1967-05-23

Hon. Robert Winters (Minister of Trade and Commerce):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to inform the house of the government's decision on the level of the Canadian Wheat Board's initial payments to producers for the basic grades of wheat, oats and barley to be delivered during the 1967-68 crop year. The initial payments, effective August 1, 1967, will be as follows:
Wheat: No. 1 Manitoba northern, basis in store Fort William/Port Arthur or Vancouver, $1.70 per bushel.
Oats: No. 2 C.W. oats, basis in store Fort William/ Port Arthur, $0.65 per bushel.
Barley: No. 3 C.W. six row barley, basis in store Fort William/Port Arthur, $1.06 per bushel.
These payments represent an increase of 20 cents a bushel for wheat, 10 cents for barley and 5 cents for oats. The initial payments for all other grades of wheat, oats and barley will be established later by the Canadian Wheat Board.


Right Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker (Leader of ihe Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, the initial payment is not the most important in determining what the farmer will receive. The extra amount announced is in keeping with the addition that was provided under the recent arrangements at Geneva. I repeat once more that as a consequence of this government's action in the last year and a half or two years in reducing the price by 17 cents a bushel, the western farmer will now be getting back that 17 cents plus a 3 cents addition.



MAIN ESTIMATES


Hon. E. J. Benson (Minister of National Revenue and President of the Treasury Board):: Mr. Speaker, I move that the message of His Excellency together with the main estimates for the year ending March 31, 1968, presented on May 9, 1967, be now referred to the committee of supply.


Mr. Speaker:: My understanding is that the motion has already been put and was adopted on Friday evening.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


John George Diefenbaker: That is nothing new for the minister.


Edgar John Benson: On a question of privilege, I wish to say that obviously I need to hire some new staff.



UNITED NATIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, there are a number of questions arising out of the critical and dangerous situation in the Middle East which I desire to address to the Prime Minister. Would he advise the house where the Canadian troops are now located, those who were members of the peace keeping force of the United Nations? What plans have been decided upon to evacuate them, and where will they be taken? Will they be sent tb another location in the Middle East rather than returned to Canada? Is it a fact, as reported in the press, that Canadian and United Nations troops have been deprived by the Egyptian forces of their transport and hospital facilities and supplies?


Right Hon. L. B. Pearson (Prime Minister):: The Canadian contingent of the United Nations force is in the Gaza strip. As far as details related to the other parts of the question are concerned, perhaps the Minister of National Defence would be in a better position to supply them than I am.


Hon. Paul Hellyer (Minister of National Defence):: The troops are in their camps operating normally and providing the services they are required to provide. The United Nations command has prepared a plan for the evacuation of the force, a phased plan which would see the forces of the various participating nations withdrawn over a period of several weeks. Due to the nature of the services provided by the Canadian contingent, the United Nations plans that our force will be one of the last, if not the last, to leave.


John George Diefenbaker: Why?
Inquiries of the Ministry Mr. Hellyer: In addition to the United Nations plan the Department of National Defence has prepared a national contingency plan which can be put into effect if for any reason beyond our control or that of the United Nations the plan prepared by the United Nations becomes inoperable.


John George Diefenbaker: Why is it that the Canadians are to stay to the end? Why will they not be withdrawn in proportion to their numbers rather than kept in this dangerous position, providing a settlement is not arranged?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: There will be some phased withdrawal during that period; as the force can be diminished in size it will be done in the normal, routine way. I think the right hon. gentleman will appreciate that we provide support services for the UN force and that some of these services will be required during the period of evacuation.


John George Diefenbaker: I have further questions on this subject, and I would ask the Prime Minister to reply to them. First, is it a fact-and I repeat the question-that Canadian troops are left without arms and without transport because of the action of the Egyptians?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, there is no evidence to support that statement at all and my hon. friend the Minister of National Defence has said they are operating normally. But naturally we will make inquiries into a very serious allegation of that kind.


John George Diefenbaker: Does the Prime Minister say he has no information on that and has to wait for eventualities?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I have said I have just heard this particular allegation from the right hon. gentleman.


John George Diefenbaker: It is not an allegation by me; it is what was carried in the press. Isn't it true? They don't even know.


Mr. David Lewis (York South):: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs, who in the last day or two has had discussions with the Secretary General of the United Nations, whether he can inform the house as to the reasons the Secretary General acted so precipitously in withdrawing the UNEF instead of seeking a meeting of the assembly or security council to discuss the matter?

May 23, 1967


Hon. Paul Martin (Secretary of State for External Affairs):: Mr. Speaker, the Secretary General, whom I saw on Saturday at the United Nations, informed me that he had ordered the withdrawal of the force for security reasons, and also because of the nature of the agreement concluded by his predecessor and President Nasser when the force was established in 1956.
I do not believe there is any difference of opinion between the secretariat and the position the Canadian government took, as I expressed it in the house on Thursday last, with regard to the authority required by the appropriate organ of the United Nations before the force loses its legal being within the terms of the resolution passed in 1956 when the force was set up.


David Lewis: I appreciate that the force may not lose its legal existence, but of what value is that legal existence if the force is withdrawn from the point at which it could be of assistance?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Of course, Mr. Speaker, for all practical purposes my hon friend is right, but I simply dealt with the question in the terms of the position taken by the Canadian government in 1956 and in 1960. The United Arab Republic requested, as it had every right to request, the withdrawal of the force from its territory. In addition, two component countries of the force indicated that they did not propose to participate in the operations of the force in view of the position taken by the U.A.R. These additional reasons for the action taken by the Secretary General were announced by him at the meeting of contributing countries on Friday afternoon last.
Canada does not dispute the right of a host country to make a request for the withdrawal of a force. That request, however, is a matter that has to be considered by the responsible United Nations body in relation to the decision which the Secretary General took, and which he believed he had the authority to take.
I may say he has been queried as to what course he would take in the event of a request by another host country with respect to another United Nations force. Specifically, of course, Canada had in mind the case of Cyprus. To that the Secretary General replied that if such a request were made he would report it to the security council. He did not feel that in those circumstances he would be in any way inhibited, as he was in the case of

May 23, 1967

UNEF by the agreement between the late Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold and the president of the U.A.R.
Hon, D. S. Harkness (Calgary North): Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the Minister of National Defence if the air field at El Arish is still under the control of and being operated by the R.C.A.F. detachment which has been carrying on those functions during the period of the United Nations force's stay in the Gaza strip, and whether this airport is to be the means by which the UNEF is to be evacuated.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Speaker, it was never, at least to the best of my knowledge, under R.C.A.F. control. It was a joint use airfield. The latest information I have is that it is still open. I do not think the contingency plan being prepared by the United Nations contemplates the use of the field at El Arish for withdrawal purposes. For obvious reasons I do not think I should discuss in any detail either the plans being prepared by the United Nations or those prepared by our own defence planners.


Mr. Harkness:: I have a further supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Is the R.C.A.F. still operating its Caribou and Otter planes from the El Arish air field?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I cannot say when the last flight was, but the last information I had was that they would be able to operate from El Arish if that is required.


Mr. Eric A. Winkler (Grey-Bruce):: I should like to direct a supplementary question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Would he inform the house whether in fact the Secretary General has the authority to make such a unilateral decision as that to which the minister referred?


Paul Joseph James Martin: That is a legal question with which I have dealt.


Mr. W. B. Nesbitt (Oxford):: Mr. Speaker, I have a supplementary question. Perhaps I did not hear the Minister of National Defence correctly. May I ask him whether it is the present intention of the Canadian government, when the Canadian troops are evacuated, to return them to Canada.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Yes, they would be coming back to Canada as soon as they were withdrawn from the Middle East.
Inquiries of the Ministry


Mr. G. W. Baldwin (Peace River):: Mr. Speaker, I have a supplementary question for the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Would he be prepared to obtain and table a copy of the agreement referred to which the predecessor of the present Secretary General made, so that members could examine it and examine the position indicated by it?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, that document of course is public. It has been circulated as one of the documents at the United Nations. I would be glad to table it, together with the resolution establishing the force.


Mr. Andrew Brewin (Greenwood):: Mr. Speaker, I do not know whether my supplementary question should be directed to the Prime Minister or to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The Prime Minister is reported to have had a conversation the other day with the president of Israel, and to have said that Canada is pressing with other countries for the revival of the UN truce supervision organization as a UN instrument to assist in dealing with the crisis which has arisen in the Middle East. I should like to ask whether that suggestion is being pressed, and what have been the results of the government's pressure to this end.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, Mr. Speaker; that suggestion has been put forward in the hope that a UN presence in the area of growing danger could be established for that purpose, and that it might be possible to build on the United Nations truce organization which is there. That suggestion now is being considered.



AGRICULTURE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Real Caouette (Villeneuve):: Mr. Speaker, for the last twenty minutes we have been in the Middle East. I would like us to come back to Canada.
Tomorrow, the farmers' march on Ottawa will take place. Some 20,000 to 25,000 of them are coming to meet the government authorities. In view of this, does the Prime Minister intend to meet the farmers who will be here tomorrow? Second, does he intend to announce, on that occasion, an improvement in the dairy policy for the benefit of Canadian dairy producers?

May 23, 1967



WATER RESOURCES


[Stage Direction]
Inquiries of the Ministry
[Stage Direction]
Righl Hon. L. B. Pearson (Prime Minister):
Mr. Speaker, when the farmers' organizations sent a telegram asking to meet the government on this particular date, May 24, and asked me to meet with them I replied that this was an impossible date for me. I think we gave them six or seven other possible dates this week or next week. I have heard nothing about the alternative dates, only that they are coming on May 24 as originally planned. It has not been very easy for me to change my arrangements, Mr. Speaker, but with the Minister of Agriculture I expect to meet the leaders of the delegation tomorrow morning to consider their representations to the government.


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Howard  Johnsion@Okanagan-Revelsioke: Mr. Speaker, I intended to direct my question to the Secretary of State, but in her absence perhaps I should direct it to the Prime Minister. Will Canada be co-operating with the government of France in a satellite program which will beam television programs to Canada?


Right Hon.   L.. B. Pearson@Prime Minister: Mr. Speaker, I would prefer to find out what arrangements the French government has in mind before dealing with this question.


Mr.  R. Gordon L. Fairweather@Royal: Mr. Speaker, I have a supplementary question. Does the Prime Minister intend soon to announce some sort of authority for Canada regarding the handling of satellite communications?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, this is one of the most important questions we are now considering. The government is giving this very careful consideration and expects shortly to set up a special body for that purpose. As soon as an examination has been completed we will be able to make an announcement on policy. This will take some time because, as my hon. friend knows, there is no more far reaching question facing us in the field of communications generally than this one.
(Mr. Caouette.]
On the orders of the day:


Mr. G. H. Aiken (Parry Sound-Muskoka):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the right hon. Prime Minister a question relating to the Canadian delegation to the international conference on water for peace, comprising some 60 members. This conference started its deliberations today, and I should like to know whether the delegation from Canada includes any members of this house other than the responsible minister.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I do not have the delegation list before me, Mr. Speaker, but I will be pleased to check to see exactly whom it includes.


Gordon Harvey Aiken: I have a supplementary question. If when the Prime Minister is checking the list he finds there are no members of this house on the delegation will he determine why such an omission occurred?


Mr. Speaker:: Order. The supplementary question is, of course, hypothetical.



INQUIRY AS TO STEPS TO MEET INCREASED COSTS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Barry Maiher (New Westminster):: Mr. Speaker, I wanted to ask the Minister of National Health and Welfare this question, but I do not see him in the house. Perhaps you will allow his parliamentary secretary to take it as notice. In view of the continuing increase in the cost of living index which is reflected in an increase in the cost of drugs, placing a heavy burden particularly on elderly and poor people, has the government any plan or policy to meet this situation?


Hon. Jean Marchand (Minister of Manpower and Immigration):: Mr. Speaker, perhaps I may answer for the Minister of National Health and Welfare. The government has the recommendations of the special committee of the House of Commons on drug costs and prices under study at the present time. Inasmuch as the implementation of these recommendations involves a matter of government policy, any action in this regard will be announced at the appropriate time.
May 23, 1987



TRANSPORT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Gasion Isabelle (Gatineau):: Mr. Speaker, my question is directed to the Minister of Transport. Is it the minister's intention to ask for a comprehensive investigation, following the railway tragedy which occurred last Sunday at the Montclair boulevard grade crossing in Hull? Furthermore, may I point out to the minister that this is the second tragedy within a few months, in full daylight, at that very grade crossing, in the heart of the city of Hull.


Hon. J. W. Pickersgill (Minister of Transport):: Mr. Speaker, this accident certainly will be investigated, and I am not sure that an investigation has not already been ordered, because in most cases action is taken immediately in order to obtain the maximum possible evidence into such tragic matters.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. E. D. Fulton (Kamloops):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the Minister of National Defence whether, inasmuch as the recent defence policy embodied in the unification bill was based largely upon the concept of Canada's defence forces in a peace keeping role, the minister is reviewing Canada's defence policy at this time in light of the undoubted setback to the concept of United Nations peace keeping forces, as a result of recent developments in the Middle East.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Speaker, I cannot accept the preamble to the question. As a matter of fact I made every effort during the debate, but apparently without success, to indicate that the reorganization of the armed forces and the concept of a single service was not in any way directly related to roles and missions. The unified force does make it easier to change roles and missions as world circumstances change, but the reorganization itself was not predicated upon nor directly related to changes in roles and missions. The question of my hon. friend, therefore, is merely academic.

Inquiries of the Ministry
In so far as the future of world peace keeping is concerned, I think all will agree that this has been a setback and one which most of us consider very regrettable. I do hope, however, that it will not discourage us from seeking in the years ahead to find means by which the nations of the world may cooperate in maintaining the peace and trying to prevent armed conflict.


Hon. Gordon Churchill (Winnipeg South Centre):: A supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Would the Minister of National Defence then inform the house what he meant in his December 7 speech when he indicated that unification w'ould make it easier for Canada to participate in not only peace keeping activities but peace restoring missions?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Speaker, we are attempting to develop a force which within the single service concept will be more responsive and more effective, which will have greater flexibility and more transportation, thereby enabling us to undertake with greater efficiency any requirements for the people of Canada, in Europe or elsewhere, that might arise from time to time.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Mr. Speaker, I have a question supplementary to the questions asked by the hon. member for Kamloops and the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre. Then was General Allard, the chief of staff, incorrect when he recently made a statement in St. Catharines, Ontario, to the effect that the whole purpose of unification was for peace keeping activities?


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. The question is not acceptable.



AIR TRANSPORT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Minister of Transport. As the minister will recall, I have asked two or three questions lately about the use of JP4 fuel by jet airliners. In view of the tragic crash at Uplands last Saturday evening will the department, entirely apart from the investigation into that accident, review its position with regard to the use of this highly inflammable fuel?

May 23, 1967
Inquiries of the Ministry


John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, I would think any such review would not have any particular connection with that accident. I must say that I rather regret the hon. gentleman's statement. In making it I am sure he is quite innocently seeking to suggest some kind of connection, for which to the best of my knowledge there is not the slightest evidence.


Stanley Howard Knowles: As a supplementary question, Mr. Speaker, may I ask the minister whether he thinks it is fair to make that imputation against me. Is it not proper for me to ask, in the light of Saturday's accident, that the department re-examine this question in the hope that we may have the greatest possible safety in air travel?


John Whitney Pickersgill: The hon. gentleman has, of course, given notice of a question to be asked at ten o'clock on this subject, and I think perhaps it would be better for it to be answered at that time.


Stanley Howard Knowles: On a point of privilege, Mr. Speaker, my question was answered at ten o'clock last Thursday night by one of the parliamentary secretaries. It is that very answer that I am asking to have re-examined. It would be a good idea if the ministers were in the house and knew what was going on.



RAFESEED AND RYE-REQUEST FOR WHEAT BOARD JURISDICTION

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. E. Nasserden (Rosthern):: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Now that the minister has taken some faltering step to find a more popular place for himself in the minds of western farmers, when may we expect an announcement with regard to rapeseed and rye being brought under the Canadian Wheat Board?


Robert Henry Winters: Mr. Speaker, I expect we will shortly have before the house a bill amending the Canadian Wheat Board Act and the matter can be debated then. I hope that will be next week.



ALBERTA-NEGOTIATIONS RESPECTING FREIGHT RATES ON SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. H. W. Herridge (Kootenay West):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to ask a very simple but
[Mr. Knowles.1
important question of the Minister of Transport. Has the government received an informal application or notification of the intention of the coal operators to build a railway on their own to the United States border in order to ship coal from British Columbia to the Pacific coast over the Great Northern in the United States? If not, has the minister any further information to give the house with respect to the present difficulties between western Canada's coal exporters and the Canadian Pacific Railway? This is important, Mr. Speaker.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, so far as the first part of the question is concerned, I thank the hon. gentleman for sending me notice which I received just as I walked into the house. To the best of my knowledge, unless it happened over the week end, there has been no official notice to the government of Canada that anyone has any intention of building a railway. I think it would be unfair to the Crowsnest industries and other related interests to give the impression that there has not been some informal exchange in respect of this matter, because there has, but it has not gone beyond that stage.
In so far as the relations of the mines and Canadian Pacific are concerned, I am happy to be able to say that the Coleman mine in Alberta, as I was also informed just before I came into the house, concluded a long term agreement with Japan which does involve the sale of coal and its transportation entirely through Canada to the coast. I think we will all be pleased that at least part of this problem is being cleared up.



TRANSPORT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. David MacDonald (Prince):: Mr. Speaker, my question is to the Minister of Public Works. In view of the considerable delay in the awarding of the contract for the next phase of the construction of the Northumberland crossing, has the government decided to defer construction of this project for up to two years in order to completely redesign the present design which is being scrapped?


Hon. G. J. Mcllrailh (Minister of Public Works):: No, Mr. Speaker.
May 23. 1967


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. The question as asked is unacceptable.


David Samuel Horne MacDonald: Mr. Speaker, I wonder whether I could put the question in another form. There has in fact been a good deal of comment on this matter, and it has been reported in the press that the government does plan to defer this project. Is that in fact true?


George James McIlraith: No, Mr. Speaker.



INDUSTRY


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
David Lewis: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Industry and ask him whether it is the intention of the government to change the criteria for designated areas so that areas of slow growth may be included, as requested by the Northeastern Ontario Development Association. If so, will northern Ontario qualify as a designated area, and will this change be announced soon?


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. I suggest to the hon. member that the question is much too general in scope to be of the type to be accepted at this time.
[DOT] (3:10 p.m.)


Hon. Mitchell Sharp (Minister of Finance) moved: that the house go into committee of supply.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS-FOREIGN POLICY
John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, to say that the house and country will be disappointed by the replies given by the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State of External Affairs today in regard to the international crisis that has developed is an understatement. I had hoped the government would have some information to give the house. When I asked the Prime Minister whether there was any justification for reports regarding Canadian UN troops being deprived by Egyptian forces of their transportation and hospital facilities, he stated that he was not in a position to answer my allegation. It is not my allegation; it is a statement carried by the press. The answer given by the Prime Minister is indicative of a
Foreign Policy
slapdash attitude on the part of this government respecting questions affecting the future of Canada and indeed the peace of the world.
The questions asked should have produced some information other than the type of circumlocution to which we have become accustomed in recent weeks.
I am amazed at the attitude of the government. Today I read according to the Canadian Press:
Cabinet Meets on Crisis
Prime Minister Pearson said "it's a tricky situation. I don't know how we're going to handle it."
This is not in keeping with the serious situation that prevails. It is strangely reminiscent of the type of answer given in the days when Mackenzie King was prime minister and he regarded external affairs as in his exclusive jurisdiction and indeed over and over again denied parliament information to which the house and country had a right.
I do not think it any exaggeration to say that at this moment the world is in fear. President Nasser demanded the removal of the United Nations peace keeping force. This force was mobilized from among seven nations. By its removal the Egyptian and Israeli armies will be facing one another. Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq and Kuwait have mobilized; yet today the answers to unprovocative questions asked in the house were offhand as though they did not merit a serious answer.
U Thant was asked by President Nasser to order the removal of these forces. The government has taken two sides in this regard. The other day the Secretary of State for External Affairs announced in a loud voice that it was apparent that U Thant had acted precipitously; at least, so I interpreted his words.


Mr.   Marlin@Essex East: I never said that at all.


John George Diefenbaker: A little later on it was confirmed by the minister that at the time the force was set up it was understood under arrangements between the then Secretary General and President Nasser that the force could not remain if his consent was withdrawn. U Thant has given outstanding leadership to the cause of peace. He is not in his position because he desired to remain aloof. At the end of his term last year, he was virtually conscripted to stay on because of his superior statesmanship. He had serious misgivings, to use his words, when he ordered the UN forces of Canada, India, Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Brazil to end their vigil on Friday last.

May 23, 1967
Foreign Policy
Today U Thant is in Egypt. What will be the consequences of the action taken the other day? Yesterday an announcement was made of the ban on shipping in the gulf of Aqaba. The U.A.R. has ordered total mobilization of its 100,000 man army reserve. Cairo's regular army within the precincts of Egypt numbers some 175,000 men. It has 40,000 still in Yemen. With the United Nations force emasculated as a result of the order, Egyptian troops now dominate the west bank of the gulf. The United States, Great Britain and France made a declaration in 1950 that they would "immediately take action, both within and outside the United Nations, to maintain the stability of all frontiers in the Middle East".
We meet in circumstances of dark and foreboding. Those who remember 1914 recall how suddenly war was with us. Canadians in that war made the supreme sacrifice of 60,000 men, greater than fell in the armed forces of the United States. I say that not by way of comparison but by way of emphasis on the danger that faces our nation and the world today. Before the second world war there were those events which ultimately culminated in war. What is going to be done now with the disbanding of the emergency force?
I do not understand the mumbo-jumbo language which the minister of defence uses -words large, sonorous and often meaningless. What is going to be done? One can get such words from Roget's Thesaurus. They give importance to announcements otherwise barren. Is there a plan in being which Canada can follow?
In my opinion, if the present emergency force goes out of existence it will be necessary to reconstitute it or another, otherwise the peace of the world will receive a setback from which it will not recover. Can a force be set up? The security council would have to bring the matter before its membership. It might be vetoed by the U.S.S.R. If the U.S.S.R. were to veto it, it would mean that country is determined, if war should break out, that it will not be an onlooker.
One of the major reasons for the terrible danger we now face in consequence of what is taking place in the Middle East is the direct fruit of the Viet Nam situation. In the Middle East Nasser has realized that the time is opportune for him to re-establish himself as the leader of the Arab countries. When I saw Nasser in 1964 he said "I have no intention of getting out of Yemen under any circumstances for three years". The Secretary of

State for External Affairs will recall that I so advised him then. The view of the department at that time was that Nasser had given his undertaking in the United Nations to remove his troops from Yemen within six months. His reply to me was that he had not undertaken to remove his troops; or at least if he had given the undertaking he had not undertaken as well not to substitute others for those moved.
[DOT] (3:20 p.m.)
The Yemen situation is a serious one. Aden brings to Great Britain problems almost beyond solution. Gibraltar is a danger spot. In Korea there are already divisions taking place and potential threats being made. In Hong Kong serious incidents are taking place. All over the world over a period of months there has developed a spirit of potential war. The same situation obtains in the field of trade but with that phase I do not intend to deal today.
Everywhere, Mr. Speaker, chaos threatens. We have asked the government over and over again for a debate so as to have before the house the views of the government. Nobody knows where the Canadian government stands on Viet Nam. Its ministers speak multilingually each advancing his own views regardless of the consequences to cabinet solidarity.
I am going to repeat what I said with regard to the views expressed by the President of the Privy Council, views diametrically opposed to the views expressed by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I have no doubt the hon. gentleman's mail is the heaviest ever received by any member of the House of Commons. Commendation for statements not in keeping with cabinet solidarity cannot be taken as an appropriate reward.
We have tried to get the government to agree to a debate. Various members-I have before me the excerpts from Hansard-have asked the government to set aside a couple of days for international affairs. The government has been afraid to permit discussion. It knows that uncertainty in its membership denies a declaration of unified policy.
In the last 48 hours the minister of manpower made a statement that what was said by the President of the Privy Council was not out of consonance with the views of the government. Each member believes he can make statements that will be attractive for the time
May 23, 1967

being, regardless of whether they are representative of government policy. Ministers go galloping off in many directions, each making statements which they regard as appropriate regardless of government policy.
This may not be the view of the government, Mr. Speaker, but it is the view of newspaper editorial writers in all parts of Canada. I wish to quote but one editorial in part from the Montreal Star for May 18 last, a newspaper never regarded as one of the warm hearted supporters of the Conservative view. The title is "Dangerous Habit Of Conning Electors", and it goes on to describe what has happened in connection with questions and answers about Viet Nam in this house. It says in part:
Instances could be multiplied. They are excused because of the belief in what has come to be known as "quiet diplomacy", by which is meant fixing something up before anybody can find out what is really going on.
That, Mr. Speaker, is representative of the view which is taken. The Halifax Chronicle-Herald has taken the stand that it was most proper to ask the government to bring before a committee of parliament the two journalists who made allegations regarding the international control commission. I do not think the government is very anxious to have them appear, because each of them has stated that such an opportunity would be welcomed, and the truth would then be forthcoming.
We are denied information. Information has become the privileged monopoly of the government. They seek to act on behalf of this nation without allowing parliament to find out what is going on. The only way to secure action is through the medium of an amendment. It will immediately be said that such an amendment, if supported, would constitute a vote of non-confidence. However, I would make the government an offer. We have tried in every way to get this government to give us an opportunity to find out what they are thinking about, if anything.
I will move this amendment, Mr. Speaker, but not for the purpose of prejudicing the government. If the government accepts the amendment it will in no way be considered by the opposition as a vote of non-confidence, but will constitute a declaration by parliament that this institution has the right to information. If the government falls in line with this suggestion I will make the immediate offer that if any subamendments are introduced by any third parties, those subamendments will not receive support from Her Majesty's loyal opposition. The purpose of
Foreign Policy
making this offer is to finally pry from this government information that is being denied to us.
What answers the Minister of National Defence gave hon. members in regard to the United Nations force and unification. The whole unification dream, now implemented into legislation, has disappeared in the last few days, as we in the opposition said it would. Today the minister is endeavouring to beat a strategic retreat.
[DOT] (3:30 p.m.)


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Don't be irresponsible.


John George Diefenbaker: Perhaps it should not be called-


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Don't be irresponsible.


John George Diefenbaker: -a strategic retreat.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Don't be irresponsible.


Mr, Diefenbaker:: I will not argue. The minister beats what is being described as a strategic retreat, but I shall be glad to amend that and say that it is a disordered defeat. With the government's support he built up the idea of unification to create a mobile force, the objects of which were to reduce expenditure and to be available for peace keeping for the United Nations. The whole proposition was built on a quicksand of political illusion. The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin) rushed in to tell us that the creation of the unified force was in pursuance of our foreign policy and an adjunct thereto. Where is that policy today? It has all collapsed. One understands why the faces on the treasury benches are so long.
For weeks the government told us what a wonderful policy was being set up. They said that unification was not designed to turn Canadian forces into an international force. Again, may I be permitted to quote from the policy speech of the President of the Privy Council (Mr. Gordon) which he delivered two weeks ago. He said:
In circumstances such as these Canada, instead of stepping up her defence budget considerably, might decide to concentrate her efforts on the maintenance of mobile peace keeping or peace restoring units to be available to the United Nations on the shortest possible notice. This might make a lot of sense. Our new unified forces should be well suited to this task.
Then General Allard cleared up the whole matter in the speech he delivered at St. Catharines on April 23 or 24. He was reported as follows:
The creation of a mobile world peace keeping force as w'ell as elimination of waste are the goals of Canada's proposed reorganization of the armed

May 23, 1967
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forces, General Jean V. Allard, chief of defence staff, said Saturday ...
The objective of the reorganization of the forces is to enable Canada to live with the realities of the times, assuming the responsibilities of the country's growing importance in world affairs ...
Canada's forces were being made into a highly mobile force, in keeping with their role as peace keepers in the world-[DOT]


Paul Theodore Hellyer: What is the right hon. gentleman quoting?


Mr. Starr:: General Allard's speech.


John George Diefenbaker: The government took the Canadian forces and dressed them up in little green uniforms. Now they are all dressed up with no place to go.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


John George Diefenbaker: The peace keeping operation, as the minister admitted involuntarily in his answer a short time ago, will have to be looked into in the years that lie ahead. Those were his words earlier today, as I recall them.
The whole foreign policy of Canada, as a result of President Nasser's action reinforced by that of U Thant who could do nothing but what he did, has disappeared. All we have now is the unification legislation. "Royal" has gone. The basis for the legislation has ceased to exist. Is it any wonder that the faces of the government's ministers on Friday wore a look of defeat? They realized then for the first time that the unification legislation would create a force that would not defend Canada. We warned them the legislation makes the United States the defender of Canada and it provides forces for the United Nations to be used in all parts of the world whenever required.
Sir, this is a serious blow to policies not fully thought out and not reasoned out and what has happened completely supports the various high ranking officers who stated that the government's policy was a chimera, a dream. They said it would lower the morale of Canada's forces without bringing effective results. The government based its foreign policy on the assumption that what the UN had put together no man could put asunder. Today we face one of the most serious setbacks to international peace witnessed over the years.
I was in San Francisco in 1945 when the dream was for the creation of an international force to preserve and maintain the peace to be mobilized by the various nations comprising the United Nations. How this was to be done was not discussed. The great 
nations, with one exception, stood by the smaller nations, and the great nations had to assume the responsibility.
Sir, the first thing to be done is to restore an alternative force. Unless that is done the United Nations will be as powerless and impotent as was the League of Nations following the action in 1935 when Mussolini moved into Ethiopia. And what has happened now? The assembly is meeting. The charter gave the responsibility for peace keeping to the security council and, when the security council was not sitting, the general assembly by resolution could assume the authority for providing a United Nations force. The dreams of the charter have not been attained. The security council with the assistance of the military staff was to apply armed force for peace keeping. Today, whether it sits or not that committee has no authority. U Thant as secretary general has become the officer commanding the forces under the United Nations. The "unified for peace" resolution has not been acted on. At a time when the peace of the world is threatened what happens? The United Nations spent its time last week passing a resolution about West Africa and South Africa's mandate over it. It must have been realized that the resolution is almost unenforceable. Yet the problem facing the world has not been brought before the assembly. I hope that Canada acts at once to bring this matter before the assembly.
[DOT] (3:40 p.m.)
The war of nerves is on. We can only hope that as a result of what has taken place in the last few days there will be a realization of the terrible danger which faces the world. If the general assembly of the United Nations would meet now to deal with this matter and discuss it the danger might yet be averted. After all, it is a forum for discussion. Why has it not been empowered to deal with this matter? Why does it sit silent on everything except the West African mandate at a time when it should be dealing with a situation which threatens the peace of the world?
So far as the United Nations force is concerned, we asked earlier today what is to be done about the Canadian element. I cannot understand why the Canadian contingent should remain there the longest. We have been dedicated to peace keeping. We in Canada have been paying the cost of the United Nations force in Cyprus-without contribution and without thanks. Two weeks ago the U.S.S.R. indicated it would make no contribution to the cost of peace keeping.
May 23. 1967

The minister suggested the other day that the United Nations force now disbanded, to use his words, might be placed inside the Israeli boundary. If this were done we would be placing a non-United Nations force, a force unarmed except for small arms, in a dangerous position. It would be transformed ultimately into a combat force between Egypt and the other Arab nations, and Israel.
The situation of Israel is dangerous and threatening. I have seen the armed forces of that country through the inexperienced eyes of one who served in the lowest officer rank. There is wonderful morale in the Israeli forces. But they do not want war. It was never intended that the United Nations force should be used as a peace preserving unit. That means war. I asked the commanding officers of the United Nations force on two occasions how long they thought that force would last in the event of hostilities breaking out. The answer was: We would not last; we have no power; we are simply here in a supervisory capacity reporting on incidents which might ultimately lead to war. But we have no power or authority to act.
Furthermore, the ambassador for Israel said of the suggestion which was made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs that Israel receive a United Nations force on her territory:
There are legal difficulties there, because legally the force is no longer in existence.
I want to see Israel stand. I paraphrase the words of an English poet: Come what will, Israel yet shall stand. But to take a United Nations force and put it inside Israel within the territorial limits of that country would turn it into a combat force, unprepared as it is for combat.
I think the failure of the government to take a stand on the Viet Nam situation has been a major factor contributing to what is now happening in the Middle East. By this I do not mean that Canada is in any way responsible. The government has failed to take a stand on Viet Nam which could be understood. It has let Canada down before the world. One member of the administration backs the United States. Another says the United States has no moral right to be where it is. This creates a false sense of security in all parts of the world to the Canadian attitude. Indeed, the Washington Post of May 19 carried this headline following the admonition delivered by the Prime Minister extramurally at the conclusion of a recent cabinet meeting: "Canadian Cabinet Discord On
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Viet Nam Papered Over". That is the response by a newspaper which has been friendly to Canada.
What about Viet Nam? I remember well the words of the Secretary of State for External Affairs when he spoke in this house on May 28, 1965, as reported at 1779 of Hansard. He said:
We know the North Vietnamese have taken advantage of social discontents to pose as the effective leaders of a reform movement. We know that by resorting to terrorism and blackmail they were able to establish control over large segments of the population and to organize the Viet Cong into an instrument of aggression directed, encouraged and supported on a grand scale since 1956 by men and equipment from the north. We believe there are at present over 35,000 highly trained guerrillas who have been infiltrated into the south from the north.
Further:
On the one hand we have the aggressive form of communism which sees wars that favour its purposes as "just wars". On the other we have the determination of the United States, for one. not to allow this aggression to be profitable, and the determination of the people of South Viet Nam to decide on their own future ...
Some people in this country-and if I interpret his comments correctly this includes the hon. member for Burnaby-Coquitlam-appear to be advocating that the United States simply get out of Viet Nam. I wonder whether these people have really thought through what this would mean ...
If the United States withdraws from Viet Nam, how far is it to withdraw? Does it mean that Thailand, the Philippines and Malaysia, to mention only three of the nations most directly affected, are to be left to fend for themselves with nothing between them and an expansionist China? What about India, which has already had a bitter taste of China's expansionism? What is to happen to Australia and New Zealand?
In these words the Secretary of State for External Affairs took a stand. And he had the Canadian people behind him. Since then there has been all this tinkering by ministers, supported now by the Minister of Manpower and Immigration (Mr. Marchand) who is sympathetic to the views expressed by the President of the Privy Council (Mr. Gordon). We say: Let it come to the peace table. That is the objective of all here. The attitude of communist China was revealed recently by Simon Malley who has just returned from Peking. He said:
[DOT] (3:50 p.m.)
China will send its vast armies into Viet Nam the moment Hanoi is threatened with a "sellout peace," Prime Minister Chou En-lai told me in his first interview with a foreign correspondent in two years.
He sat with me in his reception room in the Forbidden City of Peking and declared that Hanoi
47S

May 23, 1967
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has only to say the word to bring an avalanche oi Chinese "volunteers" to its aid.
Ultimately, he predicted, the course of events will result in just that.
Day after day over the C.B.C. we have a continual chorus being placed before the Canadian people that after all communism is not so bad. They advocate the United States get out regardless of the consequences. That proposition is a complete denial of the prospects that mankind faces.
This government has tried to be on both sides of the question of Viet Nam. At Temple University in Philadelphia the Prime Minister two years ago said:
No nation-and particularly no newly independent nation-could ever feel secure if capitulation in Viet Nam led to the sanctification of aggression through subversion and spurious wars of national liberation.
Today with the situation dark and difficult the government of Canada is on both sides of the Viet Nam question. It is at the same time on neither side. The ministers speak multilingually on foreign affairs regardless of the fact that in so doing they are failing to give leadership. I think, and I have never detoured from this position that the United States ought to carry out the appeal that was made by the United Nations Secretary General for a halt in the American air bombardment of North Viet Nam. I realize such a step would cause dangers and there are imponderables in the equation. There is no positive guarantee that it would bring about peace talks. It might enable the north to increase the flow of goods to the south and strengthen defences at home. All of this is true but, sir, let it be tried.
U Thant has said that he is afraid we are witnessing today the initial phase of world war III. No one knows what, if anything, will bring Viet Nam to the peace table but it will not be the mass evacuation of United States forces, a proposition which received such approval from the communist party in our country the other day in a release from communist headquarters. On the other hand, realizing the position of the United States I believe that there should be a bombing halt with a strenuous peace offensive by leaders everywhere in the western world.
Certainly what is happening today is frightening in its implications. Those of us who are older will not be there if war comes but the young men and women of this nation and of all the western nations will not stand idle. The other day five United States senators, both Republican and Democratic, came

out in favour of action along this line. The Democratic leader in the U.S. senate pleaded for such action. I would like to see our parliament, while realizing the tremendous contribution of the United States, make clear the view that such a bombing halt is necessary today. There will be no second prizes in the next world war.
Can we not hope that instead of being answered, as we were today, in a condescending manner, the government will come clean, will tell Canadians the facts, will let us know what the course is to be-not the unimaginative nonsense of the Minister of National Defence in setting up his personal plaything, the unified force. Let us have a declaration from the government of Canada as to what it intends to do and the course it intends to follow, denuded of these massive phrases and expostulations to which we are subjected from time to time. Let us have a statement in clear and unequivocal language.
It is on that basis that I move the amendment, and I repeat what I said when I began. There was no other course open to obtain from this government its views and the attitude of the administration. We tried to have by agreement discussion for a day or two on these matters. That was refused. We tried to bring about the convening of the foreign affairs committee, to bring before it those two Canadians, one of whom on the C.B.C. and the other in the Montreal Star, who by what they stated, if it is true, delivered up to all the world Canada's reputation for fairness and justice.
The criticism by these two men, who bear good reputations, deprived Canada of being in a neutral position on the International Control Commission. These two men should be given the opportunity to tell their story. If what they said is not true it should be so branded, but if it is true it is the utmost condemnation of this government. It shows that this government has been playing at walking down the centre of the street and pretending to do business on both sides of the street.
Therefore I move, seconded by the hon. member for Ontario (Mr. Starr):
That all the words after "that" be deleted and the following substituted therefor:
"This house regrets that, despite repeated requests by honourable members, the government has neglected or refused to make available time to debate international problems which are so serious and dangerous that they could lead to world war III and further regrets that the government has failed to state the policies of our country with clarity, without uncertainty and unequivocally with regard
May 23, 1967

to Asia and the Middle East so that Canadians and freedom-loving nations will know where Canada stands.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.
[DOT] (4:00 p.m.)


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. I believe I should bring to the attention of hon. members that it has been the practice in the past in such debates to recognize, after the Leader of the Opposition, representatives of the other parties to the left of the Chair. In view of the special circumstances of this debate, if the hon. member for York South wishes to allow the Secretary of State for External Affairs to make a reply immediately I would recognize him. I must say, however, that normally under the practice which has been established for some years now the hon. member for York South would normally be allowed to speak at this time.


David Lewis: Mr. Speaker, in view of the world situations we are discussing it seems obvious to me that the minister responsible for our foreign policy ought to have the earliest opportunity to speak. I am delighted to agree to your suggestion.


Hon. Paul  Marlin@Secretary of Slate for External Affairs: Mr. Speaker, in rising to speak at this particular point in the debate I am moved to do so for the reasons stated by my hon. friend. I thank him very much for recognizing that in view of the importance of the discussion it is desirable that I should intervene at this time.
My right hon. friend has presented an amendment in which he criticizes the government on a number of counts and thereby by implication asserts that he has no confidence in the government of Canada for the reasons stated in the amendment.


Mr. Mandziuk:: Find out who has.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I shall be glad at once to deal with what I believe to be the invalid grounds on which he has predicated his amendment. I do not propose to deal with every question he has raised in the amendment nor do I propose to deal with his speech in the same terms he has used. I shall endeavour, however, to deal with the situation confronting the world at the present time, the seriousness of which I think warrants as objective a discussion as those of us on all sides of this house are capable of giving to it. My hon. friend asks, what is the policy of the government on Viet Nam, what is the policy
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of the government with regard to the situation in the Middle East, and what is the policy of the government on this and on that. My hon. friend has a right to put these questions just as the country has a right to learn from the government its position.
Having examined the debates in the British house, in the chamber of deputies in France, in some of the Scandinavian deliberative assemblies and in Australia and New Zealand, I should like to say, with regard to the question of Viet Nam, that I challenge any hon. gentleman to indicate that in these places there has been more debate or more thorough debate either in the house or in a committee of that house. In discussing a matter of this great importance it would be well for us to bear in mind that other countries in the western world, concerned as they are about the world situation in Viet Nam, have had the same kind of indictments made against them that understandably are made against this government in respect of a worrying and difficult situation.
The Prime Minister of Great Britain-the leader of the Labour government-when requested in the House of Commons in Britain to disclose the nature of the discussions he had had with Mr. Kosygin said that he and the premier of the Soviet union devoted the major part of their discussions to Viet Nam. He said that these discussions were urgent and constructive. He also said they were confidential.


John George Diefenbaker: On what date and on what page does this appear?


Paul Joseph James Martin: It appears at pages 346 and 347 of the British parliamentary debates for February 14 this year. He said:
They were also confidential and must remain so, as must equally my contacts with the President of the United States.
Then he went on to say:
These disappointments should not drive any of us into panic measures, reversals of policy or into the delusion that peace can be secured by dramatic but ineffectual declarations. Those of us who have a role to play in this matter have a duty to keep cool and to keep our eyes fixed on the goal we set ourselves last week, to use the influence we possess to prevent the bitterness as well as the fighting from escalating, and to begin again, however difficult the circumstances, to create two-way confidence-and to remember above all that our objective is not to strike allegedly moral postures or to make unhelpful denunciatory declarations- our objective is to secure peace.

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Mr. Speaker, I believe those words are as applicable to Canada and this house as they are in Britain a country not engaged in the war in Viet Nam and having in that regard a position similar to that of Canada. We are not a combatant in that war but in 1954 we assumed a responsibility under the terms of the Geneva Accord.
My right hon. friend today although not confining himself to two subjects, dealt primarily with two. I will deal with the first one, the situation in the Middle East. As we all know, the Secretary General of the United Nations is now in Cairo on an important and delicate mission. He will be exploring with the president of the United Arab Republic the ways and means by which the United Nations might be of assistance to the parties immediately concerned with the present situation on the border of Israel. On Saturday morning I discussed with U Thant a number of matters. I should add hastily that the differences in modalities between the Canadian government and the Secretary General-and they were only differences in modalities-in no way affect our regard for the high office which he holds nor do they in any way affect the high regard we have for the Secretary General of the United Nations.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.
[DOT] (4:10 p.m.)


Paul Joseph James Martin: I discussed with him the possibility that the United Nations truce supervision organization might be reactivated in Gaza and the Sinai as an aid to peaceful conditions in the area. He will look into the possibility and, I am sure, investigate what might be feasible in the light of the position of the government of the United Arab Republic in requesting the withdrawal of the United Nations emergency force. The Secretary General explained to me in detail his reasons, some of which I have given today in an answer to a question, for the step he took in answer to the demand, addressed in the first instance by the foreign minister of the U.A.R. to the general commanding the United Nations force. He circulated a report summarizing his position in that regard to the security council on May 19 last.
I told the Secretary General that I understood and respected his position even though we differed on certain aspects of the procedures involved, but that our only concern now in view of the decision he has taken is to be of whatever assistance we can to enable the United Nations to play a useful role in the area. This will depend in part on the results of his conversations in Cairo. I did express [Mr. Martin (Essex East) .1
the hope that he might find it possible to visit other countries in the region so that when he returned to New York he could give a complete report on steps that might be taken by the United Nations to ease the position and restore peaceful conditions.
I reminded him that in a similar situation in 1958, after the landing of marines in Lebanon and British forces in Amman and Jordan, the then Secretary General announced that he was going to see the president of the United Arab Republic, and it was while he was in Cairo that he indicated his intention, in the interests of establishing an equilibrium in the area, to visit Israel and Jordan, and indeed he went to Iraq.
It is my hope that the discussions the Secretary General will have in Cairo will make it possible for this balancing kind of visit to take place. I also spoke when I was in New York on Saturday to the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, France, the United Arab Republic, Israel and Syria. I would have welcomed as well an opportunity to speak to the ambassador of the Soviet union but he was not available.
I took the opportunity to explain to these spokesmen for their governments the views of the Canadian government and as well to obtain their views. I expressed our concern over the potentially dangerous situation which had arisen and endorsed the Secretary General's plea for restraint by all concerned. I made it clear to the representatives of governments from the area that Canada had no intention of abandoning its impartial attitude toward the problems of the Middle East and that our chief interest was to work out with the United Nations some solution to restore stable conditions in the area.
I also indicated that as a major contributor to peace keeping operations we were naturally anxious that nothing be said or done which would destroy the confidence that member states must have in the United Nations as a conciliator and impartial presence. Let me say that notwithstanding the present ineffectiveness of the United Nations in many areas this government believes in its potential strength and in its necessity as an institution in this interdependent nuclear world of ours.
While in New York I also discussed the role of the security council in the present situation. My right hon. friend spoke of the authority of the assembly. It must not be forgotten that the security council is the agency under the charter constitutionally set up to deal with situations that threaten the peace.
May 23, 1967



As we know, this does not preclude the general assembly, through the uniting for peace resolution, from asserting its view, but in so far as enforcement action is concerned this can only come, as I know my right hon. friend will recall, under the authority of the security council.
I indicated that the council ought to be in continuous session, with its members constantly available so as to be ready to act whenever necessary. I well recognize that there might be some danger of precipitating a premature confrontation in the council if it were to meet before the parties to the dispute were ready to agree to some interim steps which might be taken, perhaps as a result of the visit of the Secretary General. Naturally, if there were serious incidents or other developments which might lead the council members to believe there might be conflict, then the council could meet at once to deal with the situation. Yesterday's announcement by the president of the United Arab Republic that he was stopping Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba may require the council to meet.
Urgent consultation between the members is now taking place and Canada as a member of the council is participating in these discussions. There are considerations, as I am sure the house will realize, which must be very much in the minds of the members of the council before they decide to take particular steps or before they decide to meet.
President Nasser is reported to have stated in his speech last night that U.A.R. forces had occupied Sharm-el-Sheikh and that the U.A.R. would not permit a ship flying the Israeli flag to pass through the Gulf of Aqaba.


David Lewis: May I ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs whether President Nasser did not say more than that? Did he not also say he would not permit any ship carrying strategic material to enter the gulf?


Paul Joseph James Martin: That is right. He said he would not allow ammunition or materials of war to pass through.
I was just about to observe that this was one of the matters that the Secretary General will undoubtedly be discussing. I asked our representative on the council to take full part in the discussions in New York that are now taking place, and to note particularly the discussions that have already taken place between certain of the permanent members of the council.
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As the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Hellyer) said during the question period, this situation is one that we in this country all very much regret. I am sure that people throughout the world regret it. There is recognition of the effectiveness during the past ten and a half years of the United Nations emergency force. The fact that the U.A.R. has asked for the withdrawal of the force and that two of the contributing members indicated they would no longer serve in the force-


Gordon Minto Churchill: Which two are they?


Paul Joseph James Martin: As I indicated last Friday in answer to a question by my right hon. friend, the two which took that position were India and Yugoslavia. These are considerations that have to be borne in mind in assessing the effectiveness of the force as an instrument of pacification. I welcomed this discussion in light of our experience in this particular kind of situation, but the difficult ties of maintaining a force must be borne in mind.
The United Nations truce supervision organization, essentially an observer group now with 120 men although at one time it had a personnel of some 700, has certain powers under the mixed armistice commissions created by the security council. These powers could enable it, together with certain other powers, to act as an effective international presence and a United Nations body to keep the peace between the conflicting parties. It may be that at this moment the time is not appropriate for putting this into effect, notwithstanding the desirability, because it must be remembered that such a force cannot be established without the consent of the parties involved, the host countries, in this case the United Arab Republic and Israel, nor can it be accepted in terms of an enlargement of powers by the security council unless all five of the great powers consent. So it will be understood why there should be consultations and negotiations prior to a formal meeting of the council.
[DOT] (4:20 p.m.)


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, would the minister allow a question? He mentioned those with whom he had communicated on Saturday and said he would have been willing to discuss the matter with the ambassador of the U.S.S.R. Was there any reason why that consultation did not take place, or was he absent?

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Mr.   Marlin@Essex Easl: I was not suggesting that there was any reason. I was simply told through our ambassador that it was not possible because of other arrangements that I presume the ambassador had made. The request came late, as indeed it did to all those I have seen. It was only late Friday that it was agreed I should go to New York. However, I know that there have been consultations outside the United Nations involving the Soviet union, and I would hope that these would have constructive and satisfying results.
I do not believe there is anything more I can say about this situation. We all recognize how serious it is, particularly the sensitivity in the Gulf of Aqaba. I would sincerely repeat the plea made by the Secretary General of the United Nations to all the parties concerned that this was an occasion when restraint and caution should mark their efforts and their examination of the situation.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Mr. Speaker, would the minister permit a very brief question at this point? A few moments ago the minister referred to President Nasser's declaration that Israeli ships would not be allowed to enter the Gulf of Aqaba, nor would ships of other countries carrying strategic material. Has there been any indication to our government that the United Arab Republic would demand to search ships to see whether strategic material was aboard, and was there any indication as to what would comprise strategic material?


Paul Joseph James Martin: My understanding is that two ships have already gone through. I might mention in passing that the United Nations convention of April 29, 1958, on the territorial seas and contiguous zones provides for the right of innocent passage. This treaty has been signed and ratified by 33 countries. It has not been signed or ratified by Saudi Arabia or by the United Arab Republic. It was signed by Canada. It was not ratified by Canada for reasons, as my right hon. friend will know, that had to do with our negotiations regarding problems involving the law of the sea. But there is no doubt in my mind that this convention is declaratory of international law, which provides for innocent passage in respect of international waterways.
My right hon. friend came back, as he had every right and indeed as he has a duty to do, to discuss the problem of Viet Nam. This question has been the subject of persistent interrogation, and rightly so, in this house now for two and a half years. I would simply remind the house, and I do this not by way of

defence of any kind of response that I make to questions, that in all the parliaments which I have studied questions on international affairs are put following written notice. I have not taken refuge-


John George Diefenbaker: That is what the rules say, but you have not followed that course yourself.


Mr. Martin (Essex Easl):: -in this perfectly legitimate response that I could make, because I felt that we were entitled in this house to the fullest explanation wh.ch a minister in my circumstances and having my responsibilities could give. I think the record of this house and the record of the external affairs committee will show that the government's policy has been stated over and over aga.n in the only way in which it can be stated having in mind the nature of our role on the commission, the nature of diplomacy itself. In the interests of achieving what one hopes one m ght achieve as a result of the contacts which the government has in respect of a matter so delicate and important as the war in Asia, I hope this will be understood.
But I should like to repeat again that Canada is not a belligerent in this war. Canada did not start this war. On the government benches we have said that it is not the intention of this government to commit troops to that war. I have said in answer to questions that our commitment in that regard could only arise pursuant to an obligation inherent in the charter of the United Nations. That continues to be our policy. Because it has been said that in the long run more is to be gained by quiet diplomacy, the government has been charged, as my right hon. friend charged today, with refusing to give this house and the country information which it was entitled to have. I know my right hon. friend too well, however, to take all of his observations with the same serious intent that he would have me bestow on those observations. I have sat in this house with my right hon. friend a long time. I know his technique just as well as I am sure-


Mr. Monleith:: We know yours.


Paul Joseph James Martin: -he has admiringly watched my technique.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I saw a report the other day that my right hon. friend said how dangerous a thing was quiet diplomacy. One could almost imagine him conjuring up
May 23, 1967

Wilson and complaining about secret diplomacy as though quiet diplomacy and secret diplomacy were the same kind of thing or even the other side of the same coin. The real fact is that no one can carry on diplomacy unless it be quiet. It ceases to be diplomacy if it is not quiet. You would not be able-


John George Diefenbaker: You should tell Mr. Gordon that.


Paul Joseph James Martin: -to enjoy the confidence of others if this were not the case. For instance, in my talks with the Secretary General I am sure that if I had not established a standard of credibility with him it would not have been possible for me to receive at his hands certain information which I believe to be very important and which I passed on to my colleagues in the government, as he has passed it on to certain other spokesmen for other governments.
It must also be understood that quiet diplomacy is not part of foreign policy, as some hon. gentlemen in this house, at least by implication, suggest. Quiet diplomacy is not policy. Quiet diplomacy is not a program. It is an instrument. It is a technique, and no one employed it, and rightly so, more successfully than my right hon. friend in certain situations such as that which confronted his government with respect to the Congo.
[DOT] (4:30 p.m.)
There are occasions when a government should not hesitate to make a public declaration of policy, but that is not inconsistent with the necessity, for instance, of Canada as a member of the commission treating matters with colleague states in a confidential way. Certainly that is the only way one would carry on discussions in this matter with the government of Hanoi, either through Mr. Ronning or through our present representative on the commission. Certainly one could not enjoy very long the confidence of any government unless one had created a reputation for respecting confidences and had won, as a result, a credibility where it is necessary for the Canadian government and other governments to make contacts if they are going to make their contribution to try to bring about an end to this very difficult and regrettable war in Viet Nam.
On this subject I would simply remind the house what a former Canadian diplomat, Mr. Escott Reid, pointed out the other day, namely, that quiet diplomacy is the application of sound practice in our relations with other countries. I hope that no one is going to say
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the government is refusing to give information because it observes something that every government, in the conduct of its affairs with other countries, must do in the interests of satisfactory relations and the attainment of its objectives.
We are a member of the commission. We have been there for 13 years along with India and Poland. Charges of spying against our personnel are unfounded, and I regret that my right hon. friend brought that question up today. I want to say, as Secretary of State for External Affairs, that we have every reason to be proud of the soldiers who from 1955 on have served Canada on the commission. Certainly I as Secretary of State for External Affairs am proud of the record of integrity and purpose of the foreign service officers of the Department of External Affairs who under difficult circumstances have served the cause of peace and international conciliation in a way that should win expressions of gratitude and occasion the pride which I feel in this service and in what they have done as members of this commission.
When a year ago last January the Secretary General and I discussed the question of Viet Nam I was persuaded by his argument that the settlement of this problem must be within the framework of the Geneva conference. Regrettable as it was, the United Nations, the security council or the assembly, could not be expected to deal effectively with this problem because of the absence from its membership of particular countries involved. From that moment on we sought, as I have reminded the house time and time again, to impress upon India and Poland the desirability of constituting the three members on the commission into a body that might have as its prime purpose the narrowing of the gap between the parties, based on the fact that this instrument has a readier access to Hanoi and to Saigon than any other instrument. We have not been able to persuade all the members of the commission of the importance of this proposition although both Poland and India have recognized the potential role for the commission in this situation.
We did not limit our efforts only to our role as a member of the commission, but on two occasions we sent Mr. Chester Ronning as a special emissary of the government of Canada to Hanoi, to Saigon and to Washington for the purpose of seeing whether or not he, in the name of the government of Canada, could

May 23, 1967
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make any progress in delineating the distances between the parties and seeing whether or not a formula could be reached which might at least bring about preliminary discussions between the parties involved in this war. I may say that on his first visit Mr. Ronning did bring back information which I believe was important, information which has since been partially made public but which I think, while not furthering the ultimate cause which he and the government had in mind, nevertheless has assisted us to understand the difficulties and perhaps the reasons for the inflexible position which both parties seemingly have taken in their declared positions.
Let no one say that the commission or the Canadian government has not been engaged ip trying to bring about peace. The record is there to judge when the time comes for its full exposure, and I venture to suggest that Canadians will not be ashamed of our efforts through this instrument to try to bring about peace in this situation.
We did not stop with these endeavours only. I went to the Soviet union and to Warsaw last November in connection with the war in Viet Nam. If I am not able to disclose fully the nature of the conversations which I had, it is not because these were not directed toward the kind of objective that we had in mind in the commission or toward the kind of objective that we have in mind now. Right from the beginning our position with regard to the war in Viet Nam has been that We wanted a cease fire. Right from the beginning we firmly declared our view that a military solution alone to this problem was neither desirable nor practicable. When a year and a half ago the unaligned nations made an appeal, Canada was the first country to join in that appeal. It will be recalled that we urged the United States to accept certain positions with regard to the 17-point appeal made by the unaligned nations.
My hon. friend says he is concerned about the war in Viet Nam. Is there anyone in this house who is not concerned about the war in Viet Nam? Is there anyone in Britain, in France, in Belgium, in the Scandinavian countries or in the United States who is not concerned? Governments which have particular information on certain aspects of this problem are not on that account excused from being concerned about the war in Viet Nam, about its escalation and expansion, about the dangers of further escalation and the dangers of involving other countries and of creating situations that could add to the intensity of the present conflict.
[Mr. Martin (Essex East).l
I am not asking for any sympathy from this house. I have been here too long to know the unwisdom of that kind of tactic. But I will say that the house has the right to know that as a member of this government charged with this matter there has not been anything that has occupied my time more or that of the Department of External Affairs than trying to achieve some success in the areas about which I have been talking in the past few minutes, and this has been shared by my colleagues in the government. No man has been more devoted to the cause of peace in his lifetime than the Prime Minister and it is only to be expected that any government of which he is the head would, as would a government headed by any other hon. member in the house including my right hon. friend, be anxious to bring about peace. We do not help to bring about that kind of condition when we charge, knowing full well that the government cannot take any other course, that the government is unwilling to give parliament and the public information, and when any hon. member who makes that charge knows perfectly well, if he knows anything about the conduct of foreign policy, that for the government to take any other course than the one it has followed would be irresponsible and would not be calculated to bring about peace.
[DOT] (4:40 p.m.)
Yes, Mr. Speaker, the Canadian government is concerned about the course of events in Viet Nam. If we do not say publicly exactly how we feel on every aspect of this problem, that does not mean that quiet diplomacy denies us the right or the opportunity of telling even our friends, the United States, how we feel on particular matters.


John George Diefenbaker: Would the minister allow a question? Would he say whether he agreed with the view expressed by his colleague, the President of the Privy Council (Mr. Gordon), that the United States has no moral or strategic justification to be in Viet Nam?


Mr.   Marlin@Essex East: My right hon. friend should at least accord me the privilege today of appreciating that I am trying to deal with this subject in as objective and nonpolitical a manner as I possibly can. The right hon. gentleman and I have been in this house almost longer than anyone else, and I do not think he would object to my saying this. He has had a distinguished career, but I do not think he has added to the distinction of that career by using foreign policy so often as a means of promoting political advantage.
May 23, 1367


John George Diefenbaker: Would the minister now answer the question? This was a statement which was made by one of his own colleagues.


Mr. Speaker:: Order, please. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has the floor.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, will the minister allow a question?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Nobody interrupted your
speech.


John George Diefenbaker: The minister speaks of being non-political. A few moments ago he was piling praise on himself, so I would ask him-there is nothing political about this; this statement was made by one of his own colleagues-whether he agrees that the United States has no justification, moral or strategic to be in Viet Nam. Is that government policy?


Gordon Minto Churchill: Answer the question.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, my right hon. friend must not think I am that innocent. He may try that on some young member who has been in this house for a week but he must not try it on me.
I stated that this government was concerned about the course of events in Viet Nam. For 20 years now since the end of the second world war the world community has tried to build a system of international law and order. It is part of that system to settle disputes by peaceful means. We regret that in Viet Nam recourse has been had to military means to deal with what is essentially a political problem. We are naturally concerned about the tragic toll in human suffering and destruction which this conflict is bringing to the Vietnamese people and to their country. We are also concerned that the longer the conflict continues the more difficult it will be to overcome suspicion and distrust on both sides. The longer the conflict continues the greater, of course, are the risks that it may expand, by inadvertance or deliberation, into something more serious. Accordingly we have urged restraint in those areas and in the way which we thought was the most effective.
I spoke a moment ago of Mr. Chester Ronning and of the commissioner's frequent visits to Hanoi. Has it ever dawned on my right hon. friend that if Hanoi has repeatedly observed that there is a Hanoi-Canada channel it is only because Hanoi believes that Canada does have some influence in Washington? What other reason could there be for the way in which our emissaries have been
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received? What other reason could there be for the nature of the discussions they have had?
I am not indicating to this house-and I hope that Hanoi will not suggest that I am -what these discussions have been. I have respected fully the confidences of the government of that country to our emissaries including Mr. Ronning. As I have said, if we do have a credibility in Hanoi it is because it is thought that as a friend of the United States we rightfully enjoy the confidence of the United States.
The United States is a country that we respect, whose friendship we have enjoyed and whose society is so much like our own. Would we retain any credibility in Washington Mr. Speaker, if we were to engage in consultations with the United States and at the same time follow courses of action that would inevitably destroy our right to their credibility and their confidence? This is something that Mr. Wilson mentioned following the discussions he had with Mr. Kosygin when he was charged with refusing to give the British house any information as to the results of his discussions, which extended over a period of one week, with the premier of the Soviet union.
I have stated that we are concerned about this situation, Mr. Speaker, and I make this additional point. We are not a party to this conflict. We have undertaken no military commitments in southeast Asia. The only commitment that Canada has in that area is to support and accelerate the economic development of the countries of southeast Asia.
The government intends to continue as a member of the international commission. This has been a difficult experience, Mr. Speaker, as my right hon. friend knows. I say that because he was the head of a government that was charged with the administration of the commission just as is this government. It was for that reason that I was so surprised when he belittled the commission by referring to allegations, thus far completely unfounded, with regard to the personnel of that commission.


John George Diefenbaker: Why not put these men before a committee?


Mr.   Marlin@Essex East: If that was a proper charge to make against this government then it was a proper charge for my right hon. friend to make against himself, because he was head of a government that was charged with the responsibility for the commission between the years 1957 and 1962.

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So, Mr. Speaker, we intend to carry out our responsibilities to the commission, and we believe that this is the right course for us to follow. We note with satisfaction that this is the view of India and also of Poland. The Canadian government has directed its efforts toward finding a basis on which the parties to the Viet Nam conflict might be brought into direct contact. I have indicated some of the steps we have taken in our endeavours in that regard.
The Canadian government has held that a solution to the problem in Viet Nam must be sought by political means. That is part of Canadian policy. We have made it clear that we look to negotiations to settle this problem. It seems important to us that any settlement of the present conflict should be such as to hold out a reasonable prospect of long term stability in that area. This is because we think that the problem in Viet Nam cannot be isolated from the security and stability of southeast Asia as a whole. We regard the basis of the Viet Nam problem as a political one.
[DOT] (4:50 p.m.)
As we see it, Mr. Speaker, what is primarily at issue between the parties is the future political arrangements in South Viet Nam. It is argued on both sides that the guiding principle should be the right of the people of South Viet Nam to determine their own destiny. It seems to us that the best way of achieving this is to afford the people of South Viet Nam an opportunity to determine by the test of the free ballot under what institution and under what government they wish their affairs to be conducted. We believe that the best way in which the Canadian government can bring its influence to bear on the Viet Nam situation is by doing exactly what we have done.


John George Diefenbaker: Oh, oh.


Paul Joseph James Martin: On April 11 in the external affairs committee I outlined four suggestions or ideas that are in keeping with the Geneva accords. I suggested procedures for a cease fire arrangement. I said at the time that I did not believe the climate was right for their acceptance. The reaction in Hanoi has been negative. Hanoi takes the position that there can be no parity of position between the parties, that first of all there must be an acknowledgement that the United States, as Hanoi puts it, is the aggressor, and this notwithstanding the findings of the commission in 1962.

While the United States would probably find most of our points acceptable, I believe it would register objection to an approach to de-escalation which begins with mutual disengagement in the demilitarized zone, coupled with a cessation of the bombing. I think that would be unacceptable to them.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Would the minister permit a question at this point. Is it not a fact that Dean Rusk said on television the other night that the United States had suggested to Hanoi a withdrawal of both sides from the demilitarized zone? Apparently that was not the minister's suggestion.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I am glad my hon. friend said that because Mr. Rusk, it will be remembered, said that that portion of the Canadian suggestion was acceptable to him. Mr. McNamara, the Secretary of Defence, also said that.
The point I make is that not only should there be a mutual disengagement in the demilitarized zone but that in all equity, if both sides accept that arrangement, there ought to be a cessation of bombing. Mr. Rusk has not explicitly accepted that. The Canadian government is prepared to make its own contribution to the eventual settlement in Viet Nam. We envisage that any agreed settlement of the present conflict will make provision for some sort of international presence. That, indeed, will be a very difficult assignment and if and when it comes, as the Prime Minister of Great Britain has put it, it may need to be buttressed by the guarantees of the great powers.
So, Mr. Speaker, I have today restated what I have stated on five occasions in this house and on six occasions in the external affairs committee to be the policy of Canada on the war in Viet Nam. That policy may not be acceptable to everyone.


John George Diefenbaker: Not to the President of the Privy Council.


Paul Joseph James Martin: No one recognizes more than I do the rights of individuals in this house and outside.


An hon. Member:: And in the cabinet.


Paul Joseph James Martin: But no one has
the right in the face of the government's record, in the face of the reaction of other countries toward what this government has sought to do, to charge us with not having a policy, with refusing to give information, with not trying, as a country not involved in this
May 23, 1967

war, to bring about peace discussions. The facts are otherwise.
The situation facing the world admittedly is serious, but it is not a situation to which this country has contributed directly except that by being a member of the international community we possibly must bear our share of responsibility for a climate of world opinion that permits the absence of the rule of law two decades after the most terrible experience in human history.
We dedicate ourselves in this country, in so much of our foreign policy to upholding the charter of the United Nations. I agree fully with the Minister of National Defence. Because we have suffered a reverse in peace keeping in the Middle East, that does not mean that the concept of Canadian peace keeping, as proposed and practised by the Canadian government, is invalid. We believe that this is an essential operation for the United Nations and that there will be additional situations which will require the use of UN peace keeping machinery. We still hope that in the Middle East, as I said at the outset, it will be possible for us to establish an international presence through the United Nations for this purpose.
The war in Viet Nam has disturbed the world; of that there can be no doubt. In one sense I think that disturbance represents a growing conviction of men and women everywhere that war as an instrument of national policy is anachronistic and that it has ceased to be a practical way of settling disputes between nations. But it is not our war. We did not cause this war, and the record shows that we are doing everything we can to bring it to an end.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


David Lewis: Mr. Speaker, before dealing with the Middle East and Viet Nam may I say a word about the right hon. gentleman's amendment. During the short time I have been in the house I have learned to admire the right hon. Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Diefenbaker) and to admire particularly his sense of humour. When he suggested that the government was free to accept his amendment I felt he was indulging in his admirable sense of humour. It was perfectly clear when he read the amendment that the government could not accept it. If I might say so without being unkind, even the extreme kindness of the Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) would not allow him to accept that kind of amendment.
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Lester Bowles Pearson: That was never in my mind.


David Lewis: It is our intention to move a subamendment today, despite the request of the right hon. Leader of the Opposition that we do not do so.
It would be trite to emphasize that we are in an extremely dangerous world situation. Everyone has spoken of it and will continue to speak of it, because the situation is pressing. The tragedy of the present world situation is that as conditions in Europe improved, as the cold war on the European continent receded, as a genuine detente between the Soviet union and the United States as the two major nuclear powers became possible, other parts of the world erupted to threaten the peace of humanity.
Our major difference with the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin)-and we have pressed this opinion on the house many times-is that we think the time has come for a country such as Canada to be much more forthright in its public statements of policy and to be much more demanding in public that the United Nations be not destroyed by world powers such as the United States of America which, by what it does in some parts of the world is destroying the effectiveness of the United Nations. It is no longer enough, when the world is on the brink of a third world war, for our Secretary of State for External Affairs to repeat his support for the United Nations, to repeat his desire for an end to the Viet Nam war, to repeat his appeal to the Middle East states for restraint. Such expressions of view by Canada will not be listened to in the present circumstances.
[DOT] (5:00 p.m.)
I am confident that the world is now in such danger that it is possible for a country like Canada, precisely because it is not involved in the Viet Nam conflict, precisely because it is not involved in the Middle East in any direct way and precisely because it is recognized throughout the world as a country without imperial or militaristic designs, to play a more effective role. I believe that a forthright call by Canada and forthright criticisms by Canada of the actions of governments, including, if necessary, the actions of officers of the United Nations itself, would help to arouse the kind of world opinion and the kind of unification of the people of the world which alone can stop the obvious drift toward a third world war. I cannot see any hope in the policy which is being pursued if the pressure

May 23, 1967
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on governments in Washington, in Hanoi, in Cairo and elsewhere does not come from an insistent, loud and determined voice throughout the world. We in this party think Canada is in a position to add to the effectiveness of that voice precisely for the reasons which the Secretary of State for External Affairs mentioned.
This is our major point of difference with regard to Viet Nam and other situations in the world. I am not saying this to be unkind to the Secretary of State for External Affairs-I will be guilty of making many trite statements myself-but it simply is not enough today to repeat unavoidably trite declarations about support for the United Nations and the like. I will illustrate to some extent what I mean as I deal with the situation in the Middle East.
The Prime Minister said yesterday-I had the pleasure of hearing him say this at a luncheon and I believe he has expressed the same sentiment on other occasions-that in his view and in the view of the government, Israel had shown a will to live and, like its neighbours, has a right to live in peace. The fact is that the neighbours of Israel deny Israel the right to live; they refuse to recognize that Israel has any right to continue to exist.
That is not an overstatement; I am sure the Prime Minister will agree that I have stated the position correctly. The difficulties in which we now find ourselves flow from the determination of the neighbours of Israel that Israel shall not continue to live. If the Prime Minister meant what he said-and I am confident he did-I say it is not enough for the Secretary of State for External Affairs to state in his speech, as he did if I heard him correctly, that we intend to maintain our impartiality or our neutrality, whatever the word was. He cannot have it both ways. This is precisely what blunts the influence of this country. If, as the Prime Minister stated it, it is the government's policy that Israel has the right to live and to live in peace, then the Secretary of State for External Affairs cannot be impartial or neutral in the present situation and his attempts to be so belie the statement which was made by the head of his government and help to muddy the waters in the Middle East and throughout the world.
Let me remind this house that the United Nations is responsible for the establishment of the state of Israel and therefore, in my submission, has a duty in the present circumstances of going beyond mere peace keeping

arrangements. It was the United Nations which by resolution toward the end of 1947 established the state of Israel. It is true that the following year there was a war in the Middle East which changed some of the arrangements which the United Nations had set out. None the less, the state of Israel, the idea of the state of Israel, was established by the United Nations. I therefore suggest that if the United Nations as a world institution is to preserve credibility-that is now the popular word-in the minds of people throughout the world, then having established a state it has responsibility for making as sure as it can that the state so established will continue to live.
I was in Israel recently, Mr. Speaker; I came back some four of five weeks ago. I travelled through that little country from north to south, from west to east. I do not want to make any comparison between conditions in Israel and conditions in neighbouring states because I have not been to the other Middle East states. But everyone who has visited Israel has been impressed by the considerable economic and social progress which has been made in that country, progress which is almost miraculous for a small nation of two and a half million people to have achieved. This is particularly so when one realizes that it started with a Jewish population of some six or seven hundred thousand and now has a Jewish population of over two million. In other words, in the course of 17 years the population has trebled or quadrupled. Moreover, it is made up of people from all parts of the world, not only from Europe but from parts of Africa and parts of Asia. The country to which they came was confronted by all the difficulty of integrating hundreds of thousands of immigrants who differed in some cases even in the colour of their skins and who certainly differed in their educational levels, their cultural levels, their social backgrounds, their political attitudes and the extent of their modern industrial know-how. The fact that in spite of these formidable difficulties Israel has achieved a considerable degree of social and economic development has been a cause of admiration among people in many parts of the world. And this development has been achieved despite the fact that a large part of the nation's budget is unfortunately but necessarily spent on defence.
I mention this for the reason I have already given, that it was the United Nations which established the state of Israel, and the Prime Minister having stated in recent days that
May 23, 1967

Israel has the right, together with its neighbours, to live in peace, there is therefore a special obligation upon the UN in view of the accomplishments of that country, in view of the fact that the state of Israel has not disappointed the world or abused the confidence which was placed in it. In these circumstances both the United Nations and Canada as a member of that institution have duties greater than merely hoping restraint will be shown.
Let me illustrate more definitely what I am suggesting-I hope not without some validity, and certainly with a full sense of responsibility. I find it impossible to understand the Secretary General's haste in withdrawing the United Nations emergency force. Earlier today I asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs during the orders of the day to give us the reasons which motivated this course of action. The hon. gentleman was very frank and full in his answers and I thank him for this.
[DOT] (5:10 p.m.)
But the most important implications created for Canada and other nations by Mr. U Thant's action is that he has set a most dangerous precedent for peace keeping. By his action, no matter how honestly and sincerely taken, he has weakened the potential usefulness of peace keeping undertakings by the United Nations. If, the moment a host country demands that such a force be withdrawn, the Secretary General of the United Nations acts without going either to the assembly of the United Nations or to the security council, if he acts on his own authority at the mere request of a host country then, Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that the whole notion of peace keeping is endangered beyond exaggeration. Time and time again we will be in the same position where a United Nations peace keeping force will necessarily be stationed on someone's territory and will necessarily have to be stationed there with that government's consent. Thus the precedent which the Secretary General has established seems to me to be dangerous not only in the present situation in the Middle East but dangerous for future peace keeping in the world.
Therefore in my estimation this government and the Secretary of State for External Affairs would have been justified, and would have served the cause of peace better, if they had concretely and forthrightly criticized the Secretary General for taking that step and demanded an immediate meeting of the security council on the subject, not merely, I 27053-32J
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repeat, because of the danger it represented in the Middle East but perhaps in the long run and more important because of the fact that his action undermined-I do not think that word is too strong-the potential usefulness of peace keeping in the future.
Of course I and my colleagues join with the Secretary of State for External Affairs in hoping that the visit of the Secretary General of the United Nations to Cairo will enable him to go to other capitals and that that visit result in an easing of the present situation. From my visit to Israel I do not see how it is possible for the state of Israel to accept the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the blockade of the port of Eilath which represent its only means of carrying on trade with the Far East and its only access to oil. I simply do not see how the government of that country can sit by and accept the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, for the reasons I have given. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that the Secretary of State for External Affairs should continue to demand a meeting of the security council, as apparently he has done, so that something concrete may be done to avoid the war which is clearly at our doorstep in the Middle East.
I agree with the right hon. gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Diefenbaker) when he states, if I understood him correctly, that the Middle East situation is the direct result of the situation in Viet Nam. I think he is right because when the United States has acted the way it has acted in Viet Nam it opened the door for similar action by countries like Egypt and made it impossible for the United States to carry out the role which it might otherwise have wanted to carry out. At least it made it very difficult for the United States to carry out the role of honouring the undertaking-I think it was in 1948-that the borders of the various countries in the Middle East must be protected, and difficult to carry out the convention that international waters like the Gulf of Aqaba must be available to all innocent shipping.
I say this because I can almost hear President Nasser and spokesmen for the Arab states saying to President Johnson, "Who are you to teach us international morality? Who are you to tell us what we may or may not do in terms of international law? Where has your consideration of these questions been when you decided to bomb North Viet Nam, and more recently to invade the demilitarized zone?"

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For many years now we have been the only party in Canada which has criticized American policy in Viet Nam and has criticized the government of Canada for not forthrightly and publicly condemning that policy in the hope that Canada's condemnation might persuade Washington to change it. The right hon. gentleman, the Leader of the Opposition, quoted a speech made some years ago by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in which he agreed with the American analysis of why the United States must be in Viet Nam. This is where we got into difficulty when he and other spokesmen for the government some years ago agreed with the analysis and the reasons which the Americans adopted for going in to Viet Nam.
On many occasions we have pointed out that it is far too simplistic, and indeed probably false, to suggest that the situation in Viet Nam is merely one of aggression, even though no one with his senses has denied or failed to see the communist intentions and the communist subversion in South Viet Nam. We have emphasized in many debates in this house and outside it that it is necessary to appreciate and to realize that a major factor in the Viet Nam situation is civil disagreement and a civil war between two sections of Viet Nam. Indeed in his speech today the minister said-I hope I heard him correctly because my notes are very brief, and I hope I do not misrepresent him-that the government of Canada is persuaded that the situation in Viet Nam is not a military one, that it is a political one. The minister went on to say that what we were concerned with was the future political arrangements between the two parts of Viet Nam and between the people of Viet Nam. The minister nods his head that I am representing him accurately.
If that is the case, and it is the case, what right has any big power to be in that situation? Who is to decide the future political arrangements between North and South Viet Nam and among the people of Viet Nam if it is not the people of Viet Nam themselves? If the minister says to me in reply that that is exactly what he wants, and that the policy is to create a situation in Viet Nam where the people of South Viet Nam would be free to make a decision without subversion and without interference from outside. I have no quarrel with him. But that does not require the bombing of North Viet Nam. That does not require the invasion of the demilitarized zone.

That does not require the constant and incessant escalation of the war by the United States.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Or by both sides.


David Lewis: The minister says "or by both sides." I was going to say this later but I will say it now. Every time he is asked this question the Prime Minister says "both sides," but the fact is-and let us not run away from the fact simply because it happens to relate to a country whose regime we do not like and that no one else in this house likes-that Hanoi has not bombarded any place in any other country. Let us not forget that Hanoi's activities have been limited to Viet Nam. The bombing of Hanoi, the bombing of North Viet Nam has been an act undertaken by a powerful country separated from Viet Nam by a huge ocean. We suggest, Mr. Speaker, that we ought to recognize these facts.
[DOT] (5:20 p.m.)
May I quote first a very recent editorial from the Globe and Mail of May 20. It says:
It has long been clear that the war is neither a clear cut case of aggression from the North, nor a purely civil conflict within the South.
It goes on to say:
What really matters is that the world's mightiest power has massively intervened in a war between different Vietnamese forces, whether or not they are considered to be feuding factions within a single nation, or two sovereign governments. It is this intervention which has magnified the conflict out of all reasonable proportions and has raised the awesome prospect of a much wider war.
This has more recently been made infinitely worse by the invasion of the demilitarized zone. If I am told that certain spokesmen for the United States have assured us they will not go beyond the three miles, I think it is, south of parallel 17, perhaps they will forgive me if I look at this statement with a jaundiced eye because I recall that only two, three or four weeks ago the same United States spokesmen or others promised most emphatically that they would not enter the demilitarized zone. That promise has now been broken. The logic of these escalations is that they cannot be brought to an end. If you go one step, almost inevitably you must take the next step or admit defeat which you were not prepared to admit in the first place and which no one is asking the United States to admit. In fact, the greater the escalation, the greater the involvement, the more difficult it will be for the United States and the others to extricate themselves.
May 23. 1967

What we have been urging is that the government publicly declare itself in favour of those policies advocated by the President of the Privy Council (Mr. Gordon) about whom I should like to say a few words later and who I notice has now left the house.


An hon. Member:: He is your man now. Is he running your party?


David Lewis: He is not our man and is not running our party. I may succeed later in enlightening the hon. member, but I am not sure. I know the President of the Privy Council had good reason for leaving, but we have been pressing for two or three years that the government follow precisely the policy he enunciated in his recent speech. The Secretary of State for External Affairs suggests that we are asking him to betray confidences. No one is doing that. I think every member of this house appreciates that there are some discussions which he, members of his department or envoys have had with other governments which he cannot disclose. No one expects him to do this.
I believe all of us wish that from time to time the minister's answers were a little less clothed in incomprehensible verbiage and that his circumlocutions were a little less "circum" and a little more "locution". No one, however, expects him to betray confidences. Personally I think I would appreciate it much more if the minister simply said, "I cannot answer the question; I am not in a position to give you the information". We would respect him as a responsible minister if he told us that he does not feel free to speak about certain things which take place in the realm of international diplomacy. If some of us occasionally twit the minister, it is done in good humour having regard for the very high, almost Falstaffian Shakespearean comedy in which he engages.


Mr.   Marlin@Essex East: I cannot take these compliments.


David Lewis: Having watched the minister in the house I know he can take compliments, insults or almost anything with the same equanimity. No one has asked him to betray confidences. He says that if they do not state publicly what they think on every point it is not because they do not care about it.
What we have been urging, Mr. Speaker, and the position I am trying to put today as best I can, is that the world situation is so dangerous that it can be saved only by rallying world opinion, by rallying all the smaller
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countries and states in the world in some united action at the United Nations and in a united demand to the United Nations. We believe that Canada is the right country to do it and that Canada will not and cannot do it if the minister refuses to state publicly what he suggests he may have stated privately.


Mr.   Marlin@Essex Easl: Will my hon. friend excuse me if I leave for a few minutes?


David Lewis: It is very good of the minister to ask my permission. I could not withhold it, but I appreciate his courtesy. He asked whether, if he had said publicly what he wanted to-I suppose that is what he meant -he could maintain any credibility in Washington. I say, as I and other members of my party have said before, that if the price of being listened to by Washington is acting like a dumb satellite, or if the price of being admitted into offices in Washington is to give up the right to speak with a conscience about matters which shake the world, then I am not at all sure that having access to the offices in Washington is of much value.
The following appeared in an editorial in the Globe and Mail of April 4 last:
If Mr. Pearson still thinks that Canada can have some influence on President Lyndon Johnson by refraining from public criticism of his policies, there is scant evidence to support him. Nor is it easy to envisage that his woolly words at Santa Barbara-both in his speech and at a press conference-are likely to persuade Mr. Johnson and his advisers that they should abandon efforts for a military victory in Viet Nam.
I believe the basis for our friendship with the United States is stronger than the government suggests it is. If it is not that strong, then I have great fear for such a friendship. A real friendship between independent nations ought to be able to last beyond the point where one of them says something in criticism of the other. This has been the case in other matters such as the question of the guide lines or some other things about which there have been differences. This has held true.
I do not for one moment accept the proposition that if this government, and through the government this entire parliament, said publicly, clearly and forthrightly, not necessarily in unkind or bitter terms, that Canada requests the United States government to stop bombing North Viet Nam and stop invading the demilitarized zone as a first step in negotiations for peace, our friendship with the United States would be hurt or that the doors to Washington offices would be closed.

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This is the reason I welcomed the speech of the President of the Privy Council. I welcomed it not merely because it is support for a policy which our party alone has been proclaiming; in Canada for three or four years but because of the basis on which the President of the Privy Council put it. He put it on a basis of personal conscience. He said, and I should like to refer to two or three parts of his speech:
Whatever the reasons I believe all ol us have a duty to record our concern-our growing horror if you will-over what is going on in Viet Nam. If the present policy ends in disaster-the extermination of millions of unfortunate Vietnamese, or possibly global war-our failure to speak out against what is happening will always remain on our consciences-If by chance we happen to survive-and so it should.
[DOT] (5:30 p.m.)
Later he repeated words which suggest he felt he had to speak out as a matter of personal conscience. I have never had reason to doubt the sincerity of the President of the Privy Council, nor to doubt that he is as frequently moved as all of us are by deep feelings of conscience about matters which concern the welfare and the survival of humanity. I want to say that the President of the Privy Council will go down in history as the rebel who refused to rebel. Let me say to him in all kindness that an occasional expression of courage does not a fighter make. If he felt as deeply as he said he did, and I am sure he did, about the pressure of the horrors in Viet Nam, and that he had to speak out as he did on May 13, he ought to do so again because the situation in Viet Nam has grown worse. The escalation of the war as a result of the invasion of the demilitarized zone has progressed to a point of greater danger than ever before. The destruction which he regretted has increased, and if that was a matter of conscience on May 13 last I suggest it is an even more pressing matter of conscience now.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Hear, hear. Let us hear from him.


David Lewis: I regret very much that apparently he has accepted the ukase of the Prime Minister that members of the cabinet are not to say anything more about this issue. I cannot blame the Prime Minister in this regard because I am not one, as some hon. gentlemen seem to be, who will tell the government it must maintain cabinet solidarity while on the other hand condemning the Prime Minister for trying to do just that. I am not saying to the Prime Minister that he was wrong in laying down policies for his government and

expecting members of the government to follow them. But I am more than surprised-I am shocked-that the gentleman who spoke so deeply from conscience, on an issue so important as Viet Nam, pays the price of silence ever after in order to remain a member of the cabinet. That is what is shocking to me, not the fact that cabinet solidarity is desirable, because that is a matter which is crucial to our form of government.
If the President of the Privy Council makes just that one speech of May 13 and then accepts the proposition that nothing more is to be said, I think he will have misled the Canadian people. If he was right in that speech about the things he said regarding American policy, if he was right about this determination that men of conscience ought to speak out, and if he was right in calling upon the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs to do so, as he does in one part of his speech-in my opinion he was never more right in his public life-it seems to me he has a duty to the people of Canada to continue to support the kind of policy he began to enunciate on May 13.
It is not my purpose in saying this to make a personal attack, although the criticism was inevitable. I am convinced that if men like him were to join this crusade, as he did in his one speech, for a new policy for Canada toward Viet Nam, the results both in Canada and in Washington might be considerably better. Apparently he will not do so again, so far as I have heard, and that is his decision and a matter for his conscience. He will have to reconcile one expression of conscience with another expression of conscience.
We agree with Professor Kenneth Galbraith, that the conflict now in Asia is an unnecessary one arising from a stereotyped anti-Communism out of the cold war era. In our view Canada ought to demand publicly a cessation of bombing and other things relating to it. Let me remind the house that the right hon. Leader of the Opposition also supported this view. Therefore he ought not to be upset by our subamendment.
For all these reasons I move:
That the amendment be amended by changing the period at the end thereof to a comma, and by adding immediately thereafter the following words:
"and in particular this house regrets that the government has failed to do everything in its power to press the United States to stop the bombing of North Viet Nam, as a necessary preliminary to negotiations to end the war in Viet Nam.
Let me point out that the first part of the subamendment, the part ending with the
May 23. 1967

comma, is taken word for word from the admirable speech made on May 13 by the President of the Privy Council requesting the stopping of the bombing by the United States.
I think my time is about up and I want to conclude by repeating the general suggestions I made at the outset.


Paul Joseph James Martin: May I ask my
hon. friend a question?


David Lewis: Provided it is not taken as my last word, yes.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Would my hon. friend consider adding to his amendment a reference to the stopping of infiltration from the north to the south? Would he agree to that?


David Lewis: Is the minister suggesting that if we agree to that he would support it?


Paul Joseph James Martin: I just want to know whether my hon. friend would agree to it.


David Lewis: Even though I have not been in this house as long as my hon. friend-


Paul Joseph James Martin: My question is a very serious one.


David Lewis: I want to give a serious answer. Even though I have not been in this house anywhere near as long as the Secretary of State for External Affairs, he cannot catch me in that way. Let me say without hesitation that any possible settlement in Viet Nam will require that Hanoi stop infiltrating the south. The New Democratic party clearly condemns Hanoi for its refusal at various points to take steps that might assist negotiations for peace, as we do Washington.
Let me paraphrase what the Secretary General of the United Nations, Senator Clark and many others have said, and this is why our amendment is worded as it is. The cessation of the bombing of North Viet Nam is an indispensable condition to the commencement of negotiations toward peace. Senator Clark also said that the United States, being the powerful country in the situation, can afford to take the risk involved in this regard without hurting its eventual position in southeast Asia. That is the basic difference between the United States and Hanoi. That is the only reason why our subamendment refers to American bombing and not to the other part to which the Secretary of State for External Affairs referred.
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I said, Mr. Speaker, that I wanted to conclude, and it will not take me half a minute, with the general idea that I suggested when I began my remarks, namely, that the world situation is so dangerous and so serious that the time for quiet diplomacy has gone. The time has come for forthright precise statements by the government of a country like Canada. The time has come for a country like Canada, because it is not involved in these various conflicts throughout the world, because it does have the respect and confidence of many of the new nations of the world, to give a positive and concrete lead, to criticize where criticism is necessary, whether it is Washington or Hanoi or indeed the Secretary General of the United Nations himself.
[DOT] (5:40 p.m.)


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, my hon. friend has been very kind. May I ask him another question? Would he explain why the government of Britain, which shares my hon. friend's political philosophy, follows precisely the course followed by the government of Canada?


David Lewis: May I say first that even though many members of that government are, as one would expect, personal friends of members of my party, we disagree with Mr. Wilson's policy in regard to Viet Nam. We disagree very strongly with it, and some of us have had occasion to say to him privately and to others of his government that we disagree with that policy. I do not know what the reason is for the policy of the government of Great Britain. I know that Great Britain is in unfortunate financial and economic situations which require help and sympathy from President Johnson.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


David Lewis: I know that Great Britain has other commitments elsewhere. Some of these things may have something to do with it. But I cannot tell you precisely what the reasons are for the British government's position.


Mr.   Marlin@Essex East: I can tell my hon. friend that those are not the reasons.


David Lewis: I can tell you quite clearly, Mr. Speaker, that we do not agree with the government of Britain even though we admire and agree with the Labour party of Britain in many other respects. That is part of the democratic process, is it not? We do not have to agree with them on every issue, any more

May 23. 1967
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than the Secretary of State for External Affairs has to agree with Washington on every issue-


Paul Joseph James Martin: And we do not.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Or with the President of the Privy Council.


David Lewis: -or with the President of the Privy Council. So I do not think we can be faulted in this respect. I end, Mr. Speaker, by asking the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Prime Minister and the government to consider seriously that the time has come for Canada to speak out publicly on all these issues in a much more forthright way in the hope that it will help to solidify the opinions of many nations in the world and that it will help to mobilize world opinion in the direction of peace.


Mr. Howard Johnston (Okanagan-Revelstoke):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to begin by referring briefly to the amendment and the subamendment that have been moved this afternoon, particularly that part which says that the government has failed to state the policies of our country with clarity, without uncertainty, and unequivocally, with regard to Asia. It would seem to me that the government has, as the minister has stated again this afternoon, repeatedly declared its position in this respect. The only problem is that it would seem that we have in Canada today the first psychedelic government in our history. Important members of it seem to have the ability every so often to detach themselves from the rest of the government and its policies and to look back, as it were, to the body they have left temporarily and from that high position, which is usually characterized as a high moral position, to criticize the action or lack of action of the government. Ordinarily the trip that such a member had taken would result in the Prime Minister (Mr. Pearson) the next day ejecting him completely from the government but the situation here is different and these people are able to return to the government. It would seem that one of the important differences between defection in communist countries and in Canada is that in a communist country when someone important defects they head to the United States but in Canada when someone important defects they go into the cab'net.
As to the topic that is being debated this afternoon, namely, external affairs, it seems to me that we are in a way reaping some of
[Mr. Lewis.)
the price of the settlement of the 1956 Suez crisis in what has now happened in the Middle East. We can contrast the stand that was taken at that time by the Canadian government, when it dared to criticize Great Britain and France in a most forthright manner, with the very delicate, kid glove approach that was announced by the minister in his statement today when it comes to dealing with the United Arab Republic and its relations with the state of Israel, a state that is a creation of the United Nations, to which organization we belong, and to which we gave our assent at the time that nation was created-
There was no delicacy in 1956 in telling Britain that its position was wrong and was completely unacceptable to Canada. There seems to be a great hesitancy to speak out today on the actions of the United Arab Republic particularly and the renewed crisis over Israel. This has not come about within the last few days; it has for a long time been a developing situation. Our government has failed to speak out at any time with any definiteness on the Egyptian intervention in the state of Yemen, Arabia. This has been an important intervention, an armed intervention, a military intervention, and yet there has been a strange silence from Canada in regard to it. I suppose it is to be assumed that because that corner of the Arabian peninsula is so far way, so isolated, so little known to Canadians, so completely out of the m'nds of the N.D.P. that there has never been a statement from that party on it, the Liberal government never felt it had to counter it and what went on there could be safely ignored by the Canadian government.
There seems to have been no statement made in the United Nations and certainly I have not heard, and I am sure no other member of this house has heard, of the Canadian government through its representation on the International Monetary Fund objecting to the loans from that body to the United Arab Republic to the extent of at least $108 million, which I am sure have helped it to finance the military intervention in Yemen and now the military build-up on the borders of Israel. There has been a strange silence in this respect as there was a Canadian silence some years ago when the territory of West Irian was handed over to Indonesia. The silence in both these cases comes about as a result of the fact that we in Canada have for a long time operated something of a double standard in external affairs. We have tried manfully over the years to prove that we are the only
May 23. 1967

friend the Afro-Asian bloc has and so we have kept our silence in areas where we should have spoken out.
I would contend that the external affairs policies of the government have not been so much misguided, have not grown from any lack of idealism on the part of members of the government, but have been simply out of date and unrealistic. I know I have support in that statement. It was voiced very recently in the Globe and Mail by Thomas A. Hockin in two important articles which dealt with Canadian foreign policy. This is what he said:
[DOT] (5:50 p.m.)
It would be unlair to say that our foreign policymakers have been wilfully trying to escape from reality. What is probably closer to the truth is that these policy-makers are not aware of the extent to which they are escaping.
The proof of this flight from reality is becoming clear. Our tendency to put organizational viability before purposes of organizations, our penchant to put ambiguity and peace keeping in the place of clear declaratory policy, our naive faith in the magic of negotiations, flow genuinely from our domestic experience.
Certainly we have been too concerned about the viability of organizations before considering their purposes because we know that when the policies of the United Arab Republic with regard to its neighbour in Aden were criticized in a UN committee a few weeks ago, that committee refused to criticize the United Arab Republic on the grounds that it could safely criticize colonial powers but could not criticize nations that were not regarded as colonial powers. This has seemed to be the policy of the government of Canada as well, at least if we compare what happened in 1956 with what is happening today.
Certainly a great deal has been said by the government about our policies in Viet Nam. We have heard over and over again about the importance of our negotiator there, Mr. Chester Ronning. I am convinced that our actions there and his work were seriously sabotaged by the Canadian efforts a few months ago to have communist China brought into the United Nations, an action that I am sure was the poorest timed initiative that any Canadian government has ever taken in the field of external affairs. I am sure other nations which have a better grasp of the reality of politics in Asia wondered how, at the same time as we were endeavouring to negotiate peace in Viet Nam, we could make efforts to bring communist China into the United Nations just prior to the outbreak of the red guard activities in that country, activities which have been a source of such turbulence within
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the nation itself, have had reverberations now in the British crown colony of Hong Kong and previously in the Portuguese colony of Macao. These outbreaks have also had an impact outside the borders of communist China.
When the hon. member for York South (Mr. Lewis) inquired whether North Viet Nam has bombed any other country in the world, I am sure he oversimplified the situation because the question is not really what North Viet Nam has done any more than it is what South Viet Nam has done. The question is whether the communist powers have interfered in lands outside their borders. I would suspect that the United States has learned one thing since 1956, when as well as the Suez crisis we had the Hungarian crisis, and that is that there is no part of this earth that can be safely abandoned to the tyranny of communism. I feel that the government has been too much influenced by the type of pamphlets and briefs which drop like rain on the desks of members of parliament and which seem to coincide so happily with the policies stated in the house today by the hon. member for York South. We had a wonderful example of that in a pamphlet which arrived yesterday called "Viet Nam: The Logic Of Withdrawal" by Howard Zinn. I quote one statement from it to indicate the type of logic it contains:
But surely we have learned by now that the roots of communist success everywhere are indigenous rather than external; that communism is primarily an ideological force where naziism was a military one.
It would be difficult to tell the people of Hungary and Poland that what they faced in 1956 was primarily ideological and not a military force.
This is the problem which the United States has been facing in Viet Nam where there has been a threat of one more takeover by the communist regime of one more part of the world.
We have officially approved the policies of the government when it has endeavoured to bring about peace in Viet Nam and has refused to criticize the actions of the United States, if one can forget the statements that were made by the President of the Privy Council (Mr. Gordon). But we are concerned about the failure of the government to speak out with precision and make a definite statement as to Canada's position in the Middle East, because this is a most dangerous situation. It is the one part of the world which could take away the headlines from southeast Asia and divert our attention for a while. If we are going to

May 23, 19S7
Foreign Policy
make a contribution to world peace I think we will have to forget this business of guiding the Afro-Asian bloc in the United Nations and stand squarely for world peace and for the sovereignty of nations in the world today. If we waffle along and try to pretend still that there is something to be gained from this policy, then we will be back on the slippery road which, I am sure, has produced a feeling of cynicism throughout the world toward the external affairs policies of Canada because nothing has been gained from those policies.
We know that the peoples of Africa are not united and that some of them are even beginning to find that their best friend is the Union of South Africa. We know that the nations of Asia are not united, as exemplified by the quarrel between India and Pakistan. There have been Asian nations which have almost allied themselves with either the communist government of the Soviet union or with the communist government of red China. There is no advantage to be gained in pretending somehow to speak for that diverse group of nations, and the time has come for us to speak out on the situation in the Middle East.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order. The Chair is considering the subamendment moved by the hon. member for York South and will put it to the house later.



PROCEEDINGS ON ADJOURNMENT MOTION


Mr. Speaker:: It is my duty, pursuant to provisional standing order 3 9A, to inform the house that the questions to be raised at the time of adjournment tonight are as follows: The hon. member for Kootenay West (Mr. Herridge), External Affairs-Sale to U.S. of arms for use in Viet Nam; the hon. member for Rimouski (Mr. LeBlanc), Public Works -Pointe Michel, Quebec-inquiry as to construction of wharf; the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles), Air Transport-request for ban on use of highly inflammable fuel.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 8 p.m.
[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Sharp for committee of supply, 
and the amendment of Mr. Diefenbaker, and the amendment to the amendment of Mr. Lewis.

Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order. Perhaps before the hon. member for Okanagan-Revelstoke (Mr. Johnston) continues his remarks he might let me read the subamendment which was moved by the hon. member for York South (Mr. Lewis). First of all, I want to thank the members of the house for giving me the opportunity of considering this subamendment over the dinner hour.
The subamendment reads as follows. It was moved by the hon. member for York South, seconded by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles);
That the amendment be amended by changing the period at the end thereof to a comma, and by adding immediately thereafter the following words:
"and in particular this house regrets that the government has failed to do everything in its power to press the United States to stop the bombing of North Viet Nam, as a necessary preliminary to negotiations to end the war in Viet Nam".
The Chair has had an opportunity, as I said before, to consider the subamendment. While there are some reservations in the mind of the Chair, perhaps they are not particularly serious, and in view of the debate which is now taking place the Chair has decided to accept the subamendment.


Howard Earl Johnston: Mr. Speaker, my concluding remarks will be very brief indeed. Wonder and surprise has been expressed in this debate that the Secretary General of the United Nations should have withdrawn the United Naitons peace keeping force so swiftly on application to do so from the United Arab Republic. But this does follow fairly logically. If the United Arab Republic only a few weeks ago was above criticism by the United Nations, or a committee of the United Nations, then it would follow that their wishes would be respected immediately by that organization when they came to demand that the peace keeping force be withdrawn.
I would suggest that the time has come for the United Nations, indeed all nations that are interested in maintaining peace in the world, to speak out. In addition, no nation, whether it be the United Arab Republic or any of the Arab states, a communist nation or indeed the United States itself, can be above criticism in today's world.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Mr. Speaker, I think there is one thing on which all of us in
May 23, 1967

this house are agreed, and that is that we are very much concerned about the numerous threats to world peace that are appearing in various areas of the globe. I also think we are all agreed that we in this house would like to see these threats removed by peaceful negotiation and settlement. Where we differ perhaps in some degree is in the best means of attaining this end.
I think it is quite safe to say that Canadians generally are very disturbed about these threats to peace which are being made throughout the world-in Viet Nam, in the Middle East, in Hong Kong and other places. People are disturbed because there is uncertainty, and there is nothing that disturbs people more in this world than uncertainty. People in Canada are disturbed about the objectives in Viet Nam of our closest friend and ally, the United States. People are very worried indeed about this. There is also uncertainty about what is intended by the Chinese in Hong Kong. We are uncertain as to what is intended by President Nasser in the Middle East.
Unfortunately, Mr. Speaker, I think these uncertainties are to some degree caused by the position taken by the government. As suggested in the amendment moved by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Diefenbaker), the government has not explained its position. It has not forcefully stated the reasons for its policy or, indeed, what the policy is.
[DOT] (8:10 p.m.)
The government's difficulties in this regard have been compounded by parliamentary agencies such as the C.B.C. The right hon. Leader of the Opposition has noted that that organization has been running a steady propaganda campaign against the United States for a good many years and has been distorting the views and objectives of that country. Why they do this I do not know, but that has been going on. The general impression created in this country is that the people in the United States are like demons, and that they can do nothing right under any circumstances. Never a word is mentioned when the North Vietnamese or the Viet Cong place bombs in restaurants where there are women and children; that is perfectly all right. The result has been that the public of Canada has been misled considerably by this parliamentary agency, and that has caused much trouble.
Again, had the government been more ready with information about the reasons for the position of the United States and the
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positions of others in Viet Nam, and if to counter adverse propaganda it had been more forceful in expressing reasons for its policy, it would not have to sit on the fence, so to speak and pussyfoot about its position.
There is something else I wish to mention before getting to the meat of my remarks, and that has to do with information. The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin) was vehement in objecting to observations from opposition members that the government had not been forthcoming with information about Viet Nam and other aspects of our foreign policy. His position was that the government has given out all the information it could give out. Of course this is all a matter of opinion; the minister had to decide to what degree information must be classified, and how much can be given out. I know that perfectly well. Yet last week, when noted members of the United States Senate and Congress were here at the annual meeting of the Canada-United States parliamentary group-there were such distinguished men as Senator Mansfield, Senator Aiken, Representative Gallagher, and Doctor Morgan who is Chairman of the house committee on armed services-we obtained more information from them on Viet Nam and China in two or three hours than we had been able to obtain here in the last couple of years. Those, men of course, may be in a better position to assess the importance of information than is our minister. I understand the minister's position; nevertheless the information we obtained was readily forthcoming and was very helpful.
The first of the two major problems concerning people in this country, as was suggested this afternoon by the right hon. Leader of the Opposition, is the Middle East. Perhaps the present situation, where the President of the United Arab Republic is pressing his demands on Israel, has flared up, or been prompted, because the United States is somewhat tied up in Viet Nam. President Nasser may have thought that this was the appropriate moment to press his demands. Also I cannot help feeling that the president of the U.A.R. may have been influenced by the presence of a certain gentleman who is well known to some members of this house and who is now active in Middle East and Near East politics-Doctor Shukari. He was for a long time at the United Nations, and he is a very dangerous and influential man. Knowing something of his character I have a feeling that he may have had some hand in

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what is happening in the Near East; however, that remains to be seen.
The situation in the Near East is hard to analyse. It seems strange, that, had President Nasser really meant to attack Israel, he would not have gone to war without talking about it so much. Surely he would have invaded Israel and said nothing, had he really meant war, because in these days if you want to go to war, you surprise the enemy. Because there has been much sabre rattling during the last two or three days, gives credence to the belief that President Nasser is working at some sort of negotiating lever. On the other hand his threats may be genuine. Only time will tell.
I can suggest one thing to the minister: Canada is held in a great deal of respect in the United Arab Republic. It is safe to say that Canada is very highly thought of in that part of the world. I know that from experience, having dealt with the U.A.R., and I am sure that the minister has found the same thing.
I remember a little incident that took place a few years ago when Arab students were studying in the Soviet union. President Nasser found that they were receiving more propaganda than technical training, and withdrew them from that country. Canada offered to take these students, thus making a contribution to the United Arab Republic. I could mention numerous other incidents, at the United Nations and elsewhere, to illustrate my point.
In view of the esteem in which Canada is held in the U.A.R.-and we are almost equally well received in Israel-I suggest that Canada might quietly offer the good offices and services of some prominent Canadian, perhaps that might be the minister himself, to try to bring about some settlement in the dispute. I do not know whether that would be successful, but as the minister suggested, Canada should try to do these things. Over the years Canada has taken a leading part in activities such as this, and I think we should attempt something of that sort now. If our efforts do not succeed, nobody will be the loser. Yet there is a reasonable chance that by offering to use our good offices in this situation our offer might be accepted. In any event, I think we should try.
The right hon. Leader of the Opposition spoke at some length about the apparent folly of the government's policy of unifying the armed forces. Many of us sitting on this side warned the government during the debate of the great danger of putting all our eggs in one 
basket. We said that our forces should not be designed purely for United Nations peace keeping roles. We hope that the United Nations will recover from this present setback, and that it W'U increase its peace keeping activities in the future; yet the situation demonstrates, as the right hon. Leader of the Opposition said, how unwise the government was in unifying the armed services and in designing them for the undoubted purpose of being useful only as United Nations peace keeping forces. I think the government ought to have been much surer of what would happen in the UN before it unified its forces.
I have one other observation about the Middle East, and this concerns the activities of the Secretary General of the United Nations. He of course is the United Nations senior administrative officer, and it is his duty and job to carry out the resolutions passed by the Security Council and the General Assembly. Granted, many UN resolutions are somewhat vague and subject to certain conditions, but I feel that in this instance, before summarily dismissing the UNEF, the Secretary General ought to have consulted the Security Council. I think what he did went beyond what he has discretion to do. He may have had some colour of right for his actions, but I think he went beyond proper discretion in the use of his office.
[DOT] (8:20 p.m.)
It may be said that perhaps it would have been dangerous to call a meeting of the Security Council to discuss this issue before there had been prior consultation. The Secretary General is now in Cairo, I understand, trying to work out some agreement in connection with this matter. But I think he might well have gone to Cairo to see what he could do before he summarily dismissed the peace keeping force. Then, if his efforts proved unsuccessful, he could have referred the question to the Security Council. I have known the Secretary General for many years and I have great respect for him. Nevertheless in this case I think his judgment erred, though I hope of course that his present efforts are successful.
I turn, now, to the problem in Asia, which I call the Chinese problem because Viet Nam is only one facet of it. The Peking government has made its ultimate intentions clear on numerous occasions. It wishes to recover all the land lost to China in the last century-land taken from her by European countries, including Russia. She intends to recover this land, Taiwan, or Formosa, included, and she
May 23, 1967



