The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1878-04-27 00:00:00

AN EXPEDITION BY SEA.

Now that the use of the torpedo has to be reckoned as one
of the destructive agents in naval warfare, the following
Interesting article (which is taken from The Tones of April
2o) is well worth perusal :

The prevalence of great wars conducted on scientific
principles has of late years brought abeut the decision
of many questions formerly obscure' eti-ch as the value
of "fire tactics" over that of " shock tactics," the
principles upon which attack and defence must for the
future be conducted, and varir us others; but it is
remarkable that the problems most interesting for
England remain, not only unsolved, but without the
slightest approach to practical solution. There has
been no battle between heavy ironclads carrying such
ordnance as we no-v consider common, no contest be-
tween ships and torpedoes, and no landing on a hostile
coast in face of the enemy. Yet these are exactly the
difficulties with which English forces would have
to grapple if we found ourselves at war in the East,
and perhaps some statement of the facts as they appear
to bear on either side of the question may interest our
readers. For the sake of clearness it may be well to
suppose a definite case, which shall be that of a fleet
which endeavours to keep open a narrow but deep
channel with a strong current, covering meanwhile
the advance of a flotilla which is to laud an army
corps on a coast held by an enemy who has favourable
positions on shore for his artillery. The enemy on
shore will naturally endeapur to place and keep in
position a large number of torpedoes. The fleet will
desire to prevent them from being placed, or to re-
move them they are there already. Let us first of
all consider he action of the fleet in the presence of
torpedoes.
It may appear remarkable that we have no definite
data to argue from, seeing that Turkish ironclads of
small, size were in the Danube, and that the Russians
used torpedoes against them. The fact is that it is
difficult to say whether the Russian system of torpedo
warfare or the action of the Turkish gunboats was the
more feeble. The torpedoes which were placed in the
river were self-acting, and merely anchored in the
stream. Many of them must have been swept away
by floods or exposed to view by the sinking of the
river level, and on one occasion, at least, the Turkish
ships passed unharmed over a spot where a line of
torpedoes was supposed to be; with this exception,
the Turkish naval officers appear to have accepted
the situation with much calmness, for it is certaiu
ff
that hardly any eoTts were made to destroy or dis-
lodee the submarine foes. The only torpedoes used
by the Russians with real effect were those carried by
boats at the end of -a long spar prej-.,cting from the
bow. The se are called sp w torpedoes, and the Rees-
elan plan was to fix them to any part of the ship, or
to something, such as a cable, whence they would be
drifted by the water against the ship. It is
evident that the success or failure of such a system
must depend upon the superior dash and resource
of the attackers or defenders. Guard-boats in suffi-
cient numbers kept rowing round the ship, together
with floating defence of wooden spars at a suffi-
cient distance from the ship, must inevitably cause
such attacks to end in disastrous failure ; and
though in the early portion of the war some
such attacks were successful, they Can only have
been so for the same reasons which enabled the
Russians to cross the Danube and establish themselves
on the southern shore with is loss of less than 1,000
'men. During the later months of the war no such
attack has been successful, and even in the early part
of it some of them were easily beaten off. The two
really dangerous systems of torpedoes—n-amely, that
of several rows laid chequerwise with great care and
deliberation, and so arranged as to be fired from the
shore by electricity, and the offensive action of the
Whitehead torped ,—were never tried, nor did the Turks
practise any of the known means for the removal of
the sea mines. Horrible as this warfare is, there is
an intense fascination about it, and, whether soon or
at some future time, the attention of Europe will be
concentrated breathlessly upon some such struggle.
There are various ways of ddendieg ships aeainst
the Whitehead torpedoes, but it may be wiser not
to enumerate them here. There is, however, a
method of destroying the value of fixed torpedoes
which is well known, and, in our opinion, renders
them of little value against a clever and darieg enemy.
The explosion of a charge of gun-cotton in a torpedo
causes all others within a certain radius to become
useleSs. A naval force has, therefore, only to lay one
torpedo after another in a given line and explode them
to make sure that a lane is Cleared through those which
the enemy has placed to oppose its passage. Again,
in a deep and rapid stream, such as the Bosphorus, it
is extremely difficult to lay a system of torpedoes so
that they will remain in their places and act success-
fully. In short, we believe that the danger of fixed
torpedoes has been very much overrated. Certainly up
to this time their moral effect has been considerably
greater than their physical. It may possibly be re-
served for the successors of the Great English naval
captains to demonstrate once more that that the best
way to neutralize the stinging power of a nettle is to
grasp it firmly. It is inconceivable to us that a
channel could be sown with torpedoes in the face of a
bold fleet which occupies and patrols it night and day.
There might be losses of ships, but we are not aware
that the vessels of the English navy were male to be
placed under a glass case. The victories of Nelson
were not gained by counting too closely the odds
against him, or thinking more of his own probable
losses than of that which he could inflict on an enemy.
Courage, capability, and resource will enable sailors to
triumph over torpedoes, as the same qualities have
made them victors over superior strength in vessels and
armaments and the terrible attack of fire-ships.
If we now turn to the question of landing troops
in the face of an enemy, we shall find that the condi-
tions are very much changed from those which for-
merly existed. Against the success of such an operation
it may be said with truth that the long range of modern
artillery and small arms should enable the troops on
the shore to bring a heavy fire to bear upon the boats
at a much earlier period. Formerly the accurate
range of field artillery was confined to distances cer-
tainly within 2,000 yards; the shell fire was feeble,
and if the ricochet of round shot caused such pro-
jectiles to be efficacious at longer ranges, each bound
of the shot carried it high over any advancing; line of
boats. lthisketry fire had little effect over 300 or 400
yards, and no aimed fire was of any value over 200.
Therefore, from this point ofview, the defence of a coast
line against troops advancing in boats has certainly
gained in power. But if we look at the other side of
the question and consider the overwhelming effect of
the enormous shrapnell shells which can now be fired
from the ships covering the landing, if we remember
how dangerous was the old fire of red-hot shot against
wooden ships and how useless it would be now, and
if we consider how closely boats might approach a shore
behind irenclads which could lie in the deep water,
it will appear that, except in the case of a long stretch
of shallow water fringing ashore, the lauding of troops
could be so covered by the war ships as to render its
success almost a matter of certainty. The progress
of steam navigation has added another power to
the nation whose fleets occupy the water, and this
power displays itself in various ways. For iustance,
the largest ships can, if the water is deep enough,
approach very closely to a shore without danger of
being cast away upon it. Their decks, raised high
above the water, will command the position occupied
by the enemy, and, besides the fire of their great guns,
a steady rain of rifle bullets may be kept up against
the exposed enemy. In short, an fronded ship has all
the advantages possessed by the modern fieldwork,
with the addition of being movable. It cannot be
hurt by any fire which a land army can bring to bear
against it; only the projectiles from the heaviest guns
in forts have any effect upon it, and it is not at all
necessary that fi latid,eg should take place in front of
a fort. We have said that these maritime ironclad
forts are moveable, and their mobility is one of the
most striking features of the problem. In old days
ships were dependent upon wind and tide; if these
were not favourable, they might be descried from
shore endeavouring to reach a certain point for
several hours before they succeeded in doing so.
Now they are able to move in any direction they
please, and with much greater speed than that with
which a laud force can possibly follow them. The same
power exists in the engines of the troop ships, and in
those of the steam launches, which would now tow the
boats to the shore in the case of an attempt at landing.
See, then, what facilities exist for the handling of a
force which in these days proposes to disembark in the
presence of an enemy. The fleet, including both trans-
ports and vessels of war, can appear close to a certain part
of the coast with very short warning, and cover with
her iron sides the disembarcation of the troops into
the boats. Steam launches will tow the boats to the
shore with both rapidity and a.ccuracy, never miss-
ing the spot that each one is directed to reach. If
the enemy has been well reconnoitred, it is almost
impossible to suppose that a part of the coast where
he is in force will have been selected; but if such
a mistake has been made, and if lie is so well
sheltered either by works or the configuration of
ground that he is not easily crushed by the fire of
the ships—if, on account of various adverse cir-
cumstances, the attempted landing ends in failure,
the ships ean again receive the troops into shelter
and carry them to another point of the coa-t with a
rapidity which will defy all the efforts of the enemy
to imitate it. Are we not, then, justified in aesert-
lug that sen, transport is, for fighting purposes, far
,more valuafle than any method of moving troops
on land? fhe problem has not yet been practically
solved, but the balance of argument eurely tends
heavily to tine side of the ships, which, besides the
advantnes wo' have named P. 9 applicable to the case

of one army corps, could land 100;000 troops as easily
as 10,000, and on any front required. We English
must not allow our habit of self-depreciation to toad
us into undervaluing our advantages, or imagining
that great operations are beyond us. It is certain
that we could produce many more ships than any that
have ever been used for such purposes. Yet William
of Normandy had nearly :4,000 of one sort or another.
1 he Spanish Armada had about 130 over 200 tong—a
considerable size in those days. lhey were to meet
Parma, in the (:hannel with 230 more vessels and an ad-
ditional :40,000 men—not far short of an English army
corps according to its present organization. Napoleon
assembled about 2,000 vessels in 1805 for the invasion of
England. and in alliance with another Napoleon the
EnOish lauded ab alt, 33,500 men and i,350 horses on
the shores of the Crimea in 18-4. It is true that the
arrangements were made under difficulties, and in
11. hours only 30 000 infantry and 24 guns were landed,
but by arrangements now made there would be no
difficulty in throwing on shore almost the whole of
the fihting men of an expeditionary force in the first
trip of the boats—always provided that first class
steamers, supplied with proper boats, are used for the
transport of the troops. The old idea was to throw on
shore only a few troops in the first instance, who should
make good their hold on the shore and prepare the
way for the rest acting as a sort of advanced guard,
But this plan was evidently based on the fact that
ships could not carry boats enough to perform the
operation in a more complete manner; for it is mani-
fat that if 50,000 men can be landed at once with
great rapidity, there is no reason why only 10,000
should take part in the first attempt. Since the days
of the old warfare, and even since the days of the
Crimean war, the vessels which would be used to
carry troops have inoreased greatly in size and in power
of carrying boats; so that the ships required to trans-
port each army corps can carry sufficient boat accom-
modation for the whole, or nearly the whole, of the
fighting men. The various subsidiary services could
remain on board ship till sufficient ground had been
won from an enemy to enable the expeditionary force
to advance.

If all that we have urged is true, and we shall he
surprised if any one can contradict it in a single essen-
tial feature, we have proved our point—that a Power
which, like England, holds, and must ever hold, the
command of the sea possesses signal advantages over
an army which has only land communications. It can
move its troops to the theatre of war with the great
ease, economy, and conafortto the men. It can choose
its own pint of attack with perfect secrecy, because
no special arrangements are needed for particular
cases. On account of the great speed of modern steam-
ships, many points can be threatened, and cancentration
Offoot4,ol on, any ono of bhooa with arapiaify whirthffiust
upset all calculations of an army on shore. When
the point for attack is selected, such a fire can be
brought to bear on all the apprcaches to it as has
never yet been known in warfare ; the whole of the
fighting force can be thrown on shore at once, instead
of only a small portion, as was formerly the case. If
the attack is successful, as it must be unless the force
has been disembarked in front of strong works pre,
pared by the enemy, the ships, if their anchorage be
safe, can remain as a permanent base for the army. If
the attack fails, the troops can be re-embarked, and
make another descent at a point 50 or 60 miles from
the first half a day afterwards. No army on shore
could follow its movements by any known means; and
besides, during the whole of the voyage the men would
be resting, while the shore army would be harassed
byattempts to concentrate at the new point of disem-
ba.rcation. The same swift movement of the ships and
the secrecy which results from it favours all such
operations as raids to cut railways and telegraphs, flank
movements, or a general harassing policy in prepa-
ration for a descent. And when all this is told there
remains the moral comfort to the men of knowing
that there; were always floating homes behind them;
that food in abundance would always be ready; that
the sick and wounded would not have to undergo the
tersible ordeal of long journeys over railways or
rough roads, and that their line of communication
with home could never be cut. Without any feeling
of chauvinism, and with a sincere desire that the pre-
sent difficulties in the East may not involve this
country in \\lair, we cannot for an instant admit that
the chances can be reckoned as unfavourable to
Esgland should such a war unhappily take place.
Doubtless great loss of life and suffering would
be incurred on both sides, and animosities stirred up
which might last for generations. But the greatest
sufferings would be.experienced by our opponents, and
the animosities aherished too often by the vanquished
would not lie in the thoughts of Englishmen. This
country could not be invaded. These shores would
not even be threatened. The same assertion cannot
be made with reference to any other country. All
these arguments must be familiar to the minds of
foreign strategists, who cannot but know that if
England desires peace, if it can be maintained with
honour, it is not because she has any fear of
.the
ultimate result of war.