1983-06-14

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Order, please. Before putting the motion to the House, since today is the final allotted day the House will go through the usual procedures to consider and dispose of the supply Bill. In view of recent practices, do Hon. Members agree that the supply Bill, which will go through all stages later today, be distributed now?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Hon. Edward Broadbent (Oshawa) moved:: That this House express its opposition to the escalation of the nuclear arms race by any nation and, in particular, its opposition to Canada's participation by testing in Canada any nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon delivery vehicle such as, and including, the Cruise missile.
He said: Mr. Speaker, last evening around 9.30 o'clock I was in the airport in Toronto, having spent a very busy day in southern Ontario. I, as other Hon. Members will recognize from their own personal experience, decided at that particular moment to telephone my home in Ottawa to tell my wife the time I managed to get a flight and the approximate time that I would be arriving home. Somewhat as a surprise to me, my daughter answered the telephone even though it was that time of night. It was a humid evening in Ottawa, as everyone in the city knows. She had trouble sleeping, but she was exuberant and happy to talk to her father. I in turn, as parents will certainly recognize for whatever unique, particular reason at a given time, was delighted to speak to my daughter because she symbolized in her own exuberance in the conversation a sort of warmth, humanity and the possibilities for life that one sees in children, particularly that one sees in a special way in one's own children. I hung up the telephone feeling much better, a much more contented and less tired human being than I was before I called.
I had a unique experience this morning which I would like to share with Hon. Members of the House, obviously having mulled over in my own mind at some subconscious level during the night the subject matter of today's debate. When I awoke this morning I thought of another ten-year-old child. This time she was not a blonde, blue-eyed Canadian ten-year-old by the name of Christine, but I thought back to 1945 in Japan. No
doubt at that time there was in Hiroshima a ten-year old child, perhaps named Sachi, Setsu or Yuriko, just as exuberant and just as full of the promise for life, and quite conceivably she had spoken to her father by telephone at some point on that day. Within seconds, that young, exuberant, dark-eyed, blackhaired girl was blown to smithereens.
[DOT] (DIO)
I relate this to you, Mr. Speaker and Members of the House, because I say with all the depth that I can muster that what is involved in nuclear weaponry is the ultimate possibility that I think mankind, wherever they may live, senses at quite an unconscious level that we may well be involved in the process in this century of taking steps, through our own genius at one level in terms of creative scientific imagination, to create weapons of such devastating capacity that all of mankind could be obliterated. All of the prospects, not only for my daughter obviously but for every child and adult in the world, the kinds of things they might do, the poetry they might write, the architectural leaps of the imagination that they may reveal in terms of contributing to society, the dancing they may do, the songs they may sing, the friendships they may have, may never exist again for mankind.
What is at stake in talks that are now going on in Geneva, and in a more limited but very real way the kind of decision process taking place here in the City of Ottawa in the northern part of North America, will have the most profound implications for the future of mankind. I want to quote Pope John Paul II when he visited Hiroshima in February, 1981. He said:
In the past, it was possible to destroy a village, a town, a region, even a country. Now it is the whole planet that has come under threat. This fact should finally compel everyone to face a basic moral consideration: From now on, it is only through a conscious choice and through a deliberate policy that humanity can survive.
I want to emphasize in particular in Pope John Paul's words the last phrase:
-it is only through a conscious choice and through a deliberate policy that humanity can survive.
We in this country are now at a crossroads. We have a profoundly important decision to make. In my judgment, we can continue to make fine speeches and persuasive, rhetorical arguments about the need for peace and disarmament. They are not to be dismissed because we need talk about peace and disarmament. However, words are certainly not adequate in terms of political life because speeches and rhetoric are not enough.
We can go on talking, or we can put rhetoric aside and make a decision that will take us concretely toward a sane nuclear

June 14, 1983
Supply
policy, which is to say a step toward nuclear disarmament. Surely to God now is the time that we in our own land took the same step toward nuclear disarmament.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


John Edward Broadbent: I want to begin the substance of my argument not by merely expressing the moral concern that is appropriate and is, I am sure, felt by Members on all sides. 1 want to underline that concern and the moral implications for the possible obliteration of mankind that is a unique situation in our century in the history of mankind. That kind of moral decision is before us. But I want to face the concrete power arguments, if you like, the legitimately perceived security concerns of the great powers of the Soviet Union on the one hand and the United States of America on the other.
Both sides have legitimate security interests; no one in his or her right mind will deny that. But in my view and in the view of many thoughtful people on this continent and in Europe and Asia, both sides have indulged in practices and argumentation since the Second World War that ultimately are false.
Each time one of the great powers has embarked upon a further escalation of the nuclear arms race, it has used its perceived security interests as the rationale. I think we must be honest and put aside ideology. There is no doubt which side, ideologically speaking, of those broad camps every Member of the House is on. But putting that aside, one must acknowledge a certain legitimacy in the military concerns of each of the great powers. The Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) himself has said that in the House on a number of occasions. But surely we ought to be disturbed that when the Russians put in SS-20s, they invariably say they are doing that to counter some perceived American threat of American missiles that are already there, and they use that as a bargaining instrument that they hope will cause the West to embark upon serious negotiations that will lead to disarmament.
The same kind of argument is used by the Americans and indeed has been used by the Government of Canada in the past justifying the deployment of nuclear weapons and, in the present, it is an argument that is being used with reference to the proposed deployment of ground-launched Cruise missiles and Pershing missiles in Europe.
This argument, Mr. Speaker, that is so common to both of the great powers was used in a direct conversation I had with Mikhail Gorbachev, senior member of the Politburo who visited Canada recently and met with the Prime Minister and with the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Nielsen). In a private conversation, he repeated the Soviet argument, which is exactly parallel to the American argument, that they have to escalate in this way, or they have to develop a Cruise, because if they do not the Americans will not come to their senses and so on.
I want to say, Mr. Speaker, that it is surely time that we recognize that both powers make these arguments and that in the context of existing nuclear strength those arguments do not
now have, if they ever had, any logical validity at all. 1 want to stress that. Such experts in the field from the Soviet Union are not normally free to speak, and we know that, but in the United States the experts in the field, including former Secretaries of Defence, a former head of the CIA, former Rear-Admirals, and the experts in Canada, including George Ignatieff, the distinguished former ambassador to the UN, and retired military people in Canada, all agree that there is a balance of terror in the world. They agree that the Soviet Union has superiority in some weapons but that the United States has superiority in others. One side has a more sophisticated kind of delivery system with some kind of orbital nuclear weapon, and the other side has a different kind of delivery system.
When you take all this into consideration and seriously calculate the total implication, any rational person has to conclude, as the people I have just referred to concluded, that there is a balance of terror now. That is important in the strategic argument and discussions that are going on and it is crucial to the argument that the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamontagne) has been making and that the Government of Canada has been making.
The point I want to make, Mr. Speaker, is that if the Soviet Union embarks on some kind of madness and we in the West retaliate with nuclear weapons-and there are serious moral questions about that, to say the least-there is absolutely no question of the capacity of western powers and the United States to do that and vice versa. If one side has the deterrent, both sides have the deterrent in terms of existing weapons systems now. Any question about limited nuclear wars or theatre nuclear wars is a particular kind of madness entertained by certain military figures in the United States and the Soviet Union. People whose intelligence and imagination I have a greater respect for acknowledge that this is completely ridiculous. Once the trigger is pulled, whatever the situation, however limited, we are in for a nuclear holocaust. We should have no illusions about that, Mr. Speaker.
Where does the Cruise come into this discussion? I want to say something about the Cruise because that is the subject matter of this debate; that is the entity we are talking about testing in this country. In particular, of course, I am talking about the air-launched Cruise.
What is particular about the Cruise as a nuclear weapon? First of all, all Cruise weapons, ground-launched or air launched, are deadly accurate and are low flying. In addition, they are very small and this makes their existence difficult to verify. Finally, the air-launched Cruise, the kind of weapon that is being discussed for development in this country, has a unique characteristic not common to other Cruises: it has the potential for being a first-strike weapon. When you add that potential to its accuracy, its low-flying capacity and its small size, you are confronted with a qualitative change in the development of nuclear weapons.
June 14, 1983

We are not just talking about another extension of the number of missiles or an increase in megatonnage or what have you; we are talking about a qualitatively different horrific weapon that has the potential for a first strike against the Soviet Union. Or as I understand it-because the Soviet Union is probably doing the same thing-for the Soviet Union to launch a surprise attack on the United States of America with its Cruise missile.
In this context I should like to quote an eminent authority on the seriousness of the Cruise, Mr. Speaker. Mr. William Epstein is the former director of disarmament at the United Nations and just two weeks ago he wrote in an article:
The long-range nuclear tipped Cruise missile is one of the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons ever conceived.
Mr. Epstein went on to emphasize that in his view what was particularly ominous about the air-launched Cruise was its first-strike potentiality. It completely destabilizes the current balance of terror, if you like, that exists between the two superpowers.
The other point I would make in this context is that because of its small size, it can be hidden. If the United States, with our complicity, proceeds to develop and deploy the Cruise, it will make almost impossible-but not impossible-future negotiations for verifiable disarmament agreements. This is precisely because the Cruise will be very hard to detect, whether located here in North America or somewhere in the Soviet Union. Therefore, by proceeding with this now, if we think we are having difficulty at Geneva in terms of what is being discussed, it will perhaps be a "piece of cake" to reach a settlement in the current talks compared to the kind of negotiations which would be required after the two sides develop and deploy a Cruise missile.
I would like to switch now to a related matter, Mr. Speaker, which the Government has talked about with a lot of misleading argumentation, and that is the position of NATO when it comes to the Cruise. I would like to begin with a quote from the Hon. Member for Kingston and the Islands (Miss MacDonald), who is here today for this debate, when she raised a question in the House of Commons on March 24 of this year. She said the following when referring to NATO, and I quote:
-the decision which was taken in 1979 applied to the arms control talks and to the deployment of the Cruise-
That is to say, the ground Cruise.
-and Pershing missiles in Europe only, and had nothing to do whatsoever with the testing of any guidance missile system here in Canada.
The Hon. Member made that assertion and, of course, she had responsibility for Canada at that time and knew what she was talking about. The Prime Minister, in response to the question which was raised by the Hon. Member, agreed and said:
Supply
That is to say that there was no obligation coming out of a NATO agreement at all for Canada to proceed to test, particularly, an air-launched Cruise missile. It is clear in my mind that the decision to test, or to participate in discussions which led to the formulation of an agreement between Canada and the United States pertaining to the air launched Cruise, came as a result of a specific request not from NATO but from the United States of America.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Order. 1 regret to interrupt the Hon. Member for Oshawa (Mr. Broadbent) but the time allotted to him for his remarks has expired. He would be allowed to continue by unanimous consent. Is there unanimous consent?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Agreed.


John Edward Broadbent: I thank Hon. Members for giving me the extended time. The request, Mr. Speaker, to provide a facility for testing that weapon clearly came from the United States to Canada. I would like to say in this context that the former Secretary of State for External Affairs acknowledged in the House on April 29 last that this was the case. That Minister has never denied, either outside the House or in the House of Commons, that this was the case, that it was a bilateral arrangement made between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States.
However, I regret to say that on a matter as fundamentally important as this, the Prime Minister, as is so often his wont, has attempted to mislead the people of this country. He has systematically tried to confuse the nature of the decision which was made about the Cruise. Time after time he has asserted that if Canada goes ahead and tests the air-launched Cruise, it is somehow intrinsically related to our commitments to NATO. I repeat, Mr. Speaker, that this is not the case. The former Secretary of State for External Affairs on the Conservative side, who is in the House today, says it is not the case. The former Secretary of State for External Affairs on the Government side says it is not the case. I say it is time that the Prime Minister of Canada stood up and said it is not the case.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


John Edward Broadbent: I would like now, Mr. Speaker, to refer to the Geneva talks. Without sounding Pollyannaish, I am sure 1 speak not only for all Hon. Members of my Party but for all Hon. Members here, and indeed for all people around the world who are watching what is going on, when I say that it has been refreshing to see both the United States and the Soviet Union alter their positions.
[DOT] (U30)
I will not go through the sequence of bargaining stances taken by the two great powers, but the whole world notes that each has recognized the legitimacy of changes made by the other side. There is an apparent kind of realism developing which may lead to some kind of sanity in those talks and could
That understanding is correct-

June 14, 1983
Supply
result in agreements signed between the two great superpowers. But again 1 want to stress, Mr. Speaker, that even if we get agreements in the two series of talks going on in Geneva, as important and positive as that will be for mankind, most Canadians are unaware that such agreements will have absolutely nothing to do with the right of either the Soviet Union or the United States to develop an air-launched Cruise missile. I repeat, whatever agreement is reached in the present talks, either the United States or the Soviet Union would be entitled to go on and develop the Cruise missile.
Therefore, I want now to come to our country's role in this historic process. We are at a turning point. It is not customary for Canadians to think in these terms. We are, after all, a limited power. We are not a great nation when it comes to global considerations in either our economic or military impact on the world. But I say, Mr. Speaker, that we are in a particularly important and unique position because we are part of an alliance and have entered into a bilateral arrangement with the United States concerning the possible testing of the Cruise missile. We can now as a country take a positive moral and yet realistic step towards peace and nuclear disarmament on the one hand, or we can continue in what could be a deadly march towards the ultimate holocaust by making a decision which says we, too, in Canada will play our role in developing the Cruise missile.
In what evidently is the majority of opinion of Canadians from coast to coast, including housewives, miners, loggers, bank clerks, professors, former military personnel, clergymen, farmers and political theorists, a whole cross-section of mankind as represented in our country have made it clear they are in opposition to the testing of the Cruise. Our view in this Party is that we should recognize what those people are saying to us. Sometimes majorities can be wrong, and intellectual honesty compels everyone in this House to say that. But if there ever was an instance when the collective conscience of a nation was expressing itself on the side of truth, it is on the issue of the Cruise missile. The majority is right!


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


John Edward Broadbent: ! want to conclude with these two basic recommendations on behalf of my Party. We should take that small but important step for peace by making it very clear that we will not test the Cruise missile in Canada. In addition, we should exercise a kind of imaginative leadership, appropriate for perhaps a middle power in the world, by taking the initiative to urge the United States on the one hand, and the Soviet Union on the other, to begin immediately to negotiate a complete ban on the testing and development of air-launched Cruise missiles.
The argument we could make to both sides would have much more moral and practical persuasiveness if we have already taken the correct decision ourselves. Therefore when the Minister and the spokesperson for the Conservative Party enter into this debate, I hope they will address this very
practical proposition. If they have arguments against it, we on this side would like to hear what they are.
I began, Mr. Speaker, with a personal reference to my daughter and with a reference to that other ten-year-old who was destroyed many years ago in an instant flash in Japan. Surely to God, Mr. Speaker, it is time for idealism and realism to come together in this debate and make the right choice so that children in our land will be able to develop their capacities and taients and have some joy so that never again will ten-year-olds have their lives snuffed out.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. McKinnon:: Mr. Speaker, I would like the Leader of the New Democratic Party to clarify that portion of this rather unusual resolution which reads:
-by testing in Canada any nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon delivery vehicle such as ... the Cruise-
What does he mean "any nuclear weapon", and could he explain to me if anyone in Canada with even a smidgen of authority has ever contemplated, suggested or mentioned testing any nuclear weapon in Canada, if by that he means a nuclear detonation?


John Edward Broadbent: I would be happy to answer the Hon. Member's question. It is a two-part resolution, as the Hon. Member knows. We are asking the House to commit itself to opposing the testing of any nuclear weapon on the one hand- it is a long-range commitment-but on the other hand, regarding the immediacy of the request which has now been made by the Government of the United States to the Government of Canada, we are specifically asking the House to oppose the testing of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles such as, and including, the Cruise missile. I think it is reasonably straightforward but I hope my response has clarified it.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: No, that is not the answer I was looking for. To his knowledge, has anyone in Canada with a smidgen of authority ever suggested for a moment that we would be testing nuclear weapons in Canada as opposed to a nuclear weapon delivery vehicle?


John Edward Broadbent: Well, I think the answer to that is no.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: I am very curious as to why he bothered putting it in if he was simply not trying to frighten the general public by insinuating someone was thinking of testing nuclear weapons.


Some Hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


Allan Bruce McKinnon: Well, it is in the motion and we did not put it in, the NDP did.
The Leader of the NDP brought up the spectre of the Russians reacting to the development of the Cruise missile by building a Cruise missile of their own with, as seems to be a favourite word of the Leader of the NDP, a potential for striking North America. Surely the Hon. Member is aware that the Russians have been deploying an SS-20 missile every five days for a couple of years now, and at a slightly lesser rate than that in the previous two years. Also, these do not have a
June 14, 1983

potential, but, rather, a capacity to strike North America if they were sighted on the closest Russian soil in eastern Siberia. Why does he worry about the Cruise missile, which does not have the range to get here in the first place-


Some Hon. Members:: Air-launched.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: -and, in the second place, when there is something he could worry about a great deal more, the SS-20s, which can reach the northwestern United States?


John Edward Broadbent: Mr. Speaker, I must say candidly that I am a little surprised at the question. I am well aware of the existing weapons of the Soviet Union. They are capable of being used against Canada and the United States, and I am as concerned about that possibility as the Hon. Member.
What I was discussing, in terms of the air-launched Cruise, is that if the Soviets go ahead and develop and deploy it, it will give them the real capacity of launching a strike, with first-strike capacity, which could be devastating because of all the reasons I gave concerning the uniqueness of the weapon, its accuracy and so on. Here we have a qualitative change in the arms race. I would be very interested to hear what the Hon. Member's Party stands for on this matter.


Mr. Darling:: You will hear.


John Edward Broadbent: However, this Party is opposed to the development of this kind of weapon by either the United States or the Soviet Union. We would like to see this country showing a little practical and moral leadership in proposing an agreement and helping to facilitate the great powers reaching an agreement in which neither of them develops this horrendous weapon.


Mr. Lambert:: Mr. Speaker, the Hon. Leader of the New Democratic Party-


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: It is just that on this particular occasion it is a New Democratic motion, However, I would say to him that I trust that even some of the more senior Members in his Party could recall for him and for many of his younger brethren the attitudes prior to World War II, when the same arguments which he made today with regard to nuclear arms were raised with regard to nerve gases and bacteriological warfare. They were, shall we say, the thrills of the sensational press of the weekend in those days. There was not television. Is he not aware that both sides had those weapons in World War II, but did not use them because they were so terrible? Therefore, how does he feel that appealing only to emotions, and most of his arguments were on emotional sides, will guarantee-


An Hon. Member:: Were Hiroshima and Nagasaki emotional?


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: -that nuclear weapons will be used?
Supply


John Edward Broadbent: To answer very quickly, Mr. Speaker, it would seem to me, although there are some factual inaccuracies in the contention, that the weapons prior to World War II which he described were indeed on both sides. However, with respect, I do not see how that is relevant to the argument.


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: Oh?


John Edward Broadbent: He went on from there to ask how I would think that emotional arguments would somehow be relevant to bringing about peace or disarmament and so on. That was the thrust of his point. I categorically reject the suggestion that what I offered was what the Hon. Member described as an emotional argument. I am among those who believe that passion and logic can be fused, that we are not disembodied spirits. However, I appeal to the Hon. Member that if he is not persuaded by some kind of emotional concern with the fate of mankind, will he at least do me the service of reading the logic which is embedded in the argument? If he does a little research, he will find all kinds of military experts around the world who agree with me and not with him.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich):: Mr. Speaker, the question that I would like to address to the Leader of the New Democratic Party is a request that he outline the attitude of himself and his Party, if they are the same, toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the commitments that bind the allies in that organization.


John Edward Broadbent: Mr. Speaker, so far as that is relevant to the debate, I made it very clear. I spoke of NATO's position and Canada's position as stated by his former Secretary of State for External Affairs and by the present Minister of Justice (Mr. MacGuigan). I am making the assumption that the Hon. Member heard my argument. If he did not, and 1 do not say this sarcastically, he could simply read Hansard when it is published. I made it very clear that there is no connection between a Cruise commitment and a NATO obligation.


Stan Darling: Aren't you against NATO?


Donald W. Munro: If I might ask just one small supplementary question, is the Hon. Member suggesting that Canada withdraw from NATO?


Some Hon. Members:: No, no!


Miss Jewett:: That has nothing to do with it.


John Edward Broadbent: Sometimes the logical capacity of Hon. Members here is a little bizarre. If I said that there is no connection between a Cruise decision and NATO commitments, it would seem to me, in terms of my old Logic IB, to be a non sequitur to say that this has implications for withdrawing from NATO. It may be that the Hon. Member has taken a more advanced logic course than one of which I am aware.


An Hon. Member:: You are the one who's lost.

June 14, 1983
Supply


Hon. J. Gilles Lamontagne (Minister of National Defence):: Mr. Speaker, first I want to tell the House that I greatly appreciate the words of the Leader of the New Democratic Party (Mr. Broadbent) in that we all seem to be searching together for the same goal-how to preserve peace. 1 agree with him on that score, but I certainly do not agree on the modality or the means of reaching the objective of preserving peace. When he says that speech and rhetoric are not enough, I agree, because reality is a completely different matter.
I am also very glad to have heard the Hon. Member for Victoria (Mr. McKinnon) raising the point with regard to the motion itself which, to my way of looking at it-


Miss MacDonald:: It's dishonest.


J. Gilles Lamontagne: -seems to be very misleading in that it implies that someone or some Government in Canada, the previous Government or the present Government, has considered the possibility of testing nuclear weapons in Canada. No Government of which I know, neither previous ones nor the present one, has found this to be the way our Defence was heading.

Mr. Speaker, needless to say, I am very pleased to be taking part in this debate-first of all, as Minister of National Defence, because in that capacity, I share the reponsibility with Cabinet for ensuring that the sovereignty of our country is both protected and respected, and, with our allies and our various alliances, for maintaining our democratic traditions and our rights and freedoms in this country of ours.

I am also very proud to participate in this debate because, along with many others in the House and I am sure many in the public who are listening to us this morning, we as veterans have been through war. I have been lucky enough to live through and survive one and have been a prisoner of war, like many other Canadians and allies. I know the difference between war and peace, between the misery of war and the comfort and delight of peace; but not just any kind of peace- peace with freedom. This is very important.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


J. Gilles Lamontagne: NATO's security policy is one of deterrence. Within that policy rests the firm conviction that in a nuclear war there would be no winners. The entire purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter aggression, to deter their use by others. The Cruise missile around which this debate is centred shares that purpose with all other nuclear weapons, that is, to deter aggression. But there is a paradox in the strategy of deterrence which must be recognized. If nuclear weapons are to be useful to deter aggression, they must be credible. To be credible, there must be confidence, especially on the part of the opposition, that is the other side, that they will work.
Deterrence is not an attractive way of ensuring peace but it has worked. For it to work, NATO must possess the means to respond to aggression, both conventional and nuclear. The maintenance of a credible deterrent has helped to make western Europe strong and to keep the peace between East and West for over 30 years, despite circumstances that were often very difficult. It is hard to think of any other period in European history where such political divisions and so many potential flash points would not have led to war. That deterrent posture of the West still keeps the peace today.
Deterrence also provides the necessary stability to enable us to pursue arms control measures which will really give us a safer world if they are verifiable and apply equally to both sides. The posssession of nuclear weapons is an essential fact of deterrence. In a world where such weapons exist the NATO alliance must be able to deter their use by an enemy or to resist blackmail based on the threat of nuclear attack. Moreover, the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used remains a valuable disincentive even to conventional aggression against a power possessing them.
By the way, Mr. Speaker, do you think for one minute that if Afghanistan had been a nuclear power Soviet Russia would have invaded it? I think nuclear possession by Afghanistan would have been an absolute deterrent to such invasion.
Since 1945 conventional war in other parts of the world has killed over ten million people, and more are being killed with each passing day. Not only has nuclear war between East and West been avoided, but so also has conventional war in Europe been prevented. Nuclear war is a terrible threat; conventional war a terrible reality.
The crux of the debate is the validity of the strategy of deterrence. The ethical questions raised are grave and difficult. Churchmen and laymen alike are divided by the problem. It is argued that the indiscriminate mass killing associated with nuclear weapons is invariably and absolutely wrong. Therefore deterrence is wrong, some people say. But nuclear weapons exist and they cannot be disinvented.
I noted the Leader of the New Democratic Party quoted Pope John Paul. Let me quote what Pope John Paul said last June in his message to the United Nations special session on disarmament. He attacked the arms race but called for the mutual, progressive and verifiable reduction of armaments. He emphasized that negotiation was still the only realistic response to the threat of war. On the subject now at the centre of the Christian debate he said that: in current conditions
Supply
deterrence based on balance, should certainly not be seen as an end in itself but as a step on the way to progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable. The Pope commented to anti-nuclear groups that there is a profound and sincere desire for peace but noted that their project proposal and policy can often lend themselves to political exploitation. 1 think what Pope John Paul has said is indeed something on which we should reflect.
There is as well a second morality at issue. Deterrence can be made and kept as a stable system, with only a remote chance of nuclear war. The primary intention is not to kill the enemy but to keep the peace. The question is: Does the immorality of something which will only happen in extreme circumstances outweigh the morality of what is being achieved day by day, and has been achieved for over 34 years, peace in Europe? Surely the greater good is served by ensuring that nuclear weapons are never used by preventing nuclear war in the first place.
Many Hon. Members will have followed the discussion at the recent Anglican General Synod in England on the morality of deterrence. One-sided disarmament, which is indeed what this motion calls for

Mir. Broadbent: It does not. Be honest.


J. Gilles Lamontagne: -was turned down by more than three to one. I think it is unilateral because the Hon. Member only spoke about the West. He never spoke about the other side. Instead, the church called upon the British Government to sustain their nuclear deterrent while seeking multilateral disarmament. We, too, are convinced of the correctness of this multilateral approach. In the meantime deterrence, although perhaps morally flawed for some, is the only means at present whereby war can be prevented and the threat of war kept as it is now, very low. Clearly it is the lesser evil.
Of course, that is not the end of it. No one can rest comfortably on such a policy alone as the basis of international peace for the rest of time. This is why we have to search unremittingly for better ways of ensuring a stable world. Vital among these is the Government's commitment to pursue effective measures of arms control and disarmament. In the meantime, for deterrence to remain effective Canada and other NATO nations must from time to time modernize their defence equipment, as existing systems become obsolete, if they want to retain a deterrent capability.
To those people who imply that Canada believes in building up a western nuclear war fighting capacity, I would like to say that the Government, together with other alliance governments, sees every part of our security policy and every weapon in the alliance arsenal as having only one purpose, that of contributing to deterrence and preventing war. A military balance is essential in today's world to our own security and that of our allies. We must use it as the basis for arms control, not as the starting point for an arms race. We want a balance,

June 14, 1983
Supply
but we want one at much lower levels of armament on both sides than is the case at present.
Of course, that has long been the basis of NATO policy. It was the entire basis for NATO's December, 1979 two-track decision. Canada supported that decision and continues to support its implementation on both tracks, including deployment if arms control negotiations fail to yield satisfactory results. Our deepest wish is that deployment will not be necessary. But in logic it is difficult to see how, if Canadian support for the NATO decision was not then regarded as contributing to nuclear proliferation or to the arms race, any possible assistance with the testing of one of the delivery vehicles could be so construed now.
I recognize that there is a widespread climate of uncertainty, and in some cases fear and insecurity seems to have spread in recent years in the West. Sadly some Canadians seem determined to cultivate that fear and insecurity. They would even have us believe that they have the monopoly on concern for humanity. Of course they have no such monopoly. The Government shares the same concern, at least to as great a degree. We respect those who work for peace, but we reject the sanctimony of those who take unto themselves the word "peace" as if it were their own. We are convinced that Canada and Canadians are best served by a prudent defence strategy and a realistic arms control policy. Within the NATO alliance we have both.
The upsurge of anti-nuclear sentiment, with its overtone of anti-Americanism, is one of the most important problems we face today. The United States has been and remains essential to our security and that of Europe. NATO policies and determination have brought about changes in Soviet attitudes, not those of the peace movements or the unilateralists. It is NATO which is proposing radical solutions in arms negotiations and the Soviet Union which is holding things up. Popular protest should be directed at the Soviet Union, not at the United States. If one had only two choices, to live in one or the other country as a pacifist, which one would be chosen-to live in the United States with its freedoms or in Soviet Russia which incarcerates pacifists or anyone who wants to petition their Government?


