1963-01-25

Mr. Speaker:: Before the commencement of today's proceedings I would crave the indulgence of members of the house to draw their attention to the presence in the Speaker's gallery of distinguished visitors to this house. They are the Speakers, or their representatives, of the provincial legislatures of Canada, who are gathered here for a two day conference under the chairmanship of your own Speaker in the area council of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. I am sure that on your behalf I can extend to them, coming from the various provincial capitals, a most hearty welcome to the nation's capital and say that we wish them well. (Translation):
I should like to call the attention of the house to the presence in the Speaker's gallery of a delegation of distinguished visitors. Among them, we find the Speakers, or their representatives, of all Canadian legislatures, who are meeting at a regional convention of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association.
It goes without saying that I readily act as spokesman for all hon. members to welcome our visitors and to wish them an interesting and enjoyable stay in Ottawa.
(Text):



TABLING OF INTERNAL ECONOMY COMMISSION REPORT ON SALARY INCREASES

Mr. Speaker:: I also wish to announce that the commissioners of eternal economy-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Mr. Speaker:: -or rather internal economy of this house I should say-perhaps the wish was father to the thought in that slip-have examined the salary schedules of the employees of this house and in conformity with the pay increases granted recently to certain groups in the public service of Canada the commissioners have redrawn the schedules and have granted pay increases to certain groups of house employees. For the information of the members, I wish to have leave to table copies of the salary revisions in English and in French.


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.

On the orders of the day:


Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Minister of Finance. Can he say whether the report of the commissioners of internal economy, which provides for pay increases to certain groups of employees of the House of Commons, includes all employees of the house, or whether some groups have been left out?


Hon. George C. Nowlan (Minister of Finance):: Mr. Speaker, the board of internal economy has reviewed the salaries of all employees of the House of Commons.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I ask a supplementary question. Were all the employees given increases?


George Clyde Nowlan: Mr. Speaker, I believe the hon. member can read. You have tabled the report, and I suggest that he find out. There are several hundred of them, and I cannot recall all the details.


Stanley Howard Knowles: The answer is obvious.


Mr. Fleming (Eglinton):: Why did you ask
the question then?



CANADIAN CENTENNIAL


Right Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, some weeks ago the hon. member for St. Lawrence-St. George asked me for a report in connection with the centennial administration. I realize his interest, he having been connected with the Canadian centenary council, as he still is. At the time I said that in time appointments would be made, and now I wish to make a report in connection with this question.
On several occasions I have made statements to the house about the preparations for honouring Canada's centennial of confederation. These reports have been in the nature of progress reports. As the house knows, the National Centennial Act provides for a national centennial administration to carry out the national government's part in the planning of Canada's first century of confederation. The centennial administration is not intended to override or duplicate any existing agencies or departments of government. It is not established to tell Canadians

Canadian Centennial
how centennial celebrations should be conducted. It was set up to co-ordinate, to stimulate and to assist in certain specific circumstances the furtherance of this historic event.
The real success of the centennial will rest not with the plans of the government of Canada or of the provinces but will depend on the vital role of each community and every citizen. Each community, in its own way, through its own organization, can contribute toward making the entire year of 1967 something to be remembered. This is a time when every Canadian can learn more about the richness of the heritage of our country and the promises of the next century.
I am glad, and 1 know all hon. members in all parts of the house appreciate, that many cities, towns, villages and municipalities have already outlined their plans for 1967. I express the hope that other communities will follow their example. I do not believe that in the centennial celebrations there is any need for a centennial colossus organization at the top. The administration, the members of which I am about to announce, must ever be conscious of the local initiatives, of the needs, feelings, ideals and aspirations of the various areas of our country.
There seems to be some misunderstanding about the relations between the national centennial administration and the Canadian centenary council. The Canadian centenary council is a non-government organization; its membership represents, I think, some 270 private, corporate and other associations, their aim being to stimulate public interest in the centennial observance and also recommend policies to be followed in the national field. The Canadian centenary council elects its own directors and hires its own employees. The Canadian centenary council has been assured of the close co-operation of the government and also of the national centennial administration. Indeed, to ensure there is the closest possible liaison, among the appointments is that of the president of this organization to the board of the national centennial administration.
Questions have been asked about the relationship of the Canadian world fair and the centennial. I believe that the world fair, and 1 think it is so intended, should be part of and not competitive with centennial observances. Although the Canadian world fair does not fall within the jurisdiction of the national centennial administration it does provide a fitting symbol of this country's maturity at the time of her birthday party. It is part [DOT]of Canada's centennial year and the govern-

ment will, of course, give careful consideration to the fullest possible co-operation between the national centennial organization and the organization of the fair.
The provinces and municipalities will have programs and projects of their own. The federal government is asking parliament for funds which may be used for making grants for local projects. These moneys would be credited to a non-lapsing fund from year to year in accordance with the provisions of the National Centennial Act. They will be made up of projects of a lasting nature. They will not exceed one third of the agreed estimate of cost, and a provincial contribution is a prerequisite to a federal grant. Such grants will not be considered if a project is already receiving federal aid under other legislation. Applications with respect to assistance and aid in this regard should be made to the national centennial administration through the media of the various provincial governments.
With regard to the federal government's program on the centennial, final decisions on some problems have not yet been taken but a number of projects are under way. One of these is the "mile of living history" in the city of Ottawa, a restoration project already undertaken here by the national capital commission. A four block stretch of Sussex drive is being restored to reveal its fine appearance of the confederation era, when it was the main commercial street in Ottawa. The commission is engaged in acquiring the property affected, and this project will help to recreate the traditional route taken by the Governor General between the parliament buildings and Government House.
A second project by the national capital commission involves Victoria island and Richmond landing located on the Ottawa river, a short distance west of this house. Hon. members will recall that the Ottawa river was once the trans-Canada highway of its day. To avoid the Chaudiere falls the voyageur would portage his canoe at Richmond landing, and at some later period the logger had his lumber slide at this point. The national capital commission is acquiring this property in order to create there a replica of that era and those early days. Industrial and commercial buildings constructed in the past century will be demolished, railway lines will be removed, the timber slide will be rebuilt and typical log buildings of the era will be reconstructed.
As a third project the government proposes to establish a Canadian historical museum which will record and portray the whole dramatic story of the settlement and development of Canada from the days of the aborigines to our own day.

The government has also agreed, subject to the approval of the necessary funds by parliament, to bear half the cost of construction of a group of memorial buildings in Charlottetown. These buildings are being erected to commemorate the pre-confederation conference held there in 1864. As the house already knows, a special silver dollar is also being struck to commemorate that conference.
Apart from the projects which directly form elements of the centennial program, several others are closely related. The national library is to be completed in time for Canada's hundredth birthday as a confederation. In addition a large redevelopment project involving 150 acres, known as the LeBreton flats in downtown Ottawa, has been undertaken by the national capital commission and will be largely completed by 1967. Work was begun last year on the partial restoration of the historic fortress of Louisburg, which in its time was one of the strongest bastions in North America and an important seat of French colonial government.
I have referred to those various parts of the program which have been approved. In addition many more cultural, historical and ceremonial projects are receiving study. Further announcements will be made from time to time.
As I mentioned previously, the government has obtained the services of John Fisher as commissioner of the national centennial administration. I say no more regarding Mr. Fisher than this, that his people have been in Canada since the late 1780's, one of his ancestors was a father of confederation, and he himself has been known in many parts of Canada through the years as "Mr. Canada".
The deputy commissioner of the centennial is Robert Choquette of Montreal, a professional writer of great competence. He has published five volumes of poetry, three novels and two plays. He is the winner of the Governor General's award, the prix Duvernay, the prix de l'Academie Frangaise and the gold medal of literature granted by the lieutenant governor of Quebec. There will be a board of directors of not more than eight.
I should mention that there is also a conference representative of all the provinces of Canada. This conference will comprise 60 representatives, 20 of whom will be appointed by the provinces and 40 by the federal government. As far as possible-and I welcome suggestions in this connection-we want this conference to be representative of all facets of Canadian life. We want the very best people possible on this conference,
Canadian Centennial
for on it depends, in co-operation with the officers and directors, the success of the celebrations.
The six directors outside the government are all distinguished in business and community activities. They are Mr. Hugh Mills, Halifax, a merchant; Mr. Paul Desmarais, president of the Provincial Transport Co., Montreal; George Metcalf, president of Lob-law Groceterias, Toronto; J. R. Murray, managing director of Hudson's Bay Co., Winnipeg; Dr. Norman MacKenzie, former president of the University of British Columbia and president of the Canadian centenary council; Mrs. Marianne Linnell, alderman of the city of Vancouver. The government representatives are two distinguished civil servants, Mr. Ernest Cote, assistant deputy minister of northern affairs and national resources, and Dr. John Hodgson, assistant secretary to the cabinet.
(Translation):


Hon. Lionel Chevrier (Laurier):: Mr. Speaker, I listened closely to the statement made by the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) on the establishment of a council to supervise the organization of the confederation's centennial celebrations. That most important statement could very well have repercussions throughout the country.
My first reaction following what the Prime Minister said just now was not only to assure him that we are in favour of that council, to which we shall give our strongest support, but to congratulate him as far as some of the appointments are concerned. In saying so, I am thinking of Mr. Fisher and Mr. Robert Choquette.
Mr. Fisher we have known for some time. We are aware of his experience and great qualities. I feel sure he will efficiently discharge his responsibilities; at least, we prefer to see him in the role just assigned to him by the Prime Minister than in the one he had until now.
With regard to Mr. Robert Choquette, he is an outstanding representative of French Canada. He has made his mark in the literary and academic world. I am convinced that he will fill this post with dignity.
In my opinion, it is essential that Canada celebrate the centennial of confederation in a dignified and adequate manner.
It is necessary to do some of the things mentioned by the Prime Minister, and without going over them in detail, I think of the reconstruction of the Louisburg fortress, for instance.
I feel also that it is essential for us to see that confederation rests on solid foun-

Canadian Centennial
dations when we celebrate its centennial. To achieve that aim, it is imperative to rethink, to remake the constitution as it was established in 1867.
The Prime Minister, and I remind him of this with all due respect, stated recently that we should not talk about separatism but only of unity throughout the country. All Canadians have heard that statement by the Prime Minister, but we should not forget that a movement in that direction does exist and we cannot ignore it. It seems to me that the Prime Minister is not enough in contact with some segments of the people.
That is why I was saying a while ago that a new appraisal of the basis of confederation is a must so that we may all together, properly and adequately, commemorate the centenary of confederation and that all Canadian citizens may be equal partners in that new confederation.
(Text):


Mr. Horace A. Olson (Medicine Hat):: Mr. Speaker, all I wish to say is that we welcome this announcement at this time. I am sure we can all agree there is little enough time left now to make all the arrangements and plans and co-ordinate those plans in order to be ready to have a birthday party, as the Prime Minister suggests, in keeping with the importance of this occasion.
I think we in this party can, and do, give our support to the people who have been nominated to the council. We also welcome the suggestion by the Prime Minister when he invited others to propose names for the larger convention of 60. We shall give this consideration and offer some nominations, if you like, to this council. We in this party, too, hope these celebrations will do something to further the cause of the true spirit of confederation as it was outlined nearly 100 years ago.


Mr. T. C. Douglas (Burnaby-Coquillam):: Mr. Speaker, I am sure the people of Canada are anxious to celebrate the centennial in the most outstanding way possible. It is certainly not too soon to begin laying plans at the federal, provincial and local levels. I am sure that Canadians generally will welcome the announcement made by the Prime Minister that the centenary committee is now being set up and that the board of directors has been appointed, as well as the commissioner and deputy commissioner.
I suggest to the government that in making the appointments to the council of some 60 members, 40 of whom will be appointed by the federal government, we ought to keep in

mind the fact that a celebration of this kind, if it is to have any meaning, must secure the participation of a good cross section of the Canadian people, and that on that committee there ought to be representatives of farm organizations, co-operatives, labour organizations, universities, and groups interested in the arts and literature, in order that people in all walks of life will feel that they have had some part in preparing this program and in order that we may have the fullest participation and co-operation from people in every walk of life when the actual centenary is taking place.
I think we shall all look forward to the list of monuments which it is hoped will be constructed in order to commemorate Canada's centenary. However, I think we ought not to lose sight of the fact that there are intangible monuments which are equally important, and we might try to set for ourselves, on the federal, provincial and local basis, some objectives in terms of health programs, welfare programs and other things that would give to the Canadian people a sense of pride not only in brick and mortar but in the social accomplishments which they have been able to attain by 1967.
Above all, it seems to me that every effort must be made by all of us to see to it that in 1967 the true spirit of confederation has been fully established and that we do everything possible between now and then to bring about a better understanding and a better appreciation of the culture and the point of view of the two great races that make up confederation.
We in this party will do everything we can to support the government in putting into effect a program of this kind, to the end that when we celebrate our one hundredth birthday we shall be a country in which we are bound together by bonds of co-operation and mutual understanding.



HEALTH AND WELFARE


Hon. J. W. Monteiih (Minister of National Health and Welfare):: Mr. Speaker, with the permission of the house I should like to table the report I have just received from the expert committee on the habilitation of congenital anomalies associated with thalidomide. The committee was established on the recommendation of those attending the federal-provincial conference on this subject on August 17 of last year. The committee was made up of a group of experts in various professional fields most directly concerned with rehabilitation.

At its final meeting last year, which was attended by provincial representatives, proposals were made for the techniques and principles that should be employed in the rehabilitation of children with severe limb defects. The proposals have been incorporated into the committee's recommendations, which coincide to a considerable degree with action the government is already taking. For example, one of the recommendations suggests that a short course be set up to provide training for Canadian specialists involved in this rehabilitation field, and arrangements are now being made with the child amputee centre in Los Angeles to bring a group to Toronto to provide a two week course as soon as possible. As soon as the date of this is known I shall invite the provinces to send specialists to this course. The federal government will pay the costs of presenting the course, and will share with the provinces the expenses of provincial representatives.
A second proposal is that three research and training units be developed in Canada, concerned with prosthetic services and rehabilitation for severely disabled persons. The government will seek to add $200,000 annually to the funds available under the medical rehabilitation and crippled childrens' grant to implement this proposal. The services which should be developed by this means will benefit not only children with disabilities associated with thalidomide, but others with severe disabilities from other causes.
The committee also considers that the whole problem of the training of prosthetists should be reviewed, and suitable courses established in Canada. My departmental officers are now consulting with medical educators in the rehabilitation field to determine the best way of proceeding.
The report points out that the basic components of prosthetic appliances are imported into Canada, and urges that a manufacturing potential be developed in this country. I expect that our current study of this proposal will result in satisfactory arrangements to achieve this objective very shortly.
All members of the expert committee deserve the greatest commendation on the painstaking way in which they have carried out their duties. In co-operation with the provincial authorities it is our intention to implement to the fullest extent the recommendations set forth in the report, two copies of which I should now like to table.


Mr. Speaker:: The minister asks for leave to table the document to which he has referred. Has he leave to do so? Is it agreed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
Inquiries of the Ministry ATLANTIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD



INQUIRY AS TO APPOINTMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. A. J. MacEachen (Inverness-Rich-mond):: Mr. Speaker, I have a question for the Minister of National Revenue in connection with the Atlantic development board. In view of the fact that the Atlantic Development Board Act provides that the work of the board will be organized by an executive director, can the minister tell the house whether the governor in council has appointed the chief executive officer of the board? If so, can he give the name of this officer?


Hon. H. J. Flemming (Minister of National Revenue):: Mr. Speaker, the answer to the question asked by the hon. gentleman is "not as yet".


Allan Joseph MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask a further question in connection with the Atlantic development board. In view of the appointment as chairman of the board of Brigadier J. Michael S. Ward ell, can the minister tell the house the salary offered to this gentleman to serve in this capacity?


Hugh John Flemming: Mr. Speaker, the answer to that question is that the matter has not been discussed.


Mr. H. J. Robichaud (Gloucester):: On the
same subject, Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister. In view of the importance of the duties to be performed by the newly appointed chairman of the Atlantic development board, can the Prime Minister advise the house if this same person will be called upon to resign as a member of the Canada council?


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, Brigadier Wardell has, of course, been a member of the Canada council. Through the years other people have occupied such positions as membership in the Canada council and still have been able to carry on fully whatever their other responsibilities have been.


Hon. J. W. Pickersgill (Bonavisia-Twillin-gate):: Mr. Speaker, if I may, I should like to ask a supplementary question of the Prime Minister. Can he tell the house which minister has been designated under the act to have responsibility for the board?


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I should have announced that yesterday when I was making the announcement. It is the Minister of National Revenue. I thank the hon. gentleman for asking it.

Inquiries of the Ministry


John Whitney Pickersgill: I apologize to the Prime Minister. I suffer slightly from the same disability as that from which he suffers, and I did not hear it.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


An hon. Member:: He did not say it.


John Whitney Pickersgill: That is extremely funny.


John George Diefenbaker: If he had done so, the hon. gentleman would have heard something that had not taken place.



HEALTH AND WELFARE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Stanley Haidasz (Parkdale):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to address a question to the Minister of National Health and Welfare. In view of the fact that Canada is in the worst position as far as radioactive fallout and contamination are concerned, and as the very food of the Canadian people is affected thereby, can the minister state to the house today what is the government's policy on radioactive countermeasures, a question which I asked him last October?


Jay Waldo Monteith: Mr. Speaker, I think the hon. member made an erroneous statement to begin with, but I should like to say that the department has been making tests of radioactivity across the country. Previously I made the statement that if certain steps were necessary they would be taken. These steps are certainly not close to being necessary at the moment.


Stanley Haidasz: On a question of order, Mr. Speaker, today the Minister of National Health and Welfare alleges that I made an erroneous statement. The statement I made today is a repetition of a governmental statement made to the house yesterday by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. That is not a point of order. I think the minister was referring to the expression of opinion contained in the word "worst".


Hon. Paul Hellyer (Trinity):: I should like to ask the minister a question on the same subject. Is Canada doing enzyme research to try to find means of fortifying the human body against the effects of radiation?


Jay Waldo Monteith: Mr. Speaker, the government is certainly studying all these problems all the time.
[Mr. Diefenbaker.l



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Lionel Chevrier: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the house leader. In order to facilitate the business of the house on Monday I wonder if the house leader could indicate now what the house will be doing on Monday.


Hon. Gordon Churchill (Minister of Veterans Affairs):: The normal procedure is to indicate the business of the next day at the close of the business on this day.


