The Liverpool Standard and General Commercial Advertiser.
Liverpool, Merseyside, England, 1855-07-10 00:00:00

THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL.

LAST WEEK we *were enabled to lay before our
readers a sketch of the leading events which,charac-
terised the unsuccessful attacks made upon the
Malakhoff and Redan. Since then, further details
have been communicated by the correspondents of the
London daily journals, which, although throwing
additional light on the various movements of the two
attacking parties, do not in any degree invalidate, or
even materially, modify the account already given.
On all hands it seems agreed that the attack, though
preconcerted and deliberately agreed on, was prema-
turely carried into effect, the result it is said ,of a mis-
take on the part of the Fren ch general second in command .
When made, the assault seems to have beeneenducted
with all the heroism which might have been expected
from the gallantry of the troops who made it ; but it
appears also that they were ill, or rather not at all
supported. From some cause or other, the reserve!'
were not brought up, which, under all the circmn't
stances of the case, is less to be regretted, as they
could not have rendered very effective aid in the
assault, and, without being able to afford succour to
their comrades, would have only presented a wider
target for the artillery of the enemy. Who was to
blame for the sad mishap, it is no easy matter to
determine. In a despatch, dated June 22d, General
PELISSIER, after giving a minute account of his pre-
parations for the attack, says :---

I selected the Lancaster Battery for my post, from which I
was to give the signal by star rockets for the general advance.
Notwithstanding great difficulties of ground, notwithstanding
the obstacles accumulated by the enemy, and although the
Russians, evidently informed of our plans, were on their guard
and ready to repel an attack, I am inclined to think that if the
attack could have been general and instantaneous on the whole
extent of the line—if there had been a simultaneous action and
ensemble in the efforts of our brave troops—the object would
have been achieved. Unhappily, it was not so, and an incon-
ceivable fatality caused us to fail. I was still at more than
1,000 metres from the place whence I was to give the signal
when a violent fire of musketry, intermixed with grape, ap-
prized me that the combat had commenced seriously on the
right. In fact, a little before 3 a.m., General Mayran fancied
he recognized my signal in a shell with a blazing fuse sent up
from the Brancion Redoubt. It was in vain that he was in-
formed of his mistake. This brave and unfortunate General
gave the order for the attack. The Saurin and De Failly
columns immediately rushed forward ; the first rush was mag-
nificent, but scarcely were these heads of columns in march
when a shower of balls and grape was poured in upon them.
This crushing fire came not only from the works which we
wished to carry, but also from the enemy's steamers, which
came up at full steam and manoeuvred with great skill and
effect. We, however, caused them some damage. This pro-
digious fire stopped the efforts of our troops. It became im-
possible for our soldiers to advance, but not a man retired one
step; it was at this moment that General Mayran, already hit
in two places, was knocked down by a grapeshot, and was
compelled to resign the command of his division. All this was
the work of a moment, and General Mayran was already carried
off the field of battle when I sent up the signal from the Lan-
caster Battery. The other troops then advanced to support the
premature movement of the right division. That valiant divi-
sion, disconcerted by the loss of its general, promptly rallied
at the voice of General de Failly. The troops engaged, sup-
ported by the 2nd battalion of the 95th of the line and by a
battalion of the Voltigeurs of the Guard, under the orders of
the brave Colonel Boudville, held a footing in a bend of the
ground where the general placed them, and boldly maintained
there position there. Informed, however, of this position,
which might become critical, I ordered General Regnault de
St. Jean d'Angely to send four battalions of the Voltigeurs of
the Guard, taken from the general reserve, to the support of
that division. Generals Mellinet and Uhrich marched with
that fine body of men, rallied the stragglers in the ravine of
Careening Bay, and gave a solid support to General de Failly,
by occupying the bottom of the ravine. The attack on the
centre had not a better fate. General Brunet had not yet
completed all his arrangements when the signal rockets
were fired. The whole of the right was already prematurely
engaged for more than twenty to twenty-five minutes. The
troops, nevertheless, resolutely advanced, but their valour was
no avail against the well-sustained fire of the Russians, and
against unforeseen obstacles. At the very outset Gen. Brunet
fell mortally. wounded by a ball in the chest. The flag of the
91st was cut in two by a ball. but it is needless to add that its
fragments were brought back by that gallant regiment.
To criticise the dispositions intended, but which
were not carried out, would be an idle task ; to indulge
in idle lamentations over the mischances to which
accidental misrepresentation led, would not be much
more to the purpose ; but pointed illustration of the
statement is essential to vindicate the memory of Lord
Raglan, whose share in the transaction has been
severely criticised, by parties who have seemingly had
but small means of knowing the real state of affairs.
The English Commander-in-chief, seeing the columns
of his allies engaged in the assault, and suffering under
the destructive fire of Russian missiles, had no alter-
native but to carry his portion of the agreed-upon
arrangements into execution, so far as that was pos-
sible, in order to afford them the chance of success or
even the hope of safety. This he did, so far as the
means within his reach enabled him to do. That the
operation was not successful was not his fault, and its
failure cannot, with justice, be imputed to him. The
details of the unfortunate affair are so invested with
a melancholy interest, that, even at the risk of repeti-
tion, we give the following from the special corres-
pondent of the Daily _News, who thus accounts for the
failure of the attack :---

