The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1856-01-15 00:00:00

Zburstap.

TO TIMBER MERCHANTS, RAILWAY CARRIAGE AND
COACH BUILDERS, MACHINE MAKERS, CABINET
MAKERS, JOINERS, AND SHIP BUILDERS, &c.
On THURSDAY next, the 17th inst., at Twelve o'clock, in the
Honduras Sheds, Birkenhead,
182 Logs Honduras MAHOGANY, measuring 99,757 ft. sale mea-
sure, containing rich Cabinet, Counter-top and Table Logs,
fine Panel and Machinery Wood, in Logs of the following
sizes at butt, just landed ex Agenoria, from Honduras.
1 Log 45 inches deep. 10 Logs 27 inches deep.
1 „ 35 ~ 14 „ 26 ~
2 „ 34 „ 13 „ 25 „
I 7) 33 19 13 „ 24 „
2 „ 32 „ 21 p, 23 ),
3 „ 31 IP 24 „ 22 „
4 „ 30 „
20 „ 21 „
3 ir 20 „ 20 „
~
5 , 28 25 „ under 20 inches.
311 ags Honduras MAHOGANY, of good quality and fair size,
ranging up to 45 feet long; being the cargo just landed ex
St. Croix.
173 Logs Honduras MAHOGANY; ex Atlantic.
50 Logs Honduras MAHOGANY; ex Vera.
Apply to J. CARMICHAEL, Esq., Merchant.
636 Planks Rio ROSEWOOD; ex sundry vessels.
1910 Planks Bahia ROSEWOOD; ex sundry vessels.
333 Planks ZEBRAWOOD.
3 Boxes MAPLE VENEERS.
HOLME and SLATER, Timber Measurers and Brokers.
7, Water-street, Liverpool, and 3, Canning-street, Birkenhead.

LET IJS REASON TOGETHER

HOLLOWAY'S PILLS.

PHILHARMONIC HALL.

THOMAS'S SHILLING CONCERTS.

FOURTH SEASON,
EVERY EVENING FOR ONE MONTH.

THIS DAY:(Tuesday), the 15th instant,
MISS P. HORTON

Will Sing in the Music from
THE TEMPEST,
Including " Come unto these yellow sands," '•Full fathom live,"

" Where the bee sucks."

TO-hiORROW (Wednesday) Evening,
Matthew Locke's
M A C B E T H MUSIC,

In its Integrity, with Chorus.

ADMISSION-ONE SHILLING.

THE

Riberpoof :.ztanbarb.

TUESDAY, JANUARY 15, 1856

THE PEACE MOVEMENT.

WHILE all England is prepared, as far as public
feeling is concerned, to prosecute the war to its legiti-
mate issue, it cannot be denied that the recent move-
ment made by Austria and the German Powers to
obtain a renewal of negotiations for peace, has excited
a considerable share of attention, as shown by the late
depression in the money market, which is mainly, if
not solely, attributed to the presumed failure of the
attempt. We have, throughout the affair, expressed
an opinion that the interference of Austria was not
likely to prove successful, not only from the unwilling-
ness of Russia to make such concessions as ought to
be accepted by the Western Powers, but also from
the very equivocal position which has been occupied
by Austria and the rest of Germany since the com-
mencement of the war. We can have no confidence in
the professions of a government which has throughout
endeavoured to maintain a kind of doubtful neutrality,
by a species of diplomatic intrigue, unworthy of the
cause at issue, or of the dignity of the Powers engaged
in the contest. Austria virtually shrunk from the
performance of her previous engagement, in the spirit
in which it was commonly believed to have been un-
dertaken, and has, therefore, disqualified herself, in
the minds of honourable men, from the dignified posi;
tion of mediator, which she is so anxious to assume ;
and, therefore, much as we may desire a settlement
upon the only basis which can give it a probability of
permanence, we have a right to receive with grave
suspicion any propositions emanating from Austria,
even if Russia should be inclined to receive them
favourably.
With reference to the probability of Russia con-
ceding any terms involving a guarantee for the future
independence of the Black Sea, it can hardly be antici-
pated,in the present position of parties, whatever may be
the views of the Allied Powers as to the future occupa-
tion of the Crimea. It must be remembered that as yet

we are only in possession of the southern side of the

harbour of Sebastopol; that, notwithstanding the cap-
ture and destruction of the most important stronghold
of Russia—her standing menace against Turkey—a
Russian army still holds the forts on the northern side,
and is, for the present, at least, in great force in the
Crimea, with communications for supplies and rein-
forcements still open ; and, therefore, leaving much to
be done before Russian occupation of the peninsula is
defeated. In the face of such circumstances, it is not
to be supposed that Russia will consent to forego
any of the advantages which she now possesses, and
unless they are wrung from her by the intelligible
arguments of main force, the desired security for the
future is altogether out of the question. Should the
Allies agree to be content with what has already been
done, and, after the destruction of all of Sebastopol
that is within their power, retire from the Crimea,
the capability of Russia to reinstate her position for

aggression will be as great as ever, and all the enor,

mous sacrifices which have been made for the sake of
destroying or weakening her influence will have been
virtually thrown away.
We must not forget that the chief part of the
fortifications of Sebastopol which required so enormous
a force to destroy were constructed within a com-
paratively brief space of time, in the face of a hostile
army ; and, should the Allies now retire from the
contest, might bere constructed without any possibility
of hindrance on our part. Russia has shown herself
capable of the most extraordinary exertions, in order to
carry out her long-cherished policy—of continuous
aggression and conquest—nor has she under every
defeat and disadvantage displayed the slightest in-
tention to depart from her object of universal dominion.
On the other hand, it would be consummate folly on
the part of the Allies to surrender one particle of the
advantages which they have gained, or to submit to
any conditions which do not ostensibly, as well as
really, involve the absolute independence of the Black
Sea from any future attempts of Russia to restore
the position which she occupied at the commencement
of the war.

The probability, therefore, of a successful termi-
nation to the negotiations which are said to be now
pending for a settlement of the dispute is most re-
mote ; for the simple reason that Russia will not
surrender anything which the Allies have not gained
by force of arms, and that the latter have not yet
accomplished sufficient to render the existing state of
affairs in any way satisfactory. The possession of
the Crimea has not been effected, and without it we
can have no security for the future, whatever may be
the extent of Russian promises or her professions of
peaceful intentions. She has in fact but lost a fortress ;
and should the alliance now be broken up, it is difficult
to say how slight may be the chance of its resuscita-

tion, should Russia, in the absence of a powerful
hostile force, commence the work of restoration. The
alternative appears clear, that we must persevere in
the work which we have begun, until Russian power
in the Crimea is completely annihilated, or we may be
called upon, when worse prepared for the task, to do
again all that has now been done.
We must not lose sight of the important fact that

the possession of Constantinople is the great object of
Russian ambition, and that nothing which has yet
transpired shows the slightest disposition to desist
from this aggressive policy whenever the opportunity
be afforded for its realisation. It was the special aim
of PETER and of CATHERINE, and ALEXANDER 11.
has declared his intention to walk in the steps of his
ancestors. Any conditions, therefore, short of an
absolute surrender of the Crimea would be only a
postponement of the design until a more convenient
opportunity, and this opportunity would be very soon
afforded, should peace be consented to on any terms
which Russia would grant, and the allied forces be
withdrawn. We have not yet done enough to compel
satisfactory conditions, and without such compulsion
Russia will be sure not to yield them.
In the consideration of this great question, much
difference of opinion exists as to the concessions which
the Allied Powers should persist in demanding as

absolutely indispensable. There are some who think
that we ought not to force Russia to the humiliation
of submitting to terms dictated by her conquerors,
but should rather consent to take something less than
our just demands, in order that Russia may be enabled
to preserve her position as one of the great powers of
Europe. On the other hand, there is an opinion which,
we believe, is held by the majority of people, that
Russia is a barbarous power, not to be restrained by
treaties ; and that, therefore, we ought to take ad-
vantage of the present favourable opportunity to de-
prive her of the capacity for further mischief. In order
to carry out the views of the latter, the war should be
prosecuted to extremity, at any hazard and at any
cost ; but it would be as well to consider whether the
real advantages hoped for might not be attained at a
less sacrifice, and, consequently, with more probabilities
of success. It ought to be kept steadily in view that
the great object to be gained is an effectual restraint
upon the aggressive policy of Russia, and we believe
that, with the exception of the little " peace-at-any-
price" party, this object is earnestly desired by the
people of England, and for which the present heavy
taxation &ind high prices are submitted to with some-
thing like contentment. So long as Russia maintains
her aggressive policy, and is allowed to possess the
power to give it effect, the rest of Europe is not safe
from her machinations ; for though Turkey may be the
primary object of her ambition, the other states of
Europe would soon be obliged to succumb to the same
influence. It is, therefore, the interest of all to unite
in restraining the power of Russia within reasonable
limits, and to ascertain in what these consist is the
most important point to decide in fixing the conditions
upon which peace shall be consented to.
In the propositions submitted by Austria as the
basis of renewed negotiations, much stress is laid upon
the restrictions to be imposed upon the future naval
force of Russia in the Black Sea ; but if this point
were to be conceded by the CZAR, no other security
would be offered for its fulfilment than the obligations
of a treaty which Russia would disregard at the first
convenient opportunity. We have, therefore, no right
to be satisfied even with such a concession, unless it
be accompanied with a surrender of the Crimea, the
evacuation of the provinces on both sides of the Danube,
and a surrender of all claim to the protectorate of the
Christian subjects of the Ottoman Porte. The advan-
tages to be expected from such an arrangement would
be the free navigation of the Danube, the opening of
the Black Sea to the mercantile marine of all nations,
and the independence of the Turkish empire, or at
least that immunity from Russian influence which
would give to the western states of Europe all the
benefits which may be anticipated from freedom of
trade with the Turkish provinces on both shores of the
Black Sea. If such a result be arrived at, the war will
prove of ultimate advantage, for it has already broken
down the exclusiveness of Islamism, and ere long we
may expect a far more extensive and profitable com-
merce with Turkey than ever we enjoyed with Russia,
even when our relations with her were of the most
amicable character.