Lionel Chevrier: My reason for asking the question arises from the fact that on Wednesday the acting house leader indicated that it would be announced on Thursday, and as the house leader knows it was not.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. An answer was given, and I think the position is clear at the present time.
(Translation):



PUBLIC SERVICE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Bernard Dumont (Bellechasse):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister. Recently we learned that to ensure the success of confederation, the Department of Agriculture would be fully bilingual. Has the Prime Minister given instructions that all departments are to follow the same policy?


Mr. Speaker:: It goes without saying that the hon. member should have his question placed on the order paper.
(Text):



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Thomas R. Berger (Vancouver-Bur-rard):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister. In view of the fact that the United States is renegotiating its arrangements with two NATO members, Italy and Turkey, and dismantling its nuclear bases in those countries, can the Prime Minister tell the house whether the United States has indicated to Canada that it wishes to renegotiate the arrangements it made with this country in 1959 to establish nuclear Bomarc bases in this country?


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, we are discussing this question of defence at the present time; consequently answers will be forthcoming to many phases of our defence situation after the government has been able to learn the views of the members of parliament.



REFERENCE OF RULE CHANGES TO COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister? If any changes in the rules of the house are proposed at this session, will they be referred to the special committee on procedure promised in the speech from the throne?


John George Diefenbaker: Yes, Mr. Speaker.


Allan Joseph MacEachen: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister related to the question asked by the member for Winnipeg North Centre. May I ask the Prime Minister whether his answer applies to a suspension of the rules as well as changes in the rules?


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, my answer referred to the undertaking that was given and the statement made in the speech from the throne.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister. Is the government, in order to avoid the necessity of getting its annual supply bill dealt with according to the rules, considering dissolution of parliament?


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Don't be so nervous.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Is there no answer?


Mr. Speaker:: Order. There is no necessity to comment on whether or not there is an answer or to insist upon an answer to any question.



FISHERIES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. J. A. MacLean (Minister of Fisheries):: Mr. Speaker, yesterday the hon. member for Coast-Capilano asked me a question, and on reading Hansard I find that I had not heard the last part of his question which reads "thus permitting the Japanese to fish for herring off the west coast of British Columbia".
Supply-External Affairs
I want to make it perfectly clear, Mr. Speaker, that the finding of the international north Pacific fisheries commission has reference only to the stock of herring off the west coast of the Queen Charlotte islands beyond Canadian territorial waters. There is no question of Japanese being allowed to fish for herring off the entire coast of British Columbia nor in Canadian territorial waters anywhere. At the present time the finding of the commission is under study by the government.


Mr. Jack Davis (Coast-Capilano):: Mr. Speaker, I wonder whether I would be permitted to ask the Minister of Fisheries if he is prepared to meet a very large delegation of fishermen who are coming to Ottawa to discuss this matter?


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I think these things can be done privately rather than on orders of the day.
(Translation):



FINANCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Bernard Dumont: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister.
Recently, Mr. Rasminsky stated that our banking institutions have hindered the development of the central bank in order to restrict credit. Do the Prime Minister and his government share Mr. Rasminsky's opinion?


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I should like to remind the hon. member that it is out of order to call upon ministers to comment on statements made outside the house.
(Text):

The house in committee of supply, Mr. Chown in the chair.


DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
[Stage Direction]
1. Departmental administration, $7,305,200.
Mr. Pearson:: Mr. Chairman, in participating in this discussion I should like to begin by telling the Secretary of State for External Affairs how much we on this side regret that his statement yesterday was cut short by an absence of voice. I am sure he has recovered from that very temporary indisposition, and I am sure it may well be that before I have finished my remarks he will have given evidence that his voice has returned. We are discussing-and it is an unprecedented situation, I think-the estimates of two departments.
3112	HOUSE OF
Supply-External Affairs


Gordon Minto Churchill: No.


Donald Methuen Fleming: No.


Lester Bowles Pearson: We are discussing national defence policy and external affairs policy on the estimates of one department. We are discussing the subject matters of two departments on the estimates of one department, the Department of External Affairs.


Gordon Minto Churchill: You do not have to.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That means that our debate is divided into a debate on foreign policy and a debate on defence policy, I would not complain about that if there were sufficient time to deal with these two important matters because, of course, they are very closely related.
Every debate on defence policy, and I suppose this applies to a debate on foreign policy as well, is essentially a debate on the ultimate fate of men and of states, of their wisdom in directing the genius of our species so that it can create more than it destroys. At the present time it has created the possibility of the destruction of our planet, as was pointed out by hon. gentlemen who spoke on this matter yesterday. Foreign policy of course, Mr. Chairman, is or should be the foundation of defence policy which is designed to support it. In our country neither foreign policy nor defence policy will be strong and purposeful unless Canada itself is strong, united and resolute, and that means above all Canadian unity on the basis on which we decided it in 1867, and a strong, independent Canada.
Canadianism, Canada first if you want to call it that, must reflect this national unity. It is, of course, as is so often said and so profoundly true, not national uniformity. Canada is composed of two races, two cultures, two languages, two traditions to which have been added those of many other people which have given colour and strength to the pattern of our national development.
But there is something else, Mr. Chairman, both in foreign policy and in defence policy. The national independence which I have mentioned, most especially in the day and age in which we live, must be qualified by the necessities of interdependence. No country, least of all a country in the position of Canada, can live unto itself alone. Canada first must never mean Canada only, nor in our time has it done so. By far, Mr. Chairman, at the moment the most important of Canada's political, material and economic relationships with any other country is that which we have with our neighbour the United States, which by its power has become the leader of the free world; a country which by its policies or even by its lack of


policies so greatly influences our own destiny as well as the destiny of every other country in the whole world. How we manage our relationships with our neighbour is one of the most important aspects, and in some respects is the most important aspect, of our foreign relations, of our foreign policy.
It is also a test of maturity and the good sense of Canadian nationalism, to say nothing of Canadian politics. We must, of course, stand up for our rights as Canadians. We must protect our national interests. We must speak and act firmly when those rights and those interests are threatened by American action or by the action of any other country. We must not, and we never have, become merely a satellite of any other state. But we would be pretty foolish if we tried to put ourselves alone in orbit. We must realize that a separate Canadian identity, a strong and independent Canada, does not and cannot mean either isolation or immunity. It is well to remember this while living in the shadow of the United States. It is also well to remember that, while living in the shadow of the United States has its problems and its worries for us, living without her free strength in a turbulent and dangerous world, living with a communist state as our land neighbour instead of the United States, would be a far more difficult and far more dangerous situation for us.
Perhaps it is just as well to remember also that the Soviet union, if not our land neighbour, is certainly our ice neighbour. So we do not prove our Canadianism, Mr. Chairman, but only our immaturity when we confuse the defence of Canada's rights with emotional breast beating or by criticizing whatever symbol of Americanism we think at any particular moment requires such criticism. There is more to our relationship than that. We worry not only about our general political and strategic relationships on this continent, but we worry, also and quite rightly, about United States control of so much of our industry and our natural resources. So we should, especially since it has increased in the last five years during a time when we were to be saved from this kind of domination.


An hon. Member:: It started under the Liberals.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Perhaps it did start under the Liberals. It started a long time back under both the Liberals and the Conservatives. I have some doubts about the ability of my hon. friends in the far corner to save us by their own magic nostrums from this kind of development.
In our worry over United States economic penetration, however, and any policies designed to check it-and we should have such

policies-we should not forget that United States capital has been responsible for much of that Canadian development of which we are so rightly proud and about which we boast.


Some hon. Members:: Shame.


Lester Bowles Pearson: If that shout of 'shame' means anything, Mr. Chairman, then the hon. members who make it should take steps to keep all United States capital out of our land. I wonder what would happen to our country if that were done. I wonder particularly what would have happened to the province of Alberta if that had been done. We should also remember, Mr. Chairman, that when this capital from abroad comes into our country it is subject to our laws as well as to our criticisms.


Mr. Herridge:: Not always.


Lester Bowles Pearson: It is subject to our laws. Canada makes the laws that cover Canada and activities in Canada. If we allow Canadian development to be controlled by the United States dollar, if we allow Canadian values and Canadian identity to be destroyed by the less attractive aspects of United States life and culture, this will be because we did not ourselves care enough about it to do anything effective. The fault, dear Brutus, may lie in us as well as in the stars and stripes. I apologize for my misquotation of Shakespeare in the presence of a Shakespearean expert in this house.
I hope that our worries about our neighbour, and they are understandable, will not obscure a far greater cause for worry and for fear, namely that in the world today the greatest danger of losing even the peace we have is not from American imperialism but remains from communist international imperialism with its dynamic and revolutionary aggressiveness, an aggressiveness which now seems to be centered in Peking, not Moscow. It is not the United States of America which causes us in this country to spend $1.5 billion a year on our defence.
An essential condition for a better world- one essential condition, and there are certainly others-is the closest friendship and the best possible relations between the United States and all the free democracies, including Canada. The first objective of those whom we have most reason to fear-although I hope that cause will diminish over the years and I acknowledge that there are some indications of progress in that regard-is the weakening and the ultimate destruction of such good relations between the United States and other free democracies. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, I repeat that in foreign affairs any Canada first policy must not mean isolation 27507-3-197
Supply-External Affairs or neutralism, nor should it discourage in any way the policy of building up other associations, a British commonwealth of nations or an Atlantic community.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Lester Bowles Pearson: The ultimate ideal, of course, is not a regional one, but universal, collective security and peace through a universal organization, the United Nations. But until that ideal is realized-and we in this house made this decision a good many years ago

we must rely on regional action, particularly at present through NATO.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization today remains essential for collective action by the free states which are its members. Those who advocate its disbandment, as the New Democratic party does, along with the Warsaw pact, do no service to peace or security. If the NATO organization goes, then its members return to purely national defence and to national foreign policies, "each nation for itself and God for us all." But if, on the other hand, the Warsaw pact goes as part of the bargain, communist control exercised from Moscow will remain in exactly the same manner in terms of the reality of the control. There will, in reality, be little or no change.
If NATO, however, is to remain strong and effective-and this has been said by so many so many times in this house and outside that it is becoming a cliche, but it is a cliche which has become a cliche because it is so fundamentally true-it must be a genuine partnership with a maximum of consultation so that members can act together in an emergency, and that means consultation wherever possible before an emergency develops. A take it or leave it attitude by any one member could provoke, or where it may already exist could strengthen, a go it alone reaction by another, and that reaction would express itself not only in foreign and defence policy, especially in building up separate, independent nuclear forces, but also in inward looking and discriminating trade arrangements, either national or regional.
The Atlantic alliance will not survive without this concept of partnership being carried out in practice, and without co-operation and mutual confidence. Jealousy and petty nationalism could easily kill it. If any member of the alliance thinks more of national power or national glory, and allows the prerogatives of independence to frustrate the necessities of interdependence; if a member permits a "my country first" attitude to jeopardize that country's relation with its friends in the alliance, that could certainly destroy the alliance.

Supply-External Affairs
Mutual confidence could also be destroyed either by refusing to accept a fair share of the common defence burden, because that is what collective defence should mean, or by unilaterally rejecting pledges already accepted, commitments already accepted by refusing to take the steps necessary to carry them out. That, of course, brings me to the whole question, the other side of the coin, the question of national defence policy itself.
Mr. Chairman, as I said at the beginning this is an unusual discussion of defence policy. It is confined to these two days, and we are asked to cover the whole field of foreign affairs and defence in these two days at the end of which, because of the nature of the discussion, there will be no motion possible which could be moved in order to test the feeling of the house in respect to any particular subject of external affairs or defence. It seems to me this kind of debate on these two matters, after we have been so long prevented from debating them at all, since last September, is an evasion of responsibility for providing a more meaningful discussion of such a vital matter.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Lester Bowles Pearson: In the five years since the present government took over I doubt if there is any parliament or legislative assembly in the democratic world which has had less discussion of, or less information submitted to it on, defence policy than has this parliament and the previous parliament. If you compare the discussions in congress, in Westminster and in Paris you will know what I mean.
We have had no adequate statements in recent months by government spokesmen on defence policy. Perhaps the reason for that may be differences of opinion inside the government. A house divided is not likely to welcome people to come inside. We have had no committee of the house set up on defence policy, although the request for such a committee has been made in this house more than once. We have had no realistic and responsibile statements from the government, especially since this parliament met, on this most vital of all matters, vital because it concerns peace and war. We on this side have pleaded for a defence policy committee to be set up, and other opposition parties have joined in that request.
I know, as the Prime Minister has already pointed out, that normally after a government has made up its mind on these matters, parliament agrees on them by parliamentary discussion. But in the circumstances of today and because of the situation in which we now find ourselves in view of what has happened

during the last five years, things are not normal; and certainly it would be desirable, even now, to set up a small committee on defence policy which could call witnesses, get information and discuss this question, so that we could see how much agreement we could reach on it.
That has not been done. It presumably is not going to be done as long as the present government is in power. But at least as a substitute for a defence policy committee we might have had from the Minister of National Defence, before this discussion took place, some kind of white paper on defence which would put forward the policy of the government in these matters. Not only have we not had that, but so far in this debate we have not had a single statement from any member of the government side on defence, not a word. It remains for the three opposition parties to declare their position and their views on defence policy in the absence of any statement from the Prime Minister or any member of the government on that policy. This to say the least, Mr. Chairman, is a reversal of the usual and accepted democratic parliamentary practice.
Any opposition, of course, is at a disadvantage in discussing defence matters because only the government has all the information which can be used as the basis for defence policy. Although a lot of that information cannot be made public in parliament, surely the government has an obligation to make a statement based on the information which it has, and some of which it should make public before there is a debate in the House of Commons on defence policy. Surely it was essential for some government spokesman to have made a full and frank statement on defence policy yesterday. Perhaps they will do so today, Mr. Chairman.
We all know that the only sure and enduring basis for defence, that aspect of defence policy which makes most sense, is ways and means of keeping the peace. We all know now that no country, however powerful, and no agglomeration of countries, however powerful, can win an all-out nuclear war. Indeed, we are told by experts that it is impossible to even wage one. This makes it more necessary than ever to prevent one.
As part of this process in the world in which we live we have to have a defensive force, a deterrent force if you like, including a nuclear deterrent force. This deterrent force is required to preserve the peace until we reach a state of affairs where the foundation of peace will be stronger even than that of force. I pay tribute to the sincerity and the work of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in his efforts, with others, to try to

find that kind of foundation. I accept that position, as I am sure do most hon. members, if not all, in this house. The only sincere alternative to the acceptance of this position is one of neutralism or pacifism. These can be very honest alternatives, though I believe they are misguided, unwise and dangerous, and I can see no safety in them.
Today, then, defence policy is based, as I have already indicated, more on the interdependence than the independence of nations. We know that no country can defend itself alone. We know that the only security, especially for a country like Canada, lies in collective action through a defensive alliance such as NATO, which rests, or should rest, so far as its military side is concerned, on a pooling of strength to which every member of the alliance makes its contribution. Collective defence of this kind is based on treaties, on arrangements, on pledges, on obligations undertaken, on commitments given among the member states, as well as commitments and pledges made by the member states to their own people.
When dealing with our friends inside an alliance we assume that pledges made will be kept, that commitments undertaken will be carried out. We also assume that a change of government will not necessarily mean a sudden and unilateral renunciation of defence obligations or military pledges which have been made. If we assume that, our friends have the same right to assume that the pledges of the Canadian government are the pledges of the nation; that they will not automatically disappear with a change of government; that they will be changed only by agreement, when they affect other members of the coalition; and that until changes are made by agreement, they will be honoured.
To find the best defence policy for Canada- and I cheerfully admit this-would be a difficult enough problem in any circumstances and for any government. But it has been confused and indeed complicated by the controversy over one aspect of this policy. It has been confused and complicated by other things, but I am now going to refer to only one subject of confusion and complication. That is, whether to use or not to use nuclear weapons of any kind and, if they are to be used, whether they should be under national, joint, or collective control; and, indeed, who should have the custody of them inside a coalition.
As was pointed out by my hon. friend from Red Deer last evening, the use of these weapons-and this has been pointed out by others also-has been made into a moral question. That, of course, makes explanation difficult because it arouses strong emotions, 27507-3-1974
Supply-External Affairs understandable strong emotions, which are concerned not only with human behaviour but with the very survival of mankind, because of what these particular weapons can do. Whether Canada in present circumstances uses defensive tactical nuclear weapons or not-and they are the only ones in question; no one suggests for a minute that we should take part in the strategic retaliatory nuclear deterrent in an active way-this question cannot, in my view, be decided on moral grounds without hypocrisy on our part unless we follow through on that decision with other decisions which logically flow from it. As a member of the NATO coalition we accept the nuclear deterrent in the hands of the United States as essential for defence, and we supply much of the uranium which goes into United States nuclear bombs. Therefore to say that on moral grounds we shall not accept any nuclear weapons in any circumstances is dishonest and hypocritical unless at the same time we are willing to withdraw from NATO or refuse to export to anyone uranium for military defence purposes.
The fact is, of course, that the argument for or against nuclear weapons for Canada is a political and military one, not a moral one. In saying that I am not ignoring the fact that there are moral considerations involved and that this weapon does not involve for many people a moral problem. It certainly does, but the moral problem, in my view, is concerned not with the weapon itself but with the use of the weapon; certainly not with the kind of weapon we are discussing at this time as part of the defence policy of Canada. The moral problem is concerned not so much with the weapon as with war itself, which is the basic and ultimate immorality.
As I see it, the question we have to ask ourselves is, how can Canada make her most effective military contribution to the preservation of peace and the prevention of war in co-operation with her allies-because I believe in the alliance-and how can we ensure that commitments once undertaken, pledges once given for this purpose by us in agreement with our allies can effectively be carried out until they are changed.
In dealing with this aspect of defence, the military aspect, I am aware that I am dealing with only one phase of this question. Perhaps 50 years ago if we had talked about defence in this house or in any other place we would have been talking only of the military aspect. That was defence. But there are certainly other aspects of defence now, as I mentioned a few moments ago. There is the political and diplomatic aspect; and when the Secretary of State for External

