1961-09-14

EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. L. B. Pearson (Leader of the Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, I wonder whether the Prime Minister would care to comment on a statement made in Ghana yesterday by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, presumably on behalf of the government, to the effect that the United Kingdom now had to choose between the European common market and the commonwealth.


Right Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I saw that report. It is a news report and I am sure it does not represent what was said. I have made it very clear on a number of occasions that we in Canada have made representations to the United Kingdom and have pointed out the potential effects of its joining under the treaty of Rome unless provision is made at the time of joining the Six for an exception in respect of those things upon which Canada and thte other parts of the commonwealth depend. No such alternative as that suggested by the question of the Leader of the Opposition has been advanced at any time by the government.
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, following the discussions that took place when Mr. Sandys visited various parts of the commonwealth, stated in the House of Commons that an application to join the common market would be made-I am paraphrasing what he said in that connection-but that commonwealth relationships would not be thereby weakened economically or otherwise.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask a supplementary question. Would it be possible for the Prime Minister to secure for the information of members of the house the text of what appears to have been a very important statement by the Minister of Trade and Commerce?


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, the interesting point there is that this was a meeting behind closed doors. I have found in the past, as the hon. gentleman must have found
in his experience, that some of the interpretations, speculative and otherwise, that follow such meetings very often bear little relationship to what was actually said.



VISIT OF RED CHINESE MISSION TO CANADA

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. Gordon Churchill (Acting Minister of Trade and Commerce):: Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Ottawa West asked me a question with regard to a report that a delegation from communist China might be coming to Canada to discuss trade matters. The information I have is that the Chinese state trading corporations have expressed the intention of sending a group of their representatives to Canada. I am informed that the group hopes to begin its market study in Ottawa toward the end of this month, and to have discussions with Canadian businessmen in various centres throughout the country.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Frank Howard (Skeena):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and ask the minister what progress is being made with respect to transforming the recommendations of the joint Senate and H.ouse of Commons committee on Indian affairs into legislative form, and whether we might expect an amending bill this session.


Hon. Ellen L. Fairclough (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration):: When the recommendations contained in the report are finally considered by the government and action is contemplated, the house will be informed.



INTRODUCTION OF AMENDMENTS TO IMMIGRATION ACT

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. J. W. Pickersgill (Bonavista-Twil-lingate):: If I may I should like to ask the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration a question. Does the hon. lady expect to be in a position to introduce the revision of the Immigration Act at this session of parliament?
8334	HOUSE OF
Inquiries oj the Ministry Hon. Ellen L. Fairclough (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration): Mr. Speaker, while considerable progress has been made in the considerations involved, I have not one to present to parliament yet. I am hoping to have one at the earliest possible moment.



COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask the Acting Minister of Finance a question arising out of a question I asked him yesterday. Is the statement made, according to press reports yesterday, that the deputy minister of trade and commerce will lead the Canadian delegation to the forthcoming commonwealth conference, accurate?


Hon. George C. Nowlan (Acting Minister of Finance):: The statement was accurate. I was going to reply to this question in a moment, after others had been answered. I was asked by the Leader of the Opposition as to the delegation. It is to be led by Mr. Roberts, deputy minister of trade and commerce and there is a possibility, I am told, of one change, but the plan at the moment, and the intention, is to send Mr. Roberts, Mr. J. H. Warren of trade and commerce, Mr. Latimer of trade and commerce, Dr. Annis of the Department of Finance and Mr. Turner of the Department of Agriculture. Those three government departments will be represented. Then Mr. D. R. Taylor from Canada House, London, will join the delegation and participate in the discussions.



IMMIGRATION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. L. D. Cresiohl (Cariier):: I should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister. A United Press release appearing in this morning's newspapers stated that an office receptionist wrote the Prime Minister asking him to recall the deportation order against a Polish defector and allow him to remain in Canada. My question is, did the Prime Minister receive such a letter and can the Prime Minister make any statement to the house as to whether anything is being planned to deal with this matter?


John George Diefenbaker: I think the hon. gentleman would have to be more definite in his statement than just saying "an office receptionist". Such a letter would be rather difficult to locate 

from an examination of the files. If he would give me the name of the person, I will certainly have the matter looked into.


Leon David Crestohl: This letter was sent by Sophia Horan and concerns Mr. Francis Tobias, who was recently ordered deported by the immigration department.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. A. McGrath (St. John's East):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of National Defence. Does the minister have any comment to make on reports that Canadian army personnel, who did such an excellent job in fighting forest fires in Newfoundland, are now in the process of returning to their units on the mainland?


Hon. D. S. Harkness (Minister of National Defence):: Yes, Mr. Speaker. The continuing rain and cool weather in Newfoundland have relieved the situation to an extent that the provincial authorities have agreed to the release of the armed forces. The air lift for the return of the troops to their home stations will commence today and will continue until September 24.



INDUSTRY


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. Paul Martin (Essex East):: May I ask
the genial Acting Minister of Finance a question. Can he say whether arrangements have been made to meet representatives of the city of Windsor and the united automobile workers regarding representations to be made by those agencies in connection with the Bladen report? Can the minister tell the house, now that the report has been published for some four months, whether the government has reached any decision on any of the recommendations that were made, and when we may expect some action from the government one way or another on those recommendations, affecting one of Canada's important industries in which there is so much unemployment?


George Clyde Nowlan: Mr. Speaker, action was taken on that report almost immediately in the budget, in taking the excise tax off automobiles, something which was urged on the preceding government for many years and on which no action had been taken. Many other matters are referred to in the report.

It is a most important report. Consultations and discussions have been taking place with unions and others in the industry, and in governmental committees as well. It is a very embracing step and requires a good deal of study. When decisions are made with respect to the report the house will be informed, if the house is then sitting.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I thank the genial minister, Mr. Speaker, but is he not aware, with regard to the excise tax-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. The hon. member seems to be embarking on a proposition rather than a question.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Then, Mr. Speaker, since you so forthrightly admonished me, may I ask the Minister of National Revenue whether the government will see the two bodies to which I have referred in connection with a matter that is so vital to the community from which I come, and to the industry.


George Clyde Nowlan: Mr. Speaker, the members of the government are continually meeting delegations that wish to make representations on matters of public importance. I personally have had no request made to me for such a meeting. However, if such a request has been made I am sure that every effort will be made to reach mutual agreement on a satisfactory time for such a meeting.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I thank the
minister, Mr. Speaker.


George Clyde Nowlan: I am informed by the parliamentary secretary that no approach has been made to the department itself with respect to this matter.



BROADCASTING


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. M. J. A. Lambert (Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of National Revenue):: Yesterday the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate asked a question concerning an application for a new station at Tatamagouche, Nova Scotia, by Colchester Broadcasting Company. That application was heard during the hearings of the board of broadcast governors during the week of August 22, and under date of September 5 the board made its public announcement that its recommendation on this application was for denial.


John Whitney Pickersgill: If I may I should like to ask the parliamentary secretary a supplementary
Supply-National Defence question and inquire whether the reason for the denial was that it was considered that the area was adequately served.


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: Mr. Speaker, in its public announcement the board did give its reason, and it was generally in that tenor.



TELEVISION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. H. J. Robichaud (Gloucester):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to direct a question to the Minister of National Revenue. Is he now in a position to supply the information for which I asked yesterday with regard to the application of station CJBR-TV, Rimouski, for the erection of a satellite station to serve Mada-waska and Victoria counties?


George Clyde Nowlan: Mr. Speaker, I am not in a position to answer that question today. I will try to get the information and deal with it tomorrow or Monday.



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

[Stage Direction]
232.	Departmental administration, $3,455,378.
Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Chairman, at the adjournment last night, following my remarks the Minister of National Defence quite properly said that he did not intend to take any direction from me as to what he should or should not say in this debate. But I am sure that on reflection the Minister of National Defence will agree that at this critical time it is essential for the government to state its position with regard to the question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The government can state that it has no intention at the present time of acquiring these weapons, or it can take the position that it proposes to acquire them, but it must not leave the house in the position where it is denied an opportunity of debating this matter at the earliest possible moment when the government has made its decision.
I expressed the view yesterday, bearing in mind the well known device employed by this administration, that we might well find that the government will make a decision after adjournment and before we come back to this house. The country is now asking this government to declare its policy with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The government, before this debate concludes, if it wishes to discharge its responsibility, should face this question and tell us precisely where it stands.

Supply-National Defence
We are entitled to know what is the government's policy about Canada accepting nuclear warheads. We know the position of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and we have very much suspected, from pronouncements of the Minister of National Defence, that he and his colleague are not in agreement on this subject. Indeed the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the former minister of national defence did not on this question seem to be in full accord. What conclusion are we to draw from the remarks of the Prime Minister in his speech the other day, when he paid to his colleague a tribute which he felt was deserved? He said idealism was something that was essential, but we had to recognize that opinions had to be changed from time to time, particularly in the discharge of responsibilities in this difficult and complicated period.
Are we to conclude from this that the government is about to make a decision with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons? Was this statement by the Prime Minister a forerunner of the government's intention? Was this a way of making easier the load of the Secretary of State for External Affairs? If that is the situation, then we certainly are warranted in asking the Minister of National Defence to say forthrightly where this government stands at this time with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons in Canada. We certainly cannot tell from the statement made by the minister on September 12, as reported at page 8223 of Hansard. The minister said, among other things, beginning in the second last paragraph:
Defensive weapons with a nuclear capability may be required to maintain the credibility of the deterrent, and in the event that the worst happened would be required to provide an effective defence against Soviet aggression.
Then he said:
The situation is much the same as that of a man living in a lonely cabin in the woods who fears he may be attacked by a bear. He does not wait until the bear actually attacks him to buy a rifle, but secures it beforehand and has it ready in the event of need.
One might well ask, with regard to that statement, does it mean-does the minister intend-that there shall be no ammunition for the rifle? What does the statement mean? Then he said:
The Bomarc will form part of the defences we must maintain against the manned bomber as long as there are potentially hostile aircraft in existence that can be used against us.
These statements are the closest indication the minister has given of what the intentions of the government are, but they do not tell us what, in fact, the government really intends to do in this matter. This question is of vital importance. On February 20, 1959

the Prime Minister announced the government's policy. He announced that it was the government's intention to acquire nuclear warheads. I refer to volume 2 of Hansard for 1959, and the words of the Prime Minister as reported at page 1223 are as follows:
The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada.
Then he went on to say that problems connected with the arming of the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO defence tasks were also being studied. Then, in volume 1 of Hansard of last year, the Prime Minister said at page 73-


Douglas Scott Harkness: On what date?


Paul Joseph James Martin: On January 18, 1960. He said:
We pointed out in detail that careful thought is being given to the principles that in our opinion are applicable to the acquisition and control of nuclear weapons. I proceeded to deal with our views in that connection and summarized those views by saying that the full potential of the Bomarc could be achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads.
He commented on the retention by the United States of ownership and custody of nuclear weapons and then, because he properly wanted to guard against the diffusion of nuclear weapons, he said that whatever was done, once the weapons were acquired we could be sure that they would be used only on conditions agreed to by the Canadian government. But later the government changed its mind. The Prime Minister said later that we would accept nuclear weapons from the United States only if there was joint control. The Prime Minister said he wanted the kind of joint control which prevails in the United Kingdom. Then on November 24, 1960 the Prime Minister added a new reservation, which was that no decision with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be taken as long as any progress was being made in the matter of disarmament.
The Prime Minister made it clear in his foreign policy statement on Monday that there was, indeed, no progress being made in the matter of disarmament. I agree with the right hon. gentleman that it is regrettable that notwithstanding the efforts of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and others, no progress in disarmament is being made. The test talks have been halted. The Soviet union now wants to integrate those talks with general discussions on disarmament. The Prime Minister is right in saying no progress

is being made in disarmament. But because no progress is being made in this direction are we to conclude, in the light of the statement made by the right hon. gentleman on November 24, 1960, that the government is now about to acquire nuclear weapons?
However, the Secretary of State for External Affairs does not share the Prime Minister's views as to whether or not progress is being made in this field. He said the other day in answer to what I had said that he was still optimistic about the possibility of progress in disarmament being made at the forthcoming session of the general assembly of the United Nations.
Who is right, the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs? If the Prime Minister is right, then the Minister of National Defence owes it to the country to tell us now what are the government's intentions in this matter, and not to clothe its intentions in words incapable of interpretation. Not to do so suggests that the government at this moment has not a clear and unambiguous policy.
As a matter of fact, the only definite statement we have had with regard to this matter is the statement of the parliamentary secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. When he spoke in the foreign affairs debate he said, as reported at page 8162 of Hansard:
The government's stand on this matter has been made quite clear. At the present time we say no, but if events should take place in the world that might require these weapons then the government would have to give reconsideration to that position.
The parliamentary secretary of course is not a member of the government, but he does hold an important post in the administration at the present time. He said that the present policy with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons is "No". This is the only forthright statement on this subject that we have had from this government in this debate. Is this the policy of the government? I ask the minister of defence now, is it a fact that the parliamentary secretary, unwittingly perhaps, has stated the real position of the government with regard to this matter? In any event, the ambiguity and the lack of clarity in the declarations of the minister deserve to be compared with what he is reported to have said in May of this year outside of this house. He is reported in the Toronto Star of May 20, 1961 as having said-


Douglas Scott Harkness: I would be very careful with regard to anything they report.


Paul Joseph James Martin: My hon. friend can correct me. If he thinks the Toronto Star has misreported him, let him so state. I do not want the minister to be misquoted. What
90205-6-526
Supply-National Defence I want the minister to do is to tell us precisely what the policy of the government is in this matter. This is what the minister is reported to have said:
And no decision will be taken until a satisfactory agreement on joint control of such warheads has been worked out between ourselves and the United States.
If nuclear weapons are acquired by the Canadian forces, they will only be used as the Canadian government decides and in a manner approved by the Canadian government.


Douglas Scott Harkness: That quotation from the Toronto Star is right for once.


Paul Joseph James Martin: My hon. friend says that the quotation is right. I thank him, because it advances the position one step further. Is it a fact that there is now awaiting Canadian signature an agreement with the United States which meets the conditions envisaged by the Minister of National Defence in this statement of May 20. Surely when we are discussing the estimates of the Department of National Defence, at what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said, is the most critical time since world war II, no government can function without giving parliament its views as to the situation and taking parliament and the country into its confidence. Surely that is the position. If the government takes the position at this time that it cannot state its position in any other way than it has done, let the minister give us the reason for this. We are entitled to know precisely what is the government's view and policy.
I mentioned yesterday the way the government treated parliament with regard to amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act. Two days before parliament adjourned the government, through the Minister of Labour, said it was still considering amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act, and within four or five days after parliament adjourned the government announced a royal commission to inquire into the whole question of unemployment insurance. We want to make sure at this critical time in human history that after the house adjourns this government does not make an announcement, when the house is not in session, on a matter of such vital concern to the people of Canada.
Our position is that we should not acquire nuclear weapons. The Leader of the Opposition has stated our reasons on other occasions.
I went over some of them again the other day. Our reason is not that we do not want Canadians to be as efficiently endowed with the necessary instruments to provide for effective defence as others, but we recognize that the deterrent now exists in a primary way through the United States.

Supply-National Defence
We want to discourage the diffusion of nuclear weapons. We share the government's view that we do not want war. We certainly do not want to see nuclear war. We do not agree with the Associate Minister of National Defence that we can now speak of war in terms of victory. If a nuclear war develops there will be no victor. Anyone who takes a contrary view is simply not conscious of the terrible, cataclysmic consequences which would result from the modern instruments of war. This is the situation, and so we want to discourage the diffusion of nuclear weapons. They now exist in the hands of a limited group. If we acquire nuclear weapons, how can we complain about other countries acquiring them?
We do not intend to become a nuclear power because we believe this is really beyond our resources. We believe that the fulfilment of our duty to our allies in NATO does not depend on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canada at this time. As I say, the deterrent now rests with the United States, and certainly if we were to acquire nuclear weapons in Canada-I am sure the Secretary of State for External AfEairs has argued this to his colleagues-this would not help him in his negotiations and consultations with other countries at the United Nations. Therefore we are entitled to ask, what is the government's position in this vital matter?
I have asked the minister, as have other members on this side, for a clear and unequivocal statement of policy. Surely this house is entitled to that at this time. I will say that I agree fully with what the minister said yesterday on another subject. I refer to the criticism he levelled at the position taken by the hon. member for Kootenay West regarding his party's position on NATO. I agree with him that the reservation which binds the new party with regard to NATO is one which is contrary to the very constitutional set-up of NATO now. It ignores the fact that the nuclear possession of weapons, which forms part of that reservation, is an already existent fact. The only reason we have NATO is the failure of the Soviet union to implement article 43 of the charter of the United Nations, which would render unnecessary the existence of any alliance such as NATO itself.
I would recall to the hon. member for Kootenay West and others the words of their former leader, Mr. Coldwell, who on March 28, 1949, used these words with regard to NATO, as reported on page 2073 of Hansard:
Contrary to the propaganda against the proposed North Atlantic treaty, the proposal is not an attempt on the part of so-called American imperialism to bring western European democracies

into an alliance for the purpose of destroying the Soviet union. It originates in the anxiety of western European democracies to persuade North America to support them in a defensive union. They believed this would halt a threat of aggression and provide the necessary defensive strength so that if the Soviet union has aggressive plans against them she will be turned from that course and thus make possible the peaceful solution of existing difficulties and problems.
Those words of Mr. Coldwell reflect what has happened. I agree with the Minister of National Defence that if it had not been for NATO we might have found ourselves the victims of aggression. In any event, as Mr. Coldwell has said and as we know and as the hon. gentleman knows, our membership in NATO has to do with its defensive purposes. We complain, of course, and no one has done more in that regard than the Leader of the Opposition, about its failure to live up to the economic objectives of article II of the treaty. Of course. But at this time when individual countries vis-a-vis the Soviet union would be outnumbered, what is there for like-minded nations of the free world to do other than combine in a defensive alliance?
There may be difficulties. My hon. friend has difficulties about West Germany. That is understandable because of his participation in the first world war. But the fact is that a realistic examination of the situation suggests that there was nothing else for Canada to do in 1949 but to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, so strongly supported by the leader of the C.C.F. at that time, and a year ago violently opposed in this house by the present leader of the C.C.F., now constituting itself into a new political group that now, under duress by its existing leader, gives support to NATO on terms that would render impractical the operation of that body. That is a fact that hon. gentlemen must not overlook.
I agree with the Minister of National Defence with regard to his complete answer yesterday, in which he pointed out that NATO is now a nuclear power. He forgot to mention the declaration made by General Gruenther in 1957, I believe, with regard to the intentions of NATO in that respect. On this point I am in full accord with the minister. We have given indication in this house that we appreciate the problems facing the administration at this time with regard to the current crisis in Berlin.
But having said that, I repeat to the Minister of National Defence my view that when we are discussing these estimates, estimates involving so much of the treasure of this nation; at a time when we are all concerned about the dangers that lurk ahead, dangers that have been characterized by the Secretary of State for External Affairs as indicating that we are on the brink of war,

the refusal of the Minister of National Defence in the face of that situation to state clearly what is the government's position with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons is in my judgment, I say respectfully, a misreading by the minister and the government of their obligations to the house and to the people of Canada at this critical time.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, in his usual manner the hon. member for Essex East has made such statements as "the government must declare its position now on nuclear weapons"-


Paul Joseph James Martin: Hear, hear.


Douglas Scott Harkness: -and so on, as though the government had not made numerous statements in connection with its position on nuclear weapons.
Supply-National Defence say whether you are going to get nuclear weapons and when you are going to get them", and so on is not going to get the hon. member for Essex East or anybody else in the opposition any further ahead. As I said, our position has been stated. It is there, it is clear and definite, and I am not prepared to make any further statement at this time along the lines on which the hon. member for Essex East has been insisting.


Mr. Hellyer:: Will the minister permit a question? Will he say whether the policy is the same as it was in May, when he is reported as having said in Victoria, as found in the Victoria daily Colonist, a paper not too unfriendly to the minister-


Douglas Scott Harkness: A very good paper.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Too numerous. That is the trouble.


Douglas Scott Harkness: All these statements are along the same line.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Each one different from the previous one.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think they make the position quite clear. The hon. member for Essex East read part of the statement made by the Prime Minister on February 20, and he referred to one or two other statements. Actually the position the government has taken with regard to nuclear weapons was outlined in statements by the Prime Minister on February 20, 1959, January 18, 1960, February 9, 1960, July 4, 1960, and July 14, 1960.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I read them all.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The hon. member for Essex East read parts of one or two of those statements, and 1 think the parts he read made the situation quite clear. I do not think there is any need for me to take up further time of the house in rereading them. They are there, they are quite definite, and I see no reason why the hon. member or any other hon. member needs to be in any doubt as to what has been the position of the government on nuclear weapons. What the hon. member is trying to do is bludgeon me into making a yes or no statement at this time as to the securing of nuclear weapons. I tell him right away that he is not going to bludgeon me into making any statement before the government is ready to make it.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Before it makes up its mind.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As I say, the position we have taken has been outlined and I think it is quite clear. This business of "you must
90205-6-526J


Paul Theodore Hellyer: A very fine paper, the minister says with respect to the decision regarding nuclear weapons: "Mr. Harkness stated the time to make a decision is when the time comes". Is that still the position of the minister?


Frank Howard: Mr. Chairman, I have listened with a great deal of interest to the remarks of the hon. member for Essex East, and I have read as carefully as I could the speeches made in this debate by members of the Liberal party, of the government party and of this party. It seems to me that what must logically follow from those things advocated by the hon. member for Essex East, and I am sure other members of that party are associated with him in this regard, is that he is advocating that Canada should become a full-fledged nuclear power in possession of all these hellish weapons that now exist. I think that is the government's attitude too, even though it has not yet had the courage to make such an announcement.
I should like to make a few comments about NATO and the remarks of the hon. member for Essex East in that regard, because he had such an intense interest in certain political developments about a month ago indicating that he perhaps wished that he belonged to a party that had such enthusiasm and such feeling. He says-so does
the government, and I think we all agree____
that NATO is a defensive military alliance and that its purpose primarily is that of defence. However, I think what we are doing is placing an awkward interpretation on the question of defence and trying to show that the organization is different from an offensive or aggressive military organization; because to my knowledge it was stated for the first time yesterday by the Minister of National

Supply-National Defence Defence that NATO has had a nuclear strategy, as I believe he put it, since 1954, and therefore is a nuclear power to a certain extent.
I think we must say that the type of defence that NATO has is one based on offence, just as the type of defence that the Soviet union has is one based on offence. The United States also agrees, as I understand it, that the type of defence which is based on nuclear weapons is not primarily the type of defence which means that you try to shoot down and destroy all or as many of the invading forces' equipment as you can, but one which rests upon the threat of retaliation and the threat of wreaking nuclear damage upon the invading country to as great an extent as possible. This is a type of defence which is really offensive, and offensive in two senses of the word.
The hon. member for Essex East made reference to some speeches by Mr. Coldwell in 1949, during which he made some comments about NATO itself. In this regard, I think we must remember that 1949 is not 1961, and the attitudes and concepts that were originally conceived for NATO are entirely different from those which exist today. The Leader of the Opposition, a very close friend of the hon. member for Essex East and a former secretary of state for external affairs, had a hand in the development of NATO, the use of the forces, and is given the credit for the inclusion of article 2 in the NATO agreement; at least, that is my understanding. I understand also that had it not been for the insistence of the then secretary of state for external affairs, perhaps the agreement would not have contained any reference to economic co-operation, as it does at the moment.
This was one of the primary thoughts Mr. Coldwell had, and it was one of the primary thoughts the Leader of the Opposition had then, I am sure; that we need to develop economic co-operation amongst these nations, and this would be a good means of competition, as it were, with the Soviet union's economic offensive in which she is engaged and has been engaged for some time in various parts of the world. In 1949, at the time Mr. Coldwell made his comments, NATO was not a nuclear power and did not have nuclear weapons. It was conceived as an organization which would be economic, and in the military field would be dealing with conventional weapons. It was not until 1954, as the Minister of National Defence revealed for the first time yesterday, that NATO became a nuclear power or accepted, as the minister put it, nuclear strategy. I will use his words so that I may not be accused of transforming what he said into something else.

These conditions did not exist in 1949. The concepts and ideas that Mr. Coldwell had when he endorsed the plan, and which the then secretary of state for external affairs expressed, are different from those which exist at the moment. In 1949 West Germany was not rearmed. This event took place at the insistence of the Leader of the Opposition when he was in office. Former nazi generals, as has been mentioned so adequately and no doubt will be repeated by the hon. member for Kootenay West, were not in control of and exercising influence over NATO affairs. These are factors which make the situation entirely different. When the hon. member for Essex East cites what Mr. Coldwell said in 1949 and says this is inconsistent with the attitude that exists today, he might as well go back to some of the comments of Julius Caesar and say they apply equally well today.
We support and have always supported the ideals and attitudes for which the present Secretary of State for External Affairs has worked, mainly the promotion of disarmament discussions leading to a disarmament agreement. All the other connected attitudes, ideals and concepts of the present Secretary of State for External Affairs receive our whole support. We are just as sorry as he is that the Soviet union saw fit to destroy what little faith may have existed in its present administration in any part of the world by the resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. We regret also, along with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the fact that the United States has been placed in a position of again participating in nuclear bomb tests.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, it will be necessary to make some reference to external affairs because, in my opinion, the attitudes of the Department of National Defence in relation to other countries are interwoven with the attitudes of the Department of External Affairs. We feel that the Secretary of State for External Affairs is one of the most sincere, dedicated and humble persons within the present cabinet. We wish him well in his endeavours along the lines upon which he has been working ever since he took over that particular office. We would like to see the Soviet union discontinue this bomb testing. Quite frankly, however, I do not know how this end could be accomplished except by expressing pious hopes, because this is something that is within the ambit of the Soviet government. I do not know how outside influence can be brought to bear on the Soviet union to cease and desist.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Send them a telegram.


Frank Howard: Well, I think that sort of communication would have more effect if it

came from the Department of National Defence than if it came from me. However, that is about the extent of this government's effectiveness in the world today. A telegram would be about as effective as anything else.
We wish there would be a resumption of disarmament discussions. We wish the Secretary of State for External Affairs would find that the countries would come to an agreement on the ideas which he has been propounding for a number of years. Unfortunately, though, I think he is whistling in the dark, and for a variety of reasons. The first reason is the attitude of his own government, because it is inconsistent with his ideas. We have heard references to the so-called troika principle being advocated by the Soviet union. I think we realize, too, that we have a troika principle involved in the present cabinet. We have the triumvirate of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, all engaged in the same general activity-


Paul Joseph James Martin: What about the Minister of Trade and Commerce?


Frank Howard: Well, the Minister of Trade and Commerce was unofficially rebuked today for something he may have said in Ghana. Perhaps there will be a revision of the text by the time it gets back to Canada and everything will be straightened out. However, we find that the Secretary of State for External Affairs is in a minority within this triumvirate. We find that the Minister of National Defence does not agree, and never has agreed, with the promotional work done by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The other day we heard the Prime Minister practically cut the feet from under the Secretary of State for External Affairs on this question of promoting disarmament.
We do not wish to see those ideas of the Secretary of State for External Affairs sacrificed for the ideas of retired colonels who still wish they were in the armed forces and able to direct people around the country in somewhat the same manner as they did before. I say that almost as soon as this government took the decision-and this matter was brought to a head in some decisions the Prime Minister had made-to scrap the Arrow and buy or obtain the Bomarc, at that time the government in its own mind made the decision that it was going to have nuclear weapons, tactical or otherwise, in the hands of Canadian troops on Canadian soil. However, it has not yet the courage to stand up and say that this is its attitude. It is waiting for a propitious moment. It is waiting for public opinion to be built up slowly by these
Supply-National Defence slight comments of the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister, and the variations in their policy with respect to their acceptance of nuclear weapons.
However, I venture to say that we shall have them on Canadian soil. I venture to say that we shall have them attached to the Bomarc missile when and if we get it and when and if it is operated. I venture to say that we shall have it attached to the Honest John or the Dishonest John-whatever way you want to put it-type of missile, and that we shall have it on the Voodoo aircraft. As to this attitude that the Minister of National Defence is taking, as I say he has not the courage to say so in so many words. This is a disgraceful state of affairs and in my opinion it is not too helpful in promoting any sort of war for peace on the international level.
I believe Canada has had a certain degree of respect among the other nations of the world for a number of years. However, we are gradually losing that admiration and that degree of respect which previously existed because we are becoming more and more closely allied and, to a large degree, subservient to the United States military machine. This fact is becoming recognized throughout other countries of the world. It is not our participation in NATO from which this development has arisen. As soon as the NORAD treaty was signed-and I might say that it was endorsed by both the government and the Liberal forces in this House of Commons-this was another indication that our military welfare or our so-called defence welfare and our economic welfare rested in the hands of these people in the United States.
During the course of this debate it has been stated that this is a time of crisis, a crucial moment, when we should have cool heads, logical thoughts and a non-partisan attitude in order that we may show a united front to the enemy whoever he may happen to be. By those hon. members who spoke earlier the feeling was also expressed that differing ideas were welcome, because we wanted to develop a policy that would be effective in promoting peace. One hon. member-I shall not make reference to him personally-spoke about there being a bipartisan foreign policy in Canada, and said it was too bad there was not a tripartisan foreign policy in Canada. Then he engaged in what I thought was a most unwarranted and uncalled for condemnation of the hon. member for Peterborough with respect to the remarks that hon. member had made in this house on the estimates of the Department of External Affairs, and on defence also.
That sort of thing does not add in any way to a unified feeling or unified desire to

Supply-National Defence reach a solution of these problems in so far as Canada is concerned. If, as there have been in this house, accusations of treason, treachery and selling out to the Soviet union are going to be made by members on the government side against members who may have different points of view, I submit that this does nothing to develop any conscious, sensible, unified approach to these particular questions. It is true that the hon. member for Peterborough has ideas which are different from those of the government. The hon. member for Essex East has different ideas, or so he said a moment ago.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Very different ideas.


Frank Howard: The hon. member for Trinity has different ideas. However, there is no desire to label these hon. gentlemen as treacherous souls or treasonable types because they expressed different points of view. I do not understand why members in this House of Commons will say on the one hand, "We want to develop a non-partisan attitude on defence policy matters", and then will turn around, for political reasons, and get involved in the accusations that were levelled against the hon. member for Peterborough and the hon. member for Kootenay West. As I say, I think it is regrettable that there does not exist in this house at the moment a degree of respect for differing views.
Before I conclude my remarks I should like to make a comment or two about the question of disarmament. As I have mentioned on a number of earlier occasions, it is an objective toward which the Secretary of State for External Affairs has been working for a number of years but which, of course, has been fairly well scuttled for the time being. I submit again, as I have stated earlier, that all the negotiations and discussions that have been going on throughout the approximately 340 meetings that were held, to a certain extent could not hope to come to fruition. They were not in themselves pointless, as they laid the groundwork for certain areas of agreement to be developed; but as I have said on a number of occasions, there is not going to be any disarmament unilaterally by either the United States or the Soviet union. I also submit that there is not going to be any disarmament by those two powers by agreement. Hence all these speeches and wishes about a disarmament agreement being reached between the United States on the one hand and the Soviet union on the other hand were just pious hopes. They were about something that was not going to happen.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet union was going to enter into such an agreement for disarmament, regardless of the con-

ditions about inspection and the like, because there is in the world today a third growing military power, which was recognized by the Secretary of State for External Affairs as a necessary part of the discussions. I refer to China. So long as China is a growing military power and if, as we are led to believe if we can accept the reports that emanate from various government sources, China will be a nuclear power perhaps within a period of five years or less, you are not going to see the Soviet disarm with China building up, and neither are you going to see the United States disarm. What I think will happen if these disarmament discussions are resumed-and I think it should have happened previously-is that China will become a part of them. Without China becoming a part of them they are not going to end up in any agreement one way or the other. All we shall be doing is meeting, talking and building up our nuclear forces. Without China in these discussions I think they are to a great degree, although not entirely, a waste of time.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, a few moments ago the Minister of National Defence told us that he was not going to be bludgeoned into making any further statements with regard to government policy on the use of nuclear weapons. May I say that nobody wishes to bludgeon him. However, we still hope that he will be able to make a statement in order to clarify a most important matter which we think is not clear.
His attitude reminds me of a story which perhaps I may tell the committee. It is the story of a young subaltern who had just received his commission in the army and was taking his platoon out for a march for the first time. He was leading the platoon up a hill, and at the top of the hill there was a precipice. As his platoon got closer to the precipice the young officer became a little panicky because he could not remember the order to change direction. I know how he must have felt. As they got closer and closer to the brink-and we are told, in another context, that we are on the brink now, in a more serious way- he became less and less able to think of the proper order, until finally on the very edge of the brink his sergeant turned to him and said, "For heaven's sake, sir, say something, if only good-bye".
We do not want the minister to say goodbye, at least not in this sense, but we do hope he will give us a clearer statement on this vital issue-and I will deal with this later in my remarks-than we have received over the years from any member of the government, though we have received a fairly clear statement, I admit, from one of the parliamentary secretaries.

This discussion of defence is being held in a world situation, the critical nature of which has been emphasized to us by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and other leaders of western governments. It is impossible, of course, to think of a more serious subject at a more serious time than what we should do to defend the peace, which is the only secure defence of our country, in this situation. While, of course, we do differ very strongly with government attitudes and government policies in the implementation of government objectives which we share, we do not disagree-and this has been pointed out by other hon. members of this committee-with what those objectives should be; security, defence through peace, and preparations to that end.
The Associate Minister of National Defence had this to say in his contribution to this debate on September 12. I quote from page 8241 of Hansard. Reference was made to this statement by my hon. friend from Essex East this morning:
Ii the worst should come, and if we have to fight again, I do not hesitate to say that we shall once again win the battles of tomorrow just as we won the battles of yesteryear, and this for many reasons.
Mr. Chairman, if the worst comes-and there is no reason why it should come-we will not win the battles of tomorrow in a nuclear war, because not only is it impossible to win a nuclear war but it is impossible, we are told by experts, even to wage one. So I think no one can get any comfort out of the fact that we will win the battles of tomorrow, if these battles are permitted to occur, by a breakdown in the sanity of man.
That does not mean, of course, that in the face of this situation we should just give up, sit back, wring our hands and say "Nothing can be done about it", and look around for an escape to some other planet. Perhaps that will be within the bounds of possibility in a few years. But it does mean that before we act and before we decide on policies we should be aware of not only the problems of defence but of the shifting and changing nature of those problems and what we in Canada can do to help solve them, not merely as a nation laying down policies for national defence-up to a point that is still required- but far more important, what we can do as a participant in collective defence, which is the only way we can develop enough strength to constitute a deterrent to aggression.
I have no quarrel of any kind with the minister in his emphasis on the necessity of collective action or indeed on the necessity
Supply-National Defence at times of subordinating the requirements of independence, in the pursuit of national defence policies, to those of interdependence.
This defence debate is the first we have had since this parliament met last November. In the first part of the session there was practically no discussion of defence problems. There was no defence committee discussion; there was not even a committee to discuss defence expenditures. In the face of the absence of earlier consideration of this vital matter, I think we had the right to expect from the minister and the government a report which would have gone into some of the essential problems of national defence, and a statement from the minister at this time which would have dealt with this matter in a fundamental way. We should have the kind of statement the United States congress gets periodically from the leaders of the government, the kind of statement the United Kingdom parliament gets from its minister of national defence. I refer hon. members of the committee to the kind of debate they had in that house some months ago, a debate on defence which was made possible because of the statement first made by the minister with regard to government policy on defence. And because of the white paper published which laid down the principles which govern British policy in defence.
Instead of that kind of white paper we got this blue book which was issued a few months ago, which in a very inadequate way told this house of the problems with which we are faced in this country in defence strategy, defence planning and defence policy at this particular time. It is similar to the minister's statement the other day which was inadequate and uninformative on these basic questions of defence policy.
So far as I can gather, the minister's position is that the plans and policies we have been pursuing for the last four years are still valid; they still stand up. In spite of what may have happened in the world, we continue along those lines. If you like, we continue in this particular rut, that everything is fine and unchanged and no new policy is required, except perhaps to substitute some United States equipment for Canadian equipment, especially in the air. Apparently we must not keep changing our minds. The minister makes great play over the fact, as he puts it, that we on this side of the chamber, and I in particular, have changed our minds over recent years with regard to defence matters.
Believe me, Mr. Chairman, that is true, because the situation has changed greatly in the last four years and a person would be foolish not to alter his own views in the light of these changing situations. But the

Supply-National Defence minister says that no change, as far as he is concerned, should be made. That seems to be the policy of the government, except perhaps with regard to a change in the attitude of the Secretary of State for External Affairs which is now being forecast by the Prime Minister.
With regard to the desirability of changing policies to meet changing situations let me quote one sentence from a statement made by the director of the institute of strategic studies in London, which is an organization that has done a great deal of important and fundamental research in the matter of defence problems and what can be done to meet them within Great Britain and the coalition. The director of this institute-and I heartily agree with what he says-said a few months ago:
I think you would agree that, in a field of policy as rapidly changing and as crucial as our own, it is both natural for one's views to be undergoing a constant process of refinement while at the same time it is cowardly not to make it clear when they have significantly changed. I have a great respect for those who think differently from myself. The only people I distrust are those who say "X made up my mind many years ago and have never seen occasion to alter it since."
In particular, in this development of conditions which we think necessitate a change of policy we are concerned with the attitude and the policy of the government with respect to Canada, joining what has been called the nuclear club. My hon. friend from Essex East expressed this concern this morning and I propose to deal with it also, though what he said makes it unnecessary for me to say as much as I otherwise would have done. Yesterday the minister, as I read his remarks in Hansard, depreciated the significance of this matter because, he said, it had been decided in NATO many years ago, in 1954; and that from 1954 on, all members of NATO were members of a nuclear club.
I hope to go into this matter in greater detail later, because that was a most important statement made by the minister during this debate. We should like him to substantiate what he said and give us grounds for his assertion that the members of the NATO organization have made an agreement which makes them members of a nuclear club. We should like to know the nature of this agreement. We ask the minister again, as we have asked him before, whether in his opinion Canada is now in this nuclear club. If he was right in what he said yesterday, the problem is solved; we are now a nuclear power. If not, we ask him this; whether Canada is now about to join the nuclear club.
I hope the minister will not consider us as bludgeoning him when we persist in seeking a clear-cut statement on this vitally

important matter. I am not satisfied yet, despite what the minister has said. Are we in Canada committed to the acceptance and use of nuclear weapons not under collective control, as would be the case, I would hope, in NATO-at any rate it should be the case- but under the control of our own government, with a veto exercised by one other government? I insist, notwithstanding what the minister has said this morning, that there has been shilly-shallying, procrastination, delay and indecision in the government's policy. Moreover, there has been confusion in government statements on this vitally important question.
The Prime Minister asked a question in Halifax a few weeks ago, a question directed to his audience and, presumably, to the country. It was a very significant question. I quote from his statement:
Would you, in 1961, faced by the overwhelming power of Soviet might in East Germany close to West Berlin place those who guard the portals of freedom in the position of men armed with bows and arrows?
He added:
It is as simple as that.
Mr. Chairman, it is nonsense to say it is as simple as that, or to try in this way to oversimplify one of the most difficult, dangerous and complicated questions which face us today by putting it in those terms. This particular approach to the problem was answered by the Minister of National Defence himself when he said-and I quote his statement-
The strength of the union-
This is quite true, of course; he was talking of NATO.
The strength of the union is the sum of the strengths of the individual members, and the total strength of the west thus marshalled is formidable indeed.
Then he went on to say:
Individual members do not have to maintain a balance of all the forces which go to make up modern military power.
Therefore to suggest that each individual member of NATO must be able to equip itself with all the weapons of modern war and that, failing this, they are being asked to face the enemy with bows and arrows simply does not make sense. Indeed, this particular argument was exploded only this morning by the Toronto Globe and Mail, a paper which the minister will respect. Referring to an analogy which is becoming, if it has not already become, the minister's favourite, that of the man in the lonely cabin armed with a gun while a bear prowls around outside- the minister does not tell us what the man is going to use for ammunition in his gun- the newspaper said:

The picture this conjures up, intentionally or otherwise, is that of Canada facing single combat with Russia and considering whether to become a fully fledged nuclear power to deter the prospective enemy. This is not the problem at all. Canada has no hope of becoming a nuclear power. To build long range rockets and the like as a deterrent is altogether beyond her resources. Nor is the question really the direct defence of Canada against bombing raids or invasion. The basic issue is whether Canada needs certain nuclear weapons to carry out her obligations to her allies.
That is the responsible approach to this problem, not the one indicated by the terms used by the Prime Minister in Halifax. This particular editorial concludes by pleading for the kind of responsible approach to this question which I have mentioned; that the attention of the public should be drawn to these responsible aspects of the issue rather than romancing about bears and cabins.
It seems to me, notwithstanding what the minister said, that this decision in essence, though unannounced, must have been made by the government some time ago, yet it has not been told to us and a smokescreen of uncertainty and indecision is being put around it. And if that decision has not been made in connection with nuclear weapons, the government is surely guilty of complete irresponsibility in spending millions of dollars on weapons which can only be effective to their maximum extent-and presumably we want our weapons to be effective to their maximum extent-if they have nuclear warheads.
The former chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, now free of the restraints of official responsibility, is able to talk freely on this subject, and he is talking very freely according to the press this morning. He has contributed a pamphlet on Canadian defence policy in the nuclear age for the enlightenment of the Canadian people. I am sure the minister has studied this document, and I am sure General Foulkes is a man whose opinion will be respected by the minister as it will be respected by this house. He says, and I quote from page 15 of this pamphlet:
Canada has accepted a forward task for the brigade group in the shield forces in Europe which requires heavy support for its infantry. The government has agreed to provide for this support the Honest John 762 mm. close support rocket which requires an atomic warhead.
This is perhaps the foremost military authority in this country speaking, and he says here is a weapon which requires an atomic warhead. Will the minister still tell us that the government has not decided whether it is to be given such an atomic weapon warhead? Remember, we have bought this weapon and are spending a lot of money on it. Then the pamphlet goes on to say:
Eight of the day fighter squadrons-*
90205-6-527
Supply-National Defence
Not all of them.
Eight of the day fighter squadrons are being converted to reconnaissance strike squadrons, and the government has decided to equip these squadrons with the F-104 strike aircraft which is to be armed with a small atomic bomb.
This is General Foulkes making the categorical statement that the aircraft which is to be used by eight of our squadrons in Europe is to be armed-not "may be armed" -with a small atomic bomb.


Douglas Scott Harkness: What page is that to be found
on?


Lester Bowles Pearson: At the bottom of page 15, the last paragraph. General Foulkes goes on:
To carry out these roles which the government has accepted-
That is the strike attack role in NATO which we quarreled with in the beginning.
To carry out these roles which the government has accepted, these atomic weapons are necessary.
Then he goes on, at the top of page 16:
The Bomarc missile requires an atomic warhead and two of these air defence missiles will be located in Canada. If any new fighters are procured to replace the CF-100, these fighters will require an air to air atomic missile.
What does all this talk mean? Does it mean that the government has made up its mind in the light of the emergency threat today, in respect of atomic bombs or not? The kind of double talk we have heard goes back a long way. The minister and the hon. member for Essex East quoted from the Prime Minister's statement of February 20, 1959. I will not repeat the whole quotation which is the origin of this problem in its Canadian aspects. The Prime Minister said then:
The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads.
Either we wish to use a weapon which will not achieve its full potential, and that is a strange basis for military policy, or we decided in February, 1959 to acquire the nuclear warhead without which the full potential would not be possible. As was pointed out, the Prime Minister has confirmed that statement on different occasions. I am not going into all the statements. The minister knows them and we have put some of them on the record. If they mean anything at all, surely they mean that. In essence this decision must have been made, unless we are to equip our forces with weapons which are not to achieve their potential capabilities.
While this decision must have been made in principle, we cannot get any clarification from the government now as to whether it has been implemented in the light of that basic decision made at that time. The minister

Supply-National Defence said the other day that it would take two years to two and a halt years-I think he used the expression "lead time"-to get our troops trained to use this kind of equipment, that we ought to be beginning to get the equipment now because it will take two years to two and a half years-


Douglas Scott Harkness: Excuse me. If the Leader of the Opposition is referring to my speech, I did not say that. I said that in order to acquire these modern systems and train troops to use them it would take a lead time of two or three years or more. Most of that time is taken up in actually getting the equipment after it is ordered.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I accept the minister's statement, but the statement made by the Prime Minister, which I have just quoted, was made more than two and a half years ago. If that was the decision of the government at that time there has been time to proceed along the lines which the minister has indicated.
Then on March 10, 1959 the Prime Minister made the same kind of statement. On July 3, 1959 General Pearkes, the minister's predecessor-perhaps I may interpolate and say I join very warmly now in the tribute of affection and respect which the minister paid to his predecessor-said, as reported at page 5415 of Hansard:
I presume that eventually the Canadian forces will he equipped with atomic weapons.
It seemed to be a matter of some urgency at that time, but this urgency seems to have disappeared at least in part in 1960, because in a speech to the Canadian club in Ottawa on November 24, 1960, the Prime Minister had this to say about this matter of atomic weapons:
We have taken the stand that no decision will he required while progress toward disarmament continues.
That was not the kind of decision the Prime Minister made in February, 1959, yet in November, 1960 he said:
To do otherwise would he inconsistent. When and if such weapons are required then we shall have to take the responsibility.
Then a little later:
In other words, this problem is not one requiring immediate decision.
If it takes our forces two years or two and a half years to be trained in the use of those weapon systems, if they need that lead time-and I am sure that is true-if that is so, in the light of the international situation which faces us today and which was pretty serious in November, 1960, to say that this problem is not one requiring immediate decision seems to me to be very unrealistic, especially in the light of previous statements made on the subject.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs threw some light on what seems to have been this changed attitude when he said in the House of Commons on May 2 that the decision to acquire nuclear warheads depended on progress made in the next few months toward disarmament. We have had those next few months. Goodness knows during that time there has been no progress made toward disarmament, and we all deplore it. But if the Secretary of State for External Affairs was right, then a decision should have been made by now on what to do in the light of this absence of progress. The minister himself said the same thing, as reported in the Winnipeg Free Press of May 20, and I hope I am quoting him right. He was referring to the disarmament talks and said:
If the talks fail we will have to make decisions on nuclear armaments.
Will the minister even now, in spite of what he said a few moments ago, tell us what is that decision?
It is not possible for me, and I do not think it is possible for other members of this committee, to divorce these matters of arms and equipment from the purposes for which they are to be used, from the objectives of defence itself. In this connection I think first of continental defence. For the purposes of continental defence we are linked up now through NORAD. Incidentally I would like to correct what the previous speaker said, namely that the Liberal party approved NORAD in this house. That is not the case.
We now have for continental defence ten squadrons of CF-lOO's, linked with United States planes and equipment for continental defence. The NORAD agreement was entered into by the present government and we criticized it at the time as being inadequate and ineffective, and as not providing, as they should have provided, for NORAD being part of NATO. There have been these ten squadrons of CF-lOO's which, as we told the government a year ago, were obsolete in performance to do the job which they were originally asked to do and obsolete also, as the hon. member for Trinity pointed out so effectively the other day, in regard to the purposes of continental defence in 1961, not as it was in 1957 and 1958.
We have suggested a reduction in the number of continental defence squadrons and the alteration of some of their duties, alteration perhaps if after due examination that turns out to be feasible, of their association with United States defence forces through NORAD, perhaps a return to the kind of defence association which we had before NORAD. That position was ridiculed by members of the government, but within the

last few months they have reduced the number of defence squadrons from nine to five, and have announced their intention of reequipping the five, not with the Canadian Arrow, which has been sunk without trace- there is not even a trace adequate for exhibition in the air museum-but with an American interceptor.
It is clear now from what the minister has said, and I do not quarrel with this doctrine, that the major purpose, in fact the only purpose, of continental defence which makes sense in the face of the kind of attack to which we would be subjected is to protect the deterrent, the strategic air command of the United States, which is our deterrent. The purpose is not now the defence of Canadian cities, the defence of the Canadian people and the defence of Canadian soil, because there is no such effective defence of that kind against the kind of attack we would be bound to have. To give the impression that interceptor squadrons can give the people of Canada that kind of protection is cruelly misleading. What defence there is now has to be the defence of the strategic deterrent which it is hoped will be permitted to get into the air and fly off toward the enemy before that capability is destroyed by the destruction of the bases. That is now the basis of continental defence, presumably both by planes and by missiles.
But even that basis is shifting and changing, as the hon. member for Trinity pointed out so clearly the other day, because the deterrent itself is changing. It has changed very greatly indeed since we talked about defence over a year ago in this house. So far as the deterrent now is concerned, it is admitted by those who are planning strategy in the NATO capitals that we cannot rely on fixed bases which would be knocked out of action in a few minutes. The deterrent has to be mobile. It has to be mobile in the water through Polaris submarines and it has to be mobile on land. So in the face of a mobile deterrent the kind of protection which it was hoped these squadrons and Bomarc missiles might have given a year or two ago really does not make very much sense.
It may be necessary for the United States to keep them. The United States is a great power with great resources, and has responsibilities over the whole world. Having regard to the position of the United States it has to plug up every loophole even by maintaining equipment and planes which even in their own eyes may be obsolescent. But a country like Canada, which has resources that are limited and which in the nature of things can only play an important but subsidiary role in general strategy, has to be very careful indeed how it allocates its resources for the collective 90205-6-527J
Supply-National Defence defence. While it may be necessary for the United States to maintain these squadrons and missiles for the time being, surely we are not making any effective contribution to the protection of the mobile deterrent through a few squadrons of interceptors, armed with nuclear weapons, and two squadrons of Bomarc missiles also equipped with nuclear warheads. If we rely on that kind of strategy and planning for our contribution to continental and collective defence, our participation and our policy will become as fixed and ineffective as fixed bases for strategic air forces are now ineffective in the light of new methods of attack.
I think it is in that context that we have to look at the role of the interceptor in continental defence, and if necessary to re-examine and revise that role and the arms that we may require in the air, on the land and on the water to meet this new situation. We recall very vividly that two years ago we were told that the bomber threat had diminished to the point where we scrapped the Canadian Arrow. In the speech made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on February 20, 1959, from which I have already quoted, he sought to explain why that decision was taken, a decision with which we quarrelled at the time and which we criticize even more now in the light of what has happened.
He justified that decision, as found on page 1221 of Hansard, on the ground that "the bomber threat against which the CF-105 was intended to provide defence has diminished". If we scrapped the CF-105, a great Canadian achievement, because the threat had diminished, why is it that in 1961 we are equipping our air force with United States Voodoos to meet a threat which in 1959 was supposed to have diminished to the point where a Canadian interceptor of this type was not needed? The then minister of national defence, General Pearkes, said in the same debate on February 23, 1959, as found on page 1280 of Hansard:
[DOT]. . the threat of the manned bomber against this country is diminishing.
He went on to say:
It would therefore not seem to make sense for us to go ahead and develop an interceptor which would be ready by the end of 1961 and which could be in squadron operation by 1962, to meet a threat which would hardly exist at that time.
A threat which would hardly exist in 1962, according to the then minister of national defence. Yet as we approach 1962 we are equipping five squadrons of our air force with United States interceptors, presumably to be armed with nuclear air to air missiles.
What has happened, Mr. Chairman, that has caused this change of viewpoint on the
8348	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence part of the government in defence planning and the means of meeting the threat? The Minister of National Defence in a speech in Montreal last February, I believe-he will correct me if I misquote him-rather ridiculed the idea that there was no longer a bomber threat to this continent. His predecessor said a couple of years ago that threat would be over in 1962. So let the government tell us why in the summer of 1960 the Minister of National Defence changed his views on this matter. Let the government tell us now in the light of the information they have why they consider bombers to be such a threat at this time as to require the continuation by Canada of the defence policy of meeting that threat through interceptors and through NORAD. After all, NORAD is merely an agency of co-operation, not something that stands on its own feet, and the alternative to it is not non-co-operation, because we must co-operate with the United States in continental defence. The alternative is a return to the methods of co-operation that existed before NORAD, and which were effective at that time. Perhaps the minister will deal with this particular problem at some stage during the debate.
Our role then, as we see it, is not one of non-co-operation in continental defence. It is not one of defaulting on our obligations or betraying our friends and allies. It is one which we hope will be more effective for Canada, more appropriate for Canada, than that which we took on a few years ago and to which we now seem to be bound with no room for manoeuvre or change.
We agree that Canada can play a very important role and is playing a very important role in early warning, a suitable and appropriate role, but even that particular role will soon be diminished in importance. I should qualify that by saying that Canadian participation will be diminished in importance, when it becomes a matter of warning against missiles rather than warning against bombers, because in the case of a ballistic missile early warning system we are up in the realm of billions of dollars of expenditure, and it is not likely that we will be able to play a very significant part in that particular effort.
In the realm of anti-missile missiles, which gets us into even more astronomical figures, Canada's role is less important than early warning may be. Yet it is obvious that the Royal Canadian Air Force still has to have continental planes. We have to have planes for reconnaissance, for sky patrols and to intercept and shoot down at least the isolated intruder, as we have argued for some time and as the government now agrees. However, we do not, in the carrying out of this role


effectively, have to arm ourselves, as we see it on this side, in a way which brings us into the nuclear club. We do not have to have two squadrons of Bomarcs for this purpose, the missiles for which are supplied by the United States and which, in effect, would be under the control of the United States.
The Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence make a great play about joint control and the fact that we would not accept weapons unless they were under joint control. Even if this Bomarc missile is effective-and we do not think it is effective; we think it is obsolete, and that the United States will soon be dropping it-if it is brought under joint control, what "joint control" really would mean in this context is that the authority for action would have to come from the United States. Canada would be under a veto over the use of its own weapons, because these would be weapons in the hands of Canadian forces.
Defence of this kind, Mr. Chairman, is not going to save us, and Canadian participation in defence of this kind is not going to be the best way in which we can discharge our obligations. As I have said, no effective defence of our territory is now possible. We are talking about survival rather than protection. Protection of the deterrent is becoming more difficult because the deterrent is mobile. While defence is as essential as it was a few years ago, perhaps the best defence we have now, and this has been said by others, is the certainty of swift and sure retaliation if any aggressor disturbs the peace. But this particular defence by deterrence is the responsibility of the United States which has a strategic force for that purpose; and now, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom.
We can have a better role, surely, Mr. Chairman, than the kind of participation in the kind of defence about which we have been talking and about which the government has been talking for two or three years. During the course of this debate we hope to put that role forward. We have already done so in some detail, in the debate a year ago. The role to which I refer does not mean that we are defaulting on our obligations, betraying our friends or minimizing our responsibility.
In case my own words in criticism of the role the government has now taken may appear to be prejudiced, may I quote some outside authorities in support of the position we have taken. The Vancouver Province on November 9, I think it was, said this:
A small country like ours can't afford nuclear weapons and should divert its defence spending into areas where we can be of real assistance to the United States and our other western allies.
Whatever Ottawa may think of this viewpoint, it is not furthering any kind of policy by talking

out of both sides of its mouth. If we have much more of the present inconsistency, Canada's influence in world councils will evaporate completely.
Then the Globe and Mail of May 4, 1961 had this to say, and these are impressive paragraphs to us on this side:
We may be an economic satellite of the United States in many foreign eyes, but we are not yet a military dependency and our voice still counts for something in international councils. As a junior member of the nuclear club, obliged to get permission from Washington before acting in our own defence, we would lose bargaining power in helping to achieve compromise between the two major nuclear powers, and in our dealings with the underdeveloped countries which still regard Canada as a trustworthy friend.
This editorial concludes as follows:
Our resources are better spent in strengthening conventional forces against the dangers of limited war, and in bracing ourselves and our non-nuclear friends for the new (and undeclared) political, economic and propaganda war with the Soviet union.
Let me quote also, Mr. Chairman, a Canadian whose words I am sure will be listened to with respect by members of the government. I refer to the premier of the province of Manitoba, who spoke a few weeks ago to the Couchiching conference. I have not been able to get a text of his speech because I think he spoke from notes. He is reported in the Toronto Globe and Mail of August 27, as follows:
Premier Duff Roblin made an incisive appeal here tonight for a distinctive Canadian role in world affairs. He suggested that some proportion of Canadian military expenditures might be more effectively applied to technical assistance of a more practical nature for Afro-Asian nations.
He questioned-
This is the Conservative premier of Manitoba.
-the value of the North American air defence command. If it abandoned NORAD, then Canada should also refuse nuclear weapons. "Not in any holier than thou spirit," said Premier Roblin, "but because these weapons are not essential."
He said: "Canada should seek leadership among smaller powers and within the ring of the United States nuclear deterrent, seek to reinforce the United Nations office of secretary general and rescue it from Soviet meddling. We should continue to make available to the UN a substantial and fully mobile soldiery. We should mobilize independent thinking and give expression to ideas among smaller nations. We should encourage such UN instruments of peace as the food bank.
May I call it one o'clock, Mr. Chairman?
At one o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at 2.30 p.m.
Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, at the time of the luncheon recess I was putting forward
Supply-National Defence in a very general way certain principles which I thought should govern Canada's contribution to collective defence. We on this side of the house will discuss these principles in their more detailed application as this debate goes on. However, I wish to make it quite clear, as I tried to do earlier in my discussion, that in the circumstances I put forward I was not advocating a policy of neutralism or a policy of default on our obligations or international commitments to our allies, or indeed a policy of refusing to play our part in resistance to aggression when we have no other alternative than resistance, irrespective of the consequences, something which, of course, would be tragic beyond words.
When I say that no one can win a nuclear war, that no one can win a nuclear war in the old conventional sense, that is true. However, it should not be misunderstood-and I am sure it is not misunderstood by those who might wish to break the peace-that our understanding of this position in the western countries means that we would not attempt to defend ourselves because there was no possibility of victory in the old conventional sense. Free men will always defend themselves when attacked, I hope, irrespective of the consequences. However, we should be aware of the consequences, which are so far beyond those of previous wars that they must be taken into consideration when we discuss defence.
In Great Britain in 1940 it did not look as though there was much chance of a victorious result of the war. However, it came. Yet in a sense that fact proves the other side of the coin or the other phase of the question. The resulting victory which was achieved in 1944 and 1945, and the inability of the west to follow victory with the kind of peace which would endure has brought us, through no fault of our own, to the situation in which we find ourselves today of trying to defend ourselves against a nuclear war which, if it occurred, would mean planetary destruction.
Nor do I wish it to be understood by anyone-and this was made clear in the quotation I read from a speech by the premier of Manitoba in so far as his views were concerned-that when we take the position that nuclear arms are not required by Canada under Canadian control or indeed under joint control for the defence of peace and the discharge of our obligations, we take that position because of some feeling of smug moral superiority. Of course that is not the case because, as a country, we are committed to nuclear defence. Indeed, we supply the material that makes possible nuclear defence and nuclear deterrence, through the sale of

Supply-National Defence our uranium. It is therefore not because of any superior moral considerations of that kind that we take our stand.
Neither I nor the other members of the Liberal party who sit on this side of the chamber advocate the weakening of the strategic deterrent, let alone its unilateral abandonment. Indeed, I feel that the strategic deterrent in the hands of those who now possess it should be maintained strong and unimpaired. In the words of the phrase we now use, it should be credible so that in the minds of those who are tempted to break the peace there should exist no doubt that it can be used effectively.
I believe that western strategy-and that includes Canada-should be based on the credibility and on the invulnerability of the retaliatory forces not only on our side but perhaps even on the other side, strange as that may seem-the invulnerability of both sides through mobility-so that each side would be reasonably certain that the other side could destroy it. In that way the temptation would be removed to bring about victory through some kind of sneak attack with immunity from retaliation. That kind of mutual invulnerability, which may seem to be a strange idea to put forward on our side but which has been put forward by some fairly highly respected defence experts, would certainly discourage a surprise attack based on fear.
But while we take that view with regard to the strategic deterrent, we on this side are opposed to dispersal of the nuclear deterrent. We are opposed to purely national control of that deterrent, especially with regard to the North Atlantic alliance, just as we have great doubts-in fact our feelings are stronger than doubts-as to the advisability of national custody of the nuclear deterrent beyond the limits of those three countries which already possess that weapon.
That brings me to a subject which was dealt with by the minister and which has been discussed by other members in this chamber. I now leave the question of continental strategy and come to the question of what should be our NATO strategy in the present situation and what should be the attitude members should take to collective strategy and to the use of nuclear weapons in the implementation of that strategy.
So far as our own contribution to NATO is concerned, which contribution is to be strengthened, we are told, by the dispatch of additional troops overseas, we have a brigade group and we have an air division. I wish to refer the committee to Hansard of July 3,

1959 at page 5414. This was some time ago, and we were then told by the Minister of National Defence that this question of nuclear weapons for our forces overseas in NATO was being considered. General Pearkes said then:
-the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO defence tasks are also being studied. These studies are continuing and are fast reaching a stage when there can be an exchange of notes of this matter.
He was referring, of course, to an exchange of notes with the United States. That was more than two years ago. I should like to know, and I am sure the committee would like to know, what exactly is the position now in that regard so far as our contribution to NATO forces is concerned. In the same debate, as reported at page 5415 of Hansard for July 3, 1959 the minister of national defence added:
I presume that eventually the Canadian forces will be equipped with atomic weapons under the same terms as the other NATO contingents under SACEUR-
What are these terms, and since that time has there in fact been a decision which covers the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canadian forces in NATO? From what I have said it will be clear, I hope, that I do not object to the NATO alliance possessing in some form nuclear weapons for defence purposes; indeed, they have them now, but under national control. At present all these nuclear weapons which are available to certain NATO forces are, as far as I know-and the minister will correct me if I am wrong- in the custody of the United States or the United Kingdom.
I do not think that situation has been altered by what is referred to now as a sort of double key arrangement, or a joint control of such weapons. I believe it has been assumed by NATO, and NATO defence planning has been based on this assumption, that these nuclear weapons in the possession of certain NATO members will be used immediately against any aggressive move; that those forces in NATO which have these weapons have been trained for that purpose, and that there is equipment to discharge that purpose, though it is not in the hands of NATO; it is in the hands of the United States. Indeed, the minister said yesterday decisions were taken in this matter which made NATO, as he put it-I am not sure of the exact expression-a nuclear force back in 1954. That is quite true. The outspoken Field Marshal Montgomery-a man outspoken in this and other matters-said in 1954:
I want to make it absolutely clear-

He was the NATO commander at that time:
-that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer: "They may possibly be used". It is very definitely: "They will be used if we are attacked."
That is clear enough. General Gruenther said the same thing, in different words, the same year when he confirmed that nuclear weapons would be used and agreed-and he is an expert in these matters-that once such weapons were used by NATO, that use would spread to all-out nuclear war, in what has been called the awful escalation of destruction. The minister and his predecessor have both said-I certainly remember General Pearkes saying this-that they saw no way by which you could limit the use of nuclear weapons; that if you started with a nuclear bullet-I am not quoting General Pearkes but I think this was his view-you would likely end with a nuclear bomb.
That is why we have been so anxious and so worried about nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO forces and not under NATO control, especially in circumstances like the present when NATO forces under United States immediate command are moving along or have been moving along the corridor leading to Berlin armed with weapons. In 1957 General Norstad-though he seems to have altered his views since-took the same view, that it was impossible to draw a line between the tactical use of atomic weapons against an attacker's forces-and I once hoped that line could be drawn

and their strategic use against the attacker's homeland.
Mr. Chairman, the minister said that NATO has now a nuclear strategy and in that sense is a nuclear force. We know that nuclear weapons are in the hands of certain NATO powers. Yet I do not know of any decision that has been made-and perhaps the minister will enlighten me on this point-notwithstanding the decision to which he referred, which I think was in December, 1958, and which dealt with the matter in broad principle, I do not know of any political decision that has been made by the NATO council or any other NATO body authorizing and laying down the conditions under which NATO nuclear weapons will be used, or laying down any rules governing the control of the use of such weapons in the hands of NATO members in Europe.
Surely the time has come to do something about that. In view of what General Gruenther, General Norstad and others have said about the inevitability of this escalation of destruction, to use the nuclear weapon even in its tactical form as a first strike weapon for NATO forces against an attack
Supply-National Defence surely might bring about the greatest danger of all, the danger of an atomic chain reaction, the kind of chain reaction which I have just mentioned, which begins with a bullet and ends with continent-destroying bombs.
This would result-and we have talked about this before in this house-in NATO becoming an agency, which it was never meant to become, for the conversion of what might after all be only an accidental or a limited incursion or attack, into a nuclear holocaust. That could be done either by immediate retaliation from strategic air forces which would not worry about the troops on the ground but would worry, in the language of General Gruenther, about the enemy's homeland; or it could be brought about by premature and unnecessary use of nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO front line forces or forces in reserve. Surely that is the most frightening aspect of this NATO strategic situation, and this NATO tactical situation also.
Henry Kissinger, who has written a great deal on this subject and I think is recognized as an authority, in an article called "The Necessity for Choice" had this to say:
If NATO can be defended only by all-out war, it will face a hopeless dilemma; to yield to pressure will set up a pattern of Soviet blackmail-
We know what that means. He went on to say:
-while to resist will involve catastrophic devastation.
That is the awful dilemma that those who are responsible for the political and military planning of NATO's strategy face at the present time. It seems to me that the answer, and perhaps the only way out of this dilemma, is not to do away with a NATO deterrent, even a NATO nuclear deterrent, as opposed to a United States or United Kingdom deterrent, but to bring that deterrent under some form of collective control and to build up enough conventional strength in NATO front line forces so that the nuclear deterrent will not have to be used until it is clear beyond doubt that a massive nuclear assault has been launched.
That does not mean leaving our front line forces defenceless. It does mean-and this seems to be a doctrine which is gaining more and more support-isolating the nuclear deterrent under NATO control from the conventional strength of its forces so there would not be this awful temptation to start a nuclear war when conventional defence might be sufficient to meet an attack. I have no doubt this is being looked into, and perhaps the minister will have a chance to tell us what progress is being made in NATO thinking in this regard.
I think these nuclear weapons, which NATO must have as a defence organization, must be

Supply-National Defence under some form of NATO and not national control. But I make a distinction in my mind, a distinction the full importance of which I did not realize some time ago, between custody and control. If these weapons are brought under control, and if the policy determining the use of these weapons is to be isolated from conventional weapons in some form and brought under NATO control, then it does not seem to me to matter nearly as much whether they are in United States custody or not.
The alternative-and perhaps this alternative would appeal to many people who are fundamentalists on this question-would be to have NATO not only in control but in custody of these weapons. This would mean that the United States, the United Kingdom and France would relinquish their nuclear weapons now in the possession of NATO forces to collective custody and control. I have no illusion about the difficulty of doing this, but if this were done and if weapons of this kind were in the hands of our forces as part of NATO it would not, in my view, be extending the area of membership in the nuclear club, because three members of that club would be giving up their own national control to a collective organization.
I think this would be a move in the right direction, and it would be limiting rather than expanding the extent of the nuclear club. If that is not possible, however, the only alternative which makes sense to me would be to bring about NATO control and have the nuclear weapons isolated from the conventional front line weapons and placed in reserve in the custody of those countries-I hope it would be only one-which now have that custody. In that case we might be able to resolve this awful dilemma of how to meet an attack, if there should be one, without converting the situation into nuclear war.
I am not now thinking about an all-out nuclear assault on this continent or on Europe. In that case it would not make any difference whether our weapons were under collective control or joint control or single control. Everyone would use everything he had; one would just hope for the best and pray for survival. But that is not the only kind of problem we have to face. The problem is also to deal with a limited assault which NATO perhaps could not meet without using nuclear weapons if the organization does not have sufficient conventional strength. Surely this makes it of fundamental importance to build up NATO's conventional strength so as to decrease the present reliance on nuclear retaliation. At present I think there is too much reliance on the trip wire function of the organi-

zation and on massive retaliation. The inadequate conventional strength means that the first strike in defence might be from nuclear weapons, weapons which, if we had sufficient conventional strength, would not have to be used.
This, I think and hope, is the basis upon which NATO is now developing its strategy. This position, as I understand it, requires a change in existing strategy and a change in the defence policies of its members with regard to the control and custody of atomic weapons possessed by NATO. There is certainly growing concern among NATO members about membership in an alliance where a decision to use nuclear weapons could be made without their participation and at very short notice. I read confirmation of this in the press this morning in a dispatch out of Norway. Collective control in the interests of strengthening the alliance, however difficult this may be, seems to me to be essential.
Someone is going to say, how can you have collective control in a council of 15 members? How can you have, to use the common phrase, 15 fingers on the trigger? That would be technically impossible, I think, except under the conditions I have just mentioned, which would provide for adequate conventional defence against an attack by conventional weapons in the case of anything but an all-out assault, with nuclear defence in reserve. If you could have that, if you had sufficient collective conventional defence to hold an attack, then it would be possible to call the members of the organization together and put the problem to the NATO council in the light of the conditions as they developed. I would hope this is the way in which it could be done rather than by setting up some directorate or committee.


Mr. Jones:: I wonder where the deterrent would be in that situation. What would stop the Russians sending over their missiles and bombers?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have been trying to deal with that situation. If we had sufficient conventional strength, and an attack was made by conventional forces, an attack which was not meant to be an all-out attack, we would have time to determine whether the NATO council would authorize nuclear weapons to be used. If there were to be a massive all-out nuclear assault by missiles across the continent and across the ocean, it would not make any difference what kind of mechanism we had set up.


Henry Frank Jones: The question is, what would deter the Russians from launching an attack of that kind if you could not retaliate?


Lester Bowles Pearson: There would be a more effective deterrent than we have now. We would have a threefold deterrent. They would know that we had adequate conventional forces available for front line defence. They would know that we had intermediate nuclear missiles in reserve, and they would also know that we had strategic nuclear deterrent strength across the ocean. This kind of control, which apparently does not appeal to the hon. member for Saskatoon, could avoid the frightening possibility of a national field commander acting on national orders using nuclear weapons in the front line when this might not be necessary, and might be fatal.
In this connection, and differing from what he said in 1957, at the annual conference of the NATO parliamentarians last November General Norstad had this to say:
I believe that our forces must have a substantial conventional capability. They must be able to operate, where the military situation permits, without using arms and weapons equipped with nuclear warheads. This will require shield forces of the general magnitude being provided under our present program, a program which I regret to say is not yet completed.
That is an understatement. General Norstad then went on to say:
This conventional strength requires an organization or a system under which the basic combat elements would react normally with conventional weapons-
I ask the hon. member for Saskatoon to listen to this.
-but it also requires that associated with these basic combat elements there are atomic weapon units which can be used if necessary.
And, I say, used under NATO control. General Norstad went on:
However, the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one.
That is military jargon which means, do not use nuclear weapons until you are absolutely certain it is the only protection you have against destruction. Then he concluded-and this is the very core of my argument-by saying about nuclear weapons:
The use of these weapons should be the result of a specific, deliberate decision, made at a level consistent with the policies and plans of NATO.
That is a military way of saying it should be made by a NATO agency.
Then this final sentence:
In any case, this level must be higher than that of the commander of the basic combat elements to which I have made reference.
I have made reference to the lines along which NATO strategy should develop, and I hope it is developing along these lines. There may be some strengthening rather than weakening of the deterrent both politically and militarily along those lines. That can only
Supply-National Defence be done, of course, by strengthening political unity inside NATO itself by far greater political integration among the NATO countries, by greater defence integration among the NATO countries, and by using the NATO council as a council for strategy politically and militarily. If that is done; if the NATO council is given the kind of authority it should have and has not had, then with military advice and a re-examination of the military organizational set-up in NATO, we can make this organization a far stronger organization for military defence than it has been in the past. Perhaps part of what I call this diffusing strategy could be a disarmed zone right across Europe, which would avoid the difficulty of tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of opposing forces too close together.
This is a view that is not, of course, peculiar to me. A great deal of thinking has been going on along these lines. A group of the Conservative party in Great Britain called the Bow group, a rather radical young Conservative group, in a pamphlet called "Stability and Survival" issued not so long ago, at page 28 had this to say. This represents the views of some members of the Conservative party in the British House of Commons in regard to this very problem. The paragraph reads:
The British army is equipped with Honest Johns and Corporals, the warheads being under American control. The fundamental requirement for the relationship between tactical nuclear weapons and our armed forces is that the armed forces should always have a choice between using them and not using them and still be in a position to hold the line. In other words, they must be available, but not the only means of checking aggression. Thus, to quote Kissinger, "Forces in being are more important than at any previous time in our history!" It is important to understand that units once in battle cannot switch from one mode of warfare to another. To integrate nuclear weapons into every unit would make it virtually impossible to keep a war on a conventional basis. Far from being diffused throughout the army, tactical nuclear weapons must be kept in separate units, so that the temptation for a hard pressed junior officer to use them is avoided.
I say not only should they be kept in separate units in reserve, they should be kept under NATO as opposed to national control. If that can be done I think Canada could co-operate to the full in that kind of NATO strategy. But if we are being asked in NATO to accept nuclear weapons for our air division and for our infantry brigade under other than that kind of control, under national control, or under joint control which gives the United States an overpowering authority to use or not to use them, then I do not think we should accept them in Europe. I hope that choice will not have to be made, because I hope that NATO will develop along the lines which I have ventured to outline.

Supply-National Defence If it does it will mean far greater political unity as well as defence unity, and far from weakening the deterrent it will strengthen it.
This is the kind of continental defence and NATO strategy that I venture to put forward and which I hope we will be examining in detail as we go through the estimates. I should like to return to what I said at the beginning. There is only one sure defence, and that is peace. At the present time there is only one sure military way of maintaining peace-and I do not like to say this-and that is to preserve the balance of the terror by the maintenance of a strong and powerful nuclear deterrent force. I accept that in military strategy, but I see no reason-I see a great many arguments against it-for the extension of nuclear weapons from the countries which now have them to other countries thereby weakening their position in international affairs and in the United Nations and making it quite impossible, as I see it, for any Canadian secretary of state for external affairs to go down to the United States and argue against other countries accepting nuclear weapons.
It seems to me these are the advantages of adopting the kind of course I have put forward and the disadvantages of the alternative course by which we become a member of the nuclear club with nuclear weapons under national or joint control. If we are faced with that choice we should take the choice I have indicated, thereby strengthening our position in international affairs, and making our voice stronger in the only field which will save us, namely the maintenance and strengthening of international peace.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, a little while ago the Leader of the Opposition was talking about high levels and low levels, and I must say that the speech he has given since lunch was certainly on a much higher level than the one he gave before lunch. Before lunch what he was doing in effect was attempting to rationalize the irrational. It was a further attempt on his part to try and get out of the mess which the Liberal party got into at their January meeting as far as defence matters are concerned.
I indicated yesterday the comment of some well-qualified newspapermen with regard to the so-called position the Liberals took on defence at the January meeting. The Leader of the Opposition has been making a series of speeches across the country since then trying to explain this, and he complains that people do not understand what their position was. Well, certainly they do not understand it because it was not a position which is understandable. It was a matter of confusion. As I indicated yesterday, one of the reporters who was there said they decided to take

Canada out of NORAD, then they put Canada back into NORAD, then they finally ended up with it half in and half out, that is as far as interceptors are concerned, and it was much the same thing as far as nuclear weapons are concerned and so on all down the line. It resulted, as I say, in a mess and confusion.
I noted yesterday also what a very serious writer on defence subjects had to say in a serious magazine called the Canadian Commentator. John Gellner had this to say about the position the Liberal party is taking on interceptors in particular:
The policy which the Liberal party has adopted in this matter does not even make sense.
It does not make sense, and neither does a lot more of the so-called policy of the Liberal party on defence.


Lester Bowles Pearson: What did he say about your policy?


Douglas Scott Harkness: He said that at least our policy makes sense. He does not agree with all of it, but he said that at least there is some logic in it.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Where does he say that? He does not say it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Paul, don't get too excited.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, the Minister of National Defence is a member of the government and he ought to know that it is contrary to our rules to refer to any member except as the hon. member for such and such constituency. Now, hon. gentlemen opposite do not like it, but it is about time ministers were taught that rudeness is no substitute for effective action in this house. There is no one who on occasion destroys his argument in that regard more effectively than does my genial friend the Minister of National Defence.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The hon. gentleman was in error. He does it to a greater extent than anybody else. I apologize for not mentioning the hon. member for Essex East. I realize I was in error.


Paul Joseph James Martin: According to the rules.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am sorry. I was tempted to do that by the numerous remarks the hon. member for Essex East makes along the same line, and mostly from his seat. However, what I was saying, which the hon. member hoped I would forget but he has not succeeded in throwing me off the track, was that Mr. Gellner in dealing with this matter stated:
They-

The Liberals.
-want to leave all arrangements as they are except that Canadian forces in NORAD would not actually shoot. In other words, we would warn the Americans that the enemy was coming, we would tell him who he is, we would fix and track him, but then we would virtuously withdraw and let the Americans do the killing. This is a solution worthy of Pontius Pilate, not of a Lester B. Pearson and his associates.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is not our solution at all.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think truer words were never written.


Lester Bowles Pearson: It is not true.


Douglas Scott Harkness: It is a Pontius Pilate type of policy if there ever was one. It is an attempt to stand on both sides of the fence. It is an attempt to go in two opposite directions at the same time, and all the attempts of the Leader of the Opposition in various speeches across the country to try to rationalize this completely irrational position are just not going to succeed because it is impossible for them to succeed.
First of all the Leader of the Opposition today accused those in this party and myself in particular of refusing ever to change our minds. He was talking about the fact that he had changed his mind, and he said that we refused to change our minds, that we would not budge, that we were stubborn and so on. Yet about five or ten minutes later in his speech he was complaining bitterly because we did change our minds, as he said, in connection with interceptors. He cannot have it both ways. As a matter of fact, these two statements in his speech made only about five or ten minutes apart, are typical of the lack of logic in the speeches of the Leader of the Opposition on defence. He accuses us on the one hand of being absolutely unchanging and refusing to change and look at new conditions, and five minutes later he complains bitterly because, as he says, we did change.
What can the people of Canada make of such an attitude and statements of that kind? It is all right for the members of his party who sit behind him to applaud loudly when he makes a statement of that kind but when the general public or anybody who thinks seriously about these matters sits down and analyses what he has said it immediately becomes apparent that there is no validity in most of his remarks.


An hon. Member:: Let the public decide.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The public will certainly decide, and there is no question in my mind as to how they will decide.


Mr. Deschaleleis:: Sooner or later?
Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition also went on to complain in his earlier remarks that this was the first debate we have had on defence this session, and that there had been none in the earlier part of the session. No one knows better than he does that the reason for that was his own absence and that of the hon. member for Trinity.


Mr. Chevrier:: That is not so.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, that statement is untrue.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The defence estimates were announced for consideration by the leader of the house. They were to come up on a certain day. The Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Trinity-


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is not true.


Douglas Scott Harkness: -complained and requested that they be not brought up because they said they could not be here.


Lester Bowles Pearson: So we waited for six months.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As a result consideration of these estimates was delayed. He now complains that there was no debate on defence in the earlier part of the session, but the reason was the unwillingness of the Liberal party to go ahead with a debate at that time.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is ridiculous nonsense.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition went on to say that I should have made a statement on fundamental issues and questions, and that I had not done so. I submit that if he will read the speech I made he will see that it is a statement on the fundamental defence situation as far as this country is concerned, the position the government has taken in regard thereto, and what we have been doing and are doing. His chief complaint would seem to be that we have not said we are going to get nuclear weapons next week. That is really what it all boils down to.
From the statements of the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Essex East you would think that the acquisition or non-acquisition of nuclear weapons constituted the whole field of defence policy. They are one type of weapon, and they would be used in certain circumstances and not used in others. I think they have to be regarded as a certain type of weapon and not looked upon as the end-all and be-all of defence policy, which they are not.
The Leader of the Opposition referred to an editorial in this morning's Globe and Mail, a copy of which I have here, and quoted some portions of it with approval. I should

Supply-National Defence like to point out that it would appear impossible that the writer of the editorial had read the speech I made yesterday or any of my previous speeches on defence. Otherwise he could not possibly have written this editorial, because he states here, after quoting something I had said:
The picture this conjures up, intentionally or otherwise, is that of Canada facing single combat with Russia, and considering whether to become a full-fledged nuclear power to deter the prospective enemy. This is not the problem at all. Canada has no hope of becoming a nuclear power; to build long range rockets and the like as a deterrent is altogether beyond her resources.
That is exactly what I have been saying for months. The editorial goes on to say:
The main defence of the western world against nuclear war is its deterrent force and the most important components are the missiles and heavy bombers of the United States strategic air command-[DOT]
In speech after speech I have made those very statements, and for the writer of this editorial in the Globe and Mail to write as though these views are contrary to what I have been saying is, of course, simply an indication of the fact that the writer seems to have no knowledge whatsoever of what I have been saying for months past and what I said yesterday.
I have been insisting right along that Canada's defence depends on belonging to the NATO alliance, maintaining the NORAD agreement and our efforts toward peace in the United Nations. I have emphasized this time after time. I have emphasized the fact that the forces we maintain in Canada are not forces designed to meet every eventuality. We have no long range strategic bombers, we have no nuclear weapons, we have no missiles. We have no major naval vessels except one aircraft carrier. But within the NATO alliance as a whole we have all these components, and Canada's security is arrived at as a result of her membership in this alliance and the fact that we can depend on our allies to provide these various forces if they are required.
The editorial is completely ridiculous. The writer of the editorial and the Leader of the Opposition appear to dislike the fact that I used a somewhat homely analogy about a bear and a man with a rifle. Probably they do not like analogies of any kind, particularly rather homely ones.
The Leader of the Opposition went on to talk about NATO having a nuclear strategy. Later he said that he agrees that there is a nuclear strategy and believes that it must be maintained. I am glad to have him make that definite statement, because from some of the statements he has made through the country in past months you would think that he was against that idea. Having come to this position he, I hope, will remain with it.
[Mr. Harkness.l


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have said that every time I have spoken.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I hope he will not shift his position every month or so as he has done during the past several months. He asked me a question which I was not really able to catch, as to the basis on which I stated that there were several countries in NATO that have nuclear weapons on their soil and have entered into agreements with the United States in connection with those weapons, as I stated yesterday. I do not know exactly what he meant. I think he is aware of the fact that this is the case.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I asked you what countries, what members.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The only thing I would say about that would be to quote from a statement former President Eisenhower made on January 17, 1961 in a letter to congress which has been published. This letter contains a reference to an agreement with the government of Italy for co-operation in the use of atomic energy. I quote:
To facilitate the necessary co-operation on our part legislation amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was enacted by the congress in 1958. Pursuant to that legislation agreements for co-operation were concluded with four of our NATO partners in May and June 1959. A similar agreement was also recently concluded with our NATO allies, the Republic of Italy. All of these agreements are designed to implement in important respects the agreed NATO program. This agreement with the government of Italy will enable the United States to co-operate effectively in mutual defence planning with Italy and in the training of Italian NATO forces in order that, if an attack on NATO should occur, Italian forces could, under the direction of the supreme allied commander for Europe, effectively use nuclear weapons in their defence.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask the minister a question on this point, since I brought it up? Is he now telling us that these NATO members have bilateral agreements with the United States for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by their forces under national or joint control? If so, what members of NATO have made these agreements he has mentioned?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think what I have read is self - explanatory.


Paul Joseph James Martin: That is another thing altogether; that is for the peaceful use of atomic energy.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Some people refuse to understand if it does not further their own purposes. This statement made by President Eisenhower contains this sentence to which I have already referred:
*-if an attack on NATO should occur, Italian forces could, under the direction of the supreme allied commander for Europe, effectively use nuclear weapons in their defence.

I think that is clear enough. As to the other countries, I have not seen any public statements in regard to which countries they are; therefore I have to consider that as security information.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Oh, oh.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the Leader of the Opposition says "Oh, oh". He knows quite well that anything along this line is a matter of security until it is released by the people concerned. I have read the letter signed by President Eisenhower and sent to the congress of the United States, which is a matter of public record. I think it makes the situation quite clear. There is nothing to be gained by me spelling out the other four countries to which he referred. Once more, of course, as I pointed out yesterday, all this, which has been public information for some time, makes a complete sham of the position taken in connection with NATO by the New Democratic party at its convention.
Then the Leader of the Opposition went on to mention the weapons systems we have already secured, the Bomarc, the Honest John and the 104. He quoted at the time from a statement by General Foulkes in a pamphlet entitled "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age", one of those behind the headlines booklets. He quoted what General Foulkes said as though it were government policy. The Leader of the Opposition knows that General Foulkes does not state government policy. He never did state government policy as chairman of the chiefs of staff. This was the prerogative of the members of the government under whom he served, both the government to which the hon. member belonged and the present government. From the way in which the Leader of the Opposition put this quotation on the record it would appear as though General Foulkes was stating government policy. I will not say he did so purposely, but it was designed to cause misapprehension on the part of the people listening to him or reading Hansard.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On that point, I should like to say I made it quite clear, as the record will show, that General Foulkes had no official responsibility when he made that statement.


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is fine, but I say that the way in which the quotation was put would lead most people reading Hansard to believe that General Foulkes was stating government policy. This is not the case. General Foulkes was a distinguished soldier. He is listened to with great respect on military subjects. I believe everyone in Canada accords him that respect. One of the odd things about this, and this is typical of what you
Supply-National Defence find in the Liberal party, is that only the other day the hon. member for Leeds was quoting from this same pamphlet in an attempt to show that General Foulkes was opposed to nuclear weapons. This is typical of the Liberal party, trying to go in two directions at once. The Leader of the Opposition quotes him as being strongly in favour of nuclear weapons, which he is. The hon. member for Leeds was quoting from this booklet, as a reference to page 8250 of Hansard will show, in an attempt to show that General Foulkes a great military leader in Canada, was against nuclear weapons.
This again is typical of what you get in the Liberal party. You find people going in opposite directions, so you have complete confusion in the party. I am afraid I often feel sorry for the Leader of the Opposition-


Paul Joseph James Martin: Don't feel sorry for him, feel sorry for yourself.


Douglas Scott Harkness: -as a result of the things the people in his own party do to him.


Lester Bowles Pearson: You should feel sorry for the Minister of Trade and Commerce, too.


Paul Joseph James Martin: You need the help of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs; they should be here to help you.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I should like to draw attention to the long, sustained remarks which have been coming for some time from the hon. member for Essex East, who is deliberately breaking the rules by remaining in his seat when he makes these interruptions.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I apologize.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition made a reference to the statement the Prime Minister made in regard to the acquisition of the three weapons systems to which I have referred, the Bomarc, the Honest John and the 104. He went into the question of lead times and then gave us his own interpretation of what I had said yesterday and on previous occasions in that regard. I should like to make it quite clear once more that you cannot decide today to arm your forces with nuclear weapons carriers and, having made that decision, expect to have the forces armed with these weapons within two or three years. It takes a considerable length of time after an order is placed to produce any one of these weapons systems, and it takes a considerable length of time to train people in their operation.
As I said in my speech when I opened this debate, and as I have said on numerous occasions, it has seemed the part of wisdom to acquire certain weapons systems which

Supply-National Defence are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Then in the event a decision should be taken that nuclear warheads are required, we would be in a position to make use of them. It was in connection with this use of the analogy of the bear and the rifle that the Leader of the Opposition chose to object.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I did not object to it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is the situation. If you are going to take due precautions in the extremely troubled situation which has been existing for the last two years or more and you believe that there is any possibility that you might have to have nuclear weapons for your own defence, for defence of your own territory, then it was essential to secure the carriers, the systems which could use nuclear warheads and to put in orders for them some considerable time ahead. The Leader of the Opposition objected to the fact that we had placed orders for the Bomarc, the Honest John and the F-104, I submit that it was only the part of wisdom and prudence to have done so, whether or not they are ever actually armed with nuclear warheads.
In this connection I would just recall to the minds of hon. members that yesterday the hon. member for Trinity was comparing the Honest John unfavourably with the Little John, thus indicating how absolutely little he knows about this matter. The Honest John is a very much more effective weapon than is the Little John. The Little John is not yet even an approved weapon. It has a range of less than half of that of the Honest John and its punch is approximately one sixth less than that of the Honest John. Nevertheless the hon. member for Trinity rises in his place as though he knew all about it and says that the Honest John is an obsolete weapon and that the Americans are now producing the Little John, a very much better weapon. Once more he indicated his complete ignorance of these matters of a technical nature.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You are hiding behind your security curtain.


An hon. Member:: The hon. member for Trinity is an expert on curtains.


Douglas Scott Harkness: At this point the Leader of the Opposition made his great confession about changing his mind. I have no complaint about his changing his mind. The only thing about which I complain is that he does it so frequently that you never know where you are at with him. It is quite reasonable for a man to change his mind every two years, we will say, or every year or even oftener if conditions warrant it. But to do it every month or every week seems to be

a little bit beyond reason and leaves us in a complete state of mystery as to what his position really is on these subjects.
Following that, he went on to interceptors and in effect stated that they are no more of any use. He said that their only purpose was to protect S.A.C. bases and that they were no protection whatever for Canadian cities. I submit that if there were no defence at all in Canada or in the United States against manned bombers, the world would not be in its present situation. The Russians would probably have been in control of everything a considerable length of time ago. It is the fact that there is a defence against the manned bomber particularly, which makes it unlikely that manned bombers will come over here to drop bombs. This defence therefore constitutes a great protection for Canadian cities and for the entire population.
In addition to that, of course, in the event that a war started, while it is true they would not knock down all the bombers that come over, nevertheless they would knock down a considerable number of them; and every time you knock down a bomber carrying one or two atomic bombs, you have saved the lives of a large number of people and avoided a great deal of property damage. While these things, of course, are relative, to say that they are of no protection whatever to Canadian cities is to make a statement which is just not correct.
Next, the Leader of the Opposition proceeded to discuss the Arrow. I dealt with the Arrow the other day when the matter was raised by an other hon. member on his side, and I am not going to say much about it now. However, I will make one or two comments. This was when the Leader of the Opposition complained and asked why we changed our minds. He said, "Why did the government change its views on the bomber threat?" Again he asked, "Why did they say, when the Arrow was done away with, that there was not going to be a bomber threat any more?" Of course, that was never said to begin with. What was said at the time was that other means of defence against the bomber would be investigated. I have here the statement of the Prime Minister in connection with this matter made on Friday, February 20, 1959. He ended the statement with these words:
The government has taken no decision to acquire other aircraft to replace the CF-100, which is still an effective weapon in the defence of North America against the present bomber threat. The Minister of National Defence and the chiefs of staff are now engaged in further studies in the various alternatives for the improvement of our defences.

The then minister of national defence on May 17 last year in discussing the estimates had this to say:
Regarding the need for an interceptor, as seen at that time-
This is at the time of the cancellation of the Arrow.
-the chiefs of staff were instructed to investigate the possibility of obtaining another aircraft at a cheaper price to replace the CF-105.
We did not say that the bomber threat was gone. We did not at that time say that the CF-100 would not be replaced. In fact, we said just the opposite.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Selected scripture readings again.


Douglas Scott Harkness: To continue what the minister of national defence said on May 17, 1960:
That was stated in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister when he gave his statement, that the chiefs of staff were being instructed to investigate and see whether there was any other aircraft of proven design that was available.
As a matter of fact we have secured the F-101. As I stated here yesterday, contrary to the opinions of the hon. member for Trinity it is an exceptionally good aircraft and fills the needs.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: On a question of privilege, Mr. Chairman, I should like the minister to quote the opinion which I expressed, which is contrary to the one he just quoted.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have the floor.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: He is continually falsifying the record by misrepresenting the facts.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The hon. member cannot resist interrupting, Mr. Chairman. He is extremely sensitive. I suppose there is no one so sensitive as is the man who knows he is wrong. The hon. member for Trinity demonstrates that fact.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Let us keep our tempers down.


Douglas Scott Harkness: My temper is all right. It is the tempers on the hon. member's side that he needs to worry about. I refer to the hon. member for Trinity.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Don't be smart.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think the hon. member for Essex East had better speak to his colleague. He is excited. As was stated by the then minister of national defence, the cancellation of the Arrow to a very great extent was due to the fact that it was just too costly a weapon for the Canadian economy and Canadian defence budget to be able to stand. The cost
Supply-National Defence of it would have been something in the neighbourhood of $2,250 million or about $12,500,000 a plane.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You are lying again.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Trinity has just said, "You are lying again". I would request that you ask him to withdraw that remark as any other gentleman would.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Chairman, the minister used that figure no less than a day ago-


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will you allow me to make a statement, Mr. Chairman.


Mr. Graffley:: Withdraw.


Douglas Scott Harkness: On a point of order may I say that I asked for a withdrawal. If the hon. member is not sufficient of a gentleman to observe the rules of the house, then just let him sit quietly.


Mr. Caron:: He can prove you were lying.


The Deputy Chairman:: Order. I can give the hon. member for Trinity some authority for acquiescing in the request of the minister and I would appreciate it if he would withdraw the remark.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I would like you to hear me out, Mr. Chairman.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Douglas Scott Harkness: On a point of order-


An hon. Member:: He has the right of reply.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: If I can prove the minister is lying, will you accept-


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member should withdraw. He has no right to make a speech. He must withdraw.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, if the hon. member withdraws that particular word I hope it will not be interpreted in the sense of the acceptance on this side of the chamber of facts which we know not to be accurate as stated by the minister.


An hon. Member:: That is different.


Gordon Campbell Chown: I think perhaps the Leader of the Opposition was speaking from the point of view of the group situation in bringing in that particular factor. In the matter before the committee, the allegation made by the hon. member for Trinity was direct and personal and was impugning the integrity and honour of the minister of the crown who had the floor.

Supply-National Defence
For that reason, without any preliminary explanation I would ask the hon. member for Trinity to kindly withdraw the remark.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The evidence of the defence expenditures special committee-


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: -pages 146 and 147-


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, would you please ask the hon. member to resume his seat? I have the floor.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: -the committee was advised by the-


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Order. I have the floor, as it turns out, and I do not think there is any need to exercise the temper of the committee, which has been on a fairly gentle level throughout this very serious and important debate on national defence.
I say again that there is no need for any preliminary explanation on the part of the hon. member for Trinity. I know him well enough personally, to know that he knows he should withdraw the remark so we may continue the debate that is before the committee.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I withdraw the phrase I used, in accordance with parliamentary practice, while reserving the right to vindicate the statement I made later in the debate.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, after this unseemly interruption I should like to resume what I was saying, which was that the cost of the Arrow, at $2,250 million-


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You never learn. You are stupid-


Douglas Scott Harkness: -which would have been $12,500,000 per copy as the program was presented at that time and as was the estimate of the company, was just completely beyond the capability of the budget. When we told the company that and said we could not continue the program, they then made an alternative proposal of putting in, instead of a Canadian-manufactured weapons system, a United States-manufactured weapons system and said that under those conditions the cost of the airplane would be $7,800,000 per copy instead of $12,500,000 per copy.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That was the figure of the Department of National Defence.


Douglas Scott Harkness: However, this was still completely out of reason and, as the minister of national defence said on May 17, 1960:
[The Deputy Chairman.]
All I can say in conclusion is that the cost of $12J million for an aircraft, or even, if the alternative system of fire control had been introduced, of $7,800,000, was just a price tag which was too high to be included in the defence budget of those days.
That was the situation in regard to that.


Lester Bowles Pearson: And get back half of it in
taxes.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I should like to point out in this connection that we were not alone in cancelling one of these extremely high priced airplanes. The United States cancelled their 108 really for exactly the same reasons that we cancelled the 105, because they considered the cost of the airplane was too great for the return involved, and also because they considered their other airplanes, the F-101, the F-102 and the F-106 were adequate for the purpose of meeting the bomber threat as they saw it at that time.
Of these airplanes, of course the F-101 is one of those we are going to get, and it is the only two-seater airplane of the lot. Both the 102 and the 106 are single-seater airplanes and are not adapted for the job that is to be done here in Canada. The next thing-


Gordon Campbell Chown: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the minister, but his time has expired.


Some hon. Members:: Go ahead.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Does the committee give unanimous consent to the minister continuing?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition went on to say that he thought the Bomarc was obsolete, that it is no good. Then of course the hon. member for Trinity made similar statements. If that is the case, here is a very peculiar thing which I would ask the committee to consider. There was a story written by Paul Dubois in the Ottawa Citizen of October 29, 1960. The dateline was "Thurso". It was about the speech of the Leader of the Opposition at a rally in support of Gaston Clermont, Liberal candidate in the by-election occurring at that time in Labelle riding.


Some hon. Members:: And elected.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I would read the committee the direct quote. Perhaps the Leader of the Opposition will say he was misquoted, but the direct quote of what he said was this:
A nuclear deterrent may be necessary for the U.S., but not for us and other countries. If Russia ever attacked North America and specifically Canada, Montpellier would be a prime target for the Russians, Montpellier and communities for hundreds of miles around would be reduced to ruins.

If Montpellier was going to be a prime target because it had the Bomarc base there, why does the Leader of the Opposition now say that the Bomarc is completely useless? If it is completely useless the Russians would not be wasting any bombs on it.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Douglas Scott Harkness: We find the Leader of the Opposition, for election purposes, going to this area and saying this terrible Conservative government had built a Bomarc station there and that was going to bring Russian bombers and these people would be wiped out if the balloon ever went up.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The balloon went up this last minute.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition says the Bomarc is no good and nobody takes it seriously except this government. He says the Russians do not pay any attention to it. That is another example of the logic of the Leader of the Opposition in connection with these matters. Now-


Lionel Chevrier: Take a long breath.


Douglas Scott Harkness: He went on to say that the Liberals had put up a much better policy last year and he indicated much better roles that Canada might be following as far as defence is concerned.
What was this great policy they put up last year? As described by my predecessor, it was a policy of scrap, scrap, scrap. They wanted to scrap practically everything and what they did not want to scrap in this so-called policy consisted chiefly of advocating things which we had already done or were proposing to do. I have a list here and I could go over them in detail, but I hardly think it is worth while. I will just indicate that they urged the abandonment of the SAGE Bomarc system and recommended the purchase from the United States of a number of supersonic interceptor aircraft. They knew we were negotiating at that time for supersonic aircraft, so they recommended this and thought they would get on the bandwagon, I suppose.
There is one other thing I should like to mention. They advocated, really, that the navy should become a sort of glorified merchant marine.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Assault vessels for the troops.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Fortunately that policy is not supported by anybody except themselves. That so-called policy is so full of holes that it is much worse than one of those famous cheeses.


An hon. Member:: It smells worse, too.
Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition read some quotations from newspapers supporting the position that they take. I have a whole file here attacking the position they have taken, but I certainly have not time to read them. This sort of reading does not prove very much, of course.
After lunch-I think the Leader of the Opposition must have had a good lunch-he seemed to get onto a somewhat better tack. He got away from this attempt to justify the mistakes that he and his party had made in the past in regard to defence and he got on to a discussion of NATO, what its objective should be, how nuclear weapons might be controlled in it, and so on. The hon. gentleman said he did not object to NATO having nuclear weapons. As I indicated, I was very glad to have that definite statement from him and I hope he will stay with it. I think we all realize that the control of nuclear weapons is an extremely difficult problem, as the hon. gentleman himself admitted. It is, of course, one which has been exercising the attention of governments of the NATO countries for a very considerable time. To date, no generally acceptable solution has been reached. It is a problem which I certainly trust can be solved, just as the Leader of the Opposition does and as, I think, we all do, but it has not been solved to date.
There is another question which was raised by the Leader of the Oppositoin and with which I should like to deal briefly. He referred to 15 fingers on the trigger. Of course, it would be hardly a credible type of deterrent if we had to obtain the agreement of 15 countries before nuclear weapons might be used, in certain circumstances particularly. In this connection a great deal of thought has been given to whether what are known in the navy in particular as rules of engagement might not be worked out-whether all the 15 countries of NATO might not agree to those rules of engagement, as they are called, which would lay down the situation in which each country would agree that nuclear weapons might be used. There is, I think, hope of arriving at some type of what might be called full NATO control over the use of nuclear weapons by this means.
The Leader of the Opposition spoke of the necessity, in his view, of building up the conventional front line strength of NATO. I fully agree that not only the conventional front line strength of NATO but the conventional strength of the organization generally should be built up. I do not think anybody would quarrel with the hon. gentleman in this regard. Ever since the organization was established, one of the greatest difficulties as far as NATO is concerned has been the failure

Supply-National Defence of certain members of that organization to build up their conventional forces at a sufficiently rapid pace to the strength to which they themselves had agreed to bring them at some time in the future. Of course, the greater the degree to which each of the individual countries in NATO builds its conventional strength the stronger the force will be. I think the Leader of the Opposition and myself share common ground in that regard. As a matter of fact, the increase in the Canadian force which was announced here last week is an indication of Canada's willingness to build up her own NATO strength and increase her contribution to NATO.
I should like to say a word about one idea which the Leader of the Opposition put out- the idea that the Russians might launch a limited conventional war, and that we must have some means of dealing with it. I do not think that eventuality is very likely, though I do not say it is impossible; nothing is impossible. But I think it is very unlikely that the Russians would start a limited war in Europe which they would expect to keep as a conventional war. If they were to do so I think the chance of such a conflict developing into a nuclear war would be very great. For this reason I hope the Russians would not contemplate such action for a minute because it would be an extremely dangerous type of move.
As the Leader of the Opposition pointed out, perhaps the greatest danger we face in the world today is that of a war started by accident. This is something which could happen, and it is a possibility which needs to be guarded against very carefully as far as the west is concerned'-and we trust the Russians will take equal precautions. However, as I say, the chance that they would start a fair sized conventional war in the expectation that it could be kept at that is, I think, very unlikely. The basic situation is that they have nuclear weapons in their force in eastern Europe, and if they started to move, Mr. Khrushchev himself has said they are going to use everything. That is why it is necessary to have sufficient strength to deter them from ever making such a move. I agree it is the most important thing in the world at the present time to try to ensure that peace continues. On that note I think I will end.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I apologize for taking up the time of the committee at this stage but it is most difficult to conduct a responsible examination of the estimates of the Department of National Defence when the committee cannot rely on information given it by the Minister of National Defence. The example we have had this afternoon is just one of


many. Either the minister's memory is incomparably bad or he gives us wrong information.
For example, in respect to the cost of the Avro Arrow, in May of this year, speaking on Vancouver island during the by-election, the minister is reported to have said, according to a newspaper which he indicated this morning was a good paper, that the planes would have cost $15 million each. The report in the Victoria daily Colonist reads in part:
Referring to the Liberal leader's remarks about the scrapping of the Avro Arrow jet interceptors the defence minister stated that the planes would have cost $15 million each and that the huge cost would have meant scrapping much of the army and navy strength.
This afternoon the minister must have decided in his imagination that it would be more credible if he reduced the figure to $12 million each. And then, when he was challenged, as he was yesterday when he pulled the same trick, he reduced the figure to $7.81 million each. Even that figure is too high, because that is the figure which was given to the special select committee on estimates a year ago as the cost of 108 operational aircraft plus 12 pre-production models. If hon. members do the arithmetic they will find that the cost per operational aircraft was $6.8 million each.


An hon. Member:: Still too much.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is all in the evidence. The minister is aware of it, and for him to stand up and tell this committee that the cost would have been $12 million each is an insult to hon. members, particularly as the evidence given by the former deputy minister of national defence, now Air Chief Marshal Miller, was that the planes would cost $6.8 million each. How can we have any faith in anything the minister tells us if he uses a device of this kind to try to confuse and bewilder both the committee and the Canadian people?
This is a type of arithmetic which might be applied to a new situation. The minister has just worked out an arrangement under which the Canadian Department of National Defence is to receive 66 Voodoo aircraft in exchange for certain things. I have the agreement here. I shall not read it in detail, but in exchange for the 66 Voodoo aircraft the department agrees to take over from the United States the cost of maintaining Pinetree radar stations previously maintained by the United States air force. In addition, it is to contribute $50 million toward a program of military aid- toward the acquisition of F-104 aircraft to be built at Canadair in Montreal.
In addition, it will pay one third of the cost of spares and ground handling equipment for the Voodoo in the amount of $10.9 million.

Now, there is no cut-off date as to when Canada's responsibility ends in respect of maintaining the Pinetree line. The annual cost of maintaining the Pinetree line has been variously estimated. The then minister of national defence, the Hon. George Pearkes, V.C., advised the house on March 2, 1959, as reported on page 1518 of Hansard as follows:
Mr. Speaker, before the house rose for the dinner recess, the Leader of the Opposition had asked for information with regard to the cost of the Pinetree system. As I explained, the Pinetree system is shared by the United States and by Canada, some of the stations being operated by Canadians and some being operated by the Americans. The cost to Canada of operating each year is approximately $28 million; that is the cost of operating those Pinetree stations which were either built by Canada and manned by R.C.A.F. personnel or were built by the United States and manned by R.C.A.F. personnel. The cost to the United States is approximately $43 million for operating their stations. That figure of $43 million includes some $5 million which the United States are spending on purchasing equipment for those stations in Canada.
Hence if Canada were to take over the operation of the line in its entirety it would mean the addition of $43 million to our defence budget at the present time.
A United States congressional subcommittee was advised by the director general of the United States air force budget that the saving to the United States air force by Canada taking over the cost of the Pinetree line was $50 million a year. If this is so, Mr. Chairman, let us assume that we have to maintain this Pinetree line for ten years. The cost, even by using the lower figure recorded by the Minister of National Defence, would be $430 million. Add to this $50 million which is Canada's share of the purchase of F-104's, and $10.9 million which is our share of the spares for the Voodoo, and the total cost is $490.9 million for 66 aircraft or approximately $7.5 million per copy. If we had to maintain those stations for 15 years the cost would be a total of $705.9 million, or more than $10 million a copy, far more than it would have cost to carry on with the Avro Arrow program.
The Minister of National Defence told the people in Victoria that the commencement of the Avro Arrow program was the greatest mistake ever made by the Canadian government. Well, the deal he has just made with the United States government, which could result in the cost of $10 million each for aircraft which at the most are not worth more than $2 million each, is in my opinion one of the biggest boobs ever pulled by a minister of national defence.
In closing may I say I think the minister should apologize to the committee for using figures upon which it cannot rely.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, if these allegations came from some serious source I
Supply-National Defence would take them seriously. However, I consider the source from which they come and I will merely say that the figures the hon. gentleman is producing are probably comparable with the figures he was trying to produce yesterday as to what the cost would be for the 15,000 more troops we are going to raise, which he insisted was double what I had said they would be, although this was a figure arrived at by careful estimates of the departmental officials and officials of treasury board. But he produces any figures that his imagination suggests to him and I suggest that the committee should not take him to seriously-I certainly do not take him too seriously-in regard to these matters.
As far as the actual cost of taking over these Pinetree lines, and so on, is concerned, if the cost went on for long enough, of course, it might be very considerable. But the main point is that we are taking over those radar stations in Canada, manning them by Canadian personnel and operating them with Canadian personnel rather than having them operated by United States personnel.
Hon. gentlemen opposite are always complaining about having United States personnel here stating that it is an infringement of our sovereignty. Therefore rather than complaining about it they should be happy to see Canadian personnel replacing United States personnel in manning those radar stations. The point is, if you take a long enough period you can arrive at any figures you like.
Members of the committee will recall an item which appeared in the paper the other day. There was a clergyman in Boston who sent a bill to the chancellor of the exchequer for $18 worth of damage done to the fence of his church back in 1770 something. He presented a bill for upwards of $750,000. If you take a long enough period you can come up with a terrific figure. In effect this is what the hon. member is doing.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Could I ask the minister a question arising out of the article by Mr. John Gellner which he quoted a few minutes ago. The article criticized the Liberal party. Does the minister agree with this statement in the article:
The country certainly needs a Minister of National Defence who can overcome public apathy and suspicion, and restore confidence in Canadian military policy.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Where did the hon. member find that? The reason I ask the question is that as I recall this particular statement by Mr. Gellner, he went on to say, "It looks as if Canada has secured one."


Lester Bowles Pearson: No, Mr. Chairman. I will send the article over. It went on to say:
Let us hope Harkness is the man.

Supply-National Defence
But I am sure his hopes are not realized now.


Douglas Scott Harkness: He suggests strongly that I am the man, as I recall it.
(Translation):


Jean-Paul Deschatelets: Mr. Chairman, this debate, which is of such great significance to all Canadians, has now reached its third day, and we just heard from the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) a masterful statement on all aspects of the national defence policy Canada should follow, a statement which the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Harkness) was unable to refute. We therefore have the proof that in this field as in all others, the Canadians who are looking for guidance and leadership must turn to the Liberal party and not to the government which persists in taking a confused and ambiguous position in this and every other matter.
Mr. Chairman, I intend to speak very briefly on this question which seems to me a capital one at this time and which is a subject of interest and concern for the Canadian people. The present situation may be summed up in the following question. What is the policy of this government with regard to the use of nuclear arms in Canada?
Mr. Chairman, I think that the discussion of the estimates of the Department of National Defence, which takes place this year in the midst of an international crisis, would have been a very appropriate moment for the government to state a definite policy and tell us clearly whether or not it had come to a decision with regard to the number one problem, the use of nuclear arms in Canada.
It is inconceivable that the government after three days of debate should leave us in an ambiguous position. The situation is becoming more and more confused. Only yesterday, the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) when concluding his speech called upon the government and the Minister of National Defence clearly to state their policy in respect of nuclear arms in Canada. As a matter of fact, the hon. member for Essex East said this, and I quote from page 8330 of Hansard: (Text):
We are entitled to know, before parliament adjourns, with respect to this very vital matter of whether or not the government has a policy; and if it has, the government should state it in a forthright and unambiguous way.
(Translation):
Here is the answer given by the Minister of National Defence, as recorded in Hansard on page 8330.


(Text):


Douglas Scott Harkness: In reply to that, Mr. Chairman, I would say that I do not propose to accept the directions of the hon. member for Essex East as to what I should or should not say in this debate.
I contend that this is an extraordinary statement on the part of the minister and I hope that this observation of the minister will receive wide publicity because he has overlooked a very important fact. When the hon. member for Essex East asked the government to tell us what their policy is he was not speaking on behalf of the Liberal party only but also on behalf of the Canadian people who would like to know what the decision of the government is on this important question.
(Translation):
Mr. Chairman, such indecision on the part of the government is not only disappointing but also detrimental to the interests of Canada, and as long as no clear and specific decision is arrived at on this most important matter, Canada will be incapable of playing the leading part that it should play.
I listened last Tuesday to the statement made by the minister. That statement can only lead to speculation. Here is what he said as recorded on page 8223 of Hansard:
It requires that they be equipped with weapons comparable to if not better than those of a potential adversary. It is the policy of the government that our forces should not be required to face a potential enemy with inferior weapons.
Mr. Chairman, most newspapers understood that the government had decided to acquire atomic weapons and to become a member of the nuclear club. But that statement is ambiguous and causes dissatisfaction everywhere among the public.
1 also listened to the remarks of the Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Sevigny); he too avoided any definite statement on this capital matter. Indeed, he considered war in terms of the 1914 world war or the second world war because, according to page 8241 of Hansard, he stated:
If the worst should come, if we have to fight again, I do not hesitate to say that we shall once again win the battles of tomorrow just as we won the battles of yesteryear, and this for many reasons.
Well, the minister has forgotten, I think, that victory has no meaning at all in a nuclear war. However, he was a little more careful yesterday than he was when he addressed a rally in Mont Laurier during the last by-election campaign in the constituency of Labelle. I should tell him that I was not far from the place where he was speaking and that I heard him enumerate the advantages of the La Macaza launching base. The

minister will recall, I hope, that one of the reasons for his party's humiliating defeat in the riding of Labelle was precisely the stand taken by his government on this question of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, after three days of debate, it is obvious that the government's national defence policy is several years old, as the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer) has shown, and that the government has not had the courage to adopt a definite position concerning the use of nuclear weapons in Canada. As long as this situation prevails, we cannot hope to play the part we could play, and we would be ill-advised to criticize today the other countries which belong to the nuclear club since our objections to nuclear tests would be weakened because of the position taken by the government.
That is a cause of great disappointment for all Canadians but they have one reason for keeping up their hopes, and that is the fact that there is one political party which has remained true to the policy it has always advocated with respect to nuclear weapons. Here I should like to quote from the newspaper Le Devoir of Tuesday, April 11, 1961. Here is what Paul Sauriol had to say in an editorial:
The Liberal party rally, last January, clearly declared itself against acquisition or use of nuclear weapons in Canada, under any form of control; Mr. Pearson said that such weapons were not required for the time being.
What position we took at the rally was our position before and it still is our position. That is something that one cannot say of this administration.
I do not want to be too critical of the C.C.F. members who have been wearing since last summer a new jacket which fits them about as well as a strait-jacket. As I say, I do not want to be too hard on them, because it is really pitiful to see them trying to take positions now to the left, now to the right, according to the instructions they get.
I simply say that the only encouraging sign for Canadians is the fact that at least there is in the Canadian political life one party with a clean cut position, with a clear stand, a constant stand, and I am proud to be a member of that party, the Liberal party.
(Text):


Mr. Herridge:: Mr. Chairman, regardless of the sombre nature of this debate, I for one am very pleased to note two cheering news items in the afternoon paper. The first in the Citizen, is headed, "U.S. Ready for Serious U.N. Talks With Russia". It is a Reuters dispatch from London and reads as follows:
Supply-National Defence
Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko is ready to enter into an exchange of opinions with U.S. state secretary Dean Rusk on Germany and other problems, the Soviet news agency Tass announced today.
The other one is in today's Ottawa Journal. It is a report on a meeting held by Willy Brandt, and it reads in part as follows:
Speaking in the heart of the socialist Ruhr before a quiet, attentive audience of at least 20,000 with several thousand more milling outside, Mr. Brandt rejected proposals for atomic weapons for Germany and pledged faithful adherence to the pact of London that forbids Germany to produce atomic weapons.
I thought I would mention those two news items because they are heartening, I think, to anyone who is interested in watching developments on the international scene.
We have had a rather lengthy and interesting discussion, Mr. Chairman, with respect to military hardware. It seems to me to be pretty well a stalemate, and at times the debate was difficult to follow. Of course, I would not suggest for a moment that I am capable of speaking with any knowledge or judgment on such a question. As a member of the working class I am more acquainted with the saw, the axe, the pick and shovel. I could pass some opinion as to the quality of those tools, but not those that have been mentioned previously in the debate.
Now, Mr. Chairman, at the request of a number of people I again raise a matter that I raised yesterday, a matter that is of serious concern to a great number of Canadians. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I made certain statements with respect to General Heusinger and expressed strong opposition to his appointment as chairman of the military representatives committee of NATO. This means that he is one of those who plan the strategy and tactics of NATO and who, indirectly, would direct the activities and actions of Canadian troops. I want to say that my statements were not made lightly. They were not made just to create resentment or anything of that sort. I feel very keenly on this matter and I speak with conviction. I feel as keenly as a number of other persons do, a number of other groups in Canada and in the United States.
The Associate Minister of National Defence replied briefly to my arguments and at one point said that General Heusinger was a man who had served his country with distinction. He then went on to defend the appointment of this general to this very important position. I am quite sure that the Associate Minister of National Defence spoke according to the information he had available. I am confident also that, judging from his remarks,

Supply-National Defence he has not been completely informed on this matter. In order to put the record straight, and on behalf of a number of Canadian citizens, I want to place the facts on the record. This appointment offends a good many Canadians in various groups, including religious, ethnic and other groups.
In order that there will be no misunderstanding, and for the sake of accuracy, I am going to read at some length. I trust the committee will bear with me so that the facts will be on the record. I have read a number of books and documents that have been brought to my office by people interested in this problem, including one lady of German descent. I have the Congressional Record.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Perhaps the hon. member would be king enough to indicate to the committee how long this quotation is. We have had a rather bad precedent, when a very long quotation was put on Hansard the other day, and I would not want to see this become a practice. If the hon. member would indicate to the committee how long it is, that would be helpful.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I would judge, Mr. Chairman, it is about half as long as the interesting statement put on the record by the Progressive Conservative member the other day.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Perhaps I should get the consent of the committee, then, if it is that long. Will the committee give unanimous consent to the putting on the record of this information?


Mr. Palleil:: Why does the hon. member not give the library reference, and then those who are interested can read it?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I shall give the sources.


Gordon Campbell Chown: I have not had the
consent of the committee as yet. Does the committee give its consent?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Because I was the person who unwittingly made arrangements for seeing that the situation which confronted us the other day was procedurally put on paper, may I ask is the hon. member proposing now that he just table the reference? This would be contrary to our procedure.


Gordon Campbell Chown: The hon. member indicated to me he was going to quote it. I asked him if he would be kind enough to advise the committee, in whose hands I am on this matter, how long it was. He said it was about half the length of the very long statement put on the record the other day by the hon. member for St. Boniface which


I felt, on reading Hansard, created a rather bad precedent. I feel I should ask leave from the committee to permit this substantial quotation to be put on the record. Does the committee give its unanimous consent?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I take it, then, that the statement is going to take 25 or 30 minutes to read. Under those circumstances, I do not think we could agree to have the statement read into the record.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Perhaps the hon. member could paraphrase what it says, and get it on the record in that fashion. I do not want to be unfair, but I do not want to see this practice develop in committee and I think hon. members would agree because the committee could get into a very complex and difficult situation if we were too free in our interpretation of this particular rule.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I shall try to take extracts from this reference. I would rather not paraphrase it because I want it to be exact. This is a most interesting document, and I should like the information to be recorded here. I will read extracts and I will try to be as brief as possible. I certainly do not intend to be anything like 30 minutes.
Now, I am quoting from the United States Congressional Record for April 19 of this year. These various groups had made representations to Senator Wayne Morse-


John Cameron Pallett: What page?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: The pages I start at is 5893. There are several pages, in fact, but I am only going to take extracts. An appeal was made to Senator Wayne Morse by the American Jewish congress and other groups to bring these matters to the attention of the United States senate, which he did. In doing so, he said:
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the record, as part of my remarks, the fact sheet on the record of General Adolf Heusinger.
There being no objection, the fact sheet was ordered to be printed in the record, as follows: Fact Sheet on General Adolf Heusinger
(Issued In conjunction with the appeal to Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, by the Warsaw ghetto commemoration meeting, April 16, 1961, at Manhattan Centre, New York City. The appeal urged the annulment of the appointment of General Adolf Heusinger, chairman of the military representatives committee in permanent session of NATO)
In his autobiography, "Befehl in Widersteit," published in West Germany in 1950, Heusinger wrote that he sympathized with the 1923 Hitler putsch in Munich, but did not participate because he was sure the attempt would fail.
In 1940, Heusinger became chief of operations on Hitler's general staff. Was responsible for the military planning of all Nazi invasions from then on.

In 1942 was made responsible lor all actions against partisans. In August 1942 this order, initiated by Heusinger, was sent to the army group centre on eastern front:
"The Fuehrer demands immediate retaliatory action for (partisan) attack on the railroad station in Slavnoye, with the use of the strongest measures of terror. Report what measures you take.'' Heusinger's order resulted in the following: In Slavnoye the Nazis threw several dozen live children into a deep well. None survived. In another village, Gayanka, Heusinger's troops exterminated the entire population of 115.
Heusinger, as chief of operations of the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)-the high command of the Nazi forces, commanded the special extermination squads (Einsatzgruppen). These squads were given the task of exterminating all Jews and other groups. William L. Shirer describes some of the mass atrocities committed by Heu-singer's Einsatzgruppen (see pages 961 to 963 of "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.")
In "SS-Alibi of a Nation" Reitlinger says that Heusinger planned the levy en masse of the civilian population on the eastern front (page 386).
Heusinger was one of Hitler's most trusted generals. When a bomb planted by army officers exploded at Rastenburg. East Prussia, during a meeting of Hitler and his top generals, the following facts should be remembered:
After the bombing, Hitler said on the radio, "But you should know of a crime unparalleled in German history. The bomb seriously wounded a number of my true and loyal collaborators." (For Heusinger's role in the aftermath to the July 20, 1944, bombing see Shirer, pp. 1044 et seq : Reitlinger, "SS," pp. 386 et seq.).
The loyal Hitler general who was giving a detailed report on the Russian front at the precise time of the bombing was Gen. Adolf Heusinger.
That, though wounded, the general who led the vengeful hunt against other Nazi generals who had failed in their plan to kill Hitler so that they could negotiate a separate peace with the West was Gen. Adolf Heusinger.
That the top-ranking military figure who participated prominently in the mass executions that followed wherein the victims were slowly strangled
A3!)	wires as they hung from meat hooks, was
Adolf Heusinger.
That among the handful who survived the bombing and was called by Hitler himself-
This is after the bombing.
-as "my true and loyal collaborator" was Adolf Heusinger.
That the first recipient of Hitler's July 20, 1944, medal commemorating the bombing at Rastenburg was Gen. Adolph Heusinger.


John Cameron Pallett: Will the hon. member indicate the page he is on at the moment.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Supply-National Defence today. In my opinion this type of appointment creates unnecessary suspicion so far as the Soviet and other countries behind the iron curtain are concerned. Place yourself in their position, Mr. Chairman, knowing that the chairman of the top planning body of NATO was a general who was merciless in the destruction of their civilian population.
I therefore say that in the first instance it is unsound from our point of view to create this -unnecessary irritation and to arouse suspicion on the part of behind the iron curtain countries as to our motives and as to our principles in which we profess we believe. I think it causes unnecessary distress to many people as for instance to the unhappy relatives who suffered from this sort of thing. I think it causes suspicion even among Canadians who are given cause to wonder, when we talk about our being a Christian democracy and use language of that type, how we can justify Canadian troops in reality, if not in effect, actually marching under the leadership of a general with a record such as this. It may create in young people a feeling of cynicism and a lack of belief in the things for which we profess to stand. I know that it creates a great deal of resentment among former veterans of the first and second world wars. Just imagine the feelings of relatives of veterans who sacrificed their lives in the first and second world wars in the defence of principles in which we in Canada believe. With all my heart I believe that an appointment of this type does our cause harm. I feel deeply on this question. I do not think we can justify this appointment. There are a good many other people in our country who feel keenly and sincerely with respect to a question of this type.
The hon. member for Essex East for whom I have great respect made some reference to my remarks yesterday and said that he could understand them as possibly they were somewhat motivated by my experience in the first world war. That is not the situation at all. No one can accuse me of being in any sense a person who has any antagonism towards any race. Anyone who has known of my life throughout the years and my activities in the district in which I live knows that is not true, and that on behalf of even German citizens during the war, I sought to make sure they obtained justice during those difficult times. I do not express these views because of antipathy to any race. I recognize the position of the ordinary soldier who served his country in time of war whether he was on our side or the enemy side. I refer to the ordinary soldier recruited to serve in what he considered to be his country's defence. However,


Mr. Chairman, we must remember that people like General Heusinger were the leaders. These were the people who decided policy. They were the ones who gave expression to nazi ideology, nazi ethics in battle, and who transgressed all the known ethics of modern warfare, in so far as one can term war as having any ethics at all.
A good deal of my information comes from friends of mine of German ancestry. A German lady visited my office just a few nights ago. She came from New York to visit me. I have also had Germans working for me in my constituency on many occasions and I know the contribution they make to society. They are the type of Germans who opposed nazism and left Germany because of it in the first place. They oppose nazism and I respect those people.
I am speaking of those who supported this nazi ideology which we, at great cost, defeated in world war II. I and others oppose this appointment because we believe, in the light of all the circumstances of what the western world suffered in world war II and because of our professed principles, that such an appointment is strictly immoral and, as I said before, weakens our cause.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I urge the government to consider the feelings of the people who feel keenly about this; to obtain the facts and to do what they can to see that this general is replaced by someone with a clean military record, someone who cannot stir up the feelings of many in our country and other countries by creating unnecessary suspicion as to our methods.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to enter into any argument with the hon. member for Kootenay West as to the antecedents of General Heusinger. I merely wish to say that the hon. member has given the opinions of one or two men and perhaps somebody else in connection with this matter. My information is that it was precisely because Dr. Adenauer was convinced of the anti-nazi antecedents of General Heusinger that he appointed him as his chief military adviser in, I believe, 1950. I do not think the hon. member doubts the anti-nazi character of Dr. Adenauer or his general attitude.


Mr. Macdonnell:: Mr. Chairman, I have just this to say regarding what the hon. member for Kootenay West has said. I have no means of knowing the validity of the evidence he has produced, but it seems to me that to leave this matter open, with the possibility that this kind of thing will be disseminated in Russia, with no valid answer to it except that apparently Dr. Adenauer was satisfied, would be a very dangerous thing.

I hope we will pursue this matter further. It seems to me that if there were not an adequate answer to the evidence produced by the hon. member the Russians would be able to disseminate this opinion which we have received from a reputable source. The hon. member is known to us and his own war record is known. He knows of responsible people feeling as he does in connection with this matter and I hope the matter will not be allowed to drop here.


