The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1876-03-04 00:00:00

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entit hAhAI4--vizil37evory g-roup of ligh-t I the Imperial-43rolizr-of:the

Aifforiesiblis suggestodothir possible sight
muscular actiene, and .4ceesequenf sensations of all
kinds. .-'ellai'linmediatel %slinks' and the suggested_
feelings are all in the beholder's mind. But the per-
ceived object itself means something more. II implies
the possibility of a like series of feelings IJ:l,i-other
,people's minds: - This something, said the professor, is
I.external to me, this social object, as it may. be called.
It is the same thing as our perceptions, as distinguished
,from my perceptions. But the question arises' is there
'not something else behind the perceived object different
from our ferceptions ? Mest certainly there is, but
does not tell, us anything whatever'. about that
something. To rettum from the raetaphysioar,Vo the
physical side; 44 7the iproblem; what we 'perceive iis
represented' by movements in the brain, which is
made up of certain lumps of gray__ matter,
and that percerOon is a totally different thing
from the external'itact ..tehiah; Tit :Symbolizes. In
short, we see with the eyes just. as we see with a tele-
scope. Each eye was 'a box with a hole in it. It was
filled with a transparent fluid, and behind was a net-,
work or retina, on wlich the picture was thrown, just:
as in Sir Charles Wheatstone's stereoscope. From the
two fiat or slightly curved pictures, taken from dif-
ferent points of view, the mind built up bolit forms,
just as from the three fundamental rays, red, blue er
green, and violet, it clothed the pictures with all the -
various colours. The nerves conveyed the news of
these patches of colour to theo.britin, and produced a
flutter among the points of gray matter of which it'
was composed. But the agitation of this gray matter
must not be confounded with the simultaneous mental
consciousness. The mind made as much out of the'
news of these dots of colour as the frightened boy pass-
ing through the churchyard did out of tke broomstick
he mistook for a bogey. The perception of the object
was quite different from the object itself. Bishop
Berkeley's doctrine of idealism was then stated in the
great metaphysician's own words. —"Some truths there
are so new and obvious to the mind that a man need
only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this im-
portant one to be—viz,, that all the choir of heaven
and furniture of the earth,—in a word, all those bodies
which compose the mighty frame of the world have not
any subsistence without a mind; that their being is to
be perceived or known; that, consequently, so long as
they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist
in my mind or that of any other created spirit, they
must either have no existence at all or else subsist iri
the mind of some eternal spirit—it being perfectly nn.
intelligible to attribute to any single part of them an
existence indepeudent of a spirit. To be convinced of
which the reader need only reflect, and try to sepa;
rate in his own thoughts the being of a sensible
thing from its being perceived." Professor Clif-
ford said it was remarkable to what an ex-
tent the progrese .of science had tended to
confirm Berkeley's conclusion. The visible world
exists only in our minds,, so . far as could be
scientifically demonstrated, although there may be
something invisible which it represents. To sum up,
sight is an k,,gregate of colour-feelings and muscle-.
feelings. The objects of sight are groups of such feel-
ings, suggesting; added the Professor, other feelings
both in me and in. other people. But, havine thus
pulled that 'world to pieces, let us put it together,
again.'. The words
.you hear me speak are groups of
tones variously stopped and variously gliding into one
another, but that does, not make a lecture. So the sight
• of a mountain does not make a mountain, nor the sight
of a lump
.ot iron ore that lump of iron ore. All the.
suggestions Which go along with the sensation interpret
it, just as 's language is interpreted. A sensation calls
'up a conceptiok which is made up of an aggregate of
' beliefs, and is a link between sensation and action; it
groups about the object SI the rules of action for man
which are important from his point Lview, it expresses
the practical relatipi' of, min to , the object. We live
in a world of conceptions. The things we see and think
-about are things we must talk about, and language
relates to conceptions. What diverse conceptions of
.the sky, for instance* were formed by the peasant, the
-tneteorologiitYthe' painter, the astronomer, and the
philosopher, and how differently they talked about it.
Yet they all saw the same sky. Ours was a word of
beauty and order. But this beauty and order are not
in the eye-Message, but in the correct interpretation of
it, and this lays hold of a sselection out of infinite pos-
sible groupings of the phenomena for the purposes of
man: • ,
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