The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1885-03-07 00:00:00

A MISSIONARY'S MUSIC-HALL
EXPERIENCE.

In al eC hanceryDivision of the High Court of Justice,
Mr. Justice Chitty delivered judgment on Tuesday
morning in the case of Crowderand Payne s'. Charring-
ton, which was an action by the lessees of Lusby's Music-
hall and Tavern, Mile-end-road, London, for damages,
and an injunction against Mr. Charrington, a lay
missionary, of independent means, for having inter-
fered with the plaintiffs in the conduct of their busi-
ness, by distributing tracts, comparing the music-hall
with hell, and by creating commotions and obstruc-
tions in the entrance and vicinity of the hall. His
lordship said that the question in the action was
whether a case of nuisance or slander as to plaintiffs'
business had been made out. The law was settled by
the authorities—amongst others by a case in which a
man hung up in his shop an effigy of a bishop in in-
vidious juxtaposition with an effigy of another being;
and the result of the decision was that a man
who causes crowds to assemble is responsible for
a nuisance, although the man's acts in themselves
are legal. The question then was one of fact—was
the defendant the cause of the nuisance. The state
of the Mile-end-road, in the vicinity of the music-
hall, had been well described by the chaplain of the
London Hospital. It appeared that it was thronged
by respectable persons of the working classes. The
defendant's habit was to deliver tracts and draw
persons aside, and his demeanour was spoken of
as gentlemanlike and courteous. Sonaetimes a person
to whom a tract was offered replied with a
sharp word, but it did not appear that the re-
fusal was followed by angry altercation. The
defendant and his tract-giving companions—when
he was accompanied by them—but he was often
alone, appeared t to be quiet persons, and were not
sufficiently numerous to form "the living barri-
cade" complained of by the plaintiffs. If the defend-
ant had been left to himself there would have
been no disturbance. The plaintiffs were naturally
excited against the defendant. Ile had not been left
alone. He had been hustled, kicked, and pelted with
pease pudding and human filth. He had been sworn
at and cursed. There was some truth in what the
defendant said in the witness-Lox, that he was no more
responsible for the disturbance than a target which
was shot at. The direct evidence did not show that
the plaintiffs or their employ6B were directly connected
with the outrages, described, but they at least had
cognisance of them. The case, in any view, was one
for granting an injunction on the ground of nuisance.
Then with regard to that of slander. The defendant
had compared the hall to hell, and as a place where
the harlot walked unabashed. (His lordship read a
leaflet to that effect, and continued) : That is cer-
tainly libellous. The defendant pleads justification.
With regard to these charges, no distinction could
be made between the hall and the tavern, or
between the entertainment on the stage and the con-
duct of the crowd. Where there was a place of
public entertainment there was a right of public
criticism; but the law, although allowing considerable
latitude in criticising matters of public interest, yet
made it incumbent on the critics to speak ale truth.
The defendant had not attacked the plaintiffs per-
sonally, but had stigmatised their mode of conducting
business. But, without for a minute placing the
plaintiff's case on the highest pinnacle of the temple
of morality, he was of opinion that the plaintiff's con-
ducted their business fairly well, and that defendant
was not justified in what he had said on this point.
The bulk of the people in the hall might fairly be de-
scribed as respectable, and the hall itself as conducted
in a proper way. The law allowed music halls,
and it also allowed the defendant to carry
on a crusade, but in attacking a particular
music hall he must say what was true. He
did not impugn the defendant's motives, but he
had in substance without justification slandered
and libelled this particular music hall. He, there-
fore, intended to grant an injunction, the effect of
which would be to prevent the defendant slandering
or libelling the music hall; but the form of the order
would be such that if the plaintiffs complained of the
defendant disobeying the injunction, they would have .
to show that he had actually done so, although, of
course, the judge who would decide such a question
would also remember the present trial. An injunc-
tion would therefore go restraining defendant from
slanderin; or libelling the plaintiff's music ball, and
from issuing leaflets saying that it was the resort of
prostitutes and the way to the pit of hell. As either
side had been in part unsuccessful, there would be £9
costs.