The Acting Chairman (Mr. McGee):: Shall vote 232 carry?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Chairman, there is just one brief matter to which I would refer, for the record. As reported at page 8176 of Hansard, the other day the hon. member for Kootenay West made this observation, which is reported at the top of the page:
We were listening to him carefully-
That is the Prime Minister:
-and at one point we understood him to indicate that it was the government's position that if there were any change in the status of West Berlin, or a war, that we were honour bound in this country to support war. Am I correct in that interpretation?
The Prime Minister said in reply:
What I said was this. If perchance, and all of us hope to the contrary, war came, we would become a participant because of our relationship, our undertakings and our pledges in NATO.
I simply wish to say for the record that, while it is true that under article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we would be involved, we have constitutional processes in this country which, subject of course to the exigencies of nuclear war, we must observe. That is, before there is any declaration of war by the executive arm of the government or by circumstances such as I have envisaged, such as a nuclear war, parliament must authorize a declaration of war. There is no automatic involvement. This is our constitutional position. I am sure it was inadvertently left out by the Prime Minister.


Frank Charles McGee: Shall vote 232 carry?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Before the vote carries, Mr. Chairman, I have one or two routine questions to ask the minister, if he would like to have his officials come in now. One question concerns the number of people now at national defence headquarters.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As far as the number of people actually there is concerned, I think the details are given at page 316 of the estimates book, which I note the hon. member has before him.
90205-6-528
Supply-National Defence
At page 317 it shows that for the year 1961-62 the number is 661, and for 1960-61 it was 670. In other words, last fiscal year it was 670 and this year it is 661.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Those are the figures given in the blue book, and I presume in the details. I wonder whether the minister can say if there has been any change since these figures were published?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am informed, Mr. Chairman, that there has been no change in that figure since the estimates book was published.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Could the minister indicate the number of service personnel presently stationed at national defence headquarters and give the comparable figure for a year ago?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I will just give the total figures for the navy, army, air force and triservice personnel. At December 31, 1960 the total was 3,045; at March 31, 1961, it was 3,029, and at June 30, 1961, it was 3,097. From March 31, 1960, it is given for March, October, December and then March and June. It has varied from 3,039 up to 3,097.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Could the minister say whether any additional service personnel will be required at national defence headquarters as a result of the proposed build-up both in the regular and auxiliary services?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not think there will be any increase. As a matter of fact, some of the military personnel at army headquarters have been used and will be used to man the alternate army headquarters which has been set up and which is now manned. Therefore, the number here will actually be reduced rather than built up, I think.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I note there has been practically no change in the strength of the personnel either civilian or military at national defence headquarters. I should like the minister to comment on this statement:
In my opinion the first step which should be taken as far as reorganizing Canada's defence set up is concerned is the complete reorganization of national defence headquarters in order to secure efficiency and economy at that level. I have spoken on this subject before: perhaps it may be said that I have harped on it during the past-
-two or three years.
I have made speeches on the subject when the defence estimates were up going back to a period of two or three years after the war. In speeches I have made from that time on I have referred to the top heavy organization of defence headquarters and the large proportion of service personnel in administrative and desk jobs as compared to those in fighting units.
A little later on the hon. gentleman said:
In any event it has been my contention for several years past that defence headquarters is top heavy and as a result wasteful and inefficient. I now have two very powerful witnesses to reinforce
8370	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence that claim. General Simonds has said in this article that the headquarters is top heavy. The minister, of course, said that was only his opinion. I think that opinion is a very weighty one and it is reinforced by General Macklin and every other retired officer with any experience with whom I have ever spoken with regard to the matter.
Would the minister agree to comment on that statement, and indicate if in his opinion it is still a fair reflection of his views?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Would the hon. member give us the source of that extract?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Well, with very small paraphrasing, the minister himself is the author.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I recognized some of the phrases although I did not recognize the passage entirely and I wondered what the hon. gentleman was reading. Was he perhaps paraphrasing something which appeared in Hansard'!


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The pasage appeared in Hansard on July 19, 1956 and the only change I made was to change seven or eight years to two or three years. The hon. gentleman will find the reference on page 6175 of Volume 6.


Douglas Scott Harkness: First of all, since that date the number of civilian employees employed in the headquarters of the department has been cut down from 791 to the present strength of 661. In spite of the fact that the workload has been increasing there has been a considerable reduction in the number of personnel at headquarters. As far as the various staffs are concerned, as I have indicated, some of the headquarters personnel are now toeing employed in manning the alternate army headquarters which have been set up. Some of the personnel who will be used to man the target headquarters outside cities will also come from this source.
In addition, I should like to tell the hon. member that I instituted some time ago a very thorough manpower study with the object in mind of cutting out any unnecessary personnel who might be shown to be on the strength of the national defence headquarters.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Has that study yet been completed?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, it has not been completed yet.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister say how many persons are on his personal staff at the present time and also how many are on the staff of the associate minister?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The number of persons on the combined staff of the associate minister and myself is 34. I may say that the number of persons on my own staff is, I think, smaller


than the number employed on the staff of any minister of national defence in the last years at least.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It seems that the associate minister is compensating for that difference.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think the total number of people on the staff of the minister and the asociate minister is less than the number serving in the period of Mr. Claxton and Mr. Campney, though I will have that checked. This is despite the fact that the workload has considerably increased; we have many more military commitments than we had then.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It is also due, perhaps, to some of the additional confusion.
I wonder if the minister has any plans for a new national defence headquarters and whether a site has yet been chosen.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As the hon. member is aware, this matter has been under consideration for a long time-at least for ten or 12 years and perhaps even longer than that. Several sites have been considered, but to date no agreement has been reached between the Department of National Defence, the National Capital Commission and the Department of Public Works, in particular, as to the exact site on which the national headquarters will be built. I sincerely hope we shall be able to get an agreement on the site and begin construction in the fairly near future.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is this decision subject to the troika principle?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not know what the hon. gentleman means by that. However, I think he is aware that all three departments are concerned in this matter.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I realize it is not usual to prepare any working drawings or anything of that kind before a site has been chosen, but can the minister say whether there have been any preliminary studies of the requirements with regard to space, the type of building which will be needed, the provision of the protection against fall-out and so on.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The study on manpower requirements at the national headquarters is related to this very question. If we find we can cut down the number of personnel at the headquarters it would, of course, mean we could construct a smaller building than would otherwise be the case. There have, of course, been a considerable number of studies regarding the space which would be required in order to bring under one roof, or into one set of connected buildings, all the installations, numbering at the present time something of the order of 53, I believe, which are now scattered about Ottawa.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.

Inspection services-
233.	Operation and maintenance, $7,224,436.
Mr. Carter:: I understand that the inspection services include the inspection of the quality of purchases of material and equipment and that they also cover the quality of performance. Will the minister say who carries out the inspection of the fixed assets and stores which are kept over a period of years? Will he also tell us whether the inspection services have anything to do with the inspection of the efficiency of administration or the efficiency of training?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The inspection services have nothing to do with those two latter matters. Once goods have been purchased and delivered to the respective services each service is responsible for the inspection of those stores in its own quartermaster's stores and so forth. Essentially the inspection services inspect articles which are being delivered to the Department of National Defence to ensure they are up to specification.


Chesley William Carter: Who is responsible after that? Does the responsibility for continuous inspection rest with the commanders?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Once the stores are delivered -we will take boots as an example-they are delivered to the ordnance depot and the ordnance depot is responsible for seeing that they are kept there under proper condition and in good shape. Then, when they are delivered to a unit, say an infantry battalion, that battalion is responsible for their proper storage and to see that they are kept in proper condition there.


Chesley William Carter: I was thinking of stores that might deteriorate over a period of years. Who would carry out any tests on goods that might deteriorate? Is that done by the ordnance department, or is there some machinery within the command for that?


Douglas Scott Harkness: It depends on what type of stores they are. If they are medical stores, the medical service would declare them unserviceable when they considered that they had reached that stage, we will say. With respect to dental stores, the dental people would do it. With respect to general stores, the ordnance people would do it. If a unit has some stores that it thinks are unserviceable it declares them unserviceable and the ordnance people inspect them, and if they agree they are unserviceable they take them to the ordnance stores for disposal.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will the minister elaborate a bit with respect to the extra work load referred to in the blue book? Under this item the total expenditures for construction and equipment, as he knows, are reduced this year 90205-6-528J
Supply-National Defence over last year. Therefore, it would seem that the number of inspectors necessary should decline as well. The blue book mentions the SAGE installation and radar gap-fillers as one reason for the continuing work load. Can the minister say whether he is getting assistance from the United States air force in respect of the inspection of the SAGE installation, for example? They are experienced in these matters and might be giving him some assistance. Can he explain to us why so many personnel are needed when the expenditure is reduced?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We are doing all the inspection on behalf of the United States air force for these installations in Canada.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would it not be reasonable to engage the services, by loan or otherwise, of some people who are familiar with the same types of installation in the United States?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am informed that our people are thoroughly familiar with this, and this provides means employing Canadians on this work in Canada rather than bringing in people from the United States to do it.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is fine. I presume they must have gone to the United States and probably gained at first hand the experience that was to be gained there. Can the minister say whether there are any inspection personnel at A. V. Roe? If so, what are they engaged in doing?


Douglas Scott Harkness: None of the people of the inspection service is at A. V. Roe. However, the air force has personnel there who are carrying on inspection work as the work proceeds.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
234.	Construction or acquisition of buildings, works, land and equipment, $211,000.
Chesley William Carter: Is the policy with respect to armouries likely to be revised as a result of the increase in personnel for the army? What is the present position with respect to the possibility of an armoury for Newfoundland?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The hon. member is asking this question on item 234 which comes under the inspection services. If he would bring up the question when the army estimates are under consideration I would then have the answer book here to see what the situation is in regard to an armoury in Newfoundland. Of course, the statement that I made the day before yesterday in connection with armouries generally would be applicable here. We have an armoury construction program. I would like to see it increased, but the construction of armouries has not been considered as much a priority item as some of the other things we had to spend the
8372	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence amount of money we got on, and therefore we had not been able to construct as many of them as we would like to have done.


Chesley William Carter: May I conclude that there is still hope?


Douglas Scott Harkness: As far as a specific answer to the question about an armoury in Newfoundland is concerned, if the hon. member would bring it up when we get to the army estimates I would be glad to give him the definite information.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Royal Canadian Navy-
235.	Operation and maintenance, $208,135,049.
Paul Theodore Hellyer: I should like to ask the minister a question in respect of the navy. If he will consult page 1 of his blue book, the preamble, under the heading "Royal Canadian Navy" he will see listed there four roles for the Canadian Navy in support of Canadian defence policy. This numbering is mine. The roles are: (1) maintenance of sea communications; (2) the defence of Canada against attack from the sea; (3) to contribute to the collective defence of the NATO area from attack from the sea; (4) to contribute naval forces to the United Nations as may be required. Can the minister indicate which of these four roles is the most important role of the Royal Canadian Navy?


Douglas Scott Harkness: These roles are so interconnected that I do not think I can pick out one and say it is the most important. As I think is quite clear, they are not set out 1, 2, 3, 4, as the hon. member has just put them; they are put in as a sentence. As I say they are pretty closely interconnected. Therefore, I do not think you can pick out one and say it is the most important role.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister care to tell the committee what in his opinion is the principal threat against which the Canadian navy is to operate?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Of course, the principal threat is the submarine threat and, as is indicated here-it has been indicated on numerous other occasions-our navy is basically an anti-submarine navy consisting principally of destroyer escorts and frigates. The destroyer escorts particularly are specialized anti-submarine ships. The carrier and the tracker aircraft and the interceptor aircraft that it carries really for protection from the air, and the helicopters which are now being added to the destroyer escorts-the whole thing is designed to be a well co-ordinated anti-submarine force. It also, of course, has a capability for general sea warfare.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: As the minister knows, the Russians are reported now to be producing atomic powered submarines, and concentrating on the production of atomic powered submarines from which nuclear missiles would be launched. Presumably, in an attack against the North American continent the Rusians would use their present supply, or the supply existing at that time, of nuclear powered missile launching submarines. If the minister is concerned about protecting the deterrent as well as providing such protection as he can to the Canadian civilian population, what provision is he making through the Canadian navy to cope with the threat from the atomic powered nuclear submarine?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, as I have just indicated, the navy is essentially an antisubmarine navy. It is designed to be able to hunt out and destroy enemy submarines. Part of the strategy at the present time is to do that as far away from the coasts of North America as possible. The fact that nuclear submarines may be in possession of the Russians as they are in the possession of the United States and that these nuclear submarines are faster is precisely the reason why we are equipping the destroyer escorts with helicopters. We are doing so in order that they will have the capability of tracking, and discovering and finding these submarines and destroying them at a considerable distance from the destroyer escort from which the helicopter operates and also at a considerable distance from our coasts.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is the minister contending that Canadian destroyer escorts with helicopters would be capable of seeking out and destroying nuclear-powered submarines at some distance from our shores in either the Atlantic or Pacific oceans?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The answer is certainly yes. That is the basic purpose of the destroyer escort, particularly equipped, as I say, with a helicopter.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Perhaps the minister will let me make this comment. Here again I think that we are left in a most unfortunate position. The minister has stated, and he has been very careful with his language, that that is the purpose. We all know that is the purpose of the destroyer escort. We know that is the purpose of an anti-submarine force, but the minister did not say that we have that capability and he knows that we have not. What is more, the minister knows that we are not getting that capability.
Let me say for the minister's benefit that I have seen an atomic submarine in action and it can swim circles around our destroyer escorts or anything like them. The minister

knows this, and these submarines cannot be detected and destroyed with the type of naval vessel that we have. What is the minister contemplating that will cope with this threat? Is he contemplating the construction of anti-nuclear submarine submarines or anything of that nature with the speed, range and capacity to be able to deal with that type of threat?


Douglas Scott Harkness: All I am saying is that our competent naval officers inform me that the sort of statement the hon. member has just made is completely erroneous, that our antisubmarine vessels, particularly when they are completely equipped with helicopters using sonobuoys and so on, have the capability of destroying submarines at any time. Certainly you are not going to destroy every submarine. It was not done during the last war and it was not done during the first war. However, a very considerable number of submarines were destroyed in both of those wars and the submarine threat was eventually beaten.
There is also no question that the faster the submarine the more difficult it is to detect and thus to destroy, but nevertheless we have a very considerable capacity to destroy submarines at any time. Therefore I deplore the hon. member stating as though it were a definite fact that we have no such capacity. He has no means of knowing that. What he is really doing is making such statements in direct contradiction of the opinions of all those people who have devoted their lives to naval service, not only the senior naval officers in our service but in the British, United States and other navies.


Mr. Pitman:: I should like to follow up the comments of the hon. member for Trinity because I think it is the duty of hon. members in spite of the opinions of the experts to find out as much as we can about the defence of the people whom we represent. I think we are getting right down to the bottom of this whole thing right now as to just exactly what the value of our defence is.
The minister said yesterday afternoon that the enemy can have enough power to blow up the whole world but as long as they cannot deliver this power we seem to be fairly safe. 1 think that is a very good point but there seems to be quite a difference of opinion as to just what the capability of the enemy is. Perhaps we can assume that the enemy is only going to start a limited nuclear war and will only use a few submarines, a few I.C.B.M.'s and so on, but I think this is a fantastic concept and that the war will be an all-out one from the very beginning. Surely common sense would lead to this conclusion. Certainly
Supply-National Defence a submarine war would be the most potent method having in mind their mobility and so on. I would hope that we would realize the danger of the situation. I do not think we are deploring the opinions of the experts or in any way trying to bring strategic concepts into question. If the strategic concepts of the government hold water then we have no criticism; but I wonder.
We understand, for example, that the Russians have 500 submarines. I was very happy to hear the minister say that the major role of our navy is anti-submarine activity, but do we have in mind dealing with submarines that are out to sink shipping or is it a case of dealing with submarines the purpose of which is to strike at our cities, each submarine having far more power than all the bombs dropped in the last war?
In the blue book it is stated that we are responsible for the collective defence of the NATO area. That is a very large area involving the Atlantic, the Pacific, the North sea, the Mediterranean and so on. Can the minister tell us what particular areas Canada is responsible for and can he possibly tell us how many submarines might be likely to move into this area on the basis of the studies that are being made by the experts?
The minister said that the Russian power to deliver is limited. Everything is limited. Nothing is unlimited, but to what extent is their power to deliver limited? How many of the submarines moving into the areas for which our navy is responsible would actually be nuclear submarines? We cannot tell, of course, which are and which are not. What is the speed of the aircraft carrier, the destroyer escorts and frigates which are being equipped for anti-submarine activity? What are the detection capabilities? I think the Canadian people should know to what extent they are paying for defence, or to what extent they are simply paying for activities which will show that the government is doing something in the naval field but which activities are not really very important.
I should like to remind hon. members that we are not trying in any way to add to the terrorizing effect of the U.S.S.R., as the minister seemed to suggest. Before the last war Churchill was accused of trying to terrorize the British people when over a period of four or five years he was merely trying to put before them the realities of the situation in Europe which he felt had to be met. I think the Canadian people should know what the reality is on the basis of the knowledge that is available to the Minister of National Defence. Can the minister answer any of my questions?

Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think that I had better explain first of all that the defence of the north Atlantic comes under SACLANT, the supreme allied commander Atlantic, who occupies the same sort of position as General Norstad does in SACEUR so far as NATO defence of the European land area is concerned. In the event of war he would have under his command not only the Canadian Atlantic fleet but also the United States and British Atlantic fleets, all of the other NATO naval forces in the north Atlantic. To begin with, he would dispose of all those naval forces in such a way as to form an antisubmarine screen. The purpose of the screen would be to try to destroy Russian submarines trying to get through the comparatively narrow waters leading from the Arctic ocean and between Iceland and Norway and also to prevent them from getting out of the Baltic. The purpose would be to contain as many as possible in those areas and also, of course, to destroy any that were already loose in or that got through into the Atlantic. In other words, the first function of the north Atlantic naval forces would be to destroy as many enemy submarines as possible and to keep them as far away as possible from the shores of the NATO countries. Subsequently, it may well be that Canadian naval forces would be employed in the convoying of merchant vessels in order to attempt to defend them from possible attack by submarines. I do not know whether or not this answers the question of the hon. gentleman, but broadly speaking that is the concept.


Walter George Pitman: The situation is even more serious than I suspected, Mr. Chairman. You are assuming that the Russians, if they start a war, will have all their submarines in the Baltic and the Arctic and would not have them deployed throughout the world. It appears that there is no particular duty for the Canadian navy except to act as convoy for ships. This is not facing up to the reality of the situation in which Canada would be placed if war came. The minister said himself this afternoon that the Russians would not likely engage in a limited war, and there was no sense talking about giving the forces nonnuclear weapons because there would be an all-out nuclear war.
What we are doing in connection with naval defence there has no relationship whatever to what the minister said this afternoon about the kind of war which every military expert I have read suggests is going to take place. It will be a war which will take place in 30 minutes and the destruction will be so fantastic that I doubt very much whether there will be any convoying of troops from one place to another afterwards.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think the hon. gentleman completely misapprehended the remarks I made. I said the first purpose of the North Atlantic naval forces would be to destroy Russian submarines and to contain them in their home ports in so far as possible. I said that one of the purposes would be to hunt out and destroy Russian submarines that may be loose in the Atlantic. Now, this is so far as the Atlantic is concerned. Then I said that subsequently maybe Canadian naval forces might be used in convoy work. This would only come later if a protracted struggle developed. This may not happen at all. In any event the primary purpose, and I should like to emphasize this, is to hunt out and destroy enemy submarines.
This applies also, of course, to the Pacific coast. On that coast this is a matter for cooperation between the United States Pacific naval forces and the Canadian naval forces. In the Atlantic area, the war plans are made by the supreme allied commander, Atlantic. He has specified the forces he would like from Canada and there are defence plans drawn up as to how those forces would be employed. I am not, of course, at liberty to state what those plans are.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I agree with the hon. member for Peterborough that we are carrying on here with this air of unreality which has seemed to weave in and out of the minister's remarks during the last two days. The minister deplores any statement which is made from this side of the house which is not in agreement with the statements he makes. However, this afternoon we had an example in clear terms of the fact this committee cannot rely on the information given to it by the minister. He said, in effect, you must not challenge the word of senior naval officers. I have here some opinions from a senior naval officer which are not in accordance with what the minister said. Now obviously, there is a difference of opinion.
This is what he says:
The only concession to reality is the mention of the anti-missile defence exercise on page 6-
That is in the blue book.
-when U.S. submarines, presumably playing the role of missile-firing "enemy" submarines, provided "realistic and elusive targets". I'll bet they were elusive. Our naval forces today are not designed to deal with these sorts of things at all unless the "enemy" submarine purposely presents himself for sacrifice as a part of the war "game" just to make the "friendly forces" feel better. And this is often done for political purposes.


Mr. Speakman:: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the hon. gentleman to identify the article from which he is reading.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I will identify it as soon as I am finished.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not think this is good enough. When an hon. member is asked to identify what he is reading from, I think under the rules he is required to do that and not say he will do so after he has finished.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I have been in the house when the other procedure was followed and, when a document was read it had to be tabled at the end, or the source had to be given. Whichever way you rule, Mr. Chairman, I shall comply; it makes no difference to me.


Frank Charles McGee: I suggest, not having had the opportunity of surveying the specific rulings on the matter, that it would be logical, if the hon. member were asked a question concerning the source of the material, that the committee be given the information at that time. I do not think this is a real point of dispute, is it?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Not with me, it is not. The author is Captain David Groos, and he goes on to say-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Do not turn up your nose at one of the brightest young naval officers this country has produced in quite a while.


An hon. Member:: He cannot be very bright or he would not have been in the Liberal party.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I continue the quotation:
The entire scheme of things is to my mind quite unrealistic and don't think the men in the Canadian navy don't think so too. They are, however, bound hand and foot to this concept agreed to by the government some years ago... when it was still valid... and somehow never changed since to meet the conditions of today.
As long as our navy is obliged to play this "head in the sand" game and obliged to provide forces to deal with this out of date concept, I suppose there is little wrong with the way they propose to spend our defence dollars this year... it will provide work for our shipyards and it will fill the pay envelopes of our sailors and shipbuilders. But don't let us be fooled into thinking it will provide us with any maritime defence. It won't.
Later on, he says:
Is it a valid concept in the present age? Of course not. We must come up with a "new look" in operational forces to deal with the new but very real threat from missile launching nuclear submarines. These are the real threat to this country and we must get the government to admit it. In these new forces Canadian nuclear-driven submarines designed to seek out and destroy other submarines, especially these missile-launching submarines, will undoubtedly play a major role. They are well known to be far and away the best, in fact they are the only effective type of anti-submarine vessel there is and they can be built in Canada in Canadian shipyards by Canadian workers.
Supply-National Defence
This is not an isolated opinion.


Gordon Minto Churchill: The hon. member has identified the author, but he did not give us the title of the document or the date of its production.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It is some notes on defence estimates by Captain David Groos, and I will give them to the minister or table them if that is desired.


Mr. Browne (Vancouver-Kingsway):: I
wonder if the hon. member could tell us whether or not this was the speech made while Captain Groos was a candidate in the Esquimalt-Saanich by-election?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The answer to that question is no. This is a responsible statement by an interested Canadian citizen trying to make a contribution to national affairs, and a very real contribution. This article points out in clear terms that in respect of naval policy, as in respect of most of its policies, this government has no conception whatever of what is going on in the world of military technology today. The minister told us earlier in the debate that two or three years lead time is required in the development of nuclear vehicles. During a recent trip to the United States in discussion with naval officers there, they indicated that, in their opinion, the only possible way that nuclear submarines could be dealt with would be by an atomic device. I should like to know if the minister concurs with this opinion or whether he does not. If he does, has he any plans to obtain atomic devices for the navy? If not, does he contemplate giving the matter any study because, as the minister can well appreciate, by the time he adds two or three years lead time to the end of his survey, any potential all-out war might be over.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I should like to deal with several of the comments that were made. I will deal with the last one first. There has been a good deal of study given to this matter. In fact, the means of killing submarines is one of the most intensive and continuing studies carried on by the navy. There is no question that the use of a reasonably small yield nuclear weapon would be more effective in destroying a submarine than would a conventional bomb or torpedo. I think there is no question about that fact because you get a much bigger explosion. However, there are plenty of conventional bombs and torpedoes which are also effective in destroying submarines. As to the matter that he mentioned first, namely some notes by Captain Groos, with regard to opinions as to strategy I would merely say this. I prefer to take the advice of the senior

Supply-National Defence serving officers in the Canadian navy, the British navy and the United States navy rather than the opinions of a retired naval officer who has just recently been standing as a Liberal candidate in a by-election and whose opinions on this matter might therefore be looked upon as being somewhat biased, having regard to the fact that they were supplied to the hon. member for use in this debate.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: All I can say is that the minister's policy in respect of preferring the advice of serving officers over that of recently retired officers must have changed in the last three years or so. He used to take quite a different attitude. I can assure him that there is no bias whatever in the argument presented by Captain Groos. This was put forward in all sincerity in order to help bring to the attention of the nation the head-insand attitude of the minister in the hope that at some time in the not too distant future he will pull it out.


Walter George Pitman: I think we are living in some kind of fairyland here. It just does not seem to me that the kind of war that is going to be carried on, if one takes place has come to the realization of this government. It would seem we are being told that it is going to be a much different kind of war than any in the past. Everywhere I look, in the magazines and in the latest books, it seems to be indicated that it is going to be a nuclear war and an all out war.


William Heward Grafftey: Show us your crystal ball.


Walter George Pitman: The minister says, and probably quite rightly, that our naval forces are involved in SACLANT and so on. We are dealing with the estimates of our naval forces. We have not yet found out where those naval forces might be deployed, to what extent they can handle this area, or to what extent they can actually defend Canadian shores. In other words, we cannot find out and give the information to the Canadian people. I am sorry but I do not think I can go back to my constituency and say that the naval experts say thus and thus but that our Minister of National Defence simply says this is what he believes or this is what the naval experts believe. I want to hear on the floor of this House of Commons the extent to which this defence is actually possible. I asked the question as to the area our navy can be expected to look after in such a nuclear war and I have been told that they will be deployed in a certain area. The minister did not say that for security reasons this could not be stated. He has not said that the number of our submarines could not be stated.


I should like to know to what extent these ships have detection capable of picking up these submarines. It seems to me there are a great many questions which I should like the Canadian people to have answered. If there is no defence we have got to start working somewhere else. Perhaps this will affect our emergency measures organization too. I think it is an extremely disconcerting aspect of the whole picture.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not think the hon. member took in what I said a short time ago. The defence on the north Atlantic is a combined fleet of the NATO countries which have NATO forces bordering on the north Atlantic. All the naval forces of all of these NATO countries in the event of war come under the command of the supreme allied commander, Atlantic. It is then up to him to deploy those forces in the places where the Russian submarines are found to be. You cannot say that the Canadian navy is going to be used from point A to point B and point C and point D. It may be used any place on the north Atlantic where needed to hunt down and destroy enemy submarines. The same thing applies as far as the Pacific fleet is concerned. As I said, in the event of war it is a combined command between the United States and Canada. Also the naval forces of the United States and Canada in the Pacific would be used as one co-ordinated weapon to destroy enemy submarines and to protect the sea lanes leading in there.
I think that statement is clear enough and I think the hon. member's constituents will be able to understand it quite readily. In the case of ships you do not say that they will work in this particular area and this particular area only. Under modern conditions, the whole concept of naval defence is to have a co-ordinated command which will employ all of the naval resources available in the whole North Atlantic in the place where they are most needed at that particular time. The same thing applies as far as the Pacific forces are concerned. We had the same thing, of course, during the second world war. Canadian naval vessels were employed in all sorts of places throughout the Atlantic ocean, in the Mediterranean and so on.


Walter George Pitman: I wish to remind the minister that it took five years to destroy the submarine menace in the second world war. The German submarines nearly brought Britain to her knees at that time. If an attack took place tomorrow, how long would it take before Canadian ships could occupy the areas they are expected to defend as part of this whole over-all strategy in SACLANT?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The best answer to that question I think is this. Except for the limited number that happen to be in dock refitting at any particular time, our ships are in a state of immediate readiness. At practically all times some of them are at sea. They are therefore available immediately to counter enemy submarines. This is one of the reasons why we are increasing the complement up to full strength, from an average of 86 per cent to 100 per cent. We are doing this so that they will be capable of going out and maintaining patrols for long periods. With 85 per cent manning they are able to go out and manage full operational duties for a few days but you have not enough men to keep them on three hour shifts. They therefore have to work overtime, as you might say, and they eventually become tired. That is the reason v/hy we are increasing the complement up to full strength. We are doing that in order to enable them to operate over long periods of time at full efficiency.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The minister has said that most of the Canadian navy is assigned to SACLANT.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I did not say that, Mr. Chairman. I said the Atlantic forces are assigned to SACLANT in the event of war and come under his command.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The minister says the Atlantic forces are assigned to SACLANT in the event of war. He gives the impression that, because they are part of the whole, we do not need to concern ourselves whether they do not have a particular capacity. However, two or three questions immediately come to mind. First of all, may I say this. Surely the Canadian ships have an area of responsibility. Surely there is a function they have to perform. It is an allied command. In addition to that, one of the roles which was put in the blue book-and perhaps it should not have been in the blue book-is the second one, namely the defence of Canada against attack from the sea. The question that arises is this. Are we incapable of protecting Canada against attack from the sea? Must we rely on the ships of other nationals who are also assigned to the supreme allied command, Atlantic, to protect Canadian shores from attack? Is it necessary that the submarines our navy has to cope with should be of the oldest possible vintage, nearest the surface and close in, where they can be easily spotted? I think the minister should give us some more assurance about this, because from what he has said so far I must agree with my hon. friend that there is a terrific air of unreality about this whole thing. We have no feeling of comfort 90205-6-529
Supply-National Defence whatsoever that our ships could find, let alone destroy, even the present, let alone future submarines.
Surely if the minister is going to be consistent at all-and perhaps he is not going to be, which would not be too surprising- he should concern himself with the reality of attack from the sea just as he told the committee he is concerned with the reality of attack by air.
May we please have a further explanation from the minister as to just how we are going to cope with an attack from the sea, and how Canada can play an effective role under the supreme commander of the Atlantic, when our ships are not capable of performing some of those functions they would be called upon to carry out if they were assigned a specific task?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the unreality which the hon. gentleman speaks about exists in his own mind rather than in the mind of the Department of National Defence or in the mind of the navy. He is engaging here again in what seems to be the general activity of trying to run down the defence forces of this country by saying they are obsolete, their equipment is no good and they cannot do their job.
He has been doing this regularly. This is his stock-in-trade. Once more I can only say that I deplore an attack of this kind, particularly when it has been pointed out to the hon. member on numerous occasions that the allegations he is making are completely incorrect.
As far as our Atlantic fleet is concerned, as I have already stated, in the event of war it comes under the command of SACLANT and is used in accordance with his orders anywhere in the Atlantic where it can best be used and for which he is responsible.
At the present time, of course, one of the sub-commands in SACLANT is the commander, Canadian Atlantic sub-area. Our admiral at Halifax is the commander of that sub-area. He is responsible for the command and the defence of that area. In the event of enemy forces being in there, forces might be sent by Great Britain, the United States or other NATO people. He would take command of them and would carry on the operations.
In peacetime there is a considerable area off our coasts which the Canadian navy keeps under surveillance. It does this by means of its tracker aircraft and its various ships, and also with the maritime command of the R.C.A.F., which is constantly flying various routes over those waters in order to detect any submarine or other activity of that kind.
This is the way the operation is carried on in peacetime. As I say, in wartime you have

Supply-National Defence a unified command and all the naval forces of the NATO alliance in the North Atlantic would be used to the best advantage as one striking force.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Chairman, the minister has said I am trying to run down the Canadian forces. That, of course, is not true. First of all, to distinguish between the forces and the equipment, I think the Canadian forces are of the finest in the world, but I think they are handicapped by having some of the most obsolete equipment.
The hon. member for Peterborough and myself are trying, like Winston Churchill did in the late 1930's, to shake a complacent government out of its complacency. We are trying to get it to admit the facts of the world about it, and that is a most difficult task apparently.
I wonder whether the minister would indicate to the committee when the first keel of the destroyer escorts was laid, and would he also indicate how many are still under construction.


Douglas Scott Harkness: First of all I wish to state in the most definite terms that our destroyer escorts are considered, not only by our own naval authorities but by those of other countries, as the most modern and up-to-date destroyer escorts possessed by any navy. The number under construction at the present time is six. They are of the latest class. The first of the modern destroyer escorts, the St. Laurent, was commissioned in October, 1955.


Gordon Minto Churchill: When the hon. member for Trinity was associate minister of national defence.


An hon. Member:: No, not then.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Not then. I wonder whether the minister would indicate to the committee why, in view of the tremendous technological changes which have since taken place, and more particularly the fact that since then the first atomic submarines and the first atomic missiles carried by submarines have been put into operational use, he continues to build destroyer escorts which were then incomparable and which may still be the best destroyer escorts in their class, but which today are no match for the potential enemy. That is the point we are trying to get across to the minister. We would like the minister to tell us what plans he has to meet the threat of the future?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The destroyer escorts which have been built have been subsequently improved. Improvements have been added to them constantly and their anti-submarine

capability has been constantly improved, particularly through the development of the variable depth sonar, which is an invention of the Canadian defence research people.
We are now commencing to modify the existing destroyer escorts so they can carry a helicopter each, in order to greatly extend their range of operations, and thus their ability to both detect and destroy enemy submarines.
The hon. member seems to have the naive idea that if conditions change a bit, immediately you must scrap everything you have. This is the general line he was following last year-scrap this, scrap that, scrap the other and get a complete new line of equipment. You just cannot do that, particularly as far as naval vessels are concerned. The construction of a naval vessel is a long business. The design particularly, of a new naval vessel is a long business. As I have said, our destroyer escorts are as good as any that exist in any navy in the world. I do not know how the hon. member can expect us to do better than that.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Chairman, the minister has just underlined the problem. He has said that the designing of a naval vessel is a long business and that the construction of a naval vessel is a long business.
Is the minister telling the committee, in conclusion, so we will understand his position very clearly, that he has no plans for more modern ships than those presently under construction, and that he has no plans for the introduction of atomic weapons into the Royal Canadian Navy? Is that the present position of the minister and of the department?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We have all kinds of plans. There are no plans which have been definitely decided upon, approved and funded which I can announce at this time. The navy has a very considerable number of plans for ships of different kinds and a naval construction program upon which they would like to embark. There are quite a number of variations of their projected naval construction program, but I am not in a position to announce any of these at this time because they have not been definitely approved and there has been no arrangement made as yet with regard to their financing.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Shall vote 235 carry?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Before the vote carries, Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether the minister can say what the cost will be in respect of the tanker supply vessel for the current year, and when this tanker will be commissioned and ready for service?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The total cash requirement for this tanker supply ship this year is $5 million.


Walter George Pitman: Before this vote carries I should like the minister to clarify this subject further. We have some 40 anti-submarine vessels. Can we really convince the Canadian people that if the U.S.S.R. should decide to attack Canada these vessels which are the sole defence of the Canadian area would have any hope whatsoever of destroying nuclear submarines armed with nuclear weapons? Can the minister give the Canadian people any indication or hope whatsoever that this naval contingent for which, as the hon. member for Trinity has said, we have nothing but the greatest respect, is equal to such a task? I think we should stand before the Canadian people and tell them just what the stakes are-not to give them a sense of insecurity but to show them where we stand in terms of modern warfare. Can the minister give us any indication that the Canadian navy as it is today could act capably and efficiently in dealing with nuclear submarines in such numbers as would likely be in Canadian waters or in the areas for which we shall be responsible? Would our forces be able to make any impact upon them whatsoever in the first few hours of attack in the kind of war which would take place in 1961?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have tried on several occasions already to make the situation clear to the hon. member but he seems to have the notion fixed in his mind that Canada is going to fight Russia by herself. This is not the situation. He asks whether the Canadian navy can protect Canada against Russian submarines. Well, the Canadian navy is not going to protect Canada by itself. As I have told the hon. member on three or four occasions already, the protection of Canada and of the other NATO countries will be the responsibility of the navies of all the North Atlantic treaty countries which have navies in the north Atlantic. It is a combined affair. In the same way, the R.C.A.F. is not expected to defend all of Canada by itself against the Russian attack; it is part of the continental defence of this whole continent. It is a co-ordinated defence shared by our own R.C.A.F. planes, Bomarcs, the radar lines and the forces of the United States. In the same way the sea approaches would be defended by the navies of all the North Atlantic countries. I think we have to look upon the resources of the alliance as a whole and not have it fixed in our minds, as seems to be the case with the hon. member for Peterborough, that the 43 Canadian navy vessels are going to be the sole defence of the Canadian sea approaches against a Russian submarine attack or threat.
90205-6-529J
Supply-National Defence


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Perhaps the committee would permit a layman to make a comment on this question. As I listened to the discussion it seemed to me that what we have here is the minister trying to deal with a real situation-with the facts as they are- while the hon. member for Peterborough-I say this with deference-appears to be talking as if this was merely a war game or, to change the figure, a game of chess. It seems to me there is an unreality about what he is saying and that the minister is striving again and again to reintroduce reality into the discussion as against the war game approach where you can get all the facts and calculate what this unit is going to do or what that unit is going to do.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: With the greatest respect to the hon. gentleman, may I say that if there is an air of unreality here it is not present on this side of the chamber. This is not a game of chess. This may become a game of life or death, yet we are talking about coping with 20 year old submarines. The submarine we got up from the United States so that our chasers would have something real to chase is a vessel that they had kept in mothballs. It is not reality to chase a submarine which has been kept in mothballs and which no one in his right mind would send out to sea in the event of war. That is not reality. It is putting the clock back at the very time when we should be projecting our imagination into the future. It is the hon. gentleman himself who is turning the clock back. I know he has many fine reminiscences of days gone by and he is entitled to them, but the time has come when men in responsible positions have to cease looking to the past. They have to look ahead and use imagination concerning the situation they will have to face in the future. That is what the minister has not done up to the present time, and I urge the hon. member for Greenwood to join with those of us who suggest that the minister should bring himself up to date and stop playing chess with mothball submarines and second world war equipment. He should project himself into the future so as to be aware of the real situation, not of make-believe situations.
May I call it six o'clock?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Just before you call it six o'clock, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say briefly that the hon. member has misunderstood the hon. member for Greenwood just as he misunderstands nearly everything. The point is that most submarines at the present time are, as it happens, of conventional type. Moreover, the Canadian navy gets practice with nuclear powered submarines in practically all of the exercises in which it is

Supply-National Defence engaged. Therefore the general idea which the hon. member is trying to put over, namely that the navy is playing with 20 year old submarines and does not know about anything else has no validity in fact.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at 7.30 p.m.
James MacKerras Macdonnell: I wish to make a brief interjection. This afternoon the hon. member for Kootenay West raised certain questions with regard to General Heusinger and at that time I said I thought the matter deserved further inquiry. I have made further inquiry and I wish to withdraw my request. I wish to give a brief explanation.
Hon. members will recall that the Associate Minister of National Defence referred to General Heusinger's record and said that he had never been a member of the Nazi party. He also referred to the fact that he had been one of the people suspected on July 20, 1944; of an attempt on Hitler's life that he had been arrested and escaped from his jail before he was sentenced to death.
I wish also to say that since this afternoon I have made further inquiries through the Department of External Affairs, with the following results: General Heusinger is a professional soldier of long standing, having joined the German army in 1915. In 1950, while Germany was still an occupied country, he was selected by Chancellor Adenauer to reorganize the German defence forces. Since West Germany did not regain a full measure of independence until 1954, the appointment of General Heusinger to this important post in 1950 indicates clearly that he enjoyed the confidence of the United States, the United Kingdom and French governments, which at that time had the status of occupying powers. In these circumstances I think we may accept the endorsation of those countries, and for my part I am ready to withdraw my request this afternoon that the matter be further inquired into.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, a question was asked to which I said I would give an answer. It had to do with the combined number of personnel on the staff of the associate minister and of myself, and what the number was in the previous administration. In 1956, the number on the two staffs, the associate minister's staff and the minister's staff was 42. On March 1, 1961 the number was 32, ten fewer.
fMr. Harkness.]


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will the minister bring us up to date in respect of the helicopter program for the navy which is referred to in this year's blue book. Will he indicate the number of helicopters in service at the present time and when he expects the remainder of the requirement to be available?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The number of anti-submarine helicopters held by the navy was, front line helicopters, six; reserve helicopters, two. One of these just recently was lost in aiding in the Newfoundland fires. In addition to that they have some other helicopters, four Bells and three Vertols.
As to the time that the other anti-submarine helicopters are expected, they expect that it will be something in the neighbourhood of a year before we will be getting delivery, which will be before it will be possible to install the helicopter landing platforms on the destroyer escorts.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I presume those helicopters are not the same type as the reconnaissance helicopters which are the army's requirements.


Douglas Scott Harkness: No; they are a much bigger helicopter than that.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Then, the minister has given up on the possibility of standardization, which was the reason given by his predecessor for the delay in placing orders.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, we have attained standardization on the light helicopters now for all three services. However, this type of helicopter for anti-submarine work is a specialized one on which it is not possible to standardize with the other two services.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister indicate when the last deliveries of the CS2F Tracker were made?


Douglas Scott Harkness: October, 1960.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minsiter indicate what the $4 million for aircraft in this year's estimates represents?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The breakdown is as follows: for tracker aircraft, spares and modification, $800,000, anti-submarine helicopters, $3 million, light helicopters, $155,000, delivery charges and taxes, $55,000, which makes a total of $4,010,000.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: What taxes?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The ordinary sales taxes that are charged on all equipment of this type, as I think the hon. member knows or should know, and which are paid by the department on its purchases.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In the 1961 blue book it is indicated that the Banshee aircraft can be

operated until the end of 1962 at which time the airframe reaches the end of its life. Will the minister indicate whether he has yet reached a decision with regard to a possible replacement?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There has been no definite decision on that. We have been planning on a ship-to-air missile but the exact kind has not yet been decided upon.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In view of the difficulty posed by the long lead times outlined to the committee on several occasions by the minister can the minister indicate approximately when a decision will be taken with respect to this ship-to-air missile?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, I am not in a position to do that.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I have received a complaint from H.M.C.S. Cornwallis with regard to working conditions in the laundry room and the wardroom. Has the minister received any complaints recently as to working conditions there, particularly with respect to weekend overtime and the difficult and unsatisfactory working conditions generally?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have not had any complaints along that line that I can recall. The associate minister, with whom I have checked, does not recall having received any either, nor does the deputy minister or naval headquarters.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will the minister or associate minister undertake to check into the situation to see if the complaints are justified?


Mr. Sevigny:: I will attend to this matter.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I have one final question. Would the minister indicate the final disposition of the Shannon park property? I presume that Mr. Dwyer has a paper ready on that for you.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Shannon park property is one on which the bulk of the married quarters for naval personnel in the Halifax area is situated. There is no idea of disposing of it. There is a plan for the construction by an entrepreneur of more housing there and if the plan goes ahead he will rent the houses so constructed to married personnel of the navy. There is also a projected plan to put a shopping centre there.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It was the shopping centre I was referring to specifically. As the minister may recall, the shopping centre land was sold to a private entrepreneur without tenders having been called and I understand that the enterpreneur later went into receivership. A question was raised whether the crown had protected itself, whether the land again
Supply-National Defence became the property of the crown or what was the ultimate disposition, whether or not the shopping centre has in the meantime been constructed and, if so, by whom?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I understand this project was transferred from the original man to a second one. He has now completed part of the shopping centre and the remainder is under construction.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: There is one further reassurance we would like from the minister. Is he satisfied with the progress of the shopping centre? Is it meeting the purpose for which the land was sold and filling the function which persuaded the crown to give up the land without calling for tenders in the first place?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am informed that the project has not gone ahead as rapidly as had been hoped would be the case, but it is now proceeding reasonably satisfactorily and it is expected that it will perform the function which was envisaged for it.


Mr. Brassard (Lapointe):: If the project involving construction of houses by the entrepreneur materializes, what is going to be the length of the leases?


Douglas Scott Harkness: As far as the individuals who will occupy these houses are concerned, they will occupy them on the same basis that such personnel occupy ordinary married quarters and thus will have no lease with the entrepreneur who constructs them. As far as the department is concerned, we have a lease or form of guarantee extending to 40 years occupancy.


Mr. Morris:: May I ask the minister when the Department of National Defence first proposed the use of land at Shannon park for purposes of a shopping centre, and were public tenders called at that time?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not have that information immediately available. I will send for it and give it to the hon. member later.


Edmund Leverett Morris: Is the minister under the impression that it was about 1955 and is it not a fact that there were no offers received at that time?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We are not sure about the matter. I think we will have to check the information and give it to the hon. member later. I am informed that there were no offers.


Edmund Leverett Morris: Is it not so that the land when transferred recently to the new proprietorship was an entailed sale, that is, it was sold on the clear understanding that a shopping centre would be built there?

Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: That is correct.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Just to set the record straight,
I am sure the parliamentary secretary is aware that the first time it was offered for sale there were conditions attached. In fact, it was a lease arrangement, while when it was sold the second time there were no strings attached except the building of a shopping centre and apparently there was no protection for the crown. Consequently there was trouble when the receivership took place.


Edmund Leverett Morris: The hon. member who has just spoken had so short a life in the defence portfolio that perhaps he did not have the opportunity to acquaint himself fully with the file.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You obviously have not.


Edmund Leverett Morris: When the Shannon park project was first advertised it was advertised with the object of securing someone to construct a shopping centre upon it.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: On a lease arrangement.


Edmund Leverett Morris: If anyone had come forward it would have been sold under the same conditions.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Under a lease arrangement. Do not make a false statement.


Edmund Leverett Morris: On a question of personal privilege, Mr. Chairman, I have not made a false statement.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Just check the facts.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
236.	Construction or acquisition of buildings, works, land and major equipment, $71,823,500.
Chesley William Carter: I should like to ask the minister if he would explain the reduction in expenditures for armament, equipment and electronic equipment. There is also a reduction in ammunition.


Douglas Scott Harkness: What was the first one?


Chesley William Carter: Armament, electronics and ammunition.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, so far as armament equipment is concerned, the programs have been continuing programs. They are broken down and the first is guns, mountings and weather-shields. There were $2,328,000 spent in 1960-61 and this year there will be $1,100,000. The thing is that it was a continuing program and this is the amount that is estimated will be required to complete the program this year. There was the Sidewinder missile and facilities in 1960-61, and there are none for this year. Torpedoes and equipment, anti-submarine mortars, mines, et cetera, and there is to be more spent for those this year than last, $1,138,500. Then, there

is weapons control systems and facilities, $771,000 this year as against $1,678,000 last year. Again, this was a continuing program and less is required for it. Freight charges, customs, excise and so forth amounts to $90,500 this year as compared with $130,000 last year.
The next item was electronics. There are reductions in several places here but the biggest one is in radio communication equipment. Last year we spent $3,902,000 and this year it will be $1,935,000. There will be a somewhat smaller amount spent on Sonar equipment, about half as much, $845,000 as against $1,498,000, and for electronic equipment, power supply, navigational and internal communication equipment.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I wonder if the minister would give us a recapitulation of the new equipment supplied to the brigade group in the last 12 or 24 months?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We are on the navy at the present time, Mr. Chairman. This item does not come up until we get to the army.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Canadian Army-
237.	Operation and maintenance, $359,572,000.
Paul Theodore Hellyer: I wonder if the minister would now give us the recapitulation of the new equipment supplied to the brigade group?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There is quite a long list, but I will keep on reading as long as the committee can bear with it. The list occupies two and one half of these big pages. Does the hon. member want all the items read out?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Perhaps the minister could just give us the principal ones at the start.


Douglas Scott Harkness: These are all listed as major items which have been received in stock since the second world war. There is the FN rifle and the automatic FN rifle to replace the 303 Bren gun. There is a submachine gun, 9 millimetre; there is a 106 millimetre recoilless and anti-tank rifle and ammunition; there is the 3.2 inch Heller anti-tank rocket launcher and ammunition; there is the S.S. 10 anti-tank missile for training purposes; medium mortars, 81 millimetres, and ammunition; field artillery, 105 millimetre howitzers and ammunition; surface to surface launchers and training ammunition for them; training missiles for the Honest John. There is communication equipment, including the United Kingdom family of very high frequency sets for the brigade group in Europe. There is the five-mile V.H.F. radio sets; the C-42 wireless sets to replace the No. 19. There are the cargo trailers in the one quarter ton-three quarters ton range. Then, there is the "Rat, a Canadian developed vehicle, the Ferret scout cars, standard

military pattern vehicles in the one quarter, three quarter and 2J-ton range. Partial requirements for a 5-ton cargo vehicle. There is the medium gun tank, Centurion, mark V; parachute stores and equipment; light aircraft-the L-19 for air op. flights; Bell helicopters and presently the Hiller helicopter which is now being secured, as well as two Sikorsky H-5 helicopters.
You have ammunition of various kinds. There are kits for up-gunning the Centurion tanks from 20 pounders to 105 millimetres to increase their hitting power, and associated ammunition; short range surveillance radar and counter mortar radar. Special equipment vehicle kits of all kinds; water tanks, light metal workshops, small arms repair and so on; vehicle navigational aids. Then, there is the armoured track vehicle the Bobcat which we have ordered; light reconnaissance helicopters; communications and engineering equipment of various kinds; the United Kingdom heavy ferry and heavy assault floating bridge. Then, there are various machine guns, general purpose machine guns and ammunition.
Those items are the ones that are now forecast for delivery, which have been ordered and so forth. I see these are marked "secret", so I will not go on with them. These are some of the major items of equipment which have been secured.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I thank the minister for the list. He went back quite far when he went back to world war II.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I said since world war II.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Am I wrong in saying back to world war II? Is that different from since world war II?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes; I think the implication was that it included some world war II equipment.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I am sure it does include some. Did I hear the minister correctly when he said that some of the 762 millimetre rocket launchers are already installed in Europe?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, none of them is installed in Europe as I indicated in the house when I made the announcement in connection with this matter. I think we anticipate it will be along towards the end of the year before they will be sent to Europe.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The minister anticipates that some will be installed this year. I thought I heard him refer to some practice rounds or something. I refer to the previous minister's remarks as found at page 7556 of 1960 Hansard where he states as follows:
While there are no funds allocated in this year's estimates, it has also been announced that the Canadian army is to procure the Honest John
Supply-National Defence launcher and associated surface-to-surface missile, the 762 mm. rocket. This weapon, too, has a nuclear capability.
Then before the defence estimates committee last year at page 330:
We are acquiring the Honest John which is a ground to ground weapon and which, when we receive it, will be capable of firing a nuclear warhead. When we receive it next year-
That would be this year.
-it will be capable of doing so. We are training some of our staff and some of our personnel in the uses of that weapon now. The problem in respect of storage and so forth should be solved before we receive this weapon.
My question is this. Does the minister still expect to receive them before the end of this year? If so, will the problem of storage and so forth with respect to nuclear weapons have been solved by that time?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We have received the deliveries of these Honest John launchers. We have formed a battery to operate them-and it will be sent to Europe. We have it under training at the present time. We have secured some practice rockets for practice firing with the rocket launcher. I think that is the situation. As I said, towards the end of this year or early next year we shall have a battery in shape to send over to the brigade in Europe.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I wonder whether the minister can say whether, as reported in the congressional subcommittee on defence expenditures, the 762 mm. rocket launcher is not accurate enough to use with high explosive shells?


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is the first I have heard of anything along that line. I am informed that this statement is not correct and that the United States are developing a conventional warhead to use with this rocket launcher.


Walter George Pitman: One item in the blue book indicated that one of the duties of the Canadian army was the ground defence of the Canada-United States region. Assuming an all-out nuclear war, just exactly what is included in this term, "ground defence of the Canada-United States region"? What plans are foreseen for the Canadian army in this particular situation? It would seem to me that it is rather unbelievable that the U.S.S.R. expects to invade Canada from the Arctic in this kind of war that I am assuming. I should like an explanation of this particular item, if the minister does not mind.


Douglas Scott Harkness: There is always the possibility of airborne landings in order to knock out particular installations, particularly some of the radar installations and things of that

Supply-National Defence sort, in order really to prepare the way perhaps for a large bomber attack. There is also always the possibility of a considerable amount of sabotage and things along that line. You therefore must have troops in order to guard against these possibilities. Some of our troops are trained for airborne operations, as parachutists and as airborne troops.


Walter George Pitman: That statement is very interesting but I find it rather hard to believe that they would actually invade with paratroopers before they attacked the country with missiles. It just does not seem to hold water strategically. I find it to be part of this unreality which the hon. member for Trinity was talking about this afternoon. I just cannot see this as a rational phase of the program at all, in terms of the kind of war we seem to be hearing about.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As I explained to the hon. member, the possibility of attempting to seize certain installations and thus to disrupt the general defences of the continent is something which is quite likely to be attempted. If there were no defence against it and if there were no troops that were able to counter it, it is something that would then probably happen.


Miss LaMarsh:: The minister mentioned that the brigade group was being supplied with some of the automatic FN rifles. I recently heard a report that these rifles are being withdrawn by virtue of the fact that an error has been made by Canadian Arsenals and in order that they may have the breech blocks modified. I wonder whether the minister can make any statement with respect to the alleged cost of more than $1 million in withdrawing these rifles in order to have modifications made.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The situation is that a modification is being made to the FN rifles owing to the fact that the ammunition made in some of the NATO countries and which we may have to use has a primer which does not work properly as it is pierced to too great an extent by the Canadian FN rifle. With the ammunition made in Canada there has been no difficulty whatever. However, with a very occasional round of ammunition from some of the other NATO countries there has been difficulty in that there has been a bit of a blow-back. Nobody has ever been seriously injured by this blow-back but there is the possibility that a man might lose an eye if this happened. Consequently we are modifying all these rifles in order to ensure that any country's ammunition of this calibre can be safely fired in it.


Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: Can the minister assure the committee that the modifications now required are not the result of certain modifications made at Canadian Arsenals to the Belgian designed rifle, and were not made by any of the other NATO countries which accepted and took into use this rifle?


Douglas Scott Harkness: As far as I recall the matter, although I have not been able to get the specific information here, the Canadian manufactured rifles were made with a slightly heavier barrel in order to give a longer life and a longer range. As I say, the Canadian ammunition has never caused any trouble whatever but some of the European ammunition very occasionally has resulted in a bit of blow-back, as I stated.


Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: Can the minister inform the committee what the estimated cost per rifle is for the modification?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I cannot break down what the cost is for this particular modification. Some other modifications are being made at the same time that the rifles are going in for this particular modification. They are really what you might call normal improvements and also include the replacement of damaged or worn out parts and a general clean-up of the weapon. The cost for the whole thing will run to approximately $16 per rifle.


Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: I have one other question, Is it correct that the army has directed that the FN rifle be used with a weaker cartridge than that originally designed for it because of the fact that there is a gas leak around the breech block?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, Mr. Chairman. As I indicated before, we have restricted the use of certain lots of ammunition which did not prove to work completely in all cases, in order to ensure there would be no danger to any of the personnel using it through blow-back.


Walter George Pitman: Mr. Chairman, I should like to continue the questioning on the FN rifle. Could the minister please tell the committee when the last competition for the Hamilton Galt trophy took place, and how the scores compared since the Lee-Enfield rifle has been out of use during the last few years?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have not that information here. I will have to send for it and give it to the hon. member later.


Mr. Matheson:: Mr. Chairman, on Thursday, September 7, the Prime Minister told us that the government, after consultation with allied governments in NATO, has come to the conclusion that certain measures

should be taken to strengthen Canada's preparedness for defence both at home and overseas.
I refer to a booklet called "The Record Speaks". On the cover there is this passage:
The government of Prime Minister John Diefen-baker has accomplished more for the ordinary man- and woman of Canada than any government in our history.
There is a very appealing chapter entitled "National Defence and Defence Production" over the signature of Hon. George Pearkes, former minister of national defence. The first sentence reads as follows:
Despite increased costs for new equipment in a new age, Canada is spending less dollars on defence.
In 1960-1961 defence expenditures are down 10 per cent from 1956-1957, the last year under the Liberals.
I do not wish to introduce a partisan note in this debate-


William Heward Grafftey: But you are going to anyway.


Mr. Maiheson:: -but I am concerned about what appears to be a drop of approximately $145 million on over-all defence expenditures, if I read the estimates correctly, from the year 1956-57 to which Hon. George Pearkes referred. In particular I am interested in, not the equipment of the army but the personnel of the army.
There is one thing in which I think this committee is very interested. That is the Canadian services colleges. I am referring to an article written in the Royal Military College review of 1959 by the director of studies, Colonel W. R. Sawyer, who writes as follows:
When the college was reopened after the war, strong emphasis was put on the principle that the level of instruction should be equal to that of the universities. The minister of national defence, the Hon. Brooke Claxton, stressed this in his address at the official opening ceremonies on September 20, 1948:
Colonel Sawyer goes on to say in his article:
We have steadily held to the view that these qualities can be developed best by study of the three traditional branches of learning-the humanities, the social sciences, the physical sciences.
I think there is reference to the fact that the Royal Military College is the only military institution in the commonwealth which is degree-conferring. I have occasion from time to time to be in Kingston at a sister institution and I can speak most enthusiastically about what we see and hear of Royal Military College.
I think great heart has been given to people who care about our military affairs by the strong leadership in that school and the level of teaching that has prevailed. I know that the Hon. Ralph Campney has been extremely interested in the Royal Military College and
Supply-National Defence I know that General Pearkes maintains a close interest. We rejoice in the appointment of Brigadier W. A. B. Anderson, with his superlative background, the most honoured graduate of his year in R.M.C., a graduate of Queen's University with service in the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. He has graduate training from nearly every important staff college in the world and has given our institution great dignity and strength.
We know, too, that Colonel Sawyer, with his almost 100 highly qualified teachers, nearly 40 of doctorate level, has done a great deal to lift military training in this country to an extent to which we are certainly proud. I have studied with some care the calendar offered by Royal Military College and it is amazing to see the strength of departments that are not really directly military in their nature.
Personally, I concur very much in the emphasis stressed by Colonel Sawyer of elevating Royal Military College and the sister colleges to the type of institutions that will make our cadets great service officers in due course by staffing R.M.C. with the best, most highly qualified people possible.
It seems to me that more than ever before the army needs flexibility, a fresh approach and the type of personnel who will be capable of dealing skilfully and well with many new situations, problems and people. I know how interested the minister is in these service colleges. I wish to ask him whether perhaps there has been too great a decrease in salary levels of the college. I may be misreading the estimates, but in referring to page 331 and looking at the items from director of studies down to instructor, class 1, I have formed the impression that there is approximately $100,000 less being paid in 1961-62 than there was the previous year. I know it was with great difficulty that this faculty was gathered together in Royal Military College in the first instance.
One of the persons very interested in R.M.C.'s growth and strength was W. A. Mackintosh, then principal of Queen's University. I believe he was at one time a member of the Canadian services colleges advisory board. We know that in other educational institutions of that level, generally speaking our teaching salaries are appreciating rather considerably. I think there are very few universities in Canada where in 1961-62 the salary level will be less than that of 1960-61. I am not informed or in a position to be critical, but I ask the minister whether this kind of reduction is justified.
I also wish to ask whether in our great national need for more troops, we are now bringing along enough graduates out of these schools. It is obvious that we have gathered

Supply-National Defence together an extremely able staff, gentlemen who could very easily be absorbed by other universities in Canada and the United States. As we look over the qualifications of these men we see that almost every lecturer has qualifications from several universities. I should think they would be highly mobile personnel and easily lost.
I wonder whether the minister would be kind enough to indicate what is developing at Royal Military College. I can say, from what we can see from where I live, close to Kingston, that we are extremely proud of this school. R.M.C., we think, has never stood so high, and I am one who has been in a position to form an exceptionally high opinion of R.M.C. graduates of the past.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the hon. member for his remarks about Brigadier Anderson and Colonel Sawyer. Brigadier Anderson was a good friend of mine whom I saw a good deal of during the war and since. Also, I am glad to note his interest in the Royal Military College. As far as the salaries of the professors are concerned, they have gone up, not down. I think that is clearly indicated in the details of services in the blue book at page 331. Hon. members will see that the director is getting $14,500 as against $12,000 last year. Fourteen professors are getting $168,000 as against $136,000-their salaries have gone up considerably. This has been necessary, as the hon. member pointed out, in order to retain the services of university professors of a high calibre since those men are in short supply at the present time and we at the military colleges are, of course, in competition with the universities and colleges throughout the continent. Hon. members will see that there are 23 lecturers provision for whom amounts to $136,000 this year compared with $129,000 last year. There are 14 instructors and they are receiving $73,000 this year compared with $67,000 last year. I think that is typical. The salaries have gone up and, as I say, this is necessary in order to retain the staff.
I am glad to say we have an excellent staff not only at the Royal Military College but also at the College Militaire Royale and at Royal Roads. We have on our staffs some extremely outstanding men in their particular lines. We are fortunate indeed that in many instances these men remain with us, although they have been offered higher salaries in other institutions, because they happen to like the type of work they are doing and, in particular, the type of young men with whom they are dealing, in addition to certain facilities for research which are given to them and which they might not have available in other places. As a
[Mr. Matheson.l
result we have been able to retain our staff in spite of the fact that the salaries they receive are not as high as those they have been offered in other places.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In respect to the program to replace the 20 pounders on Centurion tanks with 105 millimetre guns, I wonder if the minister would tell us what the projected program is. According to the white book of 1960, improvements to the fire power of the Centurion tanks are estimated to cost $6 million for which $482,000 is being provided in 1961-62. Then in 1962, according to the blue book:
The army major equipment program includes provision for improvements to the fire power of the Centurion tank. The estimated cost of this program is $6 million of which the estimated expenditure in 1961-62 is $587,000.
I should like the minister to tell the committee how many of the tanks overseas have been reconverted to date, and what the projected program is for the balance.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am not in a position to say how many tanks have been converted up to the present time. This work is being carried on at the discretion of the brigade commanders so that he will not have very many tanks out of action at any one time. However, the whole program will be completed at the end of this year.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is an amazing statement. The minister says the whole program is to be completed by the end of this year. How can that be accomplished when we are being asked to fund only about one sixth of the total, including last year's estimate? It will require 12 years to complete the program on the basis of the amount funded here.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The answer is that that includes the ammunition which will be secured in the future.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The $6 million figure includes the ammunition?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Could the minister tell the committee what proportion of the $6 million is required for the installation of the guns and what proportion is being spent on ammunition? I must say this seems unusual.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am sorry but we have not got that information here. We shall get it. It will come down shortly and I will give it to the hon. member.


Walter George Pitman: I am sure all of us will be glad to see that the Bobcat light tracked vehicle is being produced in Canada. Could the minister indicate how many have already

been produced and how many foreign governments, if any, have bought them? Could he also tell us what the approximate cost per Bobcat will be, including development costs.


Douglas Scott Harkness: There were four of these vehicles, hand made, one might say, as a means of developing the vehicle and experimenting with it. There are 20 being produced on a production line at the present time to discover whether there are any difficulties in turning these vehicles out in quantity and, if so, to correct those difficulties. As soon as those 20 have been produced a further 480 will be secured.


Walter George Pitman: Have any foreign governments signed contracts to accept the Bobcat? I understand there is a German carrier of the same type-if it is not of the same type perhaps the minister will tell us. But would the cost of producing that vehicle be comparable to the cost of producing ours?


Douglas Scott Harkness: A considerable number of countries have shown some interest in this vehicle but we have received no definite orders as yet. I should like to point out that a number of other personnel carriers, such as the German carrier to which the hon. member referred, are not amphibious vehicles such as this one is. They have no swimming ability, and as a carrier which can cross all types of country and which is, in addition, amphibious, we think this is the best one being developed. As a result we have hopes we shall be able to sell this vehicle to other countries.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Could the minister tell us how many of the Bobcats are now with the brigades in Europe?


Douglas Scott Harkness: That question indicates the naivete or the childishness of the hon. member. He has just heard me say that four handmade models have been produced and that 20 more are in production.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It is not childish. I was just reading the blue book and I find in it this statement:
A production run of 20 models of the Bobcat light armoured tractor carrier will be commenced in 1961-62.
What I want the minister to tell the committee is where the associate minister got the wild statement he made in this house when he told us that 500 Bobcats were on order.


Douglas Scott Harkness: When I made the announcement in connection with the Bobcat some considerable time ago I said that we were definitely securing 500 of these vehicles. I
Supply-National Defence explained that 20 of them were being produced as rapidly as they could be produced as a production line run and that as soon as they came through successfully the other 480 would immediately be secured.


Joseph Pierre Albert Sévigny: On a question of privilege, may I say that if the hon. member would just read Hansard he would see that what I said last night was exactly what the Minister of National Defence has just said.


Walter George Pitman: I assume it is too early to know what the production cost of the Bobcat, including development costs, will be. Perhaps I can reserve that question for later on.
There is one question about which I am particularly concerned and it relates to the fact that the army controls the warning system. Last Friday I asked the minister a question with reference to the fact that this had been reported as being inadequate as long ago as last January but nothing had been done about it. Second, it had been stated that the system was aimed for outside audibility but the minister suggested that such a statement had not been made.
I want to say it had been made in front of officials who I am sure are very good witnesses who said that that was the situation.
Last Tuesday two officers arrived from Picton. They came to Peterborough to carry out tests, the tests which were predicted by the Minister of National Defence. I am very happy to see that his department has gone on with this matter with the speed with which it has shown. When those two officers arrived they informed the officials in Peterborough that they were testing for outside audibility.
This afternoon the minister complained that the people on this side of the house had not been reading his speeches. It appears to me that some of the people in his own department have not been reading his speeches because they have been testing for outside audibility. When they were told what the minister had said in the house last Friday they said they had heard nothing about this. They got in touch with Ottawa and were told that no new orders had been issued and therefore they are now testing the sirens once again for outside audibility.
I wish this matter could be cleared up because it is of extreme concern. I am sure the minister realizes this because he had been made contact with in the area that I represent.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I said nothing about testing for inside audibility. What I did say was that the degree to which those sirens could be heard inside buildings depended on the type of construction of the building. For example, I used a bank vault down in the basement

Supply-National Defence of a building where you would not hear the siren at all. I used this as an extreme example.
The only way in which you can test and get a test which will be valid in Peterborough and in various parts of Peterborough or anywhere else is on outside audibility. Because, if you start testing on this structure, that structure and the other structure, you are going to get a little different result in each one, depending on the type of construction and the particular room in the building in which you carry on the test and, of course, how much the particular building happens to be shielded by other buildings from the site of the siren. The only way in which you get any sort of test which is standard or uniform is on outside audibility.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Can the minister tell the committee what are the Canadian army commitments at the present time to the United Nations or any other form of international service, and can he give us some details in regard to this service? I know figures were given some time ago but I was wondering what the figures are now.


Douglas Scott Harkness: My officials will turn up the exact figures.


Lester Bowles Pearson: While this is being done perhaps I might ask another question related to my previous one. To what extent are those Canadian contingents of United Nations forces or other international services maintained by Canadian air transport?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, as far as the location of the force is concerned, first there is the United Nations emergency force in the Suez. It consists of a total establishment of Canadian army units of 69 officers and 789 other ranks, for a total of 858 all ranks. There is a reconnaissance squadron in that, Lord Strathcona's Horse; a signal squadron, a transport company, and an infantry workshop as the main units making up that particular force.
The R.C.A.F. has 14 officers and 74 other ranks with that force, so that the total of all ranks in the force is 941.
In the Congo the army has 41 officers and 230 other ranks; the air force has six officers and two other ranks, making a total of 279.
In India and Pakistan in that truce observer role the army has eight officers. In Indochina the navy has two officers; the army has 28 officers and 24 other ranks; the R.C.A.F. has two officers, making a total of 56 all ranks.
In the United Nations truce teams in the Middle East there are 17 army officers. In other countries there are one naval officer

and seven army officers; three army other ranks; three R.C.A.F. officers; three other ranks; making a total of 17.
I am sorry, I have forgotten what the second question was.


Lester Bowles Pearson: To what extent are these Canadian forces maintained by Canadian transport?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There are five scheduled North Star flights per month from Trenton, Ontario, via Langar, England and Pisa, Italy to El Arish and return.
As far as the Suez forces are concerned, the total number of flights in support of those forces in the year ended September 30, 1960 was 66, or a total of 788,000 odd miles flown.
I do not suppose the hon. member wants the number of passengers and so forth. As far as the Congo is concerned, there are 15 R.C.A.F. personnel on the strength of the United Nations force there. That was as of June 1. There are two scheduled North Star flights per week to the Congo from Langar via Pisa, Italy to Leopoldville and return, and there are two scheduled North Star flights per month from Trenton, Ontario, down to the Congo and return.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Perhaps I may be permitted to pay my own humble tribute to the magnificent work that these men are doing on behalf of peace and for their country. I know we are all very grateful for the service they have rendered and are continuing to render under particularly difficult circumstances in the Congo at the present time.
I noticed from what the minister has said that the signals personnel in the Congo have been reduced somewhat, because in the blue book of May reference is made to the army signal unit comprising 280 all ranks. I think the figures the minister gave were a little less than that. May I ask the minister whether the transfer, if you would like to call it that, of those Canadian signallers to the Congo, when it took place, had any effect on the work of the Canadian army signals in Canada? Has the work of training the signallers been carried on in the normal way notwithstanding the transfer of so many of the signals unit to the Congo.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, the training at the signals school has been expanded considerably because of the number of signallers employed in the Congo and in the Suez, in order to increase the supply of signallers.
I should like to thank the Leader of the Opposition for the tribute he has paid to the men whom we have serving in those places in the cause of peace and particularly those in the Congo, who, as he has stated, have had an

extremely difficult time, particularly in certain spots. I know that the whole Canadian people are grateful to them for the job they have done there.
As to the difference in the numbers, originally there was a considerable contingent of Canadian officers and some other ranks on the United Nations headquarters staff in the Congo. That has gradually been cut down as other nations have made contributions to the United Nations headquarters staff and also there has been a redistribution of the signal personnel at various points in the Congo. The Leader of the Opposition will perhaps remember that fighting took place at Matadi, the seaport for Leopoldville, and that our signal detachment was under fire for some time. It was then withdrawn to Leopoldville and it has not been sent back because United Nations troops were not sent back to maintain the position there. As a result of some of these shifts of this kind, the number now is not as great as it was when the booklet was put out.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Do we pay the full expenses of all our contingents in these United Nations forces? I assume that we do and, if we do, do we get credit for that expenditure against the assessments which are levied by the United Nations to cover the expenses of United Nations activities, a credit which we will perhaps never be able to realize in cash?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Theoretically the way the matter is supposed to work so far as costs are concerned is that we pay the normal costs, pay and allowances, of our personnel who are there. The United Nations is supposed to pay the extra costs for accommodation and so forth. We bill them for these extra costs. In the case of the Suez force, it has been on a definite basis and these bills have been paid. As far as the Congo is concerned, the same system is supposed to work but there has never been any final determination of what the United Nations would pay and therefore the matter is still in abeyance.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister comment on this statement by the former minister as found on page 462 of the proceedings of the defence estimates committee? I quote:
You asked what weapons if any are replacing any of the Browning machine guns used by the Canadian army. It is planned to replace the .30 calibre Browning in due course by a machine gun of the 7.62 millimetre NATO standardized calibre. Preliminary studies are being carried out on some new machine guns which might meet the requirements. Consideration is being given to the replacement of the .5 calibre Browning in due course by the new heavy machine gun. As yet, no decision on the type of gun to adopt has been made, but various guns are being considered.
Can the minister indicate if either of these decisions has yet been made?
Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, Mr. Chairman, there has been no final decision taken on that particular matter yet.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister advise the committee as to how many of the new C-42 wireless sets have been delivered to the brigade group in Europe?


Douglas Scott Harkness: All units of the brigade in Europe are fully equipped now with this new wireless set as are the regular army units in Canada. I think some of them have also been delviered to militia units. If not, I think some will be delivered fairly soon for national survival purposes.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister indicate whether he has any plans to equip the Canadian army with light aircraft, more specifically of Otter, Beaver or Caribou class?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, there are no definite plans. Various proposals along this line have been made and studied. No decision has been made to equip the Canadian army with any aircraft of this type. There is quite a considerable question involved. The particular proposition was, of course, to equip the brigade in Europe, but for a formation of that size it is a matter of considerable doubt whether it is a practical proposition to give it its own little air force, you might say. There is quite a body of opinion that this is not a practical way to solve the problem of the need for air transportability and for air transport. As far as Canada is concerned, of course, air transport requirements can be met by the R.C.A.F.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I am sure the minister would admit that the contrary opinion is held in some quarters. Would he also indicate whether he plans to obtain any heavy helicopters for the brigade group to be used for moving personnel and equipment?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have had a considerable number of these plans and propositions put before me and have given them a good deal of study, both with respect to aircraft of the Otter or Beaver type and also heavy helicopters. I think there is a need for a certain number of heavy helicopters and I hope to be able to work out something definite in that regard in the very near future.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister advise the committee how many consultant architects and engineers were used in the last fiscal year and what was the total cost?


Douglas Scott Harkness: While that is being looked up, I might reply to a question that was asked about the Hamilton Galt trophy competition. I have the information here for the last three years only. In 1958 the trophy

Supply-National Defence was won by the second regiment, R.H.C., in 1959 it was won by the first Royal 22nd regiment and in 1960 it was won by the first P.P.C.L.I. regiment. The competition is between all regular infantry battalions and includes the scoring of all personnel of the battalion. A steady improvement in firing skill of the battalions as a whole has been experienced. The director of infantry is still searching for statistics on the actual results.


Mr, Pitman:: I thank the minister very much for that information. Could he tell us whether the scores indicated an improvement as a result of the use of the new rifle compared with the Lee-Enfield or whether the improvement resulted from greater accuracy in firing rather than the use of the FN rifle?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We have the percentage scores for these three years and they show an increase from 127 to 132 to 141. They do not show which rifles were being used which I think was the point the hon. member was getting at. I will have to send for that information. The last question was in connection with the number of architects and consultants. The amount of money which was budgeted for consultants fees in 1960-61 was $900,000 and in 1961-62 $500,000 or a decrease of $400,000. I have not got the actual number.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is the minister giving the figures for those on the staff of national defence headquarters?


Douglas Scott Harkness: These are consultants' fees.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Consultants to the department?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In his list of equipment for the brigade group the minister mentioned the S.S. anti-tank missile for training. Would he indicate his intentions with regard to an operational anti-tank missile for the brigade group?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, no final decision has been made as to what type of missile of this kind will finally be adopted as our regular equipment. We have been using the French wire-guided weapon, the S.S.-10 for practice purposes and for training. However, we have been evaluating other weapons of the same type and, as I say, no final decision has yet been made as to which one we will eventually adopt.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: If the minister examines the box score he will see the basis for our suggestion that the brigade group is not as adequately equipped as it might be. We admit quite freely that some of these programs are


coming along in more or less orderly fashion. We strongly suspect, however, that some of them have been held back for budgetary reasons. This is the reason we charge that the brigade group has been starved for equipment at the same time rather heavy expenditures have been made for other equipment which, in our opinion, is not nearly so essential.
I might give a sort of running box score: No Honest John rocket launchers in Europe, and no decision as to how they will be equipped when they get there; the FN rifle being re-constructed; Centurion tanks are being re-equipped and so far we do not know how many. The ammuniton has not all been ordered, as yet. The Bobcat is not yet ready to go into production, let alone be delivered to the brigade group. The C-42 wireless set is apparently fully installed and in use. There are no light aircraft and the minister is not yet convinced they are a requirement. I would suggest he visit some of the installations of other armies that are equipped with light aircraft to see their capabilities and then, on that basis, perhaps he would be impressed with the advisability of providing some light transport companies for the brigade group. There are no heavy helicopters yet available or on order, although the minister is giving this some consideration. Finally, there is no final decision with respect to an anti-tank missile.
This box score, Mr. Chairman, is the basis for the charge we have made, and we believe the facts substantiate the position we have taken. I wonder if the minister would give the committee a list of the equipment which has been issued to the militia for national survival operations?


Douglas Scott Harkness: My officials will turn up that list, and while that is being done I should like to say that the Centurion tank, of course, is a heavy British post-war tank and an exceptionally good one. The up-gunning of it has been proceeding quite satisfactorily and, as I said will be finished by the end of the year. With 20-pounder guns, it is still a very effective tank.
In so far as some of the other criticisms are concerned and this so-called list the hon. member has read, I would ask him to compare that list with the partial list of just some of the major equipment to which I referred a while ago as being supplied not only to the brigade in Europe but also to the regular army troops in Canada and, in some cases, to the militia. It is very easy to pick out four or five items and say that these are not yet complete. The basic fact is, however, that we have, by and large, completely reequipped the brigade in Europe and the other army units since the second world war with vehicles, weapons and what-not. This has

been a very considerable undertaking. So far as the anti-tank wire missile is concerned, to which reference was made, there are probably a half a dozen of those which have been produced in various countries. It takes a considerable length of time to evaluate all these. We also hope there will be some standardization so far as the NATO countries are concerned in putting them into their armies. In the meantime, as I say, we are using the French type.
There is a list here of the major items of survival equipment which have been issued to both the Canadian regular army and to the militia units. There are rescue kits on an operational scale for the two types of units, regular and militia. There is radiac equipment for the re-entry forces and fall-out reporting posts. There is a limited quantity of gamma survey meters, and the models of low range survey meters are the CDV-710 contamination meter and the CDV-700 in quantities sufficient to permit training and limited operations; approximately 30 per cent of the requirement of tactical dosimeters and dosimeters chargers; over 50 per cent of the requirement of personal dosimeters and approximately 40 per cent of the requirements of readers for these dosimeters; full requirements for training kits and training devices; communications equipment, including the United Kingdom C-42 wireless set, which is a 15-mile very high frequency set.
The major items of equipment which are on order and of which we hope to get deliveries fairly rapidly and regularly are the additional requirements of radiac equipment of various kinds and these dosimeter chargers for them; remote reading gamma survey meters for fall-out reporting posts; nuclear burst position indicators; communication equipment including telephone cable and public address sets, miscellaneous radio sets; portable heaters; decontamination apparatus; mobile laundry equipment; mobile bath equipment; gasoline driven saws; centrifugal pumps; torch cutting equipment; water purification equipment; various generating and lighting sets; some winter footwear; food cooking equipment; various items of crowd control equipment.
Planned for procurement are additional radiac equipment above what is already ordered; decontamination vacuum cleaners, collapsible tanks for water storage and additional lighting equipment. As I indicated last week, we have taken a considerable number of measures to speed up the securing of a considerable quantity of equipment needed for national survival purposes. We are securing all of this just as rapidly as it can be produced for us.
Supply-National Defence


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I am very pleased to learn of' this speed-up. I understand, indirectly, that to a large extent it results from the attention drawn to the need for it last year when the estimates were before the committee. At the same time, I know the minister would not wish to take credit for all the reequipment which has been given the brigade group over the years, most of which was ordered away back and then subsequently delivered to the brigade group long before the minister had any responsibility for the provision of equipment.
I wonder if the minister would give the number of resignations from the militia for the years 1959, 1960 and 1961 respectively and perhaps the rate of enlistments for the same periods?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, I would have to get the number of withdrawals from the militia. I think perhaps we could get the information best by giving the strengths at various times. The strengths going back to, we will say, March 31, 1958-this is the total strength, officers and other ranks-41,000. I will leave off the odd hundreds. December 31, 1958, 41,400.
March, 1959, 40,900; December, 1959, 40,700; March, 1960, 40,000; October 31, 41,000; December 31, 42,600; March 31, 1961, 43,200; June 30, 1961, 44,000. It will therefore be seen that during that period there has been a gradual increase of upwards of 4,000 in the numbers. We will try to get the number of the people who enlisted and the number who withdrew for the past year. I think that was what was asked for.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I should like to have the rate of enlistment or the turnover in that period if you have it handy.	.


Douglas Scott Harkness: No. We have not it at hand but we will get it. It may take some time to get it.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I wonder whether the minister would bring us up to date in relation to Maple Leaf services being supplied to the armed personnel overseas? Has he received any complaints recently, particularly with respect to the range of goods being carried and the fact that allegedly there is not a sufficient range of Canadian products?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There are, of course, complaints. There are always complaints over the operations of anything along these lines. The complaints are chiefly of two kinds. One is on the part of troops who have newly gone over to Germany. There are complaints that there is not the same variety of goods as that to which they have been accustomed at home. I think this situation can readily be understood. It is just not possible to carry

Supply-National Defence the great variety of goods, such as canned goods and so on, of all kinds which you find in a supermarket here in Canada.
The other type of complaint that I have received is with regard to the prices in the Maple Leaf services. This has been based chiefly on a belief-which is some cases is correct and in some cases is quite wrong- that the United States PX's are selling the same goods more cheaply. If you examine into this matter you find that some goods are certainly sold more cheaply in United States PX's. However, on the other hand certain goods are sold more cheaply in the Canadian Maple Leaf stores. Of course you never hear any complaint about that matter. It is taken for granted. But if there is found an item the price of which is cheaper in the United States PX's you get the complaint that it should be sold at that price in the Canadian Maple Leaf services. Of course, one of the reasons that there is a difference in prices is that the United States PX's are securing goods in very much greater quantities than we are and on a direct supply line, and thus their costs of acquisition and their transportation costs in the case of many items are less than ours. In the case of certain other items, as a matter of fact, as I say we can produce at a better price. This is the general situation with regard to complaints with respect to Maple Leaf services. However, I have never received very serious complaints in this regard.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I wish to read a rather incredible letter addressed to the Hon. Lester B. Pearson, House of Commons, Ottawa, Ontario or a copy of it. It reads as follows:
Dear Sir:
I am a retired Canadian army officer and veteran of world war II. I take the liberty of addressing this letter to you in order to place at your disposal certain facts gained from personal experience concerning Canadian complicity in the recent military action against Cuba organized by the government of the United States. It is my present conviction that the matter must be thoroughly exposed in order that proper measures be taken to prevent our further entanglement in the disastrous consequences of American policy toward Cuba.
Six months ago I was hired by the C.I.A. as an instructor and detailed to a camp where anti-Castro units were trained in landing operations. Through my close association with C.I.A. officials and participation in the camp activities, I was in a position to obtain some knowledge of the extent of Canadian involvement, as the following list of particulars will indicate:
1.	From information secured through C.I.A. channels, it is clear to me that Messrs. Diefenbaker and Harkness had full knowledge of, and indeed encouraged, the recruitment of Canadian citizens on Canadian soil by the C.I.A. for service in units being prepared for the invasion of Cuba. The same evidence indicates that R.C.M.P. officials co-operated with the C.I.A. in this activity.
2.	My estimate is that from 200 to 300 Canadians were recruited. In the main they were unemployed

persons and ex-servicemen. Practically all of them joined up because of the high rate of pay.
3.	In addition, several regular army officers took part in the training and actual landing operations in Cuba. Presumably their participation was approved by their superiors.


James Stanley Speakman: I rise on a point of order, Mr. Chairman. Will the hon. member who is reading this document kindly identify its source?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I will give it later.


James Stanley Speakman: I should like him to identify it now, Mr. Chairman.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: The initials of the gentleman are "D. J. S." I wish to finish reading it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: What is his name?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: It is just initialled.


Douglas Scott Harkness: It is an anonymous letter.


James Stanley Speakman: If it is an anonymous letter, it is out of order to read it.


Mr. Bell (Carleton):: Is the hon. member adopting it?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: No. Some rather unusual statements are given here. He is willing to come forward. I will carry on and paraphrase it.


An hon. Member:: Name him.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: He goes on to say this-


James Stanley Speakman: Mr. Chairman, will you kindly rule on that point of order.


Frank Charles McGee: I was
wondering whether the hon. member who was reading the letter was giving me his own abbreviated version of the person who signed the letter or is the letter actually signed by initials as indicated?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: No. It is initialed but not signed. I can paraphrase the contents of it.


Frank Charles McGee: Just a minute, please.


Lester Bowles Pearson: While you are ruling on this important point, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make it quite clear that I did not refer the copy of this letter to the hon. gentleman.


Frank Charles McGee: The
ruling I had in mind is to be found in Beauchesne's fourth edition, paragraph 158, subsection 3, page 134, which states:
(3) An unsigned letter should not be read in the house. On the 16th May 1928, a member stated during debate that a letter which he had been quoting was not signed. The Speaker said: "Such a letter should not be read into Hansard.', all letters when read must be signed and they become part of the documents of the house".

I think the point is well taken by the hon. member for Wetaskiwin, in view of the apparent length of the letter and also in view of the fact that it is for all practical purposes an anonymous letter. I would suggest that a free paraphrasing of it would be more in order.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I bow to your ruling, Mr. Chairman, and I shall paraphrase it. I raise the matter because he sent this letter to the Leader of the Opposition and to five members of parliament. He goes on to say this.


John Cameron Pallett: Does the hon. member take these remarks as his own as well as paraphrasing the letter? Is he taking responsibility for them?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I am not obliged to take responsibility for paraphrasing information.


John Cameron Pallett: Oh, yes, you are obliged to take responsibility for an anonymous letter.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I am not reading the letter. I want the minister to answer this.


William Heward Grafftey: Disregard the rules.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: He goes on to indicate that the invasion collapsed and he mentions money.


John Cameron Pallett: I rise on a point of order, Mr. Chairman. The point I raise is that the hon. member is purporting to read an anonymous letter and he says, "He says". I suggest that the hon. member either accept these remarks as his own, a procedure which is in accordance with the rules of the house, or accept responsibility for them.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Mr. Chairman, I can overcome that quite easily according to the rules by saying I have been informed. That is quite correct.


An hon. Member:: No, you cannot.


William Heward Grafftey: Oh, no.


Frank Charles McGee: On the
point of order that has been raised, I would appreciate it very much if the hon. member for Peel would direct the attention of the Chair specifically to the rule which covers this particular point. In my humble opinion, if this rule does exist, it has been honoured in the breach.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Oh, no.


Frank Charles McGee: I say
that from my experience, and in my opinion. I would appreciate some guidance as to the specific precedents in this matter. The point I have in mind has occurred frequently in debates and discussions in the house when in quite recent times hon. members on both sides of a particular argument have quoted
Supply-National Defence from the same editorial. Clearly hon. members on both sides of the argument cannot be assuming responsibility for the same editorial which in part seems to support both sides of the argument.


Mr. Bell (Carlelon):: Surely that would be out of order, Mr. Chairman, because it is specifically governed by citation 157, subcitation 5. That citation is perhaps not relevant to our particular discussion, but the reading of editorials in support of argument has been frequently ruled to be out of order.


John Cameron Pallett: I would refer you, Mr. Chairman, to citation 159, subparagraph 3, which by an analogy covers this situation. The citation reads:
It has been admitted that a document which has been cited ought to be laid upon the table of the house, if it can be done without injury to the public interest. The same rule, however, cannot be held to apply to private letters or memoranda. On the 18th May, 1865, the attorney general, on being asked by Mr. Ferrard if he would lay upon the table a written statement and a letter to which he had referred on a previous day, in answering a question relative to the Leeds bankruptcy court, replied that he had made a statement to the house upon his own responsibility, and that the documents he had referred to being private, he could not lay them upon the table.


Lionel Chevrier: There is another sentence which you did not read.


Frank Charles McGee: The
citation goes on to say:
-the documents he had referred to being private, he could not lay them upon the table. Lord Robert Cecil contended that the papers, having been cited, should be produced; but the Speaker declared that this rule applied to public documents only.
I think, with the lack of some immediate direction and instruction from precedents, we should proceed on a common sense basis. I think perhaps we are all of a mind in this particular instance. Without attempting to establish a precedent and-
Mr. Pallet!: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member does not accept responsibility for the statements he makes. This is fundamental to the practice of the House of Commons. It is such a fundamental rule that it is basic to the whole proceedings.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Mr. Chairman, possibly
through a lapse of memory or oversight I did transgress the rules of the house in this instance. But I will not transgress the rules of the house further. All hon. members know that I try to keep them as much as possible.


William Heward Grafftey: Do you, or do you not, take responsibility?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Having had certain information which now seems very unusual, I would ask the minister two or three questions which will be quite in order.

Supply-National Defence
First, does the minister know of any Canadians being recruited to serve in forces that were used in the invasion of Cuba?
Second, does the minister know of any Canadian army personnel being directly or indirectly involved in such an arrangement?
Third, in view of certain persons making these most unusual statements, and a certain person being willing to come forward to give information in detail, if requested, will the minister give any person who is willing to come forward and present evidence to the defence committee an opportunity to substantiate any statements they have made in correspondence, conversation or otherwise?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I shall be very glad to have anybody come forward with anything that he can substantiate in regard to any matter along this line. As far as any Canadian army personnel having had any part directly or indirectly in the Cuban affair is concerned, I know definitely that none of them had. In other words, these various statements in this anonymous letter are just completely false. There is the statement that the Prime Minister and I had full knowledge of the matter. I know that I had absolutely no knowledge of the matter in any way, shape or form. As I say, I also know that the Canadian army had no part of any kind in training people or anything else along that line.
I suspect this is the same man, as a matter of fact, who made an appearance on a television show here in Ottawa some months ago and claimed that he had been in Cuba and that there were a lot of other Canadian soldiers in Cuba. He claimed they were using Canadian army rifles, and things of this sort. I answered a question or two in the house on it. He said they had been using .303 rifles which were stolen from a certain camp. I have forgotten the name of the camp now, but on investigation it happened to be a camp where there never had been any .303 rifles because it had come into operation after the FN rifle had been issued. This showed a palpable falsehood in these claims.
As a matter of fact, the man claimed that he served in certain Canadian army units, and so forth. We looked the matter up and found he had enlisted, under his brother's name as I recall it, and had been discharged because he was found to be mentally unstable.
He then threatened me, and the R.C.M.P. were actually looking after him for a while. He was going to do away with me because of the answers I had given. But subsequently somehow or other, I think Liberty magazine printed an article for him and showed pictures of him, presumably in Cuba. It turned out on investigation that

these pictures had actually been taken by a Toronto photographer-his name was right on the back of the pictures-


Mr. Marlin (Essex Easl):: Did he have a beard?


Douglas Scott Harkness: -and they were taken in the botanical gardens at Toronto. I suspect that the fellow who wrote this letter is the same man.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: In order to clear up the matter-


An hon. Member:: Tear the letter up.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: -would the minister say whether he invites this person to come forward and sustantiate his claims?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I invite him to come forward and substantiate his claims, but if it is the same man as I suspect it is, he is just looking for more notoriety and I am not going to give it to him.
The Acling Chairman (Mr. McGee): Shall vote 337 carry?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, would the minister tell the committee to what extent the standardization of arms and ground equipment has proceeded in NATO? I know that there has been a standardization of the FN rifle. I am not sure how far that has been carried out. Has there been some backsliding from that example of standardization? What else has been done to standardize arms and equipment in the NATO forces?


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is one of the areas in which there has been disappointingly slow progress. The amount of standardization outside of the FN rifle has been disappointingly little. It arises to a large extent, I think, because each country, for purposes of maintaining employment in its own industries, and so on, always attempts to manufacture everything it possibly can in that particular country. I believe this is the main reason why it is so difficult to get standardization of these different pieces of equipment.
Mr. Chairman, a question was asked about the up-gunning of the Centurions. The hon. member for Trinity asked for the division of the $6 million which was put into this program. Six hundred thousand dollars of that amount is for the modifications to the guns, and $5,400,000 is for ammunition.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I thank the minister for that information. I wonder if the hon. gentleman has the information to enable him to answer this inquiry. I shall read it for the benefit of the minister. Without going into voluminous detail, suffice it to state that under order in council, PC 1959-1/1297 northern allowance

at $87.50 per month was converted to isolation allowance and reduced to the sum of $70 per month with effect from October 1, 1959, this new allowance to be reduced by 20 per cent each year for a period of five years, to the end that at the conclusion of this period no special allowance would be paid to personnel posted to Dawson Creek, British Columbia. However, a discrepancy arises from the fact that even at the reduced rates isolation allowance is awarded only to personnel who were posted to Dawson Creek prior to the order in council coming into effect. Personnel posted subsequent to that date receive no consideration. Therefore, a number of personnel posted prior to the order in council being passed receive $52.50 per month even after the 20 per cent reduction which became effective on October 1, 1960, in addition to normal pay and allowances, while those posted subsequent to the order in council receive only normal pay and allowances. Yet all live under the same circumstances and conditions.
I wonder if the minister would indicate, if these facts are correct, whether or not he thinks this situation is equitable and whether he proposes alleviating the discrepancy in the treatment of personnel at Dawson Creek.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am told there was a complete study made of these isolation allowances and northern allowances. In some cases they were increased as a result of this study, while in others they were decreased. In the cases where they were decreased the decrease was to be effected over a five year period. I have here a list of the areas in which allowances were decreased and of those in which they were not. I presume that if increases were paid with respect to the northwest highway system it was because a considerable number of other places such as Dawson Creek certainly cannot be looked upon any longer as isolated posts.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Does the minister not feel that even if the allowance is reduced over a five year period the amount paid should apply to all personnel at a particular station rather than be applied to some and not to others?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I must say frankly that I am not familiar with the situation, and therefore I am not in a position to answer that question.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister take it into consideration and let me know the results of his inquiries either privately or otherwise?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes, I shall be glad to have this looked into and if I cannot give an answer before the estimates are completed I shall write to the hon. member.


Chesley William Carter: I should like to direct to the minister one or two questions about the public
Supply-National Defence relations staff. Can the minister say how many such personnel the army has engaged in this work and how that number compares proportionately with the numbers employed in the other services? This is one item of expenditure in connection with which I sometimes wonder whether the taxpayer is getting good value for his dollar. I have not had much opportunity to observe the work of the P.R.O.'s. I did have one opportunity to do so in July and I cannot say I was much impressed by what I saw on that occasion. However, I should not like to draw any conclusion from a single observation.
I should like also to find out on what basis these P.R.O. people are allocated to units and formations and whether any thought has been given to unifying the work of this department in the three services.


Mr. Chambers:: The public relations directorates of the services and defence research board have three main functions:
1.	To facilitate a flow of unclassified information about the armed services and defence research board to the public.
2.	To provide counsel to their respective services, to ensure that each service is, in fact, serving the public interest to the best of its abilities, in closest possible harmony with other national interests, and that its plans, policies, programs and activities are presented or performed in such a way as to reflect the high standards of the service concerned, and its dedication to public interest.
3.	To advise upon and implement planned community relations programs, particularly at overseas establishments.
The hon. member for Burin-Burgeo will realize that wherever there is a service establishment, particularly overseas but here in Canada also, the relationship between the civilian population and the service population can sometimes cause difficulties. One of the ways in which this situation can be helped is through good public relations. I was asked to give some figures, and I can tell the committee that at national defence headquarters there are two civilian public relations officers. The navy has a total of 14 officers and ten civilians. The army has 28 officers and 34 other ranks, besides 30 civilians, for a grand total of 92. The R.C.A.F. has a total of 29 officers, 35 other ranks and nine civilians for a total of 73. The defence research board has two civilians engaged in this work.


Chesley William Carter: Could we have any indication of the total cost? Is that figure available?


Egan Chambers: It is not broken down-


Chesley William Carter: Could we not have some indication of the cost? I understand the navy has 14 officers, the army 28 officers and the
8396	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence air force 27, plus other ranks. What would the top rank be in each of those establishments? What would the average rank be?


Egan Chambers: The senior officer in each service is a lieutenant colonel or equivalent. The bulk of the working officer personnel are army captains, or equivalent.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
23S. Construction or acquisition of buildings, works, land and major equipment, $60,556,000.
Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: I should like to take this opportunity to raise a question which is of interest to my own constituency. There was an artillery armoury there called the General Brock armoury which was purchased by the department a few years ago. An anti-aircraft battery was stationed there. In June of this year the armoury was sold on tender having been declared surplus and the artillery battery was required to move into the Victoria Avenue armoury which has been the home of a company of the Lincoln regiment. Could the minister say why the General Brock armoury was declared surplus and sold? It was about three times the physical size of the armoury which remains and it was a more modern building although not so well designed as an armoury.
Consequently, we think it will now be necessary to rent space to train individuals of the militia in the Niagara area for civil defence.


Egan Chambers: Mr. Chairman, we will have to send for this information for the hon. member.


Chesley William Carter: The minister might now answer the question I asked earlier.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, I am informed that the question of a Newfoundland armoury is awaiting the decision on the ownership of the Pepperrell air base, and that some accommodation in it might be used as an armoury.


Mr. Mitchell:: I am going to ask my annual question of the minister concerning the proposed Sudbury armoury. The hon. lady from Niagara Falls gave me the idea when she was talking about the armouries. Has any progress been made with the construction of this building? I am advised that army construction experts have been in Sudbury recently looking over the situation and have made a report to the department. A new arrangement has been suggested concerning the construction of this building. I am advised that local money can be obtained for its erection on a lease back contract. It is suggested, of course, that the department oversee the construction of this building according to army regulations, and rent it for a


period of 20 to 25 years, with the purchase of same to be arranged at that time, if they so wish.
Is there any money in this year's estimates earmarked for this purpose? Of course, you realize, that the property for this armoury has already been donated to the crown and has been lying idle there. The deed is still held by the Department of National Defence.
I am asking this question to see whether the department has taken any serious thought of the construction of this building under other arrangements.


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is one of the armoury projects with which it happens I am thoroughly familiar. I went into it in considerable detail as the hon. member knows, with the delegation from Sudbury and I am doing my best to get the things approved and get construction started as soon as possible. It is at the head of our priority list for armouries in Ontario. I have not yet managed to get it approved by treasury board, but I hope to be able to do that in the very near future.


David Rodger Mitchell: Thank you.


Mr. Badanai:: I should like to direct a question to the minister with regard to the armoury situation in Fort William. It has being brought to his attention on several occasions. I wonder whether the city of Fort William is on a basis similar to that mentioned by the hon. member for Sudbury. The Department of National Defence is well aware of the need for an armoury at Fort William. Will the minister give some assurance that consideration will be given to this matter in the near future?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I dealt with this question, I think it was the day before yesterday, as a result of the speech which the hon. member made on item No. 1. I really have nothing to add to that. I said at that time we have to make arrangements to rent a hall in Fort William to accommodate a company of the Lake Superior Scottish and this will go some small way at least to meet the need there. I regret to inform the hon. member that, unlike the situation in Sudbury, the actual building of an armoury at Fort William is not close to the top of the priority list and therefore I can give no indication as to when the construction might be started on an armoury in Fort William.


Mr. McFarlane:: I am in a position almost similar to that of the two previous speakers, but my proposal to the minister is a little different. At the present time we have a militia unit in the city of Kimberley in British Columbia and we have endeavoured to carry on over a period of years, handling

part of the program in one building, part in another building and part in schools, keeping the equipment wherever cover is available. I have worked on this for some time. The last letter I had from the minister stated that the information had been requested from departmental officials and would be available at an early date. I sincerely hope it will not be very long before I will be able to obtain that material.
A brief has been submitted to the department concerning the necessity for the armouries at Kimberley. The submission is as follows:
That Kimberley Armouries limited erect a building acceptable to the Department of National Defence standards for a militia armoury.
That this building be rented to the Department of National Defence for a period of 20 years, at rates sufficient to write off the cost of construction and such other charges as may be deemed necessary.
That at the end of the contract period, the building be sold to the crown for a nominal sum agreed in the contract.
That the building be erected on the 2.25 acres of crown land held in the name of the Department of National Defence in the city of Kimberley.
Financial backing for Kimberley Armouries limited has been obtained from the Royal Trust Company, Vancouver, B.C., through the bank of Montreal, Kimberley, B.C.
The land was given to the Department of National Defence by the city of Kimberley so that an armouries could be built. It constituted the last suitable site in the community when the gift was made. The city had itself received the land as a contribution from the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada limited as park land, with a clause defining an armouries as an acceptable improvement.
There are several other items in this brief. They have enclosed the signatures of very responsible men in the community and also of members of the opposition party. In addition to that, they have given us a brief summary of the militia activities in Kimberley over the past few years. It is now known as the 17th field squadron R.C.E. at Kimberley, at Creston and at Cranbrook. During the years they have been in operation they have trained 33 officers and 525 men. In addition they have 65 cadets in the city of Cranbrook and 35 in the Creston area.
Also attached to this brief, Mr. Chairman, is the engineering project of the building as it will look when completed, in addition to the site plan which has been laid out on the property concerned; and also tentative estimates of the amount required for the construction of this building, with an approximate cost of $150,000.
In view of the fact that we feel this project is an essential in the area, I should like to give the committee a slight resume of the geographical location of Kimberley. It is situated very close to my own town, within 20
Supply-National Defence miles to be exact, in the heart of the Rocky mountains. It is my understanding that in case of an emergency the militia would be called upon to undertake a great deal of the work necessary at such a time. I took up this matter with the department and they came back with the reply that in the case of an emergency help would be forthcoming from Calgary and Kamloops where units are already established.
One look at the map, Mr. Chairman, would bring to your attention the problem that would exist in moving equipment and personnel from either of the two points mentioned. The Rocky mountains and the lakes and rivers in the area forestall any quick movement of troops and equipment. I would appreciate it if this matter could be given consideration at an early date. The Kimberley group has gone to a lot of trouble in preparing plans and data, and in the event of the citizens signing a letter of intent that they are prepared to proceed as a private group should approval be obtained within a reasonable time construction of the Kimberley armouries could also be a winter works project. We are very anxious to proceed with construction and if a prompt reply could be given by the minister or the department within the next few days or weeks we could possibly arrange for some construction this winter.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I happen to know this unit at Kimberley. It is a very excellent engineering unit and they are to be highly commended on the work they have done. I also have an additional interest in the unit. It was formerly an artillery unit and was part of the regiment that I commanded as a militia commander in the years immediately after the war. It was later converted to an engineering unit. I know what the need is for an armoury there. It has been on a priority basis for some considerable length of time. At the present time it is in the same situation in western command as Sudbury is in central command. It is at the top of the priority list so far as the construction of armouries in western command is concerned and I trust we can get some action on it fairly soon.


Mr. Weichel:: On the subject of armouries, Mr. Chairman, about a year and a half ago a brief was presented by some gentlemen in Kitchener with regard to the need for a new armoury. We have five or six units in Kitchener and Waterloo which are scattered all over the place and I am quite sure that the rent paid on the buildings now occupied would pay for a new building in about ten years time. Accommodation could also be

Supply-National Defence provided for the navy and civil defence personnel in such a building. I would appreciate it if the minister would look at that brief again.


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is another case where we realize that an armoury is very badly needed. As a matter of fact, it is fourth on the priority list of central command. I can assure the hon. member that we have it very much in mind and it is really a matter of when we can get sufficient funds to construct it, as well as a number of other armouries.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister tell us the ultimate decision with respect to the University avenue armouries in Toronto?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The city of Toronto and the metropolitan district have both indicated that they wish to have this site for a new law courts building and that they wish to proceed with the agreement entered into some years ago under which we are to turn over that site to them. We have built one other armoury, the Dennison armoury, which I believe will be officially opened next month or perhaps even this month. It has been taken over and will be officially opened very soon. There is a need for two more armouries of the same size.
The metropolitan district was supposed to assist us in securing land sites to build the two additional armouries but unfortunately nothing has been produced yet. One site was put forward but the expropriation which the metropolitan district sought to put through was cancelled when the matter was taken to the courts and therefore we lost that site. We do not have definite sites for these other two armouries. I hope we will be able to get them very shortly so that construction can be started.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister say when the department will have to give up the University avenue site and will the two other armouries be ready by that time or will there be a hiatus?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The original agreement was that we would give it up by December 31 of this year, but in view of the fact that sites have not been provided and therefore it has been impossible to proceed with construction I have informed the city officials that we cannot give up the armouries at this time and will not be able to do so until we have been able to provide alternative accommodation.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is it true that that very famous regiment, the 48th Highlanders, does not wish to carry on if it has to leave the University avenue armouries and is that situation being resolved?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not think there is any question of that. Some people may have made statements along that line. I do not know. If so, they have not come to my attention. I have had no indication whatever that the 48th Highlanders will not continue and I would be very surprised, in fact, if they are not anxious to continue.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister say whether any decision has been taken with regard to a new armouries for the city of Vancouver?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Vancouver armouries would have been started before now except for some difficulties there over the site and the objection on the part of some people to having it built on a piece of crown owned property where we originally intended to put it. I think that the matter of the site is being straightened out now. As far as western command is concerned, the Vancouver armouries is the second one on the list and comes immediately after Kimberley as a priority project.


Mr. Garland:: Could the minister say who is responsible for the establishment of these priorities?


Douglas Scott Harkness: After carefully considering the situation in the light of the needs of the militia and the accommodation at present being used, each command recommends a list of armouries in the area which they think should be constructed. This list is reviewed at army headquarters and then reviewed again by myself. The list is established on that basis.


John Richard Garland: With respect to North Bay, in view of the developments that are taking place from a military standpoint, can the minister say whether he sees any reason to believe that the priority rating for the project there might be raised? I know it is well down the list.


Douglas Scott Harkness: North Bay is not nearly as much a priority project as some of the others that have been mentioned. The list is changed from time to time depending on changes in conditions. At the present time North Bay is in seventh priority position on the central command list which would mean that there is not much hope of getting it built in the immediate future.


John Richard Garland: Perhaps the minister missed my question. In view of the fact that it has that rating and in view of the developments in the military field that are taking place across the country, I wonder whether there is any reason to believe that North Bay's priority might be raised in the reasonably near future.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As I said, the matter of armoury construction and the priority list are under review continuously and there are changes made from time to time depending on changed situations. I do not know enough about the situation with respect to this armoury compared with others to be able to give a definitive answer to the hon. member.


Edmund Leverett Morris: I wonder if the minister would inform me whether or not the department is holding land on Rainnie drive in Halifax for army building use?


Egan Chambers: Mr. Chairman, the department does hold this land for possible future army development.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Royal Canadian Air Force-
239. Operation and maintenance. $536,666,000.
Mr. Pascoe:: I should like to ask some questions on item 239 which concerns R.C.A.F. operations. I was very interested in the announcement by the minister on September 11 in connection with the replacement by 1963 of the Harvard trainer with the CL-41 jet trainer as the basic R.C.A.F. training aircraft. There is a very fine R.C.A.F. station in my home city of Moose Jaw. The minister's announcement has aroused great interest there. I was present during graduation ceremonies for the last class of student pilots, and I saw how eagerly they looked forward to their jet training after flying Harvards, although they were also very proud of the Harvards. By 1963, student pilots will be training on these jet trainers.
Could the minister tell the committee what changes may have to be made at R.C.A.F. stations to accommodate the jet trainer, particularly in so far as personnel, maintenance and repair hangars and runways. Will the runways which have accommodated the Harvards have to be lengthened or strengthened to accommodate the CL-41? I am not sure of the exact length of the runways at the Moose Jaw R.C.A.F. station, but I know that jets do not normally land there. If it is necessary to lengthen the runways, and I imagine it will be, could some of this work be done this fall and perhaps during the winter to provide winter employment?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There will be no changes required in the hangars. There will be >a very small increase in maintenance personnel. There are only two of the stations in which there needs to be an increase in the length of the runways, one is at Penhold, Alberta and the other is at Moose Jaw. The runway at Moose Jaw is only 3,700 feet long and it will need to be extended to 6,000 feet. The
Supply-National Defence work will not be undertaken this year because of the date of delivery of the new trainer, which will not be until 1963. It is not a priority matter to lengthen the runways at the present time or in the next few months.


Mr. McMillan:: I listened to the minister yesterday when he said that our troops were splendid and their equipment was excellent. I agree with the minister 100 per cent in his reference to our troops, but I have grave doubts about his description of their equipment. After listening to the debate in the committee yesterday and today, I have grave doubts about the equipment provided for the three services. At this particular time, I want to refer to the equipment of the air service.
Now, the Voodoo airplane which is being purchased is a second hand plane. It is being purchased from the United States. The CF-104 is being made in Montreal. These two airplanes will not be effective operationally with the R.C.A.F. for some time. Certainly, there are none of these planes in Europe. I do not see how the minister can say that the equipment of the air wings in Europe is excellent, particularly when they are equipped with airplanes that cannot intercept some of the commercial jet aircraft. They certainly would not be fast enough to intercept enemy fighters or fast enemy bombers.
I have read several times in the press, and the truth is, that since the cancellation of the Avro Arrow program this government has had no definite defence policy at all. It is two and a half years since the Avro Arrow program was cancelled, at which time five airplanes were nearing completion. Only now are we starting to replace them, and with slower aircraft. It is true that the government proceeded with the construction of two Bomarc bases, one in northern Ontario and the other north of Montreal, but these will not be in operation for some months yet. After two and a half years, and when we have a crisis on our hands, we find we have no adequate air defence in Canada. We have outmoded fighter planes in Europe and we have two Bomarc bases that are non-operational.
I do not pretend to know anything about the Bomarc B, but I have read articles in the press, as I know other members have, emanating from the United States and dealing with tests that were made. These tests are certainly not very reassuring. At the time the decision was taken by this government to go ahead with the Bomarc B missile bases, I read one article concerning tests made in the United States. These tests would lead one to believe the Bomarc interceptor missile was of very dubious value. This article stated at that time that in 12 tests the missile

Supply-National Defence got off the ground on only four occasions and only hit a slow moving target on one of the four occasions. There was a later article that appeared in the Toronto Globe and Mail on December 29, last and I have it here, concerning tests made of the Bomarc B missile at the Elgin air base in Florida. The article stated that the series of tests at that time were a success.
The article went on to say that eight of the tests were complete failures, and that 14 of the next 15 tests were successful. I suppose that means that in the next 15 tests the missile got off the ground 14 times, so that 14 successful tests out of 23 could not be described as great success. During these tests there was a near miss on a jet drone travelling at subsonic speed over the gulf of Mexico. The article only describes this one test, and I do not know whether or not more tests were made on a target. If the missile only made one near hit in the whole 23 tests, that is not very good.
I hope the minister can give us some information as to subsequent tests, and I hope the results were better than that. I have read some derogatory remarks from defence people in the United States concerning the Bomarc B. In view of this, I think the minister should allay some of our fears about the usefulness of the Bomarc B. As I said before, I hope he will give us some results of later tests, as these articles have appeared in the press. As I said earlier, I do not know anything about the Bomarc B. I think the minister owes it to the members of this committee and to the people of Canada generally to give some information as to the results of the latest tests made on the Bomarc B missile.
It is generally agreed that the Bomarc B missile is useless without an atomic warhead. The Prime Minister himself said this in effect two and a half years ago. He at least said that it could not reach its full potential use without an atomic warhead. I have the quotation here but I do not propose to give the quotation from page 1223 of Hansard. I heard the hon. member for Quebec East and the Leader of the Opposition quote from that speech today.
The Bomarc B will have atomic capability but the government will not announce whether or not an atomic warhead will be used. To me it looks as though United States personnel will be stationed at our two Bomarc bases and will have control of these Bomarc warheads and that we shall be able to use them only when they give us permission to do so.
After reading what the Prime Minister said over two and a half years ago about the Bomarc B and about its reaching its maximum

potential only when it is equipped with an atomic warhead, I would conclude that the decision was made by the government at that time that when the Bomarc B missiles are completed they would be equipped with atomic warheads or that at least they would be available for use. As I said before, it is over two and a half years since the Prime Minister said that the government was examining various questions with the government of the United States in connection with the acquisition and storage of Bomarc B missiles. It has taken a long time to get an answer. One can only conclude that the examination is still in progress. Even though we assume that the Bomarc B is equipped with atomic warheads, that it can get off the ground and that it can hit the target more than once in 23 times, as was reported in earlier tests, the Bomarc B missile base is still itself a target. That fact has been brought out here today by the hon. member for Trinity and the Leader of the Opposition. It is a target for the intercontinental missile. It is also a target for an air to ground missile from a bomber. If these bases are put out of commission, these bombers can just roam at will as far as the Bomarc B missiles are concerned and certainly as far as our slower aircraft are concerned at the present time.
Yesterday the minister said that Russia had comparatively few intercontinental missiles. He said that the chief means of the delivery of atomic bombs by Russia was by bombers and that we need something to stop the bombers. This is a far cry from the words of the Prime Minister when he cancelled the Avro Arrow contract two and a half years ago. I also have here the words of the Prime Minister but I do not propose to quote them now. The reason given by the Prime Minister at that time was not that the Avro Arrow was not a good machine but rather that new projects were overtaking the aeroplane. Indeed, the main reason for cancelling that contract was that we would not need interceptor planes as they would be of no use against intercontinental missiles. The minister now tells us that we need interceptor planes almost more than we need anything else.
The minister says that the Liberals have no defence policy. After all, the Liberals were developing the fastest interceptor plane in the world. By now the R.C.A.F. would have been equipped with fast interceptor planes. The government scuttled the Arrow program, yet the minister says that our party has no defence policy. After killing the ace in our defence, they say that we have nothing left. I say that they have nothing left. They certainly have nothing left at this time with which to defend us here at home. As I said

before, they have no interceptor planes that can take their part against enemy planes in Europe.
One or two of the Avro aircraft were flown with engines not adapted to them. I met a number of officers of the R.C.A.F. and I may say that they were greatly impressed by the speed of this aircraft, its manoeuvrability and its great climbing power. In any case, five of these planes at or nearing completion at the time were cut up by the blow torch and the opportunity was lost to test them further. There is no question about their being cut up by the blow torch. In an answer to a question by the hon. member for Trinity, as found at page 5683 of Hansard of July 8, 1959, the Minister of Defence Production stated as follows:
The fact is that the ministry of national defence gave orders to my department, and my department to crown assets that all equipment should be taken out of these aircraft and that they should be reduced to scrap. Those were the orders received from national defence.
I have heard hon. members on the other side of the house disparage the Avro aircraft. If the performance of this aircraft was so poor, why did the government cut them up? Why did they not save them so that the R.C.A.F. might test them and prove to their own satisfaction whether or not they were good or whether they did not come up to the required specifications. I met many officers in the R.C.A.F. who had the impression that it would still be the fastest military plane in the world.
I heard some reference to the cost. I think the minister said this plane would cost $12.5 million. I read a speech of the Prime Minister in which he said that, with certain modifications, it would cost $7.8 million. Today the hon. member for Trinity mentioned a figure of $6.8 million. The hon. member for Trinity, in giving the offset cost against the Avro Arrow, did not mention the Bomarc B bases. These cost well over $100 million, and as far as we have been able to find out they are not much use. Certainly if this were put as an offset against the cost of the Avro Arrow, the government is spending just about as much money.
The government started out on this Bomarc B program and these cheaper and slower airplanes because they did not have the money. Why did they not have the money? The weird financing of this government, the promotion of higher interest rates by the conversion loan and other fiscal procedures have certainly saddled us with a great deal of debt. Already the extra interest aggregates over $800 million. I think this, and this alone, is the main factor why we have no defence policy; why we are accepting
90205-6-530
Supply-National Defence slower airplanes than the Avro. This is the main reason why our airmen in Europe and here in Canada would be sitting ducks for faster airplanes.
If our equipment is as excellent as the minister says it is, why is he now buying secondhand airplanes from the United States? I think the government has given greater priority to the payment of higher interest rates than they have to an adequate national defence. Unfortunately for us the government has been more solicitous of the money changers of our defence and the personnel manning that defence.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I wish to say a few words in connection with the rather extraordinary statements which have just been made. In the first place, the hon. member said the F-101B is a secondhand airplane. This is not so. This is the latest two-engined interceptor that the United States have in their system. The airplanes that were secured from them are not secondhand airplanes; they are airplanes that came off the assembly line just a few months ago. Of course they have been tested, and so forth, but this has to be done with every airplane. Therefore any allegation that these are secondhand airplanes is just not correct.
The hon. member is under a complete misapprehension about the Arrow. It would not have been in service had the program been completed. The Arrow would not have been in service until late in 1962. We will have the F-lOlB's in service more rapidly than we would have had the Arrows in service had the program been continued. I should like to correct that misapprehension.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You only say that now because you cannot be disproved.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am not going into this Arrow matter again. I spoke on it two days ago and I spoke on it at some length this afternoon. I simply repeat the fact that it would have been an extraordinarily expensive program which the defence budget just could not stand and which the Canadian taxpayer could not stand. It was a terrible mistake that the program was ever initiated, and I think we have to accept that this was the case. The result was that a good deal of money was wasted on it. The hon. member says the Bomarc B is no good and he talks about some of its-


William Hector McMillan: I did not say that.


Douglas Scott Harkness: -early failures. This is what the hon. member said, as I wrote it down. The hon. member said there had only been one successful bid out of 23 tries, and so on.

Supply-National Defence


William Hector McMillan: I read that from the press.
I did not say that was true.


Douglas Scott Harkness: If you did not believe it to be the case, you should not have put it on the record of the House of Commons. You should take the responsibility for what you say.


William Hector McMillan: On a point of privilege, Mr. Chairman, I did not say that was the case.
I said I did not know anything about the Bomarc B; that I had read this in the press.
I hoped this was not the case, and I asked the minister to give us the results of some further tests.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As a matter of fact, last year and the year before in the early testing and the development of the Bomarc B which was then going on, every time a failure of a Bomarc firing was announced the hon. gentleman opposite rose and hailed it with the greatest of glee. They made as much out of it as they could. They asked all kinds of questions and made all kinds of jibes at the then minister of national defence.
Of course, when there began a series of reports of successful firings of the Bomarc B they stopped that tactic. This is the first time for some time that anything has been said about the firing ability of the weapon, its accuracy, and so forth.
A few months ago I was down at Elgin field. I saw a firing of this weapon. It was a highly successful firing. I talked to the people in charge of the program. I spent over a day there. We have two R.C.A.F. officers attached to the field. They have been there a considerable length of time. I saw records of the firings of this weapon, which are very extensive now. The weapon is well proved and is highly successful.
Reference to early failures when the weapon was being developed are of course not applicable at the present time. The hon. member said the Arrow was the ace in the defence policy. He seems to think the Arrow was the chief piece of equipment and the cornerstone of our whole defence policy. This was never the case. Then he went on to say that now we have no Arrow, we have nothing.
That is also completely contradictory of the policy adopted by the Liberal party in January and the policy they have been stating since, that we do not need interceptors; we should have only a few airplanes for reconnaissance and identification purposes, but they should not shoot.
The hon. member is now stating a proposition completely contrary to that when he says the Arrow was the ace in the defence policy. It was, of course, nothing of the kind. It was one piece of hardware. It proved to

be much too expensive a piece of hardware, and if we had gone ahead with it, it would have resulted in a completely unwarranted proportion of the defence dollar going into one particular piece of equipment.
The hon. member then went on to say the Bomarc bases cost over $100 million. As far as Canada is concerned, this is just fantasy. The actual estimated cost to Canada of these two Bomarc bases has been put on the record previously. The total cost of the two bases, the one at North Bay and the one at La Macaza, will be $13,993,560. Over half of that amount has been spent up to date. The annual cost to us of maintaining these two bases will be about $1 million.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Too much.


Douglas Scott Harkness: It will be just over $1 million a year. As a result, the Bomarcs are actually the greatest defence bargain I think Canada has ever secured. We are getting a greater amount of protection and value from these two Bomarc bases, per dollar invested in them, than from any other kind of equipment that we have ever secured in recent years. That is the actual story in connection with this.
I have read in newspapers the statements which have been made by members of the Liberal party. They have said these Bomarc bases are terrificly expensive and are costing Canada $50 million or $100 million a year.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: We did not say "in Canada"; we said "total cost".


Douglas Scott Harkness: They said the bases were costing $100 million each, and so on and so forth. As I say these are the actual figures. They are, from the national defence point of view, a very great bargain indeed.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Before we leave the subject of the Bomarc I wonder if the minister will explain how the Bomarc operates against ballistic missiles launched from beneath the wings of aircraft. This is really the central argument.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have mentioned several times in this debate that the Bomarc is designed against the manned bomber. It does not deal with intercontinental ballistic missiles, and any mention of it in connection with those missiles is, unless it springs entirely from ignorance, designed only to confuse the issue. It has been stated time and time again that the Bomarc has no connection with intercontinental ballistic missiles- stated so often that I do not know why this question continues to be brought up. The hon. member referred to intercontinental ballistic missiles but he was, I think, referring to air surface missiles launched from aircraft.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is what I said. The minister was not listening.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I was listening carefully. Perhaps the hon. member made a slip of the tongue. However, this has been asked so frequently-the hon. member asked it the other day. He asked whether the Bomarc was any good against intercontinental ballistic missiles.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I said: stand off bombs from bombers.


Douglas Scott Harkness: He said that the other day when he was speaking. Attempts to confuse the issue in this way will get nobody any place.
As far as the stand off bomber is concerned, how many stand off bombers there are or will be, and at what range they will be able to fire their missiles is something that we at present do not know. The Americans have such missiles. The weapon is still in the development stage but I think it has been developed to the point where the range runs up to 300 or 350 miles. They expect that in future it will have a range of a thousand miles. Whether or not the Russians have any of these weapons yet we do not know, but we must assume that if they have not got them they will probably get them shortly. But if they have anything like the range that they have at the present time the Bomarc is going to be effective against them long before the bombers can get off their missiles against the Bomarc bases. In any event, we are dealing here with what the possibilities are likely to be in the future. It is a matter of speculation, not a matter of fact.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Before we leave this point may I say that this is the type of information which the minister gives the committee-information which misleads both the committee and the Canadian public. The minister knows that the range of the Hound Dog missile is greater than the range he has just given. He also knows, or should know-we presume he has some of these facts at hand since he is minister of defence-that the range of the ballistic missile which will be carried by the B-52 bomber and the British V-bombers is considerably greater than that range. The figure used by the President of the United States in his message to congress was 1,000 miles. That is a far cry from 300 miles, and it does not help the discussion here for the minister to pick the figure of 300 miles in an sndeavour to convince us that since 300 is Less than 400 his Bomarc will be effective, still less that it will be effective in the future.
The Bomarc stations are not yet operational. The minister has not yet made up his mind
90205-6-530i
Business of the House as to whether they are to have atomic warheads or not. By the time he does the Russians will certainly have this type of ballistic missile with a range far greater than the range of the Bomarc. The minister cannot continue to mislead the public and the committee any longer in this regard. He has got to admit that as far as the future is concerned the Bomarc is useless because the carriers against which it is designed will never come within range of it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have had about enough of this constant harping about my misleading the committee. I state in the most definite and categorical terms that I have given no information to this committee in which I do not firmly believe and for which I have not got a basis of expert opinion behind me. As to misleading the committee, may I say that the hon. member for Trinity gives figures which he pulls out of his imagination and out of the air. He says: these are the correct figures; all the figures produced by the defence departments of the whole western world are wrong. I have had enough nonsense of that kind. The hon. member is completely childish in making these repeated statements along that line and I think he should get wise to himself.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: And I think we have had enough of these childish interruptions by the minister. I think he often gives to this committee information which is not accurate, and he must know it. He then takes the liberty of hiding behind security regulations-he cannot disclose the true figures to the house, he says, because it would not be in the national interest for us to be told the facts. He can then get up and use any figures he likes; we do not know what is going on, but he does. Figures printed in the Congressional Record are not accurate, but his are; figures printed in the message sent by the President of the United States to congress are not accurate, but his are; figures shown to other hon. members in private by representatives of the armed forces of the western world are not accurate but his are. He is the only source of wisdom, the only source of accurate figures. He suggests if we had to rely on the minister's figures we would be in a sad state indeed and I deplore the type of accusation he has just made.
Progress reported.
Resolutions adopted in the committee of supply this day reported and concurred in.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Lionel Chevrier: May I inquire what business we shall be doing tomorrow? Perhaps the leader of the house would also give us some indication of what the business will be for next week.

Business of the House


Gordon Minto Churchill: Tomorrow we shall carry on with the estimates of the Department of National Defence and we shall, I hope, finish them. Then we shall carry on with the estimates of the Department of Defence Production which I also hope we can finish tomorrow if we are to maintain the earlier hope that we would complete the work of the session in very good time.
On Monday and Tuesday of next week it is the intention to proceed with legislative items. The precise order in which they will be taken I shall announce tomorrow, but members might be prepared for the following items.
Appearing on Votes and Proceedings tomorrow will be a resolution referring to a proposal to introduce a bill dealing with amateur sport. There is a resolution already on the order paper dealing with national housing, another concerning the centennial and another concerning school lands. Hon. members should be ready for debate on the four matters which I have mentioned.
Tomorrow it is the intention to bring forward for first reading the bill concerning what we have been calling the Pine Point railway. We had a discussion of the resolution earlier in the summer and passed it. If first reading is given to the bill tomorrow it would be available for second reading on Monday.
The bill on the order paper concerning the Civil Service Act is in the committee stage and might be called.
Those are the items that the house might be ready to give consideration to on Monday and Tuesday in the resolution stage and then in the bill stage. The order in which they will be taken up I will give tomorrow.
It being 33 minutes after 10 p.m., the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to special order.
[The following items were passed in committee of supply]:



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

[Stage Direction]
232.	Departmental administration, $3,455,378. Inspection services-
233.	Operation and maintenance, $7,224,436.
234.	Construction	or	acquisition	of	buildings,
works, land and equipment, $211,000.
Royal Canadian Navy-
235.	Operation and maintenance, $208,135,049.
236.	Construction	or	acquisition	of	buildings,
works, land and major equipment, $71,823,500.
Canadian Army-
237.	Operation and maintenance, $359,572,000.
238.	Construction	or	acquisition	of	buildings,
works, land and major equipment, $60,556,000.
[Stage Direction]


Friday, September 15, 1961


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I wonder whether the Prime Minister would care to comment on a statement made in Ghana yesterday by the Minister of Trade and Commerce, presumably on behalf of the government, to the effect that the United Kingdom now had to choose between the European common market and the commonwealth.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I saw that report. It is a news report and I am sure it does not represent what was said. I have made it very clear on a number of occasions that we in Canada have made representations to the United Kingdom and have pointed out the potential effects of its joining under the treaty of Rome unless provision is made at the time of joining the Six for an exception in respect of those things upon which Canada and thte other parts of the commonwealth depend. No such alternative as that suggested by the question of the Leader of the Opposition has been advanced at any time by the government.
The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, following the discussions that took place when Mr. Sandys visited various parts of the commonwealth, stated in the House of Commons that an application to join the common market would be made-I am paraphrasing what he said in that connection-but that commonwealth relationships would not be thereby weakened economically or otherwise.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask a supplementary question. Would it be possible for the Prime Minister to secure for the information of members of the house the text of what appears to have been a very important statement by the Minister of Trade and Commerce?


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, the interesting point there is that this was a meeting behind closed doors. I have found in the past, as the hon. gentleman must have found
in his experience, that some of the interpretations, speculative and otherwise, that follow such meetings very often bear little relationship to what was actually said.



VISIT OF RED CHINESE MISSION TO CANADA

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Gordon Minto Churchill: Yesterday, Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Ottawa West asked me a question with regard to a report that a delegation from communist China might be coming to Canada to discuss trade matters. The information I have is that the Chinese state trading corporations have expressed the intention of sending a group of their representatives to Canada. I am informed that the group hopes to begin its market study in Ottawa toward the end of this month, and to have discussions with Canadian businessmen in various centres throughout the country.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Frank Howard: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and ask the minister what progress is being made with respect to transforming the recommendations of the joint Senate and H.ouse of Commons committee on Indian affairs into legislative form, and whether we might expect an amending bill this session.


Ellen Louks Fairclough: When the recommendations contained in the report are finally considered by the government and action is contemplated, the house will be informed.



INTRODUCTION OF AMENDMENTS TO IMMIGRATION ACT

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
John Whitney Pickersgill: If I may I should like to ask the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration a question. Does the hon. lady expect to be in a position to introduce the revision of the Immigration Act at this session of parliament?
8334	HOUSE OF
Inquiries oj the Ministry Hon. Ellen L. Fairclough (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration): Mr. Speaker, while considerable progress has been made in the considerations involved, I have not one to present to parliament yet. I am hoping to have one at the earliest possible moment.



COMMONWEALTH CONFERENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask the Acting Minister of Finance a question arising out of a question I asked him yesterday. Is the statement made, according to press reports yesterday, that the deputy minister of trade and commerce will lead the Canadian delegation to the forthcoming commonwealth conference, accurate?


George Clyde Nowlan: The statement was accurate. I was going to reply to this question in a moment, after others had been answered. I was asked by the Leader of the Opposition as to the delegation. It is to be led by Mr. Roberts, deputy minister of trade and commerce and there is a possibility, I am told, of one change, but the plan at the moment, and the intention, is to send Mr. Roberts, Mr. J. H. Warren of trade and commerce, Mr. Latimer of trade and commerce, Dr. Annis of the Department of Finance and Mr. Turner of the Department of Agriculture. Those three government departments will be represented. Then Mr. D. R. Taylor from Canada House, London, will join the delegation and participate in the discussions.



IMMIGRATION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Leon David Crestohl: I should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister. A United Press release appearing in this morning's newspapers stated that an office receptionist wrote the Prime Minister asking him to recall the deportation order against a Polish defector and allow him to remain in Canada. My question is, did the Prime Minister receive such a letter and can the Prime Minister make any statement to the house as to whether anything is being planned to deal with this matter?


John George Diefenbaker: I think the hon. gentleman would have to be more definite in his statement than just saying "an office receptionist". Such a letter would be rather difficult to locate 

from an examination of the files. If he would give me the name of the person, I will certainly have the matter looked into.


Leon David Crestohl: This letter was sent by Sophia Horan and concerns Mr. Francis Tobias, who was recently ordered deported by the immigration department.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
James Aloysius McGrath: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of National Defence. Does the minister have any comment to make on reports that Canadian army personnel, who did such an excellent job in fighting forest fires in Newfoundland, are now in the process of returning to their units on the mainland?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes, Mr. Speaker. The continuing rain and cool weather in Newfoundland have relieved the situation to an extent that the provincial authorities have agreed to the release of the armed forces. The air lift for the return of the troops to their home stations will commence today and will continue until September 24.



INDUSTRY


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Paul Joseph James Martin: May I ask
the genial Acting Minister of Finance a question. Can he say whether arrangements have been made to meet representatives of the city of Windsor and the united automobile workers regarding representations to be made by those agencies in connection with the Bladen report? Can the minister tell the house, now that the report has been published for some four months, whether the government has reached any decision on any of the recommendations that were made, and when we may expect some action from the government one way or another on those recommendations, affecting one of Canada's important industries in which there is so much unemployment?


George Clyde Nowlan: Mr. Speaker, action was taken on that report almost immediately in the budget, in taking the excise tax off automobiles, something which was urged on the preceding government for many years and on which no action had been taken. Many other matters are referred to in the report.

It is a most important report. Consultations and discussions have been taking place with unions and others in the industry, and in governmental committees as well. It is a very embracing step and requires a good deal of study. When decisions are made with respect to the report the house will be informed, if the house is then sitting.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I thank the genial minister, Mr. Speaker, but is he not aware, with regard to the excise tax-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. The hon. member seems to be embarking on a proposition rather than a question.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Then, Mr. Speaker, since you so forthrightly admonished me, may I ask the Minister of National Revenue whether the government will see the two bodies to which I have referred in connection with a matter that is so vital to the community from which I come, and to the industry.


George Clyde Nowlan: Mr. Speaker, the members of the government are continually meeting delegations that wish to make representations on matters of public importance. I personally have had no request made to me for such a meeting. However, if such a request has been made I am sure that every effort will be made to reach mutual agreement on a satisfactory time for such a meeting.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I thank the
minister, Mr. Speaker.


George Clyde Nowlan: I am informed by the parliamentary secretary that no approach has been made to the department itself with respect to this matter.



BROADCASTING


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: Yesterday the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate asked a question concerning an application for a new station at Tatamagouche, Nova Scotia, by Colchester Broadcasting Company. That application was heard during the hearings of the board of broadcast governors during the week of August 22, and under date of September 5 the board made its public announcement that its recommendation on this application was for denial.


John Whitney Pickersgill: If I may I should like to ask the parliamentary secretary a supplementary
Supply-National Defence question and inquire whether the reason for the denial was that it was considered that the area was adequately served.


Marcel Joseph Aimé Lambert: Mr. Speaker, in its public announcement the board did give its reason, and it was generally in that tenor.



TELEVISION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hédard-J. Robichaud: Mr. Speaker, I wish to direct a question to the Minister of National Revenue. Is he now in a position to supply the information for which I asked yesterday with regard to the application of station CJBR-TV, Rimouski, for the erection of a satellite station to serve Mada-waska and Victoria counties?


George Clyde Nowlan: Mr. Speaker, I am not in a position to answer that question today. I will try to get the information and deal with it tomorrow or Monday.

DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE 232. Departmental administration, $3,455,378.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Chairman, at the adjournment last night, following my remarks the Minister of National Defence quite properly said that he did not intend to take any direction from me as to what he should or should not say in this debate. But I am sure that on reflection the Minister of National Defence will agree that at this critical time it is essential for the government to state its position with regard to the question of the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The government can state that it has no intention at the present time of acquiring these weapons, or it can take the position that it proposes to acquire them, but it must not leave the house in the position where it is denied an opportunity of debating this matter at the earliest possible moment when the government has made its decision.
I expressed the view yesterday, bearing in mind the well known device employed by this administration, that we might well find that the government will make a decision after adjournment and before we come back to this house. The country is now asking this government to declare its policy with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The government, before this debate concludes, if it wishes to discharge its responsibility, should face this question and tell us precisely where it stands.

Supply-National Defence
We are entitled to know what is the government's policy about Canada accepting nuclear warheads. We know the position of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and we have very much suspected, from pronouncements of the Minister of National Defence, that he and his colleague are not in agreement on this subject. Indeed the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the former minister of national defence did not on this question seem to be in full accord. What conclusion are we to draw from the remarks of the Prime Minister in his speech the other day, when he paid to his colleague a tribute which he felt was deserved? He said idealism was something that was essential, but we had to recognize that opinions had to be changed from time to time, particularly in the discharge of responsibilities in this difficult and complicated period.
Are we to conclude from this that the government is about to make a decision with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons? Was this statement by the Prime Minister a forerunner of the government's intention? Was this a way of making easier the load of the Secretary of State for External Affairs? If that is the situation, then we certainly are warranted in asking the Minister of National Defence to say forthrightly where this government stands at this time with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons in Canada. We certainly cannot tell from the statement made by the minister on September 12, as reported at page 8223 of Hansard. The minister said, among other things, beginning in the second last paragraph:
Defensive weapons with a nuclear capability may be required to maintain the credibility of the deterrent, and in the event that the worst happened would be required to provide an effective defence against Soviet aggression.
Then he said:
The situation is much the same as that of a man living in a lonely cabin in the woods who fears he may be attacked by a bear. He does not wait until the bear actually attacks him to buy a rifle, but secures it beforehand and has it ready in the event of need.
One might well ask, with regard to that statement, does it mean-does the minister intend-that there shall be no ammunition for the rifle? What does the statement mean? Then he said:
The Bomarc will form part of the defences we must maintain against the manned bomber as long as there are potentially hostile aircraft in existence that can be used against us.
These statements are the closest indication the minister has given of what the intentions of the government are, but they do not tell us what, in fact, the government really intends to do in this matter. This question is of vital importance. On February 20, 1959

the Prime Minister announced the government's policy. He announced that it was the government's intention to acquire nuclear warheads. I refer to volume 2 of Hansard for 1959, and the words of the Prime Minister as reported at page 1223 are as follows:
The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads. The government is, therefore, examining with the United States government questions connected with the acquisition of nuclear warheads for Bomarc and other defensive weapons for use by the Canadian forces in Canada, and the storage of warheads in Canada.
Then he went on to say that problems connected with the arming of the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO defence tasks were also being studied. Then, in volume 1 of Hansard of last year, the Prime Minister said at page 73-


Douglas Scott Harkness: On what date?


Paul Joseph James Martin: On January 18, 1960. He said:
We pointed out in detail that careful thought is being given to the principles that in our opinion are applicable to the acquisition and control of nuclear weapons. I proceeded to deal with our views in that connection and summarized those views by saying that the full potential of the Bomarc could be achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads.
He commented on the retention by the United States of ownership and custody of nuclear weapons and then, because he properly wanted to guard against the diffusion of nuclear weapons, he said that whatever was done, once the weapons were acquired we could be sure that they would be used only on conditions agreed to by the Canadian government. But later the government changed its mind. The Prime Minister said later that we would accept nuclear weapons from the United States only if there was joint control. The Prime Minister said he wanted the kind of joint control which prevails in the United Kingdom. Then on November 24, 1960 the Prime Minister added a new reservation, which was that no decision with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons would be taken as long as any progress was being made in the matter of disarmament.
The Prime Minister made it clear in his foreign policy statement on Monday that there was, indeed, no progress being made in the matter of disarmament. I agree with the right hon. gentleman that it is regrettable that notwithstanding the efforts of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and others, no progress in disarmament is being made. The test talks have been halted. The Soviet union now wants to integrate those talks with general discussions on disarmament. The Prime Minister is right in saying no progress

is being made in disarmament. But because no progress is being made in this direction are we to conclude, in the light of the statement made by the right hon. gentleman on November 24, 1960, that the government is now about to acquire nuclear weapons?
However, the Secretary of State for External Affairs does not share the Prime Minister's views as to whether or not progress is being made in this field. He said the other day in answer to what I had said that he was still optimistic about the possibility of progress in disarmament being made at the forthcoming session of the general assembly of the United Nations.
Who is right, the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs? If the Prime Minister is right, then the Minister of National Defence owes it to the country to tell us now what are the government's intentions in this matter, and not to clothe its intentions in words incapable of interpretation. Not to do so suggests that the government at this moment has not a clear and unambiguous policy.
As a matter of fact, the only definite statement we have had with regard to this matter is the statement of the parliamentary secretary to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. When he spoke in the foreign affairs debate he said, as reported at page 8162 of Hansard:
The government's stand on this matter has been made quite clear. At the present time we say no, but if events should take place in the world that might require these weapons then the government would have to give reconsideration to that position.
The parliamentary secretary of course is not a member of the government, but he does hold an important post in the administration at the present time. He said that the present policy with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons is "No". This is the only forthright statement on this subject that we have had from this government in this debate. Is this the policy of the government? I ask the minister of defence now, is it a fact that the parliamentary secretary, unwittingly perhaps, has stated the real position of the government with regard to this matter? In any event, the ambiguity and the lack of clarity in the declarations of the minister deserve to be compared with what he is reported to have said in May of this year outside of this house. He is reported in the Toronto Star of May 20, 1961 as having said-


Douglas Scott Harkness: I would be very careful with regard to anything they report.


Paul Joseph James Martin: My hon. friend can correct me. If he thinks the Toronto Star has misreported him, let him so state. I do not want the minister to be misquoted. What
90205-6-526
Supply-National Defence I want the minister to do is to tell us precisely what the policy of the government is in this matter. This is what the minister is reported to have said:
And no decision will be taken until a satisfactory agreement on joint control of such warheads has been worked out between ourselves and the United States.
If nuclear weapons are acquired by the Canadian forces, they will only be used as the Canadian government decides and in a manner approved by the Canadian government.


Douglas Scott Harkness: That quotation from the Toronto Star is right for once.


Paul Joseph James Martin: My hon. friend says that the quotation is right. I thank him, because it advances the position one step further. Is it a fact that there is now awaiting Canadian signature an agreement with the United States which meets the conditions envisaged by the Minister of National Defence in this statement of May 20. Surely when we are discussing the estimates of the Department of National Defence, at what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said, is the most critical time since world war II, no government can function without giving parliament its views as to the situation and taking parliament and the country into its confidence. Surely that is the position. If the government takes the position at this time that it cannot state its position in any other way than it has done, let the minister give us the reason for this. We are entitled to know precisely what is the government's view and policy.
I mentioned yesterday the way the government treated parliament with regard to amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act. Two days before parliament adjourned the government, through the Minister of Labour, said it was still considering amendments to the Unemployment Insurance Act, and within four or five days after parliament adjourned the government announced a royal commission to inquire into the whole question of unemployment insurance. We want to make sure at this critical time in human history that after the house adjourns this government does not make an announcement, when the house is not in session, on a matter of such vital concern to the people of Canada.
Our position is that we should not acquire nuclear weapons. The Leader of the Opposition has stated our reasons on other occasions.
I went over some of them again the other day. Our reason is not that we do not want Canadians to be as efficiently endowed with the necessary instruments to provide for effective defence as others, but we recognize that the deterrent now exists in a primary way through the United States.

Supply-National Defence
We want to discourage the diffusion of nuclear weapons. We share the government's view that we do not want war. We certainly do not want to see nuclear war. We do not agree with the Associate Minister of National Defence that we can now speak of war in terms of victory. If a nuclear war develops there will be no victor. Anyone who takes a contrary view is simply not conscious of the terrible, cataclysmic consequences which would result from the modern instruments of war. This is the situation, and so we want to discourage the diffusion of nuclear weapons. They now exist in the hands of a limited group. If we acquire nuclear weapons, how can we complain about other countries acquiring them?
We do not intend to become a nuclear power because we believe this is really beyond our resources. We believe that the fulfilment of our duty to our allies in NATO does not depend on the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canada at this time. As I say, the deterrent now rests with the United States, and certainly if we were to acquire nuclear weapons in Canada-I am sure the Secretary of State for External AfEairs has argued this to his colleagues-this would not help him in his negotiations and consultations with other countries at the United Nations. Therefore we are entitled to ask, what is the government's position in this vital matter?
I have asked the minister, as have other members on this side, for a clear and unequivocal statement of policy. Surely this house is entitled to that at this time. I will say that I agree fully with what the minister said yesterday on another subject. I refer to the criticism he levelled at the position taken by the hon. member for Kootenay West regarding his party's position on NATO. I agree with him that the reservation which binds the new party with regard to NATO is one which is contrary to the very constitutional set-up of NATO now. It ignores the fact that the nuclear possession of weapons, which forms part of that reservation, is an already existent fact. The only reason we have NATO is the failure of the Soviet union to implement article 43 of the charter of the United Nations, which would render unnecessary the existence of any alliance such as NATO itself.
I would recall to the hon. member for Kootenay West and others the words of their former leader, Mr. Coldwell, who on March 28, 1949, used these words with regard to NATO, as reported on page 2073 of Hansard:
Contrary to the propaganda against the proposed North Atlantic treaty, the proposal is not an attempt on the part of so-called American imperialism to bring western European democracies

into an alliance for the purpose of destroying the Soviet union. It originates in the anxiety of western European democracies to persuade North America to support them in a defensive union. They believed this would halt a threat of aggression and provide the necessary defensive strength so that if the Soviet union has aggressive plans against them she will be turned from that course and thus make possible the peaceful solution of existing difficulties and problems.
Those words of Mr. Coldwell reflect what has happened. I agree with the Minister of National Defence that if it had not been for NATO we might have found ourselves the victims of aggression. In any event, as Mr. Coldwell has said and as we know and as the hon. gentleman knows, our membership in NATO has to do with its defensive purposes. We complain, of course, and no one has done more in that regard than the Leader of the Opposition, about its failure to live up to the economic objectives of article II of the treaty. Of course. But at this time when individual countries vis-a-vis the Soviet union would be outnumbered, what is there for like-minded nations of the free world to do other than combine in a defensive alliance?
There may be difficulties. My hon. friend has difficulties about West Germany. That is understandable because of his participation in the first world war. But the fact is that a realistic examination of the situation suggests that there was nothing else for Canada to do in 1949 but to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, so strongly supported by the leader of the C.C.F. at that time, and a year ago violently opposed in this house by the present leader of the C.C.F., now constituting itself into a new political group that now, under duress by its existing leader, gives support to NATO on terms that would render impractical the operation of that body. That is a fact that hon. gentlemen must not overlook.
I agree with the Minister of National Defence with regard to his complete answer yesterday, in which he pointed out that NATO is now a nuclear power. He forgot to mention the declaration made by General Gruenther in 1957, I believe, with regard to the intentions of NATO in that respect. On this point I am in full accord with the minister. We have given indication in this house that we appreciate the problems facing the administration at this time with regard to the current crisis in Berlin.
But having said that, I repeat to the Minister of National Defence my view that when we are discussing these estimates, estimates involving so much of the treasure of this nation; at a time when we are all concerned about the dangers that lurk ahead, dangers that have been characterized by the Secretary of State for External Affairs as indicating that we are on the brink of war,

the refusal of the Minister of National Defence in the face of that situation to state clearly what is the government's position with regard to the acquisition of nuclear weapons is in my judgment, I say respectfully, a misreading by the minister and the government of their obligations to the house and to the people of Canada at this critical time.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, in his usual manner the hon. member for Essex East has made such statements as "the government must declare its position now on nuclear weapons"-


Paul Joseph James Martin: Hear, hear.


Douglas Scott Harkness: -and so on, as though the government had not made numerous statements in connection with its position on nuclear weapons.
Supply-National Defence say whether you are going to get nuclear weapons and when you are going to get them", and so on is not going to get the hon. member for Essex East or anybody else in the opposition any further ahead. As I said, our position has been stated. It is there, it is clear and definite, and I am not prepared to make any further statement at this time along the lines on which the hon. member for Essex East has been insisting.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will the minister permit a question? Will he say whether the policy is the same as it was in May, when he is reported as having said in Victoria, as found in the Victoria daily Colonist, a paper not too unfriendly to the minister-


Douglas Scott Harkness: A very good paper.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Too numerous. That is the trouble.


Douglas Scott Harkness: All these statements are along the same line.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Each one different from the previous one.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think they make the position quite clear. The hon. member for Essex East read part of the statement made by the Prime Minister on February 20, and he referred to one or two other statements. Actually the position the government has taken with regard to nuclear weapons was outlined in statements by the Prime Minister on February 20, 1959, January 18, 1960, February 9, 1960, July 4, 1960, and July 14, 1960.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I read them all.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The hon. member for Essex East read parts of one or two of those statements, and 1 think the parts he read made the situation quite clear. I do not think there is any need for me to take up further time of the house in rereading them. They are there, they are quite definite, and I see no reason why the hon. member or any other hon. member needs to be in any doubt as to what has been the position of the government on nuclear weapons. What the hon. member is trying to do is bludgeon me into making a yes or no statement at this time as to the securing of nuclear weapons. I tell him right away that he is not going to bludgeon me into making any statement before the government is ready to make it.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Before it makes up its mind.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As I say, the position we have taken has been outlined and I think it is quite clear. This business of "you must
90205-6-526J


Paul Theodore Hellyer: A very fine paper, the minister says with respect to the decision regarding nuclear weapons: "Mr. Harkness stated the time to make a decision is when the time comes". Is that still the position of the minister?


Frank Howard: Mr. Chairman, I have listened with a great deal of interest to the remarks of the hon. member for Essex East, and I have read as carefully as I could the speeches made in this debate by members of the Liberal party, of the government party and of this party. It seems to me that what must logically follow from those things advocated by the hon. member for Essex East, and I am sure other members of that party are associated with him in this regard, is that he is advocating that Canada should become a full-fledged nuclear power in possession of all these hellish weapons that now exist. I think that is the government's attitude too, even though it has not yet had the courage to make such an announcement.
I should like to make a few comments about NATO and the remarks of the hon. member for Essex East in that regard, because he had such an intense interest in certain political developments about a month ago indicating that he perhaps wished that he belonged to a party that had such enthusiasm and such feeling. He says-so does
the government, and I think we all agree____
that NATO is a defensive military alliance and that its purpose primarily is that of defence. However, I think what we are doing is placing an awkward interpretation on the question of defence and trying to show that the organization is different from an offensive or aggressive military organization; because to my knowledge it was stated for the first time yesterday by the Minister of National

Supply-National Defence Defence that NATO has had a nuclear strategy, as I believe he put it, since 1954, and therefore is a nuclear power to a certain extent.
I think we must say that the type of defence that NATO has is one based on offence, just as the type of defence that the Soviet union has is one based on offence. The United States also agrees, as I understand it, that the type of defence which is based on nuclear weapons is not primarily the type of defence which means that you try to shoot down and destroy all or as many of the invading forces' equipment as you can, but one which rests upon the threat of retaliation and the threat of wreaking nuclear damage upon the invading country to as great an extent as possible. This is a type of defence which is really offensive, and offensive in two senses of the word.
The hon. member for Essex East made reference to some speeches by Mr. Coldwell in 1949, during which he made some comments about NATO itself. In this regard, I think we must remember that 1949 is not 1961, and the attitudes and concepts that were originally conceived for NATO are entirely different from those which exist today. The Leader of the Opposition, a very close friend of the hon. member for Essex East and a former secretary of state for external affairs, had a hand in the development of NATO, the use of the forces, and is given the credit for the inclusion of article 2 in the NATO agreement; at least, that is my understanding. I understand also that had it not been for the insistence of the then secretary of state for external affairs, perhaps the agreement would not have contained any reference to economic co-operation, as it does at the moment.
This was one of the primary thoughts Mr. Coldwell had, and it was one of the primary thoughts the Leader of the Opposition had then, I am sure; that we need to develop economic co-operation amongst these nations, and this would be a good means of competition, as it were, with the Soviet union's economic offensive in which she is engaged and has been engaged for some time in various parts of the world. In 1949, at the time Mr. Coldwell made his comments, NATO was not a nuclear power and did not have nuclear weapons. It was conceived as an organization which would be economic, and in the military field would be dealing with conventional weapons. It was not until 1954, as the Minister of National Defence revealed for the first time yesterday, that NATO became a nuclear power or accepted, as the minister put it, nuclear strategy. I will use his words so that I may not be accused of transforming what he said into something else.

These conditions did not exist in 1949. The concepts and ideas that Mr. Coldwell had when he endorsed the plan, and which the then secretary of state for external affairs expressed, are different from those which exist at the moment. In 1949 West Germany was not rearmed. This event took place at the insistence of the Leader of the Opposition when he was in office. Former nazi generals, as has been mentioned so adequately and no doubt will be repeated by the hon. member for Kootenay West, were not in control of and exercising influence over NATO affairs. These are factors which make the situation entirely different. When the hon. member for Essex East cites what Mr. Coldwell said in 1949 and says this is inconsistent with the attitude that exists today, he might as well go back to some of the comments of Julius Caesar and say they apply equally well today.
We support and have always supported the ideals and attitudes for which the present Secretary of State for External Affairs has worked, mainly the promotion of disarmament discussions leading to a disarmament agreement. All the other connected attitudes, ideals and concepts of the present Secretary of State for External Affairs receive our whole support. We are just as sorry as he is that the Soviet union saw fit to destroy what little faith may have existed in its present administration in any part of the world by the resumption of nuclear tests in the atmosphere. We regret also, along with the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the fact that the United States has been placed in a position of again participating in nuclear bomb tests.
I believe, Mr. Chairman, it will be necessary to make some reference to external affairs because, in my opinion, the attitudes of the Department of National Defence in relation to other countries are interwoven with the attitudes of the Department of External Affairs. We feel that the Secretary of State for External Affairs is one of the most sincere, dedicated and humble persons within the present cabinet. We wish him well in his endeavours along the lines upon which he has been working ever since he took over that particular office. We would like to see the Soviet union discontinue this bomb testing. Quite frankly, however, I do not know how this end could be accomplished except by expressing pious hopes, because this is something that is within the ambit of the Soviet government. I do not know how outside influence can be brought to bear on the Soviet union to cease and desist.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Send them a telegram.


Frank Howard: Well, I think that sort of communication would have more effect if it

came from the Department of National Defence than if it came from me. However, that is about the extent of this government's effectiveness in the world today. A telegram would be about as effective as anything else.
We wish there would be a resumption of disarmament discussions. We wish the Secretary of State for External Affairs would find that the countries would come to an agreement on the ideas which he has been propounding for a number of years. Unfortunately, though, I think he is whistling in the dark, and for a variety of reasons. The first reason is the attitude of his own government, because it is inconsistent with his ideas. We have heard references to the so-called troika principle being advocated by the Soviet union. I think we realize, too, that we have a troika principle involved in the present cabinet. We have the triumvirate of the Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, all engaged in the same general activity-


Paul Joseph James Martin: What about the Minister of Trade and Commerce?


Frank Howard: Well, the Minister of Trade and Commerce was unofficially rebuked today for something he may have said in Ghana. Perhaps there will be a revision of the text by the time it gets back to Canada and everything will be straightened out. However, we find that the Secretary of State for External Affairs is in a minority within this triumvirate. We find that the Minister of National Defence does not agree, and never has agreed, with the promotional work done by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The other day we heard the Prime Minister practically cut the feet from under the Secretary of State for External Affairs on this question of promoting disarmament.
We do not wish to see those ideas of the Secretary of State for External Affairs sacrificed for the ideas of retired colonels who still wish they were in the armed forces and able to direct people around the country in somewhat the same manner as they did before. I say that almost as soon as this government took the decision-and this matter was brought to a head in some decisions the Prime Minister had made-to scrap the Arrow and buy or obtain the Bomarc, at that time the government in its own mind made the decision that it was going to have nuclear weapons, tactical or otherwise, in the hands of Canadian troops on Canadian soil. However, it has not yet the courage to stand up and say that this is its attitude. It is waiting for a propitious moment. It is waiting for public opinion to be built up slowly by these
Supply-National Defence slight comments of the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister, and the variations in their policy with respect to their acceptance of nuclear weapons.
However, I venture to say that we shall have them on Canadian soil. I venture to say that we shall have them attached to the Bomarc missile when and if we get it and when and if it is operated. I venture to say that we shall have it attached to the Honest John or the Dishonest John-whatever way you want to put it-type of missile, and that we shall have it on the Voodoo aircraft. As to this attitude that the Minister of National Defence is taking, as I say he has not the courage to say so in so many words. This is a disgraceful state of affairs and in my opinion it is not too helpful in promoting any sort of war for peace on the international level.
I believe Canada has had a certain degree of respect among the other nations of the world for a number of years. However, we are gradually losing that admiration and that degree of respect which previously existed because we are becoming more and more closely allied and, to a large degree, subservient to the United States military machine. This fact is becoming recognized throughout other countries of the world. It is not our participation in NATO from which this development has arisen. As soon as the NORAD treaty was signed-and I might say that it was endorsed by both the government and the Liberal forces in this House of Commons-this was another indication that our military welfare or our so-called defence welfare and our economic welfare rested in the hands of these people in the United States.
During the course of this debate it has been stated that this is a time of crisis, a crucial moment, when we should have cool heads, logical thoughts and a non-partisan attitude in order that we may show a united front to the enemy whoever he may happen to be. By those hon. members who spoke earlier the feeling was also expressed that differing ideas were welcome, because we wanted to develop a policy that would be effective in promoting peace. One hon. member-I shall not make reference to him personally-spoke about there being a bipartisan foreign policy in Canada, and said it was too bad there was not a tripartisan foreign policy in Canada. Then he engaged in what I thought was a most unwarranted and uncalled for condemnation of the hon. member for Peterborough with respect to the remarks that hon. member had made in this house on the estimates of the Department of External Affairs, and on defence also.
That sort of thing does not add in any way to a unified feeling or unified desire to

Supply-National Defence reach a solution of these problems in so far as Canada is concerned. If, as there have been in this house, accusations of treason, treachery and selling out to the Soviet union are going to be made by members on the government side against members who may have different points of view, I submit that this does nothing to develop any conscious, sensible, unified approach to these particular questions. It is true that the hon. member for Peterborough has ideas which are different from those of the government. The hon. member for Essex East has different ideas, or so he said a moment ago.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Very different ideas.


Frank Howard: The hon. member for Trinity has different ideas. However, there is no desire to label these hon. gentlemen as treacherous souls or treasonable types because they expressed different points of view. I do not understand why members in this House of Commons will say on the one hand, "We want to develop a non-partisan attitude on defence policy matters", and then will turn around, for political reasons, and get involved in the accusations that were levelled against the hon. member for Peterborough and the hon. member for Kootenay West. As I say, I think it is regrettable that there does not exist in this house at the moment a degree of respect for differing views.
Before I conclude my remarks I should like to make a comment or two about the question of disarmament. As I have mentioned on a number of earlier occasions, it is an objective toward which the Secretary of State for External Affairs has been working for a number of years but which, of course, has been fairly well scuttled for the time being. I submit again, as I have stated earlier, that all the negotiations and discussions that have been going on throughout the approximately 340 meetings that were held, to a certain extent could not hope to come to fruition. They were not in themselves pointless, as they laid the groundwork for certain areas of agreement to be developed; but as I have said on a number of occasions, there is not going to be any disarmament unilaterally by either the United States or the Soviet union. I also submit that there is not going to be any disarmament by those two powers by agreement. Hence all these speeches and wishes about a disarmament agreement being reached between the United States on the one hand and the Soviet union on the other hand were just pious hopes. They were about something that was not going to happen.
Neither the United States nor the Soviet union was going to enter into such an agreement for disarmament, regardless of the con-

ditions about inspection and the like, because there is in the world today a third growing military power, which was recognized by the Secretary of State for External Affairs as a necessary part of the discussions. I refer to China. So long as China is a growing military power and if, as we are led to believe if we can accept the reports that emanate from various government sources, China will be a nuclear power perhaps within a period of five years or less, you are not going to see the Soviet disarm with China building up, and neither are you going to see the United States disarm. What I think will happen if these disarmament discussions are resumed-and I think it should have happened previously-is that China will become a part of them. Without China becoming a part of them they are not going to end up in any agreement one way or the other. All we shall be doing is meeting, talking and building up our nuclear forces. Without China in these discussions I think they are to a great degree, although not entirely, a waste of time.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, a few moments ago the Minister of National Defence told us that he was not going to be bludgeoned into making any further statements with regard to government policy on the use of nuclear weapons. May I say that nobody wishes to bludgeon him. However, we still hope that he will be able to make a statement in order to clarify a most important matter which we think is not clear.
His attitude reminds me of a story which perhaps I may tell the committee. It is the story of a young subaltern who had just received his commission in the army and was taking his platoon out for a march for the first time. He was leading the platoon up a hill, and at the top of the hill there was a precipice. As his platoon got closer to the precipice the young officer became a little panicky because he could not remember the order to change direction. I know how he must have felt. As they got closer and closer to the brink-and we are told, in another context, that we are on the brink now, in a more serious way- he became less and less able to think of the proper order, until finally on the very edge of the brink his sergeant turned to him and said, "For heaven's sake, sir, say something, if only good-bye".
We do not want the minister to say goodbye, at least not in this sense, but we do hope he will give us a clearer statement on this vital issue-and I will deal with this later in my remarks-than we have received over the years from any member of the government, though we have received a fairly clear statement, I admit, from one of the parliamentary secretaries.

This discussion of defence is being held in a world situation, the critical nature of which has been emphasized to us by the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and other leaders of western governments. It is impossible, of course, to think of a more serious subject at a more serious time than what we should do to defend the peace, which is the only secure defence of our country, in this situation. While, of course, we do differ very strongly with government attitudes and government policies in the implementation of government objectives which we share, we do not disagree-and this has been pointed out by other hon. members of this committee-with what those objectives should be; security, defence through peace, and preparations to that end.
The Associate Minister of National Defence had this to say in his contribution to this debate on September 12. I quote from page 8241 of Hansard. Reference was made to this statement by my hon. friend from Essex East this morning:
Ii the worst should come, and if we have to fight again, I do not hesitate to say that we shall once again win the battles of tomorrow just as we won the battles of yesteryear, and this for many reasons.
Mr. Chairman, if the worst comes-and there is no reason why it should come-we will not win the battles of tomorrow in a nuclear war, because not only is it impossible to win a nuclear war but it is impossible, we are told by experts, even to wage one. So I think no one can get any comfort out of the fact that we will win the battles of tomorrow, if these battles are permitted to occur, by a breakdown in the sanity of man.
That does not mean, of course, that in the face of this situation we should just give up, sit back, wring our hands and say "Nothing can be done about it", and look around for an escape to some other planet. Perhaps that will be within the bounds of possibility in a few years. But it does mean that before we act and before we decide on policies we should be aware of not only the problems of defence but of the shifting and changing nature of those problems and what we in Canada can do to help solve them, not merely as a nation laying down policies for national defence-up to a point that is still required- but far more important, what we can do as a participant in collective defence, which is the only way we can develop enough strength to constitute a deterrent to aggression.
I have no quarrel of any kind with the minister in his emphasis on the necessity of collective action or indeed on the necessity
Supply-National Defence at times of subordinating the requirements of independence, in the pursuit of national defence policies, to those of interdependence.
This defence debate is the first we have had since this parliament met last November. In the first part of the session there was practically no discussion of defence problems. There was no defence committee discussion; there was not even a committee to discuss defence expenditures. In the face of the absence of earlier consideration of this vital matter, I think we had the right to expect from the minister and the government a report which would have gone into some of the essential problems of national defence, and a statement from the minister at this time which would have dealt with this matter in a fundamental way. We should have the kind of statement the United States congress gets periodically from the leaders of the government, the kind of statement the United Kingdom parliament gets from its minister of national defence. I refer hon. members of the committee to the kind of debate they had in that house some months ago, a debate on defence which was made possible because of the statement first made by the minister with regard to government policy on defence. And because of the white paper published which laid down the principles which govern British policy in defence.
Instead of that kind of white paper we got this blue book which was issued a few months ago, which in a very inadequate way told this house of the problems with which we are faced in this country in defence strategy, defence planning and defence policy at this particular time. It is similar to the minister's statement the other day which was inadequate and uninformative on these basic questions of defence policy.
So far as I can gather, the minister's position is that the plans and policies we have been pursuing for the last four years are still valid; they still stand up. In spite of what may have happened in the world, we continue along those lines. If you like, we continue in this particular rut, that everything is fine and unchanged and no new policy is required, except perhaps to substitute some United States equipment for Canadian equipment, especially in the air. Apparently we must not keep changing our minds. The minister makes great play over the fact, as he puts it, that we on this side of the chamber, and I in particular, have changed our minds over recent years with regard to defence matters.
Believe me, Mr. Chairman, that is true, because the situation has changed greatly in the last four years and a person would be foolish not to alter his own views in the light of these changing situations. But the

Supply-National Defence minister says that no change, as far as he is concerned, should be made. That seems to be the policy of the government, except perhaps with regard to a change in the attitude of the Secretary of State for External Affairs which is now being forecast by the Prime Minister.
With regard to the desirability of changing policies to meet changing situations let me quote one sentence from a statement made by the director of the institute of strategic studies in London, which is an organization that has done a great deal of important and fundamental research in the matter of defence problems and what can be done to meet them within Great Britain and the coalition. The director of this institute-and I heartily agree with what he says-said a few months ago:
I think you would agree that, in a field of policy as rapidly changing and as crucial as our own, it is both natural for one's views to be undergoing a constant process of refinement while at the same time it is cowardly not to make it clear when they have significantly changed. I have a great respect for those who think differently from myself. The only people I distrust are those who say "X made up my mind many years ago and have never seen occasion to alter it since."
In particular, in this development of conditions which we think necessitate a change of policy we are concerned with the attitude and the policy of the government with respect to Canada, joining what has been called the nuclear club. My hon. friend from Essex East expressed this concern this morning and I propose to deal with it also, though what he said makes it unnecessary for me to say as much as I otherwise would have done. Yesterday the minister, as I read his remarks in Hansard, depreciated the significance of this matter because, he said, it had been decided in NATO many years ago, in 1954; and that from 1954 on, all members of NATO were members of a nuclear club.
I hope to go into this matter in greater detail later, because that was a most important statement made by the minister during this debate. We should like him to substantiate what he said and give us grounds for his assertion that the members of the NATO organization have made an agreement which makes them members of a nuclear club. We should like to know the nature of this agreement. We ask the minister again, as we have asked him before, whether in his opinion Canada is now in this nuclear club. If he was right in what he said yesterday, the problem is solved; we are now a nuclear power. If not, we ask him this; whether Canada is now about to join the nuclear club.
I hope the minister will not consider us as bludgeoning him when we persist in seeking a clear-cut statement on this vitally

important matter. I am not satisfied yet, despite what the minister has said. Are we in Canada committed to the acceptance and use of nuclear weapons not under collective control, as would be the case, I would hope, in NATO-at any rate it should be the case- but under the control of our own government, with a veto exercised by one other government? I insist, notwithstanding what the minister has said this morning, that there has been shilly-shallying, procrastination, delay and indecision in the government's policy. Moreover, there has been confusion in government statements on this vitally important question.
The Prime Minister asked a question in Halifax a few weeks ago, a question directed to his audience and, presumably, to the country. It was a very significant question. I quote from his statement:
Would you, in 1961, faced by the overwhelming power of Soviet might in East Germany close to West Berlin place those who guard the portals of freedom in the position of men armed with bows and arrows?
He added:
It is as simple as that.
Mr. Chairman, it is nonsense to say it is as simple as that, or to try in this way to oversimplify one of the most difficult, dangerous and complicated questions which face us today by putting it in those terms. This particular approach to the problem was answered by the Minister of National Defence himself when he said-and I quote his statement-
The strength of the union-
This is quite true, of course; he was talking of NATO.
The strength of the union is the sum of the strengths of the individual members, and the total strength of the west thus marshalled is formidable indeed.
Then he went on to say:
Individual members do not have to maintain a balance of all the forces which go to make up modern military power.
Therefore to suggest that each individual member of NATO must be able to equip itself with all the weapons of modern war and that, failing this, they are being asked to face the enemy with bows and arrows simply does not make sense. Indeed, this particular argument was exploded only this morning by the Toronto Globe and Mail, a paper which the minister will respect. Referring to an analogy which is becoming, if it has not already become, the minister's favourite, that of the man in the lonely cabin armed with a gun while a bear prowls around outside- the minister does not tell us what the man is going to use for ammunition in his gun- the newspaper said:

The picture this conjures up, intentionally or otherwise, is that of Canada facing single combat with Russia and considering whether to become a fully fledged nuclear power to deter the prospective enemy. This is not the problem at all. Canada has no hope of becoming a nuclear power. To build long range rockets and the like as a deterrent is altogether beyond her resources. Nor is the question really the direct defence of Canada against bombing raids or invasion. The basic issue is whether Canada needs certain nuclear weapons to carry out her obligations to her allies.
That is the responsible approach to this problem, not the one indicated by the terms used by the Prime Minister in Halifax. This particular editorial concludes by pleading for the kind of responsible approach to this question which I have mentioned; that the attention of the public should be drawn to these responsible aspects of the issue rather than romancing about bears and cabins.
It seems to me, notwithstanding what the minister said, that this decision in essence, though unannounced, must have been made by the government some time ago, yet it has not been told to us and a smokescreen of uncertainty and indecision is being put around it. And if that decision has not been made in connection with nuclear weapons, the government is surely guilty of complete irresponsibility in spending millions of dollars on weapons which can only be effective to their maximum extent-and presumably we want our weapons to be effective to their maximum extent-if they have nuclear warheads.
The former chairman of the chiefs of staff committee, now free of the restraints of official responsibility, is able to talk freely on this subject, and he is talking very freely according to the press this morning. He has contributed a pamphlet on Canadian defence policy in the nuclear age for the enlightenment of the Canadian people. I am sure the minister has studied this document, and I am sure General Foulkes is a man whose opinion will be respected by the minister as it will be respected by this house. He says, and I quote from page 15 of this pamphlet:
Canada has accepted a forward task for the brigade group in the shield forces in Europe which requires heavy support for its infantry. The government has agreed to provide for this support the Honest John 762 mm. close support rocket which requires an atomic warhead.
This is perhaps the foremost military authority in this country speaking, and he says here is a weapon which requires an atomic warhead. Will the minister still tell us that the government has not decided whether it is to be given such an atomic weapon warhead? Remember, we have bought this weapon and are spending a lot of money on it. Then the pamphlet goes on to say:
Eight of the day fighter squadrons-*
90205-6-527
Supply-National Defence
Not all of them.
Eight of the day fighter squadrons are being converted to reconnaissance strike squadrons, and the government has decided to equip these squadrons with the F-104 strike aircraft which is to be armed with a small atomic bomb.
This is General Foulkes making the categorical statement that the aircraft which is to be used by eight of our squadrons in Europe is to be armed-not "may be armed" -with a small atomic bomb.


Douglas Scott Harkness: What page is that to be found
on?


Lester Bowles Pearson: At the bottom of page 15, the last paragraph. General Foulkes goes on:
To carry out these roles which the government has accepted-
That is the strike attack role in NATO which we quarreled with in the beginning.
To carry out these roles which the government has accepted, these atomic weapons are necessary.
Then he goes on, at the top of page 16:
The Bomarc missile requires an atomic warhead and two of these air defence missiles will be located in Canada. If any new fighters are procured to replace the CF-100, these fighters will require an air to air atomic missile.
What does all this talk mean? Does it mean that the government has made up its mind in the light of the emergency threat today, in respect of atomic bombs or not? The kind of double talk we have heard goes back a long way. The minister and the hon. member for Essex East quoted from the Prime Minister's statement of February 20, 1959. I will not repeat the whole quotation which is the origin of this problem in its Canadian aspects. The Prime Minister said then:
The full potential of these defensive weapons is achieved only when they are armed with nuclear warheads.
Either we wish to use a weapon which will not achieve its full potential, and that is a strange basis for military policy, or we decided in February, 1959 to acquire the nuclear warhead without which the full potential would not be possible. As was pointed out, the Prime Minister has confirmed that statement on different occasions. I am not going into all the statements. The minister knows them and we have put some of them on the record. If they mean anything at all, surely they mean that. In essence this decision must have been made, unless we are to equip our forces with weapons which are not to achieve their potential capabilities.
While this decision must have been made in principle, we cannot get any clarification from the government now as to whether it has been implemented in the light of that basic decision made at that time. The minister

Supply-National Defence said the other day that it would take two years to two and a halt years-I think he used the expression "lead time"-to get our troops trained to use this kind of equipment, that we ought to be beginning to get the equipment now because it will take two years to two and a half years-


Douglas Scott Harkness: Excuse me. If the Leader of the Opposition is referring to my speech, I did not say that. I said that in order to acquire these modern systems and train troops to use them it would take a lead time of two or three years or more. Most of that time is taken up in actually getting the equipment after it is ordered.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I accept the minister's statement, but the statement made by the Prime Minister, which I have just quoted, was made more than two and a half years ago. If that was the decision of the government at that time there has been time to proceed along the lines which the minister has indicated.
Then on March 10, 1959 the Prime Minister made the same kind of statement. On July 3, 1959 General Pearkes, the minister's predecessor-perhaps I may interpolate and say I join very warmly now in the tribute of affection and respect which the minister paid to his predecessor-said, as reported at page 5415 of Hansard:
I presume that eventually the Canadian forces will he equipped with atomic weapons.
It seemed to be a matter of some urgency at that time, but this urgency seems to have disappeared at least in part in 1960, because in a speech to the Canadian club in Ottawa on November 24, 1960, the Prime Minister had this to say about this matter of atomic weapons:
We have taken the stand that no decision will he required while progress toward disarmament continues.
That was not the kind of decision the Prime Minister made in February, 1959, yet in November, 1960 he said:
To do otherwise would he inconsistent. When and if such weapons are required then we shall have to take the responsibility.
Then a little later:
In other words, this problem is not one requiring immediate decision.
If it takes our forces two years or two and a half years to be trained in the use of those weapon systems, if they need that lead time-and I am sure that is true-if that is so, in the light of the international situation which faces us today and which was pretty serious in November, 1960, to say that this problem is not one requiring immediate decision seems to me to be very unrealistic, especially in the light of previous statements made on the subject.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs threw some light on what seems to have been this changed attitude when he said in the House of Commons on May 2 that the decision to acquire nuclear warheads depended on progress made in the next few months toward disarmament. We have had those next few months. Goodness knows during that time there has been no progress made toward disarmament, and we all deplore it. But if the Secretary of State for External Affairs was right, then a decision should have been made by now on what to do in the light of this absence of progress. The minister himself said the same thing, as reported in the Winnipeg Free Press of May 20, and I hope I am quoting him right. He was referring to the disarmament talks and said:
If the talks fail we will have to make decisions on nuclear armaments.
Will the minister even now, in spite of what he said a few moments ago, tell us what is that decision?
It is not possible for me, and I do not think it is possible for other members of this committee, to divorce these matters of arms and equipment from the purposes for which they are to be used, from the objectives of defence itself. In this connection I think first of continental defence. For the purposes of continental defence we are linked up now through NORAD. Incidentally I would like to correct what the previous speaker said, namely that the Liberal party approved NORAD in this house. That is not the case.
We now have for continental defence ten squadrons of CF-lOO's, linked with United States planes and equipment for continental defence. The NORAD agreement was entered into by the present government and we criticized it at the time as being inadequate and ineffective, and as not providing, as they should have provided, for NORAD being part of NATO. There have been these ten squadrons of CF-lOO's which, as we told the government a year ago, were obsolete in performance to do the job which they were originally asked to do and obsolete also, as the hon. member for Trinity pointed out so effectively the other day, in regard to the purposes of continental defence in 1961, not as it was in 1957 and 1958.
We have suggested a reduction in the number of continental defence squadrons and the alteration of some of their duties, alteration perhaps if after due examination that turns out to be feasible, of their association with United States defence forces through NORAD, perhaps a return to the kind of defence association which we had before NORAD. That position was ridiculed by members of the government, but within the

last few months they have reduced the number of defence squadrons from nine to five, and have announced their intention of reequipping the five, not with the Canadian Arrow, which has been sunk without trace- there is not even a trace adequate for exhibition in the air museum-but with an American interceptor.
It is clear now from what the minister has said, and I do not quarrel with this doctrine, that the major purpose, in fact the only purpose, of continental defence which makes sense in the face of the kind of attack to which we would be subjected is to protect the deterrent, the strategic air command of the United States, which is our deterrent. The purpose is not now the defence of Canadian cities, the defence of the Canadian people and the defence of Canadian soil, because there is no such effective defence of that kind against the kind of attack we would be bound to have. To give the impression that interceptor squadrons can give the people of Canada that kind of protection is cruelly misleading. What defence there is now has to be the defence of the strategic deterrent which it is hoped will be permitted to get into the air and fly off toward the enemy before that capability is destroyed by the destruction of the bases. That is now the basis of continental defence, presumably both by planes and by missiles.
But even that basis is shifting and changing, as the hon. member for Trinity pointed out so clearly the other day, because the deterrent itself is changing. It has changed very greatly indeed since we talked about defence over a year ago in this house. So far as the deterrent now is concerned, it is admitted by those who are planning strategy in the NATO capitals that we cannot rely on fixed bases which would be knocked out of action in a few minutes. The deterrent has to be mobile. It has to be mobile in the water through Polaris submarines and it has to be mobile on land. So in the face of a mobile deterrent the kind of protection which it was hoped these squadrons and Bomarc missiles might have given a year or two ago really does not make very much sense.
It may be necessary for the United States to keep them. The United States is a great power with great resources, and has responsibilities over the whole world. Having regard to the position of the United States it has to plug up every loophole even by maintaining equipment and planes which even in their own eyes may be obsolescent. But a country like Canada, which has resources that are limited and which in the nature of things can only play an important but subsidiary role in general strategy, has to be very careful indeed how it allocates its resources for the collective 90205-6-527J
Supply-National Defence defence. While it may be necessary for the United States to maintain these squadrons and missiles for the time being, surely we are not making any effective contribution to the protection of the mobile deterrent through a few squadrons of interceptors, armed with nuclear weapons, and two squadrons of Bomarc missiles also equipped with nuclear warheads. If we rely on that kind of strategy and planning for our contribution to continental and collective defence, our participation and our policy will become as fixed and ineffective as fixed bases for strategic air forces are now ineffective in the light of new methods of attack.
I think it is in that context that we have to look at the role of the interceptor in continental defence, and if necessary to re-examine and revise that role and the arms that we may require in the air, on the land and on the water to meet this new situation. We recall very vividly that two years ago we were told that the bomber threat had diminished to the point where we scrapped the Canadian Arrow. In the speech made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on February 20, 1959, from which I have already quoted, he sought to explain why that decision was taken, a decision with which we quarrelled at the time and which we criticize even more now in the light of what has happened.
He justified that decision, as found on page 1221 of Hansard, on the ground that "the bomber threat against which the CF-105 was intended to provide defence has diminished". If we scrapped the CF-105, a great Canadian achievement, because the threat had diminished, why is it that in 1961 we are equipping our air force with United States Voodoos to meet a threat which in 1959 was supposed to have diminished to the point where a Canadian interceptor of this type was not needed? The then minister of national defence, General Pearkes, said in the same debate on February 23, 1959, as found on page 1280 of Hansard:
[DOT]. . the threat of the manned bomber against this country is diminishing.
He went on to say:
It would therefore not seem to make sense for us to go ahead and develop an interceptor which would be ready by the end of 1961 and which could be in squadron operation by 1962, to meet a threat which would hardly exist at that time.
A threat which would hardly exist in 1962, according to the then minister of national defence. Yet as we approach 1962 we are equipping five squadrons of our air force with United States interceptors, presumably to be armed with nuclear air to air missiles.
What has happened, Mr. Chairman, that has caused this change of viewpoint on the
8348	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence part of the government in defence planning and the means of meeting the threat? The Minister of National Defence in a speech in Montreal last February, I believe-he will correct me if I misquote him-rather ridiculed the idea that there was no longer a bomber threat to this continent. His predecessor said a couple of years ago that threat would be over in 1962. So let the government tell us why in the summer of 1960 the Minister of National Defence changed his views on this matter. Let the government tell us now in the light of the information they have why they consider bombers to be such a threat at this time as to require the continuation by Canada of the defence policy of meeting that threat through interceptors and through NORAD. After all, NORAD is merely an agency of co-operation, not something that stands on its own feet, and the alternative to it is not non-co-operation, because we must co-operate with the United States in continental defence. The alternative is a return to the methods of co-operation that existed before NORAD, and which were effective at that time. Perhaps the minister will deal with this particular problem at some stage during the debate.
Our role then, as we see it, is not one of non-co-operation in continental defence. It is not one of defaulting on our obligations or betraying our friends and allies. It is one which we hope will be more effective for Canada, more appropriate for Canada, than that which we took on a few years ago and to which we now seem to be bound with no room for manoeuvre or change.
We agree that Canada can play a very important role and is playing a very important role in early warning, a suitable and appropriate role, but even that particular role will soon be diminished in importance. I should qualify that by saying that Canadian participation will be diminished in importance, when it becomes a matter of warning against missiles rather than warning against bombers, because in the case of a ballistic missile early warning system we are up in the realm of billions of dollars of expenditure, and it is not likely that we will be able to play a very significant part in that particular effort.
In the realm of anti-missile missiles, which gets us into even more astronomical figures, Canada's role is less important than early warning may be. Yet it is obvious that the Royal Canadian Air Force still has to have continental planes. We have to have planes for reconnaissance, for sky patrols and to intercept and shoot down at least the isolated intruder, as we have argued for some time and as the government now agrees. However, we do not, in the carrying out of this role


effectively, have to arm ourselves, as we see it on this side, in a way which brings us into the nuclear club. We do not have to have two squadrons of Bomarcs for this purpose, the missiles for which are supplied by the United States and which, in effect, would be under the control of the United States.
The Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence make a great play about joint control and the fact that we would not accept weapons unless they were under joint control. Even if this Bomarc missile is effective-and we do not think it is effective; we think it is obsolete, and that the United States will soon be dropping it-if it is brought under joint control, what "joint control" really would mean in this context is that the authority for action would have to come from the United States. Canada would be under a veto over the use of its own weapons, because these would be weapons in the hands of Canadian forces.
Defence of this kind, Mr. Chairman, is not going to save us, and Canadian participation in defence of this kind is not going to be the best way in which we can discharge our obligations. As I have said, no effective defence of our territory is now possible. We are talking about survival rather than protection. Protection of the deterrent is becoming more difficult because the deterrent is mobile. While defence is as essential as it was a few years ago, perhaps the best defence we have now, and this has been said by others, is the certainty of swift and sure retaliation if any aggressor disturbs the peace. But this particular defence by deterrence is the responsibility of the United States which has a strategic force for that purpose; and now, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom.
We can have a better role, surely, Mr. Chairman, than the kind of participation in the kind of defence about which we have been talking and about which the government has been talking for two or three years. During the course of this debate we hope to put that role forward. We have already done so in some detail, in the debate a year ago. The role to which I refer does not mean that we are defaulting on our obligations, betraying our friends or minimizing our responsibility.
In case my own words in criticism of the role the government has now taken may appear to be prejudiced, may I quote some outside authorities in support of the position we have taken. The Vancouver Province on November 9, I think it was, said this:
A small country like ours can't afford nuclear weapons and should divert its defence spending into areas where we can be of real assistance to the United States and our other western allies.
Whatever Ottawa may think of this viewpoint, it is not furthering any kind of policy by talking

out of both sides of its mouth. If we have much more of the present inconsistency, Canada's influence in world councils will evaporate completely.
Then the Globe and Mail of May 4, 1961 had this to say, and these are impressive paragraphs to us on this side:
We may be an economic satellite of the United States in many foreign eyes, but we are not yet a military dependency and our voice still counts for something in international councils. As a junior member of the nuclear club, obliged to get permission from Washington before acting in our own defence, we would lose bargaining power in helping to achieve compromise between the two major nuclear powers, and in our dealings with the underdeveloped countries which still regard Canada as a trustworthy friend.
This editorial concludes as follows:
Our resources are better spent in strengthening conventional forces against the dangers of limited war, and in bracing ourselves and our non-nuclear friends for the new (and undeclared) political, economic and propaganda war with the Soviet union.
Let me quote also, Mr. Chairman, a Canadian whose words I am sure will be listened to with respect by members of the government. I refer to the premier of the province of Manitoba, who spoke a few weeks ago to the Couchiching conference. I have not been able to get a text of his speech because I think he spoke from notes. He is reported in the Toronto Globe and Mail of August 27, as follows:
Premier Duff Roblin made an incisive appeal here tonight for a distinctive Canadian role in world affairs. He suggested that some proportion of Canadian military expenditures might be more effectively applied to technical assistance of a more practical nature for Afro-Asian nations.
He questioned-
This is the Conservative premier of Manitoba.
-the value of the North American air defence command. If it abandoned NORAD, then Canada should also refuse nuclear weapons. "Not in any holier than thou spirit," said Premier Roblin, "but because these weapons are not essential."
He said: "Canada should seek leadership among smaller powers and within the ring of the United States nuclear deterrent, seek to reinforce the United Nations office of secretary general and rescue it from Soviet meddling. We should continue to make available to the UN a substantial and fully mobile soldiery. We should mobilize independent thinking and give expression to ideas among smaller nations. We should encourage such UN instruments of peace as the food bank.
May I call it one o'clock, Mr. Chairman?
At one o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at 2.30 p.m.
Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, at the time of the luncheon recess I was putting forward
Supply-National Defence in a very general way certain principles which I thought should govern Canada's contribution to collective defence. We on this side of the house will discuss these principles in their more detailed application as this debate goes on. However, I wish to make it quite clear, as I tried to do earlier in my discussion, that in the circumstances I put forward I was not advocating a policy of neutralism or a policy of default on our obligations or international commitments to our allies, or indeed a policy of refusing to play our part in resistance to aggression when we have no other alternative than resistance, irrespective of the consequences, something which, of course, would be tragic beyond words.
When I say that no one can win a nuclear war, that no one can win a nuclear war in the old conventional sense, that is true. However, it should not be misunderstood-and I am sure it is not misunderstood by those who might wish to break the peace-that our understanding of this position in the western countries means that we would not attempt to defend ourselves because there was no possibility of victory in the old conventional sense. Free men will always defend themselves when attacked, I hope, irrespective of the consequences. However, we should be aware of the consequences, which are so far beyond those of previous wars that they must be taken into consideration when we discuss defence.
In Great Britain in 1940 it did not look as though there was much chance of a victorious result of the war. However, it came. Yet in a sense that fact proves the other side of the coin or the other phase of the question. The resulting victory which was achieved in 1944 and 1945, and the inability of the west to follow victory with the kind of peace which would endure has brought us, through no fault of our own, to the situation in which we find ourselves today of trying to defend ourselves against a nuclear war which, if it occurred, would mean planetary destruction.
Nor do I wish it to be understood by anyone-and this was made clear in the quotation I read from a speech by the premier of Manitoba in so far as his views were concerned-that when we take the position that nuclear arms are not required by Canada under Canadian control or indeed under joint control for the defence of peace and the discharge of our obligations, we take that position because of some feeling of smug moral superiority. Of course that is not the case because, as a country, we are committed to nuclear defence. Indeed, we supply the material that makes possible nuclear defence and nuclear deterrence, through the sale of

Supply-National Defence our uranium. It is therefore not because of any superior moral considerations of that kind that we take our stand.
Neither I nor the other members of the Liberal party who sit on this side of the chamber advocate the weakening of the strategic deterrent, let alone its unilateral abandonment. Indeed, I feel that the strategic deterrent in the hands of those who now possess it should be maintained strong and unimpaired. In the words of the phrase we now use, it should be credible so that in the minds of those who are tempted to break the peace there should exist no doubt that it can be used effectively.
I believe that western strategy-and that includes Canada-should be based on the credibility and on the invulnerability of the retaliatory forces not only on our side but perhaps even on the other side, strange as that may seem-the invulnerability of both sides through mobility-so that each side would be reasonably certain that the other side could destroy it. In that way the temptation would be removed to bring about victory through some kind of sneak attack with immunity from retaliation. That kind of mutual invulnerability, which may seem to be a strange idea to put forward on our side but which has been put forward by some fairly highly respected defence experts, would certainly discourage a surprise attack based on fear.
But while we take that view with regard to the strategic deterrent, we on this side are opposed to dispersal of the nuclear deterrent. We are opposed to purely national control of that deterrent, especially with regard to the North Atlantic alliance, just as we have great doubts-in fact our feelings are stronger than doubts-as to the advisability of national custody of the nuclear deterrent beyond the limits of those three countries which already possess that weapon.
That brings me to a subject which was dealt with by the minister and which has been discussed by other members in this chamber. I now leave the question of continental strategy and come to the question of what should be our NATO strategy in the present situation and what should be the attitude members should take to collective strategy and to the use of nuclear weapons in the implementation of that strategy.
So far as our own contribution to NATO is concerned, which contribution is to be strengthened, we are told, by the dispatch of additional troops overseas, we have a brigade group and we have an air division. I wish to refer the committee to Hansard of July 3,

1959 at page 5414. This was some time ago, and we were then told by the Minister of National Defence that this question of nuclear weapons for our forces overseas in NATO was being considered. General Pearkes said then:
-the Canadian brigade in Europe with short range nuclear weapons for NATO defence tasks are also being studied. These studies are continuing and are fast reaching a stage when there can be an exchange of notes of this matter.
He was referring, of course, to an exchange of notes with the United States. That was more than two years ago. I should like to know, and I am sure the committee would like to know, what exactly is the position now in that regard so far as our contribution to NATO forces is concerned. In the same debate, as reported at page 5415 of Hansard for July 3, 1959 the minister of national defence added:
I presume that eventually the Canadian forces will be equipped with atomic weapons under the same terms as the other NATO contingents under SACEUR-
What are these terms, and since that time has there in fact been a decision which covers the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Canadian forces in NATO? From what I have said it will be clear, I hope, that I do not object to the NATO alliance possessing in some form nuclear weapons for defence purposes; indeed, they have them now, but under national control. At present all these nuclear weapons which are available to certain NATO forces are, as far as I know-and the minister will correct me if I am wrong- in the custody of the United States or the United Kingdom.
I do not think that situation has been altered by what is referred to now as a sort of double key arrangement, or a joint control of such weapons. I believe it has been assumed by NATO, and NATO defence planning has been based on this assumption, that these nuclear weapons in the possession of certain NATO members will be used immediately against any aggressive move; that those forces in NATO which have these weapons have been trained for that purpose, and that there is equipment to discharge that purpose, though it is not in the hands of NATO; it is in the hands of the United States. Indeed, the minister said yesterday decisions were taken in this matter which made NATO, as he put it-I am not sure of the exact expression-a nuclear force back in 1954. That is quite true. The outspoken Field Marshal Montgomery-a man outspoken in this and other matters-said in 1954:
I want to make it absolutely clear-

He was the NATO commander at that time:
-that we at SHAPE are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer: "They may possibly be used". It is very definitely: "They will be used if we are attacked."
That is clear enough. General Gruenther said the same thing, in different words, the same year when he confirmed that nuclear weapons would be used and agreed-and he is an expert in these matters-that once such weapons were used by NATO, that use would spread to all-out nuclear war, in what has been called the awful escalation of destruction. The minister and his predecessor have both said-I certainly remember General Pearkes saying this-that they saw no way by which you could limit the use of nuclear weapons; that if you started with a nuclear bullet-I am not quoting General Pearkes but I think this was his view-you would likely end with a nuclear bomb.
That is why we have been so anxious and so worried about nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO forces and not under NATO control, especially in circumstances like the present when NATO forces under United States immediate command are moving along or have been moving along the corridor leading to Berlin armed with weapons. In 1957 General Norstad-though he seems to have altered his views since-took the same view, that it was impossible to draw a line between the tactical use of atomic weapons against an attacker's forces-and I once hoped that line could be drawn

and their strategic use against the attacker's homeland.
Mr. Chairman, the minister said that NATO has now a nuclear strategy and in that sense is a nuclear force. We know that nuclear weapons are in the hands of certain NATO powers. Yet I do not know of any decision that has been made-and perhaps the minister will enlighten me on this point-notwithstanding the decision to which he referred, which I think was in December, 1958, and which dealt with the matter in broad principle, I do not know of any political decision that has been made by the NATO council or any other NATO body authorizing and laying down the conditions under which NATO nuclear weapons will be used, or laying down any rules governing the control of the use of such weapons in the hands of NATO members in Europe.
Surely the time has come to do something about that. In view of what General Gruenther, General Norstad and others have said about the inevitability of this escalation of destruction, to use the nuclear weapon even in its tactical form as a first strike weapon for NATO forces against an attack
Supply-National Defence surely might bring about the greatest danger of all, the danger of an atomic chain reaction, the kind of chain reaction which I have just mentioned, which begins with a bullet and ends with continent-destroying bombs.
This would result-and we have talked about this before in this house-in NATO becoming an agency, which it was never meant to become, for the conversion of what might after all be only an accidental or a limited incursion or attack, into a nuclear holocaust. That could be done either by immediate retaliation from strategic air forces which would not worry about the troops on the ground but would worry, in the language of General Gruenther, about the enemy's homeland; or it could be brought about by premature and unnecessary use of nuclear weapons in the hands of NATO front line forces or forces in reserve. Surely that is the most frightening aspect of this NATO strategic situation, and this NATO tactical situation also.
Henry Kissinger, who has written a great deal on this subject and I think is recognized as an authority, in an article called "The Necessity for Choice" had this to say:
If NATO can be defended only by all-out war, it will face a hopeless dilemma; to yield to pressure will set up a pattern of Soviet blackmail-
We know what that means. He went on to say:
-while to resist will involve catastrophic devastation.
That is the awful dilemma that those who are responsible for the political and military planning of NATO's strategy face at the present time. It seems to me that the answer, and perhaps the only way out of this dilemma, is not to do away with a NATO deterrent, even a NATO nuclear deterrent, as opposed to a United States or United Kingdom deterrent, but to bring that deterrent under some form of collective control and to build up enough conventional strength in NATO front line forces so that the nuclear deterrent will not have to be used until it is clear beyond doubt that a massive nuclear assault has been launched.
That does not mean leaving our front line forces defenceless. It does mean-and this seems to be a doctrine which is gaining more and more support-isolating the nuclear deterrent under NATO control from the conventional strength of its forces so there would not be this awful temptation to start a nuclear war when conventional defence might be sufficient to meet an attack. I have no doubt this is being looked into, and perhaps the minister will have a chance to tell us what progress is being made in NATO thinking in this regard.
I think these nuclear weapons, which NATO must have as a defence organization, must be

Supply-National Defence under some form of NATO and not national control. But I make a distinction in my mind, a distinction the full importance of which I did not realize some time ago, between custody and control. If these weapons are brought under control, and if the policy determining the use of these weapons is to be isolated from conventional weapons in some form and brought under NATO control, then it does not seem to me to matter nearly as much whether they are in United States custody or not.
The alternative-and perhaps this alternative would appeal to many people who are fundamentalists on this question-would be to have NATO not only in control but in custody of these weapons. This would mean that the United States, the United Kingdom and France would relinquish their nuclear weapons now in the possession of NATO forces to collective custody and control. I have no illusion about the difficulty of doing this, but if this were done and if weapons of this kind were in the hands of our forces as part of NATO it would not, in my view, be extending the area of membership in the nuclear club, because three members of that club would be giving up their own national control to a collective organization.
I think this would be a move in the right direction, and it would be limiting rather than expanding the extent of the nuclear club. If that is not possible, however, the only alternative which makes sense to me would be to bring about NATO control and have the nuclear weapons isolated from the conventional front line weapons and placed in reserve in the custody of those countries-I hope it would be only one-which now have that custody. In that case we might be able to resolve this awful dilemma of how to meet an attack, if there should be one, without converting the situation into nuclear war.
I am not now thinking about an all-out nuclear assault on this continent or on Europe. In that case it would not make any difference whether our weapons were under collective control or joint control or single control. Everyone would use everything he had; one would just hope for the best and pray for survival. But that is not the only kind of problem we have to face. The problem is also to deal with a limited assault which NATO perhaps could not meet without using nuclear weapons if the organization does not have sufficient conventional strength. Surely this makes it of fundamental importance to build up NATO's conventional strength so as to decrease the present reliance on nuclear retaliation. At present I think there is too much reliance on the trip wire function of the organi-

zation and on massive retaliation. The inadequate conventional strength means that the first strike in defence might be from nuclear weapons, weapons which, if we had sufficient conventional strength, would not have to be used.
This, I think and hope, is the basis upon which NATO is now developing its strategy. This position, as I understand it, requires a change in existing strategy and a change in the defence policies of its members with regard to the control and custody of atomic weapons possessed by NATO. There is certainly growing concern among NATO members about membership in an alliance where a decision to use nuclear weapons could be made without their participation and at very short notice. I read confirmation of this in the press this morning in a dispatch out of Norway. Collective control in the interests of strengthening the alliance, however difficult this may be, seems to me to be essential.
Someone is going to say, how can you have collective control in a council of 15 members? How can you have, to use the common phrase, 15 fingers on the trigger? That would be technically impossible, I think, except under the conditions I have just mentioned, which would provide for adequate conventional defence against an attack by conventional weapons in the case of anything but an all-out assault, with nuclear defence in reserve. If you could have that, if you had sufficient collective conventional defence to hold an attack, then it would be possible to call the members of the organization together and put the problem to the NATO council in the light of the conditions as they developed. I would hope this is the way in which it could be done rather than by setting up some directorate or committee.


Henry Frank Jones: I wonder where the deterrent would be in that situation. What would stop the Russians sending over their missiles and bombers?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have been trying to deal with that situation. If we had sufficient conventional strength, and an attack was made by conventional forces, an attack which was not meant to be an all-out attack, we would have time to determine whether the NATO council would authorize nuclear weapons to be used. If there were to be a massive all-out nuclear assault by missiles across the continent and across the ocean, it would not make any difference what kind of mechanism we had set up.


Henry Frank Jones: The question is, what would deter the Russians from launching an attack of that kind if you could not retaliate?


Lester Bowles Pearson: There would be a more effective deterrent than we have now. We would have a threefold deterrent. They would know that we had adequate conventional forces available for front line defence. They would know that we had intermediate nuclear missiles in reserve, and they would also know that we had strategic nuclear deterrent strength across the ocean. This kind of control, which apparently does not appeal to the hon. member for Saskatoon, could avoid the frightening possibility of a national field commander acting on national orders using nuclear weapons in the front line when this might not be necessary, and might be fatal.
In this connection, and differing from what he said in 1957, at the annual conference of the NATO parliamentarians last November General Norstad had this to say:
I believe that our forces must have a substantial conventional capability. They must be able to operate, where the military situation permits, without using arms and weapons equipped with nuclear warheads. This will require shield forces of the general magnitude being provided under our present program, a program which I regret to say is not yet completed.
That is an understatement. General Norstad then went on to say:
This conventional strength requires an organization or a system under which the basic combat elements would react normally with conventional weapons-
I ask the hon. member for Saskatoon to listen to this.
-but it also requires that associated with these basic combat elements there are atomic weapon units which can be used if necessary.
And, I say, used under NATO control. General Norstad went on:
However, the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one.
That is military jargon which means, do not use nuclear weapons until you are absolutely certain it is the only protection you have against destruction. Then he concluded-and this is the very core of my argument-by saying about nuclear weapons:
The use of these weapons should be the result of a specific, deliberate decision, made at a level consistent with the policies and plans of NATO.
That is a military way of saying it should be made by a NATO agency.
Then this final sentence:
In any case, this level must be higher than that of the commander of the basic combat elements to which I have made reference.
I have made reference to the lines along which NATO strategy should develop, and I hope it is developing along these lines. There may be some strengthening rather than weakening of the deterrent both politically and militarily along those lines. That can only
Supply-National Defence be done, of course, by strengthening political unity inside NATO itself by far greater political integration among the NATO countries, by greater defence integration among the NATO countries, and by using the NATO council as a council for strategy politically and militarily. If that is done; if the NATO council is given the kind of authority it should have and has not had, then with military advice and a re-examination of the military organizational set-up in NATO, we can make this organization a far stronger organization for military defence than it has been in the past. Perhaps part of what I call this diffusing strategy could be a disarmed zone right across Europe, which would avoid the difficulty of tactical nuclear weapons in the hands of opposing forces too close together.
This is a view that is not, of course, peculiar to me. A great deal of thinking has been going on along these lines. A group of the Conservative party in Great Britain called the Bow group, a rather radical young Conservative group, in a pamphlet called "Stability and Survival" issued not so long ago, at page 28 had this to say. This represents the views of some members of the Conservative party in the British House of Commons in regard to this very problem. The paragraph reads:
The British army is equipped with Honest Johns and Corporals, the warheads being under American control. The fundamental requirement for the relationship between tactical nuclear weapons and our armed forces is that the armed forces should always have a choice between using them and not using them and still be in a position to hold the line. In other words, they must be available, but not the only means of checking aggression. Thus, to quote Kissinger, "Forces in being are more important than at any previous time in our history!" It is important to understand that units once in battle cannot switch from one mode of warfare to another. To integrate nuclear weapons into every unit would make it virtually impossible to keep a war on a conventional basis. Far from being diffused throughout the army, tactical nuclear weapons must be kept in separate units, so that the temptation for a hard pressed junior officer to use them is avoided.
I say not only should they be kept in separate units in reserve, they should be kept under NATO as opposed to national control. If that can be done I think Canada could co-operate to the full in that kind of NATO strategy. But if we are being asked in NATO to accept nuclear weapons for our air division and for our infantry brigade under other than that kind of control, under national control, or under joint control which gives the United States an overpowering authority to use or not to use them, then I do not think we should accept them in Europe. I hope that choice will not have to be made, because I hope that NATO will develop along the lines which I have ventured to outline.

Supply-National Defence If it does it will mean far greater political unity as well as defence unity, and far from weakening the deterrent it will strengthen it.
This is the kind of continental defence and NATO strategy that I venture to put forward and which I hope we will be examining in detail as we go through the estimates. I should like to return to what I said at the beginning. There is only one sure defence, and that is peace. At the present time there is only one sure military way of maintaining peace-and I do not like to say this-and that is to preserve the balance of the terror by the maintenance of a strong and powerful nuclear deterrent force. I accept that in military strategy, but I see no reason-I see a great many arguments against it-for the extension of nuclear weapons from the countries which now have them to other countries thereby weakening their position in international affairs and in the United Nations and making it quite impossible, as I see it, for any Canadian secretary of state for external affairs to go down to the United States and argue against other countries accepting nuclear weapons.
It seems to me these are the advantages of adopting the kind of course I have put forward and the disadvantages of the alternative course by which we become a member of the nuclear club with nuclear weapons under national or joint control. If we are faced with that choice we should take the choice I have indicated, thereby strengthening our position in international affairs, and making our voice stronger in the only field which will save us, namely the maintenance and strengthening of international peace.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, a little while ago the Leader of the Opposition was talking about high levels and low levels, and I must say that the speech he has given since lunch was certainly on a much higher level than the one he gave before lunch. Before lunch what he was doing in effect was attempting to rationalize the irrational. It was a further attempt on his part to try and get out of the mess which the Liberal party got into at their January meeting as far as defence matters are concerned.
I indicated yesterday the comment of some well-qualified newspapermen with regard to the so-called position the Liberals took on defence at the January meeting. The Leader of the Opposition has been making a series of speeches across the country since then trying to explain this, and he complains that people do not understand what their position was. Well, certainly they do not understand it because it was not a position which is understandable. It was a matter of confusion. As I indicated yesterday, one of the reporters who was there said they decided to take

Canada out of NORAD, then they put Canada back into NORAD, then they finally ended up with it half in and half out, that is as far as interceptors are concerned, and it was much the same thing as far as nuclear weapons are concerned and so on all down the line. It resulted, as I say, in a mess and confusion.
I noted yesterday also what a very serious writer on defence subjects had to say in a serious magazine called the Canadian Commentator. John Gellner had this to say about the position the Liberal party is taking on interceptors in particular:
The policy which the Liberal party has adopted in this matter does not even make sense.
It does not make sense, and neither does a lot more of the so-called policy of the Liberal party on defence.


Lester Bowles Pearson: What did he say about your policy?


Douglas Scott Harkness: He said that at least our policy makes sense. He does not agree with all of it, but he said that at least there is some logic in it.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Where does he say that? He does not say it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Paul, don't get too excited.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Chairman, on a point of order, the Minister of National Defence is a member of the government and he ought to know that it is contrary to our rules to refer to any member except as the hon. member for such and such constituency. Now, hon. gentlemen opposite do not like it, but it is about time ministers were taught that rudeness is no substitute for effective action in this house. There is no one who on occasion destroys his argument in that regard more effectively than does my genial friend the Minister of National Defence.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The hon. gentleman was in error. He does it to a greater extent than anybody else. I apologize for not mentioning the hon. member for Essex East. I realize I was in error.


Paul Joseph James Martin: According to the rules.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am sorry. I was tempted to do that by the numerous remarks the hon. member for Essex East makes along the same line, and mostly from his seat. However, what I was saying, which the hon. member hoped I would forget but he has not succeeded in throwing me off the track, was that Mr. Gellner in dealing with this matter stated:
They-

The Liberals.
-want to leave all arrangements as they are except that Canadian forces in NORAD would not actually shoot. In other words, we would warn the Americans that the enemy was coming, we would tell him who he is, we would fix and track him, but then we would virtuously withdraw and let the Americans do the killing. This is a solution worthy of Pontius Pilate, not of a Lester B. Pearson and his associates.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is not our solution at all.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think truer words were never written.


Lester Bowles Pearson: It is not true.


Douglas Scott Harkness: It is a Pontius Pilate type of policy if there ever was one. It is an attempt to stand on both sides of the fence. It is an attempt to go in two opposite directions at the same time, and all the attempts of the Leader of the Opposition in various speeches across the country to try to rationalize this completely irrational position are just not going to succeed because it is impossible for them to succeed.
First of all the Leader of the Opposition today accused those in this party and myself in particular of refusing ever to change our minds. He was talking about the fact that he had changed his mind, and he said that we refused to change our minds, that we would not budge, that we were stubborn and so on. Yet about five or ten minutes later in his speech he was complaining bitterly because we did change our minds, as he said, in connection with interceptors. He cannot have it both ways. As a matter of fact, these two statements in his speech made only about five or ten minutes apart, are typical of the lack of logic in the speeches of the Leader of the Opposition on defence. He accuses us on the one hand of being absolutely unchanging and refusing to change and look at new conditions, and five minutes later he complains bitterly because, as he says, we did change.
What can the people of Canada make of such an attitude and statements of that kind? It is all right for the members of his party who sit behind him to applaud loudly when he makes a statement of that kind but when the general public or anybody who thinks seriously about these matters sits down and analyses what he has said it immediately becomes apparent that there is no validity in most of his remarks.


An hon. Member:: Let the public decide.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The public will certainly decide, and there is no question in my mind as to how they will decide.


Jean-Paul Deschatelets: Sooner or later?
Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition also went on to complain in his earlier remarks that this was the first debate we have had on defence this session, and that there had been none in the earlier part of the session. No one knows better than he does that the reason for that was his own absence and that of the hon. member for Trinity.


Lionel Chevrier: That is not so.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, that statement is untrue.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The defence estimates were announced for consideration by the leader of the house. They were to come up on a certain day. The Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Trinity-


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is not true.


Douglas Scott Harkness: -complained and requested that they be not brought up because they said they could not be here.


Lester Bowles Pearson: So we waited for six months.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As a result consideration of these estimates was delayed. He now complains that there was no debate on defence in the earlier part of the session, but the reason was the unwillingness of the Liberal party to go ahead with a debate at that time.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is ridiculous nonsense.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition went on to say that I should have made a statement on fundamental issues and questions, and that I had not done so. I submit that if he will read the speech I made he will see that it is a statement on the fundamental defence situation as far as this country is concerned, the position the government has taken in regard thereto, and what we have been doing and are doing. His chief complaint would seem to be that we have not said we are going to get nuclear weapons next week. That is really what it all boils down to.
From the statements of the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Essex East you would think that the acquisition or non-acquisition of nuclear weapons constituted the whole field of defence policy. They are one type of weapon, and they would be used in certain circumstances and not used in others. I think they have to be regarded as a certain type of weapon and not looked upon as the end-all and be-all of defence policy, which they are not.
The Leader of the Opposition referred to an editorial in this morning's Globe and Mail, a copy of which I have here, and quoted some portions of it with approval. I should

Supply-National Defence like to point out that it would appear impossible that the writer of the editorial had read the speech I made yesterday or any of my previous speeches on defence. Otherwise he could not possibly have written this editorial, because he states here, after quoting something I had said:
The picture this conjures up, intentionally or otherwise, is that of Canada facing single combat with Russia, and considering whether to become a full-fledged nuclear power to deter the prospective enemy. This is not the problem at all. Canada has no hope of becoming a nuclear power; to build long range rockets and the like as a deterrent is altogether beyond her resources.
That is exactly what I have been saying for months. The editorial goes on to say:
The main defence of the western world against nuclear war is its deterrent force and the most important components are the missiles and heavy bombers of the United States strategic air command-[DOT]
In speech after speech I have made those very statements, and for the writer of this editorial in the Globe and Mail to write as though these views are contrary to what I have been saying is, of course, simply an indication of the fact that the writer seems to have no knowledge whatsoever of what I have been saying for months past and what I said yesterday.
I have been insisting right along that Canada's defence depends on belonging to the NATO alliance, maintaining the NORAD agreement and our efforts toward peace in the United Nations. I have emphasized this time after time. I have emphasized the fact that the forces we maintain in Canada are not forces designed to meet every eventuality. We have no long range strategic bombers, we have no nuclear weapons, we have no missiles. We have no major naval vessels except one aircraft carrier. But within the NATO alliance as a whole we have all these components, and Canada's security is arrived at as a result of her membership in this alliance and the fact that we can depend on our allies to provide these various forces if they are required.
The editorial is completely ridiculous. The writer of the editorial and the Leader of the Opposition appear to dislike the fact that I used a somewhat homely analogy about a bear and a man with a rifle. Probably they do not like analogies of any kind, particularly rather homely ones.
The Leader of the Opposition went on to talk about NATO having a nuclear strategy. Later he said that he agrees that there is a nuclear strategy and believes that it must be maintained. I am glad to have him make that definite statement, because from some of the statements he has made through the country in past months you would think that he was against that idea. Having come to this position he, I hope, will remain with it.
[Mr. Harkness.l


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have said that every time I have spoken.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I hope he will not shift his position every month or so as he has done during the past several months. He asked me a question which I was not really able to catch, as to the basis on which I stated that there were several countries in NATO that have nuclear weapons on their soil and have entered into agreements with the United States in connection with those weapons, as I stated yesterday. I do not know exactly what he meant. I think he is aware of the fact that this is the case.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I asked you what countries, what members.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The only thing I would say about that would be to quote from a statement former President Eisenhower made on January 17, 1961 in a letter to congress which has been published. This letter contains a reference to an agreement with the government of Italy for co-operation in the use of atomic energy. I quote:
To facilitate the necessary co-operation on our part legislation amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was enacted by the congress in 1958. Pursuant to that legislation agreements for co-operation were concluded with four of our NATO partners in May and June 1959. A similar agreement was also recently concluded with our NATO allies, the Republic of Italy. All of these agreements are designed to implement in important respects the agreed NATO program. This agreement with the government of Italy will enable the United States to co-operate effectively in mutual defence planning with Italy and in the training of Italian NATO forces in order that, if an attack on NATO should occur, Italian forces could, under the direction of the supreme allied commander for Europe, effectively use nuclear weapons in their defence.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask the minister a question on this point, since I brought it up? Is he now telling us that these NATO members have bilateral agreements with the United States for the acquisition of nuclear weapons by their forces under national or joint control? If so, what members of NATO have made these agreements he has mentioned?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think what I have read is self - explanatory.


Paul Joseph James Martin: That is another thing altogether; that is for the peaceful use of atomic energy.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Some people refuse to understand if it does not further their own purposes. This statement made by President Eisenhower contains this sentence to which I have already referred:
*-if an attack on NATO should occur, Italian forces could, under the direction of the supreme allied commander for Europe, effectively use nuclear weapons in their defence.

I think that is clear enough. As to the other countries, I have not seen any public statements in regard to which countries they are; therefore I have to consider that as security information.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Oh, oh.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the Leader of the Opposition says "Oh, oh". He knows quite well that anything along this line is a matter of security until it is released by the people concerned. I have read the letter signed by President Eisenhower and sent to the congress of the United States, which is a matter of public record. I think it makes the situation quite clear. There is nothing to be gained by me spelling out the other four countries to which he referred. Once more, of course, as I pointed out yesterday, all this, which has been public information for some time, makes a complete sham of the position taken in connection with NATO by the New Democratic party at its convention.
Then the Leader of the Opposition went on to mention the weapons systems we have already secured, the Bomarc, the Honest John and the 104. He quoted at the time from a statement by General Foulkes in a pamphlet entitled "Canadian Defence Policy in a Nuclear Age", one of those behind the headlines booklets. He quoted what General Foulkes said as though it were government policy. The Leader of the Opposition knows that General Foulkes does not state government policy. He never did state government policy as chairman of the chiefs of staff. This was the prerogative of the members of the government under whom he served, both the government to which the hon. member belonged and the present government. From the way in which the Leader of the Opposition put this quotation on the record it would appear as though General Foulkes was stating government policy. I will not say he did so purposely, but it was designed to cause misapprehension on the part of the people listening to him or reading Hansard.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On that point, I should like to say I made it quite clear, as the record will show, that General Foulkes had no official responsibility when he made that statement.


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is fine, but I say that the way in which the quotation was put would lead most people reading Hansard to believe that General Foulkes was stating government policy. This is not the case. General Foulkes was a distinguished soldier. He is listened to with great respect on military subjects. I believe everyone in Canada accords him that respect. One of the odd things about this, and this is typical of what you
Supply-National Defence find in the Liberal party, is that only the other day the hon. member for Leeds was quoting from this same pamphlet in an attempt to show that General Foulkes was opposed to nuclear weapons. This is typical of the Liberal party, trying to go in two directions at once. The Leader of the Opposition quotes him as being strongly in favour of nuclear weapons, which he is. The hon. member for Leeds was quoting from this booklet, as a reference to page 8250 of Hansard will show, in an attempt to show that General Foulkes a great military leader in Canada, was against nuclear weapons.
This again is typical of what you get in the Liberal party. You find people going in opposite directions, so you have complete confusion in the party. I am afraid I often feel sorry for the Leader of the Opposition-


Paul Joseph James Martin: Don't feel sorry for him, feel sorry for yourself.


Douglas Scott Harkness: -as a result of the things the people in his own party do to him.


Lester Bowles Pearson: You should feel sorry for the Minister of Trade and Commerce, too.


Paul Joseph James Martin: You need the help of the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs; they should be here to help you.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I should like to draw attention to the long, sustained remarks which have been coming for some time from the hon. member for Essex East, who is deliberately breaking the rules by remaining in his seat when he makes these interruptions.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I apologize.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition made a reference to the statement the Prime Minister made in regard to the acquisition of the three weapons systems to which I have referred, the Bomarc, the Honest John and the 104. He went into the question of lead times and then gave us his own interpretation of what I had said yesterday and on previous occasions in that regard. I should like to make it quite clear once more that you cannot decide today to arm your forces with nuclear weapons carriers and, having made that decision, expect to have the forces armed with these weapons within two or three years. It takes a considerable length of time after an order is placed to produce any one of these weapons systems, and it takes a considerable length of time to train people in their operation.
As I said in my speech when I opened this debate, and as I have said on numerous occasions, it has seemed the part of wisdom to acquire certain weapons systems which

Supply-National Defence are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Then in the event a decision should be taken that nuclear warheads are required, we would be in a position to make use of them. It was in connection with this use of the analogy of the bear and the rifle that the Leader of the Opposition chose to object.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I did not object to it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is the situation. If you are going to take due precautions in the extremely troubled situation which has been existing for the last two years or more and you believe that there is any possibility that you might have to have nuclear weapons for your own defence, for defence of your own territory, then it was essential to secure the carriers, the systems which could use nuclear warheads and to put in orders for them some considerable time ahead. The Leader of the Opposition objected to the fact that we had placed orders for the Bomarc, the Honest John and the F-104, I submit that it was only the part of wisdom and prudence to have done so, whether or not they are ever actually armed with nuclear warheads.
In this connection I would just recall to the minds of hon. members that yesterday the hon. member for Trinity was comparing the Honest John unfavourably with the Little John, thus indicating how absolutely little he knows about this matter. The Honest John is a very much more effective weapon than is the Little John. The Little John is not yet even an approved weapon. It has a range of less than half of that of the Honest John and its punch is approximately one sixth less than that of the Honest John. Nevertheless the hon. member for Trinity rises in his place as though he knew all about it and says that the Honest John is an obsolete weapon and that the Americans are now producing the Little John, a very much better weapon. Once more he indicated his complete ignorance of these matters of a technical nature.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You are hiding behind your security curtain.


An hon. Member:: The hon. member for Trinity is an expert on curtains.


Douglas Scott Harkness: At this point the Leader of the Opposition made his great confession about changing his mind. I have no complaint about his changing his mind. The only thing about which I complain is that he does it so frequently that you never know where you are at with him. It is quite reasonable for a man to change his mind every two years, we will say, or every year or even oftener if conditions warrant it. But to do it every month or every week seems to be

a little bit beyond reason and leaves us in a complete state of mystery as to what his position really is on these subjects.
Following that, he went on to interceptors and in effect stated that they are no more of any use. He said that their only purpose was to protect S.A.C. bases and that they were no protection whatever for Canadian cities. I submit that if there were no defence at all in Canada or in the United States against manned bombers, the world would not be in its present situation. The Russians would probably have been in control of everything a considerable length of time ago. It is the fact that there is a defence against the manned bomber particularly, which makes it unlikely that manned bombers will come over here to drop bombs. This defence therefore constitutes a great protection for Canadian cities and for the entire population.
In addition to that, of course, in the event that a war started, while it is true they would not knock down all the bombers that come over, nevertheless they would knock down a considerable number of them; and every time you knock down a bomber carrying one or two atomic bombs, you have saved the lives of a large number of people and avoided a great deal of property damage. While these things, of course, are relative, to say that they are of no protection whatever to Canadian cities is to make a statement which is just not correct.
Next, the Leader of the Opposition proceeded to discuss the Arrow. I dealt with the Arrow the other day when the matter was raised by an other hon. member on his side, and I am not going to say much about it now. However, I will make one or two comments. This was when the Leader of the Opposition complained and asked why we changed our minds. He said, "Why did the government change its views on the bomber threat?" Again he asked, "Why did they say, when the Arrow was done away with, that there was not going to be a bomber threat any more?" Of course, that was never said to begin with. What was said at the time was that other means of defence against the bomber would be investigated. I have here the statement of the Prime Minister in connection with this matter made on Friday, February 20, 1959. He ended the statement with these words:
The government has taken no decision to acquire other aircraft to replace the CF-100, which is still an effective weapon in the defence of North America against the present bomber threat. The Minister of National Defence and the chiefs of staff are now engaged in further studies in the various alternatives for the improvement of our defences.

The then minister of national defence on May 17 last year in discussing the estimates had this to say:
Regarding the need for an interceptor, as seen at that time-
This is at the time of the cancellation of the Arrow.
-the chiefs of staff were instructed to investigate the possibility of obtaining another aircraft at a cheaper price to replace the CF-105.
We did not say that the bomber threat was gone. We did not at that time say that the CF-100 would not be replaced. In fact, we said just the opposite.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Selected scripture readings again.


Douglas Scott Harkness: To continue what the minister of national defence said on May 17, 1960:
That was stated in the House of Commons by the Prime Minister when he gave his statement, that the chiefs of staff were being instructed to investigate and see whether there was any other aircraft of proven design that was available.
As a matter of fact we have secured the F-101. As I stated here yesterday, contrary to the opinions of the hon. member for Trinity it is an exceptionally good aircraft and fills the needs.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: On a question of privilege, Mr. Chairman, I should like the minister to quote the opinion which I expressed, which is contrary to the one he just quoted.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have the floor.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: He is continually falsifying the record by misrepresenting the facts.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The hon. member cannot resist interrupting, Mr. Chairman. He is extremely sensitive. I suppose there is no one so sensitive as is the man who knows he is wrong. The hon. member for Trinity demonstrates that fact.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Let us keep our tempers down.


Douglas Scott Harkness: My temper is all right. It is the tempers on the hon. member's side that he needs to worry about. I refer to the hon. member for Trinity.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Don't be smart.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think the hon. member for Essex East had better speak to his colleague. He is excited. As was stated by the then minister of national defence, the cancellation of the Arrow to a very great extent was due to the fact that it was just too costly a weapon for the Canadian economy and Canadian defence budget to be able to stand. The cost
Supply-National Defence of it would have been something in the neighbourhood of $2,250 million or about $12,500,000 a plane.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You are lying again.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member for Trinity has just said, "You are lying again". I would request that you ask him to withdraw that remark as any other gentleman would.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Chairman, the minister used that figure no less than a day ago-


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will you allow me to make a statement, Mr. Chairman.


William Heward Grafftey: Withdraw.


Douglas Scott Harkness: On a point of order may I say that I asked for a withdrawal. If the hon. member is not sufficient of a gentleman to observe the rules of the house, then just let him sit quietly.


Alexis Pierre Caron: He can prove you were lying.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Order. I can give the hon. member for Trinity some authority for acquiescing in the request of the minister and I would appreciate it if he would withdraw the remark.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I would like you to hear me out, Mr. Chairman.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Douglas Scott Harkness: On a point of order-


An hon. Member:: He has the right of reply.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: If I can prove the minister is lying, will you accept-


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member should withdraw. He has no right to make a speech. He must withdraw.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, if the hon. member withdraws that particular word I hope it will not be interpreted in the sense of the acceptance on this side of the chamber of facts which we know not to be accurate as stated by the minister.


An hon. Member:: That is different.


Gordon Campbell Chown: I think perhaps the Leader of the Opposition was speaking from the point of view of the group situation in bringing in that particular factor. In the matter before the committee, the allegation made by the hon. member for Trinity was direct and personal and was impugning the integrity and honour of the minister of the crown who had the floor.

Supply-National Defence
For that reason, without any preliminary explanation I would ask the hon. member for Trinity to kindly withdraw the remark.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The evidence of the defence expenditures special committee-


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: -pages 146 and 147-


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, would you please ask the hon. member to resume his seat? I have the floor.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: -the committee was advised by the-


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Order. I have the floor, as it turns out, and I do not think there is any need to exercise the temper of the committee, which has been on a fairly gentle level throughout this very serious and important debate on national defence.
I say again that there is no need for any preliminary explanation on the part of the hon. member for Trinity. I know him well enough personally, to know that he knows he should withdraw the remark so we may continue the debate that is before the committee.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I withdraw the phrase I used, in accordance with parliamentary practice, while reserving the right to vindicate the statement I made later in the debate.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, after this unseemly interruption I should like to resume what I was saying, which was that the cost of the Arrow, at $2,250 million-


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You never learn. You are stupid-


Douglas Scott Harkness: -which would have been $12,500,000 per copy as the program was presented at that time and as was the estimate of the company, was just completely beyond the capability of the budget. When we told the company that and said we could not continue the program, they then made an alternative proposal of putting in, instead of a Canadian-manufactured weapons system, a United States-manufactured weapons system and said that under those conditions the cost of the airplane would be $7,800,000 per copy instead of $12,500,000 per copy.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That was the figure of the Department of National Defence.


Douglas Scott Harkness: However, this was still completely out of reason and, as the minister of national defence said on May 17, 1960:
[The Deputy Chairman.]
All I can say in conclusion is that the cost of $12J million for an aircraft, or even, if the alternative system of fire control had been introduced, of $7,800,000, was just a price tag which was too high to be included in the defence budget of those days.
That was the situation in regard to that.


Lester Bowles Pearson: And get back half of it in
taxes.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I should like to point out in this connection that we were not alone in cancelling one of these extremely high priced airplanes. The United States cancelled their 108 really for exactly the same reasons that we cancelled the 105, because they considered the cost of the airplane was too great for the return involved, and also because they considered their other airplanes, the F-101, the F-102 and the F-106 were adequate for the purpose of meeting the bomber threat as they saw it at that time.
Of these airplanes, of course the F-101 is one of those we are going to get, and it is the only two-seater airplane of the lot. Both the 102 and the 106 are single-seater airplanes and are not adapted for the job that is to be done here in Canada. The next thing-


Gordon Campbell Chown: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the minister, but his time has expired.


Some hon. Members:: Go ahead.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Does the committee give unanimous consent to the minister continuing?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition went on to say that he thought the Bomarc was obsolete, that it is no good. Then of course the hon. member for Trinity made similar statements. If that is the case, here is a very peculiar thing which I would ask the committee to consider. There was a story written by Paul Dubois in the Ottawa Citizen of October 29, 1960. The dateline was "Thurso". It was about the speech of the Leader of the Opposition at a rally in support of Gaston Clermont, Liberal candidate in the by-election occurring at that time in Labelle riding.


Some hon. Members:: And elected.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I would read the committee the direct quote. Perhaps the Leader of the Opposition will say he was misquoted, but the direct quote of what he said was this:
A nuclear deterrent may be necessary for the U.S., but not for us and other countries. If Russia ever attacked North America and specifically Canada, Montpellier would be a prime target for the Russians, Montpellier and communities for hundreds of miles around would be reduced to ruins.

If Montpellier was going to be a prime target because it had the Bomarc base there, why does the Leader of the Opposition now say that the Bomarc is completely useless? If it is completely useless the Russians would not be wasting any bombs on it.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Douglas Scott Harkness: We find the Leader of the Opposition, for election purposes, going to this area and saying this terrible Conservative government had built a Bomarc station there and that was going to bring Russian bombers and these people would be wiped out if the balloon ever went up.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The balloon went up this last minute.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition says the Bomarc is no good and nobody takes it seriously except this government. He says the Russians do not pay any attention to it. That is another example of the logic of the Leader of the Opposition in connection with these matters. Now-


Lionel Chevrier: Take a long breath.


Douglas Scott Harkness: He went on to say that the Liberals had put up a much better policy last year and he indicated much better roles that Canada might be following as far as defence is concerned.
What was this great policy they put up last year? As described by my predecessor, it was a policy of scrap, scrap, scrap. They wanted to scrap practically everything and what they did not want to scrap in this so-called policy consisted chiefly of advocating things which we had already done or were proposing to do. I have a list here and I could go over them in detail, but I hardly think it is worth while. I will just indicate that they urged the abandonment of the SAGE Bomarc system and recommended the purchase from the United States of a number of supersonic interceptor aircraft. They knew we were negotiating at that time for supersonic aircraft, so they recommended this and thought they would get on the bandwagon, I suppose.
There is one other thing I should like to mention. They advocated, really, that the navy should become a sort of glorified merchant marine.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Assault vessels for the troops.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Fortunately that policy is not supported by anybody except themselves. That so-called policy is so full of holes that it is much worse than one of those famous cheeses.


An hon. Member:: It smells worse, too.
Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Leader of the Opposition read some quotations from newspapers supporting the position that they take. I have a whole file here attacking the position they have taken, but I certainly have not time to read them. This sort of reading does not prove very much, of course.
After lunch-I think the Leader of the Opposition must have had a good lunch-he seemed to get onto a somewhat better tack. He got away from this attempt to justify the mistakes that he and his party had made in the past in regard to defence and he got on to a discussion of NATO, what its objective should be, how nuclear weapons might be controlled in it, and so on. The hon. gentleman said he did not object to NATO having nuclear weapons. As I indicated, I was very glad to have that definite statement from him and I hope he will stay with it. I think we all realize that the control of nuclear weapons is an extremely difficult problem, as the hon. gentleman himself admitted. It is, of course, one which has been exercising the attention of governments of the NATO countries for a very considerable time. To date, no generally acceptable solution has been reached. It is a problem which I certainly trust can be solved, just as the Leader of the Opposition does and as, I think, we all do, but it has not been solved to date.
There is another question which was raised by the Leader of the Oppositoin and with which I should like to deal briefly. He referred to 15 fingers on the trigger. Of course, it would be hardly a credible type of deterrent if we had to obtain the agreement of 15 countries before nuclear weapons might be used, in certain circumstances particularly. In this connection a great deal of thought has been given to whether what are known in the navy in particular as rules of engagement might not be worked out-whether all the 15 countries of NATO might not agree to those rules of engagement, as they are called, which would lay down the situation in which each country would agree that nuclear weapons might be used. There is, I think, hope of arriving at some type of what might be called full NATO control over the use of nuclear weapons by this means.
The Leader of the Opposition spoke of the necessity, in his view, of building up the conventional front line strength of NATO. I fully agree that not only the conventional front line strength of NATO but the conventional strength of the organization generally should be built up. I do not think anybody would quarrel with the hon. gentleman in this regard. Ever since the organization was established, one of the greatest difficulties as far as NATO is concerned has been the failure

Supply-National Defence of certain members of that organization to build up their conventional forces at a sufficiently rapid pace to the strength to which they themselves had agreed to bring them at some time in the future. Of course, the greater the degree to which each of the individual countries in NATO builds its conventional strength the stronger the force will be. I think the Leader of the Opposition and myself share common ground in that regard. As a matter of fact, the increase in the Canadian force which was announced here last week is an indication of Canada's willingness to build up her own NATO strength and increase her contribution to NATO.
I should like to say a word about one idea which the Leader of the Opposition put out- the idea that the Russians might launch a limited conventional war, and that we must have some means of dealing with it. I do not think that eventuality is very likely, though I do not say it is impossible; nothing is impossible. But I think it is very unlikely that the Russians would start a limited war in Europe which they would expect to keep as a conventional war. If they were to do so I think the chance of such a conflict developing into a nuclear war would be very great. For this reason I hope the Russians would not contemplate such action for a minute because it would be an extremely dangerous type of move.
As the Leader of the Opposition pointed out, perhaps the greatest danger we face in the world today is that of a war started by accident. This is something which could happen, and it is a possibility which needs to be guarded against very carefully as far as the west is concerned'-and we trust the Russians will take equal precautions. However, as I say, the chance that they would start a fair sized conventional war in the expectation that it could be kept at that is, I think, very unlikely. The basic situation is that they have nuclear weapons in their force in eastern Europe, and if they started to move, Mr. Khrushchev himself has said they are going to use everything. That is why it is necessary to have sufficient strength to deter them from ever making such a move. I agree it is the most important thing in the world at the present time to try to ensure that peace continues. On that note I think I will end.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I apologize for taking up the time of the committee at this stage but it is most difficult to conduct a responsible examination of the estimates of the Department of National Defence when the committee cannot rely on information given it by the Minister of National Defence. The example we have had this afternoon is just one of


many. Either the minister's memory is incomparably bad or he gives us wrong information.
For example, in respect to the cost of the Avro Arrow, in May of this year, speaking on Vancouver island during the by-election, the minister is reported to have said, according to a newspaper which he indicated this morning was a good paper, that the planes would have cost $15 million each. The report in the Victoria daily Colonist reads in part:
Referring to the Liberal leader's remarks about the scrapping of the Avro Arrow jet interceptors the defence minister stated that the planes would have cost $15 million each and that the huge cost would have meant scrapping much of the army and navy strength.
This afternoon the minister must have decided in his imagination that it would be more credible if he reduced the figure to $12 million each. And then, when he was challenged, as he was yesterday when he pulled the same trick, he reduced the figure to $7.81 million each. Even that figure is too high, because that is the figure which was given to the special select committee on estimates a year ago as the cost of 108 operational aircraft plus 12 pre-production models. If hon. members do the arithmetic they will find that the cost per operational aircraft was $6.8 million each.


An hon. Member:: Still too much.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is all in the evidence. The minister is aware of it, and for him to stand up and tell this committee that the cost would have been $12 million each is an insult to hon. members, particularly as the evidence given by the former deputy minister of national defence, now Air Chief Marshal Miller, was that the planes would cost $6.8 million each. How can we have any faith in anything the minister tells us if he uses a device of this kind to try to confuse and bewilder both the committee and the Canadian people?
This is a type of arithmetic which might be applied to a new situation. The minister has just worked out an arrangement under which the Canadian Department of National Defence is to receive 66 Voodoo aircraft in exchange for certain things. I have the agreement here. I shall not read it in detail, but in exchange for the 66 Voodoo aircraft the department agrees to take over from the United States the cost of maintaining Pinetree radar stations previously maintained by the United States air force. In addition, it is to contribute $50 million toward a program of military aid- toward the acquisition of F-104 aircraft to be built at Canadair in Montreal.
In addition, it will pay one third of the cost of spares and ground handling equipment for the Voodoo in the amount of $10.9 million.

Now, there is no cut-off date as to when Canada's responsibility ends in respect of maintaining the Pinetree line. The annual cost of maintaining the Pinetree line has been variously estimated. The then minister of national defence, the Hon. George Pearkes, V.C., advised the house on March 2, 1959, as reported on page 1518 of Hansard as follows:
Mr. Speaker, before the house rose for the dinner recess, the Leader of the Opposition had asked for information with regard to the cost of the Pinetree system. As I explained, the Pinetree system is shared by the United States and by Canada, some of the stations being operated by Canadians and some being operated by the Americans. The cost to Canada of operating each year is approximately $28 million; that is the cost of operating those Pinetree stations which were either built by Canada and manned by R.C.A.F. personnel or were built by the United States and manned by R.C.A.F. personnel. The cost to the United States is approximately $43 million for operating their stations. That figure of $43 million includes some $5 million which the United States are spending on purchasing equipment for those stations in Canada.
Hence if Canada were to take over the operation of the line in its entirety it would mean the addition of $43 million to our defence budget at the present time.
A United States congressional subcommittee was advised by the director general of the United States air force budget that the saving to the United States air force by Canada taking over the cost of the Pinetree line was $50 million a year. If this is so, Mr. Chairman, let us assume that we have to maintain this Pinetree line for ten years. The cost, even by using the lower figure recorded by the Minister of National Defence, would be $430 million. Add to this $50 million which is Canada's share of the purchase of F-104's, and $10.9 million which is our share of the spares for the Voodoo, and the total cost is $490.9 million for 66 aircraft or approximately $7.5 million per copy. If we had to maintain those stations for 15 years the cost would be a total of $705.9 million, or more than $10 million a copy, far more than it would have cost to carry on with the Avro Arrow program.
The Minister of National Defence told the people in Victoria that the commencement of the Avro Arrow program was the greatest mistake ever made by the Canadian government. Well, the deal he has just made with the United States government, which could result in the cost of $10 million each for aircraft which at the most are not worth more than $2 million each, is in my opinion one of the biggest boobs ever pulled by a minister of national defence.
In closing may I say I think the minister should apologize to the committee for using figures upon which it cannot rely.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, if these allegations came from some serious source I
Supply-National Defence would take them seriously. However, I consider the source from which they come and I will merely say that the figures the hon. gentleman is producing are probably comparable with the figures he was trying to produce yesterday as to what the cost would be for the 15,000 more troops we are going to raise, which he insisted was double what I had said they would be, although this was a figure arrived at by careful estimates of the departmental officials and officials of treasury board. But he produces any figures that his imagination suggests to him and I suggest that the committee should not take him to seriously-I certainly do not take him too seriously-in regard to these matters.
As far as the actual cost of taking over these Pinetree lines, and so on, is concerned, if the cost went on for long enough, of course, it might be very considerable. But the main point is that we are taking over those radar stations in Canada, manning them by Canadian personnel and operating them with Canadian personnel rather than having them operated by United States personnel.
Hon. gentlemen opposite are always complaining about having United States personnel here stating that it is an infringement of our sovereignty. Therefore rather than complaining about it they should be happy to see Canadian personnel replacing United States personnel in manning those radar stations. The point is, if you take a long enough period you can arrive at any figures you like.
Members of the committee will recall an item which appeared in the paper the other day. There was a clergyman in Boston who sent a bill to the chancellor of the exchequer for $18 worth of damage done to the fence of his church back in 1770 something. He presented a bill for upwards of $750,000. If you take a long enough period you can come up with a terrific figure. In effect this is what the hon. member is doing.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Could I ask the minister a question arising out of the article by Mr. John Gellner which he quoted a few minutes ago. The article criticized the Liberal party. Does the minister agree with this statement in the article:
The country certainly needs a Minister of National Defence who can overcome public apathy and suspicion, and restore confidence in Canadian military policy.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Where did the hon. member find that? The reason I ask the question is that as I recall this particular statement by Mr. Gellner, he went on to say, "It looks as if Canada has secured one."


Lester Bowles Pearson: No, Mr. Chairman. I will send the article over. It went on to say:
Let us hope Harkness is the man.

Supply-National Defence
But I am sure his hopes are not realized now.


Douglas Scott Harkness: He suggests strongly that I am the man, as I recall it.
(Translation):


Jean-Paul Deschatelets: Mr. Chairman, this debate, which is of such great significance to all Canadians, has now reached its third day, and we just heard from the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) a masterful statement on all aspects of the national defence policy Canada should follow, a statement which the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Harkness) was unable to refute. We therefore have the proof that in this field as in all others, the Canadians who are looking for guidance and leadership must turn to the Liberal party and not to the government which persists in taking a confused and ambiguous position in this and every other matter.
Mr. Chairman, I intend to speak very briefly on this question which seems to me a capital one at this time and which is a subject of interest and concern for the Canadian people. The present situation may be summed up in the following question. What is the policy of this government with regard to the use of nuclear arms in Canada?
Mr. Chairman, I think that the discussion of the estimates of the Department of National Defence, which takes place this year in the midst of an international crisis, would have been a very appropriate moment for the government to state a definite policy and tell us clearly whether or not it had come to a decision with regard to the number one problem, the use of nuclear arms in Canada.
It is inconceivable that the government after three days of debate should leave us in an ambiguous position. The situation is becoming more and more confused. Only yesterday, the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) when concluding his speech called upon the government and the Minister of National Defence clearly to state their policy in respect of nuclear arms in Canada. As a matter of fact, the hon. member for Essex East said this, and I quote from page 8330 of Hansard: (Text):
We are entitled to know, before parliament adjourns, with respect to this very vital matter of whether or not the government has a policy; and if it has, the government should state it in a forthright and unambiguous way.
(Translation):
Here is the answer given by the Minister of National Defence, as recorded in Hansard on page 8330.


(Text):


Douglas Scott Harkness: In reply to that, Mr. Chairman, I would say that I do not propose to accept the directions of the hon. member for Essex East as to what I should or should not say in this debate.
I contend that this is an extraordinary statement on the part of the minister and I hope that this observation of the minister will receive wide publicity because he has overlooked a very important fact. When the hon. member for Essex East asked the government to tell us what their policy is he was not speaking on behalf of the Liberal party only but also on behalf of the Canadian people who would like to know what the decision of the government is on this important question.
(Translation):
Mr. Chairman, such indecision on the part of the government is not only disappointing but also detrimental to the interests of Canada, and as long as no clear and specific decision is arrived at on this most important matter, Canada will be incapable of playing the leading part that it should play.
I listened last Tuesday to the statement made by the minister. That statement can only lead to speculation. Here is what he said as recorded on page 8223 of Hansard:
It requires that they be equipped with weapons comparable to if not better than those of a potential adversary. It is the policy of the government that our forces should not be required to face a potential enemy with inferior weapons.
Mr. Chairman, most newspapers understood that the government had decided to acquire atomic weapons and to become a member of the nuclear club. But that statement is ambiguous and causes dissatisfaction everywhere among the public.
1 also listened to the remarks of the Associate Minister of National Defence (Mr. Sevigny); he too avoided any definite statement on this capital matter. Indeed, he considered war in terms of the 1914 world war or the second world war because, according to page 8241 of Hansard, he stated:
If the worst should come, if we have to fight again, I do not hesitate to say that we shall once again win the battles of tomorrow just as we won the battles of yesteryear, and this for many reasons.
Well, the minister has forgotten, I think, that victory has no meaning at all in a nuclear war. However, he was a little more careful yesterday than he was when he addressed a rally in Mont Laurier during the last by-election campaign in the constituency of Labelle. I should tell him that I was not far from the place where he was speaking and that I heard him enumerate the advantages of the La Macaza launching base. The

minister will recall, I hope, that one of the reasons for his party's humiliating defeat in the riding of Labelle was precisely the stand taken by his government on this question of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Chairman, after three days of debate, it is obvious that the government's national defence policy is several years old, as the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer) has shown, and that the government has not had the courage to adopt a definite position concerning the use of nuclear weapons in Canada. As long as this situation prevails, we cannot hope to play the part we could play, and we would be ill-advised to criticize today the other countries which belong to the nuclear club since our objections to nuclear tests would be weakened because of the position taken by the government.
That is a cause of great disappointment for all Canadians but they have one reason for keeping up their hopes, and that is the fact that there is one political party which has remained true to the policy it has always advocated with respect to nuclear weapons. Here I should like to quote from the newspaper Le Devoir of Tuesday, April 11, 1961. Here is what Paul Sauriol had to say in an editorial:
The Liberal party rally, last January, clearly declared itself against acquisition or use of nuclear weapons in Canada, under any form of control; Mr. Pearson said that such weapons were not required for the time being.
What position we took at the rally was our position before and it still is our position. That is something that one cannot say of this administration.
I do not want to be too critical of the C.C.F. members who have been wearing since last summer a new jacket which fits them about as well as a strait-jacket. As I say, I do not want to be too hard on them, because it is really pitiful to see them trying to take positions now to the left, now to the right, according to the instructions they get.
I simply say that the only encouraging sign for Canadians is the fact that at least there is in the Canadian political life one party with a clean cut position, with a clear stand, a constant stand, and I am proud to be a member of that party, the Liberal party.
(Text):


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Mr. Chairman, regardless of the sombre nature of this debate, I for one am very pleased to note two cheering news items in the afternoon paper. The first in the Citizen, is headed, "U.S. Ready for Serious U.N. Talks With Russia". It is a Reuters dispatch from London and reads as follows:
Supply-National Defence
Soviet foreign minister Andrei Gromyko is ready to enter into an exchange of opinions with U.S. state secretary Dean Rusk on Germany and other problems, the Soviet news agency Tass announced today.
The other one is in today's Ottawa Journal. It is a report on a meeting held by Willy Brandt, and it reads in part as follows:
Speaking in the heart of the socialist Ruhr before a quiet, attentive audience of at least 20,000 with several thousand more milling outside, Mr. Brandt rejected proposals for atomic weapons for Germany and pledged faithful adherence to the pact of London that forbids Germany to produce atomic weapons.
I thought I would mention those two news items because they are heartening, I think, to anyone who is interested in watching developments on the international scene.
We have had a rather lengthy and interesting discussion, Mr. Chairman, with respect to military hardware. It seems to me to be pretty well a stalemate, and at times the debate was difficult to follow. Of course, I would not suggest for a moment that I am capable of speaking with any knowledge or judgment on such a question. As a member of the working class I am more acquainted with the saw, the axe, the pick and shovel. I could pass some opinion as to the quality of those tools, but not those that have been mentioned previously in the debate.
Now, Mr. Chairman, at the request of a number of people I again raise a matter that I raised yesterday, a matter that is of serious concern to a great number of Canadians. Yesterday, Mr. Chairman, I made certain statements with respect to General Heusinger and expressed strong opposition to his appointment as chairman of the military representatives committee of NATO. This means that he is one of those who plan the strategy and tactics of NATO and who, indirectly, would direct the activities and actions of Canadian troops. I want to say that my statements were not made lightly. They were not made just to create resentment or anything of that sort. I feel very keenly on this matter and I speak with conviction. I feel as keenly as a number of other persons do, a number of other groups in Canada and in the United States.
The Associate Minister of National Defence replied briefly to my arguments and at one point said that General Heusinger was a man who had served his country with distinction. He then went on to defend the appointment of this general to this very important position. I am quite sure that the Associate Minister of National Defence spoke according to the information he had available. I am confident also that, judging from his remarks,

Supply-National Defence he has not been completely informed on this matter. In order to put the record straight, and on behalf of a number of Canadian citizens, I want to place the facts on the record. This appointment offends a good many Canadians in various groups, including religious, ethnic and other groups.
In order that there will be no misunderstanding, and for the sake of accuracy, I am going to read at some length. I trust the committee will bear with me so that the facts will be on the record. I have read a number of books and documents that have been brought to my office by people interested in this problem, including one lady of German descent. I have the Congressional Record.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Perhaps the hon. member would be king enough to indicate to the committee how long this quotation is. We have had a rather bad precedent, when a very long quotation was put on Hansard the other day, and I would not want to see this become a practice. If the hon. member would indicate to the committee how long it is, that would be helpful.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I would judge, Mr. Chairman, it is about half as long as the interesting statement put on the record by the Progressive Conservative member the other day.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Perhaps I should get the consent of the committee, then, if it is that long. Will the committee give unanimous consent to the putting on the record of this information?


John Cameron Pallett: Why does the hon. member not give the library reference, and then those who are interested can read it?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I shall give the sources.


Gordon Campbell Chown: I have not had the
consent of the committee as yet. Does the committee give its consent?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Because I was the person who unwittingly made arrangements for seeing that the situation which confronted us the other day was procedurally put on paper, may I ask is the hon. member proposing now that he just table the reference? This would be contrary to our procedure.


Gordon Campbell Chown: The hon. member indicated to me he was going to quote it. I asked him if he would be kind enough to advise the committee, in whose hands I am on this matter, how long it was. He said it was about half the length of the very long statement put on the record the other day by the hon. member for St. Boniface which


I felt, on reading Hansard, created a rather bad precedent. I feel I should ask leave from the committee to permit this substantial quotation to be put on the record. Does the committee give its unanimous consent?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I take it, then, that the statement is going to take 25 or 30 minutes to read. Under those circumstances, I do not think we could agree to have the statement read into the record.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Perhaps the hon. member could paraphrase what it says, and get it on the record in that fashion. I do not want to be unfair, but I do not want to see this practice develop in committee and I think hon. members would agree because the committee could get into a very complex and difficult situation if we were too free in our interpretation of this particular rule.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I shall try to take extracts from this reference. I would rather not paraphrase it because I want it to be exact. This is a most interesting document, and I should like the information to be recorded here. I will read extracts and I will try to be as brief as possible. I certainly do not intend to be anything like 30 minutes.
Now, I am quoting from the United States Congressional Record for April 19 of this year. These various groups had made representations to Senator Wayne Morse-


John Cameron Pallett: What page?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: The pages I start at is 5893. There are several pages, in fact, but I am only going to take extracts. An appeal was made to Senator Wayne Morse by the American Jewish congress and other groups to bring these matters to the attention of the United States senate, which he did. In doing so, he said:
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that there be printed at this point in the record, as part of my remarks, the fact sheet on the record of General Adolf Heusinger.
There being no objection, the fact sheet was ordered to be printed in the record, as follows: Fact Sheet on General Adolf Heusinger
(Issued In conjunction with the appeal to Mr. Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, by the Warsaw ghetto commemoration meeting, April 16, 1961, at Manhattan Centre, New York City. The appeal urged the annulment of the appointment of General Adolf Heusinger, chairman of the military representatives committee in permanent session of NATO)
In his autobiography, "Befehl in Widersteit," published in West Germany in 1950, Heusinger wrote that he sympathized with the 1923 Hitler putsch in Munich, but did not participate because he was sure the attempt would fail.
In 1940, Heusinger became chief of operations on Hitler's general staff. Was responsible for the military planning of all Nazi invasions from then on.

In 1942 was made responsible lor all actions against partisans. In August 1942 this order, initiated by Heusinger, was sent to the army group centre on eastern front:
"The Fuehrer demands immediate retaliatory action for (partisan) attack on the railroad station in Slavnoye, with the use of the strongest measures of terror. Report what measures you take.'' Heusinger's order resulted in the following: In Slavnoye the Nazis threw several dozen live children into a deep well. None survived. In another village, Gayanka, Heusinger's troops exterminated the entire population of 115.
Heusinger, as chief of operations of the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht)-the high command of the Nazi forces, commanded the special extermination squads (Einsatzgruppen). These squads were given the task of exterminating all Jews and other groups. William L. Shirer describes some of the mass atrocities committed by Heu-singer's Einsatzgruppen (see pages 961 to 963 of "The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich.")
In "SS-Alibi of a Nation" Reitlinger says that Heusinger planned the levy en masse of the civilian population on the eastern front (page 386).
Heusinger was one of Hitler's most trusted generals. When a bomb planted by army officers exploded at Rastenburg. East Prussia, during a meeting of Hitler and his top generals, the following facts should be remembered:
After the bombing, Hitler said on the radio, "But you should know of a crime unparalleled in German history. The bomb seriously wounded a number of my true and loyal collaborators." (For Heusinger's role in the aftermath to the July 20, 1944, bombing see Shirer, pp. 1044 et seq : Reitlinger, "SS," pp. 386 et seq.).
The loyal Hitler general who was giving a detailed report on the Russian front at the precise time of the bombing was Gen. Adolf Heusinger.
That, though wounded, the general who led the vengeful hunt against other Nazi generals who had failed in their plan to kill Hitler so that they could negotiate a separate peace with the West was Gen. Adolf Heusinger.
That the top-ranking military figure who participated prominently in the mass executions that followed wherein the victims were slowly strangled
A3!)	wires as they hung from meat hooks, was
Adolf Heusinger.
That among the handful who survived the bombing and was called by Hitler himself-
This is after the bombing.
-as "my true and loyal collaborator" was Adolf Heusinger.
That the first recipient of Hitler's July 20, 1944, medal commemorating the bombing at Rastenburg was Gen. Adolph Heusinger.


John Cameron Pallett: Will the hon. member indicate the page he is on at the moment.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Supply-National Defence today. In my opinion this type of appointment creates unnecessary suspicion so far as the Soviet and other countries behind the iron curtain are concerned. Place yourself in their position, Mr. Chairman, knowing that the chairman of the top planning body of NATO was a general who was merciless in the destruction of their civilian population.
I therefore say that in the first instance it is unsound from our point of view to create this -unnecessary irritation and to arouse suspicion on the part of behind the iron curtain countries as to our motives and as to our principles in which we profess we believe. I think it causes unnecessary distress to many people as for instance to the unhappy relatives who suffered from this sort of thing. I think it causes suspicion even among Canadians who are given cause to wonder, when we talk about our being a Christian democracy and use language of that type, how we can justify Canadian troops in reality, if not in effect, actually marching under the leadership of a general with a record such as this. It may create in young people a feeling of cynicism and a lack of belief in the things for which we profess to stand. I know that it creates a great deal of resentment among former veterans of the first and second world wars. Just imagine the feelings of relatives of veterans who sacrificed their lives in the first and second world wars in the defence of principles in which we in Canada believe. With all my heart I believe that an appointment of this type does our cause harm. I feel deeply on this question. I do not think we can justify this appointment. There are a good many other people in our country who feel keenly and sincerely with respect to a question of this type.
The hon. member for Essex East for whom I have great respect made some reference to my remarks yesterday and said that he could understand them as possibly they were somewhat motivated by my experience in the first world war. That is not the situation at all. No one can accuse me of being in any sense a person who has any antagonism towards any race. Anyone who has known of my life throughout the years and my activities in the district in which I live knows that is not true, and that on behalf of even German citizens during the war, I sought to make sure they obtained justice during those difficult times. I do not express these views because of antipathy to any race. I recognize the position of the ordinary soldier who served his country in time of war whether he was on our side or the enemy side. I refer to the ordinary soldier recruited to serve in what he considered to be his country's defence. However,


Mr. Chairman, we must remember that people like General Heusinger were the leaders. These were the people who decided policy. They were the ones who gave expression to nazi ideology, nazi ethics in battle, and who transgressed all the known ethics of modern warfare, in so far as one can term war as having any ethics at all.
A good deal of my information comes from friends of mine of German ancestry. A German lady visited my office just a few nights ago. She came from New York to visit me. I have also had Germans working for me in my constituency on many occasions and I know the contribution they make to society. They are the type of Germans who opposed nazism and left Germany because of it in the first place. They oppose nazism and I respect those people.
I am speaking of those who supported this nazi ideology which we, at great cost, defeated in world war II. I and others oppose this appointment because we believe, in the light of all the circumstances of what the western world suffered in world war II and because of our professed principles, that such an appointment is strictly immoral and, as I said before, weakens our cause.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in conclusion I urge the government to consider the feelings of the people who feel keenly about this; to obtain the facts and to do what they can to see that this general is replaced by someone with a clean military record, someone who cannot stir up the feelings of many in our country and other countries by creating unnecessary suspicion as to our methods.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I do not propose to enter into any argument with the hon. member for Kootenay West as to the antecedents of General Heusinger. I merely wish to say that the hon. member has given the opinions of one or two men and perhaps somebody else in connection with this matter. My information is that it was precisely because Dr. Adenauer was convinced of the anti-nazi antecedents of General Heusinger that he appointed him as his chief military adviser in, I believe, 1950. I do not think the hon. member doubts the anti-nazi character of Dr. Adenauer or his general attitude.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Mr. Chairman, I have just this to say regarding what the hon. member for Kootenay West has said. I have no means of knowing the validity of the evidence he has produced, but it seems to me that to leave this matter open, with the possibility that this kind of thing will be disseminated in Russia, with no valid answer to it except that apparently Dr. Adenauer was satisfied, would be a very dangerous thing.

