The Stourbridge Observer, Cradley Heath, Halesowen & District Chronicle.
Stourbridge, West Midlands, England, 1878-10-05 00:00:00

THE STOURBRIDG-E OBSERVER.

OUR RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN.

(From Monday's Times)
Our relations with Afghanistan and the probable
course of the Indian Government with reference to
them are the great subjects to which all thoughts in
India are turned. Our telegraphic news from Calcutta
this morning leaves us little room to expect that mat-
ters will be arranged peaceably. War is looked upon
as almost certain, and the Government is hastening on
its military preparations in prospect of it. Troops are
being collected from all sides and sent on to various points
on the North-West frontier. There they will remain
for the present massed and in readiness to take the
offensive as soon as a forward movement has been
determined on. The Ameer has still the choice of
submission open to him. His country is not yet in-
vaded, nor is it thought likely that it will be, in force,
until the winter has passed. Strong as the reasons are
for an immediate advance, and weleome as the news
would be that it had been tried and had succeeded,
the ease for delay, as our Correspondent states it, is too
strong to be set aside. Before we could move safely
on Cabul with the troops just now at our disposal, we
must be assured of the good-will, or at least of the
neutrality, of the hill-tribes that occupy the inter-
vening passes, But we have as yet no certainty of
these. As far as they owe any allegiance, it is
to the Ameer, and not to us. Their past rela-
tions with us have been mostly hostile, and the
desire for revenge might combine now with the
lust of plunder to rouse them to active enmity.
The passage of our troops through their country
would, at the present moment, probably not be tm-
opposed; and if it were necessary for us to force our
way, our invading columns would need to be raised
considerably beyond their actual strength. The diffi-
culty, moreover, of a winter campaign in Afghanistan
is so great that it could not be lightly undertaken, nor
without the chance of some advantage sufficient to
counterbalance it. If we wait for the return of spring-,
we shall be differently placed in every way. The
weather will then be favourable to us, and there will
have been time given either to conciliate the hill
tribes or, if this is not to be done, to get ready a force
which will overcome the resistance they can offer us.
We cannot afford to begin war until we see our way
clear before us. We must run no risks that we can
avoid. Our aim must be not only to succeed in the
end, but to leave no possibility open for intermediate
failure. On a question between the instant and the
deferred invasion of Afghanistan we must accept the
judgment of the military authorities of India. They
alone can know the whole case, and, whatever may be
the issue, it is with them that the responsibility will
rest. There are plenty of ardent spirits in this
country, and, no doubt, in India too, who will chafe
at the idea that we must wait some months longer
before we move on Afghanistan, We trust, however,
that if the Indian Government is convinced of the
wisdom of delay, it will not suffer itself to be forced on
by the pressure of less patient, less well-informed, and
less responsible critics.
An invasion of Afghanistan will, our Correspondent
reminds us, be no military march over. We must
expect hard fighting before our business will be done.
The result can be in no doubt, but the resistance we
are likely to encounter will be so great that there must
be ample preparations on our part for meeting it.
War, if war we are to have, will be a troublesome and
a costly affair. It promises, nevertheless, to be well
worth its cost in the end. We may even be glad at
the opportunity now granted us of settling our rela-
tions with Afghanistan. We are so clearly in the
right that we shall have no scruple about striking, if
strike we must, very hard indeed. We hold at present
a frontier line which needs to be guarded by a long
succession of forts and by a permanent body of some
thirty-five thousand men. We may look tothe result of
a war with Afghanistan as a cure for this standing
evil. We shall hardly be content to leave matters as
they are when was is over. We shall take up a new
line of defence, more easy to be held, and giving us A
command over regions where it is necessary that our
influence should be maintained. If we cannot obtain
this peaceably—and we could hardly expect to do so
in any case—we may, after all, find some permanent
advantage from a war which we have yet done our
utmost to avoid. Even now, we are told, the Indian
Government is anxious not to act with harshness. If
the Ameer will comply with the demands we have
been making upon him, we shall be willing even
now to hold our hand. But we have both gone too
far for a return to our former position. We must
have security against foreign intrigue in Afghani-
stan, nor can any mere verbal explanation satisfy
us as to this. An apology on the part of the Ameer
and a continued presence of Russian envoys at Cabul
would be a termination we could not accept. Some
material guarantee for the supremacy of our influence
in Afghanistan we are entitled to demand, and we shall
very shortly be in a position to make our demand felt.
We may not always be as well placed for war as we are
now. We can give our full attention to the matter,
and we have already done so much in the way of mili-
tary preparation thet we shall not be willing to allow
these efforts to be wasted. An insecure peace would
be an alternative which we should refuse to take. It
would amount merely to a putting off the inevitable
struggle, and this to a time not within our own choice,
and possibly not as favourable to us as the present
time is. _

