The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1878-02-23 00:00:00

SPEECH OF PRINCE BISMARCK IN
THE GERMAN PARLIAMENT.

In Tuesday's sitting of the German Parliament Herr
von Benningsen (a National Liberal and personal friend of
Prince Bismarck) introduced the Oriental interpellation
announced by himself and other members of the various
Liberal sections. Herr von Benuingsen proceeded to give
a retrospective review of the course of events during
the Russo-Turkish War, in the course of which he said that
a year ago, when it appeared that Russia hesitated to vindi-
cate her position in Eurape, Germany might have appre-
hended that the grouping of Powers, being partially based
upon Russia's retaining her former might, would be shaken.
To-day there was the opposite danger that Russia, regarding
herself as omnipotent, would advance demands incompati-
ble with the well-Iseing of other States. lf such should
be the case, the Liberal Party were in hopes that the German
Government would know how to cause the Russian Govern-
ment to modify their demands, a sentiment which was fol-
lowed by loud applause. The German Parliament would
assist the Chancellor in effecting this purpose. Germany
lied heavy military burdens to bear, and accordingly might
expect to exercise a legitimate degree of influence on the
affairs of the Continent. He and the Liberals were assured
that the German Power being wielded by the Chancellor
would be employed to protect the pacific interests of Ger-
many and Europe.
Prince Bismarck replied that the recent debates in the
British Parliament having nearly exhausted the subject,
there was little new to be said upon it. If he had, neverthe-
less, declared this willingness to answer the iuterpellation
without loss of time, this was chiefly owing to a wish to
guard against silence b;:ing interpreted as mystery. As.
regards the preliminaries of peace, he did not think that
German interests would be violated by them. "With regard
to the Dardanelles, morei apprehensions have been raised
than were justified by actual possibilities. The question of
the Dardanellea is of poiverful importance if it is a ques-
tion of placing the key to the Bosphorus in other hands
than the present, and of deciding whether Russia shall
be able to close the Straits at her own good pleasure
or not. All other stipulations will relate more to a
time of peace than a time of war—a period when
It will beet importance to know whether the holder ot the
key of the Dardanelles is an opponent of England or of
Russia In the case of peace, so long as the Dardanelles
are in hands that are independent of Russia, the terms of
the Treaty that may be arranged will not have the im-
portance ascribed to them, It may be of interest to the
countries bordering on the Mediterranean, for it to be de-
cided whether the Russian fleet is entitled in time of peace
to sail threugh the Dardanelles and show itself in the
Mediterranean Sea; but the question whether in war time
ships of war can Pass through the Dardanelles and the
question whether the possession of the Dardanelles shall
be placed in other hands are quite another thing. This
conjuncture is not presented by the existing situation. His
only care at the present moment was to point out the
weighty interests respecting which, after the Russo-Turkish
war has come to an end, a further war might break out. He
meant to say the regulations at the Dardanelles in regard to
ships of war are scarcely so important as those in regard to
commerce. Herein lies Germany's chief interest in the
East, that the Straits and waterways like the Danube from
the Black Sea upwards be free, as they have been heretoiore.
It is certain that we shall attain this end, according to an
official communication received from St. Petersburg, which
in regard to this point simply makes reference to the stipu-
lations of the Treaty of Paris. The iuterest which we take
in the improved position of the Christians in Turkey is the
second interest Germany has in Eastern matters—one less
direct, but at the same time one that is dictated by humanity."
As to the exact position Germany would assume at the Con-
ference, he found it impossible to speak with any degree of
certainty, the official papers having only that day come into
his hands. He, however, could quite understand the
motives actuating Russia in going to war. Wishing to have
done with the Oriental Question without that question
running the risk of a fresh campaign every twenty or thirty
years, Russia opened the war lu an imposing style and ob-
tained the most favourable results which could have been
imagined. At present, when Russia was undoubtedly
victor in every part of the field, a judicious re-
gard to her own interest required her to obtain the
sanction of the signatory Poweis for the terms of peace as
proposed by herself. But should it be impossible to obtain
this consent, Russia, it was to be expected, would act on
the well-known maxim--"Beati possidentes." A Conference
had been proposed by Austria, and willingly accepted by
Germany. . . . As the Conference would hardly assemble
before the middle of March, it was really impossible for him
already to submit the programme Germany would lay down
for her conduct when attending the meeting. Germany was
happy in enjoying the confidences of all other Powers She
was on friendly terms more particularly with Russia and
Austria, between with whom she had endeavoured all along
to mediate. In carrying out this amicable task Germany
had strictly avoided throwing her power into the balance.
Indeed, there had been no need for any intervention thus
far. The terms of the armistice assigned to Russia a position
from the Danube to the Sea of Dlarmora—a proud position,
no doubt, but one which did not directly touch any interest
of this country. Nor was it of any particular concern to
Germany whether Bulgaria, Montenegro, Herzegovina, and
Servia were henceforth to bear a different relation towards
Turkey. Russia being intent upon exacting a pecuniary
indemnity, which Turkey would be hardly disposed to pay,
territory would probably be demanded in default of money.
On this point the Conference would have to be con-
sulted, it being of moment what Power was to hold the
Dardanelles. Germany's primary aim was to secure the
freedom of commerce, and here he must needs de-
clare that Germany, having been connected with Russia
fcr many years by the ties of a sincere and mutually
profitable alliance, he, for one, would think twice before
giving up the friendship of so great and powerful a State
without real necessity. (This sentiment was followed by
applause.) He, however, had to declare that no foreign
Government had asked this country to turn against Ituvia
in the present crhis. He was still in hopes that peace would
be maintained. Indeed, he could hardly conceive that
fresh complications would arise, but should they do so, the
Chancellor would not advise the Emperor to go to war,
except in harmony with the Federal Council, the Imperial
Parliament, and the German nation. Were Germany now to
announce her intentions at the Conference, she would simply
render it impossible for herself to continue the work of media-
tion. In such a case the programme announced by Germany
might be adopted by others, when the peace this country
wished to maintain might be imperilled. Accordingly it
would be a serious mistake to avow a programme which
might be evaaed by some and taken advantage of by others.
This country had no wish to act as arbiter in the pending
conflict. All her ambition was confined to the modest task
of a broker who settled a bargain between different parties.
His experience had taught him that two States, when left to
settle a delicate affair alone, were easily led to quarrel; while
the co-operation of a third party not only exer•ised a whole-
some influence, but also kept flagging negotiations up to the
mark. On the most friendly terms with Russia and Austria,
Germany enjoyed the further advantage of having no one
interest, excepting the pacific rivalry of trade, which could
bring her in opposition to England. This lucky circum-
stance would enable Germany to mediate between Fog-
land and Russia were England and Russia to wish for
her intervention. The three Emperors' alliance, if so
it might be called, was based, not upon written en-
gagements, but upon the personal sympathies exist-
ing between the three Emperors and the long and
intimate relations between the Ministers advising
them. Whenever a difficulty arose between Russia
and Austria, Germany avoided siding with either, for
fear that the tie might snap. But, after all, however
strong the three Emperors' alliance might be, it could not
be strong enough to induce any 01 the three pal ticipants to
sacrifice important national interests pour lea beaux yet=
of another Power. They had no wish to fight, and therefore
could have no wish to point to their power as an argument
in the discussion. They had no wish to imitate the Napo-
leonic example and constitute themselves the arbitera of
Europe. Suppose they were to take the advice of the Augs-
burg Allgemeine Zeitung and, assuming the part of European
policemen, intimate their resolve to resist Russian usurpa-
tion. The result would be that certain Russian person-
ages unfriendly to Germany, should they ever come into
power would be stimulating their countrymen against
us. They knew how much Russian political parties were
given to declafnation, and they could easily imagine what
they would say against them were Germany to prevent their
reaching the goal they have been pursuing for centuries. At
present political parties friendly to Germany were in power
in every part of Europe. Were they to imperil the con-
tinuation of this fortunate state of things? Were they to
jeopardize the peace of Germany for the sake of securing
the peace of one of their friends? An Empire situate in the
midst of Europe had better be cautious at such a time as
this. No doubt they were strong—they had a large army at
their disposal; but only if their own indepeudenise, their
own interests were at stake should he advise the Emperor
to Unsheathe the sword.

