FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE 
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REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 
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First Regular Session 
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Introduced by Senator M. A. Madrigal 
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EXPLANATORY NOTE 
On 16-17 July 2007, the Supreme Court initiated a landmark summit on 
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances attended by representatives 
from all three branches of the government, the diplomatic corps as well as 
representatives from civil society. Alongside the top brass of the military-police 
establishment was the participation of militant organizations like "Karapatan" 
which heretofore had snubbed official investigatory bodies like the Melo 
Commission, accusing these of partiality and lack of independence. 
Spearheaded by Chief Justice Reynato Puno, the summit elevates the High 
Court from an erstwhile reactive role of passive arbiter to active intervenor and 
unifying force in the national crisis on human rights. 
The recognition by majority of the summit participants of the politically- 
motivated nature of the summary killings and enforced disappearances in terms of 
the background of the victims, the methods used and the direct involvement or 
acquiescence of State agents in their commission is a significant step in pinpointing 
and defining official responsibility for such blatant offenses that have gone beyond 
the realm of simply being "unexplained killings." Earlier, in response to the UN 
Special Rapporteur's report on extrajudicial executions, the Supreme Court had 
assigned several regional trial courts as special courts to hear and try these cases. 
Surely enough, the repeated involvement or implication of accused and 
suspected soldiers or subordinates in the rampant, country-wide and systematic 
cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances could not have 
transpired without their superiors ordering or at the very least knowing or 
encouraging these acts. Not one suspected perpetrator of any of the 871 summary 
killings and 180 enforced disappearances of political activists since January 2001 
has been arrested, tried and convicted. This climate of impunity has fostered the 
thinking that the unabated bloody pattern targeting leftist activists stems from an 
official state policy that has placed murderous wrongdoers beyond the reach of the 
law. 
To address the problem, high on the Supreme Court summit's list of priority 
recommendations for "wholistic solutions" is the passage of a law punishing 
superior officers for the acts of subordinate members or other persons subject to 
their control under the principle of command responsibility. 


This will create a legal duty on the part of commanding officers to take the 
necessary measures to prevent human right violations and to punish the 
perpetrators thereof. This is in line with the Chief Justice’s thrust to strengthen the 
rule of law by making legal procedures “more helpful to the victims, more forceful 
against the suspected perpetrators, and more demanding of State agents to solve 
and prevent such crimes.” 
The doctrine of command responsibility has long become part of customary 
international law. It has since been continuously refined and expanded in many 
jurisdictions, especially with the creation of the International Criminal Court to 
combat impunity for war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. While the 
Philippines has yet to ratify the ICC treaty, it however adopts the generally 
accepted principles of international law as part of the laws of the land, which 
makes the doctrine of command responsibility an essential part of the country’s 
domestic law. 
The Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention states thus: ”The fact 
that a breach of the Conventions or this Protocol was committed by a subordinate 
does not absolve his superiors from responsibility if they knew, or had information 
which should have enabled them to conclude in the circumstances at the time that 
he was committing or about to commit such a breach and if they did not take all 
feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach.” Further, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Article 7(3) establishes 
that crimes committed by a subordinate do not relieve his superior of criminal 
responsibility if he knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary and 
reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators. 
Domestically, Executive Order 226 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on 17 
February 1995 states that, “Any (AFP) officer shall be held accountable for neglect 
of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility, if he has knowledge that a 
crime or offense shall be committed, is being committed, or has been committed by 
his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such 
knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during or 
immediately after its commission.” 
The principle of command responsibility was first applied in the country in 
the wartime case of Yamashita DS, Styer (G.R. No. L-129, 19 December 1945). 
However, the principle has subsequently disappeared in Philippine jurisprudence 
even if it remains much wanting in the prosecution of criminal cases. 
This bill seeks to address this deficiency. 
The bill provides for a legal basis to make superior officials culpable for the 
acts of their subordinates under the doctrine of command responsibility. It upholds 
the ethos of responsible leadership and accountability - that government officials 
must be called to account for their acts, especially murders of political activists and 
journalists in their jurisdictions, instead of hiding behind the cloak of due process 
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to avoid criminal responsibility. It seeks to integrate the principle and practice of 
command responsibility into our justice and political systems, in harmony with 
existing laws and international law. 
The immediate passage of this bill is highly encouraged in order to address 
the problem of extra-judicial killings in the Philippines and for the strict protection 
and enforcement of constitutional rights- which first and foremost is the right to 
life. 
