments. Most of all.
it has led France to continue a fruitless resistance when her
Army ems shut up in Fr t nch or German Fortresses,
and when Mobiles, raw levies, and an armed peasantry
were all she had to meet the best trained soldier. in
Europe advancing by forced marches Into the heart of the
country. The sensation of being personally safe amid
surrounding dangers, and the expectation of being relieved
before long, have largely contributed to make the Ps-
ri....lane go on for four months driving France throuah
an unparalleled succession of calamities, which they long
refused to believe, and which, when they c .uld no longer
disbelieve them, they referred to any cause but the true one
Dm legendary Barons who kept the country in a turmoil
while they were safe in their strongholds have been revived
in the Parisian populace. Thus far, then, the experiment
his not answered. There still remains the question whether
there be any special reasons for fortify ina London,
over and ears those common to all capital.. The question
has to be considered on ita own grounds. The peculiarity
against us is that London is only s few hours from
the shore; indeed, 'Wit in an estuary. Grant that
this is a eiroumstanC.e not to he ovule,. ad, even though we
see only the remotest chance of danger in it ourselves Let
it not divert attention from the much greater war-A
—the
want that may be sold to press already—the watt of on Army
that can be put In the tell at all in proportion to the interests
tube defeeded, the uretensions supported, aol the work
actually to be done, at home, in India, and in our numerous
other depeisdencier.