According to report, the plan originally agreed upon be-
tween the allied commanders was that the fire of the batteries
should open at daylight, more especially against the intended
points of attack, and that after three or four hours' bombard-
ment—after a sufficient effect had been produced upon the
enemy's works, and all his spare troops had been removed to
a distance from the immediate scene of action—the assault
should be suddenly, at a!given signal, instituted. At a late
hour, however, in the evening of the 17th instant, General
Pelimier sent to Lord Raglan to say that reasons of a very
urgent nature would compel him to assault at daylight, and
that he trusted that the British troops would be ready to do
the same on their side. This was assented to, it being under-
stood that the Redan was not to be attacked by the English
until the Malakoff hill had been gained by the French. Two
reasons are put forward to account for this change of plan.
One is, that they would necessarily be exposed to the enemy
from want of sufficient cover in the trenches and works about
the Mamelon Vert; the other, that General :Pelissier had
received notice of an intended attack on the part of the Rus-
sians.and that he was anxious to anticipate it. The alteration
alluded to was not generally known in camp. When, therefore,
the musketry fire opened just at-break of day in front of the
Mamelon, it was attributed to a sortie from the Russians;
and when the French were seen going up towards the Mala-
koff works, it was supposed that, having repulsed the sortie,
they were induced to follow up the advantage and carry on
the attack in turn against the Russian bulwarks in front.
Such was the opinion among the French troops, who were,
equally with the English, under the impression that the as-
sault was not intended to be made till seven or eight o'clock.
The preliminary bombardment was set aside.

The above it will be seen does not exactly tally with
the French commander's statement ; yet it corrobo-
rates the fact of the original agreement between him
and Lord Raglan. The severity of the cannonade ]
and bombardment of the rith may in some degree be
judged of from the annexed account given of it by an
aide-de-camp of Prince Gortschakoff, which appears
in the Invalide Busse :
The enemy having resolved to make a decisive attack on
our left flank, opened on the 6th (17th) of June, at 3 30 a.m.,
a " fire of hell" against the fortifications of the Karabelnaia
Faubourg (sections 3 and 4.) For two consecutive hours all
their batteries fired almost uninterrupted broadsides. On our
side we kept up a quick fire in return. At two in the after-
noon, at a given signal, the besiegers opened a heavy fire
against our right Lank ; the fire, which was now opened along
the whole line of our defences, lasted till an advanced hour of
the evening. At dusk and throughout the night the enemy
threw shells and rockets into the town, into the roadstead,
and the north side. A steam-frigate, which had left the allied
fleet at the same time, fired broadsides into the roadstead and
against the town. The greater portion of its projectiles fell
into the sea without touching our ships. This terrible can-
nonade and incessant bombardment did not prevent the brave
defenders of Sebastopol from actively repairing the damage
done to the works ; despite a terrible front and flank fire, the
works were successfully completed, the guns which had been
dismantled replaced by new ones on every point, and on the
morning of the 6th (18th) of June, we were perfectly prepared
to receive and drive back the enemy.

