1976-03-23

OFFICIAL REPORT

[Stage Direction]
FIRST SESSION-THIRTIETH PARLIAMENT 25 Elizabeth II

[Stage Direction]
Published under the authority of the Speaker of the House of Commons by the Queen's Printer for Canada Available from Printing and Publishing, Supply and Services, Ottawa, Canada K1A 0S9
[Stage Direction]
Tuesday, March 23, 1976


Mr. Donald W. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich):: Mr. Speaker, I rise under the provisions of Standing Order 43 on a matter of urgent and pressing necessity relating to the signs of spring, delayed this year by the heavy snows and other storms in the east, which have been so little in evidence in the nation's capital but which are manifest in the daffodils of my riding of Esquimalt-Saanich, made available in the lobby to all hon. members. With your indulgence I seek unanimous consent of the House to move the following motion:
That the Minister of Agriculture, in consultation with his colleague, the Minister of Finance, undertake a review of the regulations relating to the imposition of seasonal tariffs affecting fruits, vegetables and flowers imported into Canada so that the fruit, vegetable and flower growers in the garden riding of Esquimalt-Saanich, and elsewhere in the garden belt of Canada, shall be able to continue their commercial operations and provide those of us who have to spend so much of our lives under the snow in the east with the symbol of spring which the daffodils now available to honourable members so graphically provide.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. Such a motion, if it were to be debated, would require the unanimous consent of the House pursuant to Standing Order 43. Is there unanimous consent?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some hon. Members:: No.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Mr. Eudore Allard (Rimouski):: Mr. Speaker, pursuant to the provisions of Standing Order 43, I request unanimous consent of the House to present a motion on an important and urgent matter, and I am sure that no member will dare refuse such a motion.
Considering that the Canadian International Development Agency manages a budget of about $950 million; considering that current foreign assistance programs maintain underdeveloped countries in their underdeveloped position; considering that Canada has a responsibility towards underdeveloped and poor countries; and considering that, according to the latest statistics, industrial milk surpluses for the present campaign will reach 1.5 billion pounds, I move, seconded by the hon. member for Champlain (Mr. Matte):
That this House enjoin the government to take all the required steps in the nearest future to increase the distribution of milk products and by-products in underdeveloped countries, through the Canadian International Development Agency, with a view to avoiding as much as possible that the Canadian government use the quota system and thus refrain from penalizing overproducing milk producers on the pretext that we now have milk surpluses.


Mr. Speaker:: The House has heard the motion of the hon. member. Under the provision of Standing Order 43, the motion requires unanimous consent of the House. Is there unanimous consent?


Some hon. Members:: Yes.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Mr. Speaker:: As there is not unanimous consent, the motion cannot be put.


NATIONAL DEFENCE
Mr. Andrew Brewin (Greenwood):: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a matter of urgent and pressing necessity under Standing Order 43. I refer to the proposed purchase of Orion patrol aircraft from the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation. In view of the fact that the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Richardson) has stated that the Canadian government is considering raising a loan of $300 million from banks to help finance the production of Orions, and in view of the fact that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, because of its wasteful expenditures on bribery and similar methods of securing orders, is in a shaky financial position and is unable to raise the necessary financing in the United States or elsewhere, and, further, in view of the fact that the necessity of purchasing such expensive patrol aircraft has never been demonstrated to the Canadian public, I move, seconded by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles):
That this House directs the government to discontinue forthwith its effort to raise such loans, and further directs the government to reconsider whether a refitting of the Argus or purchase of a less sophisticat-

Milk Product Imports
ed patrol aircraft at a much smaller cost will not meet the need to protect the sovereignty of Canada's waters.


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. Such a motion can only be presented with the unanimous consent of the House. Is there unanimous consent?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some hon. Members:: No.


SUGGESTED DISCONTINUANCE OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH LOCKHEED PENDING DETAILS OF BRIBERY ATTEMPTS- MOTION UNDER S.O. 43
Mr. Andy Hogan (Cape Breton-East Richmond):: Mr. Speaker, I rise under the provisions of Standing Order 43 on a matter of urgent and pressing necessity. In view of the fact that Dr. Arthur Burns, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board in the United States, has said that the United States was exporting a corporate Watergate through the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation when it paid $24.4 million in bribes to various persons throughout the world, and in view of the fact that the Deputy Secretary of State for the United States, Mr. Robert Ingersoll, has announced that the State Department will supply the Lockheed data to other countries, I move, seconded by the hon. member for Sault Ste. Marie (Mr. Symes):
That the Canadian government break off contract relations with this corrupt corporation until all the data of Lockheed's bribery attempts are made known.


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. Such a motion, pursuant to Standing Order 43, can only be presented with the unanimous consent of the House. Is there unanimous consent?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some hon. Members:: No.



AGRICULTURE


Mr. Adrien Lambert (Bellechasse):: Mr. Speaker, under the provisions of Standing Order 43, I ask the unanimous consent of the House to move a motion dealing with an important matter of pressing necessity.
Considering the contradictory statements made by the federal Minister of Agriculture and by government members concerning dairy product imports and exports which determine the level of income of the industrial milk producers of Canada, I move, seconded by the hon. member for Roberval (Mr. Gauthier):
That this House ask the Standing Committee on Agriculture to examine very carefully what Canada's actual requirements for dairy product imports have been these last two years, as well as the implications of these import policies for the industrial milk producers of Canada.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. The House has heard the motion of the hon. member. Under the provisions of Standing Order

43, this motion requires the unanimous consent of the House. Is there such consent?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Mr. Speaker:: There is not unanimous consent; the motion therefore cannot be put.



ORAL QUESTION PERIOD


Mr. Walter Baker (Grenville-Carleton):: Mr. Speaker, in the absence of the Prime Minister, the government House leader and the Minister of National Defence, to whose department my question relates, I address my question to whoever is the Acting Prime Minister in that ramshackle government over there.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


An hon. Member:: Shame, shame.


Walter David Baker: I pulled in a lot of big fish with that one, Mr. Speaker. Yesterday the Minister of National Defence said that he was satisfied that the Lockheed Company "made no payments or commissions to any Canadian". I assume the minister was not referring to the contract the consulting firm of Reisman and Grandy Limited has to help Lockheed Limited win and hold the LRPA contract. Would the Acting Prime Minister tell the House whether, in the course of the current negotiations concerning the Lockheed contract, he or the Minister of Supply and Services received representations, directly or indirectly, on behalf of that company from Messrs. Reisman and Grandy?


Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Acting Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I should advise the hon. member that the Prime Minister, who is presently having a meeting I believe with the Premier of Prince Edward Island, will be in the House shortly. In the meantime, I can assure the hon. member I have no information with regard to the representations he has suggested.



PUBLIC SERVICE


Walter David Baker: I have a supplementary, Mr. Speaker. In light of the immense influence this firm of former deputy ministers has that could have been used to give Lockheed the inside track on this con-
March 23, 1976

tract which could cost the federal taxpayers twice as much as the St. Lawrence Seaway cost, is the government now going to bring in guidelines on the freedom of retired public servants to go to work for corporations precisely in order to lobby in areas of their intimate government expertise and with former colleagues. I ask this question in view of the fact that even customs and excise officers of the Department of National Revenue are prohibited for two years from setting up customs brokerage houses. Why, at least as a stricture, ought such a regulation not apply to these men who are by no means poor as a result of their service to the Government of Canada.
Hort. Allan J. MacEachen (Acting Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker, I am sure the hon. member would agree that both gentlemen to whom he has referred have set a high standard of ethics during their period of service to the Government of Canada. Surely, I am certain that that same approach would be followed in their private life. I recognize with the hon. gentleman that he has raised a point of some importance, but to my knowledge no jurisdiction has yet succeeded in directing the behaviour of persons who have left the public service and who have become private citizens. That applies not only to members of the bureaucracy but also to Members of Parliament and ministers.



POSSIBILITY MR. GRANDY HAD CONSULTING CONTRACT WITH PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE OR GOVERNMENT AGENCY SINCE WORKING FOR LOCKHEED

Walter David Baker: I have a final supplementary, Mr. Speaker. I suggest that some governments have the moral and ethical standards to at least try, Mr. Speaker. My final supplementary is this: Since this consulting firm went to work for Lockheed Limited was Mr. Grandy also working on a consultation contract for the Prime Minister's office or any other central agency of the federal government, and if so when was that contract terminated or completed if it was so terminated or completed?


Allan Joseph MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I will have to take that question as notice. I have no information on that point.



FINANCE


Mr. Allan B. McKinnon (Victoria):: Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Minister of Finance. Has the former deputy minister of finance, Mr. Reisman, since his employment by Lockheed made any representations to the minister or to his officials concerning the financing of the Lockheed LRPA contract and in particular concerning guaranteeing bank loans? Also could the minister tell us whether he supports in any way the concept of the government backing such a loan.


Hon. Donald S. Macdonald (Minister of Finance):: With regard to the financing, Mr. Speaker, I met personally with
Oral Questions
the new management of Lockheed when they were in town some few weeks ago but the question of interim financing was not discussed. Indeed, it was merely a meeting on our part to ensure they would continue to be in a position to perform on any contract. With regard to my officials, I would have to make an inquiry as to whether they were directly involved in the discussions in this regard. My recollection is that the discussion has been conducted by the Department of Supply and Services' officials.
On the question of the financing arrangement, that is a matter that is now before the government and upon which a decision will have to be taken.



MR. REISMAN'S ACCESS TO OFFICE FILES SINCE RETIREMENT

Allan Bruce McKinnon: I do not think that the minister stated whether or not Mr. Reisman was involved in these discussions. Perhaps he would do so in answer to my first supplementary question. Since Mr. Reisman's retirement as deputy minister of finance, has he had access to his former office files, and if so when?


Donald Stovel Macdonald: have not met Mr. Reisman in this or indeed in any other business context. I will have to take notice and report on either the contracts that he may have had or indeed on the more specific question which the hon. gentleman has asked. I will do so and be glad to report to him.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


Allan Bruce McKinnon: Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Acting Prime Minister. In view of the confusion and maladministration by the government of this very large contract and the question of conflict of interest, is the Acting Prime Minister now willing to open the negotiations and consider options other than this $59 million aircraft? I ask this question in the absence of the Prime Minister.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, the answer is no.



FINANCE


Mr. Edward Broadbent (Oshawa-Whitby):: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Finance. In view of the figures which were released today indicating that Canada has a $1.9 billion deficit in Canada-U.S. automotive trade, the largest in the eleven year old history of the auto pact, and a 50 per cent increase over the deficit for last year, what plans does the government have to turn this

March 23, 1976
Oral Questions
deficit around to one which would at least put Canada on a basis of parity with the United States?


Donald Stovel Macdonald: The government of Canada, principally under the responsibility of my colleague, the Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce, is examining the current operations of the auto pact and the most recent performance under the auto pact and would anticipate some time later in the year being in a position to make some decisions with regard to the future of the arrangement. At the moment, I cannot be any more enlightening to the hon. member than to say that this is receiving very active study within the government.


John Edward Broadbent: Mr. Speaker, would the minister confirm that, according to figures which have not yet been released, for the first time in the history of the auto pact we are running a deficit for the first three months in 1976 in vehicle trade with the United States which, if it continues, will mean that the situation in terms of the over-all trade for this year will be considerably worse than it was even last year?


Donald Stovel Macdonald: Mr. Speaker, I will be glad to check that figure.



CANADIAN SHARE OF INVESTMENT RESULTING FROM AUTO PACT

John Edward Broadbent: Can the
minister tell the House why the government has not insisted up to this point-or why it is going to wait for a few months perhaps-that Canada get its share of new investment in that industry which is at least proportionate to the amount we consume in terms of the output, the most recent figures indicating that Canadians consume about 10 per cent of the output in the industry but we only got something less than 6 per cent of the investment last year?


Donald Stovel Macdonald: I can
say to the House that the former minister of industry, trade and commerce had insisted on just such a recognition of Canada's role in the auto pact. Our proposal is to make a full analysis of the facts leading to some further decisions as to what we would do about this arrangement.



UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE


Mr. Armand Caouette (Villeneuve):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to put a question to the Minister of Manpower and Immigration.
Would the minister tell us if he plans to make an early proposal regarding the abolition of the disqualifying practice which makes a recipient of unemployment insurance not eligible for four consecutive weeks. I believe we call this "card breaking"; it consists of disqualifying recipients who are in their extension period if they work more than four but less than eight weeks, given the fact that this

procedure is considered inefficient and unfair even by Unemployment Insurance Commission officials.


Hon. Robert K. Andras (Minister of Manpower and Immigration):: Mr. Speaker, that very issue is being examined with considerable interest. I cannot make a commitment now as to if or when the change will be made, but it is one of the major suggestions we are examining with considerable interest.



THE CANADIAN ECONOMY


Mr. Lincoln M. Alexander (Hamilton West):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Finance. I had a question for the Minister of Public Works regarding the ganging up theory, but in light of the fact that recent unemployment figures are in and around the neighbourhood of 7 per cent, affecting some 800,000 people, and in light of the fact that this summer will be a very difficult one for our young people in terms of employment, I wonder if the Minister of Finance could advise whether he is aware of this and whether we can expect some new, imaginative and bold steps-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


Lincoln MacCauley Alexander: -in order to reduce this unemployment, and in particular, to assist our young people this summer?


Donald Stovel Macdonald: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the difficult situation and the unemployment figures. I am particularly concerned about the fact that through much of this year we will continue to be in a difficult situation in that regard. Of course, any program proposed by the hon. gentleman would involve a very substantial increase in government expenditure, and I have listened equally carefully to the hon. gentlemen when they have said the federal government should reduce its present rate of spending below 16 per cent.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Lincoln MacCauley Alexander: I reject that cop out by the minister and indicate that there are certain priorities.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Lincoln MacCauley Alexander: All I can say to the minister is that he is off the track somewhat. However, I will ask him another question. The former minister always indicated in this House in a gentlemanly way the number of jobs he expected to be created in any particular year. Would the minister give us the benefit of his wisdom in this regard and indicate just how many jobs he expects will be created this year as a result of the programs of this government.


Donald Stovel Macdonald: It seems to me that if there is any cop out, it is by the hon. gentleman.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!
March 23, 1976


Donald Stovel Macdonald: 

IMMIGRATION


Mr. Robert C. Coates (Cumberland-Colchester North):: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Manpower and Immigration. Is the minister aware that a deportation order has been issued in the case of Boguslaw Dudziak, that he will be picked up by immigration officers at 3 p.m. on Thursday, March 25 and returned to Poland, even though Mr. Dudziak immediately contacted immigration officials upon his arrival in Canada on August 15, 1975, having left his ship in Halifax, and claimed refugee status because he had remained a Roman Catholic during his life in Poland and sought refuge in Canada because he was not a communist?


Robert Knight Andras: Mr. Speaker, I believe I have heard representations with regard to that particular case very recently, and we are examining it. Claims for refugee status are examined very carefully, usually at two levels. One is interdepartmental committee, and if its answer is favourable, that settles it. If it is not, the person claiming refugee status has access through the appeal system to the appeal board. If he has been through those two stages and still the decision indicates he is not a refugee and a deportation order has been issued under a special inquiry, then my hands are somewhat tied. However, I am aware of the representations, and I am looking into the case.


Robert Carman Coates: The minister says he is looking into the matter but the individual has only about a day and a half left in this country unless the minister takes some action. Can the minister explain how a deportation order could have been issued without any contact with me by either himself or his department officials and even though I forwarded all available details to him by hand at his office on March 4 and March 9 and spoke to him privately asking that he examine the case in the hope that he could take action which would prevent this calamity from occurring?


Robert Knight Andras: Mr. Speaker, I think the hon. member should understand that once the process has reached the stage where a special inquiry has been held, I do not have jurisdiction. It would probably be improper for me to have jurisdiction once a deportation order has been decided upon. The exact time frame the hon. member refers to I would think, without having had an opportunity to confirm, would fit here at post inquiry stage.


Robert Carman Coates: A further supplementary, Mr. Speaker. Can the minister explain to this House how a young man who
Oral Questions
sought refuge in this nation because we stand for freedom of choice in both politics and religion, who has a firm offer of employment, who has received support from the citizens of the town of Truro as well as from myself and the hon. member for Halifax, on his files, can be forced to return to a communist country while the notorious General Quang is allowed to receive sanctuary in this nation?


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Knight Andras: Mr. Speaker, I expect to settle the issue on the second part of that question very soon. The circumstances are quite different and I think the hon. member will understand that it would take too much detail to explain at this time. In so far as the first part of the question is concerned, it all hinges on the validity of the claim of the applicant to refugee status. Criteria are clearly established as to how that is judged. Unfortunately, ship desertion from countries behind the iron curtain does not necessarily influence the decision about the validity of refugee status. Those are very carefully looked at. There are circumstances in this case that I will have to look at, but I think it is probably past the inquiry stage and beyond my jurisdiction.


Mr. Gus MacFarlane (Hamilton Mountain):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to associate the hon. member for Parkdale and myself with our two colleagues opposite in this matter and indicate that I have been writing concerning this matter well before-


Some hon. Members:: Question.


Some hon. Members:: Order, order!


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please.



AIR TRANSPORT


Mr. F. Oberle (Prince George-Peace River):: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Transport. Would the minister take this opportunity to tell the House how he will be responding to the many submissions of protest against the government's decision to impose landing fees for private aircraft at Department of Transport airports, and whether consideration has been given to people in the frontier areas, mainly northern Canada, to whom the private aircraft is an indispensable mode of transportation rather than a luxury?


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Hon. Otto E. Lang (Minister of Transport):: Mr. Speaker, as I indicated on an earlier occasion the proposal in relation to landing fees is a rather modest one having regard to the lack of increase for many years. We have been having discussions with owners and pilots associations and others, however, and I have been having discussions with members of the Liberal caucus who have a great interest in flying.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh!
12048
March 23, 1976

Oral Questions


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Otto Emil Lang: Rather than terminate these discussions abruptly and reaching a decision before we have been able to consider all the circumstances, we have decided to tolerate some modest postponements while we are looking at the question of whether the objective is sound and is generally accepted, that is, imposing user fees and obtaining money from those who have the advantage rather than from the general taxpayer. While that objective is being agreed upon, we are looking at alternative ways of collection so that we can minimize administration problems.


Frank Oberle: A supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Can the minister tell the House if he will use this interim period to discuss with his officials and people who are interested in flying-apart from the Liberal caucus- whether it would be advisable to establish a system that would apply to people living closer to the metropolitan areas and larger international airports and not those living in remote and frontier areas of our country? Would the minister also tell the House whether it is the intention to establish a system by which the Department of Transport airplanes will pay to land at air strips not under its jurisdiction?


Otto Emil Lang: Mr. Speaker, we are trying to look at all the circumstances in determining the best means of collection. I can assure the hon. member that I always get the best arguments from the Liberal caucus.



ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE


Mr. Eldon M. Woolliams (Calgary North):: Mr. Speaker, my question is directed to the Prime Minister. On Wednesday, March 17, the Prime Minister told the House that he did not learn about the request for an intervention until Monday, March 15. The Prime Minister stated, as recorded at page 11866 of Hansard:
Mr. Speaker, Mr. Ouellet told me about that precise request he made to the minister on Monday of this week.
Is the Prime Minister telling this House that he did not at any point before March 15 ask the Minister of Public Works if the former minister for consumer and corporate affairs had made a "precise request" for an intervention on his behalf?


Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I have already answered that question.



INQUIRY WHETHER PRIME MINISTER REPORTED ALLEGED INTERFERENCE WITH JUDICIARY TO QUEBEC ATTORNEY GENERAL

Eldon Mattison Woolliams: A supplementary question, Mr. Speaker, for the Prime Minister. I am sure this one has not been put to him. In light of the fact that the Minister of Public Works said at the begin-

ning of this situation on March 3, as reported at page 11457
of Hansard:
Indeed, the only intervention that would be contemplated by me would be one to see that he-
Meaning the judge.
-was in full knowledge of the facts and did his duty.
In light of the fact that the government seems to be supersensitive to the Words "improper", "wrongful" or "illegality", may I ask if the Prime Minister would advise the House whether he has reported the facts told to us by the government, unknown to us, known to them, to the attorney general of Quebec to determine whether there was an offence.


An hon. Member:: Go back to school.


Eldon Mattison Woolliams: Mr. Speaker, may I put that question again.


Mr. Paproski:: A little slower.


Eldon Mattison Woolliams: May I ask the minister if he has reported to the attorney general of Quebec the matters told to him by the former minister of consumer and corporate affairs and the admission I just read with reference to the Minister of Public Works?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, I think it is related to the preamble of the question about us being sensitive to words like "illegality" or "impropriety". The answer is we have admitted- the minister has admitted some impropriety and has apologized for it. Illegality is something else again. If there is illegality or we have cause to believe there is illegality or hon. members opposite have cause to believe there is illegality, first of all the hon. member for York-Simcoe would not have withdrawn his statement if he had some evidence of it. He does not seem to have any evidence of it and we do not have any evidence of it. If we had we would, of course, turn it over to the attorney general of the province who would be entitled to prosecute.



PRESENCE IN GALLERY OF PREMIER OF PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND, HONOURABLE ALEX CAMPBELL

Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. Before recognizing another questioner may I call the attention to the presence in our gallery of a very distinguished visitor, the premier of the very important province of Prince Edward Island, the Honourable Alex Campbell.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!
March 23, 1976



SYNCRUDE PROJECT-APPLICABLE EMISSION STANDARD FOR PLANT

Mr. T. C. Douglas (Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources? In view of the fact that the governments and the companies participating in the Syncrude agreement have overcome one hurdle in respect of the rate of return for the pipeline and utility plant built by the government of Alberta and since this brings us one step closer to a final agreement, does the government intend to insist that there be inserted in the final agreement a provision for a standard of emission-which at the present time is projected at 287 long tons per day-and insist that the 40 tons per day recommended by the Department of the Environment be enforced in an agreement with Syncrude?


Hon. Alastair Gillespie (Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources):: No, Mr. Speaker.



ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Mr. Speaker, a supplementary question. Since the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources does not seem to be at all interested in the health and welfare of the people who live in that area may I direct my supplementary question to the Minister of the Environment who on January 29 at page 10425 of Hansard in answer to a question from the leader of this party said:
Mr. Speaker, I can assure the hon. gentleman that I will insist on having this present emission reduced.
Answering a supplementary question, the minister said in part:
I think what the hon. member suggests is something the department of energy is ready to do.
Since the minister indicated that the Department of Energy, Mines and Resources is not prepared to insist on emission standards for sulphur dioxide, does he intend to fulfil the commitment he gave the House on January 29 and insist on emission standards much lower than the 287 long tons per day envisaged by Syncrude?


Hon. Jean Marchand (Minister of the Environment):: Mr. Speaker, I shall stick to the commitment I made previously. We are insisting on the reduction of sulphur dioxide emissions in the air at Syncrude and trying to convince the government of Alberta as well as the Syncrude company. I know the hon. gentleman knows that I have no legal power to compel the company or the government of Alberta to do this.


John Edward Broadbent: But you are the minister.
Oral Questions


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: A supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. What figure has the minister in mind for emission standards? Also, since the government is represented on the management committee, will the minister use his good offices to persuade the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources to insist that figures the Minister of Environment thinks are reasonable for emission standards will be inserted in the Syncrude agreement?


Jean Marchand: Mr. Speaker, not only is the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources interested in this; the Alberta government also has an interest in, and power to establish, emission standards at Syncrude. I am ready to talk to my colleague. I hope that somebody on the other side of the House will talk to the government of Alberta and convince it to act.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


Mr. Allan Lawrence (Northumberland-Durham):: Mr. Speaker, the Minister of National Defence having entered the House, may I ask him if, in the course of current negotiations concerning the Lockheed contract, he, the Minister of Supply and Services, any member of their departments, or departmental agencies received representations, directly or indirectly, on behalf of Lockheed from the consulting firm, Reisman and Grandy Limited?