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


J. Gilles Lamontagne: Perhaps we have only ourselves to blame. We had assumed that our security policy and the basis for it was both well understood and accepted by the great majority of Canadians. But we may have failed to put over to some the basic aims of the strategy of deterrence-the maintenance of peace as well as freedom. We and everyone listening to my comments are horrified by any prospect of war, but responsible governments have an obligation to face up to the horror of war and work to prevent it. That is what our security policy is about.
Quite frankly, such a motion from a Party that proposes that Canada withdraw from NATO and end our alliance with the Americans does not surprise me. Their ideas on Canadian
defence policy or the lack of it in most areas are well known to the Canadian people. It is more or less a policy of submission. Canadians are overwhelmingly in favour of NATO and our alliance partnerships. The Government will continue its current policy direction so that the freedom, security and peace of all Canadians are maintained.
To do otherwise would be to invite aggression. 1 am thankful that ideas and solutions such as those proffered by Hon. Members of the New Democratic Party did not carry the day in the 1940s in England when the liberty of all the free world was at stake. We on this side of the House have learned from history. I suggest Hon. Members opposite spend a little more time reading and pondering the hard lessons of the past. I could give them a few lessons from my own experiences.
The Hon. Leader of the New Democratic Party mentioned something about his small daughter.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: I regret to interrupt the Hon. Minister but his allotted time has expired. He may continue with unanimous consent. Is there unanimous consent?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


J. Gilles Lamontagne: I will be just a few minutes, Mr. Speaker. At the beginning of his speech the Hon. Leader of the NDP mentioned with great emotion his love and concern for his ten-year-old daughter. I could tell him that 1 have four children and I do not want them to go through what I went through in 1937, 1938 and 1939.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


J. Gilles Lamontagne: Some people at that time lacked the courage or the vision to see what was coming. They did not believe that was was imminent. Do they remember Mr. Chamberlain returning from that great peace mission in Munich? There was great elation in England.


John Edward Broadbent: Be honest, face the argument,


J. Gilles Lamontagne: Don't worry. No one remembers the nonaggression pact signed between Russia and Germany. All these things were not worth the paper on which they were written.
What this Government and most Canadians want is for us to do everything we can to preserve peace and our freedoms, liberties and rights. At the same time they want us to work very hard toward negotiations so that we can look at deescalation of nuclear weapons and see how we can attain peace. It takes two to do this. I do not think it is right to blame the United States, as many people do, for not negotiating seriously and never mentioning that on the other side Soviet Russia is not dealing seriously with the matter at all.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Anguish:: Mr. Speaker, as an individual I have a great deal of respect for the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamontagne) and for what he and others did to serve Canada during the Second World War. Also I respect his integrity as a
June 14, 1983

member of the Privy Council. However, 1 would like to point out that the New Democratic Party has never stood and I hope will never stand for any kind of unilateral disarmament.
I say sincerely to the Minister that I think the matter is cheapened when it is put to the issue of choosing whether we would rather be under Soviet control or American control. As an individual I believe, as do Hon. Members of the NDP across the country, in the freedoms and justices for which people like the Minister of National Defence and other Members of the House of Commons fought during the Second World War and during other wars in which Canada has been involved. I do not want to see this debate cheapened to an issue of politics choosing either a communist or free world. 1 believe all Members of this House would choose the free world in which we live, which we would go to arms again for under similar circumstances. I am sure Members would take up that call.

It is not an issue of the United States versus the Soviet Union. It is not an issue of New Democrats versus Conservatives versus Liberals. The question is nuclear arms. This House of Commons and this Parliament should deal very seriously with that issue. The consequences are devastating. Although the Minister mentioned that the Pope had taken an initial step, we must take steps beyond that to work for some kind of multilateral disarmament around the world. Canada can play a very key role in that. I want to set the record straight.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Order. I apologize for interrupting the Hon. Member, but the provisional orders of the House provide for brief questions and comments. It has been determined previously that 90 seconds would be reasonable in the circumstances, especially in view of the large number of Members rising to put questions and make comments. Would the Hon. Member please make his point.


Douglas Keith Anguish: Mr. Speaker, I respect your intervention. I think the less than a minute which I took is reasonable in terms of addressing the speaker. The question I have directly for the Minister of National Defence follows on a very local concern. I understand that the nuclear arms issue and the Cruise missile is a much larger issue, a global issue. My question relates to a local concern.
The constituency I represent contains within it part of the Primrose Lake air weapons range where the Cruise missile is proposed to be tested. I have constituents who live within three miles of the border of the Primrose Lake air weapons range. It has been admitted in the umbrella agreement which was tabled in this House that the Cruise missile can become lost. It was admitted as a fact that a couple of Cruise missiles have recently crashed in the United States. It does not matter to those people whether the delivery system contains a nuclear warhead or not; there is the possibility of its crashing in their community. It is nuclear weaponry. The only thing that is not there is the nuclear warhead.
Supply
What provision is made for people just outside the range with regard to the possibility of the Cruise missile becoming lost and crashing into one of the communities I represent as a Member of Parliament in this House of Commons? What provisions are there to provide security to them and to provide compensation in cases where a faulty Cruise missile is proposed to be tested?


J. Gilles Lamontagne: Mr. Speaker, I suggest that the Hon. Member read very carefully the agreement and also the memorandum of understanding in which all the security measures are listed-what we should ask from our American friends, what is the possibility of an accident and so on.
In view of the few words that have just been said, I would like to mention again that it is an unarmed missile. There is no question of a nuclear weapon at all in this case. It is the guidance system we are testing. This missile has already been tested in other places. May I assure you that all precautions will be taken to ensure that it does not fly over urban areas. All security measures will be taken, just as security measures are taken with regard to any plane or other flying object travelling over a particular area. Therefore the Hon. Member need not worry about a possible accident. Everything will be taken care of very carefully.


Mr. Heap:: Mr. Speaker, I wish to address a question to the Minister regarding that part of his speech in which he compared this motion to the proposal that was under debate within the Anglican Church in England. The Minister may have unintentionally misled the House by his remarks; his remarks could have that effect.
The motion of the Anglican Church in England was a recommendation for complete nuclear disarmament. The motion now before the House refers to only one element of the nuclear armaments system, in fact one element of the nuclear arms delivery system. The Leader of the New Democratic Party (Mr. Broadbent) went to pains to make clear in his speech that he was talking about only that one part of the system, particularly for the reason that that would have an excalating effect if allowed to proceed. He made it clear that neither he nor his Party advocates complete nuclear disarmament, as did the resolution before the Anglican Church in England. Therefore I would ask the Minister to clarify his remarks to that effect so as to remove any completely erroneous suggestion that what we are dealing with today is total nuclear disarmament.


J. Gilles Lamontagne: Mr. Speaker, I agree it is not exactly the same issue, but it is very hard to dissociate this resolution or the Anglican Church resolution from deterrence. Any weakening on what we claim to be a critical, credible deterrent would diminish the power and the credibility of such a deterrent. That was the basis on which the Anglican Church in England was discussing the issue. When they said they should eliminate all nuclear weapons in Great Britain, the argument came back as to how there would be a deterrent which would be credible if that was done. It is the same situation here. We consider the Cruise missile testing as part of the global deterrent asked for

June 14, 1983
Supply
by the Europeans on the two-track decision. We consider this as giving our allies moral support for what they are doing in Europe.


Mr. Young:: Mr. Speaker, during the course of the Minister's speech he developed an argument around the deterrent factor and suggested that if Afghanistan had had a nuclear weapon, it would have been a deterrent to any invasion by the Soviet Union. Is the Minister proposing that there be a wider proliferation of nuclear weapons as a deterrent? For example, in Third World countries such as Nicaragua, where there are tensions, should there be nuclear warheads as a deterrent against countries that may threaten them? Is that what the Minister was suggesting or was he being a bit facetious when he made that kind of argument?


J. Gilles Lamontagne: Mr. Speaker, what I meant when I said that was much more profound. I did not have time to elaborate on the issue. I wanted to illustrate the kind of power which invaded Afghanistan. I mentioned that the nuclear deterrent is essential in order to prevent war and preserve peace. I do not want to imply that every country should have nuclear weapons in order to prevent invasion. I just say that if Afghanistan had been a nuclear power, I do not think Soviet Russia would have dared risk a nuclear war by invading it. I just wanted to illustrate that when the Soviets decide to have their way, making people submit who would not do that voluntarily, they do what they want by force. That is contrary to the manner on our side which always tries to act as democratically as possible. This can be argued either way.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: Mr. Speaker, I would first like to say that I regret that the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) is not present to hear this debate. I have noticed during Question Period that he is interested in the subject and one would assume that, because of his intimate knowledge of the subject, he has quite a considerable bit to do with the making of the policy of the Government. I do regret that he is not here. I am sure that he has other duties that have kept him away.
There are really three issues that we should be discussing today in a debate on nuclear disarmament. We should first of all talk about nuclear arms control, which everybody is in favour of. We should then talk about the testing of the Cruise missile as another facet of the same problem. Finally, we should talk about the Canada-U.S. agreement. These three things are completely intertwined, and it is very difficult to discuss them together in the context of non-confidence motion. I shall have more to say about this motion in a moment.
Yesterday when I spoke in the House, I was critical of the Government for not giving us more information on the agreements that are likely to be signed. I was looking at the "Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the Canada-U.S. Test and Evaluation Program", which contains the kinds of things that I think the Government should be telling us about before it takes the final step, if it ever does, and agrees
to test the Cruise missile. I expect that what we really want is the project arrangement document. Now, as we listen to what I am about to read, we should search our minds to see if there is any security aspect that, if breached, would be devastating to a defence effort. The document reads:
The Project Arrangement document will contain, as applicable, the following:
a.	an outline of the T&E project;
b.	a description of the agreed location and the project plan;
c.	a full description of access to and use of test sites accorded to DOD including:
(1)	details of personnel and equipment to be employed in Canada,
(2)	details of troop movements, flight plans, and reconnaissance requirements,
(3)	general details of RF emitters, (specific details on power and bandwidth will be provided separately to DND for concurrence),
(4)	details of required installation and removal of DOD fixed equipment,
(5)	restrictions on access and any plans to provide additional site security that DOD may find necessary, and
(6)	any other special requirements;
d.	details of the DND control, safety and security precautions for the T&E project;
e.	details of the DND support and/or participation;
f.	a description of construction requirements;
g.	DOD mapping requirements;
h.	details of stores and equipment to be expended or left at the test site for DND disposal;
j.	a statement of DND rights to data arising from the T&E projects;
k.	description of management arrangements including the identification of Project Managers for each Department and a statement on reporting requirements;
m.	a detailed estimate of the anticipated costs for approved DND support;
n.	details on the arrangements for the protection of Intellectual Property;
p.	details of arrangements for security;
q.	details of arrangements for visits;
r.	details on the duration and arrangements for termination of a T&E project before its conclusion; and
s.	details of financial arrangements and reimbursement.
This is not Question Period, but I would hope that if the Minister gets a chance he would respond by telling me what there is within that document that would, if made known, breach security or imperil the security of Canada. If there is anything within that document that would do that, then I would be willing to back off from it. To my mind, that is exactly what I want to know about these tests and I cannot see how it would imperil security at all if I were to find out about them.
Perhaps I could now speak to this rather odd resolution that is before us. I must say that I think the Member for The Battlefords-Meadow Lake (Mr. Anguish), who was talking to the Minister about cheapening this debate, presumably had nothing to do with preparing this cheap little resolution that quite obviously was designed for purely political reasons. It should be borne in mind that this is a mischievous little resolution that includes the implication that someone is considering the testing of nuclear weapons here in Canada while it does not mention whether the two-track policy should be favoured or not. As a matter of fact, we thought of amending this resolution, but its syntax is of such a nature that it
June 14, 1983

would be almost impossible to amend without deleting the entire motion and writing a new one.


John Edward Broadbent: It is very clear.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: It is very clear? What does it mean when it says that it opposes testing in Canada of any nuclear weapon if it does not mean that the drafters of this document are trying to frighten the population?
So far, something else has arisen out of these speeches. Disregarding how Members of the NDP have taken this very, very serious subject and have tried to turn it into a political brownie point for themselves, I would like to point out that, by my understanding, today is the final Opposition Day before we rise for the summer. Today is the last Opposition Day with a vote of non-confidence and we are not touching upon employment, we are not touching upon the economy, we are not touching upon things that are important to the people. We are only touching upon this issue that is important to considerably fewer people than the number of people who are interested in unemployment and in knowing from where they will get their next meal.
Recently I sent out a questionnaire to my constituents to which I received 5,000 responses. I realize the bias that is created by questionnaires with questions that are improperly phrased and I also realize that the people who answered my questionnaire are, to a large degree, people who support me. However, the third question on the questionnaire read: "Do you believe Canada should remain in NATO?" I like to keep these questions short because I do not like to influence people. The responses were yes, 86.6 per cent; no, 7.5 per cent; and no answer, 5.9 per cent. The fourth question read: "Do you believe Canada should agree to have the Cruise missile tested at Cold Lake provided no nuclear armaments are carried into Canada during the tests?" The responses were yes, 72 per cent; no, 23 per cent; and no answer, 4 per cent.
Now, to me, the answers to these two questions were particularly interesting when considered within the context of the answer to the eighth question: "Thinking of federal politics only, do you generally consider yourself to be a supporter of the Liberal Party, the NDP or the PC Party?" The responses were Liberal, 7.3 per cent; NDP, 7.3 per cent; and PC, 73.2 per cent. There were 609 responses that did not answer that question.
Now, in actual figures that comes out to 364 people who claim that they are NDP supporters.


An Hon. Member:: Were all those PC supporters your relatives?


Allan Bruce McKinnon: I do not have 3,661 relatives, unfortunately. I segregated those 364 NDP responses to see how the respondents had answered these two questions. It might be of interest to the Hon. Member who led off this debate that in response to the question whether we should stay in NATO or not, 67 per cent of NDP supporters believed that Canada should remain in NATO. These are people who identify themselves as belonging to the NDP and 67 per cent of them go directly against the
Supply
declared policy of the NDP, which is to withdraw from NATO. Perhaps Members of the NDP should wonder how well they actually represent their own grass roots.
I was equally surprised by the response to the Cruise missile question in that 35 per cent of NDP supporters answered in favour of testing the Cruise missile and 65 per cent were opposed.
I mention these figures in order to impress upon the House something that the House knows very well at the present time, and that is that this issue runs across Party lines. There are many people in Canada who have very sincere opinions on this issue, and I think it is up to all of us to try to educate these people as much as we can so that their decisions and ultimately our decisions will reflect the deepest possible spectrum of public opinion.
Before I go to the main body of my speech, I would like to mention the theological background of this question. For a while this morning, I began to feel as if I were at some kind of a theological college where people were questioning what the General Synod of the Church of England said. A headline from the London Times of Friday, February 11, reads: "General Synod rejects unilateral nuclear disarmament". The article went on to say that unilateral nuclear disarmament was rejected and support given in principle to a British nuclear deterrence. The Synod called for a British commitment to no first use.
Along this theological vein, I read further and found a quotation from Pope John Paul who was mentioned by the Leader of the New Democratic Party. An article in The Economist said that Pope John Paul attacked the arms race and called for mutual, progressive and verifiable reductions of armaments. That is exactly what the Conservative Party called for. The article continues:
Negotiation was still, he emphasized, the only realistic response to the threat of war. On the subject now at the centre of the Christian debate, he said:
"In current conditions, deterrence based on balance, certainly not as an end in itself but as a step on the way towards a progressive disarmament, may still be judged morally acceptable".
The article also had this to say:
Inconveniently, Christianity's founder left behind a less than wholly clear set of rules. He instructed his followers to love their enemies, not to resist evil and, when struck, to turn the other cheek. (Matthew 5:39-44). In the Sermon on the Mount, he praised the peacemakers (Matthew 5:9). Yet he also whipped the traders and the money-changers out of the Temple (John 2:14-16), and rather ambiguously said he had come into the world "not to send peace but a sword" (Matthew 10:34). What were his followers to do?
What his followers do 2,000 years later, I suppose, is to debate the thing to some degree. I would ask that the debate be as informed as possible.
I am pleased that this motion is before the House because we have needed one, Mr. Speaker. I wanted to have a debate after we got the information that 1 have detailed today. I want to point out some of the misconceptions and some of the

June 14, 1983
Supply
misinformation that seems to be abroad in the country concerning the Cruise missile. In view of the number of misconceptions, perhaps it would be wise to include some of the history of the initiation and development of this weapon which has brought it to its present stage.
First of all, I believe this missile is not the great leap forward in technology that some people would have us believe. In fact, many knowledgeable people have been concerned that while the Cruise missile and the Pershing II are meant to counter the Russian SS-20, which first came into operational service some four years ago, they are not in the minds of many its equivalent.
The second point is that the Cruise missile is not a first-strike weapon. I realize that the Leader of the New Democratic Party said that it had a potential for that. For those people whose main characteristic is a kind of paranoiac anti-Americanism, it is fashionable to claim that the Cruise missile is a quintessential first-strike weapon. Such is not the case. It is, however, a very capable second-strike weapon. The main requirement of a second-strike weapon is that it should deter a first strike. The capabilities of a first-strike weapon are that it should be able to render the enemy's nuclear armaments incapable of retaliation.
Until quite recently one seldom heard the expression "first-strike weapon" applied to any type of weapon except the intercontinental ballistic missile, the ICBM, and rightly so. To fulfil the prime requirement, the ability to destroy all of the enemy's weapons that can reach your territory, is not possible at the present time for either side, and there is very little likelihood that it will be possible within the next decade.
There are really no weapons with a first-strike capability, therefore. The main weapon that prevents the first-strike scenario from being valid is nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed submarines on both sides, cruising in the deepness of the oceans. It is not possible at the present time to track or locate them but their armament is well able to be fired with fairly good accuracy onto the enemy's homeland. So let us stop the misinformation about the Cruise missile being a great leap forward and the ultimate in first-strike weapons.
I am not alone in this, Mr. Speaker. I should like to quote someone who might be recognized by the Party on my left. Mr. Ernie Regehr is the research director for Project Ploughshares. I do not agree with Mr. Regehr very often but I respect him as one who is dedicating his life to examining the question of nuclear armaments. In a letter to The Globe and Mail on February 14 he wrote:
The term "first-strike" is used by nuclear strategists to refer to a pre-emptive nuclear attack by one side against the other's nuclear weapons system-
Any country pursuing a first-strike capability would build weapons systems that are highly accurate, with a short warning time-
Any country pursuing a first-strike capacity would be unlikely to rely on cruise missiles-
Another authority, Adam Bromke, who I believe was a former adviser to the President of the United States, said:
The cruise missile is not an offensive, "first strike" weapon. The Soviets, in fact, are more concerned about the deployment in Europe of the Pershing II-
If one compares the Cruise missile to the SS-20, the comparison is not too favourable for the Cruise. To understand this it should be pointed out that the method of propulsion and the airframe that compose the main components of the Cruise missile are very similar to the German weapon of World War II which was known as the V-l. That is, both vehicles are airbreathing, pilotless aircraft. The improvement in the Cruise missile over the V-I is mainly in the guidance system, which is much more sophisticated. The Cruise missile, however, flies along at 450 to 600 miles per hour and has a range of approximately 1,800 miles. The SS-20, which it is supposed to counter, can cover 1,800 miles in some six minutes whereas the Cruise missile would take three hours to do the same thing.
Much has been made of the fact that the Cruise missile flies close to the ground and cannot be picked up by radar. In opposition to this, one should realize that whether you can pick up the SS-20 or not makes very little difference. There is nothing in any nation's arsenal at the present time that is able to stop the SS-20 from completing its course and landing on the target. Think about that for a moment-the weapon that the Cruise missile is supposed to counter is incapable of being stopped by existing defensive weapons and can go from launch to target, 1,800 miles, in six minutes. The Cruise missile could be shot down by any modern fighter if it had sufficient warning; it can be shot down by enemy ground fire and it takes three hours to cover the same distance.
In view of time constraints, Mr. Speaker, and for other reasons I will leave the history of the Cruise missile to my distinguished colleague, the Hon. Member for Kingston and the Islands (Miss MacDonald), who will go into that aspect of the debate, considering that the two-track decision was taken in 1979.
A year or two after that the NATO allies announced the development of the Pershing II and the Cruise missiles must go ahead if a self-imposed deadline were to be met; that is, that deployment should start in the late fall of 1983 or in early 1984. This announcement served to bring the Russians to the negotiating table in Europe. Unfortunately, little has developed until quite recently. I for one am very encouraged by the developments of the last six months. I agree with those who say that the fact that the Russians have made concessions is not unrelated to the NATO decision to go ahead with the deployment of the Cruise and the Pershing II and to show their united determination on this matter. It is partly because of the request of the other nations in NATO that the United States has taken a conciliatory attitude as well. I feel much more optimistic than I did six months ago about the likelihood of us taking some strides towards what we all wish to do, and that is to reduce the risk of nuclear war and reduce nuclear armaments to a manageable level at least. It is to be hoped that some time in the future we will do away with them altogether.
As to the decision at the present time as to whether we should test the Cruise missile, we should bear in mind that the missile will not bear nuclear arms in Canada. We should also bear in mind that for the last 37 years we have had the benefit
June 14, 1983

of the protection of NATO and the alliance. We have not been a strong ally, while expecting to have the protection. There is a limit, 1 expect, to the extent to which our allies would be willing to accept our non-effectiveness. That might well be when we not only preach to them about nuclear weapons but would refuse to allow them to be able to test the carrying vehicles in Canadian skies. If we expect to be treated as a member of the alliance, then surely we must expect to contribute something.
I suppose the whole question comes down to whether or not nations can trust each other. There has been little in the behaviour of the U.S.S.R. in the post-World War II era to instil confidence in us that they can as a nation be trusted. I do not believe that the people of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary or Afghanistan believe that Russia can or should be trusted. This presents real difficulty, of course, on the international stage. All Canadians, in fact all intelligent beings on earth, hope that nuclear arms can be first restricted, then reduced, and that greater security can be brought about by that means.
The main difference, in truth, between the peace activists and the rest of us, is how to get from the position we are in now to that future day when we hope to have the world not absolutely nuclear free, but at least have clear evidence of control. What I am saying is that our aim is identical. We wish to have that peaceful world where we can rest assured there is control over the defence forces which will lessen the likelihood of an outbreak.
The question is how we get from here to there without endangering ourselves unduly. I doubt if unilateral disarmament is the way. I doubt if sanctimonious protestations of our own purity will guarantee our safety. The recent statements made by the U.S.S.R. that they might be adopting a policy of launch and warning is what used to be called "sabre rattling".


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Order. I regret to interrupt the Hon. Member for Victoria (Mr. McKinnon) but his time has expired. He can continue with unanimous consent of the House.


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Agreed.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: I wish to thank my colleagues for the extended time. There is no evidence in our recent history that disarmament leads to peace. In fact, the nations which have fallen to aggressors have been those with weak forces and no allies. All of us, I am sure, certainly the Conservative Party, are in favour of nuclear disarmament, but it must be mutual, balanced and verifiable.
I wish to add a few words which were written to the Conservative Party outlining our policy in this matter on March 29. We have had a long and serious debate in our caucus on this matter. There was a memorandum circulated to all
Supply
Progressive Conservative Members of Parliament from the Hon. Member for Yukon (Mr. Nielsen) which stated, and I quote:
As 1 understood the consensus reached by us last Wednesday, March 23rd, the essence of the Progressive Conservative Party policy on disarmament is to have the Canadian government, with other middle powers, press both the Soviet Union and the United States to make progress in the Geneva negotiations for mutual, balanced and verifiable cuts in nuclear arms.
We call for productive negotiations that will result in a balance so that no new nuclear missiles will be deployed in Europe.
If the negotiations fail and NATO's deployment of Cruise and Pershing missiles proceeds, we support the testing of the Cruise missile delivery system in Canada.
Canada's defence budget and our alliance with NATO must remain strong, as our contribution to maintaining security against a conventional attack.
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.


Mr. Keeper:: Mr. Speaker, I would like to comment by way of a question to the last speaker. I might say my comments apply equally to the speech of the Minister and I am disappointed that he has already left the House. They both raised the same notion. They tried to attach to the resolution which we have brought before this House the notion that what we are advocating is unilateral disarmament. They also tried to label the peace movement in this country as calling for unilateral disarmament. That is completely false, Mr. Speaker. It is misleading and if is unfair. It is precisely what the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) tried to do in his open letter to the public.
On June 11, Mr. Speaker, we had some 25,000 people in the City of Winnipeg marching against the testing of the Cruise missile in this country. The reason they marched, and in the process formed a complete circle over many blocks, was because they are against Canada participating in the nuclear arms race. They are for multilateral mutual disarmament. They are for negotiations. We must stop this misleading, this attempt to smear the peace movement as being in favour of simply surrendering to the Soviet Union, as the Minister suggested. What we are in favour of is mutual disarmament and we are against this country participating in a nuclear arms race.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: I thought that the new rules included the likelihood of having a question. I am sorry that the Hon. Member for Winnipeg-St. James (Mr. Keeper) forgot to ask his question, if he had one.
He did imply that the Minister and I are on exactly the same footing with respect to this matter. I cannot remember exactly what the Minister said, but I feel fairly confident that an examination of Hansard would not disclose where I disparaged the peace groups at all. I feel they are fine citizens, very dedicated and sincerely believe that they are going the right way, as many people in this House who are not going the same way believe that they are going the right way. It is an honest difference of opinion among grown up people.
I do not believe the peace movement is in favour of unilateral disarmament. I believe the idea expressed that there should

June 14, 1983
Supply
be no Cruise testing is symbolic. Cruise testing is not dangerous to the people near the ranges, but it is a handy and convenient symbol. If these people really want to secure peace, and I am sure they do, I feel it would be more logical to try and stop the Pershing II, for example, which really is a much more efficient and stronger weapon than the Cruise missile. However, the Cruise missile is the one which is being tested in Canada so that has grabbed their imagination. I believe they are a fine bunch of people. I have had almost numberless meetings with them this past six months and I have found them to be great Canadian citizens to talk to and I rather like them, as a matter of fact. We have received many a constructive suggestion from them. I have nothing against them at all and I do not believe the Minister has much against them either; but he can speak for himself.


