The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1879-03-29 00:00:00

THE HEROES OF RORKE'S DRIFT.

The Morning Post, in a leader, commenting on the
achievements of Lieutenants Chard and Bromhea.d,
remarks :—" But Lieutenants Chard and Bromhead
were not the only heroes at Rorke's Drift. To bestow,
as it has been suggested, the Victoria Cross on all the
defenders of the post would perhaps render the decora-
tion too cheap. Lieutenant Chard, however, in his
despatch mentioned several men who were distinguished
above their comrade. As to the remainder the
statutes provide for their case. When a brigade, regi-
ment, troop, or comrany performs a specially gallant
act, and the officer commanding the force considers
that all were equally brave and that no selection is
possible, the officers and non-commissioned officers are
each to select one and the soldiers two of their number
to receive the decoration. This seems to us quite a
fitting mode of dealing with the defenders of R,orke's
Drift. Gallant, however, as they were, their gallantry
and devotion were exceeded by the gallantry and de.
votion of Lieutenants Melville and Coghill, who at the
cost of their lives saved the colours of the 24th."

The Standard publishes the following letter :—"lt is'right
that among the names of the brave men who, at Rorke's
Drift, saved Natal, the name of a non-combatant should not
pass without notice. The Rev. George Smith, aware of the
approach of the enemy when there was time to fly, preferred
to remain where death was before him. Through the night
of the attack he lent his gallant help to our soldiers; and yet
again he held his life of small account, when, as one of
Diajor Black's little band, he volunteered to search for the
bodies of Lieutenants Melvin and Coghill, that they might
receive, as they did receive, Christian burial at his hands.
3urely the State will not leave this hero to go without
reward. I write on the behalf of an old comrade.—l am. Sir,
your obedient servant, S. B. TRISTRAN."

