1958-07-25

[Stage Direction]
Fifth report of standing committee on miscellaneous private bills.-Mr. McCleave.
Fourth report of standing committee on veterans affairs.-Mr. Dinsdale.

Right Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to table, in English and in French, the report of the royal commission on Newfoundland finances. I wish to say that in the union of two states there are always many factors that require settlement and many divergent views have to be reconciled. Members of this house will recall the prolonged negotiations leading up to Newfoundland becoming a province of Canada on March 31, 1949.
It is not surprising that agreement was not readily reached. Although every effort was made to provide definitive terms for the entry of Newfoundland into the federation of Canada, it was found necessary to introduce a saving clause among the financial conditions. It was with respect to this reserve or saving clause, paragraph 29 of the terms of union, that the royal commission was concerned. The requirement that the financial results of union be examined within eight years by a federal royal commission was unique in the constitutional history of Canada. It is true that extensive studies have been conducted from time to time and adjustments made, in some cases, but in no other instance has there been a mandatory clause. The mandatory clause read as follows: The commission required to be appointed was-
-to review the financial position of the province of Newfoundland and to recommend the form and scale of additional financial assistance, if any, that may be required by the province of Newfoundland to enable it to continue public services at the levels and standards reached subsequent to the date of union, without resorting to taxation more burdensome, having regard to capacity to pay, than that obtaining generally in the region comprising the maritime provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island.
After full consideration of the terms of reference, the commissioners have concluded that the burden of taxation in the province of Newfoundland does not differ materially from that in the maritime provinces. It is their opinion, after studying the course of provincial finances since union, that additional financial assistance is necessary if the province is to maintain the levels and standards of public services reached.
Accordingly, basing their recommendations on the anticipated results of the fiscal year 1957-58, they have recommended that an annual payment be made to the province of $8 million a year, commencing on April 1, 1957, this amount to be reduced by the amount of any transitional grant that may still be payable.
The government will study the report and its recommendations and will decide upon the appropriate course of action. The decision will thus bring finality to the terms of union of Newfoundland and Canada.
The government is most grateful to the commissioners for their efforts in meeting the obligation in the terms of union.


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Leader of the Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, we on this side have listened to the Prime Minister's statement with much interest. We will study the report with care, as I know they will in Newfoundland. I would merely say now it is our understanding and our assumption that this report will be implemented with the least possible delay.



IRRIGATION


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I should like now to make an announcement in regard to the South Saskatchewan river dam project agreement. The agreement was signed this morning by the Minister of Agriculture, having previously been signed by Premier Douglas on behalf of the province of Saskatchewan.
The signing of this agreement with the province of Saskatchewan represents an important step forward in the development of Canada's resources. Its main objective is, through its large-scale water conservation
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Irrigation-South Saskatchewan River and irrigation potentialities, to provide stability for agriculture in central Saskatchewan, where droughts, sometimes prolonged, have in the past created serious problems for more than 50,000 farmers, a truth that is driven home by conditions this season.
While many think of irrigation as associated particularly with the production of specialty crops, it may be that the production under irrigation of alfalfa and other fodder crops in the centre of Saskatchewan's most populous farming area and in quantities sufficient to remove the fear of having to sacrifice livestock because of feed shortages in drought years or having to bring in fodder from other areas at great expense will prove to be the greatest benefit in the long run.
I say the greatest benefit. But irrigation possibilities represent by no means the only good to flow from the project that the signing of this agreement will inaugurate. The construction of the earth dam now agreed upon will make possible the production of hydroelectric power on a scale that will mean much to the industrial development of the province, while the assurance of adequate water supplies for such cities as Regina and Moose Jaw and the control of flooding are benefits that in the minds of many would of themselves justify much of the outlay that will be called for in carrying out this vast project.
It has been under discussion for many years. The need has been there, and it has been very obvious. I look back a matter of 25 years to the time when the question was first given consideration and discussion. Again after 1940 when I represented Lake Centre constituency, as it then was, within which a portion of the dam will be located, discussions continued. Fifteen years ago investigations were begun by P.F.R.A. officials, and during the past decade these investigations have been continued to determine the feasibility and economic importance of the project. Naturally I am happy that the project is now inaugurated, and I am sure the country as a whole will share my satisfaction.
I have stressed the irrigation possibilities, possibilities that may one day see water brought to 500,000 acres of Saskatchewan's good lands, the immense power development potentialities and the assurance of water supplies. There are many other benefits that will accrue as a result of the building of the dam. The control of water levels in the Qu'Appelle valley and its lakes, as well as the formation of a completely new great lake of the South Saskatchewan river system upstream from the dam, will provide recreational facilities and wildlife possibilities that will doubtless be appreciated by generations to come, and


may well become one of the major tourist attractions in the western provinces.
I am very happy that this project is now in a position where construction can proceed, and I am sure members in all parts of the house will hope that out of the completion of this project will come for agriculture within that area of Saskatchewan and for Saskatchewan and the western provinces generally the dawning of a new day.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister, in swinging from Newfoundland to Saskatchewan, makes us once again conscious of the extent and the development of our country. We on this side of the house have heard with satisfaction the announcement the Prime Minister has made, a satisfaction which I am sure will be shared by the people of Canada, especially those in Saskatchewan and the western provinces and by none more than my former colleague the former minister of agriculture, Right Hon. James Gardiner. We on this side hope, indeed we are confident, that this project will be of value not only to Saskatchewan but to all the prairie provinces, and as such will make its contribution to national development.


Mr. Harold E. Winch (Vancouver East):: We
in the C.C.F. group, Mr. Speaker-


Some hon. Members:: 


An hon. Member:: Where's the group?


Harold Edward Winch: We in the C.C.F. group want to join in the satisfaction which the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition have just expressed that at long last agreement has been reached and a contract signed for the construction of this most important work in Saskatchewan. I have been asked to convey the regret of our house leader, the hon. member for Assiniboia, that he could not be here on this occasion because of what Liberals and Conservatives know as the exigencies of conventions. The fact that at this moment I stand alone means nothing, because we represent a principle. I express, on behalf not only of our group in this House of Commons but our membership throughout all of Canada, our pleasure in the advance that has been made with the signing of the agreement at 10.15 this morning, when I took pride in the fact that I represented the C.C.F. of Saskatchewan.
It is a wonderful thing, sir, that this agreement has been finally reached. We all know that this will add particularly to the wellbeing of the province concerned, and will contribute to the well-being of all of Canada. We wish all success to this endeavour, recognizing that it is a gain to the economy of the prairies.

May I be permitted, sir, to make this comment. Since June of last year we have noted the signing of agreements, starting in the east and moving to the west with the signing of this new agreement today. I hope that westward movement will continue and that in the not too distant future we will have something on the Columbia river in British Columbia.



CRIMINAL CODE


Hon. E. D. Fulton (Minister of Justice) moved: the first reading of Bill No. S-9 (from the Senate), to amend the Criminal Code.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.



LOAN COMPANIES ACT


[Stage Direction]
Hon.	Donald	M.	Fleming	(Minister	of
Finance) moved the first reading of Bill No. S-10 (from the Senate), to amend the Loan Companies Act.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.


[Stage Direction]
Hon.	Donald	M.	Fleming	(Minister	of
Finance) moved the first reading of Bill No. S-ll (from the Senate), to amend the Trust Companies Act.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.

[Stage Direction]
On the order:	Government notices of
motions:
The Secretary of State for External Affairs-The following proposed motion:-
That items numbered 85 to 111, inclusive, item numbered 502, items numbered 542 to 549, inclusive, and item numbered 655, as listed in the main and supplementary estimates 1958-59, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
Mr. Speaker:: By order of the house this motion will be referred to government orders and will be called later this day and will be debatable.
25, 1958	2655
Inquiries of the Ministry PUBLIC SERVICE



PREVAILING RATE EMPLOYEES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. Donald M. Fleming (Minister of Finance):: Mr. Speaker, yesterday the hon. member for Skeena asked a question as to whether the prevailing rate employees were given the same privileges as classified civil servants in respect of early closing in times of excessive heat and, if not, why not.
There is no uniform practice that is followed in relation to the prevailing rate employees under conditions of excessive heat. The rule that is followed is that the practice of other similar employers in the particular area concerned and under similar conditions should be followed. Even in Ottawa there is no fixed or general rule. It depends upon the conditions both as to heat and humidity in the different buildings.



HOUSING


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. R. Garland (Nipissing):: I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Public Works. Has the minister received representations requesting mortgage financing few students' residences at colleges and universities under section 16 of the National Housing Act? If so, has the government taken any steps to provide this type of financing to colleges and universities?


Hon. Howard C. Green (Minister of Public Works):: Mr. Speaker, no representations have been received on this subject recently, but some months ago there were some. This is one of the questions that are under active consideration by the government. If and when any decision is made that policy will be duly announced.



HEALTH AND WELFARE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. F. J. Bigg (Athabasca):: I wish to direct a question to the Minister of National Health and Welfare. In view of the continuing shortage of nurses in Canada, has consideration been given to paying student nurses a nominal amount of, say, $1 a day, in order to encourage student nurses to complete their training without financial distress to themselves or their families?
2656	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry


Hon. J. W. Monteith (Minister of National Health and Welfare):: I should like to thank the hon. member for having given me notice of his intention to ask this question. I feel that the point he has raised is well taken, though I am not sure that the specific method he has suggested would be the most effective way of assisting student nurses. In any case, I shall have the matter studied by officials of my department and possibly brought before the fall meeting of the dominion council of health. I shall be happy to inform the hon. member of the outcome of these deliberations.


Hon. Paul Martin (Essex East):: If this is done may I ask the Minister of National Health and Welfare whether it will be done under the national health program?


Jay Waldo Monteith: Mr. Speaker, in my reply to the previous question I simply mentioned that we would consider this question.


Paul Joseph James Martin: It would be done under that program, I assume.



PRIVILEGE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I very seldom rise on a question of privilege, but on this occasion I feel that I must do so in view of an interjection made by the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate, who is usually very fair in debate. I know that on this occasion it was made in the heat of the moment. As reported at page 2636 of Hansard he said, "Incidentally, why is he not here?" He was referring to me.
May I say, Mr. Speaker, that I was in the house throughout the day with the exception of the period after eight o'clock last evening when I had responsibilities which, as he knows, sometimes take one out of the house. The bill was carried through the house by the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Justice. I also find there is an omission at page 2651 of Hansard when you, Mr. Speaker, said "When shall this bill be read a third time?" At that time I rose and asked whether there would be consent to third reading last evening, and that remark was also intended for Hansard. I thought I ought to clarify that.


Hon. J. W. Pickersgill (Bonavisla-Twil-lingate):: Mr. Speaker, I of course accept the Prime Minister's statement without any question, and if I said anything that is in any way offensive I at once withdraw it.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Hon. Sidney E. Smith (Secretary of Slate for External Affairs) moved:: That items numbered 85 to 111, inclusive, item numbered 502, items numbered 542 to 549, inclusive, and item numbered 655, as listed in the main and supplementary estimates 1958-59, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
He said: Mr. Speaker, in speaking to this motion I must confess that I have at the present time a feeling of anxiety with respect to international affairs, yet I hasten to add that that anxiety is brightened by a sense of hope, hope which is not founded on wishful thinking.
I am sure members will be happy to hear that I do not intend this morning to give the house a global survey of the international situation as it affects Canada, either directly or indirectly. Rather, I propose to deal with certain factors which very closely concern us at this time.
The first item, of course, with which the house will expect me to deal is the grave and vital situation in the Middle East. I am sure there is no need for me to rehearse in detail the developments in that area during the past two weeks, because members are no doubt familiar with those developments; but with respect to Canada, and indeed the whole world, our attention is directed to New York, and I propose at the beginning of my remarks to give to the house a full account of the latest happenings there.
Before doing so, however, I should make reference to the developments in Lebanon leading up to this particular crisis, and give to the house some information with respect to the evolution of that crisis. Members will recall that on May 27, 1958, Lebanon presented charges to the security council of the United Nations simultaneously with those to the Arab league. The charge of Lebanon was that the United Arab Republic had intervened in its internal affairs. The Arab league had nothing to offer in the way of a solution of the issues involved in this charge and subsequently the security council, after discussion of the charges, decided to act in this particular regard.
May I remind the house, however, that there had never been any overt aggression from Syria into Lebanon. It had to do with indirect aggression. This was a new type of aggression with which the security council had to deal. It is difficult to define what

is indirect aggression, yet the security council addressed itself to this question.
I may interpolate here that for some time the United Nations has been endeavouring without success to define indirect aggression, and certainly it was understood and recognized that the security council had power to investigate charges with respect to that type of intervention, indirect though it be, in the affairs of another country. And so on June 11 the security council set up an observation group, and I read part of the text of the resolution:
-to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders.
The government of Canada considered that the situation which was unfolding in Lebanon merited prompt action. From the beginning in the discussions in the security council we gave our firm support to this resolution, a resolution that provided machinery under the auspices of the United Nations. We welcomed the resolution, Mr. Speaker, by reason of the fact that it afforded to the secretary general an opportunity to contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Lebanon. We also welcomed the ambit of the resolution that gave certain flexibility to the secretary general in carrying out or implementing the resolution's objectives.
That resolution was adopted on June 11. There was no veto and no dissenting vote. On that particular occasion, and it was very encouraging, the U.S.S.R. abstained from voting on the resolution. The secretary general then moved very quickly, and within a few days he had officers of his observation corps present in Lebanon. Hon. members will recall that Canada immediately responded to the appeal from the secretary general and sent ten officers to join the observation group. Indeed, Canada at the moment has 11 officers there. A Canadian officer who was attached to the United Nations truce supervision organization was seconded to the observation group in Lebanon.
This group, the United Nations observation group in Lebanon, has become known as UNOGIL, and that is the designation I shall use. It encountered at the outset many difficulties in carrying out its task. Initially the group had access to only 18 kilometers out of the 324 kilometers of Lebanon's frontier with Syria. Other difficulties were encountered by reason of the rugged nature of the terrain, the location of the border populations, and also by reason of the traditional freedom of people to move across the border from Syria to Lebanon, a freedom they have had for many years. Here was a fairly
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recent boundary line between Syria and Lebanon. Many of these initial difficulties, however, were overcome by the middle of July and the observer group, UNOGIL, had access to all the frontier areas between Lebanon and Syria. They had been increased in numbers and personnel and were also getting aircraft for the purpose of carrying out their directives from the secretary general.
During recent weeks there has been one frontier of Lebanon that has been quiet. That is the frontier with Israel. Indeed, I would point out that during this difficult period all of Israel's frontiers have been quiet. That is a tribute to Israel, to the United Arab Republic and to other countries, and it is also a tribute to the effectiveness of two other United Nations organizations, the United Nations emergency force along the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line and the United Nations truce supervision organization on Israel's other frontier.
Now to return to the narrative of events that I anticipated a few moments ago I would give. On July 14 there occurred the sudden, swift and violent revolution in Iraq which transformed the situation in the Middle East overnight. Within Lebanon it appeared still further to exacerbate internal dissensions and-of this I am convinced-the happenings in Iraq rendered UNOGIL incapable, at least temporarily, of meeting its responsibilities, in the dangerous situation thus created. And so it was in this situation that President Eisenhower responded promptly and affirmatively to a request from President Chamoun of Lebanon. As President Eisenhower stated at the time of the landing of United States troops in Lebanon, the force was not there to engage in hostilities but to help Lebanon in its own efforts to stabilize the situation until-and I emphasize that word "until"-the United Nations could take the steps necessary to protect Lebanon's independence and integrity.
Two days later, as we recall, the United Kingdom found it necessary to take similar emergency action in response to an appeal from King Hussein of Jordan for military assistance in the face of a plot instigated from outside Jordan to overthrow the regime. I have been informed reliably, and I know, that there was not only a plot to overthrow the government in Jordan but also that the plot extended to other countries in the Middle East to overthrow their governments.
As the Prime Minister informed the house on July 17, the Canadian government appreciated that the United States and the United Kingdom had no alternative but to take these interim measures. We knew then that both governments had stated specifically that the

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landing of troops and the keeping of troops there would be terminated as soon as the United Nations could take effective action. We understood the difficulty of the decision that the two countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, had been forced to take.
To return to the point I attempted to make a moment ago, we recognized clearly that the United Kingdom and the United States appreciated the ultimate authority and responsibility of the United Nations.
Since that time we in Canada have made every effort at the United Nations and in some of the capitals of the world to bring about as swiftly as possible those United Nations actions which would provide some instrumentality of the United Nations to the end that the United States would withdraw their forces from Lebanon and the United Kingdom would withdraw their forces from Jordan.
In the United Nations security council, the United States and the United Kingdom have joined, or we have joined with them and other countries, in promoting steps that would provide personnel on behalf of and under the United Nations that would in turn enable those two countries to withdraw their forces. To this end we gave full support last week to a draft resolution submitted to the security council by the United States. In brief, the purpose of that resolution was to enable the secretary general to establish an instrumentality-and the type of instrument would be in his good judgment-that would add to the forces of UNOGIL now in Lebanon. We supported that; yet at the end of last Friday, just one week ago, the Russians vetoed that proposal. That was on July 18.
With respect to my own activities at this time, I may say that I had flown to Washington where I had valuable discussions with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, a valuable exchange of views. The newspapers have quoted me as taking the stand on behalf of Canada that there should be no expansion of military activities by these two countries, that is, outside of Lebanon and Jordan. The Prime Minister has also taken that stand, and he has so informed the house. From Washington I went to New York, where I had discussions with Mr. Hammarskjold. Then I came here to report fully on the situation as I saw it to the Prime Minister.
I got off the aeroplane on Saturday and heard for the first time that Mr. Khrushchev had extended an invitation for a summit meeting on the Middle East. At the Prime Minister's request I went back to New York on Monday morning where I took charge of the

Canadian delegation, and I seized the opportunity then to express the hope that nations would respond to the invitation issued by Mr. Khrushchev for a summit meeting on the Middle East. I shall deal with that matter later.
On that particular day the Prime Minister informed the house that on Monday morning he had sent messages to Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Nehru, and in those messages he expressed the hope that there would not be a negative reaction to the proposal put forward by Mr. Khrushchev.
In New York on Monday and Tuesday of last week our delegation worked very closely with the delegations from the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan in an endeavour to work out a compromise resolution which might be more acceptable to the Russians than the one they vetoed on Friday last, which had been put forward by the United States. This particular resolution was put forward by the Japanese. We were rather hopeful of this resolution that provided in its operative part for an increase in the observer group of UNOGIL and gave further authority to the secretary general to endeavour to stabilize the situation in Lebanon to the end that the United States could withdraw its forces.
As I said in the meeting of the security council on Monday of last week in support of this resolution, I deemed it a positive approach, one which offered the council an opportunity to use and strengthen the United Nations machinery that it had in Lebanon; but this, too, the Soviet union vetoed. And so, as far as the activities of the United Nations in Lebanon are concerned, we are back where we were at the beginning of last week. However, after the veto the secretary general expressed his determination to use the powers that had been voted to him on June 11 by the security council, and he said he would firmly proceed to implement his mandate in the resolution of the date to which I referred. I think it would be of interest to the house if I read a part of the statement the secretary general made on Tuesday afternoon after the veto of the Japanese resolution by the U.S.S.R. Mr. Hammarskjold said:
I am sure that I will act in accordance with the wishes of the members of the council if I therefore use all opportunities offered to the secretary general within the limits set by the charter toward developing the United Nations effort so as to help to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point at which we now find purselves.
Even before the Japanese resolution failed of adoption Mr. Hammarskjold had decided

to increase the personnel of the UNOGIL in Lebanon from about 135 officers to something approximating 200, and he requested Canada to send three additional observers. The Prime Minister has informed the house of Canada's ready response to that invitation from Mr. Hammarskjold, and I recall the words the Prime Minister uttered in this house, that Canada was willing to take that action, ready to do it, glad to do it, and then he made this statement:
Canada will supply immediately three of the additional observers, of course giving every attention to any further requirement of UNOGIL as events transpire.
Therefore what is needed now is an expansion, of the scope and importance of UNOGIL activity. The hon. member for Essex East asked a question on Wednesday of this week. I was not in the house at the time. The hon. member asked whether Canada had received any further invitation from the secretary general for additional personnel from this country. No invitation has come forward as yet, but Mr. Hammarskjold intimated on Tuesday afternoon at the meeting of the security council that if the Russians vetoed the Japanese resolution he would go to work immediately and evolve a plan for the increase in that particular group. That plan is now, we know, being developed but it has not yet been made final.
Members of the house may recall, Mr. Speaker, that at the time of the establishment of UNEF Mr. Hammarskjold, the secretary general of the United Nations, associated with himself an advisory committee of member states to assist him in the conduct of his task with respect to UNEF. There are indications now that Mr. Hammarskjold will invite certain countries to send representatives to such an advisory committee, and it may well be that he will choose the personnel of the advisory committee of UNEF, the advisory committee that has been in being for some time.
So that is where we stand now. A new United Nations body, not new since Tuesday afternoon but new since June 11, has been developed and set up, and we hope this body will be effective in enabling the Lebanese people to work out their own internal difficulties and dissensions in their own way. I have confidence that such a United Nations body, developed under a plan still to be presented by the secretary general, will be effective in establishing stability.
But what of the future? Is there a way to ensure permanently the independence and integrity of this small country with its unique balance of east and west, with its unique composition of population, about half Arab, 57071-3-168i
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half Moslem and half Christian? There were discussions in Washington while I was there-


Harold Edward Winch: Three halves? The minister referred to three halves. I could not understand the arithmetic.


Sidney Earle Smith: I am sorry for that slip. The information I have is that it was roughly fifty-fifty as between Moslems and Christians. The Moslem group, incidentally, is broken up into two parts, one part Levantine and the other part Arab. I will seek to verify my information and if I am wrong I will tell the hon. member. We had discussions in Washington about the future of Lebanon. The discussions had to do with the possibility of having the Lebanese accept a position of neutrality. Favour was expressed by the United States and United Kingdom representatives with respect to that proposal.
I was not here on Monday, but I have read the address of that distinguished representative of a member of the commonwealth, the Prime Minister of Ghana. I know that he also advanced that proposal when he addressed members of the house in joint session with members of the Senate. Can we work toward a status of neutrality for Lebanon and have an international guarantee of its neutrality such as is provided in effect for Austria? It cannot be imposed on the Lebanese, but it should not come as a novel suggestion to them because throughout the centuries, indeed from Phoenician times, the Lebanese have been merchants and traders. Their history shows that by reason of necessity to be friendly with as many people as possible in order to trade with them, they have over the centuries achieved that relationship with bordering countries.
Of course there is a new factor, one that I adverted to earlier in my remarks. Recently Lebanon has been rocked by pressures, sometimes violent pressures, from outside countries. Recently those pressures have been manifested in hostile radio broadcasts and other activities, and these pressures have brought about the vexed situation in which the Lebanese find themselves at this particular time. But it is, I think, possible to find a way out of the situation along the lines I suggested a moment ago. I would expect that the Lebanese might welcome some arrangement establishing neutrality that would assure them their independence in this middle position. But I am convinced that that cannot be brought about without the practical assistance of the United Nations. Indeed, I think it might well require some physical manifestation of United Nations authority, a physical manifestation of such authority on the ground in Lebanon.

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The task which the observer group is now performing and will perform to a greater and more successful degree, I hope, will be to insulate the political affairs of Lebanon from those of its neighbours and thus help to restore tranquility in that divided nation. That, Mr. Speaker, could be the forerunner of some continuing role on the part of the United Nations in that country, perhaps not unlike the role played not by the United Nations but by Canada and other members of the international commissions in Indochina. As hon. members will recall, these commissions were set up by the Geneva agreements of 1954.
In putting forward this suggestion I realize that the United Nations should proceed cautiously, but if the experiment were successful it might be used as a precedent for stabilizing other countries in the Middle East, torn not only by fierce internal antagonisms but by hostile external rivalries and tensions. The possibility of insulation through the United Nations raises novel problems and vast difficulties, but so acute have the problems of this region become that we must cast our minds about to examine every possible line of approach which might offer the prospect of advance.
I make another reference to the stability not only of Lebanon but also of the Middle East. Much of their trouble can be traced to the economic difficulties in which they find themselves, and I would hope it would be possible to give some assurance of economic stability not only to Lebanon but to the whole Middle East that would warrant and promote political stability. In this particular task I can foresee for the United Nations and for other organizations a really valuable role.
As the Prime Minister said the other day in the house, this is not the time for stagnant thinking, and if there is anything in this new United Nations approach, the west could seize the opportunity at the summit meeting which now appears certain to be held in New York and endeavour to make a small beginning, at any rate, in the country of Lebanon.
That was one reason that prompted the Canadian government to welcome the Soviet proposal of last Saturday, a proposal that contained offensive and provocative language giving unnecessary offence to the addressees. Indeed, I had occasion to point out to Mr. Sobolev when I was in New York that it was unnecessarily truculent and offensive. But I know I can speak for the Prime Minister when I say that in sending messages to President Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Nehru, expressing hope that there would

not be a negative attitude to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal, we had in mind that some constructive measure such as the one I have been indicating might be looked at and adopted not only for Lebanon but for the Middle East.
Then with reference to the message that was received by France, the United Kingdom and the United States from Mr. Khrushchev, we had in mind that a meeting at the top could result in a diminution of international tension. On Sunday we discussed also the terrible possibility, not the probability but the terrible possibility, of the nations of the world sliding into a global nuclear war. The leaders of the governments of this generation would never be forgiven if they did not exhaust every possible way of relieving, at least in some measure, international tension.
This was another basis for the messages that went out from the Prime Minister over the week end. I can claim that in this regard Canada took the lead. The public expression of the desire of this government to promote the holding of a summit meeting was the first public utterance on the western side in this respect. I took the opportunity in the security council, as did the Prime Minister when he informed the house on Monday, of making very clear our concept of the desirability of holding an international conference as suggested. I have in mind, but I cannot claim this, that my observations had something to do with the postponement at least of the U.S.S.R. proposal to call for a general assembly meeting in which they could indulge in more propaganda.
I have in mind also that the stand of the Canadian government, as expressed by me in the security council on Monday of last week, had something to do with the acceptance of the counterproposal put forward by Mr. Macmillan on behalf of the United Kingdom. The real significance to me of the resolution with respect to the holding of a meeting in the security council-I do now expect it will be a favourable decision-is that this meeting will be held under the aegis of the United Nations. The security council, and I quote from the United Nations charter, was established for the following purpose:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the security council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the security council acts on their behalf.
In my opinion, that is the proper forum for a meeting of Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Eisenhower, General de Gaulle and others.

We have noted with encouragement that Mr. Khrushchev has responded to this proposal that was sent out in clearer terms, perhaps, from London than from any other capital, that this meeting should be held within the security council. It could be, it may be- I emphasize the word "may"-a meeting of momentous consequence. Again, I say that it is worth trying in terms of the voice of humanity. Furthermore, I have in mind that apart from the powers whom I have named and to whom the letters were addressed by the author, the presence of Mr. Nehru, the distinguished leader of one of the nations of the commonwealth and a representative of the awakening world of Asia, would contribute much to such a conference.
With reference to the eventual composition of the conference, I am sure that the house will have noted the observations made yesterday by Right Hon. Mr. Macmillan at Westminster. These are his words:
I am glad to note Mr. Khrushchev's latest letter recognizes . . . (that) . . . until the form of the meeting has been agreed it would be premature to lay down which countries, which are not members of the security council, should attend, or by whom they should be represented.
I agree with that particular view, at this stage, when there will have to be negotiations with respect to the time, with respect to the agenda and other matters. I would say this, however; that it will be for the security council to decide what nations, which are not members of the security council, should come to the table of the security council. That is a procedural matter for the security council. I saw it in operation on Monday and Tuesday of this week, for example. The council, by formal resolution presented by the chairman before one meeting on Monday started and before the two meetings on Tuesday started, asked the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Lebanon and Jordan to come and be present at the council table. I say again, Mr. Speaker, that is a matter fcrr the security council to decide.
However, I express anxiety lest these matters having to do with who will sit and who will go to the meeting should jeopardize the holding of that meeting. Questions of this sort should not be insuperable or prevent the proposed meeting of the security council. In my opinion they should be treated and considered as secondary. With respect to this meeting in New York, whatever the date may be, I have in mind that it is desirable also, if some means can be found, to have the opinions of the numerous countries concerned, because no plan that may be evolved in the security council will be successful
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unless the proposals are accorded the approval of the peoples of those regions.
One of the problems we in Canada must always keep in mind is a concern, for example, lest the prosperity of Israel should not be safeguarded in the forthcoming negotiations. Surely it will be possible to get the views of the Middle East countries whatever the procedural device may be. Many problems, as I indicated a moment ago, will arise on the subject of time, on the subject of the agenda and prior consultation. But when the Prime Minister spoke in this house on July 25 about the possibility of holding such a meeting within the security council he deliberately used words which took into account the flexible procedure that would have to be devised if this conference is to be brought into being.
I would express on behalf of Canada the hope that we will have this concept of flexibility. It is here, I believe, that the secretary general, with his great experience and wisdom which he has shown particularly during the past two weeks, could be given the opportunity of devising some formula within the existing United Nations structure in order to enable these important conclusions to be reached with respect to those matters to which I referred, and to the end that the consultations at New York will be fruitful.
It is not inappropriate that I announce at this time an important development in connection with the responsibilities of Canada in Indo-China. I would just bring back to the attention of the members of the house the role that Canada has played through its membership in three international commissions in Indo-China; one international commission in Laos, one in Cambodia and one in Viet Nam. That was an example I used a few moments ago. Here were powers sitting down at Geneva in 1954 to deal with dissensions in these three parts of IndoChina. There was in that particular area the possibility, indeed the probability, of a collision of the communist powers on the one side and western countries on the other.
What was done? There was established at the Geneva meeting machinery whereby the situation in these three countries could be stabilized or helped to be stabilized through the presence of international commissions. Canada was and is a member of those international commissions in the three countries, the other members being India and Poland. With the physical manifestation, if nothing else, of these three international commissions the result was that in Laos the royal government was enabled to bring about the stabilization of the situation there.

External Affairs
There was a reconciliation oi the communist forces and the royal force and there came about stability. On May 4 of this year supplementary elections were held in Laos and they indicated to Canada that its task had been performed in Laos through its membership in that commission.
Hence I informed the house recently that the Canadian delegation to the international commission for supervision and control in Laos had introduced a resolution calling for the dissolution of the commission. I wish now to inform the house that the international commission for Laos was adjourned sine die on July 19. There were forces at work there -and you can guess their origin-which resisted the retirement or the adjournment of the Laos international commission.
In the end Canada joined with others in bringing about this adjournment sine die. We made it very clear that we were not getting out by reason of any threats or suggestions by Laotians, but we had in mind the representations made here by Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of Laos, that after the election had been held and the situation stabilized, he felt that the commission would have performed its task. That commission can be reconvened in Laos at the call of the chairman, the representative for India. Canada must be consulted. If we go back by reason of any particular emergency we will always have in mind the rights of the Laotian government, and we will not interfere with the sovereignty of that country. In the opinion of the Canadian government the commission which began its operations in 1954 has completed its task.
With respect to Viet Nam there is tension, as the members of the house well know, between South and North Viet Nam. That situation has not been stabilized. There is a need for the continuation of the work of the international commission in Viet Nam, but we have advice that we can apply a formula similar to the Laos one to Cambodia where the situation has been stabilized.
I seize this opportunity to pay tribute to India, which provided a chairman, for its co-operation, and also to pay a tribute to the success of the royal government in Laos in bringing about a reconciliation of the two forces that were indeed hostile to one another. We will now take up the problem with respect to Cambodia. As I indicated a moment ago, we should be able to use the same formula of adjournment.
I come back to this concept that I advanced earlier with respect to Lebanon and with respect to certain other countries in the Middle East. Is there not something in the example of the success of the international

commissions in Laos and Cambodia for a solution of some of the problems at least in some of the trouble spots in the Middle East?
I will now speak on the problem of disarmament. It may be that some will have the thought that we should not be talking about disarmament in the particularly vexed situation that we now have. I do not share that view. Indeed, the interest in and the desire for disarmament have been intensified by events in the past few weeks. In order to provide members of the house a perspective with respect to disarmament, a perspective that will be read with deeper concern during the present situation, I am tabling a white paper with respect to the disarmament discussions in 1957.
I need hardly recall for the information of the house the breakdown of the negotiations that were carried on through the subcommittee of the commission on disarmament established by the United Nations. France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada put forward certain proposals on August 29 of last year. They appeared to be a package deal, if I can use that expression. Since the time negotiations broke down, the Russians having flatly rejected the proposals, the countries of the west including Canada have been endeavouring to make clear that those proposals of August 29, 1957, were merely put forward as a basis of discussion. Indeed the Prime Minister in the general assembly last year and I myself in the political committee of the United Nations and in the general assembly urged that the Russians look at those proposals as being flexible. But that situation was not accepted by the U.S.S.R., and little if anything has been done within the United Nations since last autumn with respect to disarmament.
However, there have been some encouraging signs recently of a resumption of negotiations. We were all gratified that President Eisenhower felt it possible to make a suggestion with respect to one kind of disarmament or with respect to certain measures that could lead to one kind of disarmament, and he put those forward to Mr. Khrushchev. We are gratified and encouraged to hear that Mr. Khrushchev has accepted the proposal to establish a technical group for the purpose of examining the possibility of providing adequate supervision and control of nuclear tests and methods for the detection of nuclear tests.
The discussions began in Geneva on July 1 of this year with respect to the scientific problems involved. Even if I knew what had been happening at those discussions I would not understand the scientific problems, but I can say it is authoritatively reported that

the talks between the scientists are making headway in an encouraging manner. Without attempting to predict the final outcome of this scientific conference, I am confident that significant findings will be made by this technical group. Canada, as the house knows, is represented there by Dr. O. M. Solandt who has associated with him four other Canadian scientists. The other Canadians are Mr. H. Larnder and Mr. A. K. Longair of the defence research board, Dr. P. L. Willmore of the dominion observatory and Professor G. M. Volkotf of the University of British Columbia.
The government has held the view that after the findings of this group are made known, in which findings we feel confidence could be placed, a method might be arrived at by which to detect nuclear tests, and then the countries carrying on such tests might come to a political agreement with respect to the cessation of these tests. This is a view which has been advanced by the Prime Minister throughout the country on several occasions; but let me say that the detection and inspection, the control and supervision of nuclear tests do not constitute in themselves a measure of disarmament. They are a means to ensure disarmament; they provide sanctions for a political agreement with respect to a type of disarmament, and I would express the hope that after the successful conclusion of the present technical studies there might be taken what could be regarded as a step having a revolutionary effect on the international climate.
An initial move might be made with respect to the cessation of further nuclear tests, and in that way there might be established some element of mutual trust and confidence, after which the nations concerned could move on to the more complex aspects of a disarmament program. The suspension of nuclear tests with these guarantees as to detection could constitute the first step toward agreement, which agreement would in turn be the first step toward disarmament, even though this would not be the most important measure, which is that having to do with the use of nuclear weapons already proved.
There is another encouraging factor on which I would like to report with respect to disarmament. Mr. Eisenhower proposed that it would be useful to study practical measures to provide required safeguards against surprise attacks and we have been heartened by a rather affirmative reply by Mr. Khrushchev. We in Canada should promote in every possible way the holding of a meeting of experts of a somewhat similar nature to the present Geneva meeting with respect to the detection of nuclear tests, in order to study means and methods of preventing surprise attacks. This is a matter which is, of course,
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of very direct concern to this country with particular reference to surprise attacks over the Arctic region.
I am sure I need not spell out the implications of this matter or draw a picture of what we have advocated in this regard. I reported on our advocacy at the Copenhagen meeting. The Russians have indicated-and this I would like to emphasize-that they might be willing to sit down with such a group. I do not think a political agreement would be necessary at this stage, any more than it has been necessary to enter into a political agreement with respect to the holding of nuclear tests while the current meeting of scientists is being held. I propose, however, that experts should be brought together in order to study this further problem.
One cannot anticipate the measures which the experts would put forward. They may have to do with electronic or radar devices, or they may be along the lines of ground inspection as proposed by the U.S.S.R., which could operate rather simply as a bilateral exchange of inspectors, or a more strictly supervised international system might be involved under the control of the United Nations. We could, however, make progress in this regard.
The U.S.S.R. has on many occasions replied to the proposal for detection or knowledge of the possibility of surprise attack over the Arctic that this really does not matter very much. To us in Canada, however, it does matter, and the Prime Minister indicated last summer that for the operation of a scheme to prevent surprise attack all of the Canadian territory would be made available on a reciprocal basis if the Russians would give a similar undertaking.
The proposal has now been made by the United States and Canada that both countries would throw open their territories to inspection to ensure against surprise attacks if the Russians would do likewise, but the U.S.S.R. wants this system extended to the United States bases in Europe. The United States has said, we will throw open Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, but if we go as far as Europe will you also agree to allow inspections of that kind? It seems to me, however, that without decisions at this time as to the exact location of such inspections we would at least make a start by arranging a meeting of experts to consider effective technical measures which could be taken in the event that such a political agreement were made.
To come back to the Arctic area, it would be easier to establish a system of control and supervision in that region than it would be in the more populous areas of the North American continent; but we must arrive at