Mr. McRae:: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the Hon. Member a question dealing with the Cruise missile. The Hon. Member was present when Mr. Anderson, a senior official of DND, stated that the first missile which they would like to test would be an air-launched Cruise missile. He then stated that DND might be interested in testing a ground-launched missile subsequently-"might" be interested. I would ask the Hon. Member, who was the former Minister of National Defence, if he seriously believes that the Cruise missile testing in Canada has anything to do with the ground-launched General Dynamics missile which apparently will be deployed this fall, which will have been ordered in March at the latest with all the specifications built in and which has been thoroughly tested? Or has it to do with the whole SAC Stealth project which will be coming along and which we will be testing next winter? The basic reason for testing it is that they want a polar situation similar to the Soviet tundra area, which does not have the same kind of reference points. Given the statement of the Minister, which was that of the Department and was solicited by the Hon. Member himself, it seems to me at this particular point we are talking about an entirely different situation.
I would also like to ask the Hon. Member-


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Order, order. The question has been put.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: I have been waiting some time for you to interrupt, Mr. Speaker. First of all, I am rather surprised that the Hon. Member should not have asked his own Minister of National Defence what Mr. Anderson meant. The Minister has just finished speaking and was open for questioning. Mr. Anderson stated Department policy and it is really strange for me to be held responsible for the answer I received to a question which I asked one of the officials.
The Hon. Member talked about the Stealth system which is coming on. I do not know if this had anything to do with his first question or not. I do not know why the extra issue was thrown in. However, as I understand his question which was included in all that verbiage, it was did I honestly believe that the tests which they are going to carry out at Cold Lake have anything to do with the ground-launched Cruise missile such as will be deployed in Europe. The answer to that is yes. That is because the guidance system is still under test. It is a very complex system, as the Hon. Member no doubt knows. They
are testing it in a part of the world which is ideally suited for the test. Therefore there is a connection, that is, as far as I can tell from the word I received-I hate to tell the Hon. Member this in the Minister's presence, but I do receive some word out of the Department occasionally-which leads me to believe that the main purpose of the testing here is going to be the guidance system. We are ideally suited for it. Therefore the answer to the question is yes.


Douglas Keith Anguish: Mr. Speaker, the Hon. Member referred to the drafting of our resolution and that the use of the words "nuclear weapons" was a scare tactic. I admit that if 1 had personally drafted the resolution it would have included "nuclear warheads" as well. It is interesting that the Member talked about a questionnaire he sent out which said that there would be no nuclear weapons carried during the testing, which also could be a scare tactic as well by implying that at some point there could be nuclear weapons used in the testing process in Canada.
As the Hon. Member knows, I proposed a Private Members' Bill in the House calling for Canada to become a nuclear weapons free zone. The purpose of that, of course, is to have more countries not involved in any way in the nuclear arms race by way of testing or production. Therefore they could work to encourage countries who do possess nuclear weapons to have verifiable, negotiated multilateral arms reduction. I would ask the Hon. Member if he would in fact support a Bill that would declare Canada a nuclear weapons free zone?


Allan Bruce McKinnon: We went through this when the Hon. Member put forward such a Bill, which 1 found unacceptable for several other reasons. I do not think there was a vote on that Bill in the House, and there were quite a few other aspects concerning this brought up during the debate. I think I pointed out at that time that the Conservative Party is the only Party in this House whose skirts are clean on the subject of whether we will have a nuclear free Canada or not. The NDP voted the Diefenbaker Government out of office on that very issue by aligning themselves with their traditional allies, the Liberals, who were even hungrier for power than they are now.


Flora Isabel MacDonald: Including the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett).


John Edward Broadbent: We will watch your vote today, talking about "allies".


Allan Bruce McKinnon: We are the one Party in this House which has never voted in favour of having nuclear weapons in Canada. That is what it amounts to.


Douglas Keith Anguish: You could answer the question as well, Allan. Excellent politics.


Pauline Jewett: Mr. Speaker, it has been suggested that it might be a good idea to call it one o'clock.


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.
June 14, 1983


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Order. Is there a disposition to call it one o'clock?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


An Hon. Member:: No.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: It is not agreed.


Pauline Jewett: Mr. Speaker, in listening to the Hon. Members who spoke subsequent to the introduction of this debate by the Leader of the New Democratic Party, I was struck by the fact that they seemingly missed what it is that the Canadian, American, West German and even the East European public are concerned about. What they are concerned about and what they fear is nuclear war itself.
The words "nuclear war" are a contradiction in terms. The idea of a nuclear exchange being anything like a conventional war is absurd. When the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamontagne) and the Hon. Member for Victoria (Mr. McKinnon) refer back to World War II and suggest that somehow a nuclear exchange would be in any way comparable to that, they are absolutely and totally wrong. They remind me of the woman who felt very deeply about it and who said: "I don't want to send my boy to a nuclear war".


J. Gilles Lamontagne: Any war.


Pauline Jewett: The Minister says "any war". Once again he shows that he has simply not yet grasped the fact-


J. Gilles Lamontagne: You have to prevent any war.


Pauline Jewett: -that a nuclear exchange would mean a nuclear holocaust and not a war in the conventional sense of the word. That is what is frightening people. That is what has everyone marching and protesting. Their leaders do not seem to understand that nuclear war is impossible. It would be nuclear holocaust.
At one point in his speech the Minister said that nuclear weapons may be used. Once again he is apparently under the impression that nuclear weapons serve a military purpose. As many military people will tell him, as Lord Louis Mountbatten wrote so eloquently, nuclear weapons serve no military purpose whatsoever. The minute a nuclear weapon is used, or possibly even a warning that a nuclear weapon might be used leading to an attack on warning, there will be no limitation of the nuclear exchange that will follow and millions upon millions upon millions of people-two-thirds, three-quarters or four-fifths of the whole northern hemisphere-will in a few hours' time die.
Another related reason why people feel so insecure over the possession by many countries now of nuclear weapons is that they have no voice whatsoever in their possible use. There is no
sense of public participation in a nuclear holocaust, except the participation that comes with annihilation, annihilation without representation. They have no voice.
I will call it one o'clock, Mr. Speaker.


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Order, please. It being one o'clock, I do now leave the Chair until two o'clock this afternoon.
At 1 p.m. the House took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The House resumed at 2 p.m.


Mr. Gaston Gourde (Levis):: Madam Speaker, yesterday, the following headline appeared in Le Droit: "The Leader will speak for the Party", and the newspaper was quoting Brian Mulroney.
In her article, the reporter said that Mr. Mulroney would not tolerate Members of his party making statements on all kinds of issues. He added, however, that he would be consulting his Members.
In view of these two statements, I would appreciate it if the new Leader would publicly state his position on the new grain transportation policy, better known as the change in the Crow rate.
First of all, 1 would like to know whether he agrees with Bill C-155 which is now before the House, and second, whether he agrees that grain transportation subsidies should be paid in full to the railway companies.
The Canadian people have a right to know the position of the Progressive Conservative Leader, especially since the debate on this question is to resume on Thursday. The Leader of the Liberal Party and Prime Minister has only a few seconds to answer such questions in the House, and I shall therefore give the new Leader two days to make his position on this issue clear to the Canadian people.

June 14, 1983



NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS


Mr. Dave Nickerson (Western Arctic):: Madam Speaker, while the Progressive Conservative Party staunchly supports Canada's commitment to NATO and, in principle, supports the testing of unarmed Cruise missiles in Canada, it is obvious that specific approvals cannot be given until full knowledge of any given test proposal is made available.
As the Member of Parliament for the region over which the testing of the Cruise missile may take place, I insist that public safety of people close to the flight path be of prime consideration, and that testing not take place until it be demonstrated that there be no danger involved for the residents in the test area.
We must be assured that the missile performs properly on short range tests in the U.S. before long range trials take place in Canada. We must be assured that the proposed flight path is nowhere near inhabited settlements.
We must know what will happen in case of a malfunction during flight, and what precautions have been taken against this possibility. Only after these and numerous other questions have been answered can we be sure that the tests can take place without danger to Canadian citizens or to their property.
* *
*



NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE-DENIAL OF FRANCHISE TO SASKATOON

Mr. Bob Ogle (Saskatoon East):: Madam Speaker, yesterday, the National Hockey League took over the St. Louis Blues. NHL President, John Ziegler, said the League will "try to find suitable ownership that will take over the team and operate it in St. Louis". As you know, Saskatoon had already put in a bid, "cash on the barrell", to buy the St. Louis Blues and move the team to Saskatoon. That bid was refused by the NHL. Personally, 1 was not surprised. Professional hockey is big business, and the lords and barons of big business do not really care for little folks. Many hockey fans are from the rank and file of Mr. and Mrs. Ordinary Person.
In Saskatchewan people are born and bred hockey fans. They grow up in the "hockey player factory of the world". Saskatchewan is Gordie Howe country, Bentley country, Metz country. Mayor Cliff Wright of Saskatoon, Bill Hunter, and many others have worked hard and seriously to see that professional hockey comes to Saskatchewan. They are not going to stop now. Yesterday Mayor Wright told me that he was very pleased with the rapid progress being made in the
inquiry under the Combines Investigation Act, and the serious way in which the matter was being taken.
Other NHL teams are in trouble and will be coming up for sale. If John Ziegler feels he can stop Saskatoon by letting the League take over losing teams, he should pause to reflect.
Lastly, Saskatchewan is "next year" country. Every Saskatchewan-born person always knows that if you get "hailed out" this year, all you have to do is wait for next year.
In this vein, all seven Saskatchewan NDP federal Members are "on side" and support the efforts of Saskatoon and Mayor Wright to make Saskatchewan a National Hockey League Province.



METRIC CONVERSION


Mr. Stanley Hudecki (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Defence):: Madam Speaker, on Sunday, on board Air Canada's Flight 472 en route from Toronto to Ottawa, the captain announced to the people that we were flying at an altitude of 20,000 feet above ground level.
It is of concern to me that a Crown corporation, which provides such an important service to the public, continues to use imperial measurements-


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Stanley Hudecki: -even though Canada has metric legislation in place. One would expect that under these circumstances a Crown corporation would be among the first to join in converting-


Mr. Nielsen:: That's for air safety.


Stanley Hudecki: -its measurements to the metric system, or would at least use both systems of measurement as an interim policy while people adjust to metrication. All Crown corporations should share in the responsibility of helping to educate the public to use the metric system.
I do not know if making announcements about the altitude in feet is a general policy of Air Canada, or whether a choice is given to the individual pilots on whether they may make announcements in either metres, or feet, or both.
In light of the fact that Air Canada is a Crown corporation, and that the move to metric conversion is a reality in this country, I would urge the Government to insist that Air Canada and all other Crown corporations-


Mr. Domm:: Put them in jail!


Stanley Hudecki: -fulfil their obligations to convert to the metric system.
June 14, 1983



TOURISM


Mr. Gus Mitges (Grey-Simcoe):: Madam Speaker, it was encouraging to see the reduction in our tourist deficit from $1.09 billion to $1.05 billion in the first quarter of this year compared to the same time last year.
However, the bad news is that our two main airlines are again requesting a further increase in their fares of 5 per cent, for what they claim is compensation for losses caused by the recession.
To me, and to the business community, one does not further penalize one's customers by making them pay a higher price for a product without first making every attempt to cut fat and waste from the overhead.
By raising travelling costs, by charging double the cost of a gallon of gasoline more than is paid by our neighbours to the south, by excessive taxation on spirits, and the high cost of accommodations in Canada, everything possible is being done to discourage foreign tourists from coming to Canada, and to negate real opportunity to increase tourism and to reduce our tourist deficit further.
Our country has the potential to offer tourists every type of holiday and relaxation package that is possible. All we need is for all of us and all our Governments, municipal, provincial and federal, to work together and dovetail all our efforts, and to withdraw or negate all legislation that is detrimental to tourism. As well, it is essential to give the more than 100,000 tourist operators in Canada the assistance needed to develop this very important industry to its full potential. It is my hope that all this will be noted by all Governments, and that some positive action for the Canadian tourist industry will finally be undertaken.



THE ADMINISTRATION


Mr. Doug Lewis (Simcoe North):: Madam Speaker, my fancy engraved invitation states that all Members of Parliament are being invited to the Six and Five Awards Dinner-


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Douglas Grinslade Lewis: -by the Secretary of State Mr. Joyal and a member of the other place.


Erik Nielsen: Keith Davey.


Douglas Grinslade Lewis: At a time when there are more than two million Canadians out of work, desperately looking for jobs, at a time when personal and business bankruptcies have reached an alltime high, at a time when Canadians are still faced with no
protection from high interest rates on their mortgages, at a time when the Government cannot even process income tax returns, at a time when its credibility is at an all-time low due to the Gillespie affair, the Maislin bailout, and the Canadair fiasco, with all of these other scandals, we suggest-


Some Hon. Members:: Order.


Douglas Grinslade Lewis: -that the Liberal Government should turn its attention to the problems of Canada and forget about fancy dinners and self-congratulatory advertising schemes.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Douglas Grinslade Lewis: There it is. Read it!



NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS


Douglas Keith Anguish: Madam Speaker, today I would like to put into the public record my own personal opposition and that of the New Democratic Party to the proposed testing of the Cruise missile, and take this opportunity to urge the Liberal Government to refuse the request of the United States Defence Department to test the Cruise missile in Canada.
I am not only opposed to the testing of this single weapons system, but I am also opposed to the testing or build up of all nuclear weapons and weapons systems wherever these occur or may occur. I had proposed in my private member's Bill, Bill C-678, an Act declaring Canada a nuclear weapons-free zone, that we join with others who also desire a world free of nuclear arms. At the present time there are six nations in the world which can set off a nuclear explosion, and which possess nuclear arms. It is also speculated by some that Israel, South Africa, and Pakistan also have the capability or soon will have the capability to use nuclear weapons in some cases. In addition to that, we have documented proof that there are another nine countries that could come into the nuclear weapons field within the next couple of years.
[DOT] (MIO)
An intelligent and compassionate Canadian Government would be taking steps to halt the nuclear arms race. We are traditionally a peace loving and a peace keeping nation. We have the ability to exercise our traditions on the world stage. I believe that now is the time to do that. Now is the time to play a more meaningful role, and we should begin by refusing to test the Cruise missile.


Madam Speaker:: Order.



[Stage Direction]
June 14, 1983

Paul Edmund McRae: Madam Speaker, I rise to indicate my strong opposition to the flight testing of the air launched Cruise missile. The testing will not add to the ground launch missile being deployed in Europe but is based on SAC needs and the preparation for the production of 7,000 to 8,000 stealth Cruise missiles making, among other things, long-term arms control impossible.
I object at this point to a polarizing vote in this House on the subject. Since the vote is a matter of confidence in the Government, I will not vote against the Government-


Some Hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Paul Edmund McRae: -because it is my belief that within the Government there is growing support for not testing the Cruise missile. A vote that would defeat this Government would turn this matter over to Mr. Mulroney-


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Paul Edmund McRae: -an avowed supporter of Mr. Reagan.
Given the alternatives, and the desire for my Government to change its policy, it is my intention, along with some other Members on this side, to refrain from adding to the polarization by not voting, unless the Government is clearly threatened.



TOURISM


Stan Darling: Madam Speaker, there are two featured articles on the front page of last Thursday's Parry Sound North Star, one of the great weeklies in my riding-


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Stan Darling: [DOT]-that together tell us a lot about the effect of government policies out in Main Street, Canada. One says, "105 jobs foreseen in construction of $5 million resort." The other says "Only 52 out of 176 CIL Nobel employees to retain jobs."
Under the terms of the COED Program which is the NEED Program as applied to Ontario, the federal and provincial Governments are combining to build a resort facility in the riding, which will create 105 jobs. The catch is that those jobs last for only 2,538 work weeks, or an average of 24 weeks
each. At the same time 124 family bread winners in nearby Nobel are left permanently without a livelihood.
It is all very well to shrug and say, "Well, think of how much worse it would be if the NEED program were not in place." It would be never so much more constructive to point out how much better it would be if this Government were not in place.
Let us not lose sight of the desperate economic situation in which Canadians find themselves with the worst "misery index" in the western world. This is the direct result of the policies selected and followed by the Government.


Madam Speaker:: Order, please.



SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY


Mr. Ian Waddell (Vancouver-Kinsgway):: Madam Speaker, today Mitel Corporation of Kanata, in the Ottawa Valley, saw its shares drop substantially due to IBM plans to buy a 15 per cent interest in Rolm Corporation, which is Mitel's leading rival in the switching system market. Mitel lost a key contract. It shows the volatility of the new high tech market. If Mitel collapses, what will happen to its workers? An assembler, one of 152 workers laid off recently by Nabu Technology, said:
All high tech workers in the region better take notice of what's happening at NABU. We are among the lowest paid and most vulnerable industrial workers and we are all going to get the shaft.
We cannot be Luddites, that is, resisters to technological change. But neither should we be Atari Liberals, those who believe that all the answers will come from technological change.
Marshall McLuhan once said, "New means create new ends as new services create new discomforts." That is all the more reason why, in light of these recent developments, we should get going with a House of Commons committee on technological change, and learn to control high technology for the benefit of Canadian workers.



PRESENCE IN GALLERY OF MAYOR OF BETHLEHEM

Madam Speaker:: I would like to draw the attention of the House to the presence in our gallery of Mr. Elias Freij, Mayor of Bethlehem.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!
June 14, 1983



ORAL QUESTION PERIOD


Hon. Sinclair Stevens (York-Peel):: Madam Speaker, my question is for the Prime Minister who, as we know, has been in office for something over a decade now, a time during which the nation has been plagued with rising unemployment to the point where we now have one million more Canadians out of work than ten years ago. Most alarmingly we find that Data Resources of Canada project that this situation of having an extra one million Canadians unemployed will continue right into the 1990s. Would the Prime Minister explain to the House how we have slipped into this predicament of so many working people being without jobs? Can the Prime Minister offer any hope that the projected almost chronic unemplyment that we foresee in future years will not, in fact, materialize?


Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister):: Madam Speaker, 1 could explain. I am not sure the Hon. Member would accept or understand the explanation.


Sinclair McKnight Stevens: Try me.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: It will take a little bit of time. If the Hon. Member is patient, I will give him various reasons why this has happened. In this period of time there is a developing of new technology. There is an emerging in the Third World of countries which are getting not only into export markets that we had held in the past but are also developing higher technologies than some of the newly industrialized nations. There is a complete restructuring of the patterns of international trade. There has been a world-wide economic slow down, of which every one of the industrialized nations has been a victim. That has been caused in part by very high interest rates. That, in turn, was caused by very high inflation.
The inflationary expectations, Madam Speaker, were a result of a series of events going back to the late 1960s and the early 1970s, a time when inflation was still relatively low but when unemployment was showing signs of creeping up to 5 per cent and 6 per cent, and when the consensus, not only of the economists and specialists, but, I believe it is true to say, of most informed members of the public, was that we should try to stimulate the economy in Canada at that time to bring unemployment down from a rate which was around 6 per cent.
Unfortunately, other countries at the same time were responding to the same kind of political and social pressure. They, too, were stimulating their economies at the same time, and we laid the basis-


An Hon. Member:: Speech.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: I have been asked for a speech. So, if the Hon. Member will be patient, l will come to the 1980s if he lets me finish with the 1970s.


Mr. Epp:: You will be finished in the 1980s.
Oral Questions


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: There was, therefore, a reinforcing of inflationary pressures by the economic policies of the major industrialized countries. At the same time, Madam Speaker, there was a crisis in food production.


Madam Speaker:: Order, please. I know the question was quite general and, therefore, the answer has to be that way. But I think I have to interrupt even this answer and ask everyone to be as brief as possible. The Hon. Member for York-Peel (Mr. Stevens).


PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH RATES
Sinclair McKnight Stevens: Madam Speaker, my supplementary, of course, is for the Prime Minister. He has referred to changing technology during this period, and he is undoubtedly aware of a very recent report from the Conference Board in Canada. It points out that one of the disappointing aspects of the Canadian economic performance over the past decade has been the sharp deterioration in productivity growth.
As the Prime Minister undoubtedly knows, since 1977, while our productivity growth was flat, in Japan it went up 29 per cent, and in England it went up 13 per cent.


Madam Speaker:: Order, please.


Sinclair McKnight Stevens: My question to the Prime Minister-


Madam Speaker:: Order, please. I will stop it right now because the whole Question Period will go that way. The Hon. Member's question should be brief, as should the answers.


Sinclair McKnight Stevens: If technology has been the problem leading to our unemployment, why is Canada's record the worst of major industrial nations, for productivity growth?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Madam Speaker, the Hon. Member is just making up that statistic. It is not the worst. Some countries have been successful in productivity. The Hon. Member mentioned Japan, but most of the other industrialized countries, including the United States, have suffered very low rates of productivity, presumably because in the previous part of the economic cycle productivity had been very high in Canada and in the Unites States.
What happened in the 1970s was that Canada had the fastest rate of job creation of any industrialized nation. We were dedicated then to the creation of jobs. I repeat that we had the fastest growing labour force of any of the major industrialized nations and that we had a record much higher than even Japan or the United States in job creation. We tackled that problem.
In so far as technology is concerned, the Hon. Member has heard the budget speech. He has heard the Minister of Finance indicate the funds which would be going into research and development. He has heard the Minister of Finance announce

June 14, 1983
Oral Questions
the creation of a centre for productivity. We are asking for the co-operation at this time of the various decision makers in society to help us with that centre. I am talking of the labour side and of the managerial side.


COMPARISON WITH UNITED STATES
Sinclair McKnight Stevens: Madam Speaker, again my question is directed to the Prime Minister who, undoubtedly, is taking some comfort today in the plight of other countries. If he wants to compare Canada, perhaps he would compare its record with that of the United States since 1975, where we find that our real growth has been less, our employment creation has been less, and our unemployment has risen faster. Why are the Americans more successful in coping with current economic conditions in the world than his Government in Canada?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Madam Speaker, I do not know to what period the Hon. Member is referring. If we take the whole period of the 1970s, or indeed the whole period since 1968, which is the date that sticks in the Hon. Member's craw, we have created jobs at a faster rate than the United States and, indeed, than even Japan. We had to be attacking the problem of unemployment here-of employment, rather-because we had the fastest growing labour force. There were other countries like Germany and Switzerland which could export their unemployment by sending their gastarbeiten home. We did not use that approach in Canada. We created jobs.
So far as the ranking of Canada is concerned, the Minister of Finance just handed me an analysis in The Gazette this morning which indicates that Canada has gone up in the past year from twelfth to sixth. Even if the Hon. Member is only looking at the past year, he has the answer. If he wants to look at the whole period of the decade, I repeat that in terms of job creation, in terms of unemployment fighting, in terms of bringing down inflation, and in terms of exports, we rank among the two or three best. In some instances we are the best, such as job creation. In others, such as inflation, some other countries did better than we did. But on the average we did very well, and the Hon. Member should not try to hide that.


LABOUR RELATIONS
Mr. Charles Mayer (Portage-Marquette):: Madam Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Labour regarding the grain handling situation on the West Coast. I know the Minister appointed Mr. Kelly on Friday as labour mediator. He is a well respected person in that field. Also we know that the parties met yesterday and again this morning at 9.30 Vancouver time. Could the Minister bring us up to date on how the negotiations are progressing?


Hon.   Chas. L. Caccia@Minister of Labour: Madam Speaker, the Hon. Member has correctly stated the situation. Meetings are taking place. It would be inappropriate for me to make any further comments, except to say that we have a highly respected official representing Labour Canada involved, and that we hope the outcome will be a positive one.


Charles James Mayer: I appreciate the Minister's response.


ROLE OF DEPARTMENT
Charles James Mayer: Madam Speaker, I would just like to point out to the Minister that this is a very crucial industry not only to western Canada but to the country as a whole, and that it would be very unfortunate if there were any kind of work stoppage in this vital industry. Again I ask him to ensure that his Department stays involved to see that everything is done and that there is a settlement without a work stoppage.


Hon.   Chas. L. Caccia@Minister of Labour: Madam Speaker, the presence of the senior assistant deputy minister in charge of mediation is proof of the importance the Government attributes to this particular situation.


NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS
John Edward Broadbent: Madam Speaker, I have a question for the Prime Minister concerning nuclear disarmament. He knows that the two series of talks taking place in Geneva on nuclear disarmament do not have any relevance whatsoever to the testing of air launched Cruise missiles either by the Soviet Union or by the United States. To be specific, even if an agreement is reached in those talks at Geneva, for which we all hope, it would still permit either the United States or the Soviet Union to test an air launched Cruise.
Given the qualitative horrific nature of that particular weapon, and the possibility of both the United States and the Soviet Union proceeding each in its own way to test it, will the Prime Minister take an important step for peace and propose to each country that they begin negotiations, with the view of obtaining agreement on a test ban treaty on air launched Cruise missiles?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Madam Speaker, as far as test ban treaties are concerned, certainly I can indicate that Canada will continue advocating them and, indeed, trying to enjoin the major nuclear powers to accept a general test ban treaty, not only a partial one. The Hon. Member is correct in stating that Cruises are not directly involved in the negotiations in Geneva. Perhaps is talking in the sense that they were not excluded in SALT II, that neither side found it advantageous to say that they would not be developing the Cruise. Of course he is not correct if he is
June 14, 1983

implying-and 1 do not think he is-that the INF negotiations going on at this time are not concerned with the Cruise. They are. For instance, we know that during the walk in the woods between the two main negotiators there was a recognition by both sides that there would be some Cruise deployed.
1 am in sympathy with the hopes of the Hon. Member that there would be a total test ban, but I have to point out to him that it is well known at this time that the Soviets are testing Cruise missiles. They have an advance over us on the short range missiles; they are testing long range missiles. Secretary Andropov said so publicly last December. Therefore the case we have to solve is whether we should unilaterally stop testing when we know this and the other side says that it is testing.


REQUEST THAT PRIME MINISTER INITIATE NEGOTIATIONS
John Edward Broadbent: Madam Speaker, the precise point at issue is to present a concrete challenge, both to the Soviet Union and to the United States, on their willingness with reference to this very specific weapon, to enter into a test ban agreement. I suspect that in his conversations with Mr. Gorbachev, when he was in this country, the Prime Minister might have had with him on this matter and might have obtained some indication that the Soviet Union might be interested in that. I do not know. It will be interesting to see what the Prime Minister says.
I repeat the question. In the interests of mankind in not having either country proceed with the development of this missile beyond the level of development that has already taken place, will he go out front and publicly urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to negotiate toward a test ban treaty concerning air launched Cruise missiles?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Madam Speaker, that, of course, is exactly what I urged when I proposed in 1978, and again in 1980, the strategy of suffocation. By another name, that is stopping of all testing of new weapons and new weapons delivery systems whether they be in the laboratory or on the ground. That is what I proposed to both sides. As I have reported repeatedly to the House, neither the Americans nor the Soviets, nor for that matter the French nor the British, have been prepared to say that they would no longer test weapons. There is a partial test ban treaty but it does not cover delivery systems. It does not cover developing new weapons. It does not even cover testing those weapons by underground explosion.
Once again, I can only say that certainly this side of the House is very anxious to see that kind of a treaty be developed. I did not talk directly with Mr. Gorbachev on that particular subject. I did talk a great deal about the SS-20s and asked why they were deployed. I had occasion to report on that to the House previously.


John Edward Broadbent: Madam Speaker, the Prime Minister knows that the proposal he made at the United Nations, with which
Oral Questions
we are in sympathy and which he acknowledged obtained agreement from neither side, goes well beyond the very specific kind of test ban treaty I am talking about, which refers exclusively to the air launched Cruise missile.


