The Dorset County Express and Agricultural Gazette.
Dorchester, Dorset, England, 1870-11-22 00:00:00

Pouct bunk Exprns.

ItTiDAY, NOVEIIIIE't 22, 170.

OUR MILITARY SfRENOTII.

Now that there seems to be more danger of
Great Britain being drawn into a war tliau there
appeared to be at any time, even over the ques-
ticii of Belgian independence. it is natural that
much interest should be exhibited in the extent
and condition of our warlike resources ; and a
cursory view of these may not be out of place.
First, we have our fleet, which is oortainly far
more than a match for any other fleet afloat ; it
is probable that it is equal in power to the fleets
of any two countries. At all events, it is an.
tnensely superior to the Russian fleet; and this
is of no small importance in • question like the
one now raised. RIIIIBia arrogantly announces
that she considers those provisions of the treaties
of 1856 which forbid her to keep more than a
small naval force in the Black Sea are no longer
binding upon her. Now, if this were the only
side of the matter at issue, the course of Great
Britain would be very plain awl very easy. She
would only have to employ her superior naval
strength in preventing Russia from maintaining
iu the Black Sea more numerous and more
powerful ahlps than she is empowered by treaty
to maintain there. No country in the worid
could so well and effectively coerce Russia in
this matter as could Great Britain—either by
warning Russia that the first infraction of treaty
provisions would be followed by the despatch of
a British fleet for hostile operations in the Black
Sea, or by at once declaring war and commencing
naval hostilities against Russia at all practicable
points. But in such a war, undertaken in a
great measure on behalf of Turkey, it would be
almost impracticable for Turkey to remain
neutral; and even if she did, there is no doubt
Russia would find a pretext for invading 'Turkish
territory. This is really the danger of the
present position. Russia raises nominally a
naval question, but really that question would
quickly assume another phase, and would have
to be fought out on land, Is our military
strength adequate to intervention in such a case?
We have nearly half • million of men of all arms;
but, in accordance with our prevalent notion of
strengthening the national "defences," only •
small proportion of these men are liable to
service out of the country. The regular army
at home numbers some 100,000 men (after the
late recruiting), and by calling out our Militia
we could dispense with • largo proportion of the
army for home defence. Let us say we could
send out as an expeditionary army of 50,000 or
50,000 MOll almost immediately, and keep up the
number of that army, or even increase it, by
calling up our small army reserve and incorpo-
rating with the regular army the 20,000 Militia-
men who have signed for foreign service. Such
a force as we speak of would be ridiculously
inadequate to invade the Russian empire, either
from the shores of the Baltic or from the Black
Sea as in the Crimean war; but we should not
want to do this, since there is not another
Sebastopol to destroy. We should send an
army, not to invade Russia, but to help Turkish
to resist Russian aggression; and the 'rurka isle
army, if not nearly so numerous as that of
Russia, is bravo and now well-disciplined and
equipped—equal, we should say, to accomplish
at least half the necessary work. Egypt would
contribute her quota, too, and probably the
Roumanian army would be available against an
invasion which menaced primarily the indepen-
dence of its country. Au invaaiou of Turkey
by Russia must also bring an Austrian army
into the field, and probably a considerable
Italian contingent; so that we should have by
no means to fight alone. But suppose we had
only Turkey with Egypt as our ally, the 50,000
or 60,000 mon that wo could send from the
United Kingdom would not represent all our
possibly available strength. We :wild draw
upon our Indian Empire for Sikh and other
North Indian troops (who would be quite able
to bear the climate of European Turkey, which
is very different from that of the Crimea) for a
considerable army, together with at least a few
thousand European troops. Looking calmly,
therefore. at the possible task before us in the
event of • war with Russia, merely as a question
of military strength, them seems to be no reason
why we should shrink, on account of fancied
weakness, from any course which honour and
iutorest absolutely demand.