The Dorset County Express and Agricultural Gazette.
Dorchester, Dorset, England, 1879-09-30 00:00:00

WHAT ARE THE TROOPS TO DO?

For the last week or more the columns of the news-
papers, especially those who pretend to express the
sentaments of the present Government, have been
filled with questions and speculations as to what shall
be done with that city which has been the scene of
One Of the most audacious and probably most treacher-
ous and brutal attacks upon an English Embassy that
have occurred in modern times. The Ambassador of
Britain, protected in theory by a treaty with the ac-
knowledged ruler of the country, was allowed to enter
the citroditeCd, 'abul, with an unpretending escort, and
when as was suppored "in a manner tented
to his sty and dignity,." was attacked by an army
detachment assisted by an armed mob, overwhelmed,
and murdered with nearly all his suite. We do
DOT underrate the blackness of the crime, to which
attaches the guilt of unfaithfulness to bread and
salt, always supposed to be one of the least
expected in ferocious and partly civilised, but
yet superstitious races. And now that the Army
of Britain or of India, for it is not clear to which ills
eventually to be apportioned, is on the march to re-es-
tablish British influerce in Cabul, the question "What
will they do when they get there ?" is more the subject
of discussion than whether they will accomplish the
march, in the face of an Afghan army in front,
=en on the flanks, and an excitable population
. Such infuriates as shout—" Blow a dozen
from a gun !" and who point Earl Beaconsfield to an
empty plain, as the desert to which he should reduce
the place where Cabul used to stand," might, if they
have utterly abandoned the spirit of Christianity, at
least have "upon the heat and passion of their blood
sprinkled coot patience," by reference to the precepts
of country life. If Bishops and Reverends are too far
behind their "spirited" volley, if the New Testament
is looked on by erst-State-Churchiset as a stale worn-
out book, they might yet have taken counsel from
those who, they profess, are so much to them. Possi-
bly, though, farmers and farmers' wises are despised
by the "free aristocrat." of whom Lord Burghley is
such a shining light, and foreseeing hints, such as in
the proverb—" I tint reckon your chickens before
they are hatched,"—inay have entirely passed out of
their ardent minds. But we will assume, as every
Englishman must hope, that no hindrance will be
effectual to stay our troops from Calm!, and that the
strongest points in and about the city will be seized,
the troops, rebellious towards their own chief, being
and their power broken. What then? Are
we to hold Cabral and Jellalabed, and the whole line
of the Cabul river, thus extending our rule from
Peshawur to the heart and capital of the turbulent
land? Of, are OUT difficulties then to be only at their
commencement, and are we to pursue the Heratee re-
giments to their own city, near the borders of Persia,
and there to snatch, in the face of Persian jealousies,
a nominal sovereignty over the whole of Afghanistan,
at the risk of still more firmly cementing the alliance
between our rival Russia and the I:nd of the Shalt?
Each plan has its dangers, and will bring its immense
responsibilities, for if we stop at Cabul, the Russians
eiZobably advance from the northwest, though
stayed by the Turcomans for an uncertain time,
Br
will probably follow the fate destined for
Merv, and the Russian advance be extended as far
as that vast range of mountains called the Ilindoo
Koosh. The district here, though apparently most
difficult for the passage of armies, is not so impractic-
able but that Russian emissaries can find their way
through the defiles to excite the deluded Afghans,
smarting under defeat, if they chafe under our rule.