Supply-*External Affairs Affairs works for disarmament he works for defence. His work and the work of other Canadians at the United Nations over the years to further the cause of disarmament and to remove tension and fear between peoples is defence work.
There is also the economic aspect of defence. Trade, as often in the past and now, can cause conflict which could lead to trouble; therefore the economic aspect of defence consists of doing what we can in the countries of the world and especially in our own country to remove obstructions to international trade; and, what is perhaps of even more importance, providing economic assistance to materially underdeveloped countries. Because, as was pointed out by the hon. member for BurnaLy-Coquitlam last night, we may find that if we cannot make some progress on that front, then nuclear bombs, Bomarcs, air bases and all the rest will not amount to very much in the light of even more explosive problems of ignorance, overpopulation, fear, hunger and unsatisfied legitimate desires among the emerging hundreds of millions in Asia and Africa. So economics is an aspect of defence.
There is also the ideological aspect of defence, how we can strengthen the forces of freedom and the values and ideals which should flow from freedom. I suggest that in this other aspect of defence we must try in a non-military way to remove the tensions which bring fear, conflict and war and which divide us in this small world from those we fear.
All these things, of course, do not form the major subject of discussion in this particular debate, because we shall not have time to go into these other aspects of defence. Therefore I ask, on the military defence side, what is the situation in Canada especially as it concerns nuclear weapons? Well, we know a good deal more about this now than we did, say, a year ago, not because of statements made in the House of Commons but because of information which we have been able to secure outside the House of Commons and by reading the proceedings of the subcommittees of congressional committees on defence in Washington and by reading blue books which emerge from the United Kingdom House of Commons; also, of course, by some of the things which have been said in this house and outside in Canada.
In 1959 the Canadian government-I do not think this will be disputed, but I could produce lots of evidence to support this contention if it were-agreed that the role of our overseas air division in NATO, a role which from a military point of view is undoubtedly our most important contribution

to NATO, should be changed to the very important one of strike reconnaissance from high level interception. The Liberal opposition in parliament at that time, back in 1959, opposed this new and changed commitment for that air division, and we gave in some detail the reasons why we thought this was the wrong kind of role to be undertaken and why we thought it should not be accepted or, if accepted, why it should be changed before it became too difficult to change it. Nevertheless that role was undertaken, and after four years-I remind hon. members of the New Democratic party of this-after four years, because it takes that long, the equipment to discharge the role is now being delivered. I think the first planes were delivered last October for the first squadron which is to be converted to undertake the new role. The aircraft for this purpose are American Star-fighters, now CF-104's in the R.C.A.F. We are informed that one R.C.A.F. squadron will be in a position to go on alert by the end of April and the others in the weeks following. So the whole division will, at the present rate of progress, be equipped within a few months.
Now, in order to accomplish effectively the role which this division has undertaken, these planes are designed-and this was understood when the order was placed-to be armed with rockets which would have nuclear warheads. We know they cannot operate effectively to do the job which has been entrusted to them without such warheads. The government, however, having committed the taxpayers to the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars on these planes-the figure which has been given is half a billion dollars-has not made up its mind even yet whether to accept the warheads or not.
It has not even made the political agreement with the United States which is essential before the nuclear warheads could be made available if it were decided later to accept and use them. That agreement will certainly take some time to negotiate, as will the training of our airmen in the use of the weapons. According to the former NATO commander it will take from three months to six months. However, nothing has been done one way or the other. No decision has been made. I say that this has now become an intolerable situation, and that the result is now a serious gap in the defence arrangements of the NATO alliance. We said that we would assume a particular responsibility in that defence. In fact we are not doing so and no one else in the coalition can now do so, because we said we would do the job and we are supposed to be taking it on.

Similarly our NATO ground forces are being equipped, if they have not already been completely equipped, with United States Honest John artillery rockets designed to carry nuclear warheads, but the government has taken no decision to secure the warheads even though our ground forces are expected to use them for defence against attack, and everybody knows that fact. At home there are the United States Bomarc missiles, ground to air, which are in the same state of impotence or, if you like, suspended animation. I may say they certainly created a good deal of political animation. The government must have decided back in 1959 that the two Bomarc bases on Canadian soil were important links in the continental defence chain. Again we Liberals at the time thought they were wrong in this matter. We opposed the decision, but it was made by the government for Canada; and the missiles have now been delivered at the expense of the U.S.A. Whatever may be their value a year or so from now, we know they are completely useless now without nuclear warheads. We know that these warheads cannot be secured at once and used at once in an emergency. Plans must be made in advance and agreements must be reached with the United States in advance.
Our Bomarc missiles, for instance, stood inert and useless in the alert during the Cuban crisis. They might as well have not been there. That crisis also showed how absurd it is to think that a decision could be made and quick, effective action taken after the emergency developed. Yet we were told not long ago that this could be done. Similarly our CF-101 aircraft, again a U.S. plane, the Voodoo, to be completely effective as interceptor fighters even for the diminishing continental defence role which they have been asked to perform but which the military experts say is still of some importance, are designed to use nuclear weapons in the interception of attackers. It is also ridiculous to think that we can reserve the decision to get them, and have them ready for use, until after the emergency develops.
In short, both in NATO and in continental defence the Canadian government has made certain defence pledges and has accepted certain defence commitments on behalf of Canada which can only be carried out by Canadian forces if nuclear warheads are used. The government and nobody else made these commitments. Since then, however, the government has refused to make the decision either to alter the commitments or to accept the means to carry them out. Alteration, of course, is not so simple and so easy as it would have been a year or two ago. It takes years, as I have just indicated
Supply-External Affairs in connection with the air division, to implement major changes in defence policy and commitments. I say that it is humiliating and dishonourable for Canada to make pledges and accept commitments and then refuse to discharge them or put our men in a position to discharge them if they were called upon to do so in an emergency. Canada cannot maintain a position of respect and influence in the world on any such basis.
What then should the government do? It should act in order to ensure that the commitments accepted by Canada with her allies will be discharged by Canada as long as they exist. We have taken our place in a sector of the defence line. Canadians have done that previously in our history. We must be prepared to do the job in that sector until we agree to do something else. As a lady delegate, according to the press, reported to the recent Conservative convention, and I think her words bear repeating, the situation is this. I may say that this was not during one of the breakfast meetings nor indeed during one of the barbershop quartet meetings. This was at the meeting which discussed defence and nuclear warheads. This lady delegate is reported to have put the matter in this way, "We have contracted. We have this by agreement. We promised. We have no choice now whatsoever".
An hor.. Member: What did Mrs. Pearson
say?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I will get to that, too. Up to a year or so ago the government had some room for manoeuvring in this matter. Until the equipment had been delivered we could have changed the commitment without the difficulty or delay that is now inevitable. We on this side of the house thought that change should have been made to a better role, and we said so inside and outside the house. But now the rockets are with the batteries, but without ammunition. The planes are with the squadrons, but without the armament which they are supposed to have. Hence it is more difficult to make changes, and it will take longer. Meanwhile do we do nothing in respect of the commitments undertaken, as I understand would be the position of my hon. friends of the New Democratic party?
The Minister of National Defence in the House of Commons on March 20, 1962 as found at page 2012 of Hansard, stated as follows:
As the 104's have only begun to come off the production line and we are just setting up training facilities to train the crews to operate them, they will not be going into operation for a year and, as I said several times before, the matter of securing armaments for them is not an urgent matter at this time.

Supply-External Affairs
It is an urgent matter now because the planes are there and the crews are with them, and if they are to be trained they should begin to be trained now with the equipment necessary for them to do the job they were asked to do. Policy now has been translated into arms, into equipment and into organization. Surely it is idle to argue, Mr. Chairman, that you can go on shilly-shallying on this matter, that we need do nothing now because changes are taking place all over the place in defence strategy and in defence tactics. Of course they are, and they will continue to take place. That is only an argument for not doing anything at any time.
The cancellation of the Skybolt by the U.S.A. for the United Kingdom, for instance, has nothing whatever to do with this Canadian problem. The British ordered this nuclear missile from the United States. The United States stopped production of the Skybolt, which was to take the place of the Blue Streak. Then the United States offered the British, in place of the Skybolt which had taken the place of the Blue Streak, another American nuclear missile, the Polaris. To make that a situation which is the same as that with which we are faced, when we have taken on a certain job which can only be done by one particular missile at this time, when the government refuses to change the job or take the missile or get a substitute for it-surely to relate this problem to that which the United Kingdom government has and to which the Prime Minister has referred does not make any sense at all.
There is no parallel here, no excuse for inaction any more than there is in the Nassau communique which refers to discussions about a NATO nuclear deterrent force. The Prime Minister has said that this is something new, this is a new situation, this is a change, this is an important development, and we must hold back and see how it works itself out. Mr. Chairman, these discussions with regard to a NATO nuclear deterrent were first referred to in the House of Commons by spokesmen of the government back in the autumn of 1957 or the beginning of 1958, because it was at the NATO council meeting in Paris in the autumn of 1957 that the decision was taken regarding nuclear weapons for NATO even if that decision has not yet been fully implemented. Discussions have been going on for years and they will probably go on for many, many months before the NATO council and the NATO governments are able to work out a satisfactory collective nuclear deterrent; to use this as an excuse for inaction in carrying out now the pledges we have under-

taken with respect to making equipment available to do that does not, I repeat, make any sense.
It was because of the changing and shifting situation respecting nuclear equipment that we on this side four years ago opposed the taking on of commitments that required this kind of equipment which could only come from the United States. But the government brushed aside our objections and our doubts. So now let them carry through, or propose some other course which would be an effective one for Canada and agree on it with our allies. Meanwhile let us keep our pledged word.
The government, I repeat, should end at once its evasion of responsibility by discharging the commitments it has accepted for Canada and, as it happens, it can only do this now by accepting nuclear warheads for certain defensive tactical weapons, which cannot effectively be used without those warheads. An agreement with the United States for this purpose would have to be negotiated, presumably one similar to those signed by the United States government with the United Kingdom and other NATO countries to provide for joint control of the use of the weapons, if and when they are accepted. As I have said before, in such an agreement it is true that a United States finger would be on the trigger but a Canadian finger would be on the safety catch, and when we get a genuine NATO nuclear deterrent there will be other fingers as well on each safety catch.
The government position remains, however, that no decision need be made, that no action need be taken, a position which, of course, one might expect from this government. We can wait to see how the disarmament discussions get along or until an emergency develops or until something else happens. That is merely getting the worst of both worlds.
There are those who argue-I have no doubt we will hear this argument from the government side; we have already heard it from some members of the New Democratic party, and it has been referred to by the leader of the Social Credit party-that we have no nuclear commitments, that we have made no pledges to ourselves in Canada or to our allies which require the use of any kind of nuclear warhead. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that this is the crux of the whole question. Therefore I should put on the record the evidence which justifies the stand we have taken on this matter. The evidence surely shows how wrong that attitude is, and of this there is no shadow of doubt, no possible, probable shadow of doubt.

Let us look at the commitment or pledge. Let us go back to February 20, 1959, nearly four years ago. As found on page 1223 of Hansard the Prime Minister said this then in talking about these new weapons:
The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads.
This is back in 1959.
The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada and the storage of warheads in Canada.
That was February 20, 1959.


An hon. Member:: That is not a commitment.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On March 10, 1959, as found on page 1775 of Hansard, this appears:
The government does not anticipate concluding a formal agreement with the United States government on the acquisition of nuclear warheads in the immediate future.
Naturally he was asked why, and he answered the question by saying:
-it would be some time before nuclear weapons would and indeed could be made available for use by Canadian forces.
In other words, when the weapons were made available or could be made available to Canadian forces, an agreement would then be concluded.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Well, if language has any meaning that is the only interpretation you can give it.


An hon. Member:: Case dismissed.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I will prove that is correct by quoting the then minister of national defence, General Pearkes, who followed this up on July 2, 1959, by saying, as found on page 5393 of Hansard:
-it is government policy that Canadian troops should be armed as efficiently and as effectively as are troops with which they are co-operating.
Then he added that negotiations were going on with the United States to make this possible. These were the negotiations that the Prime Minister talked about to make possible the acquisition of nuclear warheads for this equipment. Then General Pearkes, the minister of national defence at that time, went on to say:
-in order to arrange the details of the storing of and equipping our forces with nuclear weapons as and when they would be available and as and when we would have the weapons to launch them.
That was the purpose of the negotiations. On July 3, the very next day, the then minister of national defence said that these
Supply-External Affairs negotiations, and I quote from pages 5414 and 5415 of Hansard, "are fast reaching a stage when there can be an exchange of notes on this matter". This was in July, 1959. What were the Canadian people entitled to draw from that kind of statement by the minister of national defence?


An hon. Member:: A very weak statement.


Lester Bowles Pearson: It certainly was a weak statement, as it turned out, because that was four years ago and nothing has been done about it. In the same statement the minister said in the house:
I presume that eventually the Canadian forces will be equipped with atomic weapons.
Well, when is eventually? Obviously, Mr. Chairman, at the latest it should have been when the equipment, the 'planes and missiles were delivered and the commitment had by that delivery become effective. This has now happened. Later, in confirmation of this point of view, on July 22, 1959 the defence minister in an interview over the C.B.C. admitted this. He is talking now about the air division in France:
The problem will arise when our squadrons are re-equipped with the F-104G's and then armed with nuclear weapons.
I do not need to quote the position of the present Minister of National Defence on this matter because it is well known, and within the limits of cabinet propriety it has been quite consistent. All this, from the highest sources of the Canadian government, confirms what the Canadian and NATO military chiefs have known and have said; that there was indeed a nuclear commitment, both to the people of Canada and to our allies. Our allies certainly understood this to be the case. This was confirmed only Monday last by the minister of defence in answer to a question which appears at page 2920 of Hansard for that date. I will read the question: "When the government selected the Bomarc, the CF-104, the Honest John rocket and the CF-101B, was it aware that-" was the Canadian government aware- "maximum efficiency of these weapons depended on the use of nuclear armament"? The answer was, and I am sure these words were very carefully chosen:
The government was aware that in each instance these weapon systems would reach their maximum effectiveness when armed with nuclear warheads or weapons.
Surely our government does not wish to equip our troops with weapons which cannot reach their maximum effectiveness. Then the other question was, prior to acquiring these weapons did the government indicate to the United States or to NORAD or to its
3120	HOUSE OF
Supply-External Affairs NATO allies or to NATO headquarters that it was or that it might be unwilling to accept nuclear arms? The answer was a short and categorical one, very much to the point. The answer was "No".
So much for the pledges made, the statements made and the commitments undertaken by the government, in statements in this house and outside this house. What are the commitments as understood by our allies? Last night the leader of the Social Credit group in this house said he did not know, and it was very difficult for him to make up his mind until he knew what the commitments were. I hope by now he is a little clearer in his mind in so far as statements made in parliament to the Canadian people are concerned. Let us look at the other side of the question. Was it understood by our allies that we were taking on this job?
There is no one, Mr. Chairman, who has a better right, a more respected right to speak about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on the military side, the strategic side, than the former commander of that alliance, General Norstad. He was the commander of the NATO forces in Europe and, as I said last night, as such he was not the servant of any one government, he was the servant of all the member governments of NATO. He conducted himself properly as such while he held that command. Tribute has been paid to him by the member governments for doing so. He was not only a United States military man, he was a NATO military man, a NATO statesman and a NATO diplomat. He was the representative of all the government members of NATO. It does not seem to me to add anything to the dignity of this discussion when he is referred to, as he was by the new president of the national Conservative association, as merely a retired American general; or, according to one report when he came to Ottawa the other day, as merely an American tourist whose views are not any more important than those of any other American tourist.


An hon. Member:: Are you trying to get him on the active list again?


Lester Bowles Pearson: It is very easy for my hon. friends opposite to depreciate a man whose views they accepted when he was the commander of NATO. There was not one word of criticism ever directed at him when he had this position, but when he came to Canada on a farewell visit and incidentally gave his views as a servant of Canada and when, unfortunately, he was not received by the Prime Minister but made a voluntary statement at a press conference arranged for


him at which the Associate Minister of National Defence was present, when he answered questions honestly and frankly about what we had in the way of a military commitment to NATO, when those answers did not seem to fit in with the views, prejudices, policies or desires of hon. members opposite or hon. members of the other two opposition parties, then they proceed to denigrate him, try to tear him down.
At one o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at 2.30 p.m.
Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, before the luncheon recess I was discussing the nature of the pledges we have made on this question of nuclear weapons, the evidence to support the fact that we have undertaken certain commitments, and I had reached the point where I wished to produce some evidence, not from statements of members of the government in this house but evidence from persons outside the house concerned with the military policy of the alliance, persons who would have no axe to grind in this matter and who would presumably have the expert knowledge on which to base their information.
As I have said, this question of commitments is the crux of the situation, and I am sure the government will appreciate that because the Prime Minister has already reminded us in the house that we have made certain commitments, for instance the sale of wheat to communist China, and that we are the kind of people who honour our commitments.
At the press conference with General Norstad there was in attendance, as I mentioned this morning, the Associate Minister of National Defence, and if any of the information given by the general, who was retiring from his position as NATO commander, was inaccurate in any respect there was an opportunity for the Associate Minister of National Defence to correct the record and make sure no wrong impressions had been created. As a matter of fact I believe the general at one stage of the press conference did refer to the fact that this was a question that should be answered by a government representative.
I have before me a verbatim record of that press conference. There was nothing General Norstad said at that time that was new. It was merely confirming what had been said in the House of Commons by the opposition and by Canadian military chiefs outside the House

of Commons, but it was impressive in its confirmation of these earlier statements. At one point in the press conference, talking about Canada's commitments which was the question that had been addressed to him, the former NATO commander said this:
Canada has met those commitments in numbers and in general in quality during the entire life of the alliance.
I think that is true, except perhaps one could question whether we had met our full commitment on land, which I believe is a brigade group in Europe, and that the other components of a division in Canada be equipped and ready to join that brigade group in Europe as a Canadian division. But apart from that possible difficulty the general said we have met our commitments in numbers and, in general, in quality during the entire life of the alliance. Canada had been really outstanding in meeting its military commitments in that sense. Then the question was asked:
Q. General, do you consider that Canada has committed itself to provide its Starfighter squadrons in Europe with tactical nuclear weapons?
A. My answer to that is yes.
That is categorical and unequivocal enough. The general went on in replying to another question to say:
We established a NATO requirement for a certain number of strike squadrons. This includes tactical atomic strike squadrons and Canada committed some of its force to meet this NATO established requirement. And this we depend on.
Incidentally General Norstad added, "Again, we depend on it particularly because of the quality of that air division". Then another question was:
Does it mean, sir, that if Canada does not accept nuclear weapons for these aeroplanes that she is not actually fulfilling her NATO commitments?
The answer was:
I believe that's right. She would be meeting it in force but not under the terms of the requirements that have been established by NATO.
Then another question was asked:
General, did you say that you believe that Canada has committed this Starfighter group to tactical weapons? A. No doubt-I know that they have committed the Starfighters, yes.
Then in reply to a question dealing with the political arrangements which would be required in order to make possible political agreement with the United States in order to make it possible for Canadian forces to accept or use these weapons, and to the possibility of this resulting in a proliferation of nuclear weapons, the general had this to say:
There is no proliferation so far as control is concerned, because these weapons are held in the hands of the country of their source until they are actually used. But they can be made available fust as fast to a French squadron, to a Belgian 27507-3-198
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The questioner interjected:
Yes, but subject to bilateral agreement...
And the general replied:
Yes, this is subject to bilateral agreement.
Q. Would the crews be trained to use the atomic weapons?
A. Under the bilateral agreement, yes. It does take a bilateral agreement because under the American atomic energy law, if there is a bilateral agreement between two countries concerned then the information can be made available which will permit the training with these weapons and this is being done with almost all the countries of the alliance at the present time.
Then there was this question:
Q. Lacking a bilateral agreement, how long does it take to train crews?
A. You can't train them without a bilateral agreement.
Q. What I mean is, after you get such an agreement, how long would it take?
The general said:
-I think it's about six months, isn't it; three to six months minimum?
Then Air Marshal Miller, who was there, said:
Yes, but it could be done under six months.
Then General Norstad said:
It takes some time; it takes a considerable period of time.
He went on to explain, in answer to another question, that the Canadian crews have not had this training before because in earlier days the 'planes were not available, but that now the 'planes were available and they were there. Then the question was asked: With how many countries, sir, does the U.S. have such bilateral agreements for nuclear weapons?
General Norstad said:
Essentially all the countries. I can't give you the exact number; essentially all of them.
Then the question was asked:
Could you say, that the forces of what countries are actually in a position to acquire nuclear weapons immediately now in the NATO force?
General Norstad answered:
Almost all of them.
Then the question was asked:
But where are the weapons physically, are the-
Then he said this:
This is a question I cannot answer.
The question went on:
Does this mean that the Canadian forces are the only ones in the alliance that-
General Norstad broke in:
No, not the only ones. This has really not been a problem with the Canadians in the alliance up to this time. And will not become a problem until the equipment is changed.

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Well, Mr. Chairman, the equipment has been changed and airplanes have been delivered. Then questioner went on:
Or until a bilateral agreement is signed?
A. Yes. But a bilateral agreement becomes important when the new equipment comes into the air division.
Then he added this:
I advocate the signing of the bilateral agreement because this is the only way in which you can be fully trained.
Q. When do you believe the lack of a bilateral agreement would become a problem of creating a weakness to NATO?
"A problem of creating a weakness to NATO"-and if any man was qualified to discuss the strength and weaknesses of NATO, it was General Norstad. His answer was this:
I think that it is desirable to take whatever action is necessary now, bilateral or anything else, so that the ground and air forces of Canada, which are deployed in Europe, could be used promptly with full effectiveness and I think this is important now.
Then once again the general tried to get the questioners off this question of nuclear weapons. There were questions on other subjects, but I would just like to put on the record of Hansard what the general said in winding up this press conference. He was talking about a NATO nuclear deterrent and how control would be exercised if such a deterrent force was created. He thought it should be brought under the authority of the alliance and he said:
I personally favour the authority being the authority of the alliance to the largest possible extent, and that those weapons which are developed, designed and deployed for the purpose of defending Europe, should be really controlled by the authorities, political and military, who are charged with that particular responsibility. I would like to see this within the NATO concept because I think this reduces the danger of proliferation. I think this would be satisfactory to the largest number of countries.
Mr. Chairman, I think that puts on the record the evidence given in this house which supports the view that a pledge was made to the Canadian people, and the evidence given outside this house which supports the view that the pledge was understood to be such by those who were responsible for the military side of the North Atlantic treaty alliance. Now may I, before putting forward in conclusion our own policies on defence generally, including this matter-and I can do that, I hope, very briefly-refer to what I believe to be the policy of the other two opposition parties in this matter.
The policy of the New Democratic party, as it was expressed last evening by the leader of that party, is "no nuclear weapons of any kind, in any circumstances, under any

form of control, for Canada". I think that is a fair statement of the case. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is clear not only from the statement made last evening but also, of course, from the resolutions adopted by the founding convention of that party from July 31 to August 4, 1961, because those resolutions included the following:
The New Democratic party believes that we should seek a reappraisal and change of NATO's policies and objectives.
I do not think anyone can quarrel with that. Then there was this resolution:
The New Democratic party believes that the extension of nuclear weapons to any further states and alliances threatens disaster to the world. It therefore opposes Canada's troops being supplied with such weapons at home or abroad. At present,-
I underline these words:
*-except for those nations which have independently developed atomic capacity neither NATO itself nor its members individually possess or control nuclear warheads. Should they do so, Canada must make it clear that it cannot remain in the alliance.
Those words mean, if they mean anything at all, that if there is a NATO nuclear deterrent, where the authority and control of the nuclear deterrent force would be taken out of the hands of an individual member of the alliance and put under the authority of NATO itself through a mechanism devised by the NATO council-that is, a genuine collective deterrent with nuclear defensive, tactical weapons-the New Democratic party advocate that we withdraw from the NATO alliance. Well, Mr. Chairman, we on this side of the house do not accept that position. I say with great sincerity that, while I appreciate the sincerity of hon. members of the other party who support this view, I do not believe that such a withdrawal by Canada from the alliance, in the circumstances of there being a collective nuclear, tactical deterrent under NATO, would add anything to peace or security in the world. I think it would weaken peace and security in the world. Then the resolution goes on:
To relieve tensions, Canada should press for a demilitarized zone in central Europe and-
Listen to this. I mentioned this earlier in my speech:
-for the simultaneous disbandment of the Warsaw and NATO pacts.
That puts the two pacts, presumably, on the same level of interest and importance in so far as the preservation of peace and security is concerned, and suggests that if we withdrew from both of them the balance would be maintained. I do not agree with that, Mr. Chairman. Perhaps I should add that one New Democratic party spokesman, the hon. member for York South, in explaining the policy of his party the other evening

in Toronto, and incidentally in confirming the view that the Tory government did in fact take on a nuclear commitment as far back as 1959, made a statement about Liberal party policy which is completely false when he said on January 5 as reported in the press:
The agreement on Bomarcs was negotiated with the United States by a Liberal government when the present Leader of the Opposition ... was our minister of external affairs.
Mr. Chairman, there was no negotiation of such an agreement by the previous government. I doubt if there was even at that time such a thing as the Bomarc B, which is the weapon we now have. It was under development at that time. So far as the position of the Social Credit party is concerned, the leader of that party made a strong plea for leadership, direction and decisiveness and said that all parties should at least take a stand on this matter so that people would know where they stood. He was complaining that we on this side were not definite. But the hon. member did not do very much in his statement last night, or in his broadcast the night before, or in the other statements which have appeared in the press in the last week or two, to clear up the ambiguities in the position taken by his own party on this important matter.
He is reported as having said on January 14 in Hong Kong that there is no need for nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. Nevertheless, he is reported as having said in Vancouver on January 16:
If acquisition of nuclear warheads by Canadian forces abroad means co-operation with NATO, then Canada should co-operate.
He is also reported as having said about the same time in Alberta that Americans should be permitted to make Canada their nuclear arsenal in case of war but that Canadian forces should not have such weapons. He said:
Nuclear weapons should be available to be brought to Canada in the event of a nuclear war and if that happened Canada should become the "arsenal" of the United States.
Meanwhile Social Credit does not favour extending the "nuclear club" but the party does think Canada should keep her NATO commitments even if it means equipping Canadian forces overseas with nuclear power.
I mention these things because we were reproved last night by the hon. gentleman for not being very decisive and clearcut in our statements. I must admit that the coleader of that party has been clearcut in his statement as reported in Le Devoir. He stated categorically that he opposes Canadian acquisition or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances. Then, according to the reports, he went on to say that Canada should be like Ireland and Switzerland.
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I want to conclude by putting forward the principles of a Liberal policy on defence and, indeed, in respect of this particular problem which we are discussing as part or our defence. In our approach to this matter we should try, and, indeed, I try, to avoid the thinking of both those who say "I made up my mind years ago and I see no reason to change it" and of those who say "I refused to make up my mind years ago and I see no reason to do so now." The Liberal party defence program put forward before the last election and made public on April 13, 1962 included this paragraph:
Defence policy cannot be fixed for all time. Decisions must be made in the light of changing circumstances as they become known. There must be decisiveness in doing what is necessary when it is necessary. On the basis of present knowledge, the defence policy of a new Liberal government will not require Canada to become a nuclear power by the manufacture, the acquisition or the use of nuclear weapons under Canadian or American control.
Note-"under Canadian or American control". That is, national control. And indeed, the political agreement we would make and, I assume, any political agreement which the United States government would make on this matter, would not provide for national control but would provide for joint control, both sides having a veto of the use of these weapons. The statement goes on:
A new Liberal government will, however, examine each situation in the light of the overriding responsibility for the security of the Canadian people.
Then we included this paragraph:
If the members of NATO make an agreement for a NATO nuclear deterrent under NATO collective rather than national control, then Canadian forces in NATO should not be prevented from participating in this agreement by acquiring the necessary NATO tactical and defensive nuclear weapons.
That is a statement made on the eve of the last election and it is on the record.
What will we do now? There is nothing in what we put forward now which contradicts that statement. In addition, a new Liberal government would make a complete and thorough review of our whole defence policy, which is something far beyond the use of nuclear weapons alone. We would carry out a review of our old defence policy as part of continental and collective defence which is today, I realize, more for defence through prevention than defence through protection. In this re-examination, one which cannot, of course, be concluded overnight and one which would require full consultation with our NATO allies, we should seek a defence role for our country which would be more appropriate for us than our present one and

Supply-External Affairs which would enable us to make a more effective contribution to collective security, to our own defence and to defence of peace.
The basic principles underlying such a new defence policy-and I do not mind thinking about basic principles in this debate; in that respect, perhaps, I differ from the advice given by the Prime Minister to a Conservative meeting last week-the basic principles underlying this new defence policy by which we would be guided would be as follows- I ask the indulgence of the committee while I put them on record.
1.	Defence policy must be part of our foreign policy as well as of that of our allies as long as we remain in a coalition which is directed toward the establishment of a constructive and enduring peace based on disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, on co-operation between all nations and on the promotion of freedom and human welfare everywhere.
2.	It follows that Canada's defence policy must not hinder or minimize Canada's influence at the United Nations and in the councils of the world in the efforts to realize these political objectives.
3.	We must take whatever steps are feasible for the protection of our territory through suitable measures for that purpose. Defence measures for our own territory must also be related to our international commitments for collective security. They must be determined by the circumstances of today, not of yesterday. Protection which is effective only against dangers that have disappeared is merely a waste of money, resources and effort.
4.	Canada's defence policy must be geared to its industrial resources, which means that Canadian defence equipment should be manufactured in Canada to the maximum possible extent. This would have a bearing on the kind of defence policies we adopt. As a member of a coalition which is supposed to operate on the principle of the most efficient and coordinated use of our collective defence resources and on the standardization of arms and equipment we in Canada should concentrate on doing the things that are strategically, industrially and politically best and most appropriate for our country.
Our financial resources are, of course, limited and therefore we should be careful to see that our defence dollars are spent sensibly and economically, avoiding commitments which require expensive equipment, equipment which is, or soon will be, obsolete, and activities which are, or soon will be, meaningless.
5.	Canada must continue the closest possible co-operation with the United States and all our friends in NATO-and that includes the

United States. She must do nothing to weaken NATO collective policy and action, while insisting that this requires the closest and most continual consultation between partners that is possible. Otherwise, as I tried to point out earlier today, the defence coalition will not survive and the defence policies of its members will go their separate ways along with their foreign policies.
6.	Canada's defence forces, whether stationed in this country or in Europe, should be so organized, trained and equipped as to be able to intervene wherever and whenever required for United Nations, NATO or Canadian territorial operations. We should be especially ready and willing to take part in United Nations peace preserving operations. That will require quite a change in our present defence policies. That means that it must be the first essential of Canadian defence policy to give our forces maximum mobility, especially through the provision of adequate air transport.


An hon. Member:: That is a change from 1939.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes. Many things have changed since 1939.
7.	The three Canadian defence services should be fully integrated with maximum efficiency and economy both in operation and administration and the necessary changes to that end should be made at the Department of National Defence.
8.	Canada should not contribute to the strategic nuclear deterrent, which is very much different from the tactical deterrent, except-and this is important-in early warning devices to protect that deterrent from destruction.


An hon. Member:: Bird watching.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I heard one of my hon. friends opposite mention bird watching. They have produced now a defence policy which has accepted equipment which is not even designed for that purpose; and then they refuse to follow through on the necessary steps to make it do the job which it was designated to do.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: A bird's nest policy.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Finally, I would repeat in a few words our position with regard to tactical and defensive nuclear weapons, a matter which is very controversial and which is only one aspect of defence policy. Like everybody else in this chamber I hate nuclear weapons as much as I loathe the necessity for having them at all and the possibility that weapons of any kind may have to be used in a nuclear war. Their complete abolition by international agreement should be a

second priority in disarmament negotiations. The first is the end of nuclear testing. Meanwhile, as I stated earlier today, I accept the necessity, as does our party, of the nuclear deterrent. As long as the government could change its defence pledges which required nuclear warheads, we on this side advocated that change. The government ignored our arguments. It went right ahead. Now the pledges must be implemented as long as they exist. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, a Liberal government would honour those pledges made by its predecessor for Canada in agreement with our allies as long as they exist, until they were changed. That means that we would put Canada's armed services now in a position to do the job we had entrusted to them by the role which we had undertaken and which in certain cases requires at this time the use of tactical and defensive nuclear weapons. As I see it, that would be the only honourable course for the new government representing the Canadian people. Any other course would betray our trust, weaken Canada's reputation for living up to its word, and deceive our own people with regard to pledges we had undertaken. I therefore repeat that, while keeping our pledges, we would seek a better and more effective defence role for Canada in the alliance, knowing that while this is necessary -and it will now take time-it is also necessary to honour the pledges we have undertaken until they are changed.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Chairman, I look forward with some interest to the discussions yet to take place. I think the course I suggested the other day, that an opportunity should be directly given to discuss foreign affairs and defence, which are necessarily intertwined one with the other, was a proper and effective course to follow in order to ascertain the views of the members of this house in connection with these problems. While the Leader of the Opposition suggests that a two days limitation makes it impossible so to do, I point out that this is the period usually given in the mother of parliaments where discussions take place which are incisive, direct and without unnecessary verbiage. One thing which we agree in all parts of the house is that everything possible should be done to maintain the strength of each of the nations within the free world, economically and strategically. We are in agreement that everything possible should be done to maintain our defences while at the same time we should endeavour to attain that objective which, elusive as it has been for a thousand years, has represented the hope of all mankind.
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I regret that the Secretary of State for External Affairs yesterday afternoon was unable to complete his summary of the contribution which has been made by Canada towards achieving disarmament and peace. However, even without elucidation on his part, I think Canadians everywhere realize that he has raised the standard of Canada in the United Nations to an extent that has brought honour to this country.
I am pleased to have this opportunity to reply, something that was denied me only a few weeks ago, in the parliament of this country. I intend to traverse the record. I have listened to the Leader of the Opposition. When he speaks in these loud tones near the end, I realize that the louder he speaks, the less certain he is of what he is saying. Sometimes I wonder about the source of the new policy declared. Sometimes I wonder if it is only coincidence that following some of his expeditions into a neighbouring country there is inevitably a new policy or a change in policy. I see where he objects to any suggestion of that kind. I am sure that Mr. Val Sears is one who does not speak unfavourably of those in the opposition, and this is what he said in an article in the Toronto Star on the 14th of January:
Liberal leader Pearson made his decision alone-
That was true enough because they were so surprised in Manitoba that they had to swallow themselves.
-and in the final hours before the speech was delivered. The argument, however, had been mustered days and weeks before. Mr. Pearson, loaded with memoranda on the nuclear question, went to New York early last week to attend a conference on world tension. There, he discussed the issue with a number of international observers and likely tested Washington opinion with United States representatives.
This is all very helpful but it also reveals a situation to which we certainly must give consideration. How surprising it was that the hon. member for Assiniboia, who used to be for withdrawing Canada from NATO, who used to be attacking nuclear weapons in any form, said when he heard of this statement:
"I support it. There is no question of me leaving the Liberal party over this issue." I am glad to hear that, but it does add up to one fact, that the country has had placed before it by the Leader of the Opposition a policy that bears no paternal relationship to the views he has expressed over and over again in this house. I am going to take the record today because the record tells a story that is the answer to much of what he advanced today. As far as those laudable objectives are concerned which characterized his peroration, such as securing a larger proportion of the defence dollar for Canada,

