Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures , but not all .
The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing .
However , there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care .
BACKGROUND The use of blended payment schemes in primary care , including the use of financial incentives to directly reward ' performance ' and ' quality ' is increasing in a number of countries .
There are many examples in the US , and the Quality and Outcomes Framework ( QoF ) for general practitioners ( GPs ) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform .
Despite the popularity of these schemes , there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care , or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care .
OBJECTIVES The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians ( PCPs ) and to identify : i ) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality ; ii ) the characteristics of patient population s for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives ; and iii ) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives .
Changes in Patient Experiences of Primary Care During Health Service Reforms in England Between 2003 and 2007
PURPOSE Major primary care reforms have been introduced in recent years in the United Kingdom , including financial incentives to improve clinical quality and provide more rapid access to care . Little is known about the impact of these changes on patient experience . We examine patient reports of quality of care between 2003 and 2007 , including r and om sample s of patients on practice lists and patients with long-term conditions . METHODS We conducted a cross-sectional design study of family practice s in which  question naires were sent to serial sample s of patients in 42 representative general practice s in Engl and . Question naires sent to sample s of patients with chronic disease ( asthma , angina , and diabetes ) and r and om sample s of adult patients ( excluding patients who reported any long-term condition ) in 2003 , 2005 , and 2007 addressed issues of access , communication , continuity of care , coordination , nursing care , and overall satisfaction . RESULTS There were no significant changes in quality of care reported by either group of patients between 2003 and 2007 for communication , nursing care , coordination , and overall satisfaction . Some aspects of access improved significantly for patients with chronic disease , but not for the r and om sample s of patients . Patients in both sample s reported seeing their usual physician less often and gave lower satisfaction ratings for continuity of care . Most scores were significantly higher for the chronic illness sample s than for the r and om sample s of patients in 2003 , even after adjusting for age . CONCLUSIONS There was a modest improvement in access to care for patients with chronic illness , but all patients now find it somewhat harder to obtain continuity of care . This outcome may be related to the incentives to provide rapid appointments or to the increased number of specialized clinics in primary care . The possibility of unintended effects needs to be considered when introducing pay for performance schemes
Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures , but not all .
The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing .
However , there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care .
BACKGROUND The use of blended payment schemes in primary care , including the use of financial incentives to directly reward ' performance ' and ' quality ' is increasing in a number of countries .
There are many examples in the US , and the Quality and Outcomes Framework ( QoF ) for general practitioners ( GPs ) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform .
Despite the popularity of these schemes , there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care , or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care .
OBJECTIVES The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians ( PCPs ) and to identify : i ) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality ; ii ) the characteristics of patient population s for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives ; and iii ) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives .