Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures , but not all .
The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing .
However , there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care .
BACKGROUND The use of blended payment schemes in primary care , including the use of financial incentives to directly reward ' performance ' and ' quality ' is increasing in a number of countries .
There are many examples in the US , and the Quality and Outcomes Framework ( QoF ) for general practitioners ( GPs ) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform .
Despite the popularity of these schemes , there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care , or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care .
OBJECTIVES The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians ( PCPs ) and to identify : i ) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality ; ii ) the characteristics of patient population s for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives ; and iii ) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives .
A randomized trial of a pay-for-performance program targeting clinician referral to a state tobacco quitline.
BACKGROUND Tobacco quitlines offer clinicians a means to connect their patients with evidence -based treatments . Innovative methods are needed to increase clinician referral . METHODS This is a clinic r and omized trial that compared  usual care ( n = 25 clinics ) vs a pay-for-performance program ( intervention )  offering $ 5000 for 50 quitline referrals ( n = 24 clinics ) .  Pay-for-performance clinics also received monthly up date s on their referral numbers . Patients were eligible for referral if they visited a participating clinic , were 18 years or older , currently smoked cigarettes , and intended to quit within the next 30 days . The primary outcome was the clinic 's rate of quitline referral ( ie , number of referrals vs number of smokers seen in clinic ) . RESULTS Pay-for-performance clinics referred 11.4 % of smokers ( 95 % confidence interval [ CI ] , 8.0%-14.9 % ; total referrals , 1483 ) compared with 4.2 % ( 95 % CI , 1.5%-6.9 % ; total referrals , 441 ) for usual care clinics ( P = .001 ) . Rates of referral were similar in intervention vs usual care clinics ( n = 9 ) with a history of being very engaged with quality improvement activities ( 14.1 % vs 15.1 % , respectively ; P = .85 ) . Rates were substantially higher in intervention vs usual care clinics with a history of being engaged ( n = 22 clinics ; 10.1 % vs 3.0 % ; P = .001 ) or less engaged ( n = 18 clinics ; 10.1 % vs 1.1 % ; P = .02 ) with quality improvement . The rate of patient contact after referral was 60.2 % ( 95 % CI , 49.7%-70.7 % ) . Among those contacted , 49.4 % ( 95 % CI , 42.8%-55.9 % ) enrolled , representing 27.0 % ( 95 % CI , 21.3%-32.8 % ) of all referrals . The marginal cost per additional quitline enrollee was $ 300 . CONCLUSION A pay-for-performance program increases referral to tobacco quitline services , particularly among clinics with a history of less engagement in quality improvement activities
Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures , but not all .
The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing .
However , there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care .
BACKGROUND The use of blended payment schemes in primary care , including the use of financial incentives to directly reward ' performance ' and ' quality ' is increasing in a number of countries .
There are many examples in the US , and the Quality and Outcomes Framework ( QoF ) for general practitioners ( GPs ) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform .
Despite the popularity of these schemes , there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care , or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care .
OBJECTIVES The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians ( PCPs ) and to identify : i ) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality ; ii ) the characteristics of patient population s for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives ; and iii ) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives .