1960-03-28

VACANCY

Mr. Speaker:: I have the honour to inform the house that consequent upon the notification given in this house on Friday, March 25, 1960 by the hon. member for Gatineau (Mr. Leduc) and pursuant to section 10 of the House of Commons Act, I have addressed my warrant to the chief electoral officer for the issue of a new writ for the election of a member in the electoral district of Labelle in the province of Quebec.



RAILWAYS, AIR LINES AND SHIPPING CONCURRENCE IN FIRST REPORT OF SESSIONAL COMMITTEE

[Stage Direction]
Hon. W. Earl Rowe (Dufferin-Simcoe) presented the first report of the sessional committee on railways, air lines and shipping owned and controlled by the government and moved that the report be concurred in.
Motion agreed to.


Right Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prime Minister):: Hon. members have been making some inquiries respecting the adjournment at Easter time for the vacation that is customarily taken during that season. I simply wish to advise at this time that at some convenient date a motion will be moved for the adjournment of the house from Wednesday, April 13, at the conclusion of the sitting that day, until Monday, April 25.


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Leader of the Opposition):: The house will not have been surprised at the announcement by the Prime Minister with regard to the Easter recess.


Mr. Hazen Argue (Assiniboia):: The statement as to the Easter recess is somewhat of a routine one, since the Easter recess is ordinarily of this duration. Of course this is a very acceptable announcement.



DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE ANNOUNCEMENT OF PROPOSED DATES

John George Diefenbaker: I should like to announce to the house that last week I sent a letter to the several provincial premiers proposing that a dominion-provincial conference on fiscal relations be held in Ottawa on July 25, 26 and 27 next, if these dates are generally acceptable to the various premiers.
Hon. members will recall that the Minister of Finance, at the meeting of the dominion-provincial committee of ministers of finance and provincial treasurers in Ottawa in October last, announced that the federal government intended to convene a plenary dominion-provincial conference in mid-1960 the purpose of which would be the discussing of the fiscal arrangements between the dominion and the provinces to follow the present tax-sharing arrangements, which will end on March 31, 1962.


Lester Bowles Pearson: With respect to the announcement with regard to a federal-provincial conference, which also had been forecast, it would be interesting to learn-and perhaps the Prime Minister could tell us now in view of previous statements that have been made on the matter-what will be the position of the municipalities at this conference.


Hazen Robert Argue: Mr. Speaker, I am pleased that the Prime Minister has announced that the federal-provincial conference will be held in Ottawa. I think such a conference is most essential not only because the agreements are coming to an end, as the Prime Minister has said, on March 31, 1962, but because there are many urgent and pressing fiscal policies with which the provinces wish to deal at this time, regarding the solution of which the federal government can no doubt be of help.
I am pleased that the announcement is a firm one, and does not depend on whether or not the house is in session. I remember that on a former occasion the Minister of Finance said that such a conference could not be held with parliament in session. I do not think there is any need for one to bar the other. I am glad the announcement has been made even though I anticipate that the house may still be in session.

Continental Air Defence Policy NATIONAL DEFENCE



CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENCE POLICY


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I ask leave to move the adjournment of the house under standing order 26 for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely the lack of adequate consultation between Canada and the United States, as revealed in statements made by the Minister of National Defence on and since Friday last, over the basic change made by the government of the United States in continental air defence policy, together with the decision of the minister to continue unchanged Canadian expenditures on a weapon for which a drastic cut has been proposed in the United States defence budget.
In speaking to this motion, Mr. Speaker, I do not of course have to do more than mention the importance of the subject with which it deals. I realize that under the standing order in question the matter must be not only important, but the discussion of it should be justified on the ground of urgency.
I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that statements which have been made in this house and outside the house by the minister and representative of the government have created a state of confusion, misunderstanding, and anxiety in the country which does make it urgent that this matter should be cleared up at the earliest possible date, and that one aspect of this confusion and anxiety-


John George Diefenbaker: I do not want to interrupt the Leader of the Opposition, Your Honour, but he does not have to proceed with his argument to convince us that we desire an acceptance of this motion. He need not continue in that direction at all. We will be most happy to have and welcome the opportunity for a discussion of this question to remove misapprehensions and misinterpretations which have taken place over it.


Mr. Speaker:: If there are no hon. members who wish to present a contrary view, then my task is simply one of recognizing the will of the house. I will read the proposed subject matter upon which the Leader of the Opposition asks leave to move the adjournment of the house. It is in these terms:
I ask leave to move the adjournment of the house under standing order 26 for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely the lack of adequate consultation between Canada and the United States, as revealed in statements made by the Minister of National Defence on and since Friday last, on the basic change made by the government of the United States in continental air defence policy, together

with the decision of the minister to continue unchanged Canadian expenditures on a weapon for which a drastic cut has been proposed in the United States defence budget.
Has the hon. member leave to move the motion?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Lester Bowles Pearson: In moving the adjournment of the house in order to discuss this matter, I do so not only because of the vital importance of the question of continental defence to every Canadian, but also because of our inability in this house to secure from the government any clear statement of defence policy, more particularly of continental defence policy.
This matter was brought up on this side in the debate on the address. I referred to it at some length on that occasion, as did other members of the official opposition. On that occasion the Minister of National Defence did not take advantage of the opportunity which was afforded to him of discussing this subject, a subject so very much in the minds of Canadians at this time, namely the defence of Canada and the defence of peace. Nor did any other member of the government discuss this question of defence policy and, more particularly, continental defence policy; neither have we had any such discussion in the house since that time.
It will be recalled that we had hoped-* and, indeed, I expressed this hope in the very first question I asked on the opening day of this session-that the question of defence could be submitted to a small committee of this house where it could be examined from the foundation, and where the whole concept and strategy of defence could be considered; where experts could be sent for, and where the kind of discussion which it seems to me the seriousness of the defence situation at this time warrants could have taken place quite irrespective of what may have been the practice in the house in previous years in discussing this subject.


John George Diefenbaker: I rise on a point of order. The hon. gentleman is repeating in almost identical terms what he said on a previous occasion. One might almost conclude that he was reading from the same document he used when he was discussing the motion to set up the committee-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


John George Diefenbaker: I was quite happy for a discussion to take place on the subject matter of the motion for the reason that was given in the motion on this occasion, but I submit that when the adjournment is moved for a given purpose the discussion should be



I960

[Stage Direction]
limited to what is contained in the motion for adjournment which has been moved.
Mr. Speaker:: Perhaps I should read to the house the limitations which do exist on a debate of this kind, as set out in standing order No. 26, subsection (6):
(6) The right to move the adjournment of the house for the above purposes is subject to the following restrictions:
(a)	not more than one such motion can be made at the same sitting;
(b)	not more than one matter can be discussed on the same motion;
I may have been a bit hasty in accepting this proposal as it is because there seem to be two matters raised, first the lack of adequate consultation between Canada and the United States, and second, the decision of the minister to continue unchanged Canadian expenditures on a weapon for which a drastic cut has been proposed in the United States defence budget.
As the matter of consultation is something in the past with respect to this item, I take it that the debate basically is on the decision of the minister to continue unchanged Canadian expenditures on a weapon for which a drastic cut has been proposed in the United States defence budget. That is the one matter which can be discussed on the motion. The standing order goes on to say:
(c)	the motion must not revive discussion on a matter which has been discussed in the same session:
(d)	the motion must not anticipate a matter which has been previously appointed for consideration by the house, or with reference to which a notice of motion has been previously given and not withdrawn:
Paragraph (e) which states that the motion must not raise a question of privilege is not relevant in this instance, but the succeeding paragraph reads:
(f) the discussion under the motion must not raise any question which, according to the standing orders of the house, can only be debated on a distinct motion under notice.
With those limitations before hon. members the subject to be discussed, I take it, is the decision of the minister to continue unchanged the Canadian expenditures on a weapon for which a drastic cut has been proposed in the United States defence budget.


Mr, Hazen Argue (Assiniboia):: Mr. Speaker, if I may say a word on the point of order, I submit with respect that you have already allowed this motion to be presented for discussion, and therefore it is rather difficult now to attempt to limit the discussion on the motion to only one part of it, namely the decision of the minister to continue unchanged Canadian expenditures, when in
Continental Air Defence Policy fact you yourself have said there are two parts to the motion, the first relating to the lack of adequate consultation.
While the lack of adequate consultation is a circumstance surrounding the events of last week, I would suggest to Your Honour that it raises something of fundamental importance, namely whether or not there are facilities that are being used for consultation between Canada and the United States. Even though the allowing of remarks concerning the motion as it now stands would rightly limit the discussion in the house, I suggest that you should allow discussion on the motion as it is framed not just part of it.


Mr. Speaker:: Dealing with the point which the hon. member for Assiniboia has made, I am quite content with the view he expresses. The consultation which is referred to in this motion for adjournment, of course, is consultation with respect to this particular weapons program, so in essence what we are discussing is the decision of the government with respect to this particular weapon and the exchange by consultation with the United States with respect to this weapon.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I gather that you have agreed to the discussion of these two matters referred to in the motion. While I realize that normally in a motion of this kind only one subject is put forward, I think it is also stated in Erskine May that if two matters are related to each other, Speakers in the past have permitted a discussion of the two related matters. Therefore I take it I am at liberty to discuss consultation between Canada and the United States in the field of continental defence policy, and also the expenditures on the Bomarc B weapon which is part of our weapons system and as such has a bearing on continental defence policy and on the organization of that continental defence policy. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I hope to keep my remarks within the limits of these two subjects.


Mr. Speaker:: May I say this before the Leader of the Opposition proceeds. A discussion of consultation between Canada and the United States with respect to matters other than the Bomarc, which is the weapon referred to, would seem to me to be beyond the scope of the debate. In that sense there is really only one subject before the house, namely the government's policy with respect to this weapon and the development of that policy in consultation with the United States.
The motion is, of course, a motion to adjourn the house, and its interpretation is related to this document. I expect hon. members will keep to the purpose as we have narrowed it down.

Continental Air Defence Policy


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, these two questions are related to each other. One has to do with consultation with the United States in respect of this particular weapon as part of our continental air defence, and the other with the expenditure of money on this particular weapon which is a part of our continental weapons system. Those are the two subjects, and in bringing this matter forward I had not anticipated that I would not be able to speak a length a least on the background leading up to this particular consultation and those particular expenditures. Because, Mr. Speaker, the basis of this motion is to be found in the statements made by the Minister of National Defence in this house last Friday at six o'clock, and the bearing of that particular statement, which deals with both those matters, on what the minister had said in this house only a few hours before, on Friday morning.
Consultation, Mr. Speaker, if there was consultation, which took place in regard to this matter it was a form of consultation the results of which had not been made known in any way, shape or form to this parliament while it was going on. This, Mr. Speaker, is surely an indication of the inadequacy of the present position of our defence arrangements with the United States of America. Not only are we to be put in a position where we are to continue to spend money on a weapon which is being discarded by the United States defence services-


Some hon. Members:: No.


Mr, Pearkes:: Where do you get that?


Mr. Walker:: That is not right.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


Lester Bowles Pearson: From the minister's own statement made in this house last Friday I will be able to show conclusively that it is right. The Minister of Public Works interjects and says that is not right. Let the minister get up and explain why the United States government has cut-


Mr. Pearkes:: As soon as you sit down I will.


Lester Bowles Pearson: -the appropriation from $430 million to $50 million. If this does not represent a loss of confidence in a particular weapon, what can represent a loss of confidence?
In any event, there is no doubt that so far as consultation is concerned, we have built up over the years a system of consultation between the government in Ottawa and the government in Washington on defence and other matters. I suppose when NORAD was established by this government-a continental

defence organization without any real connection with NATO-one of the reasons it was not brought under NATO control in any effective way was, no doubt, that it would help to develop a better system of consultation between Canada and the United States in defence matters by the establishment of this continental defence arrangement which we know as NORAD. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, surely we in this house had some reason to believe that if there were in fact consultations going on between the two governments in regard to continental defence policy concerning this and other weapons, the house would have some information in regard to them, in regard to the decision taken by the government of Canada on this matter.
One of our complaints-and one of the reasons we brought this motion forward at this time, Mr. Speaker-is that if there was such consultation, there has been no suggestion to that end made at any time in this house during this session, in spite of efforts on our part to try to get from spokesmen of the government some statement about national defence, some statement about the results of this consultation, something about what was going on. We could not do that by setting up a committee because the government was not prepared to agree to any committee except one to discuss past expenditures. We have been questioning the minister, up until last Friday, as to what was going on in these consultations if they were being held in respect of this particular weapon which, once the Canadian-produced Arrow was destroyed, was apparently the new weapon on which continental defence policy was based, the Bomarc B, along with continental defence squadrons equipped with CF-100 airplanes.
We have, therefore, these two Canadian elements of continental defence. We have the Bomarc missile and we have the CF-100 interceptor squadrons. The minister himself said in 1957 that the CF-100 was obsolete. The Bomarc, which was to take the place of the Arrow, as the minister has also said on many occasions and which is quite true, will have no value in action against a missile. The minister has also said that missiles are becoming the main threat. He has not been so conclusive about the effectiveness of the Bomarc B against the supersonic bomber with which the Russian air force is now equipped. But its effectiveness, even if it were developed according to plan and operated according to plan, would be very doubtful indeed against even that kind of threat.
The minister has, in the past, stated that these interceptor planes and missiles would be able to engage and perhaps knock down



[Stage Direction]
some enemy bombers. We could not count on too much in that respect. Nevertheless these are the weapons on which we have decided to base our continental defence policy, along with the CF-lOO's which, according to the minister, were obsolete two years ago. So we have a right to expect that consultation would be going on with the United States in regard to the effectiveness of this missile system and its ground environmental control system, which apparently is also now to be changed, and the possibility of maintaining interceptor squadrons of a type which would be presumably more effective than the CF-100, if such squadrons are to be retained along with the Bomarc in our continental system.
We have not at any time this session been able to get any information of any substantive character on these matters from the minister. We have asked questions; we have tried to bring the matters forward, and we have tried to set up a committee; but we did not learn, until I think it was Friday afternoon, that presumably as a result of consultation, the United States was to issue a statement that the whole basis of continental United States policy was going to be changed.
In the morning, Mr. Speaker, we asked the minister some questions about the reports in the newspapers to the effect that this had been decided. We were told in the morning -this was only a few hours before the minister's statement in the afternoon-that these were merely newspaper reports and we should not worry about them, we should not base any of our statements on reports of that kind. I think the expression the minister used was that they were merely speculative press reports; that remark can be found on page 2446 of Hansard. Yet we have learned since that on the day before, on Thursday of last week, the executive part of the government of the United States, presumably the defence department, had recommended to the appropriations committee of the United States house of representatives a transfer of funds which were to have been devoted to the production of these weapons to be used for other purposes which would increase the deterrent strength of continental defence, perhaps at the sacrifice of the more conventional points of defence.
This was confirmed by the minister himself in the statement which he gave to the house on Friday afternoon at six o'clock. I read from his statement:
The proposed transfer of funds was submitted In classified detail to the house appropriations committee in executive session on March 24, 1960.
Surely, Mr. Speaker, if that statement was made to the United States house committee
Continental Air Defence Policy on Thursday, March 24, the minister must have known about it if there was anything approaching adequate consultation. This must have been going on for weeks, and surely the minister must have known that the United States government had come to its own conclusions in regard to continental air defence, which conclusions were bound to have had an important effect on Canadian defence, if there is any such thing as Canadian defence apart from the defence of peace and the defence of the continent. Yet we got no reply from the minister in respect to questions we asked on this subject last week.
Now, on this question of consultation, this is what is included in the statement read by the minister on Friday night at six o'clock and this is the last paragraph of the statement:
Included in the revised air defence budget are provisions for SAGE direction and control in Canada. The Canadian Minister of National Defence has been kept fully informed throughout development of the air force's modified air defence plan.
Well, Mr. Speaker, there is a great deal of difference between the United States keeping a minister in the Canadian government informed about what is being done in regard to continental air defence, and consulting with the Canadian government in respect of joint continental air defence in a way which would make it possible for the Canadian government to express some views and to have some weight. If the latter kind of consultation were going on it is surprising indeed, in view of what the minister had to say on Friday morning, that at six o'clock that evening he could give a statement of this kind in the House of Commons. Indeed, one of the most surprising things of this whole surprising episode is the fact that this is a statement from the Canadian Minister of National Defence given in the Canadian House of Commons on a matter which affects Canadian defence policy, and it is headed "Statement being issued by the United States Department of Defence".
This leads us to suspect, Mr. Speaker, to say the least the adequacy of the consultation that has been going on in this matter, which is an unhappy reflection on the relationships between the two governments in a matter of such very great importance to Canada. So we ask the minister, why this snap decision on the part of the government made between Friday morning and Friday evening on a matter of such vital importance? If this decision-
George Randolph Pearkes: May I ask the Leader of the Opposition to what decision he is referring as being made between the morning and the evening of last Friday?

Continental Air Defence Policy


Lester Bowles Pearson: The decision made is obviously embodied in the United States statement which the minister gave Friday evening at six o'clock. When we questioned him in the morning about a change in defence policy he said there was no such change and that press reports to that effect were speculative; I think that is the word he used. If a change was to be made in Canadian defence policy, why is it that the minister was not able to make a statement to that effect in the House of Commons on Friday morning, but had to wait until word presumably came from Washington that they were going to make a statement there and then read the United States statement in this House of Commons?


George Randolph Pearkes: I wonder if I might answer that question right now. As was stated in the press itself, this was a leak from a meeting of a subcommittee of a committee on appropriations which was being held in camera. Does the Leader of the Opposition think I could hold up my head as an honourable member of this government and disclose a leak or disclose of information which I knew about? I was not going to confirm or otherwise a leak from a secret or in camera meeting.


Lester Bowles Pearson: If any such leak occurred, and perhaps it did-


George Randolph Pearkes: I have said so. The Leader of the Opposition must accept my statement.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I accept the minister's statement that a leak occurred in congress because the government of the United States was telling a congressional committee about the changes that were going to take place in continental air defence. But no single member of this parliament who was not a member of the government had any indication at any time in the last month that the Canadian government was even considering such a fundamental change in defence policy.


Mr. Fleming (Eglinion):: What change?


Lester Bowles Pearson: While discussion of defence policy was going on in Washington and while the minister now indicates that exchanges were going on between Canada and the United States in respect of it, we were unable to get one single word on defence policy from the minister at any time in the last two months. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, there was nothing to leak in this House of Commons because nothing was said either in public or in private.


An hon. Member:: That is why there was no leak.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is the kind of consultation we have been having. I remember the Prime Minister, a couple of years ago in talking about the improvement in the relations between Canada and the United States, saying that everything was lovely now in the garden of Canadian-United States relations; he was tending the flower so carefully now that everything was fine. This statement does not indicate that this kind of consultation of which the Prime Minister was so proud a couple of years ago is really being very effective in so far as Canada is concerned, in the matter of national defence policy.
What has been the result of the United States decision, which presumably has been agreed to by the Canadian government? I now move on to the subject of the Bomarc B weapon itself, Mr. Speaker. The United States has presumably decided that the deterrent strength of the country-we are not subscribing to that deterrent strength except in an indirect way in Canada, it is the deterrent strength of the United States- should be increased. The minister's statement makes that matter quite clear, or rather the United States statement read by the minister makes that matter quite clear. It is to be increased, if necessary, at the expense of the strictly defence aspects of defence. I am not going to quarrel with that decision on the part of the United States authorities in which perhaps the Canadian authorities have concurred. It may well be that the best defence of peace at the present time is the strengthening of the deterrent. Perhaps the only defence of peace we have at the present time is the certainty on the part of those who might break the peace that, if they do so, they will be destroyed.
In any event, as the statement read by the minister makes quite clear, that is now to be the basis of continental defence policy in so far as it is determined by the United States, that a greater share of their resources is to be devoted to the deterrent strength of that country, and that the money and resources required for this increase of deterrent strength is to be taken from the project known as Bomarc B.
If anyone on the other side of the house thinks this does not represent a change in United States policy in respect of the Bomarc B, all they have to do is read the statement from the minister and the statements that are coming out of the United States at the present time. There is no doubt in the world that in this change the United States government is down-grading the Bomarc B. How otherwise can you explain a slash from $421 million for defence to $50 million? I know the minister has been saying-and indeed

it is quite correct-that funds are available from previous appropriations which will enable more than $50 million to be spent on this project. But the fact remains that in so far as the United States is concerned, the $421 million appropriated is to be reduced to $50 million. The down-grading of this weapon appears in practically every line of the statement read by the minister last Friday.
Yet to add to our confusion, and to add to the kind of anxiety that is being shown in the country, in practically every editorial I have read this morning which has commented on events over the weekend-I refer to the Globe and Mail, the Gazette and other papers; and in order to prove this confusion and uncertainty in people's minds, may I recall that yesterday, outside of this house and on a television program, the minister went to some pains to show that this did not represent any great change in the policy of the United States government in respect of this particular weapon.
I have not the text of what he said. I tried to get it, but I understand he was speaking merely from notes. However, I think the minister will agree that he said yesterday on the air-and this is in striking contrast to the impression created by his statement on Friday-that the change in the United States Bomarc program as the result of this statement made on Friday would not be very substantial, that there would still be 12 Bomarc squadrons left plus two Canadian squadrons, which would make 14 squadrons. If in fact that is the situation now, that is a very minor change. But that is certainly not what this particular statement says. How can the minister justify a statement of that kind, that we are still going to have 14 Bomarc squadrons in spite of the changes in Washington, including two Canadian Bomarc squadrons the missiles for which would be paid for by the United States?