REQUEST THAT FREE VOTE BE HELD ON CRUISE TESTING ISSUE
John Edward Broadbent: Madam Speaker, I have a final question concerning a point raised by one of the Prime Minister's own Members earlier today on the importance of this issue to Canada. Will the Prime Minister take steps to ensure that his House Leader will view the vote that will take place later today on the important matter of testing the Cruise in Canada as not being a vote of confidence, and therefore allow his Members to vote as their consciences dictate? I assure the Prime Minister that is the way we would view this matter on this side of the House.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Madam Speaker, I am afraid I cannot answer that particular suggestion with as much understanding and sympathy as I tried to understand the two previous ones. The NDP is playing games, just as the Tories played games when they had a non-confidence motion on property rights. We are voting the last supply day today. The fate of the Government hangs on whether we get supply or not. If the Hon. Member is suggesting that we change the rules and we get unanimous consent that this not be a supply vote or a confidence vote, and if they now report to me that there has been agreement, I will consult with a few Ministers and give an answer. As far as I know, the question is hypothetical. If we are going to change the rules and say that a non-confidence motion is not a non-confidence motion, then I hope we will do that on many occasions other than just this one.


DENIAL OF NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE FRANCHISE TO SASKATOON-REQUEST THAT PRIME MINISTER INTERVENE
Hon. Ray Hnatyshyn (Saskatoon West):: Madam Speaker, my question is directed to the Prime Minister. The National Hockey League is resorting to extraordinary efforts to keep the St. Louis Blues franchise from coming to Saskatchewan. It includes the disbanding of the team and the dispersal of its players. I know that the Government has been helpful in terms of the Combines Investigation Act. 1 appreciate that very much, as do many Canadians. I would like to ask the Prime Minister whether, on behalf of the Government and the people of Canada, he would be prepared to communicate with the President of the Board of Governors of the National Hockey League, Mr. John Ziegler, indicating support for the application by Saskatchewan for the transfer of the National Hockey League team to that Province.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Madam Speaker, I have been discussing this very matter with some of

June 14, 1983
Oral Questions
my advisers, including the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs and the Minister responsible for sport. I have had the advice of one of our good Saskatchewan Liberals, Mr. Doug Richardson. I am happy that there is also one elected Tory who is interested in this matter. I will report to him later today or this week as to whether there is some way in which 1 can use my good offices to influence the President of the National Hockey League.


REQUEST FOR FAIR HEARING
Ramon John Hnatyshyn: Madam Speaker, I can only thank the Prime Minister for his consideration of this important matter which has the support of so many Canadians and which, in my opinion, is an important ingredient in terms of national unity. Indeed, I understand that the Members of the New Democratic Party are changing their position and may in fact support this application. In view of the fact that Saskatchewan has contributed so much to the National Hockey League, and that indeed the people of Canada in various ways support the National Hockey League, such as through the use of the air waves and the amateur draft, supported by taxpayers' money, is it not a reasonable expectation for the people of Saskatchewan to get a fair hearing from the NHL for a legitimate application for a franchise within their Province?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Madam Speaker, the Hon. Member is making a representation. I have indicated to him that I have had such representations from people on this side. I hope they will be made known to the President of the National Hockey League and the members of the board.


AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY
Mr. Otto Jelinek (Halton):: Madam Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. The much heralded task force report on the auto industry was presented to the Minister nearly a month ago, yet the Government continues to keep this vital sector in the dark, denying the opportunity for long-range planning in that industry and thereby creating the potential for massive employment. Can the Minister tell us at least whether he supports the thrust of the report, if not the details of it? If so, what is he going to do about it? If he has not made up his mind about the report, when, for goodness sake, is he going to come up with a decision so the industry will know where it is heading?


Hon. Ed Lumley (Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce and Minister of Regional Economic Expansion):: Madam Speaker, as I indicated the day after the report was made public, the Government will be giving serious consideration to the recommendations of the report, particularly
because of the dedicated work the members of the task force put into it. We will discuss the report over the course of the summer and respond some time in the fall.


Otto John Jelinek: Madam Speaker, the industry wants to know how long the Government will take to come up with a decision. That is the question I put to the Minister.


VOLUNTARY RESTRAINTS ON JAPANESE IMPORTS-EXPIRY OF AGREEMENT
Otto John Jelinek: Madam Speaker, in the absence of the Minister of State for International Trade I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce. With respect to the voluntary restraints on Japanese auto imports which expire at the end of this month, the travelling but ineffective Minister of State for International Trade said in this House last week that a decision will be made soon on that and, if not, he would "recommend other appropriate steps to the Government". Can the Minister tell this House and the industry whether an agreement in fact will be forthcoming before the end of this month when it expires and, if not, what those other so-called "appropriate steps" will be that the Minister of State for International Trade was talking about?


Edward C. Lumley: Madam Speaker, with respect to the first part of the Hon. Member's question, if he checks he will find that the cochairmen of the task force indicated that they did not expect to get an answer on the major thrust of the task force recommendations until the Fall. Our thinking is along the same line. Regarding the Member's second question, I do not profess to speak for any of my colleagues. When the Minister of State for International Trade returns, I am sure he can answer the Hon. Member more directly than I can.


NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS
Pauline Jewett: Madam Speaker, I wish to direct a question to the Prime Minister regarding Cruise missile testing. The Prime Minister has said on many occasions, most recently on March 24, and I quote:
-our judgment of how the other track was proceeding-
That is negotiations.
-would influence us in deciding whether we would go with the Cruise or not.
On June 1 the Prime Minister said that he would hope to be hearing "very specific proposals rejected or accepted before the end of December", in Geneva. May I ask the Prime
June 14, 1983

Minister if this therefore means that there would be no question of accepting the request for testing the air launched Cruise missile before December?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Madam Speaker, when 1 made that statement I did not know when the request would be made of us. It was made of us yesterday. I answered a question in the House yesterday indicating that we would be examining this question, that the Minister of National Defence would be bringing his appreciation of the situation to his colleagues, and that we would be making a decision. I do not know when we will be making that decision, Madam Speaker.
1 do know that there has been some indication of flexibility by both sides in recent months. Secretary Andropov moved some distance in December and then he moved again in March, I believe it was, when he offered to count warheads rather than delivery missiles. President Reagan has made other moves as regards the hotline, and has made other suggestions as regards confidence building measures, but also very recently he has made an offer to count warheads rather than missiles, and he has not held to the figure of 800 and some, which he wanted the START talks to bring the Soviets down to. He has recognized that the Soviets wanted more than that number.
There has been some show of flexibility on both sides. I can only say that the Government will continue to pursue its duties as it sees them under the two-track system, and we will continue monitoring the situation. The Cruise, in terms of the request itself, will only be tested next year, but it is logical that Canada continue to act as though it had confidence and faith in its main ally.


REQUEST THAT DECISION BE POSTPONED
Pauline Jewett: Madam Speaker, the Prime Minister said that the Cruise would only be tested next year. May I remind him that he said quite explicitly that the negotiations would influence us in deciding whether we would test the Cruise or not. From what he has said, negotiations are proceeding, both sides showing some flexibility. I therefore repeat my question. Will he allow a really adequate length of time for negotiations to continue, both IMF and START, as the air launched Cruise has more to do with START, before there is any thought whatsoever given to testing the Cruise?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Indeed, Madam Speaker, I have said that negotiations will influence us, and that is why I have given examples of the negotiations which have influenced us. I must say that I feel more secure with the possibility of successful negotiations now than I felt several months ago before Andropov and Reagan made their offers. So, Madam Speaker, that is the only answer I can give. We have to make our decision on the basis of the facts as we know them and as we see them.
Oral Questions


NATIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT FUND
Mr. F. Oberle (Prince George-Peace River):: Madam Speaker, my question is directed to the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development and deals with the approval that Cabinet gave to an expenditure of $345 million known as the Indian economic development fund. I would ask the Minister whether this money is to be spent in accordance with the Cabinet memorandum of April 29, namely, that the money is not to be spent in accordance with need or with any social objectives such as housing but rather in accordance with criteria designed to promote urban entrepreneurship and to promote the rewarding of Indian entrepreneurs who are Liberal supporters.


Hon. John C. Munro (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development):: Madam Speaker, it is not an Indian economic development fund, it is a Native Economic Development Fund. It includes Metis and other natives. As well, Madam Speaker, my colleague, the Minister of State for Small Businesses and Tourism, has responsibility for the corporation. I believe that the Hon. Member should direct his comments to that Minister.


MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Frank Oberle: Madam Speaker, if the Minister thinks that the people for whom he has a very special trust responsibility are not natives, then I would like him to explain his portfolio. He has a very special trust responsibility and I wonder how he can exercise that trust responsibility, a component of which is economic stability in native communities, when he gives away $345 million to a colleague of his who manages small businesses.


John Carr Munro: Madam Speaker, I did not say that Indians were not Natives. I did say that the title of the fund is the Native Economic Development Fund, and that includes Metis and Indians. If the Hon. Member will direct his question to my colleague, the Minister of State for Small Businesses and Tourism, who has already consulted with Mr. Ahenakew, head of the AFM, about his participation in it, I am sure that the Hon. Member will find that there is no doubt that they will receive moneys in addition to the Indian economic development moneys that are already in the Department that we disburse each year for Indian economic development. Therefore, Indians will have two pools of funds from which to draw in order to get ahead with native economic development.


INDIAN AFFAIRS
Mr. Stan Schellenberger (Wetaskiwin):: Madam Speaker, my question is also directed to the Minister of Indian Affairs

June 14, 1983
Oral Questions
and Northern Development. Bankruptcies will force band councils to close down their administration offices very soon if the Minister continues to freeze their trust accounts as he refuses to negotiate with them a mutually acceptable accounting practice. Does the Minister recognize the administrative difficulties caused by and the paternalistic effect of withholding Indian bands' own trust accounts unless they submit to his financial circulars?


John Carr Munro: Madam Speaker, I have found, and again this may be an example of it, that when Indian financial matters are such that they might result in some non-Indians in a community not getting paid, then the Hon. Members opposite are all too ready for me to become paternalistic and interfere in Indian affairs. I would like all Hon. Members to remember what the Official Opposition are now saying. They do not want a Minister who is paternalistic and who will interfere in financial handlings, and I wish that in asking future questions they would be consistent throughout the remainder of this Parliament at least.
It is very refreshing for me to hear that the Hon. Member does not want this Minister to interfere in the financial affairs of the bands. 1 can only tell him that any interference in the affairs of the particular band in question, Madam Speaker, has happened simply because the affairs have been found to be irregular, and not because we wish to be paternalistic. Under the Financial Administration act, certain actions are required on the part of our Department. Until Parliament wishes to change those regulations, we are bound by Parliament to carry them out.


BAND RESPONSIBILITY
Stanley Kenneth Schellenberger: Madam Speaker, the Minister professes to be doing everything possible to transfer decision-making authority to Indian bands, yet in the case of the Stony Indian band, where Indian mineral contracts were renegotiated without the band's knowledge or participation, his actions were inconsistent with what he just told me. I wonder whether he is continuing this practice or whether he will in fact live up to his promise to turn decision-making authority and responsibility over to Indians when those decisions affect them directly.


John Carr Munro: Madam Speaker, I wish that the Hon. Member would talk to his colleagues who have been asking me questions about West Bank for the last year. Some of his colleagues have feelings that are very close to his feelings about how I should be interfering in the affairs of that particular Indian band. But let me tell the Hon. Member again that it is only with reluctance that we do interfere, and in this particular case it was not done with any great enthusiasm and was
done only because we were legally required to do so in order to live up to the obligations we have to Parliament under the appropriate legislation.
I will check into the situation again in order to report back to the Hon. Member. If there is any way around this provision that will not infringe upon the freedom of action of the Indian people, I am quite prepared to undertake it, but I do not see a way around it at the moment.


ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE
Mr. David Orlikow (Winnipeg North):: Madam Speaker, my question is directed to the Solicitor General. Recently I received reliable information to the effect that the RCMP are involved in surveillance of groups and individuals organizing protests against the testing of the Cruise missile in Canada, that a well respected national peace and development organization is also the object of surveillance, and that the antiCruise demonstration planned for Cold Lake, Alberta, on June 26 is the object of a special task force of the Security Service. Is the Minister aware of these activities on the part of the RCMP? If so, can he explain the reasons for them and, if not, would he inquire into the matter?


Hon. Bob Kaplan (Solicitor General of Canada):: Madam Speaker, I should like the opportunity to inquire into the matter and I would appreciate having any additional information that the Hon. Member has.


INQUIRY RESPECTING SURVEILLANCE OF OTHER GROUPS
David Orlikow: Madam Speaker, if the Minister makes inquiries and finds that the facts are as I have indicated, will he inquire if the Security Service is going to put Members of Parliament under surveillance, or leaders of church communities who have expressed opposition to the testing of the Cruise missile?


Robert Phillip Kaplan: Madam Speaker, I can certainly assure the Hon. Member that the peace movement is not and could not be a target of surveillance within the meaning of the mandate of the Security Service. However, any individuals who by virtue of their activities or goals and objectives, are targets within the meaning of the mandate of the Security Service, would be the object of surveillance whether they were infiltrating the peace movement or any other non-targeted activity or movement within the country.
June 14, 1983


PETRO-CANADA ISSUANCE OF DISMISSAL NOTICES TO EMPLOYEES
Mr. Harvie Andre (Calgary Centre):: Madam Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources. Within the last few days well over 1,000 employees of Petro-Canada were given termination notices. A PetroCan spokesman said that this was necessary because there is an overlapping of staff in the wake of acquisitions such as Petrofina and BP Canada. In essence, in the height of a recession, the Government taxes Canadians, the money is used to build Petro-Canada's empire, and thousands of Canadians are put out of work.
What sense of responsibility does the Minister have toward these 1,000 or 2,000 Canadians who have lost their jobs because of the Government's policy? Is he going to take some action on behalf of these employees?


Hon. Jean Chretien (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources):: Madam Speaker, I am very surprised by the question and that the Hon. Member would ask me not to promote within Petro-Canada the best techniques of management that are possible, and ask that we should keep on staff people who are not needed. I will note that for future consideration.


Harvie Andre: Madam Speaker, that is not what I suggested. If the Minister were promoting good business practices he would not have allowed the Petrofina and BP takeovers in the first place. Taxing Canadians to put other Canadians out of work is a dumb policy.


MINISTER'S POSITION
Harvie Andre: Madam Speaker, can the minister indicate whether he has learned from this, and will he make a commitment to the House that there will be no more of this folly?


Joseph Jacques Jean Chrétien: Madam Speaker, I can inform the Hon. Member that in the case of the purchase of BP by Petro-Canada, there was no payment of funds by the Government, since it was done on a strictly commercial basis. The President of Petro-Canada at first considered using the Canadian Ownership Tax to make this purchase, but the Government refused, and we then obliged Petro-Canada to acquire BP on a strictly commercial basis. Once the transaction was completed, there was the process of integrating BP employees and applying the appropriate management procedures, and unfortunately, as a result of wanting to have a more viable company, some employees may be forced to lose their jobs, and I am happy to see that the Progressive Conservatives want us to keep these people on the Petro-Canada payroll, even if they are redundant.
Oral Questions


FINANCE
Mr. Paul Dick (Lanark-Renfrew-Carleton):: Madam
Speaker, I should like to put a question to the Minister of Finance. A previous Minister of Finance in the Government indicated that banks and financial institutions should be required to bleed a little in the current recession. Since the banking and financial institutions have been making the highest profits and have not been bleeding too much, I wonder if the suggestion that was made earlier in the House, and which was supported by Members of all Parties, to change the Interest Act, or some other financial consideration, would be supported by the Government to assist the some 700,000 home owners who are suffering as a result of high mortgage rates?


Hon. Marc Lalonde (Minister of Finance):: Madam Speaker, the monetary policy and the budgetary policy followed by the Government have gone much further than the Hon. Member tends to indicate. About a year and a half ago the prime rate was something like 21 per cent; it is down to 9.5 per cent now. This has been achieved because we have been able to bring inflation down to 6 per cent or 6.5 per cent. We have also succeeded in reducing the spread between the United States' rates and Canadian rates to less than half of one percentage point; they were as high as 6 or 7 percentage points apart some 18 months ago. We have done a lot to try to help people who have mortgages, and people who have loans on which they pay interest.


Paul Wyatt Dick: Madam Speaker, of course the Minister knows what he just said is garbage. I am talking of apples, not of oranges. I am talking about the 700,000 Canadians who are locked into mortgages for three or five more years at 21 per cent interest-not those who will get a mortgage tomorrow or the next day.


PLIGHT OF HOME OWNERS WITH HIGH INTEREST RATE MORTGAGES
Paul Wyatt Dick: Madam
Speaker, the United States and England both assist people greatly with their mortgages by making the interest deductible from taxable income. The United States has gone further by recently introducing a Bill to provide $750 million to help people so that their mortgages will not be foreclosed. Does the Minister have anything to propose that will help people in this country who are locked into high interest rates and who, because of their financial circumstances, are going to lose their homes?


Marc Lalonde: Madam Speaker, the Hon. Member must have been absent from the House during the last two years. Otherwise, he would have known that during that time, the Government implemented a number of programs, especially when my colleague, the Minister of

June 14, 1983
Oral Questions
State (Finance), was responsible for the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. We adopted a program under which people who were in financial difficulty and were unable to meet their mortgage payments would be able to receive help from the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. My hon. colleague would have been aware of this if he had bothered to keep informed of what was going on in the House and the measures taken by the Government.
1 would also invite him to take a look at the representations made to financial institutions by Hon. Members who are concerned about the welfare of their constituents, and perhaps he could follow the example of Liberal Members on this side of the House who have been quick to make representations to the appropriate financial institutions. In many cases they were able to persuade them to change their attitudes to some of their debtors. This action was taken by Liberal Members of this House who approached the financial institutions concerned. I would therefore invite my hon. colleague to try and do the same. He may get results for his constituents, if he is willing to take the trouble.


CORPORATE AFFAIRS
Mr. Bill Kempling (Burlington):: Madam Speaker, 1 have a question for the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs in the same vein as the previous questions.
I have received a number of communications from constituents who took out three-year mortgages at high interest rates with trust companies, on the understanding that they could rewrite the mortgages upon payment of a three-months' interest penalty. These people now find that the trust companies will not live up to that commitment, which was not in writing; in every instance it was given verbally. Will the Minister investigate what appears to be a bait and switch practice on the part of some trust companies?
[ Translation]


Hon. Andre Ouellet (Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs):: Madam Speaker, this question has been brought to the attention of my departmental officials. It is a situation that should not be allowed to occur, and I can assure the Hon. Member that my officials are, at the present time, making representations to the companies concerned with a view to correcting this situation.


ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE
Hon. Allan Lawrence (Durham-Northumberland):: Madam Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Justice and Attorney General and relates to the prosecution under the Official Secrets Act of one James Morrison, also allegedly known under the code name "Long Knife". I wonder if the Attorney General could indicate if the Crown will be moving at the trial for the trial to be held in camera and if so, why, when the events complained of took place 25 years ago.


Hon. Mark MacGuigan (Minister of Justice):: Madam Speaker, no questions of that kind have yet come before me for decision. When they do, I will certainly give them the proper consideration.


INSTRUCTIONS TO COUNSEL
Allan Frederick Lawrence: Madam Speaker, in the belief that the motivation of the Government should be for an open trial, I wonder if the Minister would also give consideration to instructing Crown counsel also to oppose any defence motion for the trial to be in camera.


Mark R. MacGuigan: Madam Speaker, I will take my hon. friend's representation under consideration also.


PETITIONS
Madam Speaker:: I have the honour to inform the House that the Petitions, with the exception of one, which were presented by Hon. Members on Monday, June 13, 1983, meet the requirements of the Standing Orders as to form. The Petition which did not meet the requirements is one from the Hon. Member for Kamloops-Shuswap (Mr. Riis).


BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE
Mr. Deans:: Madam Speaker, I rise on a point of order with regard to House business. Earlier today the Government House Leader no doubt heard the exchange between the Prime Minister and the Leader of the New Democratic Party with respect to the vote which will take place later today, and the willingness expressed from this side not to have the vote considered to be a matter of confidence. The Prime Minister appeared to indicate in response that he also was prepared to
June 14, 1983

consider the possibility of the vote which will take place later today on the question of the testing of the Cruise missile not to be a matter of confidence.
I would like first of all to assure the Government House Leader that our Party is prepared to enter into any manner of House order dealing specifically with this question, which will guarantee the Government that this vote will not be a matter of confidence. 1 would like to ask the Government House Leader whether, over the course of the last half hour, he has been able to ascertain if the position of the Government is that a free vote could be taken today to facilitate the wishes of many of his own colleagues who have come to me and asked that such a thing occur. Many other Hon. Members of the House of Commons have said as well that a free vote such as this would be useful, particularly in a matter as crucial as this is to the safety of Canadians.


Mr. Pinard:: Madam Speaker, I do not know whether the Hon. Member is serious about what he wants to negotiate or is just trying to make political points. If he is serious, he is not taking the right approach. The Hon. Member is aware that we are having a House Leaders meeting in a few minutes, as scheduled. I believe that is the proper venue for raising his question. The whole process of the Business of Supply is extremely complicated, and I would like to take the time to consider the implications. For instance, if today, we are prepared not to consider a vote of non-confidence as such, would the Opposition at some later date, if ever the Government were defeated on a motion of non-confidence, be prepared to agree that in exchange, that motion would not be considered a question of non-confidence, thus putting us on equal terms? That is one of many points that must be considered, and in any case, my learned friend knows perfectly well that nothing can be done in this respect without the unanimous consent of all Members of all parties of this House. 1 am prepared to discuss the matter with my hon. colleague, but I would have preferred the question to have been raised much sooner, because by doing so two or three hours before the vote it may be impossible to draft an appropriate order that would cover all aspects of supply proceedings. Nevertheless, I am prepared to give this matter very careful consideration, always provided that my learned colleague agrees that if ever the Government, during this session, were to lose a vote of non-confidence other than this afternoon's, it would not be considered as a vote of non-confidence.


Ian Deans: Madam Speaker, I want to assure the Government House Leader that the reason I raise this matter in the House is specifically to have on record that we are indeed serious about it. This is not a frivolous matter. I want to assure
Point of Order-Mr. Donald W. Munro
him that we are prepared to consider very seriously a motion which he might like to put which would guarantee the Government that the vote taken today on the question of supply, which just happens to be the same vote which deals with the testing of the Cruise missile, would not be considered a question of confidence as far as those of us on this side of the House, at least speaking for this Party, are concerned.


Yvon Pinard: Madam Speaker, my colleague knows very well that with unanimous consent there are many things that can be done. For example, we could tie the Crow Bill to the vote tonight and send the Bill to committee at the same time. Perhaps we will consider that also.


Douglas Grinslade Lewis: Madam Speaker, I would just like to indicate that as far as this Party is concerned we feel these negotiations should take place at the House Leaders' meeting which has already been set.


POINT OF ORDER
Donald W. Munro: Madam Speaker, I rise on a point of order which I believe is important. It is almost a question of privilege. The distribution of the Projected Order of Business for today, for example, reached my office at 10.15 this morning. I was looking for the text of the motion which we would be debating today. My office happens to be in the Confederation Building. I am sure that everything which is in these pages was available to be printed overnight and could have been available first thing in the morning. It may very well be that it was decided to hold the distribution of this document to be circulated with the other documents such as Hansard. However, I do believe the Projected Order of Business should receive every priority in order to reach the offices of Hon. Members at the earliest possible moment. I received this document 45 minutes before we assembled to discuss this motion. I realize that our messengers work hard, but I do believe, with all due respect, that a special effort might be taken to get the Projected Order of Business distributed to the offices which are not in the Centre Block but in some of the outlying buildings.


Madam Speaker:: I take the Hon. Member's point. However, these documents are usually distributed with all the other parliamentary documents and, of course, since the House is sitting earlier, we cannot give the same lead time which we used to give when the House started only at two. The staff works terribly hard, as the Hon. Member has said. We are doing our best. I do not know why the Hon. Member did not receive his document earlier today, but I will inquire.

June 14, 1983
Petition



ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS

[Stage Direction]
[ Translation]

Mr. Bill Blaikie (Winnipeg-Birds Hill):: Madam Speaker, I have the honour of tabling the Eighth Report of the Special Committee on Standing Orders and Procedure.
[Editor's Note: For above report, see today's Votes and Proceedings.]


INDIAN AFFAIRS
John Carr Munro: Madam Speaker, under the provisions of Standing Order 46(2), I wish to table in both official languages copies of the proposed British Columbia Indian cutoff Land Settlement Act.

[ Translation]


CANADA PENSION PLAN
Hon. Monique Begin (Minister of National Health and Welfare):: Madam Speaker, with your leave, and pursuant to the provisions of Standing Order 46(2), I wish to table, in both official languages, copies of a report published under the title: More effective participation of homemakers in the Canada Pension Plan, prepared by the Canada Pension Plan Advisory Council.


PETITION
Ian Gardiner Waddell: Madam Speaker, I have the honour to present a petition from some 150 carpenters and people in the construction trade from Vancouver and Burnaby, British Columbia, many of whom are unemployed. They petition the House that whereas the Labour Adjustment Benefits Program recognized the right of workers belonging to some specific industries, clothes factories, shoe factories and so on, who have been laid off after the age of 54 and before the age of 65, to receive a pension equal to 60 per cent of their
salaries, that therefore this benefit be extended to the construction industry. They also petition that the old age pension itself be available at age 60 rather than at age 65.
This is a petition, Madam Speaker, dealing with early retirement in the construction industry, which is a most important matter. I would like to table this petition.



HOUSE OF COMMONS ACT


Mr. Gerald Laniel (Bcauharnois-Salaberry) moved: for leave to introduce Bill C-687, an Act to amend the House of Commons Act (Internal Economy).


Some Hon. Members:: Explain!


Gérald Laniel: Madam Speaker, the purpose of this Bill is to increase the autonomy of the House of Commons with respect to its internal administration. It defines the Executive of the Commissioners of Internal Economy which the present Act does not do, and provides for the appointment of two more Members as Commissioners, to be chosen from among the backbenchers, one from each side of the House, to increase the involvement of the House in its own administration.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, Bill read the first time and ordered to be printed.

[Stage Direction]
(Questions answered orally are indicated by an asterisk.)
Mr. David Smith (Parliamentary Secretary to President of the Privy Council):: Madam Speaker, the following questions will be answered today: Nos. 4,817, 4,839 and 4,897.


Mr. Mazankowski: 1.	Is there a Farm Credit Corporation Advisory Committee and, if so (a) who are the members (b) what is the (i) background or expertise (ii) term of appointment of each member (c) what remuneration, such as salary or travel expenses, do the members receive and, for the length of each appointment to date, what amount has each member received (d) what other funding, if any, is provided by the government?
2.	(a) What are the terms of reference of the Committee (b) what matters did it consider in the Fiscal year 1982-83 (c) how often did it meet and how often is it required to meet (d) what reports and/or recommendations did the Committee publish in the Fiscal year 1982-83?