Hon. James Richardson (Minister of National Defence):: Not to my knowledge Mr. Speaker.



GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION


Allan Frederick Lawrence: Mr. Speaker, as the Prime Minister is present may I direct my supplementary question to him? Has Mr. Grandy, of the consulting firm of Reisman and Grandy Limited, worked on a consulting contract for the Prime Minister's office or any other central agency of the federal government since this consulting firm went to work for Lockheed limited? If so, when was that contract terminated or completed?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, this is the first time the matter has been drawn to my attention. I shall certainly look into it.
21804-2%

March 23, 1976
Oral Questions NATIONAL DEFENCE



LOCKHEED CONTRACT-TOTAL COMMITMENT OF GOVERNMENT

Steve Eugene Paproski: Mr. Speaker, my supplementary question is for the Minister of National Defence. What is the total proposed Canadian government commitment to the Lockheed Corporation?


James Armstrong Richardson: Mr. Speaker, there is no commitment other than that we have begun negotiations to lead to a contract under which we shall agree to purchase 18 Lockheed long-range patrol aircraft for $953 million. We have not entered into a final contract. We are still negotiating the final terms of the contract.


Steve Eugene Paproski: Is that the total commitment? I notice that the minister nods his head, as if to say yes.



AGRICULTURE


Mr. Yves Caron (Beauce):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to direct a question to the Minister of Agriculture.
After his meeting this morning with his provincial counterparts, would the minister tell the House which questions have been discussed? Has there been an agreement concerning the dairy policy for 1976-77? If so, when will the minister announce this new policy? Moreover, will the minister take into account the recommendations made by the Quebec members, and will this policy be equitable for all Quebec industrial milk producers?


Hon. E. F. Whelan (Minister of Agriculture):: Mr. Speaker, meetings with officials of my department are continuing. Every aspect of industrial milk production in Canada has been discussed. According to law, a policy must be announced or a statement made by April 1. All representations are being considered. At present we are in a difficult position, as there is a surplus not only in Canada but throughout the world.



SUGGESTED USE OF SURPLUS DAIRY PRODUCTS IN EXTERNAL AID PROGRAMS

Mr. A. D. Alkenbrack (Frontenac-Lennox and Addington):: Mr. Speaker, my supplementary question to the Minister of Agriculture concerns the same subject. We need to turn milk deficits into cash and foreign charities into trade. Will the minister examine, for policy purposes, the sale of surplus Canadian dairy products to CIDA at cost price, under our present subsidy system, and consider distributing those products at the same prices, as carried on our books, to needy countries now receiving cash by way of CIDA charitable donations?


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please.
[Mr. Trudeau.)



REDUCTION IN BUTTERFAT QUOTA FOR PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND-REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION

Hon. J. A. MacLean (Malpeque):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a supplementary question to the Minister of Agriculture? Has he received the interim report of the Prince Edward Island legislature's committee on agriculture, which was unanimously adopted by the legislature and forwarded to him, and which deplores the fact that the Prince Edward Island quota for butterfat has been reduced from 6.7 million pounds to 4.8 million pounds, a reduction of 28 per cent? It asks the minister and the Dairy Commission if an additional, upward adjustment can be made to the much reduced quota for Prince Edward Island.


Eugene Whelan: Mr. Speaker, the Minister of Veterans Affairs and the premier of Prince Edward Island met with me last night to discuss this matter. The very important document alluded to was delivered by hand from the legislature of Prince Edward Island. We discussed the matter. I point out that the Dairy Commission and the supply management committee set quotas for each province, not the Minister of Agriculture. They agree on what the quota should be for the whole country. They are discussing this and will discuss it further, because they realize the difficult position of Prince Edward Island producers, who are isolated and cannot produce other commodities. Other parts of Canada are in the same position. It is not easy to decide whose quota shall be cut, and by how much.


John Angus MacLean: A supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Was the minister able to give encouragement to the premier of Prince Edward Island who must have made representations to show the special case of Prince Edward Island, where only about 10 per cent of provincial production is used as fluid milk; therefore, the quota proposal will have a much greater impact on the industry of the province than it will in other cases. Bear in mind, Mr. Speaker, that the Maritime provinces are only about 40 per cent self-sufficient in the production of dairy products.


Eugene Whelan: Mr. Speaker, provincial ministers of agriculture, including the minister of Prince Edward Island, have made these representations to me. Of course, other ministers of agriculture feel the same toward producers in their provinces. They are all concerned about how much quotas will be cut, for whom, and who will be affected. It is safe to say that not many ministers of agriculture want to cut the production of their own dairy producers. It is unrealistic to say that we should not cut production; because, if we do not cut production, we shall be wasteful.



THE MINISTRY


Mr. Jake Epp (Provencher):: Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Prime Minister. This morning on radio station CJOB, Winnipeg, the Solicitor General openly and freely
March 23, 1976

expressed an opinion concerning station CFCF of Montreal, the station which has been charged with failing to conform to CRTC regulations concerning broadcast laws. Does the Prime Minister consider it proper that a minister of the Crown, who is responsible for seeing justice is done, should discuss publicly important questions presently before the courts?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: I will have to take note of the question. I am not sure what the matter before the courts is to which the hon. member is referring.


Arthur Jacob (Jake) Epp: A supplementary question. I should like to ask the Prime Minister whether the action taken by the Solicitor General in Winnipeg this morning violates the guidelines the Prime Minister has stated are to be observed by all members of the cabinet and, if this is the case, what action does he propose to take.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: As described by the hon. member, it does not violate the guidelines; it may be incorrect for some other reason but the guidelines, as I described them some days ago, were not infringed.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


Mr. Sinclair Stevens (York-Simcoe):: Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Prime Minister. Having regard to the right hon. gentleman's reported statement following his visit to Cuba that Premier Fidel Castro was sending troops to Africa with a great deal of thought and feeling, could the Prime Minister tell us whether he has received any new information concerning the Cuban involvement and, if so, what is the current position of the administration with respect to this unhappy situation?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: I must point out that the hon. member has grossly and inaccurately misquoted me.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Sinclair McKnight Stevens: If I am grossly and inaccurately misquoting the Prime Minister so did the Globe and Mail this morning.


Some hon. Members:: Oh!


Sinclair McKnight Stevens: Bearing in mind that Cuba is now involved in eight African countries with some 12,000 troops or other personnel, would the Prime Minister inform us whether the government has registered any official protest concerning this war involvement on the part of Cuba and, if so, what was the form of the protest?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: I am informed that the misquote in the Globe and Mail was a quote from some American paper, so the hon. member is twice removed from the truth by two very big barriers.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!
Oral Questions


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: As to our position on the presence of Cuban troops in Angola, our position was made very clear by the Secretary of State for External Affairs before I went to Cuba, it was made clear again when I was in Cuba and it has been made clear since. We are opposed to that kind of intervention.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!



NATIONAL DEFENCE


Hon. Marcel Lambert (Edmonton West):: My question is directed to the Minister of National Defence. In view of the extensive unrest and uncertainty prevailing in all parts of Canada in connection with the rumoured closing of military bases and reduction to nil strength of certain units, could the hon. gentleman indicate by what date he anticipates making a definitive announcement concerning this whole question so that if things are to happen people will know just what is going to happen?


James Armstrong Richardson: I cannot say more than I have said on other occasions. I will be making recommendations to cabinet in the very near future, probably within the next two or three weeks, but I do not know how long cabinet will take to consider those recommendations.



OLYMPIC GAMES


Mr. Roch La Salle (Joliette):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to direct a question to the Secretary of State of Canada.
Given the fact that in a few months Montreal will play host to many visitors from various countries and that interpreters will be needed to help those various nationalities communicate with each other, can the minister tell the House whether COJO officials have made a request for this interpretation service? If so, how much will be earmarked for this service?


Hon. James Hugh Faulkner (Secretary of State):: I am
not aware of the request but I will look into it and report to the hon. member.



CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION


Mr. Benno Friesen (Surrey-White Rock):: A further question to the Secretary of State, Mr. Speaker. In view of a growing number of representations concerning the cen-

Oral Questions
tralisation of the CBC has the Secretary of State re-examined the position of the Corporation with a view to allowing greater latitude for local programs within the Corporation?


James Hugh Faulkner: think the hon. member should update his information. One of the more significant things the Corporation has done in the last two years has been to decentralise, and this is manifest by new buildings in Vancouver, prospective buildings in Regina, etc. all designed to support local programming.


Benno Friesen: I should like to update the information in the possession of the Secretary of State: I received complaints yesterday with respect to farm programs which have been deleted from CBC programming, and this is one area of local representation which has been lost.



FISHERIES


Mr. Albert Bechard (Bonaventure-Iles-de-la-Madeleine):: Mr. Speaker, I want to ask a question of the Minister of State for Fisheries. I wonder if he has read the question I put to him last week which was answered in part by the Minister of the Environment. If not, I can put it again. It appears at page 11901 of Hansard and reads as follows: Has the minister or his officials now any control over the members of the Greenpeace Foundation or other characters of the same kind who are at present engaged in illegal interference, this time on the ice of the Atlantic and the Gulf of St. Lawrence where the seal hunt is taking place?


Hon. Romeo LeBlanc (Minister of State (Fisheries)):: Mr. Speaker, I believe the measures which were taken proved effective since both protest movements seem to have given up. In the meantime, I would invite them to read scientific reports and refrain from publishing halftruths as they do.
* * . *



AGRICULTURE


Joseph Adrien Henri Lambert: Mr. Speaker, I am aware that all my colleagues are pleased that I ask a question of general interest. My question is directed to the Minister of Agriculture.
I view of the fact that the Minister of Agriculture has just said a moment ago that the problem of industrial milk producers is connected with a world surplus, could the minister tell the House whether the world population is saturated with this product and that there is no need to meet, or whether there is a lack of consumer purchasing power, either at the national or the international level?


Eugene Whelan: Mr. Speaker, it would be difficult to say there would not be some place in the world where there would be a need for this product but it is not at all easy to distribute unless those countries want it, because they have the sovereign right to say what they want for their people who happen to be in need; you just don't throw it at them and hope they accept it like some scraps we are distributing. The world price of skim milk powder is little over one third of what it was two years ago. Under our CIDA program and our other aid programs we have offered assistance to distribute this product in any fashion as long as it can be put to proper use.



WORLD CONFERENCE ON FOOD NEEDS-DISCUSSION OF CANADIAN MILK PRODUCTS

Joseph Adrien Henri Lambert: On a supplementary, Mr. Speaker.
As once against this year the Minister of Agriculture attended a world conference on food needs, can the minister tell the House whether milk was discussed, with regard to feeding the peoples of the world and whether possible exchanges of dairy products on the one hand, and various products from other countries, on the other, excluded milk products, or whether the discussions dealt with exchanges capable of meeting the needs of humanity as well in Canada as in other countries of the world?


Eugene Whelan: Yes, Mr. Speaker, the nutritional aspect of food aid was certainly discussed at great length and one of the ways in which people can get proper nutrition is by being in a position to feed themselves. Canada is doing a tremendous job in helping them set up their own dairy herds and other production entities in those countries.



ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS


Hon. Donald C. Jamieson (Minister of Industry, Trade and Commerce):: Mr. Speaker, pursuant to Standing Order 41(2), I have the honour to table copies, in both official languages, of the 1976 census of Canada Census Commissioners' appointments.


Mr. MacDonald (Egmont):: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order with respect to the tabling of documents. Yesterday, the Secretary of State for External Affairs signed an important extradition treaty with the American ambassador. I would have assumed that because of the nature of the material and its importance to our country it would

have been tabled today by the Secretary of State for External Affairs or by the Minister of Justice who will have responsibility for administering this important treaty.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, the treaty which was ratified yesterday was tabled last October.


Angus (Gus) MacFarlane: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. 1 realize it is sometimes very difficult to assess whether a member is putting a preamble to his supplementary question. The reason that I mentioned the four members concerned was clearly to indicate to the minister concerned that interest in this case ranged all the way from Toronto to Hamilton, to Halifax and to Truro. I thought the supplementary was fairly important in that in a letter I have in my possession one of the officials indicated that perhaps the parties concerned are in another country. My supplementary was, if he could not go to his own country, did it not indicate that there was some concern about returning to that country?


Mr. Speaker:: The more the hon. member is persuaded of the importance of his supplementary, the more important it might be to him to put his supplementary without a preamble.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


HOUSE OF COMMONS ANTI-NUISANCE ACT MEASURE TO PROVIDE DISINCENTIVE FOR MEMBERS TO DELAY BUSINESS OF HOUSE
Mrs. Simma Holt (Vancouver-Kingsway) moved: for leave to introduce Bill C-428, to amend the Senate and House of Commons Act.


Some hon. Members:: Explain.


Simma Holt: Mr. Speaker, this is an act to be cited as the House of Commons Anti-Nuisance Act. The purpose of this bill is to amend the Senate and House of Commons Act to put an end to members attempting wanton delay and disruption of the House of Commons by proposing dilatory motions which they know to be unlikely to carry. According to the main estimates for 1976-77, it costs $109.11 per minute to operate the House of Commons. That is the penalty set, $109.11.


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Simma Holt: The annual cost-


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. I wonder whether the hon. member for Vancouver-Kingsway (Mrs. Holt) might be given sufficient attention to add one other sentence of explanation.


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: This is not explanation; it is argument.
Electoral Boundaries


Simma Holt: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. That is the cost per minute to keep this House operating, under the current estimates. The annual cost is $57,347,185.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. In the circumstances, I would think the explanation given by the hon. member is sufficient to enable hon. members to understand the nature of the bill. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the said motion?


John Edward Broadbent: Mr. Speaker, before we give our consent to this motion, I rise on a point of order. I hope the hon. member realizes that if she is objecting to dilatory measures that waste the time of the House, she is in fact referring to most government bills which are introduced.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Marshall:: On the same point of order, Mr. Speaker, may I state to the hon. member that I timed her, and she wasted $218.22.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Dionne (Northumberland-Miramichi):: On the
same point of order raised by the leader of the NDP, Mr. Speaker, I would simply point out that the remarks he made about government bills apply to interventions from the NDP.


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. I think the House should understand clearly the question before it. At this stage it is solely the question whether or not the bill should be read the first time and printed, so that it can be circulated. Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the said motion?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, bill read the first time and ordered to be printed.

Mr. Speaker:: Order. It is my duty to inform the House that an objection signed by the hon. members for Terrebonne (Mr. Comtois), Laval (Mr. Roy), Beauce (Mr. Caron), Levis (Mr. Guay), Gatineau (Mr. Clermont), Port-neuf (Mr. Bussieres), Saint-Jean (Mr. Smith), Mercier (Mr. Boulanger), Lapointe (Mr. Marceau) and Quebec East (Mr. Duquet) has been filed with me, pursuant to Section 20 of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, to the report of the Electoral Boundaries Commission for the province of Quebec.


OBJECTION TO COMMISSION REPORT RESPECTING ONTARIO
Mr. Speaker:: May I also inform the House that an objection signed by the hon. members for Broadview (Mr. Gilbert), Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles), Yorkton-

March 23, 1976
Order Paper Questions
Melville (Mr. Nystrom), Waterloo-Cambridge (Mr. Salts-man), Winnipeg North (Mr. Orlikow), Northwest Territories (Mr. Firth), Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands (Mr. Douglas), Cape Breton East Richmond (Mr. Hogan), Timiskaming (Mr. Peters), Regina-Lake Centre (Mr. Benjamin), and Oshawa-Whitby (Mr. Broadbent) has been filed with me, pursuant to section 20 of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, to the report of the Electoral Boundaries Commission for the province of Ontario.
In accordance with past practice of the House, is it agreed that these objections be printed as an appendix to today's Votes and Proceedings?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION
Mr. Ralph Stewart (Cochrane) moved: that the second report of the Special Joint Committee on the National Capital Region, presented to the House on Thursday, March 18, 1976, be concurred in.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, I desire to lay on the table of the House a petition signed by 4,860 senior citizens from 58 different points in Saskatchewan. The petition contains nine points. I shall not ask the leave of the House to read them all-I might have trouble getting leave to do so-but may I say that among other requests the petition asks that the basic pension be raised to $350 a month, that the pensionable age be lowered to age 60, and that there be a special department to deal with senior citizens. I present this petition, Mr. Speaker, on behalf of those who have signed it, their representatives being with us today, and I commend its proposals to the consideration of the government.



QUESTIONS ON THE ORDER PAPER

[Stage Direction]
(Questions answered orally are indicated by an asterisk.)
['I ask, Mr. Speaker, that the remaining questions be allowed to stand.\nNuclear Proliferation']
Mr.   J.-J. Blais@Parliamentary Secretary to President of the Privy Council: Mr. Speaker, the following questions will be answered today: 3,512, 4,038, 4,054, 4,062, 4,087, 4,097, 4,122, 4,130, 4,132, 4,138 and 4,581.



Mr. Forrestall: By department and agency, what has been the funding provided for multicultural programmes and activities in each year since 1971?


Miss Coline Campbell (Parliamentary Secretary to Secretary of State):: Secretary of
State Department	National Film Board
Fiscal year		Fiscal year	
1971-72	$ 617,000	1971-72	$129,0001972-73	1,465,000	1972-73	315,0001973-74	5,376,000	1973-74	390,0001974-75	5,307,000	1974-75	390,0001975-76	5,260,000	1975-76	300,000National Museums	of Canada	Public Archives	Fiscal year	Fiscal year	1971-72	$ 91,000	1971-72	$ NIL1972-73	525,000	1972-73	NIL1973-74	1,450,000	1973-74	215,7001974-75	1,450,000	1974-75	327,3001975-76	1,450,000	1975-76	340,000
In addition to its general services, which are available to all Canadian libraries, the National Library of Canada provides funds for two multicultural projects. These are its programme to purchase and microfilm Canadian ethnic newspapers, and the Multilingual Biblioservice, which acquires and makes available on a long term loan basis books in non-official languages to the provincial library systems. They in turn distribute these to the public libraries which service ethnic communities. The funds spent for these projects since 1971 are as follows:
Multilingual Project		1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	1974/75	1975/76 Estimate
				(started		and
				October 1/73)		Expend.
Multilingual	Purchase of Books	No expen-	35,736.00	18,729.00	63,431.00	90,000.00Biblioservice	diture	(74,124 todate)Other operating expenses and salaries	33,932.00	171,536.00	202,000.00Ethnic Newspa-	Purchase of newspapers	"	25,638.57	29,928.61	7,252.05	8,000.00per Project	and films	Other operating expenses and salaries	2,014.68	9,762.87	10,752.44	13,650.00Total Expenditure	63,389.25	92,352.48	252,971.49	314,650.00


CANADA COUNCIL GRANTS-PRIVATE INCOME
Mr. Schellenberger: Is the private income of individuals taken into consideration in the assessment of applications for Canada Council grants?


Coline M. Campbell: I am informed by the Canada Council as follows: No, except to establish the amount of leave fellowships for university scholars and the amount allocated for subsistence under the explorations program.


REFLECTIVE MARKINGS ON RAILWAY CARS
Mr. Hnatyshyn: Is the government giving consideration to requiring more visible markings on box cars and flat cars so they can be seen more easily at night at uncontrolled level crossings?


Otto Emil Lang: The
application of reflective markings to the sides of railway cars is provided for by Section 202 (1)(c) of the Railway Act and an Order of the Canadian Transport Commission. Work on this program, which began with the issuance of Order No. 97799, dated May 1, 1959, is progressing, with contributions made from the Railway Grade Crossing Fund. As of June, 1975, 125,523 cars have been equipped with reflectorized discs, with a total grant from the Fund of $504,321.68.


CN-IMPROVEMENTS TO RAIL LINES IN NEWFOUNDLAND
Mr. Marshall: 1.	Regarding the 1975 CN improvements to rail lines in Newfoundland, what is the status of the (a) installation of new rail and upgrading of two bridges and the location of each (b) 33 mile, 100 pound rail between Deer Lake and Kitty's Brook (c) 12 mile, 100 pound rail between Badger and Millertown Junction (d) topgrade ballast between Gambo and Gleenwood and preparation of the roadbed (e) replacement of the 175 foot span on the Flat Bay Bridge (f) upgrading of the bridge at Cape Ray?
2.	What are the details of the progress of the (a) $900,000 in new buildings (b) $750,000 in new track laying equipment (c) $250,000 in new machinery (d) $50,000 in new equipment (e) 360,000 tie plates (f) 205,000 rail anchors (g) 45,000 track ties (h) 33,000 board feet of treated bridge ties?
3.	What were the total freight handlings in (a) 1974-75 (b) 1975-76?


Otto Emil Lang: The Management of Canadian National Railways advises as follows: 1. (a) Installation of rail complete. Flat Bay Bridge complete. Cape Bay Bridge complete, (b) Complete, (c) Complete, (d) Complete with exception of four miles, (e) Complete, (f) Complete.
2.	(a) Corner Brook Express Building complete. Corner Brook Maintenance of Way Building now nearing completion. (b) Delivery completed, (c) Delivery complete with exception of one machine expected to be delivered first quarter of 1976. (d) Delivery complete with exception of
Order Paper Questions
one unit expected to be delivered second quarter of 1976. (e) Complete, (f) Complete, (g) Complete, (h) Complete.
3.	(a) Calendar Year 1974-1,418,900 revenue tons, (b) Calendar Year 1975-1,036,930 revenue tons.


HEALTH AND WELFARE-DEPARTMENTAL CONTRIBUTION TO UNITED NATIONS DRUG ABUSE FUND
Mr. Matte: 1.	Has the Department of National Health and Welfare contributed for the past three years to the United Nations Drug Abuse Fund and, if so, does this contribution amount to $1,000,000?
2.	Does the Department plan to continue contributing to a similar programme and, if so, in what amount?


Hon. Marc Lalonde (Minister of National Health and Welfare):: 1. For each of the fiscal years 1973-1974, 1974-1975 and 1975-1976, the Department of National Health and Welfare granted* $200,000 (for a total of $600,000) to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control.
* Please note the distinction between amounts "contributed" and amounts "granted" by reference to the Treasury Board's Authorities Manual, Chapter 30, 0.3.11.3.
2.	The Department of National Health and Welfare does not intend to grant funds to the United Nations Fund for Drug Abuse Control in the 1976-1977 fiscal year.


CANADIAN PENITENTIARY SYSTEM-PSYCHIATRIC, PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL WORK RESOURCES
Mr. Coates: 1.	Are psychiatric, psychological and social work resources available to the Canadian penitentiary system at (a) William Head (b) New Westminster (c) Drumheller (d) Prince Albert (e) Archambault (f) St. Vincent de Paul (g) Dorchester (h) Millhaven (i) Kingston and, if so, what are they?
2.	In each case, how many staff are (a) full-time (b) part-time?
3.	In each case, how many prisoners receive psychiatric, psychological and social work treatment on a (a) full-time (b) part-time basis?
4.	How many prisoners were treated at each Penitentiary during the period 1973 to 1975?