Supply-External Affairs these are fine objectives. That is what this government has done. To an extent such as never before existed, there has been between our country and the United States a recognition that Canada's industrial economy deserves and has earned a larger share of the defence expenditures.
In 1961 the amount spent by the Canadian government in Canada was $502.9 million and $26.1 million outside Canada, or 95.1 per cent of the expenditures within Canada.
Internationally we live from time to time in the hope of bettering days. We also live between the hope of an assured peace and fear. We must maintain our defences. Of that there can be no question. But I think it is of interest that in the spiritual things the western world is gaining strength among those countries which in the past have had a large or considerable communist population. In western Europe today the communists are down to 60 per cent of the strength they had in the years immediately following the second world war. One reason for that is the division which has taken place between Russia and some of her satellites and now between Russia and communist China. Another reason is that conditions among the people economically are far better than they are behind the iron curtain. There were about 4 million card carrying members of the communist party in western Europe after the war. That number is estimated today to be 2.4 million. Even people living in the communist world, as they become prosperous, are losing their fanatical adherence to communism.
Then there are the events which have taken place in the last few weeks. Mention was made of the meeting between President de Gaulle and Dr. Adenauer. The agreement signed represents a forward step that could never have been contemplated 10 years ago. It shows that in the international field today the word "never" should not be in our vocabulary. Indeed, I feel that more and more we should endeavour through trade and cultural exchanges to bring about an understanding of each other.
Take the situation recently in East Berlin when the delegates booed the Chinese spokesman. Then there is the exchange of letters between the President of the United States and Chairman Khrushchev regarding nuclear testing. This is encouraging. Of course, if an agreement were secured without the adherence of the French and particularly without the adherence of communist China, it would not be too effective. All of these things point to better relations but we must in no way let our defences down. Admissions that

things may be bettering should lead in no way to a diminution in the need of our maintaining our defences.
We are having this debate, as I said a moment ago, to secure the views of the house. I am going to show from the record that we have been consistent throughout in the stand we have taken. We shall make our decisions, and have, on the basis of Canada's security and the maintenance of our responsibilities internationally. We have made them and will continue to make them on the basis of no other consideration. I start at once by saying that any suggestion that we have repudiated any undertaking by Canada internationally is false in substance and in fact. Canada does not, has not and will not renege on her responsibilities. Let there be no doubt about that. When there is a suggestion that she has, that is but part and parcel of the attitude taken by the official opposition during the past five years of downgrading our country nationally and internationally.
The Leader of the Opposition says that we should have a committee of parliament on defence policy. The leader of the Social Credit party made a similar statement yesterday.
I point out this fact, that never at any time has there been a committee set up in our country on defence policy. There can be committees on defence for the purpose of looking into questions of defence but not for the determination of policy, which must be the responsibility of the government. Indeed, the Leader of the Opposition himself said on January 19, 1959, and in that he was consistent with the stand that was taken throughout the years by his party when in power:
The sole responsibility for the policy decision In this matter as in defence policy generally remains in the hands of the government, and they should have met it before now.
This is the tradition of British parliamentary government and we on this side do not wish, as we did not wish when we were in opposition, to depart from it in favour of the making of policy through parliamentary committees. This is the stand we take, a stand that is consistent as the Leader of the Opposition said in 1959, with the whole question of parliamentary responsibility.
Now, sir, the Leader of the Opposition has admitted that defence is a complex problem, a difficult one not alone for Canada but for all the countries in the free world who are having difficulty in this connection. All of them have made expenditures for weapons and the like which, before they were produced, have had to be put in the scrap heap. Somebody said, and I think this is a slogan that appears on the walls of some of the

defence establishments in the United States, if it works it is obsolete. There has been a tremendous expansion in plans for defence and the media for defence. How often it has been found that before the weapons are ready for distribution they have already ceased to have any effect.
I want to point out a few general rules that we in this government have adopted. We say we shall take adequate steps at all times to protect this country. We have taken these steps. Indeed, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs said on December 17 on his return to the House of Commons from the NATO conference in Paris, the various nations there without exception paid tribute to the degree to which Canada had carried out her responsibilities. There was some suggestion today that in the interest of collective security we should co-operate in things that, for us, would not be effective. The stand we take is this: Canada has co-operated and will co-operate, but she will not be a pawn nor be pushed around by other nations to do those things which, in the opinion of the Canadian people, are not in keeping with her sovereignty and her sovereign position.
Our general purpose has been to do our part to assure Canada's security, to work with our allies in close relationship, and at the same time press forward for disarmament which is the only hope for peace. This is our purpose, this is our aim and our objective. Regardless of the political consequences, we will act to do those things that will carry out our responsibilities. We will fully cooperate with the countries of the western alliance, but with policies in co-operation with them that are made in Canada and not elsewhere. We will maintain Canadian sovereignty, regardless of the pressures, of the views, of anyone visiting our country or otherwise. We will have a policy that remains flexible so as to meet changing conditions. We will do nothing to extend the nuclear family. We will do our part to assure the continuance of the contribution of Canada to all U.N. forces designed to preserve peace.
Fundamental to our policy as it relates to other nations is the desire to be a useful and ever-ready agent for peace and for productive solutions while at the same time pulling our weight. Some say you should take the advice of generals if they are eminent. This was not the view of President Eisenhower who had occupied the highest position in the western world as a general. He did not say this until the last speech he delivered prior to giving up the presidency. This is what he said at that time:
In the councils of government we must guard against acquisitions of unwarranted influence,
Supply-External Affairs whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist.
We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defence with our peaceful methods and goals, so that security and liberty may prosper together.
This has been the view of Canadian leaders, too. Sir Robert Borden, in 1917, said, "They advise but the civil authority determines". I emphasize that fact because the major portion of the argument of the Leader of the Opposition is based on the quotation of questions and answers selected from an interview that took place some weeks ago. I am going to deal with the question of nuclear weapons. This is a question that arouses in all of us those feelings of fear. I am going to deal with that at some length.
Nuclear weapons have a basis, for all peoples, of power and danger far beyond anything known before. Today, the United States has a preponderance of that power, and that caused Khrushchev to realize there would be no payoff in victory for the communists if they moved forward. This was the essence of the Cuban question and of the stand taken by the President of the United States. When the hon. member referred to Canada not having acted, may I say this? How could you act at the same time as your partner acted if you had no knowledge in advance beyond an hour and a half prior to the delivery of the speech of the President of the United States? He said, why didn't we act? We acted immediately. The United States knew in advance the course she was going to follow and had naturally had arrangements made in advance. We as a partner in NORAD had no knowledge. I simply point that out without further observation. For those in positions to control or use nuclear weapons, they possess a responsibility of magnitude and seriousness that it is hard even to imagine. It must be a frightful thing to have resting on your shoulders, as rests on the shoulders of the President of the United States, the responsibility in this connection. The United States has today taken over the herculean responsibilities that Britain carried for a hundred years, and there is resting upon the President of the United States decisions the seriousness of which affect all parts of the world.
We have been confronted with serious difficulties and problems in the defence field since 1957. One of our first acts was to continue an arrangement which our predecessors had made, which permitted United States interceptor aircraft to fly over Canada. A few weeks later we entered into a NORAD

Supply-External Affairs agreement to establish a single separate effective control of North American defences. Forces of the United States and Canada were organized to defend our two nations against nuclear attack, and I point out so far as the Bomarc is concerned it was simply part of the plan, and was not to defend Canada. That is not its purpose. Its purpose is to preserve the strategic air command from an attack which would prevent the strategic air command from striking out with all its deterrent power. We organized to defend the bases of the deterrent nuclear force which has protected us, as well as the western world, for the past half dozen years and more.
That agreement was worked out to the mutual advantage of both countries and Canadian officers have taken a full share of responsibility and have done outstanding work in carrying it out.
The question of defensive nuclear weapons is one that must receive the attention of all the countries. We believe strongly in limiting the spread of nuclear weapons at the independent disposal of national governments. In that we are in concert with the opposition.
In December, 1957, I was one of those who attended the meeting of the NATO powers in Paris. We agreed to the establishment of stockpiles of nuclear warheads in NATO nations, to be readily available for use by nuclear forces in Europe who were then confronted with the threat of Russian nuclear weapons against them.
During 1958 the Canadian government studied intensively the arms required by Canadian forces in modern circumstances, and we reached the decision we would provide aircraft for the purposes of NATO. At that time I made it perfectly clear, as I shall point out in a moment, that those forces would have to be equipped, in order to be fully effective, with defensive nuclear weapons if and when the need arose. That was recognized in taking the decision that was announced in September, 1958, to instal Bomarc anti-aircraft missiles in Canada.
The Leader of the Opposition would have you understand that there has been no change; once you do a thing you should stay. In 1958, when the Bomarc was first laid down as a plan, the great challenge to North America was believed to be bombers carrying bombs. That is what we thought. Today that is changed. More and more there is a phasing out in connection with the bomber threat as more and more intercontinental ballistic missiles are increasing in number. Those are some of the stands we have taken and I set forth the views of the government on February 20, 1959, as quoted by the Leader of the Opposition. In accordance with


that statement we proceeded to acquire equipment, aircraft, launchers and other items necessary to enable the Canadian forces to be ready to use defensive nuclear weapons if and when that became necessary.
In May, 1959, the supreme commander of NATO forces visited Ottawa and proposed to the government that the first Canadian air division in Europe should undertake a strike reconnaissance role to protect the NATO forces aircraft from the first attack on them. That we placed before the House of Commons. The government considered the proposal, and early in July announced its decision in the house to accept this role and to equip eight squadrons of the division to discharge it. Our ambassador informed the NATO council of this decision.
While nothing was specified about arming the aircraft with nuclear weapons it was realized by all that this would be desirable and that nuclear weapons should be available as and when required, under joint control, in NATO stockpiles in accordance with the general NATO decision of December, 1957, to which I have referred. Similarly, but less important, plans were made in connection with short-range defensive missiles.
Now, sir, that is all in the past. Those are the stands which we took. Those are the views that we placed before parliament in detail; and that is what surprises me, that the Leader of the Opposition, after his return from the United States a few weeks ago and after the interview with General Norstad, suddenly realized what was actually the fact. He suddenly realized that there should be some action taken, and I am going to deal with that because when I follow him in his equivocating stand throughout the past five years-if I can do it-I shall place before the house something of what I spoke so frequently-


The Deputy Chairman:: Order.


John George Diefenbaker: -of a bold and imaginative policy, straightforward and courageous.


Rémi Paul: Order. I regret to inform the house that the time of the Prime Minister has expired.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Rémi Paul: But I am sure he will receive unanimous consent to continue.


Mr. Martin (Essex East):: He always has. The Prime Minister always has.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Chairman, may I invite your attention to the rule which indicates that under all circumstances, whether in the house or in committee, the Prime Minister, like the Leader of the Opposition, is not under any limitation of time.


Paul Joseph James Martin: No one ever stops the Prime Minister from speaking.


Mr. Ricard:: Except the Liberals.


John George Diefenbaker: Except the hon. member for Essex East, with the co-operation of the hon. member for Assiniboia and some others over there, on December 19.
We have spent billions of dollars on defence since world war II. Much of what has been spent might be considered by some to have been wasted, but if it had not been for the defences we built up, and those associated with us, our freedom might long since have disappeared. Since the time we entered into these commitments I have referred to things which have changed greatly. It was not a mistake to take measures to ensure the necessary security, on the basis of the information we had then, even though in the light of subsequent events some of the things that were done had been proven, as with every country, to be unnecessary.
I referred a moment ago to the tremendous strength of the United States. In December it was publicly stated that the United States had now 200 nuclear tipped, intercontinental ballistic missiles in place and that American missiles-these were press reports-now include 126 Atlas missiles, 54 Titans and 20 Minutemen. In other words, they are moving in the direction of a new concept of defensive measures. Those new concepts were the result of the meeting in Nassau, to which I will later make reference.
No one can predict the future. We build today on the basis of information that we have. We provide the weapons today according to our best lights and following collaboration among those associated in this matter of defence. New forms of deterrent are being developed. Military mistakes and changes have been made by all the countries in the western world. A short resume will give the committee some idea of how easy it is to say what should be done now on the basis of what was done earlier in the face of other circumstances.
Britain had the Blue Streak, a long range missile which cost her some $267 million. She gave it up. Recently the United States decided that the Skybolt would not be used. The Leader of the Opposition said that they decided to end the building of the Skybolt. I do not think that is correct. What they decided was that in view of the uncertainty of this missile there was no real purpose in going on with it. But on the other hand, in Nassau the United States was willing to proceed, provided Britain would put up a corresponding amount of money in order to ascertain whether or not it could be made workable. By the spring of 1960 the United States had
Supply-External Affairs spent over $3 billion on various forms of projects, military weapons and the like, that had to be cancelled or ended in their production.
We had to take the same course. Some people talk about courage. Well, we took a stand in reference to the Arrow. No one wanted to take that stand. It is easy for members of the opposition to say it should not have been done. As I look back on it I think it was one of the decisions that was right. Here was an instrument beautiful in appearance, powerful, a tribute to Canadian production. But people sometimes say to me, "How would it have defended Canada?" What is the total area in which it would operate at full speed? The answer is, 325 miles out and back, in a vast country like Canada. We could not get sales for it at all and the cost would have been $7i million per unit. What a tremendous cost to this nation. This instrument that was otherwise beautiful, magnificent in its concept, would have contributed little, in the changing order of things, to our national defence.
Every now and then some new white hope of rocketry goes into the scrap pile. We established the Bomarc, the two units. They are effective over an area of only a few hundred miles. They are effective only against aircraft. People talk about change. Who would have thought three years ago that today the fear would be an attack with intercontinental ballistic missiles? This program cost Canada some $14 million. The United States put up the major portion of the total cost. I do not want to repeat, but it is necessary to do so, that with the advent more and more into intercontinental ballistic missiles the bomber carrier is less and less the threat that it was.
So what should we do? Should we carry on with what we have done in the past, merely for the purpose of saying, "Well, we started, and having started and having proceeded, we will continue"? Should we do this in an area, where mistakes are made? I am not dealing with those mistakes at the moment; but should we continue with such programs, in the light of changing circumstances? These were not mistakes in judgment at the time, but the failure to be able to look ahead and read the mind of Khrushchev and those associated with him in the presidium. More and more the nuclear deterrent is becoming of such a nature that more nuclear arms will add nothing materially to our defences. Greater and greater emphasis must be placed on conventional arms and conventional forces. We in Canada took a lead in that connection. In the month of September, 1961 we increased the numbers of our conventional forces. There was criticism at the time.

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I was in Nassau. I formed certain ideas. I read the communique that was issued there and I come to certain conclusions based on that communique. Those conclusions are as follows, and these are the views expressed also by the United States under secretary of state, George W. Ball: that nuclear war is indivisible; that there should be no further development of new nuclear power anywhere in the world; that nuclear weapons as a universal deterrent is a dangerous solution. Today an attempt is being made by the United States to have the NATO nations increase their conventional arms. The Nassau agreement seemed to accept these three principles as basic, and to carry them out both countries agreed to assign to NATO part of their existing nuclear force as the nucleus of a multilateral force.
What was the plan? The Skybolt, they said, had not been too successful-although it is ironical that the day after the communique the first one was successfully launched into space. The day is rapidly passing when we will have missile sites that are set, firm, on land. The new concept is the Polaris missile which is delivered from a submarine. When the Polaris missiles are delivered to the United Kingdom as part of the multilateral force, Britain will not have her independent nuclear deterrent power any more to the same extent, excepting to use these in a case of supranational emergency.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to read the paragraphs in question from the communique. They illustrate in a most striking way the state of flux of the defence of the free world. The communique shows that changes are taking place, and I will read the various paragraphs that set this out:
The president informed the prime minister that for this reason-
That was, that it was very complex, and so on:
-and because of the availability to the United States of alternative weapons systems, he had decided to cancel plans for the production of Skybolt for use by the United States. Nevertheless, recognizing the importance of the Skybolt program for the United Kingdom, and recalling that the purpose of the offer of Skybolt to the United Kingdom in 1960 had been to assist in improving and extending the effective life of the British V-bombers, the president expressed his readiness to continue the development of the missile as a joint enterprise between the United States and the United Kingdom, with each country bearing equal shares of the future cost of completing development.
Then the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, while recognizing the value of this offer, decided after full consideration not to avail himself of it because of doubts which had been expressed about the prospects of

the success of the enterprise. As an alternative, the president offered the Hound Dog missile; but the Hound Dog missile cannot be used on British aircraft because it would put the bottom of the aircraft too close to the ground, causing danger to those operating the planes.
The statement continues:
The Prime Minister then turned to the possibility of provision of the Polaris missile to the United Kingdom by the United States. After careful review, the President and the Prime Minister agreed that a decision on Polaris must be considered in the widest context both of the future defence of the Atlantic Alliance and of the safety of the whole free world... The Prime Minister suggested and the President agreed, that for the immediate future a start could be made by subscribing to NATO some part of the forces already in existence. This could include allocations from United States strategic forces, from United Kingdom bomber command, and from tactical nuclear forces now held in Europe. Such forces would be assigned as part of a NATO nuclear force and targeted in accordance with NATO plans.
Finally, they came out in favour of this multilateral NATO nuclear force. Returning to the Polaris, the president and the prime minister agreed that the purpose of their two governments with respect to the provision of the Polaris missiles must be the development of a multilateral NATO nuclear force in the closest consultation with other NATO allies. Accordingly, they agreed that the United States would make available a contribution of Polaris missiles on a continuing basis for British submarines and that the nuclear warheads for Polaris missiles should also be provided. These forces, and at least equal United States forces, would be made available for inclusion in a NATO multilateral nuclear force. At the same time, while they set up this multilateral force in embryo, the last paragraph points out that the president and the prime minister agreed that in addition to having a nuclear shield it was important to have a non-nuclear sword. For this reason, the communique concludes, they agreed on the importance of increasing the effectiveness of their conventional forces on a world wide basis.
That is a tremendous step-a change in the philosophy of defence; a change in the views of NATO, if accepted by the NATO partners. Certainly it represents a change in the views of two nations which play such a large part in the NATO organization. They went further, as I understand it. They concluded that the day of the bomber is phasing out. Britain wanted a striking force of its own. Britain needed a delivery system produced at the lowest cost. Hence, the Skybolt. With the advent of the Polaris missile the United States believed there was no longer need for the Skybolt, and this was agreed to by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. Who

made the mistake? Are they to be condemned? No less than $600 million was spent on the development of the Skybolt which was believed to be the essence of defence measures for the United Kingdom itself. I point this out because everywhere in the world, as a result of Khrushchev's changing moods, and vast improvements in technology both with respect to defensive and offensive warfare, the decisions of today are often negatived tomorrow.
When I say there has been a change, let me point out this fact. Only today, in a dispatch from Washington, it is reported that President Kennedy called Livingston Merchant, a veteran diplomat, out of retirement to lead a government team which will prepare United States proposals for a nuclear force in Europe. This was announced yesterday in a statement read to the press by the president's press secretary. The report says that although United States and British efforts to create a nuclear striking force under NATO have run into stiff resistance from the French, Mr. Salinger-he is the secretary-said: "Mr. Merchant and his group will talk with French officials as well as with officials from other NATO countries." All of us know the kind of man Mr. Merchant is- one of those dedicated servants who, in his period of office did so much to increase the good relations between our country and the United States.
Concepts are changing. I do not intend to go now into many particulars but I ask hon. members who say there is no new strategy to read the article in one of the December issues of the Saturday Evening Post. The heading is "Our New Strategy-the Alternatives to Total War", and the viewpoint given is that of Mr. McNamara, the secretary of defence of the United States.
Only on Wednesday, the Turkish government is reported to have announced that Jupiter missiles were being removed from Turkey and Polaris weapons substituted. A similar announcement was made yesterday, I think, by Premier Fanfani of Italy. As far as these missiles are concerned, the reported proposal to replace the present missiles in Italy and Turkey by submarines mounted with Polaris missiles is an example of the rapid changes of these times. Obsolete missiles in vulnerable positions are being replaced by a relatively invulnerable weapon. I cannot altogether understand what the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) meant by his observation that we should no longer produce anything which will become obsolete. After all, that has been the whole history of the development of defence in the last 17 years since the end of the war. Since
Supply-External Affairs they are mobile, these Polaris missiles can be put in position or removed as the situation requires. They can be centrally controlled by NATO or another agency. By having the weapons stationed at sea the provocation of having them mounted on the territory of close U.S.S.R. neighbours is removed. Because they are relatively invulnerable, their effectiveness as a deterrent is all the greater.
I propose to review some of the views expressed by this government on the question of defence and to go back over some of the various statements which have been made. I do this because it seems passing strange to me that the Leader of the Opposition only found them out after his trip to the United States-or only revealed that he had found them out then. I say this because I dealt with the situation in detail here in the House of Commons on February 20, 1959. I ask hon. members to read Hansard. They will find I said this-


Paul Joseph James Martin: What page,
please?


John George Diefenbaker: Page 1223. I said that in keeping with the determination that Canada should carry out its task in a balanced, collective defence-
In keeping with that determination, careful thought is being given to the principles which in our opinion are applicable to the acquisition and control of nuclear weapons. The government's decisions of last autumn to acquire Bomarc missiles for air defence and Lacrosse missiles for the Canadian army-
One doesn't hear anything more about Lacrosse missiles-
-were based on the best expert advice available on the need to strengthen Canada's air defence against the threat to this continent and on its determination to continue an effective contribution to the NATO shield.
The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada. Problems connected with the arming of the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO's defence tasks are also being studied.
It set this out in great detail. There is no concealment. There is complete revelation of what we are doing. I could read from Hansard year by year. As found at page 1223 of Hansard for 1959, I said this:
It is our intention to provide Canadian forces with modern and efficient weapons to enable them to fulfil theri respective roles... it is the policy of the Canadian government not to undertake the production of nuclear weapons in Canada... We must reluctantly admit the need in present circumstances for nuclear weapons of a defensive character.

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Then again as the Leader of the Opposition said, on a number of occasions I stated that there was no expectation of an early conclusion of a formal agreement. On January 18, 1960, as found at page 73 of Hansard, I said this:
Eventually Canadian forces may require certain nuclear weapons if Canadian forces are to be kept effective.
Then again:
Negotiations are proceeding with the United States in order that the necessary weapons can be made available for Canadian defence units if and when they are required.
That was always of the essence throughout in the stand that we took. I cannot comment in detail on these negotiations but I wish to state that arrangements for the safeguarding and security of all such weapons in Canada will be subject to Canadian approval and consent. Then again on February 9, 1960:
If and when Canada does acquire nuclear weapons it will be in accordance with our own national policies and with our obligations under the north Atlantic treaty.
Again on July 4, 1960, I said a similar thing. As found at page 5654 of Hansard I said this:
-in so far as general policy is concerned we are always in this position. On the one hand we are desirous of attaining disarmament; on the other hand we have to discharge our responsibility of ensuring to the maximum degree the security of the Canadian people. So far as that is concerned-
And so on. Again in July I mentioned the matter and again in August:
-We are, therefore, going ahead with the procurement of vehicles which can use these nuclear weapons, but the decision as to the acquisition of the nuclear warheads depends on circumstances which might develop some time in the future.
Throughout we have followed that course. I do not wish to fill the record, but again on November 23, 1960, I was asked to give a report and I said I would refer the hon. gentleman to what was said on January 19 and February 20, both in 1959; January 18, 1960; February 9, 1960; July 4, 1960 and July 14, 1960. On November 30 I said this:
-the position of Canada is completely unchanged. We have made it perfectly clear that when and if nuclear weapons are required we shall not accept them unless we have joint control,-
There has been no suggestion at any time of any watering down of that stand. Then again on September 20, 1961:
However, and I emphasize this, in each of the instruments that we have, the Bomarc and the Voodoos, nuclear weapons could be used. The defensive weapons requirements of Canada and the need for the preservation of security will be the overriding consideration in the mind of this government.

And so on throughout the entire piece. Then, as well in various speeches made outside of the House of Commons I underlined this fact, namely that we were in a position where nuclear weapons could be secured and would be secured in the event that the circumstances at the time made such a course reasonable and necessary. I went further in that connection when I said this:
Would you in 1961, faced by the overwhelming power of Soviet might in East Germany close to West Berlin with large divisions fully armed, would you place in the hands of those who guard the portals of freedom nothing but bows and arrows? They would stand against overwhelming power-it is as simple as that.
Throughout the election campaign I followed the same course. In the two speeches I made before the United Nations I asked, as had the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and as did the Leader of the Opposition today, for the abolition of nuclear weapons, the end of nuclear weapons, the systematic control of missiles designed to deliver nuclear weapons of mass destruction, the designation and inspection of launching sites for missiles, the abolition of biological and chemical weapons and the outline of outer space for military purposes. That has been our course throughout.
During the election campaign, however, with the change in circumstances that had been taking place from the point of view of defence, I outlined the position of this party in a speech which I made in Brockville. It was not too successful, judging by the results, but I spoke there during the campaign and I said this:
We shall not, so long as we are pursuing the ways of disarmament, allow the extension of the nuclear family into Canada ... We do not intend to allow the spread of nuclear arms beyond the nations which now have them.
Those in short are the views expressed, with one exception. Today the Leader of the Opposition said that when we brought into Canada the 60 F-101B interceptors, it was clearly understood that they would be armed with nuclear weapons. On June 12, 1961, I set out in detail the arrangements that had been arrived at between Canada and the United States. I think I had better read from it:
-for some time representatives of the Canadian and United States governments have been working on an agreement relating to the defence of Canada, more particularly to air defence and to the Canada-United States production sharing program. The objective of such an agreement was to reflect the desire of both governments to ensure more effective use of the productive capacities, skills and resources of each country and at the same time to demonstrate our mutual determination to improve the defensive strength of NATO and particularly of NORAD under it...
In consideration of the financial and other benefits which will accrue to the United States as a result of Canada's assumption of additional

responsibilities under the Pine Tree agreements, Canada will be furnished with 66 F-101B interceptor aircraft and appropriate support equipment. These aircraft, title to which will be vested in Canada, will be armed with conventional weapons.
Today the Leader of the Opposition said otherwise. That is the background. That is the recital of some of the stands we have taken and which are consistent throughout and which, when read in conjunction one with the other reveal the situation as we saw it. The Leader of the Opposition said, "Let us be bold; we have a policy. The government has not a policy but we have a policy". Well, I am not going to follow the Leader of the Opposition throughout the entire course of his migrations through change in connection with this problem, but I am going to refer to some of the oscillations and vacillations. I am going to try to carry hon. members through the jungle of uncertainty that he built up on behalf of the opposition during a period of several years.
In 1958 he proposed that nations manufacturing atomic weapons should agree not to do so in the future. But that did not prevent him from approving the continuing increasing sale of Canadian uranium to the United States, the chief buyer and the chief maker of atomic weapons. Furthermore, regarding the use of nuclear weapons by Canadian forces he said on the 17th of March, 1960: "There is every doubt and confusion".
What was the stand of the Liberal party? On January 18, 1960, he said: "We should not accept baby nuclear bombs or missiles". On July 15, 1960 he said: "The middle powers should have a self-denying ordinance in nuclear weapons." On August 5, 1960 he said: "Canada should get out of Bomarc operation." Hon. members will have difficulty following me though I am reading from the same gentleman.
On August 5, 1960 he said that NATO should build up its own deterrent force. On the same date, a few lines later, he said he was not suggesting a NATO strategic force. On August 5, 1960, he also said that Canada should reject nuclear weapons for its forces. On the same date a few lines further down he said: "But this should be subject to re-examination."
Be bold. Be imaginative. Be direct.


An hon. Member:: Be decisive.
Another hon. Member: Begone.


John George Diefenbaker: On March 28, 1961 he said that NATO should rely less on a nuclear deterrent. On April 27, 1961, he said in effect that over-reliance on a nuclear deterrent was a fear of his. A few lines further
Supply-External Affairs down he said: "A nuclear deterrent is absolutely essential." Then on September 14, 1961, he said:
Canada is not making any effective contribution but we should not accept nuclear weapons in Europe.
I have heard enough of this story.


An hon. Member:: Is this all in one speech?


John George Diefenbaker: It is the same thing over and over again. Now we are to be more direct and more certain. I am going to come to the latest policy because he has pulled two or three props from underneath it as a result of losing some supporters. What is the next statement?
Canada's role should not be a fighting role.
That was September 15-


Lester Bowles Pearson: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, the Prime Minister is reading a lot of statements which he attributes to me. He knows the rules, I assume, and therefore he should identify each statement as he makes it, giving the source and the date.


John George Diefenbaker: All right. I will now follow the admonition. If the hon. gentleman wants identification he will receive it. I always wait for that. It seems they never learn. We start off with a report of the Liberal convention in Ottawa in the Ottawa Journal of January 10, 1961.


Lester Bowles Pearson: You have already put that on the record.


John George Diefenbaker: He wants proof. "Pearson Proposes Non-weapon Role In NORAD." That is in big enough letters that it needs no further identification.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is a headline.


John George Diefenbaker: He went on to say that Canada should do away with interceptors, manned and unmanned, but co-operate with the United States in the role of air detection, identification and warning. That is when the Falcon became a bird watcher. The same suggestion was also embodied in a policy paper presented to a rally subcommittee on defence.
What Mr. Pearson's policy amounted to was Canadian participation in NORAD in so far as radar stations are concerned but withdrawal in so far as interceptors and the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile are concerned.
That is number one. He asked for proof. I have got the document here. It is issued with that reddish superscription.
Any extension of the possession of nuclear weapons under individual national control will greatly increase the danger of accidental outbreak of nuclear war and also the difficulty of achieving disarmament. Membership in the nuclear club, therefore, should not be extended beyond the four

Supply-External Affairs countries which now possess such weapons... Canada cannot deny nuclear weapons to other nations and at the same time arm her own forces with them.
What a tortuous course.
A new Liberal government, therefore, should not acquire, manufacture or use such weapons under separate Canadian control or under joint United States-Canadian control.
I have been told over and over again about our course. I realize the complexity when the Leader of the Opposition stands up today in shining armour and in a voice full of emotion tells us in this house what should be done. If we had listened to this advice in the past, where would we have been?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Where have you been?


John George Diefenbaker: He says: "Let us be consistent". Let me read on from there.
Canada should continue to play an important part in the defence policy of NATO which seeks security through collective action. However, NATO's objectives and the means of achieving them should be reconsidered in the light of the conditions of today rather than those of 12 years ago. The nuclear power of the United States is necessary as a strategic deterrent as long as the Soviet union maintains massive nuclear forces. But the use of this power might convert a limited attack into a general and fatal nuclear war and its non-use might mean an easy triumph for the aggressor if there were no adequate alternative defence. The sound alternative is to build up NATO shield forces adequate to prevent a communist attack.
That was the policy of the Liberal convention B.G.-before Gordon, in January of
1961.	I do not like to put these things on the record.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, no?


John George Diefenbaker: However, I felt that the house would like to have a handy and ready reference to what the hon. gentleman describes as courageous consistency.
The Soviet union has strong forces for such an attack now in process of being armed with nuclear tactical weapons. If after re-examination of its defence policy the NATO council formally decides that conventional forces should be reinforced by nuclear weapons solely for defensive tactical use, then Canadian forces under NATO command should possess such weapons.
I shall return to that in a moment because that was the policy at that time. On November 7, 1961, he spoke in Quebec and there is this headline over the report: "Liberals Would Reject Bomarcs, Says Pearson". Then, surprisingly enough he spoke in a by-election in Labelle, in which one of the Bomarc sites was located. He says do not bring politics into this thing, and then we read what he said to the people of Thurso, Quebec as reported by Paul Dubois in the Ottawa Citizen of October 29, 1960:
Referring to the planned Bomarc base at Montpellier, located in the northern extremity of

Labelle riding, Mr. Pearson condemned the government's plans to equip the missiles with nuclear warheads, missiles that would be controlled by the United States. A nuclear deterrent may be necessary for the United States but not for us and other countries.
Then we find these words, and you can just hear the emotion packed into these words as he appealed to that great gathering. I think there were 30 or 40 present.
If Russia ever attacked North America and specifically Canada, Montpellier would be a prime target for the Russians. Montpellier and communities for hundreds of miles around would be reduced to ruins.
Now, there was a reference to this policy in connection with NORAD. There is a reference in the magazine Canadian Commentator dealing with the policy that was announced:
This month's Liberal party rally has provided a dismaying example of what must happen if a military problem is resolved entirely on the basis of political considerations. The problem in question was that of Canadian participation in the North American Air Defence Command. The resolution, as it was reported, suffers somewhat from confused terminology-it approves "identification" of suspected aerial intruders by Canadian fighter aircraft, but not "interception," although the former action is not possible without the latter. Still, it is quite clear what the stand is which the Liberals are taking in this matter: They want to leave all arrangements as they are except that Canadian forces in NORAD would not actually shoot. In other words, we would warn the Americans that the enemy was coming, we would tell them who he is, we would fix and track him, but then we would virtuously withdraw and let the Americans do the killing.
Then, finally, they came out with this policy. I do not know who claims the paternity of it but certainly it was not the Liberal party who presented it. The hon. member for Lambton West has been swallowing himself ever since; he did not know anything about it. He announced in advance it was going to be a policy which was going to be antinuclear weapons. There were others in the same position. I have read this over, and I suggest everyone read it over because it is a most interesting piece of work.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


John George Diefenbaker: I am glad to see the
hon. member for St. Lawrence-St. George because he is certainly one who needs some information about it. Now then, we are-


Mr. Drury:: Mr. Chairman, just on a point of personal explanation for the benefit of the Prime Minister-


John George Diefenbaker: I am sorry; the identification was wrong but the interception was right.


Charles Mills (Bud) Drury: I am glad the Prime Minister recognized his mistake.


John George Diefenbaker: I quote:
Canada should contribute to the strategic nuclear deterrent.
Who makes this declaration of policy, this ringing declaration?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Will you read that again?


John George Diefenbaker: What was that?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, the Prime Minister has just read a statement in which he said that I said Canada should contribute to the strategic nuclear deterrent. It reads "Canada should not contribute". There is a "not" there.


John George Diefenbaker: I am reading from the report of the hon. gentleman's speech.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Read it again.


John George Diefenbaker: I say that there will be no additional-


Lester Bowles Pearson: Read it again.


John George Diefenbaker: There will be no additional knowledge for anybody reading it a second time.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Just read it correctly.


John George Diefenbaker: I did not interrupt the hon. gentleman; I listened to him.


Lester Bowles Pearson: You just left out the word "not".


John George Diefenbaker: We are going to have nuclear weapons; that is what they are for, you think, and then read on:
The government should re-examine at once the whole basis of Canadian defence policy. In particular, it should discuss with the United States and with NATO a role for Canada in continental and collective defence which would be more realistic and effective for Canada than the present one.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


John George Diefenbaker: Some of them have heard it for the first time. I continue quoting:
This examination would be concerned, among other things, with the necessity of building up NATO's conventional forces and the part Canada could play in this. However, until they are changed, a new Liberal government would put Canada's armed services in the position to discharge fully commitments undertaken for Canada by its predecessor.
What do these weasel words mean? What has been the reaction in the United States to them? Well, in the Toronto Star of January 15, 1963, there is an article by Martin Goodman which reads as follows:
Hon. Lester Pearson's attempt to clarify Liberal defence policy has further confused U.S. observers.
Canada will honour commitments, he says, and then the article continues:
Meanwhile the government re-examines Canada's defence policy with Pearson's obvious intention to shift to a non-nuclear role.
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Presumably six months or so later, the troops would stop training, the warheads and technical personnel would depart. Canada would have a new policy, but would be no closer to its implementation than it is now.
Now, that is the United States view. What about the Canadian view? All across this nation one finds one editorial after another asking, what is the meaning of this policy? Some editorials say, "More confusing". This is what the Calgary Herald says:
Just exactly where does Hon. Lester B. Pearson, national Liberal party leader, stand on the subject of nuclear warheads for Canada's armed forces? Up until last Saturday it was understood that he opposed them. On Saturday he announced that he is now in favour of Canada acquiring them.
A sigh of relief could be heard across the land.
At last a major political party was prepared to argue on behalf of this country fulfilling its mutual defence commitments.
But such rejoicing as was occasioned by hearing what has become an unusual sound in Canada, a strong, bold voice of leadership, turned to puzzlement and dismay on Wednesday.
In another public pronouncement then-
That was the Algoma East revised version.
-Mr. Pearson indicated that maybe nuclear warheads are not the answer after all.
Maybe it would be better to change Canada's commitments to NATO and NORAD, he said.
The editorial ends up in this way, and the Calgary Herald has strong feelings on this:
But in his Wednesday speech he undid much of the good impression he made four days previously.
They should have heard him today with his further revision.
Perhaps he did not make himself perfectly clear on Wednesday. But why create doubts? Exactly where does he stand now? A good many puzzled citizens would very much like to know.
So, I could go all across this country. I could continue and quote editorials from all across the country. He said the problem was confused and complicated, but to try and follow the course that has been taken by the opposition in this matter is to endeavour to follow a pathway of irresponsibility, a policy of shift, a labyrinth in shuffling, confused and contradictory.
I wish to give someone an opportunity to follow me because I know they want to do so, but I could go on with the quotations. However, that opportunity will come later. There is however one further one to which I wish to make reference, the considered statement of the Leader of the Opposition made on August 5, 1960, as reported at page 7606 of Hansard for that date.
In my view we should get out of the whole SAGE-Bomarc operation, and we should not spend any more money on radar gap fillers ... It seems to me. .. that our experience in the last three years has shown that in attempting to participate in continental defence in the way we have, we are becoming, nothing more than just the last two knots on the Bomarc tail of the defence kite. I believe that in getting out of this position, which.