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some agreement, however small and paltry it may seem, to take a step forward in order to establish some measure of mutual trust and confidence. We could go on from there to deal with the more difficult areas and more complex problems. We must, however, always be conscious of a dilemma. Every government must be concerned about the security and safety of its people. Any government which failed in that respect would be guilty of a grave sin.
On the other hand, if we are not going to think about the possibility of disarmament, if we are not going to endeavour to take some steps, what is the situation ahead of us and of the world? There is a certain inevitability, an inexorable result, that might flow from a continuation of the building up of armaments on this side and on that side. That is what I meant when I used the word "dilemma" in terms of national and international security. We will have to break that down and give our people some assurance that we do not admit the abiding necessity of building up armaments, and that we intend -to use an expression that I employed in this house some months ago-to keep our powder dry and at the same time endeavour to make some advance in establishing mutual trust and confidence and come to some understanding with the U.S.S.R. I cannot believe that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. any more than the Canadian people want to go on and on in building up armaments. Indeed, there are suggestions and signs that it concerns them economically now as well as in terms of the possibility of an international conflict that would destroy the governments and many people of all countries.
I should now like to refer to another device of the U.S.S.R., and that is the economic device to the end that they might obtain and could obtain world domination. They have been infiltrating into countries in various parts of the world that are not yet committed to the U.S.S.R., to the communist group, and not committed to the west. By economic penetration, by barter systems and loans and other means they are making advances in that regard. To me that might mean that they will win the victory in their search for world domination without ever firing a shot. I regard this as one of the most urgent aspects of our foreign relations and one of our major contributions to peace, the aid and assistance particularly of underdeveloped countries, and I know I speak for the Canadian government when I say this. There are measures that are being taken-but I think they should be increased-to respond to this challenge.
With respect to Canada's role, during the past year we have continued to support the Colombo plan and the specialized agencies

within the United Nations. Indeed, in several instances the support has been increased as compared with the year before.
The Colombo plan operates under the broad umbrella of an annual consultative conference. It really works out, though, that the assistance is given by bilateral arrangements between Canada and some other country, and out of these arrangements come discussions that have to do with the plans and priorities of the recipient country. There has been no suggestion on Canada's part, and I think it is wise and will be effective in the long run, of any political strings attached to the gifts.
With respect to the Colombo plan, there are two countries that are not within the Colombo plan but for which we have a deep concern, namely Ghana and the British West Indies. This house has been informed of the contributions that have been made to Ghana in terms of personnel and to the British West Indies also in terms of personnel. I will not take the time of the house to inform you with respect to the men who are now in those two countries, men who are particularly well qualified in their own chosen field, in order that they may assist these newly emerging countries and also help them to help themselves. The bulk of Canada's aid, however, is now under the Colombo plan which is being directed to those parts of the world for which we have a special concern.
With respect to economic aid, I would remind the house that Canada has contributed to the establishment and the sustenance of the international bank for reconstruction and development, and we would hope that agency could be strengthened. We can take pride that Canada, on a per capita basis, is the second largest contributor to United Nations technical assistance; but getting away from the per capita yardstick, Canada is the fifth country of the world in terms of total contributions to the United Nations in her technical assistance and relief programs.
Hon. members may recall-I am certain that those who were members of the committee on external affairs last session will recall-that there was much consideration given to the possibility of establishing a fund within the United Nations to be known as SUNFED. That concept as conceived at the United Nations was given up and in its place there was proposed the establishment of a special fund. This proposal was referred to a preparatory committee of the United Nations on which Canada was represented. The economic and social council is now considering the report of this preparatory committee, and at the next general assembly the final details should be settled and a new instrument of United Nations aid achieved. Canada has indicated that it would consider making an

appropriate contribution to this fund provided that the organizational arrangements are well designed and provided that there is broad support for the proposal among, particularly, the contributor nations.
During the last session information was given to the house with respect to Canada's extension of its aid in terms of flour and wheat in emergency situations.
I would go back for a moment to the West Indian contribution. I recall that a few weeks ago the hon. member for Laurier asked a question with respect to the giving by Canada of a steamship for interisland communication in the British West Indies. I intimated then that there would be a team of shipping and shipbuilding experts sent from Canada. That team has been to Port of Spain and has now returned. We expect that a report will be made in due course concerning the specifications for the new ship that Canada has undertaken to build and give to the British West Indies.
We will be holding a conference with respect to trade and economic matters within the commonwealth at Montreal in September of this year. There will be on the agenda of that conference an item relating to the economic progress of the underdeveloped parts of the commonwealth. I am confident that through those discussions Canada can make a further contribution in respect of those nations to which I referred, a contribution not only of capital but also in terms of technical assistance. I should not like to leave the impression that under the Colombo plan and other systems of aid to underdeveloped countries Canada has forgotten underdeveloped countries that are not members of the commonwealth. The most of our assistance, however, has gone to the commonwealth countries and, as I intimated a moment ago, further thought will be given to these matters in the context of the Montreal meeting.
My foregoing remarks have to do with countering the movements of the U.S.S.R. in the economic field. Indeed it is a fact, Mr. Speaker, that the west has given more and has been giving more for a longer time to underdeveloped parts of the world than the Soviet bloc. They are paying us the compliment now of following our activities in that regard, but you may be sure that their gifts always have a political string attached to them. I do not think we should ever endeavour to counter every Soviet gesture. We should work steadily, in co-operation with the people of those countries, within their plans and priorities in our earnest desire to help them and to bring reality to their hopes. In this way we can best counter the
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Russian activities in this regard and we can contribute to the peace and prosperity of the world.
I eagerly look forward to this debate and to the discussion in the meetings of the committee on external affairs, to the end that in the formulation of its external policy and in the implementation of this policy, Canada can speak with a strong voice.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, the house will, I am sure, have listened with great interest and appreciation to the statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. He has covered many important subjects, more particularly perhaps one which is very much in our minds at the present time. If he will permit me to use the expression, in recent days he has been a winged mercury flying backward and forward from here to New York, to Washington, in the search with others for a solution to an international crisis which is centred in a part of the world which may seem to be very far from Canada but which in terms of its effect is very close to Canada. He has been seeking a solution which, if it can be found, will reduce tensions and strengthen security and which, if it cannot be found, will add to those tensions and diminish that security.
I know the minister must have had a very exhausting time in recent days. I know that his work has been not only exhausting but at times it must have been frustrating, but I know also he has found it rewarding and that he has received great satisfaction out of the opportunity he has been given. I know too that he has taken full advantage of that opportunity in making on behalf of the government a contribution to the search for international peace and security, which is a search in which we are all engaged in one form or another.
I can assure him and the government on behalf of the opposition that our good wishes go with them in the work he is doing, and we wish him well. He has covered some important subjects. There are some, of course, which he has not had the time to cover and this resolution before us now, which will permit the setting up of the committee on external affairs, will give us a chance in the committee to go into some of these matters which we have not the opportunity of discussing today.
There are many subjects and there is little time. I would like to begin by making a reference-and it will be only a brief reference; some of my colleagues may follow it up later-to the United Nations and its activities in recent weeks and months. It has shown itself once again to be an indispensable piece of international machinery even when it has

External Affairs
not been effective. We have once again had driven in upon us that when trouble starts and when the big powers do not want to get into it, or want to get out of it after they have got into it, they go to the United Nations and seek-and it is right, of course, that they should seek-ways out of their difficulty through our world organization.
The United Nations now, as in the past, is being asked-thank goodness it is being asked -to come to the rescue, to stop trouble spreading. But while that is a vital role to be playing, especially at this time, even more important is the role of the United Nations in preventing trouble. We sometimes forget -the minister reminded us of this aspect of its work today-that trouble-preventing role, that positive and constructive role of the United Nations in the humanitarian, social, economic and co-operation fields; but the core and centre of its responsibilities are its political activities in its efforts to prevent war. That, of course, is where we encounter at the United Nations and elsewhere our real difficulty.
Perhaps the best example of that difficulty has been given by the minister himself in his statement this morning, when he referred to the work in the United Nations and indeed of committees outside the United Nations on disarmament, the agonizing attempt which has been made now for so many years-and I recall when it began with the old League of Nations in the late 1920's-the efforts to reconcile security and disarmament and to decide which comes first.
I welcome the white paper which the minister has been good enough to table this morning and which will perhaps give us the basis for a useful discussion of this matter in the committee on external affairs.
We are getting toward the end of July. This reminds us that the United Nations annual assembly will soon be taking place. I have no doubt that the Canadian government are now beginning to discuss and decide what attitude they should adopt at this assembly. I would like, if I might, to mention three things in which I think it might be helpful if Canada could take the initiative. Indeed, I think in at least one matter Canada has already taken an initiative. That initiative might be followed up. The first matter is I think of great importance at the present time, an importance which should not be obscured by the immediate international crisis in the Middle East which occupies so much of our time and attention, if it can be done-and I do not know where it can be done except at the United Nations-is to try to halt the spread of the manufacture of nuclear weapons to other than the three countries which now do manufacture them.

I quite appreciate the difficulties in the way. For that purpose would it not be desirable to explore at the forthcoming United Nations assembly the possibility of a resolution which might get the necessary acceptance and which would embody a self-denying principle accepted by all the other members of the United Nations in regard to the prohibition in their own territory of the manufacture of any atomic weapon of any kind? It is frightening enough to have those weapons made in three countries. It will be much more frightening if that manufacture is spread to countries all over the world, and that will happen if something is not done about it because the techniques and the procedures in regard to those matters are becoming known.
It will not be long before there will be a number of governments, some perhaps in the control of people whom we may not trust- I have no particular area of the world in mind when I say that but it may happen in the future-that may all have access to weapons which can destroy the world. While the situation is bad enough now, surely that is infinitely more frightening.
Then there is another matter which is related to the one I have mentioned. I refer to the suspension of tests of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. I think we in Canada should now push the initiative at the United Nations for the abolition of these tests over a period of let us say five years, without any conditions being attached except that of United Nations supervision which, of course, is an important one.
Then there is a third matter which does not involve taking the initiative because Canada has been pressing this at the United Nations for some time, and I believe did so at the last assembly. Is this not a good opportunity in the light of what has happened in the last few months to press forward for the establishment of a permanent United Nations police force? I hope to have something to say about that a little later. Perhaps the atmosphere now is more conducive to progress in that regard than it was a year or two years ago. These, then, are three matters which perhaps might be pushed at the forthcoming assembly of the United Nations.
I come now to the matter to which I shall devote most of my time, as the minister quite rightly did; the situation in the Middle East and more particularly in Lebanon and Jordan. This situation developed quickly, at least in its more critical manifestations of recent days. I know the difficulties the government must have had in trying to make up its mind without very much warning as to the policy that should be pursued. In

appreciation of those difficulties and with some understanding, as we should have, of the responsibilities incumbent upon us, the opposition attempted to be as constructive as possible during these days, not to ask questions merely for the sake of asking questions or which might confuse an already complicated situation and, indeed, to do nothing which would prejudice the maximum degree of unity in this house and throughout the country over an issue which transcends and I hope will continue to transcend partisan considerations. When peace is threatened- and peace was threatened and perhaps still is-we must all be as united as possible in the house and in the country.
That has been the spirit that has animated us on this side during recent days; nevertheless we have our responsibilities as an opposition, and we must discharge them in a way which will result in questions addressed to the government on various aspects of policy. Indeed, we have also a duty to put forward proposals ourselves when we think that is desirable, so I am going to deal with the Middle East question in somewhat more detail than I confess I have ever been called upon to do before either on this side or the other side of the house, and the reason for that is obvious. I am going to try, if I can, to put the problem in perspective, and that will perhaps require a little more discussion of the historical background than would normally be the case.
As I have said, the problem is greater and deeper than its recent manifestations, because they are merely the reflection of a situation which is deep-rooted, difficult and dangerous. That situation, that problem-and it certainly is an international problem-is the emergence of a passionate Arab nationalism which expresses itself at times in bitter and even savage anti-foreignism or anti-imperialism as they more often call it. Perhaps we should not forget that as we have to face the immediate problems that arise from day to day out of this situation.
The situation in its historical perspective has been well put by Professor Smith of the school of Islamic studies at McGill University in his book, "Islam in Modern History", when he says:
For 75 years the Arab has got up in the morning, has lived his life, has pursued his pleasures and his dreams, always under the shadow of guns- guns in alien, unfriendly hands, ready to fire, ready to call in from across the sea more guns, ships, tanks, planes, might. Whether this power was used, as from time to time it shatteringly was, or was merely threatened, as often it cogently could be, or was merely there, always the shadow, the shame, the oppression remained. Whether terror or insult, provocation or opiate, this bitter foreign power has stood, an abiding fact. Any thought
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about the Arab world uncoloured by the vivid imagination of this dominating reality is unfruitful, misleading, false.
I know that this feeling, expressed so graphically in this quotation, is fomented, exploited and when possible directed by the forces of the international communist conspiracy and also-and we should not forget this-by Russian imperialism, which is something else. But without communism there would still be trouble in the Middle East and there would still be Russia with her eyes and ambitions on her historic goal in the Mediterranean. That, Mr. Speaker, is the historical background against which we have to consider the crisis facing us today.
Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, this would be a good time for me to ask you to call it one o'clock.
At one o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 2.30 p.m.


Mr. Speaker:: I understand the house leader wishes to revert to motions to deal with a matter relating to the procedure of the house. Does the minister have leave?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Howard Charles Green: The suggestion has been made, Mr. Speaker, that in view of the importance of this debate on external affairs the house should not take the hour this afternoon for discussion of private bills. This course is quite satisfactory to the government, and we have arranged among the three parties that the debate on external affairs should continue right through.


Mr. Speaker:: Does the house give unanimous consent to an order dispensing with the period for private and public bills at five o'clock today?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Smith (Hastings-Frontenac):
That items numbered 85 to 111, inclusive, item numbered 502, items numbered 542 to 549, inclusive, and item numbered 655, as listed in the main and supplementary estimates 1958-59, relating to the
[Stage Direction]
External Affairs
Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
Lester Bowles Pearson: External Affairs
peace in the Middle East; and also recognition of Arab nationalism based on Arab countries free of Soviet communist threats, free of penetration and subversion, each one governing itself as it desires without interference from or without interfering in neighbouring states.
The second objective is collective security for defence against aggression. That certainly has been an objective of the British government over recent years in this area. The west, led by the British government, has tried to promote that objective of collective security through the Baghdad pact, which, we must not forget, it was hoped would embrace all the Arab states but which has never succeeded in doing so. However, it has split the Arab world into two camps, with the United Kingdom and the United States in one camp or at least with the United States half way in that camp and the other forces in the other camp.
I suggest that the third end that is being sought is security for oil supplies in that area which are vitally important to the whole economy of western Europe and, to a lesser extent, to other parts of the world; the security of navigation through the Suez canal, and the maintenance of legitimate western economic and other interests in the area.
Finally, I suggest as an objective of western policy in that area the right of Israel to a national existence within recognized and agreed boundaries. Of course there have been other objectives and policies, but perhaps these are the main ones.
A couple of weeks ago the violent and sudden overthrow of a friendly regime in Iraq seemed to strike at those policies and to foreshadow not only the end of the Baghdad pact but the revolutionary absorption of Lebanon and Jordan into the United Arab Republic; hence the intervention.
Again the question arises, does the intervention which has taken place strengthen and safeguard the objectives I have mentioned or does it serve to prevent some of the undesirable results which I have also mentioned? I doubt the first, though I admit the pressure which appeared to necessitate intervention at the time. I also admit the possibility of unhappy consequences if the action had not been taken. Presumably there was not very much time. That is one of the tragedies of international affairs these present days; there is never enough time to assess the consequences of action or no action. Presumably on this occasion there was not enough time, certainly not very much time, in which to weigh the disadvantages or advantages of intervention or no intervention because-and this is one of the most worrying features of the whole situation so far as

I am concerned-the outbreak in Iraq seems to have caught the western countries which have the most in the way of intelligence services completely by surprise. Yet we are now told by the authors of this revolution that they had been plotting it for months and years.
It is also now clear, and the minister mentioned this this morning-at least I believe he mentioned it, though if I am misinterpreting what he said he will correct me -that the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States are anxious to liquidate their intervention as quickly as possible and replace their forces by those once again, of the United Nations, for the important purpose of establishing and maintaining the right of Lebanon and Jordan not to be gobbled up, if I can put it that way. That is an understandable policy on the part of London and Washington because it is difficult, at least it is difficult for me, to see anything but difficulty ahead if this intervention has to be maintained.
We ask ourselves this question. Will the United States intervention in Lebanon increase the interference and aid for the rebels from outside, to prevent which was one of the purposes of the intervention? We read in the newspapers today, that the foreign minister of Lebanon is again complaining of assistance to the rebels from outside which he says has increased during the last week.
Another question we can hardly refrain from asking ourselves is what is the continuing objective of the intervention? What happens if King Hussein goes, or if he moves out of Jordan against Iraq? And above all, what effect will this intervention have on Arab nationalism in Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere? Mr. Hanson Baldwin, writing in the New York Times on July 16, had this to say:
Their mere presence-
That is the mere presence of the United States forces.

in Lebanon will be to Arab nationalists like a red rag to a bull-it will do more than any other event since the Port Said attack to knit together Arab nationalists throughout the Middle East and to inflame them . . . the forces of Arab nationalism, symbolized by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, will ultimately be strengthened-not weakened-by the United States action.
The London Economist gave expression to the same thought in a recent edition, and then there is another question that these governments must now be asking themselves. What about the security of the oil pipe lines if popular passions against western intervention should boil over?

However, the most important question of all is what should we do about the situation generally. I was glad to hear the minister say this morning that it is now time to look ahead and perhaps, in attempting to answer the question "What should we do about it?", we are looking ahead. My own effort to answer the question is as follows. I suggest we should recognize that the present situation in the Middle East is very much to the liking of Mr. Khrushchev of the Soviet union, who must be very happy at this western intervention since its major result may well be to stir up anti-western feeling, and who benefits most by this feeling in any part of the world. In that sense perhaps this kind of action is really playing the Russian game. I suggest that Mr. Khrushchev, in spite of all his recent words, may not have any great desire to see the United States and the United Kingdom leave these countries. I believe, however, that he has a very great desire to secure the maximum propaganda out of their being there.
I submit that the second aspect, the second phase of the policy we should adopt, which follows from my answer to the first question, is the withdrawal as soon as possible from these countries by the United Kingdom and the United States, in accordance with the desire they have themselves expressed. However, as we all know it is much easier to land troops in an emergency than it is to withdraw them, and sometimes it is not easy to avoid getting enmeshed even further than was originally intended.
This is where the United Nations comes in, and I am glad to see that that organization is playing its part. The United Nations could help make possible the withdrawal of these forces, which is the desire of the two governments concerned, and perhaps this assistance can now be obtained. It is going to be difficult to negotiate in the security council, as my hon. friend knows, because of the veto used by the Russians with respect to action in that council. Assistance may be obtained, however, through a summit meeting, although a good deal of confusion seems to now be developing over the calling and the composition of such a meeting. It was only a few days ago that we discussed this matter in this house, when Mr. Khrushchev issued his invitation to discuss the Middle East question at a summit meeting.
It seems to me that this was a suggestion which the two powers most concerned, Great Britain and the United States, should have taken up at once, especially in so far as the terms put forward by Mr. Khrushchev regarding the composition were concerned, although they certainly could not have accepted the form of the invitation which was, to
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say the least, offensive in character. Surely, however, they could have replied at once that the invitation was acceptable in the sense that the four powers and the secretary general should meet, and meet quickly, and that the meeting should be held under the auspices of the security council.
I personally felt at that time, and I still feel-even more so in the light of developments in the last day or two-that it would have been a good thing for the security council to have been called together at once. They could have set up a committee of the council to consist of the four countries plus India and the secretary general of the United Nations, as mentioned in the invitation of Mr. Khrushchev. Under the chairmanship of the secretary general that committee could have commenced work right away in any place recommended or chosen by the secretary general, with the agreement of the governments concerned. He may well have chosen, although of course I do not know this, Geneva; and while it is not possible for any summit conference to be held without a good deal of publicity, perhaps there might be a little less publicity in Geneva than on the east side of New York.
I do feel, even more strongly than I did a few days ago, that the represention put forward by Mr. Khrushchev for this meeting was a very advantageous one from the point of view of the west, because of its inclusion of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, India-a member of the commonwealth-and the secretary general. I suggest we are now getting away from that sort of clear-cut composition. The press reports would indicate that there is a good deal of manoeuvring going on, not only as to where the meeting should be held but also as to who should attend. Perhaps a solution will be found in a full meeting of the security council, with additional countries invited who have special interests in the problem, as Mr. Khrushchev has suggested, and after a first or second meeting at the summit in the security council in New York perhaps then the countries which were originally mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev might meet under the chairmanship of the secretary general in private sessions, as indeed was the practice during the Suez discussions at New York I think three years ago this summer.
But I cannot myself feel too optimistic about a full meeting of the security council to discuss Middle Eastern matters in this tense and excitable atmosphere with additional governments invited, as Mr. Khrushchev has suggested, to a number not yet determined; a meeting to be held in New York in public in the United Nations. I am

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afraid it will be difficult to avoid that kind of public meeting becoming an instrument merely of propaganda.
Mr. Walter Lippmann, who is a pretty wise commentator on these matters, I think, had this to say this morning in his column in the Montreal Gazette:
As things stand at this moment, the notion of a summit meeting in the heart of New York city has the characteristic of one of those nightmares in which one feels compelled to do what one desperately does not want to do.
At this time, a public confrontation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev would be a ghastly spectacle, almost certain to poison the air still further with charges and counter-charges.
I do not think we have to be as pessimistic as that but I do hope, and I feel certain my hope is shared by the government, that if this meeting takes place in the full security council in New York, then advantage will be taken at the earliest opportunity of arranging small and confidential meetings of those most concerned to be held under the auspices of the secretary general himself.
There are two other questions to be considered with regard to policy in the Middle East. After withdrawal, the United Nations I think should move in, if the circumstances require it, and if authority can be secured from the security council, or if not from the United Nations assembly. In referring to moving in I do not want to be too dogmatic as to how it should be done. One way would be by a United Nations emergency force, but another would be the way pointed out by the minister this morning, by strengthening the existing United Nations observer group to a point where it might be able to exercise a pacifying and stabilizing influence in the country in which it is operating.
We on this side heard with much satisfaction the statement of the minister to the effect that the government is prepared to support to the fullest extent action to strengthen that group of United Nations observers. It is encouraging to read in the press that the secretary general, without requiring a further resolution from the security council, has already taken advantage of an earlier resolution to strengthen the observer group. This constitutes another debt we owe to a man of exceptional quality, integrity and ability, the secretary general of the United Nations.
What we have been going through during the last two or three weeks-and I mentioned this earlier in my statement, before lunch- has served to underline and emphasize the necessity of a permanent United Nations emergency force. I do not mean by that 20,000 or 25,000 soldiers in a camp of their

own in some country chosen for that purpose. I mean a force consisting of contingents earmarked and available for service at the request of the United Nations authorities; ready to serve at a moment's notice, forces earmarked by other than permanent members of the security council that would be kept available in their own country for such United Nations service.


John George Diefenbaker: Would the hon. gentleman permit a question. He had his experience over the years at the United Nations. Was not that very thing attempted on several occasions, and was it not discontinued because of the fact that it was impossible of attainment? I am not attempting to throw cold water on the suggestion, because I believe in it myself, but I ask the hon. gentleman how that could be achieved in the face of the veto situation.


Lester Bowles Pearson: As the Prime Minister has
pointed out, Mr. Speaker, it was attempted more than once. It was attempted under the provisions of the charter which provide for an international force under the security council. The Prime Minister will remember that at the very beginning of the United Nations an international staff of the permanent members of the security council was set up.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Under article 43.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Under article 43 of the
charter, as my hon. friend mentions. I think that this permanent military staff is still in existence, nominally, and I am not sure that it does not even meet once a month or so. It consists of military officers from permanent members of the council. It was frustrated from the beginning by the failure of those members of the council to agree on anything, let alone building up force behind the charter. While it became clear over the years that it could not be done in that way, the Prime Minister will recall that during the Korean crisis the first steps were taken by which the assembly could move in to organize forces when the security council was paralysed by the veto. That was done by an assembly resolution which was called the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. That was the resolution used during the Suez crisis to build up on an ad hoc basis a force which I believe was of assistance and which I believe is still doing good service in that part of the world.
That was done under emergency conditions. The Prime Minister will remember that within 48 hours of the resolution of the United Nations assembly authorizing the creation of this force, the force was formally in existence, and within 72 hours the first members of the force were on the job. But surely we

should not rely on that kind of thing in an emergency. Surely it would be better using the assembly resolution for this purpose, if we cannot do it through the security council, to set up in the countries concerned -and they would have to be the non-permanent members of the security council, omitting the big powers-contingents which would be available for this kind of service if the assembly or the security council requested it; which would be organized for that purpose and which could move into action without delay.
I know that this has been attempted in the last year. I think it was brought up at the last assembly. X am not in a position to criticize anyone because it has not been done, for we have all been trying to do it. But perhaps this second demonstration in an international crisis of the value of this kind of police organism in permanent existence will give us now more chance of success in following the matter up at the next assembly than we had at previous assemblies. That is all I am putting forward at this time.


Mr. Churchill:: Mr. Speaker, on that point would the hon. gentleman permit a question. The hon. gentleman used the expression "move into action". Did he mean into military action, or would he care to change that expression?


Lester Bowles Pearson: No, Mr. Speaker; that was perhaps a careless expression. I meant that it could be moved into police and supervisory action. I know perhaps as well as most hon. members of the house the limitation of this kind of force and indeed the limitation of this kind of action. This force would be of no value at all as a military force in the normal sense. It could not stand up against a big or a middle power. If there were a dispute between the big powers this force would be futile. But as a police force operating as it did in Palestine, and operating as it might in the Middle East now under the authority of the United Nations for police purposes, it might be of great value. All I am suggesting is that if it has any possible value of that kind, that value would be very greatly increased by having the force ready to go into this kind of action when required.
But more important perhaps than the questions I have brought up as to the future policy toward this area is the necessity of following up this immediate crisis by some kind of economic and political solution for problems of the whole area, and I was delighted to hear the minister express that thought this morning. Withdrawal and perhaps replacement by a United Nations police force will not be enough unless we do some-
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thing about the political and economic difficulties that brought about the situation in the first place.
I recall very well and with a tragic memory that while in the Suez crisis we may have succeeded in producing a United Nations police force which was of help in that crisis, we failed in our major objective, which was to take advantage of that atmosphere of crisis and do something about the political and economic difficulties between Israel and her neighbours which brought about the crisis in the first place. We did nothing on that front; therefore we did not succeed there even though we may have succeeded in the more limited field of preventing the conflict spreading.
We hope we will not make that mistake this time. I know how easy it will be to make such a mistake after the immediate crisis is solved, but I hope that this time the west will try to work out on a firm and permanent basis its relations with those nationalist forces in that area I have been talking about. I believe that for this purpose the west-and I am thinking of the United States, the United Kingdom and France particularly-must base their relations with those countries on the acceptance of Arab nationalism and of the United Arab Republic; must try to bring about as much co-operation as possible with those forces; try to remove the suspicions which have been engendered over the past and which are not by any means all the fault of the west. They must accept the realities of the present and base their policy on the fact that the nineteenth century is dead and is not likely to return.
I suggest something else, and this is going to be even more difficult politically; that our policy in the Middle East in the future must recognize that the U.S.S.R. has both interest and power in that area. Indeed its power in that area is far greater than that which could be produced in the west to bear upon the problems of that area at any given time. I think we must all be very conscious of the fact that while there are 10,000 United States marines in Lebanon and two or three British paratroop battalions in Jordan, there are 23 Soviet divisions, it is reported, strung along the Iran-Turkish border. Therefore it is idle to pretend the Soviet union need only be tolerating that area. It is also idle to deny the fact that the Soviet union has very real interests in that area which perhaps should be recognized.
The minister said this morning that one of the happy developments of recent years, and a development which might be applied to the Middle East, was the successful operation of the international commissions in Indo-China.

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I agree with him, though I also agree with him when he said the time has come to wind up the activities of two of those commissions in the way he mentioned. But he himself also said-and it is an important fact-that in that operation in Indo-China one of the three members of each commission was from a communist state. While it is true that it is a state which is making moves toward communist nationalism, yet at the time it was appointed it was pretty close to the foreign policy and the defence policy of Russia. That was recognized at that time and I was at the Geneva conference when it was accepted that there could be no settlement of the kind desired in Indo-China without a recognition of the participation of the communist world in that settlement. It was done, and the results have not been too bad.
Perhaps if we are going to have a final economic and political settlement in the Middle East we will have to recognize in some appropriate way the interest of the Soviet in that settlement. Perhaps the best way to do that would be to bring any political and economic aid scheme-the minister mentioned it this morning-into the United Nations; a Marshall plan, if you want to call it that, for the Middle East but administered by the United Nations, where perhaps Soviet participation will be less open to exploitation than if it were done in any other way. Indeed they may not wish to participate at all in that kind of plan.
Then finally Mr. Speaker-it will be an important phase of our policy in this area in the future-that we have to continue in the west to give support to Israel's right to a secure national existence. We have got to do more than that with Israel's co-operation and assistance. We have to think of some way of liquidating the Arab refugee problem.
This is a very sketchy outline of the basis of our policy in the Middle East, a policy which I think provides the best hope of strengthening legitimate western influence and strength in that area and at the same time strengthening the chances of peace and security.
The alternative is the pursuit of power politics without sufficient power, or at least sufficient power in the face of the hostility of another and nearer great power which can bring more power to bear on that particular area. That is one alternative, and I certainly hope we will not follow it. But an even worse alternative than that, perhaps, is a policy of drift and uncertainty; of trying to pursue contradictory aims and trying to execute those contradictory aims in a halfhearted and confused way. I suggest the policy which I have ventured to outline in
[Mr. Pearson.l
brief is one of realism and common sense, and one which the west should pursue at this time.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I had hoped to deal with a good many other subjects, but I do not want to take up all the time of the house on this debate. I probably will have another opportunity to discuss these matters. I was going to talk about NATO and its importance in many things, and particularly in this Middle East crisis. I was glad to read in the press this morning that the NATO council is meeting today, as it has been meeting in recent days, to consider developments in the Middle East. It is of the greatest possible importance to strengthen political cooperation through the NATO council not only in the area covered by NATO but in the areas contiguous to the NATO countries which are of vital importance to them.
I also suggest that political co-operation in NATO requires a solution of the difficulties between its members with special interest in the Middle East. Something must be done, for instance to halt the growing bitterness and enmity between the two NATO countries, Turkey and Greece. I have stated a good many times, my view that a military and defence foundation for NATO is not enough, indeed it is necessary now as it was never necessary before to make progress in the field of economic and political co-operation.
Then, Mr. Speaker, there is the most important question of all, and this concerns not merely the Middle East, which is a reflection of the importance of this general question. What can we do at this time to ease tensions and remove or diminish some of the dangers of war? The minister touched upon the matter this morning, but it really deserves far more time than we can give to it in a debate of this kind. But I suggest, however, as I have suggested many times, that we should not allow the crises of the moment to prevent us continuing to seek solutions of our problems with the Soviet union through diplomatic and political channels. We should not only keep our defence strong-we have to do that, though it is a little difficult these days to know what kind of defence should be kept-but we have to keep our diplomacy enlightened and imaginative and vigorous.
The fact that we all feel-and I think we have felt it more in the last two weeks than for quite a long time-the fear of what we call in diplomacy brinkmanship should not obscure the fact that even without that kind of diplomacy, even without those tactics which at times may worry us, even without brinkmanship, we remain on the brink of

extinction. This is true because of the developments in nuclear warfare, because of the piling up of weapons of mass destruction which if they are ever used can make life on this planet impossible. We do not need brinkmanship to emphasize that we are indeed on the brink of that kind of extinction if we allow diplomacy to degenerate into conflict or the world to slide into general war, which is perhaps the only way we will get in. We have existed in this way now for more than 10 years.
We have existed in a world which is bedevilled by a combination, as I have put it before, of hate and hydrogen, of fear and ferocity. That combination still overhangs our life. Our policy surely in this country, and in all free countries, must be to bring about the replacement of that kind of thing by some form of security, on the basis at least of mutual toleration, if we cannot do any better than that, between those who must coexist but cannot co-operate, plus-and this is equally important-closer and closer co-operation between those states which can and must work together for their very survival. That, I suggest to the house, is the only policy that makes sense today. We are all proud as Canadians to know that Canada has played, and I am sure is playing and will continue to play, a good and proud part in the pursuit of that policy. Perhaps I know as well as most Canadians how terribly difficult this part is, how exhausting at times it is and, as I said at the beginning of my statement and as the minister must have found, -how frustrating it often is. At times it seems so much easier to fall back into our foxholes, into our national trenches, to dig ourselves in there and wait for what may happen. Movement is hard and at times we wonder where we are going; or if we are going anywhere. We reach a green pasture and we find that there is a greener pasture beyond. We scale a peak and we find a higher one barring the way. As a poet puts it, "We are forever climbing the ever-mounting slope". But I know all members of the house will agree with me when I say that is no reason for giving up but is a reason for continuing to climb.
I know the house will also agree with me when I say that in this search for peace in a better world all members of the house, irrespective of the party to which they may belong, as indeed all Canadians, will be happy and proud to work together.


Harold Edward Winch: Mr. Speaker, this is without doubt an important day in the present session. An opportunity is accorded for the free expression of the views of members with respect to international
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affairs and the crises that face our country and all countries of the world. It is to me, of course, a very unexpected and unusual experience to have to follow the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) of the present government and the secretary of state for external affairs of the previous government. I am the first one to admit, sir, that I do not know the intricacies and strategies of inner diplomacy as they must be known by the two previous speakers because of the present position of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the past experience of the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson).
Therefore it follows that I do not intend to go into the intricate details of strategy or policy, but I do welcome this opportunity to put forward a few general thoughts from the viewpoint of a layman. I feel quite certain that in taking part in the first discussion of external affairs this session we can all start from the same fundamental belief, namely that nobody wants to see another world war. On that premise we have to consider developments as they occur.
In the present century the major countries of the world have seen two world wars in which countless billions of dollars in productive effort have been expended in the holocaust of war. In addition millions of men, women and children have either died or been mutilated. No one wants to see that happen again, and in saying that we have particular reference to the scientific and technological developments of recent years from which it is known by all that a third world war could possibly mean the annihilation of civilization as we understand it at the present time.
This leads me to make the observation that a world war can start from a spark in international relations in the same way as a catastrophic fire. In my own province of British Columbia right now there are almost one million acres on fire, a fire that could have started from a bolt of lightning, a carelessly thrown match or a cigarette that was not put out. So it is in war. Officially at least the first world war started because an archduke was assassinated. Officially at least the second world war started because of the aggression of one country, because of the insanity of one man.
That leads us, therefore, to the realization that as nobody wants to see another world war, very close attention must be paid to international affairs and relationships to see that with modern weapons, technology and science no spark occurs to lead the world into a conflagration which could mean the end of civilization. If that is accepted, and I think logically it may well be, we have to approach our external affairs and relationships not only on the basis of day to day

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developments but on the basis of what has given rise to these developments.
There may be those who will not agree with me, which is understandable, but I quite honestly feel that if we are truly going to play our part and take every possible action to preserve peace we must understand what gives rise to certain actions by certain countries. In the past few years our major troubles have developed in the Middle East.
I have not yet seen any factual denial that even in connection with the Suez crisis it was not a matter of country against country but was a matter of the protection of oil interests. In these past few weeks we have again seen a Middle East crisis. I believe it would mean a great deal if we could be told whether or not the armed intervention was on an anti-communist basis or for the protection of certain oil interests. Personally, I am not going to state any conclusion, but I do consider this something upon which there has not been any government consideration or public answer.
I am convinced that nobody wants war. We can make the definite statement that Canada does not want war, nor do I believe that any of the western democracies want war. In view of that fact, I am led to ask if Canada could not play a greater part in advising on the present international crisis? We recognize that Canada is not a major power in the world but it is, if I can use the terms, a middle power. It is my definite belief that because Canada at no time has had imperialistic or colonial ambitions, and because of its economic strength Canada could play a most significant role in these very critical days.
When this present Middle East crisis developed I will say I was most disappointed in the first pronouncements that were made by this government. I interpreted them, and I think the majority of the press across Canada interpreted the statements as unqualified support of United States policy. I hasten to add that it was with appreciation and gratitude that, in very short order, we did see leadership and direction coming from the government, and not a supine following of the United States. There was a recognition of the seriousness of the situation, and very definite representations to deal with the crisis. Personally, I feel proud of the direction that was given after the first pronouncement, and I hope that direction may have had some effect upon the developments of recent days and the changed policies. The result has been that Canada has given some leadership on the calling of a summit meeting.
I listened very intently to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) in

what he had to say today, but I have one regret. He failed to give to this house any indication of how strong a position Canada is going to take in view of the recent pronouncements made by, or on behalf of, the President of the United States. We in this corner of the house believed even up until yesterday that some country of the western world had to speak very clearly and bluntly to the United States about its foreign policy with regard to the present Middle East situation. Personally, I cannot understand why, if we truly believe that our economy is the best in the world, that our democracy is the best, we are afraid-when I say "we" I mean as western democratic powers-to meet with anybody else in this world face to face. Quite honestly, Mr. Speaker, I think that the prestige, the influence of the free powers has slipped within the past few days if what appears in the press is correct. According to press reports the government of the United States is disturbed that Khrushchev has accepted the invitation to a summit meeting in New York. There are statements, and perhaps we will have more information about them, that they fear Khrushchev would use such a meeting for propaganda purposes.
I am not going to go into any more detail about that, Mr. Speaker, except to say that if we believe in our way of life, if we believe in our democratic system, then we need have no fear of meeting the leader of any country, any time, anywhere, especially if it may be the basis upon which some agreement may be reached to settle the present mid-eastem crisis and prevent a conflict that could possibly lead to a third world war.
This is a general discussion on external affairs, so may I add this. I know it is of importance to the Prime Minister (Mr. Dief-enbaker) and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, but I direct my remarks in particular to the Prime Minister: I am not in any way derogatory of efforts made by his government or the previous government towards the cessation of nuclear tests or on behalf of world disarmament. But I should like, on behalf of the group in this corner of the house, to ask if still greater emphasis could not De put upon the efforts of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs as between their counterparts in other governments, in the United Nations security council, the United Nations general assembly and special committees, to drive home the absolute essentiality of the cessation of nuclear tests for war purposes and disarmament if we are to avoid another world war.
We must be honest at all times. Today we have a world armament race; you can call it a defence against another country but the

other country is saying the same thing. So whilst we work on defence, we also work on offence. I think the history of the world proves that if you build weapons of offence and defence, eventually you use them. As I said before, I am saying nothing derogatory on what the Prime Minister has worked for in the past. I am just asking that in following up-and I am certain the direction has come from the Prime Minister in the present Middle East crisis-that additional emphasis be placed along the lines which I have just suggested.
We in this group completely agree-and we emphasize this point-that you cannot sit on the fence or play both ends against the middle. The western powers agree on collective security or they do not. We believe in collective security. If we are going to have collective security in the democratic countries it must not be broken down or betrayed. That is why in this house and in our convention which is still going on in Montreal we have expressed our regrets and our condemnation of the countries-yes, of the United States to the south of us and the United Kingdom in which I was born-taking independent action in the landing of troops of their own volition without going through the collective security agency which we are trying to build up, which we support and in which we are all partners. If the United Nations general assembly means anything or if the United Nations security council means anything and if it is going to have a proper respect in this world, it must be because those who are partners in it follow through on collective action. Anything else is not only a betrayal of the meaning of collective security but is making a gift of a propaganda weapon and putting it in the hands of those who we are told are our enemies and who will use it to best advantage.
Mr. Speaker, I said just a few words this afternoon about the exigencies of absence. Very often the Prime Minister, because of the responsibilities of his office, is obliged to be away. We all understand that. Various cabinet ministers, because of their responsibilities and the exigencies of their offices, also are obliged to be away. Private members also very often are obliged to be away. We in our group find ourselves in a similar position because our biennial convention is being held this week and, as I think you will all understand, it is rather important that some M.P.'s be at that convention to discuss national and international politics. Unfortunately, I was not able to be there. However, learning that certain members were not able to return in time for this discussion this afternoon, I was on the telephone for about 30 minutes speaking to a colleague in Montreal in between the
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lunch hour and now. We are a democratic party and hold a democratic convention representative of our movement across the length and breadth of Canada. I said, "I am going to have to speak this afternoon. What is the viewpoint of the national convention representative of our movement all across Canada with regard to the present situation?"


Mr. McCleave:: Are you asking for the party line?


Harold Edward Winch: No. I asked for the democratic decision of our representatives from all across Canada.


Robert Jardine McCleave: Are you asking somebody else to tell you?


Harold Edward Winch: I have been talking here completely extemporaneously. I have not a solitary note. But knowing the kind of thinking that some people do, having expressed myself completely without a solitary note I thought I should give you the decision of our democratic movement; and that will show you up, my friend. This resolution was passed by our movement:
The present crisis in the Middle East is a direct result of the failure of the western powers to evolve a constructive policy based on the legitimate aspirations of the Arab peoples for freedom from outside domination and for social and economic advances and the legitimate aspirations of the people of Israel for a durable and viable peace with their Arab neighbours.
It is also the result of the deliberate subversion of these aspirations by ambitious men and forces both within and without the Middle East.
The C.C.F. has always opposed militarism and totalitarianism in all their forms. It has always censured military intervention whether it be in Hungary, Poland, Suez, Lebanon, Jordan or elsewhere.
It has always urged and urges today that international police action should be undertaken only through the United Nations if peace is to be achieved.
This convention of the C.C.F. therefore condemns the military intervention of the American and British governments in Lebanon and Jordan.
It also censures our own Canadian government which, in the initial stages at least, condoned and supported an action which was clearly an irresponsible risk of nuclear war.
However, the very urgency of the crisis gives the nations of the world an opportunity to lay the foundations of a permanent peace in the area along the following lines:
1.	The American and British forces should be withdrawn immediately, and replaced, if necessary, by a United Nations force composed of nationals of other than the major powers.
2.	In the meantime, all the great powers, as well as the neighbouring states stay out of Iraq.
3.	An immediate meeting at the summit should be held preferably through the United Nations to work out solutions not only for the present crisis, but for the economic and political problems in the area which present a constant threat to the peace of the world.