Hon. E. F. Whelan (Minister of Agriculture):: Farm Credit Corporation advises:
June 14, 1983

1.	Yes, under Section 9 of the Farm Credit Act. (a) Ernest Boudreau; Jean-Marie Bourree; George Gardhouse; Don Knoerr; (Mrs.) Alma MacLennan; Andre Morin; Walter Olson; Ron Oswald; George Vercaigne; Robert Younge.
(b)	(i) All members have experience in the farming sector and the majority are farmers, (ii) Three years, but may be renewed.
(c)	Remuneration and expenses are fixed by the Governor in Council pursuant to Subsection 9(3) of the Farm Credit Act: E. Boudreau, from 1982 to 1983, $2,540; J.-M. Bourree, from 1979 to 1983, $12,316; G. Gardhouse, from 1982 to 1983, $1,921; D. Knoerr, 1983, $1,428; A. MacLennan, 1983, $2,300; A. Morin, from 1982 to 1983, $2,553; W. Olson, from 1981 to 1983, $5,225; R. Oswald, from 1976 to 1983, $10,519; G. Vercaigne, from 1981 to 1982, $4,055; R. Younge, from 1976 to 1983, $6,776. The amounts shown include a per diem allowance of $200.
(d)	None.
2.	(a) The Advisory Committee advises the Farm Credit Corporation with respect to matters arising under the Act and as are referred to it by the Minister or the Corporation, (b) Interest rates; role of lending institutions in the agricultural industry; staffing of the Corporation; special farm financial assistance program; financial and counselling assistance to farmers, (c) Once a year, (d) No reports or recommendations of the Advisory Committee were published in 1982-83.


Mr. Howie: Does the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE), in investigating applications for assistance, make allowances for facilities to undertake research and development projects and, if so, from January 1, 1980 to date, how many applications for assistance from the Atlantic region have included specifications for research and development facilities?


Edward C. Lumley: The
response for the Department of Regional Economic Expansion is: No. The Regional Development Incentives Act, under which the Department of Regional Economic Expansion receives applications for assistance, provides for development incentives in support of the establishment, modernization or expansion of manufacturing and certain other facilities. Applications to undertake research and development projects are considered to be ineligible for assistance.


Mr. Heap: 1.	In (a) 1980 (b) 1981 (c) 1982, what was the tonnage and dollar value of uranium sold to the Philippines?
2.	What permit applications are issued for 1983 and beyond?


Hon. Gerald Regan (Minister of State (International Trade)):: 1. (a) None, (b) none, (c) none.
2. None.
Supply


David P. Smith: Madam Speaker, I would ask that the remaining questions be allowed to stand.


Madam Speaker:: The questions enumerated by the Parliamentary Secretary have been answered. Shall the remaining questions be allowed to stand?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.



GOVERNMENT ORDERS


[Stage Direction]
The House resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Broadbent:
That this House express its opposition to the escalation of the nuclear arms race by any nation and, in particular, its opposition to Canada's participation by testing in Canada any nuclear weapon or nuclear weapon delivery vehicle such as, and including, the Cruise missile.
Pauline Jewett: Madam Speaker, in addressing the House just before one o'clock, I was taking particular issue with the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamontagne) and the Hon. Member for Victoria (Mr. McKinnon) for looking at nuclear war in a very conventional sense rather than realizing it is not only quantitatively but totally different from conventional war, such as World War I and World War II. It is because a nuclear exchange could result, indeed it is 99 per cent likely that it would result, in a nuclear holocaust that so many people in the world today are becoming concerned with the enormous nuclear arsenals. I would remind Hon. Members that it was the equivalent of 15,000 tons of tnt which exploded over and devastated Hiroshima. Today the world's nuclear arsenals are the equivalent of 16 billion tons of tnt, which could destroy the world many times over along with all life on it.
It also seems to me that the Minister is out of date when he talks about the doctrine of deterrence. I think most people saw that as the deterrence of war. Nowadays the military and civilian strategists are not talking about deterring nuclear war; they are talking about fighting and winning a nuclear war. This, too, has been so alarming to the public everywhere. It is bad enough to have a strategy of nuclear deterrence, but it is far, far worse to have a doctrine of fighting and prevailing in a nuclear war. The Minister has absolutely no concept of this radical change in thinking about nuclear arms. He stills talks about the doctrine of deterrence as it was talked about almost a generation ago, not recognizing that we have gone far beyond the real needs of deterrence.

June 14, 1983
Supply
It is significant that the Cruise missile is not simply a weapon of deterrence. It is designed for the purpose of intimidation and to fight a nuclear war. Whether we talk about the land, air or submarine-launched Cruise missile, the whole point is its pinpoint accuracy so that it can be used to take out missiles in their silos. In other words, it is designed for fighting a nuclear war, not deterring a nuclear war. Again, the Minister and others seem to have simply not recognized what has been taking place in the nuclear war strategy with the development of a new generation of nuclear weapons like the Cruise missile.
A third area where the Government and the Minister are so old fashioned and out of date is that of Canada playing a nonnuclear role in the alliance. There was a time when Canada was moving in that direction. Indeed, the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) took credit for it in answer to a question on April 22, 1983 when he said:
-I have done a great deal in Canada to denuclearize our whole approach to defence. I did that in Canada and I did that in NATO by denuclearizing our planes in Germany.
What we are asking for in this motion today is a logical extension of those independent initiatives we took by saying not only will we not deploy nuclear weapons on our soil, not only will we not have our forces in Europe nuclearized, but we will also refrain from testing any nuclear weapon delivery systems. It seems to me that is part of the logic of denuclearization.
For some reason the Government has now decided not to continue a non-nuclear role. Our military and political commitment in Europe, indeed with the United States, does not need to be expressed in nuclear terms. I have heard many Members on the Government side and within the Conservative Party say that, so why, then, are so many of those same Members urging us to play once again a nuclear capable role, which is exactly what testing is all about? Elave we simply lost all capacity for taking independent initiatives, for doing an independent assessment, or for a less uncritical acceptance of the nuclear armed strategy we hear about from Washington and elsewhere? Why do we simply and uncritically accept that if they want us to test the Cruise we will test the Cruise? It really has nothing to do with NATO, or NORAD commitments, or anything else. What it has to do with, I am sorry to say, is that we have become more and more integrated into the economic and military doctrines and values of Washington. We have therefore simply abandoned any independent judgment, any independent evaluation, any independent decisionmaking with regard to alliance nuclear weapons policies.
That is also what the Canadian public is so alarmed about. The public would like to see their Government taking a lead among the smaller nations of the world, among members of the alliance, like the lead taken by Norway, which is still a faithful member of the alliance, in saying no to any further escalation of the nuclear arms race. What the Canadian public wants is a freeze, bilateral, mutual, verifiable, followed by
massive reductions; to use George Kennan's phrase, "massive reductions and final elimination". We are not discussing any old weapon. We are discussing nuclear weapons which could see the end of this planet, whether accidentally or deliberately, and it is more likely to be accidental.
This is what the public is crying for from its Government. It thought the Government might do this a few years ago, referring to the policies of the Prime Minister, both of Canadian initiatives in denuclearization and promoting the concept of a strategy of suffocation by all the powers. Now it does not see either of them being followed by the Government.
We could untie ourselves without hurt or harm to our economy or to our relationship with the United States. We could untie ourselves from this total dependence, this uncritical acceptance of everything that is done. We could join other smaller nations and medium-sized nations in the alliance and in relations with other nations and members of other alliances in developing nuclear weapons free zones. Once one develops a nuclear weapons free zone, whether it is a single country or a group of countries, one is saying; "We will not be subject to nuclear intimidation", and that is one of the most significant aspects of the development of nuclear weapons free zones. We would be free to pursue the goals that everyone in the world wants to reach, namely, the goal of peace, freedom and security.
I close by emphasizing again, as strongly as possible, that the escalation of nuclear arms holdings does not provide security, either national security or international security, let alone personal security. We must realize, not that we must drop the word "security" but that the way to attain security, mutual security, national and international, is ultimately by ending the nuclear arms race. Only when we have done that and, as Canadians, have participated in reaching that end will everyone feel secure once again.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Kilgour:: Mr. Speaker, I wonder if I could ask the Hon. Member whether she favours Canada withdrawing completely from NATO, from NORAD and from any other western world alliance and, if so, why?


Pauline Jewett: Mr. Speaker, that is the kind of interjection that gives the Hon. Member a big kick but which really trivializes this very important debate. 1 have already said that Canada could play a non-nuclear role in the alliance, as does Norway. I am urging Canada, the Hon. Member and his Party to have us play a completely non-nuclear role in the alliance.


Mr. Taylor:: What is that?


Pauline Jewett: A non-nuclear role means that we would not be testing weapons, nor assisting in the manufacture of nuclear arms components, nor testing nuclear capable weapons. That is the subject of the debate. I look forward to hearing whether any Hon. Member of the Conservative Party or Liberal Party will say: "Yes, we will play only a non-nuclear role in the alliance. We think the nuclear arsenal has gone far beyond the
June 14, 1983

real needs of deterrence, and we will not put up with a nuclear war-fighting scenario, wherever it is".


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


David Kilgour: Mr. Speaker, 1 will ask as short a question as posssible, and I hope the Hon. Member will answer it. Does her Party favour getting out of NATO completely or not? It is a very simple question. Would she please just answer that question?


Pauline Jewett: Mr. Speaker, the Hon. Member can read our platform, and I dearly wish he would address the issue which we are discussing today. He is dodging it because he does not want Canada to play a non-nuclear role. He is not facing the nuclear issue. He can read our policies any time he wants to see them.


David Kilgour: What is it?


Pauline Jewett: Why does he not focus on what we are debating today? Membership in NATO is irrelevant to what we are debating today.


Mr. Pelletier:: Mr. Speaker, first, I would like to say to the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett) that it is extremely important to have this debate today because not only the Members of the New Democratic Party, but also the Liberals and the Progressive Conservative Members consider this issue a crucial one. I recall that about seven years ago, I and a former Member of this House, Mr. Andy Brewin, as well as the Hon. Member for Edmonton South (Mr. Roche) made several speeches on this whole issue in various parts of the country. What 1 deplore in the speech made by the Hon. Member is this. I listened to her very carefully and she made many very interesting comments, but she referred repeatedly to a nuclear missile. 1 find this quite surprising because the Cruise is not a nuclear missile. Missiles are not nuclear or atomic. A missile is a delivery system and I believe that the debate is already complicated enough without making it more so when reference is made to the missiles themselves rather than the bombs they may carry. 1 hope that the other speakers will not make the same mistake because the subject is already complicated enough without adding that dimension to it.


Pauline Jewett: Mr. Speaker, the subject is complex. Nevertheless, the air-launched Cruise missile that we are being asked to test can have either a nuclear or a conventional warhead.


Mr. Forrestall:: That's not entirety so and you know it.


Pauline Jewett: It can be either conventional or nuclear. Of course it can. Indeed, udner SALT II, as Hon. Members know, it is the American B-52 which flies the air-launched missile, right? Under SALT II, there is an agreement that if it has a nuclear warhead on it, that must be indicated in a visible way
Supply
on the plane. So far, that is a part of SALT II which has been adhered to. Therefore it seems to me that the Hon. Member is confusing the Canadian public when he suggests that the missile will have only a conventional warhead. It could have either conventional or nuclear. We are particularly concerned because the 7,000 or so which are now being deployed or are about to be deployed, particularly on submarines but the air-launched as well, will have the nuclear warhead.


Mr. Friesen:: Mr. Speaker, I listened carefully to what the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett) said. I think I quote her accurately that she said it is possible for Canada to play a non-nuclear role in NATO. 1 have in my hand press clippings from the time of the 1980 federal election campaign when Canada's relations in NATO and NORAD played a very key role within the New Democratic Party. 1 would like to quote what the Hon. Member said at that time when there was a dispute between herself and her Leader with regard to Canada's role in NATO and NORAD. When seeking re-election in the British Columbia riding of New Westminster-Coquitlam, and referring to her Leader, she told reporters:
He (Broadbent) is not speaking for me, the caucus or the Party. We do not support military action or saber-rattling. Our emphasis is and must continue to be disarmament because it is madness to have any other emphasis.
That was never in the context of nuclear war; it simply involved membership in NATO. Has the Hon. Member reversed her position?


Pauline Jewett: The Hon. Member has missed the point which I was making then, would make today and would make on every possible occasion, that we are a Party of disarmament and our goal is all disarmament. On that occasion, however, there was also a very serious talk, and if the Hon. Member had been at the meeting he would know that it was primarily the nuclear arms race and the escalation of nuclear arms that we were discussing on that occasion.


Gérald Laniel: Mr. Speaker, could the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett) tell me whether she at least recognizes that the request to deploy Cruise missiles in Europe was made by the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and not necessarily by the United States alone, and that this was done to counterbalance the deployment of Soviet missiles?


Pauline Jewett: Mr. Speaker, once again the original NATO decision made in December, 1979, was to deploy ground-launched Cruise missiles if negotiations, the second track, did not succeed. Indeed, Canada has no part, so far anyway, in helping either to deploy or to help in the testing of ground-launched Cruise missiles.

June 14, 1983
Supply
I asked an official from the Ministry of National Defence just the other day at a briefing for the Minaki conference beginning Thursday whether it was not true that regardless of the outcome of the Geneva negotiations and the deployment or otherwise of the ground-launched Cruise missiles in western Europe the United States would still want us to test the air-launched Cruise missile, because it is part of the U.S. strategic force. His answer was explicit. There were several people there. He said, yes, the U.S. would want us to test the air-launched Cruise missile regardless of what happens at Geneva.


J. Michael Forrestall: Mr. Speaker, the air-launched Cruise missile is not, of course, a strategic weapon system. It is something entirely different.
Might I ask the distinguished Member if she could give the House the benefit of her references upon which she bases the assumption that the air-launched Cruise missile in fact has a nuclear capability?


Pauline Jewett: It is not an assumption, Mr. Speaker. It is a fact.


J. Michael Forrestall: Mr. Speaker, briefly, I ask the distinguished Member, now having said it is not an assumption but it is a fact, whether she would care to give us the basis on which she makes that factual statement?


Pauline Jewett: Mr. Speaker, 1 was just reminded, I have not read it lately, but the umbrella agreement itself says that Cruise missiles must be unarmed. The Hon. Member must realize that the intercontinental strategic force, the Strategic Air Command, includes B-52 bombers, and it is on the B-52 that the Cruise missile rests.


Paul Edmund McRae: Mr. Speaker, in one of the questions, the Hon. Member mentioned that there would be 7,000 or 8,000 Cruise missiles produced and deployed. Is she aware of the fact that the U.S. Government had ordered some 4,300 Cruise missiles and then cancelled the order, cut it back to one-third, and was going to build 7,000 or 8,000 Stealth version missiles which will be longer range, probably interhemispheric and will be able to avoid radar and so on. It will be a far more dangerous weapon and much smaller. This is the kind of thing we are actually testing. We are testing for a new type and a new generation of weaponry.


Pauline Jewett: Yes, Mr. Speaker. Indeed, the Hon. Member may have forgotten that I asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) one day about what I called the Stealth missile, which was a shorthand form for Cruise missiles with the Stealth technology, and whether we would ever test those. His first reply was, no, of course we never would. Then someone told him what was happening, that the Department of Defence in the United States had already started phasing out the Cruise missile we now have, as the Hon. Member said, to develop one with the Stealth technology. From everything I have read, the Hon. Member is absolutely
right, the Stealth weapon presents even more difficult problems of verification and has even greater accuracy.


Hon. Charles Lapointe (Minister of State (External Relations)):: Mr. Speaker, I am rather surprised at the speech we just heard by the Member for New Westminster-Coquit-lam (Miss Jewett). At first, she spoke of thousands of tons of TNT that were to be found all over the world and mentioned how all this might blow up our planet. I know the thought is rather terrifying, but the Hon. Member forgot to finish her scenario. Would she rather have all those tons of TNT in the enemy camp and have us turn our backs on reality and say: TNT is terrible, we do not want any on our territory because it is dangerous. I am surprised at this extremely naive approach, especially coming from a person of her experience, who in the past has accustomed us to a far greater measure of intellectual honesty.
The Hon. Member went on to say that Liberal and Progressive Conservative Members wanted to push Canada into a nuclear role. There again, Mr. Speaker, we have a mental reservation that I would almost qualify as dishonest. The Hon. Member knows perfectly well that Canada's official policy is that there shall be no nuclear arms on Canada soil. This policy has been stated and restated many times by the Right Hon. Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Trudeau). Through a very nebulous choice of words, the Hon. Member would have her audience believe that Canada is about to establish nuclear weapons on its territory. The same misrepresentation can be found in the motion moved today in the House by the New Democratic Party.
Further on, the Hon. Member goes so far as to say that this debate has no connection with NATO or NORAD. It is only concerned with the fact that some people want to test, on Canadian soil, the guidance system of an empty unarmed shell called the cruise missile. This has no connection with NATO or NORAD, as the Hon. Member said. I did not think the Members of the New Democratic Party would be so narrowminded as to focus their comments on such a limited debate, oblivious to everything else that is happening in the world and to the fact that within the territory of Warsaw Pact countries, 350 SS-20 missiles are aimed at our allies, at Western Europe. As far as the Hon. Member is concerned, all this does not exist! I suppose there is no Soviet Block or Warsaw Pact Block either. I suppose there is no such thing as zones of influence between the two super powers. The Hon. Member prefers to put her head in the sand and say: Here I am, all alone in my own little hole and that is how I like it.
Mr. Speaker, I must admit that during the ten years I have been sitting in the House, I have always suspected that the Members of the New Democratic Party were like whitewashed sepulchers, and the speech made by the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam has just confirmed that suspicion.
June 14, 1983

One question the Hon. Member could have answered in a way that would have restored her credibility somewhat-there again, she refused to do so, to avoid focussing attention on dissension within the New Democratic Party-is as follows. The Hon. Member refused to answer a, or rather two, basic questions put to her by the Member for Edmonton-Strathcona (Mr. Kilgour): Does she or does she not favour our being members of NATO? Does she or does she not favour our membership in NORAD? The Hon. Member carefully avoided saying what she thought about the subject because, as I said earlier, she is afraid to bring to light the dissension existing within the New Democratic Party.
Mr. Speaker, the debate in the House today reflects a new awareness involving not only the politicians in this House, religious leaders and academics, but all Canadians of all ages. This debate comes forth out of a profound desire for peace and could only take place thanks to the essentially democratic nature of our society. We are all very aware of the dangers inherent in the existence of nuclear weapons. Beset by uncertainty and fear, a number of governments and individuals are urging a stop to the development and deployment of new weapons.
I feel that no rational person could be in favour of reinforcing nuclear arsenals as such. However, in a world that remains essentially polarized, unilateral disarmament-whether it means putting a stop to the development of new weapons or dismantling existing ones-remains a basically wrong approach, because there is no incentive for the other party to do likewise. For instance, when, at the end of the sixties, the United States decided to discontinue unilaterally the manufacture of chemical weapons, we all hoped at the time that the Soviet Union would follow suit. The USSR, however, continued to develop and manufacture such weapons. There were no protests among the Warsaw Pact countries, and we all know that people in Warsaw Pact countries are seldom, if ever able to voice any criticism of their governments. Surprisingly, however, there were also very few protests from Westerm countries. Today, how could anyone who is at all realistic imagine that the USSR would act any differently if we were to stop the development of defensive nuclear weaponry? Unfortunately, no incentive is created by a unilateral approach. In the long run, it can only lead to domination or aggression. There is no easy way out of our present dilemma.
Realizing this, in 1979, NATO governments undertook to modernize NATO's nuclear force through the deployment of new missiles, in the event of failure of certain negotiations with the USSR, what is now referred to as the two-track decision that was accepted by NATO countries in December 1979 for negotiations with the USSR, in order to bring nuclear weapon systems down to their lowest possible level. It would have been much easier, in the short term, to ignore the gigantic arms effort of the Warsaw Pact member countries, both with respect
Supply
to conventional and nuclear arms. The imbalance which already existed in 1979 when NATO made its two-track decision to react to the massive deployment of SS-20 Soviet missiles has increased, because since then the USSR has almost doubled the number of its missiles. More than 350 of those missiles, and we have no equivalent weapons in the West, represent a constant destructive threat to our allies.
1 think that any politician who is the least bit responsible cannot ignore this fact, nor the complex lines of force that exist in our world today, nor the fact that nuclear disarmament cannot be seen apart from this context. The NATO Council, which called a meeting at the ministerial level last week in Paris, has restated NATO's primary objective which is to maintain peace while guaranteeing the right to freedom and justice on which our democracies are based. Mr. Speaker, how could anyone support such values without being prepared to defend them? That is the responsibility Canada would take on if it decided to authorize testing of weapon systems on its territory. Canada's policy of solidarity with its allies is not one of confrontation. On the contrary, it constitutes the only possible approach, as part of a gradual movement towards mutual and balanced disarmament. It is based on the concept of deterrence, which for almost forty years has prevented any major conflicts, to an extent unheard of before in the history of Europe where unprecedented military forces stand face to face. That is in fact, why mutual deterrence is so useful. Not only is there no question of resorting to nuclear arms, since the super powers have the ability to resist a preventive attack and to inflict, as a retaliatory measure, an intolerable level of destruction on the other side, but also any recourse to conventional weapons which during the last two World Wars alone were responsible for many millions of deaths and widespread destruction.
The development and deployment of defensive weapons to guarantee a proper balance between the two sides is an essential condition to maintain the state of deterrence when the strategy is to avoid war and an actual use of force. Only such an initiative taken in co-operation with other NATO member states can pave the way for negotiating the verifiable, balanced and mutual nuclear disarmament which we all strive for. Greater security is the purpose of any action aimed at controlling weapons and disarmament and establishing nuclear-free zones. Canada is a strong supporter of the concept of nuclear-free zones, provided they are approved by neighbouring countries and promote international and regional stability. Such approval is consistent with Canada's efforts to establish an effective non-proliferation system fashioned after the nonproliferation treaty. The suggestion that Canada be made a nuclear-free zone would be realistic only if we were prepared to withdraw from the Atlantic Alliance which has served us well and has helped us maintain peace for over 30 years. That is why the Government is still convinced that our association and co-operation with our allies, and the defence production

June 14, 1983
Supply
sharing agreement we have with them do a lot more to maintain peace and security than would our withdrawal from that alliance and our isolated situation as a nuclear-free zone.
In concluding, Mr. Speaker, I would like to refer my colleagues of the New Democratic Party, and particularly the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam, to a book published recently and written by Jean-Franqois Revel, Comment les democraties finissent. Here is a paragraph on page 151 of that book by Jean-Franfois Revel:
Others before the Communists knew the art of calling "peace" a certain way of waging war. In the year 341 before our era, Demosthenes was trying to make the Athenians see the "peace offensives" of Philip of Macedonia for what they really were.
And Demosthenes said in the Third Philippic:
'Our enemy, wielding weapons and surrounded by impressive forces, talks about peace as he makes acts of war', he said to them. Indeed, Philip had his Afghans or his Czechs because, as Demosthenes tells us, 'did he not say to the unfortunate inhabitants of Oreos that, as a friendly gesture, he was sending them troops to protect them?' One has to be stupid, warned the orator, to 'consider as a state of peace a situation which will enable Philip, once he has taken everything else, to launch an attack against us ... That is how he sees peace, undoubtedly, but certainly not us\
Since Demosthenes was speaking to the Athenians in his Philippics, far from me to suggest that the members of the New Democratic Party have the basic qualities of the Athenians of the Antiquity, or even to think that I am a Demosthenes. However, given the naivety we have witnessed since the debate began this morning, and the mental restrictions which they made as they were playing with words to make us believe that Canada wants to have nuclear weapons, 1 wish the Members of the New Democratic Party would be more honest, more open-minded and less naive when they speak about that important issue.
We all want peace, Mr. Speaker; the holier-than-thou members of the New Democratic Party are not the only ones who do. We are all seeking peace when we try to convince the members of the Warsaw Pact, the countries under Soviet control to sit down with the other superpower represented by the United States of America to agree on a balance and verifiable reduction of nuclear arms. It is not with high-sounding rhetoric such as we heard this morning from a party which is completely cut off from reality that we can restore to the world the peace that we all hope for. I am therefore happy, Mr. Speaker, that this debate is being held today so that the Members opposite may be seen in their true light, especially the small group to my right on the other side.


Mr. Yurko:: Mr. Speaker, I want to pose a question to the Minister and to make some brief comments as I will not have an opportunity to speak on this matter. The real question today as I see it is: should Canada participate with the United States of America in the testing of (a guidance system that is called
TERCON) an unarmed air-launched cruise missile? I recognize fully and appreciate the massive apprehension and revulsion in the use of this issue as a symbol against the fear of nuclear annihilation.
A nuclear war can come about because of three reasons. 1 want to address a question to the Minister in this area. The first reason is that it may come about by aggressive design or intent by one of the superpowers. This is highly unlikely because they will destroy the world and themselves. The second is by escalation of a minor conflict such as a triggering conflict in the Middle East. The potential for escalation is massive and scary in the world today. That is what bothers me more than anything else, the potential for escalation. The third way a nuclear war can occur is through accident. There is real potential in this area due to a failure of equipment, a failure of systems, or a failure on the part of humans who man the systems. If there is anything we should do with a system we are going to deploy, we would want to test it extensively until we knew it would never fail or, if it did fail, under what conditions it happened.
With regard to preserving peace and preventing war, particularly by accident, which I consider the most likely reason for a nuclear war in the future, and with the tremendous potential for escalation being awesome, is the Minister considering seriously in his discussions with the Americans whether this testing is absolutely vital to the nth degree so that if the U.S. deploys the Cruise in Europe, at least we know it will not fail or cause a war by accident?
[ Translation]


Charles Lapointe: Mr. Speaker, I agree with the analysis of the Hon. Member about the possible causes of a nuclear war, namely the possible escalation of a regional conflict, the possibility of accidents. For that reason, the more we test or check the equipment, either the missile guidance system under discussion today or other systems, the easier it will be to prevent accidents and to guard against them.
Now, I am not the one in charge of negotiating with Washington our umbrella agreement with the United States, but rather my colleague the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamontagne). However, it seems obvious to me that the testing of the guidance system for the unarmed Cruise missile is part of the research needed to provide a practically ironclad guarantee that the deployment of these missiles will be accident-free.


Mr. Prud'homme:: Mr. Speaker, I would like to direct my question to the Minister, because to us this is most important.
I know that several Hon. Members of this House are wavering and are still wondering how they are going to vote. This is not my case. However, the Minister said in his speech that he was pressing-to use his own words-the Soviet block and especially the Soviet Union to start negotiating seriously. I share his view. But since the United States, this friendly nation to the south of us, have chosen to speak for the Western block of
June 14, 1983

which we are a part, can he give us the assurance that every effort is being made by the Government of Canada to also convince the United States to discuss seriously first, rather than letting us believe that we should deploy the missiles and start discussing seriously afterwards? It is my feeling that Canadians do not share that view. We are willing to honor our commitments, keeping in mind that we will deploy the missiles if negotiations fail. But for the negotiations to succeed, the United States must also be serious in these negotiations, to the same degree as their vis-a-vis. Will the Minister therefore assure this House that our ally, our friend and our neighbour, the United States, will be receiving from Canada instructions or recommendations pressing them to discuss very seriously before a final decision is taken to deploy?


Charles Lapointe: Mr. Speaker, I would like to thank the Hon. Member for Saint-Denis (Mr. Prud'homme) for his question, since we know the Hon. Member for Saint-Denis is the Chairman of our Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence and has an awareness, a very thorough knowledge of all those matters of foreign policy, and I would like to assure him that we are making identical representations to both the Americans and the Russians, in order to live up to the thrust of the decision made in December 1979 in co-operation with our NATO partners to arrive through negotiations on INF at a balanced and verifiable reduction of the number of such missiles. We exercise the same degree of pressure on both Washington and Moscow.
I would like to suggest to the Hon. Member that if he will read again the first Williamsburg declaration on armaments and the negotiations going on in Geneva, and also President Reagan's statement issued a few days after the Williamsburg Summit, in which he made new proposals to the Soviet Union, he will come to the conclusion that our American friends are very serious in their search for a balanced and verifiable reduction of INF missiles.


Douglas Keith Anguish: Mr. Speaker, in the Minister's presentation this afternoon he said on more than one occasion that he was not very happy or impressed with the intervention of the NDP to this point because we were misleading the Canadian public and the Members of this House by the arguments we were making. If the Cruise missile is not a piece of weaponry to carry a nuclear warhead, or in some cases a conventional warhead, does it have any other purpose? I submit that the Minister discredits his own argument. If the NDP has a slant on it of scare tactics toward people, he discredits his argument by the fact that he insinuates that we stand for unilateral disarmament, which is not correct. He also put out a scare tactic of his own to the public of the bogeyman in the closet when he says that if we do not have nuclear weapons to protect us, somebody will attack and blow us to smithereens. That is not the case. We do not advocate unilateral disarmament. It has to be a platform where we work toward a verifiable arms
Supply
reduction through multilateral negotiations even beyond the bilateral.
The other point the Hon. Member makes-


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin):: Order. If the Minister is to respond, he might be given the floor at this time because the period is ending.


Charles Lapointe: Mr. Speaker, since the Hon. Member did not ask his question it is very hard for me to answer. Referring to my comments, he suggested I was far from being impressed by the arguments presented by the New Democratic Party. I would like to tell him I have never been impressed by any of the NDP's arguments. And when I say that the New Democratic Party's arguments tend to give a partial and biased illustration of the facts, I will repeat the words used by the Hon. Member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett), when she said that Liberal Members and Conservative Members would have Canada play a nuclear role, although the Hon. Member knew full well that the deployment of nuclear arms is not on Canadian soil. So let her cease and desist making statements that are almost accurate while ignoring what is essential.
This is what I wanted to say.


J. Michael Forrestall: Mr. Speaker, I would like to participate in this debate because it is a somewhat historic debate. In the 17 or 18 years that I have been in this Chamber, today offers me the first opportunity that I have had to participate in a debate on this subject at this level.
Let me begin by making the statement that it is high time that Canada started letting honourable people, honourable nations, their spokesmen and their knowledgeable negotiators do the right thing. I read a story in the Christian Science Monitor some time ago when this debate, first started, particularly in Europe because it had reference to Europe, and I will paraphrase that article, with apologies to its author. But I have paraphrased that article on my own behalf, and in any event, never before has mankind had such an opportunity to understand the reasons why we must lay down instruments of massive, massive destruction. We have that opportunity now.
Let me address myself very briefly, Mr. Speaker, to what my colleague, the Hon. Member for Victoria (Mr. McKinnon), suggested much earlier, and that is, that this debate includes three or four parameters. We are probably at fault because we in this Chamber have not debated this subject. We in the country have not debated the broad questions of armament, arms procurement, burden sharing and all such questions. Not only have we not done that but we are remiss and responsible for not having debated the nuclear question to the degree that our allies from the North Atlantic Alliance have.

June 14, 1983
Supply
Let me deal with one narrow aspect of the question. I was concerned by the assumption of the last speaker for the New Democratic Party that the air-launched Cruise missile is in fact a dedicated nuclear weapons system. That is absolute nonsense. The air-launched Cruise missile is put together with rivets. It is a simple vehicle that has only one dedicated function.
I want to tell my hon. colleagues something that obviously very few of them are aware of. In the first three days of a conventional war in Europe, the task of the allies will be to interdict airports from which enemy aircraft are launched in a pre-emptive and conventional strike, to interdict important transportation corridors, to interdict radar and other electronic radio communications systems and to interdict a dozen other very important targets. Those targets are fixed. They are not mobile targets. We know precisely and exactly where they are. There is no need to use an atomic warhead to blow up an airport or a building that houses a communications centre. Perhaps it is time that the secrecy that surrounds these things was lifted a little bit and that we come to understand the potential of conventional explosives.
In the first three days of interdicting key elements in a preemptive advance against our allies, we will lose 75 per cent of all airplanes that are sent down the middle of a runway in order to render them inoperable to a potential enemy. We will lose 75 per cent of the aircraft we send because those very airports are heavily defended. As we know, those airplanes range from a single man fighter bomber all the way to a three man fighter bomber. They cost anywhere from $30 million to $75 million or $80 million each. They are operated by one, two or three living persons, human souls on board, and we will lose 75 per cent of these men and planes. Given the choice, Mr. Speaker, of sending a manned fighter bomber at a cost of $30 million, $40 million or $50 million each with one, two or three souls on board, or an unmanned Cruise missile that is air-launched and that, in terms of production if we can ever get rid of inflation in the country, would in fact cost $900,000 or $1 million, what choice would you make? The lack of knowledge that we as Canadians have with respect to what is in fact going on in the world scares and horrifies me.
This afternoon, Mr. Speaker, I essentially want to deal with host countries because I think it is important that we understand what our allies are trying to do. Later I will discuss the recipient or host country of the ground-launched Cruise missile which is a dedicated nuclear vehicle.
If I have a complaint against my friends in the New Democratic Party, it is the opportunism that they display by turning the air-launched Cruise missile testing in Canada into a nuclear debate. Let us have both. Let us debate all of this. Let us try to understand, but let us not confuse and let us not ever again convey to the Canadian people that when we talk about the technology of an air-launched Cruise missile system that is conventionally dedicated to a specific conventional role and would be finished within the first three or four days of a war, that we are talking about a massive, first strike, nuclear dedicated weapons system. I have invited Members of the New
Democratic Party to tell me what their source of reference is that indicates to them that it is a massive first strike dedicated nuclear weapons system. It is no such thing and was never intended to be that. As a matter of fact, it is a drone that flew over the skies of Alberta 25 years ago that has been upgraded slightly. We are trying to test and to perfect the guidance system. It is a conventional vehicle.
Leaving that aside, the New Democratic Party has afforded us an opportunity to discuss nuclear weapons systems. Well, let there be no mistake. There is absolutely no relationship whatsoever except in appearance between a sea-launched Cruise missile, a ground-launched Cruise missile and an air-launched Cruise missile. I doubt very much that my friends even know what the central system is. From what I have heard today, I have some doubts as to whether Members of the New Democratic Party, aside from their Leader, know the difference between a strategic philosophy and a theatre philosophy. I honestly do not think that they know what is going on in Europe.
I have had the privilege, Mr. Speaker, of sitting on the Special Nuclear Weapons in Europe Committee for some three and a half years now and I think that perhaps I have a responsibility to address myself to what is going on in West Germany, in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Italy and Belgium. We all know what happened in West Germany. On the strength of continued support for the deployment of ground-launched Cruise missiles in Europe, dedicated weapons systems have the capacity to be converted back to conventional whereas the air-launched Cruise missile does not have the capacity to be converted to a nuclear system in under three or four years because of the entirely different technology. You can certainly drop a nuclear capable air-launched Cruise missile, there is no question about that, but what we are building is not dedicated to that. To those who express surprise and say we are testing a Stealth vehicle, I say, of course we are. What do they think the name of the game is? If they trust Moscow, they can go and live there. I do not.
Under the terms of the twin-track decision of December, 1979, it was envisioned that in the event of failure to achieve INF agreement, 108 Pershing II and 96 ground-launched Cruise missiles would be deployed in Germany. Public and Government attitude toward this deployment, scheduled to begin in December, 1983, has attracted considerable attention within Germany, from other members of the alliance and certainly from the Soviet Union. Much of this attention is focused on the March 6 Bundestag election which was viewed by the outside world largely as a missile referendum. The crucial votes determining the election were in fact actually economic and social. The current 10 per cent rate of unemployment, the question of higher pensions and schemes for economic recovery appear to have been more important than nuclear missiles in spite of the extensive publicity and media coverage given to the nuclear issue.
June 14, 1983

On the other hand, the issue of missiles prompted acrimonious debate between the parties in that election held just recently. The tenor of the exchanges was harsher than in any post-war election. Some analysts have concluded that the strong emotions and fears raised may very well leave lasting scars on the population.
The divergent attitudes of political parties in West Germany toward the INF deployment provoked an unprecedent degree of outside involvement in that general election. The Soviet Union was notable for opposing deployment and intimidating those who favoured it. They used the carrot and stick approach as they frequently do. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited the FRG in January and figured prominently in the partisan domestic campaign. Painting a picture of the U.S.S.R. as benevolent and committed to a reasonable arms agreement in the Geneva INF talks, he characterized the Reagan administration as "gamblers and con men", insensitive to European problems and uncommitted to a successful outcome at Geneva.
We all know President Reagan's conclusion. He said this:
These actions reflect a bipartisan consensus on arms control, and new flexibility in the negotiations-steps to be viewed seriously by the Soviets and all others who have a stake in world peace. To the leaders of the Soviet Union, I urge that this new opportunity not be lost. To America's friends and allies around the world, I say that your steadfast support for the goals of both deterrence and arms control is essential in the future. To Congress and to the American people, 1 say let us continue to work together in a bipartisan spirit so that these days will be spoken of in the future as the time when America turned a corner. Let us put our differences behind us. Let us demonstrate measured flexibility in our approach, while remaining strong in our determination to reach our objectives of arms reductions, stability, and security. Let us be leaders in the cause of peace.
That is what we should be, Mr. Speaker. It is what Mr, Kohl in West Germany wants. It is what Prime Minister Thatcher wants, and she has just come through a very successful election. It is what the leaders in Holland want. Italy is going into an election, and that is what its leaders want. It is what the socialist movement in Italy wants; it is what members of the Communist Party in Italy want. They want a negotiated peace. It is what Canadians want. We differ on how we reach those goals, but at least let us support the leaders of the alliance who are our friends. Let us not go off on tangents and confuse an unsophisticated Canadian public on the nuclear debate. We must not do that either wittingly or unwittingly, and that is why I chose to take some time to speak about this. 1 am amazed that it was necessary to do so as I thought everyone understood the difference, the role and purpose of an air-launched Cruise missile compared to that of a ground-launched, Cruise missile or a sea-launched Cruise missile. Entirely different technologies are involved and each has a different purpose and a different role.
West Germany continues to support the principles of the December, 1979, decision. It was not easy for the leader. I tell this the way I understand it, Mr. Speaker. Mr. Kohl's victory did not necessarily come out of the debate, nor did the opposition to it. The growth of the Green Party in West Germany has been noted but it has lost most of its credibility.
In the United Kingdom, Prime Minister Thatcher did not waver at all. She has supported the 1979 agreement since its beginning. What nappened to the coalition in that country? We all saw the manifesto printed down one side of the page
Supply
and another manifesto down the other. There were 21 points, 17 of them identical. If Hon. Members would do a little research, they would understand why honourable men and women of good will always defer to the right pursuit of peace. They do not necessarily reject other courses toward peace but they will always accept the right course.
How many Governments are there in Europe? We have 15 allies in NATO. Are we always right? Are we the only ones who know what is right? In Canada we have little choice but to support the knowledgeable decisions of the Government, and I hope this is a position that this Party would take. We have the same qualifications as the Government with respect to any escalation of the nuclear arms race. Those things are clear and are well set out. My colleague, the Hon. Member for Victoria, has done that, and others will follow.
Prime Minister Thatcher's Government repeatedly rejected the Soviet demand that the United Kingdom's independent nuclear forces be included in the Geneva INF negotiations. The Government has taken the position, shared by the NATO allies, that the Soviet posture is, in fact, an attempt to decouple the U.S. from Europe by excluding U.S. nuclear weapons systems from Europe. United Kingdom officials have argued that the British and French independent nuclear systems should not be included for several reasons; they are by definition and nature strategic and not theatre forces; they are minimal deterrent forces vis-a-vis the vast Soviet nuclear arsenal, and the INF negotiations are strictly bilateral. The March, 1982, U.K. white paper did indicate, however, that if circumstances were to change significantly, that is, if Soviet military capabilities and the threat they posed to the United Kingdom were to be reduced substantially, the U.K. would, of course, be prepared to review its position in relation to arms control. They have said these things. They are in place. They are part of the debate. It is incumbent upon us to be aware of it.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Corbin);: Order. I regret to interrupt the Hon. Member but the time allotted for his speech has expired.


Douglas Keith Anguish: Mr. Speaker, the eloquence of the Hon. Member in describing his knowledge with respect to the Cruise missile, I believe has only portrayed his vast ignorance. I would like to quote to him from two sources. He has stated in questions today, and also in his speech just now, that the air-launched Cruise missile is not or cannot be equipped with a nuclear warhead. I would like to quote to him from a statement by William Epstein, who is the former director of Disarmament at the United Nations. He is referring to the air-launched Cruise missile to be tested in Canada. He said:
Each missile can carry a nuclear warhead up to about 300 kilotonnes in yield, about 20 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.
If that does not satisfy the Hon. Member, I can go to another source to back up our assertion that the air-launched

June 14, 1983
Supply
Cruise missile is designed to carry a nuclear warhead. If you look at the background papers, tabled with the umbrella agreement, which was tabled in this House, Section E, entitled, "The Cruise Missile-Deterrents and Arms Control", you will see in the last paragraph on Page 2:
Cruise missiles can be armed with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Any missiles which may be tested in Canada would, of course, be unarmed.
That is the source of our information when we say that the air-launched Cruise missile is designed to carry a nuclear warhead. Would the Hon. Member tell us what is his source of information which says the air-launched Cruise missile is not designed to carry a nuclear warhead?


J. Michael Forrestall: Mr. Speaker, my sources are the United States military authorities, the Pentagon, General Rogers, and a host of other people. I do not believe that I said that the air-launched Cruise missile was not capable of nuclear capability. I said that its role and purpose has a three or four-day duration, that it is designed to do a specific job. That job is conventional because there is no need to use a nuclear weapon to blow up a runway or a railway station. No military man whom I have met in three and a half or four years on the nuclear arms committee in Europe has ever suggested anything else. The Boeing people do not suggest that, nor does the Pentagon, where I have asked this question specifically-without getting into names. As a matter of fact, I asked General Rogers the question. General Rogers would deploy the air-launched Cruise missile specifically for the purpose I have indicated. He has said that publicly. He has said that it has no better role than to relieve the commanders of the responsibility of sending men, live people, souls, human beings, down the middle of a runway to destroy it only to know that when they issue that order three-quarters of the men will not come back. That is its role and its mission. Every nation in the world, unless we come to our senses, will deploy air-launched Cruise missiles in this particularly narrow way. There is absolutely no need to increase the cost of an air-launched Cruise missile to the level of the cost of a ground-launched missile or a sea-launched Cruise missile. There is no need to do that. You have the other weapon systems.
The Hon. Member is right in saying the system can carry anything. It can carry leaflets. It can carry mail, and God knows we need to speed up the mail around the country. However, it is not a dedicated nuclear system. I do not argue with the fact that it has the capacity to be converted to that, but it would take two to three years of new technology and new work to turn that vehicle into a nuclear-capable Cruise missile.


Mr. Sargeant:: Mr. Speaker, I am not quite sure who the Hon. Member was trying to "snow" in his answer to my friend, the Hon. Member for The Battlefords-Meadowlake (Mr. Anguish). I would like to ask him about the arguments which the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) has thrown at us over the last number of months when we have opposed the testing of this missile in Canada. The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamontagne) has also repeated this same point. We have said that this is not the missile which is going to be
used in NATO. They have said, however, that it does not really matter which of the three missiles we test, that what they are testing is the guidance system. Therefore, they are using this as a test bed for a guidance system which can subsequently be used in the ground-launched or sea-launched, or whatever launched missiles which are designed to carry nuclear weapons. That is the point we are trying to make. It is not whether this specific missile happens sometimes to carry nuclear and sometimes to carry conventional. Would the Hon. Member comment on that, please?


J. Michael Forrestall: Mr. Speaker, I have no intention of putting words in the mouth of the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau), or anyone else. He can do what he wants. The air-launched Cruise missile, just as the Tomahawk, as my friend knows very well because we viewed it together, I believe, has the capacity to carry a 1,000-pound conventional warhead. It can be converted. It is not my fault if the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence are not fully conversant with this subject. The secrecy which surrounds this debate, my dear friend, is nonsense. I believe Canadians should be aware of what is going on so that when we react out of natural human fear, we understand what we are reacting to, so that we are not reacting to something which we do not understand. It is my understanding that the system is designed to carry up to-and I should not say the numbers because I am not sure-a 1,000-pound conventional warhead missile, and that to convert it to a nuclear capacity would take at least two years. Even the guidance system is entirely different. The whole response is entirely different because its mission is entirely different from that of the air-launched Cruise missile. But it is immaterial. My concern, Mr. Speaker, is that we have taken advantage of the testing of a guidance system in Canada to expand that into a nuclear debate, and we have labelled the air-launched Cruise missile as a horrendous nuclear dedicated weapon system, which it is not.


Paul Edmund McRae: Mr. Speaker, I have a great deal of difficulty with the statements of the Hon. Member. I do not in any way question his sources or what he is trying to put across. However, it seems to me that there is one very good reason why a conventional weapon would not be satisfactory, that is, that you need a much larger explosive force in order to be as accurate as you need to be, even though you can get 100 meters from your source. I have a list of all the Cruise weapons with built-in guidance systems, the TERCON guidance system. They are the ALCM AGM 86B, which is nuclear; the GLCM, the ground-launched BGM 109G, which is a tactical weapon, nuclear; and the SLCM BGM 109A, nuclear, and there are only a few of these coming along, and they will not come on until 1986. They actually will be conventional and are for that purpose.
I believe we are talking very seriously about a nuclear weapon which can get close enough to destroy a command post, but that cannot be done in any kind of hardened situation, and cannot be done if you are using a conventional
June 14, 1983

weapon. The Hon. Member is correct, it would be a 1,000-pound warhead, but a 1,000-pound warhead is not capable of doing what he says it is capable of doing. It is only a nuclear weapon with 17 times the power of the Hiroshima bomb.


J. Michael Forrestall: Mr. Speaker, the last time I used a sledge hammer to crack a peanut I did not have anything left. You do not need a nuclear weapon to blow up a runway or render it less than useful to an enemy! You need only modern explosives.
Rather than get into a debate and take up the time of the House, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that my hon. friend use the influence of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Lamon-tagne) and others in the Government to get himself into a United States explosives factory and get himself a first-class briefing on just exactly what we can do with modern explosives. Then he will understand that no man in his right mind would drop an atomic bomb on a radio station. What in hell for? What is this debate about? To kill innocent, harmless people? It is crazy, insane and nobody would do it. Not even Moscow would do it and they have the equivalent capability. If the Hon. Member is not aware of that, perhaps he had better do a little bit of reading.


Stanley Hudecki: Mr. Speaker, I would like to open my remarks by commenting on the role of the Department of National Defence. The role is a very specific one. It is the protection of this bountiful land of ours against aggression and the preservation of peace and freedom. It must do this in the real world where there are foreign powers who do not share our values of freedom and dignity for each human being. Peace has different meanings and perceptions in different lands. For example, the Soviet Union's definition, as expressed by Lenin many years ago, was that peace simply means communist world control.
In this world, nuclear weapons do exist. We cannot wish them away or demonstrate them away. They will not go away. They exist as weapons in the hands of sovereign states, friend or foe alike, such as the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, the United Kingdom, and most likely other countries as well. Indeed, these terrible weapons are in the hands of nations whose leadership is dedicated to the very antithesis of democracy and freedom. One such superpower is the Soviet Union.
A nuclear weapon is not just a qualitative advance over previous weapons. They have added a new dimension, not only to warfare but to our very human existence. There can be no winners in a nuclear war, but nuclear arms are a reality that we must face as a nation and address as a Defence Department.
In light of its size and geography, its vast and unpopulated frontiers, its three ocean coastlines and its wide expanse of ice and snow in the north, Canada relies heavily on its alliance with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and operates under an allied defence system. There is no doubt but that Canada's security depends on co-operation with our neighbour to the south as well as with our other partners in NATO. The
Supply
motion today deals with our participation in NATO concerning deterrence, which is interpreted as an escalation in nuclear arms.
In the first place, the House is asked to oppose escalation of the nuclear arms race by any nation. Inherent in this proposition are two implications: the first is that there is in progress a "nuclear arms race". The second is that the pace of this arms race is quickening in that its dimensions are getting larger; that it is indeed escalating.
Historically the concept of an arms race has been applied to a situation in which potential military rivals or adversaries have engaged in competitive programs of armament or rearmament, each with the objective of gaining superiority over the other. Is this in fact the process in which, with respect to their nuclear arsenals, the two superpowers and, more generally, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are now engaged? If so, Mr. Speaker, if we conclude that the two rival superpowers on the one hand and NATO and the Warsaw Pact on the other hand are indeed engaged in a race for superiority in nuclear weapons, do we not then have to examine how that race was started and what are its current dynamics before we can reach sensible conclusions as to how it can best be halted and as to the effects upon the arms race of particular weapon decisions taken by either? As the Minister said in his statement on Estimates to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence on March 15:
For two decades the Soviet Union has had the potential to threaten Western Europe with intermediate-range ballistic missiles armed with nuclear weapons, without there ever having been a large number of similar systems available in the allied military structure of NATO Europe. NATO was able to tolerate this situation as long as the United States enjoyed a superiority in intercontinental ballistic missiles which kept not only the Soviet Union's counterparts, but also its land-based Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) missiles facing Europe in rough balance. Since the Soviet Union has become equally strong in intercontinental weapons, and since this rough strategic parity has been codified by the SALT agreements, there is now a greater need to correct the pronounced imbalance in intermediate-range weapons, either through a reduction by the Soviet Union or by the installation of some offsetting system by the West. In the area of intermediate-range weapons, the Soviet Union made a great and deliberate leap forward with the introduction of SS-20 missiles. The North Atlantic Alliance members were understandably concerned by this new threat to the territory of its European states.
When early efforts to dissuade the Soviet Union from deploying its SS-20s failed, Western governments took the 'two-track' decision in December 1979 to modernize NATO's intermediate-range weapons through the introduction of the Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and to offer arms control negotiations to the Soviet Union, an unprecedented procedure in which negotiations were proposed on new weapons systems before their deployment and whose objective it is to bring about a limitation of these systems in both East and West at the lowest possible level, desirably zero. Canada is convinced, as are her European allies, that the threat posed by the presence of the Soviet Union's long-range land-based INF missiles cannot be ignored. Though we greatly prefer to deal with this threat through negotiations, we also recognize and support the requirement for NATO to negotiate from a position of strength."
The lesson of history is that peace is made more likely by a balance of power; so long as East and West maintain broadly equivalent forces, there is little danger of war. But the West can only sustain its part of this relationship if its own forces are kept up to date. There is also a need to guard against

June 14, 1983
Supply
attempts by the Soviet Union to achieve military superiority in any particular area, such as the INF. Moreover, such decisions are taken only after the most careful consideration. They are not autonomous or planned. Arms control aims to control this competition, to stabilize the balance and, if possible, to reduce the level of forces on both sides.
Among the Hon. Members opposite who put forward the resolution before us, there is a number who have philosophical leanings. I would suggest that even the best philosophers would benefit from minimal knowledge of history. It would not have taken much research to show that the West simply cannot be charged with escalating the nuclear arms race. One does not even require this degree of historical expertise to observe that the only conceivable cause for war between East and West would be a Soviet military attack.
Cruise missiles are not a new weapon, nor will they give a new twist to the arms race. The Soviet Union is deploying its new SS-20s now, and has been doing so since 1977. One new SS-20 missile has been deployed on an average each week, to a total of 350, each with three warheads.
From their silence over the past six years, one can only conclude that those who tabled the resolution today were not troubled by such developments. The NATO Cruise missiles, on the other hand, which are the object of the resolution, are not due to start arriving in Europe until the end of this year at the earliest, and only then if a satisfactory arms control agreement is not reached.
In taking its modernization decision, NATO agreed that before the first missile arrived, a major effort should be made to prevent an arms spiral. As evidence of this, the Americans have already withdrawn 1,000 nuclear warheads from Europe, and they will remove one more for every new warhead deployed.
It is worth recalling that at the start the Russians refused to even talk. It was only when faced with NATO's determination to proceed with the modernization decision that the Russians concluded that they could not get what they wanted on a onesided basis and agreed to negotiate.
The resolution must be opposed. It is flawed in its essence. It has no redeeming features. It does not even call for a lessening of reliance on nuclear weapons through improvements to our conventional defences. Rather, it betrays a state of mind prepared to acquiesce in Soviet strategic superiority and to dismantle or disavow any weapons systems on our soil that the Soviet Union might regard as being provocative. The resolution bears eloquent if unwitting witness to the policital dividends that the development of nuclear superiority brings in its wake.
In conclusion, let me say that living with nuclear weapons is one of the inevitable results of mankind's unrelenting search for knowledge, just as are the many benefits that we enjoy in medicine, communications and agriculture. Nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented. We must learn to live with them. We need to create an environment where there is stability between
nuclear equipped forces so that there be no incentive to attempt aggression.
Nuclear deterrence is a dreadful form of security, but it is effective, it has proven itself, and it does prevent the horrors of any type of war. However, to be effective, it must be such that there is no doubt but that initiating a nuclear engagement would entail absolutely unacceptable costs and punishment to the initiator. I will therefore vote against the resolution.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: I would like to ask the Parliamentary Secretary a question concerning a Government policy which seems to me to be overly dedicated to secrecy. I do not know if he listened as I read a list of things that I thought we could have without endangering national security in this matter. 1 wonder if he could tell us if the Government will relax its attitude. It is not always in the interests of security to keep everything secret about everything. Would the Parliamentary Secretary have a look at the list in the Cruise Missile Project Arrangement to see if there is any reason we cannot have a much fuller briefing, a written briefing, that we could use as reference material in future debates of this nature?


Stanley Hudecki: Yes, I heard the worthy recommendations of the Hon. Member this morning. They do make sense. It seems to me, however, that it is a bilateral agreement. We would probably need agreement from NATO and from the United States officials as well. I have already taken the liberty of passing on the Hon. Member's thoughts and concerns not only to the Ministers but to the officials in the Department as well.
I hope that we will receive a favourable answer in that respect.


Allan Bruce McKinnon: I wonder if the Parliamentary Secretary would take note that in a Congressional committee in the United States, there would not be the slightest question. Agreement would be given before it was ratified. It would be the same with SALT II. It would not be held in secret by the administration in the United States until such time as the Senate or the Government there decided whether it would passs it. We are doing things backwards. We are making the decisions and then, afterwards, we receive a little dribble of information and a kind of staged debate as to whether we should or should not have gone along with the decision.


Stanley Hudecki: I was just wondering whether one of the obstacles is the need of previous knowledge of technology that is associated, whether this subject lends itself to scrutiny by a committee, or one which does not have the background in the technical knowledge of the various weapons and weapons systems.


Douglas Keith Anguish: Mr. Speaker, I have two questions to ask. Instead of asking a supplementary question, I will pose both questions at the same time and ask the Parliamentary Secretary to response to them. If in fact the Canadian people accepted the build-up of nuclear arms, nuclear weaponry, as a deterrence, where does it stop? At what point do we stop building up nuclear arms, stop hiding our heads in the sand as an ostrich would, in terms of our Canadian Government, and proposed some kind of meaningful intervention by the Canadian Government, by the Canadian people, to reduce and
June 14, 1983

eventually stop nuclear arms on the face of the earth? I am sure that that must be the objective of all people in Canada.
The second question I pose is the following: Instead of Cabinet deciding sometime during the summer, in its own isolation, as the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) has pointed out, why can there not be a decision as to whether or not we test the Cruise missile, a decision of this Parliament assembled in the House, in a vote which is not viewed as being a vote of non-confidence, so that Members of Parliament can freely express their views and that of their constituents on the question of testing the Cruise missile in Canada?


