Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns , limited evidence of their effects can be found .
BACKGROUND The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories .
Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care .
Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers ' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital setting s ( pharmaceutical budget caps or targets ) , financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes ( pay for performance interventions ) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions ( pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies ) .
This is the first up date of the original version of this review .
OBJECTIVES To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers ' practice s on drug use , healthcare utilisation , health outcomes and costs ( expenditures ) .
GP fundholding and the costs of prescribing: further results.
BACKGROUND An earlier paper published in this journal suggested that  fundholding practice s in Lincolnshire had managed to constrain the growth in their prescribing costs more successfully than had non-fundholders , largely on the basis of restricting the number of items prescribed per patient . At that time , insufficient data were available to explore the impact of a change in status from non-fundholding to fundholding on prescribing behaviour . METHOD Time-series prescribing data for the fourth-wave of Lincolnshire fundholders are analysed , and comparisons are made between this group , non-fundholders and the fundholders of the earlier waves . RESULTS In their first year of fundholding , fourth-wave practice s adopted the prescribing strategies employed previously by existing fundholders , namely , reductions in the number of items prescribed per patient and substantial increases in generic prescribing . The hypothesis that prospect i ve fundholders inflate their prescribing budget before attaining fundholding status is not generally supported by the Lincolnshire data . Evidence is presented which suggests that the prescribing cost economies accruing to fundholding status may be short term . CONCLUSIONS With the acquisition of fundholding status , the structure of incentives facing practice s changes . Our results suggest that , with respect to prescribing , practice s adjust rapidly to the new incentive structure
Although financial incentives are considered an important element in strategies to change prescribing patterns , limited evidence of their effects can be found .
BACKGROUND The proportion of total healthcare expenditures spent on drugs has continued to grow in countries of all income categories .
Policy-makers are under pressure to control pharmaceutical expenditures without adversely affecting quality of care .
Financial incentives seeking to influence prescribers ' behaviour include budgetary arrangements at primary care and hospital setting s ( pharmaceutical budget caps or targets ) , financial rewards for target behaviours or outcomes ( pay for performance interventions ) and reduced benefit margin for prescribers based on medicine sales and prescriptions ( pharmaceutical reimbursement rate reduction policies ) .
This is the first up date of the original version of this review .
OBJECTIVES To determine the effects of pharmaceutical policies using financial incentives to influence prescribers ' practice s on drug use , healthcare utilisation , health outcomes and costs ( expenditures ) .