SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE 
) 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 
)
First Regular Session 
)
<0ffitr of ti)f fo rfifta rp
*17 
MAR - 6  
R 2  --00
SENATE 
SENATE BILL NO.
RECEIVED BY:
1 3 6 1
Introduced by SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA
AN ACT
AMENDING SECTION 2 o f ACT NO. 3326, OTHERW ISE KNOWN AS “AN 
ACT TO ESTABLISH PERIODS OF PRESCRIFITON I OR VIOLATIONS 
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND 
TO PROVIDE W HEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN”
EXPIjANATORY n o t e
In the 2006 Resolution of the Supreme Court in the case of Romualdez v. 
Marcelo1, the majority opinion identified a “legislative gap” as the root cause of 
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio’s “apprehension” that the application of Section 2 
of Act No. 3326 (dated 4 December 1926)2 to the computation of the prescriptive 
period of offenses punished under special laws would be “[t]o allow an accused to 
prevent his prosecution by simply leaving this jurisdiction.” This, according to Justice 
Carpio:
... [UJnjustifiably tilts the balance of criminal justice in favor of the accused to 
the detriment of the State’s ability to investigate and prosecute crimes. In this 
age of cheap and accessible global travel, this Court should not encourage 
individuals facing investigation or prosecution for violation of special laws to 
leave Philippine jurisdiction to sit-out abroad the prescriptive period. The 
majority opinion unfortunately chooses to lay the basis for such anomalous 
practice.3
In the said 2006 Resolution, the Court dismissed the twenty-three (23) criminal 
cases filed against Benjamin (Kokoy) T. Romualdez for violation of Section 7 of 
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the “Anti-Graft and Corrupt 
Practices Act”, in connection with his supposed receipt of dual compensation in * 4
G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006.
"A n A ct To Establish Periods O f P rescription For V io la tio n s Penalized By Special Acts And M un icip a l 
O rdinances And To Provide W hen P rescription Shall Begin To Run," w h ich  has been in e ffe c t since
4 D ecem ber 1926.
Id.


government during the regime of his brother-in-law, the late former President 
Ferdinand Marcos.4
The Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision by ruling that the graft charges 
against the accused have been extinguished by prescription, despite the fact that the 
accused was admittedly absent from the Philippines from 1986 to April 27, 2000. In 
doing so, the majority opinion cited Act No. 3326 to hold that prescription period of 
offenses punished under special laws are only interrupted “when proceedings are 
instituted against the guilty person,”5 and not by the absence of the accused from 
Philippine jurisdiction, which is a grounds for the tolling of the prescriptive period 
under the second paragraph of Article 91 of Act No. 3815, otherwise known as “The 
Revised Penal Code” (RPC).
Relying on the RPC provision. Associate Carpio dissented, reasoning that the 
aforementioned second paragraph suppletorily applies to R.A. No. 3019 by application 
of Article 10 thereof.
Addressing this point, the prevailing majority in the Supreme Court ruled that 
the RPC provision cannot be given such suppletory effect because, by application of 
Section 2 of Act No. 3326,6 R.A. No. 3019, a special law, is not silent on the particular 
matter of the running of the prescriptive period for the offenses defined and punished 
therein.7
In addressing Justice Carpio’s above-quoted apprehensions, the Supreme 
Court effectively stated that the remedy to resolve such issue lies with the legislature 
and not the courts:
The m ajority notes Mr. Justice Carpio’s reser\ations about the 
effects of ruling that the absence of the accused from  the 
Philippines shall not suspend the running of the prescriptive 
period. Our duty, however, is only to intci*i>ret the law. To go beyond 
that and to question the wisdom or effects of the law is certainly beyond our 
constitutionally mandated duty. As we have already explained —
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused 
by such an omission, neither could the Court presume otherwise 
and supply the details thereof, because a legislative lacuna cannot 
be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of 
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein 
situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An omission 
at the time of the enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot be 
judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the 
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they
http://w w w .philstar.com :8080/headlines/462665/suprem e-court-reverses-ruling-clears-kokoy-graft 
Second paragraph o f Section 2, A ct No. 3326.
U nder Section 3 th e re o f and fo r purposes o f said law, "special acts shall be acts d e fin in g  and 
penalizing vio la tio n s o f the law  n o t included in th e  Penal Code".
C iting People v. Moreno, 60 Phil. 712 (1934) to  state "th a t th e  su p p le to ry app lica tio n  o f th e  Revised 
Penal Code to  special laws, by v irtu e  o f A rticle  10 th e re o f, finds relevance o n ly w hen th e  provisions 
o f th e  special law  are silent on a p a rticu la r m atter...."
2


think should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would 
have supplied if its attention has been called to the omission.8 
(Emphasis supplied)
This measure, therefore, seeks to address this so-called “legislative gap” by 
amending Act 3326 and aligning it with the second paragraph of Article 91 of the 
Revised Penal Code. For violations penalized by special laws, absence of the accused 
in the Philippines will now be a ground for tolling of the prescriptive period.
For these reasons, the passage of the measure is earnestly sought.
LI\ILA M. DE LIMA
Id. citing Canet v. Decena, G.R. No. 155344, January 20, 2 0 0 4 ,4 2 0  SCRA 388 at 394.


SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE 
) 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 
)
First Regular Session 
)
, > , . , . 3  
S e n a te
A cty' i©fficr of tljc JE'i n  ?t<ir^
*17 
H A R -6 
P12 ^ 0
SENATE 
RECEIVED BV:
SENATE BILL NO. 1 3 6 1
Introduced by SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA
AN ACT
AMENDING SECTION 2. o f ACI^ NO. 3326, OTHERW ISE KNOWN AS “AN 
ACT TO ESTAliLISII PERIODS OF PRESCRIPTION FOR VIOLATIONS 
PENALIZED BY SPECIAL ACTS AND MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES AND 
TO PROVIDE W HEN PRESCRIPTION SHALL BEGIN TO RUN”
Be It enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in 
Congress assembled.
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SECTION 1. Section 2 of Act No. 3326, otherwise knovMi as “An Act to Establish 
Periods of Prescription fo r Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal 
Ordinances and to Provide when Prescription shall Begin to Run” is hereby amended 
to read as follows:
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Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the 
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the 
disco\er}' thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation 
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against 
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed 
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
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‘FURTHEKJVIORE, IN THE CASE OF SPECIAL LAWS, THE TERM OF


PIIESCIUPTION SHALL LIKEW ISE NOT 
RUN W H ILE THE 
OFFENDER IS ABSENT FROM PH ILIPPIN E JU RISD ICTIO N .”
3 
SEC. 2. Separability Clause. - Should any pro\dsion of this Act be declared invalid, the
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remaining provisions shall continue to be valid and subsisting.
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SEC. 3. Repealing Clause. - All laws, executive orders, or administrative orders, rules
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and regulations or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby
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amended, repealed or modified accordingly.
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SEC. 4. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in
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at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,