Mr. Hugh Poulin (Parliamentary Secretary to Solicitor General):: 1. Psychiatric, psychological and inmate classification services are available to all inmates at all of the above mentioned institutions except as follows: (i) There is no psychologist available at William Head, (ii) Psychiatric services are available within the following institutions: New Westminster, Drumheller, Saskatchewan and Dorchester Penitentiaries, (iii) Psychiatric services are provided to the following institutions from the adjoining Regional Psychiatric Centres operated by the Canadian Penitentiary Service: Archambault, Laval (St. Vincent de Paul), Millhaven and Kingston (Regional Reception Centre).
2.	There are eleven full-time psychiatrists and three part-time psychiatrists employed by the Canadian Peni-

March 23, 1976
Order Paper Questions
tentiary Service. Full-time psychiatric services are available to inmates at New Westminster, Archambault, Laval (St. Vincent de Paul), Millhaven and Kingston (RRC). Part-time psychiatric services are dispensed at Drumhell-er, Saskatchewan and Dorchester Penitentiaries. All psychologists and classification officers are employed on a
full-time basis. They are employed as follows: Classification		
Institution	Psychologists	OfficersWilliam Head	0	7British Columbia	3	19Drumheller	2	16Saskatchewan	3	16Archambault Laval (St. Vincent	2 de	10Paul)	2	7Dorchester	3	12Millhaven	3	10Kingston (RRC)	4	103 and 4. The only inmates who could	be considered as
receiving psychiatric treatment on a full-time basis are those on register at the three Regional Psychiatric Centres operated by the Canadian Penitentiary Service. The number of inmates considered to be on full-time psychiatric treatment are as follows: (i) Regional Psychiatric Centre (Quebec), 64; (ii) Regional Psychiatric Centre (Ontario), 86; (iii) Regional Psychiatric Centre (Pacific), 95. No statistics are maintained on the other inmates not hospitalized at the Psychiatric Centres who occasionally receive psychiatric treatment on an out-patient basis. No inmates receive psychological or social work treatment on a full-time basis. No statistics are kept on the number of inmates receiving psychological or social work treatment on a part-time basis. Such treatment is given on request, if needed, and when it is appropriate (or on the basis of need identified by diagnostic testing and given to all inmates on admission and when required during sentence) or in relation to observed abnormal behaviour. All inmates receive the services of classification officers from the beginning to the end of their sentence on a part-time basis.


RESEARCH DATA ON ZOONOSIS
Mr. Robinson: Does the government have research data on "zoonosis"?


Marc Lalonde: The Department of National Health and Welfare has available to it the most up-to-date data on infectious diseases transmissible under natural conditions between vertebrate animals and man. (Zoonosis)


CAPITAL EXPENDITURE AND OPERATIONAL MAINTENANCE ASSISTANCE FOR COMMUNITY AIRPORTS
Mr. Forrestall: What was the combined total of capital expenditure and operational maintenance assistance for community airport project developments for each year 1960 to 1975 in (a) Yukon (b) Northwest Territories (c) British Columbia (d) Alberta (e) Saskatchewan (f) Manitoba (g) 
Ontario (h) Quebec (i) New Brunswick (j) Prince Edward Island (k) Nova Scotia (1) Newfoundland?


Otto Emil Lang: 1959-60	1960-61	1961-62	1962-63	1963-64Yukon Northwest Territo-	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -	$ -ries	29,907	5,056	15,000	-	-British Columbia	6,771	52,962	85,402	69,446	40,390Alberta	6,879	37,336	5,648	10,108	5,547Saskatchewan	27,133	8,436	6,740	12,619	24,248Manitoba	20,255	6,294	21,992	17,243	30,124Ontario	44,129	8,766	25,467	-	-Quebec	46,227	48,771	26,281	8,178	43,626New Brunswick Prince Edward	11,591	146,794	23,825	35,379	38,116Island	-	-	-	-	-Nova Scotip	3,897	3,773	-	3,537	2,594Newfoundland	-	5,273	14,727	-	51,5971964-65	1965-66	1966-67	1967-68	1968-69	1969-70Yukon Northwest Territo-	$ -	$ 9,824	$ 14,409	$ -	$ 4,007	$ 9,198ries	-	-	-	64,730British Columbia	44,493	36,261	53,270	523,013	243,064	438,722Alberta	16,528	146,912	196,284	99,199	331,282	78,114Saskatchewan	18,409	16,837	18,659	60,570	75,619	254,736Manitoba	57,814	72,519	153,778	38,005	400,051	125,801Ontario	-	216,084	153,626	585,702	503,129	224,074Quebec	45,050	135,666	418,233	161,471	380,866	499,792New Brunswick Prince Edward	6,223	16,163	99,092	69,519	171,785	85,095Island	-	-	-	-	-	-Nova Scotia	-	7,347	4,000	23,248	6,189	35,233Newfoundland	-	405,606	22,250	14,473	11,973	72,2931970-71	1971-72	1972-73	1973-74	1974-75Yukon Northwest Territo-	$ 17,897	$ 17,953	$ 9,673	$189,692	$ 21,727ries	20,012	13,375	-	-	-British Columbia	516,939	345,194	213,141	687,128	358,006Alberta	172,167	112,406	533,943	586,050	820,590Saskatchewan	183,865	245,805	167,664	89,276	92,472Manitoba	466,916	251,746	821,226	380,123	327,308Ontario	275,986	508,697	998,286	850,820	642,006Quebec	329,138	287,448	1,009,841	558,600	483,474New Brunswick Prince Edward	48,603	58,253	39,682	39,939	57,149Island	-	-	-	68,150	-Nova Scotia	46,979	87,884	66,962	19,358	61,845Newfoundland	104,630	158,303	397,698	43,193	489,800


CBC-COST OF FRENCH TELEVISION PROGRAM &quot;MONSIEUR B. EN TUNISIE&quot;
Mr. Lapointe: What was the cost of the CBC French television program "Monsieur B. en Tunisie" of December 7, 1975?


Coline M. Campbell: I am informed by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as follows: It has not been customary to require the CBC to provide information about the costs of individual programs. The background of this custom is explained in detail in the reply to Question No. 2530, May 22, 1975.
March 23, 1976


FUNDS TO QUEBEC SCHOOLS UNDER BILINGUALISM PROGRAM
Mr. Matte: Since 1974, has the government directed funds to Quebec schools, as part of its bilingualism programme, for the learning material improvement programme and, if so, in what amount?


Coline M. Campbell: The Department of the Secretary of State has not directed funds to Quebec schools for the learning material improvement programme.


RCMP-SERVICES TO MUNICIPALITIES IN THE CONSTITUENCY OF CHAMPLAIN
Mr. Matte: Did the Royal Canadian Mounted Police offer its police services under contract to some municipalities in the Constituency of Champlain in 1975-76 and, if so, what was (a) the total cost for such services (b) the number of police officers, by municipality (c) the name of the municipality concerned (d) the salary of the RCMP officers?


Fabian Hugh Poulin: No.


QUESTION PASSED AS ORDER FOR RETURN
Mr.   J.-J. Blais@Parliamentary Secretary to President of the Privy Council: Mr. Speaker, if question No. 3,259 could be made an order for return, this return would be tabled immediately.


PUBLIC SERVANTS TRAINING PROGRAMMES
Mr. Orlikow: 1.	As of December 31, 1974, what was the number of public servants on temporary training programmes (a) Language Training (b) Special Assignment Pay Plan (SAPP) (c) Career Assignment Programme (CAP) (d) Career Orientation Programme?
2.	What was the number of public servants in each programme for each incumbent level of the occupational groups in the administrative and foreign service category and the administrative support category, as of December 31, 1974?
3.	What was the average length of time public servants were expected to spend on each programme for those enrolled as of December 31,1974?
Return tabled.


Mr. Blais:: I ask, Mr. Speaker, that the remaining questions be allowed to stand.
Nuclear Proliferation



GOVERNMENT ORDERS


Allan Frederick Lawrence: That this House condemns the government for increasing the threat posed to mankind by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular by its present negotiations to resume nuclear assistance to India.
He said: Mr. Speaker, there is something wrong when the only way we can have a debate on the most critical manmade problem facing the future of mankind, namely, the growing proliferation of nuclear weaponry and the major part this country plays in its continuance, is for the opposition to force a debate against the wishes of a reluctant, tight-lipped, secrecy-prone and grouchy government.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Allan Frederick Lawrence: This is another facet of the secrecy syndrome infesting official Ottawa today-and if it does not stop, and stop soon, I warn our Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) that the long tradition and history of a bipartisan foreign policy for this nation will come crashing down around his ears. Things are changing here in Ottawa. Things are changing across the country, and if fresh winds do not start blowing through that architectural monstrosity on Sussex Drive that looks like an old-fashioned fortress, and is guarded like one, called the Pearson Building, then those winds will not only blow the minister and some of his advisers away but they could help to blow away this government as well.
We have drafted this short, blunt and pointed resolution with four thoughts in mind: to initiate a debate on the lack of nuclear safeguards in the world today and the failure of the world community to stop the spread of nuclear arms; to examine and, hopefully, force our government and this particular minister to explain and defend Canada's policy of selling nuclear power generating plants to other countries; to drag out of the minister, if we can, for the first time some rational explanation, if one exists, for the intended resumption of nuclear assistance to India; and finally if, as I suspect, there is no rational explanation, to embarrass those government members who are either unthinking enough or partisan and disciplined enough to vote willy-nilly for the government's resumption of nuclear aid to India, the timing of which, the circumstances of which and the merits of which are simply incomprehensible to the people of Canada and to the nations of the western world.
Make no mistake about it, sir, we in the official opposition are going to take special steps to make sure that the nature of the vote of government members on this particular resolution is communicated back home to the people in the constituencies, and we intend to point out those members who endorse this senseless policy of the government. Members can take that as a threat if they want, but if an appeal such as we are making today to government mem-

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Nuclear Proliferation
bers to stop this give-away of the very means to manufacture nuclear weaponry to either untrustworthy or unstable foreign governments is not halted, if they themselves do not revolt against the policies of this minister, and especially his departmental advisers, and change the course of events which surely is leading us to a world holocaust, then we have no other course but to emphasize to the electors in the constituencies that their own MP voted in favour of this policy. We will do it, and they will hear of it. Vote with the government on this one, not only at your own political peril but, in the name of the future of mankind, at your own personal peril.
Others from the official opposition will be dealing today with the general world situation which is sadly deteriorating. Others will deal with the Middle East situation which is quickly deteriorating. The Argentinian tinder-box is about to ignite, with one Canadian reactor working and another being built at a time, in a place and by financial and legal means which to say the least are extremely shaky. The South Korean transaction will be examined and our conclusion will be that a worse example of Canadian participation in this whole nuclear industry simply could not be found anywhere.
Each of Canada's contracts in these and other nations will be exposed, not as being for the general benefit of world peace, understanding or development-and certainly not for the benefit of Canada nor, in some cases, of the other country itself-but, instead, as a giant hand-out or give-away of resources, technology and manufacturing capability, at direct cost to the Canadian taxpayer, under the subterfuge that somehow, somewhere, this is going to be paid for by others when actually we in Canada will be paying for these installations. My part in the debate is simply to introduce it and to try to goad or to pry out of the minister, or even his Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau), some rational explanation of why we, as a country, are doing what we are doing.
May I also give a short history of India's nuclear connection with Canada. In 1945, Prime Minister Nehru of India, in the tradition of Gandhi before him, proposed an end to the testing by anyone, anywhere, of any type of nuclear device. That was in 1945. On May 18, 1974, at a site in the Rajasthan desert east of New Delhi, the Indian department of atomic energy exploded a nuclear bomb, it cannot be called anything else-the yield of which was between 15 kilotons and 20 kilotons which is approximately the same force as the bomb which was exploded over Hiroshima. Canada supplied the original materials, the original financing, the original knowledge and the original technology. These contributions, inescapably and inevitably, led to the Indian development in that desert almost two years ago.
In 1956, Canada established, as foreign aid, the Canada-Indian research reactor at Trombay, India. It produces no power, but it can, and does now, produce annually 10 kilograms of weapons' grade plutonium and it has produced in the ten-year period from 1964 to 1974 at least 50 kilograms-enough plutonium for at least ten fair-sized nuclear bombs. The Cirus heavy-water reactor was built at a cost of $70 million. Of this total, $35 million in credit financing was accepted by the Canadian Export Credit Insurance Corporation, with an additional $5 million in

nuclear technological information transferred to the government of India without cost or deduction from the Colombo plan or other aid assistance.
In addition to the Cirus reactor, another reactor based on the Douglas Point power reactor has been built, with Canadian assistance, at Rama Pratap Sagar in Rajasthan state. It was to be the first of two Canadian-aided plants of 200 megawatts each. But completion of the second plant is currently being held up by Canada's decision not to supply further nuclear assistance without assurance that the plutonium coming from that plant will not be used for nuclear explosions. That is enough plutonium for 50 nuclear bombs in India. Financing by the EDC for the Rajasthan projects has amounted to $47 million over four contracts dating from April 27, 1964, to May 5, 1971. While India is a member of the International Atomic Energy Agency and both a signatory and ratifying member of the partial test-ban treaty of 1963, she has neither signed nor ratified the non-proliferation treaty. Moreover, her actions of May, 1974, are pretty clear indications as to the stand of Mrs. Gandhi and the congress party on nuclear explosions.
One further reactor at Narora in Uttar Pradesh, and another at Madras, are planned to come into service by the mid-1980s. These plants will be modelled on the Rajasthan reactors, but 80 per cent of the project will be built from Indian resources. Reactors already in operation include two boiling water reactors of American design at Tarapur, near Bombay.
That is the situation today. Is Canada blameless in all of this? What part, really, did Canada play so far as the entrance of India into the nuclear club is concerned? In the last issue which came to my desk last week of the slick, in-house departmental organ called "International Perspectives", another academic apologist for the government infers that the Canadian government was as appalled and surprised as the rest of the world when the Rajasthan bomb went off.
What are the facts? Not once, but many times during the disarmament conference from 1965 through to 1970, and perhaps even beyond, the Canadian delegation was specifically warned by other nations of the use the Indian plutonium from the Canadian reactor was being put to. Indeed, in the United Nations itself at least once in May, 1965, and later in July, 1965, at Geneva, the Indian representatives themselves hinted that India's only alternative to the Red Chinese threat was to build the bomb. In October, 1965, Mr. Shahi, the Pakistan minister of foreign affairs, specifically detailed that India was building a nuclear arsenal from Canadian plutonium-publicly, not privately.
In April, 1967, the Indian external affairs minister, Mr. Chagla, came out in the open and threatened that his country had to develop and explode the bomb. In 1971, our Canadian Prime Minister went to New Delhi armed with these reports and came away docilely, trustingly, on the assurance of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that the Canadian aid was not in any way going to be misused. Well, whether it was misused or not, Canada stood by, assisting, providing, co-operating-not warning, threatening or cutting off aid.
March 23, 1976

In May, 1974, the Indians blasted their way into the nuclear club and blasted away not only the ineffectualness of the non-proliferation treaty, not only the fagade of the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency, but also, I would hope, the physical and mental stagnation of our own Canadian policy respecting nuclear assistance. For ten years the Canadian government had aided and abetted the proliferation of nuclear arms in India, and all the time they must have known what was going on and did nothing. They had full inspection and control powers in respect of what went into and came out of Indian reactors.
As in the case of the judges' affair, the Prime Minister of Canada should have known what was going on. I suspect he did know what was going on but, like in the judges' affair, he kept quiet; he did nothing. Surely, now, we are entitled to ask the government, "Why didn't you pay attention to the warnings? Who did you have doing the inspections? Where are those inspection reports? What did you do to stop this mad rush to world disaster? Why didn't you cut off assistance when India's policy became obvious? Did you even threaten to do so?" And, above all, "Why, in heaven's name, with the same minds in even greater auo-cratic, if not dictatorial, control in India today, is India any more trustworthy in 1976 than it was in 1974?"
Mr. Speaker, when conditions in the Far East and in the Middle East are more jittery now than then, when there has been a systematic destruction of parliamentary and democractic institutions as we know them in India, and when India herself is making deals to supply nuclear material and knowledge to other countries in the Arab bloc, which surely cannot be looked on anywhere with satisfaction, considering the potential, and when India's competitors, such as Pakistan, openly admit they are in a nuclear race on the subcontinent, the question has to be asked: Why now? Or, better still: Why ever? Why, when no one has devised a remedy, sanction or penalty when a nation does develop a bomb?
What do you do if India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, Korea, Chile, South Africa, Egypt, Spain, Taiwan and Indonesia develop atomic bombs? Do you slap their wrists? Do you make them pay up on their UN appropriation? Surely, you make sure they do not have the means to make them in the first place. We are rapidly leaving behind that "first place" option. What are you going to do if India makes a hydrogen bomb, as Prime Minister Ali Bhutto openly declared they are doing in Madras when he was here in Ottawa last month? What is this government's answer? This government now says they are negotiating to resume nuclear assistance. Mind you, it is not the minister who said that, but Canada's version of Kissinger, Mr. Ivan Head. Perhaps he could be more fairly described as Canada's version of Chester Bowles. In any event, on March 10 Mr. Head announced that success had been reached so far as an agreement with India for resumption was concerned.
The only small detail left, of course-and I gather Mr. Head did not give too much importance to this merely routine item-was that it still had to be approved by the cabinet. This was done at a time when the International Atomic Agency had only 47 inspectors to report on well over 200 nuclear facilities worldwide. This was done at a
Nuclear Proliferation
time when we had already provided a country such as India with a developed nuclear arsenal which Canada itself would not dream of acquiring for herself. This was done at a time when Canada's own manufacturing and technical capability is to be strained to the utmost over the next ten years to provide our own nuclear power plants for our own nuclear domestic needs without in any way adding to the stress and strain of providing CANDU reactors to others, and when we had the sneaking suspicion that our reactors were wanted so that those nations which acquired them could more easily make weapons' grade plutonium from a Canadian reactor than from the American light water reactors. Surely, if this is so and if the suspicion exists-and I assure the minister that the suspicion does exist-this places an even greater burden on Canadians generally.
Finally, this deal was concluded at a time when Canadian government expenditures are at an all time high and must be cut down. Each one of these assistance programs, each one of these CANDU reactors in foreign lands, costs the Canadian taxpayer directly, at the very minimum, 55 per cent of the capital cost of each one of them-and usually much more than 55 per cent because of the man years and the expenditure of Canadian knowledge and Canadian experience with them. I merely ask this: Are our priorities straight? Is our thinking correct? Is the government right when we siphon so much effort, so much time and so much money into a program which in India's case has been misused and will likely be seriously abused in the future? The time to stop this type of transaction and this type of deal is now.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Allan Frederick Lawrence: And the way to do it is not to send Mr. Head on any more expeditions. The way to do it is to reprimand the government in the vote in this place tonight.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Northumberland-Dur-ham (Mr. Lawrence) has done a commendable service in introducing a motion which will provide an opportunity for a public debate regarding a matter which is of vital concern to all Canadians and to the peace of the world. The nuclear bomb represents a greater threat to human survival than anything that has occurred in the history of mankind. With the development of every new weapon, man has increased his power for destruction. For the first time in all the long history of man on this earth, we now have the power not only to destroy cities or to lay waste countries but even to destroy all forms of life on this planet.
From 1945 to the present time this threat has mushroomed. In 1945, the United States was the only possessor of a nuclear capacity. Today, some 14 nations either have the nuclear bomb or have the capacity to produce one. Moreover, there are over 650 nuclear plants in 38 different countries, all of which produce radiation waste from which plutonium can be produced. In this situation Canada has greater special responsibility than any other country. The reason for that is that we have managed to produce the CANDU reactor which produces twice as much plutonium as does the light-water reactor which is used in the United States and in most of the countries of western Europe. Not only that, but the spent-fuel rods from the CANDU reactor

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation
will produce plutonium daily, whereas the light-water reactor can produce plutonium only at a scheduled refuelling shut-down which occurs only every 12 or 18 months. The CANDU reactor has some advantages, but there is no doubt that its greatest danger lies in the ease with which its radiation waste can be recycled into plutonium, the most dangerous substance known to modern science.
How has Canada discharged this great responsibility in handling the CANDU reactor? In my opinion we have discharged our responsibility shamefully. The Canadian government, through the Atomic Energy Commission, has gone around the world peddling the CANDU reactor whether or not the proposed customer is either reliable or stable. We have made a very heavy investment in producing CANDU reactors and the government is anxious to secure sales so as to get its money back. As a matter of fact, we have gone so far as to lend great sums of money to prospective customers. In the case of Argentina, we sold them a reactor on such generous terms that unless the contract is renegotiated we stand to lose over $100 million. In the case of the sale to the Republic of South Korea, we lent them $300 million and, if my memory is correct, I believe that in the case of India we actually gave them a CANDU reactor as a gift.
Who are these countries to whom we are either selling nuclear reactors or providing nuclear technology or nuclear fuel? We have India, to whom we sold a nuclear reactor; we have Argentina, to whom we sold a nuclear reactor; and we are now carrying on negotiations, since the visit of the prime minister of Pakistan to this country, with his nation. Not one of those three has signed a nonproliferation treaty. With reference to South Korea, with whom we have already entered into an agreement, they have signed the non-proliferation treaty but they have not ratified it. Do you see what happens? Every time we sell a nuclear reactor, nuclear technology or nuclear fuel to any nation, we start all its neighbours on a shopping expedition. Give India the capacity for a nuclear bomb, and immediately Pakistan is in the market. Make an agreement with Argentina to sell them a CANDU reactor, and now Brazil is in the market. Of course, with reference to South Korea, where there has been merely an armed truce for several years, there is no doubt that this has strengthened the hand of North Korea in securing some nuclear capacity from its allies.
What ought to disturb the government and this House is that almost every one of these countries with which we have been carrying on these negotiations has been, is now or is planning to procure recycling or reprocessing plants the only purpose of which can be to take the radiation waste from the CANDU reactor and produce plutonium. The production of plutonium, of course, means that with only a few pounds of it they are capable of producing a nuclear bomb.
In the case of India, India produced its own separation plant. In the case of South Korea, though they ordered one from France they agreed to cancel the order, but there is no guarantee in the agreement that if they change their mind in the near future the agreement is null and void. Argentina already has an experimental reprocessing plant which is just as capable of producing plutonium as India's plant.

Brazil, the neighbour of Argentina, is now negotiating with West Germany to get a recycling plant. Surely, no country could do anything worse for the peace and safety of the world than to sell nuclear reactors into areas which are trouble spots, such as India and Pakistan, Argentina and Brazil, or North Korea and South Korea, particularly when those countries have expressed an interest in, and in many cases have acquired the technical facilities for, extracting plutonium from the radiation waste which will come from our nuclear reactors.
The motion moved by the hon. member for Northumber-land-Durham makes special reference to India. The negotiations with India have been carried on under a cloak of secrecy and evasion. When we first began to see the newspaper reports from New Delhi of a delegation there, of whom the main spokesman seems to have been Mr. Ivan Head of the Prime Minister's office, we asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) what sort of proposals were being made and what was the purpose of the meeting between the Canadian delegation and the government of India. We were stonewalled. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that the delegation was in India and until it returned he was not in a position to say what agreement it might be discussing.
Did the minister not know before the delegation left Canada what it was authorized to discuss and what type of preliminary agreement it had authority to sign? Was Mr. Ivan Head acting under the direction of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, or was he taking his orders directly from the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau)? We have not been able to find out. When the delegation did get back from India, we asked questions of the minister and he said that the matter was before cabinet and he could not discuss it until a decision had been made. This means that parliament and the people of Canada will be told nothing until an agreement has been signed and we in parliament are faced with a fait accompli.
Surely, if the Canadian delegation in New Delhi could tell people there what proposals were being advanced, and if the Indian government could disclose some of the suggestions it was making to the Canadian delegation, could not the Canadian people and members of parliament also be told what the proposals were-not as to a final decision, but what proposals were being put forward-so that we could discuss them and the Canadian people would know what was going on? For instance, is the ban on nuclear weapons to India to be lifted only for the purpose of supplying some important components to the reactor at Rajasthan? And when that is over, are we making any commitments with reference to supplying nuclear fuel for the reactor? The report which came from New Delhi is rather interesting. It appeared in the Ottawa Journal of March 8, 1976 and contains this very enlightening sentence:
-one informed source here indicated it contains at least an oral commitment by India to refrain from any further nuclear explosions while the Canadian assistance is under way.
What happens after the Canadian assistance is completed? We received a pledge from India that none of the nuclear capacity we were giving it would be used for making an explosive device. That pledge was broken in
1974.	Is there any reason to think that it will be kept now? There is an old saying that if they fool you once, shame on

them; if they fool you twice, shame on you. Surely, the minister has a responsibility to stop playing this game of hide-and-seek. He has a responsibility this afternoon, in the course of this debate, to tell the Canadian people whether we are thinking seriously of lifting the ban which we very properly placed on India after it broke its pledged word. Also, if we are going to lift that ban, to what extent, and for what purpose?
Let us not allow the minister to tell us, as he has done so often, that we are insisting on the very highest safeguards in the world. Safeguards are worth nothing unless the people who give them are the kind of people on whom we can reply. Certainly, none of the safeguards the government has been able to produce to date have been worth the paper they have been printed on.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: What we in the New Democratic Party have been demanding is that there be a moratorium on the sale of nuclear plants, technology and fuels until such time as the seven producing nations have been able to formulate a treaty which will place a ban on nations which have not signed the nonproliferation treaty and all those nations which are not prepared to forgo purchasing reprocessing plants. No single nation can enforce provisions like that. Only the seven nations which sell nuclear technology and nuclear plants are able to do that if by treaty they agree that when any nation breaks the safeguard agreement, that nation will not be able to purchase from any of the supplying countries either plants, repairs, parts, uranium fuel, heavy-water or anything else which they require to carry on their nuclear operations. Until we get that kind of agreement, and until the producing nations are prepared to institute that kind of treaty which will enable the producing countries to impose sanctions and to enforce their safeguards, then I say that we ought not to be selling nuclear reactors outside this country.
When this was suggested to the minister on the day on which he announced the sale of the nuclear reactors to South Korea and Argentina, I thought the reply of the minister was one of the most damning indictments I ever heard any minister make of himself and of the government to which he belongs. As reported at page 10493 of Hansard of Jauary 30, 1976, the minister said, with reference to a moratorium:
Probably it would result in Canada's losing sales to other nuclear suppliers, and we would also lose whatever influence we are exercising-
That it would result in Canada's losing sales is a significant statement. Josh Billings once said that when a man says, "It ain't the money, it's the principle of the thing-it is the money." I think it is very significant that the monetary consideration seems to have taken precedence over moral considerations in the matter of the sale of nuclear reactors. Of course the people of Canada want to trade with other countries; of course they want to develop export sales. But I submit that the great majority of the Canadian people are not willing to pay the price of endangering the peace of the world in order to enable the government to sell two or three nuclear reactors in the trouble spots of the world.
Nuclear Proliferation


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: I hope that the minister will today make a full and detailed explanation to this House of the negotiations that have been going on with India. We are not asking the minister to tell us what will appear in the final agreement; but when he sent, or somebody else sent, the delegation to New Delhi they must have had some idea of why the discussions were going to be carried on. They must have known whether Canada, under certain conditions, would consider raising the ban on nuclear sales to India. We ought to know what those considerations are. Surely this House ought to know that long before an agreement is signed.
We are dealing with something that is far too important, in terms of human survival, to follow the old, diplomatic conditions of the nineteenth century which say that a government has power to sign an agreement then toss it on the floor of the House and give members ten or fifteen minutes to express an opinion on it. Surely the time has come, on so crucial a question, that these matters ought to be discussed in this House and in the standing committees of the House. Members of this parliament ought to have some input before the government makes a decision which could bring the world into a conflagration.
I do not think the Canadian people are going to accept the idea that all these negotiations regarding nuclear sales should be carried on in the hush-hush of diplomacy and that parliament and the people of Canada should be kept in ignorance of something which may well affect them, their children and their children's children for generations to come. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, we want the minister to come clean; to tell the House what is going on, and whether he is willing, in view of what happened with India and in view of the reprocessing plants that have been bought by some other countries with which we have been negotiating, to consider a temporary moratorium until such time as the seven supplier nations, who have been meeting and making some progress, are able to devise an arrangement by which we can guarantee that sales of nuclear reactors will not increase the nuclear capacities of countries which may use them to disturb the peace of the world and threaten the survival of mankind.


Mr. Rene Matte (Champlain):: Mr. Speaker, the motion now before us makes us think very seriously and very deeply, indeed. As a matter of fact, a country such as ours, known first and foremost for its peaceful role, as an example for all nations of the world, how can such a country justify nuclear aid to a country such as India?
I want to commend the mover of this motion because, in my view, we must act in a logical manner and with what is known as good horse sense. Mr. Speaker, geographically Canada is in such a situation that we wonder ourselves why we accept to have nuclear weapons. We are even wondering why we accept to have all kinds of weapons we could do without because between the United States on the one hand, our neighbours to the south and the Soviet Union on the other hand, our neighbours to the north, it is quite obvious that with our small population, we look like a pygmy between two giants, and it is absolutely ridicu-

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation
lous to have any kind of weapons to try to compete wth them.
I hope I can be excused for digressing a little bit but I happen to think I should emphasize the fact that we could radically alter our position by cutting down on defence expenditures, and this might even prove very successful in curbing inflation. Now, to come back to what I was saying, I would say that the government is definitely to blame for providing nuclear assistance and we must change our policy. We must give the example and not take advantage of opportunities to encourage the proliferation of nuclear arms. Is it not particularly illogical, Mr. Speaker, for us to provide such assistance to a country where almost one third of the people is undernourished and where thousands and thousands starve to death every day?
When we hear the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Whelan) declare over and over again that we have food surpluses, in particular milk and powered milk, but cannot systematize our food assistance to starving countries while we find ways to help them out in a useless and dangerous area like this one, which could lead to its destruction. I submit, Mr. Speaker, that this flagrant contradiction must be denounced with the utmost vehemence. There is no getting away from the fact that mankind is now living under constant threat.
And newspapers were again reporting last week how it could even be possible that the Guatemala earthquake had been caused by American nuclear tests in Nevada. Mr. Speaker, I am not saying that such is the case, but there are hypotheses leaning in that direction.
There is no doubt that our role is certainly not to act in such a way as to encourage anyone along those lines. That is why, Mr. Speaker, we fully support the motion. We hope the government will recognize the necessity of changing its policy in that field so that Canada can keep its role and its reputation as a pacifying country and not as a country capable of contributing, even indirectly, to practices that simply can generate conflicts throughout the world.
Mr. Speaker, I hope the government will bear in mind the remarks we are making, and I hope this House will vote as it should to show clearly that Canada is a peaceful country which does not want human life to be destroyed.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I appreciate the opportunity provided by the motion to comment on Canadian policy with respect to nuclear sales abroad and to underline the dedication and interest of the Canadian government in the cause of non-proliferation. As hon. members have said, nuclear proliferation is a danger in the world. It is a broad, political problem which arises from the transfer of one state's nuclear technology to another and also from the vertical proliferation in the arsenals of the superpowers of the world. It seems to me hon. members took a limited view of Canada's role in coping with the problem, particularly of the reasons for Canada's transferring nuclear technology in certain cases to other countries of the world in discharge of treaty obligations.

The subject is extensive. I should like to deal with it under the following headings: first, why are we in the business of transferring nuclear technology, nuclear material and nuclear equipment; second, what effect would the moratorium which has been advocated by all previous speakers have internationally and domestically; third, there is the safeguard system, what it can do and what it cannot do; fourth, what is Canada's role in the London club and what were the recent conclusions of the suppliers' group which the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands (Mr. Douglas) mentioned; and, finally, there is the special case of India.
As a country and as a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty we have undertaken to transfer technology to other countries for peaceful purposes. We all know that at present throughout the world nuclear power is the major alternative to hydro resources and fossil fuels. We also know that a number of developing countries and developed countries require nuclear power to further their economic and social development. So far in this debate not one speaker has mentioned the cry of the world's developing countries for access to nuclear technology. Most developing countries have adhered to the non-proliferation treaty. They say, "We have undertaken these obligations but developed, industrialized countries of the world are failing in their responsibilities to make available to us nuclear technology." That technology is urgently needed in certain developing countries as a source of power. It is not urgently needed in all of them, though it is in some.
When the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands recited our association with countries such as India, Pakistan, the Republic of Korea, and Argentina, he failed to underline that each of those countries is a developing country urgently in need of additional power resources in order to maintain their development and inch forward a bit in humanity's struggle for an improved standard of living. About this aspect not one word was said. Every spokesman on the other side ignored it totally. The Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) put the matter clearly when he said in his speech to the Nuclear Association, in Ottawa on June 17, 1975:
It would be unconscionable under any circumstances to deny to the developing countries the most modern of technologies as assistance in their quest for higher living standards. But, in a world increasingly concerned about depleting reserves of fossil fuels, about food shortages, and about the need to reduce illness, it would be irresponsible as well to withold the advantages of the nuclear age-of power reactors, agricultural isotopes, cobalt beam-therapy units.
In Canada we have developed this high technology. It is one of the show pieces of Canadian industry and has application throughout the world. This afternoon hon. gentlemen are saying, "Sit on it. Look inward. Keep this technology in Canada because we do not want to be as other countries and take risks". We take some risks, admittedly. They say, "We prefer to withdraw than to confront the dilemma proposed by our policy, namely, how can we share this technology with the rest of the world and at the same time avoid the proliferation of nuclear weapons?" That is the dilemma.
The hon. member said it was a moral issue, but he ignored the moral question which we, as a rich, developed country would face if we did as he proposed and refused to take risks which other developed countries take-and
March 23, 1976

there are risks-in sharing this technology with the rest of the world. The hon. member mentioned trouble spots. Of course there are trouble spots in the world. I wonder which parts are trouble free. Is there any part-the United Kingdom included, which has troubles with Northern Ireland- of which it could not be said that because of internal difficulties our most cautions policy would be to withdraw entirely from participating with that part of the national community.
Hon. members spoke about a moratorium. They were explicit: we should stop making available nuclear power reactors, nuclear materials including uranium, the fuel for power reactors and nuclear technology. Previously I presented the position to the House honestly. It was a statement of fact. The hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands said it was an indictment. If we were to cease our participation, sales of the CANDU reactor would be picked up by other countries. That is a fact. It is also a fact that whatever influence Canada has exercised, and continues to exercise-and it is considerable-in upgrading standards among the nuclear suppliers of the world would be less. The policy advocated by the hon. member would totally eliminate the considerable influence which Canada possesses at the present time.
I wonder whether hon. gentlemen opposite have thought through their proposals. They would affect indiscriminately the power programs of both industrialized and developing countries. Accepting the proposal they advance would constitute an abrogation of Canada's responsibility both in the field of international co-operation and in the area of adequate nuclear safeguards that would be part of our obligation under the NPT. Hon. members asked why this country did not join the NPT and take on these responsibilities. We have taken on these responsibilities, and one of them is to share our expertise and materials in this field with other countries of the world. Such a policy as advocated by the opposition would not only mean the cessation of sales of the CANDU reactor; it would have grave consequences domestically and internationally.
The power requirements of Canada's nuclear partners would be seriously jeopardized in the case of CANDU which in each instance is an integral part of the power program of those states. Pakistan is a good example. The hon. member for Northumberland-Durham (Mr. Lawrence) would presumably want us to throw our weight around in Pakistan. That is a possibility; we could cease co-operation and we could black out the city of Karachi by denying them their power source. That is a possibility which could be considered. In the case of uranium sales, the vital energy situation of some of Canada's most important trading partners, such as Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the United Kingdom, among others, would be jeopardized. I suggest, too, that a moratorium, if it is said we exclude uranium, would bring about a radical dislocation of Canada's uranium mining industry which, following the downturn demand over the past decade, is only now able to develop its full potential and play the important role in the economy of which it is capable.
I was in the House of Commons in the sixties when the bottom fell out of the international uranium market, resulting in the dislocation of the industry at Elliot Lake
Nuclear Proliferation
and a consequent need for immediate compensatory action on the part of the federal government. So if we cease to participate in these developments, if we cease to supply equipment, technology and fuel, the consequences would be both domestic and international. In addition, we would lose whatever influence we have as a partner in this business of upgrading general nuclear standards. It is a policy which I do not recommend to the House of Commons, and I doubt whether anyone on this side of the House will find much difficulty in voting against the ill-conceived motion put forward by the hon. member for Northumberland-Durham.


Mr. Beatty:: Your speech is bombing.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: As long as it is not a nuclear bomb, I am all right. Hon. members opposite have been complaining about secrecy; they say they have been kept in ignorance and do not not know what is going on. Mr. Speaker, on January 30 I tabled the agreements we signed with the Republic of Korea and with Argentina. I have also tabled a comprehensive statement on Canada's nuclear safeguards policy, the total background for the benefit of hon. members who wanted to be enlightened, who wanted to be in possession of more facts, who wanted to dispel the ignorance in which they have been so deeply immersed by members of the government. I notice that in the three speeches made, not a word was said about the safeguards policy; not a word was said about the agreements. No suggestion was made as to ways in which we might improve, if possible, the system of safeguards we have in effect.
The safeguards as reflected in those two agreements are extremely important. Hon. members clamoured for those agreements; they were clamouring for an opportunity to study them. Today we find ourselves engaged in a debate on the subject, and I have been waiting for some enlightenment as to means by which those safeguard agreements might be improved. None was forthcoming. Maybe hon. members across the way would like a moratorium on those, too. Perhaps they believe we should stop making these agreements and get out of the international field entirely. I want to tell them that safeguards are an extremely important aspect of the international non-proliferation system. There are others, of course. It must be recognized that proliferation is a political problem, one which stems from inequalities and imbalance within the international community.
If we want to succeed in the task of ensuring non-proliferation, we must cast the net wider. We must consider the causes of international tension and do something about the disparities which exist in the world. We must do something to bring about a better and more equitable international economic system. The safeguards constitute a system of legal commitments and a system of verification. The recipient state undertakes, legally, to observe certain preconditions and in particular commits itself not to undertake any explosive activity. In every negotiation in which we engage we attempt to add to the strength of this legal commitment.
As hon. members know, adherence to this legal commitment is verified by an international inspection system. Unfortunately, that system was downgraded by the hon.

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation
member in his speech. It is being constantly improved. It is implemented not only by personnel but by mechanisms. No one has ever said-and the Prime Minister made this clear in the speech to which I referred a few minutes ago-that it is a 100 per cent foolproof. But the degree of statistical certainty is high and there is a high level of inhibition against diversion. We have recently completed a series of meetings with other nuclear suppliers in an effort to improve our system of international safeguards.


Mr. Stanfield:: What are those safeguards?


Allan Joseph MacEachen: I will outline them a little later, for the benefit of the hon. member for Halifax (Mr. Stanfield). International standards, as hon. members will realize, are not static. They have been in evolution since the first agreements for co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy were concluded in the 1950s. The trend in safeguards evolution has been one toward increased stringency both in the legal commitments and verification mechanisms which are required.
The most significant development, of course, that has taken place in the evolution of the safeguards system was the entry into effect of the non-proliferation treaty in 1970. Nuclear suppliers, who have certain generally defined obligations under the NPT, met for a number of years in order to define these obligations to a satisfactory working level. In August, 1974, countries that shared or were about to share these obligations, including the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., the United States, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Canada, reached a basic consensus, one which was notified to the International Atomic Energy Agency on August 22 of that year, setting out their interpretation in some detail.
The policy of the countries which accepted this consensus required, as a minimum, that in transfers of certain nuclear equipment and materials to non-nuclear weapons states not party to the NPT the safeguards system of the IAEA applicable to individual projects be applied. The participating countries, which were later joined by others, also stated an undertaking by the recipient not to use the supplied items for any explosive or other non-peaceful purposes as a prerequisite for the transfer. Recognizing the non-proliferation treaty as the keystone for international safeguards, Canada participated in these discussions and accepted the norms which were already consistent with Canadian policy as a basic standard for the safeguards it required. We did, as a country, go further than this particular consensus to which I refer; we went beyond the breath of the "trigger list", which is fully outlined in the background paper that I tabled in the House on January 30. The details of that policy are clearly set out in that document.
In line with the argument that has been made today by the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands, the government was acutely conscious of the fact that one supplier cannot succeed unilaterally in raising the international safeguards standard and that Canada's forward position on safeguards and exports would only have real value and significance if the other major, significant suppliers also agreed to a similar set of policies.

Accordingly, a number of bilateral discussions have been initiated by Canada since the end of 1974 both on the level of officials and in the context of meetings held by the Prime Minister and myself. In part-and I think in significant part-as a result of these initiatives meetings among the officials of a number of countries have been held over the past year to examine the question of safeguards in great detail. There were diplomatic discussions of a sensitive nature, as the hon. member pointed out earlier, and in such cases it is up to the participants, if they wish to do so, to outline their role and policy. I should like to do that today on behalf of the government of Canada. I might say that all major suppliers presently on the international market shared these consultations, and more may do so. Let me only say this, that as a result of these international meetings Canada has notified certain other interested countries of the standards of safeguards required under its national policy pursuant to the consensus. This was also done by other participants.
This position reflects much, though not necessarily all, of the policy set out in the background paper I have tabled. It is, however, fully consistent with that policy, stipulating, as it does, that transfers of certain equipment, materials and technology will only be authorized on the basis of a formal governmental assurance from recipients to exclude uses which would result in any nuclear explosive devices. These transfers would also trigger the application of the safeguard system of the IAEA, and their retransfer to any third country could only be done on the basis of the consent of the government of Canada.
It is also stipulated that safeguards should apply to the items covered for their useful life as well as to the subsequent generation of nuclear material produced. It refers to the desirability of imposing provisions for mutual agreement between supplier and recipient on arrangements for reprocessing, storage, alternative use, transfer or retransfer or any plutonium and highly-enriched uranium that is covered. The observance of recommendations and standards for the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities forms part of this undertaking. The standards also call for safeguards to be triggered by the transfer of technology for heavy-water production enrichment and reprocessing. Canadian policy, I should say parenthetically, places safeguards as well on reactor technology, which as I understand it was not agreed to for various reasons by the group suppliers.
It also sets out some of the areas where the government considers progress necessary for promoting non-proliferation, such as the promotion of regional fuel cycles. These are described in the background paper. The standard does not, as Canada would have wished, stipulate that safeguards be applied to the full nuclear program of the recipient country. Such a requirement is not, however, precluded and achievement of a consensus on this question may be a future result of efforts in the suppliers' group.
I have just given an exposition of Canada's position. This position, or policy is, of course, shared by the other supplier countries concerned about the problem. As the Prime Minister has stated, however, there has been no secret agreement or binding international treaty enforcing this standard. What there has been, as a result of consultation among senior technical officials, is a consensus deci-
March 23, 1976

sion expressed in unilateral form by a number of countries to accept certain safeguards principles in all cases of nuclear exports to non-nuclear weapon states, whether party to the NPT or not. More countries are likely, on the basis of review, to make such a decision.
The Canadian government has pressed, in its discussions, for the highest possible level of safeguards to be applied to all nuclear transfer. We are satisfied that much progress has been made as a result of this effort and that further progress can be made. It is one further stage in the evolution of the international safeguards system. The London club conclusions, as the suppliers' meetings have been called, have been a success and, I believe, in line with the reasoning put forward by the hon. member for Nanai-mo-Cowichan-The Islands. We have covered one of the difficulties that is encountered by a single country acting alone.
May I say a word about India, because it has been a matter of-


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order, please. I regret that I have to interrupt the hon. minister, but the time allotted to him has expired.


Some hon. Members:: Carry on.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Is there unanimous consent to allow the minister to continue.


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Come clean in your extra period of grace.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: I have been invited to come clean in my explanation, and indeed I will be quite prepared to oblige because the situation with regard to India, or the question posed by our negotiations with India at the present time is a clear and easily understood question. The basic attitude I have taken in these negotiations is, in effect, what policy to be pursued by the government of Canada is in the best interests of non-proliferation in respect of India? I was going to make a political comment, but I had better not do so as my time is short. I will keep to the substance of the subject by saying that following the explosion in May, 1974, discussions have been held with the Indian government to ensure that existing safeguards on the RAPP reactor be strengthened, that the withdrawal of Canada from nuclear co-operation with India should not produce a collapse of the safeguards, and that India should carry out a responsible policy as a potential exporter of nuclear technology, material and equipment.


Mr. Brisco:: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I regret very much to interrupt and intrude upon the time of the minister. I only wish to point out that there seems to be an open microphone in the booth over there, and I am getting a personal conversation rather than the scintillating words of the minister.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: I am sure that our technicians will look into the matter immediately.
Nuclear Proliferation


An hon. Member:: Is it a good conversation?


Robert Hylton Brisco: I am still getting this personal conversation and it is getting more delightful by the minute.


An hon. Member:: What channel are you on?


Allan Joseph MacEachen: Following the explosion that occurred in India in May, 1974, Canada suspended its nuclear cooperation with India. It did so because in our view the carrying out of that explosion was in clear violation of the understanding that had been reached between Canada and India. In my view, no amount of argumentation can conceal the fact that the Indian government knew perfectly well that any kind of explosion would be contrary to the understanding that had been reached between Canada and India. That is clear to me.
The other argument has been put by India to the effect that you can have an explosion for peaceful purposes. We claim that the technology required for a so-called peaceful explosion is the same technology that leads to nuclear weaponry. No valid distinction can be drawn between an explosion for peaceful purposes and an explosion for weapons' purposes. That is our position, and it has continued to be our position up to the present time, although studies apparently have been launched, or are proposed to be launched under the auspices of the NPT respecting the suggestion that you can have an explosion for peaceful purposes.
We suspended our nuclear co-operation with India. The power reactor is not completed, but the shipment of materials has been suspended. Under the agreement with India that we entered into, we have an obligation to complete the shipment to the reactor, both of material and fuel. That is the obligation that is now in suspense. It is suggested, I believe, by the hon. member very clearly that at this stage Canada should put into a permanent state its suspension of co-operation with India. That is a possible line of policy. But I ask the hon. member, has he considered the risk that might result if India then allowed the safeguard system at that reactor to disappear entirely?
They have, at the present time, on that reactor a safeguard system and part of our objective, if we continue our relationship with India, would be to upgrade the existing safeguards on the RAPP reactor. That is a question hon. members have to consider, and it is a question that I am presently considering. We have no intention of staying permanently in India. The purpose of our negotiations is to get out, and get out we will. The question is, do we get out now, or do we get out when we complete our current obligations; and in completing our current obligations, are we doing more for the non-proliferation system; and if we do get out now, do we leave that RAPP reactor unsafeguarded? Basically, this is one of the main questions that is now under consideration.
The hon. member has asked me to come clean with the House. I should like to put before the House some of the questions I am presently considering before making a final recommendation to my colleagues as to whether we ought to complete this particular aspect of our co-operation with India prior to terminating it altogether, because that is the total objective of our policy in the long-run.

Nuclear Proliferation
What would be the consequences of making permanent the suspension of supplying nuclear co-operation to India? What would be the consequences on the safeguard system? Would the Indian government consider that the co-operation obligations of Canada had been breached, and that the safeguards-which are an integral part of the co-operation agreement-should be removed? To what extent should co-operation be resumed in order to permit an upgrading of existing safeguards on the RAPP reactor? Is the proposed agreement effective in ensuring that spent fuel from the RAPP reactor will never be used for explosions? To what extent does the proposed agreement represent new and significant safeguard obligations for India which would bear on the development of its nuclear policy? How would any upgraded system relate to this particular reactor about which we are concerned? How would such an upgraded system compare with Canadian and other suppliers' standards? Would our completing this single, particular program by which we might upgrade the safeguard system, lead to an over-all upgrading in the situation which other suppliers could accept and respect?
Other questions are: Would the completion of our particular project with India be an inhibiting or delaying factor regarding a further explosion in India? Would we have any effect or, indeed, would a second explosion be delayed or be out of bounds in India? These are some of the main questions that are now before me. They are questions which have been considered by the negotiators in India who have been acting under my instructions and have reached an understanding with their India counterparts.
I have not reached any conclusion on these understandings because there are further questions I want to ask and further refinements I want to achieve in respect of the interpretations of various terms that are being employed. But the simple test, really, is which is best for non-proliferation? Is it to get out, as the hon. member for Northumber-land-Durham suggests, or to complete our particular single project and thereby achieve an upgrading of the safeguards system on an important nuclear reactor which, in the absence of the completion of our program, might be left unsafeguarded long into the future? That is the basic issue we face in so far as the India situation is concerned.
It has been a great disillusionment for Canada and the Canadian people that this unhappy and tragic explosion did take place in India. It certainly was against the understandings that we had reached and it had a serious effect upon all of us, I believe, in an attempt to reassess and reagonize over the dangers in respect of proliferation which exists in any transfer of nuclear technology, nuclear materials or nuclear equipment. We have reached the conclusion that even though there is a very difficult balancing to be made between the objective of sharing and the objective of non-proliferation, those two objectives can be pursued simultaneously and, as a responsible supplier, we probably, as a country, will do more to reach the objectives put forward this afternoon by participating energetically with principles rather than by withdrawing within a Canadian cloister.


