The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1884-05-17 00:00:00

THE VOTE OF CENSURE.

In the HOUSE-OE-003111()NS Sir 31. Hicks-Beach,
pursuant to notice, moved a vote of censure on the
Government for their failure to take the necessary
steps to secure the success of General Gordon's mission,
and especially to provide for his personal safety. Re-
viewing at the outset of his speech the history of
the mission, he recalled the feeling of gratification
with which the country, after its experience of the
Ministerial policy in Egypt, had heard that he was
to have a "free hand," and that he was to carry
out his mission of rescue and retire without the
interference of the Government. But he contended
from the papers that from the very beginning the
British Government had thwarted all his suggestions,
even at the time when they were defending themselves
against the approach of having abandoned Sinkat by
the necessity of not disturbing his plans. For instance,
they forced him against his inclination to accept office
from the Egyptian Government, they declined to allow
him to seek an interview with the Mandi or to go to
the equatorial districts, and they refused to send him
Zebehr Pasha, although this step was recommended by
Sir E. Baring. On this last point the right hon. baronet
said he admitted the difficulty in which the Government ,
were placed, but their decision threw additional
responsibility on them; whereas they not only neglected
to suggest any alternative policy, but utterly defeated
any chance of his mission being pacifically accom-
plished by their useless military operations in
the neighbourhood of Sinkat. But he maintained
from General Gordon's memorandum in accept-
ing his mission that he contemplated receiving
military assistance if he could not accomplish the
objects.f or which he was sent pacifically, and that the
British Government fully understood and acquiesced in
this. The last chance of a pacific success was destroyed
by the military operations in the neighbourhood of
Sinkat, which he showed, General Gordon did not
approve, and which, unless they had been intended to
lead up to assistance being sent to Khartoum involved
unnecessary bloodshed. Gordon expected that there
would be a march to Berber; and, whatever might be
the opinion of the Governmeni, both General Wood and
General Stephenson awere of opinion thlt" it was a fea-
sible military operation, and he believed that General
Craltam TrouLl avi lt objeeLed iu uuder take it.
Instead of this, the Government, in an open telegram,
intimated that no assistance lirduld be sent, and in what
he characterised as a disgraceful despatch, invited him
to retire the best way he could and desert those whom
he had induced to put their trust in him. This " inde-
libre disgrace " Gordon had refused to submit to. Then,
amid Opposition cheers, he read the last despatch, in
which General Gordon had expressed his opinion of
the situation in which he was left and of the advice
which had been given to him, declaring that the
Government had been compelled to submit to this
strong language from a subordinate because they knew
the country held it to be true. He complained that
even yet the Government, with the obstinate optimism
which had always distinguished them, refused to believe
that Gordon was in. any danger at Khartoum. But
the country, recognising the true• state of the case,
would demand that he should be saved with those who
had trusted them, and the Government ought at once
to announce their determination to take the necessary
steps to relieve him, peacefully if possible, but by mili-
tary means if those were necessary. If the Govern-
ment could not satisfy the country that they would
save its honour from the intolerable shame which would
rest on it if Gordon were endangered, they would
not long escape the condemnation of an outraged
people. -
Mr. Gladstone, contrasting the pale and colourless
'motion with the valorous speech in which it had been
moved, drew the inference that the leaders of the
Opposition were not willing to endorse the aims of the
right hon. baronet, which, he maintained, were neither
more nor less than an immediate despatch of British
troops to Khartoum, without any regard to climate,
the supply of water, the state of the river, &c., and ,the
putting down of the Mandi, which meant the recon-
quest of the Soudan. Examining the allegations of the
speech, he denied that it was against his will that the
General had received a commission from the Khedive,
or that the Government had. absolutely negatived the
visit to the Mandi or to the Equatorial region.
Before discussing the terms of the motion, he made
some general remarks on the question of Egypt
which, he said, amid some expressions of dissent
was only a secondary question in the eyes of the mass
of the population, but which had presented more diffi-
culties in the way of the Executive than any question
with which he had been acquainted. Passing then to a
verbal criticism of the motion, he contended that the
Government had not failed to take any steps which
could " tend " to the success of the mission, which he
again maintained was solely and entirely pacific, and
under no contingency contemplated military measures.
On March 11 General Gordon had expressed his grati-
tude for the manner In which he had been supported,
and if in April he wrote the strong telegrams which had
been published, he had not at that time received the
later telegrams from Her Majesty's Government. It
was true that the Government had declined to send
troops to Wady Haifa and to Berber, but they had
acted on military advice, and bearing in mind not
merely the great military risk and the small military
advantage which would have resulted. Gordon, ho
said, had never asked for British soldiers, he had never
stated that he could not leave Khartoum, and he
had never represented that he was in any danger
from without. In support of this contention, and to
illustrate his statement that Gordon is in no mili-
tary danger, he read the telegrams received from
Gordon, including one just received from Dongola
describing the state of affairs at Khartoum. He com-
plained that the case stated by Sir 31. Hicks-Beach had
been supported by piecemeal and inconsequential
extracts, and that the motion suggested no alternative
policy, but had simply for its object the transfer of
power from one side to the other. He-admitted to the
full the obligations of the Government to General
Gordon, and by the despatch of April 23 he conceived
that the Government had entered into a covenant with
him that on reasonable proof of danger he would be
assisted. The country would never grudge any reason-
able effort for the protection of its agents; but it was
the duty of the Government to consider the treasure,
the blood, and the honour of the country, and the
circumstances of the time, the season, the climate, and
the military difficulties. Conscious of what their
obligations were, they would continue to use their best
endeavours to fulfil them, unmoved by the threats and
the captious criticisms of the Opposition.
Mr ;',orst reminded the Government that their diffi-
culti were aggravated by the fact that their Egyptian
policy was a violation of their own principles and con-
victior s. They had undertaken an impossible task, and
the result was that their course in Egypt had been
marked by failure and misfortune, until even the
patience of their own supporters was nearly exhausted.
Sir G. Campbell contended that, in the interests of
humanity and of this country, General Gordon should
be recalled from the Soudan, there being no prospect of
relieving the garrisons and establishing a settled govern-
ment by peaceful means.
Baron H. de Worms warmly supported the motion,
characterising the action of the Government in regard
to General Gordon as cowardly, vacillating and im-
becile. _ _