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4.	A guarantee by the United Nations, to which the great powers are collectively committed, of all the nations in the area, including the state of Israel, against aggressive action.
5.	In order that conditions permitting lasting peace in the Middle East can be established, oil resources should be transferred in a peaceful and orderly fashion to the ownership and control of the Arab peoples and to this end the United Nations should offer to establish an international Middle East development commission, to assist the economic development of the area and ensure the raising of living standards for the people of these areas. Only such a broad and constructive approach to the problems of the area can end the legacy of hatred and dangers that threatens to engulf the whole world.
This convention therefore demands-
They say demand but I say request, sir.
-that the government of Canada pursue these policies unequivocally and vigorously at the United Nations and seek to unite all middle and small powers in a determined effort to achieve a peaceful and constructive settlement of the perilous situation in the Middle East.
I had a very good reason, Mr. Speaker, for wanting to place on the record at this time a decision made only within recent hours at the national convention of the C.C.F. This was because on the occasion of another debate in this house, when we were discussing national and international affairs, some hon. members, including the Prime Minister-as a matter of fact it was the Prime Minister who raised the issue and said that I and other members were saying something different to what had been passed at a provincial convention. This was when we were discussing NORAD and the Prime Minister read a news report with a good deal of relish. I do not blame him, for it was good politics. But I am a federal member, we are all federal members, in this house, and in the Prime Minister's party and in that of the Liberals and also among ourselves there are differences of opinion in localities and provinces, but national and international policy is laid down in the C.C.F. by a national convention. This is the national convention policy on the issue which we now face and I give it to the house unequivocally.
I am now about to draw my remarks to a dose. I am sure the Prime Minister knows the importance of this matter but I wish to commend to his attention the fact-and this I wish to emphasize-that Canada can exercise great influence and leadership but that the guidance must come from the Prime Minister himself through, of course, his ministers. I think upon consideration he will agree that emphasis would not be misplaced on the banning of nuclear tests and the working towards disarmament in this crisis or in any future one. That action should not be taken by individual countries but only under the United Nations as a collective action when it is found to be necessary in the

interest of the maintenance of peace. Forces should not, moreover, be landed in any country in the uniform of any particular nation but only under the aegis of the United Nations emergency force.
The Prime Minister and I, belonging as we do to different parties, perhaps have a different outlook on fundamental philosophy, politically speaking, but we have had two world wars in our time and nobody wants another. It is unfortunate that power politics are being played by two great nations but it is my belief that this country, small as it may be, might nevertheless be able by its sense of direction and sanity to maintain peace throughout the world. I am but one of a group of eight members in this house, but this is my thinking which I commend to the Prime Minister for his consideration.


Hon. Alvin Hamilton (Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to take advantage of this debate on external affairs to report to the house on Canada's participation in a very important international gathering which took place some three or four months ago. It will not of course be on the lofty level on which this debate has so far been conducted but it will be a proud story nevertheless.
I am going to digress if I may-I feel in one way that I should not, but I cannot help but pass this observation. I am sure the house listened with interest to the statement of policy of the C.C.F., particularly because many of us recall the varieties of C.C.F. policies on international affairs over the years. Back in the thirties, particularly around 1935 to 1937, the policy of the C.C.F. was, I believe, pacifism; by 1940, after our troops had gone abroad, the policy was to withdraw them from Europe and to sell our goods to both sides and to let the imperialistic powers fight it out; but 1945 the slogan was "Vote for the C.C.F. and help win the war". The varieties and shifts in C.C.F. policy will make one of the most interesting studies in Canada's history when the time comes some day to write the story of the rise and fall of this party.
My story today, however, deals with the international conference on the law of the sea held at the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva between February 24 and April 28 of this year. Sometimes in our preoccupation with the high principles and great hopes of the peoples of the world for the achievement of a family of nations living at peace with one another we forget the ordinary workaday procedures of the many hundreds of delegates and representatives of various countries who work, without the bright lights of publicity upon their

efforts, and yet move steadily forward in man's progress towards a more peaceful state. This report is a record of one of the more prosaic but none the less tangible steps forward made by mankind in its long and slow progress towards a peaceful civilization.
This conference is one of the most significant of international conferences of recent years and one that has achieved far-reaching results. It is true that much more was heard of the failure of the conference to reach agreement on the matter of fishing limits and the breadth of the territorial seas but may I remind the house and the nation that this was merely one article of 73. One hardly ever hears of the articles passed and which became part of international law, but this conference dealt with problems which were very complex and which had a tremendous range of conflicting interests, namely those of 86 different nations. In order to achieve any sort of agreement with so much complexity and among so many nations is in itself a very substantial achievement.
It will, I know, be a source of satisfaction to hon. members on all sides of the house to learn that during the deliberations the Canadian delegation played a leading role and its contribution, throughout the nine weeks of the conference, will long be remembered as one of the outstanding features of the conference. A good deal of the credit for this must go to the Honourable George Drew who gave such vigorous and imaginative leadership to the Canadian delegation and to the able and devoted team of officials who assisted Mr. Drew as members of that delegation. During my own brief visit to Geneva I was able to observe at first hand that Mr. Drew was regarded on all sides as one of the persons playing a very major part in the conference and one to whom the success of many of the negotiations was due.
It is worth while recalling here that the last conference of a similar type on the law of the sea was held at The Hague in 1930. It was known as The Hague codification conference. At that time some 40 nations participated and the international conference broke down on a single issue, the question of the breadth of the territorial sea. Twenty-eight years later with twice as many nations participating it seems rather significant that this same obstacle to agreement did not bring the conference to failure. The significant thing is that the participants achieved many things that went far beyond anything achieved in the whole history of international law since mankind first began to keep its history.
Specifically, the conference produced four international conventions as well as a protocol providing for the judicial settlement
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of disputes. These four conventions were (1) a convention on the high seas; (2) a convention on fishing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas; (3) a convention on the continental shelf; and (4) a convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone. It was on April 29 that Mr. Drew signed these conventions on behalf of Canada as well as the protocol on the settlement of disputes and the final act of the conference. I might say that Canada was the first nation to sign all six of the instruments embodying the results of the conference. The four conventions and the protocol on the settlement of disputes are, of course, subject to ratification by the government of Canada and will not enter into force until ratified by at least 22 nations. Copies of these conventions have already been tabled by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) and are reported in Votes and Proceedings of July 15.
Before dealing in more detail with the conventions and their significance to Canada it might be of interest to provide a little background on the events leading up to the conference and the method of work adopted by the conference. The conference was called as a result of a resolution by the general assembly of the United Nations on February 21, 1957-Resolution 1105X1. It grew out of the studies and recommendations made over the years by the international law commission of the United Nations which had been meeting since the initial formation of the United Nations in 1946. The commission had given very intensive study to all aspects of maritime law and then produced an extremely comprehensive report. It provided for 73 articles and was a compilation of all the rules of the sea which have been adopted over the years by the various nations. These 73 recommendations or rules have two different aspects to them. On the one hand they sought to codify all existing international law where there was already in existence extensive practice, precedent and doctrine. Then, on the other hand, they were concerned with the progressive development of international law on matters such as the continental shelf that were as yet largely unregulated because 30 years ago at The Hague conference they hardly thought of such a thing. And then, in addition, the conference was asked by the general assembly to consider a matter not included within the compass of the international law commission report the question of access to the sea by landlocked countries.
After a brief plenary session the conference resolved itself into five committees of the whole, each of which was charged with the

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consideration of a group of related articles. The results of the committees' work were considered in the final plenary sessions during the last week of the conference. The committees and the subject matter referred to each were as follows: committee I, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, and specifically articles 1 to 25 and article 66 of the original I.L.C. report; committee II, the high seas, general regime, and specifically articles 26 to 48 and 61 to 65; committee III, the high seas, fishing, and specifically articles 48 to 60; committee IV, the continental shelf, and specifically articles 67 to 73; and committee V, access to the sea of landlocked countries. That was a new subject to be discussed at the conference itself. It will be seen that the breakdown of the conference into these five committees follows in general the subjects of the conventions I have already listed.
It may be of interest at this point to comment briefly on some of the results of the conference which were of particular significance to Canada. In commenting on this I might point out that for the first time in history there is now an international agreement on the continental shelf. I mention this first because it is usually lost sight of because this subject was uneventful in terms of news coverage and as far as producing quarrels or differences is concerned.
The continental shelf convention gives to the coastal state sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the sea bed and subsoil off its coast out to a depth of 200 meters. It also provides that these rights may be exercised beyond that depth if the exploitation of the resources is a practical possibility. In the long term, this agreement may have consequences of far-reaching importance to Canada in the development of underwater oil and mineral resources. It means, in effect, a very substantial addition to the potential area of Canada's natural resources. Those who have followed with interest the development of techniques in the exploration of resources know that we can drill for oil at depths of 1,500 feet under the surface of the sea.
It is not without significance that it was a proposal put forward by Canada in committee IV that led to the adoption of the convention on the continental shelf nor is it without significance that it was a Canadian proposal to the final plenary session that led to a prohibition against reservations to the three main substantive articles in the convention. To have permitted these reservations might have undermined the whole purpose of the convention. Finally, it was not without significance that it was Canada which

proposed that this convention should enter into force when signed by 22 nations instead of 50 as proposed by another power.
The second convention dealt with fishing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. The convention on high seas fishing is the first such general convention regulating high seas fishing and it accords well with Canadian interests. It recognizes the special interest of the coastal state in maintaining the productivity of the living resources of the high seas in areas adjacent to its territorial sea. It also entitles the coastal state to take part on an equal footing in any system of research or regulation for purposes of conservation in that area even though its own nationals may not carry on fishing there. To all people who understand the importance of fishing to underdeveloped countries, the significance of this particular article is self-evident. Further, it provides that when conservation measures in the high seas have been adopted by a coastal state, they must be observed by fishermen from other countries. And then finally, under emergency circumstances, coastal states may unilaterally enact the necessary conservation measures on the high seas.
The third important feature to Canada was the question of straight base lines and bays. To those of us who live in the island portions of Canada the fact that our coastline is very irregular hardly comes to our attention but in trying to define territorial waters the sinuosity of our coastline is a matter that gives us considerable concern and therefore these regulations in this regard, as drafted and codified by this international law of the sea, are very important to the future of our country.
In the convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, article 4 provides that where the coast is deeply indented the method of drawing straight base lines from headland to headland may be followed in setting the boundary of the territorial sea rather than following the sinuosities of the coastline. I think the importance of that can be realized. Thirdly, our shoreline now in so far as the territorial sea is concerned is not the line of the high water mark or the low water mark; it is a line drawn from headland to headland. This provision, which reflects the 1951 decision in the well-known Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case is of particular interest to Canada because much of our coastline is deeply indented, as I have already pointed out.
In the committee stage there was a move to impose a limitation of 15 miles on straight baselines which would have had undesirable

results for us. However, action by Canada in the plenary session was successful in having this limitation removed. The conference also adopted a provision recognizing that bays with mouths of 24 miles or less are to be regarded as internal waters. This limitation would not, of course, affect bays along coasts where the baseline system is applicable.
The fourth convention deals with the general law of the high seas. The convention on the high seas has perhaps less significance for Canada than the others because, in the main, it simply codifies existing international law. It provides for the first time a systematic compilation of recognized international law on a number of important matters and seeks to ensure the maximum freedom of the high seas. This applies not only to navigation but to fishing on the high seas, flying over the high seas and such activities as the laying of submarine cables and the building of pipe lines under the high seas.
Among other things, the convention deals with such matters as the nationality of ships, safety of life at sea, the suppression of piracy and the slave trade, the right of hot pursuit in certain circumstances and the prevention of pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil or the dumping of radioactive waste. It was, Mr. Speaker, a very thorough compilation of the existing laws of the sea into a code which we now hope will be ratified by the great majority of the nations of the world.
I have referred in brief summary, Mr. Speaker, to some of the highlights of the four conventions. Now I would like to turn to the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and the related question of coastal fishing zones. It is on this subject, of course, that the publicity was given which attracted such widespread public interest. It is unfortunate in one way that this aspect of the conference's work reached so much public interest because it tended to obscure many of the more constructive achievements of the conference. I would like to give some of the background of this matter of the breadth of the territorial sea to see whether we cannot make clear what the problem is and the importance of Canada's contribution so far and what we think it can be in the future.
There has been no uniform practice, Mr. Speaker, in so far as the breadth of the territorial sea is concerned. Generally speaking, the great maritime nations have accepted and enforced the three-mile territorial sea off the coasts of the various countries of the world. Many countries for many years have had breadths of the territorial sea off their countries of more than three miles. There are 57071-3-169
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countries with a four-mile territorial sea; there are several with a six-mile territorial sea and there is one with a nine-mile territorial sea-that is Mexico-and the Soviet union has a 12-mile territorial sea. Some go beyond that, even to the extent of 200 miles. This great variety of claims on the breadth of the territorial sea indicates that there is no such thing as uniformity. Generally speaking, the maritime powers have insisted on and recognized only three miles, even though there has not been any direct challenge to the countries that have territorial seas of different widths. As a matter of interest, the U.S.S.R. has a territorial sea of 12 miles, going back to the days of the Czars and it is not likely that anyone is going to challenge anything that has been in existence for over 50 years.
Having given this background, I think it is now fitting for me to point out that this problem was so complex that the international law commission did not make any definite recommendations to this general conference of the United Nations on this matter, but simply pointed out that 12 miles in its opinion was the maximum limit that they thought should exist. Now, for some time Canada has felt that a 12-mile limit was necessary to protect our fishing interests but we have recognized that an extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles might jeopardize the proper interests of those nations and those people who want to maintain freedom of the sea and freedom for air navigation. Therefore, our dilemma was, how could we reconcile the defence interests, freedom of the seas and the freedom of the air, which really requires a very narrow territorial sea, and the needs of our people on our coasts for some priority in harvesting the fish off their shores?
It is a matter of general knowledge, Mr. Speaker, that at the present time by Canadian law we have forbidden Canadian trawlers to fish within 12 miles of our coasts, and yet, because there is no international law, the trawlers from foreign nations can come inside our 12-mile limit and do fish in waters that the Canadian people do not allow Canadian trawlers to fish in. Quite frankly, we would like to reserve those first 12 miles off our shores for the people who cannot afford the big trawlers and who would like to make a living out of this band of water that they can get to and from with their limited resources as far as capital equipment is concerned.
Now, that was the problem that we faced at this conference, and this goes back for several months and years. The Canadian government proposed what became known as the Canadian proposal. This was first put


Harold Edward Winch: I rise on a point of order. I do this because the minister has said he is drawing to a conclusion. I have not raised the question before, and I think in this I have been considerate. I should like to know under which of the items, 85 to 111, 502 and 542 to 549 this matter comes for discussion? I deliberately waited until the minister had completed his remarks, but I should like to know under which of the items mentioned in this motion the matter to which the minister has referred can be discussed.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: I am not an
authority on the matter of estimates, but I am sure in these estimates you will find an item covering the expenses of delegations to overseas conferences. I believe it is also the practice, during these debates on external

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affairs, for ministers who have been representing their country at international conferences to take this opportunity to give a report to the house on these important conferences.


Harold Edward Winch: I do not deny that for one moment. I am very happy if the minister and other ministers want to do that. However, I am referring to the motion now under discussion. I feel I was very considerate in not raising the matter until now, but I do believe, sir, it should be drawn to your attention that this is a discussion of external affairs. The opportunity was provided by the government for that particular purpose. We have heard a most interesting summary from the minister but, as a point of order, I should like to know under what item contained in the motion the minister can discuss this subject?


Lester Bowles Pearson: On the point of order, surely it is the practice in the house, under the first item of the estimates of a department, to have a general discussion of any item of international affairs. Surely, then, it is in order for the minister to discuss any international conference under that item.
May I ask the minister, before he takes his place, two questions in connection with what he has been saying. Can he tell us whether the policy and attitude of the Soviet union in regard to the Canadian proposal for the width of the territorial sea was the same as that of the United Kingdom, the United States and France? Would he also inform the house whether the Canadian government is going to recognize the action taken unilaterally by Iceland since the conference in establishing its own jurisdiction over a 12-mile zone irrespective of the results of the conference?


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: I do not mind dealing with these questions, because they are pertinent and should be answered.


Harold Edward Winch: May I ask whether or not we are going to deal now with the point of order? I should like to hear from the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) as to the authority for continuing with this report.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: Estimate No.
90.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: I believe that on item 1 of the estimates a discussion of a general nature can take place. Naturally, it is preferable to adhere as closely as possible to matters pertaining to external affairs. I do consider that the minister's remarks have been in order to date, and I cannot rule him out of order.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: I have just about concluded. I was pointing out that in this very important part of Canada's external relations, a part that does not show on the surface, delegations do go to conferences and achieve worth-while results. I have been asked two very important questions by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson). The first question was, what was the stand of the U.S.S.R.? At the conference the U.S.S.R. had a proposal that the width of the territorial sea should be 12 miles. Then they had an additional clause, over which the lawyers argued back and forth, which would seem to indicate that they believed the territorial sea should be 12 miles or more in certain cases. Their stand, informally, was that they would give support to the Canadian proposal, but that declaration was never made formally on the conference floor. However, countries like India and Mexico, had the definite impression that the U.S.S.R. and their satellite countries were very much in favour of guaranteeing to coastal states exclusive fishing rights for 12 miles.
Canada co-sponsored a proposal with Mexico and India, which more or less accepted the status quo by limiting the territorial sea to what nations already had in effect, and gave exclusive fishing rights up to 12 miles. When the Indians and Mexicans found out the Russians among others were not going to support this, they withdrew and our coalition fell apart. We went back to our original proposal. I might say that the attitude of the smaller nations, if I can report this accurately and I think I can, was one of intense disappointment that the U.S.S.R. position had been one thing in discussion but when the votes were down, and when it seemed possible Canada would get a two-thirds majority, they backed away from supporting us. This affected the good feeling that had existed between the U.S.S.R. and the Afro-Asian nations.
The second question deals with Iceland. We opposed at the conference the idea of any change any nation might make unilaterally, in the hope that there would be no unilateral declarations before a second conference. Since that time Iceland has declared that on September 1 she will have a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone off her territory. As you know, this has been opposed by the United Kingdom. Our stand is still the same. We do not think the answer lies in any nation unilaterally trying to establish any changes in the breadth of the territorial sea or establishing fishing rights in a larger zone, so long as there is any hope of achieving agreement through the United Nations.

Naturally enough, we would oppose such a matter being dealt with in any smaller regional groups because the subject affects nations all over the world. We have an obligation to our allies in this struggle to give to coastal nations some share of fishing off their coasts. We hope that these two civilized nations, Iceland and the United Kingdom, meeting together in some form of bilateral understanding, can resolve these differences or postpone them until they can be dealt with by the United Nations conference, which I hope will come next year.
I should like to repeat that I am quite confident, once we can get rid of the impact of these power blocs and the issue can be clearly dealt with on an economic basis that a decision can be arrived at supported by two-thirds of the nations of the world. If we can achieve some modus vivendi among traditional fishing countries in this period of adjustment, civilized nations dealing with this on a purely economic basis could resolve these differences. If we can achieve agreement on this article dealing with the breadth of the territorial sea and the breadth of the fishing zone off the coasts of our country, we will have achieved something that mankind has looked forward to for nearly 2,000 years.
I should like to close with a statement of my own as far as the visit to Geneva is concerned. I think I can report to the house, as can every other Canadian delegate who has been to any of these international conferences, the growing respect for Canada by people all over the world for our moderation and for the principles on which we operate. I think that we can play a great part which the United Kingdom and the United States cannot play.
Whether we like it or whether we do not, these newer nations of Africa and Asia- and to some extent this is true of the South American republics-sometimes are reluctant to rely too implicitly on the United States and the United Kingdom. To them they sometimes represent a form of something which they have been trying to get away from. At the same time these same nations in Africa and Asia do not want to come under the subjection of imperialistic power which does not give them any freedom whatsoever. They are looking for leadership of a moderate sort. In their minds Canada has no axe to grind. They feel that when we put forward a proposal that we are going to stick to the three-mile zone for the territorial sea and when we tell them why we want to support it, they tend to trust us; and when we advocate moderation on this question of the 12-mile limit they tend to follow us.
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Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order. I regret to inform the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources that his time has expired.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I have just one sentence more.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Finish it.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the house that the minister be allowed to continue?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: I think that the long term advantages gained at this conference will not only be in the fact that our country is rising in the respect of these nations but that we are winning the battle for the minds and the hearts of men in these new nations. Particularly, with this friendship coming from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, Ghana and these moderate Arab states who are looking to our country for leadership, I think that we should try to give it to them.
(Translation):


Mr. Jacques Flynn (Quebec South):: Mr. Speaker, in rising to take part in this debate, I realize of course the responsibility if not the risk I am taking, and the house will not expect me to venture into the intricacies of the diplomatic process. I do not intend to more than bring out a few general ideas which guide, as they must, our foreign policy.
In the light of developments in these last two weeks, it is appropriate, I believe, that our Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) be warmly congratulated for the excellent job he has done in the interest of Canada and peace at United Nations. In my opinion, he has ably expressed Canada's position and like his predecessors, he was a credit to Canada.
The position taken by Canada in the field of foreign affairs can be expressed by two propositions. The first one, a positive proposition, is to promote understanding between all the nations and the second, a negative one, is to prevent armed conflicts and to maintain peace which is essential to the well-being of all nations.
The promotion of understanding between nations is quite in line with our belief that the state must serve the individual and not the other way around. It is in accordance with this principle, Mr. Speaker, that we have gradually come to reject the idea that international conflicts must be settled by force and by war. It is also that philosophy which made us realize the interdependence of nations and, as a consequence, the responsibility of the haves to help the have-nots.

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Thus, Mr. Speaker, through the Colombo plan, through similar organizations within the United Nations and through the British Commonwealth oi nations, Canada has given help to underdeveloped or economically weak countries and has continued gradually to evolve a policy of assistance to those countries. In fact, I was glad to hear this morning the Secretary of State for External Affairs refer to the gratifying results of this policy of support, of understanding and of assistance to weaker and needier nations. It is a policy of the utmost importance, one that yields better dividends, because it is calculated to ensure world peace.
However, foreign policy aimed at preventing armed conflicts runs into more serious difficulties. It becomes so much more of a problem, due to the fact that our philosophy -and I mean the philosophy of Canada as well as that of other free nations-conflicts with that of the communist countries and their satellites.
But, Mr. Speaker, whether we profess our own philosophy or that of communist countries, the progress achieved in the field of nuclear weapons forces us to extreme caution in the field of international relations, precisely because of that danger, the possibility of a nuclear war.
Undoubtedly, the small conflicts arising here and there could lead to a conflict which might mean world destruction.
The current crisis in the Middle East is extremely serious. It illustrates this ideological conflict between free nations and communist nations. Even if it is not just like the one we had in 1956-and I agree with the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) that it is not of the same nature-I believe that both crises have resulted from the same cause and that the one led to the other. It remains, Mr. Speaker, that the situation in the Middle East is not serious simply because American troops have landed in Lebanon or because British troops are posted in Jordan, nor because there was a revolution in Iraq. It is serious mainly because all those events stem from the very strength of Arab nationalism which began to develop since the rise to power of Colonel Nasser in Egypt.
In itself, that surge of Arab nationalism would not be as threatening as it is, were it not that communist countries are using it as a pretext to move in and to substitute their influence in the Middle East to the traditional influence of France, Great Britain and the United States.
At the time of the Suez conflict, it was possible to confine that outbreak by creating a United Nations force but that force which was sent to Egypt, did not constitute an

adequate solution and no doubt, at that time, great hopes were entertained that the crisis had definitely been settled. It was indeed the opinion of the Leader of the Opposition who said on March 15, 1957, I am quoting from page 2351 of Hansard:
This Middle East problem has been almost continuously before the United Nations assembly since I spoke to this house on external affairs last November and that consideration by the United Nations I think has helped not only to bring the fighting to an end in that area but to prevent the conflict breaking out again or, even worse, spreading.
However, at that time there were reasons to fear that this first conflict might spread and break out elsewhere. May I be allowed to quote a statement made at the time by the then leader of the opposition, now the Prime Minister, in reply to the secretary of state for external affairs, as reported on page 2371 of Hansard. He said:
First, we said that if necessary we should extend the United Nations police action to cover not only the borders between Egypt and Israel but also the borders between Israel and Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, because we believe it is of the greatest importance that peace must be maintained in that area. We asked that there be a peace treaty arrived at between Israel and the Arab states, and we know the extraordinary difficulties which lie in the road of that. We are convinced also that no matter how annoyed we may feel at certain individuals in the Middle East, no matter how angered we may be by their actions, it would be folly to let either annoyance or anger change us from a settled course. This course must be to secure a settlement in that area, through peace treaties arrived at between the opposing countries.
Now, precisely because the United Nations, at the time, failed to consider settlement of the whole problem, Arab nationalism, abetted by Russia, broke out once more, this time by way of indirect aggression. It is in the face of this indirect aggression, somewhat reminiscent of what happened before world war II, that the role of the United Nations organization becomes most ticklish.
We are a long way from the scene but surely we must be interested in the solution of this problem because today, the interdependence of free nations is an acknowledged fact. In the face of this difficult situation, what has been the policy of Canada and on what principles was it based?
Mr. Speaker, I think that it would not be hard to prove that our attitude in those circumstances has been consistent with our philosophy which rejects the settlement of conflicts by force. We have demonstrated our confidence in the United Nations. However, the United Nations is no stronger than its moral authority which, in turn, depends upon the support of all member nations. We know that this moral authority can fail when one or two great powers withhold their support

and also because, too often, the United Nations cannot apply in a practical way the authority it holds from the majority of its members. And 1 do believe that, if it were possible to solve the technical and practical problems involved, it would be an ideal solution to put a permanent force at the disposal of the United Nations. However, in such circumstances, there would still remain the difficulty of deciding at what time, in case of indirect aggression, this permanent force should step in.
As far as Canada is concerned, it seems to me that our policy should first be determined on the basis of unity of thought.
It is essential that we work out our international policy first on a non-partisan basis, seeking unity of thought within our country. And I believe that, in this field, the present government has continued to apply the principles applied by the former government, seeking the unity of all men of good will in the determination of our policy. I was glad to hear, last Monday, the Prime Minister thanking the Leader of the Opposition for a suggestion he had made, inviting all hon. members to present theirs and assuring them that any of their suggestions would be seriously considered by the government.
Not only should we endeavour to achieve unity of thought throughout the country, but we should also strive to achieve the same unity of thought with our allies, within the British commonwealth and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The British commonwealth, as a result of the diversity of nations which it includes and the diversity of economic interests of these various nations, is a body through which it is possible to work efficiently in favour of peace and understanding between nations. Within the commonwealth, precisely on account of Canada's action to which I referred a moment ago, we contribute, I think, towards greater understanding between peoples of all parts of the world. If within this organization we do achieve some unity of thought in the working out of our foreign policy, I am sure that in the United Nations we shall carry more authority over other member nations. And the situation is almost the same with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is, of course, a defence organization. However, the latest developments, in my opinion, call for more frequent consultation between all nations belonging to that organ-
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ization, in order that no unilateral action may be taken, and in order that any decision taken by one member of that body may be communicated to and approved by the others, in advance. In fact, here as well as abroad, we must promote understanding, we must try to understand others and make them understand our point of view.
Secondly, Mr. Speaker, I believe that our international policy must be realistic. It must be based on facts. Let us be guided by principles, but those principles must be applied to individual facts in all cases. Of course we have reached full nationhood, we are in a position to hammer out our own international policy, and we are doing just that. It would be naive to contend that our decisions are merely dictated by a feeling of subservience to Great Britain or the United States.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, since reality prevents us from taking decisions based on sentimentality, the danger at the present time is rather that, due to our economic interdependence with the United States, we might be inclined to submit to their dictates.
On the other hand, even if we have reached our maturity, we should harbour no illusion as to our ability to prevent conflicts.
Canada should not repeat the mistake of the frog that would bloat itself bigger than the ox.
It is important, Mr. Speaker, that we realize that our role should be that of a mediator, of a go-between and arbiter within the British commonwealth of nations and within NATO. If we succeed in being accepted as conciliator and mediator within these two organizations, I believe that we stand a much better chance of commanding respect for our views at United Nations. I repeat, it is important that we fully realize that ours must be a personal role, but it is also important that we do not overdo it. As long as we have a proper understanding of this role, and if we are content with it, Canada, in my opinion, will be in a better position to contribute to world peace and to the well-being of nations.
(Text):


Mr. Heaih Macquarrie (Queens):: Mr. Speaker, it is a real pleasure to be able to have an opportunity to say a word about this subject which has evoked such great interest not only in the House of Commons but in this country. I think we have all been

External Affairs
much impressed in the last few days to have witnessed a part of the drama of parliament. In those recent days which were more tense than the present the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) made his statements on the international situation and we saw evidence of a high level of mature bi-partisanship in the very friendly relationship that existed between him and the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson). I am sure we were all cheered and perhaps even a little thrilled by the drama of this wonderful democratic system of parliament.
I believe, too, that all Canadians followed with much interest and great pride the activities and actions of our distinguished Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) as he represented Canada-and indeed, I am sure, at many times he spoke for a certain part of the free world-in these delicate and extremely important conversations which were held in the country to the south of us last week. We are proud of him, Canada is proud of him, and rightly and justly so. This is not the first crisis to stir the Canadian parliament and to interest and arouse the people of Canada and I am sure it will not be the last.
It has been said, and it is all too sadly true, that tensions today are normal. We move from crisis to crisis. We fear perhaps that one will become an explosion with catastrophic and universal effects. Happily, I believe, we live in a world which despite all its disadvantages in this connection at least has this advantage, and that is, the boiling point is higher today than it was some years ago. The nations tolerate and accept incidents which in an earlier period would have evoked a war-like response. Although the potential for destruction is greater than before, the tolerance of the nations today at least allows for a freedom of manoeuvre-ability into which our statesmanship and diplomacy may flow.
It is perhaps wrong in a general debate of this kind to concentrate all our attention on recent events in one portion of the world. Therefore perhaps I might seek in a few words to present my point of view-I am proud and happy to belong to a party which allows a backbencher to express his point of view and listens to it-on a subject so important as the relationship of some of the immediate events with the general pattern of world diplomacy.
[Mr. Macquarrie.l
The whole picture of diplomacy has changed. I can remember studying geography much less than a half century ago and at that time we learned about the great powers. I think there were seven in my day. Most of them were European and certainly the great burden of responsibility rested on the continent of Europe. We used to see an arrangement of power alignments among various members of the group of great powers. For a long time that situation prevailed and the responsibility for world peace was primarily that of Europe. Throughout the outreaches of the world the great stabilizing power of the British navy was ever-present.
Those calmer, quieter days are gone forever. We now have a situation in which two leading super-powers-one quite non-European and the other as much Asiatic as European-loom on the horizon of international affairs. The relationships between these two powers in all parts of the world form an essential part of every equation in the consideration of diplomatic questions because whether we like it or not we must accept the fact that the diplomatic interests of the U.S.S.R. and of the U.S.A. are worldwide. In recent times we have seen occasions when the interests of these two great powers have come into conflict and at some times in certain sensitive areas on the periphery of soviet power we have encountered threats that were very serious, just as threatening and dangerous as the situation through which we are now passing.
We can remember shortly after the conclusion of the second world war the problem of Iran. Then, we remember also when it was in northern Greece that the two worlds were in contact, in unhappy and bloody contact. Then, it was Korea and before that it was Berlin. I remember that over the Berlin blockade there was great danger and great anxiety, and it was the masterly display of united power that brought about a solution of that very grave situation.
Then, another place was Indo-China where the two worlds met and some kind of accommodation was necessary. I suppose a very simple illustration would be for one to look at a map of the world which we see in 1958 and compare it with one for 1938. If we did that we would see one fundamental effect of diplomatic life, and that is the tremendous spatial expansion of the Soviet union. Its growth, its extension, has been phenomenal.

We remember, too, that at one time the United States had a policy which was called a policy of containment and we used to speak about the Truman doctrine. I am one of those who still believes that the doctrine of containment was a good doctrine and that the Truman policy was a good, sound and very effective policy for dealing with the new situation which had then developed. The Berlin airlift was an expression of that and was one of the great triumphs of the western world when in unity, dignity and strength we stood by our position and we won. It is very easy-and I find a great tendency in Canada to do this-to criticize the errors, the miscalculations and the blunders of the United States in recent times in the field of foreign policy. But I think it is essential for us as an ally of the United States to consider at all times some of the difficulties and some of the realities of its position and therefore of ours.
The role of the western world has been essentially defensive. We have allowed the initiative-because we had to-to lie with the Soviet union, so we never knew just where on this great area of contact the excesses of tension would break out. At the same time it requires massive power on the part of the United States to stand ever-prepared for such a situation. It also requires great efforts on the part of the United States to bring together alliances of friends in strategic areas as an important development of its own military might. Much of the activity of the United States in the last 10 years has been in the development of those two arms of defence.
The magnitude of the responsibility of the leader of the western world has been immense. There is one that I think it is proper for a group of parliamentarians to consider. It is this, that in its diplomacy the western world must operate in the framework of popular democracy and always with regard for the moral content of our diplomatic values. We can never, in our part of the world, judge any action in purely strategic or military terms.
A few years ago there was a suggestion, which never was a very serious one, that the United States, for strategic reasons, should launch a preventive war. Whether or not, even in the narrow strategic and military sense, that would have been feasible, it was utterly impossible with the sense of values we have; but yet it was not impossible for the Soviet union to take the action which it took in Hungary not long ago. It is not under the same moral restraints as a free country with ideals and ethics which its people insist 57071-3-170
External Affairs
upon. This cannot be forgotten. Indeed, I think it should always be remembered in our occasionally, ill-advised, perhaps sometimes ungenerous criticism.
If there is one thing I believe in, not only in the history of democracy but in the history of any political or social development, it is that it is very difficult to be dogmatic, to be certain and to be self-confident. I wish I could be as sure as some members who have spoken that the action at Suez some months ago was altogether wrong, or that I could so easily and so thoroughly condemn the attitudes of the United States and the United Kingdom when, in the first moments of flux, of uncertainty-(indeed, I think the only certain thing was that a dangerous situation existed)-and believe that that immediate action was wrong, was immoral. As I say, I cannot be sure about these things; there are too many "if's"; that we can only read back into those events in the light of the things which are possible. But, as we look forward to the summit conference, we can recognize that this, too, is a part of a continuing policy.
I am sure we all were impressed the other day when the Prime Minister referred to this country's attitude on a summit meeting and said, as reported at page 2473 of Hansard:
I still believe that no nation should or dare shut the door on any matter that offers the prospect of any solution or even a diminution of international tensions.
This attitude is not at all inconsistent with a sustained posture of strength in a determination to support and maintain the position of the western world, because the two great power agglomerations today must establish some basis of accommodation, else the prospect of the future is too awful to contemplate. Therefore, I think it shows a good perception of the existing situation that our country should take an important part in arranging for the forthcoming summit meeting.
It is not my intention to discuss the various technical arrangements or make an appraisal as to whether it would be more beneficial to hold the meeting at the United Nations or elsewhere, but I do think that the general emphasis upon the universality of the United Nations' responsibility is all to the good and I think our government and our country, for this is not a partisan matter, should be commended for its action.
The present area of tension is certainly not a new one. All down through the years, from the very early days of man's social experience, this part of the world has been a trouble spot.
It has been the meeting place of continents.
It has been the lifeline of ancient empires.

External Affairs
It has been a buffer zone between east and west, often vulnerable to attack. The rough boots of the conquering invader have perhaps been heard more times over this area than in any other part of the world.
Here again in our own time we have the same area causing universal concern. But we have here factors of tension in the situation which are somewhat unique. We have fomenting in the Middle East the heady new wine of nationalism, an expression of national feeling which was very strong in Europe a century ago and very weak in other parts of the world. But now the situation is quite different and nationalism is a potent factor in Asia and Africa. I believe this was portrayed so well by a representative of an Asian nation at the United Nations some years ago when, after discussing the splendid job of administration which had been done in his country by Great Britain, he went on to say that good government is no substitute for self-government. That attitude, that very deep-seated thinking, is something which cannot be ignored.
There are other factors that are difficult to understand in their entirety and to which it is perhaps difficult to adjust ourselves. We have not only a feeling of nationalism there but strong forces leading to some kind of union among various states whose separate existence is somewhat incongruous. Many movements like to find a prophet and the present dictator of Egypt obviously aspires to be the leader of the great movement of pan-Arabism although, it would be wrong to say that he led it or created it. Perhaps he merely appropriated it. But the ambitions of the Egyptian dictator are very clearly set out in these words in a book which he wrote:
When I consider these hundreds of millions, I emerge with a sense of the tremendous possibilities which we might realize through the co-operation of all Moslems . . . enabling them and their brothers In faith to wield power wisely and without limit.
This man is the man on the scene today, a man who has the tremendous psychological impact of this feeling behind him. Perhaps in recent years we have failed, as other speakers have mentioned, to realize fully and to appreciate the forces of nationalism in this key area. I think the efforts of the western alliance were very clear. The attempt was made to build a bridge of support right across the northern tier of the Middle East, as it was called. But this was never developed with strength and in our time we have seen the constant withdrawal of western power. The withdrawal of western power seems to delight some members but whether or not it is greeted with delight or something else it has certainly happened. France withdraws from her former mandates.

Britain departs from the Suez and Sudan. She forsakes Palestine. Then into this vacuum of power comes indirect Russian power and the highly activated development of nationalism.
One hon. member has pointed out that it must be recognized that the Soviet union has interests in the Middle East. Russia has had interests in the Middle East for many years and no one denies that. Indeed Russian interest was a very definite part of the strategy and diplomacy of that period. Fifty years ago Great Britain and Russia made an arrangement as to sphere of influence in Persia. One of the agreements among those many unhappy agreements before the first world war dealt with the realization of an old Russian dream, control of Constantinople. If we remember the Victorian era, the great emphasis in British foreign policy at that time was on the containment and curtailment of Russian penetration into the Middle East. We might recall one figure who was identified with that policy, that great statesman Benjamin Disraeli.
The Middle East for over 2,000 miles bounds upon the territory of Russia or of her satellites or her allies. Her interest there is very great and she is pursuing it with all the means at her disposal, nonetheless significant or effective because often indirect.
In the Middle East we find that one of the old factors in the equation has been removed, and that is the traditional friendship between Arabs and Britons. It is a long story and it is not altogether a happy story. There were many misunderstandings, some broken promises, some agreements which perhaps should never have been made and others which perhaps should never have been broken. But in any case that old friendship is gone and it can no longer be relied upon when we consider this part of the world and this portion of the diplomatic equation.
It is always a part, of course, of every country's foreign policy to accommodate itself to new conditions. We cannot now deny the fact of Arab nationalism. Nor can we deny the fact of what is called Nasserism. It is too late to cast recriminations as to how Nasserism was created or how it was fostered. I quite agree with the hon. gentleman who declared that we must, in following our policies in this area, have reference to the interests, needs and desires of the millions of people living there. I think that in the long run that will be in our interests too.
The Leader of the Opposition and the Secretary of State for External Affairs were profoundly right when they pointed out that beyond this immediate crisis there is great urgency and great need for long-range consideration as to what will be done about the

Middle East. The western record there in recent years has not been a glorious one. We have suffered reverses. There is more that we can do and we must take the initiative. We in Canada are proud of the fact-I hope it is a wholesome and not a smug pride and I think it is the former-that we do not have a legacy of ill will there, that we are not suspect. We say that our record is good. That being the case, I think it behooves us to take more responsibility.
I have been impressed in recent years how, with the development of Canadian diplomatic posts across the world, we seem to have been so neglectful of the Middle East. There were areas there in which we should have had more highly developed listening posts than we did have. I think we could have used our position to better advantage. We could make use of our reservoir of good will and our recognition of the importance of the economic question.
We have confidence, I think, in the immediate developments. We listened with great interest as the Secretary of State for External Affairs recounted the steps which the United Nations were to take. We will follow with interest the activities of UNOGIL. However, none of these things can ever be regarded as in any way a permanent solution to the problems. Our country has not been very long in this field of foreign policy. It is only a few years, historically speaking, since Sir Robert Borden won for us a place in the international field, so to speak. We have been doing rather well, but I am sure that the challenges before us will be ever greater. I am confident that, aware of the responsibilities which we have, our response to them will be fuller, more complete, than ever before.
I hope that we will never forget that, differ as we may in the details amongst the members of the western alliance, and using our influence as we might to try to persuade the policies of those who are stronger than we are, the greatest folly of all would be to contribute in any way to the weakening of the basic unity which must exist between members of the western alliance. If there was one thing which was more disturbing than anything else in the recent Suez crisis it was the fact that there appeared to be a weakening of that essential unity which must exist between members of a free alliance dedicated to the same principles, principles which we must pursue with vigour and determination in these very tense days.


Mr. W. G. Dinsdale (Brandon-Souris):: It is
a fortunate circumstance, Mr. Speaker, that makes it possible for me to participate in this debate following the distinguished member from Prince Edward Island who has just
57071-3-170J
External Affairs
spoken. It is not the first time I have heard him speak on the very important subject of external affairs, because just a few years ago we were more or less linked in a common interest in these matters out in my own city of Brandon. I am sure the members of the house would agree that his contribution has been enlightening and helpful this afternoon.
I have been impressed during this discussion with the unanimity that appeared on all sides. Every member who has contributed to this discussion so far has joined in agreeing that during the past few days we have been faced with the most critical situation that has confronted the world since the end of world war II, in the events that have transpired in the Middle East. I am not going to endeavour to look at this problem from the standpoint of praise and blame. I was impressed the other day, as I listened to the distinguished Prime Minister for Ghana, who I thought made an excellent contribution to the whole approach to foreign affairs, when he said he was not going to pass any judgment. It would be foolish, and it would be premature, because we are dealing with matters that are so complex that only the Almighty himself could understand actually what has transpired and what might inevitably result therefrom.
There has been the common reaction that we, in this chamber, have been deeply disturbed and troubled by the events. I think the general feeling that has gone across the country has been that we have been hovering in the shadow of a possible outbreak of world war III. Perhaps one of the reasons for such a deeply troubled feeling in the country is that these events are taking place in the Middle East. The Middle East is generally regarded as the cradle of civilization, as it is from that area that the three great western religions have had their source, Judaism, Moslemism and Christianity. Yet, notwithstanding the historic past in this part of the world, it has almost seemed in recent years that what we have regarded as the cradle of civilization might become, unless we are very careful and unless we are very wise in the way we handle this problem, the grave of civilization. I believe that is the spirit that has been present in this discussion this afternoon and is the universal attitude in regard to these matters. Mankind has the feeling that he lies under the threat of universal Hiroshima.
Of course, the Middle East problem is not the only trouble spot in the modern world. Like the previous speaker, I feel we in this mid-twentieth century period have almost become accustomed to living from crisis to crisis. It is these circumstances that arise which add to the confusion of the twentieth

External Affairs
century in which we have seen social and political change move forward at such tremendous speed it has been quite impossible for the mind of man to keep abreast, and certainly it has been impossible for our social institutions to keep up with these changes.
In every generation, the record of history tells us that there are times of social change and social confusion. In fact, if we were to go back to the beginning of the record in scripture, we would find in the opening verses of the Book of Genesis a description of the beginning of things which would tell us that the pattern that has unfolded since that time has been typical of the situation in human affairs. We are told that in the beginning God created the world. Then, the words go on to say:
And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep.
Finally, we are given a ray of hope:
And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.
And God said, let there be light: and there was light.
In that second verse I think we have a very apt description of the situation confronting those of us in the twentieth century, namely that the affairs of men are without form and void and darkness is brooding over the face of the earth. The events of recent days and of recent years have definitely demonstrated that there is continuing chaos and confusion.
It has been my privilege, Mr. Speaker, since I came into this house, to take part in several debates on external affairs. I have done so only infrequently because these matters deal with complex matters that cannot be discussed without considerable thought and consideration. I remember the discussions that revolved around Canada's participation in NATO. I remember the heart searching there was when we were considering the proposal of German rearmament and German participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At that time it was thought that here was the main trouble-spot in the world and that here would be the possible source in the future of any serious outbreak of hostilities. It might be that such is still the case because we are still confronted with the very vexing problem of German reunification. I agreed entirely with the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) when he emphasized that we should not forget the role of the NATO nations during the present crisis, and that is something we must continually keep in the back of our minds.
Then the trouble-spot moved towards the Far East to Korea, Formosa, Indo-China and all those other areas that have marked the

headlines of our newspapers during the years that have gone by in the recent past. We thought that there might be the final source of the outbreak of hostilities which is universally dreaded by mankind everywhere. But now attention has been focused on the situation in the Middle East. As a result of the Suez event, and as a result of the continuing difficulties on the Israeli frontier I sometimes feel that we are forced to the conclusion that today the way to Washington and Ottawa and London may be through New Delhi and Cairo.
It seems to me that a new power situation has emerged in the world or at least has become clarified. The trends have been there for some time but it is only in recent years that these trends have emerged in a distinctive form. I refer to the awakening of the underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa, their demands for independence and selfgovernment and the rising claim of the coloured races to their share of the world's goods.
As I look at the situation, Mr. Speaker, and as I have seen the pendulum of the threat of war swing from Europe to the Far East and now to the Middle East, I am almost forced to the conclusion that this awakening of the peoples of Africa and Asia is a more significant development than even the events of world war I and world war II and even more significant than the rise and fall of Hitler and nazism or the Russian revolution. As a result of these new forces in world affairs we are no longer faced with the power situation that confronted us immediately following the war. I refer to the so-called east-west bloc with the west on one side of the chasm and the east on the other, the west led by the United States of America and the east led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, separated by the unbridgeable chasm in world affairs since the end of world war II.
But now in the world we have this new situation-we might almost call it a third force-the tremendous political power of the upsurge of nationalism in the underdeveloped countries and their increasing desire and demands for a place in the sun. These nations are largely the smaller neutral nations. It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that they are exerting and are going to exert in the future an influence to which we in the west must pay increasing attention.
I say that this force represents a neutral force because as I have examined the situation and as I have listened to spokesmen and as I met some of those spokesmen here is what I found. Judging from their statements and their comments, they have no particular

desire to be drawn in the direction of either the western orbit or the eastern orbit. That point was underlined by the prime minister of Ghana when he spoke in this house the other morning. I merely quote his words to emphasize that point. He spoke of a positive neutralism. As the Hansard record reveals it, he said this:
I should like to take this opportunity to comment on certain aspects of our foreign policy. Basically the policy of our government is one of non-alignment and positive neutrality. I have emphasized on several occasions, however, that this should not be interpreted as a purely negative neutralism. On the contrary, we will always adopt whatever positive policy will do most to safeguard our independence. We have a vested interest in peace, and we will do everything in our power to support the United Nations.
I think we make a mistake, Mr. Speaker, if we regard the cause, so far as our relationships with these new uncommitted countries are concerned, as a lost cause. Out of the present disturbance in the Middle East I am optimistic enough to believe that there yet will come a new and more positive approach to these difficulties. Actually I suppose that the real motivation in the thinking of these neutral powers today is their mortal fear of the military force concentrated in the so-called civilized nations of the east and of the west.
In this debate so far it seems to me that the shadow of the Suez crisis has been hovering near. In his remarks the Leader of the Opposition made some reference to this matter this afternoon. It is true that there are certain similarities that can be noted in reference to the Suez crisis and the present difficulty. It was a manifestation of anticolonialism which is peculiar to these neutral nations.


Mr. Speaker:: 
Harold Edward Winch: With respect to the bill passed and amended by the Senate, may I ask whether the amendment has received the approval of this house?
The Royal Assent
A message was delivered by Major C. R. Lamoureux, Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, as follows:
Mr. Speaker, the Honourable the Deputy Governor General desires the immediate attendance of this honourable house in the chamber of the honourable the Senate.
Accordingly, Mr. Speaker with the house went up to the Senate chamber.
And being returned:
Mr. Speaker informed the house that the Deputy Governor General had been pleased to give, in Her Majesty's name, the royal assent to the following bills:
An act for the relief of Therese Beaudoin Girard.
An act for the relief of Dorothy Elizabeth Nairn Anderson Bloodsworth.
An act for the relief of Anne Marie Mathilde Vautelet Gagnier.
An act for the relief of William Leonard Mugford.
An act for the relief of James Clancy.
An act for the relief of Marjorie June Gabrielson Trainor.
An act for the relief of Kathleen Mitchell Cabana.
An act for the relief of Fernande Leduc Clarke.
An act for the relief of Ann Westwater Murphy.
An act for the relief of Gaynor Jenkins Douglas.
An act for the relief of Roland Paquin.
An act for the relief of Jone Vanda Skakauskaite Kaniewski.
An act for the relief of Ivy Elizabeth Shaw Labbee.
An act for the relief of Constance Jean Backhouse Brayton Lapierre.
An act for the relief of Lisbet Schlosser Wisternitz.
An act for the relief of Virginia Marshall Stani-forth.
An act for the relief of Elie Kouri.
An act for the relief of Margaret Stirling Izett Brown.
An act for the relief of Norman Weisman.
An act for the relief of Dawn Yvonne Tonkin Kadas.
An act for the relief of Betty Taylor Sharpe.
An act for the relief of Doris Williams Timmins.
An act for the relief of Marjorie Mary Ellen Bowes Jupp.
An act for the relief of Earl Bruce Carswell.
An act for the relief of Beverly Joan Smithson Rook.
An act for the relief of Joseph Francois Gabriel Rene Denis.
An act for the relief of Solomon Seymour Yetman.
An act for the relief of Margaret St. Aubin Brennan.
An act for the relief of Lidija Plesums Koppel.
An act for the relief of Vera Hamburg Colson.
An act for the relief of Margaret Griffin Clarke.
An act for the relief of Katie Miller Fisch.
An act for the relief of Greta Claire Van Valken-burg Stenstadvold.
An act for the relief of Beatrice Madeleine Schmid Layton.
An act for the relief of Anne Gold Zidile.
An act for the relief of Thomas Mastropaolo.
An act for the relief of Charles Coorsh.
An act for the relief of Claire Aubin Daunais.
An act for the relief of Maurice Gardner Swaine.
An act for the relief of William Arthur Terry.
An act for the relief of Frances Eileen Fisher Baker.
An act for the relief of Marie Aurore Cecile Gauthier Thomson.

The Royal Assent
An act for the relief of James Dunn Drummond.
An act for the relief of Marie Eva Desorcy Valiquette
An act for the relief of Norman Silver.
An act for the relief of Herbert Everett Follette. An act for the relief of Abie Cubitz.
An act for the relief of Eva Shtull Hager.
An act for the relief of Georges Etienne Brais.
An act for the relief of Barbara Eisenstein Packer. An act for the relief of Margaret Patricia Winckworth Thornton Sherwin.
An act for the relief of Benita Gertrude Kozlov Cohen.
An act for the relief of Marie Marguerite Amelia Genier Wright.
An act for the relief of Winifred Jean Garrett Somers.
An act for the relief of Frances Erdanova (Erdan) Weiskopf, otherwise known as Esther Weiskopf Weiskopf. otherwise known as Frances Erdanova (Erdan) Stern, otherwise known as Esther Weiskopf Stern.
An act for the relief of Mac Bernard, otherwise known as Manny Bernard.
An	act	for	the	relief	of	Marcelle Gagnon
Lachance.
An act for the relief of Jean Claude Albert Leonard.
An	act	for	the	relief	of	Anne McCluskey
Templeton.
An act for the relief of Lillian May Seymour Perez.
An act for the relief of Lucille Esther Hudson Donnelly.
An act for the relief of Dorte Glahn Carnie.
An act for the relief of Marie Therese Carmen Pauline Legault Lortie.
An act for the relief of Joseph Leo Nolet.
An act for the relief of Naomi Ruth Wolf son Fischel.
An act for the relief of Florence Lillian Henderson Pinkney.
An act for the relief of Francine Major Daigneault. An act for the relief of Odette Lemay Dussault. An act for the relief of Joan Collie Showier.
An act for the relief of Johanna Hendrika Jilderda Haring.
An act for the relief of Patrick Charles Stanford. An act for the relief of Beryl Elizabeth Scrase Laliberte.
An act for the relief of Barbara May Ramsey Bryant.
An act for the relief of Joyce Sherman Fogel.
An act for the relief of Wilfred David Oliver.
An act for the relief of Joseph Urban.
An act for the relief of Olive Margaret Lester James.
An act for the relief of Florence Mildred Matthews Dawe.
An act for the relief of Marie Berthe Helene Guerard Maher.
An act for the relief of Marie Juliette Pauline Josette Beaudoin Said.
An act for the relief of Judith Margaret Bianchi Sartori.
An act for the relief of Clarabel Ellement Vaillancourt.
An act for the relief of Alice Elizabeth Edden Aumais.
An act for the relief of William Gordon Heughan. An act for the relief of Roland Doutre.
An act for the relief of Gerald Edward Burnham. An act for the relief of Ottilie Wilhelmine Auguste Stegelitz Carpentieri.
An act for the relief of Francine Josephine Ghis-laine Boisdenghien Lebrun.
An act for the relief of Doris Cahill Chabot.

An act for the relief of Ruth Marsha Yanover Caunter.
An act for the relief of Joseph Wilfrid Rene Fortier.
An act for the relief of Ingeborg Alves-Probst Wright.
An act for the relief of Paulette Priscilla Benning Buchanan.
An act for the relief of Irene Georgina Descyca White.
An act for the relief of Eszter Jeszenszky Tahy.
An act for the relief of Alice Latou Tubbs Wood Green.
An act to amend the Yukon Act.
An act to amend the National Parks Act respecting the boundaries of Cape Breton Highlands national park.
An act to provide for the resumption of the British Columbia coast steamship service operated by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.



[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Smith (Hastings-Frontenac):
That items numbered 85 to 111, inclusive, item numbered 502, items numbered 542 to 549, inclusive, and item numbered 655, as listed in the main and supplementary estimates 1958-59, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
At six o'clock the house took recess.

AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.
Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: Mr. Speaker, when the house rose at the supper hour I had been dealing with what I regard as a very important development in the power structure of international affairs and pointing out that no longer is a two-power world a valid concept. 1 mean by that the old east-west motion of power politics that prevailed after world war II. It seems to me that the rising influence of the neutral, uncommitted nations is the most significant development in international affairs in recent times. They have the legitimate desire to strive for a place in the sun.
As I understand the problem of the Middle East it would certainly appear that in the background, at least as the basic motivating force, is this desire for self-government, for independence, for a place in the sun on the part of an increasing number of underdeveloped regions. The Middle East situation has been at the boiling point for some years. As the house rose I was making a comparison with the events that took place at the time of the Suez crisis-this was referred to by the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon-

and was about to comment that in those events we can trace the growing wave of anti-colonialism.
I recall, for example, during the last war when I had the privilege of being in the Middle East in the uniform of the Royal Canadian Air Force that even as far back as 18 years ago that underlying hostility to the west could be felt on all sides. It is also significant that the mere fact that I and other Canadian servicemen were wearing the Canada badge at that time caused us to be regarded with special respect by the people in the city of Cairo, where we had contact from time to time during our visits to that area.
That spirit of anti-colonialism is present today in much greater intensity. It is generated by this striving toward nationalism. Certainly it has been encouraged by a political figure such as Nasser but it would be present even had Colonel Nasser not risen to a position of influence in the Middle East at the present time. Some one has said that no matter what attempts are made to the contrary, under the upsurge of interest in the United Arab Republic, federation will take place regardless of other considerations.
At the time of the Suez situation there was a fundamental difference from the condition prevailing at the moment. There was an unfortunate confusion and division in policy amongst the nations of the west. This prevailed in both the NATO countries and the countries of the commonwealth. To my mind that was the most unhappy aspect of the whole Suez crisis. I felt at the time, and I stated in the debate that took place on that occasion, that Britain's withdrawal from the Middle East would leave a power vacuum that was bound to create even greater trouble in the future. There is not a doubt in the world but that the present machinations there have been intensified and facilitated by the departure of British influence from that area. I believe this point was made this afternoon by the Leader of the Opposition, and I thought it was rather speculative, that if Britain had not gone through with its intervention in that area in that particular incident then Nasser would have been crushed by the Israeli forces. My understanding of the British intervention at that time was that it was a desire to stop hostilities in the fear that their continuation might precipitate a third world war which is feared so much in all parts of the world.
There is a very much happier note in the crisis we are facing today. There is a spirit of unity of purpose and unity of policy amongst the commonwealth nations as well as amongst the nations participating in the
External Affairs
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I should like to express a word of appreciation at this time to both the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefen-baker) and the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) for the important part they have played in making possible this present spirit of unanimity amongst the nations of the west. They have exerted initiative in exactly the right amount and at precisely the correct moment to make it possible for the western forces to rally around a common meeting point. In so doing for the first time Canada is beginning to enter into that long-desired role where she is initiating policy of her own rather than being a mere echo of either the British viewpoint or the viewpoint of our neighbour to the south, the United States of America.
It is a happy state of affairs when we see the commonwealth and western nations working together in a unity never achieved before to meet a common crisis. It goes without saying, too that we are all delighted that this problem is finding its way back to the United Nations and that the prestige of the United Nations is not being undermined by any attempt to institute deliberations outside the framework of that organization. A large part of the credit for the initiative in this regard, I feel, goes to the Prime Minister and our Secretary of State for External Affairs.
Having said that much about the note of unanimity I must add a further word concerning the general approach to the problem confronting us. It seems that the concept of power politics is still the basic approach of the west to the settling of these disturbed conditions. The very fact that we have had to adopt at least military acts by landing troops in the trouble area is a confession of our own failure to grasp the essential nature of the problem and to try to reconcile this growing spirit of nationalism with the interests of the western nations in the Middle Eastern area.
It does not need any emphasizing to make the point that in this hydrogen age it is no longer possible to maintain the balance of power by means of the old power politics idea. It is much too dangerous a balance to try to resolve on that basis. That is why it is so disturbing when we read remarks by the premier of the soviets as quoted in an editorial of the Globe and Mail today, as follows:
Let the imperialists beware. We are revolutionaries. We are Marxists and we are delighted when the colonial nations rise up and cast off their chains. The boot of the foreigner must be removed from their soil.
That is not the kind of attitude that is going to bring about the necessary reconciliation of viewpoint and interests at this time. There had been an encouraging indication,

External Affairs
particularly since 1956, that the Russian emphasis on power politics, the effectiveness of power politics in the world struggle had diminished somewhat. They seemed to be backing away from a brutal power concept. For example, they had minimized somewhat their stress of the theory of the inevitability of war in achieving desired ends, and also there seemed to be a softening of belief in the necessity for civil war for the seizure of power in any outside nation. More recently, too, there has been the tendency to emphasize the economic struggle rather than the political or the military struggle. It is to be hoped that spokesmen of the U.S.S.R., when they come together in the contemplated summit conference, will adopt a much milder tone than in the statement that was released by the Russian premier in response to the statement of the President of the United States of America.
I cannot get out of my mind that in the background somewhere in the thinking of the soviets there might be mischief contemplated and I still remember the quotation of Premier Khrushchev when he said /'Always remember that the bear can crush just as effectively with a hug as it can with a blow." That is provocative language and it is language that should not be used if we are to have any success at all in the summit conference.
I say that the old concept of power politics is outmoded by the very nature of the world in which we live. We could not keep up to the soviet in adopting this technique even if we tried. The Minister of External Affairs (Mr. Smith) referred to the subtle intervention penetration of the soviets and the difficulty of analysing the nature of this subtlety. That is quite true. A monolithic state such as the soviets is always at an advantage in this regard. There are no democratic inhibitions, no rules to follow, and on top of it there is the strong outthrust in the cold war of communism as a new world religion. We just cannot compete in the same league with that kind of approach.
I feel, Mr. Speaker, that our approach at this time-and I am sure the sharp reaction of all the leaders of the west indicates that they realize the difficulty-toward a solution of the problem must be other than that of the outmoded power politics. Already we have made very remarkable forward steps in this regard, and I refer now to the attempts of the west to provide economic assistance to those under-developed areas in a gesture of good will and of understanding. It is a great step forward when we reach the point that we are more and more interested in

offering economic aid than we are in providing military aid to assist those new and developing neutral nations.
I could spend some time this evening, were time available, in analysing the role that oil plays in the present problem of the Middle East. There is not the time but I think we are aware that if we are to avoid further alienation of the neutral nations we must make it quite certain that we have only their best interests at heart, that we want to assist them in every way to achieve their legitimate desires for independence and self-government.
My final point, Mr. Speaker, is perhaps the main point that I wish to bring before the house tonight. It deals further with this subtle approach, this subtle intervention that is the growing influence in world affairs at the present time. I refer to the impact of psychological warfare, the psychological factors in the cold war, the role that values play in influencing world events. At the time of Suez the United States prided itself on the fact that it had struck the correct moral tone in its approach to that problem and condemnation was heaped upon Britain and France because they had acted independently of the United Nations, outside the moral framework of our Christian ethic. Well, as far as that went at the time I could agree with the United States postulate. It is very important that we exert a proper moral leadership. The difficulty was that having, as they claimed to have, achieved a position of prestige and world leadership in the Middle East, the United States did not move fast enough to consolidate that position.
We always have to look at these problems from two standpoints, the standpoint of political realism as well as the standpoint of idealism. We in the west are essentially idealistic. The Americans and Canadians are particularly idealistic but I am afraid there are times that our idealism is so badly adulterated by materialism that we cannot see the woods for the trees, as it were. President Eisenhower has said that in the end result there is very little difference between atheistic materialism and theistic materialism. The soviet system is quite unashamedly materialistic.
They believe in the efficacy of physical power, prowess and military force. We have depended upon these things only because we have felt ourselves forced by outside pressures and threats.
Yet as a theistic society, we too have become saturated by theistic materialism. Our symbols of democracy, those things that we would wish to bring before people who in the first instance actually receive their inspiration from the west through our missionaries, our religious missionaries, our

church missionaries, our political emissaries, our commercial salesmen, have been contused by these people with such physical achievements as skyscrapers, juke boxes, refrigerators and the like. Sometimes too it seems to me that the symbols of democracy are obscured completely by the very struggle for existence of these underdeveloped nations.
A truism that used to be preached by General Booth of the Salvation Army was that you cannot preach to a man with an empty stomach. I am quite sure that we cannot expect these nations, with their low standard of living and faced with very difficult economic circumstances, to understand our democratic ideas as long as all their time is consumed in the task of eking out a bare existence.
My time is expiring, Mr. Speaker, and I must bring these remarks to a close. I think we are in a much happier position in the present crisis than we were at the time of Suez. Canada has added laurels to the lustre that is already ours because of our participation in world affairs down through the years. The Prime Minister of Ghana paid us a generous tribute in speaking in the house last Monday when he said that he was greatly impressed by Canada's record in the field of international affairs in recent years. I believe firmly that at the summit conference and out of the present discussions and deliberations we will see a coming together of the leaders of the various nations of the world, a closer understanding of the basic issues and an attempt to get at the common humanities underlying the skin of each one of us. If we get the other man's point of view I think we can go a long way in helping to resolve the problem.
Mr. Speaker, I recall an interesting discussion at the United Nations in the fall of 1955. The very delicate and difficult race problem in South Africa was under discussion. I remember that the representative of Indonesia was speaking. He said that the white man believes that the only solution for the problem of South Africa is for all blacks to turn white. With a smile and with a good natured chuckle he went on to say, "I have got another solution for the problem. Why should not all white men turn black?" You see Sir it all depends how you look at the situation.
We have many problems to contend with but I think the basic solution is that we interpret correctly our way of life, the values underlying our way of life. As the United Nations charter so ably puts it, if wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds and hearts of men that the defences of peace must be built. Canada has made a great
External Affairs
contribution to that great structure in the past and will make even greater contributions in the critical days that lie immediately ahead.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, I am sure that the debate that has taken place on the resolution proposed today by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) represents the common desire of all of us in the house to assist the government in the very difficult responsibilities confronting it at this time. At the same time each of us is anxious to bring forward views that we believe are directed towards that particular objective. We may not all agree on the details of foreign policy of the government of our country but I am sure that all of us in the house without exception are united by a common purpose on a common understanding of the difficult problems involved and confronting each country in the world at this particular moment.
Like my leader I should like to say to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that we on this side of the house, free from direct responsibility, extend to him, to the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) and to the other members of the government our best wishes for a satisfactory discharge of their responsibilities in respect of these matters, some of which in other days have engaged the attention of some who have spoken today. Possibly in my case I can say to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, remembering the period when I did have a status best described by saying that I was in statu pupillari, that I have for him nothing but best wishes in the discharge of responsibilities which are his for some months.
I echo at once the words of my leader who expressed his faith in the United Nations and in its charter. As one who has spent a good part of his life in a less effective way at the league of nations and at the United Nations, I feel that it is well that we should have had today, through one who has played such a great part in current events in our time, an expression of faith in the value of the charter and in the concept of collective security as a means of bringing about order in a disturbed world. I am sure that hon. gentlemen opposite will not begrudge me this opportunity to say that. We have been proud of my leader in his former capacity of secretary of state for external affairs and as a great exponent of peace in our time. But we thought today that in the bold initiative he took in his speech he lived up in an exceptional way to the high standards which he has set for himself in this important field of human endeavour.
He began his speech by suggesting to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that

External Affairs
as the general assembly would meet in normal session some time in the month of September, consideration might be given by the Canadian delegation to a strong sponsorship and initiative regarding certain matters that have a bearing on whether or not we are going to be able to ease current international tension and make a contribution in a positive way to the preservation of peace in the world.
He suggested we might take the initiative at the assembly in the matter of trying to bring about some agreement that would lead to the arresting or stopping of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, now confined to three powers; that secondly, we might put forward in a way acceptable to a wide number of nations an agreement that would lead to the suspension of tests, he suggested for a period of five years, under the supervision of the United Nations; and, thirdly, echoing one of his favourite themes, he urged that in the face of the current international situation we might find great encouragement for pressing forward with the establishment of a permanent United Nations police force.
I am sure that all members on all sides of the house, including the Prime Minister, whose interest in this matter was represented by the interrogation he levelled at the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson), will agree, at least in principle, that the principle of collective security as envisaged by its authors at San Francisco can be effectively realized by the acceptance of an additional principle of collective security and by doing indirectly what it has not been possible to do directly because of the intransigence of the Soviet union in respect of the implementation of article 43 of the charter of the United Nations. Whether or not it is possible to establish a permanent United Nations police force remains to be seen. But undoubtedly, if we are to pursue the original concept of the interdependence of the nations of the world as envisaged by Her Majesty's Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, this is the next phase towards which we must seek to develop the principle of collective security, attempted in 1919 in the covenant and so unfortunately rejected Anally in September of 1939 by so many members of the league of nations.
Then, my leader spoke of the importance of initiative, not irresponsible initiative but initiative on the part of nations who have won respect of their fellow members in the United Nations, capable of providing constructive solutions for difficult problems. Possibly no one had a greater right to suggest that we should pursue this tactic of initiative than my leader, who perhaps more than any other man in the last decade, has day in and

day out at the United Nations himself given an example of what responsible initiative can mean towards the achievement of good purposes amongst the nations. He expressed the views, and I think we all associate ourselves with this, that we are proud of the role of Canada in recent days. This does not mean that every particular act of the administration commends itself to us. Indeed, speaking for myself, it would be possible to argue that in the Arst few hours of this current situation there might be found occasion for justiAable wonder as to the actual course that the government of our country had in mind.
Whether or not that is right, the fact is that subsequent events, declarations of the Prime Minister in this house, statements of the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the United Nations, the reported meetings that he has had with his opposite number in the United Kingdom and the United States, all suggest that the role of Canada in the past few days has been such as to warrant the observation of my leader that we approve in a general way the role of Canada in these recent days. However, I wonder why the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when he spoke today about meetings in Washington on Friday of last week with Mr. Dulles and with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, referred to the reports made in the United States press as to the nature of Canada's contribution. It may be that because negotiations on these matters sometimes obviously must be private at certain stages he could go no further. But it would have been helpful, assuming that under the circumstances it would have been desirable for him to do so, to have an account from him of precisely the position that Canada took in the conversations that were held at that time, prior to the conversation he had the following day on this crisis with the secretary general of the United Nations.
We had today from my leader, I think, a valuable historical statement of the situation in the Middle East, a historical narrative that puts its problems in prospective. Then, associated with that, was the concrete proposal made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs who spoke Arst. Speaking of the situation historically in the Middle East, my leader mentioned the constant strife that has prevailed in that theatre, without attributing to any particular source the cause of the strife, indicating the competitive forces that persist; the interest of the Soviet union currently and historically in the Middle East; the animosities that prevail between the various groups, and suggested that whatever kind of formula eventuates we must bear in mind these impotrant historical facts, amongst

which is the natural urge of the people of the Middle East, as well as other nations, for self-determination. We must note their desire to use whatever help they can get, from whatever quarter, to further their nationalist aspirations. We must recognize, too, that these aspirations, no matter what will happen within the next few months, are bound in the processes of human history, to assert themselves as they have asserted themselves in the past. I thought he left the implication that what we must seek to do is avoid creating any unduly lengthy breach of misunderstanding between the western nations and these nations in the Middle East.
It undoubtedly was because of considerations of this sort that the Secretary of State for External Affairs projected the idea that one way of bringing about stability in the Middle East would be to provide for some form of international guarantee of the neutrality of Lebanon. When I first heard the Secretary of State for External Affairs make this proposal, without in any way disagreeing with it, but reflecting on what it meant, I found myself hoping that the Secretary of State for External Affairs might have found it possible-he undoubtedly had his reasons for not doing so-to explain the reasons which prompted him to underline this very interesting suggestion, which I noted during the dinner hour was made in a recent issue of Le Monde.
The article in that newspaper called attention to the fact that Lebanon vis-a-vis the other nations of the Middle East for a long time has occupied a position of unofficial but acknowledged neutrality, a neutrality that was respected historically up until perhaps a year ago by the adoption of the Eisenhower doctrine, a position which the Secretary of State for External Affairs compared to the guarantee of neutrality given to Austria in the treaty of peace signed by the Soviet union and certain western powers four or five years ago.
I am sure there is much merit in the suggestion made today by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. However, I am sure that he would agree with me that the guaranteeing of the neutrality of Lebanon to preserve the national integrity of that historic little community and state could serve as a pilot project for guaranteeing the neutrality of other countries in the Middle East as well. One thinks, of course, immediately of Israel. Certainly to guarantee the integrity of Israel would be a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. But one should not even stop with Israel. Guaranteeing the neutrality of other nations of the Middle East by these nations themselves
External Affairs
and by other nations of the world might well prove to be an extremely important factor just as the neutrality of Austria in recent years has proved to be a valuable asset and as the neutrality of Switzerland for a long period now has served as an extremely useful facet in the conduct of international affairs.
I would hope that I do not misread the objectives that the government has in mind and particularly the Secretary of State for External Affairs in saying that not only would we want to guarantee the territorial and national integrity of Lebanon but we would also want to see the expansion of that principle in the wider theatre of the Middle East itself as a means of steadying and disciplining those forces that have existed and have contributed so much to the lack of order which has existed in those areas during the past decade and more. In any event, one can only hope that these suggestions will be pursued with vigour and initiative by the government of this country in the days and months ahead in order to achieve what we all so earnestly desire.
Immediately we are confronted with a proposal by which this problem in the Middle East is to be met and by which it is hoped tension can be eased not only for the benefit of this area but for other areas as well. The proposal has been made that the way in which to do this is for the heads of the governments of the great powers to confront one another and to deliberate on matters relating to the Middle East. This it is argued might have a steadying and'clarifying influence. I want to say first of all that as an individual I believe that nothing is to be lost in principle by those who have the responsibility in these matters in various countries getting to know one another in the hope that as a result of such acquaintance they will better be equipped and disposed to resolve the frightening problems that divide them. But I think we have to resort to the practice and the achievements of history in assessing whether or not this understandably good wish is practical in every circumstance. Argument, talks and articles about a summit meeting to end the cold war I think very often give one a feeling of unrealism, almost childishness, sometimes of nightmarish insincerity. The notes fly back and forth on who will meet, where, when, how, why, and with what; notes usually given to the public before they have been received by the person or the country to whom they are addressed. I think the former secretary of state for external affairs, my leader, properly

External Affairs
expressed the situation in this particular when at Williamsburg he recently said:
The best kind of summit meeting that I can visualize in present circumstances-and it would be no formal conference at all-would be a meeting of the heads of the American and Russian governments for a couple of days, without agenda, files, or crowds of experts; to exchange views informally and frankly; to try to get to understand each other and in the process perhaps to remove some misconceptions and even some fears. Then, the work of negotiation and diplomacy on a wider basis and dealing with concrete problems-the long, hard pull-could follow and in perhaps a better atmosphere.
Then he went on to say this:
The worst kind of summit conference that I can imagine is a meeting of the heads of a dozen or more governments, more or less evenly divided between communists, anticommunists and uncommitted, each with a staff of a hundred or so, and all surrounded by 4,000 journalists, photographers, radio and television commentators, crouching on any ledge they can find, however uncomfortable, providing it is on or near the summit. In this melange, there will be only one man who knows exactly what he wants to do, Mr. Khrushchev. He will submit ten propositions at once to the conference, full of such words as peace, co-existence, disarmament, prohibition, and ask that they be agreed to at once as being entirely consistent with the Sermon on the Mount and the U.N. Charter. He will have a wonderful time and the Asians, Africans and Arabs-and others-will blame everything on Mr. Dulles.
My leader has fairly good authority for this a priori view that not necessarily is related to the current suggestion that, in the face of exigencies as they are now presented, there is no alternative but to do what I think the Prime Minister so properly suggested the other day, namely that this meeting should take place. Sir Winston Churchill said as early as 1953:
This conference-
He was speaking of a summit conference.
-should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda or led into mazes and jungles of technical details, zealously contested by hordes of experts and officials drawn up in a vast cumbrous array.
The conference should be confined to the smallest number of powers and persons possible. It should meet with a measure of informality and a still greater measure of privacy and seclusion.
No one will deny that throughout the whole of his prime ministership during the period of war no one was more properly gregarious and more interested in meeting those in other countries who had to do with similar problems than was the prime minister of Great Britain. Indeed, Viscount Montgomery expressed the same view in this city only a few weeks ago when he said:
Two talking couldn't decide anything but at least they might find out what is the trouble.
In the preparations and the suggestions that the Prime Minister and his colleagues will be making about this summit meeting I think

they will want to bear in mind, as I am sure the Prime Minister is doing, the desirability of a meeting at the summit under circumstances the most practicable and in a form the most desirable to achieve the purposes that he and all others must at this time have in mind.
My leader suggested the other day when commenting on a statement made by the Prime Minister in this house and bearing in mind, undoubtedly, some of these particular situations which I have related, that a subcommittee of the security council might be devised to decide on the most effective way of bringing about what is commonly desired in this matter. This may not be possible and the Prime Minister has information, as has the Secretary of State for External Affairs, which is not available to the rest of us, but I think that this may be a valuable suggestion for the Prime Minister to bear in mind.
Assuming there is a summit conference and assuming that he will take responsibility, as head of the government of Canada, for sitting in the Canadian chair, and assuming that it should turn out-and I am not saying that this will eventuate-that the particular locale selected and the particular prearranged circumstances for the meeting prove not to be fully satisfactory, then this idea of a smaller committee could very well prove workable and it could be convoked at some subsequent date, possibly not too far removed from the date of the larger meeting but in another locale or even on another continent. This locale could be Geneva. We must not forget that in the month of July 1954 the heads of the governments of the United States, the Soviet union, France and Great Britain did meet for a week in Geneva. President Eisenhower, Premier Bulganin, Premier Faure and Mr. Eden were present and we all recall that at that meeting, when the agenda was not too carefully pre-arranged, the discussions resulted in the creation- perhaps it was a false creation but it nevertheless existed-of a measure of confidence and trust as between the four powers which had not existed for some time.
I suspect that in spite of the fact that there was a lot of publicity connected with that meeting the negotiations for the most part were held in private and it may be that this experience will prove useful when considering the events having to do with the setting up of the machinery and the decisions on the circumstances as to where and when the heads of the great powers or the members of the security council and certain other invited states shall meet. In any event, those are suggestions put forward without any background knowledge to the Prime Minister, who I know wishes to discharge, as do his

colleagues, his responsibilities in this matter in the interests of our country and in the interests of preservation of peace in the world; and as a private member of this house I give them to him.
I was very interested in what the Secretary of State for External Affairs had to say about the formula for the adjournment sine die of the international supervisory commission on control in Laos and Cambodia. These commissions, as I understand it, have now adjourned sine die-


Sidney Earle Smith: In Laos.


Paul Joseph James Martin: -in Laos and in Cambodia the adjournment has yet to take place. All I can say is that even though he did not say this, it seems clear that the adjournment sine die means that the commissions will not return, certainly not to Laos; and assuming the realization of the same position in Cambodia, it will not return to Cambodia. I am not quarrelling with that; I think this is a rather ingenious solution to a problem which has concerned the government of Canada for some time.
No doubt these two commissions as well as the commission in Viet Nam have served an outstanding purpose and, as the Leader of the Opposition said today, the fact that Poland, India and Canada are represented on those commissions is possibly demonstrative of what can happen on a much wider scale in a sphere in which there would be participation by nations of both east and west which would be designed, by employing the instruments of adjudication and conciliation, to ease tension and preserve peace.
It is right that the commission in Viet Nam should continue as a means of guaranteeing satisfactory conditions for the holding of an election in that country on terms which will permit the elections to be free and so that the people of that troubled country may have the opportunity of deciding whether or not they are to follow the leadership of that great liberal-minded statesman, President Diem, or to follow the dictates of the representatives of communist China and of the Soviet union in North Viet Nam.
I also want to pay tribute to the members of the international commission in the three countries I visited a year and a half ago, not only with respect to the military personnel but also those officials of the Department of External Affairs who under great difficulties and sacrifices have rendered a very distinct service to our country and to the cause of international peace.
The Secretary of State for External AfEairs
concluded his statement with a recital of the
problems of disarmament. Of course, as my
External Affairs
leader said, disarmament could begin with the suspension of nuclear tests. This could be the beginning of a solution for a problem which has confronted the United Nations since the first meeting of that body in Church House in London, in 1946. It has not been possible to achieve any success with respect to this matter, and I fully agree with the Secretary of State for External Affairs who believes that because of the tensity of the current international situation we should not prevent a discussion of disarmament. I am not going to engage in an argument as to whether disarmament is the cause of war or whether it is a reflection of international tension, but undoubtedly the very reasons that provoked the suggestion that there should be a suspension of tests are the same kind of reasons which should provoke civilized men and women to try and bring about in their respective countries policies designed to reduce the heavy burdens of armament in a manner consistent of course with national security.
We have always made it plain in this country-and this applies to this government as well as the previous administration-in our talks with the Soviet union and with our friends the representatives of the United States, of France and of the United Kingdom, that we are not engaged in a process of trying to bring about unilateral disarmament but that we wanted disarmament on such conditions that we would be certain both sides of an agreement were carrying out the various terms to which they had committed their governments. I agree that for us not only inspection and control are important. It is also important that we have a clear understanding with the Soviet union as to what we mean by the objectives of control.
The Soviet union has traditionally taken the position that this really does not matter but that what does matter is an agreement in principle, the matter of control could be decided or discussed later. That is a chance, obviously, which in the light of the current international situation no country could take. I was a little mystified, however, when the Secretary of State for External Affairs, referring to the disarmament program as revealed in the white paper which he tabled, described it as a package deal. If by "package deal" is meant that there must be an acceptance of all its provisions, then I must say I never understood that to be the position of the previous administration nor do I understand it to be the position taken by the United States, by France or by the United Kingdom. I have always understood that we were prepared to embark on a stage by stage program insisting only at the end of each stage that

External Affairs
there would be set up the kind of international control and inspection which would guarantee the fulfilment by both sides of the features of the particular stage to which agreement in principle had been accorded.
In any event, if we have not succeeded in bringing about some progress in a measure of disarmament the fault lies at the doorstep of the Soviet union because of its reluctance to accept these elementary guarantees of control and supervision which are inherent in the character of nuclear weapons of war now in the possession of at least three of the great powers.
I hope the government will persist in this matter of disarmament, and I believe it will, no matter how frustrating it becomes and no matter how much patience it takes, remembering as the Leader of the Opposition recalled today one of his own initial participations in the field of international affairs at a disarmament conference long before the outbreak of the second world war. We all remember the long periods of discussion from 1922 on under the chairmanship of Mr. Henderson toward conditions which ultimately led to a form of unilateral disarmament which placed many nations of the free world in a disadvantageous position visa-vis Hitler's Germany. That shall not occur again, that is clear. And once the deliberations of the scientists at Geneva have been concluded, once it is determined that it is scientifically possible to supervise the suspension of these tests, it may be hoped that will be a strong stimulant for agreement in the first stages covering conventional arms and leading ultimately down to the prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic weapons along the lines indicated by my leader this afternoon.
I fully agree with what was said about economic assistance to other countries. The role of Canada in the Colombo plan is well known. Now we have to envisage a wider form of assistance, either bilaterally or through the United Nations toward countries in the Middle East or countries already begun through the form of limited technical assistance thus far in the Caribbean and, let it not be mistaken, apart from Ghana, assistance to other theatres, including Africa itself.
This will place great obligations on the citizens of individual countries where the governments of those nations have to make policies that lead to the act of giving. That will place not only upon the people but upon those of us in political parties the responsibility of realizing that in urging these things in parliament we are in honour bound precluded from using them in inverse manner when we come to face the electorate which so often happens and has happened in this

country. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs may be assured that they have from us on this side of the house, as my leader said with much greater authority than I, nothing but good will and best wishes in the prosecution of their difficult responsibilities.
We are not the leading power in the world. That is a self-evident statement. But we are a nation that is respected. We are a nation which, because of the achievements in this field during the past decade, has won for itself an honoured place among the nations of the world. We have an opportunity of taking initiatives not open to every other country, not only among the smaller and middle but among the greater powers, initiatives which still rest within the power of any government of our country. Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, writing in the Ottawa Journal of May 15, 1958, said:
The more intransigent the Soviet union the more important it is for us constantly to put forward proposals which demonstrate our willingness to settle, but which also define the issue for which we are prepared to contend. We should make no proposal we are not willing to see accepted but by the same token we should not refrain from making proposals simply because we believe they may not be accepted. We are under no obligation to frame proposals we are sure the Soviet union will accept. To do so would invite the U.S.S.R. to drive us back step by step. We are under an obligation to make responsible proposals which are not designed to undermine legitimate soviet interests.
These are words to which I am sure all of us will subscribe and which I commend to the Prime Minister at this time. I take my seat by simply saying to the Prime Minister on one occasion when my leader as then secretary of state for external affairs asked me to go to the United Nations to head our delegation, the right hon. gentleman served on that delegation as an observer. He will recall our pleasant and what I think I may describe as a useful association. As I now look at him sitting in the seat-my leader said in the seats of the mighty, and it is true,- occupied by the first minister of this country, I recall that association and I know that now occupying a post of even greater responsibility than that which he occupied in 1955 the right hon. gentleman will go to the United Nations bearing in mind the tradition in the field of foreign affairs established by others and to which this house has contributed in its discussions, and he will do his utmost not only for the honour of Canada but for the peace of the world.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, this is indeed an occasion, one of those that occur from time to time, when this House of Commons becomes a cathedral in devotion to great principles. I am sure every hon. member of this house

was moved by the power and eloquence of the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) as he revealed his views in connection with the seriousness and in keeping with the seriousness of the situation which has been the basis of our discussion today. Indeed, from the time the debate started this afternoon one could be very proud of a House of Commons which produced the contributions that were made here as hon. members on both sides of the house spoke, beginning with the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) and followed by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) in what I may be allowed to say was a masterful analysis, and finally now concluding with the speech of the hon. member for Essex East. I am not going to bring into this discussion any of those things that are past. Once or twice the Leader of the Opposition went back two years ago, almost to the crisis at the time of Suez. On this occasion I do not intend to return to those events, nor to deal with them again.
Today we are faced with a situation, and have been during the last two weeks, serious in its import, challenging in the opportunity that comes to those of us in office who have responsibility. We hope we may discharge those duties that are imposed upon us by virtue of the position we occupy in keeping with the nature of the challenge that is ours. We find, however, that there are bright sides. Today we find the United Kingdom and the United States in a degree of unity which is necessary if freedom is to be preserved. We realize something of how fearful the prospect would be if the United Kingdom, the United States and France found themselves in disagreement at a time like this.
As the hon. member for Essex East said, whatever the results of the summit conference, should it be convened-and I am implying no doubt by placing my remarks in that form-mankind and free men everywhere must never place that degree of faith in the conference which would remove the realities of the future or the realization of the fact that the division as between the forces of freedom and the communist world will still continue, not I hope in the same attitude of mind as has prevailed recently but certainly let no one carry in his heart the hope that all will be solved.
In the last two weeks the communist world has shown its point of view again on more than one occasion. Mr. Khrushchev has spoken in words that cannot be misunderstood regarding his relationships with Tito and with all communist nations that believe that communism can be a matter of nationalistic concern alone.
External Affairs
When my hon. friend mentions the needs of disarmament-and all of us in the free world hold that view-and of the hopes that he has that out of the conference in Geneva will come a measure of agreement that will permit of disarmament, I can only bring to his attention the fact that on the twelfth day of July Mr. Khrushchev said that the hope to work out a system of complete and fool-proof control over disarmament is unfounded. That is the atmosphere today in the communist world. 1 believe that the dynamism of the communist world will not be met by frozen negativism, and it is because I believe that that I took the stand in the House of Commons on Monday last when I set out something of the point of view of this government, something of our ideas and of our concepts of our responsibilities. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the members of the government and myself agreed that whatever the purpose that Khrushchev may have had in mind in suggesting a summit meeting, for any of the nations of the free world, and in particular for the United Kingdom or the United States, to turn down that invitation preemptorily and without the fullest consideration of its import, the realization that it might convey a new hope for mankind, would be acting in a way detrimental to world peace.
I am very pleased this evening, as I have been throughout this day, as I have listened to the hon. members on the other side of the house join in their words of commendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, for after all, just as the Leader of the Opposition at one time occupied that position and at another time the former prime minister, Mr. St. Laurent-and generally through those days we in the opposition endeavoured to join as Canadians to achieve a degree of unity in foreign affairs-so on this occasion members of the opposition in generous terms have followed that course which is representative of true democracy within our country.
The hon. member for Essex East stated that in everything he would not agree. I would not expect that because after all there are bound to be disagreements as to the means being adopted, while agreement as to the objective is being maintained. It is because of that fact that a few days ago I stated I would welcome this debate with a view to having the views of the members of this house expressed on a matter that far transcends party affiliations or political consequences.
The stand that we as the government of this country take on this question is one that we hope will command the support of Canadians as a whole. Certainly the members of

External Affairs
the opposition on this occasion in the contributions that they have made have shown that realization of the gravity of the occasion and the necessity for closed ranks. In other words, each of us realizes that the events of the next few weeks may indeed have a tremendous influence not only on the future of our country but on the welfare of mankind.
I am going to refer to one or two suggestions made by the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon. One of the things that he suggested was an international police force and, as he said, that is no recent inovation or suggestion. Indeed, as I listened to him my mind went back 350 years in the reading of history to when the concept of an international police force was first brought to the attention of mankind by Grotius. The hon. member for Essex East referred to the league of nations and its failure in 1939. I think it failed prior to that when, in spite of the need of the establishment of an international force being generally recognized, it failed to secure the necessary support for the setting up of such a force, that aside from the fact that the restriction of the membership by the actions of one or two nations made it almost impossible for the league of nations to be a success.
I remember on one occasion hearing the late John W. Dafoe say that the only way in which mankind can preserve peace will be through the instrumentality of an international organization having the power to command respect and obedience to its commands and its determinations. The Leader of the Opposition has suggested that the general assembly might take steps towards the establishment of such a force. Under the uniting for peace resolution the general assembly has recognized the need for the existence of an armed force which could be used collectively notwithstanding the failure of the security council to discharge its responsibility. Article 43, to which reference was made by the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Essex East, is as follows:
1.	All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the security council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2.	Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3.	The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the security council. They shall be concluded between the security council and members or

between the security council and groups of members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
As the Leader of the Opposition said this afternoon, that has been the aim and purpose of successive meetings of the assembly but the achievement of that aim and ideal is still far removed. The general assembly has indeed recommended that states members maintain national armed forces elements for service as a United Nations unit or units upon recommendation by the security council or the general assembly.
Similar considerations which led to the enactment of the united for peace resolution or a development of the recommendations in that resolution might indeed lead to the establishment of some kind of permanent United Nations force, but there are, as was recognized here this morning, this afternoon and this evening, immense practical and political difficulties before agreement between the nations can be achieved. I am not going to give quotations this evening of some of the stands over the years in that behalf that have been taken by various members in the house. Suffice it to say that in March of 1945, prior to the convening of the United Nations conference in San Francisco, in common with other members of the house I advocated the need of the establishment of such a force. Later on in 1946 in the United Nations assembly Mr. St. Laurent advanced the proposition as one worthy of support.
But unfortunately as we look back on the perspective of events those who were in a position to bring about the achievement of that desirable end, without which peace under an international organization is founded on a slender reed, have made no great advance towards the attainment of this objective.
The Leader of the Opposition mentioned disarmament. I am going to refer to that a little later. He also dealt with the economic phase, as did the hon. member for Essex East, the need of assistance being given to underdeveloped countries. In that regard there are no boundaries to the attitude taken in support of that proposition by members in all parts of the house, and in the last year or so there have been material increases but that of itself is not sufficient.
One of the most serious challenges today is the challenge of the U.S.S.R. in its economic warfare, and in 1955 Khrushchev said, "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes." Everywhere in the world today the U.S.S.R. and the communist world generally are expanding their

trade relations without regard to profit considerations and Russia is measuring its success on the basis of the degree to which it is able to achieve control of the minds of those who for the moment trade economic advantage and ultimately lose their freedom. Only recently the New York Times made a survey of the trade offensive of the communist world and indicated that in 1955 communist trade exceeded $6 billion, that the communists have achieved footholds in 19 countries and that the increase in trade is double that of five years earlier. Indeed, at this very moment China is engaged in a trade offensive in Asia and Europe involving farm products, cement, textiles, manufactured products and the like. It affects us here. The U.S.S.R. is engaged in similar conduct with respect to aluminum, rails and general production.
I place before the house as worthy of attention that one of the courses we must take is the reconsideration of the resources of the international monetary fund and the international bank to the end that we will be able to achieve that degree of economic stability within the free world which will permit, indeed encourage the expansion of trade so that we can meet this offensive. For as the Leader of the Opposition said this afternoon, this is one of the major means being used by the communists today to undermine the stability and strength of the free world. The Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out in a similar statement that the economic stage is one of the most important today, and one that challenges the free world by the tremendous danger that faces our trade and economic welfare by reason of this communist campaign.
I suggest that the international monetary fund, having played a useful part particularly in the last two or three years in helping countries tide over the rough spots in any balance of payments by making available short term loans in foreign exchange, mainly United States dollars, Canadian dollars and deutschemarks, deserves further assistance at this time. The fund has resources in gold-based currencies amounting to about $2,750 million, more than half of which are already committed in stand-by credits. I believe that consideration must be given to an increase in quotas of 50 per cent which would bring in an additional $3,000 million in gold and useful currencies, the result of which would be, according to the economists, substantially to increase the liquid assets underpinning world trade and give confidence to members of the fund that help would be available in case of need, so that they would not have to impose fresh import restrictions to deal with a temporary balance of payments problem.
External Affairs
In so far as the international bank is concerned, that position is also one that deserves attention. All the uncommitted countries of the world today look to the international bank for help in their development programs. The bank has become the main source of dollar capital for this purpose, with loan commitments now approaching $4,000 million. The main source of funds for lending is now the sale by the bank of its debentures to private investors. These debentures can be sold readily on account of the guarantee provided by the United States, and by other financially strong countries, of 80 per cent of their capital subscriptions. I suggest that if the bank continues to lend at the current rate it will, within a couple of years, have to issue additional debentures, which would bring its obligations within sight of the amounts guaranteed by the United States and Canada. In other words, by an increase of the guarantee from 80 per cent to 160 per cent of national capital subscriptions, there would be an increase in the banks borrowing power by several billions of dollars. Such action at this time would assure the less developed countries of the possibility of further assistance and would build a bulwark against the communist advance in the uncommitted countries. This would shore up those countries economically and give them new hope to meet the economic challenge of the communist world.
I mention this because the Leader of the Opposition dealt at some length with the need for economic action in the Middle East. His plan was a United Nations plan, as I understood it, the contributions to which were to be made by all countries, including the U.S.S.R. While naturally any step in that direction would be welcome, I am sure that the experience of the hon. gentleman in the past does not lead him to look too hopefully on the attainment of the objective that he mentioned, however desirable it might be.
Those were two of the matters to which the hon. gentleman gave particular attention. I come now to the question of a summit meeting. I betray no confidence when I say that the Secretary of State for External Affairs did, in the last week or ten days, give the leadership to break the deadlock which seemed to result from the original letter from Mr. Khrushchev offering a summit meeting. The press of our country have been generous, and have been mindful of his contribution and of the action taken, which I am glad, in general terms, has received the support of the opposition. The fact that we believe there is a responsibility in Canada in the Middle East as a threat to the world, is indicated by certain courses that are about to be adopted.

External Affairs
At the present time we have an ambassador in Cairo who is accredited to Lebanon, with Lebanon being in charge of a charge d'affaires. We have an ambassador in Athens who is accredited to Israel, and a charge d'affaires in Tel Aviv. With the problem of the Middle East so much in our minds, and the need of having the closest relationship with those countries so that we may be assured that our views shall receive full consideration and also to strengthen our relations both politically and commercially and, as I said a moment ago, through our missions, to increase our knowledge and understanding of the area, and of our confidence in its future, we intend within the next few days to initiate negotiations with the governments of Israel, Lebanon and Iran, with a view to setting up full, permanent diplomatic missions in the capitals of these three countries. These countries represent to us the standard bearers of freedom in that section of the Middle East which, up to the present time, have not received the diplomatic representatives which they had been desirous of having and have been entitled to have.
Having mentioned that, I now want to say a word in regard to the general question of a summit meeting, and some of the ideas and views that were held by the government with respect to this meeting. I think in the last few days events have moved very quickly. Mr. Khrushchev, having first advocated the necessity for a summit conference outside of the United Nations, finally agreed that the summit conference might be called in connection with the United Nations. It is the United Nations aspect of the forthcoming meeting that I think deserves the most serious consideration at this time.
I want to give you something of the thinking of the government on this matter for this meeting may well constitute a precedent for similar meetings in the future. Generally speaking, Khrushchev's prompt acceptance of the suggestion that the discussions between the representatives of the great powers should take place before the security council, not at a separate meeting at Geneva or elsewhere, does underline the authority of the United Nations. It was my view that any attempt to deal with the subject of the Middle East, with which the United Nations was seized, outside of the security council at this time would derogate from the real authority of the United Nations.
I think generally speaking-and it has been evidenced here today-there is reasonably general agreement that the proper auspices for the holding of this meeting should be under the aegis of the United Nations. There, there are rules of procedure which provide

for the calling together of a special group of nations as has been suggested, and any additional nations upon which the security council agree. In the interests of continuing peace which, after all, is the supreme purpose to which this country is dedicated, we believe there is being offered an opportunity to strengthen the security council and the United Nations by demonstrating that the rules that already are in existence which govern its activities are effective to deal with present problems. To have a separate meeting of nations to deal with specific problems which the security council itself has been discussing would, I repeat, be nothing less than a declaration to the whole world that the security council is incapable of carrying out the duties and responsibilities for which it was created.
We took a lead in this regard because while from the point of view of population we are still one of the smaller nations, we believe -and I think the belief is held generally throughout the whole world as the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Winch) said -that smaller nations must be recognized and their rights upheld in the United Nations and the assurance of their viewpoint being placed before the United Nations maintained. It is for this reason that we take the view that a formal council meeting to initiate the talks between the heads of government concerned, after the procedure has been determined by the security council regular membership, should be attended by the heads of government able to be present. For it is in the full security council that the heads of government of the major powers, in whom our destiny rests in such large measure, can best explain their policies and having done so obtain the moral support needed to carry them out in accordance with the rule of law as symbolized in the charter of the United Nations.
It may not be possible for all heads of government to attend the special security council meeting of which I am thinking but I hope as many as possible will attend. I believe that they should request the great powers to meet and after quiet and reasoned discussion-the four powers to meet in private -to report to the security council on the issues. To this end Canada is prepared to take all necessary steps. Instructions are therefore going forward to our permanent representative to the United Nations to consult immediately with the secretary general, and with other delegations to the end that urgent consideration be given to the further steps necessary if this heads of government meeting of the security council is to pave the way for practical discussions and hoped for solutions of the problem which beset the

Middle East area. To that end we believe that some preparatory meetings of the security council, as I said a moment ago, in regular session will have to be held within the next few days to work out the details, for all of us must appreciate the fact that a top level meeting of that body, to the success of which mankind attaches such great importance, may take some little time to arrange.
In achieving this purpose and laying the proper foundation, we will be guided by the wisdom and experience of the secretary general in setting the necessary procedures in motion and a broad pattern will be sought. The procedure is something as follows. It will be first necessary to inscribe on the agenda of the security council in regular session an item sufficiently broad to permit not only a discussion of the problems of Lebanon and Jordan, of which the council is already seized, but to move on to those more deep-rooted issues which affect the area as a whole and of which, as the Leader of the Opposition said this afternoon, the Lebanese and Jordanian crises are but a manifestation.
When my hon. friend spoke this afternoon of the rise of Arab nationalism I thought of the book by Nasser entitled "Egypt's Liberation". That little book of 120 pages or so is the blueprint upon which Nasser has proceeded. He set the course out as clearly as ever did Hitler whose viewpoint in Mein Kampf few regarded seriously until it was too late. Indeed as one reads this book and sees something of the psychological influences which were referred to by the hon. member for Brandon-Souris (Mr. Dinsdale) this evening he realizes something of the tremendous forcefulness and tenacity of purpose which Nasser has exhibited in bringing about first among the peoples in that area a realization of their nationalism and also using that nationalism under the activating influence of the U.S.S.R. for purposes which brought about the conditions existing today in that area. After dreaming his dreams, giving his viewpoint, revealing his innermost thoughts, he says:
The pages of history are full of heroes who created for themselves roles of glorious valour which they played at decisive moments. Likewise the pages of history are full of heroic and glorious roles which never found heroes to perform them. For some reason it seems to me that within the Arab circle-
This book was written or published in 1955.
-there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search of a hero. And I do not know why it seems to me that this role, exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled down, tired and weary, near the borders of our country and is beckoning to us to move, to take up its lines, to put on its costume, since no one else is qualified to play it.
External Affairs
There is the story. He took the role. He did what the Leader of the Opposition said today. He fomented. He aroused. He inspired. That is why, because of this matter of nationalism, the Arab countries cannot be taken for granted. It is one of the questions that deserves the most serious consideration by this summit meeting.
As far as the inscription is concerned, perhaps the item need be no more specific than "The Question of the Middle East", and I would hope that all members of the security council would find it possible thus to set the stage for discussions of an area which has been the focal point of so much strife and international tension in recent years. The heads of government when they meet at the special session of the security council, as I hope they will-and everything I have said is based on that meeting taking place- would address themselves to this broad problem and would express their concern and make available their ideas to those nations both in and out of the council whose interest in the Middle East is of a more direct nature. All of us recognize the primary responsibility of a few in this matter but the manner in which they discharge that responsibility is of vital concern to all nations great and small, both inside and outside the area concerned. Canada as a middle power occupying a strategic position wants the right to speak on this occasion.
As far as Canada is concerned, we believe that after the general discussion and after the opening statements, if that viewpoint is accepted in the security council, those principally concerned with the Middle East, namely the four or five powers mentioned by the Leader of the Opposition would be able to carry on their deliberations in private. I could not be more in agreement with the member for Essex East with respect to his remarks when he described what a conference of this kind might be if it were conducted under the glare of klieg lights and transmitted to all parts of the world by television. I believe we must free those at this meeting from the temptation to use it in order to turn it into a propaganda agency, for to do so would indeed be to hold back the advance of what I hope will be a reasonable degree of security in the Middle East and a realization, through discussion of the problems, by all parties, of the need for a decision to be arrived at.
If this were generally agreed Canada would be prepared to introduce a resolution at the special session of the security council calling on the permanent members most directly concerned with the Middle East to meet at the heads of government level in order to

External Affairs
carry forward the discussions initiated, in the council in full session, with the secretary general present in an appropriate capacity.
Some reference was made to the need for other nations to be called in, in particular India, and I am one of those who believe, with the Secretary of State for External Affairs that Mr. Nehru has a contribution to make at this time. Provision has already been made by article 31 of the charter which provides as follows:
Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the security council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the security council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that member are specially affected.
Finally I would suggest that our resolution should call upon the secretary general to report the results of the private deliberations to the end that the people in the various countries concerned would have some knowledge of the discussions taking place. The question arises as to where to hold the meeting and much has been said about New York being the United Nations headquarters. Others have pointed out the possible dangers of holding a meeting in that city but there is naturally preference for New York out of regard for the necessity of preserving and consecrating, if I may use that word, the United Nations aspect of the proceedings which is of paramount importance. It would therefore seem logical on the whole to hold the initial high level security council meeting in New York but, if as a result of the general discussions or the full consideration of the problem in all its ramifications, it was decided that the meeting should be held elsewhere, I would remind the house that when I wrote to the Soviet union leader on January 18, 1958, I said:
You may be aware that there has been a suggestion in the Canadian House of Commons that the government might invite the participants in such a meeting to consider holding it in Canada. This suggestion was undoubtedly prompted by the consideration that Canada is the next-door neighbour of the United States and the U.S.S.R. and has a special relationship to commonwealth countries and to France. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that when the participants decide that they are ready to call such a meeting and should they decide to hold it in Canada, they will be welcome.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


John George Diefenbaker: There are several other matters with which I wanted to deal on this occasion, including the matter of disarmament, but I think I have covered in general the immediate problem, namely that of the meeting and the attitude of Canada
towards that meeting. I repeat what I said originally that I believe Canadians as a whole are proud of the fact that Canada took the initiative in bringing about the attainment of this meeting in which the hopes of mankind will indeed be reposed.
In conclusion, I remember well, in April of 1945, at the United Nations meeting in San Francisco, seeing the beginnings of that organization and feeling the hopes then held for the success of a world organization which would preserve and maintain peace. The United Nations Organization has had its ups and downs since 1945. It now has what I believe is its appointment with destiny and I hope-and I am sure this hope is being expressed throughout the world not only in the free world but behind the iron curtain- that if the summit conference takes place, in good sense and with appreciation of the awful consequences of failure, the participants, through the security council, will go forward with the feeling that whatever the cost we must endeavour to attain at least some degree of assurance of security which has not existed in recent years. It is almost too much to hope for, but while there are some who say "why discuss these matters when past discussions have not been successful," I would like to remind the house that it has also been said, "While they are talking they are not fighting." One has only to go back to the remarks of Lord Grey in his memoirs when in reference to 1914 he said that if the nations in Europe had continued to talk rather than arriving at the conclusion that further talks were useless, world war I could and would have been prevented.
This meeting can be the crossroads for a new future. That is my hope and that hope has been shown in abundant measure today in the opening speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and in the contributions made by the Leader of the Opposition and the other hon. members who have spoken here.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.

Mr. Chevrier:: Mr. Speaker, I presume the business for tomorrow is as announced last night?


Howard Charles Green: Yes, Mr. Speaker, the estimates.


[Stage Direction]
It being three minutes after ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to the order of the house passed on July 14.

Questions
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS	CONSUMER PRICE INDEX VARIATIONS
The following answers, deposited with the Clerk of the house, are printed in the official report of debates pursuant to standing order 39:

Mr. Robichaud: 1.	Have public tenders been called for the motor transport mail route from Pokemouche to Bathurst, Gloucester county, New Brunswick?
2.	If so, what are the names of those who submitted tenders, and what was the amount of each tender?
3.	To whom was the mail contract awarded?
Answer by: Hon. W. M. Hamilton (Postmaster General):
1.	Yes.
2.
Leon J. Boudreau, Maisonnette	$ 8,000
Alfred John Daigle, 956 avenue St.
Peters, Bathurst	 8,000
Herbert Wilson Savoy, Pokemouche 8,000
Vincent Savoie, Evangeline	 8,700
Clifford Boudreau, Bathurst	 8,990
Mederic P. Chiasson, Bathurst	 9,490
Adelbert Landry, Ste. Anne du Bocage 9,949 James Landry, Ste. Anne du Bocage .. 11,600
Leonard Doucet, Bathurst	 12,000
Herbert Allen Branch, 222 St. George,
Bathurst	 14,000
3. Herbert Wilson Savoy.

Question No. 161-Mr. Deschatelets:
1.	What was the variation of the consumer price index for the following commodities in the months of June, 1957 and May, 1958, on (a) food; (b) shelter; (c) clothing; (d) household operation; (e) other commodities and services?
2.	What was the variation of price index on farm machinery in the months of August, 1957 and January, 1953, for (a) eastern Canada; (b) western Canada?
Answer by: Hon. Gordon Churchill (Minister of Trade and Commerce):
1. The variation of the consumer price index for the following commodities and specified dates is:
				Per-
June	May	centage1957	1958	change(a)	Food 	117.7	122.7	4.2(b)	Shelter 	134.8	137.9	2.3(c)	Clothing 	108.4	110.0	1.5(d)	Household	operation ....	119.1	120.7	1.3(e)	Other commodities	and services ....	126.5	130.6	3.22.	The variation of price	index	on farmmachinery for eastern and	western Canada	for specified dates is:	Per-August January centage	1957	1958	change(a)	Eastern Canada	225.1	237.9	5.7(b)	Western Canada	224.2	235.4	5.0
Saturday, July 26, 1958



COMMITTEES OF THE HOUSE

[Stage Direction]
Fifth report of standing committee on miscellaneous private bills.-Mr. McCleave.
Fourth report of standing committee on veterans affairs.-Mr. Dinsdale.

John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I wish to table, in English and in French, the report of the royal commission on Newfoundland finances. I wish to say that in the union of two states there are always many factors that require settlement and many divergent views have to be reconciled. Members of this house will recall the prolonged negotiations leading up to Newfoundland becoming a province of Canada on March 31, 1949.
It is not surprising that agreement was not readily reached. Although every effort was made to provide definitive terms for the entry of Newfoundland into the federation of Canada, it was found necessary to introduce a saving clause among the financial conditions. It was with respect to this reserve or saving clause, paragraph 29 of the terms of union, that the royal commission was concerned. The requirement that the financial results of union be examined within eight years by a federal royal commission was unique in the constitutional history of Canada. It is true that extensive studies have been conducted from time to time and adjustments made, in some cases, but in no other instance has there been a mandatory clause. The mandatory clause read as follows: The commission required to be appointed was-
-to review the financial position of the province of Newfoundland and to recommend the form and scale of additional financial assistance, if any, that may be required by the province of Newfoundland to enable it to continue public services at the levels and standards reached subsequent to the date of union, without resorting to taxation more burdensome, having regard to capacity to pay, than that obtaining generally in the region comprising the maritime provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island.
After full consideration of the terms of reference, the commissioners have concluded that the burden of taxation in the province of Newfoundland does not differ materially from that in the maritime provinces. It is their opinion, after studying the course of provincial finances since union, that additional financial assistance is necessary if the province is to maintain the levels and standards of public services reached.
Accordingly, basing their recommendations on the anticipated results of the fiscal year 1957-58, they have recommended that an annual payment be made to the province of $8 million a year, commencing on April 1, 1957, this amount to be reduced by the amount of any transitional grant that may still be payable.
The government will study the report and its recommendations and will decide upon the appropriate course of action. The decision will thus bring finality to the terms of union of Newfoundland and Canada.
The government is most grateful to the commissioners for their efforts in meeting the obligation in the terms of union.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, we on this side have listened to the Prime Minister's statement with much interest. We will study the report with care, as I know they will in Newfoundland. I would merely say now it is our understanding and our assumption that this report will be implemented with the least possible delay.



IRRIGATION


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I should like now to make an announcement in regard to the South Saskatchewan river dam project agreement. The agreement was signed this morning by the Minister of Agriculture, having previously been signed by Premier Douglas on behalf of the province of Saskatchewan.
The signing of this agreement with the province of Saskatchewan represents an important step forward in the development of Canada's resources. Its main objective is, through its large-scale water conservation
2854	HOUSE OF
Irrigation-South Saskatchewan River and irrigation potentialities, to provide stability for agriculture in central Saskatchewan, where droughts, sometimes prolonged, have in the past created serious problems for more than 50,000 farmers, a truth that is driven home by conditions this season.
While many think of irrigation as associated particularly with the production of specialty crops, it may be that the production under irrigation of alfalfa and other fodder crops in the centre of Saskatchewan's most populous farming area and in quantities sufficient to remove the fear of having to sacrifice livestock because of feed shortages in drought years or having to bring in fodder from other areas at great expense will prove to be the greatest benefit in the long run.
I say the greatest benefit. But irrigation possibilities represent by no means the only good to flow from the project that the signing of this agreement will inaugurate. The construction of the earth dam now agreed upon will make possible the production of hydroelectric power on a scale that will mean much to the industrial development of the province, while the assurance of adequate water supplies for such cities as Regina and Moose Jaw and the control of flooding are benefits that in the minds of many would of themselves justify much of the outlay that will be called for in carrying out this vast project.
It has been under discussion for many years. The need has been there, and it has been very obvious. I look back a matter of 25 years to the time when the question was first given consideration and discussion. Again after 1940 when I represented Lake Centre constituency, as it then was, within which a portion of the dam will be located, discussions continued. Fifteen years ago investigations were begun by P.F.R.A. officials, and during the past decade these investigations have been continued to determine the feasibility and economic importance of the project. Naturally I am happy that the project is now inaugurated, and I am sure the country as a whole will share my satisfaction.
I have stressed the irrigation possibilities, possibilities that may one day see water brought to 500,000 acres of Saskatchewan's good lands, the immense power development potentialities and the assurance of water supplies. There are many other benefits that will accrue as a result of the building of the dam. The control of water levels in the Qu'Appelle valley and its lakes, as well as the formation of a completely new great lake of the South Saskatchewan river system upstream from the dam, will provide recreational facilities and wildlife possibilities that will doubtless be appreciated by generations to come, and


may well become one of the major tourist attractions in the western provinces.
I am very happy that this project is now in a position where construction can proceed, and I am sure members in all parts of the house will hope that out of the completion of this project will come for agriculture within that area of Saskatchewan and for Saskatchewan and the western provinces generally the dawning of a new day.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, the Prime Minister, in swinging from Newfoundland to Saskatchewan, makes us once again conscious of the extent and the development of our country. We on this side of the house have heard with satisfaction the announcement the Prime Minister has made, a satisfaction which I am sure will be shared by the people of Canada, especially those in Saskatchewan and the western provinces and by none more than my former colleague the former minister of agriculture, Right Hon. James Gardiner. We on this side hope, indeed we are confident, that this project will be of value not only to Saskatchewan but to all the prairie provinces, and as such will make its contribution to national development.


Harold Edward Winch: We
in the C.C.F. group, Mr. Speaker-


Some hon. Members:: 


An hon. Member:: Where's the group?


Harold Edward Winch: We in the C.C.F. group want to join in the satisfaction which the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition have just expressed that at long last agreement has been reached and a contract signed for the construction of this most important work in Saskatchewan. I have been asked to convey the regret of our house leader, the hon. member for Assiniboia, that he could not be here on this occasion because of what Liberals and Conservatives know as the exigencies of conventions. The fact that at this moment I stand alone means nothing, because we represent a principle. I express, on behalf not only of our group in this House of Commons but our membership throughout all of Canada, our pleasure in the advance that has been made with the signing of the agreement at 10.15 this morning, when I took pride in the fact that I represented the C.C.F. of Saskatchewan.
It is a wonderful thing, sir, that this agreement has been finally reached. We all know that this will add particularly to the wellbeing of the province concerned, and will contribute to the well-being of all of Canada. We wish all success to this endeavour, recognizing that it is a gain to the economy of the prairies.

May I be permitted, sir, to make this comment. Since June of last year we have noted the signing of agreements, starting in the east and moving to the west with the signing of this new agreement today. I hope that westward movement will continue and that in the not too distant future we will have something on the Columbia river in British Columbia.



CRIMINAL CODE


Edmund Davie Fulton: the first reading of Bill No. S-9 (from the Senate), to amend the Criminal Code.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.



LOAN COMPANIES ACT


[Stage Direction]
Hon.	Donald	M.	Fleming	(Minister	of
Finance) moved the first reading of Bill No. S-10 (from the Senate), to amend the Loan Companies Act.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.


[Stage Direction]
Hon.	Donald	M.	Fleming	(Minister	of
Finance) moved the first reading of Bill No. S-ll (from the Senate), to amend the Trust Companies Act.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.

[Stage Direction]
On the order:	Government notices of
motions:
The Secretary of State for External Affairs-The following proposed motion:-
That items numbered 85 to 111, inclusive, item numbered 502, items numbered 542 to 549, inclusive, and item numbered 655, as listed in the main and supplementary estimates 1958-59, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
Mr. Speaker:: By order of the house this motion will be referred to government orders and will be called later this day and will be debatable.
25, 1958	2655
Inquiries of the Ministry PUBLIC SERVICE



PREVAILING RATE EMPLOYEES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Speaker, yesterday the hon. member for Skeena asked a question as to whether the prevailing rate employees were given the same privileges as classified civil servants in respect of early closing in times of excessive heat and, if not, why not.
There is no uniform practice that is followed in relation to the prevailing rate employees under conditions of excessive heat. The rule that is followed is that the practice of other similar employers in the particular area concerned and under similar conditions should be followed. Even in Ottawa there is no fixed or general rule. It depends upon the conditions both as to heat and humidity in the different buildings.



HOUSING


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
John Richard Garland: I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Public Works. Has the minister received representations requesting mortgage financing few students' residences at colleges and universities under section 16 of the National Housing Act? If so, has the government taken any steps to provide this type of financing to colleges and universities?


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Speaker, no representations have been received on this subject recently, but some months ago there were some. This is one of the questions that are under active consideration by the government. If and when any decision is made that policy will be duly announced.



HEALTH AND WELFARE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Frederick Johnstone (Jack) Bigg: I wish to direct a question to the Minister of National Health and Welfare. In view of the continuing shortage of nurses in Canada, has consideration been given to paying student nurses a nominal amount of, say, $1 a day, in order to encourage student nurses to complete their training without financial distress to themselves or their families?
2656	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry


Jay Waldo Monteith: I should like to thank the hon. member for having given me notice of his intention to ask this question. I feel that the point he has raised is well taken, though I am not sure that the specific method he has suggested would be the most effective way of assisting student nurses. In any case, I shall have the matter studied by officials of my department and possibly brought before the fall meeting of the dominion council of health. I shall be happy to inform the hon. member of the outcome of these deliberations.


Paul Joseph James Martin: If this is done may I ask the Minister of National Health and Welfare whether it will be done under the national health program?


Jay Waldo Monteith: Mr. Speaker, in my reply to the previous question I simply mentioned that we would consider this question.


Paul Joseph James Martin: It would be done under that program, I assume.



PRIVILEGE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I very seldom rise on a question of privilege, but on this occasion I feel that I must do so in view of an interjection made by the hon. member for Bonavista-Twillingate, who is usually very fair in debate. I know that on this occasion it was made in the heat of the moment. As reported at page 2636 of Hansard he said, "Incidentally, why is he not here?" He was referring to me.
May I say, Mr. Speaker, that I was in the house throughout the day with the exception of the period after eight o'clock last evening when I had responsibilities which, as he knows, sometimes take one out of the house. The bill was carried through the house by the Minister of Labour and the Minister of Justice. I also find there is an omission at page 2651 of Hansard when you, Mr. Speaker, said "When shall this bill be read a third time?" At that time I rose and asked whether there would be consent to third reading last evening, and that remark was also intended for Hansard. I thought I ought to clarify that.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, I of course accept the Prime Minister's statement without any question, and if I said anything that is in any way offensive I at once withdraw it.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Sidney Earle Smith: That items numbered 85 to 111, inclusive, item numbered 502, items numbered 542 to 549, inclusive, and item numbered 655, as listed in the main and supplementary estimates 1958-59, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
He said: Mr. Speaker, in speaking to this motion I must confess that I have at the present time a feeling of anxiety with respect to international affairs, yet I hasten to add that that anxiety is brightened by a sense of hope, hope which is not founded on wishful thinking.
I am sure members will be happy to hear that I do not intend this morning to give the house a global survey of the international situation as it affects Canada, either directly or indirectly. Rather, I propose to deal with certain factors which very closely concern us at this time.
The first item, of course, with which the house will expect me to deal is the grave and vital situation in the Middle East. I am sure there is no need for me to rehearse in detail the developments in that area during the past two weeks, because members are no doubt familiar with those developments; but with respect to Canada, and indeed the whole world, our attention is directed to New York, and I propose at the beginning of my remarks to give to the house a full account of the latest happenings there.
Before doing so, however, I should make reference to the developments in Lebanon leading up to this particular crisis, and give to the house some information with respect to the evolution of that crisis. Members will recall that on May 27, 1958, Lebanon presented charges to the security council of the United Nations simultaneously with those to the Arab league. The charge of Lebanon was that the United Arab Republic had intervened in its internal affairs. The Arab league had nothing to offer in the way of a solution of the issues involved in this charge and subsequently the security council, after discussion of the charges, decided to act in this particular regard.
May I remind the house, however, that there had never been any overt aggression from Syria into Lebanon. It had to do with indirect aggression. This was a new type of aggression with which the security council had to deal. It is difficult to define what

is indirect aggression, yet the security council addressed itself to this question.
I may interpolate here that for some time the United Nations has been endeavouring without success to define indirect aggression, and certainly it was understood and recognized that the security council had power to investigate charges with respect to that type of intervention, indirect though it be, in the affairs of another country. And so on June 11 the security council set up an observation group, and I read part of the text of the resolution:
-to ensure that there is no illegal infiltration of personnel or supply of arms or other materiel across the Lebanese borders.
The government of Canada considered that the situation which was unfolding in Lebanon merited prompt action. From the beginning in the discussions in the security council we gave our firm support to this resolution, a resolution that provided machinery under the auspices of the United Nations. We welcomed the resolution, Mr. Speaker, by reason of the fact that it afforded to the secretary general an opportunity to contribute to the stabilization of the situation in Lebanon. We also welcomed the ambit of the resolution that gave certain flexibility to the secretary general in carrying out or implementing the resolution's objectives.
That resolution was adopted on June 11. There was no veto and no dissenting vote. On that particular occasion, and it was very encouraging, the U.S.S.R. abstained from voting on the resolution. The secretary general then moved very quickly, and within a few days he had officers of his observation corps present in Lebanon. Hon. members will recall that Canada immediately responded to the appeal from the secretary general and sent ten officers to join the observation group. Indeed, Canada at the moment has 11 officers there. A Canadian officer who was attached to the United Nations truce supervision organization was seconded to the observation group in Lebanon.
This group, the United Nations observation group in Lebanon, has become known as UNOGIL, and that is the designation I shall use. It encountered at the outset many difficulties in carrying out its task. Initially the group had access to only 18 kilometers out of the 324 kilometers of Lebanon's frontier with Syria. Other difficulties were encountered by reason of the rugged nature of the terrain, the location of the border populations, and also by reason of the traditional freedom of people to move across the border from Syria to Lebanon, a freedom they have had for many years. Here was a fairly
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External Affairs
recent boundary line between Syria and Lebanon. Many of these initial difficulties, however, were overcome by the middle of July and the observer group, UNOGIL, had access to all the frontier areas between Lebanon and Syria. They had been increased in numbers and personnel and were also getting aircraft for the purpose of carrying out their directives from the secretary general.
During recent weeks there has been one frontier of Lebanon that has been quiet. That is the frontier with Israel. Indeed, I would point out that during this difficult period all of Israel's frontiers have been quiet. That is a tribute to Israel, to the United Arab Republic and to other countries, and it is also a tribute to the effectiveness of two other United Nations organizations, the United Nations emergency force along the Egyptian-Israeli armistice line and the United Nations truce supervision organization on Israel's other frontier.
Now to return to the narrative of events that I anticipated a few moments ago I would give. On July 14 there occurred the sudden, swift and violent revolution in Iraq which transformed the situation in the Middle East overnight. Within Lebanon it appeared still further to exacerbate internal dissensions and-of this I am convinced-the happenings in Iraq rendered UNOGIL incapable, at least temporarily, of meeting its responsibilities, in the dangerous situation thus created. And so it was in this situation that President Eisenhower responded promptly and affirmatively to a request from President Chamoun of Lebanon. As President Eisenhower stated at the time of the landing of United States troops in Lebanon, the force was not there to engage in hostilities but to help Lebanon in its own efforts to stabilize the situation until-and I emphasize that word "until"-the United Nations could take the steps necessary to protect Lebanon's independence and integrity.
Two days later, as we recall, the United Kingdom found it necessary to take similar emergency action in response to an appeal from King Hussein of Jordan for military assistance in the face of a plot instigated from outside Jordan to overthrow the regime. I have been informed reliably, and I know, that there was not only a plot to overthrow the government in Jordan but also that the plot extended to other countries in the Middle East to overthrow their governments.
As the Prime Minister informed the house on July 17, the Canadian government appreciated that the United States and the United Kingdom had no alternative but to take these interim measures. We knew then that both governments had stated specifically that the

External Affairs
landing of troops and the keeping of troops there would be terminated as soon as the United Nations could take effective action. We understood the difficulty of the decision that the two countries, the United Kingdom and the United States, had been forced to take.
To return to the point I attempted to make a moment ago, we recognized clearly that the United Kingdom and the United States appreciated the ultimate authority and responsibility of the United Nations.
Since that time we in Canada have made every effort at the United Nations and in some of the capitals of the world to bring about as swiftly as possible those United Nations actions which would provide some instrumentality of the United Nations to the end that the United States would withdraw their forces from Lebanon and the United Kingdom would withdraw their forces from Jordan.
In the United Nations security council, the United States and the United Kingdom have joined, or we have joined with them and other countries, in promoting steps that would provide personnel on behalf of and under the United Nations that would in turn enable those two countries to withdraw their forces. To this end we gave full support last week to a draft resolution submitted to the security council by the United States. In brief, the purpose of that resolution was to enable the secretary general to establish an instrumentality-and the type of instrument would be in his good judgment-that would add to the forces of UNOGIL now in Lebanon. We supported that; yet at the end of last Friday, just one week ago, the Russians vetoed that proposal. That was on July 18.
With respect to my own activities at this time, I may say that I had flown to Washington where I had valuable discussions with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, a valuable exchange of views. The newspapers have quoted me as taking the stand on behalf of Canada that there should be no expansion of military activities by these two countries, that is, outside of Lebanon and Jordan. The Prime Minister has also taken that stand, and he has so informed the house. From Washington I went to New York, where I had discussions with Mr. Hammarskjold. Then I came here to report fully on the situation as I saw it to the Prime Minister.
I got off the aeroplane on Saturday and heard for the first time that Mr. Khrushchev had extended an invitation for a summit meeting on the Middle East. At the Prime Minister's request I went back to New York on Monday morning where I took charge of the

Canadian delegation, and I seized the opportunity then to express the hope that nations would respond to the invitation issued by Mr. Khrushchev for a summit meeting on the Middle East. I shall deal with that matter later.
On that particular day the Prime Minister informed the house that on Monday morning he had sent messages to Mr. Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, and Mr. Nehru, and in those messages he expressed the hope that there would not be a negative reaction to the proposal put forward by Mr. Khrushchev.
In New York on Monday and Tuesday of last week our delegation worked very closely with the delegations from the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan in an endeavour to work out a compromise resolution which might be more acceptable to the Russians than the one they vetoed on Friday last, which had been put forward by the United States. This particular resolution was put forward by the Japanese. We were rather hopeful of this resolution that provided in its operative part for an increase in the observer group of UNOGIL and gave further authority to the secretary general to endeavour to stabilize the situation in Lebanon to the end that the United States could withdraw its forces.
As I said in the meeting of the security council on Monday of last week in support of this resolution, I deemed it a positive approach, one which offered the council an opportunity to use and strengthen the United Nations machinery that it had in Lebanon; but this, too, the Soviet union vetoed. And so, as far as the activities of the United Nations in Lebanon are concerned, we are back where we were at the beginning of last week. However, after the veto the secretary general expressed his determination to use the powers that had been voted to him on June 11 by the security council, and he said he would firmly proceed to implement his mandate in the resolution of the date to which I referred. I think it would be of interest to the house if I read a part of the statement the secretary general made on Tuesday afternoon after the veto of the Japanese resolution by the U.S.S.R. Mr. Hammarskjold said:
I am sure that I will act in accordance with the wishes of the members of the council if I therefore use all opportunities offered to the secretary general within the limits set by the charter toward developing the United Nations effort so as to help to prevent a further deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, and to assist in finding a road away from the dangerous point at which we now find purselves.
Even before the Japanese resolution failed of adoption Mr. Hammarskjold had decided

to increase the personnel of the UNOGIL in Lebanon from about 135 officers to something approximating 200, and he requested Canada to send three additional observers. The Prime Minister has informed the house of Canada's ready response to that invitation from Mr. Hammarskjold, and I recall the words the Prime Minister uttered in this house, that Canada was willing to take that action, ready to do it, glad to do it, and then he made this statement:
Canada will supply immediately three of the additional observers, of course giving every attention to any further requirement of UNOGIL as events transpire.
Therefore what is needed now is an expansion, of the scope and importance of UNOGIL activity. The hon. member for Essex East asked a question on Wednesday of this week. I was not in the house at the time. The hon. member asked whether Canada had received any further invitation from the secretary general for additional personnel from this country. No invitation has come forward as yet, but Mr. Hammarskjold intimated on Tuesday afternoon at the meeting of the security council that if the Russians vetoed the Japanese resolution he would go to work immediately and evolve a plan for the increase in that particular group. That plan is now, we know, being developed but it has not yet been made final.
Members of the house may recall, Mr. Speaker, that at the time of the establishment of UNEF Mr. Hammarskjold, the secretary general of the United Nations, associated with himself an advisory committee of member states to assist him in the conduct of his task with respect to UNEF. There are indications now that Mr. Hammarskjold will invite certain countries to send representatives to such an advisory committee, and it may well be that he will choose the personnel of the advisory committee of UNEF, the advisory committee that has been in being for some time.
So that is where we stand now. A new United Nations body, not new since Tuesday afternoon but new since June 11, has been developed and set up, and we hope this body will be effective in enabling the Lebanese people to work out their own internal difficulties and dissensions in their own way. I have confidence that such a United Nations body, developed under a plan still to be presented by the secretary general, will be effective in establishing stability.
But what of the future? Is there a way to ensure permanently the independence and integrity of this small country with its unique balance of east and west, with its unique composition of population, about half Arab, 57071-3-168i
External Affairs
half Moslem and half Christian? There were discussions in Washington while I was there-


Harold Edward Winch: Three halves? The minister referred to three halves. I could not understand the arithmetic.


Sidney Earle Smith: I am sorry for that slip. The information I have is that it was roughly fifty-fifty as between Moslems and Christians. The Moslem group, incidentally, is broken up into two parts, one part Levantine and the other part Arab. I will seek to verify my information and if I am wrong I will tell the hon. member. We had discussions in Washington about the future of Lebanon. The discussions had to do with the possibility of having the Lebanese accept a position of neutrality. Favour was expressed by the United States and United Kingdom representatives with respect to that proposal.
I was not here on Monday, but I have read the address of that distinguished representative of a member of the commonwealth, the Prime Minister of Ghana. I know that he also advanced that proposal when he addressed members of the house in joint session with members of the Senate. Can we work toward a status of neutrality for Lebanon and have an international guarantee of its neutrality such as is provided in effect for Austria? It cannot be imposed on the Lebanese, but it should not come as a novel suggestion to them because throughout the centuries, indeed from Phoenician times, the Lebanese have been merchants and traders. Their history shows that by reason of necessity to be friendly with as many people as possible in order to trade with them, they have over the centuries achieved that relationship with bordering countries.
Of course there is a new factor, one that I adverted to earlier in my remarks. Recently Lebanon has been rocked by pressures, sometimes violent pressures, from outside countries. Recently those pressures have been manifested in hostile radio broadcasts and other activities, and these pressures have brought about the vexed situation in which the Lebanese find themselves at this particular time. But it is, I think, possible to find a way out of the situation along the lines I suggested a moment ago. I would expect that the Lebanese might welcome some arrangement establishing neutrality that would assure them their independence in this middle position. But I am convinced that that cannot be brought about without the practical assistance of the United Nations. Indeed, I think it might well require some physical manifestation of United Nations authority, a physical manifestation of such authority on the ground in Lebanon.

External Affairs
The task which the observer group is now performing and will perform to a greater and more successful degree, I hope, will be to insulate the political affairs of Lebanon from those of its neighbours and thus help to restore tranquility in that divided nation. That, Mr. Speaker, could be the forerunner of some continuing role on the part of the United Nations in that country, perhaps not unlike the role played not by the United Nations but by Canada and other members of the international commissions in Indochina. As hon. members will recall, these commissions were set up by the Geneva agreements of 1954.
In putting forward this suggestion I realize that the United Nations should proceed cautiously, but if the experiment were successful it might be used as a precedent for stabilizing other countries in the Middle East, torn not only by fierce internal antagonisms but by hostile external rivalries and tensions. The possibility of insulation through the United Nations raises novel problems and vast difficulties, but so acute have the problems of this region become that we must cast our minds about to examine every possible line of approach which might offer the prospect of advance.
I make another reference to the stability not only of Lebanon but also of the Middle East. Much of their trouble can be traced to the economic difficulties in which they find themselves, and I would hope it would be possible to give some assurance of economic stability not only to Lebanon but to the whole Middle East that would warrant and promote political stability. In this particular task I can foresee for the United Nations and for other organizations a really valuable role.
As the Prime Minister said the other day in the house, this is not the time for stagnant thinking, and if there is anything in this new United Nations approach, the west could seize the opportunity at the summit meeting which now appears certain to be held in New York and endeavour to make a small beginning, at any rate, in the country of Lebanon.
That was one reason that prompted the Canadian government to welcome the Soviet proposal of last Saturday, a proposal that contained offensive and provocative language giving unnecessary offence to the addressees. Indeed, I had occasion to point out to Mr. Sobolev when I was in New York that it was unnecessarily truculent and offensive. But I know I can speak for the Prime Minister when I say that in sending messages to President Eisenhower, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Nehru, expressing hope that there would

not be a negative attitude to Mr. Khrushchev's proposal, we had in mind that some constructive measure such as the one I have been indicating might be looked at and adopted not only for Lebanon but for the Middle East.
Then with reference to the message that was received by France, the United Kingdom and the United States from Mr. Khrushchev, we had in mind that a meeting at the top could result in a diminution of international tension. On Sunday we discussed also the terrible possibility, not the probability but the terrible possibility, of the nations of the world sliding into a global nuclear war. The leaders of the governments of this generation would never be forgiven if they did not exhaust every possible way of relieving, at least in some measure, international tension.
This was another basis for the messages that went out from the Prime Minister over the week end. I can claim that in this regard Canada took the lead. The public expression of the desire of this government to promote the holding of a summit meeting was the first public utterance on the western side in this respect. I took the opportunity in the security council, as did the Prime Minister when he informed the house on Monday, of making very clear our concept of the desirability of holding an international conference as suggested. I have in mind, but I cannot claim this, that my observations had something to do with the postponement at least of the U.S.S.R. proposal to call for a general assembly meeting in which they could indulge in more propaganda.
I have in mind also that the stand of the Canadian government, as expressed by me in the security council on Monday of last week, had something to do with the acceptance of the counterproposal put forward by Mr. Macmillan on behalf of the United Kingdom. The real significance to me of the resolution with respect to the holding of a meeting in the security council-I do now expect it will be a favourable decision-is that this meeting will be held under the aegis of the United Nations. The security council, and I quote from the United Nations charter, was established for the following purpose:
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the security council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the security council acts on their behalf.
In my opinion, that is the proper forum for a meeting of Mr. Macmillan, Mr. Khrushchev, Mr. Eisenhower, General de Gaulle and others.

We have noted with encouragement that Mr. Khrushchev has responded to this proposal that was sent out in clearer terms, perhaps, from London than from any other capital, that this meeting should be held within the security council. It could be, it may be- I emphasize the word "may"-a meeting of momentous consequence. Again, I say that it is worth trying in terms of the voice of humanity. Furthermore, I have in mind that apart from the powers whom I have named and to whom the letters were addressed by the author, the presence of Mr. Nehru, the distinguished leader of one of the nations of the commonwealth and a representative of the awakening world of Asia, would contribute much to such a conference.
With reference to the eventual composition of the conference, I am sure that the house will have noted the observations made yesterday by Right Hon. Mr. Macmillan at Westminster. These are his words:
I am glad to note Mr. Khrushchev's latest letter recognizes . . . (that) . . . until the form of the meeting has been agreed it would be premature to lay down which countries, which are not members of the security council, should attend, or by whom they should be represented.
I agree with that particular view, at this stage, when there will have to be negotiations with respect to the time, with respect to the agenda and other matters. I would say this, however; that it will be for the security council to decide what nations, which are not members of the security council, should come to the table of the security council. That is a procedural matter for the security council. I saw it in operation on Monday and Tuesday of this week, for example. The council, by formal resolution presented by the chairman before one meeting on Monday started and before the two meetings on Tuesday started, asked the representatives of the United Arab Republic, Lebanon and Jordan to come and be present at the council table. I say again, Mr. Speaker, that is a matter fcrr the security council to decide.
However, I express anxiety lest these matters having to do with who will sit and who will go to the meeting should jeopardize the holding of that meeting. Questions of this sort should not be insuperable or prevent the proposed meeting of the security council. In my opinion they should be treated and considered as secondary. With respect to this meeting in New York, whatever the date may be, I have in mind that it is desirable also, if some means can be found, to have the opinions of the numerous countries concerned, because no plan that may be evolved in the security council will be successful
External Affairs
unless the proposals are accorded the approval of the peoples of those regions.
One of the problems we in Canada must always keep in mind is a concern, for example, lest the prosperity of Israel should not be safeguarded in the forthcoming negotiations. Surely it will be possible to get the views of the Middle East countries whatever the procedural device may be. Many problems, as I indicated a moment ago, will arise on the subject of time, on the subject of the agenda and prior consultation. But when the Prime Minister spoke in this house on July 25 about the possibility of holding such a meeting within the security council he deliberately used words which took into account the flexible procedure that would have to be devised if this conference is to be brought into being.
I would express on behalf of Canada the hope that we will have this concept of flexibility. It is here, I believe, that the secretary general, with his great experience and wisdom which he has shown particularly during the past two weeks, could be given the opportunity of devising some formula within the existing United Nations structure in order to enable these important conclusions to be reached with respect to those matters to which I referred, and to the end that the consultations at New York will be fruitful.
It is not inappropriate that I announce at this time an important development in connection with the responsibilities of Canada in Indo-China. I would just bring back to the attention of the members of the house the role that Canada has played through its membership in three international commissions in Indo-China; one international commission in Laos, one in Cambodia and one in Viet Nam. That was an example I used a few moments ago. Here were powers sitting down at Geneva in 1954 to deal with dissensions in these three parts of IndoChina. There was in that particular area the possibility, indeed the probability, of a collision of the communist powers on the one side and western countries on the other.
What was done? There was established at the Geneva meeting machinery whereby the situation in these three countries could be stabilized or helped to be stabilized through the presence of international commissions. Canada was and is a member of those international commissions in the three countries, the other members being India and Poland. With the physical manifestation, if nothing else, of these three international commissions the result was that in Laos the royal government was enabled to bring about the stabilization of the situation there.

External Affairs
There was a reconciliation oi the communist forces and the royal force and there came about stability. On May 4 of this year supplementary elections were held in Laos and they indicated to Canada that its task had been performed in Laos through its membership in that commission.
Hence I informed the house recently that the Canadian delegation to the international commission for supervision and control in Laos had introduced a resolution calling for the dissolution of the commission. I wish now to inform the house that the international commission for Laos was adjourned sine die on July 19. There were forces at work there -and you can guess their origin-which resisted the retirement or the adjournment of the Laos international commission.
In the end Canada joined with others in bringing about this adjournment sine die. We made it very clear that we were not getting out by reason of any threats or suggestions by Laotians, but we had in mind the representations made here by Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister of Laos, that after the election had been held and the situation stabilized, he felt that the commission would have performed its task. That commission can be reconvened in Laos at the call of the chairman, the representative for India. Canada must be consulted. If we go back by reason of any particular emergency we will always have in mind the rights of the Laotian government, and we will not interfere with the sovereignty of that country. In the opinion of the Canadian government the commission which began its operations in 1954 has completed its task.
With respect to Viet Nam there is tension, as the members of the house well know, between South and North Viet Nam. That situation has not been stabilized. There is a need for the continuation of the work of the international commission in Viet Nam, but we have advice that we can apply a formula similar to the Laos one to Cambodia where the situation has been stabilized.
I seize this opportunity to pay tribute to India, which provided a chairman, for its co-operation, and also to pay a tribute to the success of the royal government in Laos in bringing about a reconciliation of the two forces that were indeed hostile to one another. We will now take up the problem with respect to Cambodia. As I indicated a moment ago, we should be able to use the same formula of adjournment.
I come back to this concept that I advanced earlier with respect to Lebanon and with respect to certain other countries in the Middle East. Is there not something in the example of the success of the international

commissions in Laos and Cambodia for a solution of some of the problems at least in some of the trouble spots in the Middle East?
I will now speak on the problem of disarmament. It may be that some will have the thought that we should not be talking about disarmament in the particularly vexed situation that we now have. I do not share that view. Indeed, the interest in and the desire for disarmament have been intensified by events in the past few weeks. In order to provide members of the house a perspective with respect to disarmament, a perspective that will be read with deeper concern during the present situation, I am tabling a white paper with respect to the disarmament discussions in 1957.
I need hardly recall for the information of the house the breakdown of the negotiations that were carried on through the subcommittee of the commission on disarmament established by the United Nations. France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada put forward certain proposals on August 29 of last year. They appeared to be a package deal, if I can use that expression. Since the time negotiations broke down, the Russians having flatly rejected the proposals, the countries of the west including Canada have been endeavouring to make clear that those proposals of August 29, 1957, were merely put forward as a basis of discussion. Indeed the Prime Minister in the general assembly last year and I myself in the political committee of the United Nations and in the general assembly urged that the Russians look at those proposals as being flexible. But that situation was not accepted by the U.S.S.R., and little if anything has been done within the United Nations since last autumn with respect to disarmament.
However, there have been some encouraging signs recently of a resumption of negotiations. We were all gratified that President Eisenhower felt it possible to make a suggestion with respect to one kind of disarmament or with respect to certain measures that could lead to one kind of disarmament, and he put those forward to Mr. Khrushchev. We are gratified and encouraged to hear that Mr. Khrushchev has accepted the proposal to establish a technical group for the purpose of examining the possibility of providing adequate supervision and control of nuclear tests and methods for the detection of nuclear tests.
The discussions began in Geneva on July 1 of this year with respect to the scientific problems involved. Even if I knew what had been happening at those discussions I would not understand the scientific problems, but I can say it is authoritatively reported that

the talks between the scientists are making headway in an encouraging manner. Without attempting to predict the final outcome of this scientific conference, I am confident that significant findings will be made by this technical group. Canada, as the house knows, is represented there by Dr. O. M. Solandt who has associated with him four other Canadian scientists. The other Canadians are Mr. H. Larnder and Mr. A. K. Longair of the defence research board, Dr. P. L. Willmore of the dominion observatory and Professor G. M. Volkotf of the University of British Columbia.
The government has held the view that after the findings of this group are made known, in which findings we feel confidence could be placed, a method might be arrived at by which to detect nuclear tests, and then the countries carrying on such tests might come to a political agreement with respect to the cessation of these tests. This is a view which has been advanced by the Prime Minister throughout the country on several occasions; but let me say that the detection and inspection, the control and supervision of nuclear tests do not constitute in themselves a measure of disarmament. They are a means to ensure disarmament; they provide sanctions for a political agreement with respect to a type of disarmament, and I would express the hope that after the successful conclusion of the present technical studies there might be taken what could be regarded as a step having a revolutionary effect on the international climate.
An initial move might be made with respect to the cessation of further nuclear tests, and in that way there might be established some element of mutual trust and confidence, after which the nations concerned could move on to the more complex aspects of a disarmament program. The suspension of nuclear tests with these guarantees as to detection could constitute the first step toward agreement, which agreement would in turn be the first step toward disarmament, even though this would not be the most important measure, which is that having to do with the use of nuclear weapons already proved.
There is another encouraging factor on which I would like to report with respect to disarmament. Mr. Eisenhower proposed that it would be useful to study practical measures to provide required safeguards against surprise attacks and we have been heartened by a rather affirmative reply by Mr. Khrushchev. We in Canada should promote in every possible way the holding of a meeting of experts of a somewhat similar nature to the present Geneva meeting with respect to the detection of nuclear tests, in order to study means and methods of preventing surprise attacks. This is a matter which is, of course,
External Affairs
of very direct concern to this country with particular reference to surprise attacks over the Arctic region.
I am sure I need not spell out the implications of this matter or draw a picture of what we have advocated in this regard. I reported on our advocacy at the Copenhagen meeting. The Russians have indicated-and this I would like to emphasize-that they might be willing to sit down with such a group. I do not think a political agreement would be necessary at this stage, any more than it has been necessary to enter into a political agreement with respect to the holding of nuclear tests while the current meeting of scientists is being held. I propose, however, that experts should be brought together in order to study this further problem.
One cannot anticipate the measures which the experts would put forward. They may have to do with electronic or radar devices, or they may be along the lines of ground inspection as proposed by the U.S.S.R., which could operate rather simply as a bilateral exchange of inspectors, or a more strictly supervised international system might be involved under the control of the United Nations. We could, however, make progress in this regard.
The U.S.S.R. has on many occasions replied to the proposal for detection or knowledge of the possibility of surprise attack over the Arctic that this really does not matter very much. To us in Canada, however, it does matter, and the Prime Minister indicated last summer that for the operation of a scheme to prevent surprise attack all of the Canadian territory would be made available on a reciprocal basis if the Russians would give a similar undertaking.
The proposal has now been made by the United States and Canada that both countries would throw open their territories to inspection to ensure against surprise attacks if the Russians would do likewise, but the U.S.S.R. wants this system extended to the United States bases in Europe. The United States has said, we will throw open Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, but if we go as far as Europe will you also agree to allow inspections of that kind? It seems to me, however, that without decisions at this time as to the exact location of such inspections we would at least make a start by arranging a meeting of experts to consider effective technical measures which could be taken in the event that such a political agreement were made.
To come back to the Arctic area, it would be easier to establish a system of control and supervision in that region than it would be in the more populous areas of the North American continent; but we must arrive at


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, the house will, I am sure, have listened with great interest and appreciation to the statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. He has covered many important subjects, more particularly perhaps one which is very much in our minds at the present time. If he will permit me to use the expression, in recent days he has been a winged mercury flying backward and forward from here to New York, to Washington, in the search with others for a solution to an international crisis which is centred in a part of the world which may seem to be very far from Canada but which in terms of its effect is very close to Canada. He has been seeking a solution which, if it can be found, will reduce tensions and strengthen security and which, if it cannot be found, will add to those tensions and diminish that security.
I know the minister must have had a very exhausting time in recent days. I know that his work has been not only exhausting but at times it must have been frustrating, but I know also he has found it rewarding and that he has received great satisfaction out of the opportunity he has been given. I know too that he has taken full advantage of that opportunity in making on behalf of the government a contribution to the search for international peace and security, which is a search in which we are all engaged in one form or another.
I can assure him and the government on behalf of the opposition that our good wishes go with them in the work he is doing, and we wish him well. He has covered some important subjects. There are some, of course, which he has not had the time to cover and this resolution before us now, which will permit the setting up of the committee on external affairs, will give us a chance in the committee to go into some of these matters which we have not the opportunity of discussing today.
There are many subjects and there is little time. I would like to begin by making a reference-and it will be only a brief reference; some of my colleagues may follow it up later-to the United Nations and its activities in recent weeks and months. It has shown itself once again to be an indispensable piece of international machinery even when it has

External Affairs
not been effective. We have once again had driven in upon us that when trouble starts and when the big powers do not want to get into it, or want to get out of it after they have got into it, they go to the United Nations and seek-and it is right, of course, that they should seek-ways out of their difficulty through our world organization.
The United Nations now, as in the past, is being asked-thank goodness it is being asked -to come to the rescue, to stop trouble spreading. But while that is a vital role to be playing, especially at this time, even more important is the role of the United Nations in preventing trouble. We sometimes forget -the minister reminded us of this aspect of its work today-that trouble-preventing role, that positive and constructive role of the United Nations in the humanitarian, social, economic and co-operation fields; but the core and centre of its responsibilities are its political activities in its efforts to prevent war. That, of course, is where we encounter at the United Nations and elsewhere our real difficulty.
Perhaps the best example of that difficulty has been given by the minister himself in his statement this morning, when he referred to the work in the United Nations and indeed of committees outside the United Nations on disarmament, the agonizing attempt which has been made now for so many years-and I recall when it began with the old League of Nations in the late 1920's-the efforts to reconcile security and disarmament and to decide which comes first.
I welcome the white paper which the minister has been good enough to table this morning and which will perhaps give us the basis for a useful discussion of this matter in the committee on external affairs.
We are getting toward the end of July. This reminds us that the United Nations annual assembly will soon be taking place. I have no doubt that the Canadian government are now beginning to discuss and decide what attitude they should adopt at this assembly. I would like, if I might, to mention three things in which I think it might be helpful if Canada could take the initiative. Indeed, I think in at least one matter Canada has already taken an initiative. That initiative might be followed up. The first matter is I think of great importance at the present time, an importance which should not be obscured by the immediate international crisis in the Middle East which occupies so much of our time and attention, if it can be done-and I do not know where it can be done except at the United Nations-is to try to halt the spread of the manufacture of nuclear weapons to other than the three countries which now do manufacture them.

I quite appreciate the difficulties in the way. For that purpose would it not be desirable to explore at the forthcoming United Nations assembly the possibility of a resolution which might get the necessary acceptance and which would embody a self-denying principle accepted by all the other members of the United Nations in regard to the prohibition in their own territory of the manufacture of any atomic weapon of any kind? It is frightening enough to have those weapons made in three countries. It will be much more frightening if that manufacture is spread to countries all over the world, and that will happen if something is not done about it because the techniques and the procedures in regard to those matters are becoming known.
It will not be long before there will be a number of governments, some perhaps in the control of people whom we may not trust- I have no particular area of the world in mind when I say that but it may happen in the future-that may all have access to weapons which can destroy the world. While the situation is bad enough now, surely that is infinitely more frightening.
Then there is another matter which is related to the one I have mentioned. I refer to the suspension of tests of nuclear weapons of mass destruction. I think we in Canada should now push the initiative at the United Nations for the abolition of these tests over a period of let us say five years, without any conditions being attached except that of United Nations supervision which, of course, is an important one.
Then there is a third matter which does not involve taking the initiative because Canada has been pressing this at the United Nations for some time, and I believe did so at the last assembly. Is this not a good opportunity in the light of what has happened in the last few months to press forward for the establishment of a permanent United Nations police force? I hope to have something to say about that a little later. Perhaps the atmosphere now is more conducive to progress in that regard than it was a year or two years ago. These, then, are three matters which perhaps might be pushed at the forthcoming assembly of the United Nations.
I come now to the matter to which I shall devote most of my time, as the minister quite rightly did; the situation in the Middle East and more particularly in Lebanon and Jordan. This situation developed quickly, at least in its more critical manifestations of recent days. I know the difficulties the government must have had in trying to make up its mind without very much warning as to the policy that should be pursued. In

appreciation of those difficulties and with some understanding, as we should have, of the responsibilities incumbent upon us, the opposition attempted to be as constructive as possible during these days, not to ask questions merely for the sake of asking questions or which might confuse an already complicated situation and, indeed, to do nothing which would prejudice the maximum degree of unity in this house and throughout the country over an issue which transcends and I hope will continue to transcend partisan considerations. When peace is threatened- and peace was threatened and perhaps still is-we must all be as united as possible in the house and in the country.
That has been the spirit that has animated us on this side during recent days; nevertheless we have our responsibilities as an opposition, and we must discharge them in a way which will result in questions addressed to the government on various aspects of policy. Indeed, we have also a duty to put forward proposals ourselves when we think that is desirable, so I am going to deal with the Middle East question in somewhat more detail than I confess I have ever been called upon to do before either on this side or the other side of the house, and the reason for that is obvious. I am going to try, if I can, to put the problem in perspective, and that will perhaps require a little more discussion of the historical background than would normally be the case.
As I have said, the problem is greater and deeper than its recent manifestations, because they are merely the reflection of a situation which is deep-rooted, difficult and dangerous. That situation, that problem-and it certainly is an international problem-is the emergence of a passionate Arab nationalism which expresses itself at times in bitter and even savage anti-foreignism or anti-imperialism as they more often call it. Perhaps we should not forget that as we have to face the immediate problems that arise from day to day out of this situation.
The situation in its historical perspective has been well put by Professor Smith of the school of Islamic studies at McGill University in his book, "Islam in Modern History", when he says:
For 75 years the Arab has got up in the morning, has lived his life, has pursued his pleasures and his dreams, always under the shadow of guns- guns in alien, unfriendly hands, ready to fire, ready to call in from across the sea more guns, ships, tanks, planes, might. Whether this power was used, as from time to time it shatteringly was, or was merely threatened, as often it cogently could be, or was merely there, always the shadow, the shame, the oppression remained. Whether terror or insult, provocation or opiate, this bitter foreign power has stood, an abiding fact. Any thought
External Affairs
about the Arab world uncoloured by the vivid imagination of this dominating reality is unfruitful, misleading, false.
I know that this feeling, expressed so graphically in this quotation, is fomented, exploited and when possible directed by the forces of the international communist conspiracy and also-and we should not forget this-by Russian imperialism, which is something else. But without communism there would still be trouble in the Middle East and there would still be Russia with her eyes and ambitions on her historic goal in the Mediterranean. That, Mr. Speaker, is the historical background against which we have to consider the crisis facing us today.
Perhaps, Mr. Speaker, this would be a good time for me to ask you to call it one o'clock.
At one o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 2.30 p.m.


Mr. Speaker:: I understand the house leader wishes to revert to motions to deal with a matter relating to the procedure of the house. Does the minister have leave?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Howard Charles Green: The suggestion has been made, Mr. Speaker, that in view of the importance of this debate on external affairs the house should not take the hour this afternoon for discussion of private bills. This course is quite satisfactory to the government, and we have arranged among the three parties that the debate on external affairs should continue right through.


Mr. Speaker:: Does the house give unanimous consent to an order dispensing with the period for private and public bills at five o'clock today?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Smith (Hastings-Frontenac):
That items numbered 85 to 111, inclusive, item numbered 502, items numbered 542 to 549, inclusive, and item numbered 655, as listed in the main and supplementary estimates 1958-59, relating to the
[Stage Direction]
External Affairs
Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
Lester Bowles Pearson: External Affairs
peace in the Middle East; and also recognition of Arab nationalism based on Arab countries free of Soviet communist threats, free of penetration and subversion, each one governing itself as it desires without interference from or without interfering in neighbouring states.
The second objective is collective security for defence against aggression. That certainly has been an objective of the British government over recent years in this area. The west, led by the British government, has tried to promote that objective of collective security through the Baghdad pact, which, we must not forget, it was hoped would embrace all the Arab states but which has never succeeded in doing so. However, it has split the Arab world into two camps, with the United Kingdom and the United States in one camp or at least with the United States half way in that camp and the other forces in the other camp.
I suggest that the third end that is being sought is security for oil supplies in that area which are vitally important to the whole economy of western Europe and, to a lesser extent, to other parts of the world; the security of navigation through the Suez canal, and the maintenance of legitimate western economic and other interests in the area.
Finally, I suggest as an objective of western policy in that area the right of Israel to a national existence within recognized and agreed boundaries. Of course there have been other objectives and policies, but perhaps these are the main ones.
A couple of weeks ago the violent and sudden overthrow of a friendly regime in Iraq seemed to strike at those policies and to foreshadow not only the end of the Baghdad pact but the revolutionary absorption of Lebanon and Jordan into the United Arab Republic; hence the intervention.
Again the question arises, does the intervention which has taken place strengthen and safeguard the objectives I have mentioned or does it serve to prevent some of the undesirable results which I have also mentioned? I doubt the first, though I admit the pressure which appeared to necessitate intervention at the time. I also admit the possibility of unhappy consequences if the action had not been taken. Presumably there was not very much time. That is one of the tragedies of international affairs these present days; there is never enough time to assess the consequences of action or no action. Presumably on this occasion there was not enough time, certainly not very much time, in which to weigh the disadvantages or advantages of intervention or no intervention because-and this is one of the most worrying features of the whole situation so far as

I am concerned-the outbreak in Iraq seems to have caught the western countries which have the most in the way of intelligence services completely by surprise. Yet we are now told by the authors of this revolution that they had been plotting it for months and years.
It is also now clear, and the minister mentioned this this morning-at least I believe he mentioned it, though if I am misinterpreting what he said he will correct me -that the governments of the United Kingdom and the United States are anxious to liquidate their intervention as quickly as possible and replace their forces by those once again, of the United Nations, for the important purpose of establishing and maintaining the right of Lebanon and Jordan not to be gobbled up, if I can put it that way. That is an understandable policy on the part of London and Washington because it is difficult, at least it is difficult for me, to see anything but difficulty ahead if this intervention has to be maintained.
We ask ourselves this question. Will the United States intervention in Lebanon increase the interference and aid for the rebels from outside, to prevent which was one of the purposes of the intervention? We read in the newspapers today, that the foreign minister of Lebanon is again complaining of assistance to the rebels from outside which he says has increased during the last week.
Another question we can hardly refrain from asking ourselves is what is the continuing objective of the intervention? What happens if King Hussein goes, or if he moves out of Jordan against Iraq? And above all, what effect will this intervention have on Arab nationalism in Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere? Mr. Hanson Baldwin, writing in the New York Times on July 16, had this to say:
Their mere presence-
That is the mere presence of the United States forces.

in Lebanon will be to Arab nationalists like a red rag to a bull-it will do more than any other event since the Port Said attack to knit together Arab nationalists throughout the Middle East and to inflame them . . . the forces of Arab nationalism, symbolized by President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, will ultimately be strengthened-not weakened-by the United States action.
The London Economist gave expression to the same thought in a recent edition, and then there is another question that these governments must now be asking themselves. What about the security of the oil pipe lines if popular passions against western intervention should boil over?

However, the most important question of all is what should we do about the situation generally. I was glad to hear the minister say this morning that it is now time to look ahead and perhaps, in attempting to answer the question "What should we do about it?", we are looking ahead. My own effort to answer the question is as follows. I suggest we should recognize that the present situation in the Middle East is very much to the liking of Mr. Khrushchev of the Soviet union, who must be very happy at this western intervention since its major result may well be to stir up anti-western feeling, and who benefits most by this feeling in any part of the world. In that sense perhaps this kind of action is really playing the Russian game. I suggest that Mr. Khrushchev, in spite of all his recent words, may not have any great desire to see the United States and the United Kingdom leave these countries. I believe, however, that he has a very great desire to secure the maximum propaganda out of their being there.
I submit that the second aspect, the second phase of the policy we should adopt, which follows from my answer to the first question, is the withdrawal as soon as possible from these countries by the United Kingdom and the United States, in accordance with the desire they have themselves expressed. However, as we all know it is much easier to land troops in an emergency than it is to withdraw them, and sometimes it is not easy to avoid getting enmeshed even further than was originally intended.
This is where the United Nations comes in, and I am glad to see that that organization is playing its part. The United Nations could help make possible the withdrawal of these forces, which is the desire of the two governments concerned, and perhaps this assistance can now be obtained. It is going to be difficult to negotiate in the security council, as my hon. friend knows, because of the veto used by the Russians with respect to action in that council. Assistance may be obtained, however, through a summit meeting, although a good deal of confusion seems to now be developing over the calling and the composition of such a meeting. It was only a few days ago that we discussed this matter in this house, when Mr. Khrushchev issued his invitation to discuss the Middle East question at a summit meeting.
It seems to me that this was a suggestion which the two powers most concerned, Great Britain and the United States, should have taken up at once, especially in so far as the terms put forward by Mr. Khrushchev regarding the composition were concerned, although they certainly could not have accepted the form of the invitation which was, to
External Affairs
say the least, offensive in character. Surely, however, they could have replied at once that the invitation was acceptable in the sense that the four powers and the secretary general should meet, and meet quickly, and that the meeting should be held under the auspices of the security council.
I personally felt at that time, and I still feel-even more so in the light of developments in the last day or two-that it would have been a good thing for the security council to have been called together at once. They could have set up a committee of the council to consist of the four countries plus India and the secretary general of the United Nations, as mentioned in the invitation of Mr. Khrushchev. Under the chairmanship of the secretary general that committee could have commenced work right away in any place recommended or chosen by the secretary general, with the agreement of the governments concerned. He may well have chosen, although of course I do not know this, Geneva; and while it is not possible for any summit conference to be held without a good deal of publicity, perhaps there might be a little less publicity in Geneva than on the east side of New York.
I do feel, even more strongly than I did a few days ago, that the represention put forward by Mr. Khrushchev for this meeting was a very advantageous one from the point of view of the west, because of its inclusion of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, India-a member of the commonwealth-and the secretary general. I suggest we are now getting away from that sort of clear-cut composition. The press reports would indicate that there is a good deal of manoeuvring going on, not only as to where the meeting should be held but also as to who should attend. Perhaps a solution will be found in a full meeting of the security council, with additional countries invited who have special interests in the problem, as Mr. Khrushchev has suggested, and after a first or second meeting at the summit in the security council in New York perhaps then the countries which were originally mentioned by Mr. Khrushchev might meet under the chairmanship of the secretary general in private sessions, as indeed was the practice during the Suez discussions at New York I think three years ago this summer.
But I cannot myself feel too optimistic about a full meeting of the security council to discuss Middle Eastern matters in this tense and excitable atmosphere with additional governments invited, as Mr. Khrushchev has suggested, to a number not yet determined; a meeting to be held in New York in public in the United Nations. I am

External Affairs
afraid it will be difficult to avoid that kind of public meeting becoming an instrument merely of propaganda.
Mr. Walter Lippmann, who is a pretty wise commentator on these matters, I think, had this to say this morning in his column in the Montreal Gazette:
As things stand at this moment, the notion of a summit meeting in the heart of New York city has the characteristic of one of those nightmares in which one feels compelled to do what one desperately does not want to do.
At this time, a public confrontation between Eisenhower and Khrushchev would be a ghastly spectacle, almost certain to poison the air still further with charges and counter-charges.
I do not think we have to be as pessimistic as that but I do hope, and I feel certain my hope is shared by the government, that if this meeting takes place in the full security council in New York, then advantage will be taken at the earliest opportunity of arranging small and confidential meetings of those most concerned to be held under the auspices of the secretary general himself.
There are two other questions to be considered with regard to policy in the Middle East. After withdrawal, the United Nations I think should move in, if the circumstances require it, and if authority can be secured from the security council, or if not from the United Nations assembly. In referring to moving in I do not want to be too dogmatic as to how it should be done. One way would be by a United Nations emergency force, but another would be the way pointed out by the minister this morning, by strengthening the existing United Nations observer group to a point where it might be able to exercise a pacifying and stabilizing influence in the country in which it is operating.
We on this side heard with much satisfaction the statement of the minister to the effect that the government is prepared to support to the fullest extent action to strengthen that group of United Nations observers. It is encouraging to read in the press that the secretary general, without requiring a further resolution from the security council, has already taken advantage of an earlier resolution to strengthen the observer group. This constitutes another debt we owe to a man of exceptional quality, integrity and ability, the secretary general of the United Nations.
What we have been going through during the last two or three weeks-and I mentioned this earlier in my statement, before lunch- has served to underline and emphasize the necessity of a permanent United Nations emergency force. I do not mean by that 20,000 or 25,000 soldiers in a camp of their

own in some country chosen for that purpose. I mean a force consisting of contingents earmarked and available for service at the request of the United Nations authorities; ready to serve at a moment's notice, forces earmarked by other than permanent members of the security council that would be kept available in their own country for such United Nations service.


John George Diefenbaker: Would the hon. gentleman permit a question. He had his experience over the years at the United Nations. Was not that very thing attempted on several occasions, and was it not discontinued because of the fact that it was impossible of attainment? I am not attempting to throw cold water on the suggestion, because I believe in it myself, but I ask the hon. gentleman how that could be achieved in the face of the veto situation.


Lester Bowles Pearson: As the Prime Minister has
pointed out, Mr. Speaker, it was attempted more than once. It was attempted under the provisions of the charter which provide for an international force under the security council. The Prime Minister will remember that at the very beginning of the United Nations an international staff of the permanent members of the security council was set up.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Under article 43.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Under article 43 of the
charter, as my hon. friend mentions. I think that this permanent military staff is still in existence, nominally, and I am not sure that it does not even meet once a month or so. It consists of military officers from permanent members of the council. It was frustrated from the beginning by the failure of those members of the council to agree on anything, let alone building up force behind the charter. While it became clear over the years that it could not be done in that way, the Prime Minister will recall that during the Korean crisis the first steps were taken by which the assembly could move in to organize forces when the security council was paralysed by the veto. That was done by an assembly resolution which was called the "Uniting for Peace" resolution. That was the resolution used during the Suez crisis to build up on an ad hoc basis a force which I believe was of assistance and which I believe is still doing good service in that part of the world.
That was done under emergency conditions. The Prime Minister will remember that within 48 hours of the resolution of the United Nations assembly authorizing the creation of this force, the force was formally in existence, and within 72 hours the first members of the force were on the job. But surely we

should not rely on that kind of thing in an emergency. Surely it would be better using the assembly resolution for this purpose, if we cannot do it through the security council, to set up in the countries concerned -and they would have to be the non-permanent members of the security council, omitting the big powers-contingents which would be available for this kind of service if the assembly or the security council requested it; which would be organized for that purpose and which could move into action without delay.
I know that this has been attempted in the last year. I think it was brought up at the last assembly. X am not in a position to criticize anyone because it has not been done, for we have all been trying to do it. But perhaps this second demonstration in an international crisis of the value of this kind of police organism in permanent existence will give us now more chance of success in following the matter up at the next assembly than we had at previous assemblies. That is all I am putting forward at this time.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Mr. Speaker, on that point would the hon. gentleman permit a question. The hon. gentleman used the expression "move into action". Did he mean into military action, or would he care to change that expression?


Lester Bowles Pearson: No, Mr. Speaker; that was perhaps a careless expression. I meant that it could be moved into police and supervisory action. I know perhaps as well as most hon. members of the house the limitation of this kind of force and indeed the limitation of this kind of action. This force would be of no value at all as a military force in the normal sense. It could not stand up against a big or a middle power. If there were a dispute between the big powers this force would be futile. But as a police force operating as it did in Palestine, and operating as it might in the Middle East now under the authority of the United Nations for police purposes, it might be of great value. All I am suggesting is that if it has any possible value of that kind, that value would be very greatly increased by having the force ready to go into this kind of action when required.
But more important perhaps than the questions I have brought up as to the future policy toward this area is the necessity of following up this immediate crisis by some kind of economic and political solution for problems of the whole area, and I was delighted to hear the minister express that thought this morning. Withdrawal and perhaps replacement by a United Nations police force will not be enough unless we do some-
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thing about the political and economic difficulties that brought about the situation in the first place.
I recall very well and with a tragic memory that while in the Suez crisis we may have succeeded in producing a United Nations police force which was of help in that crisis, we failed in our major objective, which was to take advantage of that atmosphere of crisis and do something about the political and economic difficulties between Israel and her neighbours which brought about the crisis in the first place. We did nothing on that front; therefore we did not succeed there even though we may have succeeded in the more limited field of preventing the conflict spreading.
We hope we will not make that mistake this time. I know how easy it will be to make such a mistake after the immediate crisis is solved, but I hope that this time the west will try to work out on a firm and permanent basis its relations with those nationalist forces in that area I have been talking about. I believe that for this purpose the west-and I am thinking of the United States, the United Kingdom and France particularly-must base their relations with those countries on the acceptance of Arab nationalism and of the United Arab Republic; must try to bring about as much co-operation as possible with those forces; try to remove the suspicions which have been engendered over the past and which are not by any means all the fault of the west. They must accept the realities of the present and base their policy on the fact that the nineteenth century is dead and is not likely to return.
I suggest something else, and this is going to be even more difficult politically; that our policy in the Middle East in the future must recognize that the U.S.S.R. has both interest and power in that area. Indeed its power in that area is far greater than that which could be produced in the west to bear upon the problems of that area at any given time. I think we must all be very conscious of the fact that while there are 10,000 United States marines in Lebanon and two or three British paratroop battalions in Jordan, there are 23 Soviet divisions, it is reported, strung along the Iran-Turkish border. Therefore it is idle to pretend the Soviet union need only be tolerating that area. It is also idle to deny the fact that the Soviet union has very real interests in that area which perhaps should be recognized.
The minister said this morning that one of the happy developments of recent years, and a development which might be applied to the Middle East, was the successful operation of the international commissions in Indo-China.

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I agree with him, though I also agree with him when he said the time has come to wind up the activities of two of those commissions in the way he mentioned. But he himself also said-and it is an important fact-that in that operation in Indo-China one of the three members of each commission was from a communist state. While it is true that it is a state which is making moves toward communist nationalism, yet at the time it was appointed it was pretty close to the foreign policy and the defence policy of Russia. That was recognized at that time and I was at the Geneva conference when it was accepted that there could be no settlement of the kind desired in Indo-China without a recognition of the participation of the communist world in that settlement. It was done, and the results have not been too bad.
Perhaps if we are going to have a final economic and political settlement in the Middle East we will have to recognize in some appropriate way the interest of the Soviet in that settlement. Perhaps the best way to do that would be to bring any political and economic aid scheme-the minister mentioned it this morning-into the United Nations; a Marshall plan, if you want to call it that, for the Middle East but administered by the United Nations, where perhaps Soviet participation will be less open to exploitation than if it were done in any other way. Indeed they may not wish to participate at all in that kind of plan.
Then finally Mr. Speaker-it will be an important phase of our policy in this area in the future-that we have to continue in the west to give support to Israel's right to a secure national existence. We have got to do more than that with Israel's co-operation and assistance. We have to think of some way of liquidating the Arab refugee problem.
This is a very sketchy outline of the basis of our policy in the Middle East, a policy which I think provides the best hope of strengthening legitimate western influence and strength in that area and at the same time strengthening the chances of peace and security.
The alternative is the pursuit of power politics without sufficient power, or at least sufficient power in the face of the hostility of another and nearer great power which can bring more power to bear on that particular area. That is one alternative, and I certainly hope we will not follow it. But an even worse alternative than that, perhaps, is a policy of drift and uncertainty; of trying to pursue contradictory aims and trying to execute those contradictory aims in a halfhearted and confused way. I suggest the policy which I have ventured to outline in
[Mr. Pearson.l
brief is one of realism and common sense, and one which the west should pursue at this time.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I had hoped to deal with a good many other subjects, but I do not want to take up all the time of the house on this debate. I probably will have another opportunity to discuss these matters. I was going to talk about NATO and its importance in many things, and particularly in this Middle East crisis. I was glad to read in the press this morning that the NATO council is meeting today, as it has been meeting in recent days, to consider developments in the Middle East. It is of the greatest possible importance to strengthen political cooperation through the NATO council not only in the area covered by NATO but in the areas contiguous to the NATO countries which are of vital importance to them.
I also suggest that political co-operation in NATO requires a solution of the difficulties between its members with special interest in the Middle East. Something must be done, for instance to halt the growing bitterness and enmity between the two NATO countries, Turkey and Greece. I have stated a good many times, my view that a military and defence foundation for NATO is not enough, indeed it is necessary now as it was never necessary before to make progress in the field of economic and political co-operation.
Then, Mr. Speaker, there is the most important question of all, and this concerns not merely the Middle East, which is a reflection of the importance of this general question. What can we do at this time to ease tensions and remove or diminish some of the dangers of war? The minister touched upon the matter this morning, but it really deserves far more time than we can give to it in a debate of this kind. But I suggest, however, as I have suggested many times, that we should not allow the crises of the moment to prevent us continuing to seek solutions of our problems with the Soviet union through diplomatic and political channels. We should not only keep our defence strong-we have to do that, though it is a little difficult these days to know what kind of defence should be kept-but we have to keep our diplomacy enlightened and imaginative and vigorous.
The fact that we all feel-and I think we have felt it more in the last two weeks than for quite a long time-the fear of what we call in diplomacy brinkmanship should not obscure the fact that even without that kind of diplomacy, even without those tactics which at times may worry us, even without brinkmanship, we remain on the brink of

extinction. This is true because of the developments in nuclear warfare, because of the piling up of weapons of mass destruction which if they are ever used can make life on this planet impossible. We do not need brinkmanship to emphasize that we are indeed on the brink of that kind of extinction if we allow diplomacy to degenerate into conflict or the world to slide into general war, which is perhaps the only way we will get in. We have existed in this way now for more than 10 years.
We have existed in a world which is bedevilled by a combination, as I have put it before, of hate and hydrogen, of fear and ferocity. That combination still overhangs our life. Our policy surely in this country, and in all free countries, must be to bring about the replacement of that kind of thing by some form of security, on the basis at least of mutual toleration, if we cannot do any better than that, between those who must coexist but cannot co-operate, plus-and this is equally important-closer and closer co-operation between those states which can and must work together for their very survival. That, I suggest to the house, is the only policy that makes sense today. We are all proud as Canadians to know that Canada has played, and I am sure is playing and will continue to play, a good and proud part in the pursuit of that policy. Perhaps I know as well as most Canadians how terribly difficult this part is, how exhausting at times it is and, as I said at the beginning of my statement and as the minister must have found, -how frustrating it often is. At times it seems so much easier to fall back into our foxholes, into our national trenches, to dig ourselves in there and wait for what may happen. Movement is hard and at times we wonder where we are going; or if we are going anywhere. We reach a green pasture and we find that there is a greener pasture beyond. We scale a peak and we find a higher one barring the way. As a poet puts it, "We are forever climbing the ever-mounting slope". But I know all members of the house will agree with me when I say that is no reason for giving up but is a reason for continuing to climb.
I know the house will also agree with me when I say that in this search for peace in a better world all members of the house, irrespective of the party to which they may belong, as indeed all Canadians, will be happy and proud to work together.


Harold Edward Winch: Mr. Speaker, this is without doubt an important day in the present session. An opportunity is accorded for the free expression of the views of members with respect to international
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affairs and the crises that face our country and all countries of the world. It is to me, of course, a very unexpected and unusual experience to have to follow the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) of the present government and the secretary of state for external affairs of the previous government. I am the first one to admit, sir, that I do not know the intricacies and strategies of inner diplomacy as they must be known by the two previous speakers because of the present position of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the past experience of the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson).
Therefore it follows that I do not intend to go into the intricate details of strategy or policy, but I do welcome this opportunity to put forward a few general thoughts from the viewpoint of a layman. I feel quite certain that in taking part in the first discussion of external affairs this session we can all start from the same fundamental belief, namely that nobody wants to see another world war. On that premise we have to consider developments as they occur.
In the present century the major countries of the world have seen two world wars in which countless billions of dollars in productive effort have been expended in the holocaust of war. In addition millions of men, women and children have either died or been mutilated. No one wants to see that happen again, and in saying that we have particular reference to the scientific and technological developments of recent years from which it is known by all that a third world war could possibly mean the annihilation of civilization as we understand it at the present time.
This leads me to make the observation that a world war can start from a spark in international relations in the same way as a catastrophic fire. In my own province of British Columbia right now there are almost one million acres on fire, a fire that could have started from a bolt of lightning, a carelessly thrown match or a cigarette that was not put out. So it is in war. Officially at least the first world war started because an archduke was assassinated. Officially at least the second world war started because of the aggression of one country, because of the insanity of one man.
That leads us, therefore, to the realization that as nobody wants to see another world war, very close attention must be paid to international affairs and relationships to see that with modern weapons, technology and science no spark occurs to lead the world into a conflagration which could mean the end of civilization. If that is accepted, and I think logically it may well be, we have to approach our external affairs and relationships not only on the basis of day to day

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developments but on the basis of what has given rise to these developments.
There may be those who will not agree with me, which is understandable, but I quite honestly feel that if we are truly going to play our part and take every possible action to preserve peace we must understand what gives rise to certain actions by certain countries. In the past few years our major troubles have developed in the Middle East.
I have not yet seen any factual denial that even in connection with the Suez crisis it was not a matter of country against country but was a matter of the protection of oil interests. In these past few weeks we have again seen a Middle East crisis. I believe it would mean a great deal if we could be told whether or not the armed intervention was on an anti-communist basis or for the protection of certain oil interests. Personally, I am not going to state any conclusion, but I do consider this something upon which there has not been any government consideration or public answer.
I am convinced that nobody wants war. We can make the definite statement that Canada does not want war, nor do I believe that any of the western democracies want war. In view of that fact, I am led to ask if Canada could not play a greater part in advising on the present international crisis? We recognize that Canada is not a major power in the world but it is, if I can use the terms, a middle power. It is my definite belief that because Canada at no time has had imperialistic or colonial ambitions, and because of its economic strength Canada could play a most significant role in these very critical days.
When this present Middle East crisis developed I will say I was most disappointed in the first pronouncements that were made by this government. I interpreted them, and I think the majority of the press across Canada interpreted the statements as unqualified support of United States policy. I hasten to add that it was with appreciation and gratitude that, in very short order, we did see leadership and direction coming from the government, and not a supine following of the United States. There was a recognition of the seriousness of the situation, and very definite representations to deal with the crisis. Personally, I feel proud of the direction that was given after the first pronouncement, and I hope that direction may have had some effect upon the developments of recent days and the changed policies. The result has been that Canada has given some leadership on the calling of a summit meeting.
I listened very intently to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) in

what he had to say today, but I have one regret. He failed to give to this house any indication of how strong a position Canada is going to take in view of the recent pronouncements made by, or on behalf of, the President of the United States. We in this corner of the house believed even up until yesterday that some country of the western world had to speak very clearly and bluntly to the United States about its foreign policy with regard to the present Middle East situation. Personally, I cannot understand why, if we truly believe that our economy is the best in the world, that our democracy is the best, we are afraid-when I say "we" I mean as western democratic powers-to meet with anybody else in this world face to face. Quite honestly, Mr. Speaker, I think that the prestige, the influence of the free powers has slipped within the past few days if what appears in the press is correct. According to press reports the government of the United States is disturbed that Khrushchev has accepted the invitation to a summit meeting in New York. There are statements, and perhaps we will have more information about them, that they fear Khrushchev would use such a meeting for propaganda purposes.
I am not going to go into any more detail about that, Mr. Speaker, except to say that if we believe in our way of life, if we believe in our democratic system, then we need have no fear of meeting the leader of any country, any time, anywhere, especially if it may be the basis upon which some agreement may be reached to settle the present mid-eastem crisis and prevent a conflict that could possibly lead to a third world war.
This is a general discussion on external affairs, so may I add this. I know it is of importance to the Prime Minister (Mr. Dief-enbaker) and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, but I direct my remarks in particular to the Prime Minister: I am not in any way derogatory of efforts made by his government or the previous government towards the cessation of nuclear tests or on behalf of world disarmament. But I should like, on behalf of the group in this corner of the house, to ask if still greater emphasis could not De put upon the efforts of the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs as between their counterparts in other governments, in the United Nations security council, the United Nations general assembly and special committees, to drive home the absolute essentiality of the cessation of nuclear tests for war purposes and disarmament if we are to avoid another world war.
We must be honest at all times. Today we have a world armament race; you can call it a defence against another country but the

other country is saying the same thing. So whilst we work on defence, we also work on offence. I think the history of the world proves that if you build weapons of offence and defence, eventually you use them. As I said before, I am saying nothing derogatory on what the Prime Minister has worked for in the past. I am just asking that in following up-and I am certain the direction has come from the Prime Minister in the present Middle East crisis-that additional emphasis be placed along the lines which I have just suggested.
We in this group completely agree-and we emphasize this point-that you cannot sit on the fence or play both ends against the middle. The western powers agree on collective security or they do not. We believe in collective security. If we are going to have collective security in the democratic countries it must not be broken down or betrayed. That is why in this house and in our convention which is still going on in Montreal we have expressed our regrets and our condemnation of the countries-yes, of the United States to the south of us and the United Kingdom in which I was born-taking independent action in the landing of troops of their own volition without going through the collective security agency which we are trying to build up, which we support and in which we are all partners. If the United Nations general assembly means anything or if the United Nations security council means anything and if it is going to have a proper respect in this world, it must be because those who are partners in it follow through on collective action. Anything else is not only a betrayal of the meaning of collective security but is making a gift of a propaganda weapon and putting it in the hands of those who we are told are our enemies and who will use it to best advantage.
Mr. Speaker, I said just a few words this afternoon about the exigencies of absence. Very often the Prime Minister, because of the responsibilities of his office, is obliged to be away. We all understand that. Various cabinet ministers, because of their responsibilities and the exigencies of their offices, also are obliged to be away. Private members also very often are obliged to be away. We in our group find ourselves in a similar position because our biennial convention is being held this week and, as I think you will all understand, it is rather important that some M.P.'s be at that convention to discuss national and international politics. Unfortunately, I was not able to be there. However, learning that certain members were not able to return in time for this discussion this afternoon, I was on the telephone for about 30 minutes speaking to a colleague in Montreal in between the
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lunch hour and now. We are a democratic party and hold a democratic convention representative of our movement across the length and breadth of Canada. I said, "I am going to have to speak this afternoon. What is the viewpoint of the national convention representative of our movement all across Canada with regard to the present situation?"


Robert Jardine McCleave: Are you asking for the party line?


Harold Edward Winch: No. I asked for the democratic decision of our representatives from all across Canada.


Robert Jardine McCleave: Are you asking somebody else to tell you?


Harold Edward Winch: I have been talking here completely extemporaneously. I have not a solitary note. But knowing the kind of thinking that some people do, having expressed myself completely without a solitary note I thought I should give you the decision of our democratic movement; and that will show you up, my friend. This resolution was passed by our movement:
The present crisis in the Middle East is a direct result of the failure of the western powers to evolve a constructive policy based on the legitimate aspirations of the Arab peoples for freedom from outside domination and for social and economic advances and the legitimate aspirations of the people of Israel for a durable and viable peace with their Arab neighbours.
It is also the result of the deliberate subversion of these aspirations by ambitious men and forces both within and without the Middle East.
The C.C.F. has always opposed militarism and totalitarianism in all their forms. It has always censured military intervention whether it be in Hungary, Poland, Suez, Lebanon, Jordan or elsewhere.
It has always urged and urges today that international police action should be undertaken only through the United Nations if peace is to be achieved.
This convention of the C.C.F. therefore condemns the military intervention of the American and British governments in Lebanon and Jordan.
It also censures our own Canadian government which, in the initial stages at least, condoned and supported an action which was clearly an irresponsible risk of nuclear war.
However, the very urgency of the crisis gives the nations of the world an opportunity to lay the foundations of a permanent peace in the area along the following lines:
1.	The American and British forces should be withdrawn immediately, and replaced, if necessary, by a United Nations force composed of nationals of other than the major powers.
2.	In the meantime, all the great powers, as well as the neighbouring states stay out of Iraq.
3.	An immediate meeting at the summit should be held preferably through the United Nations to work out solutions not only for the present crisis, but for the economic and political problems in the area which present a constant threat to the peace of the world.

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4.	A guarantee by the United Nations, to which the great powers are collectively committed, of all the nations in the area, including the state of Israel, against aggressive action.
5.	In order that conditions permitting lasting peace in the Middle East can be established, oil resources should be transferred in a peaceful and orderly fashion to the ownership and control of the Arab peoples and to this end the United Nations should offer to establish an international Middle East development commission, to assist the economic development of the area and ensure the raising of living standards for the people of these areas. Only such a broad and constructive approach to the problems of the area can end the legacy of hatred and dangers that threatens to engulf the whole world.
This convention therefore demands-
They say demand but I say request, sir.
-that the government of Canada pursue these policies unequivocally and vigorously at the United Nations and seek to unite all middle and small powers in a determined effort to achieve a peaceful and constructive settlement of the perilous situation in the Middle East.
I had a very good reason, Mr. Speaker, for wanting to place on the record at this time a decision made only within recent hours at the national convention of the C.C.F. This was because on the occasion of another debate in this house, when we were discussing national and international affairs, some hon. members, including the Prime Minister-as a matter of fact it was the Prime Minister who raised the issue and said that I and other members were saying something different to what had been passed at a provincial convention. This was when we were discussing NORAD and the Prime Minister read a news report with a good deal of relish. I do not blame him, for it was good politics. But I am a federal member, we are all federal members, in this house, and in the Prime Minister's party and in that of the Liberals and also among ourselves there are differences of opinion in localities and provinces, but national and international policy is laid down in the C.C.F. by a national convention. This is the national convention policy on the issue which we now face and I give it to the house unequivocally.
I am now about to draw my remarks to a dose. I am sure the Prime Minister knows the importance of this matter but I wish to commend to his attention the fact-and this I wish to emphasize-that Canada can exercise great influence and leadership but that the guidance must come from the Prime Minister himself through, of course, his ministers. I think upon consideration he will agree that emphasis would not be misplaced on the banning of nuclear tests and the working towards disarmament in this crisis or in any future one. That action should not be taken by individual countries but only under the United Nations as a collective action when it is found to be necessary in the

interest of the maintenance of peace. Forces should not, moreover, be landed in any country in the uniform of any particular nation but only under the aegis of the United Nations emergency force.
The Prime Minister and I, belonging as we do to different parties, perhaps have a different outlook on fundamental philosophy, politically speaking, but we have had two world wars in our time and nobody wants another. It is unfortunate that power politics are being played by two great nations but it is my belief that this country, small as it may be, might nevertheless be able by its sense of direction and sanity to maintain peace throughout the world. I am but one of a group of eight members in this house, but this is my thinking which I commend to the Prime Minister for his consideration.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: Mr. Speaker, I would like to take advantage of this debate on external affairs to report to the house on Canada's participation in a very important international gathering which took place some three or four months ago. It will not of course be on the lofty level on which this debate has so far been conducted but it will be a proud story nevertheless.
I am going to digress if I may-I feel in one way that I should not, but I cannot help but pass this observation. I am sure the house listened with interest to the statement of policy of the C.C.F., particularly because many of us recall the varieties of C.C.F. policies on international affairs over the years. Back in the thirties, particularly around 1935 to 1937, the policy of the C.C.F. was, I believe, pacifism; by 1940, after our troops had gone abroad, the policy was to withdraw them from Europe and to sell our goods to both sides and to let the imperialistic powers fight it out; but 1945 the slogan was "Vote for the C.C.F. and help win the war". The varieties and shifts in C.C.F. policy will make one of the most interesting studies in Canada's history when the time comes some day to write the story of the rise and fall of this party.
My story today, however, deals with the international conference on the law of the sea held at the European headquarters of the United Nations in Geneva between February 24 and April 28 of this year. Sometimes in our preoccupation with the high principles and great hopes of the peoples of the world for the achievement of a family of nations living at peace with one another we forget the ordinary workaday procedures of the many hundreds of delegates and representatives of various countries who work, without the bright lights of publicity upon their

efforts, and yet move steadily forward in man's progress towards a more peaceful state. This report is a record of one of the more prosaic but none the less tangible steps forward made by mankind in its long and slow progress towards a peaceful civilization.
This conference is one of the most significant of international conferences of recent years and one that has achieved far-reaching results. It is true that much more was heard of the failure of the conference to reach agreement on the matter of fishing limits and the breadth of the territorial seas but may I remind the house and the nation that this was merely one article of 73. One hardly ever hears of the articles passed and which became part of international law, but this conference dealt with problems which were very complex and which had a tremendous range of conflicting interests, namely those of 86 different nations. In order to achieve any sort of agreement with so much complexity and among so many nations is in itself a very substantial achievement.
It will, I know, be a source of satisfaction to hon. members on all sides of the house to learn that during the deliberations the Canadian delegation played a leading role and its contribution, throughout the nine weeks of the conference, will long be remembered as one of the outstanding features of the conference. A good deal of the credit for this must go to the Honourable George Drew who gave such vigorous and imaginative leadership to the Canadian delegation and to the able and devoted team of officials who assisted Mr. Drew as members of that delegation. During my own brief visit to Geneva I was able to observe at first hand that Mr. Drew was regarded on all sides as one of the persons playing a very major part in the conference and one to whom the success of many of the negotiations was due.
It is worth while recalling here that the last conference of a similar type on the law of the sea was held at The Hague in 1930. It was known as The Hague codification conference. At that time some 40 nations participated and the international conference broke down on a single issue, the question of the breadth of the territorial sea. Twenty-eight years later with twice as many nations participating it seems rather significant that this same obstacle to agreement did not bring the conference to failure. The significant thing is that the participants achieved many things that went far beyond anything achieved in the whole history of international law since mankind first began to keep its history.
Specifically, the conference produced four international conventions as well as a protocol providing for the judicial settlement
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of disputes. These four conventions were (1) a convention on the high seas; (2) a convention on fishing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas; (3) a convention on the continental shelf; and (4) a convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone. It was on April 29 that Mr. Drew signed these conventions on behalf of Canada as well as the protocol on the settlement of disputes and the final act of the conference. I might say that Canada was the first nation to sign all six of the instruments embodying the results of the conference. The four conventions and the protocol on the settlement of disputes are, of course, subject to ratification by the government of Canada and will not enter into force until ratified by at least 22 nations. Copies of these conventions have already been tabled by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) and are reported in Votes and Proceedings of July 15.
Before dealing in more detail with the conventions and their significance to Canada it might be of interest to provide a little background on the events leading up to the conference and the method of work adopted by the conference. The conference was called as a result of a resolution by the general assembly of the United Nations on February 21, 1957-Resolution 1105X1. It grew out of the studies and recommendations made over the years by the international law commission of the United Nations which had been meeting since the initial formation of the United Nations in 1946. The commission had given very intensive study to all aspects of maritime law and then produced an extremely comprehensive report. It provided for 73 articles and was a compilation of all the rules of the sea which have been adopted over the years by the various nations. These 73 recommendations or rules have two different aspects to them. On the one hand they sought to codify all existing international law where there was already in existence extensive practice, precedent and doctrine. Then, on the other hand, they were concerned with the progressive development of international law on matters such as the continental shelf that were as yet largely unregulated because 30 years ago at The Hague conference they hardly thought of such a thing. And then, in addition, the conference was asked by the general assembly to consider a matter not included within the compass of the international law commission report the question of access to the sea by landlocked countries.
After a brief plenary session the conference resolved itself into five committees of the whole, each of which was charged with the

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consideration of a group of related articles. The results of the committees' work were considered in the final plenary sessions during the last week of the conference. The committees and the subject matter referred to each were as follows: committee I, the territorial sea and contiguous zone, and specifically articles 1 to 25 and article 66 of the original I.L.C. report; committee II, the high seas, general regime, and specifically articles 26 to 48 and 61 to 65; committee III, the high seas, fishing, and specifically articles 48 to 60; committee IV, the continental shelf, and specifically articles 67 to 73; and committee V, access to the sea of landlocked countries. That was a new subject to be discussed at the conference itself. It will be seen that the breakdown of the conference into these five committees follows in general the subjects of the conventions I have already listed.
It may be of interest at this point to comment briefly on some of the results of the conference which were of particular significance to Canada. In commenting on this I might point out that for the first time in history there is now an international agreement on the continental shelf. I mention this first because it is usually lost sight of because this subject was uneventful in terms of news coverage and as far as producing quarrels or differences is concerned.
The continental shelf convention gives to the coastal state sovereign rights over the exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of the sea bed and subsoil off its coast out to a depth of 200 meters. It also provides that these rights may be exercised beyond that depth if the exploitation of the resources is a practical possibility. In the long term, this agreement may have consequences of far-reaching importance to Canada in the development of underwater oil and mineral resources. It means, in effect, a very substantial addition to the potential area of Canada's natural resources. Those who have followed with interest the development of techniques in the exploration of resources know that we can drill for oil at depths of 1,500 feet under the surface of the sea.
It is not without significance that it was a proposal put forward by Canada in committee IV that led to the adoption of the convention on the continental shelf nor is it without significance that it was a Canadian proposal to the final plenary session that led to a prohibition against reservations to the three main substantive articles in the convention. To have permitted these reservations might have undermined the whole purpose of the convention. Finally, it was not without significance that it was Canada which

proposed that this convention should enter into force when signed by 22 nations instead of 50 as proposed by another power.
The second convention dealt with fishing and the conservation of the living resources of the high seas. The convention on high seas fishing is the first such general convention regulating high seas fishing and it accords well with Canadian interests. It recognizes the special interest of the coastal state in maintaining the productivity of the living resources of the high seas in areas adjacent to its territorial sea. It also entitles the coastal state to take part on an equal footing in any system of research or regulation for purposes of conservation in that area even though its own nationals may not carry on fishing there. To all people who understand the importance of fishing to underdeveloped countries, the significance of this particular article is self-evident. Further, it provides that when conservation measures in the high seas have been adopted by a coastal state, they must be observed by fishermen from other countries. And then finally, under emergency circumstances, coastal states may unilaterally enact the necessary conservation measures on the high seas.
The third important feature to Canada was the question of straight base lines and bays. To those of us who live in the island portions of Canada the fact that our coastline is very irregular hardly comes to our attention but in trying to define territorial waters the sinuosity of our coastline is a matter that gives us considerable concern and therefore these regulations in this regard, as drafted and codified by this international law of the sea, are very important to the future of our country.
In the convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, article 4 provides that where the coast is deeply indented the method of drawing straight base lines from headland to headland may be followed in setting the boundary of the territorial sea rather than following the sinuosities of the coastline. I think the importance of that can be realized. Thirdly, our shoreline now in so far as the territorial sea is concerned is not the line of the high water mark or the low water mark; it is a line drawn from headland to headland. This provision, which reflects the 1951 decision in the well-known Anglo-Norwegian fisheries case is of particular interest to Canada because much of our coastline is deeply indented, as I have already pointed out.
In the committee stage there was a move
to impose a limitation of 15 miles on straight
baselines which would have had undesirable

results for us. However, action by Canada in the plenary session was successful in having this limitation removed. The conference also adopted a provision recognizing that bays with mouths of 24 miles or less are to be regarded as internal waters. This limitation would not, of course, affect bays along coasts where the baseline system is applicable.
The fourth convention deals with the general law of the high seas. The convention on the high seas has perhaps less significance for Canada than the others because, in the main, it simply codifies existing international law. It provides for the first time a systematic compilation of recognized international law on a number of important matters and seeks to ensure the maximum freedom of the high seas. This applies not only to navigation but to fishing on the high seas, flying over the high seas and such activities as the laying of submarine cables and the building of pipe lines under the high seas.
Among other things, the convention deals with such matters as the nationality of ships, safety of life at sea, the suppression of piracy and the slave trade, the right of hot pursuit in certain circumstances and the prevention of pollution of the seas by the discharge of oil or the dumping of radioactive waste. It was, Mr. Speaker, a very thorough compilation of the existing laws of the sea into a code which we now hope will be ratified by the great majority of the nations of the world.
I have referred in brief summary, Mr. Speaker, to some of the highlights of the four conventions. Now I would like to turn to the question of the breadth of the territorial sea and the related question of coastal fishing zones. It is on this subject, of course, that the publicity was given which attracted such widespread public interest. It is unfortunate in one way that this aspect of the conference's work reached so much public interest because it tended to obscure many of the more constructive achievements of the conference. I would like to give some of the background of this matter of the breadth of the territorial sea to see whether we cannot make clear what the problem is and the importance of Canada's contribution so far and what we think it can be in the future.
There has been no uniform practice, Mr. Speaker, in so far as the breadth of the territorial sea is concerned. Generally speaking, the great maritime nations have accepted and enforced the three-mile territorial sea off the coasts of the various countries of the world. Many countries for many years have had breadths of the territorial sea off their countries of more than three miles. There are 57071-3-169
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countries with a four-mile territorial sea; there are several with a six-mile territorial sea and there is one with a nine-mile territorial sea-that is Mexico-and the Soviet union has a 12-mile territorial sea. Some go beyond that, even to the extent of 200 miles. This great variety of claims on the breadth of the territorial sea indicates that there is no such thing as uniformity. Generally speaking, the maritime powers have insisted on and recognized only three miles, even though there has not been any direct challenge to the countries that have territorial seas of different widths. As a matter of interest, the U.S.S.R. has a territorial sea of 12 miles, going back to the days of the Czars and it is not likely that anyone is going to challenge anything that has been in existence for over 50 years.
Having given this background, I think it is now fitting for me to point out that this problem was so complex that the international law commission did not make any definite recommendations to this general conference of the United Nations on this matter, but simply pointed out that 12 miles in its opinion was the maximum limit that they thought should exist. Now, for some time Canada has felt that a 12-mile limit was necessary to protect our fishing interests but we have recognized that an extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles might jeopardize the proper interests of those nations and those people who want to maintain freedom of the sea and freedom for air navigation. Therefore, our dilemma was, how could we reconcile the defence interests, freedom of the seas and the freedom of the air, which really requires a very narrow territorial sea, and the needs of our people on our coasts for some priority in harvesting the fish off their shores?
It is a matter of general knowledge, Mr. Speaker, that at the present time by Canadian law we have forbidden Canadian trawlers to fish within 12 miles of our coasts, and yet, because there is no international law, the trawlers from foreign nations can come inside our 12-mile limit and do fish in waters that the Canadian people do not allow Canadian trawlers to fish in. Quite frankly, we would like to reserve those first 12 miles off our shores for the people who cannot afford the big trawlers and who would like to make a living out of this band of water that they can get to and from with their limited resources as far as capital equipment is concerned.
Now, that was the problem that we faced at this conference, and this goes back for several months and years. The Canadian government proposed what became known as the Canadian proposal. This was first put

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forward two years ago. Reduced to its simplest terms it was an attempt to reconcile the interests of defence, freedom of the seas and freedom of the air with the interests of the people who live in coastal states and whose living is largely dependent on the products of the sea off that coast. This Canadian proposal was very simply to have a three-mile territorial sea but to have an additional nine miles in which the coastal state would have exclusive rights for Ashing. This became known in our minds at least as the three-and-nine mile proposal, three miles of territorial sea, and nine additional miles in which the littoral state would have exclusive Ashing rights. At the present time under international law coastal states have certain rights in that 12-mile area with respect to sanitation, Ascal arrangements, customs arrangements and immigration and we thought we would like to extend that principle to include Ashing.
I think it can be said, Mr. Speaker, that this suggestion was acceptable to Canadians generally and was supported by all political parties. During the conference the basic con-Aict was between those states which have Ashing interests off their own coasts and those that wish to see the widest measure of freedom to secure or to maintain Ashing rights in distant waters off the coasts of other coun-ries. The Canadian suggestion of a Ashing zone in which a coastal state would have the same Ashing rights as in its territorial sea was an entirely new concept and from the time of its introduction by Mr. Drew at Geneva it affected profoundly the whole course of discussion. Canada played a major role throughout the discussions and negotiations on this matter and it was not for any lack of initiative or good will on the part of Mr. Drew and the Canadian delegation that the Canadian effort to achieve a satisfactory solution was not crowned with some success.
Here I might note that one of the most signiAcant features of the conference was the importance of the position taken by Canada to the newer national states. The Canadian delegation was keenly aware of the legitimate aspirations of these newer nations which have neither traditional claims to established Ashing rights in distant Ashing waters nor well developed Asheries in their own offshore waters but which are looking more and more to this important source of food and income as a part of their national birthright. In plain language, Mr. Speaker, Canada took the lead among these newer national states in trying to achieve greater economic security and stability for their own people and at the same time to express the new nationalism of

their people in a responsible manner. We were very keenly aware of the legitimate demands of these nations.
Our delegation enjoyed the very closest and friendliest relations with the African and Asian delegates, particularly with the very able delegates from our commonwealth partners, Sir Claude Correa from Ceylon, Mr. Bing who represented the new commonwealth nation of Ghana, Mr. Suffian from Malaya and Dr. Bhutto from Pakistan. I want to acknowledge the constructive and important contribution of the delegation from India under the leadership of Dr. Senn.
We also had occasion to work very closely with the delegation from Mexico, particularly Dr. Robles who represented that delegation on the Arst committee. I should like to pay a warm tribute to Prince Wan of Thailand, the president of the conference, to the able chairmen of the Ave main committees and in particular Professor K. G. Bailey, solicitor general of Australia, who presided over the deliberations of the Arst committee which dealt with the vexing problem of the breadth of the territorial sea and Ashing zone.
I should like to relate to the house, if I may, an anecdote which occurred on the Friday preceding the very tense and dramatic voting on Saturday in the second last week of the conference when Mr. Dean made a very brilliant exposition of the United States proposal lasting for 45 or 50 minutes. The Hon. Mr. Drew representing the Canadian delegation spontaneously walked up to the podium without notes and, taking about 45 minutes, put forward in one of the most brilliant presentations the case of Canada and the smaller nations as opposed to those who had so-called traditional Ashing claims in distant waters. Professor Bailey, the chairman, got up and told the assembled delegates that they would rarely see such a high standard of parliamentary presentation of argument as they had witnessed that day and the whole convention Aoor of delegates of 86 nations took time out to applaud these two very Ane men.
It is my impression that the signiAcance of the Canadian proposal, which was adopted by a simple majority vote of the committee but which did not get the necessary two-thirds majority in the plenary session, was made quite evident in spite of the bitter opposition from most of the major powers. It is my impression that the majority vote accorded the Canadian proposal in committee represents the Arst time in any United Nations conference that an important substantive matter has passed without the support of any of the Ave permanent members of the security council. I wish the house could see

the picture as I saw it with the United Kingdom, the United States, China, France and the U.S.S.R., together with all their friends over whom they have influence and exercise persuasion, massed against Canada, India, Mexico, Libya and many of the newer and younger nations reaching out for some claim to fish in the waters off their coasts. I wish hon. members could have been there to see the little nations, in spite of all the pressure of the five permanent members of the security council united on one side of a very important substantive issue, mustering a majority. I believe that is the first time the five permanent members have been defeated when they were on one side of an issue.
Although the Canadian proposal was rejected in the plenary session, a new concept of international law has been introduced which must surely be taken into account in any future consideration of this question. In the early stages of the conference the United States of America supported the Canadian proposal. Later, however, the United States delegation introduced a proposal of its own for a 6-mile territorial sea with an additional fishing zone. The fishing zone in the United States proposal, however, was not exclusive because it granted so-called traditional rights in perpetuity in the 6-mile zone.
The United Kingdom had introduced earlier a 6-mile territorial sea proposal which was in reality a 3-mile territorial sea with an additional 3-mile fishing zone. The Canadian delegation made every effort to accommodate these two important and friendly partners. As a matter of fact, it was very much because of our concern over the defence aspects so far as the United Kingdom and the United States were concerned that we originally introduced the proposal for a 3-mile territorial sea and 9-mile fishing zone instead of a straight 12-mile territorial sea.
It was very disappointing when first the United Kingdom and then the United States abandoned the 3-mile rule after we had made such efforts to accommodate them, and after this development the Canadian delegation felt justified in converting its proposal into a 6-mile territorial sea with an additional 6-mile fishing zone, the form in which it received a majority in the committee vote, in an effort to reach general agreement. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, in the final analysis the central issue before the conference was not whether there should be a fishing zone but whether it should be subject to existing traditional rights as proposed by the United States or whether it should be exclusive and without impediment as proposed by Canada.
It is quite evident that the Canadian proposal had a tremendous impact on the conference. Without this concept there would 57071-3-169J
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have been no hope whatever of agreement because of the basic conflict between those states interested in coastal fishing rights and those interested in maintaining the maximum freedom of the high seas. This question remains unsettled for the moment, but it has not been forgotten and is still under very active international consideration. I might point out in this connection that the conference adopted a resolution put forward by Cuba in these words:
-to request the general assembly to study at its thirteenth session (1958) the advisability of convening a second international conference of plenipotentiaries for further consideration of the questions left unsettled by the present conference.
It is felt in New York, Mr. Speaker, that the Canadian delegation will press for a second conference to be held at the earliest possible date to carry on the consideration of this question. I think it is safe to assume that any solution ultimately arrived at will incorporate the Canadian fishing zone concept in one form or another. At any rate, the Canadian position remains that the concept of an exclusive fishing zone should be adopted, and our efforts will be directed to this end. Agreement on a regime of law is very important to us, and to all countries. Without it, conflict and disagreement are inevitable, with dangers to the peace and welfare of all countries.
I believe, Mr. Speaker, that agreement can be reached, and when it is achieved Canada will have played a significant part in reaching it. In closing, may I repeat that in spite of the fact that the questions of the territorial sea and the fishing zones have not yet been completely resolved, the conference on the law of the sea can be regarded, both from the Canadian viewpoint and from the standpoint of strengthening international relations, as a most significant milestone.