Loud applause followed this speech, part of which the
Prince, owing to a weakness in one of his legs, had asked
permission to deliver sitting.
In a subsequent part of the debate Prince Bismarck said;

"As regards the arbiter's part we are desired to under-
take, it stands to reason that a more thankless office does
not exist. Not so very many years ago, the Emperor
Nicholas peremptorily called Prussia to order at Olmiltz.
We did not exactly understand what lie meant, and
of course were not particularly grateful for the
rebuff, neither was Austria, Niaholas's client, on
that memorable occasion. Again, when we tried
to make peace after Villafranca. all turned against
us. Nor can I say that I ever forgave the Emperor
Napoleon his intermeddling after Sadowa. But for the
Emperor Napoleon interfering much more might have been
effected there and then. In my opinion too much im-
portance is attached to the Dardanelles. They have long
been in possession of the Sultan without making him
more powerful than he was. Our relations with Austria
are excellent. The two Emperors have real confidence
In each other, and I have much pleasure in regarding
myself as a personal friend of Count Andrassy. lie is as sure
of my telling him the truth as I am of his telling me the
truth. I confess that in former years I did not believe a
word of what he told me and regarded his every asseveration
as so much moonshine; but all is changed now, and any
attempt to make us suspect each other's designs will be fruit-
less."—[The greater portion of the above report of Prince
Bismarck's speech is from the account sent to The limes by
their Berlin Correspondent.]