Mr. Laing confessed that in the face of the speech of
the Prime Minister he could no longer preserve the illu-
sions he had entertained with regard to the future
action of the Government. Believing that the policy
just inaugurated in Egypt was the .first chapter of the
history of the decline and fall of the British Empire, he
declined to give it his support.
The discussion was continued by Mr. A. J. Balfour,
who estimated the strength of the Government case by
the speech of the Prime Minister. The Liberal party
had never been in greater difficulties.
Mr. F. W. Buxton attributed the mistakes of the
Government to the action of the Opposition.
Mr. Gibson animadverted upon the vague and indefi-
nate character of the Prime Minister's statement,
which disclosed no intention on the part of the Govern-
ment to take any action for the rescue of General
Gordon. This motion, he declared, deserved the sup-
port of the country.
Lord E. Fitzmaurice, in defence of the Government,
read numerous extacts from the Parliamentary Papers
to .},our +hilt Gordon had ...ovcr dcailed to visit the
Mandi, that the mission of Gordon was the evacuation
of the Soudan, and to justify the refusal of the Govern-
ment to send Zebehr Pasha to Khartoum. He also
showed that there was no evidence assuming that
any military' dangers existed at Khartoum.
On the motion of Mr. Chaplin the debate was
adjourned.
Some other business was disposed of, and the House
was counted out at twenty-five minutes past one
o'clock.

In the HOUSE OF LORDS, May 13, the Public Notaries
Bill, which proposed to abolish the distinction between
notaries and solicitors, was rejected on the motion for
second reading by 92 to 30.
The Commons' amendments to the Contagious
Diseases (Animals) Bill were agreed to.
A conversation on the Conference was initiated by
the Earl of Carnarvon, in which Earl Granville Earl
Cairns, the Lord Chancellor, the Marquis of Sali.:bury,
and the Earl of Kimberley took part.
Their lordships rose at twenty-five minutes past seven
o'clock.

THE VOTE OF CENSURE.
In the HOUSE or COMMONS the adjourned debate on
Sir M. H. Beach's Vote of Censure on the Government
for their conduct with regard to General Gordon was
resumed, at the morning sitting, by Mr. Chaplin, who,
after describing the speech of the Prime Minister as the
most lame, impotent, and unhappy contribution to a
great debate that had ever been made by a Premier
called upon to vindicate the honour of his country,
contended that what lay at the root of the tremendous
difficulties which now had to be encountered was the
refusal of the Government to have anything whatever
to do with the affairs of the Soudan. Half-hearted
language at such a juncture as the present would not
satisfy the English people, who were determined that
everything which the resources of the empire could
accomplish should be done without delay for General
Gordon.

