1969-04-24

[Stage Direction]
Fifth report of Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections-Mr. Ovide Laflamme (Montmorency).
[Editor's Note: The text of the foregoing report appears in today's Votes and Proceedings.]


Right Hon. P. E. Trudeau (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to inform the house that I have this morning received a letter of resignation as a member of the government from the Hon. Paul Hellyer, Minister of Transport, and that I have recommended to the Deputy Governor General, the Right Hon. Mr. Justice Cartwright, that the minister's resignation be accepted.
I will table later in the day correspondence exchanged between the minister and myself relative to the resignation.



MOTION TO ADJOURN UNDER S.O. 26 HOUSING RESIGNATION OF MINISTER AND FAILURE OF GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE ACCOMMODATION-MOTION TO ADJOURN UNDER STANDING ORDER 26

Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. I have a bit of a difficult problem which I have to bring to the attention of the house, in that earlier today the Chair received two notices provided for under Standing Order 26. One of the two motions preceded the other, and I might say had the additional qualification of having been tendered and received within the time limit set by the rules. In fairness, and in
attempting to consider this matter as Solomon might have, I think that the first motion, the one received initially by the Chair, should be put, subject to the Chair reading both motions to the house. The first motion to which I have alluded is one which was tendered by the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands (Mr. Douglas).
[DOT] (2:10 p.m.)


Mr. T. C. Douglas (Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands):: Mr. Speaker, I ask leave, seconded by the hon. member for York South (Mr. Lewis), to move the adjournment of the house under Standing Order 26, for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter requiring urgent consideration, namely the resignation of the Minister of Transport (Mr. Hellyer), because of the failure of the government to agree to take action to increase the housing supply in Canada, and the consequent danger of further delay in the taking of adequate legislative and financial steps to meet the housing crisis that now faces this country.


Mr. Speaker:: As I indicated a moment ago, I had received the motion which has now been read by the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands (Mr. Douglas) and a similar motion from the hon. Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Stanfield) moving the adjournment of the house under Standing Order 26 for the purpose of discussing a specific and important matter requiring urgent consideration, namely the resignation from the government of the Hon. Paul Hellyer as Minister of Transport, because of the failure of the government to reach decisions urgently needed to meet the housing crisis in Canada.
Since both notices cover exactly the same ground I might deal with both motions at the same time. The matter raised by the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands and the proposed motion by the Leader of the Opposition deal of course with a most important matter, so important indeed that there is some thought in my mind that it should be considered by the house as soon as possible. As hon. members know, the house, under a special order, has set aside two days sittings for a discussion of Canada's participation in NATO.
April 24, 19G9
7894	COMMONS
Resignation of Minister of Transport
I am of the opinion that it would not be desirable to alter our business for today. Whether the business for tomorrow should be altered is another matter to which I have given serious thought. In reviewing the request for adjournment of the house I have had difficulty in resolving the question of whether this matter should or might be raised in another form. It seems to me the matter of housing is in the circumstances a continuing problem but to that problem has been added another, the resignation of the Minister of the Crown who has been charged with the federal government's responsibility in the field of housing. The resignation of the minister is not necessarily in itself reason or ground for moving the adjournment of the house nor is the operation of the government's housing policy necessarily a matter of such urgent importance as to warrant a motion under Standing Order 26.
Having said that, however, when these two events are tied together it seems to the Chair there is a matter of urgency which may very well satisfy the provisions of Standing Order 26 in respect of the matter of urgency of debate. Having put aside any doubt in respect of the question of raising this matter as a matter of confidence in the government under Standing Order 58, I am inclined to allow the motion under the discretion vested in the Chair by citation (9) of Standing Order 26. I have said that I do not believe the business of the house for today should be disturbed, in view of the special order setting aside today for the consideration of government policy dealing with NATO. Any decision under Standing Order 26 would apply to tomorrow rather than today.
In view of the desirability of resolving certain procedural questions in relation to Bill C-150 I am directing that the matter be set down for consideration at two o'clock tomorrow afternoon provided the procedural matters relating to Bill C-150 have been disposed of earlier.



ORAL QUESTION PERIOD


Hon. Robert L. Stanfield (Leader of the Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the Prime Minister a question which arises out of the valedictory of the hon. member for Trinity this morning in which he said there is


still no indication as to when a housing policy will be decided upon by the cabinet. I should like to ask the Prime Minister whether it is still the plan of the government to bring forward housing legislation based upon the task force recommendations prior to the summer recess in view of the response by the Minister of Transport in reply to a question I asked him last week, that it was still the intention of the government to bring down legislation-


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. Perhaps before the Prime Minister replies to the question I should refer to a ruling I made some time ago involving the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowi-chan-The Islands when there had been an agreement to debate a particular subject. That hon. member at that time attempted to ask questions and I suggested that the hon. member might wait until the debate took place in the house.
I would think that position should apply generally, although I realize we are dealing with a matter of some urgency. I should not like to set down a hard and fast ruling, but I hope hon. members will exercize some discretion and remember that we have just agreed to hold a special debate tomorrow afternoon.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, the intentions of the government have not changed. We do intend to introduce new legislation at this session within a matter of a few weeks.



RESIGNATION OF MINISTER-HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS WITHIN FEDERAL INITIATIVE

Robert Lorne Stanfield: In view of the statement made by the recent Minister of Transport, in which he said the delay in making a decision regarding housing policy is the result of a theoretical concept of federalism on the part of the Prime Minister, which does not accept housing and urban affairs as being in this area of the federal initiative, will the Prime Minister make an early statement to reassure the house and the people of Canada that this government does regard housing, pollution and other urban problems as national problems and that he is willing to accept responsibility for federal initiative in these fields, of course always respecting areas of provincial jurisdiction?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, this question by way of a statement of non-policy is not very helpful. Of course this involves the constitution, and this
April 24. 1969

is part of the difficulty in dealing with matters such as housing and pollution. To this extent I agree completely with the hon. Leader of the Opposition.
In answer to the question as to whether this is a matter of national interest my answer is, of course it is. And we believe that, but we must then ask ourselves how all matters of national interest must be dealt with under the constitution. That is exactly the policy of this government.



AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS TO MUNICIPALITIES

Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the Prime Minister whether the government has rejected the proposal that the federal government make funds available to the municipalities for housing purposes?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, I have just said that the government would be introducing new legislation in the house very shortly. It is now at the drafting stage. The policy matters have been decided by the government, and the hon. member will have to wait a few more days or, at the most, a couple of weeks before seeing what is in the legislation.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Mr. Speaker, in view of the fact the former Minister of Transport, who was responsible for housing, is alleged to have made the statement at his press conference this morning that one of his disagreements with the Prime Minister was that the government refused his proposal to make housing funds available for municipalities, I wonder whether the Prime Minister might clear up that point for members of the house?


Mr. Speaker:: I am wondering whether the hon. member is not now actually entering into a discussion of the very subject which in my view is the subject matter to be debated tomorrow afternoon. I doubt very much whether that type of question should be asked at this time, or whether in fact it should not rather be asked tomorrow afternoon, when we are debating this matter in an attempt to elucidate such points.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: I rise on a point of order, Mr. Speaker. With great deference to Your Honour I should like to point out that if we are to have any type of worth-while discussion tomorrow, surely the house is entitled to
Inquiries of the Ministry some statement as to whether or not the allegations made by the minister who has resigned were valid, and surely we are entitled to a statement from the Prime Minister.


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. I doubt very much whether the point raised by the hon. member is valid. He realizes that in ordinary circumstances such debates are allowed the same day, and there is no opportunity for members of the opposition or any member of the house to ask questions because the debate is brought on immediately. Therefore, I cannot think that the standing order makes provision for, first, a question period allowing hon. members to obtain information, and then to have an adjournment debate for the purpose of discussing the information obtained during the question period. This would be my interpretation of the rule.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, may I just submit this point for Your Honour's consideration. Tomorrow we will have the debate, with no opportunity for asking questions, and there is information which members are entitled to have before that debate begins.


Mr. Speaker:: I do not want to enter into a discussion with the hon. member, but I must point out that there is a procedural difficulty here, because normally such debates are held on the same day. If the debate were held today, I doubt that there would be an opportunity for hon. members to ask questions on the matter, although it might be very useful for them to do so. This is not really provided for by the rules.



INQUIRY AS TO REPLACEMENT OF MINISTER FOLLOWING RESIGNATION

Hon. George Hees (Prince Edward-Has-tings):: Mr. Speaker, could the Prime Minister advise the house when he expects to make an announcement of the appointment of a new minister of transport to handle the rather sorry state of affairs described by the minister who resigned this morning?


An hon. Member:: Let George do it.
Another hon. Member: Good idea.


George Harris Hees: Just hand it over.

April 24, 1969
Inquiries of the Ministry [Translation]



FEDERAL-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE AS TO CONSTITUTIONALITY

Hon. Martial Asselin (Charlevoix):: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Prime Minister.
In view of the constitutional difficulties raised by the housing problem, in connection with the respective jurisdiction of the federal and provincial governments, is it the intention of the Prime Minister to call at his earliest convenience a federal-provincial conference where the parties concerned could agree on the constitutionality of the housing problem and take a decision in the best interests of all Canadians?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member is no doubt aware that many federal-provincial conferences have been held on housing, and it was precisely because no agreement was reached to give increased power to the federal government that we are now in such a predicament.
Also, a little more than a month ago the minister met in Toronto with the provincial ministers responsible for housing, and the matter was then discussed once again. Therefore, the house should not think there have been no consultations between the federal and the provincial governments on that subject and its constitutional aspect.


Martial Asselin: I would like to ask a supplementary question, Mr. Speaker.
Can the Prime Minister assure us that at the constitutional conference to be held in June, the problem of housing will be on the agenda to enable the parties concerned to make a decision?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, I assume the hon. member and his party question the provincial competence with regard to housing. The hon. member shakes his head in dissent. All I can say then, Mr. Speaker, is that the constitutional conference will take place as expected, according to the prepared agenda.



RESPONSIBILITY FOR HOUSING IN INTERIM PERIOD FOLLOWING RESIGNATION OF MINISTER

Mr. David Lewis (York South):: Mr. Speaker, perhaps I did not hear part of the announcement made by the Prime Minister, but I did not hear any date mentioned in the
[Mr. Hees.}
announcement. May I ask the right hon. gentleman when the resignation of the Minister of Transport is to become effective, and if it becomes effective immediately, would the right hon. gentleman inform us who has been put in charge of housing in the meantime, pending the appointment of another minister?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: The minister asked that his resignation become effective on April 30, and it is this resignation that I have advised the Deputy Governor General to accept.


David Lewis: I have a supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Would the right hon. gentleman inform the house whether the minister who resigned is to carry on all his duties relevant to transport and to housing for the next few days-there are about six days still left-or whether the housing matters, which include public housing, urban renewal and other matters under discussion, are to remain under the table until a new minister is appointed.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: The relevancy of the date is that there would be no cabinet meeting before next Thursday, and by that time the minister's resignation will have become effective. In the meantime I expect that the minister wants to use the remaining days, not to initiate or discuss policy but to clear up some outstanding matters before his resignation becomes effective.


David Lewis: Can one have an assurance from the Prime Minister that any requests or applications by municipalities for public housing assistance, urban renewal assistance or assistance in other fields will receive attention during the next week, or will they have to wait until a new appointment is made?


Mr. Fairweaiher:: The mail will not be in anyway.


Mr. Speaker:: Does the hon. member for Temiscamingue wish to ask a supplementary question?


Mr. Real Caouette (Temiscamingue):: No,
Mr. Speaker, my question deals with another matter.



POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER RESIGNATIONS- PARTICIPATION IN DEBATE

Mr. G. W. Baldwin (Peace River):: I have a supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. In
April 24. 1969



view of the fact that the Prime Minister indicated by his answer to the Leader of the Opposition that the resignation of the Minister of Transport will result in some decisive action in the housing field, can we look forward hopefully to other resignations shortly, including that of the Minister of Agriculture?


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I have a supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. I wonder if the Prime Minister will assure us that he will take part in the debate tomorrow.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: I will give that question consideration, Mr. Speaker.
In reply to the previous question I would be inclined to say that if resignation brings action, then there should be many resignations in the opposition ranks.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Gerald William Baldwin: We have nothing to resign from.


Some hon. Members:: Resign.


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please.


Mr. Eldon M. Woolliams (Calgary North):: questions in reference to the Department of Transport, and in particular those with regard to housing are to be answered, will the Prime Minister inform the house whom the acting minister in the house to answer these questions will be.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: As the hon. member knows, the roster system does not provide for the Minister of Transport to be present in the house today.


An hon. Member:: How about tomorrow?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: As for tomorrow, I can assure the house that there will be a minister answering questions with regard to the department.


Gerald William Baldwin: How about the Holy Ghost today?


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. I bring to the attention of hon. members that many questions have been asked on what I realize is an important point, and I see that another seven or eight hon. members are anxious to ask supplementary questions on this subject. However, the hon. member for Temis-camingue and other hon. members are anxious to ask questions on other matters, so I
Inquiries of the Ministry believe we should not press the matter much further. I wonder therefore whether hon. members might not allow the Chair to call the hon. member for Temiscamingue, and if we run out of subjects in the next fifteen minutes we might return to this one.



NATIONAL PARKS


David Réal Caouette: Mr. Speaker, I should like to put a question to the Minister of Regional Economic Expansion.
It was announced recently that a very important meeting between the minister and the authorities of the province of Quebec would be held in connection with the establishment of a national park in the Gaspe peninsula. Is the minister in a position to tell the house today if he met the provincial authorities and, if so, have they reached an agreement on the matter?


Hon. Jean Marchand (Minister of Regional Economic Expansion):: Mr. Speaker, this
meeting has not yet been held.



FISHERIES


Mr. James A. McGrath (St. John's East):: have a question for the Minister of Fisheries and Forestry which arises out of the statement released by the department today. Has the minister defined a floor price for groundfish, and has the department worked out the mechanics for the purchasing and receiving of the groundfish mentioned in the press release?


Hon. Jack Davis (Minister of Fisheries and Forestry):: The answer is yes, the department has worked out the mechanics of this purchasing arrangement, both with the trade and in concert with some of the other fish exporting countries selling frozen groundfish in the United States. The Fisheries Prices Support Board will be buying at market prices fish which is offered at any price below the prevailing market price, with a view to supporting the price and bidding it up to a point where it covers the basic costs of our efficient Canadian producers.

April 24, 1969
Inquiries of the Ministry Mr. McGrath: A supplementary question, to ask the minister why he chose to make a statement on this subject outside the house at noon today instead of dealing with it on motions. Second, when may we expect a statement on salt codfish policy?


John (Jack) Davis: I hope to be able to make a statement on salt codfish policy tomorrow.



COMBINES


Mr. Barry Mather (Surrey):: May I ask the
Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs a question? What action is the minister taking with regard to the request of the government of British Columbia for an investigation of a possible infringement of the combines legislation by the pharmacists of British Columbia in connection with the imposition of extra charges in the case of welfare recipients' prescriptions?


Hon. Ron Basford (Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs):: I am not aware I have received any such request from the government of British Columbia, but I will check to see whether one has come in without my knowledge. I made some comments on this situation the other day in answer to a question.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Mr. Rene Matte (Champlain):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to direct a question to the Secretary of State.
Could he tell the house whether the government has been officially invited to the meeting of the Ministers of Education in Paris?


Mr. Speaker:: While the matter is being considered-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


David Réal Caouette: Is the
Secretary of State absent from the house, Mr. Speaker?


Mr. Lambert (Edmonton West):: My question is to the Minister of Labour-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I suggest the minister might be allowed to reply to the question asked by the hon. member for Champlain.


Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Secretary of State for External Affairs):: The question was not
directed to me, Mr. Speaker and I was therefore not quite sure whether I should reply. It was addressed to the Secretary of State. However, perhaps I ought to answer the question. The situation is this: Canada attended the Kinshasa conference as a full member, and incidentally took part in the decision of the conference to hold its second session in Paris. The arrangements arrived at between Ottawa and the provincial governments for Kinshasa worked well, and we have no reason to believe that the same arrangements cannot be applied for the second session; this was made clear last year. I do not think it would be helpful to comment on the suggestion that an attempt might be made to exclude Ottawa from the Paris meeting, other than to say I fail to see how it could be in the interests of any of the authorities concerned to adopt such a policy.


Mr. Roberi Muir (Cape Breton-The Sydneys):: In view of Quebec's acceptance of the invitation and in view of Canada's representation at the first conference, is it the government's intention to send a representative, having regard to its declared commitment to assist French speaking African states?


Mitchell William Sharp: I thought my answer was quite clear. We do not need an invitation. We have already been invited.


David Réal Caouette: Mr. Speaker, I wish to put a supplementary question.
Could the minister tell us who would represent Canada as Minister of Education at the Paris meeting?


Mitchell William Sharp: The arrangements were worked out with the Quebec government which was, I believe, quite satisfied, and I hope they can continue in Paris.


David Réal Caouette: Mr. Speaker, could the-
April 24, 1969


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I have already allowed a few supplementary questions, I think that we should move on to something else.


David Réal Caouette: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order.
Only one supplementary on that point, and I will be finished.


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: So will we.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I will return to the hon. member for Temiscamingue in a few moments.



AIR CANADA


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: My
question is directed to the Minister of Labour. Yesterday I put the following question to the hon. gentleman:
I am just asking the minister, because of his interest-I am sure his interest is shared by all-in getting this dispute settled, whether he will tell the house in general terms just what might be the issues.
The minister replied: "The answer is no."
Will the minister now tell the house what he told the radio and television commentators outside the house-information he refused to give inside the house in reply to this question?


Hon. Bryce S. Mackasey (Minister of Labour):: Earlier in the question period the hon. member for Edmonton West posed the following question-in fact, it was in the nature of a statement or a suggestion:
Perhaps the minister could take the house and the country into his confidence and tell us in general terms-we are not asking for the dollars and cents-whether it is a question of wages, fringe benefits, seniority: or what are the problems?
To which I replied:
Mr. Speaker, the hon. gentleman has done a very capable job of outlining the problems yet to be resolved in all these areas.
That is precisely what I said on television ten minutes later.


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: That is not so.



WHEAT-DEMAND BY JAPAN FOR REBATE ON INFERIOR QUALITY

Mr. Gordon Ritchie (Dauphin):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to address this question to the
Inquiries of the Ministry Minister without Portfolio temporarily in charge of the Wheat Board. Did the Japanese food agency demand $300,000 U.S. in compensation for rain-damaged wheat supplied in November, and did the Wheat Board offer to supply wheat free of charge-as they have some left over-and, if so, was a settlement reached?


Hon. Otto E. Lang (Minister without Portfolio):: There were discussions between the Japanese and the Wheat Board in connection with wheat, not damaged but different in quality from what they had expected to receive, and these discussions are not yet in every respect completed.


Mr. Don Mazankowski (Vegreville):: Would the Minister without Portfolio from Saskatchewan advise the house whether the delay in the settlement of this claim has had an adverse effect on future sales to Japan?


Otto Emil Lang: No, Mr. Speaker, it has not had an adverse effect.


Mr. A. P. Gleave (Saskaioon-Biggar):: May I
address a supplementary question to the Minister of Agriculture in connection with this situation? Will he take steps to investigate the circumstances with relation to the Board of Grain Commissioners to find out how such a substandard shipment could have been made?


Hon. H. A. Olson (Minisier of Agriculture):: From a technical point of view, the Board of Grain Commissioners has assisted the Wheat Board in all aspects relating to the testing of samples, and matters of that sort. This information has been made available to the Canadian Wheat Board.



THE MINISTRY


Mr. Andrew Brewin (Greenwood):: I want to ask the Prime Minister a question which does not relate directly to housing though it relates to the question of resignations from the government. I ask it subject to your direction, Mr. Speaker. Has the Prime Minister given consideration to, or taken advice upon, the question of the constitutional propriety of the Minister of Transport remaining as a minister of the Crown for approximately a week after having openly expressed lack of

April 24. 1969
Inquiries of the Ministry confidence in government policies and disagreement with them?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Yes, Mr. Speaker.


Francis Andrew Brewin: What was the result of that consideration?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: The result I announced to the house, Mr. Speaker.


Mr. Thomas M. Bell (Saint John-Lancasier):: In view of the resignation of the Minister of Transport, will it now be possible to get Bill Lee through the Prime Minister's switchboard?


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.



NATIONAL HOCKEY TEAM-CO-OPERATION FROM N.H.L. TEAMS

Mr. C. Terrence Murphy (Sault Ste. Marie):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Minister of National Health and Welfare. In view of the urgency of planning now, if our National Hockey team is to make a creditable showing in next year's competitions, and in view of the recent announcement that Toronto Maple Leafs will make three of their players available for the team next year, can the minister tell the house if this type of co-operation is expected from the Montreal team?


Mr. Speaker:: Order please. I always hesitate to refuse questions relating to hockey. Perhaps this one might be adjourned until ten o'clock.



THE GOVERNOR GENERAL


Mr. Robert Simpson (Churchill):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister. I refer to the current visit of His Excellency the Governor General to the northern regions of Canada. In that connection would the government consider suggesting a more lengthy visit to the town of Churchill, Manitoba, than is presently contemplated?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, on these questions I give very general advice to the Governor General.
[Mr. Brewin.l



PUBLIC SERVICE


Mr. A. D. Alkenbrack (Frontenac-Lennox and Addington):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister which arises out of recent extramural statements made by his parliamentary secretary. Was the parliamentary secretary to the Prime Minister stating the view of the government when he said that departmental directives have pushed civil servant bilingual requirements beyond the intent of the legislation by parliament.


Mr. Speaker:: Order please. The hon. member knows that questions asked about statements made outside the house may only be put where they relate to statements made by ministers. I would not think this rule extends to parliamentary secretaries. I will say no more.



POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT


Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Minister of Communications in his capacity as Postmaster General. I ask it seriously and hope he will give it serious consideration. Since there are now only three days in the week, Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday, when we can mail letters with any assurance they will be delivered promptly, will the minister take a new look at the entire question of the five-day delivery week and review the possibility of re-establishing a six-day delivery.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Hon. Eric W. Kierans (Minister of Communications):: Mr. Speaker, the answer is no.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, would the minister like to discuss this question some night at ten o'clock?


Mr. A. D. Hales (Wellington):: May I direct a supplementary question to the Postmaster General, Mr. Speaker. While he is considering this matter would he also consider keeping post office counters or lobbies open on a six day a week basis.


Eric William Kierans: Mr. Speaker, they are already open on a six day a week basis in many areas.
April 24, 1969



SUGGESTED DELAY IN CLOSING OP SMALLER OFFICES

Mr. R. E. McKinley (Huron):: A supplementary question to the Postmaster General, Mr. Speaker. Would the minister consider delaying the closing of some of the smaller post offices throughout the country until other major problems in the post office have been straightened out?


Eric William Kierans: Mr. Speaker, we are proceeding on a number of different fronts. Last night I had dinner with the executive of the two national unions and we had a very good general discussion. There is now no need to reduce our efforts in one area in order to speed them up in another. I think most hon. members know, or have already noted, that service out of Ottawa has become considerably improved.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Eric William Kierans: If hon. members opposite have not noticed that, at least some members of the press gallery have. Distinct improvements throughout the post office are taking place.



INSTALLATION OF ADDITIONAL STAMP VENDING MACHINES

Mr. Mac T. McCulcheon (Lambton-Keni):: supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Last September the Postmaster General announced a program to instal additional vending machines for stamps. When is that program to start?


Eric William Kierans: We are at present actively engaged in that program, Mr. Speaker. Because of the changed design of our 25 cent pieces our first priority was to redesign existing machines.



THE MINISTRY


Mrs. Grace Maclnnis (Vancouver-Kingsway):: Mr. Speaker, may I revert for a moment to the question of housing. I address my question to the Prime Minister and ask him whether he would consider that this is an appropriate time to implement something that many people in this country have been urging for some time, the establishment of two different portfolios with respect to transport and housing, so that we could have a minister of transport and another minister to take charge of the housing field.
Inquiries of the Ministry FLOODS



TRAIL, B.C.-ACTION TO CONTROL EMERGENCY SITUATION

Mr. Bruce Howard (Okanagan Boundary):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister. Has the government of British Columbia asked for emergency help to cope with the flooding situation at the city of Trail, British Columbia. Has the demand been for financial assistance or for assistance under the Emergency Measures Organization. If so, is the government giving favourable consideration to this demand.


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Mr. Speaker, we have had reports of some floods, starting in British Columbia in the area of Trail. Our indication of this moment is that neither the military nor the E.M.O. have received any request from the provincial or municipal authorities for help in combatting the situation. At the moment it is therefore considered a local problem which is dealt with by local volunteers.



INQUIRY OF THE MINISTRY

Mr. Steven E. Paproski (Edmonton Centre):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister. May I ask whether, in view of the wording of the motion now before the house, he accepts it as a motion of confidence. If defeated, is he prepared to resign? I ask this question in view of what took place on another, similar occasion a little over one year ago.


Mr. Speaker:: Order please. I think the hon. member will have to see what the result is.



ARTS, LETTERS AND SCIENCES

[Stage Direction]
EXPENDITURES FOR NATIONAL MUSEUMS Hon. W. G. Dinsdale (Brandon-Souris): Mr. Speaker, my question is for the Secretary of State. In view of the crisis in Canada's national museums, as represented by the resignation of Dr. Banfield, the director of the Museum of Natural Sciences, what action does the minister contemplate taking to restore confidence in this important cultural activity.
Hon. Gerard Pelletier (Secretary of State):: Mr. Speaker, the board of directors of the corporation which comprises the National Museums is presently studying this question
April 24, 19G9

Inquiries of the Ministry and will be making recommendations to us. The matter is also being studied within the department.
{English}


Mr. Dinsdale:: A supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Will the Secretary of State use his influence with the government to launch the development program deferred by the government back in 1965, which is the crux of the problem.


Mr. Speaker:: Order please. The hon. member is making a representation to the government which, I assume, has been noted.



AIR CANADA


Mr. Donald Maclnnis (Cape Breton-East Richmond):: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Labour. Yesterday, answering the hon. member for Edmonton West, the minister said while speaking of the Air Canada mechanics strike as reported at page 7858 of Hansard:
I will have no hesitation in telling the house and the country who is the culprit, if there is a culprit, in the dispute.
Does the Minister of Labour not realize that in that statement he is questioning the word of his Prime Minister?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: You are the culprit.


Donald MacInnis: Mr. Speaker, I do not know whether the Prime Minister's remark is on record. He has just indicated that I am the culprit.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Donald MacInnis: Mr. Speaker, in order to show the Minister of Labour just where he is questioning the Prime Minister may I refer to page 7623 of Hansard for April 17-


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please.


Donald MacInnis: -where the Prime Minister definitely identified the union.


Mr. Speaker:: Order please. It seems to me that this is becoming a debate.



STRIKE OF MECHANICS-TRANSPORTATION OF PERISHABLE GOODS

[Stage Direction]
Mr. T. C. Douglas (Nanaimo-Cowichan-The
Islands): Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question

to the Prime Minister. Answering a question last Friday, he indicated that any problems related to the handling of perishable commodities ought to be directed to the Minister of Transport.
Gerald William Baldwin: He has become a perishable commodity himself.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: Since many hon. members are
receiving complaints from their constituents, may I ask to whom these problems are now to be referred, particularly since because of limited facilities, Canadian Pacific Airlines have refused to take any air cargo. What minister will be in charge of these matters from now on?


Pierre Elliott Trudeau: Any such complaints should be directed either to the Canadian Transport Commission or to the minister, directly, Mr. Speaker.



EDUCATION


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I would like to ask the Minister of Manpower and Immigration whether he is concerned about any difficulties that Canadian scholars may be having in securing employment in Canadian universities? I ask him this question in full recognition of the fact that such matters are within provincial jurisdiction, and of course hirings are made by the universities. Is the Minister of Manpower and Immigration concerned about difficulties Canadians may be having in this area?


Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Minisfer of Manpower and Immigration):: I would prefer to see an increasing number of Canadian scholars seek employment in Canadian universities. I am afraid the department cannot go beyond that.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I have a supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Is the minister sufficiently concerned that he is making inquiries as to the cause of such difficulties, and whether there exists any unfortunate situation which might be influenced in a proper way?


Allan Joseph MacEachen: The answer is yes, Mr. Speaker.
April 24, 1969



COMMUNICATIONS


Mr. Ed Schreyer (Selkirk):: My question Mr. Speaker, is directed to the Minister of Communications. Can the minister explain to the house how it was possible for him to say in reply to a question in the standing committee the other day that he was not in a position to indicate what the government target was in terms of a return on an investment in the Canadian Telesat Corporation, and then two hours later give that information to the press?


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please.


Edward Richard Schreyer: Mr. Speaker-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. Before the hon. member questions my judgment, perhaps he should allow me to indicate that I think this is purely argumentative and not the type of question in any event which can properly be asked at this time.


Edward Richard Schreyer: May I submit to Your Honour what I consider might be regarded as a question of privilege. It would be on a subject concerning which the minister refused to give information in committee, and very soon thereafter gave specific information to the press.


Mr. Speaker:: It may be difficult to explain, but I would think it is still not a question of privilege. If it were put as a question of privilege, I would have to consider it, but I gather this is not what the hon. member has done at this time.


Eric William Kierans: On a question of privilege, Mr. Speaker: In reply to the question raised by the hon. member-


Mr. Speaker:: The minister may have a question of privilege on his own, but I have not allowed the hon. member for Selkirk a question of privilege and I have not allowed him to ask the question. I doubt whether the minister can now reply to a question which has not been allowed.


Eric William Kierans: On a question of privilege, Mr. Speaker. The reports in the press were taken entirely from the hearing. I spoke to no member of the press afterwards, to the best of my knowledge. During the hearings of the committee I did say I hoped that the corporation would achieve a profit between 8 and 12 per cent. This is the basis for the reports which appeared in the newspapers.
Inquiries of the Ministry


Gerald William Baldwin: On the
point of order which Your Honour raised, may I say this practice is now becoming so shockingly prevalent that Your Honour might give consideration to varying the rule you have properly propounded. This procedure has prevailed in the past, that of ministers saying one thing in the house and saying something different outside the house. It has become so widespread and prevalent, Your Honour might give some thought to this matter.


Eric William Kierans: On a question of privilege, Mr. Speaker-


Mr. Speaker:: We are not making much progress. The minister made his point on a question of privilege. He has assured the house that he did not make a statement subsequent to his evidence given in committee. I do not see why the matter should be pursued further.



IMMIGRATION


Steve Eugene Paproski: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker: I asked the Minister of Manpower and Immigration about a very serious matter the other day, and he was not in the house yesterday. It concerns Rudolph Holata who has been held in a Czechoslovakian prison. I do not know what is happening to him. He is a member of the Department of Transport.


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. I am sure the house would not mind the reply being given at this time.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: I am aware of the interest of the hon. member. However, I have investigated the case and I find it is a matter within the jurisdiction of my colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs.


Steve Eugene Paproski: Can he answer it, Mr. Speaker?


Hon. Donald S. Macdonald (President of the Privy Council):: Mr. Speaker-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Mr. Speaker:: The President of the Privy Council can be recognized in a moment. The minister has been allowed to reply to the question in the time allocated for questions.

April 24, 1969
Business of the House
Perhaps we might dispose of that point, and then I will recognize the President of the Privy Council.


Mitchell William Sharp: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Edmonton Centre asked the Minister of Manpower and Immigration whether the government knew Mr. Holata had been arrested in Czechoslovakia and whether presentations had been made on his behalf.
The Canadian embassy in Prague learned on January 6, 1969, of the arrest of Mr. Holata, a dual national who emigrated to Canada in 1951 and obtained Canadian citizenship in 1957. Mr. Holata, who is employed as an electrician by the Department of Transport at Vancouver international airport, was arrested while visiting his parents in Joblanec for Christmas, and is charged with espionage on behalf of a nation other than Canada. The charge pertains to incidents which occurred prior to his immigration to Canada. Consular access was granted to the representatives of the embassy on January 23, 1969. The trial, which was to be held in early March, has been postponed pending completion of documentation by the prosecution. The embassy is providing all possible assistance to Holata and continues to press the Czechoslovakian authorities for an early trial.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE


Donald Stovel Macdonald: Mr. Speaker, in response to the inquiry about the business for the coming week, tomorrow we will call the omnibus bill to amend the Criminal Code. On Monday we will call it again. What the business will be for the balance of the coming week will depend very much on the progress made on that bill. Thursday will be an allotted day.
In view of the expressed intention of the Ralliement Creditiste to continue ad infinitum the debate on the Criminal Code bill, I think we can assume that for several more days at least we will be discussing that bill.
I will advise the house of any change in order of business.


James Aloysius McGrath: Would the Chair permit a question on government business to the house leader? Would he tell the house when he expects to bring forward the debate for concurrence in 
the fifth report of the Transport Committee, in order to prevent the honourable and distinguished chairman of that committee from resigning and following in the steps of the hon. member for Trinity?


Donald Stovel Macdonald: I assume the hon. member and his colleagues will continue to filibuster that matter, so there seems little point in bringing it forth again.


Stanley Howard Knowles: May I ask a supplementary question with respect to the comments of the President of the Privy Council? Would he consider, perhaps on Monday or Tuesday, calling a meeting of the house leaders to see if we might reach an agreement in regard to the time to be spent on Bill C-150?


Donald Stovel Macdonald: I would be glad to make those efforts again, but I can advise the hon. member and the house that repeatedly in the past several days I have sought to see if there was any change in the position of the Ralliement Creditiste and that I failed to get any indication that an agreement would be possible.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Possibly we could help you.



GOVERNMENT ORDERS


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed, from Wednesday, April 23, consideration of the motion of Mr. Trudeau:
That this house supports the government's policy of continued Canadian participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the intention of the government, in consultation with Canada's allies, to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of Canadian forces in Europe.
And the amendment thereto of Mr. Stanfield (p. 7875), and the amendment to the amendment of Mr. Douglas (Nanaimo-Cowi-chan-The Islands) (p. 7880).
Mitchell William Sharp: Mr. Speaker, so far this debate has produced two amendments to the motion put forward by the government, one from the Official Opposition and one from the New Democratic party and, if I may say so,
April 24. 1969



both these amendments were predictable. The amendment proposed by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Stanfield) is very good at negatives, but it fails to propose any alternative to the policies that the government has put forward. The amendment moved by the Official Opposition contends that Canada is retreating from internationalism to isolationism, according to the Prime Minister's (Mr. Trudeau) statement. But surely the Prime Minister's speech and the statement he made on April 3 indicate that the government is moving in exactly the opposite direction, in an outward direction in favour of more internationalism and less isolationism.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Mitchell William Sharp: The Prime Minister's statement makes it very clear that Canada is broadening its horizons in every direction and is intent on playing a still more active role in world affairs. There was an absence of constructive, Conservative suggestions in the speech made by the Leader of the Opposition. I did not hear a single one although I listened most attentively to a very good political speech by him, a speech completely lacking in constructive suggestions. I really did admire the way in which he put in the needle, but the trouble, Mr. Speaker, was that there was nothing in his speech. It was just emptiness. It was without any constructive suggestions as to what Canada should do in the world today.
I suggest that the debate so far has indicated that it is the Conservative opposition which is isolating itself in this house. Members of the government party and of the New Democratic party have proposals to make, but what the Leader of the Opposition has said is, "Let us not disturb anything. It is now nice and comfortable. So far as my party is concerned I will not put forward any proposals for change."


An hon. Member:: Where are your
proposals?


Mitchell William Sharp: We have a motion before the house in very clear terms, and the Leader of the Opposition has done nothing but condemn the government for its statement. The subamendment offered by the New Democratic party does some condemning too, but at least it also makes some positive suggestions. The problem with their amendment, however, is one which appears to haunt that party. It is based not on the world as it is but on a world that they would like to think exists. But the government is in a position of responsibility 29180-500J

and it has to deal with the world as it is. Canada and Canadians have to operate in a world that is much more dangerous and complex than members of the New Democratic party would lead us to believe.
The Leader of the Opposition has developed a complicated line of reasoning to suggest that in some way the government has determined upon its defence policy before settling upon its foreign policy. The superficiality of this argument becomes obvious when we consider the circumstances under which we are having this debate.
The government felt under an obligation, and certainly as Secretary of State for External Affairs I urged this upon the government, to give to our NATO allies as much information as we could about our future position before the Washington meeting of our NATO friends. It would have been very simple for the government to limit its announcement, in contemplation of that meeting, to its decision to remain in NATO. That would have been the simplest thing to do. It would have avoided the kind of debate we are having now. We could have avoided any mention of our decision to reduce, in due course and in an orderly way, the size of our forces on the ground in Europe.
I can well imagine the accusations that could properly have been made against the government if we had simply announced our intention to stay in the alliance prior to that meeting, and then later let people in on the fact that we intended to reduce our forces in Europe. That would have been dishonest. That would have been concealing. We felt that the only frank and honest thing we could do was to convey to our allies, first, our foreign policy decision to stay in the alliance and, second, our military decision, still incomplete, to reduce our forces in Europe. I say that this decision is still incomplete since it cannot in the nature of things be completed, and it was impossible for the government to have gone any further at that stage than to make the decision it made on April 3. I say to the Leader of the Opposition who made so much of this argument, who said the government's statement was deliberately intended to mean different things to different people, that it would have been quite impossible for us, in advance of our consultation with our allies, to have gone any further than we did at that stage.
As I say, we had an alternative. We could have said nothing. Then we could have been charged with deceit. As it is, I suggest to the

April 24, 1969

Leader of the Opposition that we are being as frank and honest as it was possible for us to have been under the circumstances.
We said that the planned and phased reduction in our forces in Europe will be made in consultation with our allies. We have not undertaken to consult our allies on whether or not we should reduce our forces in Europe. This decision has been made by the government and is not, as such, negotiable. However, we will be consulting our allies about how this decision is to be put into effect. This is no more than the responsible behavior to be expected of this country.
The other NATO nations may wish to make adjustments arising from Canadian reductions in strength in Europe, and we will certainly want to carry out our plans1 causing the least possible difficulty to our allies who are also, it should be remembered, among our oldest and closest friends in the international community. As a matter of fact, under cross-examination at a press conference in Washington I said it was not our intention by our action to weaken the alliance, and that remains1 the policy of Canada.
Without attempting any general definition, let me make even more clear what we mean by consultation in these circumstances. As we work out how we are going to make the planned and phased reduction of our forces in Europe we will keep our allies informed, listen to their views, and discuss the matter with them. The problems they face, and the views they express, will be taken into account in our decision-making process, but eventually the decision can only be made by the Canadian government, having regard to our national interests, our capacities and our objectives.
[DOT] (3:10 p.m.)
In the course of his1 remarks yesterday the Leader of the Opposition seemed to be confused about the timetable of our decisionmaking process with regard to the planned and phased reduction of our forces in Europe. He tried to ridicule the apparent conflict in the statements made by the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux) and myself on the decisions' and when they would be made. This, I suggest, is a confusion of his own making. I expect that my colleague, the Minister of National Defence, will explain this timetable more fully in the debate. I shall content myself by setting out in the most general terms1 the steps as we expect them to occur.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Explain what you said at Washington.


Mitchell William Sharp: I will-all consistent with the government's policy. The decision in principle about Canada's future in NATO was announced on April 3. That was the first decision the government made. The NATO defence planning committee meeting in May will provide an occasion for us to outline in general terms to our allies how we propose to proceed with our program of planned and phased reduction of our forces in Europe. As I said, we have to make a decision before we put a proposal before our allies. We have to make that decision and there is nothing abnormal about that. This is the normal process of decision-making on force commitment in NATO which leads to the annual meeting of foreign and defence ministers in December when each country is required to make firm force commitments for the following year. So each of us was speaking about the respective decisions and was speaking within the terms and text of the NATO treaty. If my hon. friend does not know what is in the treaty, he should read it.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I read it.


Mitchell William Sharp: The fact that the decision-making process with regard to our military presence in Europe is still going on while the basic decision to stay in NATO could be announced on April 3 shows clearly how defence policy flows from foreign policy. We had to assess the importance to us of our membership in the alliance having regard to our other responsibilities and areas of interest. We had to make our own judgment of the usefulness of NATO to us as a means through which we can contribute to international stability and as an important element in our relations with Europe. We had to study NATO's capacity as an instrument for increasing contacts and improving relations with the U.S.S.R. and its associate states. These are by no means all of foreign policy considerations that went into our review of our place in NATO, but they are among the more important. It was only after we had dealt with all these and other foreign policy questions that we could turn our minds to the effect of our political decision upon our defence arrangements.
Foreign policy decisions must take into account Canada's position in tomorrow's world. The 1970's will be a period of accelerating economic, technological and social change, accompanied by persistent
April 24, 1969

political and ideological rivalries and tensions, and by continuing civil unrest in many countries. We are not yet into the 1970's but still unrest is spreading and rising from many of these factors.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: Even in this chamber.


Mitchell William Sharp: Could be, and even in this country.


An hon. Member:: Even in this chamber.


Mitchell William Sharp: Even in that party.


An hon. Member:: No.


Mitchell William Sharp: When I listened to the Leader of the Opposition and the kind of speech Dalton Camp made I wondered whether Dalton Camp ever belonged to that party.
It may also prove to be a time of hopeful evolution and promise in the relations between the western and Soviet worlds. There is a prospect of Soviet-United States talks on the limitation of strategic arms beginning soon, and substantial great power conversations on basic political issues such as the Middle East and in due course the problems of a divided Europe. There is beginning to be a real hope, shared by our partners in NATO, that a start can now be made on the long and difficult process of political and military de-escalation between east and west. Evolution, change, unpredictability-in this world situation Canada must be in a position to adapt its policies and its outlook quickly, flexibly and effectively to the challenges of the future. We must not isolate ourselves in the problems of the past.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Mitchell William Sharp: As hon. members know, several of my colleagues and myself have just returned from several days in Japan. Coming as it did in the midst of our discussions of our NATO policy, this experience has been a most timely one for us. One gets a very different perspective on Canada from the other side of the Pacific. From Tokyo it is the west coast that is seen in high relief, in sharp focus; it is eastern Canada that lies behind the wide prairies and is more dimly perceived. Japan may soon be our second best customer, rivalling Britain.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: Order, please. I regret to interrupt the minister but his time has expired.


Some hon. Members:: Carry on.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: Does the house give unanimous consent?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: No, Mr. Speaker. I do not want to be small about this, but it was agreed as an order of the house that the opening speakers in each party would have 40 minutes, or whatever the time limit provided is, and that everybody else would be confined to 15 minutes.


An hon. Member:: I thought you wanted to hear all about it.
Another hon. Member: He hasn't said anything yet.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: Order, please.


Robert Lorne Stanfield: I rise on a point of order, Mr. Speaker. I object to any minister of this government calling out that I do not want to hear the Secretary of State for External Affairs when all we are asking is that ministers conform to the order adopted by the house after discussion among all parties in the house. I resent that.
The Aciing Speaker (Mr. Bechard): Order, please. It is correct that there is a special order of the house that speakers will have only 15 minutes except for the mover of the motion and the Leader of the Opposition.


Francis Andrew Brewin: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the minister whether he could conclude his speech in five minutes? If he can, I suggest we give consent.


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some hon. Members:: No.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: There is no unanimous consent.


Mr. Broadbenl:: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order, I wonder whether the house would give serious consideration to allowing the Secretary of State for External Affairs an extra few minutes. I think this would be an act of courtesy by those on this side of the house.


Donald MacInnis: He is only speaking about degrees of honesty anyway.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: The hon. member for Calgary Centre.

April 24, 1969


Hon. D. S. Harkness (Calgary Centre):: Mr. Speaker, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp) spent some time on what was bound to be an unsuccessful attempt to explain the unexplainable so far as the conflicts are concerned in what he, the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau), and other ministers have said. In addition, he gave us a few generalities. The only definite point in his speech was that he made it plain that the consultation referred to in the motion means no more than telling our allies in NATO that our troops will be withdrawn and advising them to take the necessary steps to fill the gap. That is all the consultation amounts to. This is the one thing the Secretary of State for External Affairs did make clear.
The motion of the Prune Minister is in two parts. The first part states that Canada will remain in NATO. The second part states that we will withdraw from NATO our forces in Europe. It is quite evident that the two parts of the resolution are in direct contradiction of each other and therefore in essence the motion is a fraud.
[DOT] (3:20 p.m.)
During the past year there has been almost complete confusion as to the government's intentions in respect of NATO. This has been the result of the conflicting statements of the Prime Minister and other ministers about what the government intended to do in so far as NATO was concerned. The present motion and the Prime Minister's statement and explanation of it continue this confusion. We now know definitely that it is the intention of the government to remove a number of our troops from Europe. As pointed out yesterday by my leader, we do not know whether a few or practically all our forces in Europe will be withdrawn. The confusion still exists and we are still up in the air in this regard.
We must consider the whole matter in conjunction with the Prime Minister's earlier statements, both before he occupied his present position and since. For the most part these statements, particularly some of his earlier ones, were definitely along the line that Canada should withdraw its forces from NATO. Thus the only conclusion I can come to is that the Prime Minister intends to end our military contributions as quickly as possible.


An hon. Member:: Hear, hear.


Douglas Scott Harkness: An hon. member opposite applauds. There is no doubt that his attitude is shared by a few members but not by the
[The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard).]
majority in this chamber, including many on the Liberal side.
Let me put this another way. The Prime Minister's policy is one of scuttle-get out just as fast as possible. This is the same policy General de Gaulle followed. The only conclusion one can come to is that the Prime Minister is using General de Gaulle as an example in this regard and intends to do exactly the same thing, with perhaps one difference in that he intends to do so in slower stages. The final result will be the same.
Yesterday the Prime Minister in effect accused those of us who do not agree with his views in respect of NATO of living in the past. As recorded at page 7867 of Hansard he said:
Canadians must be prepared to face the world of actuality, the world of 1969.
That is exactly what the Prime Minister is not doing. Ke does not recognize that the basic threat to our security which brought NATO into existence in the first place still exists and that we have a responsibility to continue to play a role commensurate with our population and resources to counter that threat.
A great deal of wishful thinking has taken place in the last few years along the lines that the aggressive intention of Russia has disappeared and that a period of detente has occurred. Some people believe that all that is necessary is to treat Russia with kid gloves and in a nice way and this detente will continue. The events in Czechoslovakia last year ended these illusions very abruptly for most people. It did not end them for everybody. These events ended the hopes of those people in Europe who are under a direct threat. This was made abundantly clear to the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence who spent two weeks in Europe immediately before Easter. This was the reaction we observed in every country we visited, whether a NATO country or a neutral country such as Switzerland or Sweden.
Let me point out that the first object of the foreign and defence policy of any country is to maintain its security and independence. In the past many countries were able to do this on their own; however, that time has long passed. Security and independence can only be maintained now by most countries, particularly countries of our size, and I have in mind population, through alliances with like-minded nations. These people face the same
April 24, 1S69

dangers and must combine to resist these dangers.
The most important of these alliances to our security during the past 20 years has been NATO. The purpose of that alliance throughout its existence has been the maintenance of peace and to prevent a third great war rather than having to fight such a war. This deterrent role of the alliance must be emphasized and re-emphasized because many people still think of NATO as an organization designed to fight a war rather than to prevent one. The alliance has prevented a major war or further aggression in Europe during the past 20 years. It can continue to do so only if it remains strong, and it will only remain strong if its members continue to contribute military forces relative to their ability to do so.
This is the very thing the present government through this motion is proposing to end. We will not contribute military forces to the alliance with any relationship to our ability, population and resources to do so. We will not be contributing forces in relation to any other factor. I am sure everyone will agree that France's withdrawal of its troops from the NATO alliance seriously weakened it. The result has been that other countries have had to increase their contribution to make up for the loss of French forces. Surely no one would attempt to argue that the withdrawal of Canadian forces from NATO will not further weaken the alliance.
While it is true that our forces are relatively small in numbers, they are very highly trained and very efficient, probably more so than any others in Europe. This again was made plain to us during our trip overseas. The withdrawal of Canadian forces will create a gap which will be hard to fill. This was also impressed upon us by the people in Europe.
More important than the military loss as a result of the withdrawal of Canadian troops is the psychological effect and the feeling it will produce in European countries. They will begin to feel that we are retreating to the American fortress and that they cannot count on us to give them help in the event of war. This is bound to result in a decline in morale and the feeling that perhaps the other small members of the alliance should do the same thing.
The Prime Minister has discounted the so-called domino theory that because one country takes a certain line of action others are likely to follow. The theory is that because a

country such as Canada withdraws from NATO other European countries are likely to do the same thing. That may be his opinion and the opinion of some members of the committee, but it was not the opinion of one single individual we talked with in Europe. The European people were unanimous, including those in neutral countries such as Sweden and Switzerland, that a Canadian withdrawal of troops from NATO would weaken the alliance and have the effect of increasing this already existing feeling in the small European countries, with the result that they might follow Canada's example and do likewise. Therefore we must keep in mind the psychological effect from both these factors, that of perhaps inducing other people to follow the same course, and that of making the Europeans feel they are more isolated and cannot count on our help. These psychological effects will be very serious indeed.
[DOT] (3:30 p.m.)
The Prime Minister stated, as recorded on page 7869 of Hansard:
The government's NATO decision is based on the belief that, during the forthcoming years, there are better uses of the Canadian forces-
I ask the Prime Minister and every other member of the house, what better uses are there for Canadian forces than their use in NATO? How can they contribute more to Canada's security than by the role they are playing in NATO at the present time? I have given this question considerable thought, and I think I have some knowledge and experience in these matters. I can think of no single way, not one, in which Canadian forces could do more for the security of this country, the maintenance of peace and the independence of this country than the role they are discharging in Europe at the present time.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The various statements the Prime Minister has made, particularly in his speech in Calgary, have left the impression that nearly all of our military forces are devoted to NATO. This, of course, is very far from being the case; it is a complete distortion of the facts. We are supposed to have about 100,000 people in our forces, though we are admittedly not up to strength, and only about 10,000 of them are on NATO service in Europe or about one-tenth of our forces. It is true that our maritime forces have a NATO-commitment, it is true that we have other possible commitments to NATO from the forces in Canada; but the fact is that the

April 24, 1969

great bulk of our Canadian forces are not oriented to NATO or committed to NATO. The bulk of our forces are available for the other tasks the armed forces have to perform, the protection of the land, sea and air of our country, NORAD, peacekeeping missions, and so on. I object to the Prime Minister trying to convey the impression to the people of Canada that practically all our forces are devoted to NATO. This is just not so. Quite a small number of our forces proportionately are devoted to that end.
I repeat, in closing, what I said at the beginning of my remarks. The Prime Minister's policy is one of scuttle; it is a retreat to isolationism and continentalism, as stated by my leader yesterday and expressed in the amendment moved by this party, which I hope will receive the support of the house.


Mr. Norman A. Cafik (Ontario):: Mr. Speaker, I rise to speak in this NATO debate primarily because I am a member of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence and have been since the beginning of the 28th parliament. As such I have some strong views in this regard and I would like to express those views today in the House of Commons. Prior to doing so, may I say I think it is important that the House of Commons and the people of Canada realize the scope of the study made by the committee on this very important problem.
On Thursday, January 16, 1969, pursuant to an order issued by the House of Commons, our committee was given the obligation of looking into policy changes in defence and external affairs. Following this, we held 24 meetings in Canada and heard evidence pro and con from people with divergent views, ranging from getting completely out of NATO, to staying in and getting in much more deeply, or to becoming an unaligned, neutral country. Name it, and we heard about it in that committee. In Canada we received testimony from 16 witnesses, and between March 8 and March 22 we travelled to Europe in order to see for ourselves the role our forces were playing in Europe and to discuss these problems with leaders and representatives of other countries. We also looked into the possibilities of neutrality in Sweden, and peacekeeping operations in Cyprus.
I speak on this subject because I think it is important that we establish the scope and depth of the study given this matter by the committee. But there were also certain limitations, the primary limitation being time. We found ourselves faced with a fact that we
[Mr. Harkness.l
could not ignore, namely, the Washington NATO meeting on April 10, wherein the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) intended to outline broadly the conclusions of this policy review. We were forced, as a result, to come to conclusions prematurely. This is not to say that I back away from any of those conclusions; in fact, I support them very strongly. I did in the committee, and I do so here in the House of Commons.
The important thing is that defence and foreign affairs are not limited just to NATO. There is the whole problem of national defence, which takes in Canadian sovereignty, NORAD, peacekeeping and many other aspects of Defence. We must look at all avenues. Our committee, because of this limitation of time and our being forced to come to a conclusion by certain deadline, had to confine itself solely to our participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We did not have enough time to hear evidence regarding all aspects even in regard to this limited question. I think every member of the committee would agree with this statement.
Our committee made a report which said that we could not make a recommendation in terms of role or numbers of forces in Europe, or whether we should be involved in a nuclear strike force or maintain a mechanized brigade. We could say nothing with regard to any of these matters. We felt that the matter was of sufficient importance that we as a committee, and the government, give these questions urgent consideration.
There is one element of our report that does not ring entirely true with the government's proposals. Recommendation No. 3 of the report said we should maintain our present role in Europe until such time as the major equipment of our mechanized brigade and air role in Europe was phased out and became obsolete. We made that recommendation in good faith. I think we felt it was quite important. But I am the first to admit that because I did not study the nature of this whole matter there is reason to question even one's own decision in this regard.


An hon. Member:: You had lots of chance to study it.


Norman Augustine Cafik: We did not study the question of role.


An hon. Member:: Why didn't you?


Norman Augustine Cafik: Because we did not have time. In any event, I would appreciate it if the hon.
April 24, 1969

member would be kind enough to save his interruptions for another speaker.
I would like to talk about the recommendations made by the committee. The first was that we remain in NATO. If you read the motion before the house today, you must come to the conclusion that this is exactly what the government wants to do.
In our second recommendation, which is a very important one and I think much of the controversy involves this question, we said that Canada should continue to maintain forces in Europe as a contribution to the collective defensive arrangements of NATO. I subscribe to this principle, the vast majority of the members of the committee subscribe to it and, in my interpretation of what the Prime Minister has said, he subscribes to it as well. In this regard I should like to quote the following from the motion:
[DOT] (3:40 p.m.)
-to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of the Canadian forces in Europe.
A reduction is not a withdrawal. I do not think you can reduce the forces to nothing and still be honest with the terms of this motion.


Eldon Mattison Woolliams: Who said they were honest?


Norman Augustine Cafik: I believe the Government said exactly what it means-a phased reduction. It is very important to know whether it is going to be reduced to such an extent that our contribution would become token and meaningless. I would be absolutely opposed to that now, and in the future on the basis of the information I now have. However, I do not think that that is the intent of this motion. I think that we are going to maintain our forces in Europe and we are going to play a role in the defence of the free world through our participation in the NATO alliance.
I will give a couple of arguments supporting my belief that it is extremely important that we maintain a physical presence1 in Europe. First of all I believe, on the basis of evidence, that the real threat to international peace lies in Europe. This is where the two superpowers have sufficient interest at stake that a nuclear war could occur. That is what the NATO alliance is all about, and I believe that is why we must remain a part of it.
The next point is that there is nothing more valuable for us as a parliament to do than to ensure that our government takes appropriate action to preserve peace and avoid a nuclear 29180-501

war. That is in the interest of every citizen, whether he has good or bad housing. Whatever his problem is I think he wants to live more than he desires some of these other things. The preservation of peace is the most important thing. Our job is to determine how we can best achieve this lofty objective. I believe it is very important that we maintain a presence in Europe in order to achieve that absolutely basic and essential objective.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Norman Augustine Cafik: Some may argue that we can rely upon the nuclear deterrent of the United States or upon the nuclear stalemate between the two superpowers. I say that this1 is not looking at the whole question, according to the evidence that I have heard from those who gave evidence and who spoke to us in Europe. The problem in Europe is to have a conventional force that would make the nuclear power of the U. S. credible.
If you withdrew all the conventional forces in NATO from Europe, you would do nothing more than to encourage Russia to expand its territory and dominate Europe completely. So we must do something to stop that. It is not reasonable to expect the United States to start a nuclear exchange with Russia, which would surely destroy both countries, in the event that Russia or the Warsaw Pact countries were to move forward a little bit in Europe. It is too monstrous to believe that any rational person would destroy his whole nation over such an issue. So to restrain them we must prove to Russia that we can respond in more than just a nuclear manner. We must have the conventional capacity to wage a conventional war in Europe in order to avoid a nuclear war. I think that that is part of the reason why our troops in Europe are necessary and important.
The third recommendation that we made in the committee regarding the long-term military role of Canada is consistent with phase two of the government's review. However, I would be very interested to find out what their conclusions will be, and I think we would all be interested in making this determination. I do not think you can predict from the resolution exactly what it means or where it leads. I believe the government intends to keep Canadian forces in Europe and to play a meaningful role there.
The fifth recommendation by the committee is in regard to the role played by Canada in NATO toward the achievement of a detente and balanced force reductions in Europe consistent with the Harmel report. I believe that

April 24. 1969

that is totally consistent with all the statements ever made by the Prime Minister with regard to our foreign affairs and defence policy.
In conclusion I should like to say that I oppose the amendment proposed by the Leader of Her Majesty's Official Opposition (Mr. Stanfield). I do so because I do not honestly and sincerely believe that the government through this motion is retreating into isolationism. There is ample evidence that the government, probably more than any other government that I know of, is doing exactly the reverse. For this reason I cannot support the amendment. Second, I cannot possibly support the amendment to the amendment proposed by the New Democratic party, which in effect calls for real isolationism and for a complete withdrawal from Europe. I do not think this is in the interests of Canada or of the free world. Third, so far as the Prime Minister's motion is concerned I wish to say that I am willing to support it and I do so without any reservation, trusting that we will in effect play a meaningful role in the preservation of peace in this country and in the world. We Canadians have more to lose from a nuclear war than most countries in Europe. We are between two superpowers and we must ensure that they do not engage in nuclear war. I am confident we will play a meaningful, viable and realistic role for peace in the world in which we live today.
[DOT] (3:50 p.m.)


Martial Asselin: Mr. Speaker, we have just heard the hon. member for Ontario (Mr. Cafik) speak eloquently on the trip we made with the committee on external affairs and national defense, in conjunction with the review of Canada's role within NATO.
The hon. member for Ontario seems to have changed his mind quite a bit since that trip on which he was one of those who recommended most strongly to the committee that Canada should continue to keep forces in Europe to participate in NATO's joint defence agreements.
His speech this afternoon contradicts the remarks and claims he made to the committee to the effect that Canada should be allowed, as before, to keep troops overseas under its NATO commitments, and to play the role it should.
During the election campaign, the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) spoke to us of a policy of participation. I wonder if that was his
(Mr. Cafik.]
goal in advocating a review of Canada's foreign policy with regard to NATO, for we have heard several ministers say exactly the contrary to what 'they had formerly advocated in this house.
At this point, I should like to mention the statements made in this house by the Minister of Communications (Mr. KieransO, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp), and especially the firm and categorical assertions of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux), who repeatedly stated that Canada should stay in NATO and continue in the role it has played for 20 years.
I wonder whether the involved and timid statement of the Prime Minister on the role Canada should now play within NATO and on the reduction of its forces may not have had as sole purpose to save the face of the cabinet and tone down the differences of opinions within the cabinet and amongst government members.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, there were 17 Liberal members accompanying the delegation on the visits we made across Europe in the course of that trip. I may be mistaken but there were at least 14 of them who shared the opinion now expressed by the opposition, which is that Canada should remain in NATO, take time before reducing its forces and prevent its foreign policy from getting bogged in isolationism and con-tinentalism.
Mr. Speaker, if the Minister of National Defence has, so far, tempered his statements about the position adopted by the cabinet and the Prime Minister, it is due to the fact that he is a very patient man. I am convinced that he shares* the opinion of the opposition and whenever he feels he should state that our role within NATO should be maintained in order to preserve world peace and to sustain the prestige of Canada among the concert of nations, he will always win the admiration and support of the members on this side of the house.
Mr. Speaker, as the hon. member for Ontario said earlier, we have indeed visited many countries, including England where we met the Minister of Defence and the Foreign Secretary.
We also have been to Geneva where we met with Mr. Ignatieff, Canada's representative on the disarmament Commission, who said, it substance, that he did not believe that Canada would decide to review its role within NATO with the purpose of curtailing its military forces since by so doing Canada would
April 24. 1969

jeopardize its prestige in the eyes of the Disarmament Commission of which it is now a member.
As I said a short while ago, we met the Defence Minister and the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain. Even if that country has already reduced its armed forces within NATO, we were asked not to follow suit because this would have dire results for the future of the Alliance.
Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that all the people that we met were wrong all at the same time. The Prime Minister and the cabinet surely cannot convince us that they are the only ones to be right when Canada's role within NATO is under review.
We also visited a neutral country, Sweden, and we know how much this country is spending for national defence in an effort to safeguard its neutrality. We were told that should that country be attacked, it would still go to NATO to find protection for the national territory.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe that all those experienced people who live in those circles, who have been dealing with NATO for 20 years, who keep in touch with defence experts, have been backing the wrong horse. I would rather support the argument of the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Stanfield) to the effect that we should stay within NATO as long as international relations are as tense as they are now.
The Prime Minister said in his speech that he was charged with having made a premature announcement, and, in my estimation, it was.
If we consider what happened recently in Czchoslovakia, we realize that Russia and its satellites have concentrated in Europe considerable forces of an extraordinary mobility that startled our allies. When it invaded Czechoslovakia, Russia initiated an international crisis. Had NATO, a deterrent force, not existed, we can wonder if the Russians would not have invaded Berlin, thus launching another world war.
In my view, that is the reason for the existence of NATO. In twenty years of existence, because of its deterrent capacity, its efforts to reduce international tension and its strength of which it convinced the enemy, the organization was successful in avoiding major and minor conflicts. At present, its role and its existence are still justified, if we do not want another world war to happen.
This is why, Mr. Speaker, I strongly support the amendment moved by the Leader of 29180-50U

the Opposition, because I am convinced that it is still the best policy Canada could follow in 1969.
Mr. Speaker, the previous speaker for the Conservative party, the former Minister of National Defence, stated the reasons why we should not withdraw from NATO nor, least of all, reduce our forces.
It is obvious-and all the experts we met during our trip said so quite clearly-that should Canada decide to reduce its forces serving under NATO, it would create some kind of psychosis in the other member countries. It would weaken the morale of those countries which might then be inclined to follow the example of Canada as far as its foreign policy is concerned.
The decision of the present government will contribute shortly to the disintegration of NATO and it will also encourage some NATO members, as I was saying a moment ago, to follow the example of Canada and to reduce their forces.
The government's decision aimed at reducing its forces within NATO is going to diminish the prestige of Canada within international organizations, above all as far as disarmament and detente are concerned in the world.
How shall we be able, in the future, to be a member of the great international organizations which are engaged in disarmament if we are no longer interested in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization? We have allies that we must support and help, and we know also that the best defence for Canada is still that of Europe. Even if the Prime Minister would like to convince Canadians that his policy would enable taxpayers to save money, I think that if he withdrew Canadian troops to ensure a more adequate defence of our territory, Canadian taxpayers would not save anything. If air-borne forces were sent to help the members of the Alliance, I think, with figures to support me, that it would not save money to the Canadian taxpayers but that on the contrary it would entail additional expenditures.
[DOT] (4:00 p.m1
So, Mr. Speaker, I maintain that the government's decision to reduce its forces within NATO will contribute to increase the antagonism of the Warsaw Pact countries.
What struck me most after the statement of the Prime Minister of Canada regarding the review of our role within NATO was that not a single allied country congratulated the Canadian government. We have received official congratulations only from the U.S.S.R.

April 24. 1969

Now, Mr. Speaker, all hon. members know that the main enemy for Europe, Canada and the United States is still the U.S.S.R. If I were the Prime Minister of Canada, I would beware of congratulations offered me by the U.S.S.R. for a reduction of our forces in NATO.
I feel that this will not lead the Warsaw Pact countries to behave in a more conciliatory manner in dealing with the NATO countries.
Mr. Speaker, I think that this decision is untimely. The Prime Minister should heed the advice of the Minister of National Defence who is supposed to have said several times the opposite in some statements he made in public.
This decision of the government will tarnish, as I said, our international image. Canada will no longer play the role it played before, when he was chosen as mediator in conflicts that arose now and then in the world.
For all these reasons, and after hearing all the evidence during that trip, I approve straight away the amendment proposed by my party leader. In my opinion Canada should reverse the decision to reduce our forces in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Mr. Speaker, during the last election campaign we were told about a policy of participation and I am wondering why members of the committee on external affairs and national defence were sent in Europe. We studied the problems on the spot. We gathered information. We rubbed elbows with experts and met important peoples. Upon our return, we presented immediately our report to the house and under paragraph 2 of this report we stated that Canada should continue to maintain forces in Europe according to the terms of the NATO collective defence agreements. We gave a lot of thought to this during our trip back and it was almost unanimously that we made this recommendation.
I wonder why the cabinet did not take our recommendations into account. What has become of the policy of participation of the present govermnent and particularly what is the value, the importance given to the work of our committees? When reports presented to the house, like the one concerning NATO, are put aside by the Prime Minister, it is frustrating.
Mr. Speaker, in closing I must say that the amendment moved by the leader of my party is practical and clearly reflects the present
[Mr. Asselin.i
circumstances as far as the international tension is concerned. I hope that the Liberal members who went on that trip and considered the problem of Canada's participation in NATO, will, upon thinking things over, support the amendment moved on behalf of my party, to show their disagreement with the Prime Minister's statement which is confusing and does not offer anything new in respect of the review of Canada's role in NATO.


Mr. Colin D. Gibson (Hamilton-Wentworth):: Mr. Speaker, having heard the Prime Minister's (Mr. Trudeau) speech yesterday and having given it much consideration, I respectfully submit that he has taken a bold initiative to strengthen our country's foreign policy. He has stated that no other parliament will make our foreign policy. I contrast that remark with those of the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Stanfield), who said we have waffled, bungled and watered down our foreign policy.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Colin David Gibson: He accused the government of being isolationist. Nothing could be farther from the truth. Our -country at this time is busily engaged at Geneva at the disarmament conference. Ambassador George Ignatieff is taking a prominent part in the discussions in one of the highest councils of the world in an effort to secure world peace. He outlined to members of the committee some far-reaching, broadly visionary, and practical schemes to bring about detente. In light of that I ask, is this a government -of isolationism? I put it to you, Mr. Speaker, it is absolute poppycock to call Canadian policy isolationist.
Hon. members probably know that the external affairs committee made a report.


An hon. Member:: Where is it?


Colin David Gibson: They will also know that we visited Geneva and heard outlined a program for disarmament. That program is being negotiated at this time in the highest council of the world at Geneva. Efforts are being made by our Canadian representative. I ask, which country made an effort to bring the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries together at the conference table in order to secure detente? It was Canada. Is this the country of isolationism the Leader of the Opposition speaks of? If it is, it certainly is not the one I know and am proud to represent.
I believe our responsibilities toward NATO require a significant change. As the Prime
April 24. 1969

Minister said yesterday, we should not always be tied to heavy armour and tanks.


An hon. Member:: Nobody said that.


Colin David Gibson: We want to question NATO's present role, and to reserve the right to question it. That is what we are doing. We believe in leaving troops in NATO, but we also believe in locating them where they can be used most efficiently. At any rate, I advocate that. I believe the armoured brigade is too fixed in nature. Germany is better able to supply armour in Europe than is Canada.
Personally, I advocate a highly mobile armoured force. It should be lightly armoured but air transportable so that it can be used in Canada, Europe, or as a peacekeeping force in other areas. I think this would bring about a more practical use of our arms than has been the case in the past. Having an armoured brigade anchored to one spot and geared to staying in Europe ad infinitum, does not show much imagination. I think that the role of our forces ought to be changed significantly. As light, mobile forces they should be geared to undertaking operations anywhere in the world as peacekeeping forces.
Members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence visited Europe. We had an opportunity to examine Canada's role in1 NATO, and we began with Cyprus. It is with great pride that I report on the role Canadians are playing as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Cyprus. Our men are setting an example to the entire world. Do they come from a country geared to the isolationism the Leader of the Opposition speaks of? Our troops have preserved the peace in Cyprus for over two years in cooperation with other United Nations troops. I have heard predictions that, in co-operation with unarmed United Nations observers, we shall accomplish a very great step forward in peacekeeping roles under the United Nations.
On visiting France and Germany we saw that our forces were well trained, well equipped and doing a first rate job. Their morale was high. I wish to commend the way officers and men are carrying out their duties. As I said a moment ago, we saw Ambassador Ignatieff at Geneva and we also were able to capture the spirit which will lead to future disarmament. Fostering this spirit is, I believe, one of our primary roles.
In Sweden we were entertained by members of a civilized and neutral country. They were most hospitable and friendly. One must remember that Sweden is much smaller than

Canada and does not share a 3,000-mile border with the United States. Neither do they lie between the United States and Russia. While neutralism may work for Sweden, it would be an unrealistic role for Canada to adopt.
After having heard relatively harsh discussions in Paris, we were heartened at Brussels, in Belgium, to hear the brilliant and hopeful words of Mr. Harmel, foreign minister of Begium. His belief, shared by many who served on our committee, is that we should seek multilateral withdrawal of troops from Europe as a means to detente. That is No. 5 among our recommendations, and we have viewed this matter very seriously indeed. We all stand by that recommendation so far as I know. Any members that I have spoken to certainly stand by our obligation to negotiate a detente with the Warsaw Pact nations.
[DOT] (4:10 p.m.)
I personally believe that our role in NATO must always be by physical presence. Any realistic alliance requires presence of forces to demonstrate solidarity of purpose. I believe that serious discussion must continue at the highest level toward multilateral disarmament. I am distressed that the NATO-Warsaw Pact Conference seems to have bogged down in interminable technical delay. I submit we should press on with those discussions immediately. I urge a demonstration of our intention to carry out our policy of detente. I believe detente can best be achieved by conferences such as are proceeding in Geneva. I urge the government to open up discussions with the Warsaw Pact countries and NATO immediately.
In keeping with my leader and members of the committee, I do not believe we have let this country down one bit by asserting our own independence. We stand as an independent nation. We are not dominated by those in Europe or anywhere else. We are very independent. We are being led forward to assert ourselves- as an entity. I have confidence in the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux). We will maintain our genuine solidarity by keeping troops in Europe.


Mr. Heath Macquarrie (Hillsborough):: Mr. Speaker, it is puzzling to know what the main motion means. Of late it is being said that God is dead. Yesterday and today I have been thinking that whether or not that is true, surely Mackenzie King is still alive! There has been a great effort here to flutter with the

April 24, 1969

hawks and coo with the doves at the same time.
We are today examining NATO itself. We are putting that alliance under scrutiny. We must look at the effect upon us of the dimunition of our role. That is exactly what it is. We must also look at the effect of Canada adopting such a policy. NATO has always been under attack by those who are our enemies. It has always been regarded by them as a militant group, a collection of war-like nations.
We find in the arguments put forward by the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) and others the suggestion that NATO has seemingly become an inhibitor to Canada in the whole field of foreign policy.
In Calgary the Prime Minister stated that NATO had become practically all of our foreign policy. He said we had no foreign policy of any importance except that which flowed from NATO. He said, "We do not want a military alliance or defence policy to pre-empt our choice." Does NATO pre-empt all our choices? Is it NATO which contributes to world tension? Is NATO deterring the detente? Is NATO a threatening alliance? Does NATO really menace eastern Europe? Would Canada be a better and more effective member of the United Nations if we were not a NATO member? Not much mention has been made of the United Nations by the Prime Minister. What would happen if we were a less active or non-member of NATO? Are we less competent in the world scene because of our membership in NATO?
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp) was also in Calgary. He said:
This arrangement gives smaller members of the alliance like Canada a chance to participate in the making of policy on a wide range of major issues of concern to us that we would not have in any other circumstances.
Because of our NATO membership, are we inhibited in our pursuit of peace and in our efforts to play a more meaningful role in diminishing world tension and decreasing ignorance, want and starvation? I submit to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that on the question of suffering in Biafra other members of this alliance were able to do far more than we did and the alliance did not inhibit them. Are our efforts to bridge the gulf between the haves and the have-nots, the developed and developing nations1, vitiated by our membership card in NATO? Is the NATO tag inhibiting the entrance to Peking? One of the first members to go through that door was Britain. Are we inhibited from relationships
[Mr. Macquarrie.l
with the Vatican because we are a NATO member? Hardly! Have we really been tied in such a strait-jacket by our NATO membership? Has there been anything we could have done in the world scene to follow the goal set out by the Prime Minister which we were kept from doing because of being a NATO member?
Is the dimunition of our NATO role being put forward as a means whereby a greater degree of our national budget will be allocated for other activities such as external aid? This we do not hear. Another such suggestion which has been made is that if it is not harmful to our greater and broader efforts, NATO has reached a stage where our contribution can be diminished. It has been said that Europe can defend itself. We must look at this in a thoughtful way. We are not involved in NATO to defend Europe, but in fact to defend ourselves. The Secretary of State for External Affairs in his famous Calgary speech said:
-I cannot escape the conclusion that what happens in Europe matters very much to Canada. Our interests there cover many areas-history, culture, trade and finance, to mention only a few. Perhaps the most fundamental of all, however, relates to the fact that it is in Europe that the vital interests of the superpowers are in starkest confrontation, so that there is the greatest chance of a conflict escalating into a nuclear war. Because of Canada's geographic position between the two superpowers, this war would be fought out above our very heads. This is why Canada has a direct, selfish interest in the prevention of war.
There is no suggestion there that Europe could take care of itself.


Mitchell William Sharp: That was the speech I was going to make when I was interrupted.


Mr. Thompson:: You should have planned your time a little better.


Heath Nelson Macquarrie: I do not want to be interrupted because I do not have much time. NATO by its continuing existence as an international alliance has established quite a record of longevity. It has demonstrated an emotional solidarity and common awareness of values which makes it quite a significant organization. I agree with those who believe it has done far better in military co-operation than in non-military matters. This I deplore and regret.
[DOT] (4:20 p.m.)
This is an area in which we should give an increasingly active lead. There are questions about military obsolescence about which we
April 24, 1969

laymen do not know. I am a bit disturbed when I hear about submarine chasers whose top speed is a little slower than the submarines they are supposed to be chasing. There are questions of hardware. Of course there are. I think it would have been far more helpful in this instance if we had had a clear statement of what we are basing these decisions on. Are we withdrawing troops to save money? Are we to dismantle our military establishment and make an alternative use of this pcfttion of our national budget? This has not been said. No one should suggest that Canada is inhibited by its NATO membership from doing the things which as a highly developed and long-time, internationalist-minded, sensitive nation it should be doing to help other nations.
The hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Brew-in) has gone back to the proposal for a cadre of peacekeepers. This is an attractive suggestion, but the sad part of it is that as I look at the decisions taken in the various bodies of the United Nations there seems not to be as great an acceptance of this idea as there was originally.
There are many decisions on foreign aid which the government could have taken long ago irrespective of whether or not Canada was to remain in NATO. We have a most excellent man directing our international development agency. We have built up a good reputation in the field of foreign aid, although it is true we have made a number of bloopers, but I cannot believe that a country with our limited resources can mount a meaningful program of aid to 64 countries all over the world. Surely we should approach more effectively the matter of foreign aid without divesting ourselves of our NATO role. It is not NATO which is preventing us from being more active in that important field.
I agree with those who stress that the great crisis ahead is between those who belong to the have nations and those who belong to the have-not nations of the world. At the United Nations a few years ago I heard a great statesman say that the decisions for the next generation may very well be decided by the people who live south of the equator, whose problems at present are monumental and whose resources are so very minimal. But there are many things we should do without looking on NATO as an excuse for inaction. There is an area to our south crying out for greater aid. The former British West Indies in the Caribbean area is a place where there are grave problems. A just mixture of

Canadian interest and involvement could do wonderful things there, and perhaps make all the difference between economic and political stability and viability and something else.
I am sorry to say that this argument has been based not upon fundamentals but the suggestion that to change, to be contemporary, is somehow to be profound and to be clever. One remark I noted by the hon. member for St. Paul's (Mr. Wahn), in a speech which impressed me as-I would not like to call it nationalistic jingoism, but if somebody else said that I do not have the argumentation to deny it-was that:
Our policies may sometimes be right; they may sometimes be wrong. But the important thing, to my mind, is that they will be made in Canada.
I say that a homemade fiasco is still a fiasco. The important thing is that these policies be made wisely and well so that they will be in Canada's interests. It is in Canada's interests not to look upon itself only, not to turn inward but to look upon its place in the world scene, to consult with its allies, to look over the opportunities and the challenges of the broad world, and not to rest upon the laurels of being novel or of being excessively nationalistic so that whatever blunders are made we can proudly say in the future that not only did we do something new in the realm of stupidity but we did it alone here in Canada.


Mr. Warren Allmand (Notre-Dame-de Grace):: Mr. Speaker, I intend to support the government motion because it goes in the direction I would like to go, but I want to make it clear that I do not find it completely satisfactory. Much will depend on what is meant by "early steps", and much will depend on what is meant by "planned and phased reduction." I would like "early" to mean as soon as possible, and I would like "planned and phased reduction" to mean a complete withdrawal of our forces from Europe.
When the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) announced this policy on April 3 he said that the cabinet had only agreed to the following propositions, first, that Canada would remain in the NATO alliance and, second, that there would be a planned and phased reduction of Canadian forces in Europe. When he was questioned as to the extent and timing of the phased reduction he announced that these matters would be dealt with in phase two of his study. I understood by this that everything was open, including complete withdrawal. Of course I realize that this is an

April 24, 1969

optimistic interpretation and that the statement could also mean that there could be a reduction of our troops in Europe but not a complete withdrawal. According to my colleague who sits behind me and to my left, it means that Canadian forces will definitely be left in Europe but, as I say, I hope the reduction will lead to a complete withdrawal.
As a member of the External Affairs Committee I participated in the complete study of the NATO question, including the two months' study in Canada and the two weeks' study in Europe. In reply to some of the criticism that was levelled against that committee 1 wish to say that I feel the study the committee made in Europe was extremely valuable. If the Canadian government is going to spend millions of dollars in Europe through defence and external affairs, it is important that the elected representatives of the Canadian people find out how this money is being spent and why.
As a result of our studies I came to the conclusion that we should remain a member of the NATO alliance and that there should be a withdrawal of our troops from Europe. I would like to discuss both of these propositions. The Prime Minister said that our foreign policy should come first and that our military policy should follow our foreign policy objectives. I fully agree. I feel that our foreign policy objectives should be peace between nations, justice between nations, and security for nations from aggression, intervention and domination, and I believe that in pursuing those objectives we should remain in the NATO alliance.
At present in Europe there is a situation that is potentially dangerous for world peace. There is much at stake in Europe which contains the two most completely devastating armed camps in the world, the Warsaw Pact nations and the NATO troops. It is in Europe that a minor incident could easily escalate into a major war quicker than in any other place in the world.
If the confrontation is between the Warsaw Pact and NATO then Canada should be sitting at the council table within NATO to make sure that the policies of NATO are those of detente and disarmament vis-a-vis the Warsaw Pact, rather than of war. Our policy within NATO should be one leading toward detente, as the Harmel report has said and as NATO itself has said on several occasions. It should be a policy of trying to bring about disarmament and limitation of arms with the Warsaw Pact countries. I

would hope that Canada, within NATO, will continue to pursue that policy, especially now following the Czechoslovakian incident which some members of NATO seem to interpret as an opportunity for increasing our armaments in Europe. I would be opposed to that. I would hope we would not use it as an opportunity to escalate the arms race in Europe but would keep cool and try to still bring about some disarmament and some detente.
[DOT] (4:30 p.m.)
If our policy within NATO is one of detente, then I think our military role in NATO must follow our political role. Therefore I would think the only policy for Canada in NATO consistent with a policy of detente is to withdraw our troops from Europe and earmark for NATO troops that will be stationed in Canada.
I should like to discuss the reasons for that policy. Some members who have spoken in this debate, one of whom was the Leader of the Opposition, have said they would like someone in this house to prove it is better for our security to have troops in Canada than to have troops in Europe. Well, if by withdrawing our troops from Europe we bring about a situation of detente, then that in my opinion would be protecting our security. I believe it is in the interests of our security to try to reduce the confrontation in Europe and try to bring about a detente. Therefore I think it is much more in the interests of our security to have our troops here in Canada than in Europe. I do not think it is a natural situation in peacetime for the troops of a country situated across an ocean to be placed in a country in Europe and strung along a so-called front, what would almost appear to be a wartime front.
I also feel that we in Canada with our limited resources are trying to play too many roles. We are not a large country. We are a country of approximately 20 million people. Yet, we find our forces in five areas of the world. We find them within Canada playing a possible defence role. We have troops stationed here for several purposes. We play a military role in the Atlantic and we play a military role in the Pacific with the Pacific arm of our navy. We are playing a peacekeeping role in the United Nations and we have troops in Europe. I have not mentioned the fact that we also have an Arctic Ocean frontier.
April 24, 1969

Many people, especially those in Europe, who look at Canada think of Canada as only an Atlantic nation. It is not. We have ties with Europe and look toward the Atlantic and Europe, but we are also a Pacific nation. We are also a very large nation in territory and yet we have a sparse population. So I feel that if we are to make the best use of our resources for defence and security we must have a specialized role. I see that specialized role as one where we have armed forces stationed in Canada which would be of a nature that they could be used for Canadian purposes, for United Nations peacekeeping purposes and for NATO purposes, but stationed in Canada and earmarked for NATO to be used in an emergency.
Some members who have spoken during this debate have spoken as if our withdrawal of troops from Europe meant a withdrawal from the military role altogether. Several Conservative members have said that this afternoon. Either they have not read the motion or they have not been listening to the debate. Nobody on this side has suggested we should completely withdraw our troops from NATO. Many countries which are members of NATO do not have troops along the east-west German frontier, but they still have a military commitment to NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty does not say that members of NATO must keep troops in Europe. It says that if one of the countries of NATO is attacked the other countries must come to its assistance, all subject to the U.N. charter. As pointed out by the Prime Minister, many countries which are members of NATO have their troops on their own soil playing a home defence role but also earmarked for NATO. When we joined NATO we did not have any troops in Europe. We sent them to Europe only during the Korean war period.
One of the arguments against a policy of keeping troops in Canada rather than in Europe is that there will be a re-emergence of German militarism. It was suggested that with the withdrawal of our troops the gap would have to be filled by the German army. When I was in Europe with the committee we met many German politicians, prominent journalists and military people. I must say that I was greatly impressed by the democratic attitude of the Germans. I personally do not feel that the majority of the people of Germany today have any sympathy whatsoever with militarism or nationalism. I get the impression they are bending the other way. If they are to be our allies I think we must not

be ambivalent in our attitude toward them. If they are to be our allies I believe we should trust them and let them play a role with us in the alliance that is suitable in relation to their size and so on. I do not suggest that they should have nuclear arms or that any other country in the alliance should have nuclear arms. I feel, however, that it is a red herring to bring into the argument a suggestion that we should not withdraw our troops from Europe because this will in some way encourage German militarism.
Second, there is the argument that if we did withdraw our troops from Europe we would not be paying our way or pulling our full load. Again I think this argument fails to recognize the fact that in withdrawing our troops from Europe we would still be earmarking troops for NATO but they would be stationed in Canada. We would be doing the same thing that is being done by many other countries in NATO which are not accused of not paying their way or not pulling their share of the load. I must point out that when people make that type of argument they do not realize that Canada, after all, is a NATO country and that Canadian territory is NATO territory. By keeping our troops in Canada and earmarking them for emergencies we are contributing to NATO and paying our way. As a matter of fact, right now and in the past few years I think we have been paying too much to NATO.
I should like to spend a few minutes discussing some of the arguments raised by other hon. members. I found the speech of the Leader of the Opposition very disappointing. He spoke for approximately 40 minutes and spent the whole time in a negative way attacking the speech made by the Prime Minister. He did not put forward an alternative proposal to that put forward by the Prime Minister.


Francis Andrew Brewin: Would the hon. member permit a question?


William Warren Allmand: I am afraid not. I have only 15 minutes and it goes by quickly. If I have time at the end I would be pleased to answer a question. Even the amendment put forward by the Leader of the Opposition is expressed in negative terms. On the other hand, I am much in sympathy with the amendment put forward by the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands (Mr. Douglas), although I was not too much in sympathy with his speech which was the usual partisan speech filled with demagogic cliches and so

April 24, 1969

on. He also attacked the Prime Minister, but at least he put forward an alternative policy.
The Leader of the Opposition, however, put forward no alternative policy and spent the whole 40 minutes in a very negative way. This was in great contrast to the Prime Minister who did not indulge in personalities and discussed foreign policy at a very high level. Personally I thought he made a very good speech and gave me encouragement that he will finally-
[DOT] (4:00 p.m.)


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order, please. I must interrupt the hon. member to tell him his time has expired.


David Lewis: Mr. Speaker, owing to the time one has, I can only deal with one or two points. I want to say at the outset that I find the announced government policy on NATO to be an unhealthy compromise resulting from a lack of will to do precisely what the right hon. Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) orated about yesterday, namely, to deal with the world of today and refuse to be bound by the actions of yesterday. I also say before I go any farther, and this follows the position our leader expressed yesterday along with the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Brewin), that we cannot vote for the Conservative amendment because, despite its wording which was rather original, obviously what the Conservatives want is the status quo for Canada in NATO and, indeed, to strengthen our military contribution. We do not agree with this and will therefore vote against the amendment.
On April 13 when the Prime Minister first announced his so-called policy, and I have to say that because I do not yet know what it is, I said at a press conference in the absence of my leader that the Prime Minister's statement made that day was imprecise and confusing. That still remains true. His excuse appears to be that he has not yet completed the review of our foreign and defence policies. First, I cannot understand that or why it should take so long in view of the immense resources at the disposal of the government. In any case I would say, without intending to be offensive but very sincerely and firmly, that if the Prime Minister has not yet decided on his policies then he should stop talking as if he had. If he has nothing to tell parliament or the people of Canada he should say so instead of indulging in general lectures which merely add to confusion at home and to uncertainty abroad.
[Mr. Allmand.l
If the Prime Minister's statement means anything at all in so far as one can gather what it means, then his analysis leads to the clear and inevitable conclusion that Canada should withdraw all its forces from Europe as quickly as possible after consultation with its allies. Why do I say that? Time and again the Prime Minister at his press conference on April 3, in his speech on April 12 in Calgary, and in speech yesterday, emphasized that our military contribution in Europe is marginal that it is insubstantial and that our proper role in NATO is political rather than military. We agree with all of that and I agree with him also that the situation in western Europe has changed. When NATO was first established that part of the world was economically devastated and militarily dismantled. Today, fortunately, western Europe is economically and, therefore, militarily strong. The Prime Minister said this on more than one occasion and we agree with him in this analysis.
I say to you, Mr. Speaker, that if the Prime Minister had the courage of his convictions then the clear and inescapable conclusion from this analysis would be that Canada's forces in Europe serve no useful purpose and ought to be totally withdrawn. Instead of this unequivocal policy which the N.D.P. has proposed for a few years, and proposes now, we get from the government vague words about planned and phased reduction of our forces without being told when that reduction will take place, what the size of the reduction will be and at what point it will stop.
What is even more important, as far as I am concerned, is that I simply cannot follow the logic of a government which states that a mechanized brigade and six air squadrons in Europe provide no useful role but that a smaller commitment in Europe would. This is the kind of lack of logic which makes me question the integrity of the proposition that has been pushed on this parliament and the people of Canada.
I was a member of the external affairs committee and travelled through Europe. Every one of us got the impression that I suppose his predilections led him to receive. My experience from meeting with NATO military leaders all over Europe raised a very deep concern about that organization. It led me to the conclusion which I had been gradually working toward, but it emphasized an underlying conviction that NATO has become almost entirely a powerful military alliance.
April 24, 1969

What is worse, when you speak to the leaders of NATO you get the impression, at least I did, that it is almost entirely controlled by military objectives and psychology and that it is under the domination of military leaders. The political role of NATO, I suggest, has become minimal, but lip service continues to be paid to it with no effective steps being taken to seek detente in Europe. Nor has Canada taken any steps in NATO to seek such detente. Indeed, when a while ago the Warsaw Pact issued a direct invitation to meet with the NATO powers to discuss questions of a possible political solution and a reduction of forces in Europe, what did NATO do, with the participation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp) and the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux)? NATO rejected that invitation.