Writing from the camp before Sebastopol on the
20th of June, the correspondent of the Times says :
It is but natural that the attack of the Allies on the prin-
cipal points of the Russian defences should now be scrutinized
in all its details, and, as it has failed, that the plan of that
attack should be severely criticized and unsparingly censured.
It is certainly true that, in some respects, these details were
imperfect. As an example of this imperfection, it is stated
that the supports were too distant from the attacking parties ;
that proper care was not taken to prevent the men becoming
confused and losing their way in the labyrinth of works before
the Redan ; that no steps were formed above the berm of the
parapet so that the men could step over in order; that the at-
tacking parties were too weak, and that the men were crowded
into narrow works and trenches which could not afford them
cover, and were difficult of access and exit. It is, moreover,
affirmed that no proper instructions were given to the artillery
for their guidance in the event of success or defeat, and that
it was only when the Russians had crowded over their para-
pets and through their embrasures, and had been shooting
down our men for some time on their retreat, that an artillery
officer obtained permission from Lord Raglan to open fire upon
their lines ; that no directions were addressed even to the am-
bulance corps with respect to locality or action, and that many
minor points of some importance were also neglected. We
never searched out the strength of the Redan on that
morning, and the Russians might have—for all we knew and
know—replaced every injured gun, and have had the battery
in as good order as when we opened fire. We were certain of
success. Sir George Brown, inflated by the bloodless conquest
of Kertch and Yenikale, directed the operations as if the gar-
rison of Sebastopol were a body of serf-militia. It does not
appear why there was no attack on the Russian works on our
left. One would certainly have thought that even a feint by
the French against the Flagstaff Batteries would have been
Sir
attended with advantage. George Brown had the direction
of the assault. The 1,750 men in each instance were formed
of 400 men for the assaulting column, a working party of 400
men to cover them in case of a lodgment, and to reverse the
support, and 100 riflemen or sharp-
work, 600 men as a
shooters preceding the head of the assaulting column to keep
down the fire of the batteries and of the enemy's Chasseurs,
and 50 men carrying woolpacks to bridge over the ditches.
e
To these were added sixty sailors, bearingsaling-ladders. The
Light Division column was to attack the right of the Redan
at the re-entering angle ; the Second Division column was to

attack the apes-of. to Redan as soon as the Light Divisiat
and Fourth Division had carried the work at the flanks ; the
Third Division was to assault the Cemetery and the Barrack
Batteries ; the Fourth Division column was to assail the left
flank of the Redan at the re-entering angle. The Second Div-
ision were only to attack the apex after the Light Division and
Fourth Division had gained the flanks, and effected a junction
along the base of the works, when they were to prevent the con-
sequences of forcing a strong body of theenemy from the flanks
into the angle of the Redan. The attacking column of the
Light Division was furnished by the 7th Fusfleers,:23rd Welsh,
33rd (Duke of Wellington's) Regiment, and 34th Regiment.
The storming party was led by Col. Yea,of the7th. The 19th
77th, and Bth' Regiments, or the Second Brigade, were in re-
serve, under Col. Shirley. Soon after twelve o'clock they
moved down from camp and took ground in the trenches under
the direction of Major Halliwell, Deputy Assistant-Quarter-
master-General-of the division. The Second division was -on
their left, the Fourth division on the left of the Second Divi-
sion, and the Third Division on the extreme left. The move-
ment was simultaneous, and the troops moved off together till
they came into the trenches, from which they were to issue
forth to attack -the dark wall of earth serrated with embra-
sures before them. These embrasures were only two well
filled. The fire which we opened on Sunday morning, preli-
minary to the assault, was marked by great energy, weight,
and destructiveness. In the first relief the Quarry Battery,
commanded by Major Strange, threw no less than 300 8-inch
shells into the ,Redan, which is only 400 yards distant, and the
place must have been nearly cleared by the incessant storm of
iron splinters-which flew through it. So near are the works
that fragments of our 13-inch shells fly back from the Readan
into the Quarry Battery, and on some occasions our men have
been injured by the splinters of their own shells, which have
radiated from the inside of the Russian batteries. Through-
out Sunday our artillery fired 12,000 rounds of the hea-
viest ordnance into the enemy's lines, and on the following
day we fired 11,946 rounds of shot and shell. The Russian
fire was weak and wild. Although they fired a good deal,
they kept many pieces masked, and one six-gun and one eight-
gun battery on the flanks of the Redau were silent, and were
left comparatively unnoticed by our artillerymen. The only
damage they did by all their fire throughout the whole of
Sunday was the demolition of the wheel of a gun carriage.
Had the three hours' cannonade and bombardment which
Lord Raglan decided on administering to the Russian batte-
ries before we assaulted been delivered to them, it is very pro-
bable that we should have found but a small body of troops
prepared to receive us at the parapets ; and it must be esteemed
a very unfortunate circumstance that his lordship was induced
to abandon his intention in deference to the wishes of General
Pelissier. As the 34th Regiment advanced, the supports, by
some means or another, got mixed together with them, and
some confusion arose in consequence. On crossing the trench,
our men, instead of .coming upon the open space in a firm
body, were broken into twos and threes. This arose from the
want of a temporary step above the berm, which would have
enabled the troops to cross the parapet with regularity; in-
stead of which they had to scramble over it as well as they
could ; and, as the top of the trench is of unequal height and
form, their line was quite broken. The moment they came
out from the trench the enemy began to direct on their whole
front a deliberate and well-aimed mitraille, which increased
the want of orderand unstearliness caused by the mode of their
advance. Poor Colonel Yea saw the consequences too clearly.
The gallant old soldier, by voice and gesture, tried to form and
compose his men, but the thunder of the enemy's guns close at
hand and the gloom of early dawn frustrated his efforts ; and,
as he rushed along the troubled mass of troops which were
herding together under the rush of grape, and endeavoured to
get them into order for a rush at the batteries, which was
better than standing still, or retreating in a panic, a charge
of the deadly missile passed, and the noble soldier fell dead in
advance of his men, struck at once in the head and stomach
by grape shot. The division has lost upwards of 320
men killed and wounded, and it suffered severely as it re-
tired from the futile attack. The signal for our assault was to
r be given by the discharge of two service rockets, which were
to have been fired when the French got into the Malakhoff,
and the latter were to have hoisted a flag as a signal of their
success. It is certain that the French did for a short time
establish themselves in the Malakhoff, but they were soon
expelled with loss, and I saw with my own eyes a large
triangular blue and black flag waving from the Malakhoff all
during the fight. The moment the rockets were fired, the
Light Division rushed out of cover ; in a quarter of an hour
this infantry Balaklava was over, so far as any chance of suc-
cess was concerned. The Second Division, seeing that the flank
attacks failed, wisely kept under cover, and suffered but a tri-
fling loss. Had they foolishly advanced, we should have to de-
plore greater and more useless slaughter. Poor Sir John Camp-
bell seems to have displayed a courage amounting to rash-
ness. He sent away Captain Hume and Captain Snodgrass, his
aid-de-camp, just before he rushed out of the trench, as if
averse to bring them into the danger he meditated, and fell in
the act of cheering on his men.

SUCCESS OF THE ATTACK ON THE CEME-
TERY AND BARRACK BATTERIES.

The brigade under Major-General Eyre, which was destined
to occupy the Cemetery and to carry the Barrack Batteries,
consisted of the 9th Regiment, 18th Regiment, 28th Regiment,
38th Regiment, and 44th Regiment. Four volunteers from
each company were selected to form an advance party, under
Major Fielden, of the 44th Regiment, to feel the way and
cover the advance. The 18th Royal Irish followed as the
storming regiment. The brigade was turned out at 12 o'clock
and proceeded to march down the road on the left of the
Greenhill Battery to the Cemetery, and halted under cover
while the necessary dispositions were being made for the
attack. General Eyre, addressing the 18th, said, " I hope,
my men, that this morning you will do something that will
make every cabin in Ireland ring again !" The reply was a
loud cheer, which instantly drew on the men a shower of
grape. The skirmishers advanced just as the general atttack
began, and, with some French on their left, rushed at the
Cemetery, which was very feebly defended. They got pos-
session of the place after a slight resistance, with small loss,
and took some prisoners, but the moment the enemy retreated
their batteries opened a heavy fire on the place from the left
of the Redan and from the Barrack Battery. Four companies
of the 18th at once rushed on out of the Cemetery towards
the town, and actually succeeded in getting possession of the
suburb. Captain Hayman was gallantly leading on his com-
pany when he was shot through the knee. Captain Esmonde
followed, and the men, once established, prepared to defend
the houses they occupied. As they drove the Russians out,
they were pelted with large stones by the latter on their way
up to the battery, which quite overhangs the suburb. The
Russians could not depress their guns sufficiently to fire down
on our men, but they directed a severe flanking fire on them
from an angle of the Redan works. Meantime the Russians
did their utmost to blow down the houses with shell and shot,
and fired grape incessantly, but the soldiers kept close, though
they lost men occasionally, and they were most materially
aided by the fire of the regiments in the Cemetery behind
them, which was directed at the Russian embrasures; so that
the enemy could not get out to fire down on the houses below.
Some of the houses were comfortably furnished. One of them
was as well fitted up as most English mansions, the rooms full
of fine furniture, a piano in the drawing-room, and articles of
luxury and taste not deficient. Our men unfortunately found
that the cellars were not empty, and that there was abundance
of fine muscat wine from the south coast of the Crimea, and
of the stronger wines, perfumed with roses and mixed with
fruits, which are grown in the interior, in the better sort of
houses. Some of the officers, when they went away, carried
off articles of clothing and papers as proofs of their entrance
into the place, and some others took away pigeons and Guinea
pigs, which were tame in the houses. The troops entered the
place about four o'clock in the morning, and could not leave
it until nine o'clock in the evening. The Russians blew
up many of the houses and set fire to others, and when
our men retired the flames were spreading rapidly along
the street. The 18th Regiment lost 250 men. In the middle
of the day Captain Esmonde wrote to General Eyre to say
that he required support, that the men were short of ammu-
nition, and that the rifles were clogged. A sergeant volun-
teered to creep back with this letter, but when he reached the
place where the general ought to have been, he found that the
latter had been obliged to withdraw owing to his wound, and
he therefore delivered the document to Colonel Edwardes.
As there was no possibility of gettinr, support down to the
troops, Colonel Edwardes crept down along with the sergeant
and got into the houses to see how matters were going on.
The officer in command, on learning the state of the case, or-
dered the men to keep up the hottest fire they could ; and
meantime they picked up the rifles and ammunition of the
killed and wounded, and were'by that means enabled to con-
tinue their fusilade. The 9th Regiment succeeding in effect-
ing a lodgment in the houses in two or three different places,
and held their position, as well as the 18th. A sergeant and
a handful of men actually got possesion of the little Wasp
Battery, in which there were only twelve or fourteen Russian
artillerymen. They fled at the approach of our men, but
when the latter turned round they discovered they were quite
unsupported ; and the Russians, seeing that the poor fellows
were left alone, came down on them and drove them out of
the battery. An officer and half-a-dozen men of the same regi-
ment got up close to a part of the Flagstaff Battery, and were
advancing into it when they, too, saw that they were by
themselves, and, as it was futile to attempt holding their
ground, they retreated. About 15 French isoldiers on their
left aided them, but as they were likewise unsupported they
had to retire. Another officer with only 12 men took one of
the Russian Rifle Pits, bayonetted those they found in it, and
held possession of it throughout the day. Meantime, while
these portions of the sth and 18th and parties of the 44th and
28th were in the houses, the detachments of the same regi-
ments and of the 38th kept up a hot fire from the Cemetery
on the Russians in the battery and on the sharpshooters, all
the time being exposed to a tremendous shower of bullets,
grape, round shot, and shell. The loss of the brigade, under
such circumstances, could not but be extremely severe. One
part of it, separated from the other, was exposed to a destruc-
tive fire in houses, the upper portion of which crumbled into
pieces or fell in under fire, and it was only by keeping in the
lower story, which was vaulted and well built, that they were
enabled to hold their own. The other parts of it, far ad-
vanced from our batteries, were almost unprotected, and were
under a constant mitraille and bombardment from guns which
our batteries had failed to touch. Captain Smith, of the 9th,
was struck by a grapeshot in the back as he was in the act of
getting Captain Armstrong, of the 18th, into a litter with the
assistance of Captain Gaynor. The shot broke his spine and
drove his ribs into his lungs. He has sinee died.