I hope we will pursue this matter further. It seems to me that if there were not an adequate answer to the evidence produced by the hon. member the Russians would be able to disseminate this opinion which we have received from a reputable source. The hon. member is known to us and his own war record is known. He knows of responsible people feeling as he does in connection with this matter and I hope the matter will not be allowed to drop here.


Frank Charles McGee: Shall vote 232 carry?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Chairman, there is just one brief matter to which I would refer, for the record. As reported at page 8176 of Hansard, the other day the hon. member for Kootenay West made this observation, which is reported at the top of the page:
We were listening to him carefully-
That is the Prime Minister:
-and at one point we understood him to indicate that it was the government's position that if there were any change in the status of West Berlin, or a war, that we were honour bound in this country to support war. Am I correct in that interpretation?
The Prime Minister said in reply:
What I said was this. If perchance, and all of us hope to the contrary, war came, we would become a participant because of our relationship, our undertakings and our pledges in NATO.
I simply wish to say for the record that, while it is true that under article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we would be involved, we have constitutional processes in this country which, subject of course to the exigencies of nuclear war, we must observe. That is, before there is any declaration of war by the executive arm of the government or by circumstances such as I have envisaged, such as a nuclear war, parliament must authorize a declaration of war. There is no automatic involvement. This is our constitutional position. I am sure it was inadvertently left out by the Prime Minister.


Frank Charles McGee: Shall vote 232 carry?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Before the vote carries, Mr. Chairman, I have one or two routine questions to ask the minister, if he would like to have his officials come in now. One question concerns the number of people now at national defence headquarters.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As far as the number of people actually there is concerned, I think the details are given at page 316 of the estimates book, which I note the hon. member has before him.
90205-6-528
Supply-National Defence
At page 317 it shows that for the year 1961-62 the number is 661, and for 1960-61 it was 670. In other words, last fiscal year it was 670 and this year it is 661.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Those are the figures given in the blue book, and I presume in the details. I wonder whether the minister can say if there has been any change since these figures were published?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am informed, Mr. Chairman, that there has been no change in that figure since the estimates book was published.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Could the minister indicate the number of service personnel presently stationed at national defence headquarters and give the comparable figure for a year ago?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I will just give the total figures for the navy, army, air force and triservice personnel. At December 31, 1960 the total was 3,045; at March 31, 1961, it was 3,029, and at June 30, 1961, it was 3,097. From March 31, 1960, it is given for March, October, December and then March and June. It has varied from 3,039 up to 3,097.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Could the minister say whether any additional service personnel will be required at national defence headquarters as a result of the proposed build-up both in the regular and auxiliary services?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not think there will be any increase. As a matter of fact, some of the military personnel at army headquarters have been used and will be used to man the alternate army headquarters which has been set up and which is now manned. Therefore, the number here will actually be reduced rather than built up, I think.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I note there has been practically no change in the strength of the personnel either civilian or military at national defence headquarters. I should like the minister to comment on this statement:
In my opinion the first step which should be taken as far as reorganizing Canada's defence set up is concerned is the complete reorganization of national defence headquarters in order to secure efficiency and economy at that level. I have spoken on this subject before: perhaps it may be said that I have harped on it during the past-
-two or three years.
I have made speeches on the subject when the defence estimates were up going back to a period of two or three years after the war. In speeches I have made from that time on I have referred to the top heavy organization of defence headquarters and the large proportion of service personnel in administrative and desk jobs as compared to those in fighting units.
A little later on the hon. gentleman said:
In any event it has been my contention for several years past that defence headquarters is top heavy and as a result wasteful and inefficient. I now have two very powerful witnesses to reinforce
8370	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence that claim. General Simonds has said in this article that the headquarters is top heavy. The minister, of course, said that was only his opinion. I think that opinion is a very weighty one and it is reinforced by General Macklin and every other retired officer with any experience with whom I have ever spoken with regard to the matter.
Would the minister agree to comment on that statement, and indicate if in his opinion it is still a fair reflection of his views?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Would the hon. member give us the source of that extract?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Well, with very small paraphrasing, the minister himself is the author.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I recognized some of the phrases although I did not recognize the passage entirely and I wondered what the hon. gentleman was reading. Was he perhaps paraphrasing something which appeared in Hansard'!


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The pasage appeared in Hansard on July 19, 1956 and the only change I made was to change seven or eight years to two or three years. The hon. gentleman will find the reference on page 6175 of Volume 6.


Douglas Scott Harkness: First of all, since that date the number of civilian employees employed in the headquarters of the department has been cut down from 791 to the present strength of 661. In spite of the fact that the workload has been increasing there has been a considerable reduction in the number of personnel at headquarters. As far as the various staffs are concerned, as I have indicated, some of the headquarters personnel are now toeing employed in manning the alternate army headquarters which have been set up. Some of the personnel who will be used to man the target headquarters outside cities will also come from this source.
In addition, I should like to tell the hon. member that I instituted some time ago a very thorough manpower study with the object in mind of cutting out any unnecessary personnel who might be shown to be on the strength of the national defence headquarters.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Has that study yet been completed?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, it has not been completed yet.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister say how many persons are on his personal staff at the present time and also how many are on the staff of the associate minister?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The number of persons on the combined staff of the associate minister and myself is 34. I may say that the number of persons on my own staff is, I think, smaller


than the number employed on the staff of any minister of national defence in the last years at least.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It seems that the associate minister is compensating for that difference.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think the total number of people on the staff of the minister and the asociate minister is less than the number serving in the period of Mr. Claxton and Mr. Campney, though I will have that checked. This is despite the fact that the workload has considerably increased; we have many more military commitments than we had then.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It is also due, perhaps, to some of the additional confusion.
I wonder if the minister has any plans for a new national defence headquarters and whether a site has yet been chosen.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As the hon. member is aware, this matter has been under consideration for a long time-at least for ten or 12 years and perhaps even longer than that. Several sites have been considered, but to date no agreement has been reached between the Department of National Defence, the National Capital Commission and the Department of Public Works, in particular, as to the exact site on which the national headquarters will be built. I sincerely hope we shall be able to get an agreement on the site and begin construction in the fairly near future.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is this decision subject to the troika principle?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not know what the hon. gentleman means by that. However, I think he is aware that all three departments are concerned in this matter.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I realize it is not usual to prepare any working drawings or anything of that kind before a site has been chosen, but can the minister say whether there have been any preliminary studies of the requirements with regard to space, the type of building which will be needed, the provision of the protection against fall-out and so on.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The study on manpower requirements at the national headquarters is related to this very question. If we find we can cut down the number of personnel at the headquarters it would, of course, mean we could construct a smaller building than would otherwise be the case. There have, of course, been a considerable number of studies regarding the space which would be required in order to bring under one roof, or into one set of connected buildings, all the installations, numbering at the present time something of the order of 53, I believe, which are now scattered about Ottawa.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.

Inspection services-
233.	Operation and maintenance, $7,224,436.
Chesley William Carter: I understand that the inspection services include the inspection of the quality of purchases of material and equipment and that they also cover the quality of performance. Will the minister say who carries out the inspection of the fixed assets and stores which are kept over a period of years? Will he also tell us whether the inspection services have anything to do with the inspection of the efficiency of administration or the efficiency of training?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The inspection services have nothing to do with those two latter matters. Once goods have been purchased and delivered to the respective services each service is responsible for the inspection of those stores in its own quartermaster's stores and so forth. Essentially the inspection services inspect articles which are being delivered to the Department of National Defence to ensure they are up to specification.


Chesley William Carter: Who is responsible after that? Does the responsibility for continuous inspection rest with the commanders?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Once the stores are delivered -we will take boots as an example-they are delivered to the ordnance depot and the ordnance depot is responsible for seeing that they are kept there under proper condition and in good shape. Then, when they are delivered to a unit, say an infantry battalion, that battalion is responsible for their proper storage and to see that they are kept in proper condition there.


Chesley William Carter: I was thinking of stores that might deteriorate over a period of years. Who would carry out any tests on goods that might deteriorate? Is that done by the ordnance department, or is there some machinery within the command for that?


Douglas Scott Harkness: It depends on what type of stores they are. If they are medical stores, the medical service would declare them unserviceable when they considered that they had reached that stage, we will say. With respect to dental stores, the dental people would do it. With respect to general stores, the ordnance people would do it. If a unit has some stores that it thinks are unserviceable it declares them unserviceable and the ordnance people inspect them, and if they agree they are unserviceable they take them to the ordnance stores for disposal.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will the minister elaborate a bit with respect to the extra work load referred to in the blue book? Under this item the total expenditures for construction and equipment, as he knows, are reduced this year 90205-6-528J
Supply-National Defence over last year. Therefore, it would seem that the number of inspectors necessary should decline as well. The blue book mentions the SAGE installation and radar gap-fillers as one reason for the continuing work load. Can the minister say whether he is getting assistance from the United States air force in respect of the inspection of the SAGE installation, for example? They are experienced in these matters and might be giving him some assistance. Can he explain to us why so many personnel are needed when the expenditure is reduced?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We are doing all the inspection on behalf of the United States air force for these installations in Canada.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would it not be reasonable to engage the services, by loan or otherwise, of some people who are familiar with the same types of installation in the United States?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am informed that our people are thoroughly familiar with this, and this provides means employing Canadians on this work in Canada rather than bringing in people from the United States to do it.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is fine. I presume they must have gone to the United States and probably gained at first hand the experience that was to be gained there. Can the minister say whether there are any inspection personnel at A. V. Roe? If so, what are they engaged in doing?


Douglas Scott Harkness: None of the people of the inspection service is at A. V. Roe. However, the air force has personnel there who are carrying on inspection work as the work proceeds.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
234.	Construction or acquisition of buildings, works, land and equipment, $211,000.
Chesley William Carter: Is the policy with respect to armouries likely to be revised as a result of the increase in personnel for the army? What is the present position with respect to the possibility of an armoury for Newfoundland?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The hon. member is asking this question on item 234 which comes under the inspection services. If he would bring up the question when the army estimates are under consideration I would then have the answer book here to see what the situation is in regard to an armoury in Newfoundland. Of course, the statement that I made the day before yesterday in connection with armouries generally would be applicable here. We have an armoury construction program. I would like to see it increased, but the construction of armouries has not been considered as much a priority item as some of the other things we had to spend the
8372	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence amount of money we got on, and therefore we had not been able to construct as many of them as we would like to have done.


Chesley William Carter: May I conclude that there is still hope?


Douglas Scott Harkness: As far as a specific answer to the question about an armoury in Newfoundland is concerned, if the hon. member would bring it up when we get to the army estimates I would be glad to give him the definite information.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Royal Canadian Navy-
235.	Operation and maintenance, $208,135,049.
Paul Theodore Hellyer: I should like to ask the minister a question in respect of the navy. If he will consult page 1 of his blue book, the preamble, under the heading "Royal Canadian Navy" he will see listed there four roles for the Canadian Navy in support of Canadian defence policy. This numbering is mine. The roles are: (1) maintenance of sea communications; (2) the defence of Canada against attack from the sea; (3) to contribute to the collective defence of the NATO area from attack from the sea; (4) to contribute naval forces to the United Nations as may be required. Can the minister indicate which of these four roles is the most important role of the Royal Canadian Navy?


Douglas Scott Harkness: These roles are so interconnected that I do not think I can pick out one and say it is the most important. As I think is quite clear, they are not set out 1, 2, 3, 4, as the hon. member has just put them; they are put in as a sentence. As I say they are pretty closely interconnected. Therefore, I do not think you can pick out one and say it is the most important role.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister care to tell the committee what in his opinion is the principal threat against which the Canadian navy is to operate?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Of course, the principal threat is the submarine threat and, as is indicated here-it has been indicated on numerous other occasions-our navy is basically an anti-submarine navy consisting principally of destroyer escorts and frigates. The destroyer escorts particularly are specialized anti-submarine ships. The carrier and the tracker aircraft and the interceptor aircraft that it carries really for protection from the air, and the helicopters which are now being added to the destroyer escorts-the whole thing is designed to be a well co-ordinated anti-submarine force. It also, of course, has a capability for general sea warfare.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: As the minister knows, the Russians are reported now to be producing atomic powered submarines, and concentrating on the production of atomic powered submarines from which nuclear missiles would be launched. Presumably, in an attack against the North American continent the Rusians would use their present supply, or the supply existing at that time, of nuclear powered missile launching submarines. If the minister is concerned about protecting the deterrent as well as providing such protection as he can to the Canadian civilian population, what provision is he making through the Canadian navy to cope with the threat from the atomic powered nuclear submarine?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, as I have just indicated, the navy is essentially an antisubmarine navy. It is designed to be able to hunt out and destroy enemy submarines. Part of the strategy at the present time is to do that as far away from the coasts of North America as possible. The fact that nuclear submarines may be in possession of the Russians as they are in the possession of the United States and that these nuclear submarines are faster is precisely the reason why we are equipping the destroyer escorts with helicopters. We are doing so in order that they will have the capability of tracking, and discovering and finding these submarines and destroying them at a considerable distance from the destroyer escort from which the helicopter operates and also at a considerable distance from our coasts.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is the minister contending that Canadian destroyer escorts with helicopters would be capable of seeking out and destroying nuclear-powered submarines at some distance from our shores in either the Atlantic or Pacific oceans?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The answer is certainly yes. That is the basic purpose of the destroyer escort, particularly equipped, as I say, with a helicopter.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Perhaps the minister will let me make this comment. Here again I think that we are left in a most unfortunate position. The minister has stated, and he has been very careful with his language, that that is the purpose. We all know that is the purpose of the destroyer escort. We know that is the purpose of an anti-submarine force, but the minister did not say that we have that capability and he knows that we have not. What is more, the minister knows that we are not getting that capability.
Let me say for the minister's benefit that I have seen an atomic submarine in action and it can swim circles around our destroyer escorts or anything like them. The minister

knows this, and these submarines cannot be detected and destroyed with the type of naval vessel that we have. What is the minister contemplating that will cope with this threat? Is he contemplating the construction of anti-nuclear submarine submarines or anything of that nature with the speed, range and capacity to be able to deal with that type of threat?


Douglas Scott Harkness: All I am saying is that our competent naval officers inform me that the sort of statement the hon. member has just made is completely erroneous, that our antisubmarine vessels, particularly when they are completely equipped with helicopters using sonobuoys and so on, have the capability of destroying submarines at any time. Certainly you are not going to destroy every submarine. It was not done during the last war and it was not done during the first war. However, a very considerable number of submarines were destroyed in both of those wars and the submarine threat was eventually beaten.
There is also no question that the faster the submarine the more difficult it is to detect and thus to destroy, but nevertheless we have a very considerable capacity to destroy submarines at any time. Therefore I deplore the hon. member stating as though it were a definite fact that we have no such capacity. He has no means of knowing that. What he is really doing is making such statements in direct contradiction of the opinions of all those people who have devoted their lives to naval service, not only the senior naval officers in our service but in the British, United States and other navies.


Walter George Pitman: I should like to follow up the comments of the hon. member for Trinity because I think it is the duty of hon. members in spite of the opinions of the experts to find out as much as we can about the defence of the people whom we represent. I think we are getting right down to the bottom of this whole thing right now as to just exactly what the value of our defence is.
The minister said yesterday afternoon that the enemy can have enough power to blow up the whole world but as long as they cannot deliver this power we seem to be fairly safe. 1 think that is a very good point but there seems to be quite a difference of opinion as to just what the capability of the enemy is. Perhaps we can assume that the enemy is only going to start a limited nuclear war and will only use a few submarines, a few I.C.B.M.'s and so on, but I think this is a fantastic concept and that the war will be an all-out one from the very beginning. Surely common sense would lead to this conclusion. Certainly
Supply-National Defence a submarine war would be the most potent method having in mind their mobility and so on. I would hope that we would realize the danger of the situation. I do not think we are deploring the opinions of the experts or in any way trying to bring strategic concepts into question. If the strategic concepts of the government hold water then we have no criticism; but I wonder.
We understand, for example, that the Russians have 500 submarines. I was very happy to hear the minister say that the major role of our navy is anti-submarine activity, but do we have in mind dealing with submarines that are out to sink shipping or is it a case of dealing with submarines the purpose of which is to strike at our cities, each submarine having far more power than all the bombs dropped in the last war?
In the blue book it is stated that we are responsible for the collective defence of the NATO area. That is a very large area involving the Atlantic, the Pacific, the North sea, the Mediterranean and so on. Can the minister tell us what particular areas Canada is responsible for and can he possibly tell us how many submarines might be likely to move into this area on the basis of the studies that are being made by the experts?
The minister said that the Russian power to deliver is limited. Everything is limited. Nothing is unlimited, but to what extent is their power to deliver limited? How many of the submarines moving into the areas for which our navy is responsible would actually be nuclear submarines? We cannot tell, of course, which are and which are not. What is the speed of the aircraft carrier, the destroyer escorts and frigates which are being equipped for anti-submarine activity? What are the detection capabilities? I think the Canadian people should know to what extent they are paying for defence, or to what extent they are simply paying for activities which will show that the government is doing something in the naval field but which activities are not really very important.
I should like to remind hon. members that we are not trying in any way to add to the terrorizing effect of the U.S.S.R., as the minister seemed to suggest. Before the last war Churchill was accused of trying to terrorize the British people when over a period of four or five years he was merely trying to put before them the realities of the situation in Europe which he felt had to be met. I think the Canadian people should know what the reality is on the basis of the knowledge that is available to the Minister of National Defence. Can the minister answer any of my questions?

Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think that I had better explain first of all that the defence of the north Atlantic comes under SACLANT, the supreme allied commander Atlantic, who occupies the same sort of position as General Norstad does in SACEUR so far as NATO defence of the European land area is concerned. In the event of war he would have under his command not only the Canadian Atlantic fleet but also the United States and British Atlantic fleets, all of the other NATO naval forces in the north Atlantic. To begin with, he would dispose of all those naval forces in such a way as to form an antisubmarine screen. The purpose of the screen would be to try to destroy Russian submarines trying to get through the comparatively narrow waters leading from the Arctic ocean and between Iceland and Norway and also to prevent them from getting out of the Baltic. The purpose would be to contain as many as possible in those areas and also, of course, to destroy any that were already loose in or that got through into the Atlantic. In other words, the first function of the north Atlantic naval forces would be to destroy as many enemy submarines as possible and to keep them as far away as possible from the shores of the NATO countries. Subsequently, it may well be that Canadian naval forces would be employed in the convoying of merchant vessels in order to attempt to defend them from possible attack by submarines. I do not know whether or not this answers the question of the hon. gentleman, but broadly speaking that is the concept.


Walter George Pitman: The situation is even more serious than I suspected, Mr. Chairman. You are assuming that the Russians, if they start a war, will have all their submarines in the Baltic and the Arctic and would not have them deployed throughout the world. It appears that there is no particular duty for the Canadian navy except to act as convoy for ships. This is not facing up to the reality of the situation in which Canada would be placed if war came. The minister said himself this afternoon that the Russians would not likely engage in a limited war, and there was no sense talking about giving the forces nonnuclear weapons because there would be an all-out nuclear war.
What we are doing in connection with naval defence there has no relationship whatever to what the minister said this afternoon about the kind of war which every military expert I have read suggests is going to take place. It will be a war which will take place in 30 minutes and the destruction will be so fantastic that I doubt very much whether there will be any convoying of troops from one place to another afterwards.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think the hon. gentleman completely misapprehended the remarks I made. I said the first purpose of the North Atlantic naval forces would be to destroy Russian submarines and to contain them in their home ports in so far as possible. I said that one of the purposes would be to hunt out and destroy Russian submarines that may be loose in the Atlantic. Now, this is so far as the Atlantic is concerned. Then I said that subsequently maybe Canadian naval forces might be used in convoy work. This would only come later if a protracted struggle developed. This may not happen at all. In any event the primary purpose, and I should like to emphasize this, is to hunt out and destroy enemy submarines.
This applies also, of course, to the Pacific coast. On that coast this is a matter for cooperation between the United States Pacific naval forces and the Canadian naval forces. In the Atlantic area, the war plans are made by the supreme allied commander, Atlantic. He has specified the forces he would like from Canada and there are defence plans drawn up as to how those forces would be employed. I am not, of course, at liberty to state what those plans are.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I agree with the hon. member for Peterborough that we are carrying on here with this air of unreality which has seemed to weave in and out of the minister's remarks during the last two days. The minister deplores any statement which is made from this side of the house which is not in agreement with the statements he makes. However, this afternoon we had an example in clear terms of the fact this committee cannot rely on the information given to it by the minister. He said, in effect, you must not challenge the word of senior naval officers. I have here some opinions from a senior naval officer which are not in accordance with what the minister said. Now obviously, there is a difference of opinion.
This is what he says:
The only concession to reality is the mention of the anti-missile defence exercise on page 6-
That is in the blue book.
-when U.S. submarines, presumably playing the role of missile-firing "enemy" submarines, provided "realistic and elusive targets". I'll bet they were elusive. Our naval forces today are not designed to deal with these sorts of things at all unless the "enemy" submarine purposely presents himself for sacrifice as a part of the war "game" just to make the "friendly forces" feel better. And this is often done for political purposes.


James Stanley Speakman: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask the hon. gentleman to identify the article from which he is reading.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I will identify it as soon as I am finished.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not think this is good enough. When an hon. member is asked to identify what he is reading from, I think under the rules he is required to do that and not say he will do so after he has finished.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I do not know, Mr. Chairman. I have been in the house when the other procedure was followed and, when a document was read it had to be tabled at the end, or the source had to be given. Whichever way you rule, Mr. Chairman, I shall comply; it makes no difference to me.


Frank Charles McGee: I suggest, not having had the opportunity of surveying the specific rulings on the matter, that it would be logical, if the hon. member were asked a question concerning the source of the material, that the committee be given the information at that time. I do not think this is a real point of dispute, is it?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Not with me, it is not. The author is Captain David Groos, and he goes on to say-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Do not turn up your nose at one of the brightest young naval officers this country has produced in quite a while.


An hon. Member:: He cannot be very bright or he would not have been in the Liberal party.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I continue the quotation:
The entire scheme of things is to my mind quite unrealistic and don't think the men in the Canadian navy don't think so too. They are, however, bound hand and foot to this concept agreed to by the government some years ago... when it was still valid... and somehow never changed since to meet the conditions of today.
As long as our navy is obliged to play this "head in the sand" game and obliged to provide forces to deal with this out of date concept, I suppose there is little wrong with the way they propose to spend our defence dollars this year... it will provide work for our shipyards and it will fill the pay envelopes of our sailors and shipbuilders. But don't let us be fooled into thinking it will provide us with any maritime defence. It won't.
Later on, he says:
Is it a valid concept in the present age? Of course not. We must come up with a "new look" in operational forces to deal with the new but very real threat from missile launching nuclear submarines. These are the real threat to this country and we must get the government to admit it. In these new forces Canadian nuclear-driven submarines designed to seek out and destroy other submarines, especially these missile-launching submarines, will undoubtedly play a major role. They are well known to be far and away the best, in fact they are the only effective type of anti-submarine vessel there is and they can be built in Canada in Canadian shipyards by Canadian workers.
Supply-National Defence
This is not an isolated opinion.


Gordon Minto Churchill: The hon. member has identified the author, but he did not give us the title of the document or the date of its production.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It is some notes on defence estimates by Captain David Groos, and I will give them to the minister or table them if that is desired.


John Ferguson Browne: I
wonder if the hon. member could tell us whether or not this was the speech made while Captain Groos was a candidate in the Esquimalt-Saanich by-election?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The answer to that question is no. This is a responsible statement by an interested Canadian citizen trying to make a contribution to national affairs, and a very real contribution. This article points out in clear terms that in respect of naval policy, as in respect of most of its policies, this government has no conception whatever of what is going on in the world of military technology today. The minister told us earlier in the debate that two or three years lead time is required in the development of nuclear vehicles. During a recent trip to the United States in discussion with naval officers there, they indicated that, in their opinion, the only possible way that nuclear submarines could be dealt with would be by an atomic device. I should like to know if the minister concurs with this opinion or whether he does not. If he does, has he any plans to obtain atomic devices for the navy? If not, does he contemplate giving the matter any study because, as the minister can well appreciate, by the time he adds two or three years lead time to the end of his survey, any potential all-out war might be over.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I should like to deal with several of the comments that were made. I will deal with the last one first. There has been a good deal of study given to this matter. In fact, the means of killing submarines is one of the most intensive and continuing studies carried on by the navy. There is no question that the use of a reasonably small yield nuclear weapon would be more effective in destroying a submarine than would a conventional bomb or torpedo. I think there is no question about that fact because you get a much bigger explosion. However, there are plenty of conventional bombs and torpedoes which are also effective in destroying submarines. As to the matter that he mentioned first, namely some notes by Captain Groos, with regard to opinions as to strategy I would merely say this. I prefer to take the advice of the senior

Supply-National Defence serving officers in the Canadian navy, the British navy and the United States navy rather than the opinions of a retired naval officer who has just recently been standing as a Liberal candidate in a by-election and whose opinions on this matter might therefore be looked upon as being somewhat biased, having regard to the fact that they were supplied to the hon. member for use in this debate.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: All I can say is that the minister's policy in respect of preferring the advice of serving officers over that of recently retired officers must have changed in the last three years or so. He used to take quite a different attitude. I can assure him that there is no bias whatever in the argument presented by Captain Groos. This was put forward in all sincerity in order to help bring to the attention of the nation the head-insand attitude of the minister in the hope that at some time in the not too distant future he will pull it out.


Walter George Pitman: I think we are living in some kind of fairyland here. It just does not seem to me that the kind of war that is going to be carried on, if one takes place has come to the realization of this government. It would seem we are being told that it is going to be a much different kind of war than any in the past. Everywhere I look, in the magazines and in the latest books, it seems to be indicated that it is going to be a nuclear war and an all out war.


William Heward Grafftey: Show us your crystal ball.


Walter George Pitman: The minister says, and probably quite rightly, that our naval forces are involved in SACLANT and so on. We are dealing with the estimates of our naval forces. We have not yet found out where those naval forces might be deployed, to what extent they can handle this area, or to what extent they can actually defend Canadian shores. In other words, we cannot find out and give the information to the Canadian people. I am sorry but I do not think I can go back to my constituency and say that the naval experts say thus and thus but that our Minister of National Defence simply says this is what he believes or this is what the naval experts believe. I want to hear on the floor of this House of Commons the extent to which this defence is actually possible. I asked the question as to the area our navy can be expected to look after in such a nuclear war and I have been told that they will be deployed in a certain area. The minister did not say that for security reasons this could not be stated. He has not said that the number of our submarines could not be stated.


I should like to know to what extent these ships have detection capable of picking up these submarines. It seems to me there are a great many questions which I should like the Canadian people to have answered. If there is no defence we have got to start working somewhere else. Perhaps this will affect our emergency measures organization too. I think it is an extremely disconcerting aspect of the whole picture.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not think the hon. member took in what I said a short time ago. The defence on the north Atlantic is a combined fleet of the NATO countries which have NATO forces bordering on the north Atlantic. All the naval forces of all of these NATO countries in the event of war come under the command of the supreme allied commander, Atlantic. It is then up to him to deploy those forces in the places where the Russian submarines are found to be. You cannot say that the Canadian navy is going to be used from point A to point B and point C and point D. It may be used any place on the north Atlantic where needed to hunt down and destroy enemy submarines. The same thing applies as far as the Pacific fleet is concerned. As I said, in the event of war it is a combined command between the United States and Canada. Also the naval forces of the United States and Canada in the Pacific would be used as one co-ordinated weapon to destroy enemy submarines and to protect the sea lanes leading in there.
I think that statement is clear enough and I think the hon. member's constituents will be able to understand it quite readily. In the case of ships you do not say that they will work in this particular area and this particular area only. Under modern conditions, the whole concept of naval defence is to have a co-ordinated command which will employ all of the naval resources available in the whole North Atlantic in the place where they are most needed at that particular time. The same thing applies as far as the Pacific forces are concerned. We had the same thing, of course, during the second world war. Canadian naval vessels were employed in all sorts of places throughout the Atlantic ocean, in the Mediterranean and so on.


Walter George Pitman: I wish to remind the minister that it took five years to destroy the submarine menace in the second world war. The German submarines nearly brought Britain to her knees at that time. If an attack took place tomorrow, how long would it take before Canadian ships could occupy the areas they are expected to defend as part of this whole over-all strategy in SACLANT?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The best answer to that question I think is this. Except for the limited number that happen to be in dock refitting at any particular time, our ships are in a state of immediate readiness. At practically all times some of them are at sea. They are therefore available immediately to counter enemy submarines. This is one of the reasons why we are increasing the complement up to full strength, from an average of 86 per cent to 100 per cent. We are doing this so that they will be capable of going out and maintaining patrols for long periods. With 85 per cent manning they are able to go out and manage full operational duties for a few days but you have not enough men to keep them on three hour shifts. They therefore have to work overtime, as you might say, and they eventually become tired. That is the reason v/hy we are increasing the complement up to full strength. We are doing that in order to enable them to operate over long periods of time at full efficiency.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The minister has said that most of the Canadian navy is assigned to SACLANT.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I did not say that, Mr. Chairman. I said the Atlantic forces are assigned to SACLANT in the event of war and come under his command.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The minister says the Atlantic forces are assigned to SACLANT in the event of war. He gives the impression that, because they are part of the whole, we do not need to concern ourselves whether they do not have a particular capacity. However, two or three questions immediately come to mind. First of all, may I say this. Surely the Canadian ships have an area of responsibility. Surely there is a function they have to perform. It is an allied command. In addition to that, one of the roles which was put in the blue book-and perhaps it should not have been in the blue book-is the second one, namely the defence of Canada against attack from the sea. The question that arises is this. Are we incapable of protecting Canada against attack from the sea? Must we rely on the ships of other nationals who are also assigned to the supreme allied command, Atlantic, to protect Canadian shores from attack? Is it necessary that the submarines our navy has to cope with should be of the oldest possible vintage, nearest the surface and close in, where they can be easily spotted? I think the minister should give us some more assurance about this, because from what he has said so far I must agree with my hon. friend that there is a terrific air of unreality about this whole thing. We have no feeling of comfort 90205-6-529
Supply-National Defence whatsoever that our ships could find, let alone destroy, even the present, let alone future submarines.
Surely if the minister is going to be consistent at all-and perhaps he is not going to be, which would not be too surprising- he should concern himself with the reality of attack from the sea just as he told the committee he is concerned with the reality of attack by air.
May we please have a further explanation from the minister as to just how we are going to cope with an attack from the sea, and how Canada can play an effective role under the supreme commander of the Atlantic, when our ships are not capable of performing some of those functions they would be called upon to carry out if they were assigned a specific task?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, the unreality which the hon. gentleman speaks about exists in his own mind rather than in the mind of the Department of National Defence or in the mind of the navy. He is engaging here again in what seems to be the general activity of trying to run down the defence forces of this country by saying they are obsolete, their equipment is no good and they cannot do their job.
He has been doing this regularly. This is his stock-in-trade. Once more I can only say that I deplore an attack of this kind, particularly when it has been pointed out to the hon. member on numerous occasions that the allegations he is making are completely incorrect.
As far as our Atlantic fleet is concerned, as I have already stated, in the event of war it comes under the command of SACLANT and is used in accordance with his orders anywhere in the Atlantic where it can best be used and for which he is responsible.
At the present time, of course, one of the sub-commands in SACLANT is the commander, Canadian Atlantic sub-area. Our admiral at Halifax is the commander of that sub-area. He is responsible for the command and the defence of that area. In the event of enemy forces being in there, forces might be sent by Great Britain, the United States or other NATO people. He would take command of them and would carry on the operations.
In peacetime there is a considerable area off our coasts which the Canadian navy keeps under surveillance. It does this by means of its tracker aircraft and its various ships, and also with the maritime command of the R.C.A.F., which is constantly flying various routes over those waters in order to detect any submarine or other activity of that kind.
This is the way the operation is carried on in peacetime. As I say, in wartime you have

Supply-National Defence a unified command and all the naval forces of the NATO alliance in the North Atlantic would be used to the best advantage as one striking force.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Chairman, the minister has said I am trying to run down the Canadian forces. That, of course, is not true. First of all, to distinguish between the forces and the equipment, I think the Canadian forces are of the finest in the world, but I think they are handicapped by having some of the most obsolete equipment.
The hon. member for Peterborough and myself are trying, like Winston Churchill did in the late 1930's, to shake a complacent government out of its complacency. We are trying to get it to admit the facts of the world about it, and that is a most difficult task apparently.
I wonder whether the minister would indicate to the committee when the first keel of the destroyer escorts was laid, and would he also indicate how many are still under construction.


Douglas Scott Harkness: First of all I wish to state in the most definite terms that our destroyer escorts are considered, not only by our own naval authorities but by those of other countries, as the most modern and up-to-date destroyer escorts possessed by any navy. The number under construction at the present time is six. They are of the latest class. The first of the modern destroyer escorts, the St. Laurent, was commissioned in October, 1955.


Gordon Minto Churchill: When the hon. member for Trinity was associate minister of national defence.


An hon. Member:: No, not then.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Not then. I wonder whether the minister would indicate to the committee why, in view of the tremendous technological changes which have since taken place, and more particularly the fact that since then the first atomic submarines and the first atomic missiles carried by submarines have been put into operational use, he continues to build destroyer escorts which were then incomparable and which may still be the best destroyer escorts in their class, but which today are no match for the potential enemy. That is the point we are trying to get across to the minister. We would like the minister to tell us what plans he has to meet the threat of the future?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The destroyer escorts which have been built have been subsequently improved. Improvements have been added to them constantly and their anti-submarine

capability has been constantly improved, particularly through the development of the variable depth sonar, which is an invention of the Canadian defence research people.
We are now commencing to modify the existing destroyer escorts so they can carry a helicopter each, in order to greatly extend their range of operations, and thus their ability to both detect and destroy enemy submarines.
The hon. member seems to have the naive idea that if conditions change a bit, immediately you must scrap everything you have. This is the general line he was following last year-scrap this, scrap that, scrap the other and get a complete new line of equipment. You just cannot do that, particularly as far as naval vessels are concerned. The construction of a naval vessel is a long business. The design particularly, of a new naval vessel is a long business. As I have said, our destroyer escorts are as good as any that exist in any navy in the world. I do not know how the hon. member can expect us to do better than that.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Chairman, the minister has just underlined the problem. He has said that the designing of a naval vessel is a long business and that the construction of a naval vessel is a long business.
Is the minister telling the committee, in conclusion, so we will understand his position very clearly, that he has no plans for more modern ships than those presently under construction, and that he has no plans for the introduction of atomic weapons into the Royal Canadian Navy? Is that the present position of the minister and of the department?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We have all kinds of plans. There are no plans which have been definitely decided upon, approved and funded which I can announce at this time. The navy has a very considerable number of plans for ships of different kinds and a naval construction program upon which they would like to embark. There are quite a number of variations of their projected naval construction program, but I am not in a position to announce any of these at this time because they have not been definitely approved and there has been no arrangement made as yet with regard to their financing.


Gordon Campbell Chown: Shall vote 235 carry?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Before the vote carries, Mr. Chairman, I wonder whether the minister can say what the cost will be in respect of the tanker supply vessel for the current year, and when this tanker will be commissioned and ready for service?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The total cash requirement for this tanker supply ship this year is $5 million.


Walter George Pitman: Before this vote carries I should like the minister to clarify this subject further. We have some 40 anti-submarine vessels. Can we really convince the Canadian people that if the U.S.S.R. should decide to attack Canada these vessels which are the sole defence of the Canadian area would have any hope whatsoever of destroying nuclear submarines armed with nuclear weapons? Can the minister give the Canadian people any indication or hope whatsoever that this naval contingent for which, as the hon. member for Trinity has said, we have nothing but the greatest respect, is equal to such a task? I think we should stand before the Canadian people and tell them just what the stakes are-not to give them a sense of insecurity but to show them where we stand in terms of modern warfare. Can the minister give us any indication that the Canadian navy as it is today could act capably and efficiently in dealing with nuclear submarines in such numbers as would likely be in Canadian waters or in the areas for which we shall be responsible? Would our forces be able to make any impact upon them whatsoever in the first few hours of attack in the kind of war which would take place in 1961?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have tried on several occasions already to make the situation clear to the hon. member but he seems to have the notion fixed in his mind that Canada is going to fight Russia by herself. This is not the situation. He asks whether the Canadian navy can protect Canada against Russian submarines. Well, the Canadian navy is not going to protect Canada by itself. As I have told the hon. member on three or four occasions already, the protection of Canada and of the other NATO countries will be the responsibility of the navies of all the North Atlantic treaty countries which have navies in the north Atlantic. It is a combined affair. In the same way, the R.C.A.F. is not expected to defend all of Canada by itself against the Russian attack; it is part of the continental defence of this whole continent. It is a co-ordinated defence shared by our own R.C.A.F. planes, Bomarcs, the radar lines and the forces of the United States. In the same way the sea approaches would be defended by the navies of all the North Atlantic countries. I think we have to look upon the resources of the alliance as a whole and not have it fixed in our minds, as seems to be the case with the hon. member for Peterborough, that the 43 Canadian navy vessels are going to be the sole defence of the Canadian sea approaches against a Russian submarine attack or threat.
90205-6-529J
Supply-National Defence


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Perhaps the committee would permit a layman to make a comment on this question. As I listened to the discussion it seemed to me that what we have here is the minister trying to deal with a real situation-with the facts as they are- while the hon. member for Peterborough-I say this with deference-appears to be talking as if this was merely a war game or, to change the figure, a game of chess. It seems to me there is an unreality about what he is saying and that the minister is striving again and again to reintroduce reality into the discussion as against the war game approach where you can get all the facts and calculate what this unit is going to do or what that unit is going to do.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: With the greatest respect to the hon. gentleman, may I say that if there is an air of unreality here it is not present on this side of the chamber. This is not a game of chess. This may become a game of life or death, yet we are talking about coping with 20 year old submarines. The submarine we got up from the United States so that our chasers would have something real to chase is a vessel that they had kept in mothballs. It is not reality to chase a submarine which has been kept in mothballs and which no one in his right mind would send out to sea in the event of war. That is not reality. It is putting the clock back at the very time when we should be projecting our imagination into the future. It is the hon. gentleman himself who is turning the clock back. I know he has many fine reminiscences of days gone by and he is entitled to them, but the time has come when men in responsible positions have to cease looking to the past. They have to look ahead and use imagination concerning the situation they will have to face in the future. That is what the minister has not done up to the present time, and I urge the hon. member for Greenwood to join with those of us who suggest that the minister should bring himself up to date and stop playing chess with mothball submarines and second world war equipment. He should project himself into the future so as to be aware of the real situation, not of make-believe situations.
May I call it six o'clock?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Just before you call it six o'clock, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say briefly that the hon. member has misunderstood the hon. member for Greenwood just as he misunderstands nearly everything. The point is that most submarines at the present time are, as it happens, of conventional type. Moreover, the Canadian navy gets practice with nuclear powered submarines in practically all of the exercises in which it is

Supply-National Defence engaged. Therefore the general idea which the hon. member is trying to put over, namely that the navy is playing with 20 year old submarines and does not know about anything else has no validity in fact.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at 7.30 p.m.
James MacKerras Macdonnell: I wish to make a brief interjection. This afternoon the hon. member for Kootenay West raised certain questions with regard to General Heusinger and at that time I said I thought the matter deserved further inquiry. I have made further inquiry and I wish to withdraw my request. I wish to give a brief explanation.
Hon. members will recall that the Associate Minister of National Defence referred to General Heusinger's record and said that he had never been a member of the Nazi party. He also referred to the fact that he had been one of the people suspected on July 20, 1944; of an attempt on Hitler's life that he had been arrested and escaped from his jail before he was sentenced to death.
I wish also to say that since this afternoon I have made further inquiries through the Department of External Affairs, with the following results: General Heusinger is a professional soldier of long standing, having joined the German army in 1915. In 1950, while Germany was still an occupied country, he was selected by Chancellor Adenauer to reorganize the German defence forces. Since West Germany did not regain a full measure of independence until 1954, the appointment of General Heusinger to this important post in 1950 indicates clearly that he enjoyed the confidence of the United States, the United Kingdom and French governments, which at that time had the status of occupying powers. In these circumstances I think we may accept the endorsation of those countries, and for my part I am ready to withdraw my request this afternoon that the matter be further inquired into.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, a question was asked to which I said I would give an answer. It had to do with the combined number of personnel on the staff of the associate minister and of myself, and what the number was in the previous administration. In 1956, the number on the two staffs, the associate minister's staff and the minister's staff was 42. On March 1, 1961 the number was 32, ten fewer.
fMr. Harkness.]


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will the minister bring us up to date in respect of the helicopter program for the navy which is referred to in this year's blue book. Will he indicate the number of helicopters in service at the present time and when he expects the remainder of the requirement to be available?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The number of anti-submarine helicopters held by the navy was, front line helicopters, six; reserve helicopters, two. One of these just recently was lost in aiding in the Newfoundland fires. In addition to that they have some other helicopters, four Bells and three Vertols.
As to the time that the other anti-submarine helicopters are expected, they expect that it will be something in the neighbourhood of a year before we will be getting delivery, which will be before it will be possible to install the helicopter landing platforms on the destroyer escorts.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I presume those helicopters are not the same type as the reconnaissance helicopters which are the army's requirements.


Douglas Scott Harkness: No; they are a much bigger helicopter than that.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Then, the minister has given up on the possibility of standardization, which was the reason given by his predecessor for the delay in placing orders.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, we have attained standardization on the light helicopters now for all three services. However, this type of helicopter for anti-submarine work is a specialized one on which it is not possible to standardize with the other two services.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister indicate when the last deliveries of the CS2F Tracker were made?


Douglas Scott Harkness: October, 1960.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minsiter indicate what the $4 million for aircraft in this year's estimates represents?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The breakdown is as follows: for tracker aircraft, spares and modification, $800,000, anti-submarine helicopters, $3 million, light helicopters, $155,000, delivery charges and taxes, $55,000, which makes a total of $4,010,000.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: What taxes?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The ordinary sales taxes that are charged on all equipment of this type, as I think the hon. member knows or should know, and which are paid by the department on its purchases.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In the 1961 blue book it is indicated that the Banshee aircraft can be

operated until the end of 1962 at which time the airframe reaches the end of its life. Will the minister indicate whether he has yet reached a decision with regard to a possible replacement?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There has been no definite decision on that. We have been planning on a ship-to-air missile but the exact kind has not yet been decided upon.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In view of the difficulty posed by the long lead times outlined to the committee on several occasions by the minister can the minister indicate approximately when a decision will be taken with respect to this ship-to-air missile?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, I am not in a position to do that.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I have received a complaint from H.M.C.S. Cornwallis with regard to working conditions in the laundry room and the wardroom. Has the minister received any complaints recently as to working conditions there, particularly with respect to weekend overtime and the difficult and unsatisfactory working conditions generally?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have not had any complaints along that line that I can recall. The associate minister, with whom I have checked, does not recall having received any either, nor does the deputy minister or naval headquarters.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Will the minister or associate minister undertake to check into the situation to see if the complaints are justified?


Joseph Pierre Albert Sévigny: I will attend to this matter.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I have one final question. Would the minister indicate the final disposition of the Shannon park property? I presume that Mr. Dwyer has a paper ready on that for you.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Shannon park property is one on which the bulk of the married quarters for naval personnel in the Halifax area is situated. There is no idea of disposing of it. There is a plan for the construction by an entrepreneur of more housing there and if the plan goes ahead he will rent the houses so constructed to married personnel of the navy. There is also a projected plan to put a shopping centre there.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It was the shopping centre I was referring to specifically. As the minister may recall, the shopping centre land was sold to a private entrepreneur without tenders having been called and I understand that the enterpreneur later went into receivership. A question was raised whether the crown had protected itself, whether the land again
Supply-National Defence became the property of the crown or what was the ultimate disposition, whether or not the shopping centre has in the meantime been constructed and, if so, by whom?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I understand this project was transferred from the original man to a second one. He has now completed part of the shopping centre and the remainder is under construction.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: There is one further reassurance we would like from the minister. Is he satisfied with the progress of the shopping centre? Is it meeting the purpose for which the land was sold and filling the function which persuaded the crown to give up the land without calling for tenders in the first place?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am informed that the project has not gone ahead as rapidly as had been hoped would be the case, but it is now proceeding reasonably satisfactorily and it is expected that it will perform the function which was envisaged for it.


Augustin Brassard: If the project involving construction of houses by the entrepreneur materializes, what is going to be the length of the leases?


Douglas Scott Harkness: As far as the individuals who will occupy these houses are concerned, they will occupy them on the same basis that such personnel occupy ordinary married quarters and thus will have no lease with the entrepreneur who constructs them. As far as the department is concerned, we have a lease or form of guarantee extending to 40 years occupancy.


Edmund Leverett Morris: May I ask the minister when the Department of National Defence first proposed the use of land at Shannon park for purposes of a shopping centre, and were public tenders called at that time?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not have that information immediately available. I will send for it and give it to the hon. member later.


Edmund Leverett Morris: Is the minister under the impression that it was about 1955 and is it not a fact that there were no offers received at that time?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We are not sure about the matter. I think we will have to check the information and give it to the hon. member later. I am informed that there were no offers.


Edmund Leverett Morris: Is it not so that the land when transferred recently to the new proprietorship was an entailed sale, that is, it was sold on the clear understanding that a shopping centre would be built there?

Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: That is correct.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Just to set the record straight,
I am sure the parliamentary secretary is aware that the first time it was offered for sale there were conditions attached. In fact, it was a lease arrangement, while when it was sold the second time there were no strings attached except the building of a shopping centre and apparently there was no protection for the crown. Consequently there was trouble when the receivership took place.


Edmund Leverett Morris: The hon. member who has just spoken had so short a life in the defence portfolio that perhaps he did not have the opportunity to acquaint himself fully with the file.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You obviously have not.


Edmund Leverett Morris: When the Shannon park project was first advertised it was advertised with the object of securing someone to construct a shopping centre upon it.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: On a lease arrangement.


Edmund Leverett Morris: If anyone had come forward it would have been sold under the same conditions.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Under a lease arrangement. Do not make a false statement.


Edmund Leverett Morris: On a question of personal privilege, Mr. Chairman, I have not made a false statement.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Just check the facts.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
236. Construction or acquisition of buildings, works, land and major equipment, $71,823,500.
Chesley William Carter: I should like to ask the minister if he would explain the reduction in expenditures for armament, equipment and electronic equipment. There is also a reduction in ammunition.


Douglas Scott Harkness: What was the first one?


Chesley William Carter: Armament, electronics and ammunition.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, so far as armament equipment is concerned, the programs have been continuing programs. They are broken down and the first is guns, mountings and weather-shields. There were $2,328,000 spent in 1960-61 and this year there will be $1,100,000. The thing is that it was a continuing program and this is the amount that is estimated will be required to complete the program this year. There was the Sidewinder missile and facilities in 1960-61, and there are none for this year. Torpedoes and equipment, anti-submarine mortars, mines, et cetera, and there is to be more spent for those this year than last, $1,138,500. Then, there

is weapons control systems and facilities, $771,000 this year as against $1,678,000 last year. Again, this was a continuing program and less is required for it. Freight charges, customs, excise and so forth amounts to $90,500 this year as compared with $130,000 last year.
The next item was electronics. There are reductions in several places here but the biggest one is in radio communication equipment. Last year we spent $3,902,000 and this year it will be $1,935,000. There will be a somewhat smaller amount spent on Sonar equipment, about half as much, $845,000 as against $1,498,000, and for electronic equipment, power supply, navigational and internal communication equipment.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I wonder if the minister would give us a recapitulation of the new equipment supplied to the brigade group in the last 12 or 24 months?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We are on the navy at the present time, Mr. Chairman. This item does not come up until we get to the army.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Canadian Army-
237. Operation and maintenance, $359,572,000.
Paul Theodore Hellyer: I wonder if the minister would now give us the recapitulation of the new equipment supplied to the brigade group?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There is quite a long list, but I will keep on reading as long as the committee can bear with it. The list occupies two and one half of these big pages. Does the hon. member want all the items read out?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Perhaps the minister could just give us the principal ones at the start.


Douglas Scott Harkness: These are all listed as major items which have been received in stock since the second world war. There is the FN rifle and the automatic FN rifle to replace the 303 Bren gun. There is a submachine gun, 9 millimetre; there is a 106 millimetre recoilless and anti-tank rifle and ammunition; there is the 3.2 inch Heller anti-tank rocket launcher and ammunition; there is the S.S. 10 anti-tank missile for training purposes; medium mortars, 81 millimetres, and ammunition; field artillery, 105 millimetre howitzers and ammunition; surface to surface launchers and training ammunition for them; training missiles for the Honest John. There is communication equipment, including the United Kingdom family of very high frequency sets for the brigade group in Europe. There is the five-mile V.H.F. radio sets; the C-42 wireless sets to replace the No. 19. There are the cargo trailers in the one quarter ton-three quarters ton range. Then, there is the "Rat, a Canadian developed vehicle, the Ferret scout cars, standard

military pattern vehicles in the one quarter, three quarter and 2J-ton range. Partial requirements for a 5-ton cargo vehicle. There is the medium gun tank, Centurion, mark V; parachute stores and equipment; light aircraft-the L-19 for air op. flights; Bell helicopters and presently the Hiller helicopter which is now being secured, as well as two Sikorsky H-5 helicopters.
You have ammunition of various kinds. There are kits for up-gunning the Centurion tanks from 20 pounders to 105 millimetres to increase their hitting power, and associated ammunition; short range surveillance radar and counter mortar radar. Special equipment vehicle kits of all kinds; water tanks, light metal workshops, small arms repair and so on; vehicle navigational aids. Then, there is the armoured track vehicle the Bobcat which we have ordered; light reconnaissance helicopters; communications and engineering equipment of various kinds; the United Kingdom heavy ferry and heavy assault floating bridge. Then, there are various machine guns, general purpose machine guns and ammunition.
Those items are the ones that are now forecast for delivery, which have been ordered and so forth. I see these are marked "secret", so I will not go on with them. These are some of the major items of equipment which have been secured.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I thank the minister for the list. He went back quite far when he went back to world war II.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I said since world war II.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Am I wrong in saying back to world war II? Is that different from since world war II?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes; I think the implication was that it included some world war II equipment.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I am sure it does include some. Did I hear the minister correctly when he said that some of the 762 millimetre rocket launchers are already installed in Europe?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, none of them is installed in Europe as I indicated in the house when I made the announcement in connection with this matter. I think we anticipate it will be along towards the end of the year before they will be sent to Europe.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The minister anticipates that some will be installed this year. I thought I heard him refer to some practice rounds or something. I refer to the previous minister's remarks as found at page 7556 of 1960 Hansard where he states as follows:
While there are no funds allocated in this year's estimates, it has also been announced that the Canadian army is to procure the Honest John
Supply-National Defence launcher and associated surface-to-surface missile, the 762 mm. rocket. This weapon, too, has a nuclear capability.
Then before the defence estimates committee last year at page 330:
We are acquiring the Honest John which is a ground to ground weapon and which, when we receive it, will be capable of firing a nuclear warhead. When we receive it next year-
That would be this year.
-it will be capable of doing so. We are training some of our staff and some of our personnel in the uses of that weapon now. The problem in respect of storage and so forth should be solved before we receive this weapon.
My question is this. Does the minister still expect to receive them before the end of this year? If so, will the problem of storage and so forth with respect to nuclear weapons have been solved by that time?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We have received the deliveries of these Honest John launchers. We have formed a battery to operate them-and it will be sent to Europe. We have it under training at the present time. We have secured some practice rockets for practice firing with the rocket launcher. I think that is the situation. As I said, towards the end of this year or early next year we shall have a battery in shape to send over to the brigade in Europe.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I wonder whether the minister can say whether, as reported in the congressional subcommittee on defence expenditures, the 762 mm. rocket launcher is not accurate enough to use with high explosive shells?


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is the first I have heard of anything along that line. I am informed that this statement is not correct and that the United States are developing a conventional warhead to use with this rocket launcher.


Walter George Pitman: One item in the blue book indicated that one of the duties of the Canadian army was the ground defence of the Canada-United States region. Assuming an all-out nuclear war, just exactly what is included in this term, "ground defence of the Canada-United States region"? What plans are foreseen for the Canadian army in this particular situation? It would seem to me that it is rather unbelievable that the U.S.S.R. expects to invade Canada from the Arctic in this kind of war that I am assuming. I should like an explanation of this particular item, if the minister does not mind.


Douglas Scott Harkness: There is always the possibility of airborne landings in order to knock out particular installations, particularly some of the radar installations and things of that

Supply-National Defence sort, in order really to prepare the way perhaps for a large bomber attack. There is also always the possibility of a considerable amount of sabotage and things along that line. You therefore must have troops in order to guard against these possibilities. Some of our troops are trained for airborne operations, as parachutists and as airborne troops.


Walter George Pitman: That statement is very interesting but I find it rather hard to believe that they would actually invade with paratroopers before they attacked the country with missiles. It just does not seem to hold water strategically. I find it to be part of this unreality which the hon. member for Trinity was talking about this afternoon. I just cannot see this as a rational phase of the program at all, in terms of the kind of war we seem to be hearing about.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As I explained to the hon. member, the possibility of attempting to seize certain installations and thus to disrupt the general defences of the continent is something which is quite likely to be attempted. If there were no defence against it and if there were no troops that were able to counter it, it is something that would then probably happen.


Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: The minister mentioned that the brigade group was being supplied with some of the automatic FN rifles. I recently heard a report that these rifles are being withdrawn by virtue of the fact that an error has been made by Canadian Arsenals and in order that they may have the breech blocks modified. I wonder whether the minister can make any statement with respect to the alleged cost of more than $1 million in withdrawing these rifles in order to have modifications made.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The situation is that a modification is being made to the FN rifles owing to the fact that the ammunition made in some of the NATO countries and which we may have to use has a primer which does not work properly as it is pierced to too great an extent by the Canadian FN rifle. With the ammunition made in Canada there has been no difficulty whatever. However, with a very occasional round of ammunition from some of the other NATO countries there has been difficulty in that there has been a bit of a blow-back. Nobody has ever been seriously injured by this blow-back but there is the possibility that a man might lose an eye if this happened. Consequently we are modifying all these rifles in order to ensure that any country's ammunition of this calibre can be safely fired in it.


Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: Can the minister assure the committee that the modifications now required are not the result of certain modifications made at Canadian Arsenals to the Belgian designed rifle, and were not made by any of the other NATO countries which accepted and took into use this rifle?


Douglas Scott Harkness: As far as I recall the matter, although I have not been able to get the specific information here, the Canadian manufactured rifles were made with a slightly heavier barrel in order to give a longer life and a longer range. As I say, the Canadian ammunition has never caused any trouble whatever but some of the European ammunition very occasionally has resulted in a bit of blow-back, as I stated.


Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: Can the minister inform the committee what the estimated cost per rifle is for the modification?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I cannot break down what the cost is for this particular modification. Some other modifications are being made at the same time that the rifles are going in for this particular modification. They are really what you might call normal improvements and also include the replacement of damaged or worn out parts and a general clean-up of the weapon. The cost for the whole thing will run to approximately $16 per rifle.


Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: I have one other question, Is it correct that the army has directed that the FN rifle be used with a weaker cartridge than that originally designed for it because of the fact that there is a gas leak around the breech block?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, Mr. Chairman. As I indicated before, we have restricted the use of certain lots of ammunition which did not prove to work completely in all cases, in order to ensure there would be no danger to any of the personnel using it through blow-back.


Walter George Pitman: Mr. Chairman, I should like to continue the questioning on the FN rifle. Could the minister please tell the committee when the last competition for the Hamilton Galt trophy took place, and how the scores compared since the Lee-Enfield rifle has been out of use during the last few years?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have not that information here. I will have to send for it and give it to the hon. member later.


John Ross Matheson: Mr. Chairman, on Thursday, September 7, the Prime Minister told us that the government, after consultation with allied governments in NATO, has come to the conclusion that certain measures

should be taken to strengthen Canada's preparedness for defence both at home and overseas.
I refer to a booklet called "The Record Speaks". On the cover there is this passage:
The government of Prime Minister John Diefen-baker has accomplished more for the ordinary man- and woman of Canada than any government in our history.
There is a very appealing chapter entitled "National Defence and Defence Production" over the signature of Hon. George Pearkes, former minister of national defence. The first sentence reads as follows:
Despite increased costs for new equipment in a new age, Canada is spending less dollars on defence.
In 1960-1961 defence expenditures are down 10 per cent from 1956-1957, the last year under the Liberals.
I do not wish to introduce a partisan note in this debate-


William Heward Grafftey: But you are going to anyway.


Neil Alexander Matheson: -but I am concerned about what appears to be a drop of approximately $145 million on over-all defence expenditures, if I read the estimates correctly, from the year 1956-57 to which Hon. George Pearkes referred. In particular I am interested in, not the equipment of the army but the personnel of the army.
There is one thing in which I think this committee is very interested. That is the Canadian services colleges. I am referring to an article written in the Royal Military College review of 1959 by the director of studies, Colonel W. R. Sawyer, who writes as follows:
When the college was reopened after the war, strong emphasis was put on the principle that the level of instruction should be equal to that of the universities. The minister of national defence, the Hon. Brooke Claxton, stressed this in his address at the official opening ceremonies on September 20, 1948:
Colonel Sawyer goes on to say in his article:
We have steadily held to the view that these qualities can be developed best by study of the three traditional branches of learning-the humanities, the social sciences, the physical sciences.
I think there is reference to the fact that the Royal Military College is the only military institution in the commonwealth which is degree-conferring. I have occasion from time to time to be in Kingston at a sister institution and I can speak most enthusiastically about what we see and hear of Royal Military College.
I think great heart has been given to people who care about our military affairs by the strong leadership in that school and the level of teaching that has prevailed. I know that the Hon. Ralph Campney has been extremely interested in the Royal Military College and
Supply-National Defence I know that General Pearkes maintains a close interest. We rejoice in the appointment of Brigadier W. A. B. Anderson, with his superlative background, the most honoured graduate of his year in R.M.C., a graduate of Queen's University with service in the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery. He has graduate training from nearly every important staff college in the world and has given our institution great dignity and strength.
We know, too, that Colonel Sawyer, with his almost 100 highly qualified teachers, nearly 40 of doctorate level, has done a great deal to lift military training in this country to an extent to which we are certainly proud. I have studied with some care the calendar offered by Royal Military College and it is amazing to see the strength of departments that are not really directly military in their nature.
Personally, I concur very much in the emphasis stressed by Colonel Sawyer of elevating Royal Military College and the sister colleges to the type of institutions that will make our cadets great service officers in due course by staffing R.M.C. with the best, most highly qualified people possible.
It seems to me that more than ever before the army needs flexibility, a fresh approach and the type of personnel who will be capable of dealing skilfully and well with many new situations, problems and people. I know how interested the minister is in these service colleges. I wish to ask him whether perhaps there has been too great a decrease in salary levels of the college. I may be misreading the estimates, but in referring to page 331 and looking at the items from director of studies down to instructor, class 1, I have formed the impression that there is approximately $100,000 less being paid in 1961-62 than there was the previous year. I know it was with great difficulty that this faculty was gathered together in Royal Military College in the first instance.
One of the persons very interested in R.M.C.'s growth and strength was W. A. Mackintosh, then principal of Queen's University. I believe he was at one time a member of the Canadian services colleges advisory board. We know that in other educational institutions of that level, generally speaking our teaching salaries are appreciating rather considerably. I think there are very few universities in Canada where in 1961-62 the salary level will be less than that of 1960-61. I am not informed or in a position to be critical, but I ask the minister whether this kind of reduction is justified.
I also wish to ask whether in our great national need for more troops, we are now bringing along enough graduates out of these schools. It is obvious that we have gathered

Supply-National Defence together an extremely able staff, gentlemen who could very easily be absorbed by other universities in Canada and the United States. As we look over the qualifications of these men we see that almost every lecturer has qualifications from several universities. I should think they would be highly mobile personnel and easily lost.
I wonder whether the minister would be kind enough to indicate what is developing at Royal Military College. I can say, from what we can see from where I live, close to Kingston, that we are extremely proud of this school. R.M.C., we think, has never stood so high, and I am one who has been in a position to form an exceptionally high opinion of R.M.C. graduates of the past.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I wish to thank the hon. member for his remarks about Brigadier Anderson and Colonel Sawyer. Brigadier Anderson was a good friend of mine whom I saw a good deal of during the war and since. Also, I am glad to note his interest in the Royal Military College. As far as the salaries of the professors are concerned, they have gone up, not down. I think that is clearly indicated in the details of services in the blue book at page 331. Hon. members will see that the director is getting $14,500 as against $12,000 last year. Fourteen professors are getting $168,000 as against $136,000-their salaries have gone up considerably. This has been necessary, as the hon. member pointed out, in order to retain the services of university professors of a high calibre since those men are in short supply at the present time and we at the military colleges are, of course, in competition with the universities and colleges throughout the continent. Hon. members will see that there are 23 lecturers provision for whom amounts to $136,000 this year compared with $129,000 last year. There are 14 instructors and they are receiving $73,000 this year compared with $67,000 last year. I think that is typical. The salaries have gone up and, as I say, this is necessary in order to retain the staff.
I am glad to say we have an excellent staff not only at the Royal Military College but also at the College Militaire Royale and at Royal Roads. We have on our staffs some extremely outstanding men in their particular lines. We are fortunate indeed that in many instances these men remain with us, although they have been offered higher salaries in other institutions, because they happen to like the type of work they are doing and, in particular, the type of young men with whom they are dealing, in addition to certain facilities for research which are given to them and which they might not have available in other places. As a
[Mr. Matheson.l
result we have been able to retain our staff in spite of the fact that the salaries they receive are not as high as those they have been offered in other places.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In respect to the program to replace the 20 pounders on Centurion tanks with 105 millimetre guns, I wonder if the minister would tell us what the projected program is. According to the white book of 1960, improvements to the fire power of the Centurion tanks are estimated to cost $6 million for which $482,000 is being provided in 1961-62. Then in 1962, according to the blue book:
The army major equipment program includes provision for improvements to the fire power of the Centurion tank. The estimated cost of this program is $6 million of which the estimated expenditure in 1961-62 is $587,000.
I should like the minister to tell the committee how many of the tanks overseas have been reconverted to date, and what the projected program is for the balance.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am not in a position to say how many tanks have been converted up to the present time. This work is being carried on at the discretion of the brigade commanders so that he will not have very many tanks out of action at any one time. However, the whole program will be completed at the end of this year.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is an amazing statement. The minister says the whole program is to be completed by the end of this year. How can that be accomplished when we are being asked to fund only about one sixth of the total, including last year's estimate? It will require 12 years to complete the program on the basis of the amount funded here.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The answer is that that includes the ammunition which will be secured in the future.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The $6 million figure includes the ammunition?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Could the minister tell the committee what proportion of the $6 million is required for the installation of the guns and what proportion is being spent on ammunition? I must say this seems unusual.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am sorry but we have not got that information here. We shall get it. It will come down shortly and I will give it to the hon. member.


Walter George Pitman: I am sure all of us will be glad to see that the Bobcat light tracked vehicle is being produced in Canada. Could the minister indicate how many have already

been produced and how many foreign governments, if any, have bought them? Could he also tell us what the approximate cost per Bobcat will be, including development costs.


Douglas Scott Harkness: There were four of these vehicles, hand made, one might say, as a means of developing the vehicle and experimenting with it. There are 20 being produced on a production line at the present time to discover whether there are any difficulties in turning these vehicles out in quantity and, if so, to correct those difficulties. As soon as those 20 have been produced a further 480 will be secured.


Walter George Pitman: Have any foreign governments signed contracts to accept the Bobcat? I understand there is a German carrier of the same type-if it is not of the same type perhaps the minister will tell us. But would the cost of producing that vehicle be comparable to the cost of producing ours?


Douglas Scott Harkness: A considerable number of countries have shown some interest in this vehicle but we have received no definite orders as yet. I should like to point out that a number of other personnel carriers, such as the German carrier to which the hon. member referred, are not amphibious vehicles such as this one is. They have no swimming ability, and as a carrier which can cross all types of country and which is, in addition, amphibious, we think this is the best one being developed. As a result we have hopes we shall be able to sell this vehicle to other countries.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Could the minister tell us how many of the Bobcats are now with the brigades in Europe?


Douglas Scott Harkness: That question indicates the naivete or the childishness of the hon. member. He has just heard me say that four handmade models have been produced and that 20 more are in production.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It is not childish. I was just reading the blue book and I find in it this statement:
A production run of 20 models of the Bobcat light armoured tractor carrier will be commenced in 1961-62.
What I want the minister to tell the committee is where the associate minister got the wild statement he made in this house when he told us that 500 Bobcats were on order.


Douglas Scott Harkness: When I made the announcement in connection with the Bobcat some considerable time ago I said that we were definitely securing 500 of these vehicles. I
Supply-National Defence explained that 20 of them were being produced as rapidly as they could be produced as a production line run and that as soon as they came through successfully the other 480 would immediately be secured.


Joseph Pierre Albert Sévigny: On a question of privilege, may I say that if the hon. member would just read Hansard he would see that what I said last night was exactly what the Minister of National Defence has just said.


Walter George Pitman: I assume it is too early to know what the production cost of the Bobcat, including development costs, will be. Perhaps I can reserve that question for later on.
There is one question about which I am particularly concerned and it relates to the fact that the army controls the warning system. Last Friday I asked the minister a question with reference to the fact that this had been reported as being inadequate as long ago as last January but nothing had been done about it. Second, it had been stated that the system was aimed for outside audibility but the minister suggested that such a statement had not been made.
I want to say it had been made in front of officials who I am sure are very good witnesses who said that that was the situation.
Last Tuesday two officers arrived from Picton. They came to Peterborough to carry out tests, the tests which were predicted by the Minister of National Defence. I am very happy to see that his department has gone on with this matter with the speed with which it has shown. When those two officers arrived they informed the officials in Peterborough that they were testing for outside audibility.
This afternoon the minister complained that the people on this side of the house had not been reading his speeches. It appears to me that some of the people in his own department have not been reading his speeches because they have been testing for outside audibility. When they were told what the minister had said in the house last Friday they said they had heard nothing about this. They got in touch with Ottawa and were told that no new orders had been issued and therefore they are now testing the sirens once again for outside audibility.
I wish this matter could be cleared up because it is of extreme concern. I am sure the minister realizes this because he had been made contact with in the area that I represent.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I said nothing about testing for inside audibility. What I did say was that the degree to which those sirens could be heard inside buildings depended on the type of construction of the building. For example, I used a bank vault down in the basement

Supply-National Defence of a building where you would not hear the siren at all. I used this as an extreme example.
The only way in which you can test and get a test which will be valid in Peterborough and in various parts of Peterborough or anywhere else is on outside audibility. Because, if you start testing on this structure, that structure and the other structure, you are going to get a little different result in each one, depending on the type of construction and the particular room in the building in which you carry on the test and, of course, how much the particular building happens to be shielded by other buildings from the site of the siren. The only way in which you get any sort of test which is standard or uniform is on outside audibility.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Can the minister tell the committee what are the Canadian army commitments at the present time to the United Nations or any other form of international service, and can he give us some details in regard to this service? I know figures were given some time ago but I was wondering what the figures are now.


Douglas Scott Harkness: My officials will turn up the exact figures.


Lester Bowles Pearson: While this is being done perhaps I might ask another question related to my previous one. To what extent are those Canadian contingents of United Nations forces or other international services maintained by Canadian air transport?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, as far as the location of the force is concerned, first there is the United Nations emergency force in the Suez. It consists of a total establishment of Canadian army units of 69 officers and 789 other ranks, for a total of 858 all ranks. There is a reconnaissance squadron in that, Lord Strathcona's Horse; a signal squadron, a transport company, and an infantry workshop as the main units making up that particular force.
The R.C.A.F. has 14 officers and 74 other ranks with that force, so that the total of all ranks in the force is 941.
In the Congo the army has 41 officers and 230 other ranks; the air force has six officers and two other ranks, making a total of 279.
In India and Pakistan in that truce observer role the army has eight officers. In Indochina the navy has two officers; the army has 28 officers and 24 other ranks; the R.C.A.F. has two officers, making a total of 56 all ranks.
In the United Nations truce teams in the Middle East there are 17 army officers. In other countries there are one naval officer

and seven army officers; three army other ranks; three R.C.A.F. officers; three other ranks; making a total of 17.
I am sorry, I have forgotten what the second question was.


Lester Bowles Pearson: To what extent are these Canadian forces maintained by Canadian transport?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There are five scheduled North Star flights per month from Trenton, Ontario, via Langar, England and Pisa, Italy to El Arish and return.
As far as the Suez forces are concerned, the total number of flights in support of those forces in the year ended September 30, 1960 was 66, or a total of 788,000 odd miles flown.
I do not suppose the hon. member wants the number of passengers and so forth. As far as the Congo is concerned, there are 15 R.C.A.F. personnel on the strength of the United Nations force there. That was as of June 1. There are two scheduled North Star flights per week to the Congo from Langar via Pisa, Italy to Leopoldville and return, and there are two scheduled North Star flights per month from Trenton, Ontario, down to the Congo and return.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Perhaps I may be permitted to pay my own humble tribute to the magnificent work that these men are doing on behalf of peace and for their country. I know we are all very grateful for the service they have rendered and are continuing to render under particularly difficult circumstances in the Congo at the present time.
I noticed from what the minister has said that the signals personnel in the Congo have been reduced somewhat, because in the blue book of May reference is made to the army signal unit comprising 280 all ranks. I think the figures the minister gave were a little less than that. May I ask the minister whether the transfer, if you would like to call it that, of those Canadian signallers to the Congo, when it took place, had any effect on the work of the Canadian army signals in Canada? Has the work of training the signallers been carried on in the normal way notwithstanding the transfer of so many of the signals unit to the Congo.


Douglas Scott Harkness: 
Lester Bowles Pearson: Do we pay the full expenses of all our contingents in these United Nations forces? I assume that we do and, if we do, do we get credit for that expenditure against the assessments which are levied by the United Nations to cover the expenses of United Nations activities, a credit which we will perhaps never be able to realize in cash?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Theoretically the way the matter is supposed to work so far as costs are concerned is that we pay the normal costs, pay and allowances, of our personnel who are there. The United Nations is supposed to pay the extra costs for accommodation and so forth. We bill them for these extra costs. In the case of the Suez force, it has been on a definite basis and these bills have been paid. As far as the Congo is concerned, the same system is supposed to work but there has never been any final determination of what the United Nations would pay and therefore the matter is still in abeyance.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister comment on this statement by the former minister as found on page 462 of the proceedings of the defence estimates committee? I quote:
You asked what weapons if any are replacing any of the Browning machine guns used by the Canadian army. It is planned to replace the .30 calibre Browning in due course by a machine gun of the 7.62 millimetre NATO standardized calibre. Preliminary studies are being carried out on some new machine guns which might meet the requirements. Consideration is being given to the replacement of the .5 calibre Browning in due course by the new heavy machine gun. As yet, no decision on the type of gun to adopt has been made, but various guns are being considered.
Can the minister indicate if either of these decisions has yet been made?
Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, Mr. Chairman, there has been no final decision taken on that particular matter yet.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister advise the committee as to how many of the new C-42 wireless sets have been delivered to the brigade group in Europe?


Douglas Scott Harkness: All units of the brigade in Europe are fully equipped now with this new wireless set as are the regular army units in Canada. I think some of them have also been delviered to militia units. If not, I think some will be delivered fairly soon for national survival purposes.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister indicate whether he has any plans to equip the Canadian army with light aircraft, more specifically of Otter, Beaver or Caribou class?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, there are no definite plans. Various proposals along this line have been made and studied. No decision has been made to equip the Canadian army with any aircraft of this type. There is quite a considerable question involved. The particular proposition was, of course, to equip the brigade in Europe, but for a formation of that size it is a matter of considerable doubt whether it is a practical proposition to give it its own little air force, you might say. There is quite a body of opinion that this is not a practical way to solve the problem of the need for air transportability and for air transport. As far as Canada is concerned, of course, air transport requirements can be met by the R.C.A.F.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I am sure the minister would admit that the contrary opinion is held in some quarters. Would he also indicate whether he plans to obtain any heavy helicopters for the brigade group to be used for moving personnel and equipment?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have had a considerable number of these plans and propositions put before me and have given them a good deal of study, both with respect to aircraft of the Otter or Beaver type and also heavy helicopters. I think there is a need for a certain number of heavy helicopters and I hope to be able to work out something definite in that regard in the very near future.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister advise the committee how many consultant architects and engineers were used in the last fiscal year and what was the total cost?


Douglas Scott Harkness: While that is being looked up, I might reply to a question that was asked about the Hamilton Galt trophy competition. I have the information here for the last three years only. In 1958 the trophy

Supply-National Defence was won by the second regiment, R.H.C., in 1959 it was won by the first Royal 22nd regiment and in 1960 it was won by the first P.P.C.L.I. regiment. The competition is between all regular infantry battalions and includes the scoring of all personnel of the battalion. A steady improvement in firing skill of the battalions as a whole has been experienced. The director of infantry is still searching for statistics on the actual results.


Mr, Pitman:: I thank the minister very much for that information. Could he tell us whether the scores indicated an improvement as a result of the use of the new rifle compared with the Lee-Enfield or whether the improvement resulted from greater accuracy in firing rather than the use of the FN rifle?


Douglas Scott Harkness: We have the percentage scores for these three years and they show an increase from 127 to 132 to 141. They do not show which rifles were being used which I think was the point the hon. member was getting at. I will have to send for that information. The last question was in connection with the number of architects and consultants. The amount of money which was budgeted for consultants fees in 1960-61 was $900,000 and in 1961-62 $500,000 or a decrease of $400,000. I have not got the actual number.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is the minister giving the figures for those on the staff of national defence headquarters?


Douglas Scott Harkness: These are consultants' fees.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Consultants to the department?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: In his list of equipment for the brigade group the minister mentioned the S.S. anti-tank missile for training. Would he indicate his intentions with regard to an operational anti-tank missile for the brigade group?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, no final decision has been made as to what type of missile of this kind will finally be adopted as our regular equipment. We have been using the French wire-guided weapon, the S.S.-10 for practice purposes and for training. However, we have been evaluating other weapons of the same type and, as I say, no final decision has yet been made as to which one we will eventually adopt.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: If the minister examines the box score he will see the basis for our suggestion that the brigade group is not as adequately equipped as it might be. We admit quite freely that some of these programs are


coming along in more or less orderly fashion. We strongly suspect, however, that some of them have been held back for budgetary reasons. This is the reason we charge that the brigade group has been starved for equipment at the same time rather heavy expenditures have been made for other equipment which, in our opinion, is not nearly so essential.
I might give a sort of running box score: No Honest John rocket launchers in Europe, and no decision as to how they will be equipped when they get there; the FN rifle being re-constructed; Centurion tanks are being re-equipped and so far we do not know how many. The ammuniton has not all been ordered, as yet. The Bobcat is not yet ready to go into production, let alone be delivered to the brigade group. The C-42 wireless set is apparently fully installed and in use. There are no light aircraft and the minister is not yet convinced they are a requirement. I would suggest he visit some of the installations of other armies that are equipped with light aircraft to see their capabilities and then, on that basis, perhaps he would be impressed with the advisability of providing some light transport companies for the brigade group. There are no heavy helicopters yet available or on order, although the minister is giving this some consideration. Finally, there is no final decision with respect to an anti-tank missile.
This box score, Mr. Chairman, is the basis for the charge we have made, and we believe the facts substantiate the position we have taken. I wonder if the minister would give the committee a list of the equipment which has been issued to the militia for national survival operations?


Douglas Scott Harkness: My officials will turn up that list, and while that is being done I should like to say that the Centurion tank, of course, is a heavy British post-war tank and an exceptionally good one. The up-gunning of it has been proceeding quite satisfactorily and, as I said will be finished by the end of the year. With 20-pounder guns, it is still a very effective tank.
In so far as some of the other criticisms are concerned and this so-called list the hon. member has read, I would ask him to compare that list with the partial list of just some of the major equipment to which I referred a while ago as being supplied not only to the brigade in Europe but also to the regular army troops in Canada and, in some cases, to the militia. It is very easy to pick out four or five items and say that these are not yet complete. The basic fact is, however, that we have, by and large, completely reequipped the brigade in Europe and the other army units since the second world war with vehicles, weapons and what-not. This has

been a very considerable undertaking. So far as the anti-tank wire missile is concerned, to which reference was made, there are probably a half a dozen of those which have been produced in various countries. It takes a considerable length of time to evaluate all these. We also hope there will be some standardization so far as the NATO countries are concerned in putting them into their armies. In the meantime, as I say, we are using the French type.
There is a list here of the major items of survival equipment which have been issued to both the Canadian regular army and to the militia units. There are rescue kits on an operational scale for the two types of units, regular and militia. There is radiac equipment for the re-entry forces and fall-out reporting posts. There is a limited quantity of gamma survey meters, and the models of low range survey meters are the CDV-710 contamination meter and the CDV-700 in quantities sufficient to permit training and limited operations; approximately 30 per cent of the requirement of tactical dosimeters and dosimeters chargers; over 50 per cent of the requirement of personal dosimeters and approximately 40 per cent of the requirements of readers for these dosimeters; full requirements for training kits and training devices; communications equipment, including the United Kingdom C-42 wireless set, which is a 15-mile very high frequency set.
The major items of equipment which are on order and of which we hope to get deliveries fairly rapidly and regularly are the additional requirements of radiac equipment of various kinds and these dosimeter chargers for them; remote reading gamma survey meters for fall-out reporting posts; nuclear burst position indicators; communication equipment including telephone cable and public address sets, miscellaneous radio sets; portable heaters; decontamination apparatus; mobile laundry equipment; mobile bath equipment; gasoline driven saws; centrifugal pumps; torch cutting equipment; water purification equipment; various generating and lighting sets; some winter footwear; food cooking equipment; various items of crowd control equipment.
Planned for procurement are additional radiac equipment above what is already ordered; decontamination vacuum cleaners, collapsible tanks for water storage and additional lighting equipment. As I indicated last week, we have taken a considerable number of measures to speed up the securing of a considerable quantity of equipment needed for national survival purposes. We are securing all of this just as rapidly as it can be produced for us.
Supply-National Defence


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I am very pleased to learn of' this speed-up. I understand, indirectly, that to a large extent it results from the attention drawn to the need for it last year when the estimates were before the committee. At the same time, I know the minister would not wish to take credit for all the reequipment which has been given the brigade group over the years, most of which was ordered away back and then subsequently delivered to the brigade group long before the minister had any responsibility for the provision of equipment.
I wonder if the minister would give the number of resignations from the militia for the years 1959, 1960 and 1961 respectively and perhaps the rate of enlistments for the same periods?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, I would have to get the number of withdrawals from the militia. I think perhaps we could get the information best by giving the strengths at various times. The strengths going back to, we will say, March 31, 1958-this is the total strength, officers and other ranks-41,000. I will leave off the odd hundreds. December 31, 1958, 41,400.
March, 1959, 40,900; December, 1959, 40,700; March, 1960, 40,000; October 31, 41,000; December 31, 42,600; March 31, 1961, 43,200; June 30, 1961, 44,000. It will therefore be seen that during that period there has been a gradual increase of upwards of 4,000 in the numbers. We will try to get the number of the people who enlisted and the number who withdrew for the past year. I think that was what was asked for.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I should like to have the rate of enlistment or the turnover in that period if you have it handy.	.


Douglas Scott Harkness: No. We have not it at hand but we will get it. It may take some time to get it.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I wonder whether the minister would bring us up to date in relation to Maple Leaf services being supplied to the armed personnel overseas? Has he received any complaints recently, particularly with respect to the range of goods being carried and the fact that allegedly there is not a sufficient range of Canadian products?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There are, of course, complaints. There are always complaints over the operations of anything along these lines. The complaints are chiefly of two kinds. One is on the part of troops who have newly gone over to Germany. There are complaints that there is not the same variety of goods as that to which they have been accustomed at home. I think this situation can readily be understood. It is just not possible to carry

Supply-National Defence the great variety of goods, such as canned goods and so on, of all kinds which you find in a supermarket here in Canada.
The other type of complaint that I have received is with regard to the prices in the Maple Leaf services. This has been based chiefly on a belief-which is some cases is correct and in some cases is quite wrong- that the United States PX's are selling the same goods more cheaply. If you examine into this matter you find that some goods are certainly sold more cheaply in United States PX's. However, on the other hand certain goods are sold more cheaply in the Canadian Maple Leaf stores. Of course you never hear any complaint about that matter. It is taken for granted. But if there is found an item the price of which is cheaper in the United States PX's you get the complaint that it should be sold at that price in the Canadian Maple Leaf services. Of course, one of the reasons that there is a difference in prices is that the United States PX's are securing goods in very much greater quantities than we are and on a direct supply line, and thus their costs of acquisition and their transportation costs in the case of many items are less than ours. In the case of certain other items, as a matter of fact, as I say we can produce at a better price. This is the general situation with regard to complaints with respect to Maple Leaf services. However, I have never received very serious complaints in this regard.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I wish to read a rather incredible letter addressed to the Hon. Lester B. Pearson, House of Commons, Ottawa, Ontario or a copy of it. It reads as follows:
Dear Sir:
I am a retired Canadian army officer and veteran of world war II. I take the liberty of addressing this letter to you in order to place at your disposal certain facts gained from personal experience concerning Canadian complicity in the recent military action against Cuba organized by the government of the United States. It is my present conviction that the matter must be thoroughly exposed in order that proper measures be taken to prevent our further entanglement in the disastrous consequences of American policy toward Cuba.
Six months ago I was hired by the C.I.A. as an instructor and detailed to a camp where anti-Castro units were trained in landing operations. Through my close association with C.I.A. officials and participation in the camp activities, I was in a position to obtain some knowledge of the extent of Canadian involvement, as the following list of particulars will indicate:
1.	From information secured through C.I.A. channels, it is clear to me that Messrs. Diefenbaker and Harkness had full knowledge of, and indeed encouraged, the recruitment of Canadian citizens on Canadian soil by the C.I.A. for service in units being prepared for the invasion of Cuba. The same evidence indicates that R.C.M.P. officials co-operated with the C.I.A. in this activity.
2.	My estimate is that from 200 to 300 Canadians were recruited. In the main they were unemployed

persons and ex-servicemen. Practically all of them joined up because of the high rate of pay.
3.	In addition, several regular army officers took part in the training and actual landing operations in Cuba. Presumably their participation was approved by their superiors.


James Stanley Speakman: I rise on a point of order, Mr. Chairman. Will the hon. member who is reading this document kindly identify its source?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I will give it later.


James Stanley Speakman: I should like him to identify it now, Mr. Chairman.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: The initials of the gentleman are "D. J. S." I wish to finish reading it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: What is his name?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: It is just initialled.


Douglas Scott Harkness: It is an anonymous letter.


James Stanley Speakman: If it is an anonymous letter, it is out of order to read it.


Richard Albert Bell: Is the hon. member adopting it?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: No. Some rather unusual statements are given here. He is willing to come forward. I will carry on and paraphrase it.


An hon. Member:: Name him.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: He goes on to say this-


James Stanley Speakman: Mr. Chairman, will you kindly rule on that point of order.


Frank Charles McGee: I was
wondering whether the hon. member who was reading the letter was giving me his own abbreviated version of the person who signed the letter or is the letter actually signed by initials as indicated?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: No. It is initialed but not signed. I can paraphrase the contents of it.


Frank Charles McGee: Just a minute, please.


Lester Bowles Pearson: While you are ruling on this important point, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make it quite clear that I did not refer the copy of this letter to the hon. gentleman.


Frank Charles McGee: The
ruling I had in mind is to be found in Beauchesne's fourth edition, paragraph 158, subsection 3, page 134, which states:
(3) An unsigned letter should not be read in the house. On the 16th May 1928, a member stated during debate that a letter which he had been quoting was not signed. The Speaker said: "Such a letter should not be read into Hansard.', all letters when read must be signed and they become part of the documents of the house".

I think the point is well taken by the hon. member for Wetaskiwin, in view of the apparent length of the letter and also in view of the fact that it is for all practical purposes an anonymous letter. I would suggest that a free paraphrasing of it would be more in order.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I bow to your ruling, Mr. Chairman, and I shall paraphrase it. I raise the matter because he sent this letter to the Leader of the Opposition and to five members of parliament. He goes on to say this.


John Cameron Pallett: Does the hon. member take these remarks as his own as well as paraphrasing the letter? Is he taking responsibility for them?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I am not obliged to take responsibility for paraphrasing information.


John Cameron Pallett: Oh, yes, you are obliged to take responsibility for an anonymous letter.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I am not reading the letter. I want the minister to answer this.


William Heward Grafftey: Disregard the rules.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: He goes on to indicate that the invasion collapsed and he mentions money.


John Cameron Pallett: I rise on a point of order, Mr. Chairman. The point I raise is that the hon. member is purporting to read an anonymous letter and he says, "He says". I suggest that the hon. member either accept these remarks as his own, a procedure which is in accordance with the rules of the house, or accept responsibility for them.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Mr. Chairman, I can overcome that quite easily according to the rules by saying I have been informed. That is quite correct.


An hon. Member:: No, you cannot.


William Heward Grafftey: Oh, no.


Frank Charles McGee: On the
point of order that has been raised, I would appreciate it very much if the hon. member for Peel would direct the attention of the Chair specifically to the rule which covers this particular point. In my humble opinion, if this rule does exist, it has been honoured in the breach.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Oh, no.


Frank Charles McGee: I say
that from my experience, and in my opinion. I would appreciate some guidance as to the specific precedents in this matter. The point I have in mind has occurred frequently in debates and discussions in the house when in quite recent times hon. members on both sides of a particular argument have quoted
Supply-National Defence from the same editorial. Clearly hon. members on both sides of the argument cannot be assuming responsibility for the same editorial which in part seems to support both sides of the argument.


Thomas Miller Bell: Surely that would be out of order, Mr. Chairman, because it is specifically governed by citation 157, subcitation 5. That citation is perhaps not relevant to our particular discussion, but the reading of editorials in support of argument has been frequently ruled to be out of order.


John Cameron Pallett: I would refer you, Mr. Chairman, to citation 159, subparagraph 3, which by an analogy covers this situation. The citation reads:
It has been admitted that a document which has been cited ought to be laid upon the table of the house, if it can be done without injury to the public interest. The same rule, however, cannot be held to apply to private letters or memoranda. On the 18th May, 1865, the attorney general, on being asked by Mr. Ferrard if he would lay upon the table a written statement and a letter to which he had referred on a previous day, in answering a question relative to the Leeds bankruptcy court, replied that he had made a statement to the house upon his own responsibility, and that the documents he had referred to being private, he could not lay them upon the table.


Lionel Chevrier: There is another sentence which you did not read.


Frank Charles McGee: The
citation goes on to say:
-the documents he had referred to being private, he could not lay them upon the table. Lord Robert Cecil contended that the papers, having been cited, should be produced; but the Speaker declared that this rule applied to public documents only.
I think, with the lack of some immediate direction and instruction from precedents, we should proceed on a common sense basis. I think perhaps we are all of a mind in this particular instance. Without attempting to establish a precedent and-
Mr. Pallet!: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member does not accept responsibility for the statements he makes. This is fundamental to the practice of the House of Commons. It is such a fundamental rule that it is basic to the whole proceedings.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Mr. Chairman, possibly
through a lapse of memory or oversight I did transgress the rules of the house in this instance. But I will not transgress the rules of the house further. All hon. members know that I try to keep them as much as possible.


William Heward Grafftey: Do you, or do you not, take responsibility?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Having had certain information which now seems very unusual, I would ask the minister two or three questions which will be quite in order.

Supply-National Defence
First, does the minister know of any Canadians being recruited to serve in forces that were used in the invasion of Cuba?
Second, does the minister know of any Canadian army personnel being directly or indirectly involved in such an arrangement?
Third, in view of certain persons making these most unusual statements, and a certain person being willing to come forward to give information in detail, if requested, will the minister give any person who is willing to come forward and present evidence to the defence committee an opportunity to substantiate any statements they have made in correspondence, conversation or otherwise?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I shall be very glad to have anybody come forward with anything that he can substantiate in regard to any matter along this line. As far as any Canadian army personnel having had any part directly or indirectly in the Cuban affair is concerned, I know definitely that none of them had. In other words, these various statements in this anonymous letter are just completely false. There is the statement that the Prime Minister and I had full knowledge of the matter. I know that I had absolutely no knowledge of the matter in any way, shape or form. As I say, I also know that the Canadian army had no part of any kind in training people or anything else along that line.
I suspect this is the same man, as a matter of fact, who made an appearance on a television show here in Ottawa some months ago and claimed that he had been in Cuba and that there were a lot of other Canadian soldiers in Cuba. He claimed they were using Canadian army rifles, and things of this sort. I answered a question or two in the house on it. He said they had been using .303 rifles which were stolen from a certain camp. I have forgotten the name of the camp now, but on investigation it happened to be a camp where there never had been any .303 rifles because it had come into operation after the FN rifle had been issued. This showed a palpable falsehood in these claims.
As a matter of fact, the man claimed that he served in certain Canadian army units, and so forth. We looked the matter up and found he had enlisted, under his brother's name as I recall it, and had been discharged because he was found to be mentally unstable.
He then threatened me, and the R.C.M.P. were actually looking after him for a while. He was going to do away with me because of the answers I had given. But subsequently somehow or other, I think Liberty magazine printed an article for him and showed pictures of him, presumably in Cuba. It turned out on investigation that

these pictures had actually been taken by a Toronto photographer-his name was right on the back of the pictures-


Murdo William Martin: Did he have a beard?


Douglas Scott Harkness: -and they were taken in the botanical gardens at Toronto. I suspect that the fellow who wrote this letter is the same man.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: In order to clear up the matter-


An hon. Member:: Tear the letter up.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: -would the minister say whether he invites this person to come forward and sustantiate his claims?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I invite him to come forward and substantiate his claims, but if it is the same man as I suspect it is, he is just looking for more notoriety and I am not going to give it to him.
The Acling Chairman (Mr. McGee): Shall vote 337 carry?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, would the minister tell the committee to what extent the standardization of arms and ground equipment has proceeded in NATO? I know that there has been a standardization of the FN rifle. I am not sure how far that has been carried out. Has there been some backsliding from that example of standardization? What else has been done to standardize arms and equipment in the NATO forces?


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is one of the areas in which there has been disappointingly slow progress. The amount of standardization outside of the FN rifle has been disappointingly little. It arises to a large extent, I think, because each country, for purposes of maintaining employment in its own industries, and so on, always attempts to manufacture everything it possibly can in that particular country. I believe this is the main reason why it is so difficult to get standardization of these different pieces of equipment.
Mr. Chairman, a question was asked about the up-gunning of the Centurions. The hon. member for Trinity asked for the division of the $6 million which was put into this program. Six hundred thousand dollars of that amount is for the modifications to the guns, and $5,400,000 is for ammunition.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I thank the minister for that information. I wonder if the hon. gentleman has the information to enable him to answer this inquiry. I shall read it for the benefit of the minister. Without going into voluminous detail, suffice it to state that under order in council, PC 1959-1/1297 northern allowance

at $87.50 per month was converted to isolation allowance and reduced to the sum of $70 per month with effect from October 1, 1959, this new allowance to be reduced by 20 per cent each year for a period of five years, to the end that at the conclusion of this period no special allowance would be paid to personnel posted to Dawson Creek, British Columbia. However, a discrepancy arises from the fact that even at the reduced rates isolation allowance is awarded only to personnel who were posted to Dawson Creek prior to the order in council coming into effect. Personnel posted subsequent to that date receive no consideration. Therefore, a number of personnel posted prior to the order in council being passed receive $52.50 per month even after the 20 per cent reduction which became effective on October 1, 1960, in addition to normal pay and allowances, while those posted subsequent to the order in council receive only normal pay and allowances. Yet all live under the same circumstances and conditions.
I wonder if the minister would indicate, if these facts are correct, whether or not he thinks this situation is equitable and whether he proposes alleviating the discrepancy in the treatment of personnel at Dawson Creek.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am told there was a complete study made of these isolation allowances and northern allowances. In some cases they were increased as a result of this study, while in others they were decreased. In the cases where they were decreased the decrease was to be effected over a five year period. I have here a list of the areas in which allowances were decreased and of those in which they were not. I presume that if increases were paid with respect to the northwest highway system it was because a considerable number of other places such as Dawson Creek certainly cannot be looked upon any longer as isolated posts.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Does the minister not feel that even if the allowance is reduced over a five year period the amount paid should apply to all personnel at a particular station rather than be applied to some and not to others?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I must say frankly that I am not familiar with the situation, and therefore I am not in a position to answer that question.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the minister take it into consideration and let me know the results of his inquiries either privately or otherwise?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes, I shall be glad to have this looked into and if I cannot give an answer before the estimates are completed I shall write to the hon. member.


Chesley William Carter: I should like to direct to the minister one or two questions about the public
Supply-National Defence relations staff. Can the minister say how many such personnel the army has engaged in this work and how that number compares proportionately with the numbers employed in the other services? This is one item of expenditure in connection with which I sometimes wonder whether the taxpayer is getting good value for his dollar. I have not had much opportunity to observe the work of the P.R.O.'s. I did have one opportunity to do so in July and I cannot say I was much impressed by what I saw on that occasion. However, I should not like to draw any conclusion from a single observation.
I should like also to find out on what basis these P.R.O. people are allocated to units and formations and whether any thought has been given to unifying the work of this department in the three services.


Egan Chambers: The public relations directorates of the services and defence research board have three main functions:
1.	To facilitate a flow of unclassified information about the armed services and defence research board to the public.
2.	To provide counsel to their respective services, to ensure that each service is, in fact, serving the public interest to the best of its abilities, in closest possible harmony with other national interests, and that its plans, policies, programs and activities are presented or performed in such a way as to reflect the high standards of the service concerned, and its dedication to public interest.
3.	To advise upon and implement planned community relations programs, particularly at overseas establishments.
The hon. member for Burin-Burgeo will realize that wherever there is a service establishment, particularly overseas but here in Canada also, the relationship between the civilian population and the service population can sometimes cause difficulties. One of the ways in which this situation can be helped is through good public relations. I was asked to give some figures, and I can tell the committee that at national defence headquarters there are two civilian public relations officers. The navy has a total of 14 officers and ten civilians. The army has 28 officers and 34 other ranks, besides 30 civilians, for a grand total of 92. The R.C.A.F. has a total of 29 officers, 35 other ranks and nine civilians for a total of 73. The defence research board has two civilians engaged in this work.


Chesley William Carter: Could we have any indication of the total cost? Is that figure available?


Egan Chambers: It is not broken down-


Chesley William Carter: Could we not have some indication of the cost? I understand the navy has 14 officers, the army 28 officers and the
8396	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence air force 27, plus other ranks. What would the top rank be in each of those establishments? What would the average rank be?


Egan Chambers: The senior officer in each service is a lieutenant colonel or equivalent. The bulk of the working officer personnel are army captains, or equivalent.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
23S. Construction or acquisition of buildings, works, land and major equipment, $60,556,000.
Julia Verlyn (Judy) LaMarsh: I should like to take this opportunity to raise a question which is of interest to my own constituency. There was an artillery armoury there called the General Brock armoury which was purchased by the department a few years ago. An anti-aircraft battery was stationed there. In June of this year the armoury was sold on tender having been declared surplus and the artillery battery was required to move into the Victoria Avenue armoury which has been the home of a company of the Lincoln regiment. Could the minister say why the General Brock armoury was declared surplus and sold? It was about three times the physical size of the armoury which remains and it was a more modern building although not so well designed as an armoury.
Consequently, we think it will now be necessary to rent space to train individuals of the militia in the Niagara area for civil defence.


Egan Chambers: Mr. Chairman, we will have to send for this information for the hon. member.


Chesley William Carter: The minister might now answer the question I asked earlier.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Well, I am informed that the question of a Newfoundland armoury is awaiting the decision on the ownership of the Pepperrell air base, and that some accommodation in it might be used as an armoury.


David Rodger Mitchell: I am going to ask my annual question of the minister concerning the proposed Sudbury armoury. The hon. lady from Niagara Falls gave me the idea when she was talking about the armouries. Has any progress been made with the construction of this building? I am advised that army construction experts have been in Sudbury recently looking over the situation and have made a report to the department. A new arrangement has been suggested concerning the construction of this building. I am advised that local money can be obtained for its erection on a lease back contract. It is suggested, of course, that the department oversee the construction of this building according to army regulations, and rent it for a


period of 20 to 25 years, with the purchase of same to be arranged at that time, if they so wish.
Is there any money in this year's estimates earmarked for this purpose? Of course, you realize, that the property for this armoury has already been donated to the crown and has been lying idle there. The deed is still held by the Department of National Defence.
I am asking this question to see whether the department has taken any serious thought of the construction of this building under other arrangements.


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is one of the armoury projects with which it happens I am thoroughly familiar. I went into it in considerable detail as the hon. member knows, with the delegation from Sudbury and I am doing my best to get the things approved and get construction started as soon as possible. It is at the head of our priority list for armouries in Ontario. I have not yet managed to get it approved by treasury board, but I hope to be able to do that in the very near future.


David Rodger Mitchell: Thank you.


Hubert Badanai: I should like to direct a question to the minister with regard to the armoury situation in Fort William. It has being brought to his attention on several occasions. I wonder whether the city of Fort William is on a basis similar to that mentioned by the hon. member for Sudbury. The Department of National Defence is well aware of the need for an armoury at Fort William. Will the minister give some assurance that consideration will be given to this matter in the near future?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I dealt with this question, I think it was the day before yesterday, as a result of the speech which the hon. member made on item No. 1. I really have nothing to add to that. I said at that time we have to make arrangements to rent a hall in Fort William to accommodate a company of the Lake Superior Scottish and this will go some small way at least to meet the need there. I regret to inform the hon. member that, unlike the situation in Sudbury, the actual building of an armoury at Fort William is not close to the top of the priority list and therefore I can give no indication as to when the construction might be started on an armoury in Fort William.


Murray Lincoln McFarlane: I am in a position almost similar to that of the two previous speakers, but my proposal to the minister is a little different. At the present time we have a militia unit in the city of Kimberley in British Columbia and we have endeavoured to carry on over a period of years, handling

part of the program in one building, part in another building and part in schools, keeping the equipment wherever cover is available. I have worked on this for some time. The last letter I had from the minister stated that the information had been requested from departmental officials and would be available at an early date. I sincerely hope it will not be very long before I will be able to obtain that material.
A brief has been submitted to the department concerning the necessity for the armouries at Kimberley. The submission is as follows:
That Kimberley Armouries limited erect a building acceptable to the Department of National Defence standards for a militia armoury.
That this building be rented to the Department of National Defence for a period of 20 years, at rates sufficient to write off the cost of construction and such other charges as may be deemed necessary.
That at the end of the contract period, the building be sold to the crown for a nominal sum agreed in the contract.
That the building be erected on the 2.25 acres of crown land held in the name of the Department of National Defence in the city of Kimberley.
Financial backing for Kimberley Armouries limited has been obtained from the Royal Trust Company, Vancouver, B.C., through the bank of Montreal, Kimberley, B.C.
The land was given to the Department of National Defence by the city of Kimberley so that an armouries could be built. It constituted the last suitable site in the community when the gift was made. The city had itself received the land as a contribution from the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Company of Canada limited as park land, with a clause defining an armouries as an acceptable improvement.
There are several other items in this brief. They have enclosed the signatures of very responsible men in the community and also of members of the opposition party. In addition to that, they have given us a brief summary of the militia activities in Kimberley over the past few years. It is now known as the 17th field squadron R.C.E. at Kimberley, at Creston and at Cranbrook. During the years they have been in operation they have trained 33 officers and 525 men. In addition they have 65 cadets in the city of Cranbrook and 35 in the Creston area.
Also attached to this brief, Mr. Chairman, is the engineering project of the building as it will look when completed, in addition to the site plan which has been laid out on the property concerned; and also tentative estimates of the amount required for the construction of this building, with an approximate cost of $150,000.
In view of the fact that we feel this project is an essential in the area, I should like to give the committee a slight resume of the geographical location of Kimberley. It is situated very close to my own town, within 20
Supply-National Defence miles to be exact, in the heart of the Rocky mountains. It is my understanding that in case of an emergency the militia would be called upon to undertake a great deal of the work necessary at such a time. I took up this matter with the department and they came back with the reply that in the case of an emergency help would be forthcoming from Calgary and Kamloops where units are already established.
One look at the map, Mr. Chairman, would bring to your attention the problem that would exist in moving equipment and personnel from either of the two points mentioned. The Rocky mountains and the lakes and rivers in the area forestall any quick movement of troops and equipment. I would appreciate it if this matter could be given consideration at an early date. The Kimberley group has gone to a lot of trouble in preparing plans and data, and in the event of the citizens signing a letter of intent that they are prepared to proceed as a private group should approval be obtained within a reasonable time construction of the Kimberley armouries could also be a winter works project. We are very anxious to proceed with construction and if a prompt reply could be given by the minister or the department within the next few days or weeks we could possibly arrange for some construction this winter.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I happen to know this unit at Kimberley. It is a very excellent engineering unit and they are to be highly commended on the work they have done. I also have an additional interest in the unit. It was formerly an artillery unit and was part of the regiment that I commanded as a militia commander in the years immediately after the war. It was later converted to an engineering unit. I know what the need is for an armoury there. It has been on a priority basis for some considerable length of time. At the present time it is in the same situation in western command as Sudbury is in central command. It is at the top of the priority list so far as the construction of armouries in western command is concerned and I trust we can get some action on it fairly soon.


Oscar William Weichel: On the subject of armouries, Mr. Chairman, about a year and a half ago a brief was presented by some gentlemen in Kitchener with regard to the need for a new armoury. We have five or six units in Kitchener and Waterloo which are scattered all over the place and I am quite sure that the rent paid on the buildings now occupied would pay for a new building in about ten years time. Accommodation could also be

Supply-National Defence provided for the navy and civil defence personnel in such a building. I would appreciate it if the minister would look at that brief again.


Douglas Scott Harkness: This is another case where we realize that an armoury is very badly needed. As a matter of fact, it is fourth on the priority list of central command. I can assure the hon. member that we have it very much in mind and it is really a matter of when we can get sufficient funds to construct it, as well as a number of other armouries.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister tell us the ultimate decision with respect to the University avenue armouries in Toronto?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The city of Toronto and the metropolitan district have both indicated that they wish to have this site for a new law courts building and that they wish to proceed with the agreement entered into some years ago under which we are to turn over that site to them. We have built one other armoury, the Dennison armoury, which I believe will be officially opened next month or perhaps even this month. It has been taken over and will be officially opened very soon. There is a need for two more armouries of the same size.
The metropolitan district was supposed to assist us in securing land sites to build the two additional armouries but unfortunately nothing has been produced yet. One site was put forward but the expropriation which the metropolitan district sought to put through was cancelled when the matter was taken to the courts and therefore we lost that site. We do not have definite sites for these other two armouries. I hope we will be able to get them very shortly so that construction can be started.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister say when the department will have to give up the University avenue site and will the two other armouries be ready by that time or will there be a hiatus?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The original agreement was that we would give it up by December 31 of this year, but in view of the fact that sites have not been provided and therefore it has been impossible to proceed with construction I have informed the city officials that we cannot give up the armouries at this time and will not be able to do so until we have been able to provide alternative accommodation.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is it true that that very famous regiment, the 48th Highlanders, does not wish to carry on if it has to leave the University avenue armouries and is that situation being resolved?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I do not think there is any question of that. Some people may have made statements along that line. I do not know. If so, they have not come to my attention. I have had no indication whatever that the 48th Highlanders will not continue and I would be very surprised, in fact, if they are not anxious to continue.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Can the minister say whether any decision has been taken with regard to a new armouries for the city of Vancouver?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The Vancouver armouries would have been started before now except for some difficulties there over the site and the objection on the part of some people to having it built on a piece of crown owned property where we originally intended to put it. I think that the matter of the site is being straightened out now. As far as western command is concerned, the Vancouver armouries is the second one on the list and comes immediately after Kimberley as a priority project.


John Richard Garland: Could the minister say who is responsible for the establishment of these priorities?


Douglas Scott Harkness: After carefully considering the situation in the light of the needs of the militia and the accommodation at present being used, each command recommends a list of armouries in the area which they think should be constructed. This list is reviewed at army headquarters and then reviewed again by myself. The list is established on that basis.


John Richard Garland: With respect to North Bay, in view of the developments that are taking place from a military standpoint, can the minister say whether he sees any reason to believe that the priority rating for the project there might be raised? I know it is well down the list.


Douglas Scott Harkness: North Bay is not nearly as much a priority project as some of the others that have been mentioned. The list is changed from time to time depending on changes in conditions. At the present time North Bay is in seventh priority position on the central command list which would mean that there is not much hope of getting it built in the immediate future.


John Richard Garland: Perhaps the minister missed my question. In view of the fact that it has that rating and in view of the developments in the military field that are taking place across the country, I wonder whether there is any reason to believe that North Bay's priority might be raised in the reasonably near future.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As I said, the matter of armoury construction and the priority list are under review continuously and there are changes made from time to time depending on changed situations. I do not know enough about the situation with respect to this armoury compared with others to be able to give a definitive answer to the hon. member.


Edmund Leverett Morris: I wonder if the minister would inform me whether or not the department is holding land on Rainnie drive in Halifax for army building use?


Egan Chambers: Mr. Chairman, the department does hold this land for possible future army development.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Royal Canadian Air Force-
239. Operation and maintenance. $536,666,000.
James Ernest Pascoe: I should like to ask some questions on item 239 which concerns R.C.A.F. operations. I was very interested in the announcement by the minister on September 11 in connection with the replacement by 1963 of the Harvard trainer with the CL-41 jet trainer as the basic R.C.A.F. training aircraft. There is a very fine R.C.A.F. station in my home city of Moose Jaw. The minister's announcement has aroused great interest there. I was present during graduation ceremonies for the last class of student pilots, and I saw how eagerly they looked forward to their jet training after flying Harvards, although they were also very proud of the Harvards. By 1963, student pilots will be training on these jet trainers.
Could the minister tell the committee what changes may have to be made at R.C.A.F. stations to accommodate the jet trainer, particularly in so far as personnel, maintenance and repair hangars and runways. Will the runways which have accommodated the Harvards have to be lengthened or strengthened to accommodate the CL-41? I am not sure of the exact length of the runways at the Moose Jaw R.C.A.F. station, but I know that jets do not normally land there. If it is necessary to lengthen the runways, and I imagine it will be, could some of this work be done this fall and perhaps during the winter to provide winter employment?


Douglas Scott Harkness: There will be no changes required in the hangars. There will be >a very small increase in maintenance personnel. There are only two of the stations in which there needs to be an increase in the length of the runways, one is at Penhold, Alberta and the other is at Moose Jaw. The runway at Moose Jaw is only 3,700 feet long and it will need to be extended to 6,000 feet. The
Supply-National Defence work will not be undertaken this year because of the date of delivery of the new trainer, which will not be until 1963. It is not a priority matter to lengthen the runways at the present time or in the next few months.


William Hector McMillan: I listened to the minister yesterday when he said that our troops were splendid and their equipment was excellent. I agree with the minister 100 per cent in his reference to our troops, but I have grave doubts about his description of their equipment. After listening to the debate in the committee yesterday and today, I have grave doubts about the equipment provided for the three services. At this particular time, I want to refer to the equipment of the air service.
Now, the Voodoo airplane which is being purchased is a second hand plane. It is being purchased from the United States. The CF-104 is being made in Montreal. These two airplanes will not be effective operationally with the R.C.A.F. for some time. Certainly, there are none of these planes in Europe. I do not see how the minister can say that the equipment of the air wings in Europe is excellent, particularly when they are equipped with airplanes that cannot intercept some of the commercial jet aircraft. They certainly would not be fast enough to intercept enemy fighters or fast enemy bombers.
I have read several times in the press, and the truth is, that since the cancellation of the Avro Arrow program this government has had no definite defence policy at all. It is two and a half years since the Avro Arrow program was cancelled, at which time five airplanes were nearing completion. Only now are we starting to replace them, and with slower aircraft. It is true that the government proceeded with the construction of two Bomarc bases, one in northern Ontario and the other north of Montreal, but these will not be in operation for some months yet. After two and a half years, and when we have a crisis on our hands, we find we have no adequate air defence in Canada. We have outmoded fighter planes in Europe and we have two Bomarc bases that are non-operational.
I do not pretend to know anything about the Bomarc B, but I have read articles in the press, as I know other members have, emanating from the United States and dealing with tests that were made. These tests are certainly not very reassuring. At the time the decision was taken by this government to go ahead with the Bomarc B missile bases, I read one article concerning tests made in the United States. These tests would lead one to believe the Bomarc interceptor missile was of very dubious value. This article stated at that time that in 12 tests the missile

Supply-National Defence got off the ground on only four occasions and only hit a slow moving target on one of the four occasions. There was a later article that appeared in the Toronto Globe and Mail on December 29, last and I have it here, concerning tests made of the Bomarc B missile at the Elgin air base in Florida. The article stated that the series of tests at that time were a success.
The article went on to say that eight of the tests were complete failures, and that 14 of the next 15 tests were successful. I suppose that means that in the next 15 tests the missile got off the ground 14 times, so that 14 successful tests out of 23 could not be described as great success. During these tests there was a near miss on a jet drone travelling at subsonic speed over the gulf of Mexico. The article only describes this one test, and I do not know whether or not more tests were made on a target. If the missile only made one near hit in the whole 23 tests, that is not very good.
I hope the minister can give us some information as to subsequent tests, and I hope the results were better than that. I have read some derogatory remarks from defence people in the United States concerning the Bomarc B. In view of this, I think the minister should allay some of our fears about the usefulness of the Bomarc B. As I said before, I hope he will give us some results of later tests, as these articles have appeared in the press. As I said earlier, I do not know anything about the Bomarc B. I think the minister owes it to the members of this committee and to the people of Canada generally to give some information as to the results of the latest tests made on the Bomarc B missile.
It is generally agreed that the Bomarc B missile is useless without an atomic warhead. The Prime Minister himself said this in effect two and a half years ago. He at least said that it could not reach its full potential use without an atomic warhead. I have the quotation here but I do not propose to give the quotation from page 1223 of Hansard. I heard the hon. member for Quebec East and the Leader of the Opposition quote from that speech today.
The Bomarc B will have atomic capability but the government will not announce whether or not an atomic warhead will be used. To me it looks as though United States personnel will be stationed at our two Bomarc bases and will have control of these Bomarc warheads and that we shall be able to use them only when they give us permission to do so.
After reading what the Prime Minister said over two and a half years ago about the Bomarc B and about its reaching its maximum

potential only when it is equipped with an atomic warhead, I would conclude that the decision was made by the government at that time that when the Bomarc B missiles are completed they would be equipped with atomic warheads or that at least they would be available for use. As I said before, it is over two and a half years since the Prime Minister said that the government was examining various questions with the government of the United States in connection with the acquisition and storage of Bomarc B missiles. It has taken a long time to get an answer. One can only conclude that the examination is still in progress. Even though we assume that the Bomarc B is equipped with atomic warheads, that it can get off the ground and that it can hit the target more than once in 23 times, as was reported in earlier tests, the Bomarc B missile base is still itself a target. That fact has been brought out here today by the hon. member for Trinity and the Leader of the Opposition. It is a target for the intercontinental missile. It is also a target for an air to ground missile from a bomber. If these bases are put out of commission, these bombers can just roam at will as far as the Bomarc B missiles are concerned and certainly as far as our slower aircraft are concerned at the present time.
Yesterday the minister said that Russia had comparatively few intercontinental missiles. He said that the chief means of the delivery of atomic bombs by Russia was by bombers and that we need something to stop the bombers. This is a far cry from the words of the Prime Minister when he cancelled the Avro Arrow contract two and a half years ago. I also have here the words of the Prime Minister but I do not propose to quote them now. The reason given by the Prime Minister at that time was not that the Avro Arrow was not a good machine but rather that new projects were overtaking the aeroplane. Indeed, the main reason for cancelling that contract was that we would not need interceptor planes as they would be of no use against intercontinental missiles. The minister now tells us that we need interceptor planes almost more than we need anything else.
The minister says that the Liberals have no defence policy. After all, the Liberals were developing the fastest interceptor plane in the world. By now the R.C.A.F. would have been equipped with fast interceptor planes. The government scuttled the Arrow program, yet the minister says that our party has no defence policy. After killing the ace in our defence, they say that we have nothing left. I say that they have nothing left. They certainly have nothing left at this time with which to defend us here at home. As I said

before, they have no interceptor planes that can take their part against enemy planes in Europe.
One or two of the Avro aircraft were flown with engines not adapted to them. I met a number of officers of the R.C.A.F. and I may say that they were greatly impressed by the speed of this aircraft, its manoeuvrability and its great climbing power. In any case, five of these planes at or nearing completion at the time were cut up by the blow torch and the opportunity was lost to test them further. There is no question about their being cut up by the blow torch. In an answer to a question by the hon. member for Trinity, as found at page 5683 of Hansard of July 8, 1959, the Minister of Defence Production stated as follows:
The fact is that the ministry of national defence gave orders to my department, and my department to crown assets that all equipment should be taken out of these aircraft and that they should be reduced to scrap. Those were the orders received from national defence.
I have heard hon. members on the other side of the house disparage the Avro aircraft. If the performance of this aircraft was so poor, why did the government cut them up? Why did they not save them so that the R.C.A.F. might test them and prove to their own satisfaction whether or not they were good or whether they did not come up to the required specifications. I met many officers in the R.C.A.F. who had the impression that it would still be the fastest military plane in the world.
I heard some reference to the cost. I think the minister said this plane would cost $12.5 million. I read a speech of the Prime Minister in which he said that, with certain modifications, it would cost $7.8 million. Today the hon. member for Trinity mentioned a figure of $6.8 million. The hon. member for Trinity, in giving the offset cost against the Avro Arrow, did not mention the Bomarc B bases. These cost well over $100 million, and as far as we have been able to find out they are not much use. Certainly if this were put as an offset against the cost of the Avro Arrow, the government is spending just about as much money.
The government started out on this Bomarc B program and these cheaper and slower airplanes because they did not have the money. Why did they not have the money? The weird financing of this government, the promotion of higher interest rates by the conversion loan and other fiscal procedures have certainly saddled us with a great deal of debt. Already the extra interest aggregates over $800 million. I think this, and this alone, is the main factor why we have no defence policy; why we are accepting
90205-6-530
Supply-National Defence slower airplanes than the Avro. This is the main reason why our airmen in Europe and here in Canada would be sitting ducks for faster airplanes.
If our equipment is as excellent as the minister says it is, why is he now buying secondhand airplanes from the United States? I think the government has given greater priority to the payment of higher interest rates than they have to an adequate national defence. Unfortunately for us the government has been more solicitous of the money changers of our defence and the personnel manning that defence.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I wish to say a few words in connection with the rather extraordinary statements which have just been made. In the first place, the hon. member said the F-101B is a secondhand airplane. This is not so. This is the latest two-engined interceptor that the United States have in their system. The airplanes that were secured from them are not secondhand airplanes; they are airplanes that came off the assembly line just a few months ago. Of course they have been tested, and so forth, but this has to be done with every airplane. Therefore any allegation that these are secondhand airplanes is just not correct.
The hon. member is under a complete misapprehension about the Arrow. It would not have been in service had the program been completed. The Arrow would not have been in service until late in 1962. We will have the F-lOlB's in service more rapidly than we would have had the Arrows in service had the program been continued. I should like to correct that misapprehension.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You only say that now because you cannot be disproved.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am not going into this Arrow matter again. I spoke on it two days ago and I spoke on it at some length this afternoon. I simply repeat the fact that it would have been an extraordinarily expensive program which the defence budget just could not stand and which the Canadian taxpayer could not stand. It was a terrible mistake that the program was ever initiated, and I think we have to accept that this was the case. The result was that a good deal of money was wasted on it. The hon. member says the Bomarc B is no good and he talks about some of its-


William Hector McMillan: I did not say that.


Douglas Scott Harkness: -early failures. This is what the hon. member said, as I wrote it down. The hon. member said there had only been one successful bid out of 23 tries, and so on.

Supply-National Defence


William Hector McMillan: I read that from the press.
I did not say that was true.


Douglas Scott Harkness: If you did not believe it to be the case, you should not have put it on the record of the House of Commons. You should take the responsibility for what you say.


William Hector McMillan: On a point of privilege, Mr. Chairman, I did not say that was the case.
I said I did not know anything about the Bomarc B; that I had read this in the press.
I hoped this was not the case, and I asked the minister to give us the results of some further tests.


Douglas Scott Harkness: As a matter of fact, last year and the year before in the early testing and the development of the Bomarc B which was then going on, every time a failure of a Bomarc firing was announced the hon. gentleman opposite rose and hailed it with the greatest of glee. They made as much out of it as they could. They asked all kinds of questions and made all kinds of jibes at the then minister of national defence.
Of course, when there began a series of reports of successful firings of the Bomarc B they stopped that tactic. This is the first time for some time that anything has been said about the firing ability of the weapon, its accuracy, and so forth.
A few months ago I was down at Elgin field. I saw a firing of this weapon. It was a highly successful firing. I talked to the people in charge of the program. I spent over a day there. We have two R.C.A.F. officers attached to the field. They have been there a considerable length of time. I saw records of the firings of this weapon, which are very extensive now. The weapon is well proved and is highly successful.
Reference to early failures when the weapon was being developed are of course not applicable at the present time. The hon. member said the Arrow was the ace in the defence policy. He seems to think the Arrow was the chief piece of equipment and the cornerstone of our whole defence policy. This was never the case. Then he went on to say that now we have no Arrow, we have nothing.
That is also completely contradictory of the policy adopted by the Liberal party in January and the policy they have been stating since, that we do not need interceptors; we should have only a few airplanes for reconnaissance and identification purposes, but they should not shoot.
The hon. member is now stating a proposition completely contrary to that when he says the Arrow was the ace in the defence policy. It was, of course, nothing of the kind. It was one piece of hardware. It proved to

be much too expensive a piece of hardware, and if we had gone ahead with it, it would have resulted in a completely unwarranted proportion of the defence dollar going into one particular piece of equipment.
The hon. member then went on to say the Bomarc bases cost over $100 million. As far as Canada is concerned, this is just fantasy. The actual estimated cost to Canada of these two Bomarc bases has been put on the record previously. The total cost of the two bases, the one at North Bay and the one at La Macaza, will be $13,993,560. Over half of that amount has been spent up to date. The annual cost to us of maintaining these two bases will be about $1 million.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Too much.


Douglas Scott Harkness: It will be just over $1 million a year. As a result, the Bomarcs are actually the greatest defence bargain I think Canada has ever secured. We are getting a greater amount of protection and value from these two Bomarc bases, per dollar invested in them, than from any other kind of equipment that we have ever secured in recent years. That is the actual story in connection with this.
I have read in newspapers the statements which have been made by members of the Liberal party. They have said these Bomarc bases are terrificly expensive and are costing Canada $50 million or $100 million a year.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: We did not say "in Canada"; we said "total cost".


Douglas Scott Harkness: They said the bases were costing $100 million each, and so on and so forth. As I say these are the actual figures. They are, from the national defence point of view, a very great bargain indeed.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Before we leave the subject of the Bomarc I wonder if the minister will explain how the Bomarc operates against ballistic missiles launched from beneath the wings of aircraft. This is really the central argument.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have mentioned several times in this debate that the Bomarc is designed against the manned bomber. It does not deal with intercontinental ballistic missiles, and any mention of it in connection with those missiles is, unless it springs entirely from ignorance, designed only to confuse the issue. It has been stated time and time again that the Bomarc has no connection with intercontinental ballistic missiles- stated so often that I do not know why this question continues to be brought up. The hon. member referred to intercontinental ballistic missiles but he was, I think, referring to air surface missiles launched from aircraft.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is what I said. The minister was not listening.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I was listening carefully. Perhaps the hon. member made a slip of the tongue. However, this has been asked so frequently-the hon. member asked it the other day. He asked whether the Bomarc was any good against intercontinental ballistic missiles.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I said: stand off bombs from bombers.


Douglas Scott Harkness: He said that the other day when he was speaking. Attempts to confuse the issue in this way will get nobody any place.
As far as the stand off bomber is concerned, how many stand off bombers there are or will be, and at what range they will be able to fire their missiles is something that we at present do not know. The Americans have such missiles. The weapon is still in the development stage but I think it has been developed to the point where the range runs up to 300 or 350 miles. They expect that in future it will have a range of a thousand miles. Whether or not the Russians have any of these weapons yet we do not know, but we must assume that if they have not got them they will probably get them shortly. But if they have anything like the range that they have at the present time the Bomarc is going to be effective against them long before the bombers can get off their missiles against the Bomarc bases. In any event, we are dealing here with what the possibilities are likely to be in the future. It is a matter of speculation, not a matter of fact.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Before we leave this point may I say that this is the type of information which the minister gives the committee-information which misleads both the committee and the Canadian public. The minister knows that the range of the Hound Dog missile is greater than the range he has just given. He also knows, or should know-we presume he has some of these facts at hand since he is minister of defence-that the range of the ballistic missile which will be carried by the B-52 bomber and the British V-bombers is considerably greater than that range. The figure used by the President of the United States in his message to congress was 1,000 miles. That is a far cry from 300 miles, and it does not help the discussion here for the minister to pick the figure of 300 miles in an sndeavour to convince us that since 300 is Less than 400 his Bomarc will be effective, still less that it will be effective in the future.
The Bomarc stations are not yet operational. The minister has not yet made up his mind
90205-6-530i
Business of the House as to whether they are to have atomic warheads or not. By the time he does the Russians will certainly have this type of ballistic missile with a range far greater than the range of the Bomarc. The minister cannot continue to mislead the public and the committee any longer in this regard. He has got to admit that as far as the future is concerned the Bomarc is useless because the carriers against which it is designed will never come within range of it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have had about enough of this constant harping about my misleading the committee. I state in the most definite and categorical terms that I have given no information to this committee in which I do not firmly believe and for which I have not got a basis of expert opinion behind me. As to misleading the committee, may I say that the hon. member for Trinity gives figures which he pulls out of his imagination and out of the air. He says: these are the correct figures; all the figures produced by the defence departments of the whole western world are wrong. I have had enough nonsense of that kind. The hon. member is completely childish in making these repeated statements along that line and I think he should get wise to himself.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: And I think we have had enough of these childish interruptions by the minister. I think he often gives to this committee information which is not accurate, and he must know it. He then takes the liberty of hiding behind security regulations-he cannot disclose the true figures to the house, he says, because it would not be in the national interest for us to be told the facts. He can then get up and use any figures he likes; we do not know what is going on, but he does. Figures printed in the Congressional Record are not accurate, but his are; figures printed in the message sent by the President of the United States to congress are not accurate, but his are; figures shown to other hon. members in private by representatives of the armed forces of the western world are not accurate but his are. He is the only source of wisdom, the only source of accurate figures. He suggests if we had to rely on the minister's figures we would be in a sad state indeed and I deplore the type of accusation he has just made.
Progress reported.
Resolutions adopted in the committee of supply this day reported and concurred in.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Lionel Chevrier: May I inquire what business we shall be doing tomorrow? Perhaps the leader of the house would also give us some indication of what the business will be for next week.

Business of the House


Gordon Minto Churchill: Tomorrow we shall carry on with the estimates of the Department of National Defence and we shall, I hope, finish them. Then we shall carry on with the estimates of the Department of Defence Production which I also hope we can finish tomorrow if we are to maintain the earlier hope that we would complete the work of the session in very good time.
On Monday and Tuesday of next week it is the intention to proceed with legislative items. The precise order in which they will be taken I shall announce tomorrow, but members might be prepared for the following items.
Appearing on Votes and Proceedings tomorrow will be a resolution referring to a proposal to introduce a bill dealing with amateur sport. There is a resolution already on the order paper dealing with national housing, another concerning the centennial and another concerning school lands. Hon. members should be ready for debate on the four matters which I have mentioned.
Tomorrow it is the intention to bring forward for first reading the bill concerning what we have been calling the Pine Point railway. We had a discussion of the resolution earlier in the summer and passed it. If first reading is given to the bill tomorrow it would be available for second reading on Monday.
The bill on the order paper concerning the Civil Service Act is in the committee stage and might be called.
Those are the items that the house might be ready to give consideration to on Monday and Tuesday in the resolution stage and then in the bill stage. The order in which they will be taken up I will give tomorrow.
It being 33 minutes after 10 p.m., the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to special order.
[The following items were passed in committee of supply]:



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

[Stage Direction]
232.	Departmental administration, $3,455,378. Inspection services-
233.	Operation and maintenance, $7,224,436.
234.	Construction	or	acquisition	of	buildings,
works, land and equipment, $211,000.
Royal Canadian Navy-
235.	Operation and maintenance, $208,135,049.
236.	Construction	or	acquisition	of	buildings,
works, land and major equipment, $71,823,500.
Canadian Army-
237.	Operation and maintenance, $359,572,000.
238.	Construction	or	acquisition	of	buildings,
works, land and major equipment, $60,556,000.
[Stage Direction]


Friday, September 15, 1961