Whether the insolent conduct of Shere All has or
not been instigated by Russia is more than we can say
certainly. We will forgive her freely if she has rendered
us this service, whatever may have been the motive
that has prompted her to it. Nor can we rouse our-
selves even to the mildest anger at any Russian exulta-
tion over the prospect of trouble to England. If Russia
really thinks we shall break our teeth upon Afghan-
istan, she may be as jubilant as she pleases over the
as yet unaccomplished fact. But when Russian
journals go on further to talk of the help
Shere Ali may expect. from Russian subjects they
are on less safe ground. The argument that as
England gave assistance to Turkey in the late
war, so may Russia give assistance by and by to
Afghanistan, is not as conclusive as they may think
it. Sound as a matter of inference, it has no weight
if the assumption on which it proceeds is untrue, and
this it is unquestionably. England not only gave no
active assistance to Turkey, but prohibited such
assistance from being given by English subjects,
and took what care she could to see that the pro-
hibition was obeyed. We should not permit an
opposite course on the part of Russia, nor have
we any belief that she intends to follow it. But
we cannot be surprised if some of our countrymen
are minded to be less charitable, and if we hear
in some quarters loud counter•threats of what Eng-
land will do if Russia directly or indirectly inter-
feres with her in Afghanistan. If such feelings are
aroused and such words used, it will be to
a portion of the Russian Press that this mischievous
excitement must be debited. As for the notion of the
Novoye Vremya that
parties in England will be divided
on the Afghan question, and that the attacks of the
parliamentary Opposition on Lord Beaconsfield's
Ministry will be renewed—to the advantage, we pre-
sume, of some other interest than England's—this we
may dismiss as foolish rather than malicious. If any-
thing could unite all parties, it would be the occurrence
of a war in which English credit and English interests
weraelt to be alike concerned, and it is such a war as
this on the brink of which we are now standing.

The Calcutta Correspondent of Th,e Times, under
date Sept. 29, gives the following further detailed par-
ticulais of the Mission and its collapse :—" On the 16th
of August the Viceroy sent to the Ameer the following
letter :

" 'The authentic intelligence which I have lately received
of the course of recent events at Cabul and in the countries
bordering on Afghanistan has rendered it necessary that I
should communicate fully and without reserve with your
Highness upon matters of importance which concern the
Interests of India and Afghanistan. For this reason I have
considered it expedient to depute a special and confidential
envoy of high rank, who is known to your Highness—his
Excellency General Sir Neville Chamberlain—to visit your
Highness immediately at Cabul, in order that he may con-
verse personally with your Highness regarding these urgent
affairs It appears certain that they can be best arranged for the
tranquillity and welfare of both States and for the preserva-
tion of friendship between the two Governments by a full
and frank statement of the present position This letter,
therefore, is sent in advance by a faithful and honoured
sirdar, who will explain all necessary details as to the time
and manner of the Envoy's visit. It is asked that your
Highness may be pleased to issue commands to your sirdars
and to all other authorities upon the route between
Peshawur and Cabul that, without delay, all necessary ar-
rangements for securing to my Envoy, the representative of
a friendly Power, due and safe conduct and suitable accom-
modation according to his dignity while passing with his re-
tinue through your Highness's dominions. I beg to express
the high consideration I entertain for your Highness, and
remain, dcc.'

"On the 23rd of August the following letter was
sent :

"'After the despatch from Situla of my letter dated the 16th
of August I received the melancholy news that your highness
has suffered a great affliction in the untimely death of
Sirdar Abdulla Jan, heir apparent to the Cabot Throne and
its dependencies. I desire to express to your Highness
personally the sincere regret which ,this intelligence has
caused me, but life and death are in the hands of God, and
resignation to His will unavoidable. In consequence of this
calamity I have directed my Envoy to Postpone for a short
time his departure in order that your Highness may not be
troubled by public business, however urgent, until the
usual period of mourning should have elapsed.'

_
"No answer has been received to these letters, the
Ameer having adopted the same line of contemptuous
silence as he adopted on the last occasion in 1876 when
the Viceroy wrote to him. At a later date Chamberlain
wrote a courteous but rather more peremptory letter
to the Commandant of the Ali Musjid Fort, intimating
his intention to press the mission.
"The reasons which actuated the Viceroy in push-
ing forward the mission without waiting longer for the
Ameor's leave to pass were that information had been
receised that the Ameer had no intention of ever
receiving it, but was merely playing in a derisive and
insolent manner with the expectation of the Govern-
ment. The tenour of his language was

"'lf I choose to receive a mission, I will myself invite II;
but meanwhile it must await my pleasure at Peshawur.' -
"This tone of course the Viceroy could not brook.
Indeed, if he had it would have been remembered
against us for all time, as there is no description of
reply which Orientals so thoroughtly admire as one of
accepted insolence. Great danger, too, was incurred
by further delay, as the Ameer has been intriguing
with the Kbyberies to break faith with us, and the
risk of their desertion had to be considered.
"In these circumstances the Government wisely
decided to push on the mission and put to the test the
question of the good faith of the Ameer. and thus have
the matter definitely decided. It is infinitely more
advantageous with regard to future policy to force the
Ameer to declare himself an open enemy than to
remain in the insecure position of having to rely
upon the false neutrality or alliance of his disguised
enmity."

The correspondent of the Daily Telegraph says that the
vernacular press of Northern India is nearly unanimous in
wofillnsahtiovwe
praise of the Viceroy's Cabul policy. The lAhore Kohinoor
a exists between the
and several other journals specially approve the employment
1.1 which, they say,
rulers and the ruled, and will also exhibit to the people the
tnoebfloerseig in
ne.rsthenCeabLlion Mission
confidence of the Government in native loyalty. The
Kohinoor recalls the fact that an ancestor of the Todpore
Maharajah was employed by Shah Jehan on a mission to
Cabul. The chief exception is the Mooradabad newspaper,
which Lays that the quarrel must be settled wits Russia.

The Rvsski lfrir ! 3 of that the defeat susts.thel by
Lord Lytton will be severely felt by Lord 13oacoutsfleld, tli
latter having so long inclined to competition with Russia for
the recovery of British prestige and the protection of the
road to India. The English, we are told, intended to cement
a 'Lbw and solemn alriance rith tbo Ameer, previous gOdd