Supply-External Affairs X consider to be an ineffective one for Canada, we would be rejecting the use by us of any form of nuclear weapons for what is mistakenly called the defence of our territory. I believe, however, that we should continue the part we are now playing in early warning operations, though they will be of diminishing importance-
It is one of those things that caused delays, and hours of concern and worry. We ask "Are we doing what is right?" Well, I can tell you that we have not in any way broken any of our undertakings. We have at all times maintained the best defence that we have been able to, on the basis of the information we had at the time.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


John George Diefenbaker: To summarize our viewpoint, there is a will to peace, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs said yesterday. There is progress being made. We must maintain our defence. We shall not allow Canada to be placed in a subservient or unsovereign position. We shall follow the course that we have been following-one that has been consistent. It has been one of calm consideration of the matters as they arise.
We know, as the Leader of the Opposition said, that the way to prevent nuclear war is to prevent it. What course should we take at this time? I emphasize what I have already stated, that we shall at all times carry out whatever our responsibilities are. I have said that strategic changes are taking place in the thinking of the western world, and there is general recognition that the nuclear deterrent will not be strengthened by the expansion of the nuclear family. With these improvements in the international situation, this is no time for hardened decisions that cannot be altered. We must be flexible and fluid, for no one can anticipate what Khrushchev will do.
A meeting is about to take place in Ottawa of the NATO nations. They will meet here on May 21 to 23 and the very fact that they are meeting here indicates the attitude towards Canada and the feeling of the NATO nations towards her. As was said by the Leader of the Opposition when they met here previously, it represented a recognition that Canada had a very important part to play.
What shall our attitude be? It will not be one of recklessness, not one of making final decisions in the face of a changing world. I mentioned Nassau a moment ago and, as one examines what took place there, he realizes that we are living in a new and changing world of defence realism.
The Leader of the Opposition says all the F-104G aircraft have been delivered.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I never said that.


John George Diefenbaker: You did not say that? I am sorry. My interpretation was that he repeated over and over again that that was so. The total number that has been delivered is one squadron. Following SACEUR's recommendation, as we saw the situation in 1959 and as I said earlier in my remarks, we undertook to equip our squadrons assigned to NATO for a strike reconnaissance role, which role would include the mission of delivering nuclear weapons. No one was under any misunderstanding in that connection. Parliament approved this program and appropriated the funds.
I have said earlier that all the nations made mistakes, $3 billions worth of mistakes and more, up to 1960 but the fact that a mistake may have been made, or may not have been made, should not be a basis for the continuation of a policy just because to admit it would be wrong. Delivery of the F-104G has commenced, but the strike reconnaissance role has been placed under doubt by the recent Nassau declaration concerning nuclear arms, as well as other developments both technical and political in the defence field. It will be necessary, therefore, at this meeting in May, for Canada to give consideration to this matter and we will, in co-operation with the nations of NATO, undertake a clarification of our role in NATO defence plans and disposition.
We are united in NATO. We have never and will never consent to Canada breaking any of her pledged words or undertakings. It is at that meeting, where there will be reviewed the entire collective defence policy, that we shall secure from the other member nations their views, and on the basis of that we will be in a position to make a decision, a consistent decision, first to maintain our undertakings and second, to execute, if that be the view, the maintenance of our collective defence. In the meantime the training of Canadian forces in the use of these weapon systems can continue.
So far as NORAD is concerned I have said at the beginning of my remarks that Canada's sovereignty must be maintained. We shall continue our negotiations. They have been going on quite forcibly for two months or more.


Mr. Harkness:: For two or three months.


John George Diefenbaker: Yes, they have been going on for two or three months. Sometimes I wonder whether that is the reason the Leader of the Opposition rushed in with his statement the other day, because he found that out and knew about it. But there was never any concealment of the fact. We will negotiate with the United States so that, as I said earlier, in case of need nuclear warheads will be made readily available. In

other words, we will be in a position to determine finally, in the interests of Canada and our allies, the course to be followed in the light of changing circumstances in the disarmament field, which have become encouraging recently through Khrushchev's acceptance of even a minimum observation of nuclear testing. We will discuss with the nations of NATO the new concept of a nuclear force for NATO. If that concept at Nassau is carried into effect, much of our planning in the past will pass out of existence.
Mr. Chairman, it is so easy to say what should be done. Conscientiously and honestly we have tried, in the face of changing conditions, to bring about peace. We do not want to do anything at this time to rock the boat. If in the progress of disarmament it is found that we are beginning to approach that new era that all of us look forward to, the NATO nations meeting together can make that determination in agreement that is best for each and all. If, on the other hand, there is going to be set up a multilateral nuclear force, then all our planning to date, or most of it, will be of little or no consequence. I know they say, "Make decisions. Be concrete; be direct". Mr. Chairman, recklessness was never evidence of decisiveness. We will, as a result of the fullest discussion and consideration, determine a course which I believe now means a vast alteration in all the defensive techniques that we have accepted in the last few years, and we will come back to parliament and place before it the considered view of this government.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You will come back when?


John George Diefenbaker: I throw this back to the opposition. We never sold Canada. We have never in any way made undertakings that we have not carried out. Canada has a proud record. The opposition should not try, for political purposes, to besmirch that record. All of us should be true Canadians when facing a problem that touches the heartstrings of each and every one of us. My prayer is that we will be directed in this matter. Some may ridicule that belief on my part. I believe that the western world has been directed by God in the last few years, or there would have been no survival. I believe that will continue. My prayer is that we shall so live as to maintain not only the integrity of Canada and its high reputation by carrying out our responsibilities, but at the same time that we will be right, that the Canadian people will be able to say that, whatever decision is made, it was made with every consideration being given to all those moral and psychological things that form one's make-up.
Supply-External Affairs
I would rather be right, Mr. Chairman, so that those who come after may say, "He refused to be stampeded. He refused to act on the impulse of the moment. He and his colleagues together, with the support of the Canadian parliament, brought about a policy, in co-operation with their allies and by influence over their allies, that led to the achievement of peace".
Ths Chairman:	The hon. member for
Trinity.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Some hon. Members:: Shame.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman-


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Chairman, we have witnessed in this two-day debate an incredible spectacle-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Donald Methuen Fleming: The hon. member has risen on a point of order, Mr. Chairman.


The Chairman:: Order.


Thomas Clement (Tommy) Douglas: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, the period of time set aside for this debate was two days. Yesterday each of' the parties had an opportunity to speak. Today the two major parties have occupied the entire day. I do not object, because the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition had a right to make full statements, and they came very close to taking almost two hours apiece. But now to deny either of the other two parties an opportunity to take part in the conclusion of this two-day debate seems to me, Mr. Chairman, to be sheer discrimination.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Order. I regret the comment of the hon. member for Burnaby-Coquitlam. The Chair, in exercising its judgment in this rather difficult situation, with ten minutes to go before the allotted time elapses, was put in a very embarrassing position if it was to discriminate between either of the two parties at the far end of the chamber. This was the problem that I had in mind. No private member from either the government or the opposition side has at any time in the past two days been permitted to speak and-


An hon. Member:: What about the hon. member for Essex East?


Gordon Campbell Chown: I should correct that by saying that they have not been called, because obviously they have risen and then other hon. members have been given the floor. I thought that was a fair and equitable way of settling the question in this short period of ten minutes. If I had recognized

Supply-External Affairs an hon. member of the Social Credit party I am sure the hon. member for Burnaby-Coquitlam would have been unhappy-


Some hon. Members:: No.


Gordon Campbell Chown: -or vice versa. In closing the remarks on this subject, let me say that any member of either of those parties is perfectly at liberty to move that a member of his own group be heard, although I have now given the floor to the hon. member for Trinity.


Stanley Howard Knowles: As a matter of fairness, I move that the hon. member for Villeneuve be now heard.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Would the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre put his motion in writing?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In the circumstances I have no hesitation in yielding the floor, if that is the general wish of the committee.


Gordon Campbell Chown: I thank the hon. member for Trinity for his co-operation.
(Translation):


Mr. Caouelie:: Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank sincerely the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer) and the hon. member for Burn-aby-Coquitlam (Mr. Douglas) for the courtesy they have extended to me. In fact, I believe that both minority parties represented here should have the opportunity, during this second day of the debate, to put forward their views concerning the external affairs and the national defence of this country.
Mr. Chairman, we have listened with interest to the speeches made by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) and by the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker), and we must admit that neither of them have enlightened us very much, although they spoke for nearly two hours each. This reminds me somewhat of what Mr. Clemenceau said after the first world war:
I apologize to the memory of Attila and of his like, but the art of keeping people alive is much more complex than that of slaughtering them.
Mr. Chairman, during the whole day we have heard about national defence, armaments or nuclear weapons. We have heard also about possible attacks, to such an extent that we might have thought we were on the verge of a national, international or world conflict, while people like you and I are not thinking about any conquest nor seeking to stock nuclear weapons in Canada, but merely security, accompanied by freedom.
Mr. Chairman, national defence has been described to us as being the main problem
[The Chairman.]
of the Canadian government. In fact, the Leader of the Opposition stated that national defence should be based on national security, which we now have. And while he has managed to find out the weak points in the government, which cannot take a stand for or against and which seems to say: "Are we in favour of nuclear weapons or not?", the Leader of the Opposition did not say, however, what he would do if he were in the place of the government.
Two or three times he gave us to understand that if the Liberal party were reelected he would perhaps have some changes made, in order that we would not be in need of any nuclear warhead nor anything else like it.
Mr. Chairman, yesterday evening, when the Leader of the Opposition opened his remarks, the hon. member for Lapointe (Mr. Gregoire) rose on a point of order to make the following remarks:
Would the house consent to General Norstad sitting beside the Leader of the Opposition while the latter delivers his speech?
And the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson), with his usual spirit, his fluency of speech and especially his quick-wittedness, managed to say:
Mr. Chairman, that intervention represents the level of intelligence of the hon. gentleman with regard to General Norstad-
Of course, he is the only one in this house who can understand General Norstad.
-I may say that I would rather have General Norstad, a NATO commander and therefore a servant of Canada, sitting beside me than Mr. Hitler or any of his henchmen.
Mr. Chairman, I do not know what the leader was referring to when he made that statement. But I still say this to him: I would not like to have near me or by my side in this house neither Hitler, nor General Norstad, nor even the Leader of the Opposition who cannot act up to his convictions as a Canadian, on behalf of the Canadian people who are ready to give their lives and their blood for their country.
And it is this man who comes here and tells us, in a two-hour speech: "What would we do in Canada if we did not have the United States to tell us what to do? What would we do in Canada if we did not have General Norstad to tell us what to do, to teach us nationalism or internationalism?"
Mr. Chairman, any Canadian, whether the leader of a political party, Liberal or anything else, who is not able to assume his responsibilities as a Canadian any better than the Leader of the Opposition did today, does not even deserve the confidence of his own followers.

The Leader of the Opposition also ventured this afternoon to hold up to ridicule the leader of our party, the hon. member for Red Deer (Mr. Thompson), when he tried to prove that our leader contradicts himself, that he makes a statement in the west, another kind of statement in a different province and still another one elsewhere.
The leader of our group took part in the discussion yesterday. He called the attention of the house to the present situation in Canada. Among other things, he has put forward the general policy of our party.
That policy is not for one province only or for one area of our country, but for the whole of Canada.
This is what the leader of our party said:
First of all, what are the logical policies which develop out of this approach?
Let us face up to the problem as it is.
On behalf of my party, I pledge that Social Credit will never adopt or support a defence policy whereby Canada adopts or makes use of offensive weapons of indiscriminate or uncontrollable mass destruction. Canada should rather use its best efforts to promote the complete abandonment of this type of armament throughout the world, through effectively supervised multilateral international agreement.
(Text):
Progress reported.


Mr. Speaker:: When shall the report be
received? Now?


Stanley Howard Knowles: We wonder if the house would give unanimous consent to continuing to deal, during the hour from five to six, with the business which we have had before us up to this point. I raise the matter because the bills at the top of the list are in the names of members of this group. I refer particularly to my friend the hon. member for Kootenay West, whose bill would be called. We would be willing that this hour be given to the debate on external affairs.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I would point out to Your Honour that it does not matter whose bill is at the top of the list. If the time is sacrificed, it makes it that much more difficult for the other bills to be heard. We see no reason whatever for deviating from the normal rules of parliament.


Mr. Speaker:: It has been proposed to set aside the rule applicable for private members business, but it would require the unanimous consent of the house. Is it the wish of the house that the house revert to committee?


Some hon. Members:: Yes.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Mr. Speaker:: Is there unanimous consent?


Some hon. Members:: Yes.
Supply-External Affairs


John Whitney Pickersgill: When I rose, Mr. Speaker, I did so simply to point out that for my part I saw no particular reason for this procedure. However, if it is the general view of the house that it would be preferable to go on with this debate, I certainly should not like to be the only member of the house who stood in the way of doing so. In the circumstances I would suggest that we make it unanimous.


Mr. Speaker:: Is it unanimously agreed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.

The house in committee of supply, Mr. Chown in the chair.



[Stage Direction]
1. Departmental administration, $7,305,200.
David Réal Caouette: Mr. Chairman, I am very grateful to the members of the New Democratic party for their courtesy. My wish is that justice be given to the New Democratic party right after I am finished with my comments.
(Translation):
Mr. Chairman, I was quoting the points made yesterday by the hon. member for Red Deer with regard to the use of atomic arms.
He dealt with the following point:
The second point concerns whether or not Canada should acquire defensive nuclear weapons at this time-
That is the position now. The hon. member for Red Deer does neither establish nor analyse any of those principles, but he looks at the facts and takes them exactly as they are.
-at home or with NATO. The leader of the Liberal party has said that we must acquire nuclear armaments in order to keep our commitments with NORAD, with NATO. This is a reversal of the policies he enunciated up until the last couple of weeks.
And the Prime Minister gave us a striking example when he quoted from the statements the Leader of the Opposition made one, two and three years ago.
In the third instance, the hon. member for Red Deer said this:
How can this house make any sound decision before it has the facts. I say that the onus is on the government to make these necessary facts available. We on our side of the house agree that a special defence committee should be set up. It is absolutely imperative that means of continued sound approach to the safety of this country be established. Let us not forget that consideration. We in Social Credit are convinced that Canada's defence policy must not be a matter of partisan politics or party squabbles.
Now, since yesterday we are hearing about that attitude, about the attitude of the various parties in the house.
3140	HOUSE OF
Supply-External Affairs
I noted that the views of the New Democratic party were imbued with a Canadian spirit until its leader mentioned an international government which would establish centralization. In such a case, the hon. member might assume about the same importance as a church warden in some Canadian parish.
Social Crediters insist on having a clear and definite policy. We are against the use of nuclear weapons. We advocate instead the use of essential foodstuffs to feed the hungry people of the world. We would then set a real example of peace in the world, rather than an example of defence. When I speak of true peace, Mr. Chairman, this does not imply an armed peace, as some would have it. When we speak about defence, let us admit that we consider the possibility of a world wide communist attack, from Russia, China or somewhere else.
Well, communism, whether we like it or not, is an ideology and the way to fight efficiently against it, in the world, is not by using atomic weapons any more than by using nuclear bombs or weapons, or rifles, or guns.
One can kill communists, yes. One can put communists in jail, yes. But one cannot kill an idea. The way to fight an idea is with a better idea.
If we do not want to have communism, let us fight it with a better idea, one which, while guaranteeing security and freedom, will be such as to make freedom felt. That is what we Social Crediters are striving to achieve and to make people understand throughout Canada.
In the past, we have seen small countries in a state of extreme poverty sink into communism. Why is Russia not willing to use atomic weapons? It is because she is in the course of winning over the small countries of the world, purely from an economic standpoint, without resorting to war or atomic weapons.
I should like to state here, Mr. Chairman, that Cuba, a small country which is situated close to the American shores, would not be communist now if the free world had helped her when her citizens were dying of hunger as is the case at present in some Asiatic countries.
We appreciate that Canada must have some kind of a defence program in case of attack but we would not go too far in that respect.
We of the Social Credit party believe in the kind of offensive which provides food for
nvlr. Caouette.]

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It is our view, however, that Canada should contribute to the western alliance. It would be naive lor us to assume, as some do, that war can be avoided by weakness, disunity or unilateral disarmament. It is our obligation to seek by every possible means for multilateral and complete disarmament, the building of a world community and the establishment of the rule of law, and the fullest support for the United Nations does not absolve governments from planning to maintain the security of democratic institutions by building up a balance of power to deter or resist aggression. To this purpose Canada must contribute, and it is only sensible that her contribution should be made in co-operation with those nations to whom she is closely allied by ties of history, geography and common democratic tradition.
However, Mr. Chairman, the very fact that we are in an alliance enables us to contribute to the alliance the particular type of forces which the alliance most needs on the one hand and which this nation or any individual nation within the alliance can most suitably provide. It is our view that Canada's most suitable contribution to the alliance should not be in a nuclear form.
We find the switch of the Liberal party to advocating a nuclear role for Canada incomprehensible, unless indeed they are simply reflecting a view of political expediency and seeking perhaps to mirror rather than lead public opinion on this vital matter.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: We are not.