Allan Frederick Lawrence: Mr. Speaker, would the minister permit a question?


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Is the minister prepared to answer a question by the hon. member?


Allan Joseph MacEachen: Yes.


Allan Frederick Lawrence: Mr. Speaker, I wonder whether the minister would add a few questions to the list he is asking his officials.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: I am asking myself.


Allan Frederick Lawrence: Then I will ask the minister right now whether the safeguards, for instance, in respect of the original reactor we provided for India are retroactive? Will the safeguards, for instance, cover the new reactors near Madras in which Canada will have very little input? A third question might well be: If, for instance, India exported some of its own technology and material to a country, let us say like Iran, and the deal is being made now, do these safeguards cover the whole nuclear industry in Iran, rather than just the small portion which may come from India? There is one other thing: would the minister please remember the old saying, "Once bitten, twice shy"?


Stanley Howard Knowles: Not this minister.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: I believe these are extremely pertinent questions. The hon. member asks whether the original reactor, the research reactor Cirus, would be subject to safeguards.


Allan Frederick Lawrence: One even before that.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: This is the one from which the plutonium was produced, the RAPP reactor. These are questions we are now examining. I would ask the hon. member, if I may, rhetorically, whether he would prefer to have all of them, or would one or two be better than none?


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Mr. Speaker, there seem to be a few smart alecks around today. I think most of us recognize we are discussing perhaps the most serious question that confronts any of us in the world today. The minister, during the course of his remarks, said that the Indian experience had been a great disillusionment to the government and the Canadian people. I have no doubt that is so. However, I am concerned today that the minister and the Canadian people may have some even further disillusionment as a result of the policy he and his government are pursuing.
I think we are all agreed upon the importance of the question. This represents one of the great challenges of our time. I think we are all agreed on the very obvious danger to mankind. We have learned, in a way, to live in a certain balance of terror between the two superpowers. But proliferation, to other countries, smaller countries and countries which may react with fear and desperation, obviously greatly heightens the menace to mankind. We, the opposition, have been addressing ourselves mainly to the minister and to the government today. I want to make clear that so far as I am concerned, this problem is not the responsibility just of the government of Canada.
I do not think we can be very happy about the behaviour of the international community generally with regard to

the nuclear threat and the threat of nuclear proliferation. The countries which have nuclear technique want to retain it and use it for their own purposes. Some manufacture bombs for their own purposes and some, like Canada, use these techniques for peaceful purposes. The countries which have the technique are trying to persuade those which do not to accept the fact that half a dozen countries or so have the technology and the others do not.
The means of persuading these other countries to accept this fact is the sharing of the technology which the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) and his Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) emphasize so frequently. They emphasize that this is part of the obligation Canada undertook in signing the non-proliferation treaty; that is, the obligation to share. But the Secretary of State for External Affairs almost took the position today that one is either for or against sharing. That is not the point we are making.
I do not want to overemphasize the importance of the development of power by nuclear technology. I do not want, necessarily, to subscribe to the view expressed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs that the development of nuclear technology is necessarily the main alternative to the development of power from fossil fuel. He may be right. However, I notice that the Economist, for example, questions this. The Economist is quite critical of the fact that the AIEA, which is supposed to be an international control and inspection agency, is spending two-thirds of its budget on promoting the development of power from nuclear sources around the world. But even if the Secretary of State for External Affairs is right in thinking that nuclear power is the main alternative to power developed from fossil fuel, do we have to accept one or the other alternative that he has put before us today? Are we prepared to sit here and be embarrassed by the fact that he chastises us and suggests that because we are critical of the conditions under which Canada is sharing its knowledge, and under which it is entering into contracts, we want to be isolationists; we want to simply sit on our knowledge and we do not want to share anything-in fact, that we want to be inward-looking? I reject that.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I like and admire the Secretary of State for External Affairs, but I have to say to him that it is a cheap debating manipulation to suggest that those who were criticizing the government for the deals it is making are simply inward-looking, dog-in-the-manger people who are not prepared to share advanced technology with the rest of the world.
The question is: Can we not work out methods under which this technology can be safely shared? Those who are urging a moratorium are, I am certain, not taking the position that they want to be dogs-in-the-manger, nor that they want to prevent the development of underdeveloped countries; but they think it is wiser to take a little more time in the international community, particularly among those nations which have the technology, working out, in co-operation, a safe method of sharing this technology.
Nuclear Proliferation
So it is not just a question of sitting on it; it is not a question of members in the opposition parties either being in favour of the government's programs or against any kind of sharing at all. What we are concerned about, and what we are prepared to face and confront, is the great challenge that is not put fairly before the House or before the Canadian people by a minister who suggests it is either a question of sharing they way this government is sharing, or simply taking a narrow, inward look.
I say that Canada has particular reasons to be careful in discharging its responsibility, for two reasons. First, there is the fact, as has been pointed out frequently, that the CANDU reactor generates more plutonium than the alternative methods of developing power from nuclear sources. Second, there is the bitter experience in India to which the minister referred this afternoon. Yet Canada seems to be prepared to run risks to make sales of its reactors.
Let us look at the customers. South Korea is in a very unstable part of the world. It is in the process of negotiating a deal for a processing plant. It is said that it has no longer the intention of acquiring a processing plant; but so far as I know, the government of Canada has not received an assurance, for whatever it might be worth, from the government of South Korea that it will not acquire a reprocessing plant during any definable term of years. Argentina is not a signatory of the non-proliferation treaty. Terrorism is rampant there and there is instability in the country. Yet Canada is now negotiating the contract and it has very quickly entered into a contract for nuclear technology without any real care about ensuring an adequate standard of safeguards.
Then there is the Italian deal under which Canada was licensing an Italian company to manufacture CANDU reactors and re-export that technology. What has happened to that deal? Where does it stand? What assurances can the minister or anybody give us about safeguards with respect to that arrangement? Then there is Pakistan which also is not a signatory to the non-proliferation treaty. There must be a great temptation for the government of Pakistan to try to develop a bomb in response to what has happened in India. Then there is India itself which has used Canadian technique and resources to achieve a nuclear explosion.
I think it is right, and I think it is our duty to ask ourselves whether we should be in this business on these terms, taking these high risks. The minister admits that there are risks involved, and I suppose there will always be some risks. But is it good enough simply to boast that our safeguards are the highest in the world, when he admits that there are risks and everybody can see that? Has the minister any real confidence that these safeguards are adequate? Has he any real confidence that these safeguards can prevent happening in other countries what has happened in India? Why does the government want to impose this kind of a risk on the conscience of the Canadian people?
The minister says we want to enter into a moratorium. A moratorium does not mean that we will forgo all this business for all time; it means that we will not make any deals until we are satisfied that we have made a real effort to get an international mechanism that really works. He says we will forgo sales. I think the Canadian people would be prepared to forgo sales to permit that kind of

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation
effort to be made. Far from that causing us to lose influence, I think the fact that Canada is prepared to forgo or postpone these kinds of deals will increase our moral influence.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Lorne Stanfield: The minister and others have said that we do not provide any aid to customers who have not signed a non-proliferation agreement. We may make a deal with a country that has not signed a non-proliferation agreement, but we will not provide any aid. I have to say to the minister that I do not believe that because the government is not prepared, for example, to disclose the terms under which these loans are made. It was not prepared to do it in the case of South Korea, and I do not think it will be prepared to do so in the case of Argentina. How can the government expect any of us to believe that these loans are made on purely commercial terms and that there is in them no aspect of aid to countries which have not signed a non-proliferation agreement when they want to enter into a deal with us?
History has indicated that Canada has been pretty anxious to make sales. I do not want to be unfair. I think that Canada has been sufficiently anxious to make sales, but it has not been sufficiently anxious to provide adequate safeguards, not in the case of India nor in the case of Argentina. I wonder if the government and those who are advising the government are not acting on the premise that these potential customers are going to get the bomb anyway, and Canada might as well get the business.


An hon. Member:: Come on, you can do better than that.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I might be able to do better than that, but that is doing pretty well: that is putting it pretty bluntly.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Hees:: Merchants of death!


Robert Lorne Stanfield: This government has certainly adopted a very lofty attitude toward this House and, despite what the minister says, a highly secretive attitude. The one thing which disturbs me is not just that this government is very secretive about the whole thing, but that the so-called London club, the club of the countries which have nuclear technology, is being exceedingly secretive. The minister did not disclose the terms of the consensus today. I suppose he is not authorized to do so. Those countries which reached consensus have been so secretive that I understand even the IAEA, which is supposed to enforce these things in so far as they are enforced, has not been told the terms of the consensus reached by the London club.
What is going on here? Are we back in the days of Maeterlinck and the Congress of Vienna; or are we living in the latter part of the twentieth century, trying to deal with one of the gravest problems which has confronted mankind? How does the minister justify coming into the House of Commons unable to disclose what Canada has agreed to? I understand there was an exchange of letters in January incorporating this consensus. How does the Secretary of State for External Affairs justify this highly secre-

tive approach? This consensus is either so inadequate that it will not stand the light of day, or there is something wrong with it. While the Secretary of State for External Affairs is certainly not responsible for all the deficiencies of international relations, or for all the deficiencies of international efforts to secure some agreement on this subject, surely he can come into this House and tell its members why members of the suppliers' club are ashamed of publishing the consensus they claim they reached.
We would like to see the consensus so we can judge whether it is in any way adequate, so we can see to what degree it is inadequate so we can see the total context, and so we can get a picture of the situation in which Canada is entering into contracts bilaterally; so we can assess the risks Canada is taking and so we can assess the risks to which the government of Canada is exposing the world and the possible shame and humiliation to which our government is exposing the Canadian people in making these deals.
Can we not have a little openness? Even if the government of Canada thinks, because it is elected to government, that it has to keep the opposition at a distance, even if it feels it has to keep the opposition in its place and exercise its traditional right to enter into an agreement and then place it before the House for ratification-even if it feels it has to maintain that kind of relationship, surely the government of Canada can insist, before its associates in this club, that it must be able to come before this House and the people of Canada and tell us precisely what the consensus is so that the people of Canada have the facts.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Apart from anything else, the Secretary of State for External Affairs is not discharging his duty to this House or to the people of Canada by being unable to come before this House and tell us what this consensus is so that we know what the facts are.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Guay (St. Boniface):: Oh, oh!


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Let us not have any more confusion thrown around by the government whip or by anyone else. I have read the safeguards put forward by this government. They are not the same thing-


Joseph-Phillippe Guay: Oh, you did?


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Let the hon. member keep quiet for a minute. If he would listen to me, or even to his minister, he would know that the safeguards proposed by the government of Canada is one thing, and the safeguards agreed to by this club of exporters is quite a different thing-and the people of Canada are entitled to know the safeguards agreed to by the exporters. Surely, even the hon. member for St. Boniface (Mr. Guay) can get through his head that the people of Canada are entitled to know that, because it would enable them to assess to some degree the risks the government of Canada is taking, the risks to which the government of Canada is exposing the people of Canada in exporting nuclear technology and nuclear reactors to South Korea, Argentina and all these other countries.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I suspect that my time is getting short. I did not really rise to preach to the minister. However, before I sit down I should like to say to him that in this desperately important area of trying to control nuclear proliferation, we are seeking the same kind of international fumbling and bumbling which we have seen in the past and which has led to international disaster. This time, the government of Canada cannot shrug its shoulders and say that this kind of international bumbling is something undertaken by the great powers, over which we have no control or with whom we have nothing to do. This is not a mess being imposed upon us by others; this is a mess in which Canada and its government are participating. I warn the minister that this is what is going on. It is not a matter of Canada not having any part to play, because the members of this government are right in there pitching- and "pitching" is a pretty good word to use, because the sales pitch is obviously a very important part of their thinking.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Maurice Dupras (Labelle):: Mr. Speaker, at the beginning of his comments, the mover of the motion, the hon. member for Northumberland-Durham (Mr. Lawrence), indicated to the House that there was no opportunity to launch a debate on the role of the Canadian government in the sale of nuclear equipment and that it was as a result of an allotted day that he could question the minister on the matter. I would like to point out to the mover of the motion, Mr. Speaker, that he had some opportunities and that he took advantage of them. He had two opportunities on March 6 or 7, 1975 and on March 13, 1975. He had another opportunity on May 22, 1975 and his last opportunities were on December 2 and 12 last when indeed he directed some questions to the minister about Canadian policy.
Mr. Speaker, I wish first of all to commend the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) for his excellent speech and the clarity with which he delivered it and I hope that this time all opposition members have understood what is the Canadian policy governing the sale of nuclear material to countries which signed the nonproliferation treaty.
Mr. Speaker, within the next 15 minutes that are allotted to me, I would like to refer in particular to that part of the motion which deals with the sale of nuclear material to India. I wish to refer as well to the nuclear explosion that many of us-and I see that the mover has made the same mistake-consider as an atom bomb explosion. There is a huge difference, Mr. Speaker, between exploding an atomic bomb and a nuclear explosion.
What happened in Ragasthan in 1974, Mr. Speaker-and it was told to me by Indians and not by Canadians-is that first of all this explosion was not a bomb and second, the Indian people could have used their expertise, their ability to detonate a nuclear bomb well before 1974.
What I am trying to say, Mr. Speaker, is that people from India are telling us that they had no need whatsoever for our expertise or our equipment for the 1974 explosion.
Nuclear Proliferation
They could even have released that bomb before the Chinese, that is to say almost ten years ago.
Therefore I wonder what prompted this hysterical crisis which caused huge problems to the Indians, particularly if you recall the co-operation program we have been pursuing with India for almost 20 years, since they got their independence, and especially for the past few years.
And if one considers the importance, the amount Canada contributed for these unfortunate people and the importance they attach to the Canadian contribution, one will easily understand that they may wonder about the future of our cooperation program and about the way India is using the nuclear material Canada sold her. Surely it is not to fulfill the ambition to produce atomic bombs and use them. The Indians were a pacific people. They have been much more often under occupation or attack than they were either occupants or attackers. These people need the assistance of Canada, it is not endowed with natural resources as we are in Canada. As everyone knows, industrialized countries helped them by building a system of irrigation channels contributibg to make the unproductive land a little more fertile, but there are still other needs. Energy is one of the great needs the Indian economy is faced with, and this is why, Mr. Speaker, we insist so much on the participation of Canada for the maintenance of this co-operation program in which we have been involved for such a long time.
There is not a single Indian I met who believes for one minute that his country has any ambition to develop and produce an atomic bomb or even to deliver it. I do not know this simply from speaking to from the man on the street, Mr. Speaker. Like other delegates in India last November, including some from the motion sponsor's party, I had the opportunity to meet India's Secretary for External Affairs of India Kamas Singh who assured us, Mr. Speaker, that in no way were there any ambition to develop atomic bombs and spend fabulous amounts in that area. Quite the contrary, it is that expertise, that knowledge they want to develop, mainly to foster economic development in a country which has such a need for it. They also wish to help generate rather cheap power. They are not the only ones to do so, because in the last few months this has become the less costly, the most economical way to produce power. Already at the end of 1974, there were no fewer than 170 reactors in 19 countries around the world. Those 170 reactors were producing at least 73,000 megawatts of electricity, and it is estimated that by 1980 some 28 countries may produce 185,000 megawatts.
Should we Canadians deprive a developing country, a country in dire need, should we deprive Indians of the right to use that economical form of energy, capable of being installed anywhere in their vast country? Clearly, India's intention is not produce the atom bomb. As I said, there are assurances from the major part of the people, from those who are in places of responsibility.
I believe some of my colleagues who were acting as delegates in India November last were exposed to comments by the leaders, by the Indian parliamentarians who entertained us. Of course they convinced some of us of the urgency for Canada to continue its negotiations as fast as possible so that India may continue to benefit from the Canadian assistance program.

Nuclear Proliferation
This faith that we Canadians gave to the Indian statements is shared by almost, I would even say all members of the delegation which also included Progressive Conservatives. A member of our delegation even said in a public speach-and to be charitable I will not mention his name, my colleagues who were with me are here to confirm it- that he understood the Indian government for having produced a nuclear explosion; he believed that India had no ambition to produce a nuclear bomb and that he wished- this Canadian delegate is a Progressive Conservative- that our negotiations and our agreements with India would continue.
So, the views of the members of this party on that subject are very different. They went to India and had the opportunity to study on the spot what the production of cheap energy represents for that country. We are not in a position to evaluate what it could represent for India as we are excessively wealthy when it comes to hydroelectric power and, traditionally, in some area of the country, we have always produced our electricity through other means than those at India's disposal. When a country like India depends almost exclusively on oil and coal to produce its electricity it is obvious then since 1973 this country is at grips with tremendous difficulties and the enormous costs that it might represent for India is certainly much more important than what it could represent for instance for the province of Nova Scotia that had to raise its sale tax by one cent effective Monday morning to compensate for the rising cost of oil used to produce electricity.
Yet, Mr. Speaker, I know that there could be some arguments about the moral issue whether or not Canada should decide if a nation should have its own nuclear bomb. I do not think we wish to play this part. We expressed it repeatedly to our parliamentary colleagues in India when we met them on this touchy subject. We told them it was not fair from some countries to make us play this part. We put trust in some countries as they accepted like us to sign a non-proliferation treaty.
Who will determine who can come into power, and who can obtain and produce a nuclear bomb, Mr. Speaker? I do not believe that the Canadian people would be interested. However, we cannot remain indifferent to the very great needs that are apparent when we visit the large country that India is.
Mr. Speaker, I said that I only wanted to attack the part of the motion of the hon. member for Northumberland-Durham (Mr. Lawrence) that concerns the continuation of our agreements with India. I hope, Mr. Speaker, that my speech will have succeeded in convincing some of my colleagues, those who did not have like me the opportunity to see for themselves the great sincerity of the Indian people and the threat with which these people, who are surrounded by hostile countries, have been living for so many years. I invite those who have not done so to read for instance the book entitled Cette nuit la liberte and to see with what mentality, with what philosophy the Indian people can accept the reluctance of people like ourselves, like Canadians, to resume an assistance program which is valuable for them, and which, in many cases, is essential for their survival, Mr. Speaker. Of course, there is no question of wanting to produce expensive nuclear devices, it is simply a matter-and I hope that I have succeeded in

convincing some of my colleagues of this-it is simply a matter of the wish to produce energy less expensively and as quickly as possible to continue the industrialization program which India introduced a few years ago and which is, in fact, very successful.
For my part, Mr. Speaker, I hope that the question of our agreement with India can be settled as quickly as possible and that our agreements can be continued.


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, today we are debating perhaps the most important subject ever raised on an opposition day. This government's attitude to its international responsibilities and continued nuclear assistance to India rank high on the list of moral decisions which the government must make and the people of Canada must accept or reject. I was amazed to hear the position of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen), for whom I have great respect. Although many countries involved with nuclear technology and the production of nuclear materials and equipment are re-evaluating their positions, the minister apparently, despite his well-known sensitive, political antenna is not re-evaluating his position in considering domestic aspects and international responsibilities.
I was also surprised at what the minister said about safeguards and obligations under the non-proliferation treaty. Apparently he considers continued negotiations concerning treaty obligations as sacred as the Holy Writ. Certainly, his relating of obligations to the ultimate terms of the non-proliferation treaty is surprising. The minister no doubt recalls the evaluation of William Epstein, assistant director of the United Nations Disarmament Division, at the five-year review session on the non-proliferation treaty which took place last year. According to Mr. Epstein, the conference results were "poor" and confirmed the opinion of many non-signatory nations which observed the proceedings that signing the treaty was not worth it. Mr. Epstein said this to remind us of the dangers of proliferation and to show that the problem will not be solved merely by entering into new, extended treaties. The solution involves complex factors relating to the economic field, not just technical safeguards. The mere ratification of the treaty alone is not enough to ensure that India, for instance, or other countries receiving nuclear assistance will not again explode an atomic device.
The International Atomic Agency has indicated that by the year 2000 the annual rate of the world's plutonium production will be about one million kilograms, enough to make 100,000 nuclear explosive devices. Needless to say, Canada's contribution to this potential is significant and disturbing. At present, 30 countries are capable of producing nuclear materials which can be used for weapons. By 1985 it is said that 50 countries will possess at least one nuclear plant capable of producing plutonium for weapons.
We must face the fact that an increasing number of nations of various political stripes and of varying responsibility will acquire the capability of producing nuclear material. Not all of it will be used for the production of electrical energy. We must also consider the increasingly large stockpiles of radioactive wastes in the world. These
March 23, 1976

will increase at an exponential rate. Before long, 120 tons of plutonium will be lying around in the world.
The question is not so much how we are to deal with the situation today, which seems to concern the Secretary of State for External Affairs: it is, what are the long-term implications of this build-up and is there an alternative?
Dr. Frank Barnaby, writing in the New Scientist, estimates that in ten years the 120 tons of plutonium will increase to about 1,400 tons. Testifying on United States nuclear non-proliferation policy before a Senate committee of the United States, Secretary Kissinger said:
-we support the worldwide goal of finding alternative sources of energy to reduce reliance on oil.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs alluded to this. Secretary Kissinger went on to say:
Yet a progressive pattern of proliferation could set back, if not cripple entirely, the continued growth of peaceful nuclear energy to service mankind's needs, as exporters and importers alike came to lose confidence in the ability of the international system to find effective techniques for realizing the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy while eliminating its inherent security risk-
Mr. Kissinger, whose country is involved with the exporting of nuclear technology and materials, has expressed far greater caution than that expressed by the minister in giving the sort of assurances he gave us this afternoon.


Miss Begin:: My goodness; what is that? You are wrong.


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: My goodness; I am right.


Monique Bégin: No, you are wrong.


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: I hope we shall hear the views of the parliamentary secretary later in this debate.


Monique Bégin: Be assured, you will.


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: Perhaps she can correct her mentor, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and give the kind of assurances he could not give this afternoon. Unlike a few other countries, we are not exporting nuclear weapons per se. Yet we are certainly trafficking in the nuclear hazard and the potential for destruction. Proliferation does not merely mean that there is to be a spread of nuclear weapons to more nation states who to a varying degree have a stake in the present international system; proliferation means that there is a greater likelihood of such weapons falling into the hands of disenchanted individuals or terrorist groups. I did not hear the Secretary of State for External Affairs allude to this fact which is of growing concern to many countries-not merely to those directly involved in the export of nuclear technology, materials and equipment. He did not speak about the danger which would arise if this technology were to fall into irresponsible hands.


An hon. Member:: Sheer rubbish.


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, an hon. member opposite says, "Sheer rubbish." He is ridiculing the views of responsible scientists who know the possibilities of misuse.


An hon. Member:: What responsible scientists?
Nuclear Proliferation


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: Surely hon. members opposite cannot ignore the views of increasing numbers of responsible people who have been involved in nuclear development. Surely hon. members will not fly in the face of established facts. Increasingly, we face the situation in which the spread of nuclear technology increases the likelihood of nuclear terrorism and blackmail.


An hon. Member:: Come off it.


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: The October, 1975, conference sponsored by the Stanley Foundation listed five consequences of proliferation. First, there is the possibility of theft of nuclear weapons. I did not hear the Secretary of State for External Affairs give assurances to alleviate our fears about the possibility of nuclear theft. If hon. members opposite think this is not a danger, I hope they can provide better assurances than were provided by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and his officials to set at rest the concern of many countries about these matters. In recent years we have become only too familiar with acts of terrorism. In years to come, nuclear materials will become more plentiful. Stockpile depots will become more abundant. If there is no effective control with respect to security, the likelihood of these materials falling into irresponsible hands is obviously that much greater. I would have thought that, in addition to the possible use of nuclear technology and materials for terrorist activities, the prospect of the theft of plutonium for contamination purposes would in itself be serious. In addition, I do not think any attention has been paid to the possible sabotage of nuclear powered plants or to waste storage facilities being properly established to prevent the release of radio activity, or to the growing threat of pollution problems which have been a matter of concern even in this country, one which has taken the lead in developing this whole technology.
It strikes me as ludicrous, if it were not so tragic, that on the one hand the minister can argue that we have in a sense led the field in the development of nuclear technology, while on the other we are apparently not really concerned about adequate standards in the long term for the safe disposal of waste products in countries which have little sophistication in the nuclear field.
Some three or four weeks ago I asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs a question with respect to one specific safeguard which might, on an interim basis at least, offer some protection. I understood from the answer I received that either the government was unaware of the suggestion or that it was not under active consideration. I was referring to the suggestion by U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger that regionally controlled nuclear fuel centres might be established, to include centres for fuel classification, plutonium reprocessing, waste management and storage.
In the comments the Secretary of State for External Affairs made with respect to safeguards it was obvious he avoided dealing with the most basic element in any effective safeguard system, which is the question of enforcement. He did not tell us what, if any, sanctions or penalties existed for non-compliance with the safeguards. He did not refer to any sanctions or to any penalties, or to any means
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whereby the safeguards might be enforced. He seemed prepared to rely on assurances, verbal or otherwise, that he might receive from the countries involved. In the case of India, for example, I find it strange that the hon. gentleman would be prepared to accept an assurance from a country which at the present time, if one examines the domestic situation there, appears in no way to be able to offer the kind of long term assurance which is obviously desirable if the time period involved is to make any sense.
The suggestion of Mr. Kissinger with respect to the establishment of regional fuel centres seems to me to offer an interim means of assuring the kind of workable safeguards which very much concern members of this party and which should very much concern the government. Such a system would remove control from the hands of any single nation state with respect to reprocessing of the spent fuels, a question of great importance when it comes to the development of a weapons device. In addition it would reduce our dependence on individual assurances, assurances which in some cases would in no way be satisfactory. It would also mean the involvement of all states; it would remove the tension related to the intentions of individual states.
Another matter which was hardly touched upon by the Secretary of State for External Affairs this afternoon was the kind of regional dispute in which we seem all too ready to involve ourselves, for example, that between India and Pakistan.
One does not have to know a great deal about international politics to realize there is a long-standing dispute between India and Pakistan. One has to reflect that by resuming nuclear assistance to India we are encouraging the government of Pakistan to think that either with our assistance, or with the assistance of another supplier, it will be obliged to compete in similar terms with Indian technology which is also capable of producing some kind of explosive device. Has the Secretary of State taken this into account when considering whether he will offer the same kind of package to Pakistan? The establishment of regional centres would at least offer an interim solution in terms of controlling the number of sites, the movement of nuclear materials and possible proliferation.
With respect to the position of India, I should like to remind the Secretary of State for External Affairs that it was his predecessor, the present President of the Privy Council (Mr. Sharp), who said in a release following the Indian detonation:
We cannot be expected to assist and subsidize directly or indirectly a nuclear program which in a key respect undermines the position which Canada has, for a long time, been firmly convinced is best for world peace and security.
I ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs: what happened to that perception of responsibility? Does he intend to wait for a similar event to take place, after which he will tell us, wringing his hands, that he did not expect to be let down by the government of India? I might say at this point that I am not more critical of the government of India than I am of other countries which are attracted toward developing a nuclear device. I do not think India is any more wrong than some other countries which have the same end in mind.

It is interesting that a year ago an organization known as the Gandhi Peace Organization insisted that only the most gullible would believe that the detonation which was effected with those devices was done for a peaceful purpose. When the minister says we have a moral responsibility I am not sure where he has been taking his moral training. It seems that what he is saying to a number of countries, both those which are recipients of nuclear technology and those which are suppliers, can be construed as a green light. Bearing this in mind, the present position of the Canadian government, as reflected in the statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs is one not of moral responsibility but of moral irresponsibility.
The minister was specific in chastising previous speakers in the debate for neglecting to say that one of the moral issues at stake here was our responsibility to provide alternate sources of energy to the developing nations. He suggested we must be very concerned that they have alternate energy sources apart from those of a petroleum nature. Indeed, in this respect he quoted the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau).
With the situation in the world today, I ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs is it understandable, or even commendable, if our government is so concerned with guaranteeing lower priced and dependable energy sources for these countries that are hoping to develop domestic industry, that we should saddle these nations with such expensive and often difficult to control power sources? I do not think the Secretary of State for External Affairs has made the case at all with respect to the economies to be gained by this kind of alternate energy technology.
Surely a much more logical approach would be to assist those nations with research into forms of renewable energy which are already available, and there are a number that have not been mentioned. In fact, Mr. Speaker, if you look at the actual power that will be supplied to these countries by nuclear reactors, with respect to RAPP 1 which is now operating, it provides in the order of .1 per cent of India's total energy needs. RAPP 2, which the minister has been talking about this afternoon, will provide together with RAPP 1 .25 per cent of the needs of India for energy.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order, please. I have to interrupt the hon. member as the time allotted to him has now expired. Unless there is unanimous consent for him to continue I will have to recognize the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Brewin).


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: I will conclude very quickly, Mr. Speaker, because I know there are other members who wish to speak. Let me just quote the other figures so they are on the record and we will not be at cross purposes in our mathematics. As far as India is concerned, both RAPP 1 and RAPP 2 supply one-quarter of one per cent of India's energy needs. With respect to the KANUPP reactor in Pakistan, .6 per cent; with respect to the one contemplated in Argentina, nine-tenths of one per cent; and with respect to the South Korean reactor, about 1.1 per cent.

Therefore when the minister talks of alternate energy and the development of nuclear power, he is not talking about solving the great energy crisis with which these developing nations are faced. In this regard the minister has introduced a very large red herring. It would have been much better for him to talk frankly and seriously about the lack of research in this country. I have a number of figures, which I will not bore the minister with today, with respect to this matter. These figures indicate the kind of low level of priority that the government is giving the matter. It is really locked into a kind of archaic kind of technology at the moment.
I feel sorry for the minister who has had to defend a very weak case. Sometimes he does it very well, but I felt particularly sorry for him this afternoon. It will only be a brief matter of time before he or his successor comes back to this House and reverses himself. There is no question in my mind that history is not on the side of the minister, and I think he knows that. History is on the side of the angels, on the side of those who increasingly realize that the kind of major sales plan we have got ourselves locked into with our nuclear bag of tricks is now an anachronism, a point of sorry history for us.
The sooner the government comes to its senses and realizes that it is only endangering hundreds of thousands, indeed millions of people by this kind of foolhardy program, and the sooner it presents a policy that promotes sensible and sane alternate energy development, the sooner it will receive the support of all members of the House. At the present time, with respect to its nuclear assistance to India and the other countries mentioned, it is in a most foolhardy position.



ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order, please. Before recognizing the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Brewin), it is my duty to inform the House that an objection signed by the hon. members for London West (Mr. Buchanan), Middle-sex-London-Lambton (Mr. Condon), Bruce-Grey (Mr. Douglas), Kitchener (Mr. Flynn), London East (Mr. Turner), Lincoln (Mr. Andres), Windsor-Walkerville (Mr. MacGuigan), Burnaby-Seymour (Mr. Raines), Niagara Falls (Mr. Young), Hamilton Mountain (Mr. MacFarlane) and Halton (Mr. Philbrook) has been filed with me pursuant to section 20 of the Electoral Boundaries Readjustment Act, Chapter E-2, RSC 1970, to the report of the Electoral Boundaries Commission for the province of Ontario.
If the House agrees, I would suggest we follow past practice and print the text of the objection as an appendix to this day's Votes and Proceedings. Is that agreed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
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GOVERNMENT ORDERS


[Stage Direction]
The House resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Lawrence:
That this House condemns the government for increasing the threat posed to mankind by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular by its present negotiations to resume nuclear assistance to India.
Francis Andrew Brewin: Mr. Speaker, we in this party have made it clear that we warmly approve of the opposition motion that condemns the government for increasing the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The motion refers to nuclear assistance to India, but it should not be forgotten that other countries with which Canada has either entered into agreements for sale of nuclear weapons and materials or is discussing such sales include, in addition to India, Pakistan, Korea and the Argentine. Of these countries, three out of four have not subscribed to the non-proliferation treaty which by many is thought to be a highly important part of the whole attempt to secure safeguards.
I want to make my protest, as others have, against the degree and measure of secrecy that we have had in this highly important matter. The minister made a lot out of the fact that he issued the text of the agreements between the Government of Canada and the Government of Korea, and between the Government of Canada and the Government of the Argentine. In addition we have had made available to us extracts from "Safeguards", a document published by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Furthermore, we have had a background paper on nuclear safeguards and Canadian safeguard policy prepared by the Department of External Affairs. But these documents are extremely vague. They fail to reveal the details of the agreements in question; they fail to reveal the real nature of these safeguards. Certainly they do not constitute an adequate disclosure.
There may be some things in this field that cannot be disclosed, but the government has fallen far short of anything in the nature of full disclosure. Indeed, though the minister seems not to understand this, a careful examination of these documents which he has produced and which he has accused us of not reading clearly reveals the dubious efficacy of these safeguards systems in which he apparently puts his reliance.
In addition, the recent conference of states which export nuclear equipment made an attempt to tighten the safeguards so as to prevent the potential diversion of nuclear materials, but the details have been kept effectively secret. We do not know what was discussed. I do not understand why the peoples of the world, in this day and age, are not allowed to know clearly what efforts are being made to prevent the disaster that faces them. The government has failed to refer these agreements to parliament for ratification, notwithstanding the fact that it used to be the policy that when any serious, important international engage-

March 23, 1976
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ment was entered into the ratification of parliament was sought. A mere debate like this is not equivalent to the ratification of parliament.
Even more than that, the government has failed to refer these documents to the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence where we could have heard witnesses such as General Burns, a distinguished Canadian expert on disarmament, and David Lilienthal, first chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Committee. Both these men have warned against the sale of nuclear devices. They could have explained to the Canadian people what is involved in the sale of nuclear reactors. No such explanation has been given. We have not had one single distinguished scientist quoted to us to justify the statement that these safeguards are in any way adequate. I dare say there are some who could do that, and if they could do so it might be very reassuring to the Canadian people. But that we should be left without an opportunity for a proper scientific investigation into what is involved here is, in my opinion, a shameful dereliction of democratic duty.
It somehow seems that the Canadian government is more interested in the financial aspects of these nuclear sales than the frightening potential that they may lead to disaster. David Lilienthal, to whom I have already referred, one of the best known scientists of my generation, and I think of the present generation, spoke of the "impending disaster" in the international proliferation of nuclear bombs. He is a careful scientist and not the sort of man who uses loose rhetorical phrases. He talks about the impending disaster. I got no feeling whatsoever that the minister, or the government for which he speaks, had appreciated the impending disaster, and I notice even now that he prefers to engage in a private conversation with his colleagues rather than listening to the debate.
Mr. David Lilienthal went on to say:
I am glad I am not a young man and I am sorry for my grandchildren.
The government keeps repeating that it has worked out within various agreements the best safeguards available, but we are given no details of what these safeguards are. The question obviously arises at the present time as to whether these safeguards are sufficient. Maybe they are the best, but the real question is, are they sufficient to give reasonable assurances that our nuclear material and the reactors we sell and make available to others will not be diverted to weapons material? The strongest opinion seems to be that the effectiveness of the so-called safeguards depends upon the reliability of the governments entering into or administering the agreements.
The minister said just a few months or weeks ago that there is no safeguard where there is a will to disregard these safeguards. Mr. Kenneth Fasick, who is the director of the International Division Accounting Office of the United States, in the New York Times, on January 31 of this year, said that the U.S. and international experts had "generally confided that the country could circumvent safeguards if it was willing to assume the risk of detection, incur the expense and take the trouble to do so". He says that the IAEA has 40 inspectors who keep track of nuclear materials and 400 nuclear facilities.

The Canadian background paper on safeguards, recently prepared by the Department of External Affairs, states that within the IAEA, the division of safeguards and inspection, there is a total staff of 186 people, 74 of whom are professional staff members. It is perfectly clear if you read the IAEA paper that it recognizes the limitations of policy in the enforcement of safeguards. In the extract from this publication at page 7 it says there is no single solution to the problem of nuclear weapons. Technological control, in the absence of genuine political commitment, is inadequate, and political willpower is likewise insufficient without an effort at the technological level. "The avoidance of nuclear war depends on the ability of nations to act co-operatively-and by adopting measures that limit and reduce the availability of such conflict. Neither effort is entirely feasible or credible without the other."
What the energy agency, the people who are expert in this field, is telling us is that we cannot depend on technological safeguards; we must also be able to depend on political willpower. Where the political circumstances are not stable any political commitment creates a situation where feasibility and credibility of safeguards are in doubt. I am not suggesting that all of the countries involved and that have been under discussion are of the same degree of political reliability. Frankly I do not think they are. However, in the choice we have made we certainly seem to have included two questionable countries. I was reading of a military coup anticipated in Argentina even today, and anybody who does not know the situation in South Korea should look into it if he thinks there is any stability in that country.
The IAEA goes on to say at page 10 that the risks of detection by the verification process are substantial. They may be substantial, but how substantial? They have to be substantial enough to be effective; if not 100 per cent in all cases, at least in a very high percentage. Yet even the IAEA says that the risks of detection are substantial. I suggest this is a very guarded way of saying that the safeguards system will not necessarily work.
Again at page 36 the IAEA states:
Cooperation between the agency and national personnel is the crucial intangible in safeguards application.
I invite somebody to look seriously into "the national personnel" in such a country as South Korea and tell us whether they find that crucial intangible satisfactory for the safeguards applied or accepted by that country.
Precisely the same message emerges in the Canadian background paper with which we have been furnished. It was prepared quite recently by the Department of External Affairs. It refers to the IAEA safeguards as an "open-ended" system whose intention is not to lay down rigid rules for safeguards implementation. On page 15 it says:
In this way the Agency endeavours to ensure the maximum effectiveness of safeguards-
I like the choice of the word "endeavours". It does not say it succeeds or there is a reasonable prospect of success, but it endeavours to do so.
On the same page it is stated that the agency's safeguards system or the NPT safeguards system "cannot prevent clandestine diversion of safeguarded nuclear material to military or explosive purposes, they can inhibit a state

from such action by posing a high risk of detection". I ask why we should put our faith in a safeguards system which we are told by the Canadian government, or by the department the minister is in charge of, cannot prevent clandestine diversion of nuclear material to military purposes? This is a clear indication that the whole case the minister has built up in this matter is a house of cards that falls over immediately you look at his own documents.
In the same paper it goes on to state:
In the event of such unauthorized diversion of nuclear materials or facilities to proscribed purposes by a state, international sanctions may be applied to that state.
Let us look again at the dubious language "may be applied". Some of us have made a study of international sanctions and know very well that seldom in history have they been adequately applied.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order, please. If the hon. member requires only a few minutes, perhaps the House would allow him to complete his speech so that the Chair might recognize the hon. member for Wellington (Mr. Maine) after dinner. Is this agreed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Francis Andrew Brewin: The House will be pleased to know I am approaching the end of what I have to say. I said "approaching". I am not right at it. Again, on page 15 we find:
... the recipient member may be asked to return the materials and equipment made available to them.
I have forgotten my grammar, but I can say that I believe the phrase "may be" means remote and unlikely. That is precisely the situation.
Finally, page 17 refers to Canada's new policies requiring a binding assurance that Canada-supplied nuclear material and technology will not be used to produce a nuclear explosion. A state cannot develop a nuclear explosion devised for peaceful purposes without acquiring a capability to produce nuclear weapons. The minister made that very clear. I ask, what is left of the binding assurance if it is given by a militaristic undemocratic, unstable state? What is the deduction to be made from this material? It is surely that at least a temporary embargo should be put on the export of all nuclear material as suggested bv Dr. Lilienthal.
We understand as well as the minister the dilemma involved. We have seen the problems in respect of technological development and the transfer of technological resources, but we urge that the common sense answer, until we have greater assurance than we have today about safeguards, is that' we adopt Dr. Lilienthal's advice. I urge the government to have a full inquiry into this and other fields in the production of nuclear energy so that this generation and this country shall not have laid upon them the guilt of enhancing the prospect of world-wide destruction.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: It being after six o'clock I do now leave the chair until eight o'clock tonight.
At 6.06 p.m. the House took recess.
Nuclear Proliferation AFTER RECESS
The House resumed at 8 p.m.


Mr. Frank Maine (Wellington):: Mr. Speaker, the motion before the House today reads:
That this House condemns the government for increasing the threat posed to mankind by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in particular by its present negotiations to resume nuclear assistance to India.
This motion has two parts to it and I would like to deal with each part separately. First of all I wish to deal with the part which refers to increasing the threat posed to mankind by the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
I should like to differentiate between nuclear weapons and power reactors. They are not the same, they are not interchangeable. Let us go into that a little further. There are technical reasons why the CANDU does not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The CANDU is a system that uses natural uranium which is made up of .71 per cent of the uranium isotope U-235, the balance being the uranium isotope U-238. This is very important because it is a unique system in the world. It is different from the U.S. system which uses enriched uranium, and it is also very different from the environmental aspect and the hazard it presents. When one is talking about the importance of the CANDU system one should be aware of the fact that one cannot generalize about power reactors as do many people, especially members of the opposition.
Why is it important that we use natural uranium with a high content of uranium 238? Uranium 238 under irradiation in a power reactor, where it gets 6,000 megawatt-days per tonne irradiation converts a lot of that uranium 238 into plutonium 239 and plutonium 240. These two isotopes of plutonium are very different. The importance of plutonium 239 is that it is used primarily to make the bomb, but not plutonium 240. As a matter of fact it is plutonium 240 from which they do not want to make material that can be made into a bomb. The longer you leave fuel in the reactor, the more plutonium 240 you make.
Therefore if one wants to make fissionable material for a bomb one would not leave it in the nuclear reactor for 6,000 megawatt days per tonne, one would irradiate it for 600 megawatt days per tonne, which is a factor of one tenth. This is quite a different situation, from a practical and economical point of view, when you are considering the making of electricity. The CANDU system is a total design. It is designed to be fed the fuel continuously, and the fuel feeding of the reactor is such that the uranium will be irradiated to the 6,000 megawatt days per tonne level. If you change it by a factor of ten, either you have to redesign your system completely-and since Canada has designed the CANDU system it would mean a foreign buyer having to ask us to redesign the system-or else you will have to shut the system down to take out the fuel.
The CANDU system is designed to make electricity. If you happen to shut the electricity down more than you use it, the system will not be generating electricity. For these very practical reasons, if you want to generate electricity you use the CANDU system, but if you want to make bombs you do not use the CANDU system.

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation


Joseph-Phillippe Guay: Somebody is going to learn something tonight.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I hope so.


Francis William (Frank) Maine: If you want to make plutonium 239 for a bomb, you use an NRX type of reactor, which the Indians already have in the CIRUS reactor and which already makes 80 pounds of plutonium per year. I think the hon. member for Halifax (Mr. Stanfield) mislead the House when he used plutonium in a generic sense and said we were contributing to the over-all massive increase in the production of plutonium, as if all plutonium were the same and as if there is no difference in the types which are generated and the uses to which they can be put.
CANDU is not an efficient or useful way to make effective weapons. An air-cooled graphite-moderated reactor should be used, which is much simpler and easier to run than the power reactor, or another approach could be used such as the approach of the Chinese. They used a centrifuge to concentrate uranium 235 for their weapons programs to produce bombs. This would be smaller, much easier to conceal, and is one tenth of the cost, approximately $50 million as opposed to $500 million.
I agree that it is not impossible to produce bombs with CANDU plutonium, but it is not practical. The value of electricity to the Indian economy is much higher than that of producing bombs, and we should weigh our foreign aid as to the possible abuse of it in weapons versus the aid we should be giving to the poor, starving nations of the world. We are not giving them new technology, just the capability to produce nuclear electric power, and even without the safeguards we would not be helping them one iota with any ideas they may have about a weapons program. Indeed, we had an international obligation when we signed the non proliferation treaty not only not to pursue a weapons program ourselves, but to help undeveloped and underdeveloped nations with peaceful developments of nuclear energy.
Why is there this interest and concern about energy? In this world today there are three major problems; over population, lack of food, and shortage of energy, and they are interrelated. We face an energy problem in this country as all countries around the world do. As the poorer and less developed nations of the world ask for a new international economic order, they are also asking for a higher standard of living which is derived from the utilization of energy. Where can we get that energy today? In the short term there are only two possible solutions where technology is already available, and they are using coal to generate electricity, and nuclear fission to generate electricity. The technology is here. It is a matter of economics and transportation. Those are the key problems to be resolved.
Our product mix of energy of the past is changing, and will change in the future. We have come from an era where wood and coal were primary sources. We are presently in an era where petroleum, both oil and natural gas, are significant contributors to our sources of energy, and in the short term future, coal and nuclear fission are great hopes because of increasing demands for energy.

By the middle of 1980's there will be contributions from the Alberta tar sands followed by contributions from Arctic and Atlantic offshore areas of oil and natural gas, and by the year 2000 we should be getting our energy from solar and possibly nuclear fusion. There will be no significant contributions before that time from new technologies such as the wind, geothermal, tidal and other such novel techniques which are presently being investigated. For this reason research is being done in the nuclear fission area, but several things are needed.
What is the future program and the ongoing program for deriving electricity from fission after the present CANDU system with its pressurized heavy water reaction? The next generation will see plutonium used as a fuel in a boiling light water reactor. After that, as it becomes more expensive, we will see plutonium used to transform thorium into uranium 233, which is fissionable. It is more expensive to do, and we will not be doing this until our present supplies of uranium and more expensive uranium in the lower concentrations in ore are exhausted, but there is more thorium around than uranium, and this certainly will see us off into the future.
When those two technologies have been developed and utilized, we see the possibilities of nuclear fusion. India has the CIRUS research reactor it got from Canada. It got its heavy water from the United States and its reprocessing plant from France, which is needed to separate the plutonium and which will be used for the fuel cycle, which uses plutonium, as well as for the generation after that which will use the plutonium thorium cycle which makes uranium 233. Unfortunately some of the plutonium was sidetracked from their research reactor for a detonation. This is regrettable and should be safeguarded against, and as the hon. member for Northumberland-Durham (Mr. Lawrence) mentioned this afternoon, these safeguards should ensure against that in the future.
In addition, with India signing these new safeguards, which have been and are being signed by such countries as South Korea and Argentina, it is certainly not acceptable internationally to have one standard for South Korea and Argentina and another standard for countries such as India. They should all be following the same rules and getting the same help.
I should like to make a few comments in reply to some of the remarks made by hon. members of the opposition.
[Editor's Note: A power failure extinguished the lights in the Chamber for 15 seconds.]


Some hon. Members:: What happened to the lights?