Stanley Hudecki: I do not feel that the whole issue of deterrence is entirely understood. It is a technique whereby the country or the force which is using deterrence must have two components. First, it must show that it has the equipment and the material with which to deter the enemy and, second, there must be a will, both a political will and a will of the people, to use it if it must. If these conditions are fulfilled, then deterrence will work and will not necessarily have to escalate, because with NATO, we have the second track. Using this second track approach, it is anticipated there will be a reduction, not an escalation. What will happen if none of these systems will work is a question that 1 am not that much of a visionary to be able to answer. But the very fact that for 38 years it has worked, and has some credibility, gives reason to hope for and to anticipate a favourable result.


Gordon Edward Taylor: Mr. Speaker, I want to make a short comment and then ask a question. I found out years ago as a boy that the only way to stop a bully in the school yard was with a strong punch to the nose. Otherwise, you continued to be bullied and there was no stopping a person whose objective was to bully.
In the Hon. Member's speech he mentioned the two superpowers. He did not mention that the objectives of the United States, one of the superpowers, is peace. The U.S. protects people. The Americans have no ambitions to take over the world. The declared objective of the Soviet Union, of communism, is world domination. That is why the communists walk into nations that cannot defend themselves, such as Afghanistan, Poland, Hungary and the Ukraine. I do not want to live in a country in which the communists can march in. 1 want to be able to protect myself.
Why in Canada do we have a continual bombarding of a nation whose objective is peace, namely the U.S.A., while the build-up of weaponry in the Soviet Union whose objective is world domination is almost ignored?


Stanley Hudecki: Mr. Speaker, I think that is the crux of the whole issue. It may very well be that we in the role of the Department of National Defence and we in the role of Government from a political point of view have not really stated the issues clearly enough. We have not used our educational
Supply
techniques in order to get down to the basic issues and to distribute information.


Terence James (Terry) Sargeant: Mr. Speaker, 1 have a question for the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hudecki). In his speech he talked about the need for stability between the two nuclear camps. How does the Cruise missile contribute to that stability when almost every serious thinker and writer on disarmament issues, and indeed people who practise disarmament negotiations for both sides-and another person who made this assertion was a former Secretary of the U.S. Navy-have all said that the Cruise missile in particular is a destabilizing weapon because of its non-verifiability? It does not add anything to the stability of the nuclear camps. There is no denying that it adds to the punch of the nuclear camps. Would the Parliamentary Secretary please explain how these things fit together?


Stanley Hudecki: Mr. Speaker, 1 think it has to a degree promoted stability in that along with the threat of using a Pershing II missile it has been able to bring the superpowers together at Geneva to the IWF and the Start meetings. It has been very difficult for those who have been promoting peace and who wanted NATO to meet with these organizations and have been unable to do so. When the threat of using these two weapons is made available, the two of them will meet and hopefully it will be the beginning of a de-escalation of the arms race, and that will add to the stability of the country.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: The period of questions and answers has expired. It may continue if there is unanimous consent. Is there unanimous consent?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some Hon. Members:: No.


Flora Isabel MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, we are today debating an issue of the utmost gravity to mankind. In doing so, surely we can agree that no one individual in this House and no single Party has a monopoly on the desire for peace in this world. Surely that is a goal we all seek. Yet I find the wording of this NDP motion before us today demeans and belittles the seriousness of this critical debate.
In the confusion and controversy that presently surrounds the role that Canada may be called upon to play in the testing of the Cruise missile guidance system, we should begin by recognizing that a limited nuclear war in Europe would be disastrous. Not only would it devastate the towns and cities of that continent but it is inconceivable that it would remain limited in terms of the size of the weapons used or of the geographic area. There are no obvious fire breaks that would halt it. There are no sure ways of limiting the use of these weapons to the so-called "little ones". To use the word "limited" is to commit a double error. A limited nuclear war would in all probability destroy western Europe. A limited nuclear war would almost certainly become intercontinental and,

June 14, 1983
Supply
therefore, unlimited. For these reasons we here in Canada cannot suppose that this is a remote issue, remote from us. We are not armchair spectators watching in some disinterested fashion the tactics of the respective sides or pontificating from a limited base of knowledge. We have a role to play, and that role is to be found within NATO.
The policies that Canada advocates in the Council at NATO can do two things. They can take us closer to a nuclear war which would engulf this country among others, or the policies that we advocate within NATO can lead to a safer, more stable and perhaps ultimately non-nuclear environment in Europe. That would be vastly to our advantage. Nor should any of this surprise us, Sir. Twice alrealdy in this century Canadians have felt obliged to enter a war which began as a European conflict. The great difference now is that the nuclear tinderbox in Europe includes us, whether or not we wish to be included.
Given the immense gravity of this issue then, there is a broad path that I think we should take. On the one hand we must make sure that the immediate balance of forces is preserved so that the mutual deterrent continues to work in Europe as it has worked for almost 40 years. On the other hand, we must lend our weight to reversing the nuclear militarization of Europe even if this involves greater commitments to conventional weapons.
The 1979 decision of NATO of which, as Secretary of State for External Affairs I was a part, was quite compatible with this approach that I have outlined. At that time, as I remember, there was widespread concern in European countries about the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers in the western Soviet Union. There was a great deal of concern. The SS-20 missile, in particular, was seen directly to threaten the European members of NATO. There were no long-range theatre nuclear weapons held by NATO forces which could counter or offset the SS-20 missiles.
The vulnerability of our NATO partners-and it was expressed by so many of them in very direct terms-led us, that is the countries, of NATO to what has become known as the two-track decision. That decision meant, first, countering the SS-20 missiles and the Backfire bombers by deploying long range theatre nuclear weapons within the European countries of NATO, namely deploying the Pershing II and the Cruise missile. That was the first track of that two-track decision. Second, that decision meant seeking arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union to eliminate all long range theatre nuclear weapons from Europe, both East and West. Deployment was not to take place for four years. The decision reached was that there would be no deployment by NATO of these weapons for a four-year period, namely until December 1983 at the earliest. In the intervening period, the intention was to concentrate on the second track, to concentrate consistently and urgently on the arms control negotiations which would be carried out in Geneva.
One of the major concerns at that 1979 NATO ministerial meeting was to find a policy which would maintain the unity of NATO members. It was not easy; it was a very difficult search. Small countries of NATO, in particular, were not anxious to participate in a policy which would lead to arms escalation. The search for a consensus was indeed a difficult one. The Government of which I was a part agreed with the analysis of the imbalance in theatre nuclear forces in Europe at that time and it accepted that this imbalance had the very serious effect of potentially decoupling the American nuclear deterrent from the deterrents of nuclear war in Europe.
Our European partners in NATO were very concerned about this possibility. It bespoke volumes about their vulnerability to the SS-20 and the Backfire bombers with no guarantee that they could ultimately rely on the back-up of the American deterrent. The Canadian position at that time sought to allow European members of NATO to find their own consensus about the most appropriate response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20s. Clearly any NATO deployment would be on their territory, not in Canada. The deployment would be on the territory of western European countries. It was up to them to decide whether and how they wished to deploy these weapons.
Our concern at that time was not to strike any postures or to engage in rhetoric which might prejudice the ability of western Europeans to achieve a consensus. We should be quite clear, though, that throughout those meetings which resulted in the decision in 1979 at Brussels the decision in no way constituted a commitment by Canada to test the Cruise missile, nor was any such discussion entered into at the time of the NATO agreement. It never came up for discussion.
If we have an obligation now, it is because our attempt to find a common policy with our allies clearly imposes responsibilities, including co-operation in the testing of weapons systems which we have collectively agreed to deploy in western Europe should the arms control negotiations not be successful. Therefore, and specifically in regard to the Cruise missile, it is quite clear that our first and most urgent obligation is to use all our influence in the pursuit of an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union in Geneva. Anything else, including the testing of the guidance system of the Cruise missile, is secondary to the central issue of arms control. We must not allow ourselves to be deflected from the goal of arms control and reduction. That is what the 1979 decision of NATO was all about.
We should realize that today we have only six months left of the original four years which were agreed to to make progress toward an arms control agreement before deployment of the Cruise missile takes place in western Europe, six months left out of that four-year period. If the decision to deploy is implemented, if that is what we arrive at at the end of this year because the arms control negotiations have not been successful, then I feel we are obliged to share in the alliance effort which obviously will involve testing the guidance system of the
June 14, 1983

Cruise missile in Canada. But that obligation, related as it is to arms control negotiations, in no way required the Canadian Government to sign a bilateral agreement with the United States to test all manner of American weapons systems on Canadian territory. Yet that is the situation the Government created on February 10, 1983, when it signed the umbrella agreement with the U.S. That is the situation into which we have been put.
Under this new agreement or umbrella arrangement we have no guarantee that the weapons which are to be tested in Canada in the future will be part of our alliance commitments. They could equally be used for counterinsurgency in any part of the world, and the decisions could be made in secret, with no guarantee that Parliament will ever have the opportunity to debate the merits of these arrangements. All of this is being done by a Government which promised to suffocate the arms race in the laboratories. It is being done by a Government which has scarcely made any contribution to the discussion of arms control in Europe. Since the decision was taken in 1979, three and a half years have gone by and the Government has not yet been seized of the urgency of this situation. Surely it should realize that now is the time for Canada to take the initiative in an effort to move the negotiations forward. We should not underestimate our potential for doing so, nor our opportunity, nor indeed our responsibility.
If we look at the situation with regard to our other NATO colleagues, we realize it is extraordinary difficult for the British and the French to show flexibility because their nuclear forces are at the very heart or the centre of the dispute. For political reasons it is equally difficult for the West German Government to take the lead in the promotion of new ideas. If one looks at the political positions of the more junior members of NATO, one by one it becomes clear that there are precious few governments able to take initiatives and to introduce arms control proposals into public discussion. By contrast, Canada is in a position to test new ideas and to put into private and public discussion suggestions which may command some considerable support within the alliance. That is something we can do. As an interested and involved party, we should now be concentrating our efforts on presenting proposals to NATO which reflect both our own concerns and the political realities confronting our European allies, those I have mentioned.
We should begin not by engaging in a debate about the number of missiles on each side but by identifying some guiding principles. The Palme Commission suggested the notion of mutual security as the touchstone for negotiations with the Soviets. We should not, therefore, ignore the security dilemmas feed by the Soviets and we must realize the reality with which they live, namely that British and French or sea-based nuclear warheads are just as devastating as land-based warheads. Mutual security requires a formula and an approach which will deal with the Cruise and the SS-20 and will place them in the broader context of all medium range nuclear weapons currently targeted on both parts of Europe, East and West.
Supply
Our task as Canadians is to consider some of these possible solutions. It is well within the capacities of our experts to evaluate them and to explore the common ground of Washington and our European partners. To be rebuffed in this exercise will be disheartening. If we were to undertake it and be rebuffed, it would indeed be disheartening, but not to attempt it at all would be an abandonment of our role and our interest in the alliance. It would be to forget that there is still a place for genuine mediation within the alliance. It would be to assume that we in Canada have entirely lost influence and credibility with our closest friends. It would be to accept passivity and helplessness as the mark of our international diplomacy.
There are times when I am critical of the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) for some of his travels abroad, that they have not brought about the results that he or we might want to see. However, I would have no criticism, only commendation, if I could see the Prime Minister of this country engage in shuttle diplomacy from one country to the other in the western alliance to try to promote a much stronger effort by Canada for arms control negotiation in Geneva.
In this particular context, it is inappropriate to dwell upon specific numbers. Before we come to the precise arguments of the specialists, our task is to impose certain political principles on the negotiating process. Both in North America and in Europe there are hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens who perhaps have seen more clearly than the scientists in defence laboratories and the strategists in the world of acronyms who know where present trends are leading us. We are faced with an apparently endless proliferation of nuclear weapons and destructive capabilities. Every new weapon has its own logic and its own reason, but the outcome is illogical, irrational and inhumane.
Therefore, and beginning with the INF negotiations Canada's approach to arms control should be guided by two broad principles. First, we must present realistic negotiating positions which emphasize minimal deployment of new weapon systems. We must begin to stem the tide of nuclear proliferation in Europe. Second, a negotiated outcome to the INF problem must encourage and actively promote further discussions on nuclear arms control.
In summary, the testing of the Cruise missile is not a decision which can or should be taken in isolation. Instead it must be placed, as I have argued, in the broader context of direction in arms control.
Finally, Canada must establish its own purposeful criteria for arms control and bend its efforts to achieving the only goal that in the long-term makes any sense, the progressive denuclearization of the world.


Paul Edmund McRae: Mr. Speaker, I was pleased to hear the speech of the Hon. Member. I am sure she is aware that before 1963 there were 600 SS-4s and SS-5s deployed in the eastern European operation. The Americans withdrew their Jupiter and Thor missiles. Therefore, there were 600 single missile

June 14, 1983
Supply
warheads in place until the SS-20s were deployed. Then there were the SS-20, SS-4 and SS-5. Two weeks ago the Russians made an offer to get rid of the SS-4 and the SS-5 and to reduce the SS-20 to the number equivalent to that which the French and British have, that is, 594, almost 600. The Russians said they would reduce their SS-20 warheads to the number that were there before 1963.
The SS-20 is a much less dangerous weapon, with only one-seventh of the capability of the SS-4 and the SS-5. It is much more stable in the sense that it is mobile, cannot be destroyed and does not have to be used as a first strike. It is an arms controller's dream. Are we not in a much better position today with this offer than we were in 1963 when we removed these missiles? Is this not an approach we might accept in terms of the negotiations?


Flora Isabel MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, I will not ask the Member to repeat the question. He asks that I remember back to 1963. I remember 1963 very well. It was at that time that the Liberal Government wanted to install Bomarc missiles in Canada. The Party of which I am part stood very staunchly against that. We did not want nuclear weapons in Canada at that time or at any time since.
With regard to the hypothetical position the Hon. Member has put forward, as far as I am concerned the role that Canada can take in this is to look at the situation that now exists in Britain and in France. That is one of the major stumbling blocks in the negotiations in Geneva, the missiles that are deployed in those countries at the present time. I would sooner see us use every bit of influence and power that we have to try to bring these countries into some discussion on what would happen in the balance between East and West that could incorporate the missiles that are presently deployed by those countries. I may say that that was a proposal put forward just the other day by Lord Carrington, the former foreign minister of Britain. If we were to advocate something like that and see it come to a successful conclusion, we might break some of the deadlock that presently exists in Geneva.


Pauline Jewett: Mr. Speaker, I found the Hon. Member's address very interesting. I would agree with a great deal of it. In fact, I hope everyone in the House would agree that enormous emphasis must be placed on Canada's participation, providing ideas, assistance and so on for arms control negotiations.
I wonder if the former Minister would have something to say about the testing of the Cruise in the context of the negotiations, both INF and START. Although the air-launched Cruise missile is not yet in the START negotiating structure, it certainly was in SALT II and I hope would come again.
Because it is the air launch that we are being asked to test, would she not see some merit for putting off any decision to test until we see more about the progress of the negotiations in Geneva which may take many months? I know she spoke of four years, but negotiations were not going on a lot of that time.
Even though the Hon. Member does not want Canada to play a non-nuclear role in the alliance, which would include not testing, does she not see some merit in putting this way off down the line while the very negotiations that she feels very strongly about are going on?


Flora Isabel MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, not only do I feel strongly about the arms control negotiations now, I felt strongly about them when that decision was made in 1979. If there is one great regret that I have, it is that we in Canada have treated the arms control negotiations as a secondary issue and have focused the attention of the country on the testing of a weapons system rather than the other way around. The important issue is surely how we can bring some control and reduction to nuclear weapons.
That we will come to a breakthrough in the negotiations within the next few months is not yet apparent, although there has been some minor movement, but if I were to see that we were anywhere near a major breakthrough that would then not necessitate the deployment of Cruise missiles or Pershing missiles in western Europe, I would certainly advocate that the negotiations continue for a limited period of time. No one would be so foolish as to turn down a possibility and a hope of that nature.


Mr. Allmand:: Mr. Speaker, I have listened very closely to the hon. lady and I was pleased to hear-


Flora Isabel MacDonald: Member will do.


William Warren Allmand: Excuse me, I apologize to the Hon. Member. I was pleased to hear her say that there was nothing in the 1979 NATO agreement which obliged Canada to test any nuclear weapon. I would like to ask first if, according to her experience and her assessment, under the first track of the 1979 agreement which was to maintain the balance of power and deterrents, it is necessary to develop the Cruise missile system. Does she not agree that NATO now has enough nuclear power to obliterate the Soviet Union? In other words, is it necessary to move ahead with these weapons under that policy?
My second question is with respect to the second track of the agreement, which was to pursue arms control and disarmament. Does she believe that the NATO alliance, in the last couple of years, has been faithful to the 1979 commitment by pursuing that side of the policy with enough vigour and commitment?	[DOT]
Finally, after listening to the Hon. Member's speech, I must say that I am not too sure which side she is voting for. Is she voting for the motion or against the motion? I did not hear that.


Flora Isabel MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, I will begin by answering the last part of the Hon. Member's question. I will be voting against the motion. I want the Hon. Member to know that from the outset I have said that if the arms control negotiations are not successful, then I feel that Canada should, as part
June 14, 1983

of the collective decision which is arrived at, assume some role in implementing that decision. That is why we are in NATO. If we are then asked to test the guidance system of the Cruise missile, I feel that we should do so. That was not ever raised as part of the discussion in 1979. There were no assignments handed out. All we knew was which countries would deploy the missiles on their own territory.
I am sorry, there was a second question which the Hon. Member asked.


William Warren Allmand: Yes, Mr. Speaker, does the Hon. Member think that it is necessary, under the 1979 agreement, that we do in fact develop a missile such as the Cruise when we already have overwhelming fire power that could destroy the East?


Flora Isabel MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, I tried to express the very real feeling of vulnerability that was conveyed at that December, 1979, meeting that the population of these countries in western Europe have because they have nothing to counter the SS-20. These people have lived through two world wars. But they have seen thousands of citizens of their countries die. They do not want to be overwhelmed again. They want something in the way of a deterrent, and the only thing they have in the way of a deterrent to the SS-20 at the present time is the American inter-continental ballistic missile system. That is where their defence lies, and they articulated that they are not at all sure that they can count on it.
If there is a strike made against them by the Soviet Union, they are not at all sure that the United States will automatically put itself into that battle. That is why these people say, "We want to be sure that we have some defensive mechanism to protect ourselves." As long as the people of the countries of western Europe feel that way, then I feel that we as a member of NATO supporting them must agree to that kind of defensive system which, in this case, means the Cruise missile and the Pershing 11.


Mr. Garnet M. Bloomfield (Parliamentary Secretary to Minister of National Revenue):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to take this opportunity to comment on a subject that has received a great deal of attention lately, and that is the testing of the Cruise missile in Canada. As all Hon. Members know, on February 10, 1983, Canada and the United States signed a five-year umbrella weapons testing agreement which established general ground rules for the testing of some of the U.S. military equipment and defence systems in Canada. At a later date, negotiators from both countries will try to establish a precise framework for the testing of different weapons, including the air-launched version of the Cruise missile in Alberta. However, to date no specific arrangement has been made to test Cruise missiles in Canada.
At the heart of the recent controversy is the Cruise missile itself, a missile which is basically a small, pilotless vehicle capable of delivering a nuclear warhead with great accuracy over long distances. It is too slow to be counted as a first strike weapon, but its accuracy and difficulty of detection makes it a devastating weapon. The Cruise missile is really the now generation of the V-l rocket the Germans developed near the
Supply
end of the Second World War that wrought such havoc on old London. The Cruise missile is very similar to that rocket except that it has wings and a guidance system. The Americans are not the only ones to have a Cruise missile. The Soviets, the French and the British also have similar vehicles, but only the Americans have developed the missile to such a high degree.
The U.S. is currently working on half a dozen different types of the Cruise missile. Most versions are being developed by the United States Navy and can be launched from submarines, surface ships or, in the case of the European version, by land. The other major type of Cruise is designed to be launched by B-52 bombers. This is the only type of Cruise that is presently being considered for operational testing in Canada.
The Cruise missiles have interchangeable roles. Almost every type of Cruise can be converted from nuclear to conventional warheads in relatively short order. They can also be outfitted to perform electronic warfare or surveillance roles. By making trade-offs with weapon payload, speed and fuel volume, the range of a Cruise can be extended from 370 miles to 1,500 miles without changing the missile's basic design.
Since Canada has foresworn the use of nuclear weapons on its own soil, it is already understood that none of the U.S. tests will involve nuclear warheads, nor will Canada be expected to deploy any of the missiles. The United States is expected to bear all testing costs. Also, there is a provision in the umbrella agreement which gives both countries the right to cancel or suspend any specific test. This gives us a great deal of control over the actual testing of weapons in Canada.
I think it is very important for Canadians to realize that we fully support NATO and the alliance. We believe that a credible deterrent is needed to maintain peace with liberty. That is why we supported NATO in 1979 when it adopted the "talk and deploy" or the two-track strategy. This strategy allows the western world to actively engage in negotiations that could contribute to meaningful and verifiable arms control and disarmament agreements, while at the same time to work with our allies to modernize our theatre and conventional defence forces in Europe so that they will in fact form a deterrent to the frightening build-up of Soviet armaments.
The military strategy of NATO, the strategy of flexible response, serves to preserve military security. Its aim is to prevent war through deterrence. Deterrence is effective when the allies are able to make credible their capability and willingness to defened themselves against any conceivable attack and can make the risk of attack unacceptable for a potential aggressor.
NATO is only capable of deterrence and defence through the close political and strategic co-ordination between North America and western Europe. Intercontinental strategic nuclear weapons, nuclear forces in Europe and conventional forces are required as deterrents for the entire spectrum of possible armed conflicts. NATO holds nuclear weapons at the ready not because it wants to wage a nuclear war, but rather because it wants to prevent war. The destructive power of

June 14, 1983
Supply
nuclear weapons is intended to deter the use of war as an instrument of policy.
Military security presupposes an approximate balance of military forces between East and West. Arms build-up alone, however, is not enough to provide certainty that a balance will remain stable and reliable in the long term. In order to attain lasting security, an attempt must be made to contribute to the creation of a stable military equilibrium at the lowest possible level by means of balanced limitations of military potentials.
Any efforts at obtaining quantitative and qualitative limitation and reduction of armaments must take into account the military efforts of the other side, especially existing imbalances in the ratio of military force, and must guarantee security in terms of defence capability at every stage of the process. Defence planning and arms control must be closely co-ordinated to preserve the capabilities necessary for the realization of this strategy. The defence and deterrent capability must be secured through the necessary military measures.
Deterrence is not an attractive way of ensuring peace, but at least it has worked. The maintenance of a credible deterrent has helped to make western Europe strong and to keep the peace for over 30 years, despite circumstances that were often difficult. That deterrent posture of the West still keeps the peace in Europe. To abandon our security system now in favour of alternatives that have not even been described coherently let alone thought through would be immensely dangerous. Deterrence also provides the necessary stability to enable us to negotiate international agreements on disarmament measures which will really give us a safer world if they are verifiable and apply equally to both sides. The possession of nuclear weapons is an essential fact of deterrence: in a world where such weapons exist the NATO alliance must be able to deter their use by an enemy or to resist blackmail based on the threat of nuclear attack.
At the same time, so long as there is no denying that it may fail, and it would be irresponsible not to have plans for trying to limit the damage once nuclear weapons are used. If the West is to remain dependent on the nuclear power of the United States, there is an obligation on us all to be constructive in our criticisms of United States policies, or at the very least to understand what they are trying to do. There is another obligation on which consensus appears to be developing on both sides of the Atlantic, that is, the need to improve conventional forces and so diminish reliance on nuclear weapons.
Canada participates in the nuclear strategies of NATO. However, our direct military contributions to alliance deterrence and defence lie in the defence by conventional means of land, air and maritime areas. This is not a question of morality. It is a question of how we can best contribute to our own security, given our limited resources and force size. But we cannot rationally condemn the possession of nuclear weapons by others in an alliance of which we are a member and in which nuclear weapons provide the basis of deterrence and
while we are sheltered by the deterrent nuclear umbrella of the United States or while we accept the contribution to deterrence and the prevention of war made by the nuclear forces of our British and French allies. To do so would be to adopt a position of no integrity whatever.
Canada's support for the maintenance of forces sufficient to deter aggression and defend the NATO area is entirely consistent with our commitment to a vigorous arms control policy. Indeed, the two policies are more than consistent, they complement and support each other, forming a coherent whole. They serve the same goal of enhancing security and preserving peace. Security is the key. Only on a basis of undiminished security can nations be expected to accept limitations on the numbers and quality of their weapons, and only on such a basis can they be brought to consider mutual and balanced reductions of their armed forces.
We are determined to do what we can to do what we can to achieve, by negotiation, a better international security environment. We are deeply involved in this effort. Canada not only encourages nuclear arms control between the two super powers, we also continue to seek mutual and balanced reductions in the conventional forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries confronting each other in central Europe. These are negotiations that impact directly on the Canadian forces.
In addition to our participation in alliance consultations on strategic arms and intermediate-range nuclear force negotiations, our direct participation in the mutual and balanced force reduction talks and the conference on security and co-operation in Europe review process, Canada also plays a full role in the work of the United Nations and the Committee on Disarmament. Like other members of the United Nations, Canada is committed to the search for realistic and verifiable multilateral measures of arms control and disarmament which will halt the arms build-up. Canada's priorities in the United Nations are the achievement of a comprehensive multilateral nuclear test ban treaty, a chemical weapons convention, intended to complement the existing 1925 Geneva protocol and the 1972 bacteriological weapons convention, which would prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of all CW and provide for the destruction of existing stocks, and a treaty to prohibit the development, testing and deployment of all weapons for use in outer space. In all these areas Canada has made major contributions to the work being undertaken by the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.
The call by the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) at the First United Nations Special Session on Disarmament, in 1978, UNSSOD 1, for a four-part strategy of suffocation and the unfolding of that strategy at UNSSOD II in 1982 into a policy of stabilization which took account of on-going negotiations, illustrates the contributions to the arms control and disarmament dialogue made by Canada in the past. We will continue our efforts in the future.
Several factors have contributed to the growth of antinuclear sentiment in Canada, many of which are common to other alliance countries. In part, it is a natural reflection of the
June 14, 1983

sharpening of East-West tensions following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the uncertainties of the Polish situation. This has led in some quarters to a fear that war, particularly nuclear war, has become a real possibility. This has not been helped by various comments which were interpreted by some as implying that the U.S. was planning to fight a limited nuclear war in Europe. These fears have been heightened by recent nuclear defence decisions. NATO's INF modernization, in particular, continues to generate public controversy and opposition, which could grow in Europe especially as the time for the first deployment nears. The Government's decision to permit the testing in Canada of certain U.S. defence systems, particularly the Cruise missile, has added to public concern about nuclear weapons, and the debate in the U.S. over the MX strategic missile has also focused attention on the subject. The extensive media coverage given to these decisions has served to convince many that the nuclear arms race continues to escalate.
The conjunction of western decisions in the nuclear field and increased international tension has provided a natural impetus to the activities of the anti-nuclear lobby. A considerable amount of literature has appeared, much of it critical of nuclear weapons. Many of the arguments used by the antinuclear lobby are traceable to the Soviet propaganda campaign launched in 1979 to try to pre-empt the INF modernization decision.
The main themes of the anti-nuclear movement in part reflect the differing membership of the various organizations and in part the wider public concern about nuclear war. But the themes are relatively few, recur constantly in anti-nuclear literature and letters from the public and are concentrated on nuclear weapons issue specifically.
I personally support NATO's two-track policy and feel it is the safest route to follow at this time. To disarm unilaterally offers no protection against the bully who has expansionist tendencies and, in reality, would create a dangerous shift in the world balance of power. Indeed, it could rapidly lead to deterioration in relations between the super powers and a corresponding outbreak of another military confrontation.
For those of us who remember World War II, this position is all too clear. We can recall the disastrous appeasement policy of the allies in the pre-war days. The tragic results of this policy taught the free world that it does not pay to bow down before expansionist totalitarian powers. If we refuse to allow the testing of the Cruise in Canada by the U.S. then it will display to the Soviets that the western world is not united and will further erode the hopes for real, genuine negotiations on disarmament.
I am not suggesting that 1 am against disarmament; indeed 1 know of nobody in our country who would not favour disarmament. It is the ultimate goal that all mankind should strive to achieve. However, I do not feel this can be done by offering unilateral concessions. This tends to create imbalances, and at the very least leads to demands for more unilateral concessions. It is the path toward ultimate catastrophe. Surely we do
Supply
not want to return to that pre-World War II policy of appeasement.
In light of this I feel that we should proceed with the negotiations with the U.S. on testing the Cruise missiles. If an agreement is reached, Canada will be able to play a part in ensuring the strength and effectiveness of the NATO forces in maintenance of peace and security. However, if an arms control agreement is somehow reached between the Soviet Union and the West in the meantime, then the Cruise testing will be less urgent. If history teaches us anything, we would do well to remember that compromise and weakness did not prevent World War II. It nearly cost the western world its freedoms. Canadians as a whole support the strengthening of the NATO alliance believing that the best deterrence to war is to be prepared. The NATO countries dare not allow their military capabilities to become outdated. We watch with much anxiety the happenings in eastern Europe in recent years and in Afghanistan.
1 am confident that we will give serious consideration to any genuine Soviet proposals which would enhance the chance for effective and verifiable disarmament agreements. However, it is obvious that real progress can only be made on the basis of the principle of mutual security. I would like to remind all Canadians that the crux of the issue at hand is our own security, without which we are unlikely to continue to enjoy peace, independence, and hope. On this point we would all be well advised not to lose sight of these very important facts.