FURTHER DESPATCH FROM SIR BARTLE FREEE.
The last despatch received from Sir Bartle Frere in the
Blue-book issued last Friday was dated February 10. The
following further despatch from the High Commissioner was
received at the Colonial Office by the last mail (March 21):
" Pietermaritzburg, Natal, Feb. 12, 1879.
"Sir,—ln my despatch of the 24th of January last
I only partially answered your despatch of the 18th of
December. I was, in fact, interrupted while writing
by the intelligence of our disaster at the Head-quarter
Camp on the 22nd, and was obliged to close my un-
finished despatch to be in time for the mail. The
very serious check which we received on the 22nd
does not, however, seem to me to call for any
modification in the opinions I had already ven-
tured to lay -before Her Majesty's Government ;
on the contrary, it seems to confirm most strongly
the arguments I had already advanced in my despatch
of the 24th to show that it WAS impossible, with any
regard to the safety of these colonies, to defer placing
in the hands of the General commanding Her Ma-
jesty's forces the enforcement of the demands made
on Cetywayo. Deeply as, in common with every
subject of Her Majesty, I deplore the disastrous
check we have received, it is impossible to shut one's
eyes to the fact that it was, in all human proba-
bility, mainly due to disregard of the General's
orders that so great a disaster occurred; while every
circumstance accomeanying or following the events
of that day prove what an insecure position we
occupied both here and in the Transvaal with such
a neighbour along so many hundred miles of unde-
fended frontier. As a consequence of the crippling of
Colonel Glyn's and Colonel Durnford's columns, and
the shock which has been given to the colonial forces,
European as well as native, the columns of Colonel
Pearson and Colonel Wood have been obliged to sus-
pend their advance and await reinforcements, which
can only be looked for to the extent required from
more distant parts of South Africa and from England.
It has become painfully evident that the Zulu King
has an army at his command which could almost
any day unexpectedly invade Natal, and, owing
to the great extent of frontier and utter helpless.
nem of the undisciplined hordes of Natal
natives to offer effectual resistance, the Zulus
might march at will through the country, de-
vastating and murdering, without a chance of being
checked as long as they abstained from attacking the
intrenched post of Her Majesty's troops, which are
from 50 to 100 miles apart. The capital and all the
principal towns are at this moment in • laager ' pre-
pared for attack, which even if successfully resisted
would leave two-thirds of them in ashes, and the country
around utterly desolated. From every part of South
Africa outside the colony, where the native races pre-
dominate, come the same reports of uneasiness and of
intended risings of the native races against the white
man; while the majority of the Transvaal European
population is in a state of avowed readiness to take
any opportunity of shaking off the yoke of the
English Government. It may be said that these
are only the stronger reasons why hostilities should
not have been commenced with the Zulu King. But
I submit that every circumstance which has lately
occurred shows how impossible it was to defer
hostilities for more than a tew weeks at the utmost,
possibly till the harvest now ripening was gathered
and till the Tugela was fordable. The feeling which
has just burst out, both among native tribes and in the
Transvaal, was there already, and in the Transvaal, at
all events, its expression could not have been deferred
by any postponement of hostilities with the Zulus.
But what possible chance was there that Cety-
wayo himself would for any length of time
have remained quiescent within his own bor-
ders? He had not acknowledged officially, and in the
usual form, the award of the disputed territory in his
favour, nor had he condescended even to discuss the
terms of the High Commissioner's messages to him.
Had Lord Chelmsford's large force been kept per-
nostaently on nib rontier, he might possibly have
refrained from action as long as this force remained.
But its permanent retention was not, as Cetywayo
knew, probably, and the removal of the force would
assuredly have led to a renewal of the encroachments
and the violations of territory which he had directed
or acquiesced in during the preceding year and a
half; the slightest accident might have led to a collision
taking us at disadvantage, and what he had the power
to do in a colony so little prepared for self-defence
may be judged from what he has done since her
Majesty's troops crossed the border. It seems to me
vain—l had almost said criminal—to shut our eyes to
the fact that there has grown up, by our sufferance,
alongside this colony a very powerful military organit•
zation, directed by an irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and
treacherous despot, and that as long as this organi-
zation exists and is so directed it is impossible for
peeceful subjects of her Majesty to feel security of life
or property within fifty miles ot his border. The exist-
ence of this military organization makes that of a peace-
ful English community in his neighbourhood impos-
sible, and unless Cetywayo's power of murder and
plunder be restrained this colony can only continue to
exist as an armed camp. Bgain, it may be said that
before attempting to coerce Cetywayo the presence of
a larger force in the field should have been secured.
To this I can only answer that, though a larger force
might undoubtedly have lessened the chance of suc-
cessful opposition, there was no reason whatever at
the time to suppose that the force at our disposal
was too small for the task attempted. I will not
dwell on what might have been the case had orders
been obeyed, and had things happened otherwise
than they did happen. I stand on the broad fact that
I sought information in every possible quarter, and
had, and have, no reason whatever, to suppose that
there was anything rash in the undertaking. I know
of no one who is supposed to know the Zulus best
whose advice has not been as fully heard as I could
obtain it, Of the three persons who, among unofficial
as well as official authorities, are supposed best to know
the Zulus, their feelings and probable intentions, one
expressed to me his own belief in the ultimate accept-
ance of the terms offered without fighting; another
considered we had, in our military calculations,
greatly over estimated the Zulu power; and a third,
who had perhaps better means of judging them
than any one else, while agreeing that the Zulu
power had been much overrated, was convinced that
the Zulu people themselves would bring their tyrant
to reason, and that, after a single action or two, the
military system of the Zulus would collapse. It is a
singular coincidence that this latter opinion was ex-
pressed to me on the 22nd, at the very time that our
camp at Isandlana was in possession of the Zulus.
Looking back on the past in the light of what
has happened, I cannot think that the work was rashly
undertaken. But even if I could have hoped that fur-
ther reinforcements could be expected within a reason-
able timein answer to a call for them, there was no time
to wait. No one who had carefully studied tbe events
of the la.,t two years, and knew the ways of these
barbarians, could reasonably have expected the Zulus
to remain quiet, and it Was clear that, even if they
deferred action, there were elements of strife else-
where which could not be evaded oie delayed. As
I have said before, and in other communications,
the die for peace or for war had been cast more than
two years ago. It was a simple queetion whether we
should steadily bring our differences to an issue on a
clear and unmistakable demand for our right to live at

peace with our neighbours, or whether we should
await the convenience of the Zulu King and be taken
at disadvantage when he saw his opportunity. It
seems to me that this same principle of said-preserva-
tion and self-defence should be steadfastly adhered to
in all our future proceedings. It may be quite possible
to patch up a peace with this or that tribe which shall
for the time be more or less satisfactory to some of the
interests in this or in a neighbouring colony. But I sub-
mit that her Majesty's Government should not permit
peace to be made till her Majesty's unquestioned
supremacy has been established and recognlzed by all
Zulu tales who now acknowledge Cetywayo between
this and the Portuguese territory around Delagoa
Bay. This I firmly believe to be the only guarantee
for peace, security, good government, and progressive
civilization throughout her Majesty's poFseesions and
all neighbouring territories in South Africa; and,
without such security, I feel assured that this colony
of Natal can never be a safe residence for peace-loving
and civilized men of European descent.—l have, &c.,
"11 B, E. FRERE, Governor and High
Commissioner.
' "The Right Hon. the Secretary of State for the Colonies."