An hon. Member:: You are ruined, Frank.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


Francis William (Frank) Maine: Hon. members should really appreciate how important energy is to us today. We just cannot get along without it.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Francis William (Frank) Maine: If we do not do something about it, we will not have it in the future. We will have blackouts and
March 23, 1976

brownouts, and we will not be able to carry on our business.
The hon. member for Egmont (Mr. MacDonald) made several points this afternoon.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Turner):: Order, please. The hon. member for Wellington (Mr. Maine) has the floor.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I thought he was better in the dark.


Francis William (Frank) Maine: Hon. members of the opposition get very excited about a blackout. The hon. member for Egmont was not happy that the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) did not deal with several questions he raised. One of the reasons I think these were not dealt with was that they did not deal with this motion at all. However, let me respond to some of the questions the hon. member raised. He raised the question of terrorists, which has nothing directly to do with the problem of nuclear proliferation in the lesser developed countries of the world. Certainly it is a very unrealistic comment to make that a terrorist is going to come into possession of a nuclear weapon. Let us think about this for a moment.
Is a terrorist going to rush into Pickering and grab a fuel bundle which is radioactive? He would not get out of the plant before he would be killed, so if we were going to get any nuclear weapon at all, he certainly would not steal the material from a power plant and reprocess it. There is only one possible way he could get the material, and that would be to steal a weapon which is already made, and Canada does not make nuclear weapons. If he wants to steal a weapon, he would not steal it from this country or from the countries with which we are dealing.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Famous last words.


Francis William (Frank) Maine: He would steal them from a country like the United States. If he was to steal them, there would not only be the possibility of a nuclear explosion, but also of a delivery system to go along with it.


An hon. Member:: There go the lights again.


Francis William (Frank) Maine: There is a lot of power in my remarks.


Arthur Jacob (Jake) Epp: Give us more light and less heat.


Francis William (Frank) Maine: It is unrealistic to think of a terrorist stealing a nuclear weapon just to blow it up in his own backyard. He would want to deliver the system, and by stealing a nuclear weapon from a country like the United States he would have the capability of both exploding the device and of delivering it. So the problem is not one of a terrorist in our country at all. It is a problem of a terrorist in the United States, which the Americans have to deal with, and it has already been conceded that it would be very difficult to stop the most determined efforts of terrorists to obtain a nuclear device in this manner. However, I am quite confident that several steps have been taken to try to ensure against this possibility.
Another comment made by the hon. member for Egmont was that plutonium contamination would be terrible if anyone were to come into the possession of some plutoni-
Nuclear Proliferation
um and just spread it around. Plutonium is a chemical and there are many chemicals equally as toxic or much more toxic which are in everyday use right now. You have heard of some of the problems we have when we do have accidents-when a chlorine tanker is derailed or when a tanker of sulphuric acid is derailed and it is spilled, or when we have an ammonia leak. These chemicals, certainly in high concentrations, are just as toxic as plutonium. We live with these problems of chemical contamination. We have contingency plans to try to nullify any disaster that may result from an accidental contamination. Plutonium contamination is certainly no worse than some of the problems we deal with in everyday life in the chemical industry.
A comment was made about sabotage and what a terrible threat it is. This is again extremely unrealistic, Mr. Speaker. There was Dr. Morton Shulman with his crazy idea of dropping three sticks of dynamite in at Pickering. That would do absolutely nothing. If you were able to get the dynamite to the actual fuel bundle itself the most you could hope to do is rupture the fuel bundle and thereby expose an increased surface of nuclear contaminant. The increased contamination in that area would be minimal and would not extend any further than the immediate environment of the fuel rod. The only way to create a serious problem of sabotage is to use an atomic bomb to explode these expended fuel rods. There would be more problems with the atomic bomb than there would be with the result of the sabotage. This is another red herring that the opposition has dragged out to confuse the issue.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Francis William (Frank) Maine: There was another comment about the great stockpile of plutonium-


Arthur Jacob (Jake) Epp: Do you understand it, Joe?


Francis William (Frank) Maine: -and how we are producing more plutonium. The problem gets worse and worse every day, they say, because we have tons and tons of plutonium. But as I mentioned earlier, plutonium is the fuel of the future; our future energy. We need to store it now and use it when we have the technology to harness it. We are developing that now. Plutonium 239 has a half life of 24,000 years; plutonium 240 has a half life of 6,000 years, so by stockpiling it and protecting it, as we are doing, we will have the fuel to meet our future energy needs and any programs to harness energy in the future. Not only is it not a shame but it is very necessary that we produce and store this plutonium for our future energy needs.
The hon. member for Egmont made a comment about alternate energy forms available. Mr. Speaker, they are not available to be utilized right now. In the short term we are depending on electricity generated from coal and electricity generated from nuclear fission. This will satisfy our immediate increase in energy requirements. There are no other options. The sooner the people of Ontario and of this country wake up to that fact, the sooner we will come to grips with the whole energy conservation problem in order to satisfy the increased needs of the future.

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation
The hon. member also commented that India only derives a quarter of one per cent of its energy from nuclear fission. Well, Mr. Speaker, only 1 per cent of Canada's energy is derived from nuclear produced electricity. By the year 2,000 that will be in the order of 25 per cent. There is no reason for us to stop our nuclear program now and say it is not an important amount.
Another comment was to the effect that energy research and development are not being carried out in this country as they should be. This is erroneous, Mr. Speaker. The Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (Mr. Gillespie) only a month ago in this House announced an extra $10.6 million to be expended on energy research and development with respect to our needs for the next decade or two. The kind of energy options we are talking about, geothermal, tidal, solar and so on, are being worked on now but we will not see the benefits for ten, 20 or 30 years.
The hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Brewin) also made some comments which I believe were misleading and incorrect. He talked of a prominent scientist saying that we have an impending disaster. Any impending disaster in the nuclear weapon area is not going to be from Canada supplying the less developed countries with CANDUs.


An hon. Member:: The disaster is over there.


Francis William (Frank) Maine: Mr. Speaker, the disaster is on the opposite side of the House-with the New Democratic Party.
The hon. member also raised the question of the conditional statement that governments may be asked to return expended fuel, and asked why this was a conditional statement, and the reason for it. There is no reason to force ourselves into the possibly uneconomic proposal of having to repatriate any expended fuel. It may not be necessary, it may not be essential or economic-it may not even be possible. Why force ourselves into a commitment whereby we have to bring every ounce of expended fuel back?
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I should like to summarize by saying that I think the opposition in some of its generalities has misled this House by contending that the course we are taking is the wrong course; it is not the wrong course, it is the right course, and I fully support it.


Mr. Douglas Roche (Edmonton-Strathcona):: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Wellington (Mr. Maine) gave us the viewpoint of the scientist. I am sure he would not have us believe it is the only scientific point of view. I shall be quoting a few other scientists whose views are diametrically opposed to his, some of whom have given us the following scenario to consider.
I ask you to consider a band of terrorists in a developing country who steal some plutonium-which is not hard to do-from a newly constructed reactor, and build a nuclear device which, while amateurish, is effective. They load the device in a plane and fly it over London or New York city, any major city, and demand an astronomical sum of money. Not only the New Yorkers or Londoners, but the whole world knows that the dreaded moment of annihilation has come-and no one, anywhere, is safe.
I used to think this scenario was a bit too alarming but events are moving so fast in the specialized world of nuclear technology that I now believe people must be

shocked into waking up to the grave dangers mounting throughout the world.
Canada is very much involved. We have become one of the leading exporters of nuclear material-primarily uranium, nuclear equipment, specifically CANDU reactors, as the motion before us brings to the forefront, and nuclear technology.
At the end of this year there will be 650 nuclear reactors operating in 38 countries. In addition to the principal nuclear powers such as the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain, France, and China, about a dozen more are on the threshold of nuclear strike capacity. Some countries have not ratified the non-proliferation treaty; of course this is a larger problem than Canada's involvement, but this country is obviously and admittedly in the race to export nuclear technology.
The former minister of energy, mines and resources who is now the Minister of Finance (Mr. Macdonald) said in this House on December 20, 1974, when unveiling the nuclear policy of the present government, that Canada is in the race to enjoy the economic gains from sales abroad of major high technology components and services. I wish that the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Mac-Eachen) had quoted from that speech this afternoon as justification for Canada's policy. I regret that he laid so much of the motivation for the pursuit of Canada's nuclear export policy on what he advances as a moral argument, the argument it would be helping developing nations. If he were going to lay such emphasis upon our responsibility to help developing nations I wish he had thought at the same time about realistic ways in which Canada can further that responsibility.
I waited for the minister to couple his arguments with, for example, the conference on the Law of the Sea being held in New York at the United Nations. Surely that would be a much more realistic way of helping developing nations-through the exploitation of mineral resources at the bottom of the sea including those on the continental shelf extending beyond Canada's 200 mile economic zone. The utilization of those mineral resources under an international authority or a concrete plan of revenue sharing would be a genuine move toward helping the developing nations. That would be a much more realistic way for us to take our responsibility, and a much safer way.
I could not believe my ears when I heard the minister lay such emphasis on our responsibility to help the developing nations through exporting technology. I hold in my hands Canada's official policy for helping developing nations, called "Strategy for International Development Co-operation 1975 to 1980" as outlined by the minister at the seventh special session of the United Nations General Assembly which reconfirmed the new economic order to which Canada gave its support. As I go through all 21 points I cannot find one item that deals with the export of nuclear technology.
When the government presents to us the rationale for the export of nuclear technology under the guise of helping developing nations I say that is a cover-up for the real motivation unveiled by the former minister of energy, mines and resources on December 20, 1974 when he said that we want to sell CANDU reactors. I wish the government would get its story straight. We are doing this either
March 23, 1976

because we want to help developing nations, or because we want to recover our substantial investment in CANDU.
If the government were to raise the sales argument in the House and allow us to discuss sales of nuclear technology in terms of the revenue we will gain from the sale of CANDU reactors, its approach would be more forthright than it presently is. Now it argues that it is doing this to help developing nations. Why does the government say this when our official policy makes no mention of it? I hope hon. members on the government side will respond to this point. Hon. members opposite answered questions raised by opposition members earlier today. I believe the point I just made very much needs answering.
I wish the Secretary of State for External Affairs had explained how we can help developing nations through vigorous participation in the commodities policies to be raised at UNCTAD IV, to be held in Nairobi in May of this year. What will Canada's policy be to help developing nations stabilize the prices of 18 primary commodities, prices which are controlled by the developed nations, Canada included? They have been the subject of rhetorical negotiation at United Nations special sessions, and will be the subject of hard negotiation at UNCTAD IV, in May.
I wish the minister had referred to his commendably valuable work as co-chairman of the conference on International Economic Opportunities, commonly called the North-South Conference, operating out of Paris. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has been co-chairman of that conference on behalf of the developed world. He knows how important Canada's role is in helping developed nations become involved in our international commerce and trade, and in the work of the North-South Conference.
So far we have not heard discussed the work of UNCTAD IV, the North-South Conference, or the Law of the Sea. We have not heard about the views of those organizations regarding the export of nuclear technology. So I say, Mr. Speaker, with respect, that the government's argument is a red herring, presented to us as justification and rationale.
I recognize that we face a terrible moral dilemma. We can overcome the dilemma only with honest talk in this House. On the one hand the Third World is undoubtedly pressing for access to nuclear technology available to developed nations. On the other hand sales of uranium and nuclear reactors raise the danger and probability of proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Thus we are asked to weigh the goal of achieving equity with regard to energy sources against the spectre of nuclear holocaust. And, make no mistake: as we have seen in the case of India, any country which has available to it a supply of uranium and reprocessing technology can construct a nuclear bomb with plutonium derived from a CANDU reactor.
We have considered the expansion of our sales, sales undertaken despite the experience in India, to which my colleagues alluded earlier and which I will not repeat. Now we come to the case of South Korea, Argentina, and Pakistan.
Nuclear Proliferation
Let me say a word about South Korea. Several times in the House, and in committee, I have protested against the sale of a CANDU reactor to Korea. I protested on two grounds; first, the international safeguards are not there; second, the current South Korean regime is not stable. This afternoon the minister chided us for not knowing the policies he had tabled in the House. Well, I have copies before me, have read them, and wish to ask some questions concerning the agreement he tabled on January 30, 1976, following the signing of the agreement with South Korea, an agreement which, in my judgment, leaves three main areas open to question. They are the root of the present debate. There is still time for the government to act before it reaffirms its nuclear arrangements with India. There is still time to put some hard questions to the government. That, of course, is the purpose of the motion we are debating.
I am now concerned about South Korea. The agreement has been signed and the documentation tabled. I suggest to the minister that, apart from suspending nuclear assistance and supplies, Canada has no effective sanction against Korean abuse of nuclear technology. Second, spent fuel rods are not to be returned to Canada. Thus over a period of time South Korea will acquire a large inventory of unprocessed plutonium. All who have studied this subject know how little plutonium you need-it can be leaked or stolen-to make a nuclear device.
Third, the South Korean agreement was signed one day before the seven supplier countries, referred to as the London Conference, implemented a new agreement. I ask, is the South Korean agreement in accord with the safeguards agreement of the London Conference? These are important questions which the minister ought to answer.
As I said, the government completed its sale to South Korea. I regret this. If any country in the world is politically unstable, it is South Korea. I pleaded with the minister in committee to consider carefully with what sort of government in Korea we are dealing. It is one of the most repressive regimes in the world today. The Park administration is accused by international observers of economic injustice, corruption, and increasing violation of human rights.
An Amnesty International mission to South Korea said this:
The mission found torture is frequently used by law enforcement agencies both in an attempt to extract false confessions and as a means of intimidation.
Other secular human rights groups have criticized the regime, including the International Commission of Jurists and the International League for the Rights of Man. The World Conference of Religion for Peace has publicly expressed its deep concern about the political repression in South Korea, especially for those who, out of their religious conscience, have expressed their stand against the violation of human rights by the Park government and who are now in jail. This is the administration the Canadian government says it will trust.
I am unwilling to trust the South Korean government. Unfortunately the agreement is now a fait accompli. There is not much you can do. We were not able to debate the South Korean agreement before it was signed because the government had some spurious notion that we do not
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Nuclear Proliferation
debate international agreements in the House before they are signed. What legal precedent is there for that position, since the contrary has been our experience time and again? For instance, former Prime Minister Mackenzie King said that before international agreements are ratified, they ought to be debated in this House.
Why was this House deprived of the right of debating and voting on such an international agreement before it was entered into? We ought to consider that question as we consider circumstances relating to India. The opposition to the government's stand of members of this House, of the media, and even of distinguished experts, some of whom I shall mention, has been fruitless. The government was determined to sell the $500 million CANDU reactor to South Korea even though that regime was unstable and international safeguards inadequate.
Anybody who knows anything about IAEA knows how inadequate is the staff of the organization. Indeed, IAEA in large part is devoted to the promotion of nuclear energy, not to inspection where treaties are in force and not to the preservation of safety. I conclude that again money has triumphed over morality. It happened in the case of South Korea, and the case of India brings into sharp focus exactly what has happened.
We now find that the rapid escalation in the number of nuclear reactors is resulting in the production of more plutonium than can be effectively monitored. Even when reactors are being used for the peaceful production of energy, the danger grows that plutonium will be diverted for the creation of nuclear bombs. That is why this evening I must raise a question of concern to many scientists. What would happen if plutonium were stolen? As India proved, you need merely a small laboratory staffed with experts in order to make a bomb. No wonder scientists themselves are worried. As British physicist Dr. Amroy Lovins said, "Any country with a power reactor can make atomic bombs if it wishes."
Three high level engineers recently resigned from the General Electric Company protesting that "Nuclear power has become a technological monster, and it is not clear who, if anyone, is in control." David Lilienthal, chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, sees "impending disaster" from the international proliferation of nuclear bombs.
Lilienthal calls for a moratorium on nuclear sales, something the government has laughed at every time we have proposed it in the last several months. I well recall the hon. member for Halifax last June proposing a moratorium on nuclear sales. The government paid no heed. That is the very approach taken by General E.L.M. Burns, respected head of Canadian disarmament teams for many years. General Burns insists that it is the Canadian government's duty to do nothing which may lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and that this obligation, which is explicit in article III of the non-proliferation treaty, takes precedence over Canada's desire to assist, through nuclear technology, the underdeveloped nations of the world.
There is a ray of hope. In his concluding comments this afternoon the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that he was not sure in his own mind if the export of nuclear technology and materials to India ought to be resumed. There were some questions he was still asking

himself and he posed the dilemma in these terms: would it be better for us to suspend completely the nuclear negotiations with India, as we have done on a temporary basis, or should we go on to complete the present deal applying to it the strictest sanctions we could? Which would be the better choice? If we are to adopt a moral approach to this question I think the answer is to be found in the advice General Burns has given us-Canada ought to do nothing which might lead to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. And this takes precedence over Canada's desire to assist developing nations.
The minister told the House that the new agreements represent juridical assurances of high order. All we can do is pray that he is right because we have not seen the proof, and the questions I have posed indicate there is every reason to think that the safeguards are anything but adequate. What we are left with are documents which the receiving country can ignore if it wishes to do so. This calls into question the trustworthiness of South Korea, it calls into question the intentions of India, it calls into question the intentions of any state with which we conclude an agreement.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Turner):: Order. I regret to interrupt the hon. member but his time has expired. He can only continue with unanimous consent. Does the hon. member have unanimous consent to carry on?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Douglas Roche: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I know there are many who wish to take part in the debate so I shall not abuse the courtesy of the House.
I shall conclude by returning to the principal argument advanced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs this afternoon in favour of the policy he is pursuing. He says this is the way in which we should be helping the developing nations. I say again that this is a serious argument. If we are to advance an argument based on moral grounds in favour of exporting nuclear technology I believe Canada should stand up in favour of action based on a sounder moral premise, that is to say, a much more vigorous expansion of trade economic co-operation with the developing nations, such as those nations are now demanding so urgently, and which they need far more than they need nuclear technology.


Mr. Peter Stollery (Spadina):: Mr. Speaker, it is always difficult for most of us average Canadians who do not pretend to be experts in the field of nuclear technology to address ourselves to such complicated questions as, for example, whether or not we should sell nuclear power stations to the third world nations.
I do not pretend to be an expert on nuclear technology, and when I read some of the names which are used in the manuals to describe these pieces of machinery I find the subject even more difficult. They talk about CANDU, about advanced gas-cooled reactors, steam-generating heavy water reactors, breeder reactors, and that sort of thing. I certainly am no expert-


Arthur Jacob (Jake) Epp: You have said that three times now, so you must believe it.


Peter A. Stollery: Nevertheless, there are a few points which I understand as well as most Canadians. I think it is fair to say that today in the Canadian House of Commons the Conservative Party has launched anti-India day.


Some hon. Members:: Oh!


Peter A. Stollery: It says right in the motion-


Steve Eugene Paproski: Shame on you!


Joseph-Phillippe Guay: Right on!


Peter A. Stollery: I don't want to appear to be on the side of the people who ignore the fact that there is a world energy crisis, that the cost of energy in the undeveloped world has increased by a factor of eight since 1970. I would certainly not want to associate myself with the concept that we in Canada are so comfortable that we shall decide who shall get energy and who shall not.
I find it offensive that the hon. member in whose name the motion stands should have bullied the undeveloped countries, bullied the emerging world in his motion, and, in his bullying manner, told us he is going to make sure the people in our constituencies know how we vote on this issue. That is what he said. I am happy to inform him that the people in my constituency will be pleased to know that I shall not take up his stick to beat people, many of whom live outside a cash economy, because the hon. member for Northumberland-Durham (Mr. Lawrence) feels that Indians and others in the undeveloped world do not have the right to energy at reasonable prices.
I must say the former leader of the opposition adopted a more reasonable attitude inasmuch as he expressed a genuine concern about this business. I notice that much of it seems to have been lifted from an editioral which appeared in the Economist on November 3, 1974. I would say to members on the other side that I too read the Economist from time to time and I hope hon. members opposite will continue the habit of trying to make themselves a little knowledgeable about world events.
Earlier today we heard talk about whether we ought to sell nuclear technology to unstable countries. Anyone who can read a newspaper knows that what members opposite are really saying is that from a comfortable Canadian point of view we should not sell nuclear technology in circumstances which might cause us the slightest embarrassment.
Where are all these tremendously stable regimes for which hon. members are looking? We all know that much of the world is in turmoil as a result of colonialism. There was an article in the The Economist about Africa, and I detect an anti-black, anti-African sentiment in this motion. How unstable is Africa!


An hon. Member:: What about Algeria?


Peter A. Stollery: We do not sell Algeria anything. They have had two heads of government and one unsuccessful coup in
Nuclear Proliferation
the last 13 years. We sell nothing to Nigeria because in 16 years they have had five heads of state, three successful coups, one unsuccessful coup, and one civil war. Since the average Nigerian has an annual income of a couple of hundred dollars we do not want to sell them any of our technology or give them the opportunity to compete industrially. It might mean they would be able to produce power at a reasonable price and possibly avoid the eight times energy cost factor facing most countries in the world today. So we cannot deal with the Nigerians, Mr. Speaker. As for dealing with Uganda, no way. Somaliland has had three governments and one coup. The same can be said of Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad and the Upper Volta Republic.
The only African countries to which we might sell nuclear technology which would satisfy the opposition would be the Republic of South Africa and perhaps Rhodesia, because they have a stable background. Therefore it would be perfectly all right for the Government of Canada to enter into some form of agreement with the Rhodesians!
Many Canadians are concerned about the problems created by nuclear power. The hon. member for Edmonton-Strathcona (Mr. Roche) made a couple of points that had no reference at all to the motion but rather referred to the problems caused by nuclear power. What the motion asks, in effect, is: do we sell technology to the third world, India being the example used? The hon. member also made mention of American scientists who had a problem coming to terms with the ecological consequences of nuclear power. It seems to me these two points are utterly different and in no way go together.
I think it is unfortunate that the motion reads the way it does. It is blatantly aimed at one country, at one sector of the world. I think the real question that we should be discussing is: is nuclear power in fact a practical and safe kind of power? Unfortunately the motion does not address itself to this.
As I recall some of the speeches of hon. members opposite, their concern centres around Indians, Pakistanis, South Koreans, Iranians, all of them people who live life a little differently from us. Most of their comments had to do with how we know what is better for these people than they do themselves. They could not possibly know what is best for them because they are not advanced enough! This is the point the opposition is making, and I think it should be made clear that that is the point.


Steve Eugene Paproski: That is Liberal philosophy.


Peter A. Stollery: I acknowledge that I am a Liberal and I am not ashamed of it. Members of the opposition have been very careful not to mention the American undergraduate in Boston who explained on educational television how to build a nuclear weapon. Boston is all right; it is a little different from India. India is a long way away. Hon. members opposite also very conveniently did not discuss some of the problems with European nuclear technology.
I would ask them, what would happen if you built a nuclear power station in California where there is an earthquake fault and the whole bloody thing could blow up? We heard nothing about that. All we heard were hon. members standing up and telling other people who live in the Third World that they know better what is good for
2 1804-472

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation
them than they know themselves. I shall certainly be voting against this motion tonight, and I hope my colleagues will do the same.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Is the hon. member rising on a point of order?


Henry Perrin Beatty: Would the hon. member permit a question?


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: This can only be done with consent.


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Henry Perrin Beatty: The hon. member made reference to antiblack sentiment in the motion today. I wonder whether he would clarify his remarks and indicate to the House whether he is imputing racism to hon. members on this side of the House?


Peter A. Stollery: No, Mr. Speaker, I was not imputing racism. I was just taking note of the fact that the motion mentions India and that all the debate today has centred on the Third World. That is not racism.