Mr. Cadieux (Labelle):: No.


David Lewis: Yes, it rejected that invitation and substituted for that clear, intelligent and courageous invitation weasel words about the commencement of discussions to find out the subjects in respect of which further discussion might take place.


Léo Alphonse Joseph Cadieux: May I ask the hon. gentleman a question? Does he know that the Budapest communique excluded the United States and Canada from the discussions?


David Lewis: Mr. Speaker, I am aware of the effect of the Budapest communique, but I put it differently. It was limited to European countries on both sides.


Mitchell William Sharp: Do you agree with that?


David Lewis: No.


Mitchell William Sharp: Then why do you think we should accept it?


David Lewis: It would have been wiser to acept the invitation, to arrive there as one NATO organization-


Mitchell William Sharp: We would not have been there.


David Lewis: If they did not appear at that table then the hollowness of their attitude is exposed instead of the steps that were taken to-


Mitchell William Sharp: That is a political attitude, not a constructive one.


David Lewis: It is a perfectly constructive one. Let me tell the minister that every time he does not do anything his excuse is that he

April 24. 1969

though smaller complexes in other countries, is in tact in control of NATO, as it is of other aspects of international and national policies, unfortunately.
I have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the time has come for a country like Canada to use its resources primarily to help raise the level of life in the developing nations, in the knowledge that the elimination of poverty and disease, lifting peoples who are now underdeveloped to a decent level of life, is an essential deterrent against war, an even more essential one than military confrontation. The time has come when Canada should use its resources in this way, rather than wasting them on military commitments of doubtful value, as the Prime Minister himself admits our commitment in Europe is. I suggest-and there is nothing original about this-that the time has come, and is in fact long overdue, when Canada should join with other, smaller countries in a relentless attack upon the insanity of the nuclear terror and on the international military-industrial complex which feeds it.
I suggest there are two facts in the modern world which any viable foreign and defence policy of a country like Canada-I am speaking only of our country-must take into account. The first is that the peace of the world now depends on the insane balance of nuclear terror, a balance that can at any moment be upset, either deliberately by some evil government or by accident by some stupid general. To rely upon the balance of nuclear terror seems to me to ask for the kind of destruction that all of us tremble may some time happen. Therefore in this case a country like Canada, without nuclear capability, not wishing to have any nuclear capability, ought in my opinion to give an immense amount of its resources, an immense amount of its energies, to every aspect of peace and disarmament negotiations in every part of the world. We should do more than that. We should speak out firmly and loudly against the continuing nuclear arms race. We should not be timid about telling Washington that we disapprove of the deployment of A.B.M.'s because they are a danger to the future peace of the world. We should do that.


An hon. Member:: What about Russia?


David Lewis: We should do that with Moscow, too, and every other military power. We should be one of the countries shouting against this kind of behaviour in the world. I am not naive enough to think that merely Canada saying it will produce results, but I

believe in something else and, if it is not true, there is no hope for the world. I believe that if a sufficient number of nations like Canada keep demanding that this insane nuclear arms race cease, if we all do it, if we all leave the military alliances so that no one can point the finger of satellite at us, as they can now, if a great enough number of countries make these demands and co-operate together to do so, at the United Nations and every other forum, eventually the sanity of the world's people will prevail. If this is not possible, there is no hope for the world.
The second major issue before the world is the question of hunger throughout the world and the danger this represents to the peace of the world. We ought to give a great deal of our resources and energies to this sphere of activity, to save and lift up the peoples of the world.
[DOT] (5:00 p.m.)


Mr. Henry Lalulippe (Compion):: Mr. Speaker, it gives me pleasure to say a few words on the world situation, on NATO and on the present economic situation in Canada.
I believe it would be a good idea to give my speech the title: cannons at the expense of bread and Canadian lives. We must first establish peace amongst ourselves in Canada in order to ensure at the same time our security.
At the time present, we are faced with a rather complex international and national situation, as much for the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp), as for the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux), for they must take sides and determine the nation's future, as well as the form of our participation in NATO.
Mr. Speaker, we have to remember, as was said by the leader of the New Democratic party (Mr. Douglas), that for the past 20 years we have contributed to the NATO forces and when we decided to follow that course it was for a major reason but on a temporary basis only. However the years have passed and this contribution continues.
I think the time has come to put an end to it.
The government should withdraw for two years all its troops from NATO and affect instead the money spent on defence to stimulate the Canadian economy, by building houses for the Canadian people who live in slums and pay rents of $200 or $300 a month which they cannot afford.
April 24, 1969

This- is, Mr. Speaker, the humanitarian work we could do. The huge amounts spent on defence could be affected to building houses for the Canadian people, to develop industries with a view to providing work for Canadians. We could then two years later if necessary resume our participation to NATO.
But a pause of two years would enable the Canadian people to stabilize their economy because they are always faced with debts and outstanding taxes, and have to live in constant uncertainty only to pay off war debts or to contribute to some international defence system which might never be used.
Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that so much progress should enable us to provide our people and the destitute in other countries with the things that are essential to the well-being of man. Since we are called upon to live in a society where affluence and poverty exist side by side, our first duty, it seems to me, is to secure peace at home.
In the face of atomic war threats, there is no more urgent task than to ensure the protection of humanity. Rulers and ordinary citizens are all in the same boat, and if we are unable to find an effective means of securing peace, we are doomed to certain destruction.
In the face of all those nuclear arms and destruction hardware, we cannot afford to keep on maintaining our armed forces, which will be powerless against such tremendous weapons.
Mr. Speaker, people must put order and justice in their daily life, which is not what we are doing at present. We certainly do not put this principle into practice when we introduce bills such as the omnibus bill.
The solution to our problem is to live as men, to respect our fellowmen and to give every individual the opportunity to grow and to develop his personality.
Mr. Speaker, NATO forces should be reinforced, according to some people, under the pretext of fighting communism. But we are not even able to solve the problems of hunger and slums at home; yet, those are situations likely to promote communism. It is not with defence, or arms, or cold war that we shall fight communism.
With all our resources, our human capital, our monetary capital, our technology and our scientific research, we should be able to face communism.
Mr. Speaker, even if we are decided to do all that, we must be fully aware that it is only a materialistic force which will be used

to contain communism for some time through strength and violence, but we shall never succeed by those sole means in ensuring order, justice and peace.
If we only set might against might and counterbalance ideology, we will never beat the communist world. Neither could we do so through fear or violence, in this atomic age.
We would only destroy ourselves because our system of debts and taxes, even with Canada's 21 million people and inexhaustible resources and with the help of American technology and increased aid. Our tremendous national debt paralyses our productive activities, our purchasing power and the development of our productivity.
We can no longer produce because industries are unable to borrow money at 10 per cent or even at 24 per cent.
If we increase our expenditures for defence and armaments in proportion to our responsibilities the government will have to increase taxes, when our debt is so high that owners have to sell their homes to pay taxes and the tribute to a few individuals who control the economic life of this country.
Without regard for human beings who have the right to live, all our initiatives are affected by the same cancer eating away the honest comfort of the people, in Canada as well as in Europe and in other parts of the world.
[DOT] (5:10 p.m.)
The same system is found everywhere, but with a few variations. We could, if we wanted to, make use of all our human and physical resources and continue to expand both our respective and our common means of defence.
We could also intensify research in all sectors and increase production in all fields, thus creating jobs for the unemployed who consider themselves as useless members of society and who live in insecurity, hardship and poverty. Those people form too large a part of our population.
The situation could be improved, provided we are determined to deal with the problems, instead of letting them grow until a war comes along to upset everything.
Technical problems call for technical remedies. That is why, Mr. Speaker, we are unable to find any solutions.
Hitler proved to us that war was not only a question of money, but a question of weapons and material. Germany did not lose the war because it lacked money, but because of a shortage of troops and material.

April 24, 1969

During the war, money was flowing freely all over the world. It was then a case of killing, slaughtering, destroying. However, when the war came to an end, the monetary problems and the European problems emerged once again. Development is only possible through borrowing, being loaded with debt, at extremely high interest rates. The rates varied from 2 to 3 per cent during the war. They have now reached 7, 9 and 10 per cent.
As far as the building of houses is concerned, we should consider the things I have just said. That is where the shoe pinches, that is what causes so much misery and so much worries to humanity in the sullied history which is ours. We could manage to find a solution for a good many of our problems by making financially possible what is physically possible, in every country, in accordance with their resources in manpower and material.
Mr. Speaker, in order to give my ideas a more concrete form, I would like the House to study a resolution regarding economy and finance. We are dealing with war and defence, and not of financial matters. We shall levy taxes, we shall overtax people-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. member but his time has expired.


Robert Norman Thompson: Mr. Speaker, the North Atlantic Treaty story goes back to the end of world war II. The western allies, demobilized and disarmed, determined to reconstruct and rebuild. Russia, with her forces intact, embarked on a program of expansion in Europe through communist subversion. By 1948 Berlin was blockaded and free Czechoslovakia fell to Soviet expansion. It is well to remind ourselves of these things. The western nations decided it was time to say to the communists: "Thus far-no farther." This required the organization of a collective defence system which could provide a credible shield for the entire Atlantic area. Thus the North Atlantic Treaty came to being and NATO was born. This was in 1949, just 20 years ago.
During the 20-year interval the people of Western Europe have enjoyed peace and prosperity. Why has this been so? The NATO-created balance of forces and a mutual determination to resist have prevented any further communist gains in Europe. As long as the Soviet Union shows no sign of reducing her forces, this balance must be maintained. The people of Europe understand these things

very well, even though some in Canada do not. We who were with the defence committee in Europe recognized this attitude in every country we visited; it was reflected by everyone we spoke with.


William Warren Allmand: How did you know?


Robert Norman Thompson: I am referring to those who talked with us even though some of us may not have understood what they were saying.
It is strange that neither the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) nor any of the speakers on the government side have mentioned Czechoslovakia in this debate though in every country we visited every official to whom we spoke emphasized the events of last August when talking to us. Not one member on the other side has pointed out that the Warsaw Pact countries have continued a heavy military build-up.
The statistics are evidence of this situation. The combined strength of the Warsaw Pact countries in direct confrontation with the west is 170 divisions of ground forces with 7,000 aircraft. Combined NATO forces total 76 divisions and only 3,200 aircraft. In the central European sector where the Canadian forces are deployed the picture is even more lopsided. There are 100 ground divisions on the Warsaw Pact side with 3,400 aircraft. On the combined NATO side there are 26 divisions and 2,000 planes. These are the statistics lor last year.
I come now to a further point, and I have not heard any member on the government side mention this either. Last year NATO reduced its forces by 80,000 troops. If the Warsaw Pact countries had any intention to de-escalate they would have decreased their forces in like number, as it was expected they might do because an attitude of detente was present in Europe. But this did not happen. Instead, the Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia.
Consider the case of Norway. At the time of joining NATO Norway required that no foreign troops should be located on its soil and that no nuclear arms should be placed there. With such a policy one might expect that the U.S.S.R. would place a lesser force on its common border with Norway than in other parts of Europe. But this has not been the case. There has been a continued build-up along this northern frontier as well.
It is obvious that Soviet policy regarding NATO is clear and simple: first, to weaken the will of individual NATO members to resist and, second, to split NATO into its
April 24, 1969

European and United States components. I contend this is what the Prime Minister is bringing to pass with the policy he has now enunciated. We hear continued talk from some members of the government party and of the N.D.P. about the United States industrial-military complex. But I say that the industrial-military complex in the United States is ruled by a democratic government. Those same hon. members say nothing about the industrial-military complex in Russia where it is not ruled by a democratic process but rather where it is a law unto itself.
We need to remind ourselves that Khrushchev no longer rules in the Kremlin. The present rulers of the Kremlin are all older men trained under Stalin, men who have obviously reverted to a Stalinistic policy which, under Khrushchev, had perhaps begun to change. There is no evidence in modern history that the communists have ever been ready to talk in face of weakness. On the other hand, that there is plenty of evidence that they do talk in face of strength. What happened in Czechoslovakia is clear evidence that the Soviets will use brute force whenever they can get away with it. This is why the conventional role of military equipment has not yet seen its day in Europe. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. The NATO alliance is just as necessary today on the military side as it was in 1949.
We are asked now to accept the views of a man who has been entrusted with the great responsibility of the office of Prime Minister but who holds a pre-conceived idea of the world based on a doctrinaire ideology that the U.S.S.R. is mellowing, that there is no longer any danger of confrontation. Well, Mr. Speaker, the United Kingdom minister of defence told the Committee on External Affairs and National Defence that this was an ideological perch. He urged that the committee come down from that ideological perch and face the facts.
The Hon. Mr. Denis Healey said that the practical reality of life was that the basis of security and peace in Europe still depended upon a strong NATO. The day might come, he added, when de-escalation of the military aspect would be possible, and Britain would welcome it when it came, but under the present leadership and policies of the U.S.S.R. it was not yet a reality.
I would remind members of the New Democratic party, including the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Brewin) and the hon. member for York South (Mr. Lewis), that the

labour-socialist government in the United Kingdom, which they claim to be a party similar to their own, made it very clear that the policy advocated by the N.D.P. in this country was wrong. Today Britain is increasing its commitment to NATO in response to the situation which exists at the present time.
The Prime Minister said yesterday that those who criticize his policy as being isolationist have a fixation on old wars and old problems. I say to the Prime Minister that he is altogether wrong in this assumption. It is he who lives in a dream world, refusing to face the facts of life in 1969. His philosophy is not new. He promulgated it when he was part of the Peace Research Institute a few years ago. Chamberlain did the same in 1938. The only people he pleases are the bitter isolationists in the United States and those who smirk behind the curtains. Certainly he is not pleasing the Canadian people.
[DOT] (5:20 p.m.)
On December 1, 1968, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion revealed that 64 per cent of the Canadian people believed that Canadian troops should continue to stay in Europe as part of the NATO forces. No wonder the government is split on this issue. The consensus of government members on the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence was that we should continue to play our part in NATO. This difference of opinion caused Senator Aird to resign. He refused to accept the kind of policies being advocated at present. No wonder the government is split in this regard.
Yes, Mr. Speaker, I sympathize with the Prime Minister. For one who took the position during world war II that the war was being fought between the imperialists and had nothing to do with Canada, and who in the years following world war II took another, well known position it must now be extremely difficult to enunciate a realistic defence policy. I do not believe the leader of our nation has the right to formulate a minority policy which would mean a breaking away of Canadian foreign policy from that of our friends and allies. Neither has he the right to discuss and formulate defence policies which are out of context with what is going on today in the world.
The Prime Minister talked about Canada withdrawing to a continental role and of his hope that Canada will lead in the field of disarmament research. I ask, what has the 17-nation United Nations commission on

April 24, 1969

disarmament been doing for the past ten years? Those 17 nations, of which Canada is one, have done a commendable job. Has that commission succeeded? No, it has not. I remind the Prime Minister that the secret of disarmament will be found in the willingness of the U.S.S.R. to agree to disarmament. It is as simple as that, and the representatives of the 17 nations on the commission know it.
Recently the members of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence visited four NATO countries in Europe, one neutral nation and one non-aligned nation. Without exception all those nations did not want Canada to weaken NATO by withdrawing from it. Neither did our senior diplomatic and military personnel serving in Europe, who are authorities on this subject, wish us to withdraw.
It is interesting to note that Canada's defence budget, when it is related to gross national product, is far lower than that of any other NATO country. When he appeared before our committee the foreign minister of Belgium was asked what he thought of the possibility of Canada withdrawing in whole or in part from NATO. He answered quickly by saying: "Such action is incredible. We smaller nations need and must have the support of a larger middle power such as Canada, free and freedom loving." The statesmen of Europe said that the purpose of NATO is to keep the peace in Europe. It is to prevent hell in Europe and not to create heaven.
I submit that the purpose of NATO in part is to give the smaller nations a collective power and force which without NATO they would not have. They must have that force and influence both within and without NATO. This applies not only to the military role of NATO but also to the economic, political and cultural aspects as well. May I also point out that NATO has a secondary function, that of keeping the balance of power in Europe. Here I refer to the fact that as part of NATO Germany is a lesser threat to Russia or to anyone else than she would be if she were on her own and out of NATO.
I am convinced, Mr. Speaker, that Canada's role in NATO is a positive one. It is a morale-building role. We uphold the morale of the smaller nations of the Atlantic community. The purpose of NATO also is to bring about strength through collective security. It is to strengthen neighbours and friends who are part of the Atlantic community. Above all, Mr. Speaker, NATO is a peacekeeping force. In fact, when we participate in

NATO we participate in the most important peacekeeping role there is today in the world.
It is inevitable that this situation will change, and I hope it will change for the better. I hope that when changes come we shall be able to adapt to them. In the meantime our role in NATO must continue as at present, I also hope that our role on the economic, political and cultural planes will be enlarged. At present, however, reality demands that we should remain in NATO and that we should make our military contribution in Europe. Any new role to be undertaken ought to be worked out in co-operation with our NATO allies. There is no other way for us to act.


Léo Alphonse Joseph Cadieux: Mr. Speaker, I am pleased to speak after my good friend from Red Deer (Mr. Thompson) in this debate, because he has just stated, I believe, that after all he fully supports the policy advocated by the government. In fact, he has just said that we must keep our membership in NATO and that we must make a realistic contribution in Europe. This is precisely the significance of the governmental policy.
My friend, the hon. member for Charlevoix (Mr. Asselin), referred a while ago to the various statements which I have already made in this connection. I do not know if he was trying to embarrass me, but if so, he failed, because in the past I have said two things, among others, namely that I considered NATO as being essential to the security of Canada and that it had a part to play in addition to its military role.
Now, after extensive studies by the ministerial committee, we have in the first place rejected any suggestion leading to the neutrality of Canada. In the second place, we have stated that we adhered to the principles of collective security and thirdly, that we were going to maintain our membership in NATO. Consequently, I do not see why the position of the government could in any way embarrass me now, as a result of my previous statements.
Mr. Speaker, I have also stated on several occasions that, in my opinion, those defence matters should also seek both a detente and disarmament.
Unlike my good friend from York South, I am convinced that the Atlantic Alliance has made some valid efforts which furthermore have already proved successful.
April 24, 1969



For example, he raised the matter of the Budapest communique, and he said that Canada had never taken any initiative towards a detente, and that we had advised to reject the proposal from the Warsaw group.
I would remind him that the communique of the meeting in Washington insisted precisely on the fact that the participating nations had asked that the proposal be examined carefully and that there be efforts made to overcome the obstacles which, at first sight, seemed to prevent us from initiating the necessary negotiations right now.
We have also indicated that the discussions on the Budapest communique resulted from a Canadian paper on East-West relations. Therefore, I sincerely believe, Mr. Speaker, that to the extent that such action can be effective, Canada has already made a useful contribution to the cause of disarmament through NATO.
At the time my good friend opposite was Minister of National Defence, our participation to NATO was reduced as it was last year or this year, when I announced that we had to close the Zweibriicken base. The opposition did not blame us, because it was a realistic decision. By concentrating our forces in two bases, we were able to save money in the fields of administration and staff.
It was said also that no government member reacted when Czechoslovakia was invaded. Has it been forgotten, for example, that our reaction was to delay the decision to make a 20 per cent reduction in our air forces? That was how the Canadian government reacted to the invasion of Czechoslovakia.

[DOT] (5:30 p.m.)


Robert Norman Thompson: Might I just say one word? I was referring-


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member has had his full time.


Léo Alphonse Joseph Cadieux: Mr. Speaker, we have now reached phase 2 of this long-term study, as was announced by the Prime Minister. It is now up to the Minister and to the Department of National Defence to translate the government's decision into military and realistic terms.

The purpose of this phase is to determine the kinds of forces and equipment best suited
to carry out the military roles to meet defence policy objectives outlined in the statement of principle issued by the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) on April 3, 1969. It is a military planning phase. It involves detailed military plans and since a change in the operation of a complex force, is also involved, some hon. members will appreciate that considerable time inevitably will be taken before it is completed. In this process, we will be considering, inter alia, a number of alternative plans for the reduction of our forces stationed in Europe, and what type of forces we should continue to maintain to enable us to contribute effectively to collective security abroad.
In his statement yesterday, Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister said that Canada's resources, although immense, are not limitless. Let me add, sir, that the share of these resources at the disposition of the government also is not limitless, and that defence is one of many competing demands made upon these resources. Amongst the objectives of the government's defence policy outlined in the statement issued by the Prime Minister on April 3, there are two which I wish to emphasize.
First, that our forces will be capable of playing important roles in collective security and peace keeping. This, sir, is not an isolationist or fortress America objective. Second, that the structure, equipment and training of our forces must be compatible with their performance of the four roles: the surveillance of our territory, the defence of North America, support of NATO, and international peace keeping. Ini their present roles, our forces committed to NATO require different equipment and different training from the forces we maintain in Canada for national purposes and to carry out international peace keeping missions. The differences or incompatibilities in maintaining two different kinds of forces increase our defence costs and, if continued in the future, would increase them even more.
An objective of our current studies is, therefore, to develop in the next few years fully compatible forces, which will provide at the same time a capacity to play important roles in collective security and peace keeping. Unless all are prepared to accept a large increase in our defence expenditures, the present roles of our forces now in Europe limit our ability to achieve the posture for the Canadian forces which the government believes appropriate for the future. To overcome this, we must start now to convert our

April 24, 1969

forces from their present roles in Europe and to plan the reduction of the total number of Canadian forces which are stationed there. The size and timing of these reductions remains to be decided when our planning is completed.
We have said all along that all this would be done in consultation with our allies. I do not see where we differ with the members on the other side on this particular point. The government has stated that it will begin consultations with our NATO allies on our proposals for the planned and phased reduction of the Canadian forces stationed in Europe at the ministerial meeting of the NATO Defence Planning Committee, which is to be held at the end of May of this year.
The normal procedure used by the NATO member nations to consult with each other regarding any changes which they plan to make in their forces assigned or earmarked for assignment to the integrated NATO commands, such as the Allied Command in Europe or the Allied Command Atlantic, is the NATO defence planning review. The May meeting of the Defence Planning Committee will initiate a new cycle in the NATO defence planning review, which for the first time will be carried out over a period of two years.
The main task of the defence ministers at this meeting will be to decide, in the light of an appreciation of the military situation to be presented by the NATO military authorities, what guidance, political, economic and financial, should be given to the NATO military planners as the basis for their preparation of the over-all NATO force plans for the years 1971 to 1975, inclusive. The major NATO commanders and the NATO military committee will develop their force plans in the light of the guidance provided by the ministers. Again, I refer to some of the remarks that this is entirely a military organization controlled by generals. This is not so. The political direction is clearly indicated in that procedure.
NATO force planning must take into account the military plans of the member nations, and I think it only reasonable, at the beginning of a new NATO planning cycle, that Canada should provide its allies and the NATO military staffs with as much indication of its planning intentions as is possible. It is my expectation, Mr. Speaker, that phase II of our defence policy review will have advanced sufficiently by the end of May, that I shall be able to present to my NATO colleagues a fairly detailed outline of that part of our

force plans affecting our present NATO undertakings.
Hon. members will be aware that national undertakings to commit forces to the NATO commands are given for a period of one year. Our present undertakings extend to the end of 1969. As a part of the NATO defence planning review running separately from, but in parallel with, the development of the over-all force plans for the years 1971-75, we shall be asked during the next few months to inform NATO what forces we plan to commit to the NATO commands during the year 1970. Our plans for this one year will be reviewed with the NATO military authorities and our allies in the fall and we shall be asked to adopt them as firm commitments until the end of 1970 at the ministerial meeting in December. I trust that this explanation will clear any misunderstandings that have recently come to light.
As the house will know, Mr. Speaker, well established procedures exist, through the Permanent Joint Board on Defence and other bodies, for continuing consultation with our United States allies on matters affecting our joint efforts in the defence of North America. As the plans to implement our new policy take shape, we shall be using these procedures to discuss with the United States government how we can best contribute in future to the defence of the continent. Joint studies have already begun on the plan for modernization of the system of bomber defence. We shall be able to decide how we can most usefully contribute both to the surveillance of our air space and to the modernized antibomber system as those studies proceed. We shall also be seeking early occasions to consult the United States government as to how we can employ the maritime and land forces which we require for our national purposes to the best advantage in furthering our mutual interests in defending the continent.
As hon. members will understand, this period of planning and consultation will take some time. No doubt during this time there will be conjecture as to what we plan to do. As Minister of National Defence, I am concerned that these conjectures will have an upsetting effect on the members of our forces. We, as members of parliament awaiting the results on election night, can understand the feelings of the forces during this period.
[DOT] (5:40 p.m.)
It will be a difficult period during which time a number of changes will be discussed
April 24, 1969

and examined by the Defence Staff. Some of these plans will be incorporated into the over-all plan and others will be discarded. I want to assure hon. members, and especially I want to assure all of the members of the Canadian Armed Forces, that our plans will not be announced until we feel confident that every option has been fully analysed by itself and in relation to other options. I want to repeat to the forces that conjecture will be simply conjecture.
I am sure, Mr. Speaker, that hon. members will agree that defence problems never remain static. The members of the Canadian Armed Forces have demonstratively proved that they are ready and able to adapt to any new change, perhaps more than any other segment of our society. The Canadian Armed Forces must continually make readjustments to meet changing defence problems. As hon. members are well aware, the members of the Canadian Armed Forces have been undergoing a change towards unification for the past few years. It has not been an easy task, but their professionalism and sense of duty have overcome many of the obstacles.
Now, we must undertake new tasks to meet the new policy roles. How these tasks will be carried out, as I said before, is being examined by the Defence Staff. I am sure that we can expect the continued high degree of professionalism from the forces that they have so ably demonstrated in the past. In return, I think every Canadian should, by whatever means he can, recognize that our forces have made many sacrifices in the past and have endured many hardships in the performance of their duty. This is a part of their life which they are willing to accept, providing the objectives are clear and sensible.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order, please. I am afraid the minister's time has expired and the only way we could proceed with a question is by unanimous consent. If there is unanimous' consent to extend the minister's time, then we could allow the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Brewin) to put a question. Is there unanimous consent?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Francis Andrew Brewin: May I put a question to the minister?


Léo Alphonse Joseph Cadieux: By all means.


Francis Andrew Brewin: During the debate the subject of Canada's contribution and attitude towards anti-ballistic missiles was raised. I appreciate

the minister did not have time to deal with that subject, but will he arrange to discuss it as soon as possible with the Committee on National Defence and External Affairs? I think it is a subject of great importance and interest.


Léo Alphonse Joseph Cadieux: Mr. Speaker, what I would have to say would depend on whether the meeting was held in camera or not. I have had a brief prepared, which could be very extensive. It was not prepared by military people but by scientists of the Defence Research Board, and it could be presented to the committee.


Francis Andrew Brewin: Thank you.


Mr. J. M. Forreslall (Darimouih-Halifax East):: Mr. Speaker, my remarks, following immediately upon the comments of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux), will be a little bit disjointed. I would like to make some comments on the minister's explanations', but in the absence of a text it is difficult to bring the whole thing into clear focus. I hope that later this evening someone will have an opportunity to deal with one or two points that the minister attempted to clarify, but about which questions1 were left dangling as a result of his explanations. The matter raised with him by direct question just a moment ago is one of them.
In the context of any defence review, it is difficult to ignore what is topical and of major concern. Here, I refer to the A.B.M. system. It is a matter of understandable regret that the minister was not able to deal with it. It is also a matter of regret that he was not able to give us more specific information, particularly from the standpoint of those who are serving in our armed forces. As long as questions such as this remain' unanswered there will be uncertainty and fear in the minds of officers and men, not only among those serving in continental Europe but also those serving in Canada.
I join with everybody else who has said that we would welcome a proper opportunity to get out of the business of war, out of anything that has to do with war, so that we could) bring our troops home from Europe. As a matter of fact in that context, we would even welcome the disbandonment of Maritime Command, but I caution the minister in any review he undertakes not to lay a finger on it.
I intend to restrict my remarks to the report of the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. That report

April 24. 1969

represents several months of concentrated effort on the part of 30 men, not to mention 16 eminent witnesses from the academic and other fields in Canada and from as far away as Germany.
I think the questions and the arguments that developed were sound. The witnesses placed well thought out positions before the committee and these were deeply considered by members of the committee. The headings in the report are indicative of the extent to which witnesses and members went in trying to arrive at some rational conclusion on what Canada's defence posture should be in relation to NATO.
The committee dealt briefly with Canada's membership in the United Nations. We indicated to this house and to the country that we did not feel Canada was directly menaced by any threat of invasion, and that the threat to Canada lay elsewhere, primarily in Europe. We reviewed our existing alliances. I hope that the Minister of National Defence will include these in his review because I doubt if there is a living Canadian who can recite all 47 of them.
We dealt with NATO, with its history and its provisions. We were all very much aware of the role that Canada had to play within the terms of that alliance. We were all aware that we were not committed to send troops to Europe. We touched on NORAD and indicated to the people of Canada that members of the committee had not agreed on any definitive roles in this context. We felt the committee should go further into this matter in the near future. Our present military contribution to NATO was thoroughly reviewed, both here at home and by a physical tour of Europe.
[DOT] (5:50 p.m.)
We dealt with the question of neutrality for Canada. I might say I was pleased to see the government's rejection of this as an optional role for Canada at this particular time. I am one of those who has long believed we cannot afford the luxury of neutrality. We went on to deal with the question of whether or not Canada should rely on the United States for its sole protection. Here, we get closer to the matters with which I should like to deal. The presentations made before the committee in some part-not in whole because there was considerable opposition to this-argued that Canada could substantially reduce the amount of money presently being spent on defence because the geographic proximity of the United States makes it necessary for the
[Mr. Forrestall.l
United States, in a sense, to defend Canada in order to defend itself. This was referred to I think as the so-called "free ride" theory. These arguments were rejected by the committee. Quite to the contrary, there is a conviction among all members of the committee I am sure, and among most Canadians with whom I have had an opportunity to discuss this, that Canada should be prepared to incur its fair and reasonable share of military responsibility in the world. Particularly, we must be prepared to do that and indeed are prepared to do that, so far as our relations with the United States are concerned.
The question of foreign aid being substituted for defence expenditures was rejected by the committee. I indicate to the minister, as he is probably well aware, that this is a question the committee probably will want to examine in some depth at a very early opportunity. The question of our peacekeeping role has been dealt with. In this connection the minister surely is well aware, much more so than the members of the committee, of the difficulty in pursuing this as a primary line of defence posture for Canada.
This leads us to the impact of the effect of Canada's alliance membership, not only our political affiliation but our full role within our means within the integrated military structure of NATO. In our report at page 35, the second last paragraph, there is this conclusion:
*-Canada's influence with other nations of the world, including the non-aligned and developing nations-
The so-called third world.
-will be determined more by the degree of independence, objectivity and fairness which Canada exhibits in its relations with other countries than by its alliance associations.
My dear friend from Hillsborough posed a number of questions which I think are valid. I would repeat one of them. He asked in what way does our association with NATO and NATO's- integrated military structure inhibit those- things that the so-called doves would pursue with eagerness and ait the expense of Canada making a fair and equitable contribution to the defence of the western world. I fail to see any way. I fail to see any real argument that we should not bear the cost of maintaining a physical presence in Europe. At -least I fail to see one that would persuade any individual who has bothered to look into the question-.
Indeed, it is my understanding the cost of keeping our troops in Europe is approximately $20 million. I am perfectly aware that the
April 24. 1969

paper figures run somewhere in the order of $140 million. In the absence of a clearly enunciated policy in respect of what we would do with these troops when we bring them home, that is whether they would be employed in the surveillance of our territory and whether or not maritime command might form the basis for a specialized military role, and ini the absence of any indication that we would substantially expand our air capability here in North America or our ground troops, I can only conclude that it is premature to seriously consider even a phased reduction. I think we all know a phased reduction will mean a total reduction.
To those who have supported the government motion in the hope that a phased plan of reduction will mean the withdrawal from NATO of only a few troops, I say they are whistling in the dark. They know very well, as do all of us, that once reduction starts, phased or otherwise, it will be total. If the Minister of National Defence remains in that capacity I predict he will find shortly after August, the first point at which we can indicate to our partners in the Alliance that we intend to withdraw in one year's time, that it will be a sorry day for Canada and its integrity among not only the western nations of the world but among all the countries of the world.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: It being six oclock this sitting stands suspended until 8 p.m.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 8 p.m.
Mr. Gerald Laniel (Beauharnois):: Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Esternal Affairs and National Defence committee and of the Defence committee since 1963, it is my duty to take part in this debate on the Canadian contribution to NATO. I fully support the government and the motion presented to the house.
The study undertaken during the last months has enabled me to come to certain conclusions which might even go somewhat beyond the views publicly expressed by the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau).
I must admit that my views have changed progressively during the past five years, especially since the visit of the committee to Halifax in 1964, my trip to Berlin in November of

the same year with the NATO parliamentary delegation, the debate on the unification of the armed forces and finally this study by the committee.
Mr. Speaker, I must confess that sometimes I felt that I was going through so much brainwashing with regard to military matters that I was convinced for a while that no change in our foreign defence policies was possible unless that status quo was maintained.
On some occasions and in particular during trips and visits by members of the committee, I had a similar impression of being brainwashed by some military personnel. I first woke up when I finally realized that many other members around me were under the same pressures. Of course, as a veteran I was certainly slower than others to realize it because at that time you were either a member of the team or you were not. You had to agree with the commitments, the participation of Canada, and to accept without any reservation, the general policy of NATO and NORAD. Then, you were a responsible member of parliament, a representative of the people, who had the privilege of sticking out his chest and of being proud of the international stature of Canada, even though it was almost dictated to us by others and at times beyond our means.
The morale of our troops came first, as well as that of our generals, our admirals, not to mention that of the generals of our allies. The morale of our troops is most important, but not to the extent-and I realize that today- of keeping us from even thinking of the possibility of studying other possibilities for our external and our defence policies.
It is also true that the efficiency of our Canadian forces is recognized throughout the world and not merely with regard to our participation to NATO; our forces are also on duty in Cyprus and elsewhere. Why can our present role under SACEUR and SACLANT not be changed? Why has Canada's participation become sacrosanct to the extent where our allies, especially the military leaders in NATO, cannot even conceive of our changing it?
On the committee's last trip to Europe, I even argued a bit with an American general about this. He simply could not understand why Canada should consider revising its military participation to NATO. In reply, I said this and I quote:

Canada as a small nation with its limited financial capability is just as proud as others and just as

April 24, 1969

proud as the United States, and it likes to do small things in a big way, giving them particularly a Canadian identification.
[DOT] (8:10 p.m.)

And he was quite surprised.
In times of peace, even when it seems uncertain, we should assign our armed forces to more correlated roles, and give them functions within peace organizations, or with the United Nations.
That would help to coordinate the work of the Army, the Navy and Air Force.
It is all very nice to go to Europe to Halifax, to win trophies and competitions-and at this stage, I wish to praise our brigade, our air division in Europe, and our Canadian Atlantic Force-but it is important to know, considering the tactics and present constitution of NATO, whether we would win if a war broke out.
Mr. Speaker, it is time we stopped taking pride in winning competitions because the ribbons we earn are costly for Canada. I agree, to give NATO credit for that, because as a rule, I believe in NATO and recognize its merits.
Surely, the balance of forces in Europe has been partly responsible for the absence of conflicts on the continent for the past twenty years. But by promoting that organization alone have we really made progress as regards detente and dialogue?
Will the arms race become a permanent thing? Will confrontation on the continent be a current thing 20 years from now, when our children have taken over? I hope Mr. Speaker.
That is why the fact that Canada is presently reviewing its defence policy, particularly as regards our participation in NATO, takes on a special importance, because Canada is thereby showing that it is truly concerned with the problem of the Atlantic Alliance. That is why everybody is concerned, everybody wonders if it will weaken NATO, which may serve to remind our allies that this international Alliance must do more to reduce the risks of this confrontation in Europe.
Up until now, it seems we have always asked at various meetings and various levels: where do we stand? And now, the moment has come when we must ask ourselves where we are going.
Mr. Speaker, I must confess that I have never really been satisfied with the report of
[Mr. Laniel.l
the committee on external affairs and national defence, of which I am a member. I have nothing to say against its general contents, but I am very disappointed with the third part, which contains recommendations that I see as very timid and conservative, especially as to the future role of Canadian Forces. I realize that the door is still open, because it seems that the purpose was to appease those who wanted some change, and they were somewhat taken in. Moreover, I had no intention to submit a minority report.
However, I wish I had been able to convince the members of the committee-and I tried to do so-to include a recommendation suggesting that Canada should indicate officially to her allies her intention to change the role of Canadian forces in Europe, and to enter immediately into discussions on this possibility.
In my opinion, the Canadian armed forces must become a more homogeneous, ultramobile conventional military force where the three services, the army, the navy and the air force, must operate jointly. This kind of military force would give us more flexibility in the use of our troops for NATO, the North American defence and the United Nations.
Even if we wanted to recall our heavy brigade and our air division, we would not know what to do with them. This operation would be costly and useless. I do not mean that we have made a mistake when we accepted our present commitments, but today we must start to think of altering them. If we only had ultra-mobile troops for multiple purposes but without nuclear weapons, a reduction of our forces in Europe would have less disastrous consequences and would not bother everybody.
Due to the possibility of a decision to carry out the complete withdrawal of our forces-I do not advocate this today, but it could happen if conditions changed-I say that it would be possible to take such a decision without completely disorganizing the European defence under a single command.
Mr. Speaker, I would like to conclude by stating some of my views on the defence policy of Canada. I do not pretend that I have in hand all the facts which would enable me to justify my conclusions and I do not know whether our allies would accept them. It is their problem and not mine. This is why I wish to respect all the same the views of others. I feel that it is time to alter our defence policy. Let us not be diffident at least with our allies.
April 24, 1969

I do not see how Canada could isolate itself in neutrality. That seems to me unthinkable, and the more so since the other countries in the world will never consider Canada as a neutral or non-aligned country, first of all and in particular because we are next door to the United States.
However, as I said before, we should change our role within the NATO forces and even foresee a long-term phasing out of our establishment, when tension eases in Europe, and thereby perhaps reminding our allies to be prepared to act more positively, and even sooner than expected, so as to accelerate the process.
As concerns our contribution to SACLANT, I have been puzzled about it ever since 1965. I wonder why, indeed, our Navy keeps chasing submarines in the Atlantic, especially if one considers how much it is costing us, particularly when it is time to renew our equipment.
Mr. Speaker, Canada owes it to itself to be identified, as it was in the past, with an international force known the world over, and I do not see why, especially since we discussed the Defence estimates this week, we could not find a way to reduce considerably our armed forces' salaries by establishing in Canada some kind of service-be it called compulsory or voluntary-in which young Canadians would be enlisted. We could then ask them to join a Canadian peace force. They would not necessarily be required to become experts or to make a military career of it, but simply to hold on to an ideal, as Canadians, in order to serve in Cyprus, in the Congo or anywhere else where their services could be needed.
Mr. Speaker, the Canadian forces are made up of specialists. We have noticed from the estimates that they include more chiefs than Indians, since the number of private soldiers represents only 20 per cent of a total of 90,000 men.
I think however that by changing our defence policy to make our forces more homogeneous, we could have a place for volunteers willing to specialize in defence and, by the same token, a special branch for young people in order to attract more of them into our armed forces. We could ask them if necessary to sacrifice one year of their life for their country and for the promotion of peace.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: Order, order!


Mr.  R. Gordon L. Fairweaiher@Fundy-Royal: Mr. Speaker, it is interesting to reflect on

the number of speakers in a debate of this sort when the time limit for speeches is set at 15 minutes. It means that there can be participation from the back as well as the front benchers. We in Canada are fortunate that there are no political implications in the results of our National Hockey League games. In the city of Prague, where I was last week, the downtown buildings are marked with the results of two games of political and other importance to the people of Czechoslovakia. The scores are marked 4:3, 2:0, and the admonition is to remember, remember. Unfortunately, these admonitions are in chalk. At the institute of philosophy at Charles University the billboards, still of a transient nature, carried the projected weather reports advising of storms and thunder ahead, and inside the storm clouds the students had drawn Russian tanks. The slogans, of course, were gestures of defiance. Perhaps it can be said that because of this defiance, and that of the journalists as well as the trade unionists, the Soviet Union had no alternative but to cause the resignation of Dubcek. Just as in 1938 the poet, Edna Millay wrote: "There is no balm in Gilead", so in 1968 and 1969 there is no balm in the western world to salve the agony of Czechoslovakia.
[DOT] (8:20 p.m.)
But that does not mean that we should not do all in our power to maintain all possible contact with eastern Europe, diplomatic, trade, cultural, and even parliamentary. Detente, after all, and I think all speakers have agreed with this, is a legitimate policy objective of modest powers like Canada as well as of the so-called super powers. Perhaps these few sentences are a bit of a diversion, but diversion is not an unknown characteristic of parliamentary debates. It is interesting that under the Soviet system power blocs must be kept in line by means of invasion* witness Hungary in 1956 and last summer's episode in Czechoslovakia.
Of course, the alliance that we are debating today needs no such military intervention. Here, we are debating the alliance, and apparently it is stable enough even to survive yesterday and today. On April 10, in a lead editorial, the New York Times reminded us that the alliance has been reported in disarray almost annually since its inception. But there has always been more to unite it than divide it. The editorial goes on to say that the achievement of a European settlement remains the chief unfinished business of a troubled world.

April 24, 1969

May I remind the house that my leader and this party do not for a minute suggest that a European settlement is the only unfinished business in the world. Speakers from this side and in other parties have reminded us, and accurately so of course, of that third world, crowded, hungry and sick, which demands our attention and our compassion. It demands the attention and compassion of the NATO alliance.
The amendment proposed by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Stanfield) was specifically designed to draw attention to the need for a widening and not a narrowing of our world wide obligations.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Robert Gordon Lee Fairweather: It was drawn up in recognition of the validity of the words of a distinguished Canadian diplomat, Escott Reid, who said that the two most important world issues of the next 20 years are how to speed up the dangerously slow rate of economic growth of the two thirds of the world that is poor and how to narrow the dangerously wide gap between China and the rest of the world.
I suggest that our Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp) and our Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux) have an obligation to exercise the leadership in the 1960s and 1970s that their predecessors did 20 years ago.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Robert Gordon Lee Fairweather: This country must be in the vanguard of those seeking, through NATO, a multilateral east-west forum which can serve as a practical alternative to the sort of propaganda device suggested by the Soviet Union and billed as a conference on European security.
We need, in concert but not alone, mutual force reductions. We need, in concert but not alone, arms control. We need, in concert, a plan for access to all of Berlin. We need, in concert, freer west-east travel, trade and cultural exchanges.
I seriously suggest that the purpose of this debate is to question whether Canada can maintain a believable role in these and other objectives if we turn our backs on the collective principle of the alliance. The Economist of April 12 suggests:
However small the amounts involved, the collective principle is endangered by any unilateral reduction.

There is the issue. Canada has embarked on a unilateral reduction. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said this afternoon that Canada's decision is not negotiable, which I think his colleague, the Minister of Labour (Mr. Mackasey) would admit is a rather odd way in which to begin the government's heralded consultative process with our allies. If consultation still means to the government what it does to the editors of the Oxford Dictionary, namely to take counsel, to seek information and advice, one wonders how valid the process will be if, before taking counsel or seeking information and advice, the government has already closed the door by saying "not negotiable".


