FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC) 
First Regular Session 
OF THE PHILIPPINES 
Introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago 
EXPLANATORY NOTE 
In the case of Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 (1987), the Supreme Court 
pronounced the sub judice rule anew. The rule means that when a legal matter or controversy 
has come under the jurisdiction of a court (sub judice), nobody, including the press and other 
media should interfere by publication or public clamor with the court’s proper handling o f  the 
proceeding. 
The sub judice rule is a foreign legal concept. It originated in countries whose justice 
systems have adopted trial by jury, such as the United States. There is no trial by jury in the 
Philippines. Yet, not too frequently, Philippine courts invoke the sub judice rule to prohibit the 
press and other media from reporting, commenting on, or publishing events surrounding a trial. 
This is notwithstanding the palpable absence of a panel of jurors which need to be impaneled and 
sequestered from widespread publicity surrounding a court trial. Thus, through long and 
unfettered court practice, the sub judice rule has endeared itself as a reasonable restriction on the 
constitutional guarantees of free press and of the people’s right to petition and information on 
matters of public concern. 
In the United States, the sub judice rule also used to be seen as a reasonable restriction on 
the freedom of the press. Today, however, most U.S. Supreme Court decisions regard it as an 
unconstitutional impairment of the latter. In Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 362-363, the US. 
Supreme Court noted that: “there is nothing that proscribes the press from reporting events that 
transpire in the courtroom.” This is just like saying that once a public hearing had been held, 
what transpired there could not be subject to prior restraint. 
That trend in America is decidedly a welcome improvement on the sub judice rule. It 
affirms and supports that idea that a people’s liberty depends on the freedom of the press which 


cannot be limited without being lost. Now, if Philippine courts have transplanted the sub judice 
rule into local jurisprudence, perhaps then, it is also high time that they improve on it. The 
constitutional guarantees of free speech, free press, and right to information occupy lofty 
positions in the Filipino people’s hierarchy of values. Any attempt at “freezing” them, which gag 
orders or other form of prior restraint do, must be shown to be necessitated by an interest more 
substantial than the guarantees themselves. Absent such a showing, the sub judice rule must be 
acknowledged by Philippine courts as an impermissible incursion on the salutary constitutional 
precept that discussion of public affairs in a free society cannot depend on the preliminary grace 
ofjudicial censors. Hence, this bill provides for the elimination of the sub judice rule.’ 
* This bill was originally filed during the Thirteenth Congress, First Regular Session. 


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FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC) 
L 
._I . 
OF THE PHILIPPINES 
) 
First Regular Session 
) 
Introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago 
AN ACT 
PROHIBITING COURT ORDERS, WRITS AND INJUNCTIONS WHICH PREVENT 
MEDIA REPORTS AND COMMENTARIES ON, OR PUBLICATION OF, PROCEEDINGS 
SUB JUDICE, EXCEPT UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES 
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in 
Congress assembled: 
SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as the “Judicial Right to Know Act.” 
SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy. - Conformably with the constitutional guarantees of 
free press and of the people’s right to petition and to information on matters of public concern, it 
is hereby declared a national policy that no court order, writ, or injunction shall issue that would 
have the effect of enjoining the press and other media from publishing information in connection 
with a criminal, civil, or administrative case of widespread concern to the community. 
SECTION 3. Gag Orders Generally Unlawful; Exception. - Court orders, writs or 
injunctions which prohibit media reports and commentaries on, or publication of, proceedings 
held in public or on events that transpire in the courtroom shall be invalid. 
In cases where the report, commentary, or publication is based on information gained 
form other sources, a gag order may lawfully issue only upon prior showing by the party who 
seeks its issuance that the report, commentary, or publication will likely prevent, directly and 
irreparably, a fair and impartial resolution of the case. This requires a clear showing that the 
report, commentary, or publication will prejudice the outcome of the proceedings of the case and 
that no less restrictive alternatives are available. 
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Notwithstanding such a showing, a gag order, writ or injunction may not issue unless it is 
also shown that a previous report, commentary, or publicatiop will not render the order, writ, or 
injunction inefficacious. 
SECTION 4. Repealing Clause. - All laws, rules and regulations inconsistent with this 
Act repealed or modified accordingly. 
SECTION 5 .  Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its 
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation. 
Approved, 
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