The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1879-02-22 00:00:00

WHY we MARCH in SMALL COLUMNS
AGAINST the ZULUS.

Under the above heading, the Daily News of Wed-
nesday gives the following instructive article, which
will be read with interest at this particular period :

" It may somewhat relieve the painful suspense under
which the public are labouring, pending the arrival of Lord
Chelmsford's despatches, to give a simple and brief explana-
tion of a few of the general principles by which the move-
ments and supply of an army in the field are regulated.
"Why, it may be asked, and indeed has been asked, should
our army in Zululand be split up into four or five different
columns, instead of marching in one large, powerful mass
which might defy the attacks of all the Zulus in Africa 1 The
chief reason is this, that it such an army as we
have in Zululand marched along one road, it would form
so long a column that the head might be cut
to pieces before the rear could come to its assist-
ance. In the second place, a large force such as that in
question is necessarily attended by a long train of waggons
containing ammunition, food, entrenching tools, field-tele-
graphs, pontoons, dec., and such wretched 'tracks' as those
along wnich we must march in Zululand would be so cut
up by the foremost waggons that the rearmost would be
drawn with the greatest diflieulty, if indeed they did not
stick fast and remain behind altogether. In the third place, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, in such a country as
Zululand, to feed so large a force as that in question ; and,
finally, in all large columns there is a considerable loss of
men from what the Germans call 'friction' a word which
we can only paraphrase in English by the wear and tear'
of the march. In order to gain a definite notion of the
losses arising from 'friction, let us compare Napoleon's
great march across France from Boulogne to Ulm, in
1805, with his march through Russia to Moscow.
Napoleon marched from Boulogne in three corps which
followed different routes. He was enabled to do this,
because the roads in France are numerous and good. In
order to diminish as much as possible the leugth of the
three columns, each corps marched by divisions at
one or two days' interval, that is to say, if the first division
of the first corps marched to-day the second division of the
same corps started to-motrow, or the day after to-morrow.
The average length of the routes followed by the three corps
was 400 miles, and the time taken to march this distance was
26 days. This gives an average of 15 to 16 miles a day, or, it
allowance be made for the halts which were permitted every
few days, of nearly 20 milesfor each marchi,g day. This was
very rapid marching indeed, yet we are told that the troops
reached the Rhine ' punctuallyand in perfect condition, with
almost incredibly few casualties, and immediately crossed
the river and resumed their march towards the Danube.'
During the invasion of Russia, Napoleon was compelled by
the want of roads to move as many as 60,000 men at a time
in one long column, instead of the divisions of some B,COO
men which ne moved singly across France. The distance in
either case was the came, about 400 miles ; yet he occupied
fifty days in marching from the Niemen to Srnoleusko, wnich
gives an average of twelve miles a day for the actual
marching days. 'The weather was hot,' says Colonel
Colley, 'but not unfavourable, and the march was a
triumphal advance, almost without fighting. Yet the cen-
tral column lost 90,000 men, solely from the fatigues and
hardships and " friction " arising from crowding so many
men on a limited number of rends.' The reader can form a
definite nation of what friction means. From friction
Napoleon lost In seven weeks a force outnumbering con.
*adorably the whole home army of England. The following
figures will convey an adequate idea of the enormous length
of large columns of troops :—The army with which Napoleon
invaded Belgium in 1815 consisted of 90.000 infantry, 20,000
cavalry, and 350 guns. Had he marched by one road
instead of three the length of his column of march would
have been 41 miles. 'Had I marched the entire army
(about 100,000 men) in one column,' wrote M'clellan to his
Commander-in Chief during the American Civil War, 'instead
of advancing by five different parallel roads, the column
with its train would have extended about 60 miles, and
the enemy might have defeated the advance before the rear
could have reached the scene of action.' To descend from
these large armies to our small ones, an Eoglish
division of some 9,600 men occupies, when march-
ing along one road, a length of about eight miles.
A brigade would occupy about three miles. We have touched
upon tee average rate of marching per day; what is the
average rate of marching per hour? The pace of the march
Es measured naturally by the pace of the slowest marchers,
the infantry. In very small bodies the infantry can cover
nearly 3 miles per hour ; but if a corps marches along one
road it is hopeles to expect more than 2 miles per hour. and
sometimes even that cannot be done. Lord Strathnairn is
the last man in the world that can be accused of unnecessary
delay; yet on one occasion, during the Central Indian cam-
paign, he took 12i hours to march ten miles, owing to the
invincible sloth aed obstinacy of the artillery bullocks.
Such a rate of marching may seem ludicrously slow in these
days of professional walkers but if we consider the dif-
ference between the conditions under which the pro-
fessional's walk and the soldier's march takes place, the
slowness of the latter will seem natural enough. In the
first place the eoldier carries a heavy weight; secondly, he
may have to go a mile or more to his camp after finishing
his march. During the march he may have to patrol, and
after it he may have to go on that most harrassing of
duties—outpost duty, mount sentry, and, practically speak-
ing, lose his night's sleep. Finally, he has to perform a
variety of necessary minor duties, and look after his arms
and accoutrements.

"The conclusion of the whole matter is this. Suppose a
division, which occupies a length of some eight miles, and
marches about two miles an hour, has to march from Camp
Ato Cam o Z sixteen miles off. It the head of the column
starts at 6 am., the rear will not be able to move off before
10 a.m., because the column is eight miles long, and can
only march some two miles per hour. The head of
the column will arrive at Z about 2 p m., but for the
same reason the rear will not arrive until 6 p.m. Then
comes the drawing and distribution of food, in addi.ion
to a hundred other duties; and be it remembered that the
difficulty of feeding an army lies not so much in drawing the
suppliesas in bringing them to the men. Starvation was the
primary cause of Napoleon's enormous loss of 90,000 men in
his Russian march. He bad ample stores of provisions, but
his columns were so long that it was almost impossible to
bring the food to the men. Even with the division we are
considering the distribution of rations would be a long and
teoious business. The last served would not get their
rations before 10 p.m., and if the arrangements were faulty
they might not get them efore midnight. We have said
enough, we trust, to show the authorities in South Africa
were not altogether bereft of reason when they determined
to invade Zit' land in four small columns instead of one
large column. We know very little of Zululand, unfortunately,
but we know at least three facts about it :—First, there are no
roads in the country, in the proper sense of the word ; second-
ly, there is considerable difficulty in collecting food; and,
thirdly, the means at our disposal for transporting suppltes
of all kinds are faulty in the extreme. 'The difficulty lies,'
wrote Lord Chelmsford to the Secretary of State for War on
the 25th November last, in the commissariat and transport
arrangements necessary to enable troops to advance and
live In an enemy's country Which is destitute of any supplies
beyond cattle."