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FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE ) 
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES 
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First Regular Session 
) 
S E N A T E  
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Introduced by Senator M. A. Madrigal 
AN ACT 
PUNISHING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OR SUPERIORS 
FOR CRIMES OR OFFENSES COMMITTED BY THEIR SUBORDINATES 
UNDER THE PRINCIPLE OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 
Section 1. Title. -This Act shall be known as the "Command Responsibility Act of 
2007." 
Sec. 2. Policy. -It shall be the policy of the State: 
A. To uphold the Constitutional principle that public office is a public trust; 
B. To implement the basic Constitutional premise that public employees must 
at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost 
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and act with patriotism and 
justice; and 
C. To make public officials and superiors accountable for the acts of their 
subordinates under the principle of Command Responsibility. 
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms. -The following terms shall mean: 
A. Command Responsibility - is the responsibility of an official or superior for 
crimes or offenses committed by their subordinates subject to their effective 
control or supervision or which their subordinates were about to commit or 
have committed, and such official or superior did not take measures to 
prevent such commission of crimes or offenses, or having learned about 
such crimes or offenses did not act to prevent and punish the offending 
subordinates. 
8. Official/Superior - is the person who has actual powers to exercise effective 
control over the actions of their subordinates considering their position, 
their capacity to issue orders, the procedure for appointment; and the tasks 
that their subordinates are performing; and that they have the material 
ability to prevent and punish criminal acts of their subordinates. The control 
may be de jure or de facto and the official/superior may be military or civilian. 


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C. Subordinate - is the person or persons under the effective control of the 
official/superior. 
Sec. 4. Scope. - This law shall apply to all employees of the government whether in 
the executive, legislative and judicial branches and all their agencies and 
instrumentalities as well as in all Constitutional Commissions. 
Sec. 5. Application of Command Responsibility. - Any government official or 
superior shall be responsible for the crimes or offenses committed by their 
subordinates if the official or superior has knowledge that a crime will be 
committed or has been committed by their subordinate and, despite such 
knowledge, did not take any measures to prevent such commission of crimes or 
offense, and having learned about such crime or offense did not act to prevent and 
punish the offending subordinate. 
Sec. 6. Responsibility of Military Commanders and Superiors. - 
A. A military officer or person effectively acting as a military commander shall 
be criminally responsible for crimes committed by forces under their 
effective command and control, or effective authority and control as the case 
may be, as a result of their failure to exercise control properly over such 
forces, where: 
1. That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
2. That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
B. With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
Section 5.A, a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes committed 
by subordinates under his or her effective authority and control, as a result 
of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such subordinates, 
where: 
1. The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information which 
clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to 
commit such crimes; 
2. The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and 
3. The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures within 
his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit the 
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matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution 
Sec 7. Presumption of Knowledge. - A government official or superior is presumed 
to have knowledge of the crime committed by his or her subordinates when any of 
the following circumstances are present: 
A. When the same crime was committed by his or her subordinates two or 
more times in one year, whether or not the said offenses were committed by 
the same subordinate; 
B. When the crime committed by the subordinate was pursuant to a policy 
being implemented by the official or superior whether or not said policy is 
in writing; and 
C. When tho crime was committed in compliance with the order of the 
superior, albeit only the intended result was manifested to the subordinate. 
Sec. 8. Penalties. -For violation of the acts stated in Sections 4 and 5, the following 
penalties may be imposed: 
A. Imprisonment for a specified number of years, which may not exceed a 
maximum of thirty (30) years; or 
B. A term of life imprisonment when justified by the extreme gravity of the 
crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person. 
In addition to imprisonment, the Court may impose: 
C. Afine; or 
D. Forfeiture of proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly 
from that crime, without prejudice to the rights of bona fide third parties. 
In all cases, the penalty provided shall carry with it the accessory penalty of 
perpetual disqualification from holding public office. 
Sec. 9. Separability Clause. - If any part, section or provision of this Act shall be 
held invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions shall not be affected thereby. 
Sec. 10. Repealing Clause. - All other acts, laws, executive orders, presidential 
issuances, rules and regulations or any part thereof which are inconsistent 
herewith are hereby deemed repealed or modified accordingly. 
Sec. 11. Effectivity CZause. -The provisions of this Act shall take effect fifteen (15) 
days from its publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national 
newspapers of general circulation. 
Approved, 
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