The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1878-02-23 00:00:00

THE POSITION OF ENGLAND.

The Times of Wednesday published the following
letter :

Sir,—At a moment when there exists a very widespread
discontent at the position in which this country is placed, I
think it is the duty of every Englishman, before venting it
on the Ministry or the Russians, to ask himself two ques-
tions. First, whether his Government could have followed
any course of policy ess'ntially different from the one they
have pursued? Secondly, whether the position that so
irritates him is not a natural and inevitable consequence of
that policy? And I hope you will allow me to say a few
words on both points.

With regard to their choice of policy, I do not think it can
be made out that they had more than the proverbial three
courses even apparently open to them, and two of these I
think I can show were not merely dangerous but impossible.
1. They might have undertaken the support and reform of
Turkey together, and forbidden Russia to break the peace.
They might have said to Russia, "We agree with you upon
the necessity of reform in the government of the Christian
Provinces; we are willing and, we Lelieve, able to effect it;
but a state of peace is necessary to such a reform, and we are
bound to warn you that if you insist on attacking the Porte
you will find us opposed to you." And to furkey, "You
shall have our support against Russia, but only on the eon-
dition that you carry out according to our directions certain
reforms in the administration of the Christian Provinces of
your Empire."

Such a policy as I have very roughly indicated would
have had, I think, much to recommend it. It might have
removed the chief source of danger to the Turkish Empire
and the peace of Europe. It might have given the Turks
time to reform, if reform was possible to them; it might
have secured an indefinite period of peace to South-
Eastern Europe, and it would have effectually protected
British interests, morality included. That the 'rinks would
have jumped at such a bargain there can be little doubt.
Aurd. I think its risks, as far as any one unacquainted with
the secrets of foreign politics can tell, would not have been
very great. ItUssian statesmen would have paused long
before committing their country deliberately to a war
against England and Turkey combined, and, besides this,
their chief excuse for aggression would have been taken
away. Of course, there would have been some risk of war;
but it mast be remembered that ne policy is devoid of risk
on a question of this kind, as we are now finding out to our
considerable perturbation.

But, right or wrong, wise or foolish, whether it ever
found favour with our Government or not, such a policy
was impossible. The furious outcry against Turkey that
followed the suppression of the insurrections, the passionate
demand reiterated again and again by an influential and
considerable section of the country that nothing should be
done that would thwart Russia iu her designs for the
liberation of the Christians, or that should even look like a
support of Turkey, put it entirely out of the question. An
attempt to prosecate it could only have ended in either a
downfall ef the Ministry and a reversal of the policy, or a
war with Russia, who would probably have trusted to the
chance that no Constitutional Government would dare to
face such an outcry.

2. We might have forced reform on Turkey in concert
with the other Powers, or, to speak plain English—for only
one Power was prepared to resort to force—in concert with
her enemy Russia. Such a policy, it seems to me, would
have been not unlike a policeman Assisting a garrotter to
overcome an inebriate and disorderly gentleman. Allies of
such different character with such different objects in
view could scarcely have maintained their amity for any
length of time. They would have been agreed on the
necessity of protecting the Christian subjects of the Porte,
but on nothing else The aim of Russia would have been
to weaken Turkey as much as possible, and to procure ad-
vantages for herself. England, on the other hand, would
have felt herself bound by her conscience, her interests, and
the existence of a strong Tarkisk party in the country, to
respect the rights of the Turks and the safety of their
empire, as far as was consistent with the work in hand.
And as she could hardly have pleaded that she was not
responsible for the action of her co-operator, I cannot but
believe that such a policy would have ended In a quarrel
that might have set all Europe in a blaze.
But as some, doubtless, will disagree with these views, I
prefer to base my proof of the impracticability of such a
policy on surer ground. It is a fact, then, that there was
at no time any party in England in favour of such a policy
numerous enough to enable any Government to carry it
out. Though it must have been some temptation to an
Opposition to start a brilliant policy of their own which
would never have had to undergo the trying ordeal of prac-
tical experiment, its advocates failed to convert the bulk of
the Liberal Party; and no one, I imagine, will urge that
It would have found much favour with the Conservatives,
in spite of its spirited and warlike character.

These two courses, then, being impracticable, and the
division of opinion In the country on the merits of the
Eastern Question being what it was, I do not see that any
course was open to any Government but the neutral one
which they pursued.
And now, Sir, as to the second question whether our pre-
sent position is the natural and inevitable consequence of this
policy of neutrality. I believe that it is, I believe that it is an
inevitable consequence of such policy that we should be now
In a worse position to resist any aggression on the part of
Russia than we were before Turkey was subdued ; that it is
inevitable that some of our interests should, at least, appear
to be insecure; inevitable, as a matter of course, that the
Russians should make for themselves the strongest position
possible, both moral and military, before discussing with
possible unfriendly Powers the terms of peace; inevitable,
and a matter of course, that after the sacrifices they have
made they should "protect their own interests" as far as
they dare ; inevitable that at such a time they should be
jealous of and indignant with any neutral Power that they
suspezt of an intention to rob them of their spoils. These
things may be unpleasant to us, but they are the inevitable
consequences of the neutrality that the mass of the country
deliberately elected to maintain, and are not therefore sub-
jects for surprise or for the species of indignation that it
produces.

I think it Is our duty at this moment to acknowledge this
to ourselves ; to open our eyes to the facts that it is impos-
sible to combine the advantages and economies of neutrality
with the privilogGs of intervention, and that neutrality has
dangers peculiarly its own; and to strive to assume that
happy mixture of good temper and firmness which alone can
give dignity to our situation, and overcome with safety the
difficulties by which it is beaet.—Yours, ezo., PEMBROKE.
Wilton, Feb. 18.