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Robert Gordon Lee Fairweather: When the Committee on External Affairs and Defence was hearing evidence, one of the distinguished witnesses was General Charles Foulkes who suggested a different military role for Canada within the alliance. If, out of the obscurity of the government's announcement, comes the creation of a highly mobile force, many would not quarrel with this military decision. But all the advice I listened to in Europe stressed the importance of the Canadian presence on that continent. There are reasons for this within the armed forces themselves, and I was naive enough to ask this question in Brussels-an innocent abroad, perhaps. I asked whether, leaving aside every other aspect but the military aspect, it is not valid to think that it is useful to have troops in a different milieu than that of the North American continent. Of course the advice was, yes.
I do not look upon NATO and our participation in it as an extension of Canada's somewhat shopworn posture of tagging along behind the United States and the United Kingdom. In fact, NATO provides us with a role in Europe which continues no matter what other international aspirations and commitments we may have.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Robert Gordon Lee Fairweather: As the Economist said, it is a crucial aspect of our foreign policy. We are dealing, I hope, with facts of life. The former minister of transport used to call them "hard facts". One of them is that the United States, the United Kingdom and Germany, the three essential members of the alliance, no matter what we may do, mean to carry on the alliance.
April 24, 1969

[DOT] (8:30 p.m.)
I suggest that we must carry on, and that to keep our role within the alliance believable we must participate in it to the full. We realize we are not living in those days 20 years ago, and we thank God for it, when a massed, all-out armed assault by the Warsaw Pact powers in Central Europe, which would have been met by immediate nuclear retaliation, was a threat to be reckoned with. Today, this is no longer a probability. We know, however, that we must be prepared for possibilities.
May I again quote an edition of the Economist-an earlier edition this time, that of April 5. Here is an article entitled "What NATO Needs", offering the suggestion that three matters have to be put right.
First, NATO needs more formations to defend the rear areas in Germany. Both the Germans and the British are now trying to do something to sort this problem out. Second, NATO needs forces which can contain, or, by getting there fast, can deter, any scuffle which might develop along the German border were eastern Europe to be in an uproar. Third, it needs troops which can convincingly do much of the same anti-trespassing job on the flanks, particularly in the Balkans after the last Yugoslav scare, but in Scandinavia as well.
All three objectives could be secured were NATO to have active formations of "light" troops with tactical ability through the use of helicopters and strategic ability through the use of transport planes.
The author goes on to say:
But inevitably these light cavalry men of the air would be short of tanks and guns. So they would need plenty of anti-tank weapons, including helicopter-borne ones, a good sprinkling of engineers for laying minefields, setting up roadblocks and demolitions, and strong close support air cover.
If the government's proposal is based upon a reduction not only of the number of troops in Europe but of the proportion of the budget which the government must spend on defence, I fail to see that the right hon. gentleman has made any case. Comments we heard before the committee were to the effect that defence would continue to account for a large proportion of our budget. One of the witnesses before the committee, a German journalist, used a metaphor to describe the NATO situation. I am making a precis of his remarks. He said that moves toward a detente were like a house with three storeys. On the top floor were the super powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which cleared their throats and made noises while suggesting new attempts to talk to each other. Now, this is my comment, Mr. Speaker: talk they

must, before each side is committed irrevocably to costly, irrelevant and hugely expensive antiballistic missile systems.
On the next floor are other countries of the east and west of Europe represented by the NATO and Warsaw pacts. These countries have compelling reasons of history, geography and economics to move toward an ending of mutual suspicion and fear.
The ground floor of the metaphorical house contains West and East Germany, and common blood ancestry and tradition are added to the other reasons which make talking together mutually advantageous. Like other houses, the one I call to mind has windows facing outward and stairways leading up and down between the different levels. These are the windows which show us the third world, the world which Escott Reid and others have mentioned. In fact, it has all the attributes of a useful place in which to pursue understanding and peace.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: Order, please. I regret to interrupt the hon. member but his time has expired.


Mr. John Roberts (York-Simcoe):: It is a
disheartening thing that so much of the discussion of foreign policy at the present time is oriented toward the past rather than being an attempt to look ahead to see what are the prospects and opportunities for Canadian foreign policy in the future.
We cannot form an adequate foreign policy by resolutely looking to the past. The fact that we have always participated in certain arrangements is not, in itself, a sufficient reason for continuing to take part in them. That attitude seems to spring from a belief that if you can only see where you have been you will know where you want to go. But a man who tries to drive an automobile by looking in his rear-view mirror is likely to crash. We have all heard about those generals who make preparations for future battles as though they would be a continuation of previous wars. To keep going uncritically in the same direction as in the past is a recipe for disaster.
No one doubts that our policy has been successful in the past. We participated in Europe in the establishment of a credible, flexible response to forces of Soviet expansion. The purpose of this response, maintained through NATO, was to deter the Soviet Union from any military adventure in Europe. The question which confronts us today is whether Canadian participation in

April 24, 1969

military arrangements in Europe is essential, or useful, in making this collective response effective in the future. Is Canada's participation important enough to give her influence on the design of these defence arrangements and could her resources be used to equal, or better, purpose in seeking some other foreign policy objective?
It appears to me that the maintenance of a credible, flexible response in Europe is the paramount responsibility of the European countries themselves. Our original commitment to keep forces resident in Europe was expressly temporary, designed to assist in defence until Europe was sufficiently recovered economically to provide for its own defence. One cannot argue that a renewed Europe remains economically incapable of providing an effective collective defence. Europe does not participate in the defence of North America and it is difficult to argue that the participation of Canada is essential to the defence of Europe.


Some hon. Members:: Oh!


J. Michael Forrestall: The voice of experience.


John (Moody) Roberts: I am not suggesting a new policy. It is a reiteration of what has always been the basis of our commitment to Europe. I suggest we should now make it clear publicly to our allies that our commitment is still temporary, and that we look forward to terminating it in the near future as soon as it can be arranged without grave disruption to their interests. Above all, since re-equipment is now at a critical stage, we should not allow ourselves to undertake any re-equipping which could lock us into a commitment for several years and thus preclude us from exercising our option to withdraw.
It is clear that our present military role in NATO is unsatisfactory. There was almost unanimous agreement on this point among knowledgeable witnesses who appeared before the committee on external affairs. Almost all witnesses with military expertise stressed that our air-strike reconnaissance role in Europe, which costs $70 million each year, and the mechanised brigade, constitute an expensive and wasteful use of our military resources.


J. Michael Forrestall: Nonsense.


John (Moody) Roberts: The hon. gentleman should simply look at the record of the committee. He can do it.


J. Michael Forrestall: I have had a long look at it.

[DOT] (8:40 p.m.)


John (Moody) Roberts: The hon. member did not look
at it long enough or, if he did, he did not read it thoroughly enough. Rather than disperse our efforts in varied military tasks, our forces should be tailored to one concept, the mobile concept. The mobile concept gives an opportunity to do a very great variety of jobs. We have now two types of ground forces. We have a heavy brigade in Europe devised for limited nuclear warfare on the continent of Europe, which has to be supplemented, of course, by forces in Canada for the necessary rotation and we have the beginnings of a true mobile force which is much more lightly equipped fulfilling a different concept. It is an intervention force for small conflicts. We should drop our heavy ground force altogether and establish one type of mobile force. It would be much more economical because we could rotate from a much greater reservoir. We would not have to have two types of equipment and two types of training.
Similar arguments apply to our air role. Here, too, we have a force in NATO for a task that is not duplicated anywhere else in the Canadian defence organization-that is, the strike reconnaissance role. For our six squadrons we have to maintain rotational capabilities and training capabilities. We have to feed new crews into it. If all our air efforts were in the tactical field or supplementary to our mobile ground forces, then we could not provide squadrons of nuclear strike aircraft. I am not arguing, Mr. Speaker, that we have no interests in the defence of Europe nor in maintaining a deterrent capacity in North America. May I say, however, that the objectives we have do not require us to maintain our present military commitments.
I suggest that the NORAD bomber defence system is obsolete and, in any case, one cannot conceive that bombers would be used until I.C.B.M.'s have already been brought into play. Money spent on improved bomber interception is completely wasted, since it neither adds to our defence nor to our deterrent power. Anti-submarine warfare has reached a level of technological development which makes it inordinately expensive for us to continue in this activity.
The economic recovery of Europe and the increasing crystallization of a separate European strategic interest have removed the original justification for the presence of Canadian forces in Europe. The temporary nature of our original commitment to NATO forces in Europe should be reiterated and we
April 24, 1969

should look forward to a withdrawal of our forces within, at most, five years. The strike reconnaissance force and the heavy brigade should be phased out and replaced by strengthening our mobile force. Under no circumstances should we re-equip in such a way as to lock ourselves into a NATO role which would preclude our military withdrawal in the near future.
May I submit, as my last point, that both NORAD and NATO are instruments of discussion and, perhaps, consultation, although these intangible benefits can be marginal. Nevertheless, there are very useful benefits-


An hon. Member:: I am disappointed in you, John.


John (Moody) Roberts: Well, I was disappointed in the speech the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Stanfield) made. It was an entirely negative speech. I am told he made it yesterday; unfortunately I only had the opportunity of reading it in Hansard to-day. From my reading of it, it contained not one positive point. If that speech were a declaration of the foreign policy of the Conservative party it would be a declaration of bankruptcy.
Today, in the House of Commons, the Leader of the Opposition refused to give unanimous consent for the Secretary of State for External Affairs to continue his speech.


An hon. Member:: That was a house order, my boy.


John (Moody) Roberts: That was an ungenerous act. Also, it was uncharacteristic. The Leader of the Opposition was more than ungenerous in his discussion of the government's foreign policy. He did a disservice in distorting the presentation of our position.


An hon. Member:: Nonsense.


John (Moody) Roberts: All this talk about "isolation" and "fortress America" has done great disservice. If one takes the trouble to read what the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau), said recently at Calgary, one will see what is this government's attitude toward foreign policy. Our Prime Minister said that our foreign policy ought to serve our national interests. In his speech the other night he went on to say:
-when I say national interests I am not thinking in any egotistical sense of just what's happening to Canadians. It's in our national interest to reduce the tensions in the world, tensions which spring from the two thirds of the world's population who go to bed hungry every night, the two thirds of the world's population who are poor whereas

the other third is rich, and the tensions which spring from this great ideological struggle between the east and the west.
That is the aim of our foreign policy. It has nothing to do with isolationism or fortress America. Also, if one examines the speech the Prime Minister made in the House of Commons, one will see that among the five points he proposed there are points relating to peace keeping, to arms limitation and to increasing our contribution for purposes of external aid. Those points have nothing in common with isolationism or the concept of retreating into fortress America. That approach has nothing in common with the approach described- inaccurately-by	the Leader of the
Opposition.


An hon. Member:: Come on, John. Be
honest.


John (Moody) Roberts: We cannot withdraw ourselves into a fortress America. We cannot adopt a policy of isolationism or of North Americanism.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


John (Moody) Roberts: I knew if I spoke long enough I would find my hon. friends supporting me.


Mr. Alexander:: That's because you are coming to the meat of it.


John (Moody) Roberts: Slogans are no substitute for a foreign policy-even the out of date slogans of the Leader of the Opposition. We cannot wash our hands of what is happening outside our continent. We cannot hope to see permanent peace in the world if we adopt an approach in our foreign policy of isolationism and continentalism. I submit that the foreign policy of the government is not tailored to fit isolationism. It would equally be folly to adopt a rear view mirror approach to our foreign policy and to decide that we must do in future what has been done in the past. If we do that we fail to take into account the real threats to security in the world today. It is no use trying to fight again the battles of yesteryear.


An hon. Member:: Who wrote that line, John?


John (Moody) Roberts: I should like to refer the hon. member to a speech that Mr. Khrushchev gave in 1961. In it he said that the real threat to security came from wars of national liberation; we would call it aggressive subversion. That is the kind of thing about which we ought to be concerned. These are not simple

April 24, 1969

military problems. They are most complex, involving questions of military, political, social and economic relations. Those are the kinds of problems we are faced with when we deal with problems of subversive aggression.
It is all too easy to minsunderstand these problems. They are difficult, complicated, and not easy of solution. If we are to meet such problems we must be concerned about peace keeping and be ready to play our part in international aid efforts.
The first of two major objectives in our foreign policy is peace keeping. There have been over 50 wars since 1945 and there is a need for improved institutional arrangements in the world to control and contain these disputes. There is nothing isolationists in that approach. The other objective of our foreign policy ought to be the encouragement of external aid and development work. The need for expanding Canada's efforts in external aid and development work, seem to me so obvious as not to need lengthy elaboration. We are a rich country and have access to technical skills and investment capital which underdeveloped countries badly need. We are a trading nation containing two major cultures, each speaking a world language. We spend about half of one per cent of our gross national product on external add. That is not enough. We must do more.
There are many basic tasks for us to perform, valuable to others and useful for our own interests. We do not want for work, nor do we want for capacity to undertake it. Our task is to construct pragmatic policies to deal with a work-a-day world and not to yearn for a grander, more dramatic and more self-congratulatory role as saviour of Europe.


Mr. David MacDonald (Egmonl):: Mr. Speaker, I hope that by speaking in this debate I shall contribute, if ever so slightly perhaps, to the dimension of the discussion that has been taking place in this chamber. It ought to be obvious by now that the debate that began yesterday afternoon is basic to the question of national security. We want to know how we are to preserve it. We want to preserve, in this nation, many of the values and benefits our people have enjoyed over the past century of development. It strikes me, however, that we ought to be concerned about three basic areas that touch our national security, and they will become obvious if we consider the problem in a methodical way. In the first place, we must be concerned about preserving some semblance of national unity

and some simple law and order within this country. We must also be concerned about the possibility of revolution at home. Our first concern in maintenance of national security is that of peace at home.
[DOT] (8:50 p.m.)
Secondly, it is the preoccupation of every nation to take all reasonable steps to prevent aggression from abroad. We are a rather fortunate nation in the history of this world, even though we have been in existence for a century. We have only suffered direct aggression on our soil once. Perhaps it is one of the ironies of history that that particular aggression was by a country that has always been regarded as our best neighbour, the United States.
The third basic way in which we preserve our national security is in dealing with possible hostilities or confrontations in some other part of the globe that could eventually boil over and involve us in our own country. It is this third matter of national security which concerns us. We are concerned here specifically with the viability and vitality of our NATO commitment. It is, perhaps, not strange to think that our country has been preoccupied for the better part of this century with peace in Europe. It is not strange because we have given the best treasure that this nation possesses in two very ghastly world wars on that continent.
We have been concerned in a pre-eminent way, therefore, in maintaining the peace of Europe. The main contention of those who continue to argue the validity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is that it has in the past 24 year period, a considerable passage of time, preserved peace on that continent. If the argument is accepted at face value, as so often it is, surely it is not a strong one because there are many countries in this world who have been involved in these two world conflicts in this century. Countries such as Australia, South Africa, Sweden and others could, in fact, say they have also known peace for this period but have not been involved in a similar alliance. They might be moved to say, because they were not involved in that alliance, their peace was preserved.
It is rather interesting to realize the nature of the NATO alliance. It is the enemies of yesterday who have, in fact, for this period of a quarter of a century been the allies of today. It may be when we speak freely of the prevention of war in Europe, that we are
April 24, 1969

referring to the fact that the major combatants find themselves within the ambit of this particular organization. More recently this view has been given some validity by the fact that the NATO organization is its flexible response.
Since the discovery and realization of the nuclear weapon, it has been necessary for man to indicate what limits are involved in attempting to prevent or protect himself from aggression. The argument of flexible response has been used often and loudly. The suggestion that without it every provocation would become a danger, not only to the peace of Europe but the very security of the whole world, is an interesting argument. I think it is more than a little possible to argue from the other side. It has been suggested that once we have accepted the fact of a flexible response, then we give an indication not only to our allies but to our potential enemies that we are willing to suffer certain levels of hostility rather than press that button for massive retaliation.
Some may argue that is a weak, if not a ludicrous, argument. If that is so, we have not fully considered the implications of what occurred in Czechoslovakia last summer. What did we learn from Czechoslovakia? Most of us seem to be of the opinion that we learned Russia is still extremely aggressive. I find this to be no particular surprise because I think we have known that all along. We discovered with the invasion or occupation of Czechoslovakia the lightning speed with which Russia could move her forces. The NATO organization, in fact, made this great discovery. If it was a new discovery for NATO intelligence headquarters, it makes me a little uncomfortable about the accuracy of our intelligence. Next, and most important, is the belief that the knowledge of a flexible response, both in the east and west, was sufficient for the Russians to believe that they could occupy Czechoslovakia without greatly endangering their own security or that of their allies in the Warsaw Pact. It may not be an argument acceptable to many, but I think it is well worth considering in these changing times.
A large body of opinion in our time is that, militarily at least, NATO has been successful. If that is true, what then is our answer to those who subsequently ask, what about political success? As long as Germany remains divided in the heart of this confrontation, and as long as Russian leaders and

Russian people suffer from the extreme German paranoia which I believe exists, we cannot believe we have secured very much either for ourselves or for our allies in what has been happening to date within the context of this alliance.
It is my purpose here this evening to raise basic questions which I think must be considered if we are in any way to have some sense in our foreign and military policies. What are the greatest dangers in 1969 to our national security? Who has told us in an official way in this debate what it is that we should fear most? I cannot recall the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau), the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Sharp) or the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Cadieux) indicating to us in some definite way what these first priorities are. How have they, as the custodians of the government of this country, perceived the real threat which faces our own national security? We are in a rather strange situation when discussing military or foreign matters. We talk about defending ourselves and our security, yet we never point to what are our greatest dangers. We are a little like that well known fable about the emperor in the great parade going down the street of a very large city. Everyone is watching it go by, cheering and applauding this great man when suddenly a little child says, "He has no clothes". This is what has been happening so often in our debates on vital matters of defence and security.
We have not clearly stated the greatest threat to our national security. If I were to make that challenge in this debate, I would immediately hear from all sides of this house, "communism"! I am not afraid to use the word. We are afraid that communism is at the root of the danger to our national security. What form of communism is it we fear? Is it the Russian variety, Chinese, Yugoslavian, Albanian, Czechoslovakian, Rumanian, Polish, East German or some other form? Presumably, we have made some determination on one or all these different kinds of which we have some fear.
[DOT] (9:00 p.m.)
Yet in 1949, when we put together the Alliance that we used in one major way to cover the danger from this potential threat, we did not have to ask ourselves any questions with regard to these different forms of communism. I might also ask, if the threat is real why has communist success been so

April 24, 1969

erratic from place to place? Is it really communism that is at the bottom of the threat to our security? Is it in fact, and I intend no pun, a red herring dragged across in front of us to distract our attention from the vital things, the basically dangerous things that do indeed threaten our security, those six devils we all have confronted from time to time in our concern as men in public office: hunger and disease, fear and despair, oppression and corruption?
Where and how have we recognized these as the real threats to our national security? If we try to delude ourselves into believing that these particular threats to our security have somehow diminished and gone into a state of unimportance, we are not recognizing the facts. We know only too well from reading our daily newspapers that the enemy has grown. The threat is not only real, it is increasing. It is a genuine threat to each and every member of this house and to each and every home in this country that we represent.
How can we say, as we so often do, that we are concerned about maintaining our national security if we do not address ourselves to these basic threats? In the beginning of this speech when I indicated the three broad areas of national security, I mentioned that the first one was maintaining security at home. How have we maintained harmony and peace at home over the decades? We have not done so with armies and ammunition, but through concern for our fellowmen. A public figure of our time has indicated that the new name for peace in our time is, and must be, development. We have known it all along. We have just not been willing to recognize it sufficiently. If we forget it in 1969 and the 1970's in this one world, we forget it in our peril.


Mr. Alasiair Gillespie (Etobicoke):: Mr. Speaker, in speaking to this motion I wish to make it quite clear that I support the motion; that I interpret "planned and phased reduction" to mean reduction and re-arrangement, not to mean the effective withdrawal of our forces from Europe at this time as some hon. members opposite have done; that it means we will continue in Europe beyond the end of 1969 but on a reduced and different basis, a basis to be discussed with our allies.
I would like to deal with three points and to underline those three points. The first is that conditions are changing and that we must adapt to, indeed, anticipate change. More than that we should try to bring about the kind of change that we think is needed.

