The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1879-05-17 00:00:00

THE STOURBRIDGE OBSERVER.

Skew Ameer, as a man of recognised abilitie
3nusthave thoroughly weighed the conditions
of the situation before he thus came to the
head-quarters of those who had invaded the
dominion 3 of his father. He doubtless saw
the hopelessness of further resistance to the
progress of the British arms.
The history of our dispute with Afghanis-
tan—or rather with the late Shore Ali—
supplies a remarkable instance of human
fatuity, and of blind recklessness and folly on
the part of an Eastern potentate. Twelve
months have passed within a few days since
the English Government summoned 7,000
troops from India to Malta in the then
threatening aspect of foreign affairs. Prince
Gortschakoff. . at once resolved to create a
diversion which should necessitate the keep-
ing of our sepoy army upon its native soil.
The understanding which existed between
Great Britain and Russia not to send an
Embassy to Cabul was departed from, and
in the month of June a mission from St.
Petersburg was rather ostentatiously re-
ceived in the Afghan capital.. This being
so, the Government at Calcutta asked for
the concession of a similar privilege, which
Shere Ali refused. Whilst welcoming the
representative of a Power with whom our
irelationsl.to use a mild :term, "strained,'
the Ameer had uncourteously denied to
. England that which he had willingly acceded
to Russia. In view of the adverse effect
which this might have upon the susceptible
millions of Hindostan, amongst whom the
enemies of our rule are constantly endeavour
ing to foment disaffection, it was deter-
mined to send an armed mission to Cabal-
The Ameer, regarding this as a menace,.
forbade it to enter his territory, and we all
remember how, on the 21st September laid,
it had to .turn back. An ultimatum was
then despatch to Shere Ali, giving him the
alternative, before the 21st November, of
receiving the British mission or of war.
When that date arrived, no answer had been
received, and it was assumed that the Ameer
was prepared for battle. The reply did not
come until the 30th, and it was not sent off
until the 19th when it could not possibly,
have reached the frontier by the time speci-
fied. It was not of unfavourable character,
conceding in effect the British demand, and
had it been received earlier the war might
Fare been averted. But by the time it was
in the hands of the proper authorities, the
war had begun by the advance of our forces,
and it was concluded that the Ameer's delay
in answering our ultimatum was accounted
for by the fact that he was thoroughly pre-
pared for hostilities. Nothing, as it turned
out, could be farther from the truth. Shere
All had not only not soz.ght to avert war by
failing to send an answer to the ultimatum
by the specified time, but he was not ready
for it when it came upon him through his
own procrastinatien. Important mountain
passes which could have been held by a few
men were left unguarded, and our soldiers
found very few obstacles to their onward
march. The Ameer fled from his capital,
and with him left the Russian mission,
whose reception had been the cause of the
Afghan ruler's troubles. Shere Ali became
a fugitive- into Muscovite territory, whet e
his presence became inconvenient, and at
length his death in exile left the way open
for the accession of his son, with whom he
was not, to say the least, on friendly terms.
Yakoob Khan had seen the policy of pursuing
a course less disastrous to his personal in-
terests than that which was so fatally fol-
lowed by his father; - hence his visit to the
British camp and the discussion of terms of
peace.
Upon another continent where we have
a trouble with an uncivilised potentate,
matters have not advanced so far in the
direction of a pacific solution. We hear
nothing as yet of Cetewayo coming to the
British camp and discussing terms of peace.
Yet, looking at the number of troops under
Lord Chelmsford's command, between 12,000
and 14,000, the commander of the forces in
South Africa has now sufficient men to form
two strong and complete columns, whilst
disposing of a larger force for the defence of
the frontier than he ever had before. As
more reinforcements have been demanded,
not many weeks will have elapsed before we
have 20,000 soldiers in South Africa—a very
serious consideration in view of possible
complications in Europe. To say nothing of
military skill, the mere weight of such a
number of men ought very speedily to tell a
tale upon the fortunes of the campaign,
which, as we are not likely to forget, was
begun four months ago, and for years to
come will leave sadder memories behind it
than that which we have carried out in
Afghanistan.