also wishes to regain her sphere of influence in the surrounding territories of Asia including southeast Asia and particularly the part which is now North and South Viet Nam.
At the present time China appears to be a particularly difficult country with which to deal. We have all seen evidence of this. Diplomats representing countries which have been very anxious to recognize China have been dragged through the streets; their wives and children have been beaten up, put in fear of their lives and made to do all sorts of things which are degrading. Some years ago, rightly or wrongly, the United States decided that it was advisable to check Chinese expansion by entering South Viet Nam at the request of the South Viet Nam government. This request was made because a revolutionary group known as the Viet Cong, assisted and abetted by North Viet Nam by the infiltration of war materials, weapons and men, was making the task of the civilian government impossible. The attack was, in fact, similar to the attack made on south Korea a few years earlier. In passing, it is worthy of note that in modern days war does not necessarily mean some formal military activity; it can equally mean subversion, infiltration and so on, varieties of modern warfare which are just as effective.
Another point is worth noting, one which is often disregarded in the press and elsewhere. The United States is not the only nation which is closely concerned in this affair. Asian and Pacific nations are just as concerned. I refer to Korea, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Japan, to mention only a few. Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines and south Korea have troops actively fighting in South Viet Nam-a fact which is often overlooked or played down for some reason. The United States is not the only country which has troops there. These other countries have forces there as well.
Recently there has been a great deal of talk about the bombing of North Viet Nam. The United States has made it clear that as long as military supplies, weapons and men continue to enter South Viet Nam from North Viet Nam it will be extremely difficult for the government of South Viet Nam to control that country effectively, and that the flow of these supplies must be stopped. It has also been made clear-and some of our United States colleagues made this clear to us the other day-that the United States recognizes that if North Viet Nam were openly invaded by
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United States forces there would be great danger of China actively entering the conflict.
Demands are repeatedly made that the bombing should be stopped. All of us are interested in seeing a negotiated peace. If there is a possibility that stopping the bombing in North Viet Nam would assist in bringing about these negotiations, I think we would all be in agreement. As has been suggested by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Diefenbaker), by the spokesman for the New Democratic party and by a great many others outside this house, stop the bombing and see what happens. Frankly, I do not see that it would make any difference. But if there is any hope of results from such a move I think it should be tried. Certainly, the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong might well cease for a period of time to see whether the other side responds; but it must be remembered of course, that on previous occasions when bombing was stopped North Viet Nam simply profited by the occasion to deliver enormous quantities of supplies and military equipment into South Viet Nam resulting in a substantial increase of hostilities there. As an experiment it certa.nly might be worth while to cease bombing Hanoi and that area, even at the risk of this happening again, but I certainly think that the immediate supply routes from the north to the south should not be given this immunity unless some undertaking is received to stop the flow of supplies.
One interesting suggestion has been made-and I am led to understand it is presently in process of being carried out. It is that in order to stop effectively the flow of military supplies from North to South Viet Nam a wall be built across the country between the north and south, and extended through Laos. This would of course be a very expensive project. The idea, as I understand it, would be to build some sort of wall or fence which would be cleared of vegetation on both sides and which would effectively prevent infiltration. It must be extended through Laos-otherwise it would be like the old Maginot Line which was not extended across the Belgian frontier, and was not therefore very effective.
If such a wall or fence were completed in the near future it would of course greatly reduce the necessity for any bombing or active hostilities in North Viet Nam itself. It would seal off the flow of military supplies from the north and enable the government of South Viet Nam to look after its own territory without having to worry about the further

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infiltration of men and war material. There is one thing that was brought very forcibly to the attention of those members of the house who were members of the U.S.-Canada parliamentary group. All members of the United States delegation seemed concerned about this. It is something that we have all heard of elsewhere, and it is something that should be noted.
[DOT] (9:30 p.m.)
A great worry of many members of the United States congress is not so much the peace movements and the influence of the peace movements in the United States -because these, we are informed, are the concern of a relatively minute group, a very small group in the United States-but rather the increasing demand by the public of the United States to use nuclear weapons.
One member mentioned to me-and I do not care to mention his name because in my view that should not be done-that in one week 27 young men from his electoral district were killed. The parents of these young men said to him, not unreasonably "When you have the weapons to stop these people, why did my son have to die?" That is a pretty compelling argument; and the great worry of these members of congress seemed to be the increasing growth of this pressure in the United States to use nuclear weapons. This was the great concern and I think it should be the concern to all of us, and something we should consider in any views we express here or in any action that is to be taken.
Those of us in this party agree generally with the government's policy on North Viet Nam. I think we might try to send more medical help, particularly for civilians, children and the like. I also agree that we should certainly keep our position on the International Control Commission. It has not done anything yet to speak of, but it may in the future form a valuable potential springboard from which some sort of negotiations may come, and I think that is worth while. But I think our position in this regard on the International Control Commission, and our other positions on Viet Nam should be much better publicized to the general public. The people of Canada do not seem to be aware of our position in this regard and of why we are maintaining it. I am surprised at the minister in this regard, because he is usually diligent in communicating his views to the public. Over the years he has achieved a great deal of experience in this regard, and I think if he exercised some of this experience with the
[Mr. Nesbitt.!
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department, in making sure the public is better informed of what our position is and why, it would be very helpful, and would subject the government to less criticism.
We have heard a great deal about getting peace negotiations started and these must eventually take place as neither side can win the present conflict in Viet Nam. The United States and others have tried repeatedly to get North Viet Nam to the conference table, but there has always been an unequivocal No. I have heard it said that the United States has had no contact with China in this regard, but I have been assured that the United States government on numerous occasions has had direct contact with the government of Peking, and each time it tried to discuss the matter, the Peking government brought up the subject of Taiwan and said that until that was settled there could be no negotiations on anything in Asia.
A great many people have said that the United States is not serious in its peace efforts, that its peace efforts are phony and the like. I do not believe this, I do not think it is true. I believe the United States, recently at least, has made repeated efforts to try to get negotiations going. SO far as I am concerned, I do not think there is any likelihood of peace negotiations at the present time or of any immediate stop to the Vietnamese war. I believe this for several reasons, the main one being that I do not think the Chinese will permit any negotiations to take place. I think Chinese interests are being served by a continuation of the war in Viet Nam.
This conflict is one of the principal items, if not the principal item, preventing further closer association between the United States and the Soviet union. In the last year at the United Nations in a number of fields, on the Security Council, in the non-proliferation treaty and elsewhere, there was an increasingly closer co-operation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. and this, of course, does not serve the present interests of the existing government in Peking. There is little doubt, because of geographical proximity and other things, that the voice of Peking in North Viet Nam must be pretty strong, and this is one of the three reasons that the Chinese government is unlikely to permit North Viet Nam to make peace at the present time.
The second reason of course is that this war is a tremendously costly war to the United States, not only in materials but in men and manpower. The more the Chinese can bleed
May 23, 1967



the United States in this war, the happier they are, and it is not costing the Chinese any manpower, despite the vast numbers they have. It is costing the lives of other people, the North Vietnamese, but it is certainly not in the interests of the Chinese to stop the cost to the United States.
My third reason for saying this is that those in this house who have had some experience of negotiating with communist countries have always found that if any communist-type country sees any likelihood whatsoever of your changing your position, even one sixteenth of an inch, they will remain absolutely adamant hoping you will change.
They do not have to answer to an electorate. In this country we think other people react like we do because we always interpret others in terms of ourselves. But in communist countries they do not have to answer to an electorate. They have one position one day, and they change it overnight-I have seen it happen-and it does not make any difference to anyone.
I think the North Vietnamese and the Chinese feel that as long as they can keep up pressure on the United States abroad, with people condemning the United States for bombing the North and the like, and keep up pressure on the United States at home through peace movements and the like, the United States government may not be forced to withdraw entirely but may be forced to moderate greatly its position in favour of the North Vietnamese. As long as they think there is the slightest likelihood of this happening, I do not see any likelihood of any serious negotiations.
[DOT] (8:40 p.m.)
The facts of life, whether one likes it or does not like it, is that, regardless of the reasons and results, the United States is in South Viet Nam and the United States simply cannot turn tail, run, and get out. Any Americans I have talked to in the last few months, regardless of their views on how the war may or may not be conducted, have been quite firm on this. The United States is not going to get out of Viet Nam. It is not going to turn tail and run, because if it did it would open up a regular Pandora's box all over the world.
The Russians and the Chinese would be encouraged to start activities in every trouble spot in Asia, South America, or anywhere else. Believe me, Mr. Speaker, the present sweetness and light that they flaunt in Europe is not because of their love of the United
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States. It is because of NATO and because of the increased strength of the United States and western Europe. Russian long range objectives remain, despite the fact that at present they look quite peaceful. But anywhere they can find a soft spot which they can use, they will open it up, and if the United States turned tail and ran in Viet Nam we know exactly what would happen. If you think there is trouble now, it is nothing to what there would be then.
There are one or two other things I would like to mention in concluding. The first is the strength of the views of Canadians in the world. We are a nation that I think is well respected throughout the world, and well liked, but I think we should understand that we cannot rally world opinion, as the hon. member for York South (Mr. Lewis) rather naively put it this afternoon.
You may try to rally all the opinion you like, but when a major power like the United States, or China, or the Soviet Union is irrevocably committed to something, it is not going to be influenced very much by what smaller countries think. All you have to do is remember what happened in Hungary. A great storm was raised throughout the world about what the Soviet union did in Hungary, but the Soviet union did not pay one iota of attention because the Russians felt their vital interests were concerned. The Americans think just as strongly about Viet Nam, and if Canada went out to rally public opinion throughout the world on this subject, I do not think it would have very much effect on the United States. You have to be realistic about this.
There is one thing I think Canada can do in this regard. It is not something we can do today or tomorrow, and perhaps not for years, because I think the present temper of the government of Peking is such that it is not now possible to deal with them. If we should send an envoy there, it is possible that he would be dragged through the streets. We cannot expect people to go there under these conditions. Undoubtedly, however, this will settle down. I believe it is quite clear that the other western nations, particularly the United States, cannot continue to have relations with a country like China, which are likely to lead to war at any time. Something must be done in an effort to normalize relations between the two countries. Because of political and other reasons I do not think it is possible for the United States to make these overtures even in the reasonably near future; nor do I

May 23, 1967
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think it is likely that the Chinese would do the right hon. Leader of the Opposition asks so, because of their rather deep rooted dislike the government to tell all, tell everything for the United States. I think there is one they know, and express their inner thoughts, country which can do this, and that country is
Canada.


An hon- Member:: Oh, oh.
Already Canada has made a start. The hon. member for Qu'Appelle (Mr. Hamilton) when he was minister of agriculture got this country's toe in the door by starting to sell wheat in open trade with China. Improvement of relations will take a long time; it will not be done overnight. The Chinese are a very proud people and they certainly were dealt with badly by the western nations in the last century. We must look ahead ten, 15, 20 years, or even longer into the future. I think Canada might be the country which, above all other nations, is best able to do this. The British, the French, the Germans and others, certainly the Russians, are not in the same position because of their activities in years gone by. We have had successful trade relations with China and I think, while at the present time it probably is out of the question, that just as soon as we seen an opportunity the government should do everything it can to try to get its toe a little further in the Chinese door, with the hope that it might be able to normalize relations as soon as this conveniently can be done not only on behalf of this country but on behalf of the western world.
I see that my time is up, Mr. Speaker. All I should like to say to the minister in this connection is that I think he might save himself and his government a great deal of trouble if he could be a little more forthcoming with information on important subjects such as Viet Nam and the Middle East, and give greater publicity to the reasons for the government's activity. The Canadian people are uncertain concerning our objectives and the objectives of the United States. It is this uncertainty which causes the great unease in Canada. This uncertainty is aided and abetted by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and some of its friends.


Mr. John R. Matheson (Parliamentary Secretary to Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, the amendment moved by the right hon. Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Diefenbaker) regrets that the government has neglected or refused to make available time to debate international problems, and regrets that the government has failed to state the policies of our country with clarity, without uncertainty, and unequivocally, with regard to Asia and the Middle East. To summarize that motion,


John Ross Matheson: Well, I have heard that interjection and although it would take him a long time I think it would do my friend some good if he would read some of the rather scholarly speeches on Asia made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin). I would suggest by way of a starter that he read the series of three speeches delivered by the minister at Columbia University in the Blaustein Foundation, which lectures are being studied all over the world by students of the Far East.
The subamendment moved by the hon. member for York South (Mr. Lewis) regrets that the government has failed to do everything in its power to press the United States to stop the bombing of North Viet Nam, and so on. To summarize the subamendment, we are asked by the New Democratic party to attack or criticize the United States. So the official opposition asks the government to tell everything they know, and the New Democratic party suggests we take a good crack at the United States. It may be contended that either or both of these resolutions in effect say that the government should get off the International Control Commission and cease to use what offices it has in respect to this important dispute.
Everyone in Canada knows that the position of the Canadian forces now in the Middle East is sensitive and critical. No leader representing his country in international affairs could have been expected to do more than has been done by the Secretary of State for External Affairs even in the last few hours with regard to this very delicate situation. Certainly nobody knows better than this government how pregnant with disaster the situation in the Middle East may actually be.
What possible good would be achieved if the government were to reverse its policy of impartiality in this disturbing area where we pray, above all else, that violence will not erupt. What possible good would it do, except to make a show of ourselves as a country, if we were to attack verbally either of the parties in the far east.


Mr. More:: Would the hon. member permit a question?


John Ross Matheson: If there are questions, I think it would be better that they be asked at the conclusion of my comments. The hon.
May 23, 1967

member for Oxford (Mr. Nesbitt), speaking a moment ago, referred to the fact that a number of countries are involved in the complex developments in Viet Nam. Recently I obtained a copy of a study by a number of responsible people with regard to the economic, political and military developments since 1960 in Laos, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, South Korea, Japan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia, all of which countries in some degree are interested very directly in a solution to the Viet Nam problem.
As the hon. member for Oxford indicated, South Korea, the Philippines, New Zealand and Australia are involved with a military commitment. I believe sincerely the quality of leadership which has come from Canada at this stage is the most hopeful there is with regard to a possible solution. May I read just a part of the evidence given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to the House of Commons standing committee on external affairs on April 11, 1967. This was no niggardly statement. There are 18 pages of evidence; the statement is pretty exhaustive. However, the essence of it I believe is summarized pretty well at page 11 where it says:
In response to those who have asked the government to dissociate itself from the bombing of North Viet Nam by the United States, we have made it clear that we would, indeed, like to see the bombing stopped, hut that we would also like to see the infiltration stopped, and that we would like to see negotiations looking towards the peaceful solution of this conflict begun.
He went on:
[DOT]-it will continue to be the object of our diplomatic efforts to try to establish a basis on which the two sides might be brought together.
May I ask hon. members what they think could be accomplished by Canada voicing its views with regard to the merits of either side of the issue.
[DOT] (8:50 p.m.)
That, of course, means dissociation from the only body which might possibly be successful in this complex situation, namely the International Control Commission. On February 13 the Secretary of State for External Affairs urged his critics in parliament and across the country to understand the circumstances under which our foreign policy must be conducted. He said at that time that in matters of negotiation, particularly in respect of war and peace, the government should not be expected on every occasion to make disclosures which would not be in the
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best interests of achieving those things everyone has in mind. This seems to be what we are coming back to, because the Leader of the Opposition suggests that we should disclose everything, tell all and give complete details about our proposals, what has been said and what we have done. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has urged the efficacy of quiet diplomacy.
It was my privilege on several occasions last summer to talk to Anthony Eden, now Lord Avon, who came to Canada to honour the Brockville Rifles on the occasion of their centennial. At that time I had the opportunity to discuss Viet Nam with this renowned diplomat, who played such a very active role in Geneva in 1954. I do not think I am inaccurate or incorrect when I say that Lord Avon had nothing but praise for the energy, knowledge and resourcefulness of Canada as it contrived to bring some sort of sanity out of the lunacy in Viet Nam.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs told us that it would be self-defeating for us as Canadians to be neutral if statements were made that had the effect of slamming doors, and it is perfectly clear that doors are still open. Many people in the world wonder why it is that we are able to carry on quiet and discreet discussions at different levels with various people in opposite camps. He referred to two missions undertaken by Chester Ronning last year in this regard, and there are many others.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs indicated that the International Control Commission might not, in the end, be the instrument that would be used to promote a settlement. Perhaps there will be a third world war which will be final. Surely we can hope that this will not be the case. It is Canada's duty to be ready and able to exploit every opportunity to achieve a settlement. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said there may be a special role for us to play in the Viet Nam situation as it is now unfolding. I should like to ask who in the house is in a better position to judge that possibility than the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
Recently when I was in Asia I picked up a number of newspapers which covered the John Steinbeck reports. He said that there was a new kind of warfare in Viet Nam with no fronts and no rear. He said "It is a feeling war."

May 23, 196!
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In one of his speeches, and I have forgotten which one, the Secretary of State for External Affairs referred to the complex strands of the controversy. A wise speech was delivered in Brockville by Tom Gould, who has substantial knowledge of the country from personal observation. He referred to the complexities of the war in this land that has been divided for many, many years by the natural divisions in the hills and valleys in the north and south, as well as by differences of dialect.
The most useful material I have seen in respect of Viet Nam is contained in the second lecture delivered by the Secretary of State for External Affairs to Columbia University on April 27, 1967. As I say, this was the second in a series of three lectures. This contains some useful factual information that might well be recalled.
On that occasion speaking to an international audience he said:
The Geneva conference of 1954, which brought an end to hostilities in Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia, was the classic case of the attempt at peaceful resolution of conflict outside the United Nations context.
In his earlier address the Secretary of State for External Affairs said, regarding the role of peacekeeper:
If, in our judgment, the peace keeping role in any particular case should not be consistent with Our conception of a just or speedy settlement or with our national interests we would not hesitate to decline or to terminate Canadian participation. If we do participate, it is because in all the circumstances we believe it to be the most appropriate and most helpful action for us to take.
The fact that Canada is committed to this job on the International Control Commission does not mean that Canadians have no feelings, knowledge, information or opinions as to the rights and wrongs of any particular dispute, be it in Kashmir, Gaza the Congo or Viet Nam. It does mean that while we take part in certain discussions by reason of international arrangement we have the good sense to play that game according to the rules, and the rules dictate that we do our job with quiet diplomacy, with all the knowledge we have and in good faith, without taking sides. As Mr. Martin said in New York:
We have taken that action each time we have been asked to do so. Our general view has been that the UN is the most suitable international instrument to keep the peace. It may not be the best or most efficient. Regional organizations have a prior claim under the terms of the charter itself and the more disputes they can help to settle the less burdened will be the UN's agenda.
[Mr. Matheson.l
He also quoted Mr. Dag Hammarskj old's words:
The greatest need today is to blunt the edges of conflict among the nations, not to sharpen them.
We know today that there is an organization called SEATO that has interested itself in the Viet Nam conflict. We are not identified with SEATO but we are involved with NATO, which is one of those examples of an organization which acts outside the United Nations area of co-operation. Since world war two, no one has been killed as a result of a war in which NATO forces have taken part. It has kept the European peace.
We do not want this conflict to be resolved by a decisive military victory by either side, but rather by a cessation of hostilities by both sides. Surely to ask for a cessation on one side as is suggested in the subamendment would immediately remove ourselves from any possible useful role. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, in referring to the conference in Indochina, which grew out of the Berlin conference, suggested we must remember the conflict between the big four in 1954 regarding the problems of Korea. The Korean conference was limited in membership to five great powers, the United States, the Soviet union, communist China, Britain and France and the four Indochina governments, Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam and the democratic republic of Viet Nam.
The four permanent members of the Security Council who were involved in the Geneva conference were as deeply divided on the issues of Korea and Indochina as they were on the issues of Europe. Therefore, is it surprising really that in 1967 there is not agreement in respect of Viet Nam? What could we reasonably expect?
[DOT] (9:00 p.m.)
The Geneva conference at least achieved a cease fire and made an attempt at providing a basis for a long term political settlement. We know there were deep-rooted political and ideological differences and divisions beneath the surface, that these were fundamental to Indochina and has persisted there for countless years. In the exact words of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
There are many strands woven into the complex fabric of the Viet Nam tragedy.
As we all know, Canada has played many roles in the international family. It has been a loyal member of NATO. It was a member of the United Nations forces in the Korean war. It has been a participant in nearly every
May 23. 1967

peace keeping operation that has been undertaken by the United Nations. The Secretary oi State for External Affairs told the Americans and his audience at Columbia who came from every country, that the problem in Viet Nam has represented the most frustrating, the most disillusioning, the most complex and the most difficult role that Canada has ever assumed in the international field. The present division of Viet Nam is not new. There was a wall separating two warring dynasties in the 17th and 18th centuries. We cannot forget this when we look at the difficulties today. The isolation of the villages of South Viet Nam from central authority is not a modern phenomenon, but simply a continuation of a problem which even the most illustrious and powerful emperors of Viet Nam were seldom if ever able to resolve.
Recently I spoke separately to four Ottawa ladies who are married to Canadians. They were all Vietnamese and had come from different parts of Viet Nam, with different ideological and social backgrounds. I realized after talking to these interesting people, who loved Canada even after the short while they had been here, how very complex this situation really is. As I read some of the studies that have been prepared by other countries, Australia, the Philippines, South Korea, Laos and Thailand, it is clear that these Asians who are intimately involved with the dispute recognize how very complex it is.
It seems passing strange that Canadians in Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal and Winnipeg think that somehow or other by a simple process of logic they can come to easy solutions in respect of problems that have not been resolved by indigenous people at least for decades. We know that Viet Nam is a country that has been occupied by the French since world war II. When the Geneva powers met in 1954 the war in Viet Nam had been in progress for eight years and it had spilled over into Laos and Cambodia. We sometimes forget this fact. It seems to me that we concentrate too much on the present and overlook some of the frightening things that have happened in Asia in recent times.
I have been told, for instance, that in Indonesia, which I think has a population of something like 110 million people, since the coup in 1965 well over 500,000 people have been killed and over 1,200,000 injured. I am not aware of any comment or concern in Canada about this situation. I remember some time ago in London having a discussion with a brigadier from Pakistan who was annoyed
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that Canadians had no concept of the hundreds of thousands of people who had starved in his country. There was no comment at all in Canada on this situation. I am not trying to minimize the deaths in Viet Nam. Every single death, every eye out, every child who loses an arm or is injured in any way is evidence of a shocking situation. Every death is infamous; and war is something that we all hate. Surely there is no element in this house that is more righteous than any other in this desire and concern for peace.
The difficulties in Viet Nam were not caused by the simple case of a war between France on the one side and all Vietnamese nationalists, led by the communists, on the other. It is much more complex than that. Nationalist non-communist elements within the Viet Minh were gradually denuded of power and influence or completely eliminated. The French at the same time found themselves allied with many Vietnamese who were just as determined as the Viet Minh to achieve an independent Viet Nam, but who were prepared to pursue their objective by political rather than military means and who were as least as opposed to communist control as to French colonialism.
Surely as a country we, although committed to the democratic way of life and passionately, I hope, committed to freedom, are prepared in our economic and international affairs to agree that the world is pluralistic; it consists of different systems, different ideological groupings, and I am sure we are not trying, nor do I believe the United States is trying to impose its political or economic structure, its system of government on other parts of the world.
I would commend to my hon. friend from York South (Mr. Lewis) the statement of Arthur Goldberg to the Foreign Correspondents Club in Tokyo, which was reported very carefully in the newspapers-this was during the late days of February of this year -at the beginning of his fact finding trip. He spoke for perhaps two hours, answered many questions, and many of his comments were extemporaneous and extraordinarily frank. He said very clearly to my recollection that the United States did not want to stay there, did not intend to stay in that part of the world, did not intend to occupy any country, did not intend to impose its system of government on the people; but that they, of course, were not prepared, either, to abandon their commitments to South Viet Nam under pressure of force.

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The democratic republic of Viet Nam was recognized by all the countries of the communist bloc in 1954. The state of Viet Nam was recognized by more than 30 other countries. Today when we discuss the Viet Nam problem and try to do so objectively and impartially, we have to recognize how complex, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs has said, are the strands which not only complicate the matter in that peninsula but also affect neighbourhood countries.
I remember talking to Canadian boys who went to Korea. They thought they were serving the cause of peace, just as 1 think Canadians have believed to be the case in virtually every war. But if Korea had collapsed, what would have happened would have been a movement of communist forces toward the sea of Japan and the East China Sea. Of course, the situation in Viet Nam is altogether different. They have neighbours in Cambodia, Thailand and Laos, Burma is very close, and of course to the north there is China. I think it is clear that Canadians, by their posture, seek to be friends of the Chinese, the Russians and all those people whose views ideologically are far apart from our own. I think that is our posture, and I believe it is credible. I think it is the only way in which we can usefully serve at this moment of history.
We did not expect to be invited into the International Control Commission when the invitation was extended to India and Poland. We were invited to join the commission and we knew we were the nominee of the NATO group. We knew that Poland was the nominee of the Bandung group, and India was invited to become a member of the commission because she was ostensibly neutral. Canada could very easily have taken the position of always supporting the west. I think it is fair to say that when Canada was recommended, Communist China had envisaged a troika arrangement in which Poland would represent the interests of one of the parties, Canada would represent the interests of the other and Ind a would have, in effect, the deciding vote.
As the Canadian representatives began to examine the problem of their responsibility I think they came to the conclusion that this was imposing an intolerable burden on the one neutral member of the commission. That is to say, if Canada always took the position of the west, as a nonrnee might in a labour arbitration representing either labour or capital, and left it to the third member to have the deciding vote, this would not serve any useful purpose. So Canada decided from the

very beginning-and this point the Secretary of State for External Affairs made clear, and he pointed it out fearlessly to his American friends and to those in the other parts of the world, in Poland and in Russia-that we would try to avoid being a rigid advocate for the west. We are there in the commission to promote an objective and balanced approach. This is hard for some people to understand.
[DOT] (9:10 p.m.)
It is hard for any Canadian to be neutral. It seems to me that a virile and courageous people like the Canadians would find it much easier to throw in their lot willy-nilly with one particular side in a war and then get to it. But is there not something nobler, more difficult and perhaps even more heroic in doing precisely what Canada is doing at this stage, namely trying to use its good offices to effect a cease fire and even offering its troops by way of buffer? The offer has been made in the past by the Prime Minister and by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and we know, if there has to be an occupation of a demilitarized zone, if there has to be peace keeping, and what a hazardous task that will be, who other than Canada may be called upon to assume this very difficult and costly operation?
On March 10, 1967, the Prime Minister met with a large group of university professors at Victoria College, University of Toronto, upon which occasion he said:
I realize, as the public debate over Viet Nam here and elsewhere over the past few years has shown, that it is possible to arrive at different assessments of the rights and wrongs of the various positions represented in the conflict.
Speaking for myself I would not have much respect for a member in this House of Commons who did not have some strong views on this issue right now. All of us could blurt out
what we feel about this conflict. However, the important question is: Would this serve any useful purpose, and would it add to the sum total of Asian happiness and the chance for peace? The Prime Minister said:
-whatever the view one might hold about the origins and development of a situation such as we face in Viet Nam today, I believe that the right and proper course for the Canadian policy maker is to seek to establish that element of common ground on which any approach to a solution must ultimately rest.
This is exactly what Arthur Goldberg stressed in Tokyo when he said that at least there are certain common grounds in the views of North Viet Nam, the U.S. and South
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Viet Nam on this issue. These we must pursue. Frankly I had hoped a month or more ago that there was enough consensus on common objectives that this might be a basis for peace.
The Prime Minister said:
In what might be called a process ol public diplomacy-
And this touches exactly on the motion of the right hon. Leader of the Opposition when he spoke about the process of public diplomacy.
-the parties themselves have gone some distance over the past year or so in defining their positions. This open exchange of propositions is, of course, useful in settling international problems, but it must, I think, be accompanied by other, less conspicuous efforts, since public positions are generally formulated in maximum terms.
Here we have the Secretary of State for External Affairs sedulously searching from one side to the other for what may possibly be some little strand of common ground. He said:
-the Viet Nam conflict will ultimately have to be resolved by way of negotiation.
What other way is there except total war? He said:
In the process, confidential and quiet arguments by a responsible government are usually more effective than public ones.
This is the only effective way, at least for Canada, to make some contributions. Of course there are other ways of being involved in this war. Some of our good friends, such as the Australians, the New Zealanders and the Philippines conscientiously have taken the other course. That course would not be acceptable to many people in Canada. I would like to believe that what we are doing is offering to back up negotiations with the actual presence of our elite troops, this being the finest and the noblest contribution that Canada could possibly make.
The Prime Minister said to the professors:
I have repeatedly stressed that I would be glad to see the bombing stopped, northern infiltration into the south stopped, and unconditional peace talks begin.
The Prime Minister has never been prepared for a half motion such as the one made by the hon. member for York South, a motion which would hold the hand of one side but not the other. Nor is he prepared to take any position which will destroy the usefulness of this Canadian position, which we trust is objective, balanced and hopefully designed to contribute to peace.
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The Secretary of State for External Affairs speaking in New York said:
The political objectives of the governments representing the two communities of Viet Nam were in direct conflict, and this became more and more evident in the months following July, 1954.
Surely it has become even more evident since then.
One of the problems raised by Arthur Goldberg in Tokyo and elsewhere is simply the fact that negotiations which have no possible chance of constructive development are probably not worthy of beginning, although he said he was prepared to make any kind of attempt. He said that before there is negotiation he would like to think there might be some hope of resolution of the deep and fundamental problems separating these peoples. I would be very disappointed if Canada thought she had no interest or part to play in the troubled parts of the world. It seems to me we have to live according to the maxim that no man is an island, that in fact we are all related one with the other, and that we are all deeply involved. On the other hand there is a certain arrogance, ignorance and foolishness in Canadian thinking that we have superior wisdom, and that somehow or other many thousands of miles away we are in a position to resolve matters which could not be resolved by the native and indigenous people over a long period of their history.
I should like to say in conclusion that Canada has consistently attempted to act objectively and to support findings against either side if they were in fact substantiated by impartial investigation. That is why we are on the International Control Commission in the first place, and that is why we have stayed there. The line of the 17th parallel which created North and South Viet Nam has not been envisaged as a permanent frontier, any more than the lines within Berl'n and between the Koreas. The sad fact is that it is continued, and that the commitment of the prestige of the major powers to the protection of the north and the south has made unification of the country impossible. So it is not simply the case of resolving differences between north and south. The fact is that the 17th parallel was as sensitive a boundary as any truce commission ever tried to police. Nevertheless let us have hope, because just a few short years ago many of us despaired of a conclusion to the Korean conflict. I was talking to a Canadian sergeant not long ago who told me that he, together with his bombardier and a civilian, were policing the boundary

May 23, 1967
Foreign Policy
line with perfect amity and no difficulty. Can anyone seriously question at this critical moment whether we should stay on the commission? I suggest that if we were to pass either the amendment or subamendment, we would have to take the only logical course, and step out. If we step out, then what? What is our course if we step out of the International Control Commission?
As the Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out in New York, the commission stands as a symbol of the cease fire agreement of 1954. He said:
The commission stands as a symbol of the 1954 cease fire agreement and can be considered as an indication of the continuing interest of the Geneva powers in the situation. Most important of all, however, is our belief that in the right circumstances the commission might be able to make a positive contribution to a peaceful settlement of the Viet Nam issue.
That is one of the reasons for the two trips made by Mr. Chester Ronning. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said:
The fact that our efforts to contribute to the search for a peaceful settlement in Viet Nam have not borne fruit is not, in my opinion, a reason for abandoning them.
[DOT] (9:20 p.m.)
I do not think we should be quitters even in the cause of peace. We would not be quitters in the cause of war, would we? If things were difficult in a war and we were an incumbent force we would not think of chickening out, but would stay right there, whether it meant a loss of a brigade, a division or a corps. Is that not so? This is no time to pull out because we happen to be there, and things are not going as we would wish. We are there, not as fighters for war but as fighters for peace. We believe that a military solution alone is neither practicable nor desirable. Is it not strange that the two countries with whom we are good friends at the moment, namely Japan and Germany, were both countries which we fought so vigorously? Anything is possible in even a short time. We now clearly see that North Viet Nam is not going to impose its control over South Viet Nam by military means, which seems to be the standard method of achieving revolutionary gain.
We are all familiar with the doctrines of Lin Piao and the writings of Mao Tse-tung in this regard. We can be satisfied that the north will not prevail over the south by military might. Surely what we hope for is de-escalation, to bring the fighting gradually, steadily, but inevitably to a halt and then to find a more permanent solution.

The United States has made a vast contribution to overseas aid. I think particularly of the Asian bank in the Far East, where their contribution is matched only by that of Japan. They have made a fantastic contribution to the betterment of underdeveloped peoples. If we could all start to swing our collective efforts toward the restoration of sound economic conditions among the Asian peoples this would permit a return to prosperity and peace. We believe that this peace will come only by an international presence in that sad and troubled land of Viet Nam. Our presence on the International Control Commission may be stage one in a process of even greater involvement.
For the reasons I have indicated, Mr. Speaker, I feel it would be disastrous to the cause of peace to accept the amendment and the subamendment which have been moved. For that very reason, in the interest of peace I contend we must not abandon our sensitive, embarrassing, difficult, awkward and troublesome role on the International Control Commission. I respectfully ask that confidence be placed in a government that is trying quietly and responsibly to do what it believes is in the very best interest of people so far away from our shores.


Francis Andrew Brewin: Mr. Speaker, there are two matters I should like to discuss in this debate. The first is peace keeping, the second Viet Nam.
I understood, though I may have understood wrongly, that in his speech this afternoon the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Diefenbaker) suggested that because of the withdrawal of UNEF from the Middle East, or from its position in the Middle East, the failure if not the futility of peace keeping forces generally had been demonstrated. However, I think that later in his speech he spoke of the necessity for finding some alternative. Then he went on to deal with the question which we debated at some length last session, namely the role of our unified forces, and he seemed to suggest that because we are progressing toward a unified military force, what had happened in the last week or so in the Middle East required us now to change our direction.
Of course, Mr. Speaker, it was never the case that the unified forces contemplated by Canada were to be limited to what are called United Nations peace keeping operations. This was said again and again and was just as clearly and vigorously contradicted. This is not the sole purpose of such a force, though it was one of the purposes.
May 23, 1967

I do not wish to go back and rehash the debate we had last session, even though the remarks of the Leader of the Opposition tempt one to do so. I want to seek to deal with what he said about the apparent lesson to be learned from the withdrawal of UNEF, the lesson that demonstrated the futility and failure of peace keeping forces.
Indeed, Mr. Speaker, it is true that some of the difficulties of peace keeping have been clearly underlined by what has happened. However, I remind the members of this house that the process of growth of the institution of peace keeping forces is necessarily a matter that is attended by frustration, difficulty and occasional failure. We must remember that this particular peace keeping force was established in 1956 under very special circumstances, and for us to conclude from the fact that this force has now been withdrawn at the request of the country in which it was established that it is futile for us to worry about or to pin faith in peace keeping forces in the future would be a grievous error.
It has always been recognized that the development of the United Nations peace keeping forces was experimental; that we had to learn from experience; that these forces were set up from time to time in emergency situations in an improvised manner. It is natural that in building human institutions there should be frustrations and failures.
One of the human institutions upon which we must rely for our own security within national communities is the rule of law. Yet as everyone who has studied the matter would be ready to acknowledge, not only has the rule of law never been perfect and has failed from time to time, but its development has broadened down from precedent to precedent. If those who sought to establish a rule of law within national societies had given up at the first experience or experiences of failure or difficulty, then we would never have succeeded in developing that very essential and very necessary human institution.
I do not know, and neither does anyone else in this house or in the world know, what the future holds for the development of the rule of law within the nations of the world. But we in this country, in the special position that we are in, have the opportunity, I believe, to continue to give leadership in this field. I suggest that we should not be easily pushed aside from a determination to continue to support peace keeping activities within the United Nations by whatever means we can make available.
Foreign Policy
I venture to suggest that although something may fail or does not appear to succeed today, it will nevertheless be required tomorrow, the day after tomorrow and the day after that. The world has now reached the stage where it cannot afford to allow wholesale wars to break out. It cannot allow disputes that human beings and nations are bound to have, to be settled by the old method of war.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, even though peace keeping may be experimental and frustrating, may make demands upon our imagination, may run counter to our ideas of national sovereignty and may be something that requires patience and fortitude to establish, if we are concerned about the future welfare of the world I think we must continue, despite these difficulties and frustrations, to put the whole weight of our particular influence behind the maintenance of this particular development upon which so much of the hope of the world depends.
[DOT] (9:30 p.m.)
I am not saying-and I see the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre (Mr. Churchill) looking at me-that this is all we need to do and that we should concentrate exclusively on this role; but I say that to allow ourselves to become disappointed and frustrated-and not to see the value of this role-because of what happened this week would be a grave error.
The other subject I wished to discuss was Viet Nam, the subject matter of the subamendment moved by my deputy leader, the hon. member for York South. The subamendment is in its present form because, stripped of all complexities, Viet Nam is the key issue facing the world. It will not be possible for us to move forward with other developments, with the detente in Europe, with the settlement of problems in the Middle East so long as the conflict in Viet Nam continues, and threatens to escalate.
The key issue is the one set out in our amendment; how can the conflict be stopped. The key point in stopping the war is that the United States forces stop bombing Viet Nam. Why do I say this? I say it because almost every competent observer who has visited Viet Nam-from Chester Ronning of our country to U Thant and the Russian leaders who have gone to Viet Nam-has said that the essential preliminary to negotiating other matters is that the bombing of Viet Nam should stop. That being the key issue, we have included it in the subamendment, and

May 23, 1967
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every member of the house will have to examine his conscience and decide where he stands on tins issue.
The hon. member for Oxford (Mr. Nesbitt) mentioned that some of us were delegates at the United States-Canadian parliamentary conference. As you know, Mr. Speaker, I had the privilege of being a delegate. The different v ews expressed sometimes by some of the United States delegates from the U.S. senate and congress and by some delegates from Canada involved a basic difference of analysis. Of course, there was no absolute uniformity of view among delegates from either country, as cne would expect in any democrat.c discussion among democratic friends. Nevertheless we were told again and again tha the involvement of the United States in Viet Nam was justified to prevent the threat of Chinese communist expansion. This was the bas c reason for the United States presence in Viet Nam.
This underlying hostility to China in our view is a tragic error; from this wrong analysis flow many tragic consequences. It is true that China has experienced a revolution which, as does every revolution, has left her isolated and ideologically aggressive. But those expert in the matter do not think that China constitutes a military threat to the western world, despite the deep and legitimate grievances she may have had in the past. We believe that everything possible must be done to end China's isolation. We believe that the main criticism of the war in Viet Nam is not a criticism of intentions, or of the good wishes of the American people; we critic ze the inherent futility of what they are seeking to do there. They are seeking to intervene in a revolutionary situation, and the intervention is bound to end in failure.
I am indebted to the President of the Privy Council (Mr. Gordon) for giving in his speech of May 13 two excellent quotations to illustrate my point. The first is from Doctor Blake, General Secretary of the National Council of Churches in the United States-a great churchman and a great American-who said, as reported in the New York Times of April 27:
In the second place our Viet Nam policy is wrong because we cannot win. By this I do not mean we cannot obliterate Viet Nam, north and south. We have the military power to do that. But when the swamps of the Mekong delta are filled up with dead Vietnamese and when the flower of our youth lies dead with them, what victory will have been won?
Force cannot obliterate ideas.

The second quotation in the excellent speech of the President of the Privy Council is attributed to Senator McGovern who, in a speech reported in the New York Times said this:
After all the dead are counted-American and Vietnamese-and the countryside is laid waste, we will have accomplished nothing. Having sown the wind, we shall reap the whirlwind.
We have opposed the course of the American government in Viet Nam and we have said that the government of Canada must clearly do the same thing, not because of any prejudice against the United States, or became of lack of friendliness for its people, but because we believe, as was so well put by the President of the Privy Council that the present United States policy will bring disaster to us all-to the United States, Canada, and the other countries in the western world.
There is a basic difference between our viewpoint and that presented this afternoon by the hon. member for Leeds (Mr. Matheson) in his speech. He says that the present quiet diplomacy, the modest, muted way we have of not speaking clearly on this matter is the most effective way to end the disastrous situation in Viet Nam. Our basic difference is not that we do not believe in quiet diplomacy-there is of course a place for quiet diplomacy-but that we do believe that when the world is rushing to disaster quiet diplomacy is inadequate.
We believe that everybody who feels we are rushing to disaster should join in expressing that view; the cumulative weight of opinion might make itself felt in a way that would be far more effective than any so-called quiet diplomacy at this stage. Many matters between our two countries may properly be solved by quiet diplomacy. We do not wish to discount all the usual means of quietly discussing problems that concern our two countries. Those means are essential. But when the world is faced with a crisis of conscience, when we think that with all good intentions the United States is rushing to disaster in Viet Nam, to an escalation of the war that could end by wiping out the world, nothing less than saying clearly what we thing will do. We should stop the quiet diplomacy and firmly say where we believe the present course will lead.
I know that this view crosses party lines; many in the different parties agree with the line taken by the President of the Privy Council the other day. I believe that his was a cry of conscience. I share the feelings of the
May 23, 1967

hon. member for York South about the action the President of the Privy Council ought to take. Though I admire greatly what he said, I think, when he was told that his policy was diametrically opposed to the policy of the government to which he is a member, and that he could not repeat what he said and remain a member of the government, he ought to have resigned.
The hon. member feels as do many men in every part of the government of the world-the Pope, U Thant, and many of the most experienced and wise leaders of the United States. This is precisely the point we are making in our amendment, which is: Stop the bombing of north Viet Nam.
[DOT] (9:40 p.m.)


Paul Joseph James Martin: May I ask the
hon. member a question? I do not think the Holy Father took that position.


Francis Andrew Brewin: I hope the minister will allow me to complete my peroration before he asks any questions. I was about to say that what we have put in our amendment expresses not just an emotional view; it embodies a course which qualified people have declared to be necessary in order to end this was by negotiation. 1 say that all people of good will including the government of Canada, should stand up and be counted on this particular issue.
We know the negotiations will be long and difficult. But we have been told by authorities who know what they are speaking about that this is a necessary preliminary, and all we ask is that it should be followed. I believe the Pope spoke for the conscience of mankind when some time ago he used very simple words in this connection and addressed them to the government of the United States. What he said was: "For God's sake, stop."
I think we can do no less than join in the chorus of people throughout the world who would say, with him, to our powerful friends, our very dear friends in the United States: "For God's sake, stop."


Douglas Scott Harkness: If one
were to take a globe of the world tonight and encircle every trouble spot on it in red, and then turn to that portion showing Europe, Africa and Asia, it would look like a bad case of measles. One thinks immediately of Viet Nam, of China, Hong Kong, of the Near East, Nigeria, southwest Africa, Aden, the Yemen and so on, to mention just a few places.
In all these areas where disturbances are threatening world peace the two which are
Foreign Policy
most dangerous are undoubtedly the Near East and Viet Nam. I think, myself, that at the present moment the situation in the Near East involving Israel and the Arab states, particularly Syria and the U.A.R. is the most pressing and presents the most immediate danger to world peace. Whether, as we all hope, it will prove possible to prevent war developing in this area or whether, by terrible misfortune, war does break out there, I am afraid the prestige of the United Nations has been seriously damaged.
I believe that one of the things to which we should now seriously address ourselves is the search for means by which the prestige of the United Nations can be restored. One reason why the high regard in which the United Nations is held by so many people has been diminished as a result of the precipitate withdrawal of the United Nations force from the Gaza strip is that many people fail to realize that the United Nations has no military or economic power of its own, but possesses only such economic and military power as is provided by its members. Of itself, the United Nations has only moral force and moral power. To the extent that it is able to exert economic power in the form of sanctions or military power in the form of force, it must be through action taken and forces provided by its members.
The moral power of the United Nations depends on its prestige, and for this reason I believe that no matter what happens in the Middle East a severe blow has been dealt to the United Nations and it will be necessary for all countries which believe in that organization and which want to see it remain a powerful force for peace in the world to do everything in their power to rebuild that lost prestige.
I suggest that its restoration must take the form of a two-stage program. The first, the short term stage essential in order to get control of the present situation in the Middle East, is that action be taken by the Security Council or the Assembly, or the two combined, to ensure that war does not break out in the area and to prevent the Arabs or the Israelis starting a conflagration which, because of the geographical area with which we are concerned, could readily engulf the entire world. What action could be taken, or how it could best be pursued, I am not in a position to know; the minister is in a better position in this regard than I am.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The hon. member may be interested to know that the Canadian

May 23, 1967
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ambassador to the United Nations has joined with the Danish ambassador in requesting a meeting of the Security Council which, I hope, will take place tomorrow.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am very glad indeed to hear that the Security Council is being summoned and will be placed in a position, I hope, to deal with this crisis. I suggest that the action of the council might be effective if the powerful nations who constitute its per* manent members were to talk in very strong and plain terms to both the Arabs on the one side and the Israelis on the other. It seems to me that this is an essential first step on the part of the Security Council to prevent the extension of this conflict.
[DOT] (9:50 p.m.)
I heard the minister on television the other night, and I believe he said it in this house although I am not certain, that he had suggested to U Thant that the United Nations force in the Gaza strip should be deployed on the Israeli side of the boundary. We have heard nothing from the minister since in that connection, and I think the house and Canada as a whole would be interested in knowing what has been the reaction to that suggestion.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I was informed on Saturday by the foreign minister of Israel that, for reasons he outlined, the proposal was not acceptable. I may say that when I received this response events, had of course, overtaken the suggestion which had been made to the Israel ambassador here in Ottawa prior to the actual decision of the Secretary General effecting the withdrawal of the force.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am sorry that that suggestion which the minister made, and in which I thought there was considerable merit, is not being followed through. In spite of what has been said on this matter I personally can see no difference between the United Nations peace keeping force being on the Egyptian side of the border or on the Israeli side of the border. In fact, I always thought it was a mistake that it was not on both sides of the border from the beginning. I think it would have been much better had it straddled the border from the beginning, as it would have made any outbreak much more unlikely than was the case when it was only on one side of the border.
In that connection I might say that when I was in the Gaza strip in the last week of 1962, and was going along the line of demarcation, which was only a narrow ditch, I jumped
[Mr. Martin (Essex East) .1
across the ditch on to the Israeli side, and the United Nations people nearly went out of their minds. They shouted, "Get back right away", and when I returned said, "It's a wonder you were not shot". It always seemed to me a great mistake to have a situation in which if anybody deliberately or inadvertently went across a ditch that size, he might be shot. It would have been a much safer situation to have had the peace keeping force spread at least a mile or so on each side of the border, and I would hope that if there is a future operation of this kind this is what might be done, because it would be much safer.
These are some of the things which I think might possibly be done on a short term basis. Also on a short term basis I think the United Nations General Assembly might take some action in calling on those on either side of the dispute to use moderation and be prepared to talk in connection with the whole matter.
At the present time it seems to me that the situation in the gulf of Aqaba presents a particular danger. The U.A.R. has announced that it is going to blockade the mouth of the gulf, which it can readily command from Sharm El Sheikh without the use of ships. From that point the gulf can be commanded by artillery fire, but the Israelis have stated that they are going to continue the use of the port at the head of the gulf. This creates a hard position, one which more than any other may produce the spark to start the conflagration.
I believe it is the duty of the Security Council to put all the pressure necessary on both contestants to make sure that shots do not start to be fired at the entrance to the gulf of Aqaba.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I have just been informed that the Security Council will meet at 10.30 tomorrow morning.


Douglas Scott Harkness: So much for the short term situation. From the long term point of view of restoring and building up the prestige of the United Nations there are a considerable number of steps which may be taken. The first of these is that the United Nations should be much more active and insistent on having some of the basic causes of the conflict along the boundary cleared up. Since 1956 refugee camps have been maintained in the Gaza strip. These presently hold over a million Palestinian Arabs whose original homes were in what is now the state of Israel. They fled from there during the war, and since that
May 23, 1967

time have been supported by the United Nations in a condition just above the starvation level.
These refugees live in conditions of complete misery. I was never more saddened and discouraged than when I spent a day going through the refugee camps in the Gaza strip and saw the conditions in which these people were living, saw the rations which were given out to them and, in particular, saw the complete lack of any opportunity for them to be able to secure an education, to learn a trade, or to have any prospects or opportunities. I should qualify that by saying there was one small trade school which was training a limited number of the refugees who, after training, were being accepted in other Arab countries as trained mechanics, etc. But that was only a drop in the bucket.
That situation is not only in the Gaza strip. It exists to a greater extent in Jordan, and it also exists in Syria and the Lebanon. In my view the United Nations has been very slow to act. Really, it has been derelict in its duty in allowing this situation to drift on from year to year. It has taken no action and, so far as I know, has never really tried to get this basic situation cleared up, a situation which, as long as it exists, is going to cause trouble and the chance of war between Israel and her Arab neighbours.
As long as you have that Palestinian refugee problem, with these people living in miserable surroundings in camps along the perimeter of Israel, you are going to have the threat of war. You are going to have border raids and anything else along that line which makes for an unstable situation. Therefore I say the United Nations has been derelict in its duty. It has not attempted to cope with this problem and find a solution for it.
I think a solution for it can only be arrived at by the countries of the United Nations as a whole being prepared to take action to accept these people as immigrants, and by other Arab countries being prepared to take these people and absorb them in their general populations, something that they have not done because they wanted these people to remain there as a festering sore in order to keep alive the bad feelings between themselves and the Israelis.
The Israelis also have been responsible, to a considerable extent, because they would not allow any of these people to go back to their original homes, and would not provide money to move them to other places, even though as part of the original settlement they were 27053-331
DEBATES	51 f
Proceedings on Adjournment Motion supposed to provide funds for this purpose. Ineffect, the responsibility for this situation rests on the Arab countries, on the Israelis and on the United Nations. If we are ever* going to have long-term peace in the Middle' East this is a situation which must be corrected. As soon as the immediate crisis is over, Canada and the other members of the United Nations should insist that action be taken to deal with this problem.
May I call it ten o'clock, Mr. Speaker.
[DOT] (10:00 p.m.)	;
PROCEEDINGS ON ADJOURNMENT * MOTION	,
A motion to adjourn the house under provisional standing order 39 A deemed to have been moved.
EXTERNAL AFFAIRS-SALE TO U.S. OF ARMS FOR USE IN VIET	NAM	5


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Mrl Speaker, on May 17 I asked the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in brief, why when our policy is to refuse to sell arms to certain countries we continue to sell arms to the United States. This is a matter which has been of considerable concern to me and to the members of this group. We all know that various	professors at universities	and	othergroups	throughout Canada	have	presented
signed petitions to the Prime Minister. I have had letters from my constituents which indicate that some of these people have sent letters to the Prime Minister because of their concern about this matter.
I see on May 13 that 172 members of the teaching staff of the University of Saskatchewan forwarded a petition to the Prime Minister, in which they say:
We strongly urge you as a member of the house to support a policy which will
(1)	curtail all military shipment to participants in the Viet Nam conflict,
(2)	seek a peaceful solution to the war,
(3)	involve Canada in a program of immediate medical assistance.
This is what we have been trying to do since we discussed this very important, unfortunate and urgent question. The members of this party completely disagree with the Canadian government's quiet diplomacy policy in respect of the war in Viet Nam, and reject the reasons advanced by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs for following this policy; Briefly, the government's argument is that it should refrain from making what the
May 23, 1967

Proceedings on Adjournment Motion Secretary of State for External Affairs term "strong public declarations" on the war on the grounds that it would impair its efforts to bring the war to an end through negotiations. The argument is that Canada must maintain a neutral stance and avoid offending either of the combatant nations so that its mediation attempts will not be rebuffed.
We contend this reasoning is fallacious. The events of the past few years have disclosed that Canada, far from remaining neutral, has publicly defended American activities in Viet Nam while criticizing alleged acts of aggression by the National Liberation Front and North Viet Nam. Hansard is full of speeches to this effect by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and Other government spokesmen.
In addition, Canada is selling to the United States every year some $300 million worth of armanents, much of which is forwarded to American troops in Viet Nam. This is the issue with which many are concerned; this is a moral issue. It is a matter of conscience. I have heard people, even over television, say that this is nothing to be concerned about. From our point of view, however, this is a moral issue.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs says that the sale of munitions to the United States is the result of a commitment made in the defence production sharing agreements of 1959 and 1963. But the fact is that Canada has signed no agreement to ship arms to the United States, and is therefore under no legal obligation to do so. The agreements simply provide for Canadian companies to bid on an equal basis with United States firms for United States government contracts, and the $300 million in arms sales annually is the result of this arrangement. Whether or not all these armaments go to Viet Nam, what this means is that it makes it possible for the United States to send a certain amount of arms to that country.
The sale of Canadian war material to the United States is therefore a flagrant violation of our government's long standing policy, adopted after world war II, of not shipping arms to combatant nations, particularly in areas where Canadians are involved in peace keeping activities. For example, Canada has refused to supply arms to Israel and the Arab states, to Pakistan and India, to Greece and Turkey, and to other areas where hostilities have broken out, such as Malysia and Angola. There is no excuse whatever for making an exception to this policy in the case of Viet
[Mr. Herridge.l

Nam, especially when Canada is a member of the International Control Commission there.
Even if Canada had remained genuinely neutral, there is no evidence whatever that its efforts to influence the combatant nations would have been successful. On the contrary, all indications point to the conclusion that the United States has been deterred from even greater escalation of the war solely by those nations and world leaders who have had the courage to speak out against American bombing, crop poisoning, and scorched earth tactics.
It has been world opinion, as voiced by such nations as France, Sweden and India, and by individuals such as U Thant and Pope Paul, and the protests against the war by peace groups in the United States and other countries, that has prevented the war in Viet Nam from expanding into a global catastrophe. Those countries which have, like Canada, acted as apologists for United States policy in Viet Nam or have remained silent have been ignored in Washington. That has been obvious in recent days. Canada's quiet diplomacy, in short, is serving to prolong the war, not shorten it. The Viet Nam war is the greatest moral issue of our time. The world's strongest military nation is systematically obliterating a small peasant country by all the means of mass destruction in its vast arsenal, short of nuclear weapons, and we are assisting by supplying those weapons. This barbaric behaviour verges on attempted genocide, and I have no hesitation in using those words. I give great credit to the work done by the federation of veterans in this regard. These men have taken part in war and they know something about it. To refuse to condemn this behaviour, as the Canadian government has done, is to condone it.
I should like to ask the parliamentary secretary how he justifies the supplying of arms to the United States under these circumstances.


Mr. D. S. Macdonald (Parliamentary Secretary to Secretary of State for External Affairs):: Mr. Speaker, one would think
that if the hon. member found this to be such a driving moral issue he would have paid more attention to it and, in part:cular, he would then know that this question was raised and answered on the late show on February 7, 1967 as reported at page 12775 of Hansard.
I must say that the hon. member's remarks strike a rather familiar note. They appear to bear a very close resemblance to a document
May 23. 1967	COMMONS
being distributed early this week or late last week by a group describing itself as the Ottawa committee with respect to Viet Nam. His remarks indicate an inspiration from that particular group.
Really what the hon. member has said has already been effectively dealt with previously by statements in the house. The first genera] complaint against the United States was effectively dealt with by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
This question should not be considered in the narrow perspective of Viet Nam, but rather in the full context of our international relations, and particularly those with the United States. Taking it first, however, in the context of Viet Nam, I wonder whether the hon. member seriously thinks that this subtraction of equipment would really affect the issue there. I think there can be no question that the breaking off of relations as advocated by the hon. member for Kootenay West could not help but be deleterious to our influence with the United States. I again raise the question, how could the creation of bad diplomatic relafions between the United States and Canada save one additional life in Viet Nam?
I do not think it could. Rather, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out this afternoon, and I think this has been recognized by Hanoi, the greatest value of Canada on the international commission is as a friend and ally of Washington, perhaps her closest friend and ally.
The hon. member inquires why we do not break off relations with that country. Certainly it is my view and the view of this party that we should not seek bad diplomatic relations with the United States, as apparently my hon. friend does. It was as a strong friend and ally of the United States that we first became a member of the control commission, and it seems to me from the standpoint of both Hanoi and Washington that we can continue to exercise an effective role, provided we keep the door open. We have heard suggestions from both sides of the argument in this country that we should slam the door on one or other of the contestants, and we have heard from the hon. member in particular, that we should slam the door on Washington. We do not think this would be in the best interest either of the Vietnamese nor of anyone else, that we should break off relations with Washington. For this reason I think we should reject the question raised by the hon. member.
DEBATES	513
Proceedings on Adjournment Motion [Translation]


Mr. Guy LeBlanc (Rimouski):: Mr. Speaker, if, a few days ago, I directed a question to the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Mcllraith) with regard to harbour facilities or to the construction of a wharf at Pointe-Michel, on the north shore, it was because of an important fact, of a serious development in my constituency a few weeks back. 1 refer to the sale of a ferry-boat serving both shores of the St. Lawrence river, at Rimouski and Baie Co-meau.
We know and understand that since 1961 the policy on ferry-boats serving two areas within one province comes under provincial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, that ferry service is always related to harbour organizations or facilities.
The population was proud of that ferryboat which we had between Rimouski and Baie Comeau for over five years and which was very useful for transporting passengers, automobiles and trucks. It was also very useful to and very important for the economy of the Rimouski area, of the South shore in general and we were also conscious that we were helping our neighbours on the opposite north shore.
That is why, as a result of the sale of this boat after five years of service, various intermediate organizations of the area, municipal councils, retail merchants associations and the Chamber of Commerce of Rimouski undertook various steps expressed in resolutions among other things. On May 8, a resolution was addressed to various government officials, either at the provincial level for what concerned provincial jurisdiction or to various federal departments. The resolution addressed to the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Mcllraith) said:
-to ask the hon. Minister of Public Works of Canada to take forthwith necessary measures to have the construction of a wharf at Pointe-Michel started as soon as possible and that assurance be given to the Compagnie de Navigation Nord-Sud Limitee that such works will in fact be carried out.
Mr. Speaker, the reason why I am repeating my question to the Minister of Public Works tonight is to ascertain his attitude on this problem, on this wish of the population concerning the construction of a wharf at Pointe-Michel, opposite Rimouski, in order to facilitate trade between our two regions through the harbour of Rimouski.
May 23, 1967

Proceedings on Adjournment Motion
[DOT] (10:10 p.m.)
[English] ,	... t.
Hon. G. J. Mcllraiih (Minister of Public
Works): Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. member for raising this matter and giving me an Opportunity to provide an answer that I would have given when the question was put <an the orders of the day had the rules permitted me to do so. I regret that I did not realize the question would be raised at ten o'clock, on the motion to adjourn, until six o'clock tonight, when it was too late to get the files and assure myself of the point the investigation of the matter has reached at this moment. However, I am familiar with the situation. I well understand the concern of the people in the area who desire service from the south shore to the north shore by the most direct and shortest route, as would result from a terminal point at Pointe-Michel.
In addition to the resolution passed by the Rimouski Chamber of Commerce, some other correspondence has come in from companies which might be users of the service, indicating their interest in the problem. At the present time I am not certain whether or not a formal request has come from the ferry company, but if it has not, I understand it is doming. In any event we are having engineers look into the whole matter of the feasibility of putting in the facility requested, and what it involves. I will be able to give a more definitive answer to the hon. member when this study is completed. In the meantime I can assure him that his request and the representations of the hon. member for Saguenay (Mr. Blouin) are being given every attention by the department.
AIR TRANSPORT-REQUEST FOR BAN ON USE :	OF HIGHLY INFLAMMABLE FUEL


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, on the orders of the day this afternoon I put a question to the Minister of Transport (Mr. Pickersgill) regarding the use by jet airliners of JP4 fuel. I Have the feeling that the minister did not quite understand my question, and that is the reason I put it down for tonight's late show.
I gather I drew the late late show. When 1 asked my question this afternoon the Minister of Transport seemed to think that I was suggesting that the use of JP4 fuel was somehow the cause of Saturday night's tragic accident at Uplands airport. I am sure he would realize on a moment's reflection that I was not suggesting that at all. But, as I indicated when I asked questions about JP4 fuel on

previous occasions, it does seem to me there is something to the point of view that if an aircraft is using a fuel with a low flash point, sometimes called high inflammability, the danger of fire or explosion after a crash is greater than if an airline is using a fuel with a high flash point. It is because of this belief, which seems to me quite logical and which is held by the International Transport Workers Federation and subscribed to by certain other people as well, that I think the government should make a study of the question and determine whether or not it should ban the use of JP4 fuel by jet aircraft in Canada.
Ironically enough, when I asked the question previously- I was given an answer last Thursday night on the late show to the effect that the evidence pointed the other way, and that the matter I had asked about had been looked into but there seemed to be no reason to carry out the suggestion I had made. It is a bit ironical that only two nights later this crash took place. I am not suggesting that I know the details of the accident, but even the press release which the minister put out today does refer to an explosion taking place after the crash. That is the whole point of my concern about this matter. You cannot prevent accidents or crashes by using one type of fuel rather than another, but if there is a difference in what happens after a crash takes place on the basis of whether an aircraft is using a low flash point fuel or a high flash point fuel, surely it is common sense to try to avoid an explosion or a fire after the crash, if it is possible to do so.
Let me make it as clear as I possibly can that I was not suggesting that the use of JP4 fuel was the cause of Saturday night's accident. But it does seem to me that in the light of that accident having taken place, in addition to the investigation that is being made into the crash itself, the department should re-examine-academically, if you will, but very practically now-the whole question of the use of JP4 fuel.
As I say, I do not think it is good enough to tell me that an investigation into the crash itself has been ordered. I think the statement that was made by the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources last Thursday night now has to be re-examined. That is all I am asking for, and I look the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Transport in the eye and suggest to him that surely he cannot answer me with anything less.
May 23, 1967

[DOT] (10:20 p.m.)


Mr. J. A. Byrne (Parliamenlary Secretary to Minister of Transport):: Mr. Speaker, since I am not a technician or an expert on fuels it seems to me that it would be expected that any fuel suitable for internal combustion would be explosive in an impact, as was the experience in the particular accident to which the hon. member referred. So far as the misunderstanding this afternoon is concerned, I can hardly suggest that the hon. member's asking the question today is coincidental with the accident that took place on Saturday evening, inasmuch as the question had been asked the previous Thursday night.
I am sure that Air Canada as an operating air line, while it may be accused of other deficiencies, has a safety record that cannot be criticized. The hon. member pointed out in his earlier question that he understood that this fuel is some 8 per cent cheaper than fuel used by other air lines. It is quite unlikely that a saving or just one or two cents per gallon
Proceedings on Adjournment Motion by using less expensive fuel would influence the air line in the choice of the fuel it uses.
Nothing has occurred since the hon. member asked his question last Thursday to alter the statement that was made by the parliamentary secretary to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources, when he stated that it was decided after a number of experiments following the war when the explosive nature of the alternative fuels had been under study that the JP4 fuel was as safe as any alternative fuel that can be used for jet engine purposes. The hon. member went on to say, as reported at page 407 of Hansard:
Under certain conditions it is safer than paraffin, basically kerosene, which is used by some of the other air lines. On other occasions it is less safe. However it is the total range of conditions which must be considered, particularly conditions under which jet aircraft fly in this country. In other words, this situation has been reviewed carefully. It is being reviewed from time to time and will be reviewed again as new fuels are developed and as circumstances change.
Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at 10.26 p.m.



Wednesday, May 24, 1967