Terence James (Terry) Sargeant: Mr. Speaker, 1 would like to direct a question to the Parliamentary Secretary. I was a little sorry when he made the comment charging that a lot of the information, a lot of the statements made by anti-nuclear groups, come out of communist propaganda. I would like to quote from a magazine article which reminds me of the fact that the more things change, the more they remain the same. This is an article from the magazine Cite Libre, about 20 years ago, at another time when we had a fairly large nuclear debate in Canada. I quote:
I fully realize that it is fashionable among "evolved" Liberals to joke about the emotionalism, the intellectualism, the naivety, of those who are against nuclear arms.
Mr. Pearson has even accused them of helping communism-.
This greatly resembles the tactics of the late Mr. Duplessis and those of Senator McCarthy.
Mr. Pearson went so far as to apply the word "slackers"-
Those are similar words to the ones the Parliamentary Secretary used in his speech. Would the Parliamentary Secretary comment on that? I should tell him that that article was in Cite Libre in April, 1963, written by the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau).


Garnet McCallum Bloomfield: I believe we would do well to remember that history repeats itself, and of course these arguments will come forward at different times and at different stages of development as a country. I do not feel that the Russian aims to circumvent or subverse our way of life have changed in 20 years. Therefore, I feel that in 20 years' time, perhaps, we will have the same or similar argument.

June 14, 1983
Supply


Ian Deans: Mr. Speaker, I have just one question. The Parliamentary Secretary made reference toward the end of his speech to his opposition to unilateral disarmament. Does the Parliamentary Secretary think for one moment there is anyone in the House who is proposing unilateral disarmament? Would he not agree that what is being proposed is that we ought not to escalate further and that we should negotiate some reasonable reduction?


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: It being 5.45 o'clock, it is my duty pursuant to Standing Order 62(10) to interrupt the proceedings and put forthwith every question necessary to dispose of the business of supply. The question is on the motion of the Hon. Member for Oshawa (Mr. Broadbent). All those in favour of the motion, please say yea.


Some Hon. Members:: Yea.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: All those opposed, please say nay.


Some Hon. Members:: Nay.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: In my opinion, the nays have it.
And more than five Members having risen:


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Call in the Members.
And the division bells having been rung:


Madam Speaker:: The question is the following-


Yvon Pinard: I rise on a point of order, Madam Speaker.
[ Translation]
Madam Speaker, on a point of order.


Madam Speaker:: The Hon. President of the Privy Council (Mr. Pinard), on a point of order.


Yvon Pinard: My apologies for interrupting you, Madam Speaker, but I had asked for a message to be sent to the Chair to the effect that I have had consultations with my Opposition colleagues with a view to avoiding a substantial number of recorded votes and saving precious time for all Hon. Members. We have reached the following agreement, which I would like to read to you.

The motion is rather short, but explicit; that following the disposal of the proceedings of the motion by the Hon. Member for Oshawa (Mr. Broadbent), the House shall consider the business of Supply as follows: first, opposed item in the Main Estimates, No. 8, provided that the same division shall apply to and be recorded on opposed item in the Main Estimates, No. 15, and opposed item in the Supplementary Estimates (A), No. 2; second, opposed item in the Main Estimates, No. 3, provided any division shall apply to and be recorded on opposed items in the Main Estimates, Nos. 4, 5, 10, 11, 12 and 21, and opposed items in the Supplementary Estimates (A), No. 1, and the motion for concurrence in the remaining Supplementary Estimates (A); third, opposed item in the Main
Estimates, No. 1, provided any division shall apply and be recorded to opposed items in the Main Estimates, Nos. 2, 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19, and the motion for concurrence in the Main Estimates; fourth, opposed items in the Main Estimates, Nos. 9, 13 and 20, each of which is to be considered separately, the understanding and the reality being that the Government votes "yea" on all the divisions on the opposed items.


Madam Speaker:: Does the House agree to this arrangement of the divisions?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Madam Speaker:: Before we proceed to the vote on the Estimates, 1 would like to rule on certain of the Opposition notices. Notices Nos. 9 and 13 listed under the Main Estimates oppose statutory items. As I stated in my ruling on June 6, 1983, when ruling on a point of order raised by the Hon. Member for Mississauga South (Mr. Blenkarn) in relation to a statutory item, such items are not treated as budgetary matters; they are for information purposes only. In this regard I refer Hon. Members to citations 484 and 498 of Beauchesne's Fifth Edition. Therefore I must rule that notices Nos. 9 and 13 are not receivable. That disposes of two of the three separate votes which were to take place.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 1, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Hon. Herb Gray (President of the Treasury Board) moved:: That Vote 1, in the amount of $44,561,000 under the Department of Agriculture-Administration, in Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


Madam Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the said motion?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some Hon. Members:: No.


Madam Speaker:: All those in favour of the motion will please say yea.


Madam Speaker:: I declare the motion lost.


Some Hon. Members:: Yea.


Paul Edmund McRae: Madam Speaker, I would like to have the record show that I was present for the vote but I refrained from voting.
[ Translation]


Irénée Pelletier: Madam Speaker, I was also present when the vote was held, but I did not vote.


Mr. Duclos:: Madam Speaker, I expressly abstained.


Mr. Weatherhead:: Madam Speaker, my position is the same as the two previous speakers.


Some Hon. Members:: What position is that?


Mr. Frith:: Madam Speaker, I would like the record to show that I was present and abstained from voting.


Mr. Irwin:: Madam Speaker, I would like the record to show likewise.


Mr. McKnight:: Madam Speaker, I would like the record to show that I was here and that I voted.


Some Hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Madam Speaker:: All those opposed will please say nay.


Some Hon. Members:: Nay.


Madam Speaker:: In my opinion the yeas have it.
And more than five Members having risen:


Madam Speaker:: Call in the Members. Shall we dispense with the bells?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Ian Deans: Madam Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I am sorry, but following the agreement that was made earlier, would you be kind enough to refer to the proposal put by the Government House Leader in order that I can determine exactly which votes we are dealing with at the moment?


Madam Speaker:: Order, please. In accordance with the proposal made by the President of the Privy Council (Mr. Pinard), we are on motion No. 1 and the opposed item in the Main Estimates No. 1, provided any division shall apply to opposed items in the Main Estimates, Nos. 2, 6, 7, 14, 16, 17, 18 and 19, and the motion for concurrence in the main Estimates.

June 14, 1983
Supply


Madam Speaker:: I declare the motion carried.
Motion No. 1 agreed to.


Erik Nielsen: Madam Speaker, I rise on a point of order. 1 thought that 1 had heard my name called in support of the motion to restore, but some of my colleagues close around me inform me that it was not. 1 want to ensure that my name is recorded as being in favour of the motion.


Madam Speaker:: That is what the Chair understood.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 5, DEPARTMENT AGRICULTURE
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 5, in the amount of $203,900,000 under the Department of Agriculture-Agri-Food Development- -Operating expenditures, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 1, MINISTRY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 1, in the amount of $18,350,000 under the Ministry of State for Economic Development-Program expenditures and contributions, in the Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 5, MINISTRY OF STATE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 5, in the amount of $4,942,000 under the Ministry of State for Economic Development-Northern Pipeline Agency, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


Madam Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the said motion?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some Hon. Members:: No.


Madam Speaker:: Ail those in favour of the motion will please say yea.


Some Hon. Members:: Yea.


Madam Speaker:: All those opposed will please say nay.


Some Hon. Members:: Nay.


Madam Speaker:: In my opinion the yeas have it.
And more than five Members having risen:


Madam Speaker:: Call in the Members. Shall we dispense with the bells?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Madam Speaker:: 1 declare the motion carried. Motion No. 4 agreed to.
Messrs.
Gourd	Lapointe	Pinard(Argenteuil-Papineau)	(Beauce)	Por tela neeGourde	LeBlanc	Prud'homme(Levis)	Leduc	ReidGray	Lefebvre	(Kenora-RaGuilbault	Loiselle	RobertsHarquail	Lumley	RobinsonHerbert	MacBain	(Etobicoke-IHervieux-Payette	MacGuigan	Rompkey(Mrs.)	MacLaren	RooneyHopkins	MacLellan	RossiHudecki	Malepart	RoyIrwin	Maltais	SavardIsabelle	Marceau	SchroderIttinuar	Masse	SimmonsJohnston	Masters	SmithJoyal	McCauley	TardifKaplan	McRae	TessierKelly	Munro	TobinKillens (Mrs.)	(Hamilton East)	TousignantLachance	Nicholson (Miss)	TrudeauLajoie	Olivier	TurnerLalonde	Ostiguy	VeilletteLamontagne	Ouellet	WatsonLanders	Parent	WeatherheadLang	Pelletier	WhelanLaniel	Penner	Yanakis-137.Lapierre Lapointe	Pepin


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 25, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 25, in the amount of $1,150,000,000 under the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources-Petroleum Incentives Program, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 50, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 50, in the amount of $306,586,000 under the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources-Atomic Energy of Canada Limited-Operating expenditures, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 55 DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, MINES AND RESOURCES
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 55, in the amount of $29,310,000 under the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources-Atomic Energy of Canada Limited-Capital expenditures, in the Main Estimates for the Fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 40, DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 40, in the amount of $35,000,000 under the Department of External Affairs-Payment to the Export Development Corporation for operating losses, in the Main Estimates for the Fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: Blenkarn Bosley Bradley	Gurbin Gustafson	McCuish McDermidThat Vote 1, in the amount of $39,769,000 under the Department of Finan-	Halliday	McDonald (Ms.)ce-Financial and economic policies, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year	Broadbent	Hamilton	(Broadview-G reen wood)endine March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred	Cardiff	(Qu'Appelle-Moose	McKenziein.	Carney (Miss)	Mountain)	McKinnonClark	Hargrave	McKnightThe House divided on the motion which was agreed to on	(Yellowhead) Clark	Hawkes Heap Hees	McLean McMillanthe following division:	(Brandon-Souris)	MillerClarke	Hnatyshyn	Mitchell (Mrs.)(Vancouver Quadra)	Hovdebo	MitgesCook	Howie	MunroCooper	Huntington	(Esquimalt-Saanich)(Division No. 342)	Corbett Cossitt (Mrs.)	Jarvis Jelinek	Murphy MurtaCrombie	Jewett (Miss)	NeilYEAS	Crouse	Keeper	NickersonDantzer	Kempling	NielsenMessrs.	Darling Deans	Kilgour King	Nowlan NystromAllmand	Berger	Burghardt	de Jong	Knowles	OberleAppolloni (Mrs.)	Blais	Bussieres	Dick	Korchinski	OgleBachand	Blaker	Caccia	Domm	Kushner	OrlikowBaker	Bloomfield	Campbell (Miss)	Ellis	Lambert	Paproski(Gander-Twillingate)	Bockstael	(South West Nova)	Elzinga	Lawrence	ParkerBeauchamp-Niquct	Bossy	Campbell	Epp	Lewis	Patterson(Mrs.)	Breau	(Cardigan)	Fennell	Lewycky	ReidBegin (Miss)	Bujold	Chenier	Forestall	(St. Catharines)
June 14, 1983

Supply
Riis	Siddon
Roche	Skelly
Sargeant	Speyer
Schellenberger	Stevens
Scott	Stewart
(Hamilton-Wentworth)	Taylor
Shields	Thacker
Messrs.
Thomson
Towers
Waddell
Wenman
Wilson
Wright
Young-118.
Motion No. 10 agreed to.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 30, DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 30, in the amount of SI,544,000 under the Department of Finance-Tariff Board-Program expenditures, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 1, in	the amount of $48,731,900 under the Department of Indian	
Affairs and Northern Development-Administration, in the Main Estimates for		
the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the		amount voted in Interim
Supply), be concurred in.		
The House divided on the motion, which was agreed to on		
the following division:		
	(Division No. 344)	
++YEAS
Messrs.
Allmand	Blaker
Appolloni (Mrs.)	Bloomfield
Bachand	Bockstael
Baker	Bossy
(Gander-Twillingate)	Breau
Beauchamp-Niquet	Bujold
(Mrs.)	Burghardt
Begin (Miss)	Bussieres
Berger	Caccia
Blais	
Campbell (Miss) (South West Nova) Campbell (Cardigan)
Chenier
Chretien
Collenette
Comtois
Corbin

June 14, 1983
Supply
Messrs.
Corriveau	Gourde	MasseCosgrove	(Levis)	MastersCote (Mrs.)	Gray	McCauleyCousineau	Guilbault	McRaeCullen	Harquail	MunroDaudlin	Herbert	(Hamilton East;Dawson	Hervieux-Payette	Nicholson (Miss)De Bane	(Mrs.)	Olivierde Corneille	Hopkins	OstiguyDemers	Hudecki	OuelietDeniger	Irwin	ParentDesmarais	Isabelle	PelletierDingwall	Ittinuar	PennerDion	Johnston	PepinDionne	Joyal	Pinard(Chicoutimi)	Kaplan	PortelanceDionne	Kelly	Prud'homme(Norlhumberland-	Killens (Mrs.)	ReidMiramichi)	Lachance	(Kenora-RainyDubois	Lajoie	RobertsDuclos	Lalonde	RobinsonDupont	Lamontagne	(Etobicoke-LakiDupras	Landers	RompkeyDuquet	Lang	RooneyErola (Mrs.)	Laniel	RossiEthier	Lapierre	RoyEvans	Lapointe	SavardFerguson	(Charlevoix)	SchroderFisher	Lapointe	SimmonsFleming	(Beauce)	SmithFlis	LeBlanc	TardifFoster	Leduc	TessierFox	Lefebvre	TobinFrancis	Loiselle	TousignantFrith	Lumley	TrudeauGarant	MacBain	TurnerGauthier	MacGuigan	VeilletteGimaiel	MacLaren	WatsonGingras	MacLellan	WeatherheadGourd	MalSpart	Whelan(Argenteuil-Papineau)	Maltais Marceau	Yanakis-137.
Althouse
Andre
Anguish
Beatty
Benjamin
Blackburn
Blaikie
Blenkarn
Bosley
Bradley
Broadbcnt
Cardiff
Carney (Miss)
Clark
(Yellowhead)
Clark
(Brandon-Souris)
Clarke
(Vancouver Quadra) Cook Cooper Corbett Cossitt (Mrs.)
Crombie
Crouse
Dantzcr
Darling
Deans
de Jong
Dick
Domm
Ellis
Elzinga
Epp
Fennell
Forrestall
Fraser
Messrs.
Fretz
Friesen
Fulton
Gamble
Gilchrist
Greenaway
Gurbin
Gustafson
Halliday
Hamilton
(Qu'Appelle-Moose Mountain)
Hargrave
Hawkes
Heap
Hees
Hnatyshyn
Hovdebo
Howie
Huntington
Jarvis
Jelinek
Jewett (Miss)
Keeper
Kempling
Kilgour
King
Knowles
Korchinski
Kushner
Lambert
Lawrence
Lewis
Lewycky
MacDonald (Miss)
(Kingston and the Islands) Malone
Manly
Mayer
Mazankowski McCain McCuish McDermid McDonald (Ms.)
(Broadview-G reen wood) McKenzie McKinnon McKnight McLean McMillan Miller
Mitchell (Mrs.)
Mitgcs
Munro
(Esquimalt-Saanich)
Murphy
Murta
Neil
Nickerson
Nielsen
Nowlan
Nystrom
Oberle
Ogle
Orlikow
Paproski
Parker
Patterson
Reid
(St. Catharines)
Riis
Roche
Sargeant
Schellenberger
Messrs.
Scott	Stevens	Waddell(Hamilton-Wentworth)	Stewart	WenmanShields	Taylor	WilsonSiddon	Thacker	WrightSkelly	Thomson	Young-118.Speyer	Towers	
Motion No. 12 agreed to.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 10, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 10, in the amount of $510,569,000 under the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce-Trade-Industrial-Grants and contributions, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 25, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 25, in the amount of $185,000,000 under the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce-Payments under the Small Business Investment Grant Act, in the Main Estimates for the Fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


Madam Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the said motion?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Madam Speaker:: On division?


Some Hon. Members:: No.


Madam Speaker:: Ail those in favour of the motion will please say yea.


Some Hon. Members:: Yea.


Madam Speaker:: All those opposed will please say nay.


Some Hon. Members:: Nay.


Madam Speaker:: In my opinion the yeas have it.
And more than five Members having risen:


Madam Speaker:: Call in the Members. Shall we dispense with the bells?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE L30, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote L30, in the amount of $1,600,000 under the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce-Advances to assist Canadian defence industry, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 65, DEPARTMENT OF INDUSTRY, TRADE AND COMMERCE
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 65, in the amount of $19,087,000 under the Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce-Payments to the Federal Business Development Bank, in the Main Estimates for the Fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE I. DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 1, in the amount of $5,248,893,000 under the Department of National Defence-Defence Services-Operating expenditures, in the Main

June 14, 1983
Supply
Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 10, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 10, in the amount of $164,341,519 under the Department of National Defence-Defence Services-Grants and contributions, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 5, PARLIAMENT-HOUSE OF COMMONS
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 5, in the amount of $102,795,500 under Parliament-House of Commons, in the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984 (less the amount voted in Interim Supply), be concurred in.


Madam Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the said motion?


Some Hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some Hon. Members:: On division.
Motion No. 20 agreed to on division.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE, I DEPARTMENT OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 1, in the amount of $18,081,000 under the Department of the
++NAYS
Messrs.
Althouse	Crombie	HamiltonAndre	Crouse	(Qu'Appellc-lAnguish	Dantzer	Mountain)Beatty	Darling	HargraveBenjamin	Deans	HawkesBlackburn	de Jong	HeapBlaikie	Dick	HeesBlenkarn	Domm	HnatyshynBosley	Ellis	HovdeboBradley	Elzinga	HowieBroadbent	Epp	HuntingtonCardiff	Fennell	JarvisCarney (Miss)	Forrestall	JelinekClark	Fraser	Jewett (Miss)(Yellowhead)	Fretz	KeeperClark	Friesen	Kempling(Brandon-Souris)	Fulton	KilgourClarke	Gamble	King(Vancouver Quadra)	Gilchrist	KnowlesCook	Greenaway	KorchinskiCooper	Gurbin	KushnerCorbett	Gustafson	LambertCossitt (Mrs.)	Halliday	Lawrence
June 14, 1983
Supply
Lewis	Mitges	Sargcant	Hervieux-Payctte	MacGuigan	Prud'hommeLewycky	Munro	Schcllenberger	(Mrs.)	MacLaren	ReidMacDonald (Miss)	(Esquimalt-Saanich)	Scott	Hnatyshyn	MacLellan	(St. Catharines)(Kingston and the Islands) Murphy	(Hamilton-Wentworth)	Hopkins	Malepart	ReidMalone	Murta	Shields	Howie	Malone	(Kcnora-Rainy River)Manly	Neil	Siddon	Hudecki	Maltais	RobertsMayer	Nickerson	Skelly	Huntington	Marccau	RobinsonMazankowski	Nielsen	Speyer	Irwin	Masse	(Etobicoke-Lakcshore)McCain	Nowlan	Stevens	Isabelle	Masters	RocheMcCuish	Nystrom	Stewart	Ittinuar	Mayer	RompkcyMcDermid	Oberle	Taylor	Jarvis	Mazankowski	RooneyMcDonald (Ms.)	Ogle	Thacker	Jelinek	McCain	Rossi(Broadview-Greenwood) Orlikow	Thomson	Johnston	McCauley	RoyMcKenzie	Paproski	Towers	Joyal	McCuish	SavardMcKinnon	Parker	Waddell	Kaplan	McDermid	SchellcnbcrgerMcKnight	Patterson	Wenman	Kelly	McKenzie	SchroderMcLean	Reid	Wilson	Kempling	McKinnon	ScottMcMillan	(St. Catharines)	Wright	Kilgour	McKnight	(Hamilton-Wentworth)Miller	Riis	Young-118.	Killens (Mrs.)	McLean	ShieldsMitchell (Mrs.)	Roche	King	McMillan	SiddonKorchinski	McRae	SimmonsMotion No. 21	agreed to.	Kushner Lachance	Mi*ges Munro	Smith SpeyerLajoie	(Esquimalt-Saanich)	StevensLalonde	Munro	StewartMOTION FOR	CONCURRENCE IN MAIN	ESTIMATES, 1984	Lambert	(Hamilton East)	TardifLamontagne	Murta	Taylor


Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: Landers Lang	Neil Nicholson (Miss)	Tessier ThackerThat the Main Estimates for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, laid upon	Laniel	Nickerson	Thomsonthe Table, Tuesday, February 22, 1983, except those items disposed of earlier	Lapierre	Nielsen	Tobinthis day, and less the amounts voted in Interim Supply, be concurred in.	Lapointe (Charlevoix)	Nowlan Oberle	Tousignant TowersThe House divided on the motion which was agreed to on	Lapointe (Beauce)	Olivier Ostiguy	Trudeau TurnerLeBlanc	Paproski	WatsonLeduc	Parent	Weather heatLefebvre	Patterson	Wenman(Division No. 352)	Lewis	Pelletier	WhelanLoiselle	Penner	WilsonLumley	Pepin	WrightYEAS	MacBain	Pinard	Yanakis-2'.MacDonald (Miss)	Portelance	Messrs.	(Kingston and the Islands)	NAYS	Allmand	Cook	Ethier	Messrs.	Andre	Cooper	Evans	Althouse	Hovdcbo	MurphyAppolloni (Mrs.)	Corbett	Fennell	Anguish	Jewett (Miss)	NystromBachand	Corbin	Ferguson	Benjamin	Keeper	OgleBaker	Corriveau	Fisher	Blackburn	Knowles	Orlikow(Gander-Twillingate)	Cosgrove	Fleming	Blaikie	Lewycky	ParkerBeatty	Cossitt (Mrs.)	Flis	Broadbent	Manly	RiisBeauchamp-Niquet	Cote (Mrs.)	Forrestall	Deans	McDonald (Ms.)	Sargcant(Mrs.)	Cousineau	Foster	de Jong	(Broadview-G rcen wood)	SkellyBegin (Miss)	Crombie	Fox	Fulton	Miller	WaddellBerger	Crouse	Francis	Heap	Mitchell (Mrs.)	Young-29.
Blais Blenkarn Bloomfield Bockstael Bosley Bossy Bradley Breau Bujold Burghardt Bussieres Caccia
Campbell (Miss)
(South West Nova) Campbell
(Cardigan)
Cardiff Carney (Miss)
Chenier
Chretien
Clark
(Yellowhead)
Clark
(Brandon-Souris)
Clarke
(Vancouver Quadra) Collenette Comtois
Cullen Dantzer Darling Daudlin Dawson Dc Bane de Corneille Demers Deniger Desmarais Dick Dingwall Dion Dionne
(Chicoutimi)
Dionne
(Northumberland-
Miramichi)
Domm
Dubois
Duclos
Dupont
Dupras
Duquet
Ellis
Elzinga
Epp
Erola (Mrs.)
Fraser Frctz Friesen Frith Gamble Garant Gauthier Gilchrist Gimaicl Gingras Gourd
(Argenteuil-Papineau)
Gourde
(Levis)
Gray
Greenaway
Guilbault
Gurbin
Gustafson
Halliday
Hamilton
(Qu'Appellc-Moose
Mountain)
Hargrave
Harquail
Hawkes
Hees
Herbert


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.

Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 2a, in the amount of $240,000,000 under the Ministry of State for Social Development-Canadair Limited, in the Supplementary Estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN VOTE 3A, MINISTRY OF STATE FOR SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That Vote 3a, in the amount of $60,000,000 under the Ministry of State for Social Development-de Havilland Aircraft of Canada Limited, in the Supplementary Estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, be concurred in.


MOTION FOR CONCURRENCE IN SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES
[Stage Direction]
(A)
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: That the Supplementary Estimates (A) for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1984, laid upon the Table, Wednesday, May 18, 1983, except those items disposed of earlier this day, be concurred in.


Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: that Bill C-164, an Act for granting to Her Majesty certain sums of money for the Government of Canada for the financial year ending March 31, 1984, be read the first time and printed.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, Bill read the first time and ordered to be printed.
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: that Bill C-164, an Act for granting to Her Majesty certain sums of money for the Government of Canada for the financial year ending March 31, 1984, be read the second time and referred to the Committee of the Whole.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, Bill read the second time and the House went into Committee thereon, Mr. Francis in the Chair.
[Stage Direction]
Clauses 2 to 6 inclusive agreed to on division.
Schedule A agreed to on division.
Schedule B agreed to on division.
Clause 1 agreed to on division.
Preamble agreed to.
Title agreed to.
Supply
Cyril Lloyd Francis: Shall I report the Bill?


Some Hon. Members:: On division.
Bill reported.


Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: that the Bill be concurred in.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.
Herbert Eser (Herb) Gray: that the Bill be read the third time and do pass.


Madam Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the motion?


Some Hon. Members:: On division.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, Bill read the third time and passed.
Madam Speaker:: It being almost 7 p.m., the House stands adjourned until eleven o'clock tomorrow morning.
At 6.57 p.m., the House adjourned, without question put, pursuant to Standing Order.

Wednesday, June 15, 1983