Miss Flora MacDonald (Kingston and The Islands):: Mr. Speaker, I rise to take part in this debate as a concerned Canadian and a concerned parliamentarian. It truly appalls me to think that there has been so little continuing discussion, analysis, and concrete information about the government's nuclear policy given not only to parliamentarians but to the public generally. If I may say so, I am even more appalled to hear the remarks of the hon. member for Spadina (Mr. Stollery), who lowered a debate on a question of such magnitude and importance to this country and the world to the level of racism. His remarks were both stupid and offensive.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Flora Isabel MacDonald: Why is it that we in the opposition have raised this matter today, Mr. Speaker? The reason is that there has been secrecy about this issue. There has been secrecy about nuclear development in this country for the past 30 years. Such secrecy may have been justified during the second world war, but I submit that now, with the escalation of this country's investment in nuclear power, both domestically and internationally, there should be wide open debate on this matter with the people of Canada so as to let the people of Canada decide whether to accept a commitment that has implicit health and environmental hazards and the danger of nuclear holocaust-an open, honest debate with all the relevant information put straighforwardly to the country. By not doing so the government is shirking its responsibility in this nuclear age, an age unlike any other in the history of mankind.
Many governments in other countries have recognized their responsibility to present the necessary information to their people. I think in particular of Sweden where an intense public debate on nuclear energy has resulted in a pronounced reduction in plans to expand Sweden's nuclear capability. I think of the United States where a Senate committee holds continuous hearings on all aspects of nuclear development, and it has the right to call upon

witnesses to appear before it, witnesses who have detailed information to provide to the public through that committee.
Furthermore, in the United States before any nuclear deal is completed abroad the government must present the terms to Congress where members have a chance to discuss it, to raise objections, and to have their questions answered. Such a thing never happens in this House. No minister feels he has to come before the House and present the terms of agreements before they are signed. They just hide it in a blanket of secrecy. That is the practice here in Canada.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Flora Isabel MacDonald: There is a constant refusal to provide legitimate information when requested, and you only have to look back over the records of this House to see that day after day, question after question, we get the same kind of answers from the minister. The minister says "I will consider tabling the information after it has been agreed to," or "I do not consider this proper parliamentary procedure," or a number of other excuses. Does the minister think in giving this kind of answer that Canadian people are not concerned about this issue? Does he think they are not capable of understanding it?
The government lightly signs agreements that could lead to a nuclear holocaust without consultation with parliament or with the people of Canada. What excuse does the government give? What excuses do the ministers give when questions are put to them? The only excuse I have heard so far is that it is up to the opposition to raise this matter for debate. Today the opposition has raised the matter for debate and the government still is not prepared to provide information. I would say to the minister that this is not a matter for a one-day debate initiated by the opposition. This is a matter of such importance that it should be a continuing national debate with the government shouldering the responsibility to sustain it. I feel this way because of the terrifying situation we are in and in which we are placing the world. Just think back over our nuclear development for a number of years.
The nuclear reactor which marked Canada's entry into the atomic age is now 30 years old. It was on September 5, 1945, that the country's first reactor, a very small one and part of a wartime weapons development program, went into operation.
There was no hint of ultimate destructive purpose in Canada's coming of atomic age. As early as June, 1946, the federal government in a deliberate policy action made the decision that it would not develop nuclear weapons although it was in a favourable position to do so. That decision made Canada one of a special breed of nations-a major nuclear power which is not a nuclear weapons state.
As a country we pledged our nuclear technology to peaceful purposes. Canadian scientists have made major contributions to the world's knowledge of how atomic energy can be used to the benefit of mankind, and Canadian statesmen over these 30 years have established reputations for themselves and for this country through their work to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear war.
March 23, 1976

They have made contributions in other fields. Radioactivity through their efforts has proved important in cancer therapy, in the use of isotopes as tracers in medicine, in metallurgy and agriculture, and in the treatment of food for long-term storage.
Considered in this way, Canada's commitment to the development of nuclear power for peaceful purposes reads like a success story. Yet there is a flaw in the narrative, an ugly twist in that line stretching over the past 30 years. Its source can be traced to the ominous smoke which rose over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August, 1945. It is now generally accepted that material for these first atomic bombs came from the Eldorado Mine at Great Bear Lake in the Northwest Territories.
Implicit in its beginnings, 30 years ago, we have Canada's nuclear dilemma of the 1970's, and it is this: can we as a nuclear power disclaim responsibility for its application? Can we export resources and technology with no concern for their ultimate uses? Can we implicate ourselves in the processes which threaten destruction of society without ourselves being destroyers?
One of the earliest Canadian post-war research projects was to examine the possibility of using nuclear energy to generate electricity. With rich supplies of uranium available, Canada developed the CANDU reactor which uses natural uranium as its fuel. Then the federal government through its Crown corporation, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, began to seek markets for these reactors in countries throughout the world. But as Robert Reford pointed out in an article published last May by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, there is one fly in the ointment, and it is this:
One of the by-products of all nuclear reactors is plutonium... which can also be used to make an atomic weapon. Thus a purchaser of a CANDU reactor inevitably becomes a potential nuclear weapon state. It is a step on the road to proliferation.
We know that nuclear weapons are relatively easy to make if the right materials are available.
David M. Krieger, a political scientist and former director of the International Relations Centre at San Francisco State University, has said of the whole question of terrorists and nuclear technology:
The danger is great; the question is not whether the worst will happen, but where and how.
The memory of the 1974 so-called peaceful nuclear explosion in India can only constantly remind us of what David Krieger said:
The danger is great; the question is not whether the worst will happen, but where and how.
The bomb that was exploded in the Rajasthan Desert was the same size as those which destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was developed with the aid of plutonuim obtained as a by-product from a nuclear research reactor purchased from Canada. The CANDU reactor as well, is ideally suited to the production of weapons-grade plutonium. Thus with each CANDU reactor it exports, Canada exports extension of the nuclear hazard.
The government has stated that its new safeguards introduced in 1974 are the toughest in the world, requiring the promise of the buyer not to use the materials or the technology to manufacture weapons, and to allow inspec-
Nuclear Proliferation
tion to ensure that the agreement is followed. While these safeguards are, according to the minister, more stringent than those which we required India to sign as a condition of its purchase of nuclear materials, nevertheless they are far from fool-proof. It is strange that the government's faith in such safeguards hardly seems to have been jarred by that blast which opened a crater in the Rajasthan desert in India. I would remind the minister of the words I used recently when I said, "Acceptance of a country's word that it will not use our technology to create weapons is a show of confidence which conditions in today's society do not warrant.
"Faith in a country's avowals of its peaceful purposes, avowals which can be withdrawn at any time, for any reason, amounts to naive gullibility. Trust that any country will prevent materials and knowledge from falling into the hands of criminals and lunatics is suicidal stupidity." The time to set policy, to draw up new safeguards and conditions, is not while a sale is in progress. In fact there should be no sales, no further exports until the international community has developed the most stringent measures possible to prevent use of reactor fuel in the manufacture of weapons.
Even the London group has not been able to bring about that kind of safeguard. The strongest safeguards in the world are no good when experience has proved them not strong enough. One wonders really if, in the final analysis, any safeguards can be guaranteed to work. Let me quote William Epstein, for many years director of the Disarmament Division of the UN Secretariat, on the subject in particular as it concerns Canada:
In the field of safeguards, while they ...
The nuclear powers
... were interested in tightening international controls and improving the IAEA safeguards system, the nuclear powers and other supplier states such as Canada would not undertake to supply nuclear material and equipment only to non-nuclear states that agreed to place all of their nuclear material and nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards. By refusing to go that far, they preserved the absurd situation whereby non-parties to the NPT are in a more advantageous position than are parties ... unless safeguards apply to the entire fuel cycle they leave a loop-hole large enough through which to drive a nuclear bomb. This extraordinarily shortsighted position is due almost entirely to commercial rivalry and the competition for markets. It is likely to facilitate rather than curb the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries.
That was Mr. Epstein's analysis and I contend that that has been Canada's approach.
It is argued that with the depletion of international oil preserves we must explore alternate forms of supplying our energy needs. I agree. But we must not solve one problem by creating another and possibly a worse one. I consider the nuclear dilemma one of the most vitally important issues before the Canadian people today. But it is one which I believe has not been presented to us honestly by our leaders, in all its naked ugliness and destructive potential. Some would say, as the hon. member for Spadina has said, that this is too complex for ordinary people to understand, that it is fraught with implications and counter-implications.

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation
Surely there is no difficulty in understanding the basic issue which underlies the nuclear question and it is this: we cannot, as a country, pretend to stand above and apart from those conflicts and terrors which we ourselves have permitted, even helped to grow and spread in the world. We are, in the end, responsible, however we may attempt to rationalize away the knowledge. The government, by its current policy on export of nuclear technology, is leading the country in a dangerous and self-destructive charade.
When it suits his convenience the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) talks of sharing, of making do with less so that more disadvantaged parts of the world may have more. We have heard him state that over and over again. But what a reversal takes place when his Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) attempts to defend our indefensible policy on the sale of nuclear reactors. Here the talk of sharing or self-denial is replaced by the promotion of hot deals and cold cash. Here the pose of humanism is swept away and we see a different philosophy, one of cynicism, hypocrisy, and criminal short-sightedness.
It is unthinkable that the government should be permitted to do what no government before it has dared to do, to offer the integrity of Canada for sale on the open market. It is insupportable that the government should be listened to seriously when it talks pious cant about safeguards and assurances while knowing that the higher the price offered, the fewer the demands for safeguards our negotiators feel they need to make.
A conspiracy of silence promoted and sustained by government is keeping Canadians ignorant of exactly where we are being led in this matter. The government must level with the people. It must honestly state exactly what it has been doing in negotiating the sale of nuclear reactors to countries which have refused to give assurance that they will use them only for peaceful purposes or which have shown by their past behaviour that their word of assurance is not to be trusted. Above all the government must stop talking of safeguards when it knows full well that no foolproof safeguards exist at present and that any safeguard which is not demonstrably 100 per cent effective is worse than useless.
It is absurd to practise secrecy in the delicate negotiations which precede nuclear sales abroad. There is no delicacy about an exploded nuclear device. There is no secrecy about the method of making such a device once the necessary materials, the materials which we are spreading in the world through our sales policy, have been obtained. There is only a great finality. If we are to avoid rushing toward that fate ourselves, dragging hundreds of thousands of others with us, the government should immediately place a ban on all nuclear sales until adequate, universally accepted safeguards have been established.
We have nothing to lose. Our resources and technology will not disappear because of the delay. The demand for them will not disappear. Only the fatal cloud which the government, by its nuclear policy, has placed over Canada and over the world community of nations will disappear. And that cannot happen soon enough.


Monique Bégin: Mr. Speaker, "we have nothing to lose". That is what I have just heard from

my preopinant, the person who spoke before me. "We have nothing to lose", of course, because the ban or the moratorium will apply to others and not to us. That is exactly the point I would like to develop. Once more today we have discussed transfer of nuclear technology by way of sales or by way of aid to development.
Once again the minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Dr. MacEachen, has been explaining with great care-


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


An hon. Member:: Right on.


Monique Bégin: Mr. Speaker, I am sorry. I have heard so much about Dr. Kissinger in this Chamber this afternoon that I thought if hon. members have not read the biography of our Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) then that is too bad.
He has been explaining with great care and deep concern Canada's attitudes and active role in upgrading security measures and safety standards for any form of nuclear development-not only with fellow nations of the Third World but, what is far more difficult and far more significant, with business partners, the other industrialized supplier countries.
Once again the opposition parties through their major spokesmen-that means women-applied the credibility their seniority and personal reputation have given them to exploit the natural and understandable fear of Canadians regarding nuclear proliferation. I am sorry to say that I think the speech of the speaker who has just preceded me was a perfect illustration of that.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Monique Bégin: This, in my view, is totally irresponsible and badly misleading.
Starting with the former leader of the official opposition, who indicated recently that he would apply himself to the field of foreign policy, which all of us welcomed, he abused this afternoon the stature he had gained with many, many Canadians by quoting from older magazine articles on nuclear technology, which is probably the fastest developing technology in the entire world. He then went on to challenge the Secretary of State for External Affairs to tell us about the so called London Club consensus, although the minister had just stated very clearly the seven points emerging from the nuclear suppliers' meetings. He then asked what Canada intended to do!
Let me say that it is Canada who had initiated these meetings which led to a consensus as a result of which the situation improved all over the world. Canada had given her competitors the very text on the safeguards we require bilaterally in addition to the international standards required to ensure maximum peace and security in the world. The hon. member for Halifax (Mr. Stanfield) concluded by calling all that "a sales pitch". Bad salesmen we are, very bad indeed, when we state to our competitors the tough terms and conditions under which we make our sales or transfers, thus making us the "highest bidders" in that market!
March 23, 1976


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Monique Bégin: I ask, Mr. Speaker, does the hon. member for Halifax or the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands (Mr. Douglas), who is also a former premier, or the hon. member for Northumberland-Durham (Mr. Lawrence), who was once a cabinet member in a provincial legislature, or the hon. member for Egmont (Mr. MacDonald) really believe what they say-in which case they have not done their homework-or do they play very dangerous partisan politics-in which case I would be justified, in the name of my constituents, in accusing them at least of "impropriety"?


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Keep the judges affairs out of this.


Monique Bégin: What sense of responsibility is that in a person of the high standard of the hon. member for Kingston and the Islands (Miss MacDonald), who spoke of "criminals and lunatics" when speaking about the Indian government in the context of our current negotiations to honour our commitment to continue nuclear aid for that nation? Am I to conclude that such language is fine because that particular debate on March 8 took place at 10.31 p.m. when there was just a handful of members in the House?


Flora Isabel MacDonald: What has that got to do with it?


Monique Bégin: Double standards all the way through, that is what I suggest, Mr. Speaker. The more I listen to the debate, the more I think it might not even be a double standard, it might be that hon. members opposite do not know the procedures of the House.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Monique Bégin: I am tempted to explain-going back to my former role as a teacher-that when the minister tables some document in the House it means that every member has the duty, if he has any sense of priority, to obtain a copy of that document and acquaint himself with the Canadian policy on nuclear safeguards. The document in this case was tabled on January 30, not yesterday. Several bilateral agreements have also been tabled, but nobody seems to even know of their existence. I know why. It is difficult to read and it takes time to read, but let me tell you it is worth it if we want to be responsible.
Is it fair to talk about Dr. Kissinger and what he told a U.S. Congressional committee when every member in the House-but not every Canadian we have the responsibility to represent-knows that U.S. cabinet ministers are not elected and therefore are not accountable to the electorate the way we are, and the way the Secretary of State for External Affairs is, and demonstrates it every day?


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Monique Bégin: Again, is it fair that we should hear so much about Dr. Kissinger's proposal when all members of this Chamber know it to be an unquestionable fact that Canadian safeguards are the highest and the toughest in the whole world?
Pseudo-scientific facts are stated today-because very few of us are scientists-let us face it and say the truth at
Nuclear Proliferation
least once. Hon. members pick these pseudo-scientific facts here and there, and state them out of context. They hide behind that smokescreen and try to frighten fellow Canadians whom we are supposed to represent and for whom we are responsible. To me that is absolutely unacceptable.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Monique Bégin: There are Canadians who are very concerned about world peace and security, and no matter from what platform they speak or what voice they raise to express these preoccupations, these are very well taken because the government knows how strongly the vast majority of Canadians feel about nuclear dangers of different sorts. The majority of Canadians know how well our Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) is aware of these dangers-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


Monique Bégin: -but they feel secure with him and they return him to office. They know that he, and in particular the Secretary of State for External Affairs, have an understanding of people here and abroad. They do not accept double standards. What is good technology for us here in Canada, which is converted to around 25,000 jobs here with an annual turnover of around $1 billion for the construction of the CANDU program, must also be good for others, those anonymous faces of people in Asia or elsewhere who live on less than $200 a year per person.
Canadians know that their government is a responsible one which will not sell or give nuclear technology to, for example, a country blessed with a good water system since their natural energy technology should be in hydro electricity, not in the nuclear business.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh!


Monique Bégin: Study your dossiers and we will talk after that. I did not hear any facts from over there, only demagoguery. When you understand facts, we will talk of particular cases.
Canadians know that in our country of great natural resources we are lucky and have been able to research and develop in every one of the energy industries. In each of the energy industries we have specialists for industrial and personal needs. We can assist other countries because we have a particularly wide experience. This puts us in a unique position and gives us a unique responsibility. We are assuming both to the fullest.

Mr. Speaker, it is important-


Mr. Lavoie:: Hear, hear!


Monique Bégin: Thank you. At least, there is one Quebecer opposite who understood something!
Mr. Speaker, it is important to consider a matter concerning the peace and stability of the world. It is important to consider an issue representing for Canadians a domestic industrial program, and I refer to the CANDU program that could easily reach, according to experts, $5 billion

March 23, 1976
Nuclear Proliferation
before 1983. If Canadians reject this they must tell it frankly and directly. I did not hear it yet today.
We always have one law for the rich and another for the poor. We are good, we are clever, we are developed and the others must shift for themselves. We are not going to lose our reputation, we are not going to take that risk! However, I think it is the responsibility of governments and of hon. members from all sides of this House, on such an explosive issue-I say it without playing on words-to provide their constituents with objective information.
It is also the responsibility of mass media to explain clearly and readily what is done and what happens. It is not difficult, the papers are constantly tabled. There are also many questions put in this House. Maybe hon. members opposite do not know there exits something called the "late show" in which they would find thousands of concrete data. To go back to media, I find very interesting, for instance, the special issue of March 75 of Le Monde, No. 19 on nuclear power. This is the type of non-partisan contribution, the only one which is valuable in such an important and dangerous debate as this one.
This is what the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacEachen) did today as well as my colleagues on this side. I think it is also what the Prime Minister did when he raised the issue of a "New Society". And I conclude on this, Mr. Speaker, maybe it is true that the happiness of Canadians and the less privileged people, even if we do not like it or if it disgusts some overly candid minds in this House, their happiness is measured in kilowatts.


Mr. Bob Wenman (Fraser Valley West):: Mr. Speaker, from time to time in this House it seems we are preoccupied with many relatively unimportant matters. Seldom, however, are we in this House faced with an issue of the magnitude of the issue before us today. This is one of Canada's first real opportunities to play a significant role in shaping the future for the inhabitants of this planet.
Five months ago I had the privilege of serving as a delegate to the Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference held in New Delhi, India. While there I came to realize the deep-seated historical animosity felt by that nation toward China and the widespread and real fear of the nuclear capacities of China. Likewise, the mutual hostility between India and Pakistan was clearly evident, as was the distrust felt in each country about the intentions of the other in rushing ahead in the development of nuclear energy and potential nuclear armaments.
I suggest to this House that given the context, both historical and current, of the Indian nation, it is inevitable that that country will seek and successfully develop a nuclear weapons capacity. I think the hon. member for Spadina (Mr. Stollery) sunk to a new low in a recent speech. The Third World is fed up with this kind of perverse paternalism displayed by the hon. member for Spadina.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Lloyd Wenman: India has too often been portrayed as a poor, helpless, downtrodden nation. India is a strong, proud nation which has practised and has strong historical

and traditional diplomacy, the kind of diplomacy Canada would do well to match. I am sure the Indians must have been laughing quietly at our fledgling attempts as our new minister stepped into the international arena trying his new wings. I am concerned about the feathers of this new minister. I am concerned that they are being plucked. The new minister's naivete seems to be greatly evident, and as he makes these international thrusts I have great concern because of the understanding I have gained about India and its intention.
While I do not condemn India for seeking this power, I condemn Canada for giving it the means to attain this power. Even with the possibility that non proliferation could be guaranteed, there exist other and perhaps ultimately more significant reasons to declare an immediate moratorium on such exports. I refer particularly to the potentially devastating environmental consequences of nuclear proliferation as a result either of accident in nuclear facilities or of inadequate safeguards attendant upon the storage and disposal of nuclear radioactive waste products.
A recent book called the "The Nuke Book", which was presented by Pollution Probe of Ottawa, states a few rather frightening facts. The United States Atomic Energy Commission sponsored Brookhaven Report was assigned to show the risk or lack thereof in the operation of a nuclear power plant. It outlined the damage which could be caused by a major accident in a 200 megawatt plant located 30 miles from a major city. It is interesting to note that the Pickering plant is a 2,000 megawatt station-ten times that size-and is located not 30 miles, but 20 miles, from the core of Toronto.
An accident in the smaller plant could kill up to 3,400 people, injure 43,000, and create up to $7 billion in property damage. Radioactivity might contaminate up to 150,000 square miles. What is the chance of this kind of thing happening? The study shows that there is a chance of an accident factor which could actually be as high as one in 25. Plutonium 239 can cause cancer of the skin, bones, lungs, and thyroid, and is one of the most lethal poisons known to man. Genetic damage by radiation for generations yet to come can be a result of radiation. The Brook-haven Report asks all foreseeable generations of human beings to guard this element from accident, sabotage, or act of God not for a generation but for 240,000 years for one expedient term of atomic energy.
Then we ask, what is the reaction of the government to this? As I consider the reaction of the government, I am appalled. I am appalled by the Minister of the Environment (Mr. Marchand). The Minister of the Environment, given the authority, given the responsibility to protect the environment of Canada and to show responsibility and leadership as a developed country in environmental matters, is not very helpful. On a previous occasion I asked the minister if he would agree that with the export of nuclear material comes the moral responsibility to provide technological information on environmental protection. What was his answer, Mr. Speaker? Is he going to provide environmental protection along with that kind of energy technology? Not at all. He replied that if we do not have it we cannot export it. Mr. Speaker, why do we not have environmental technology that is equivalent to the energy technology we are exporting from Canada?


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Lloyd Wenman: Not only do we not have it but we have the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Mac-Eachen) taking an irresponsible stand-we will export it, it does not matter about the environmental effect, that is up to the country we are exporting to, let them look after it-that is his attitude. Not only do we export that kind of technology and tell them to look after it themselves but we do not even tell them how. We are one of the most developed countries in the world and we do not have the environmental technology to match our energy technology. That is a shame, Mr. Speaker; it is a damning indictment of the efforts of the government.
There are so many things we could talk about, but there is only one minute left so I must conclude. It is clear from what has been said here today that nuclear technology, and specifically the byproducts thereof, pose a tremendous threat to the well-being of our environment. It is equally clear that the government and the Minister of the Environment have not formulated or implemented adequate safeguards in this area. Given this situation we have an indication of the moral bankruptcy of the government.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Lloyd Wenman: It continues to export nuclear capability to countries even less equipped than ourselves to handle these potentially disastrous problems.
As the leader of my party has stated on many occasions, it is not enough simply to point out the mistakes and omissions in government policy. I would therefore add my voice to those of my colleagues in demanding four points: first, a moratorium on the export of nuclear material, at least until such time as adequate safety and environmental standards are in effect; second, House of Commons ratification of all future sales; third, the repatriation to Canada of spent fuels from our exported reactors, and fourth, as a prerequisite to future sales the signing by the recipient country of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Robert Lloyd Wenman: In the name of the morality of this country, before the government commits us and commits Canada to its first and greatest international misdirection, I urge the minister to reconsider.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear!


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order, please. It being 9.45 p.m. it is my duty, pursuant to section 9(a) of Standing Order 58, to interrupt the proceedings and put forthwith every question necessary to dispose of the motion before the House.
The question is on the motion in the name of the hon. member for Northumberland-Durham (Mr. Lawrence). Is it the pleasure of the House to adopt the said motion? All those in favour of the motion will please say yea.


Some hon. Members:: Yea.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: All those opposed to the motion will please say nay.
Nuclear Proliferation


Some hon. Members:: Nay.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: In my opinion the nays have it.
And more than five members having risen:


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Call in the members.


Mr. Speaker:: I therefore declare the motion lost.
It being after 10 o'clock this House stands adjourned until two o'clock tomorrow.
At 10.18 p.m. the House adjourned, without question put, pursuant to Standing Order.

Wednesday, March 24, 1976