John George Diefenbaker: Will the hon. gentleman permit a question?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes.


John George Diefenbaker: If these figures are correct, that there will be 12 Bomarc squadrons in the United States and two Bomarc squadrons in Canada, would the small reduction that is being made be understood by the minister as a proper one and not a major change of policy?


Lester Bowles Pearson: If that is in fact the situation, we have more cause than ever to criticize the minister for the statement he made last Friday.
Continental Air Defence Policy


Donald Methuen Fleming: The Leader of the Opposition is running away from the question.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I will come to the question in the next point, and it is a very easy question to answer. If that in fact is the situation, will the minister explain the reduction of $421 million to $50 million to be spent on these Bomarc squadrons? The minister himself on March 7, 1960 as reported at page 1789 of Hansard, had this to say when he told us we were losing our sense of proportion because we were worried about what was happening in the field of national defence, and especially in respect of this particular weapon which had been tried seven times and seven times found wanting.


Mr. Bigg:: So what?


Lester Bowles Pearson: "So what", says someone on
this side. How many times does it have to fail before this government will give up on it?


David James Walker: May I ask a question?


Some hon. Members:: No.


David James Walker: Did the Leader of the Opposition appreciate that the Bomarc A had 80 failures before it finally succeeded?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Of course I appreciate that.
I have been told that enough times in this house; and I have also been told that the Bomarc A was not adequate for the job we have to do, that we need the Bomarc B. If the Bomarc A was such a fine weapon and had so many successes after 80 failures, why do we not arm our forces with the Bomarc A instead of the Bomarc B? We are now discussing the Bomarc B, which the minister has said is to be the basic missile weapon for the Canadian air force, even though it has failed seven times in a row. These are just growing pains apparently, these failures.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Will the hon.
gentleman answer the Prime Minister's question?


Lester Bowles Pearson: When we discussed this
matter we were told that we were losing all sense of proportion.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Speaker-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. Unless the hon.
member who has the floor wishes-


Donald Methuen Fleming: I just wished to
ask him to answer the Prime Minister's question.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I would be glad to. Here
is what the minister said with regard to
2502	HOUSE OF
Continental Air Defence Policy this matter, as reported on page 1789 of Hansard for March 7:
I might mention that the United States, in this fiscal year, is spending $421.5 million for the development of Bomarc sites across this continent, of which there are 18 interlocking sites. Two of these will be constructed in Canada.
The minister told us on March 7 that the United States is going to spend $421.5 million on 18 Bomarc B sites, including two in Canada. He tells us now that the $421.5 million has been reduced to $50 million; and then he tells people of this country over the air that $50 million will do the work in respect of 14 stations, when he said on March 7 that $421 million would be required for 18 stations. Perhaps the minister can explain that; perhaps he will answer it now. Are there to be 14 Bomarc B stations constructed by the United States and Canada costing $421.5 million this year?
Mr. Speaker, that was the impression he had been giving us, and up until Friday last we had assumed that was quite correct and there was no change. Then suddenly this statement is issued by the United States which said, "we are going to cut this expenditure". Some of the people in the Boeing aircraft company have gone much further even than the statement in regard to the cut. But the minister having given that impression to the country, he tells us now there will be a great change in the whole Bomarc program. Indeed, he said outside the house on Friday that if the current development of the Bomarc did not succeed, it would be out completely. That is from a report in the Montreal Star. Then on Sunday he said that the changes are very minor, not substantial, and we will have 14 instead of presumably 18 Bomarc B squadrons.
Mr. Speaker, the minister then wonders why there is confusion and uncertainty in the country over our national defence policy. A Washington report of last Saturday quotes an official of the Boeing aircraft company as saying that the reduced funds for all these missiles made by the Boeing aircraft company will permit no major production at all, but will be used only to continue research.


John George Diefenbaker: From what is the hon. gentleman reading?


Lester Bowles Pearson: From a press statement from Washington attributing a report to a high official of the Boeing aircraft company.


John George Diefenbaker: What is the newspaper?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have not got it before me-


John George Diefenbaker: Ah.


Lester Bowles Pearson: -but the Prime Minister
does not have to believe me if he does not


want to. I make this statement on my own responsibility as an hon. member, and that should be good enough for the Prime Minister. As a matter of fact it would not be very difficult for me to get the clipping, because there are a lot of others to the same effect.
The fact is that unless the minister can give us evidence to the contrary, this $50 million will probably serve the same purpose as the $50 million the Prime Minister talked so much about when the Arrow was scrapped. It will liquidate the operation. Perhaps this $50 million may serve as a sort of funeral expense for the Bomarc B weapon in the United States and Canada. The minister will have something to say about that later, no doubt; but whatever the fact is on that score, he cannot deny the fact that the United States is moving away from this weapon. I said last Friday that they are changing their kite, but that the same old Canadian tail of the Bomarc B will be used.
Mr. Speaker, at a time when this whole weapon, this whole concept of continental defence, is under review by the United States, how can the minister justify carrying on without a change in Canada in exactly the same way? We are going to build two Bomarc sites and continue our nine continental defence squadrons. We do not know whether we are going to equip them with CF-lOO's much longer or whether we are going to get new United States planes at great expense. We do not know whether there is going to be brought in perhaps some new kind of army missile. We do not know anything about it except what the minister has vouchsafed to tell us occasionally in answer to questions, some of which had later to be contradicted by the development of events. Never was that confusion worse confounded than it was last week. Therefore perhaps when the minister speaks in this discussion he will try to remove some of this uncertainty-and that is a mild word indeed to use-with regard to the use of this particular weapon as the basic missile for the Royal Canadian Air Force at a time when it is being dropped by the United States, so far as the reduction of expenditure from $421.5 million to $50 million indicates it is being dropped.
Perhaps the minister will also tell us whether he is satisfied with the kind of consultation he has had on this matter, and on other defence matters related to it, with the United States. There is nothing much more important that we could be discussing in this house than this question of defence, Mr. Speaker, and there is no more important aspect of defence policy than that of continental defence. The government has taken its stand; continental defence should be

worked out by joint arrangement with the United States through a joint committee called NORAD, rather than having it worked out on a broad collective basis through NATO.
Mr. Speaker, I submit that the government has therefore to justify its concept of continental defence. It has to justify the expenditure of hundreds of million of dollars on weapons which are of no use whatever against missiles, and which are of very little use whatever against supersonic bombers. Of what use are they? When one of these weapons, the basic Bomarc B, is tried and found wanting in the United States, and that fact is recognized by the United States through a reduction of the appropriation for that weapon from $421.5 million to $50 million, then let the government justify expenditures on that weapon in Canada to the amount of $125 million, which the minister says will be the Canadian cost of the installation of two Bomarc squadrons in this country.


George Randolph Pearkes: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask a question, if I may.


Mr. Speaker:: If the minister speaks now he will be speaking in the debate.


George Randolph Pearkes: Then I will wait.


Lester Bowles Pearson: If the minister has a question I think he should be permitted to ask it.


George Randolph Pearkes: I would like to know whether the Leader of the Opposition could give me the quote where I said that $125 million was being spent on these two Bomarc stations. I have stood up in this house at least three times during this session and said that the total Canadian expenditure on these two Bomarc stations is approximately $15 million, yet the hon. gentleman stands up again and again and repeats $125 million. He knows he is not speaking the truth.


Mr. Speaker:: I am sorry, but as I understood the minister who has just taken his seat-I hope I did not understand him correctly-the import of what he said was such that I hope he will reconsider it before Hansard, is allowed to go further.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, the minister said that I know I am not telling the truth in using that figure. Let the minister prove that. I know what the minister said. He has said more than once-


Some hon. Members:: Where?


Lester Bowles Pearson: In the house and outside, and we will be glad to quote him before the debate is over. But the minister-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. The Leader of the Opposition is preventing me from fighting
Continental Air Defence Policy his battle, and I do not wish to enter into unnecessary difficulties. The Minister of National Defence has in effect accused the Leader of the Opposition of deliberately misstating the facts. He will recall, from his long experience in parliament, that no hon. member, when he has reflected on a statement of this kind which he has inadvertently made, would allow it to stand, and I trust he will modify it immediately.


George Randolph Pearkes: The figures I have quoted continually in this house are $15 million. When this first proposal to include the Bomarc was introduced I pointed out that the Canadian content of these stations would amount to approximately $20 million. Then, after a review had been made, I explained to the house that the amount of the two Bomarc stations was approximately $15 million. I know the Leader of the Opposition was in his seat on both those occasions-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Mr. Speaker:: I think the minister misunderstands me. I am not concerned about the truth of what he said; what I am concerned about is the propriety of his statement. If an hon. member on one side of the house were allowed to say of another member that he had deliberately misstated the truth, we should lose all the respect we have for each other and debate would not be possible.


George Randolph Pearkes: I am quite prepared to change "deliberately" to "inadvertently".


Lester Bowles Pearson: I am glad the minister has made that withdrawal, and we shall be very glad to show before the debate ends exactly what the figures are, from the minister's own sources.


Hazen Robert Argue: I am
pleased to see that the Minister of National Defence and the Leader of the Opposition are once again on friendly terms in the house, even though they are not entirely in agreement as to the policy which is being followed by the government.
The motion moved this afternoon by the Leader of the Opposition asks for the adjournment of the house-
-for the purpose of discussing a definite matter of urgent public importance, namely the lack of adequate consultation between Canada and the United States, as revealed in statements made by the Minister of National Defence on and since Friday last, on the basic change made by the government of the United States in continental air defence policy, together with the decision of the minister to continue unchanged Canadian expenditures on a weapon for which a drastic cut has been proposed in the United States defence budget.
I think there is substantial evidence to support the contention that there is a lack of adequate consultation between Canada and

Continental Air Defence Policy the United States. I think the minister himself, in his statement to the house on Friday last in reply to a series of questions, indicated clearly that there is inadequate consultation. As a matter of fact, from the minister's own statement it would seem clear that although he knew something was brewing in the United States, that some inquiry was being made and that some changes might well be made in defence policy, he had no idea that a sweeping change of the magnitude mentioned in the statement he made a few hours later was under contemplation. I say this because the Minister of National Defence had this to say in reply to the initial question put to him by the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer). The hon. gentleman said:
Mr. Speaker, Canada has been consistently consulted regarding a possible revision of the joint air defence plan which might be adopted in order that the development of defence and warning against ballistic missiles might be accelerated.
There are so many qualifications-so many "mights" and so many "possibly's"-in that statement by the minister that it seems to me he did not expect such sweeping changes to take place. The minister's defence, the minister's reply, is that he could not reveal to the house the discussions which were taking place because they were in camera. I would not ask the Minister of National Defence to reveal to the Canadian parliament matters which were before a United States committee in camera, but I do think the minister could have been more forthright with the Canadian parliament and public in the last few months by pointing out that there was every possibility of major changes being made in the defence policy of the United States and, as a result, in the defence arrangements between the two countries.
Instead, the people of Canada have been given no inkling that these sweeping changes might take place. They have been led to believe by the minister's statements that if reliance were placed on the Bomarc missile, the greatest defence possible would be achieved. I think it is disturbing that we should have been able to obtain fuller reports over the radio, a few hours before the questions were put to the minister, than were disclosed to this house; or that people in New York, for example, who read the New York Times should have been in a position to read a story in the issue of Friday, March 25, under a Washington date line of March 24, setting out very clearly the precise proposals which were made to the United States congress.
I repeat that what concerns me most is not the fact that the Canadian government did not disclose secret negotiations, but that it never took parliament or the Canadian people

into its confidence even to the point of saying that there were very serious matters under consideration in the United States in connection with this whole defence concept which might very soon lead to a drastic change in our own defence plans.


Mr. Spencer:: And also tell our potential enemies that.


Hazen Robert Argue: Well, I suppose our potential enemies have access to the New York Times and probably learn some of the statements which are made on the radio from time to time, although it is impossible for a member of parliament to get from our Minister of National Defence a frank appraisal of the defence situation on this continent and the consultations on defence which are taking place.
For some time the C.C.F. party has questioned the effectiveness of the Bomarc B even at the operational stage as an adequate or worth-while object of expenditure for the defence of this country. Let me hasten to say that we are most anxious that in every respect our way of life-the democratic foundations of this nation-shall be given the fullest protection. But we think it is not protection, and it is not defence, to be spending vast sums of money on weapons which afford little if anything by way of protection. The Bomarc B is a weapon against manned bombers, as I understand it. I do not think there is any military expert here who does not believe that in the case of an all-out Soviet attack by say 1,000 manned bombers, 500 or at least a large proportion of the attacking force would succeed in getting through. Certainly enough would get through to wipe out our civilization as we know it. The protection of this country comes not from a potential number of potentially operative weapons that could wipe out perhaps only a minor percentage of attacking bombers equipped with atomic weapons; rather the protection of this continent comes from the availability of a deterrent, a counteroffensive being undertaken that would wipe out the nation foolish enough to make an attack on this continent.
That is the pith and substance of the United States statement that was read in this house. The United States have decided that there should be a tremendous reduction in their expenditures on the Bomarc, from $421 million to $50 million, in order to concentrate on the development of a deterrent, the ICBM's and IRBM's. We think this is the only military protection there can be for us and for the western world at this time, namely a mutual deterrent.

These are not ideas that are being advanced for the first time today. I made a "Nation's Business" broadcast on January 22 in which I had this to say:
The Bomarc missile on which Canada will spend hundreds of millions of dollars is already obsolete and a waste of the taxpayers' money. The Bomarc, even with nuclear warheads, would not shoot down enough Soviet planes in the event of an attack to prevent the total destruction of the country. In other words, enough Soviet planes would always get through in a single attack to wipe us all out. This shows that when even dealing with airbreathing aircraft, the Bomarc is absolutely a waste of money from beginning to end.
Canadian defence policy apparently remains unaltered in view of all the substantial changes. We feel that these expenditures are not adding to the defence of Canada. The hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Winch) at the beginning of this session placed on the order paper a resolution which outlined in some detail the attitude and policy of the C.C.F. with respect to general defence. We feel that recent developments have underlined the correctness of the position we took at that time.
On Friday I said that one of the disturbing aspects of this controversy is something that seems obvious. Canada is not only a junior partner in the common defence of this continent but is not an effective partner, even in terms of adequate consultation. Canada's voice, if in fact it is raised, does not get the ear of Washington. When questioned in the house hon. members opposite do not take us into their confidence to the point of informing us of general discussions and the trend of military thought in the United States.
We have the degrading picture of the Minister of National Defence standing up in the house, after repeating his faith in the Bomarc, and reading a statement which was entitled, "Statement Being Issued by the United States Department of Defence." This obviously was not a joint statement, but something phoned or wired to the minister for him to read in the Canadian House of Commons. That is not good enough for Canada or for parliament. We think the Minister of National Defence should not be merely a messenger boy of the United States defence department, but should put forward Canada's position in the strongest possible terms, and he should take parliament into his confidence.
When party spokesmen in this house engage in sweeping condemnations of Canada's defence policy it behooves them on behalf of their party to offer something in its place. It is clear from what has been said by spokesmen of the Liberal party that they consider the Bomarc a waste of money. What is not clear, however, is what the official opposition put forward as an alternative. Yesterday
Continental Air Defence Policy I heard the hon. member for Trinity speaking on a television broadcast. When asked if he believed there should be a reduction in defence expenditures the hon. member said no. He said there should be more expenditure on defence.


Lester Bowles Pearson: No.


Hazen Robert Argue: That was what I heard him say. No doubt the transcript can be produced. I understood him to say that if we would put half of our unemployed to work it would so increase the gross national product of the country that part of the increase could be channelled into defence expenditures.
I am completely opposed to increases in defence expenditures, and so are members of this group. We think we are already spending too much money in the defence department, and it is not providing adequate or worth-while defence. We think there should be a change in emphasis. There are encouraging signs in the world that a disarmament agreement may not be far away. An agreement may be reached with respect to the suspension of nuclear tests, and some measure of control may be agreed to.
These are the hopeful signs. Here is the place for the greatest possible emphasis. We suggest there should be a transfer of Canada's resources from the moneys now spent on defence to the provision of economic assistance to underdeveloped countries, and to the emerging new countries and states of the world.


Mr. Smith (Calgary South):: Mr. Speaker, would the hon. member permit a question. Does the hon. member take the position that he would disband all forces?


Hazen Robert Argue: No, I would not be prepared to disband all forces. That is a very good question. I think there should be a steady and substantial reduction in our defence expenditures.


Mr. Hamilton (Notre Dame de Grace):: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order-


Hazen Robert Argue: I am answering a question.


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member is rising on a point of order.


William McLean Hamilton: On
a point of order, Mr. Speaker, the motion as presented by the Leader of the Opposition deals specifically with the question of the Bomarc missile, the government's action in connection therewith and certain relations between the Canadian and United States governments. We have now proceeded from the question asked by the hon. member for Calgary South (Mr. Smith) a moment ago to the discussion of another program proposed

Continental Air Defence Policy by the hon. member who is speaking. I suggest to you, sir, that nothing that is now being discussed has anything to do with the Bomarc missile. Indeed, it suggests putting our resources in another field entirely, and is completely out of order.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On the point of order, if I follow it correctly, I was limited by your decision, Mr. Speaker-I do not quarrel with it-to these two matters. If there had been any other decision I would have been prepared to discuss alternative basic defence proposals on that basis.


Hazen Robert Argue: Before you make your ruling, Mr. Speaker, I wish to point out that I was answering a question put to me by the very distinguished member for Calgary South. I thought it was a very good question, and I was endeavouring to give an adequate answer. I have merely given him my first point in the answer I would like to make.


Mr. Speaker:: If the hon. member was led astray by the member for Calgary South he will probably have to find his way back, because on this motion he cannot discuss any question which, according to the standing orders of this house, can only be debated under a distinct motion after notice has been given. In other words, the introduction of other matters goes beyond the scope of the debate.


Hazen Robert Argue: I appreciate that very much. What I shall try to do, however, is relate my remarks to the last part of the motion, which says:
-together with the decision of the minister to continue unchanged Canadian expenditures on a weapon for which a drastic cut hase been proposed in the United States defence budget.
I support this criticism of the government in continuing unchanged Canadian expenditures on a weapon for which a drastic cut has been proposed in the United States budget, and I submit that ways and means of spending the money which would be released by such a change is in order on the motion because, Mr. Speaker, it would be a rather inconsequential debate if all we could do is criticize the government for having gone forward with those expenditures and have the Minister of National Defence or the Prime Minister, who does this kind of thing so well, say to us "Well, fine; you have criticized what we are doing, but what would you do? What would you do with this money?" I was endeavouring to say that we would change the emphasis from expenditure on a weapon such as the Bomarc B missile to the use of the money to assist underdeveloped countries, and some of the new emerging nations.
[Mr. Hamilton (Notre Dame de Grace) .1
There is another way, Mr. Speaker, a military way if you like we would use the money. We feel that such expenditures could be used for the provision and maintenance of a Canadian defence force which would be available to the United Nations upon request.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I am sorry to interfere with the hon. member's progress in this debate, but I do not comprehend this motion as opening the door for a general proposal with respect to defence. The matter of urgency arises out of the statement of the Minister of National Defence and apparently a change in approach to Canadian defence weapons by our allies in the United States.


Hazen Robert Argue: Mr. Speaker, if I can get back to a directly negative approach, which apparently is what is required-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Mr. Grafftey:: A reflection on the Chair.


David James Walker: How about some wheat?


Hazen Robert Argue: There is only one Speaker in the chair. If that is a reflection on Your Honour, I withdraw it. I see there are a great many budding speakers at the far end of the chamber whose main contribution to debate in recent days has been to object to what other members who have the floor are saying.


William Heward Grafftey: You are always out of order.


Hazen Robert Argue: We are critical of the money that is being spent on the Bomarc because we feel that it is an inadequate weapon; that by developing the Bomarc we merely pretend that we have a weapon that can protect Canada in the event of war when in fact no such protection does exist. We object to the Bomarc being stationed on Canadian soil because of our understanding from the government that it is to be equipped with nuclear warheads. We think it is a mistake for the area of the world in which nuclear warheads may be stationed to be increased at this time. We do not think the Bomarc itself provides adequate defence, and we object to it further on the ground that, if the present procedure is followed, it will be equipped with nuclear warheads.
We are convinced, Mr. Speaker, that the government's defence policy is in the wrong direction. We think the policy of the Canadian government has been dealt a serious and crippling blow by this new announcement coming from Washington. Rather than the Minister of National Defence trying to protect the government in pursuing a dead duck, we think the government would be far better advised to re-examine its defence

policy, to take the shackles off the defence committee which prevent it from making recommendations, and to allow a full and unfettered discussion not only on the floor of the House of Commons but in any defence committee that is established.


Mr. Speaker:: Is the hon. member for Victoria-Carleton rising on a point of order?


Mr. Montgomery:: On a question of
privilege, Mr. Speaker, the hon. member is deliberately refusing to follow the ruling of the Chair. The Leader of the Opposition started it, but he did not pursue the subject.


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member has a point. The hon. member who has the floor was beginning to discuss the question of a reference to a committee of the house, which is not involved in this debate.


Hazen Robert Argue: I was saying that in my view, in spite of the government clinging unrepentant to this dead duck, to this inoperative and obsolete weapon, it would be far better advised to re-examine its policy and see that the $1,600 million spent in the Department of National Defence is spent in such a way as to give Canada its maximum of defence. In our view this can only come about if the government abandons its faith in the Bomarc missile and spends this money on other more useful purposes.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a question of privilege. This is the first opportunity I have had to reply to the statement of the Minister of National Defence that I inadvertently stated an untruth in my reference to the cost of the Bomarc project. I would like to give the authority for my statement.


Mr. Speaker:: I am sorry; that is not a question of privilege. I took exception to the accusation, which was a reflection on the conduct of the hon. member. I do not think it is necessary either to justify or to deal with how the matter arose because, as I understand it, the minister has withdrawn his charge that there was a deliberate misstatement of fact.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, but he repeated that I had inadvertently stated an untruth. I would like to clear that point up, if I have your permission, just by quoting from Hansard.


Mr. Speaker:: I am not satisfied that the Leader of the Opposition is pursuing the right course in doing this. After all, it is a matter of the parliamentary proprieties and when the minister revised his statement it seems to me that if the Leader of the Opposition was not satisfied with the revision he should have said so. I took it he was satisfied with the alteration that was made.
Continental Air Defence Policy


Lester Bowles Pearson: I was satisfied, of course, when the minister withdrew his original statement and put the word "inadvertently," before the word "untrue". However, I did not have my sources in front of me at that moment, as I have now, and I should like to quote from the sources of the statement I made.


Mr. Speaker:: I think there could be a matter of personal privilege there, if the hon. member wishes to make an explanation as a matter of privilege.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is what I hoped you would give me permission to do. On page 927 of Hansard, February 10, 1960, under the words "National Defence", there is this heading: "Bomarc Missile-Inquiry as to Over-all Cost of Program". The answer to the question addressed on that matter by the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer) is given by the Minister of National Defence as follows on page 928:
On July 2 in the same connection I mentioned that the total estimated cost was $125 million, covering two Bomarc stations, SAGE and the gap fillers and so forth. That is a realistic estimate-
I was talking about the Bomarc program and the minister will agree that the Bomarc program includes SAGE because the Bomarc is of no value without SAGE.


George Randolph Pearkes: On this question of privilege, may I point out that the Leader of the Opposition has just shown how inaccurate the statement that he made was. He has read a statement that this includes gap fillers, SAGE and other points. There may be a heading on that, which I did not write, regarding the Bomarc.
In reply, too, I should like to call his attention to a statement which was given in the white paper in which it shows very clearly what the cost is:
Under the cost-sharing arrangements with the United States covering the construction of additional radar sites and gap fillers for the Pinetree system and the introduction of Bomarc missiles and SAGE electronic control equipment, the construction of bases and the provision of unit equipment, estimated at approximately one third of the total cost, will be provided by Canada. The estimated cost of the items to be provided by Canada is approximately $125 million of which $10 million is included in the 1959-60 estimates.
I should like to refer to other references which have been made in this house. In Hansard, July 2, 1959, page 5354, there is a reference to the fact that there is $125 million for SAGE, et cetera, of which $20 million is for Bomarc. At page 919 of Hansard of February 10, 1960 I referred to the fact that $15 million is required for the two Bomarc stations and at that time there was some $393,000 spent. Then in Hansard of March 6, 1960, page 1789, I refer again to the $15 million to be spent on these projects, that is

Continental Air Defence Policy the two Bomarc stations, of which approximately $300,000 has already been spent.
You cannot say that SAGE is required solely for Bomarc. SAGE is required to control all interceptors which may be operating over Canada. The gap fillers are separate from the Bomarc, as are the extra heavy radars which are to be installed in western Canada. I think I have made it clear that $15 million is the total Canadian expense for these two bases.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I just refer again to the heading in Hansard from which I drew my information, "Bomarc Missile-Inquiry as to Over-all Cost of Program".


Mr. Speaker:: Does the minister wish to take part in the debate now?


George Randolph Pearkes: Yes.


Mr. Marlin (Essex East):: If the minister speaks now, is it the understanding that he will close the debate, Mr. Speaker?


Mr. Speaker:: No.


George Randolph Pearkes: I think I should speak at this time because a number of points have been raised which must be cleared up otherwise they will give a very false impression to the people of this country. I have endeavoured to take down rough notes of what has been said. I cannot be quite certain that I have written word for word every point that has been raised.
The first part of this motion deals with the means of consultation that there are between Canada and the defence department of the United States. There are many means, and there is frequent consultation. I should like to run over the general means of consultation, and I want to try to give some idea of the amount of co-operation that there is between Canada and the United States. First of all, shortly after the change of government, this government established the NORAD organization. This was to ensure that there could be frequent consultation between those who are responsible for the defence of this continent. The defence of the North American continent is indivisible. You cannot develop a separate defence for Canada and a separate defence for the United States.
Experience over the last half century has shown that those countries which tried to stand alone were very quickly swallowed up by aggressors. It is only by taking cooperative action prior to the outbreak of war that you can ensure that there will be a proper combined defensive organization set up. I believe that the experience of the past 50 years has shown that had such a defensive agreement been reached in the earlier part

of this century, and had it been known that the commonwealth or the United States would enter world war I and world war II, it is quite possible there might not have been any such wars at all. Our fundamental policy, therefore, being that of a deterrent against war, we entered into this North American defence organization which is known as NORAD.
We have at NORAD not only the deputy commander but quite a large number of staff officers who are integrated into the command. If not at the moment, then recently, there has been a Canadian head of the operational division. They are in constant touch with the plans which are being projected for the defence of this North American continent. This organization was set up by this government and we have insurance, in that way, of consultation between the commanders, because the commander at NORAD is every bit as much a Canadian commander as he is a United States commander. He has visited Ottawa frequently and has laid his plans before our chiefs of staff who have had every opportunity to examine those plans and have sent back their comments on those plans. Those comments, to my knowledge, have resulted in modifications of the original plan. That is one level of consultation.
We also have at Washington a considerable staff of officers who are in daily contact with their opposite numbers in the Pentagon. Actually there are today some 60 Canadian officers of the army, the navy and the air force who are sitting in daily on various committees at the Pentagon and from the senior officer-who is Air Vice Marshal Hendrick -right down through that group of officers, they are in daily consultation. They keep the chiefs of staff here in Ottawa advised by letter, telegram and telephone. There is hardly a day but what the chiefs of staff are advised as to the plans which are formulated or which are being developed jointly by the Canadian and the United States officers for the defence of this continent.
Then again, a year or so ago, this government set up a committee of cabinet ministers to confer with their opposite numbers in the United States. The late Mr. Sidney Smith, then secretary of state for external affairs, was the first secretary of state for external affairs to attend a meeting of that committee which at that time was held in Paris. We now have the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Green), the Minister of Finance (Mr. Fleming), myself and the Minister of Defence Production (Mr. O'Hurley). The last meeting was held last fall at Camp David.

If there is any question at all about that meeting being a meeting of consultation, I should like to emphasize the fact that there was no long table at which we sat down with minutes and paper before us. However, we sat around in an informal group and we had the most intimate discussion on all defence matters. That meeting was attended by advisers. The chairman of the Canadian chiefs of staff committee, namely General Foulkes, was there as was General Twining, the chairman of the United States general staff, and Mr. Gates who was then assistant secretary of defence and now is secretary of defence in the United States. We were also represented by other officials than those of the Department of National Defence. The Department of External Affairs was represented there by its officials. Officials of the Department of Finance were there as were officials of the Department of Defence Production.
At that meeting one of the decisions arrived at was that there should be meetings of the committee of consultation which had not met for some long time previously. However, we thought that if we could revive this committee of consultation consisting of the senior officers of the various departments it could do a great deal of preliminary work prior to meetings of the ministers. A date has already been set early this summer for the next meeting of this committee of ministers. They are to come to Canada this time where there will be every opportunity again of having a thorough discussion of these defence matters at the very top level. It has been decided that there will be two meetings a year of the ministers in the two countries. I suggest that is top level consultation.
In connection with the particular matters to which reference has been made may I say that for weeks I have been familiar with some of the various proposals which were being advanced by the United States joint chiefs of staff, by their air force, turned over and discussed again with the commander at NORAD; and, because he is a Canadian commander as well as a United States commander, those recommendations advanced or the various proposed schemes which were being worked out were referred to us.
As recently as last Saturday week I was talking at some length to the secretary of defence for the United States, namely Mr. Gates, who called me-I did not call him- on the long distance telephone in order to explain to me in detail various proposals. He was leaving the next day in order to go to Germany and he said, "I want to get your views on these matters before I leave for Germany". That was last Saturday week.
79951-0-159
28, 1960	2509
Continental Air Defence Policy Since then I have had conversations over the long distance telephone. I have had letters from Mr. Douglas who is assistant secretary of defence and who has been in Washington all this last week end. I had a full report of what the proposals to this subcommittee were. I knew that discussions were going on. I also knew that they had leaked out.
These are tentative proposals. This is a plan which has been formed and recommended to a subcommittee of the committee of representatives in the United States. It is not a fixed plan. It is not one which has yet been accepted by congress. It is not in its final form. At least, the committee has not had the opportunity of hearing General Kuter the commander in chief at NORAD on the final proposals or he has not been able to give his evidence before the subcommittee. It will be a long time before this plan is finally approved. It must go to the committee on appropriations. It must go to congress. Congress may make radical changes in this proposed plan. It is a tentative plan.
When I rose in my place here on Friday all I could say-and all that any honourable man could say-was that this was a speculative story. It had leaked out but not from here. Some astute press man whose job it is to get information, and all of it he can get by whatever means he can get it, had somehow or other obtained the information. I was advised from Washington that there had been a leak. But I was not going to do what I consider would be a distinctly dishonourable action, namely to have stood up here and to have confirmed or otherwise before the Canadian parliament something which I knew was going on in a committee in another country which was being held in camera. I do not believe any hon. member would really have done that.
Following my remarks on Friday morning I was again in touch with Washington. I said that this information, some of it not entirely correct, had been published in Canadian papers and that I thought it was my duty to make a statement in this house if I possibly could in order to clear up the situation. Because I had stated before that it was a speculative story, and if Washington was going to make a statement I said I thought it should be made at the same time as any statement made in the House of Commons. The original statement was to be given out in Washington at 5.15 p.m. As there had not been time to get that statement and reproduce copies here, I asked for a postponement of that time of release in Washington until 5.45, at which time I rose in my
2510	HOUSE OF
Continental Air Defence Policy place here and asked for leave to revert to motions so that I could make that statement.
The statement I received, of course, was the statement the gist of which I had received some days before. I had one extra copy, and when I received a request from the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) I sent him the only spare copy I had so that he might have an opportunity to read it beforehand. As it had come across to me typewritten, it was headed: "Statement being issued by the United States department of defence". I had tried to accommodate the Leader of the Opposition, but now he is tearing his hair because the piece of paper I sent him over so hurriedly in order that he might have a chance to read it through beforehand happened to bear that heading.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, that is not what I was complaining about. What I was complaining about was that the statement which had been given to the press and also used in this house had a United States heading instead of a Canadian heading. There is your consultation.


George Randolph Pearkes: I have described the origin of that statement and the events which took place between the morning session and the evening. Remember that this was a Friday afternoon, the last hour of which is normally devoted to private members' business. But I thought it was desirable that the house should be fully acquainted with all the proposals. If there had been time I could very well have put out a joint Canadian-United States statement, but it was a question of time and getting it out for the information of hon. members.
I feel I have disposed now of these suggestions that there is not adequate consultation between the two defence ministries. If I have not told hon. members of the House of Commons what these proposed plans were and how they were gradually being evolved, I have kept the members of the government informed in that respect, particularly the Prime Minister. There is no question about not being informed ahead of time or not being consulted. I have explained the various processes of consultation.
Now let me deal with this idea that a snap decision was made between nine and six o'clock last Friday that there should be a change. If I could produce the papers, which are all classified, showing how months ago the search to see how funds could be changed from the pure defence of the North American continent to that of increasing the power of retaliation, it would prove conclusively that no snap decision has been made.


This matter has been under consideration for months. I stood up in this house and explained two years ago how there was a general shift in emphasis coming gradually toward the missile rather than the bomber. But it was a gradual transfer. The fact that there were likely to be changes has repeatedly been stated. None of our defence plans can be rigid and fixed. There must be a large degree of flexibility, because not only are they dependent upon local conditions but they are also dependent upon the attitude of any possible aggressor. If different plans or inventions come to light which a possible enemy may have adopted, naturally you have to change your own defence plans in order to meet those changing threats.
Time and time again the Prime Minister and I have stood up in this house and referred to the changing threat, from bomber gradually towards missile. I am not going to take up a lot of time in making quotations. I have not had the opportunity to look them up, but I will just mention one. On January 18 of this year the Prime Minister of Canada spoke in this house, as reported on page 69 of Hansard, and he said this:
Defence policy cannot be certain. If it could be certain, and if we could determine today the course for the next three or four years, great savings might be made. If when the hon. gentleman was a member of the government-
The Prime Minister was there referring to statements made by the Leader of the Opposition.
-it could have been determined in 1945 or 1946 the changes that would take place in the intervening years, billions of dollars could have been saved in Canada on expenditures that had to be made for materials that are today obsolete. If we could anticipate what the U.S.S.R. would do, naturally we would be able to look into the future as to the course that should be followed with the same clarity that all of us can look into the past.
On the same day, in speaking to congress the President of the United States had this to say:
The last few years have witnessed what have been perhaps the most rapid advances in military technology in history. Some weapons systems have become obsolescent while still under development...
Thus, in the last few years a number of programs which looked very promising at the time their development was commenced have since been completely eliminated.
Those are two quotations which indicate that some time ago it was realized that changes must be made in defence policy and in the type of equipment being used by our defence forces.
These are fundamental changes which have taken place. We are in a period of transition which, I suggest, is unequalled at any time in history. I think it is almost a platitude to

say that. We are changing from the day of the manned bomber; now we are talking about missiles; and we have begun to talk about satellites being used for military purposes. That is a long, long way from the type of equipment which was used at the end of the last war.
References have been made to the future. There is no government in the world today which is more sincere in its quest for effective disarmament than the government of Canada. Canada is taking a leading part in the discussions which are now going on, but we would be wrong- we would not be living up to our responsibilities-if we were to anticipate the results of these disarmament conferences by taking action before an effective and enforcible system of disarmament is achieved. We must maintain, not so much our defence as our deterrent power. We base everything on the hope that we can deter an enemy from going to war. I have repeatedly said in recent weeks that there is no defence at the present time against the missile once it has been launched. Therefore we must do everything we can to prevent missiles being launched, and this means we must let the Russians, if they are our enemy, know that if they once start a war they will be met by such a tremendous counter-attack, such retaliation, that the loss to their own country would be so great that it would be suicide for them to attempt war.
The whole philosophy of our defence at the present time is that of a deterrent to war rather than of the actual defence of any particular country. I am not going to stand here and say we can shoot down every bomber that there is. I have heard statements made in this house in the past which were fantastic in the claims they made with regard to the number of bombers that could be shot down. I do not pretend for one moment that the defences we have can shoot down every bomber that might be sent against us. Mind you, the Russians have in their inventories in service today with their air force a large number of bombers, some of which are obsolete, some of which are more modern. None of them, to my knowledge, are supersonic as was claimed by the Leader of the Opposition. I do not know where the hon. gentleman got that information, but I have heard no analysis of the Soviet equipment which makes me believe that the Russians have supersonic bombers in operation today.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On that point raised by the minister, I got the information from a statement he made to the committee of estimates discussing defence two years ago last summer.
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Continental Air Defence Policy


George Randolph Pearkes: As far as I know the Russians have no supersonic bombers today. They may have tomorrow.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


George Randolph Pearkes: They are always changing. I do not laugh at that statement, though hon. members on the other side may. The Russians are changing and advancing in just the same way as we are. They have more advanced types of bombers than those which were in operation when the CF-100 was first made. I have made that statement before. It is quite possible, indeed, it is almost certain, that if war were to break out in the near future Russian bombers would be used.
I claim we have no protection against the missile today. The missile, once launched, cannot be shot down. Missiles will very likely be directed against the forces of retaliation which are, in the main, concentrated in the United States. However, it is more than likely that after the attack in the United States with missiles a bomber attack against the industrial cities would follow.
Nobody has told me that there will not be a war in the next three or four years. I do not think it is likely that there will be one. I do not think that the Soviet union is preparing for war against us today. Nevertheless, I am Minister of National Defence, and to a very large extent I am responsible for the defence of this country against any form of attack which may occur today, next year, or ten years from now, and while we make plans for ten years hence, I still have the responsibility, and the service chiefs still have the responsibility of meeting any possible attack today as best we can.
However, our funds are not unlimited and we would only be playing into the hands of an enemy if we set a burden upon the manpower and financial resources of our country sufficient to meet every possible form of attack. By doing so we should really be reducing the economy of our country to such a state as to be making ourselves susceptible to, may I say, psychological forms of attack. Thus, without overburdening the manpower and the financial resources of the country we have to provide the best form of defence that we can.
I have said, and I repeat it, that there is no defence against the missile once launched. We must therefore stress the power of retaliation. Canada does not play a very important part with respect to the power of retaliation. It has been said we are not in that league because of the enormous expenditure which is required to produce these modern weapons of retaliation. Perhaps I should mention a few of the costs involved. Some of the weapons which the United States started to

Continental Air Defence Policy develop and later had to abandon because of changing conditions included the Dart, an anti-tank guided missile on which some $10 million had been spent. After spending some $387 million, the United States navy abandoned the P6M, and the F8U3 was abandoned after the expenditure of some $136 million. The missile Regulus was abandoned after $120 million had been spent and other missiles which have been abandoned include the Rascal after an expenditure of $448 million and the Navaho, a missile on which there was an expenditure of $679.8 million.
To give hon. members some idea of the cost of some of these missiles of retaliation which are the only defence the west has at the present time-the power of retaliation-there is the Atlas and the Titan. Their development cost over $5 billion. Only a few of the Atlas are in operation. The cost of the Polaris in the fiscal year 1961 is expected to be $952 million. One nuclear carrier costs $471 million. That gives some indication as to why Canada cannot possibly enter that league where great sums of money have to be spent on the forces of retaliation.
What do we do? We are spending large sums of money on defence, part of which is spent on the defence of the North American continent. Part of the expenditure on defence of the continent is devoted to the Royal Canadian Navy so that with our surface ships and marine aircraft we can keep the hostile submarines away from our shores and prevent them launching missiles against our inland cities.
We spend considerable sums of money- millions-on the air defence of this continent in our warning systems which we provide, in part with the United States, as warning against the possibility of bomber attacks. We are looking into the future, working out at the present time means of assisting the United States in detecting the intercontinental ballistic missiles which might be launched against us. The main point of these warning systems is that the forces of retaliation, a number of which are still bombers in the strategic air command, can get off the ground in the few minutes that are available. If there was not that time to get off the ground they would be caught and destroyed on their air bases. Surely that money which is being spent on improving the warning systems is assistance to the only defence that we have at the present time, the power to make it clear to the enemy that it is not worth their while to attack.
We come now to the more immediate problem, the question of the change in the air defence plan. I have emphasized the point that retaliation is our one means of deterring

war, perhaps making it as difficult as can be for the enemy to attack. I am sure hon. members have read in the papers or heard comments about the so-called gap that exists between United States missile development and Russian missile development. At the present time the Russians may be a little bit ahead of the United States in their missile development but I think it is compensated by the fact that the United States has available for the defence of the west a variety of means of retaliation. Not only are there missiles presently in operation in United States-few in number, I will admit, but with others coming along in the next year or two-but there is a very large force of bombers which can travel from United States and deliver their bombs on the targets of every city in European and Asiatic Russia if Russia ever starts the attack. Also, to increase the diversity and flexibility of the powers of retaliation from the United States there are the United States submarines-again perhaps few in number but with more coming along *-which will have the potential of firing missiles. More and more submarines capable of carrying a Polaris will come into operation which will be able to go to any part of the world and from their unknown position in the ocean deliver their missiles against Russian targets.
In addition to that there are the medium range missiles of the Thor and Jupiter type stationed in the United Kingdom and planned for various European countries. And so, if the United States is a little behind Russia in the actual number of ballistic missiles they have, that is compensated for by the diversity of the United States weapons.
I see that you are on your feet, Mr. Speaker. I hope you are not going to stop me.


Mr. Speaker:: I hesitate to interrupt the hon. minister in the middle of a sentence, but unless the house gives indulgence I am obliged to advise the hon. gentleman that his time has expired.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I think the minister should be allowed to continue.


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


George Randolph Pearkes: Thank you. As I was saying, there may be a gap but that is partially compensated by the diversity of the United States means of retaliation. The United States realizes that it is essential that they speed up the production of their intercontinental ballistic missiles so as to close any gap that may exist. Even United States funds, however, are not unlimited. They have to draw from somewhere the money to

provide these very expensive weapons and so, because the threat from the bomber is decreasing, they have decided in consultation with Canada and the Department of National Defence that sacrifices must be made in the actual physical defence of this continent in order to make more funds available this year from purely defence to speeding up and increasing the power of retaliation.
The Bomarc program is considered an essential part of the defence plan of the North American continent so that they may deter bombers from coming over and so that some degree of defence can be given to the populated centres of the North American continent which are mainly concentrated in the east both in Canada and the United States. It so happens that the eastern approaches are the ones most likely to be followed up by Russian bombers if Russian bombers are used to follow up attacks of the missiles.
There had been a plan of some 18 Bomarc units distributed across the continent. Some of these stations-approximately four-have been eliminated. Those are ones which were not giving direct protection to the highly industrialized part of Canada. But the remaining stations, three of which are in operation, five of which are under construction in the United States at the present time, are distributed so that they can give protection to Canadian cities from Winnipeg to the Atlantic. There is more than one Canadian city today that will not benefit from the Bomarc plan when it is completed, and it is expected that this Bomarc plan will be completed, or that the last stations will come into operation, in 1963. They will cover every city from Winnipeg to the Atlantic, not our two Canadian ones. Our two Canadian Bomarcs, when established at North Bay and La Macaza, will give coverage from approximately Sault Ste. Marie to Quebec. Halifax is covered by Bomarc stations in Maine in exactly the same way as Winnipeg will be covered by Bomarc stations in the middle west.
That is the picture. There will be this chain of mutually supporting interlinked stations built to cover the Canadian air space for some 400 miles north of the border. The two Canadian stations are key links in that chain. I want to emphasize the fact that this is not an isolated defence; that these are not two lonely stations all by themselves. They are two important links in this chain of stations, and I cannot emphasize this too much because it does not seem to be realized by the general public.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Will the minister permit a question on this point? Is this chain of
Continental Air Defence Policy stations that he is talking about, the 12 or 14 in the United States, to be equipped with Bomarc A missiles or Bomarc B missiles?


George Randolph Pearkes: Three are in operation today. Those are equipped with Bomarc A missiles. The Bomarc B missiles will be at other stations. I cannot tell at the moment the number of stations which are A's and the number designated for B's; but in the first instance it will probably be about 50-50. Then, if there is still a threat from the bomber, according to the original plans, the B would take over from the A station.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask the minister this question. Is it contemplated that from its present appropriations the United States will equip those stations with Bomarc B missiles?


George Randolph Pearkes: It is contemplated and there are funds available in the appropriation to equip a number of those stations. I am not saying all because three are already operative. The sum of $2,230 million has already been allocated by the United States for this program.


Lester Bowles Pearson: How much of that has been
spent?


George Randolph Pearkes: As the Leader of the Opposition knows perfectly well, the funds do not go back to the general treasury once they have been voted. There are hundreds of millions of dollars still left in that appropriation for them to develop the program. It is quite wrong to think that $50 million is the only money available. There has been a reduction in order to make more money available for the powers of retaliation. There has been a reduction from $421 million, which was in the original plan drawn up a year ago, to $50 million; but the money which is allocated for the Canadian stations and for other stations in the United States not yet under construction is already voted and available to the United States air force for that particular purpose.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask the minister this question, because it is a very important aspect of the matter, and we have heard nothing about this previously. There is enough money presumably available, from the minister's reply, for the United States to complete its present Bomarc B program?


George Randolph Pearkes: It depends-do not smirk and smile like that-it depends entirely on what the Leader of the Opposition means by the present program.


Lester Bowles Pearson: There must be a program.


George Randolph Pearkes: There is the present program which includes the whole 18 stations. There is a suggested change in that program not
2514	HOUSE OF COMMONS
Continental Air Defence Policy yet approved by congress. There is not enough money-if the amount is reduced to $50 million-to provide for all the original ones, but there is ample money to provide for the reduced: number. The reduced number is 14 units.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Some of which are A and some of which are B?


George Randolph Pearkes: Some of which are A. At the present time there are three operational, and since there are no B's operational those three must be A's.


Lester Bowles Pearson: We are now getting our defence policy.


Mr. Nesbitt:: The Leader of the Opposition has to have it explained.


George Randolph Pearkes: There was an interruption and I have lost my trend of thought. I hope that has cleared up the situation. I repeat, up to June of 1960-and, remember, the United States fiscal year starts on July 1- $2,230 million has been allocated to the Bomarc program and Bomarc only; it has nothing to dp with SAGE; it has nothing to do with gap fillers. Let me make that quite clear. Do not get confused about other things as you have been confused about the costs of the Canadian Bomarc.


Lester Bowles Pearson: How much of that has been spent already?


George Randolph Pearkes: I have not be actual figures. I tried during the debate to get the actual figures. All I can state at the moment is that there are hundreds of millions of dollars not yet spent; that is all they could tell me at the time. I should think that is adequate.
I think I have shown clearly that this is not a useless weapon. This is part of the essential defence of the North American continent. Of course, all weapons are useless perhaps, if they are not used in defence, unless you recognize the fact that they are useful in that they do deter the enemy from going to war. Withdraw those Bomarcs, ruin that chain of defence and then you have left the continent wide open and there would not be a deterrent to the Russian bombers which we know are in the Russian air force today. If we can maintain peace for the next five years, then you may say quite definitely that this has been a most useful weapon and that it has played a very prominent part in the power of retaliation, the power of the deterrent to deter the enemy from attacking this continent with bombers.
You have asked me about the effectiveness of the Bomarc B. Hon. members opposite, with one exception, have almost been rejoicing in the failures that there have been of this weapon.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


George Randolph Pearkes: They have given every indication that they were pleased that this weapon, in which I have said I have confidence, had again failed. It has failed seven times.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Why shouldn't we mention it, then?


George Randolph Pearkes: It is not merely the mention of it, but it is the pleasure which has been shown on your faces when you have mentioned it.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Another form of closure.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Lester Bowles Pearson: We must not even talk about these things; cannot speak about anything.


Mr. Speaker:: Order; the Minister of
National Defence has the floor.


George Randolph Pearkes: These tests of the Bomarc B have been carried out. Those who are connected with it, the officials who have watched these tests, the officials of the company, the officials of the department of defence of the United States, have repeatedly stated, and only as recently as today, that they have confidence in the ultimate success of this weapon. When you come to think of it, you are trying to devise a weapon which has to hit another very small target which is travelling well over 500 miles an hour and at a distance of 400 miles away. That is not an easy thing for anybody to develop.
This Bomarc B is based on the same principle as the Bomarc A. The Bomarc A, within the limits of its range, has proved to be a successful weapon.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Two hundred miles.


George Randolph Pearkes: This is doubling that range, but the basis is the same. I have confidence that this weapon will be developed, based upon the information and the statements that I have received. I feel that we should go on with our small share in the preparation for receiving these weapons. The instruments of the Bomarc B's, with their launching pads, when placed at our disposal, will have cost the United States and Canada somewhere in the neighbourhood of $91 million. We are contributing somewhere about $15 million in order to provide the housing and structures for these weapons. Some of the equipment has already been ordered. At the present time one of the sites is being cleared of the brush and the approach road is under construction. It is suggested that we should cancel that because some members opposite have lost faith in this weapon. I have not lost faith in the Bomarc B. I think we

should continue with the construction work. We are expecting to hear that further tests have been carried' out in the not too distant future. But the principle is sound and the United States have confidence in it.
I say that I welcome the motion which has called for the adjournment of the house because I have had an opportunity, for the first time, to show what our defence policy is. I have had an opportunity of replying to a number of incorrect statements which have been made by hon. members opposite giving a false impression to the people of this country. I have given hon. members information. I have held nothing back. I think any reasonable person can see that we have had every opportunity of consulting with our allies; that they have listened to our recommendations in many cases. We are constantly in touch with them, and I think I have shown clearly that the Bomarc is an essential weapon in our mutual efforts to deter the outbreak of war. We are going to stand by the agreement we have made with our allies. We have entered into an agreement for the development of these Bomarc stations, and we are not going to scrap that sacred agreement with our allies and give up just because somebody says there is a possibility that the Bomarc B may not be successful.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, I am sure that the house has listened with great interest to the speech of the honourable and gallant gentleman, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes). This is the 28th day of March and today marks the first statement that the Minister of National Defence has made in this house since the opening of this session, except for replies he has made to the questions which have been asked him from time to time. If the action taken by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) today serves no other purpose, it will serve the constructive purpose of having encouraged the Minister of National Defence to make at least one report this session on some aspects of defence policy.
It must not be forgotten that the minister with an associate minister is the head of a department that is responsible for a larger expenditure of public money than any other department of government. It is, perhaps, for the minister at some other time to explain why he has only now taken advantage of the opportunity, in the light of the importance of national defence both in terms of international application and of the national budget, to explain to the house some of the matters that he regards as vital to the security of the nation and to the unity of Canada's associated states in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Continental Air Defence Policy
It is amazing, however, to think that the minister should have used this opportunity of debate to say what the Leader of the Opposition had been denied the opportunity of saying in laying the foundation for his motion. How desirable it would have been if a defence committee had been set up along the lines suggested by him in which it would have been possible for members representing the various parties of this house to explore problems that are in the public mind but which, at this time, remain unanswered.


Some hon. Members:: Order, order.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The Minister of National Defence has just finished a speech three quarters of which was devoted to defence policy. That opportunity was denied the Leader of the Opposition and pursuant to the policy of closure being followed by the government I am now being called upon not to make any comments on the remarks made by the Minister of National Defence. The Minister of National Defence discussed the particular issue only in the first ten minutes of his speech and in the last 15 minutes. The body of his speech had to do with defence policy which the Leader of the Opposition was not permitted to discuss.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. May I remind the hon. member for Essex East that if he had a point of order to raise and wished to object to the course followed by the Minister of National Defence, the time to do it was when he was transgressing.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I am not raising a point of order, Mr. Speaker. The point of order is being raised by hon. gentlemen who now want to deny to the opposition a right which the opposition did not deny to the Minister of National Defence.


John George Diefenbaker: Oh, oh.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I know the Prime Minister does not like this. He was the one who objected to what the Leader of the Opposition said.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I particularly enjoy hearing the hon. gentleman discuss defence and I want him to have the opportunity of touching those peaks he normally touches when he knows little about a subject.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Once again, Mr. Speaker, we have the Prime Minister of this country upholding the great dignity of his office by making observations which, under our tradition, normally would be made only by one who sat in the last seat in the last row. The Prime Minister, of course, has such a high regard for the exposition of all the facts that it pleases him now and then to

Continental Air Defence Policy descend from his high office and to make such constructive observations as the one with which he has now delighted his followers. That procedure, of course, makes the Prime Minister a great parliamentarian.
I am sure the Minister of National Defence will regret having said that we on this side of the house rejoice in the failure of the Bomarc. That is a statement which I am sure the Minister of National Defence, on reflection, will want to withdraw. He knows perfectly well that it is the duty of an opposition to expose the weaknesses of the administration as it sees them. He knows that it is the duty of the opposition to discuss matters which it believes require attention by the administration. I should have thought that the hon. and gallant gentleman would welcome the opportunity to have this particular debate and that, while he might not agree with what hon. gentlemen in the opposition said, he might at least have attributed to them the sincerity of purpose which he expects-and rightly so-and which every hon. member in this house attributes to him. However, I let the statement of the Minister of National Defence speak for itself.
We are not rejoicing at these failures. We are sharing with the people of Canada generally at this time concern and disquietude over this particular matter and particularly over the conduct of national defence by the hon. gentleman and his colleagues who comprise the present government of Canada. That concern is reflected not only in the attitude of the party on whose behalf I am speaking at the moment but is reflected elsewhere in the nation.
In his attitude at the outset of today's deliberations the Prime Minister revealed the concern which he recognized is felt not only by members of this house but by people throughout the country generally because he did not give the Leader of the Opposition time to finish his argument but said, "We accept at once your proposal to discuss this particular matter of the Bomarc''. The reason the Prime Minister did so was that, good politician that he is, he recognized the fact that all over this country since Friday last there has arisen a question mark about this government's defence policy. That is the reason why the Prime Minister readily accepted the suggestion that debate on the matter now under discussion should be provided for under the procedure of moving the adjournment of the house.
Addressing himself to the question of consultation, which is one of the main arguments adduced by those of us in this party against the government at this time, the Minister of National Defence outlined the whole

mechanism of consultation which theoretically exists between the United States and Canada in matters of military affairs. No one denies that this set-up on paper presents an extremely complete picture. But the question at issue is whether or not, in this instance, the processes of consultation were operative; whether or not in the particular instance- altogether apart from the occasions or the instruments for consultation-they were in fact used; whether or not in fact the minister really was informed of the important events that were taking place in the United States.
As an example of the consultation that exists, the minister stated that he knew what was the total amount of moneys originally voted by the United States for this Bomarc program. Yet when asked by the Leader of the Opposition what was the total expenditure made to date out of the moneys voted the Minister of National Defence was not able to give a definite reply. If the consultation with the United States is as efficient as the Minister of National Defence says it is, surely it would not have taken very long for the Minister of National Defence, in preparing his material for today, to have ascertained from the United States how much money has already been spent out of the moneys voted in the United States for the Bomarc program. We would then be in a position to determine whether or not the argument made by the Minister of National Defence with regard to the future use of the Bomarc was deserving of the validity suggested by the Minister of National Defence.
I refer the house to a statement made by the Prime Minister when he spoke on February 20, 1959 in this house. That was on the occasion of the abandonment of the CF-105. As reported at page 1222 of Hansard of that year the Prime Minister stated as follows:
Having regard to the information and advice we have received, however, there is no other feasible or justifiable course open to us. We must not abdicate our responsibility to assure that the huge sums which it is our duty to ask parliament to provide for defence are being expended in the most effective way to achieve that purpose.
Those were wise words.


John George Diefenbaker: What page was that?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Page 1222. Those were words which the Prime Minister and the members of the government ought to apply to the present situation, namely:
We must not abdicate our responsibility to assure that the huge sums which it is our duty to ask parliament to provide for defence are being expended in the most effective way to achieve that purpose.
Whether or not one accepts the argument made by the Minister of National Defence,

no one will deny that as a result of the incidents on Friday last a prima facie case at least was established for questioning whether or not, in the particular context, public moneys were being properly used for the purpose intended.
In the same debate, as reported at page 1224 of Hansard of that year, the Leader of the Opposition stated as follows:
Surely if we are going to make this change from an interceptor developed and built in Canada to a missile developed and built in the United States, then we must be confident in our own minds-all of us who have an obligation in parliament in this matter-that this change is going to increase our lefence capacity.
In the light of the events which now confront us, how wise these words of the Leader of the Opposition were.
The principle which the Prime Minister has enunciated in his statement and which should guide not only Canadian but United States policy in this matter is the principle of the pooling of our resources continentally and on an Atlantic basis for collective defence. Surely that does not mean that Canada is to be asked to take part in collective continental defence in so far as planning and operation are concerned but not in so far as the development of resources and industrial capacity are concerned.
The important part of the statement of the Leader of the Opposition is that we have an obligation to make sure that this change is going to increase our defensive capacity.
Now, do events as they were unfolded on Friday and as told to us today by the Minister of National Defence meet the requirements laid down in these remarks of a year ago by the Leader of the Opposition? It is clear, Mr. Speaker, whether the minister agrees or not, that from the events of Friday last there is every justification for questioning the consultation that has prevailed between the United States and Canada in this matter. All we have to do is to review the incidents of Friday last in order to see how justified this statement is and how warranted are the fears of journalists in our newspapers who have expressed editorial opinion, as well as the remarks of commentators through other instruments of dissemination of opinion. Not only in this parliament but throughout the country it is clear that there is an uncertainty in the public mind as to whether Canada, a loyal ally; one that has paid its own way and has been co-operative in its relations with the United States and as a member of NATO; one that has been treated as an equal partner or, in this particular instance, as a satellite, not receiving from her partner the kind of co-operation and consultation expected between two nations equal in function if not in power.
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Continental Air Defence Policy
The incidents of last Friday speak for themselves. In the morning the Minister of National Defence expressed doubt about the Washington reports that the United States had practically stopped the development of the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile. Is there any doubt that that was the result of the observations of the Minister of National Defence, that he did express grave doubt as to whether or not these reports which have been referred to were in fact warranted or true? Seven hours later-Hansard is there as a record- the minister rose in his place and read a statement from the United States defence department to the effect that that department and the government of which it is a department was cancelling most of the Bomarc program.
Mr. Speaker, the Leader of the Opposition has commented on the fact that the minister read in this house a statement prepared by the information service of the United States department of defence. If we had had the kind of consultation with the United States that the minister argued a few moments ago existed, surely it would have been possible to have had sufficient notice to enable the minister's officials to prepare a statement, in accordance with our traditions, which would have at least expressed the government's opinion on a paper which would have come from this House of Commons or from the Department of National Defence. The reason why the Minister of National Defence used a statement from the United States defence information services was because there was not time, I would suggest, for the minister to make the kind of changes-I do not mean changing words-which would put the statement in a form which would have satisfied the dignity of this country, an equal partner; if not in function at least in status, with the United States in these matters.


George Randolph Pearkes: May I ask the hon. member a question. Could he inform me at what time this leaked out?


Paul Joseph James Martin: I could not give the minister the time.


George Randolph Pearkes: Perhaps you had some
advance notice that there was going to be a leak and I did not.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The minister is in touch with the United States continually and did not need time. He could have done precisely what I said, but for some reason or another the instruments of consultation between the two departments of government have not functioned in this matter, and it is clear not only from the incidents of last Friday but from other incidents during the course of the last six months that the minister

Continental Air Defence Policy and his opposite number and their respective departments have not had the kind of consultation desired.


George Randolph Pearkes: Name one.


Paul Joseph James Martin: As a matter of fact, in a matter of this sort why is the medium of consultation not between the Department of External Affairs and the state department? Usually in matters involving the relations of our two friendly states the medium of communication is between the state department and I suggest should be in this instance, as far as Canada is concerned, the Department of External Affairs. But the fact is that if we had not insisted as we did on Friday we would not have had the statement from the minister that we did ultimately receive.


George Randolph Pearkes: You cannot substantiate that.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The minister says nonsense. That is his conclusion and I am giving him my interpretation after witnessing the incidents of Friday last. It is clear, Mr. Speaker, that the Minister of National Defence was kept in ignorance of the decision of the United States defence department concerning the Bomarc, and I say that is a reflection upon our country and on the kind of partnership which should prevail between this country and our neighbour, particularly in matters of such great importance as this. I think it is quite clear that the United States still intends, and if I am wrong the minister will say so-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The hon. member for Brome-Missisquoi (Mr. Grafftey), who usually takes matters so seriously-


William Heward Grafftey: I could not take that seriously.


Paul Joseph James Martin: -I am sure on reflection will not want to be referred to as one having expressed laughter in respect of a matter which now so agitates the people of Canada.


William Heward Grafftey: On a question of privilege, I did express laughter on that last remark.


Paul Joseph James Martin: It is also evident that the United States still intends to send to Canada a weapon which the United States now feels is too inefficient for use in its own defence.


George Randolph Pearkes: You have asked me to reply to that. It is completely and utterly false.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The minister says I am wrong, but I can only say that we will


find out whether the assurance of the minister today will be borne out by events tomorrow. We have had many assurances from the minister and subsequent events have shown that his optimism was not confirmed.
In any event, if it had not been for the Leader of the Opposition today it would not have been possible for us to have received from the Minister of National Defence an enunciation of policy on this very important matter. We would have again have been treated to a policy of silence or a policy of announcements over the radio, rather than giving this house an opportunity to confront the minister in a friendly manner which is characteristic of this chamber. We would not have had the opportunity of having statements made by the government and having these examined by the Leader of the Opposition and by the house generally in order to arrive at an understanding as to what is the situation. Had it not been for this debate we would not have had some of the elucidations which have come to us this afternoon.
I repeat, to use a United States release instead of a Canadian release, instead of an assessment based upon an appreciation by the government of Canada, was in itself significant. It would be interesting to know whether there was a meeting of the cabinet on Friday last which dealt with the important developments which ensued between the time the minister first spoke on Friday morning and when he made his statement at 5.45 p.m. on the same day, because some of the things the minister said in his statement involved matters of government policy, matters that can only be determined by the cabinet collectively, not on the basis of the view of one minister, even though that minister might be the minister in charge of the department concerned.
The minister said there was no snap decision made on Friday in the United States. If that is the case, why did he express confidence on Friday at 11.30 a.m. and then make a statement later in the day which sought to explain his earlier reaction to the situation? If the minister-and I respect him for this, and the house will respect him for it-was anxious to keep an undertaking made with a friendly government, that is understandable; but surely the parliament of the nation is not to be treated as though it were composed of officials of the department. Surely it would have been possible for the minister to have said: certain circumstances have arisen, and I would ask that at this time that we proceed with some other matter, and I tell the house on my authority as a minister that I will make an important statement on Monday. Surely it would have been

possible for the minister to have taken a course of that kind. Instead, he chose a course which has caused lack of confidence, a course which has caused confusion and which has caused uncertainty. I say also, with some justification because of the evidence which is now about us, that it was a course which caused much disquiet in the country with regard to the government's defence policy.
What is the situation in the United States? Is there any doubt in that country as to whether the government of the United States will see to it that the Bomarc B missile will ever be introduced into the United States system, though plans do continue to provide Canada with two squadrons for use at North Bay and Mont Laurier? It would be interesting to know whether it was Canada's idea or the idea of the United States to go ahead with the Canadian sites. That question has never been dealt with by the minister. As far as I can recall, we do not know whose decision it was, and this matter has never been mentioned by the Minister of National Defence.
In the light of the developments of the last few days, the question takes on an added importance. The minister said, if I understood him correctly, that we are not reviewing the efficiency of the Bomarc at all. Yet I see that according to the Winnipeg Free Press of March 25, Dr. Herbert F. York, chief of the United States defence department research, told senators that the Bomarc program was undergoing critical review because of a series of test failures. We have never been told that it was undergoing a critical review. We have been told that the minister has confidence in the ultimate success of this weapon.
Last Friday the minister told us he has confidence in the Bomarc. The minister may have confidence, but what value is that confidence in the light of a statement made by a man who is closely connected with research production in the United States-Dr. Herbert F. York, chief of the United States defence department research division-who must be regarded as a man of great authority in the field and who, I repeat, told the senators of the United States that the Bomarc program is undergoing critical review. Yet the minister says he has great confidence in this particular project.
I hope the minister's confidence is well placed, but we are challenging in this deliberative assembly the basis of that confidence. We are not challenging the integrity or the capacity of the minister. We are challenging something which is of the very essence of our defence at this time, something which is going to cost the Canadian people a great deal of money. Because this is so, and because we are an equal partner with the 79951-0-160J
Continental Air Defence Policy United States under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, we are asking that we should be consulted by that country and by its department of defence as an equal, just as I am sure we would, unhesitatingly, if the shoe were on the other foot, see that our partner was fully advised of whatever courses we were taking.
The minister questioned the statement of the Leader of the Opposition with regard to the figure of $125 million. I am glad that he withdrew the allegation of lack of veracity with which he allowed his remarks to be associated. But there was justification for what the Leader of the Opposition said. The Leader of the Opposition has referred to Hansard at page 925, to a question asked by the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer) and the reply of the minister. If there was any misunderstanding, that misunderstanding has been copied by those who report the proceedings of this house. I have before me the Ottawa Journal of February 1 containing an article by the Canadian Press staff writer, Dave McIntosh, a responsible writer on these matters and a man in close touch with national defence. He wrote:
Canada's contribution to the total cost of the Canadian Bomarc-SAGE program has been estimated at $125 million.
Again, the Montreal Gazette, in today's paper, said in an editorial:
Of this sum the United States will pay two thirds. This leaves Canada with a bill for $125 million.
Then Mr. Harold Greer, writing on February 2, in the Toronto Globe and Mail said:
Some $10 million has reportedly been spent on the two bases so far and another $20 million will be spent in the coming fiscal year. Canada's overall investment in the Bomarc program is expected to be around $125 million.


George Randolph Pearkes: You believe that rather than what I said in the house?


Paul Joseph James Martin: The point I am making, and the minister has obviously misunderstood it, is that there was justification for the interpretation given by my hon. friend.


An hon. Member:: No, there was not.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The hon. member, who no doubt is well informed on these matters, said there was not. If the Leader of the Opposition is wrong, then Hansard is wrong, the reporter for the Globe and Mail is wrong, the Montreal Gazette is wrong everybody is out of step but the minister. The government, with its great majority, obviously does not like to be caught out on a limb as it has been with regard to this matter.

Continental Air Defence Policy
This matter could have been dealt with effectively if the request made by the Leader of the Opposition for a defence committee had been accepted. At a time when, as the minister says, the intercontinental ballistic missile has provided many transformations in the defence policies of the countries concerned it would have been very helpful if the government had accepted the proposal for the setting up of such a committee so that the minister could have given the kind of statement he has made today and proper precautions for security could have been taken in the circumstances when necessary. There could have been a real examination made of the total defence program of Canada in light of the changes that are being made in the United Kingdom, France and the United States.
We are now face to face with disarmament discussions. The Soviet union is prepared, it says, to reduce its conventional forces down to very low levels. The United States have contemplated reductions in conventional forces, too, and countries like Canada, France and the United Kingdom will be expected to play their part if such a program is arrived at which, of course, we all will do. These steps are now being taken by the Soviet union in my judgment not only because they want to see a comprehensive system of disarmament but because the very strategy of modern war has changed. The new instruments of human destruction now make unnecessary the great expenditures of money that are now being expended in many avenues of defence effort. It would be worth while for us to know in what particular areas of our own national defence these reductions could, consistent with security, take place.
That kind of question and the question that is before us today could have been searchingly examined in a defence committee and we would not be faced-


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member keeps coming back to the subject of the defence committee. The house has already disposed of that matter and it is quite improper, as it was for the hon. member for Assiniboia (Mr. Argue), to repeat the argument raised at that time.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, I regret that you say it is improper, but if you say it is I accept your view. I ask you, however, to remember that the Minister of National Defence discussed the whole question of national defence policy much more generally than I have done.
I now incorporate as part of my own speech two paragraphs from an editorial which appeared in this morning's Globe and


Mail which I think characterizes this situation, this debate and the concern of the country at this time:
The relationship between Canada and the United States is of great interest abroad. While Canada, a relatively weak country, remains a free and independent ally of her mighty neighbour, an ally treated with dignity and respect, Canada presents convincing evidence of United States integrity, of United States good intentions in the world. But if the United States shows any inclination to treat Canada as a satellite, United States integrity will soon be doubted and its good intentions sharply questioned.
There is no doubt that Canada has been treated shabbily in the matter of the Bomarc. This fact must be drawn to United States attention in no uncertain manner.
High! Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prime Minister): Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to traverse the ground covered by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes). After all, sir, you will have noted in the very fine contribution made by the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) that it was obvious that the explanation given by the Minister of National Defence satisfied him for all through his remarks ran the thread that if only this explanation had been given before there would have been no necessity for this debate today.
I wish to point out with great respect, Mr. Speaker, and in no way bringing Your Honour into the debate, that on Friday last after the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) and the hon. member for Assiniboia (Mr. Argue) had made rather lengthy speeches on the matter, the Minister of National Defence, as reported at page 2490 of Hansard, rose and said:
Mr. Speaker, may I Just answer a couple of questions?
In reply to this Your Honour stated:
In view of the time, and in view of the usual practice with statements, where comment is permitted but not debate, although the hon. member for Assiniboia perhaps strayed from that in his comment, I think it would be inappropriate to continue the discussion.
I believe it is obvious from the record that the minister would have answered as he answered today had the rules according to Your Honour's interpretation-and I am not disagreeing with that in any way-not being applied as strictly as they were.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Ten after six.


John George Diefenbaker: I am very glad that we have had the opportunity of having this discussion today. Indeed, if Your Honour had taken a side glance at the Leader of the Opposition, and the hon. member for Essex East, and had noticed their reaction when I unreservedly accepted this motion to adjourn

you would have realized that hon. gentlemen opposite had not expected that we were waiting for just this opportunity.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Lester Bowles Pearson: You had months to do it.


John George Diefenbaker: Oh, Mr. Speaker, it is amazing how their consciences prick them at this moment. Otherwise they would not be interrupting. If you could have seen their faces when the motion was accepted you would have realized that it was one of the greatest surprises they ever had. My colleagues and I had been wondering whether or not they would provide this opportunity by such a motion, we did not expect that strategically they would have done so. I want to thank them immediately for having provided this forum, and this opportunity to answer the kind of thing which they have so sedulously and wrongly advanced since Friday.
When you analyse everything that has been said here today you realize the fact that the Liberal party is opposed to a continental defence policy for North America. They are opposed to it because it implies a non-acceptable excessive dependence on the United States.


Paul Joseph James Martin: That, of course, is not a fact.


John George Diefenbaker: Both the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Essex East say that is not so. Let me read from a speech delivered by the hon. member for Laurier (Mr. Chevrier) on March 26, 1960, as reported by the national Liberal federation of Canada:
Mr. Chevrier said the Liberal party was opposed to a continental defence policy because it implies a "non-acceptable" excessive dependence on the United States.


Paul Joseph James Martin: That is not the same thing at all.


John George Diefenbaker: The hon. member for Laurier then went on to say:
-our defence policy should be one of fuller integration within NATO.
Their attitude from the beginning has been one of opposition to the geographical necessity that requires Canada to be joined with the United States in continental defence. I join with the hon. member for Essex East in abhorring any thought that this means being a satellite. It does not mean being a satellite, nor does it involve any sense of dependence on the United States to a degree that would render us in any way subservient. It means two equals joined together as we are, we in Canada requiring for our preservation and
28. 1960	2521
Continental Air Defence Policy the protection of our life itself, close integration in defence with the United States. Any other policy would be dangerous to the future of Canada and the preservation of freedom.
When they speak about the necessity of the fullest consultation one has only to read the references made by various leaders in the United States and in Canada who have recognized the fact that the days of our subservience ended in June of 1957, and the days of consultation began. They talk about consultation. Have they forgotten that they spent some $400 million on the CF-105?


Lester Bowles Pearson: At least it could fly.


John George Diefenbaker: And they made no arrangement whatever with the United States to make purchases of any of those aircraft when produced when they realized that unless they could Canada could not possibly produce the aircraft at a reasonable or economic price. When they speak of consultation, when the hon. member says that the Department of the Secretary of State for External Affairs should have interested itself in this regard I recall to his mind this fact. When he and the present head of Rio Tinto, Robert Winters, were ministers of the former government an agreement was entered into with the United States for uranium, which cut off in 1962.


Mr. Hellyer:: Order.


John George Diefenbaker: It secured nothing for Canada on the conclusion of the contract except the expression of a hope rather than anything of certainty, or anything that should lead Canadians as a whole to feel that Canada's interest was going to be protected.
Consultation there was. Consultation there will be as between our two countries on the basis of equality.


Mr. Pickersgill:: Will the Prime Minister permit a question?


John George Diefenbaker: Yes, I will be glad to have a question from the hon. member.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Will the Prime Minister tell us about the consultation which has taken place over the uranium business since he came into office?


John George Diefenbaker: I will be glad to deal with that at any time. As a matter of fact, consultation was more or less continuous. Representations were made from time to time, and strongly, but we had pointed out to us the fact that the Canadian government had entered into an agreement without there being any provision for the future. Having regard to the surplus which had been built up in the United States, it could not be expected that the United States would continue to pile up a surplus for the future.

Continental Air Defence Policy Mr. Pearson: One letter.


John George Diefenbaker: Let me just deal with the two matters. First of all, there is consultation. I think this has been covered admirably by the Minister of National Defence. Second, there were all the observations made over the weekend about dead ducks, the end of the Bomarc, the reduction from $451 million to $50 million this year by the United States. All of that was explained by the minister today as clearly and as definitely as it could be explained.
He pointed out that the numbers of the stations have been reduced from 18 to 14, including the two in Canada, beginning at the head of the lakes and thence taking in the concentration of industry, particularly in Ontario and Quebec, and along the Atlantic seaboard, Halifax and Saint John; thence to New York, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit and that area. All of those areas are encompassed in the new plan which followed from the discussions and consultations.
When the Leader of the Opposition mentioned today that the whole thing had been ditched-I am not sure that was his word- he had heard the minister explaining the facts on Friday, explaining the change that had been made. He knew the actual facts when he was speaking today, as a result of having heard the Minister of National Defence on Friday and yet, in the face of that, he moved the motion which reads as follows: -the, lack of adequate consultation between Canada and the United States-
I have dealt with that. I continue:
-the basic change made by the government of the United States in continental air defence policy-
It is not a basic change; it is an amendment to meet changing conditions.
Since 1945 Canada has spent $20 billion on defence. How many times have we had to change during that period of time? Khrushchev does not send messages to us in advance to tell us what he is going to do. It becomes necessary to have a flexible policy to meet changed and changing conditions.
Today we and the United States are joined in this regard in the Bomarc. In addition to that, the United States is going in for the most tremendous expenditure on ICBM's. Is there anybody in this house who will say that Canada should join in that? Is there anyone in this house who will say that Canada, in order to assert herself in the matter of defence, should enter into a field of expenditure which will run into billions and tens of billions of dollars before it is achieved? We have, within the limitations of the population of this country, done those things which we IMr. Diefenbaker.]
believe, as a result of consultation with the United States, represent a true measure of defence.
The same sort of arguments take place in the United States committees. The opposition says the United States is not prepared. It speaks of missile gaps and the frightful danger that the United States is in. Read the debates in the British house of commons. See what the leader of the opposition said there. He used almost the same words as the Leader of the Opposition used here today.


Lester Bowles Pearson: They have debates over there.


John George Diefenbaker: If it were not for the
fact that I am sure the Leader of the Opposition is not a plagiarist I would say that both he and the leader of the opposition in the United Kingdom have a fondness for the same exaggerated words.
We welcome the opportunity of meeting the arguments that were raised today. I thank the hon. member for Essex East. I believe that this is what parliament is for. I want to see the opposition discharging its responsibilities to the full.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Give us a committee, then.


John George Diefenbaker: Let me say that when I hear my hon. friend talking about closure-


Mr. Marlin (Essex Easi):: No, a committee.


John George Diefenbaker: They talk about closure, Mr. Speaker-


Lester Bowles Pearson: More diversion.


John George Diefenbaker: Closure is one word that is written on their hearts. As history shows the word "Calais" was written on the heart of Mary, so they find "closure" written on their hearts. There will never be closure applied in this house as long as this government is in power.
We thank them for having brought up this motion, for having given the opportunity to the Minister of National Defence to make a full and complete answer, I appropriate the words and sentiments of the hon. member for Essex East, "If we had known this the motion for adjournment would not have been necessary".
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 8 p.m.
John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, when the house took recess at six o'clock the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) had just concluded an extraordinary intervention in this debate. It is

mainly with the points that were raised by the Prime Minister that I wish now to deal. The Prime Minister began by saying that the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) had been quite satisfied with the explanation given by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes), and that if the minister had had an opportunity, which the Prime Minister rather insinuated he had not been given, to give on Friday the explanation which he gave today there would have been no occasion for this debate. I can assure you, sir, so far as I am concerned, and I have consulted my hon. friend and he has authorized me to speak for him, and I think so far as the whole opposition is concerned, we are not at all satisfied with the explanation given by the Minister of National Defence.
The explanation given by the Minister of National Defence, if it had been given on Friday, as it should have been given and as I think I can show it could have been given, would undoubtedly have changed the character of the intervention made today by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson). We would have been in possession at least of the point of view of the government. I do not know that we would have been in possession of any more facts, but we would have known the point of view of the government instead of it being a mystery to us and to the country, and we would at least have had some information as to the basis on which they were clinging like leeches to this extraordinary weapon with which no one else seems any longer to wish to be associated.
But the other thing which seemed to me was very extraordinary-extraordinary for any prime minister in the history of this country but not perhaps so extraordinary in the case of the present Prime Minister-was the way the Prime Minister began his intervention this afternoon. He began it, characteristically, by a personal reference to the motives of those who were moving the motion, who were putting it forward. This is the usual way in which the Prime Minister seeks at all times to elevate the tone of debate in this parliament. It does seem to me, sir, that this kind of intervention in a matter so serious as this is unworthy of the head of the government of this country.
Here we are talking about a matter that concerns our very lives, and all the Prime Minister can do is bring the debate down to the level of petty politics, which he does on almost every occasion in which he intervenes in a debate in this house. The Prime Minister's intervention, had we cared to bring it up, was against the rules of the house. He was imputing motives to other hon. members which, I may say, is the main line of
28, 1960	2523
Continental Air Defence Policy argument used by the Prime Minister at all times. I think it is about time some protest was made about this and I do not hesitate, sir, to make it right here and now.
I have no intention whatever of emulating the Prime Minister in this kind of debate. I intend to talk about the motion before the house which, incidentally, the Prime Minister hardly mentioned. Before doing so, I do intend to repudiate, and repudiate utterly on my own behalf-I think I can speak on behalf of our party-any implication that hon. gentlemen opposite have any monopoly of concern for the defence of this country. As a matter of fact, there has not been one effective, constructive thing done by Canada for the defence of this continent since hon. gentlemen began to occupy the treasury benches. The only accomplishment they have to their credit, and they can have all the credit they can get out of it, is the destruction of the Arrow; that is all they have done. This has been their whole defence policy up to now, apart from clinging like leeches to this weapon of very dubious ancestry and of even more dubious performance.
The Prime Minister also told us that subservience had ended in 1957. I have never been able to appreciate what the subservience was before 1957-


Frederick Johnstone (Jack) Bigg: Read your history.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I have written more history than the hon. member for Athabasca (Mr. Bigg) could ever learn if he sat here for over half a century. All the hon. gentleman from Athabasca does is to make interventions and comparatively obscure murmurings behind the backs of hon. gentlemen who speak. He never dares to get up and face anybody in this house, and I do not think he ever will.
I was saying that I can remember no example of any kind of subservience whatever in the days before 1957, and I certainly can remember no occasion when any minister of national defence, or anyone else who occupied the treasury benches before June 21, 1957 got up in this house, to which every minister is responsible, and said, "I could not tell you because it was a secret that had to be kept for the United States." That, sir, is the essence of this whole thing.


George Randolph Pearkes: Have you no honour?


John Whitney Pickersgill: Oh, yes, I have honour, and I know who elected me, too. I am going to tell the minister something about responsible government. The minister was elected and the government was elected to represent the people of Canada, not the people of the United States. The minister came in here and said, that the Americans had

Continental Air Defence Policy told congress they were going to change the defence policy of their country but it was a secret and, although we are partners, the Canadian parliament had no right to be told; that is what he told us and that is his whole defence. He said, I knew all the time; they told me, but they said, keep it a secret. We are going to tell congress, but you must not tell your parliament. This is the kind of partnership these gentlemen who are not subservient enter into; that is their idea of equality.
I tell you that since 1867 no more abject example of colonialism has ever been displayed in this country than was displayed this afternoon by the Minister of National Defence. Nobody who knows anything-


An hon. Member:: Put your hands in your pockets.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I was saying, Mr. Speaker, when I was interrupted by a murmur in the house, that anybody who knows anything about politics in the United States, knows this.


An hon. Member:: Read some history.


John Whitney Pickersgill: He knows that when a proposal to change the defence policy of that country is made to congress, it is going to appear in the New York Times and practically every other newspaper the next morning. If the hon. gentleman knew-as he said he did on Friday; and I believe him, of course; I have not any doubt that is true -that the United States defence department had proposed a change in the policy with respect to the Bomarc and had proposed this change to congress, he ought to have known-or he ought not to have been in his present portfolio if he did not know this-[DOT] that it would appear in the newspapers. He therefore should have been prepared to deal with that matter here in this house.
Indeed, Mr. Speaker, it seems to me that when this extremely important decision was taken by the United States defence department to cut what they were asking for in respect of the Bomarc from $421 million to $50 million; the moment the minister was told that he should have said, "You are going to tell that to congress; therefore on the basis of partnership and on the basis of equality I shall be obliged to tell it to my parliament". Incidentally if we had the defence committee which we ought to have the committee would have been there to which to tell it. But we did not have it. If we are partners and if there is any equality,

the moment congress was going to be told about it, we should have been told about it here in this house.


George Randolph Pearkes: May I ask the hon. gentleman a question?


John Whitney Pickersgill: The minister may ask me any questions he likes to ask when I have finished.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


John Whitney Pickersgill: We listened patiently this afternoon to the minister digressing all over the lot. I am going to speak very briefly precisely on the point. When I have finished I shall be extremely happy to answer any questions the minister chooses to ask.
As I was saying, the moment the minister was told that a fundamental change in policy was going to be proposed by the defence department of the United States he ought to have known, from his experience, that the proposal would be public within 24 hours. He ought to have been prepared for that event. They ought to have had an agreed statement worked out beforehand and an agreed technique in case there was a leak, because there always are leaks. If that had happened, when my friend the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer) raised this matter on Friday morning the minister would have been able to rise in his place, as he should have been able to do, and give the explanation he gave this afternoon.
This parliament is entitled to nothing less than that. If these things are going to be told to congress, we are entitled to be told about them here. But we were not told. We were told that it was speculative, that there was a leak and things of that sort. The minister now tells us he knew it was the policy of the department all the time but he was in honour bound not to tell. He was in honour bound not to tell what, for heaven's sake? Was he in honour bound not to tell us that in this joint program in which we are supposed to be equal partners the United States government was proposing great changes to their congress but this parliament was not to be told anything about it? That is the point. That is the real point.
If the minister had any sense of his obligations to this parliament and to the people of this country he would have said, "This is intolerable; I cannot agree to it; if you are going to change this policy I insist on being able to tell the people of my country and to tell my parliament". That is the nub of this whole thing. But the plain fact is that the policy with respect to Canada was changed- the minister told us that-not the Bomarc part but the SAGE part. We were told

nothing about that. The Americans were told about it but we were not. It was in their statement. In other words, we got our orders from Washington. That is really what it amounts to.
Then even more extraordinary than that, it seems to me, was what the Prime Minister said to us this afternoon. He said the Leader of the Opposition had no business making the kind of motion he made. Why? Because the minister had gone on television and explained everything on television.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


John Whitney Pickersgill: This is a new conception of the rights of parliament from the great exponent, the great advocate, the man who is going to restore the rights of parliament. What do we get? We get the unemployment policy announced by the Prime Minister on television within two hours of the time when the debate ends. We get defence policy announced on television on a Sunday. That is a new conception of parliament. That is the restoration of the rights of parliament which the hon. gentleman promised the people in this country in 1957 and 1958.
I say to you, Mr. Speaker, that regardless of the merit of this question-and about the merits I do not pretend to be an expert at all and I am not going to speak about them-what I am saying is that in so far as the parliament of Canada is concerned, every right we have is being trampled in the dust. There is no better example of it than the example we had over this Bomarc question. Moreover, I say that it is intolerable to have our policy dictated to us over the telephone, to have the extraordinary situation we had on Friday morning where the minister speaks of speculation and rumour and then comes in at a quarter to six and says, "I have now orders from Washington; here they are; it is too late to debate them but here they are". Then there is such a commotion in the press over the week end that the Minister of National Defence gives an entirely different explanation over television and because that is done the Prime Minister says we have no right to raise the question in parliament.


Mr. Pallell:: He did not say that at all and the hon. member knows it.


John Whitney Pickersgill: The hon. gentleman can look at the Prime Minister's words. The Prime Minister said that the Leader of the Opposition should not have brought in this motion because he knew the facts already.
Mr. Pallet!: Read his statement.
Continental Air Defence Policy


John Whitney Pickersgill: The hon. member for Peel, (Mr. Pallett), who never gets the point until it is repeated about three times, may look at the words of the Prime Minister if he wishes to do so and perhaps he will see that after all I am right and he is wrong.


John Cameron Pallett: The hon. gentleman had better have a look at the speech tomorrow and see for himself what was said.


An hon. Member:: What is the point?


John Whitney Pickersgill: Someone says "What is the point?" The point is that we in this parliament are entitled, as soon as the United States congress gets it, to have a proper explanation of the joint policies of the two countries, if indeed they are joint policies. But nothing could be clearer to anybody who reads the editorial writers in papers like the Montreal Gazette and the Globe and Mail, which papers are not notoriously friendly to us but were once friendly to hon. gentlemen opposite-that they cannot find out anything about this matter except what they read in their news columns, it is not surprising that the rest of the Canadian people are puzzled. It also seems to me that that puzzlement, that confusion, that concern, that anxiety has not been assuaged at all by the explanation given by the Minister of National Defence. As for the purely political intervention of the Prime Minister, of course it did nothing to restore the dignity of parliament.


George Randolph Pearkes: May I ask the hon. gentleman the question I wanted him to answer? Does the hon. gentleman know that the committee on appropriations has not yet reported to congress?


John Whitney Pickersgill: I am glad the minister asked me that question because that is one of the points I wanted to make. This afternoon the minister said-I have a note of it here-said something about it being flexible; yes, he said it was not a fixed plan. Those were his exact words. It is beyond my comprehension what the minister means by that statement. When the defence department of the United States goes to congress and says-


George Randolph Pearkes: They have not gone yet. That is the point.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Perhaps the minister would allow me to reply. I am replying to his question. When they go and tell congress, "The defence department are suggesting that you cut this from $420 million to $50 million", does the minister really think that congress is going to force more money on them?


George Randolph Pearkes: Quite possibly.


John Whitney Pickersgill: If it is, let me ask the minister this. Does that mean that congress, not

Continental Air Defence Policy even the United States defence department but congress, is making our defence policy, because that is what the minister is saying? In other words, the minister says that a policy put forward by the defence department is of no particular validity but that the congress of the United States from now on will make the defence policy of Canada. I do not think many Canadians are going to regard that as the end of subservience.


Mr. Speakman:: I wonder whether the hon. gentleman would answer a question for me?


John Whitney Pickersgill: Surely.


James Stanley Speakman: Would he tell the house how much of this reduction, about which he has made such a great thing, is coming out of the Canadian treasury?


John Whitney Pickersgill: I said that I would answer the hon. gentleman's question, but perhaps I did him too much credit. I thought the question would be intelligible and capable of an answer.


James Stanley Speakman: Just answer the question and do not make statements concerning my intelligence.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I quite frankly confess that I did not understand the hon. gentleman's question but if it means what I think it means, that the reduction in the American appropriation affects the treasury of Canada, the answer is apparently not, but I think it should.


Mr. G. C. Fairfield (Porlage-Neepawa):: Mr. Speaker, I am a little surprised, although not too much, that the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate (Mr. Pickersgill) has made a political attack on the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) when he is unavoidably absent. This is becoming somewhat of a habit as far as he is concerned. The Prime Minister has a lot of business to attend to and the hon. member probably expects him to be absent when he speaks because many of his speeches are in a political vein.
In his opening remarks the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate made one statement that I thought was very intelligent. He said that he did not know anything about the Bomarc and therefore he was not going to talk about it. That was one of his more intelligent statements.


An hon. Member:: What was the other one?


George Clark Fairfield: The hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) talked about limbs being cut off. When the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes) wielded the axe I am sure that hon. members opposite were the ones who were sitting on the limb. The members


of the opposition seem to be rather confused about policy generally in respect of defence. They have no constructive criticisms to offer. However, I fear that many of their remarks are accepted in all good faith by the Canadian people and there is serious objection to this, particularly in a debate concerning the Bomarc.
The opposition brought up the matter of consultation and the minister quite openly gave the reasons for the consultations and said that there definitely had been consultations. When the hon. member for Essex East was talking about the leak of information or where the information emanated from he was kind enough to point out to the Minister of National Defence how such a situation could be handled. It was very nice of him, an exminister now in the opposition, to do that since he probably has a great deal of experience in offering advice but I would not think with regard to defence policy particularly.
I do not know about consultations with Washington but with respect to NORAD but I do have some knowledge about the organization. I have friends who have served in it and have now come back to Canada. One thing they are worried about is the fact that, instigated by the opposition, there has been a great deal of talk in the House of Commons and throughout the country to the effect that Canada is losing its sovereignty to the United States. They say that the Americans connected with NORAD have become supersensitive on this point and that not only do they consult on all matters but that they also lean over backwards to accept the advice of Canadian defence personnel assigned to NORAD. Yet, financially speaking, our share of the operation is very small although our voice is very loud. This is something that the people of Canada do not know. From the speeches made by members of the opposition both in the house and outside the people of Canada have been led to expect a great deal less.
The hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate said that we had shown our abject subservience to the Americans with regard to the Bomarc. The minister explained how the leak occurred. The announcement was made by Washington at five p.m. and the minister made the announcement later. Does the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate think that the parliament and people of Canada should have been given this information before the people of the United States?


John Whitney Pickersgill: Would the hon. member permit a question?


Mr. Bell (Saint John-Albert):: You would not allow one.


Mr. Monleiih (Perlh):: You would not allow
one.


John Whitney Pickersgill: The hon. gentleman has done me the courtesy.


Jay Waldo Monteith: Give him the same courtesy.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I was going to ask the hon. member whether he does not think that we in this parliament are entitled to the information as soon as it is given to a committee of the United States congress?


George Clark Fairfield: Not as soon as it is given to a committee or subcommittee of the United States congress, especially when it is sitting in camera. The hon. member expects that we should have the information before the United States congress gets it.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Not before; at the same time.


George Clark Fairfield: That is absolutely ridiculous. Of course, the opposition wants much of this confidential information made known to the Canadian people before the people of the United States get it. I think he is probably right that there should be a joint announcement but in this case in was almost impossible to do so because of the unfortunate leak that occurred. It was really a joint announcement in that the Minister of National Defence could not make the announcement before a quarter to six because of the time lag.
With regard to the Bomarc missile, I hope the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) will go over Hansard very carefully and try to correct the impression he has given the Canadian people that the Bomarc missile is of no use and that nothing is of any use against missiles. No one has claimed that the Bomarc is an anti-missile missile.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Of course not.


George Clark Fairfield: The Leader of the Opposition left the impression that the Bomarc was a useless anti-missile missile. It was never claimed to be an anti-missile weapon at all.
The minister explained very carefully to the rather confused opposition about the Russian bombers and their increasing activity over the past two years. It is quite obvious to our observers that the Russian bombers are doing a great deal of training. Despite the fact that there is a gap in continental ballistic missiles, we still have the danger of the Russian bombers. We have in our armament a fairly good interceptor but, as the minister explained, we cannot estimate at what point the U.S.S.R. may be in possession of a supersonic bomber, and neither can the opposition unless they get a leak from the U.S.S.R. as well, and
Continental Air Defence Policy that might be possible. In these circumstances we are obliged to have some deterrent during the period of time which is available to us, and that will probably have to be the Bomarc ground-to-air missile.
There has been no change in our policy or in United States policy as far as the Bomarc is concerned. The opposition has made great play with regard to the reduction in expenditure from $421 million to $50 million. Though the minister explained the situation very carefully, his words did not seem to have reached or penetrated the minds of the opposition. The fact of the matter is that they have every confidence in this armament. Our policy, and everyone has known it for years, is defensive, and for this reason we do not take any large share in such a field as the hon. member for Assiniboia (Mr. Argue) referred to, perhaps inadvertently, when he stated that we should become full partners with the United States with respect to mutual deterrence.


Hazen Robert Argue: I did not say that at all.


George Clark Fairfield: You had better read your Hansard. I listened very carefully to the hon. member and he said "mutual deterrence". That is beyond our means. That has been explained time and time again, and I am sure the hon. member for Assiniboia will make a proper correction. In the time gap of which I have spoken we shall still be in danger from Russia bombers. We must, therefore, be in possession of this line of defence, the 14 Bomarc units. If we drop the development of these units because of the anxieties felt by the opposition the idea would wrongly be raised in the minds of the Canadian people that we do not know what they are doing, but that the opposition does; that we are no longer capable of continuing to lead the country.
I should like to see any policy other than that advocated by the hon. member for Assiniboia who tried to speak on defence on television the other night, suggesting that no matter how much the government might go into the red we should give more money away to countries abroad.
As to the figure of $125 million, I am sure it was some sort of a mistake which arose in caucus between the two opposition groups. I remember that at one time, as announced in the press by one member of the C.C.F., it was stated that it was going to cost Canada $300 million. So the figure depends merely on how receptive the political audience is, and how many people are likely to question the figures. I do not know how often this matter has to be explained to the opposition. Perhaps in the defence committee the minister could take
2528	HOUSE OF
Continental Air Defence Policy a blackboard and draw it and print it out in simple words. The opposition could be given copies, and then they might understand.
The minister has confidence in the Bomarc B. I have been told that the Bomarc A was tested 80 times, 82 times, in fact, before it finally became operational. There is no doubt, in my mind at least, that when there was this nonsense in the press that the Bomarc had failed it was repeated by the opposition with a great deal of relish, if not with rancour. Let us face this. The failings discovered by the research experts, despite Mr. York's remarks- he is only one of the defence experts concerned-are small failings which we are sure can soon be fixed, and this anti-aircraft missile will soon be operational.
My main worry about all this is how the Canadian people are going to take it. By their criticism and by the attitude they have taken the opposition are doing, I believe, unlimited harm. Most people do not go into these questions, except to read the headlines in the newspapers. They do not read the technical announcements which are made. A feeling of panic hits them, and they feel the situation is due to the weakness of government policy when, in fact, this is the first time we have had a policy of any fixed type for many years. If it is said that we have not done anything in the field of defence policy, I should like to remind the house of one thing, though it is probably not pertinent to this motion: What about civil defence? That, at least is receiving attention.


Some hon. Members:: Oh.


George Clark Fairfield: There was a certain amount of freedom allowed to the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin). He did everything but tell us about the election in 1957.
I believe that in this to-do about the Bomarc bases we must face the fact that they are all part of a defensive line. If we abandon this project, the whole line is cracked. The United States would be forced to abandon it too, because it is the centre of the line, the part most important for ourselves and the United States. Unless we do our share we might just as well abrogate any agreements we have with the United States, including NORAD.


Murdo William Martin: I suppose I, also, shall be condemned by hon. members on the government side because I have the temerity to say a few words about the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) when he is not here. However, I am afraid that if we have to wait until he is here before we can say anything which involves him, we shall need to keep silent for a great deal of the time we spend in this house. This is not a criticism of the Prime Minister, because I know


he is a busy man, but it is a criticism of government supporters who are so touchy that if anyone says anything about the Prime Minister in his absence then, right away, we hear this nonsense: you would not say that if he were here, and so on.
Today, when the Prime Minister rose and so eagerly accepted the challenge of the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) to debate this matter of the Bomarc, I am sure we were all hopeful that at last we would get a little common sense out of this very senseless defence program we have been trying to examine for the last number of months. But I am afraid the Canadian people will be just as disappointed as I was.
I remember occasions when the Prime Minister took three hours in which to say nothing in this house, but today he succeeded in doing so in just ten minutes. In the four sessions of parliament that I have attended I never heard him say nothing so convincingly as he said nothing today. The defence he offered for the actions of this government over the past week fell flat on its face. The greatest head of steam he could work up was when he said categorically that Canada and the United States were two equals joined together. I said in this house last week that the only link joining us with the United States is the link joining the tail to the kite, and it is quite apparent that there is no communication line in that link.
The first paragraph of the interesting lead editorial in this morning's Montreal Gazette reads as follows:
The issue of the Bomarc B has produced almost complete confusion among the Canadian people. Rarely, in matters of defence, has the want of understanding between the government and the people become so wide. The practice of not taking the people fully and frankly into its confidence has left the government in a position where few Canadians understand what it is trying to do, or why it is trying to do it.
If the Prime Minister's speech today was designed to restore the confidence of the Canadian people in the defence policy of this government I would say his attempt was as big a failure as the Bomarc missile.
The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes) also attempted to put up a defence today and I must confess I felt rather sorry for him although I felt even sorrier for the Canadian people. He was faced with an unhappy situation today and I might have skipped him altogether in my remarks. I listened to him carefully and his position seemed to me to be as hopeless as it was last Friday when he expressed his abiding confidence in the Bomarc B. I think we should rename it the BB because in terms of defence today it is just about as useful as a BB

gun. Perhaps it will fly some day but as a defence weapon I think it is useless and fail to see how the minister can retain confidence in it. If it ever works, it is not even scheduled to become effective until 1964 which is four years from now. If we look at the happenings of the last three years it is no wonder that the Canadian people are confused at trying to find any sense in the present government's defence policy.
In the last two and a half years what have we seen? The missile-carrying Mark VI was scrapped because we had the Arrow. The Arrow was then scrapped because we had the Bomarc and now we see the Bomarc scrapped as well. I know that hon. gentlemen opposite will say it is not scrapped and that the sum of $50 million remains in the United States kitty for this project but I recall to the attention of hon. members opposite that we still had $40 million in the kitty when the Arrow was scrapped which was just enough to sweep out the empty shell where the Arrow used to be produced and the $50 million we have in the fund today would just about dust off the sites that have been abandoned.
The Minister of National Defence today failed to answer any questions to satisfy the Canadian people or ease the minds of the opposition. I will list just a few. I wish someone on the government side would explain why we have been given different figures representing the cost of these missile bases under the Bomarc program. We were first told that the United States was going to spend $72 million on these two sites in Canada and that Canada would contribute an additional $15 million, making a total of $87 million or a cost of $43.5 million for each site. Then we had an announcement by the minister on March 7 that there were to be 18 bases in the Bomarc line at a cost of $23.5 million each. Now he says the program has not been abandoned but just revised slightly. On March 25 we were told that there would be 14 bases at a cost of $3.5 million each. Is it any wonder that there is confusion in the minds of the Canadian people?
I have been searching for some reason for the adamant stand of the Minister of National Defence and his government with respect to this project. I finally found a reason today which perhaps makes some sense. It is contained in an article by Robert Duffy which appeared in today's Globe and Mail. This is the first indication I have had of a reason why the government adheres so rigidly to the program which has been scrapped by the United States. The article states in part:
Even the most cynical person here would not suggest that the government's undying loyalty to
Continental Air Defence Policy the Bomarc firework could be decided by electoral considerations. Nobody, however, has noted any tendency in the government to deal urgently with the question of whether or not the program should be revised.
The article deals, of course, with an event which may occur at the site of one of the two proposed bases in Canada, the one at Mont Laurier which is in the centre of a riding where there may be a by-election in the near future.
We have heard the government severely and justifiably criticized by the official opposition in respect to its defence program but the Liberal party has advanced no alternative. We therefore have had an indication of the similar problem we would be facing if the Liberals were in office today instead of the Conservatives.
I wish to read a paragraph from an article by Arthur Blakely, which appeared in the Montreal Gazette today and which reads in part as follows:
If, however, the Liberals have devised any genuine alternative to existing policies, they have kept it under wraps. They are much more cautious than the C.C.F.'ers about a unilateral program of disarmament. And they have had some difficulty in devising an acceptable alternative to an arms policy which is at least partially of their own making.
It is fine to criticize the government but it is not enough to do so. You should offer some kind of alternative.
I am pleased to see that the United States government has accepted the view this group has been advocating, that the only possible defence is a deterrent rather than just a straight so-called defence. The Prime Minister, the Minister of National Defence and hon. member for Portage-Neepawa (Mr. Fairfield) have said that a deterrent is beyond the means of this country and that may be so, but if it is true let us face up to the fact. A deterrent is the only defence we have in sight today.
What is the sense of going ahead blindly and spending millions of dollars when all we are doing is going through the motions of defence without ever having one bit of defence for the people of this country? The government seems to think that as long as we spend money we are defended. I say, Mr. Speaker, this is not a good enough answer for the people of this country today.


Arthur Smith: Mr. Speaker, I should like to make one or two brief comments concerning the remarks of one or two hon. gentlemen who have preceded me and perhaps to say a word, not to enlighten them because at this stage they refuse to be enlightened by the Minister of National Defence, (Mr. Pearkes) or anyone else, but

Continental Air Defence Policy rather to make one or two corrections in the comments they have made. When you reach an impasse in a debate, when the opposition in effect say to you, "We have made up our minds; don't confuse us with the facts", the debate merely comes to a dead stop.
We have seen an interesting performance tonight, Mr. Speaker-


Mr. Peters:: The same is true of the government occasionally.


Arthur Smith: As an example, we have seen the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson), obviously ill-prepared, coming in here and giving us a lecture on air defence with little regard for the facts. We have seen the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin), with his usual wind and fury, produce something less than his usual mouse. His chief concern apparently is that the statement read by the minister was on a United States letterhead rather than a Canadian letterhead. This was the whole point of his argument. My friend, the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate (Mr. Pickers-gill), showed his usual lack of intestinal fortitude, which the services generally call guts, in making an attack on the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker), something that he would not have done under any other circumstances.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, I am rising on a question of personal privilege. The hon. gentleman has suggested that I said things in the house this evening that I would not have said if the Prime Minister had been here.


David James Walker: That is right.


John Whitney Pickersgill: The hon. gentleman knows perfectly well that that statement is completely untrue, and that 1 have said much harsher things about the Prime Minister when he was here. I might add, sir, that it is not my fault that the Prime Minister is not here.


Arthur Smith: I hardly think that is a question of personal privilege. I do not think it is going to be the most important factor in the debate. I merely make a comment on it because it has become rather consistent practise of the hon. member.
I wish to try to express in as simple a form as one can where the Bomarc fits into the defence system which as it is integrated and is not a single weapon, in our defence; not something on which we are entirely dependent for the continental defence of North America, but rather a component and which is in its early stages of experimentation, something which no one has denied.
(Mr. Smith (Calgary South).]
Before we examine this weapon let us remind ourselves, as the opposition, and in particular the Leader of the Opposition, failed to do, that when one talks about defence one must make some reference to all of the aspects which make up the total defence of this continent. We get the impression-and it is obviously one intentionally left by the opposition-that because this weapon has not been successful, or because the Canadian government rejected the Arrow, Canada is left completely undefended. Nothing is further from the facts and no one knows it better than the Leader of the Opposition.
I think it is safe to say that when this government, through its negotiations with the United States, introduced the defence alliance which we know as NORAD, it was the first step in continental defence that has made some sense in modern defence planning. It was quite obvious that a nation with a defence budget of $1,700 million and a population of 16 million people is not going to be able to give comprehensive continental defence either to itself or to its allies to the south. I have never been able to understand yet whether the opposition support the principle of NORAD or not, because they continually talk out of both sides of their mouths on this and other subjects.
NORAD, then, is a principle of defence upon which Canada must rely to a very large extent. I ask the Leader of the Opposition and his associates whether or not they support this principle? Second, I ask them whether or not they believe that our contribution is in any way subservient to that of the United States? It has already been clearly indicated that in Air Marshal Slemon, the deputy commander, we have the second most senior officer in the air force. In a Canadian air vice marshal we have the chief of operations. The fact is well-known, then, in this house and certainly to the Canadian people, that Canada, in relation to its contribution to all of the defence of the continent, has a far greater say in the continental defence of North America than the United States in proportion to the dollars that are put up for it.
I hope the day will come when we do not insist on dealing with questions of sovereignty in relation to defence which in effect are not questions of sovereignty at all but are introduced purely with a political motivation in order to confuse or distress the Canadian people by suggesting to them that they are going to lose their birthright. The fact of the matter is we share with the United States in the defence of the free world to a far greater extent than any other country. When we think of a budget of $1.7 million and some 16J million people, we see the picture in its proper perspective.

Let us look at Bomarc and this cost of $15 million and relate it to an integrated system which involves three large radar chains. To the sum of $15 million must be added two groups of separate squadrons of air defence; to the $15 million must be added a complete partner which has not only the use of the deterrent through the strategic air command, but defence squadrons of Europe and, of course, of the United States; the $15 million involves an over-all pattern of defence. This is the subject matter of the debate. I suggest that the $15 million item should be brought into perspective with our own defence expenditures, $15 million in a budget of $1,700 million.
The Leader of the Opposition moved the adjournment of the debate to express a complete lack of confidence, as he said, in the defence policy, because of this principle. I am delighted to see the hon. member for Essex East back in his seat. We always welcome him and his pleasant smile. I would point out that if those in opposition are going to tell us that Canada's defence policy is related only to a single weapon in its experimental stages, which supplements a defence system which is as comprehensive as one can be in relation to that which we can afford, then it brings this debate into proper perspective.
Let us look at the history of Bomarc. First of all, we know that there were several experimental stages of the earlier edition, the model A, There were some 82 tests before it was successful. Because of certain limitations in our air defence we extended our support for NORAD by having two bases built in Canada. Through negotiations with the United States we contracted for those bases. We then agreed to take a certain number of Bomarc B's. It should be remembered, that in its early stages it may not be entirely satisfactory. This, of course, we do not deny, but we have an insurance for an amount of $15 million placed on this one particular weapon.
This is the point I should like to bring home to the house. We hear repeatedly, particularly from the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer >, expressions of regret that the government decided to cancel the Arrow contract. This is a debate that will long be remembered in this chamber. Certainly, the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate has never had any firm views on this subject. Certainly, the Leader of the Opposition has never at any time yet agreed with the views of the hon. member for Trinity. It was obvious to this house that the Arrow was not going to be a satisfactory weapon for the air defence of Canada. It was then up to this government to provide an alternative and
Continental Air Defence Policy to supplement the air squadrons, so this $15 million insurance item was put up for the test, to complement our air defence.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Would the hon. member permit a question?


Arthur Smith: Yes, when I have concluded my remarks. Having occupied most of the time of this house in debates on defence, you can wait your turn.
So, having now in the early stages put up this $15 million out of a total budget of $1,700 million, we see these great defence critics trying to create the impression both in Canada and outside of Canada that Canada is left defenceless. Could anything be more silly, more utterly stupid than that observation by the opposition.
We have also had considerable comment from the Leader of the Opposition and his colleagues on the question of consultation. This, of course, is related to the problems, which they have described, of Canadian sovereignty and the infringement by a foreign country. The Minister of National Defence, who is responsible for the defence of this country to a large degree, gave an itemized account of the various consultations which have taken place, all of which are certainly related to his administration and which were not even conceived by the former government. These were all introduced and initiated by the present government. It seems hardly necessary for me to itemize them all again.
Certainly we have had consultations at the cabinet level; consultations between the House of Commons members and the United States senate and congress; then, through NORAD and through the senior levels of government. I took the time during the recess to ask exactly what consultations at the staff working level, if any, took place prior to the statement read by the minister to the house on Friday. I think it is important because this information would be available to anyone if they took the time to ask for it. The impression has been left that all of a sudden there was a telephone call and our Minister of National Defence then had to make a statement which was dictated by the United States and Canada had no say in it whatever.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Hear, hear.


Arthur Smith: This is the impression, and the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) says, "hear, hear."
Let us look at the record. First of all, on February 24 representatives of the R.C.A.F. on the higher level met at Washington with the United States air force. On February 28 in Washington, there was a further consultation on the air defence problem, which

Continental Air Defence Policy the R.C.A.F. again attended. On March 1, in Ottawa, a further discussion on exactly the same problem and a team of senior United States air force officers came here to meet with the R.C.A.F. On March 9 there was a further consultation in Ottawa on the same problem.
These are some of the consultations at the working level during the discussion of various changes in the policy of the United States as it might affect Canada. These are actual examples of co-operation that took place between United States and Canadian forces in determining continental defence policy through NORAD. I suggest this is exactly the type of information those in opposition might have checked before they said anything.
My friend, the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate, widened the debate when he said that this present government had made no useful contribution to the defence of Canada, or words to that effect. I would answer, first, of course that I am going into an area which is beyond the terms of the initial resolution, but since the subject was introduced to such an extent by the minister for Essex East (Mr. Martin) who explored almost every conceivable alley available, and by the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillin-gate, let us have a look at the record to see what we have done.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, I am rising on a point of order.


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I am rising on a point of order. The hon. gentleman said that my hon. friend from Essex East had widened the debate. The only person who has taken part in this debate who widened the debate was the Minister of National Defence, who spoke generally about policy without exception being taken by anyone on this side. But when my hon. friend-


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I am speaking to a point of order.


Frederick Johnstone (Jack) Bigg: Are you writing history or interjecting?


John Whitney Pickersgill: But when my hon. friend from Essex East attempted to reply in kind, he was called to order. I think the hon. gentleman should stick to the motion before the house.


Arthur Smith: I realize, Mr. Speaker, that you do an excellent job when you are in the chair, and for this reason I am delighted that the hon. member for


Bonavista-Twillingate will never find himself in that position. Consequently, I can proceed because I am just replying to comments made by the hon. member in this respect and I shall do so quietly because I know he would like to listen. He said that this government had made no useful contribution to the defence of Canada. I wonder if he would make a checknote of these things.
First of all, he will recognize the change in the type of defence that was recommended, something which the Leader of the Opposition did comment upon when he was in the committee on defence, before the estimates committee.


Lester Bowles Pearson: And I was not allowed to comment on it today.


Arthur Smith: At that time, the Leader of the Opposition left some doubt about the ability of the CF-100 in the future-


Mr. Mcllraith:: I should like to raise a point of order. Surely, there cannot be two sets of rules applied in this house. When members of the opposition sought to debate general defence policy they were not allowed to do so. The point has been raised by the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate, and I am sure we have the right to ask the Chair to deal with it.


Arthur Smith: May I comment on the point of order? It is quite understandable that the hon. member does not want to hear the record. I am merely replying to the charge made by the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate who stated that we have made no useful contribution whatever to defence. I think it is important to have it very clear on the record.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Of course, hon. members are usually permitted to answer statements, but I would ask the hon. member not to take more time in answering this question than the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate did.


John Whitney Pickersgill: That was one sentence.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: I would say It was
very short.


Arthur Smith: You are, of course, being very fair. There was, of course, the re-equipment of our air division of NATO.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That was over two years ago.


Arthur Smith: There was the re-equipment of our NATO allies; the establishment of consultations at the top level; United States participation in NORAD; the improvement in defence contracts with the United States; the changes and improvements

in the equipment of our navy; the re-equipping and improving of the maritime command with new aircraft; the re-organization of the militia for its new role; the addition of new mobility and fire power for our army-[DOT] this record could go on for hours and hours.
I have not been permitted to do so because of the rules of the house, but I could elaborate upon it. I can understand the embarrassment of the Leader of the Opposition.
There is one point. First of all, we have to decide whether or not the motion to adjourn the house is important in the sense the Leader of the Opposition really realized what he was entering into. He received information, he says, and I gather he feels that this was something to which he had not access before.
He now understands that Bomarc is only one part of an integrated defence, or I hope he does so. He now understands that while it is admittedly completely unproved it still has a potential, and that Canada's contribution is $15 million which is fairly good insurance for the type of weapon we may yet get. He will realize that Canada's defences are not in such complete jeopardy as he would lead the nation to believe. He will realize that this debate has brought before us a very important fact and it is this. The C.C F. for their part would tell us that they would want no defence whatsoever-


Hazen Robert Argue: That is not so.


Arthur Smith: -that they do not believe in it.


Hazen Robert Argue: That is not true.


Arthur Smith: On the other hand, the Liberals have not a single solitary suggestion to make on how to defend this country; and they are not even sure of the facts or the information with which they entered this debate. The policy of this government enunciated by the Minister of National Defence is a clear and concise example of the problem that must be faced, recognizing that we are in a transitional period and the need for flexibility and recognizing the great problems that are ahead of us. As a result of that, I am sure the Liberals have done a service to this parliament and to this country by giving this government the opportunity through the minister to give a clear indication that Canada is being well defended and well administered.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Speaker-


An hon. Member:: Bomarc.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.
Continental Air Defence Policy


Lester Bowles Pearson: That's right; shout him down before he starts.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I hope the time allowed for my speech will not be reckoned until the house has come to order.
I must admit that when I heard the news Friday night that the Minister of National Defence had announced to this house that the United States air force was now cutting back its appropriations for expenditures on the Bomarc installations from $421 million to $50 million and that notwithstanding this major shift in United States policy, the Canadian government intended to carry on in its announced policy, I could not believe the news. It seemed to me to be incredible that any government under these circumstances would persist in a policy which appears to be so out of keeping with the times. Indeed, it has been said that this decision is something that no government in its right mind would make.
I have here a dispatch which came from the New York Times of March 25. It reads in part as follows:
Washington, March 24-The air force proposed to congress today a drastic cut-back in development funds for the Bomarc air defence missile on the ground that it was becoming obsolete.
Congressional sources reported that Gen. Thomas D. White, air force chief of staff, disclosed the change in plans for the Bomarc missile in secret testimony today before the defence subcommittee of the house appropriations committee.
General White, the sources reported, said the air force had decided to reduce its request for Bomarc funds in the coming fiscal year from $420 million to $50 million.
The reason given for the reduction, according to the sources, was "changing military requirements'' brought about by the Soviet shift from manned bombers to intercontinental ballistic missiles.
The supersonic Bomarc missile, which has been under development for several years at an estimated cost of nearly $3 billion, is designed as an unmanned interceptor to down enemy bombers. It is useless against ballistic missiles.
Another reason for the air force move, however, is that development of an advanced version of the Bomarc, known as Bomarc B, has run into serious technical difficulties that have delayed the time when it will be ready for operational use.
In other words, Mr. Speaker, it has become obvious during the testing program of this missile that it will not be operational in time to fill the function for which it was being designed, namely to fill that important function in the defence of the North American continent against the manned bomber in those days or years before the Soviet has sufficient missiles to send against all major North American targets.
The reasons the United States gave for cancelling this program were, first of all, that it is becoming obsolete; not, as the minister said this afternoon, for other reasons but that it is becoming obsolete. That
2534	HOUSE OF
Continental Air Defence Policy was their first reason. Then the second reason that I have just read from this Washington dispatch in the New York Times was technical difficulties in development. The third reason is the fact that the Bomarc missile bases are so vulnerable to missiles; I refer not only to intercontinental ballistic missiles but also missiles fired from manned bombers from several hundred miles away.
There have been seven tests of the Bomarc B, this weapon upon which the Canadian government places its defence future; and in each case the tests have been failures. The minister has told us that he is optimistic and he continues to take that attitude. The eighth test is scheduled for some time this coming week. We shall be greatly interested to see whether it flies. If it does so, I suppose we can expect a tremendous barrage of propaganda. The minister will get his propaganda gentlemen here, they will have pictures in all the newspapers and on television and they will say that at last the Bomarc has become a success because it has managed to get off the ground.
Even if the eighth one should fly, even if the eighth missile should manage to get off the ground, there is still a great deal of testing to be done before it can be called an operational weapon. That fact has been made patently clear by the evidence given by the United States military authorities. There is still the problem of finding its target and, once having found the target, of proceeding to the target and of intercepting a supersonic bomber or indeed a supersonic missile fired from a bomber. These, as Dr. York has told us, are major technical problems which have yet to be overcome.
It is because of these major technical problems that the United States air force now believes this weapon may not and in fact will not be available in time to do the job for which it was intended. Even if it should become an operational weapon at some time in the distant future, the bases are still vulnerable to missiles. They are fixed installations and as such offer no promise of a defence capability as far as the North American continent is concerned.
At the same time we were advised by the United States military authorities that they are taking a second look at interceptors. Indeed, some of the money which is being saved because of the cut-back in this program is being diverted to improve United States interceptor capabilities, to improve the effectiveness of the Century class of interceptors. We had an interceptor in this country and it was infinitely superior to the Century class of interceptors. But what happened to it? What happened to the Avro
[Mr. Hellyer.l

Arrow? What happened to the one thing Canada was developing on its own which was to fit into the NORAD plan, which was to fit into the plan of integrated defence of the North American continent against manned bombers?
We were told again tonight by the hon. member for Calgary South (Mr. Smith), who is now elsewhere, that much has been said about that great interceptor in this house. We know what happened to it. It was scuttled and the remains were cut up with acetylene torches. It was buried before it had the opportunity to be properly proven.


Norman Leonard Spencer: It should never have been born.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: "Never have been born", my hon. friend says. One thing different about it was that it was a live baby. It flew from the first test. It had real possibilities and unlike this adopted child we are now getting from the United States it was not stillborn and grotesque.


David James Walker: Pure imagination.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: This afternoon the minister said that these proposals from the United States are tentative. If I have his words correctly, he said that the program has not yet been fixed. He said that it is not a plan which has been accepted by congress, at least, that the committee has not had the opportunity of hearing General Kuter, the commander in chief of NORAD, on the final proposals, that he has not been able to give his evidence before the subcommittee. It will be a long time, the minister told us, before this plan is finally approved. It must go to the committee on appropriations. It must go to congress. Congress may make radical changes in the proposed plan. It is a tentative plan, the minister told us.
Now he is back to the position he took last Friday morning when he told us that the reports from Washington were speculative, that they were rumours emanating from closed sessions. On Friday afternoon we thought he had given us a statement which was presumably a statement of fact. Today he comes back and says that the plans are just tentative, that they have not been completed, that congress has not yet had the opportunity of dealing with them and, in addition, the committee has not yet heard General Kuter, the chief of NORAD.
It is surprising to some of us to see this recently acquired interest by the government and the Minister of National Defence in the opinions of the NORAD chief. Our government and our Minister of National Defence did not pay any attention to him when he recommended that we carry on with

the production of the Avro Arrow. They did not pay any attention to him when he came and asked that we re-equip our air defence squadrons with supersonic planes.


David James Walker: On a point of order, Mr. Speaker, is the hon. member allowed to carry on with this discredited old alibi of the Avro Arrow, which is a broken, worn record, in a debate of this kind dealing with a specific matter?


Mr. Habel:: It hurts.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, on the point of order, you will recall that this afternoon the Minister of National Defence traversed the whole field of defence. The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Walker) may not wish to give us the same privilege but I suggest to you that the hon. member who is speaking has exactly the same privilege as the Minister of National Defence.


Mr. Speaker:: I was following the remarks of the hon. member for Trinity who has the floor. He referred to the choice of the Bomarc as against the Avro Arrow. It seemed to me that one could scarcely say that his remarks were irregular or beyond the scope of the debate.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Speaker, we think it is surprising that the government, which has repeatedly turned down and ignored the advice of the chief of this collective arrangement about which we have heard so much in the last two or three days, should now be very much interested in the advice he is going to give to congress, that they should now be in the position of waiting with bated breath for him to come to the rescue of their pet project, the Bomarc missile.


William Heward Grafftey: Nonsense.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The gentleman who is the chief man in NORAD may in fact tell congress that he wishes he had more funds for the Bomarc program but his chief has recommended to congress that this cut take place, and that is the position in which we find ourselves at the present time. The government of Canada paid no attention when they were advised to do certain things and now they are very much interested in getting some support from that same quarter.
It is interesting that our government, when the policy of the United States was to proceed with a more comprehensive program of continental air defence against manned bombers, contracted out. We said that we would no longer do the things we were best capable of doing, that we would no longer carry on with the project which was undertaken by us as our contribution to this total defence effort.
Continental Air Defence Policy
But now that the basic policy has changed in Washington, when they have finally come to the conclusion that the threat from the manned bomber is diminishing and that funds should be diverted to greater expenditure on intercontinental ballistic missiles, when the United States realizes the vulnerability of fixed installations such as the Bomarc to missilry, then our government does a complete somersault and says that now that the United States has changed its basic policy we want to contract in. When they needed us, when the plan was more comprehensive, we were out but now that the plan is washed out practically in its entirety we want to contract back in.
This raises a very interesting question as to why our government would take this rather inexplicable attitude. The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes) told us this afternoon that fundamental changes have taken place, that we are in a period of transition unequalled at any time in history. He told us that it was almost a platitude to say this. A few minutes later the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) said, "This is not a basic change". I ask you, Mr. Speaker, which one is giving us the correct information, the Minister of National Defence when he says that we are going through a period of fundamental change greater than in any other period in history or the Prime Minister when he told us just a short time later that this was not a basic change? The inconsistency of their positions was obvious.
The minister went on to spend much time discussing defence policy generally. He also spent much time talking about United States programs that had been scrapped. He did not say very much about the points at issue today. It is inevitable that some programs will not come to fruition; that in a group of programs some will not turn out to be satisfactory. Some money is bound to be wasted when a country or a group of nations attempts to cover the waterfront, as it were, in defence matters. But it is one thing to waste money on defence and it is something entirely different to waste money deliberately. In my opinion, further expenditure on Bomarc sites for Canadians at this period is a wanton and wasteful expenditure of the Canadian taxpayers' money. We cannot condone useless expenditure at this point.
If I may, I should like to comment on a point raised by the hon. member for Assini-boia (Mr. Argue) this afternoon. He quoted me as having said "No" on a television broadcast yesterday when I was asked if I believed there should be a reduction in defence expenditure. The hon. member went on to say

Continental Air Defence Policy that I had said there should be more expenditure on defence. The hon. member is not in his seat. I was going to give him this opportunity to set the record straight. What I said was that the hon. member for Assini-boia had got the cart before the horse in my opinion and that first of all we should find out if there were necessary and useful things which we should be doing. If there were, it was our responsibility as a partner in this collective defence agreement to do them. If there are no expenditures which can usefully be made, it would be time to take the decision to cut defence spending. This is planning, and in this party we believe you must have the facts before making plans, and we are surprised that the hon. member for Assiniboia should take a different view and do it the other way round.
The Minister of National Defence told us this afternoon that this reduction of expenditure by the United States was minuscule. Since when was $371 million minuscule? He will say that he was referring to the expenditure of the United States government-
Mr. Pallet!: You were not here. He never said that.


George Randolph Pearkes: I yet have not the word the hon. member is using.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: It is in the notes that I have, and I presume it is correct.


An hon. Member:: It is not correct.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I copied it from a press reporter's report.


George Randolph Pearkes: Do not put words into my mouth.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: If it is not the correct word, perhaps the minister would give me the word he used.


An hon. Member:: Why should he help you?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Since when was $371 million minuscule? Nor is the expenditure of $15 million of the Canadian taxpayers' money minuscule. It is a colossal waste when spent in this way. The hon. member for Calgary East-


Arthur Smith: Calgary South.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: -kept repeating the figure so often-Mr. Speaker, I am trying to get the constituency correct, and if I do-


Arthur Smith: It would be the first time tonight that you have got anything right.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The hon. member kept repeating the figure of $15 million. This was all the money Canada was spending, and he said it was a small sum.


Some hon. Members:: On the Bomarc.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Yes, on the Bomarc, but how about the rest of the SAGE system? How are you going to control it? Are you just going to push the missiles out there and let them fly without direction? Is that what the government proposes to do? The hon. member has been trying to create the impression in the country that we are only talking about $15 million; we are talking about $125 million.


An hon. Member:: Your figure.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is the figure which both the Minister of National Defence and the Prime Minister put on the record.


George Randolph Pearkes: Would the hon. gentleman at least give me the quotation to which he is referring when he says that I had stated that the Bomarc was costing this country $125 million?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I see a number of the minister's high-priced help in the gallery. Perhaps they could look it up for the hon. gentleman.


John Whitney Pickersgill: It was put on the record this afternoon.


Some hon. Members:: No it was not.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: What the Minister of National Defence said was that the SAGE-Bomarc; Canada's contribution to the SAGE-Bomarc system, would cost from $110 million to $125 million.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: A reduction from the figure of $135 million used by the Prime Minister earlier on. At page 928 of Hansard appears the following:


George Randolph Pearkes: On July 2, in the same connection, I mentioned that the total estimated cost was $125 million covering two Bomarc stations, SAGE and the gap fillers and so forth.


Lester Bowles Pearson: All part of the system.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: These are the minister's own words.


James Stanley Speakman: On a point of order-


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member should raise a point of order from his own seat.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: These are the minister's own words, and this covers the whole system. You cannot just put a missile on a piece of concrete and have it fly itself. There must be some direction.

Mr. Pallet!: On a point of order, the hon. member for Trinity has read the answer from the Minister of National Defence purporting to appear on page 928. In order that he may not be guilty of misleading the house, would the hon. member care to read the question to which the answer was given?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I should be glad to have the hon. member read the whole speech, or question, or whatever it was, when I have finished.
The record stands that the system which is to control the Bomarcs, and the interceptors which Canada has not got because the government turned down the earlier advice of the NORAD chief, is to cost $125 million. It does not matter how many pieces you cut this into, this is the total as given by the minister. If he wishes to change the record he will have plenty of opportunity to do so when this much talked of committee on defence expenditure holds its sittings.
The minister told us that this minuscule reduction of $371 million should be considered in relation to the total United States expenditure on this missile of something more than $2 billion. What the minister did not tell us is how much of that $2 billion or more has already been spent.


George Randolph Pearkes: May I correct that statement? I said there were hundreds of millions of dollars left.


Lester Bowles Pearson: You said you did not know the figure.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: So we are told there are hundreds of millions of dollars left. The minister did not say how much was required for the further testing of this missile.


David James Walker: Hundreds of millions.


John Whitney Pickersgill: That is the first intelligent observation from the Minister of Public Works.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: But what if it takes longer and costs more to develop and test the missile than was anticipated? What is to be used for the appropriation if this extra testing is necessary?


George Randolph Pearkes: Nothing from the Canadian budget.


David James Walker: May I ask the hon. member for Trinity a question? Does he object to the expenditure of $15 million on the Bomarc development where there has been a United States national defence expenditure of $2.2 billion? Does the hon. member object to that, and want us to retire from this part of the defence policy?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: I think the record speaks for itself. It was only last Friday that I moved in the house that the expenditure of this
Continental Air Defence Policy government be reduced by the amount necessary for the Bomarc installations.


David James Walker: What have you got to substitute?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Something that would work.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The minister told us there is lots of money available-


George Randolph Pearkes: When did I say that: please quote me.


Lester Bowles Pearson: You said hundreds of millions.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Is the minister now indicating that there is not enough money available to continue this development?


George Randolph Pearkes: On a question of privilege, Mr. Speaker, hon. members are questioning me now about the expenditure of another country. I cannot be expected to know every detail of the expenditure which may be voted by the United States and to answer questions as to how much more money is to be spent.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Mr. Speaker, with respect I submit that the minister should be able to answer every detail because every detail is relevant to the continental defence of North America.


George Randolph Pearkes: I have no right to answer with respect to every detail.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Every detail is relevant to the question as to whether or not the government should proceed with the expenditure of the Canadian taxpapers' money to instal two Bomarc squadrons, because if there are not sufficient funds available in the United States to continue with the production, development and testing of these missiles, what will we have? All we will have will be two huge concrete monuments, one to the Minister of National Defence and one to the Prime Minister.
The dispatch reads:
Under the air force's modified continental air defence plan announced Friday, some development for the Bomarc B would be continued, but production plans would be cut to the bone, with the exception of the two squadrons of the Bomarc B to be produced for the Canadian government.
Even the planned 16 United States squadrons of the shorter range liquid-fuelled Bomarc A are to be cut to 12, and the costly electronic aircraft warning and alert system known as SAGE will be reduced to divert more funds to intercontinental ballistic missiles and giant radar and satellite warnings systems against long range enemy missiles.
Some Bomarc A squadrons-this missile has a range of some 200 miles against 500 for the B model-are in operation. The original air defence program called for gradual replacement of the Bomarc A with the solid-propellant B model as it reached production stage.
Now there is doubt in the United States air force whether any B models will ever be introduced into
2538	HOUSE OF
Continental Air Defence Policy
the American system, though plans are continuing to provide Canada's two squadrons at Mont Laurier, Quebec, and North Bay, Ontario.
Mr. Pallet!:	Mr. Speaker, would the hon.
member indicate the nature of the document from which he is reading?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Yes, Mr. Speaker. It is a
dispatch by the Canadian Press writer, Harold Morrison, and it is a Canadian Press dispatch.


John Whitney Pickersgill: From Washington.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The Minister of National
Defence seems to be the only one whose confidence in this project is unshaken with the exception of some of his supporters on the benches opposite who have not given the matter as much thought as they might have.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Where did you get your information?


John Whitney Pickersgill: We certainly did not get
it from the government.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The minister has told us that
he has confidence and that he had no reason to believe otherwise. That is not what the records shows. Let me read from the Congressional Record of the United States house of representatives-


An hon. Member:: We are in Ottawa, not
Washington.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: From the standpoint of our
defence policy you would never know it. I wish to read from testimony given to the committee on defence appropriations by Hon. Thomas S. Gates, Jr., secretary of defence, as follows:
Now, it might be well before this budget is spent or committed further-I mean in the course of the fiscal year 1961-that we have another reappraisal. Such a reappraisal might change the emphasis on certain factors, in which case there might be a change in the air defence plan. I know there have been some further studies on the air defence problem-not along the lines of the F-108, but along the line of reconsidering the continued use, in numbers, of aircraft interceptors. One of the reasons for this is that the Bomarc sites themselves are vulnerable, as fixed sites, to good accurate missiles. An enemy could put a few missiles on a Bomarc site and thus knock out an important part of our continental air defences. Perhaps fighter squadrons because they are mobile will continue to have their usefulness as a supplement to Bomarc.
Has any evidence presented ever been a greater indictment of the defence policy of this government than the evidence I have just read, given by defence secretary Gates?


Mr. Browne (Vancouver-Kingsway):: Would the hon. member permit a question?


Paul Theodore Hellyer: After I have finished.


Jay Waldo Monteith: The hon. member
for Bonavista-Twillingate wouldn't either.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The evidence shows that reconsideration was being given in the United States months ago, yet when we in this house pleaded with the minister and the government to reconsider all we were given were bland and fatuous assurances that all was well and that the policy of Canada was now in complete accord with that of United States, and that we were now able to repel attack. These were the assurances given us by the minister who has a misplaced confidence in this missile program. We cannot understand why the government insists on going ahead with this program. There must be some reason for the government's intransigence. There must be a reason for it but what it is we have yet to determine.
One hon. member suggested a possible reason tonight, the one raised by a columnist in one of this morning's papers, that this decision had some reference to a future byelection.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


George Randolph Pearkes: You ought to be ashamed of yourself.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: Yes, it is indeed difficult to believe that this government would stoop so low. A more likely reason is that the govermnent is in a position where it must save face.
When this government took office in the summer of 1957 one of the first acts it undertook was to cancel the CF-100, Mark VI, which was to replace the CF-100 now in service. It cancelled the CF-100, Mark VI because it had the infinitely superior Avro Arrow which was coming along and it said the CF-100, Mark VI would be obsolete. It therefore decided to cancel the CF-100, Mark VI, and carry on with the new and greatly improved and highly promising Avro Arrow program. Later on, the Prime Minister said they were reconsidering the Avro Arrow program. Then we all remember the sad day in February when the Prime Minister rose in this house and said the Avro Arrow was obsolescent and so had to be cancelled, and this was done, despite his promise, without any warning. It was announced that we had an alternative in the Bomarc. I was interested to hear the hon. member for Calgary wherever it is-


George Randolph Pearkes: Calgary South.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: -say tonight that it was an alternative.


George Randolph Pearkes: You do not know where you are, you are completely lost.


Jay Waldo Monteith: That will help you out in Alberta.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The hon. member for Calgary South said it was the government's substitute for the manned interceptor. It was to protect Canadians from attack by air from manned bombers. Hon. gentlemen opposite first cancelled the Mark VI to make way for the Arrow and then cancelled the Arrow to make way for the Bomarc and now they do not know where to turn for there is nowhere left to go.


George Randolph Pearkes: We are keeping straight on.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: You would turn somewhere else if there was any possible place for you to go, but how could you stand up and say to the Canadian people, "We are going to cancel the Bomarc for the infinitely better bow and arrow," because that is just about the position you are in at the present time. Hon. gentlemen opposite are like babies on the day of birth, completely without air protection whatsoever. This is the end of the cycle as far as the government is concerned. We have no protection from manned bombers, from intermediate range ballistic missiles launched from the sea or from intercontinental ballistic missiles.


Mr. Hees:: And we have no protection against you.


Paul Theodore Hellyer: The government's air defence program is washed up and wiped out like this government's defence policy and hon. gentlemen opposite might just as well cancel it out forthwith.


Mr. Roger Parizeau (Lake St. John):: Mr. Speaker, before entering on the subject of the Bomarc I should like to read from Hansard of February 10, 1960, at page 927, a question asked of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes) by the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer):
I should like to direct a question to the Minister of National Defence. The minister told the house today that the cost to Canada of the Bomarc sites would be reduced to about $15 million as the result of a change in design. Can the minister tell the house what the total cost will be of the whole program, the gap fillers, the SAGE electronic control system, and the Bomarc stations?
In reply, the Minister of National Defence said:
On July 2 in the same connection I mentioned that the total estimated cost was $125 million, covering two Bomarc stations, SAGE and the gap fillers and so forth. That is a realistic estimate and, of course, it may be reduced a little now that the estimated cost of the Bomarc installations has been reduced.
That is the answer to the question raised by the hon. member for Trinity.
Continental Air Defence Policy


Paul Theodore Hellyer: That is exactly what I said; I read the whole sentence.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I am afraid there are too many who want to join in this debate at all times. The hon. member for Lake St. John has not much time left.
(Translation):


Joseph Aimé Roger Parizeau: Mr. Speaker, I listened with great interest to the speeches of hon. members of the opposition, and I found, which did not surprise me in the least, they were utterly confused because of their complete ignorance of defence matters and, no doubt, because of the surprise they got when the government allowed them to discuss the Bomarc missile and our relations with NORAD, matters which they were not at all ready to deal with.
As far as I am concerned, I am asking myself the following questions: Should we completely abandon all defence against the bomber menace? If Russia should decide to attack America, should we let ourselves be destroyed? Today, we are able to establish Bomarc bases cheaply. Tests with this defensive weapon are costing the Canadian taxpayer absolutely nothing and we trust that when completed the weapon will give us good protection. As a matter of fact, in case of an attack by 25 enemy bombers, the Bomarc could destroy about twenty of them before they reach their target, while another wave of shorter-range missiles could destroy the other four or five. The Bomarc is therefore the most efficient weapon we know of against manned bombers.
But, you may say, why not scrap the Bomarc if the potential enemy seems to have stopped producing bombers? I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that as long as Russia has at its disposal about 10,000 intercontinental bombers, we must take the necessary means to defend ourselves against that threat, and the necessary means, in my opinion, is the Bomarc B.
Opposition experts-that is, the hon. members for Essex East (Mr. Martin), for Bon-avista-Twillingate (Mr. Pickersgill), for Trinity (Mr. Hellyer) or the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson), whose great experience comes no doubt from their long years of service in the Canadian army-claim that the Bomarc is inefficient. On what basis do they make this assertion? Is it because seven tests on the Bomarc B have ended in failure? Do they not realize that the Bomarc B is to become operational only around 1963 or 1964, which gives enough time to Boeing aircraft experts to improve it at the expense of our American allies? Do they not also realize
2540	HOUSE OF
Continental Air Defence Policy that a weapon of such precision cannot be put into production after a single test, when it takes years of testing to make a modern aircraft perfectly safe? And incidentally, let me point out that the Avro Arrow had not yet proven itself after a number of tests.
Opposition members would expect American engineers to perform a miracle in successfully firing the Bomarc B at the first test. If the Russians boast of their successes, you may be sure that they never tell about their failures, even though they had many of them before their recent achievements. I do not believe that by reducing the number of bases from 18 to 14, including the two in Canada, the Americans want to show that they no longer have confidence in Bomarc B; I am rather inclined to believe that they tend to direct their efforts towards offensive rather than defensive weapons.
As for us, Canadians, who have always favoured a defensive policy-and it is good that we should stick to it-it is hard to imagine Canada attacking some other country. It is true that the Liberal government of 1939 had seen fit to declare war before London had done so. But I am sure that this government would not do such a thing. Our advantages in keeping Bomarc for our defence lie in the fact that Bomarc B requires little money to provide protection for our industrial centres. And even if Bomarc were to be scrapped in 1970, I am sure that we would have had a good protection during those ten years, at an average cost of $1,500,000 a year.

I am convinced that, as a result of the wisdom of the Department of National Defence and of our alliance with the United States in NORAD, we will always find a way to get adequate protection for Canada.
I am convinced that despite the complaints of the hon. members of the opposition and despite their confusion, Bomarc would be useful to the people of Canada in the event of enemy attack.
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BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

John Whitney Pickersgill: Before you leave the chair, Mr. Speaker, perhaps the leader of the house will indicate what the business will be up until Thursday evening?


Mr. Churchill:: For tomorrow, Mr. Speaker, for the period 2.30 to six o'clock we shall have the motion standing in my name, which is a reference to the standing committee on agriculture and colonization to examine into the delivery of grain to feed mills in the prairies, item No. 246 on today's order paper. It will be followed by item No. 239 on today's order paper, which is a resolution in the name of the Minister of Public Works, dealing with an amendment to -the Trans-Canada Highway Act.
At eight o'clock the Minister of Finance will be available to continue the study of the final supplementary estimates. I am not able to forecast the events for Wednesday and Thursday.


[Stage Direction]
At ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.