We should not react passively but we should anticipate actively.
The second is that NATO is not just a military alliance. It is a political alliance with political objectives. Similarly, Canada as a participant in NATO participates in more than just a military way. Membership gives a country political benefits, and resident membership in the club provides just that many more.
Third, the decision to re-examine our nuclear role in Europe is timely and one which I hope will lead us to reject nuclear weapons as part of our armaments, after discussion with our allies.
I fear some of the things that the last speaker mentioned. I fear perhaps more than anything else miscalculation or accident. I fear misunderstanding, and misunderstandings will develop if there is not a clear intention on the part of the western alliance.
In speaking to these three points, I think it is important that we recognize the foreign policy framework within which our NATO posture must operate. First, defence policy should be a servant and not the master. This debate should have taken place before now. It should have taken place at the time of the unification debate, at that time or before it. It is long overdue.
Second, we should see our foreign policy objectives as a whole, not as component parts. Too often there is a tendency to look at foreign policy in terms of military objectives, set aside from cultural or political objectives, or set aside from trade objectives. In my view, we should examine each of our foreign initiatives against each of these tests. For instance, how does NATO serve our political objectives? How does it meet the test of our cultural or national identity objectives, and our trade objectives? In my view, it meets them all, and meets them well.
In foreign policy terms, obviously our primary role is a security one in NATO. We believe in collective security and in maintaining the stability of the world order; but it is also important that we see security not just in these military terms, not just in terms of survival, but that we see security in terms of economic strength and political understanding, in terms of composing national interests and ambitions.
Those within the alliance have trade objectives and objectives of national identity, and we are no different. Similarly, our trade interests in Europe are important to our economic health, which in turn determines our
April 24, 1969

ability to play a part in the security system, and our ability to take initiatives in seeking ways of reducing tensions between east and west.
It seems to me that there is a real danger, and we have seen evidences of it in this debate, that we may lose our perspective and see our interests in Europe as being no more than military. I emphasize that we have infinitely more at stake than a mere military role. We need Europe, and Europe needs us.
Some 20 years ago, Mr. Speaker, Europe was recovering from a devastating war. There was all sorts of evidence of aggressive Russian intentions. Europe was weak and we were strong. We ranked behind the United States as the No. 2 power economically, and behind the United Kingdom and the United States as No. 3 militarily. But we also needed Europe because we needed collective security. And while Europe needs us today, it needs us in a different way.
Europe has recovered economically, but it requires our partnership in NATO for the political role that we can play. In this connection I would like to say something about the importance of Europe and NATO to our national identity. I think the sense of Canadian identity requires more than bilingualism or an acknowledgement of our multicultural nature. These are very important. They help to identify us, but bilingualism and multicul-turalism by themselves are not the same thing as identity. We find our identity in the things we do well. It reposes in our self-respect and our national pride. It is revealed best when we share a common purpose with others. Our identity as a nation will not be viewed in the same way by all Canadians. Our experience and our cultural heritage will influence our point of view; but our identity as a nation will develop as we pursue common goals with others.
[DOT] (9:10 p.m.)
I should like to return to a view that has been put by some speakers. The voice has been heard in the land that today Europe is strong, that it no longer needs us. I should like to deal with two aspects of this as being misleading. I have already mentioned one. Europe today needs us for different reasons than it did twenty years ago. It needs us for the political contribution we can make by virtue of our military participation in Europe and our unique position within the alliance. Secondly, in my view the argument is false because it ignores, as I think I have already

said, the other side of the coin; Canada still needs Europe. NATO is important to us because it is multilateral, because it provides an institutional connection with the second most powerful area in the western world.
NATO also provides Canadian parliamentarians with an opportunity to meet and communicate with parliamentarians of the NATO countries. While I would not want to overemphasize this as one of the benefits of our participation in NATO, I think it is something worth remembering and remarking on at this time. Again referring to the North Atlantic assembly, last November I was privileged to attend as a member of the Canadian parliamentary delegation, most ably led by Senator Aird. I very much regret his resignation but I respect his reasons for it. He will be missed.
Canadians do not have the same opportunities as Europeans to meet and discuss matters of public policy or of joint or international initiative at the parliamentary level; nor do we have the same opportunity to discuss conflicting international interests in a public forum with other parliamentarians. I think the North Atlantic assembly is important to Canadians because it provides them with an opportunity to discuss international matters with others so involved.
Thus, for reasons of collective security and stabilization of the world order, for reasons of national identity and for economic and trade reasons, NATO and Europe are important to us. More particularly, our membership is important to us because it will enable us to play a creative role in reducing the tensions of the world.
Finally, I should like to refer to one matter with which I dealt in my third point and which was dealt with in the Prime Minister's speech. I refer to the question of nuclear weapons. Surely, we have a major responsibility to seek ways of reducing and not just limiting the number of persons in the nuclear club. While we can take pride in the fact that we have signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, let us make every effort to reduce our own nuclear participation so that we may encourage others to take the same step. I refer in particular to the fact that Germany has not yet signed the nonproliferation treaty. I think this is a matter of concern to Canadians as I think it is to the people of many other countries. I feel our membership in NATO will be important in securing this objective.

April 24, 1969

For reasons then of change, and for reasons involving the security of Canada and the stability of world order, let us waste no time this evening in approving the motion before us.



THE MINISTRY


Mr. J. E. Walker (Parliamentary Secretary to Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, may I have unanimous consent to revert to motions?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


James Edgar Walker: Earlier today the Prime
Minister indicated that correspondence relating to the resignation of the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer) as Minister of Transport would be tabled. I, therefore, would now like to table copies of that correspondence in French and in English.



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau):
That this house supports the government's policy of continued Canadian participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the intention of the government, in consultation with Canada's allies, to take early steps to bring about a planned and phased reduction of the size of Canadian forces in Europe.
John Edward Broadbent: Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister recently suggested in two speeches, one in Calgary and one yesterday in this chamber, that foreign policy should dictate defence policy and not vice versa. I agree. I should like to demonstrate that, instead of contributing to our foreign policy objectives, continued membership in NATO at this time serves mainly as a hindrance.
First of all, I would suggest four objectives of foreign policy which I think most Canadians could agree upon. First is the preservation of international peace, particularly but not exclusively between the nuclear powers. The second is the provision of assistance to the developing nations of the world. The third is the fostering and protecting of democratic societies. The fourth is the maintenance of our national sovereignty.
NATO came into being 20 years ago because the economically and militarily weak nations

of western Europe felt quite justifiably a threat coming from the Soviet Union. Canada was one of the initiators of NATO. We saw the threat of the Soviet Union and appropriately responded by helping to found NATO. At that time, we had both the financial and military resources that were badly needed by our western European friends. However, now, 20 years after, the North Atlantic world has changed in two important respects. First, western Europe is strong both militarily and financially. In short, the countries in western Europe can, in the main, look after their military needs.
The second point is that it has been recognized for some time that the main deterrent to Soviet expansion in western Europe comes from the nuclear capability of the United States of America. We all know that the United States is not going to withdraw from NATO. What then are the logical conclusions Canadians should draw? The first is that militarily we are no longer needed. The Prime Minister indicated this in his speech yesterday and the hon. member for York South (Mr. Lewis) this afternoon showed the logical implications of his own conclusions in that regard.
The western Europeans are quite capable of replacing our excellent but small military contribution. The only reason for remaining in NATO is, as the Prime Minister again suggested, that membership would be politically advantageous to Canada. It is my view that continued membership in NATO would have in fact a negative and not a positive effect upon our political objectives.
[DOT] (9:20 p.m.)
Let us consider the elements I have mentioned one at a time. The first is the preservation of international peace. I suggest Canada would be in a much better position to take meaningful initiatives in attempting to achieve an acceptable disarmament plan in Europe. It is illusory to believe this can be done effectively within NATO. Of course, there is a non-military clause in the charter, which has been there for 20 years, but does anyone seriously think it will be implemented? Does anyone seriously believe that the military figures who dominate NATO will initiate disarmament proposals? Just last week NATO turned down an offer by the Warsaw Pact countries to discuss disarmament.
Quite apart from western Europe, we would be much more acceptable in the world
April 24, 1969

at large as a peace keeping force if we were not a member of NATO. This is particularly true of the developing nations, many of whom are in direct conflict with old colonial powers in NATO, and Portugal is a good example, or fear involvement with the United States or the Soviet Union. If any of us were members of a developing nation and we were asked in all seriousness, would we prefer to deal with a Canada which shared its military intelligence with Portugal, Greece and the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States? Of course, the answer is no, we would not like to be in that position, but would like rather Canada to be independent.
Canada, as a non-member of NATO, would be free at the United Nations to criticize equally the two dominant powers in the world. When we rightly criticized the barbarism of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia it would have had more meaning to the rest of the world if we had also previously joined the thousands of United States citizens who condemned their country's invasions of the Dominican Republic and Viet Nam. Such freedom to criticize, of course, is not nearly so likely to come from fellow members of NATO.
Finally, on this point of withdrawal from NATO, this does not mean we would be unwilling to aid in the defence of our old allies if one or all should be attacked. A tactical mobile force, as suggested by many members of this house from all parties, could be made available to the United Nations and would be available to halt or check aggression anywhere in the world, whether in western Europe, southeast Asia or some other spot. Canada should be proud to make such a contribution.
The second foreign policy objective that Canada should follow has to do with assistance to the developing nations of the world. As has been said so many times, two thirds of the world's population lives in poverty. They are poor in health, in education and in housing. One of our main foreign policy objectives should be to do what we can to change this situation. I was pleased to note the Prime Minister's intention to take this objective seriously. However, answers to questions on the order paper by the hon. member for York South revealed very clearly that one of the great things that Canada emphasizes, our great assistance to developing nations, is a myth. The answers reveal very clearly that Canada's record is poor in this regard as compared with what other less prosperous industrial nations are doing.

By withdrawing completely from NATO and simultaneously changing our military requirements, it is possible to make massive reductions in our military expenditures. One expert, principal Escott Reid of Glendon College, York University, estimates in all seriousness that we could cut our military budget of $1.8 billion by half. Even if his estimate is exaggerated and we could not reduce it by that amount, it is certain that millions of dollars could be cut. We would then be able to contribute millions of dollars more to the poor countries of this world, to our friends in the Commonwealth, our friends who are members of the United Nations and our more recent friends in the Francophone world.
A third objective is the fostering and protection of democratic societies. Somewhere in the NATO charter there is the commitment to the protection of democratic societies. What a sham this is, Mr. Speaker. Should we not speak the truth? Portugal is a fascist country. Greece is a fascist or at best a quasi-fascist country. According to Andreas Papandreou, a respected senior member of the former democratic government of Greece, the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States was a very important instrument in establishing the new regime and removing the old one. Are we not hypocrites when we condemn the brutality and rape of human values by the Russians in Czechoslovakia but turn our eyes away from the same violence in Portugal and Greece? Once again, let me say that membership in NATO restricts our capacity to speak and act in defence of democracy.
The next objective or goal is maintenance of national sovereignty. Since the birth of nation states, one of the central goals of foreign policy has been to preserve national sovereignty. Militarily this has meant guarding one's borders. If we consider our geographic position and modern weaponry, it becomes appropriate to ask whether military defence is at all relevant to Canada's sovereignty. Who is going to attack us? Are the Russians likely to send troops over the North Pole? Is the United States likely to send troops to cross our southern border? Could we stop either country if it decided to do so?
We should completely abandon any futile attempt to defend our borders. Instead, we should be thinking very seriously about ways in which our geographic position can be used to avoid the most serious danger facing mankind. I refer, of course, to nuclear war. Should we not be devoting intellectual energy to devising schemes for preventing a first

April 24. 1969

strike attempt by either the U.S.S.R. or the U.S.A. against one another?
The Prime Minister had the courage to raise questions about the legitimacy of the possible first strike role assigned to our "A" bomb carrying aircraft in Europe. We should apply this same reasoning here at home, and we should recognize that the Russians as well as the United States have a legitimate fear of being attacked first by nuclear weapons. Perhaps we, as Canadians, could make a major contribution to the avoidance of nuclear war by seriously considering means whereby our own geographic position might be used to reduce tensions on both of our powerful neighbours. It seems to me that continued membership in NATO would make such a possibility incapable of realization.
In conclusion, I should like to suggest that Canadians should choose a course of action which reveals emotional and intellectual maturity. We will not be abandoning our friends by leaving NATO. Rather, we will be striking off on a new course which is consist tent with contemporary facts. Our democratic allies in Europe are now prosperous and strong, and they are capable of defending themselves. We are now in the position of being able to join those middle power nations like Sweden and Yugoslavia who seek to chart their own courses in world history.
We are part of the family of man. We have much to contribute to the preservation of peace and the alleviation of world poverty. It is1 to these ends we should now devote our energy.


Mr. H. E. Stafford (Elgin):: Mr. Speaker, we have heard much about our forces in Europe. Much of this may apply to a reduction in size rather than a withdrawal of our forces. Like many others in this house, I have been attempting to put the many pieces of this jigsaw puzzle together but no matter how I place the pieces I cannot develop a clear picture of any definite policy. It may be that I have been too skilful in putting the pieces together. Many of our partners in the alliance have already expressed their concern. The West German Foreign Minister, Willy Brant, expressed his anxiety at home and when, he was in Canada. Britain's defence minister, Denis Healey, warned that unilateralism is very infectious. This was one of the two major subjects discussed by the NATO members when they met in Washington for the 20th anniversary of the alliance. It is no exaggeration to say that the government's 
unilateral decision regarding NATO did not add to the general stability of the alliance.
[DOT] (9:30 p.m.)
On April 14 the Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) answered a question in the house from one of the hon. members opposite by stating, "We never talked about a planned withdrawal; we talked about a planned reduction". This answer would seem to indicate that we are planning only a reduction of our forces in Europe, and not a withdrawal.
I do not intend to review the many statements made in this regard. Reductions have been made in our NATO forces on four previous occasions. We did this after discussion and consultation with our partners in NATO. This time we made the decision without the usual consultation, and this has caused much consternation among NATO members. The government's announcement in this regard, although indefinite, would lead one to assume that the government has something more in mind than a slight reduction of our forces in Europe.
It seems rather unfortunate that such a decision had to be made at this time. The European balance of security has been altered by the presence of Soviet troops in Czechoslovakia. This new deployment of Warsaw pact troops puts West Germany, Austria and even Yugoslavia in a much more vulnerable position. Previously, the armed forces of Czechoslovakia, even though a member of the Warsaw pact, were not such a serious' threat. I do not agree with the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands (Mr. Douglas) that the invasion of Czechoslovakia is a sign of Russian weakness. The Soviet Union has also posed a new strategic threat by its naval build-up in the Mediterranean and in the North Atlantic.
I do not imagine that our military contribution to NATO causes the Warsaw pact nations any undue alarm. Only two countries, Iceland and Luxembourg, contribute less per capita to NATO. Our leaving NATO would not make any decisive difference militarily. It is quite a different matter politically. The Soviet Union is continually looking for some break-up or erosion of the NATO alliance. So, politically, any reduction or withdrawal at this time does suggest a weakening of the alliance and any such political disadvantage is a matter of importance.
The hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands asserted yesterday that NATO had turned a cold shoulder to the proposal for
April 24, 1969

a conference made by the Warsaw pact countries at their meeting in Budapest last month. For years, the alliance has been attempting to achieve a parallel and balanced force reduction on both sides. The Budapest communique has not been rejected, and all avenues are kept open. It is being studied in Washington. The alliance is approaching the communique with great concern. This concern is obvious, since there are conditions which NATO must accept if the proposed European security conference is to be successful, such as the acceptance of the present division of Germany, the present boundaries in Europe, and only European countries are to participate.
Since 1945, we have been involved in serious discussions on disarmament. At that time Canada felt so concerned that the government sent General McNaughton to New York to lead our delegation in these discussions. Since 1956, we have been participating in the 18-nation disarmament conference in Geneva. Despite the fact that some agreement has been reached on the peaceful uses of outer space and non-proliferation, the basic fact remains that Russia and its Warsaw pact allies have not made one move on the question of basic disarmament of their forces.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Harold Edwin Stafford: We have sent two of our most prominent advocates of disarmament, General Burns and Ambassador Ignatieff, to lead the Canadian delegation at Geneva. The Russians have shown us that they are less than enthusiastic in agreeing to any bilateral reduction in armaments. In fact, they have gone in the opposite direction. The Warsaw pact has never been stronger. With the invasion of Czechoslovakia, NATO is now facing a hard core of front-line fighting Russian troops. At a time when NATO nations should be showing a solidarity of resolve and determination, we are the termites that are chewing away the very foundations of NATO. We are the ones who are demonstrating to the Warsaw pact nations that we no longer support in an effective manner the collective security and principles upon which NATO was founded 20 years ago.
Our present policy regarding NATO weakens the alliance and suggests to the communists that if they just wait, perhaps NATO will disintegrate by itself without their having to make any concessions in their forces for a reduction in NATO forces. The communist doctrine for the triumph of communism throughout the entire world has never 29180-5031

changed. The Communists combine that fixed goal with any amount of tactical flexibility so they can change their line by adopting a hard line one moment and a soft one the next, but none of these zigs and zags indicate any change.
Surely, the hon. member for Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands is not suggesting that we practice unilateral disarmament. In the 1930's the countries of the free world were the only ones to disarm, and the results were disastrous. Surely, the hon. member is not suggesting that NATO members are not willing to discuss bilateral disarmament and carry it out if possible. The whole history of the United States, for example, is in itself evidence that the United States would be only too happy to disarm if it could be done in safety. The hon. member seems so concerned that we differ with the United States that he does not even take the time to consider that the United States could be right.
Every member of this house would like to see us spend our money on feeding the hungry nations of the world, curing disease and developing the have-not nations instead of spending so much on defence. This is so obvious that it defies repetition. The advocates of such a policy, in venting their emotional theories, never reveal the secret of how it can be done in safety if only one side is willing to disarm.
Both Canada and the United States are members of the Atlantic community of nations, and NATO is as important to the preservation of freedom on this continent as it is in Europe. President Nixon, in his address to the NATO ministers council in Washington, when speaking of NATO said:
We celebrate a momentous anniversary. We celebrate one of the great successes of the postwar world.
NATO members present at this momentous anniversary were very concerned over Canada's future in NATO. The U.S. State Department handled the situation very diplomatically. Instead of criticizing Canada for talking of pulling back, they praised Canada for deciding to stay in the alliance at all. They were looking at the positive side. The United States was very diplomatic because they realize the surest way to justify Canadian policy in the eyes of Canadian nationalists is for the United States to oppose it.
The United States has practised this attitude of restraint on many other occasions. The United States swallowed its anger when

April 24, 1969

the North Koreans shot down an American EC-121 with 31 service personnel aboard. Washington sat silently while Moscow imposed its discipline on Czechoslovakia. Washington has looked the other way on many occasions and has aimed at negotiation instead of confrontation. Restraint is necessary if detente or arrangement with the Soviet Union is ever to be achieved. This same attitude of restraint is shown by all NATO members. They want us to continue in NATO, but it would be strictly counterproductive for them to denounce Canadian policy.
Our reasons for a planned and phased withdrawal are difficult to understand. The Prime Minister said on April 3:
We want to play a role, which in the first Instance will be essentially defensive of our sovereignty of North America.
I can think of no better way of defending our sovereignty than staying in NATO.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Harold Edwin Stafford: It is the purpose of NATO to prevent war in an area where there is the greatest concentration of power in the world today. That area is in Europe, where any conflict which will affect our sovereignty is most likely to occur. One thing is certain, that if any threat from the Soviet Union is involved we would certainly protect our sovereignty by very close collaboration with the United States and other western countries.
We have been actively discussing disarmament for many years. We cannot consider any unilateral disarmament. We have learned from past experience that most of the talk on disarmament with the Warsaw pact nations goes on an on for propaganda purposes. Even the Warsaw pact nations are obviously not going to break off negotiations on disarmament, as this would put them at a propaganda disadvantage.
I trust our policies on NATO have not been made to create a new independence, a new isolation or a new identity. This country was not built on isolationism. Canada's best friends are in NATO. In that group are those nations whose investment capital and technological capacity helped this country achieve the second highest standard of living in the world. Our partners in NATO have shown their concern. They know the political advantage of NATO as a great collective force against those forces in the world with which we do not agree. They want us to stay in, not with a mobile force which we can fly to Europe in an emergency but to be present in

Europe as part of that great collective effort of NATO nations, the importance of which is out of all proportion to the cost as a deterrent to aggression.
We are often so critical of others in this search for peace and the preservation of freedom. If we have anything to offer, it can best be done as a contribution to the collective effort of NATO nations who, as history shows, have a strong desire for peace. If we want an effective voice in Washington and Europe, we will have to share the military burden. In this way we can put our efforts to work in an attempt to influence the attitudes of the NATO nations along the best road to peace.
President Nixon said at the 20th anniversary of NATO in Washington:
[DOT] (9:40 p.m.)
The United States fully intends to undertake deep and genuine consultation with its allies both before and during any negotiations directly affecting their interests. That is a pledge I shall honour.
I do not think anyone in this chamber would deny that the Warsaw pact nations are far more liable to negotiate through strength than through weakness. The Leader of the New Democratic party who spoke yesterday said he feels that an outstretched hand will do more for the cause of peace than a clenched fist. It will, if the other side genuinely wants peace, but I am not aware of any positive indication in this direction.
Perhaps the hon. member might stretch his hand through the barbed wire entanglements of the Berlin wall and test the response to his theory. If it works we will be forever grateful. If it fails and he returns to this house minus his right arm, we will give him our sympathy.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Gerald William Baldwin: No wonder you were separated from Steve Otto.


Robert Elgin McKinley: Would the hon. member permit a question? I wonder if the hon. member would be prepared at this time to say he believes that the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Trudeau) wants to get out of NATO as quickly as he can, and would the hon. member agree with the rest of us that we should stay in it?


Harold Edwin Stafford: I have already said there have been so many statements made that I, for one, have been unable to put the jigsaw puzzle together to find out what it is all about. What I am concerned about, however,
April 24, 1969

is the fact that at the Washington conference everyone was aroused. Whatever we have done, we have caused concern among the NATO allies that we have never caused before.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: Order, please. It being 9.45 p.m. it is my duty, pursuant to a special order made on Wednesday, April 16, 1969, to interrupt these proceedings and put forthwith the question. Is the house ready for the question?


Some hon. Members:: Question.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: those in favour of the amendment will please say yea.


Some hon. Members:: Yea.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: those opposed will please say nay.


Some hon. Members:: Nay.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: In my
opinion the nays have it.
And more than five members having risen:


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Bechard):: Call in
the members.


Mr. Speaker:: I declare the amendment to the amendment lost. The question is now on the amendment to the main motion. All those in favour of the said motion will please say yea.


Some hon. Members:: Yea.


Mr. Speaker:: All those opposed will please say nay.


Some hon. Members:: Nay.


Mr. Speaker:: In my opinion the nays have it.
And more than five members having risen:
[DOT] (10:10 p.m.)


Mr. Speaker:: Is it the wish of the house that we proceed with the vote without the ringing of the bells?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Mr. Speaker:: I declare the amendment lost. The question is on the main motion. Is it the pleasure of the house to adopt the said motion? All those in favour please say yea.


Some hon. Members:: Yea.
April 24, 1969	COMMONS DEBATES	7949
Division


Mr. Speaker:: All those opposed?


Some hon. Members:: Nay.


Mr. Speaker:: In my opinion the yeas have it.
Is it the wish of hon. members that we proceed with the vote without the ringing of the bells?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Mr. Speaker:: I declare the motion carried. This house stands adjourned until eleven o'clock tomorrow morning.
At 10.28 p.m. the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.

Friday, April 25, 1969



ROUTINE PROCEEDINGS


[Stage Direction]
Fifth report of Standing Committee on Privileges and Elections-Mr. Ovide Laflamme (Montmorency).
[Editor's Note: The text of the foregoing report appears in today's Votes and Proceedings.]