But if we are able to push our conquering columns
to Herat, and to occupy that advanced post against
Russo' Persian ambition, the unthankful task remains
behind of pacifying a whole country full of turbulent
and factious tribes, united only in their hatred to the
conquering force. In a financial point of view, the
look-out is still more unpromising, for Afghanistan is,
to a civilised debt-paying enemy, a most unprofitable
speculation—in fact, the results of the conquest would
be like pig-shaving, "more noise and bristle than
wool." The finances of India, taxed to their utmost,
would be loaded beyond the limit of the burden they
could bear, and in England, the candle-burning at
both ends has gone on so far that even the Conserva-
tive Colonels and other fire-eaters would find it hard
to get the Ere,lish tax-payer on their side : the old
toast—" Bloody wars, and quick promotion"—would
be found all too late, when the cost had to be paid
out of the losses of bail times. These are the difhcul-
ties to which the Imperial and imperiotto policy of
lucky novelists has brought this country, and the out-
look is sufficiently lila& as it otando. But if the
"blood and fire and desolation" ravings of the Tory
vanguard are to lie listened to, in how much worse a
position shall we be! Supposiiig that our artny
proceed to Cabul, overpower all resistance, and, after
inflicting such "vengeance" as may gratify the Tories'
revenge for the baffling of their policy, should then
fire the city, reduce it to ashes, and if possible prevent
its ever being rebuilt. What then? shall the army
advance further, with an enraged and houseles
population at its luck and flank ? The prope,to of
Its ever reaching lerat or joining our forces at
Candahar would he of the smallest. Whether any
Mussulman ruler were of influence enough to preach
a *had or not, the "holy war" would be preached to
every Afghan by the sight of his homeless women and
children, and the long-drawn communications from
Peahawur would be interrupted by guerrilla attacks
on a dozen or a hundred points. Rapacity and
hiwger would incite constant robberies of the commis-
sariat, the vehicles and the beasts would be con.
tintudly a prey to a population tilled with desperation
and vengeance, leading to a disastrous end. It may
be possible that, to cover Lord Lytton's blunders
with the gilt of apparent success, it may be necessary
to advance to Cated. But, once there, if an English
force cannot show itself calm and just enough to
secure by moderation what it has won by strength,
the straggle kitpower in Asia on England's part will
have began to fail. Lord Chelmsford's burning of
Ulundi and retreat therefrom are said, so far as they
had influence, to have delayed the settlement of the
Zulu question, and certainly if we destroyed Cabul,
whether we advanced to Ilerat, flank-marched to
Candahar, or hurried back to jellalabad and Pesha.
your, the result would be disastrous to our influence,
and deprive us of a position in Afghanistan.
We appear to have now fairly re-embarked in the
rivalry with Russia to which she was challenged by
the assumption of the title India, Imperatrix by our
Sovereign. But if we are rivals, not with peoples
but with tyrannies, not with men because they are of
different races, but with systems of mis-government
because they debase and pauperise and enslave the
i 4 in short, we are not the enemies of the
Itaiaian people, but of their abominable oligarchy and
despotism—(for the two are present in the RUTSLIII
system)—so long arc we not afraid of the result,
whether it be in the Balkan Peninsula, on the borders
of China, or in the valleys and cities of -Afghanistan.
Starting, then, with the question—" What are the
Troops to do ?"—we reply "To take Cabul ; but
certainly not to 'burn, destroy, and plunder.' " And
the work will be undone if it be left entirely or mainly
to the troops. It is ill-omened that the military
chiefs have orbidden civilians to accompany, for we
seed—first information as to what is actually done at
Cabal, that a check may be imposed, and any excesses
prevented which shall disgraccour name and hinder the
pacification of Afghanistan. Anil as soon as possible
we need a large quasi-civilian element to represent
Britain at Cabul, and show the Afghans that, as at
Peshawur, our influence is fur their good. But that
isfluasce must be really wise and humane; all thought
of brutal vengeance should be suppressed, for indeed
the Cabulese were only second in the crime, which
was caused and mainly committed by the regiments
from Herat. But latest advices show that the domin-
ant party or parties at Cabul have adopted the crime,
for they have closed the gales of the city, and appear
resolved to resist. Ott the other hand, it is pleasing
to flail that the Ameer, though "fully suspected" by
the Viceroy's Government, has remained faithful to
his engagement with the British, for he has given the
best of hostages by placing himself and his son in our
power at Kushi. It now remains to be seen whether
the directors of our army will show sufficient judg•
meet to use as a leverage the influence the Ruler must
have over some of the Afghan nation, to bring about
a settlement after a capture of Cahill, or whether, by
LO unrelenting harshness, they will manage to convert
the whole nation into our foe. In short, directly
opposing the spirit of imperious Imperialism, the
mission of Britain at Cabul, while it may first be
Cry to "do lastly," should also be to "love
mercy. The third part of the requirement we may
leave those to enforce who claim to be the champions
of the necessity for connecting religion with the State.
Discass.