The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1884-05-24 00:00:00

GENERAL . GORDON'S POSITION.

The Daily Telegraph says: Ws have received the
following from a source- of the highest authority. It
not only discusses the nature of the position in which
General Gordon is placed from a military standpoint,
but indicates what he has contemplated doing and
will probably attempt to carry out before he leaves
the Soudan:

" Personally have very little apprehension about
Gordon's safety. He is full of resource, and his posi-
tion is by no means desperate. His own life will be
the last consideration with him, and therein lies the
only source of danger to himself. I am perfectly
sure he will not attempt to leave Khartoum, even if a
British force were there, unless he can save tho
garrison and all the people who have stood loyally
by him. Yes, I think he will go a step further
than that. He will insist before quitting the
country that the other garrisons in the Soudan
shall, if possible, be rescued, and something done
to give future good government to the people of that
country. Provisions and ammunition are plentiful
enough in Khartoum to last till September next. I
don't think it is at all likely Gordon will be deserted
by the garrison. They, or at any rate a considerable
portion of them, and of the friendly Arabs, will
adhere to him. He has qualities about him that will
ensure that. I take it that he will be able to retain
the services of men enough to hold an enclosed work
on the river, safely guarding such steamers and boats
as he thinks necessary to move his force. The Arabs
always slow to attack fortified positions or walled en-
closures of any kind, and there is no likelihood that
Gordon will leave the slightest chance open for them
to successfully carry the place by assault.
"Now as to his means of retreat, should he select
that course. There are three routes open to him.
When the Nile rises he may take to the steamers and
boats and go down stream towards Berber; or he may
go up the Blue Nile and then march across country
towards Abyssinia; lastly—and his predilection is for
this route—he may journey up the White Nile,
making for the Equatorial provinces, to effect a junc-
tion with Lupton Bey. Gordon will-almost certainly
eventually proceed towards the Equator if no help is
vouchsafed to him from the North. I use the word
North, because if England declines the mission of
rescue and succour others may not be so halting in
the work. Once Gordon meets Lupton he will con-
cert means with him, and he expects Stanley may
help from the Congo, to settle the Soudan question
and the slave trade in his own way without inter-
ference from European Governments. It would
mean the creation of an Equatorial African Govern-
ment seeking alliances with the more powerful Arab
leaders of the abandoned Soudan provinces.
"Whilst the waters of the Nile are rising, Gordon,
now that he is quite unfettered by our Government
telegrams and orders, you may rest assured is hard at
work in various directions trying to carry out the
object for which 119 went to the Soudan, namely, to
save the garrisons and assist in the establishment of
local governments, not leaving the country a prey to
anarchy. He intends to, and doubtless will, treat
with the different sheikhs with that object, and if he
despairs of success in that direction will even perhaps
invite the French Government to assist him through
the Tunisian and Algerian Arabs, who maintain warm
friendly relations with their brethren in the Soudan.
General Gordon has openly avowed that if France
chooses, by means of the Arabs in those two provinces,
and with very little outlay of French treasure or blood,
she may, now that England has compelled Egypt to
retire from the Soudan, possess herself of all that
vast country. He further states the Soudan has never
been a financial burden to Egypt, but, on the contrary,
has yielded over and above all expenditure a revenue
of £llO,OOO annually, and this amount would scarcely
represent a tithe of the country's capabilities as a
revenue-producing region if stable and honest admjn-
istration were secured to the natives.

"There are several ways, notwithstanding the
opportunities that have been deliberately thrown
away—still open for helping General Gordon. Not
many weeks ago it would have been an easy matter
to have ensured the success of the mission on which
he was sent by our Government to the Soudan. The
Arabs are not utterly destitute of reason or com-
mon-sense, and a British force of not more than 1000
men, which could have been pushed forward easily
enough to Berber, When Gordon asked for help, would
have settled the whole sad business. The Arabs would
have realised that the power of England had to be
reckoned with, and not a solitary man who had no
soldiers behind him. To-day the English Government
can render substantial help to Gordon by declaring
to the tribes that if the garrisons are attacked
and cut up they will bring down on their heads
terrible reprisals. Next, by directly—not through the
justly distrusted Egyptian authorities in any way—
inviting the Arab chiefs to assist in the settlement of
the country, declaring that we mean, the moment the
Nile rises, to send a force to Khartoum. Again, an
important diversion could be made even now by way
of Abyssinia. The fierce Christian warriors could not
only relieve Kassala, but, by their presence there, lead
to the withdrawal of many of the Arabs about Khar-
toum. When the autumn comes, any relief expedition
has, for a choice of routes up the Nile (which ensures
a safe retreat), by Souakim and Berber, or by way of
the cold, mountainous, and well-watered Abyssinia to
the Blue Nile—the pleasantest, if not the most prac-
ticable, route.

"My own belief is that things will drift along till
the nation compels the Government to make prepara-
tions to send an English expedition to Khartoum. Mr.
Gladstone is thoroughly annoyed at the whole matter,
and determinedly anxious to be rid of Egypt and
Egyptian questions, at any cost. He considers that
country of little real interest or value to the Empire,
and has told me that it is engrossing attention in
England which ought to be devoted to the far more
important matters of home policy. General Gordon,
on the other hand, believes that Egypt is an import-
ant factor for England's welfare, and that the Eastern
Soudan is really indispensable to Egypt. The Nib-
meter at Khartoum, he holds, should be watched in
the interest of the people of the delta, and even the
bed and banks of the White Nile should be guarded
in order to prevent its waters being wasted in
the desert. When an English expedition arrives
at Khartoum, if it find Gordon there, un-
less he be compelled, I am sure he will not leave the
country without seeing some strong government set
up. He cares not what power controls the Soudan as
long as good government is secured to the public.
He considers now that the Soudan and he himself
having been abandoned, he is fully free to do the
best he can for the Arabs. His friends trust that he
may be able to carry out his plans, and knowing them
and his endless fertility of resource I don't by any
means despair of his success, or of his saving the
Bastern Soudan to Egypt, in spite of the Malidi's
rebellion and the proclaimed policy of its abandon-
ment by our Government. The logic of events is
often too strong for governments and their policies,
and the Soudan, I firmly believe, will prove another
instance of a British Government being saved from a
great error in spite of itself."