The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1876-07-01 00:00:00

WHAT MIGHT HAVE HAPPENED.

We make the following extract from a leader in The Ti7)148
on the recent debate on Army Mobilization
In spite of all that has been said on it from time to
time both ia Parliament and by the Press, there still
seems to be some misunderstanding of the object and
scope of the scheme, and many persons who might
know better persist in confusing it with the general
military organisation of the country. We will endea-
vour, therefore, to explain as clearly as possible what
the Mobilization scheme is and why some such arrange-
ment is necessary. If a great European War had
broken out last year and this country had been called
upon to interfere, the Government would have had to
deal with exactly the same officers and men as are now
under the hand of the Minister of War, but would have
found them what Lord Etch° somewhat strongly
described as "a ghastly chaos of Regulars, Volunteers,
Militia, and Yeomanry." The Military authorities
would have been called upon to bring order out of this
chaos at a moment of great pressure and danger. Sup-
posing that no system of Mobilization had been pre-
pared beforehand, the very first principles would have
had to be considered. So quickly are previous difficul-
ties forgotten in England, that we should not be sur-
prised to find members of Parliament, or even public
officials, now ignorant of the fact that no such thing
as a Brigade or Diviaon organized for war was in
existence even on paper; that the War Office and the
Admiralty had no mutual understanding as to the
proportions of Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery which
should be combined in an Expeditionary Corps, nor
what the number of horses and carriages nor the
amount of baggage or ammunition it would be neces-
sary to provide. A Committee had been at work for
several years on the details of these proportions—the
elementary preparation for war—but nothing was
settled. Such a want of system could produce neither
economy nor efficiency. Its direct effect could only be
long delay, confusion, and a great peril of disaster.
If, instead of a foreign expedition being planned, the
shores of this country had been threatened with inva-
sion, the confusion would have been far worse. Not a
single officer or man, whether of the Regular or
Reserve forces, would have known his place. The
arrangements which it costa many months to work out
quietly during peace would have had to be made at °nee
on the spur of the moment, and all at Head Quarters
in London, whence every single order for the movement
of half a dozen men from one district to another
must have been sent; Woolwich would have been
called upon to despatch to the Provinces a number of
carriages so great that, if they were standing horsed
and packed, a fortnight would be required to move
them out of the Dockyard gates; the Admiralty and
the Railway Companies would have been besieged
with requisitions for impossible transport ; the Tele-
graphs would have been unable to convey all the
contradictory messages sent to them for despatch ;
the railway stations would have been choked by
troops passing backwards and forwards; accidents
must have occurred, private business would have
been entirely interrupted, the overstrained De-
partments at the War Office and Admiralty must
h_we broken down, and the nation would have
felt the most profound shame sorrow, and distrust.
What the ultimate effect would have been it is not
for us to prophesy. England has "pulled through"
many a great danger, and we set no limits to our be-
lief in the national power of overcoming calamity. But
the danger must have been great, and nothing is more
certain than that our enemies, well informed of our
condition would have reckoned beforehand on the con-
fusion. . . .