?rheirair
eo;hoa.dP opwu et r ,f
or
oat hceormhpalnedt
e degfeednce,
thatcourse taken by the Government, who acknowledged
their responsibility for the safety of General Gordon,
urged
f the
and their intention to neglect no measures for his safety
which were physically possible.
Lord R. Churchill regarded the speech of the
Premier as the announcement of the final and definitive
abandonment of Gordon, and reminded the House that
the fear of going to war in support of an envoy was a
sure indication of a decaying erapire. Did the Premier,
he asked think that the English people would wait
patiently until October to hear what the Government

meant to do; and it they would, clid lie think the
Mandi would wait? Admitting that the object of the
motion was the transfer of political power, he avowed
his opinion that the sooner that transfer took place the
better. The country demanded that Gordon should be
rescued without delay, and great though the Prime
Minister's power was, the odds against him were so
overwhelming, that he must either submit or resign.
Mr. Forster regretted that he could no longer support
the Government, who, while professing to acknowledge
their responsibilities, seemed to have entirely forgotten
them. Had they made the necessary preparations for
helping Gordon, and thus shown the people of the
Soudan that they were in earnest, no expedition would
have been necessary; but they not only withheld all
help from Gordon, but gave him no assurance that it
would be forthcoming. That gallant officer might find
that his mission was hopeless after their refusal to help
him, but he was not the man to slink off by himself
and leave to their fate those who had compromised
themselves by supporting him. The responsibility of
the Government for the Soudan had been clearly
, pointed out by Sir Evelyn Baring, and in their useless
' and eventually costly attempts to shirk their responsi-
bility. Mr. Forster declared that he was unable to sup-
port them.
The Marquis of Hartington contended that Mr. Glad-
stone's statement, while it contained a repudiation of a
policy of military action for purposes external to, and
inconsistent with, the mission of General Gordon, also
contained the fullest and most absolute recognition of
the responsibility of the Government of this country
for the safety of Gordon. But before any expedition
for his relief was sent, it was the duty of the Govern-
ment to satisfy themselves by every means in their
power as to its necessity and practicability. Such an
expedition was not to be sent to enable Gordon to
"smash the Dlandi," or for the purpose of giving a
satisfactory government to the inhabitants of
the Soudan—a task entirely beyond the respon-
sibility of the British Government; it was not to be
undertaken even to enable the Egyptian garrisons
to march out with the honours of war. The Govern-
ment must be satisfied that it was necessary to secure
the safety of General Gordon and of those whose safety
he had made himself responsible, and they must also
satisfy themselves of its practicability as well as its
necessity. If the necessity should be shown and the
practicability of an expedition demonstrated, he be-
lieved the country would grudge no sacrifice to save
the life of General Gordon, and at the same time it
would be prepared, if it were possible, to give relief to
those garrisons, for the safety of which her Majesty's
Government accepted no responsibility, but whose un-
deserved sufferings in the name of mercy and humanity
they fully and completely appreciated.
The sitting was suspended shortly before seven
o'clock. _ .

The debate was continued at the evening sitting by
Sir H. Giffard, who, referring to the Government's
admiZun ur their responsibility, declared that what the
country wanted to know was what that admission was
going to lead to.
The motion was also supported by Mr. Ashmead-
Bartlett and Mr. Cowen, and opposed by Mr. Arnold
and Mr. J. Morley.
Mr. Goschen failed to see that any effort had been
made by the Government to render Gordon any kind of
assistance or to hold out a hand to him. He should
entertain no doubt of their intention to send an ex-
pedition to the relief of Gordon if only they had
announced it; but no such announcement had been
made. For his own part, he declined to go with those
members of the Liberal party who, stifling their own
convictions, would by their votes approve of the course
taken by the Government merely because they had
confidence in it upon other questions.
Mr. Dawnay addressed an appeal to the Government
to give their recognition to a volunteer expedition
for the relief of General Gordon, in answer to which,
Sir C. Dilke, who defended at some length the
general policy of the Government, said that whatever
steps were taken must be upon the responsibility of
Ministers.

Sir S. Northcote contended that the great object of
Ministers all through had been to shield themselves
from responsibility and to throw it upon others, and
that they had thereby done the greatest injustice to
General Gordon. _ _ _

_
On a division, the resolution VraS negatived by a
majority of 28-303 to 275—and the announcement of
numbers was received with loud cheers from the Mink-
terialists, and still louder cheers from the Oppoaition.
The House adjourned at two o'clock.