Mr. Brewin:: The commitments, such as they may have been, to NATO were made at a time when the prevailing military doctrine was that tactical nuclear weapons were an essential part of western defence against superior conventional forces. They were made at a time when the essential importance of conventional forces was overlooked. There is an almost unanimous stream of informed opinion that what the western alliance lacks is not nuclear weapons, either strategic or tactical, but adequate conventional forces.
Mr. Chairman, Sir John Strachey, former minister of war in Great Britain, in an article in "Encounter" of last April, called for reversal of NATO strategy. He recognized that there was a general impression that nuclear arms and nothing else were of importance. He pointed out that a nation or alliance which maintains large scale nuclear weapons alone would put itself at an extreme disadvantage as compared to a nation or alliance which maintained both such a nuclear force and adequate conventional forces also. The latter, he said, would almost certainly be able to have its way on all issues of less than life

and death importance. Over the years such a series of secondary triumphs might well add up to world hegemony.
Later, he says therefore for NATO to possess no forces on the ground or merely token ground forces, would be a formula for piecemeal capitulation. He further points out the danger of the use of tactical nuclear weapons which the Leader of the Opposition says are so important. The introduction of such weapons to redress the balance between the ground forces was, he said, a wholly unsuccessful move. The wide scale devastation of any country in which they would be used makes it almost certain that any limited nuclear war, or the use of tactical nuclear weapons, would escalate almost at once to a full scale nuclear war.
He goes on to say this; while it may be necessary while the Russians possess tactical nuclear weapons that the west should possess them also for deterrent reasons, it is important that they be held well back, under a separate chain of command, and never integrated with the front line ground forces.
I recommend, Mr. Chairman, to the members of this committee an excellent series of articles by a number of American scientists under the title "Arms Control, Disarmament and National Security". I had intended to give the committee the benefit of some of the observations here, but I am going to cut that short. I should like to refer, however, to a passage on page 310:
The uncertainties in the use of tactical nuclear weapons remain, even when they are under Anglo-American and Russian control. The disadvantages to either side that would follow from its initiating tactical nuclear war looms so great that it seems safe to predict that this possibility would be delayed until all other less dangerous means were exhausted. In short, more prolonged exposures to the rigours of nuclear strategy have led to increasing disenchantment with proposals for limiting nuclear war. The consequence is a reassessment of the role of conventional land armies in dealing with the explosive clashes of national wills, so as to maintain a risk that is commensurate with the provocation. The basic military mission of NATO is to provide just such a series of graduated responses. In the end the argument leads unavoidably to the conclusion that the only sensible military policy for the west would be to counter the Soviet conventional offensive forces in Europe by conventional counter forces-
-And it is in the redress of this unbalance that the smaller powers could make their strongest contribution to the defensive strength of NATO. This would mean the abandoning of any pretense that the use of nuclear weapons in Europe would be likely to do other than lead to widespread nuclear war.
I point out to this committee in commenting on this passage that the policy which is advocated by the Leader of the Opposition in this house, although he says it is a mistake, is that we should continue that policy of providing troops in Europe with these nuclear

weapons, the use of which this author has said here, and it is perfectly sound, would lead to widespread nuclear war. It is just when these opinions I have quoted, Mr. Chairman, are reaching general acceptance, and when a reappraisal of NATO strategy is in order, that the Liberal party or at least its leadership, have swung to the idea that Canada's role should be to proceed with the installation of nuclear warheads, albeit that a simultaneous effort apparently is to be made to renegotiate its commitment. Whatever this commitment may be, I suggest it is absolutely certain that it is the type of commitment that can be renegotiated before it is put into effect.
As I said before, the Leader of the Opposition in our opinion, clearly in the passage quoted by the Prime Minister and by the hon. member for Burnaby-Coquitlam yesterday, was of the opinion that rapid technological changes and changes in strategic doctrine always make it necessary in this field to be ready to discard the obsolete and dangerous. Yet at this very moment, when it is clear that tactical nuclear weapons are becoming both obsolete and dangerous, we have the Leader of the Opposition urging this country to step into that field.
He seeks to assume the mantle of national honour. In our view there is nothing honourable about insisting on pursuing a course that involves enormous waste of public funds, a misdirection of Canada's whole effort in defence, and a serious handicap to Canada's position as a conciliator amongst the nations.
The hon. member for St. Antoine-West-mount, in what I though was an interesting and worth-while contribution in this house in December, put a number of tests as to what Canada's role should be. I thought one of the most important he put forward was this: Our military function, he said, should not impede or run counter to the possibility of useful diplomatic initiatives which Canada can, and if she can should, undertake in the world. We should not, he said, be estopped from putting forward in the diplomatic field a constructive productive effort on behalf of peace. I could not agree more with the hon. member, and yet the policy which he now espouses seems to me totally inconsistent with that test. The adoption of nuclear arms by Canada cannot help but inhibit Canada from the effort to join with other nations, such as Sweden, in expanding the non-nuclear club, and cannot help but look as though Canada were a satellite of the United States.
In my opening remarks, I referred to the fact that the adoption of nuclear weapons for Canada was not only militarily unsound
Supply-External Affairs but also politically disastrous, and I added the words "morally unjustifiable". I do not mean by this that even the great horror of nuclear weapons makes any reliance on them morally wrong. Canada depends upon the deterrent effect of the nuclear power of the United States. However much we regret the balance of nuclear terror, we cannot condemn those who maintain that balance for our advantage. Canada's attitude cannot be that of renunciation of responsibility and the assumption of moral superiority. The reason I say that the adoption of nuclear weapons would be morally unjustifiable is that if, as I have argued, it is militarily unnecessary and politically disastrous, it would be morally wrong to pursue a course that adds to the danger of the proliferation and spread of nuclear capacity and the dangers of its ultimate use.
I concede, Mr. Chairman, to those who believe that Canada has an effective military role, and who believe that Canada would be strengthening and not weakening her political influence, that they may have moral justification for their attitude that Canada should then act accordingly. But I suggest that there is a very heavy onus on those who urge the necessity or advisability of Canada's entering the nuclear arms race, to show such a necessity clearly and unequivocally. In my opinion the proponents of nuclear arms for Canada, and that includes the Leader of the Opposition, have utterly failed to discharge that onus.
There is a naive argument put forward from time to time, sometimes by people who should know better, that Canadian troops should be armed with the most effective possible weapons, and it implies that the most effective possible weapons must necessarily be tactical nuclear weapons. This argument flies in the face of the far more important argument that such weapons should not, and please God never will in fact be used. It also flies in the face of the fact that we must do all in our power to prevent their use in order that our defence forces, as well as our civilization, shall be spared from annihilation.
Mr. Chairman, I think we have made our position unequivocally clear. I must say I thoroughly enjoyed today's speech by the Prime Minister, but I still listened with some interest to try to discover what the policy of the government was in regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. I still think that it was left in a fluid-the word he used -intangible state. I still do not know what the actual situation is.
I suggest the time has come for the government to make up its mind whether we should have a nuclear role or not, and to tell the
3144	HOUSE OF
Supply-External Affairs people of Canada where it stands in that regard. I hope and I wish that this house maybe given an opportunity of voting on this matter, and in accordance with its convictions, so that our convictions can be registered. Because this is a matter of such vital import there may be differences within individual parties, but I suggest this is a situation where Canada is at a point of choice between a nuclear and non-nuclear course which may spell out our fate and the fate of our children and grandchildren for years to come; and I believe we in parliament should be given the opportunity of voting and putting ourselves clearly on record as to where we stand on this issue. If we are not given that opportunity here then I hope it will not be too long before the people of Canada themselves will be given an opportunity to express their views on this issue. To make it crystal clear, I repeat that we are against the adoption of nuclear weapons for Canada or on Canadian soil.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Chairman, before the hon. member for Marquette speaks, I would like to ask if we are to understand that the Minister of National Defence, who is in the committee, does not intend to participate in this debate on defence?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I think, coming after the nearly two hour speech by the Prime Minister in connection with our position in regard to this, there is not much to be served by me going into the debate at this moment. I would just like to say that the estimates of the department will be before the house very shortly and I will be delighted to make all statements and answer all questions anybody would like to put.


Paul Joseph James Martin: May I ask the
Minister of National Defence if he is not aware this is the first time in Canadian history when defence matters have been discussed that the minister of national defence has remained silent?


Donald Methuen Fleming: That statement is utter rubbish.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Has the extinct volcano come to life?


Donald Methuen Fleming: The blabbermouth from Bonavista-Twillingate is still active.


Mr. Mandziuk:: Mr. Chairman, this day's debate has no doubt given the Canadian people a clear idea as to where the four parties stand on matters of foreign policy and matters of defence. In the short time left at my disposal I do not propose to review anything that has been said by others on these two points. I just wish to make a few reflections, such as no doubt would be made


by the Canadian people on reading Hansard, reading the newspapers or hearing the radio and television.
The comments I wish to make are on the first two addresses to the house yesterday. The first address by the Secretary of State for External Affairs was given in a manner as befits a senior statesman, with no bricks thrown at the opposition nor at his predecessors in the same office. He was not playing a political game. He used no vote-catching phrases. He did not play up to the galleries. It was just an honest review of world affairs as he saw them, and from what he said he showed that he has mastered the portfolio of foreign affairs for which he is responsible.
Sincerity could be heard in every word of his speech, but contrast that with the address by the first spokesman for the Liberal party, the hon. member for Essex East. He opened his remarks with some slurring statement on the minister's inability to proceed with his address. He minimized the efforts of the minister in trying to achieve peace. The hon. member might at least have been as kind as a British journalist who, as reported in a special to the Globe and Mail on November 27, 1962, said:
When you come right down to it, the Canadian delegation is the best at the United Nations. Can't understand why.
The hon. member could at least have been as generous as that to the Canadian delegation. Not once did the minister refer in the first person to anything that had been done. He gave credit to those who worked under him and worked with him, but the hon. member for Essex East reached the height of eloquence when he extolled the role of his leader as a freedom fighter. He repeated what he had said in a previous debate on external affairs. He used different quotations from other debates of this kind, and soon he will have put on record everything that the Leader of the Opposition ever said in the United Nations when he was leader of the Canadian delegation. It appeared as if he were defending his leader. If he had that motive, against whom was he defending his leader? There had been no criticism from this side of the house regarding that hon. gentleman's performance while he had the task of leading the Canadian delegation and had the portfolio now held by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I was answering the Prime Minister.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: One had the feeling he was trying to build up his leader. We have no quarrel with that. Probably his leader does need a little bit of building up, particularly

after some of the events which occurred in the last few weeks and months when some very prominent lieutenants of that party left the leaky boat of the Liberal ship, defecting, and going out to what they think are greener fields. But I think he reached a greater height of eloquence when he attacked the Prime Minister of Canada. Oh, yes, he rubbed his hands with glee and those behind him applauded because they thought they had found something, some little promise that the Prime Minister had made which he did not carry out, an election promise. The Canadian people know the promise he made. He made a promise that he would put before the United Nations a resolution condemning Soviet imperialism, and he did not do it. Those to whom the hon. gentleman is catering, those he expects to keep under the Liberal flag, or those he expects to entice under the Liberal flag, know that this resolution was not put before the United Nations because it would not have received majority support.


Paul Joseph James Martin: That is right.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: He, with the experience that he claims in international affairs and at the United Nations, knows why. Power politics is one reason. Even the United States secretary of state, Dean Rusk, who still believes in one indivisible Russia, would have been very reluctant to have gone along with us. Second, the composition of the United Nations is changing. We have there a very large bloc of Afro-Asian nations. They only understand imperialism in so far as it concerns the question of the whites over the blacks. They cannot understand Russia's imperialism over the whites. They cannot understand the dangers of communism, and we must bear with them until they see through Russian duplicity.
Why did the hon. member for Essex East deviate from the subject about which he was speaking to take a crack at the Prime Minister? It is not hard to draw your own conclusions. These are the Liberal tactics- destroy the leader, and they think they can destroy the party. I assure this house that they will not destroy the leader, and they will not destroy the party.


Mr. Byrne:: They will destroy themselves. They have done it.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: Keep dreaming. That is what you are living on, dreams and wishful thinking. If any hon. gentleman opposite thought that the Prime Minister was not fit, they had a sample of his fitness this afternoon.


Miss LaMarsh:: We certainly did.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: You asked for a sample of the Prime Minister's fitness, and you received it.
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Supply-External Affairs


James Allen (Jim) Byrne: He was in a fit all right; there is no doubt about that.


Gordon Minto Churchill: The hon. member had better withdraw that remark.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: He intended to downgrade the Prime Minister-


Gordon Minto Churchill: Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to interrupt, but I think the remark made by the hon. member opposite should be withdrawn. It would read rather badly, I think, in Hansard, and perhaps not the way he intended it.


Mr. Laing:: Then you should want to leave it there, perhaps.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Order. I am afraid the Chair did not hear the remark and therefore cannot pass judgment on it. That is one of the difficulties experienced in this particular location in the house, that interjections that are so close to the Hansard reporter do not reach the ear of the Chair. However, they do reach the Hansard reporter if he happens to be sitting in close proximity to that part of the chamber from which the interjection is made. I would have to hear the remark in order to pass judgment on it.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Kootenay East interjected, with regard to the Prime Minister, that he was in a fit. That would have reached the ear of the Hansard reporter. It is a remark that is very uncomplimentary and very unparliamentary, and I suggest it should be withdrawn.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Is the hon. member going to withdraw the remark?


James Allen (Jim) Byrne: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member who was speaking suggested that the Prime Minister was quite fit. I said that he appeared to be in a fit all right this afternoon.


Mr. Green:: Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that the hon. member for Kootenay East withdraw his remark. That is no withdrawal and no explanation; it is just a repetition of the insulting remark that he made.


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Mr. Pigeon:: That is all he can do, anyway.


Gordon Campbell Chown: It would not be a very pleasant way to cap our day, to have something of that nature on Hansard, and I think the hon. member would prefer to withdraw it.


James Allen (Jim) Byrne: Mr. Chairman, I made the remark in answer to what was said by the hon. gentleman who was speaking, that the Prime Minister was quite fit. I said that he appeared to be in a fit, and to me he appeared to be in a fit. I do not see anything offensive in that.

Supply-External Affairs


Howard Charles Green: That is no withdrawal; that is just a repetition of the insulting statement a third time.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Order. I am sure that such a remark about the hon. member's leader would not be accepted by the members of the opposition. I would ask him to withdraw the remark, without referring to Beauchesne or any specific reference, which I am quite prepared to do if that is the desire of the hon. member. Accordingly I would ask him to withdraw the remark.


James Allen (Jim) Byrne: If the house feels that it is an improper remark-


Some hon. Members:: We do.


James Allen (Jim) Byrne: -I am quite happy to withdraw it. I have noticed that a number of things have been said back and forth. I do not think my remark has any greater implication than the other things which have been said. But if it is the wish of the house that I should withdraw it, the remark is withdrawn.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: Mr. Chairman, in continuing I wish to say that such small potato tactics of criticism in order to downgrade a world statesman have no effect at all on the members of this house or on the Canadian people.


Mr. Teillel:: Mr. Chairman, I think in all fairness it should be pointed out that the hon. member has withdrawn his remark, and I would suggest that what the hon. member has just said is quite uncalled for.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: My remarks did not refer to the hon. member's withdrawal; they referred to the opposition's criticism, slander and downgrading of my leader.


Arthur Laing: Slander?


James Allen (Jim) Byrne: Mr. Chairman, I think the hon. member should give some consideration to what he is saying. There has been no attempt to slander anyone here this afternoon in any of the speeches I have heard. This charge that the-


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: I was not referring to the hon. member.


James Allen (Jim) Byrne: -opposition benches are attempting to slander the Prime Minister simply has no foundation whatsoever. The Prime Minister is the leader of the government. If we believe that what the government is doing is wrong in principle in every way, then we have every right to tell him so. So far as the Prime Minister's health is concerned, I have never cast any reflection upon his health. His perception as to what is right and what is wrong, his ability to make decisions, that is another thing. But so far


as his health is concerned I have never at any time questioned it, and I do not think anyone in this party has either.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: Mr. Chairman, the world knows that the leader of this party from the time he took public office has been a freedom fighter. In the house and outside the house he has fought that people might receive full Canadian citizenship. He has fought for the freedom of all peoples. He champions the weak. 'If I had the time-as I would if there had not been these interruptions-I would have appreciated the privilege of putting on the record the resolution which the Prime Minister sponsored at the NATO ministerial meeting in September, 1957. With regard to the enslaved nations of Europe he said:
The suppression of their liberty will not last forever.
I could quote what the Prime Minister said at the United Nations general assembly on September 26, 1960, but I have no time to do so. I could quote what he said at a meeting for the unveiling of a monument of Taras Shevchenko in Winnipeg before 25,000 to 30,000 Ukrainians in July, 1961. I could quote what the leader of my party said to the Polish alliance when he spoke to that distinguished body in Sarnia on August 18, 1961. I could quote his address to the ethnic groups, an address which he gave in Toronto on November 22, 1961. However, time does not permit me to put those quotations on the record. Nevertheless, I assure you, Mr. Chairman, that those who look up to the Prime Minister as a world statesman did not in vain present him with a plaque in New York in 1961. I believe I shall have the time to read the wording on the plaque. It is as follows:
To the Right Hon. John George Diefenbaker in grateful recognition for the support he has given to the cause of freedom for the nations of east central Europe and his forthright stand in the United Nations against Soviet colonialism.
This is signed by the assembly of captive European nations. What criticism can be levelled at a man who has stood up so often to defend the rights and freedoms of peoples behind the iron curtain? I am not criticizing the Leader of the Opposition. But let us put everything on the record. I wish to say this: the words which the Prime Minister has used on these various occasions are the words used at the anniversary celebrations of our different national and ethnic groups in Canada. The Ukrainians, for example, are celebrating the forty fifth anniversary of their independence this week. As a matter of fact only three days ago, on January 22, those in the free world are celebrating or have celebrated the forty fifth anniversary of independence.

Business of the House


Paul Joseph James Martin: A very happy anniversary.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: The Byelorussians celebrate theirs on March 25, and the Poles mark their anniversary on November 11. All these people look up to this man who has taken up their cause. He had the courage to speak to this imperial dictator-to speak to the emperor of this godless empire and challenge him to give these people an opportunity freely to express by their votes whether or not they wish to be within the Russian colonial empire.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Would the hon. member permit a question?


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: Certainly.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Since the hon. gentleman wants everything on the record, does he recall the Hungarian people who my hon. friend the Leader of the Opposition did so much to help come into this country-35,000 of them when the previous government was in office? Let us put the whole record straight.


J. Nicholas (Nick) Mandziuk: I am not belittling the Leader of the Opposition. I am just pointing out the role the Prime Minister has played in world affairs. I say on the subject of repercussions that after he had delivered that address to the ethnic groups in Toronto the ambassador of the Soviet union took exception to it. At a press conference in December the latter told the press that every time the Canadian prime minister spoke about Russian colonialism it put him into a humorous mood because there was no such thing as Russian colonialism or Russian imperialism. He held himself out as an Armenian who was, nevertheless, ambassador for the U.S.S.R. He also pointed out that the military attache at the embassy was of Ukrainian origin. But I ask this house: is Armenia free? Is the Ukraine free?
I am proud of the role played by the Canadian delegation at the United Nations. I am proud of the address given by the hon.
member who led the Canadian delegation in this last session. It is true that when he began speaking the Soviet delegation walked out. But, in the words of the Prime Minister, you cannot have in international politics two principles contrary to each other. If we condemn colonialism in Africa and Asia we must condemn it in Europe. I feel that in the light of the attitude Canada has taken, of the attitude the Secretary of State for External Affairs has taken and the way the Prime Minister is carrying on, the time is not far distant when the words of Mr. Khrushchev will apply-the words he used when he said that colonial empires will disintegrate. His will do so, even if it is the last one to disintegrate.
Progress reported.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

John Whitney Pickersgill: Before you leave the chair, Mr. Speaker, I wonder if I could ask the leader of the house to indicate what business the government is proposing for next week.


Gordon Minto Churchill: The business for Monday will be legislation-item No. 4 on today's order paper, Bill C-87 to provide for a national economic development board. The second item will be No. 2 on today's order paper dealing with the Freight Rates Reduction Act. If that should be completed there is No. 27 on the order paper, the resolution dealing with the National Productivity Council Act.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Could the minister indicate what business there will be for the subsequent days and whether the business he has announced will be continued with until completed? Could he also tell us if there is to be a budget next week?


Gordon Minto Churchill: Mr. Speaker has cautioned the house against entering into a debate at this time. I have announced the business for Monday.


[Stage Direction]
At six o'clock the house adjourned without question put, pursuant to standing order.
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[Stage Direction]
Monday, January 28, 1963