Harold Edward Winch: I rise on a point of order. I do this because the minister has said he is drawing to a conclusion. I have not raised the question before, and I think in this I have been considerate. I should like to know under which of the items, 85 to 111, 502 and 542 to 549 this matter comes for discussion? I deliberately waited until the minister had completed his remarks, but I should like to know under which of the items mentioned in this motion the matter to which the minister has referred can be discussed.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: I am not an
authority on the matter of estimates, but I am sure in these estimates you will find an item covering the expenses of delegations to overseas conferences. I believe it is also the practice, during these debates on external

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affairs, for ministers who have been representing their country at international conferences to take this opportunity to give a report to the house on these important conferences.


Harold Edward Winch: I do not deny that for one moment. I am very happy if the minister and other ministers want to do that. However, I am referring to the motion now under discussion. I feel I was very considerate in not raising the matter until now, but I do believe, sir, it should be drawn to your attention that this is a discussion of external affairs. The opportunity was provided by the government for that particular purpose. We have heard a most interesting summary from the minister but, as a point of order, I should like to know under what item contained in the motion the minister can discuss this subject?


Lester Bowles Pearson: On the point of order, surely it is the practice in the house, under the first item of the estimates of a department, to have a general discussion of any item of international affairs. Surely, then, it is in order for the minister to discuss any international conference under that item.
May I ask the minister, before he takes his place, two questions in connection with what he has been saying. Can he tell us whether the policy and attitude of the Soviet union in regard to the Canadian proposal for the width of the territorial sea was the same as that of the United Kingdom, the United States and France? Would he also inform the house whether the Canadian government is going to recognize the action taken unilaterally by Iceland since the conference in establishing its own jurisdiction over a 12-mile zone irrespective of the results of the conference?


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: I do not mind dealing with these questions, because they are pertinent and should be answered.


Harold Edward Winch: May I ask whether or not we are going to deal now with the point of order? I should like to hear from the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) as to the authority for continuing with this report.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: Estimate No.
90.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: I believe that on item 1 of the estimates a discussion of a general nature can take place. Naturally, it is preferable to adhere as closely as possible to matters pertaining to external affairs. I do consider that the minister's remarks have been in order to date, and I cannot rule him out of order.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: I have just about concluded. I was pointing out that in this very important part of Canada's external relations, a part that does not show on the surface, delegations do go to conferences and achieve worth-while results. I have been asked two very important questions by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson). The first question was, what was the stand of the U.S.S.R.? At the conference the U.S.S.R. had a proposal that the width of the territorial sea should be 12 miles. Then they had an additional clause, over which the lawyers argued back and forth, which would seem to indicate that they believed the territorial sea should be 12 miles or more in certain cases. Their stand, informally, was that they would give support to the Canadian proposal, but that declaration was never made formally on the conference floor. However, countries like India and Mexico, had the definite impression that the U.S.S.R. and their satellite countries were very much in favour of guaranteeing to coastal states exclusive fishing rights for 12 miles.
Canada co-sponsored a proposal with Mexico and India, which more or less accepted the status quo by limiting the territorial sea to what nations already had in effect, and gave exclusive fishing rights up to 12 miles. When the Indians and Mexicans found out the Russians among others were not going to support this, they withdrew and our coalition fell apart. We went back to our original proposal. I might say that the attitude of the smaller nations, if I can report this accurately and I think I can, was one of intense disappointment that the U.S.S.R. position had been one thing in discussion but when the votes were down, and when it seemed possible Canada would get a two-thirds majority, they backed away from supporting us. This affected the good feeling that had existed between the U.S.S.R. and the Afro-Asian nations.
The second question deals with Iceland. We opposed at the conference the idea of any change any nation might make unilaterally, in the hope that there would be no unilateral declarations before a second conference. Since that time Iceland has declared that on September 1 she will have a 12-mile exclusive fishing zone off her territory. As you know, this has been opposed by the United Kingdom. Our stand is still the same. We do not think the answer lies in any nation unilaterally trying to establish any changes in the breadth of the territorial sea or establishing fishing rights in a larger zone, so long as there is any hope of achieving agreement through the United Nations.

Naturally enough, we would oppose such a matter being dealt with in any smaller regional groups because the subject affects nations all over the world. We have an obligation to our allies in this struggle to give to coastal nations some share of fishing off their coasts. We hope that these two civilized nations, Iceland and the United Kingdom, meeting together in some form of bilateral understanding, can resolve these differences or postpone them until they can be dealt with by the United Nations conference, which I hope will come next year.
I should like to repeat that I am quite confident, once we can get rid of the impact of these power blocs and the issue can be clearly dealt with on an economic basis that a decision can be arrived at supported by two-thirds of the nations of the world. If we can achieve some modus vivendi among traditional fishing countries in this period of adjustment, civilized nations dealing with this on a purely economic basis could resolve these differences. If we can achieve agreement on this article dealing with the breadth of the territorial sea and the breadth of the fishing zone off the coasts of our country, we will have achieved something that mankind has looked forward to for nearly 2,000 years.
I should like to close with a statement of my own as far as the visit to Geneva is concerned. I think I can report to the house, as can every other Canadian delegate who has been to any of these international conferences, the growing respect for Canada by people all over the world for our moderation and for the principles on which we operate. I think that we can play a great part which the United Kingdom and the United States cannot play.
Whether we like it or whether we do not, these newer nations of Africa and Asia- and to some extent this is true of the South American republics-sometimes are reluctant to rely too implicitly on the United States and the United Kingdom. To them they sometimes represent a form of something which they have been trying to get away from. At the same time these same nations in Africa and Asia do not want to come under the subjection of imperialistic power which does not give them any freedom whatsoever. They are looking for leadership of a moderate sort. In their minds Canada has no axe to grind. They feel that when we put forward a proposal that we are going to stick to the three-mile zone for the territorial sea and when we tell them why we want to support it, they tend to trust us; and when we advocate moderation on this question of the 12-mile limit they tend to follow us.
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Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order. I regret to inform the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources that his time has expired.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. I have just one sentence more.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Finish it.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the house that the minister be allowed to continue?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Francis Alvin George Hamilton: I think that the long term advantages gained at this conference will not only be in the fact that our country is rising in the respect of these nations but that we are winning the battle for the minds and the hearts of men in these new nations. Particularly, with this friendship coming from India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Malaya, Ghana and these moderate Arab states who are looking to our country for leadership, I think that we should try to give it to them.
(Translation):


Jacques Flynn: Mr. Speaker, in rising to take part in this debate, I realize of course the responsibility if not the risk I am taking, and the house will not expect me to venture into the intricacies of the diplomatic process. I do not intend to more than bring out a few general ideas which guide, as they must, our foreign policy.
In the light of developments in these last two weeks, it is appropriate, I believe, that our Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) be warmly congratulated for the excellent job he has done in the interest of Canada and peace at United Nations. In my opinion, he has ably expressed Canada's position and like his predecessors, he was a credit to Canada.
The position taken by Canada in the field of foreign affairs can be expressed by two propositions. The first one, a positive proposition, is to promote understanding between all the nations and the second, a negative one, is to prevent armed conflicts and to maintain peace which is essential to the well-being of all nations.
The promotion of understanding between nations is quite in line with our belief that the state must serve the individual and not the other way around. It is in accordance with this principle, Mr. Speaker, that we have gradually come to reject the idea that international conflicts must be settled by force and by war. It is also that philosophy which made us realize the interdependence of nations and, as a consequence, the responsibility of the haves to help the have-nots.

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Thus, Mr. Speaker, through the Colombo plan, through similar organizations within the United Nations and through the British Commonwealth oi nations, Canada has given help to underdeveloped or economically weak countries and has continued gradually to evolve a policy of assistance to those countries. In fact, I was glad to hear this morning the Secretary of State for External Affairs refer to the gratifying results of this policy of support, of understanding and of assistance to weaker and needier nations. It is a policy of the utmost importance, one that yields better dividends, because it is calculated to ensure world peace.
However, foreign policy aimed at preventing armed conflicts runs into more serious difficulties. It becomes so much more of a problem, due to the fact that our philosophy -and I mean the philosophy of Canada as well as that of other free nations-conflicts with that of the communist countries and their satellites.
But, Mr. Speaker, whether we profess our own philosophy or that of communist countries, the progress achieved in the field of nuclear weapons forces us to extreme caution in the field of international relations, precisely because of that danger, the possibility of a nuclear war.
Undoubtedly, the small conflicts arising here and there could lead to a conflict which might mean world destruction.
The current crisis in the Middle East is extremely serious. It illustrates this ideological conflict between free nations and communist nations. Even if it is not just like the one we had in 1956-and I agree with the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) that it is not of the same nature-I believe that both crises have resulted from the same cause and that the one led to the other. It remains, Mr. Speaker, that the situation in the Middle East is not serious simply because American troops have landed in Lebanon or because British troops are posted in Jordan, nor because there was a revolution in Iraq. It is serious mainly because all those events stem from the very strength of Arab nationalism which began to develop since the rise to power of Colonel Nasser in Egypt.
In itself, that surge of Arab nationalism would not be as threatening as it is, were it not that communist countries are using it as a pretext to move in and to substitute their influence in the Middle East to the traditional influence of France, Great Britain and the United States.
At the time of the Suez conflict, it was possible to confine that outbreak by creating a United Nations force but that force which was sent to Egypt, did not constitute an

adequate solution and no doubt, at that time, great hopes were entertained that the crisis had definitely been settled. It was indeed the opinion of the Leader of the Opposition who said on March 15, 1957, I am quoting from page 2351 of Hansard:
This Middle East problem has been almost continuously before the United Nations assembly since I spoke to this house on external affairs last November and that consideration by the United Nations I think has helped not only to bring the fighting to an end in that area but to prevent the conflict breaking out again or, even worse, spreading.
However, at that time there were reasons to fear that this first conflict might spread and break out elsewhere. May I be allowed to quote a statement made at the time by the then leader of the opposition, now the Prime Minister, in reply to the secretary of state for external affairs, as reported on page 2371 of Hansard. He said:
First, we said that if necessary we should extend the United Nations police action to cover not only the borders between Egypt and Israel but also the borders between Israel and Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, because we believe it is of the greatest importance that peace must be maintained in that area. We asked that there be a peace treaty arrived at between Israel and the Arab states, and we know the extraordinary difficulties which lie in the road of that. We are convinced also that no matter how annoyed we may feel at certain individuals in the Middle East, no matter how angered we may be by their actions, it would be folly to let either annoyance or anger change us from a settled course. This course must be to secure a settlement in that area, through peace treaties arrived at between the opposing countries.
Now, precisely because the United Nations, at the time, failed to consider settlement of the whole problem, Arab nationalism, abetted by Russia, broke out once more, this time by way of indirect aggression. It is in the face of this indirect aggression, somewhat reminiscent of what happened before world war II, that the role of the United Nations organization becomes most ticklish.
We are a long way from the scene but surely we must be interested in the solution of this problem because today, the interdependence of free nations is an acknowledged fact. In the face of this difficult situation, what has been the policy of Canada and on what principles was it based?
Mr. Speaker, I think that it would not be hard to prove that our attitude in those circumstances has been consistent with our philosophy which rejects the settlement of conflicts by force. We have demonstrated our confidence in the United Nations. However, the United Nations is no stronger than its moral authority which, in turn, depends upon the support of all member nations. We know that this moral authority can fail when one or two great powers withhold their support

and also because, too often, the United Nations cannot apply in a practical way the authority it holds from the majority of its members. And 1 do believe that, if it were possible to solve the technical and practical problems involved, it would be an ideal solution to put a permanent force at the disposal of the United Nations. However, in such circumstances, there would still remain the difficulty of deciding at what time, in case of indirect aggression, this permanent force should step in.
As far as Canada is concerned, it seems to me that our policy should first be determined on the basis of unity of thought.
It is essential that we work out our international policy first on a non-partisan basis, seeking unity of thought within our country. And I believe that, in this field, the present government has continued to apply the principles applied by the former government, seeking the unity of all men of good will in the determination of our policy. I was glad to hear, last Monday, the Prime Minister thanking the Leader of the Opposition for a suggestion he had made, inviting all hon. members to present theirs and assuring them that any of their suggestions would be seriously considered by the government.
Not only should we endeavour to achieve unity of thought throughout the country, but we should also strive to achieve the same unity of thought with our allies, within the British commonwealth and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The British commonwealth, as a result of the diversity of nations which it includes and the diversity of economic interests of these various nations, is a body through which it is possible to work efficiently in favour of peace and understanding between nations. Within the commonwealth, precisely on account of Canada's action to which I referred a moment ago, we contribute, I think, towards greater understanding between peoples of all parts of the world. If within this organization we do achieve some unity of thought in the working out of our foreign policy, I am sure that in the United Nations we shall carry more authority over other member nations. And the situation is almost the same with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which is, of course, a defence organization. However, the latest developments, in my opinion, call for more frequent consultation between all nations belonging to that organ-
External Affairs
ization, in order that no unilateral action may be taken, and in order that any decision taken by one member of that body may be communicated to and approved by the others, in advance. In fact, here as well as abroad, we must promote understanding, we must try to understand others and make them understand our point of view.
Secondly, Mr. Speaker, I believe that our international policy must be realistic. It must be based on facts. Let us be guided by principles, but those principles must be applied to individual facts in all cases. Of course we have reached full nationhood, we are in a position to hammer out our own international policy, and we are doing just that. It would be naive to contend that our decisions are merely dictated by a feeling of subservience to Great Britain or the United States.
As a matter of fact, Mr. Speaker, since reality prevents us from taking decisions based on sentimentality, the danger at the present time is rather that, due to our economic interdependence with the United States, we might be inclined to submit to their dictates.
On the other hand, even if we have reached our maturity, we should harbour no illusion as to our ability to prevent conflicts.
Canada should not repeat the mistake of the frog that would bloat itself bigger than the ox.
It is important, Mr. Speaker, that we realize that our role should be that of a mediator, of a go-between and arbiter within the British commonwealth of nations and within NATO. If we succeed in being accepted as conciliator and mediator within these two organizations, I believe that we stand a much better chance of commanding respect for our views at United Nations. I repeat, it is important that we fully realize that ours must be a personal role, but it is also important that we do not overdo it. As long as we have a proper understanding of this role, and if we are content with it, Canada, in my opinion, will be in a better position to contribute to world peace and to the well-being of nations.
(Text):


Heath Nelson Macquarrie: Mr. Speaker, it is a real pleasure to be able to have an opportunity to say a word about this subject which has evoked such great interest not only in the House of Commons but in this country. I think we have all been

External Affairs
much impressed in the last few days to have witnessed a part of the drama of parliament. In those recent days which were more tense than the present the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) made his statements on the international situation and we saw evidence of a high level of mature bi-partisanship in the very friendly relationship that existed between him and the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson). I am sure we were all cheered and perhaps even a little thrilled by the drama of this wonderful democratic system of parliament.
I believe, too, that all Canadians followed with much interest and great pride the activities and actions of our distinguished Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) as he represented Canada-and indeed, I am sure, at many times he spoke for a certain part of the free world-in these delicate and extremely important conversations which were held in the country to the south of us last week. We are proud of him, Canada is proud of him, and rightly and justly so. This is not the first crisis to stir the Canadian parliament and to interest and arouse the people of Canada and I am sure it will not be the last.
It has been said, and it is all too sadly true, that tensions today are normal. We move from crisis to crisis. We fear perhaps that one will become an explosion with catastrophic and universal effects. Happily, I believe, we live in a world which despite all its disadvantages in this connection at least has this advantage, and that is, the boiling point is higher today than it was some years ago. The nations tolerate and accept incidents which in an earlier period would have evoked a war-like response. Although the potential for destruction is greater than before, the tolerance of the nations today at least allows for a freedom of manoeuvre-ability into which our statesmanship and diplomacy may flow.
It is perhaps wrong in a general debate of this kind to concentrate all our attention on recent events in one portion of the world. Therefore perhaps I might seek in a few words to present my point of view-I am proud and happy to belong to a party which allows a backbencher to express his point of view and listens to it-on a subject so important as the relationship of some of the immediate events with the general pattern of world diplomacy.
[Mr. Macquarrie.l
The whole picture of diplomacy has changed. I can remember studying geography much less than a half century ago and at that time we learned about the great powers. I think there were seven in my day. Most of them were European and certainly the great burden of responsibility rested on the continent of Europe. We used to see an arrangement of power alignments among various members of the group of great powers. For a long time that situation prevailed and the responsibility for world peace was primarily that of Europe. Throughout the outreaches of the world the great stabilizing power of the British navy was ever-present.
Those calmer, quieter days are gone forever. We now have a situation in which two leading super-powers-one quite non-European and the other as much Asiatic as European-loom on the horizon of international affairs. The relationships between these two powers in all parts of the world form an essential part of every equation in the consideration of diplomatic questions because whether we like it or not we must accept the fact that the diplomatic interests of the U.S.S.R. and of the U.S.A. are worldwide. In recent times we have seen occasions when the interests of these two great powers have come into conflict and at some times in certain sensitive areas on the periphery of soviet power we have encountered threats that were very serious, just as threatening and dangerous as the situation through which we are now passing.
We can remember shortly after the conclusion of the second world war the problem of Iran. Then, we remember also when it was in northern Greece that the two worlds were in contact, in unhappy and bloody contact. Then, it was Korea and before that it was Berlin. I remember that over the Berlin blockade there was great danger and great anxiety, and it was the masterly display of united power that brought about a solution of that very grave situation.
Then, another place was Indo-China where the two worlds met and some kind of accommodation was necessary. I suppose a very simple illustration would be for one to look at a map of the world which we see in 1958 and compare it with one for 1938. If we did that we would see one fundamental effect of diplomatic life, and that is the tremendous spatial expansion of the Soviet union. Its growth, its extension, has been phenomenal.

We remember, too, that at one time the United States had a policy which was called a policy of containment and we used to speak about the Truman doctrine. I am one of those who still believes that the doctrine of containment was a good doctrine and that the Truman policy was a good, sound and very effective policy for dealing with the new situation which had then developed. The Berlin airlift was an expression of that and was one of the great triumphs of the western world when in unity, dignity and strength we stood by our position and we won. It is very easy-and I find a great tendency in Canada to do this-to criticize the errors, the miscalculations and the blunders of the United States in recent times in the field of foreign policy. But I think it is essential for us as an ally of the United States to consider at all times some of the difficulties and some of the realities of its position and therefore of ours.
The role of the western world has been essentially defensive. We have allowed the initiative-because we had to-to lie with the Soviet union, so we never knew just where on this great area of contact the excesses of tension would break out. At the same time it requires massive power on the part of the United States to stand ever-prepared for such a situation. It also requires great efforts on the part of the United States to bring together alliances of friends in strategic areas as an important development of its own military might. Much of the activity of the United States in the last 10 years has been in the development of those two arms of defence.
The magnitude of the responsibility of the leader of the western world has been immense. There is one that I think it is proper for a group of parliamentarians to consider. It is this, that in its diplomacy the western world must operate in the framework of popular democracy and always with regard for the moral content of our diplomatic values. We can never, in our part of the world, judge any action in purely strategic or military terms.
A few years ago there was a suggestion, which never was a very serious one, that the United States, for strategic reasons, should launch a preventive war. Whether or not, even in the narrow strategic and military sense, that would have been feasible, it was utterly impossible with the sense of values we have; but yet it was not impossible for the Soviet union to take the action which it took in Hungary not long ago. It is not under the same moral restraints as a free country with ideals and ethics which its people insist 57071-3-170
External Affairs
upon. This cannot be forgotten. Indeed, I think it should always be remembered in our occasionally, ill-advised, perhaps sometimes ungenerous criticism.
If there is one thing I believe in, not only in the history of democracy but in the history of any political or social development, it is that it is very difficult to be dogmatic, to be certain and to be self-confident. I wish I could be as sure as some members who have spoken that the action at Suez some months ago was altogether wrong, or that I could so easily and so thoroughly condemn the attitudes of the United States and the United Kingdom when, in the first moments of flux, of uncertainty-(indeed, I think the only certain thing was that a dangerous situation existed)-and believe that that immediate action was wrong, was immoral. As I say, I cannot be sure about these things; there are too many "if's"; that we can only read back into those events in the light of the things which are possible. But, as we look forward to the summit conference, we can recognize that this, too, is a part of a continuing policy.
I am sure we all were impressed the other day when the Prime Minister referred to this country's attitude on a summit meeting and said, as reported at page 2473 of Hansard:
I still believe that no nation should or dare shut the door on any matter that offers the prospect of any solution or even a diminution of international tensions.
This attitude is not at all inconsistent with a sustained posture of strength in a determination to support and maintain the position of the western world, because the two great power agglomerations today must establish some basis of accommodation, else the prospect of the future is too awful to contemplate. Therefore, I think it shows a good perception of the existing situation that our country should take an important part in arranging for the forthcoming summit meeting.
It is not my intention to discuss the various technical arrangements or make an appraisal as to whether it would be more beneficial to hold the meeting at the United Nations or elsewhere, but I do think that the general emphasis upon the universality of the United Nations' responsibility is all to the good and I think our government and our country, for this is not a partisan matter, should be commended for its action.
The present area of tension is certainly not a new one. All down through the years, from the very early days of man's social experience, this part of the world has been a trouble spot.
It has been the meeting place of continents. It has been the lifeline of ancient empires.

External Affairs
It has been a buffer zone between east and west, often vulnerable to attack. The rough boots of the conquering invader have perhaps been heard more times over this area than in any other part of the world.
Here again in our own time we have the same area causing universal concern. But we have here factors of tension in the situation which are somewhat unique. We have fomenting in the Middle East the heady new wine of nationalism, an expression of national feeling which was very strong in Europe a century ago and very weak in other parts of the world. But now the situation is quite different and nationalism is a potent factor in Asia and Africa. I believe this was portrayed so well by a representative of an Asian nation at the United Nations some years ago when, after discussing the splendid job of administration which had been done in his country by Great Britain, he went on to say that good government is no substitute for self-government. That attitude, that very deep-seated thinking, is something which cannot be ignored.
There are other factors that are difficult to understand in their entirety and to which it is perhaps difficult to adjust ourselves. We have not only a feeling of nationalism there but strong forces leading to some kind of union among various states whose separate existence is somewhat incongruous. Many movements like to find a prophet and the present dictator of Egypt obviously aspires to be the leader of the great movement of pan-Arabism although, it would be wrong to say that he led it or created it. Perhaps he merely appropriated it. But the ambitions of the Egyptian dictator are very clearly set out in these words in a book which he wrote:
When I consider these hundreds of millions, I emerge with a sense of the tremendous possibilities which we might realize through the co-operation of all Moslems . . . enabling them and their brothers In faith to wield power wisely and without limit.
This man is the man on the scene today, a man who has the tremendous psychological impact of this feeling behind him. Perhaps in recent years we have failed, as other speakers have mentioned, to realize fully and to appreciate the forces of nationalism in this key area. I think the efforts of the western alliance were very clear. The attempt was made to build a bridge of support right across the northern tier of the Middle East, as it was called. But this was never developed with strength and in our time we have seen the constant withdrawal of western power. The withdrawal of western power seems to delight some members but whether or not it is greeted with delight or something else it has certainly happened. France withdraws from her former mandates.

Britain departs from the Suez and Sudan. She forsakes Palestine. Then into this vacuum of power comes indirect Russian power and the highly activated development of nationalism.
One hon. member has pointed out that it must be recognized that the Soviet union has interests in the Middle East. Russia has had interests in the Middle East for many years and no one denies that. Indeed Russian interest was a very definite part of the strategy and diplomacy of that period. Fifty years ago Great Britain and Russia made an arrangement as to sphere of influence in Persia. One of the agreements among those many unhappy agreements before the first world war dealt with the realization of an old Russian dream, control of Constantinople. If we remember the Victorian era, the great emphasis in British foreign policy at that time was on the containment and curtailment of Russian penetration into the Middle East. We might recall one figure who was identified with that policy, that great statesman Benjamin Disraeli.
The Middle East for over 2,000 miles bounds upon the territory of Russia or of her satellites or her allies. Her interest there is very great and she is pursuing it with all the means at her disposal, nonetheless significant or effective because often indirect.
In the Middle East we find that one of the old factors in the equation has been removed, and that is the traditional friendship between Arabs and Britons. It is a long story and it is not altogether a happy story. There were many misunderstandings, some broken promises, some agreements which perhaps should never have been made and others which perhaps should never have been broken. But in any case that old friendship is gone and it can no longer be relied upon when we consider this part of the world and this portion of the diplomatic equation.
It is always a part, of course, of every country's foreign policy to accommodate itself to new conditions. We cannot now deny the fact of Arab nationalism. Nor can we deny the fact of what is called Nasserism. It is too late to cast recriminations as to how Nasserism was created or how it was fostered. I quite agree with the hon. gentleman who declared that we must, in following our policies in this area, have reference to the interests, needs and desires of the millions of people living there. I think that in the long run that will be in our interests too.
The Leader of the Opposition and the Secretary of State for External Affairs were profoundly right when they pointed out that beyond this immediate crisis there is great urgency and great need for long-range consideration as to what will be done about the

Middle East. The western record there in recent years has not been a glorious one. We have suffered reverses. There is more that we can do and we must take the initiative. We in Canada are proud of the fact-I hope it is a wholesome and not a smug pride and I think it is the former-that we do not have a legacy of ill will there, that we are not suspect. We say that our record is good. That being the case, I think it behooves us to take more responsibility.
I have been impressed in recent years how, with the development of Canadian diplomatic posts across the world, we seem to have been so neglectful of the Middle East. There were areas there in which we should have had more highly developed listening posts than we did have. I think we could have used our position to better advantage. We could make use of our reservoir of good will and our recognition of the importance of the economic question.
We have confidence, I think, in the immediate developments. We listened with great interest as the Secretary of State for External Affairs recounted the steps which the United Nations were to take. We will follow with interest the activities of UNOGIL. However, none of these things can ever be regarded as in any way a permanent solution to the problems. Our country has not been very long in this field of foreign policy. It is only a few years, historically speaking, since Sir Robert Borden won for us a place in the international field, so to speak. We have been doing rather well, but I am sure that the challenges before us will be ever greater. I am confident that, aware of the responsibilities which we have, our response to them will be fuller, more complete, than ever before.
I hope that we will never forget that, differ as we may in the details amongst the members of the western alliance, and using our influence as we might to try to persuade the policies of those who are stronger than we are, the greatest folly of all would be to contribute in any way to the weakening of the basic unity which must exist between members of the western alliance. If there was one thing which was more disturbing than anything else in the recent Suez crisis it was the fact that there appeared to be a weakening of that essential unity which must exist between members of a free alliance dedicated to the same principles, principles which we must pursue with vigour and determination in these very tense days.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: It is
a fortunate circumstance, Mr. Speaker, that makes it possible for me to participate in this debate following the distinguished member from Prince Edward Island who has just
57071-3-170J
External Affairs
spoken. It is not the first time I have heard him speak on the very important subject of external affairs, because just a few years ago we were more or less linked in a common interest in these matters out in my own city of Brandon. I am sure the members of the house would agree that his contribution has been enlightening and helpful this afternoon.
I have been impressed during this discussion with the unanimity that appeared on all sides. Every member who has contributed to this discussion so far has joined in agreeing that during the past few days we have been faced with the most critical situation that has confronted the world since the end of world war II, in the events that have transpired in the Middle East. I am not going to endeavour to look at this problem from the standpoint of praise and blame. I was impressed the other day, as I listened to the distinguished Prime Minister for Ghana, who I thought made an excellent contribution to the whole approach to foreign affairs, when he said he was not going to pass any judgment. It would be foolish, and it would be premature, because we are dealing with matters that are so complex that only the Almighty himself could understand actually what has transpired and what might inevitably result therefrom.
There has been the common reaction that we, in this chamber, have been deeply disturbed and troubled by the events. I think the general feeling that has gone across the country has been that we have been hovering in the shadow of a possible outbreak of world war III. Perhaps one of the reasons for such a deeply troubled feeling in the country is that these events are taking place in the Middle East. The Middle East is generally regarded as the cradle of civilization, as it is from that area that the three great western religions have had their source, Judaism, Moslemism and Christianity. Yet, notwithstanding the historic past in this part of the world, it has almost seemed in recent years that what we have regarded as the cradle of civilization might become, unless we are very careful and unless we are very wise in the way we handle this problem, the grave of civilization. I believe that is the spirit that has been present in this discussion this afternoon and is the universal attitude in regard to these matters. Mankind has the feeling that he lies under the threat of universal Hiroshima.
Of course, the Middle East problem is not the only trouble spot in the modern world. Like the previous speaker, I feel we in this mid-twentieth century period have almost become accustomed to living from crisis to crisis. It is these circumstances that arise which add to the confusion of the twentieth

External Affairs
century in which we have seen social and political change move forward at such tremendous speed it has been quite impossible for the mind of man to keep abreast, and certainly it has been impossible for our social institutions to keep up with these changes.
In every generation, the record of history tells us that there are times of social change and social confusion. In fact, if we were to go back to the beginning of the record in scripture, we would find in the opening verses of the Book of Genesis a description of the beginning of things which would tell us that the pattern that has unfolded since that time has been typical of the situation in human affairs. We are told that in the beginning God created the world. Then, the words go on to say:
And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep.
Finally, we are given a ray of hope:
And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters.
And God said, let there be light: and there was light.
In that second verse I think we have a very apt description of the situation confronting those of us in the twentieth century, namely that the affairs of men are without form and void and darkness is brooding over the face of the earth. The events of recent days and of recent years have definitely demonstrated that there is continuing chaos and confusion.
It has been my privilege, Mr. Speaker, since I came into this house, to take part in several debates on external affairs. I have done so only infrequently because these matters deal with complex matters that cannot be discussed without considerable thought and consideration. I remember the discussions that revolved around Canada's participation in NATO. I remember the heart searching there was when we were considering the proposal of German rearmament and German participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At that time it was thought that here was the main trouble-spot in the world and that here would be the possible source in the future of any serious outbreak of hostilities. It might be that such is still the case because we are still confronted with the very vexing problem of German reunification. I agreed entirely with the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) when he emphasized that we should not forget the role of the NATO nations during the present crisis, and that is something we must continually keep in the back of our minds.
Then the trouble-spot moved towards the Far East to Korea, Formosa, Indo-China and all those other areas that have marked the

headlines of our newspapers during the years that have gone by in the recent past. We thought that there might be the final source of the outbreak of hostilities which is universally dreaded by mankind everywhere. But now attention has been focused on the situation in the Middle East. As a result of the Suez event, and as a result of the continuing difficulties on the Israeli frontier I sometimes feel that we are forced to the conclusion that today the way to Washington and Ottawa and London may be through New Delhi and Cairo.
It seems to me that a new power situation has emerged in the world or at least has become clarified. The trends have been there for some time but it is only in recent years that these trends have emerged in a distinctive form. I refer to the awakening of the underdeveloped countries in Asia and Africa, their demands for independence and selfgovernment and the rising claim of the coloured races to their share of the world's goods.
As I look at the situation, Mr. Speaker, and as I have seen the pendulum of the threat of war swing from Europe to the Far East and now to the Middle East, I am almost forced to the conclusion that this awakening of the peoples of Africa and Asia is a more significant development than even the events of world war I and world war II and even more significant than the rise and fall of Hitler and nazism or the Russian revolution. As a result of these new forces in world affairs we are no longer faced with the power situation that confronted us immediately following the war. I refer to the so-called east-west bloc with the west on one side of the chasm and the east on the other, the west led by the United States of America and the east led by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, separated by the unbridgeable chasm in world affairs since the end of world war II.
But now in the world we have this new situation-we might almost call it a third force-the tremendous political power of the upsurge of nationalism in the underdeveloped countries and their increasing desire and demands for a place in the sun. These nations are largely the smaller neutral nations. It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that they are exerting and are going to exert in the future an influence to which we in the west must pay increasing attention.
I say that this force represents a neutral force because as I have examined the situation and as I have listened to spokesmen and as I met some of those spokesmen here is what I found. Judging from their statements and their comments, they have no particular

desire to be drawn in the direction of either the western orbit or the eastern orbit. That point was underlined by the prime minister of Ghana when he spoke in this house the other morning. I merely quote his words to emphasize that point. He spoke of a positive neutralism. As the Hansard record reveals it, he said this:
I should like to take this opportunity to comment on certain aspects of our foreign policy. Basically the policy of our government is one of non-alignment and positive neutrality. I have emphasized on several occasions, however, that this should not be interpreted as a purely negative neutralism. On the contrary, we will always adopt whatever positive policy will do most to safeguard our independence. We have a vested interest in peace, and we will do everything in our power to support the United Nations.
I think we make a mistake, Mr. Speaker, if we regard the cause, so far as our relationships with these new uncommitted countries are concerned, as a lost cause. Out of the present disturbance in the Middle East I am optimistic enough to believe that there yet will come a new and more positive approach to these difficulties. Actually I suppose that the real motivation in the thinking of these neutral powers today is their mortal fear of the military force concentrated in the so-called civilized nations of the east and of the west.
In this debate so far it seems to me that the shadow of the Suez crisis has been hovering near. In his remarks the Leader of the Opposition made some reference to this matter this afternoon. It is true that there are certain similarities that can be noted in reference to the Suez crisis and the present difficulty. It was a manifestation of anticolonialism which is peculiar to these neutral nations.


Mr. Speaker:: 
Harold Edward Winch: With respect to the bill passed and amended by the Senate, may I ask whether the amendment has received the approval of this house?
The Royal Assent
A message was delivered by Major C. R. Lamoureux, Gentleman Usher of the Black Rod, as follows:
Mr. Speaker, the Honourable the Deputy Governor General desires the immediate attendance of this honourable house in the chamber of the honourable the Senate.
Accordingly, Mr. Speaker with the house went up to the Senate chamber.
And being returned:
Mr. Speaker informed the house that the Deputy Governor General had been pleased to give, in Her Majesty's name, the royal assent to the following bills:
An act for the relief of Therese Beaudoin Girard.
An act for the relief of Dorothy Elizabeth Nairn Anderson Bloodsworth.
An act for the relief of Anne Marie Mathilde Vautelet Gagnier.
An act for the relief of William Leonard Mugford.
An act for the relief of James Clancy.
An act for the relief of Marjorie June Gabrielson Trainor.
An act for the relief of Kathleen Mitchell Cabana.
An act for the relief of Fernande Leduc Clarke.
An act for the relief of Ann Westwater Murphy.
An act for the relief of Gaynor Jenkins Douglas.
An act for the relief of Roland Paquin.
An act for the relief of Jone Vanda Skakauskaite Kaniewski.
An act for the relief of Ivy Elizabeth Shaw Labbee.
An act for the relief of Constance Jean Backhouse Brayton Lapierre.
An act for the relief of Lisbet Schlosser Wisternitz.
An act for the relief of Virginia Marshall Stani-forth.
An act for the relief of Elie Kouri.
An act for the relief of Margaret Stirling Izett Brown.
An act for the relief of Norman Weisman.
An act for the relief of Dawn Yvonne Tonkin Kadas.
An act for the relief of Betty Taylor Sharpe.
An act for the relief of Doris Williams Timmins.
An act for the relief of Marjorie Mary Ellen Bowes Jupp.
An act for the relief of Earl Bruce Carswell.
An act for the relief of Beverly Joan Smithson Rook.
An act for the relief of Joseph Francois Gabriel Rene Denis.
An act for the relief of Solomon Seymour Yetman.
An act for the relief of Margaret St. Aubin Brennan.
An act for the relief of Lidija Plesums Koppel.
An act for the relief of Vera Hamburg Colson.
An act for the relief of Margaret Griffin Clarke.
An act for the relief of Katie Miller Fisch.
An act for the relief of Greta Claire Van Valken-burg Stenstadvold.
An act for the relief of Beatrice Madeleine Schmid Layton.
An act for the relief of Anne Gold Zidile.
An act for the relief of Thomas Mastropaolo.
An act for the relief of Charles Coorsh.
An act for the relief of Claire Aubin Daunais.
An act for the relief of Maurice Gardner Swaine.
An act for the relief of William Arthur Terry.
An act for the relief of Frances Eileen Fisher Baker.
An act for the relief of Marie Aurore Cecile Gauthier Thomson.

The Royal Assent
An act for the relief of James Dunn Drummond.
An act for the relief of Marie Eva Desorcy Valiquette
An act for the relief of Norman Silver.
An act for the relief of Herbert Everett Follette. An act for the relief of Abie Cubitz.
An act for the relief of Eva Shtull Hager.
An act for the relief of Georges Etienne Brais.
An act for the relief of Barbara Eisenstein Packer. An act for the relief of Margaret Patricia Winckworth Thornton Sherwin.
An act for the relief of Benita Gertrude Kozlov Cohen.
An act for the relief of Marie Marguerite Amelia Genier Wright.
An act for the relief of Winifred Jean Garrett Somers.
An act for the relief of Frances Erdanova (Erdan) Weiskopf, otherwise known as Esther Weiskopf Weiskopf. otherwise known as Frances Erdanova (Erdan) Stern, otherwise known as Esther Weiskopf Stern.
An act for the relief of Mac Bernard, otherwise known as Manny Bernard.
An	act	for	the	relief	of	Marcelle Gagnon
Lachance.
An act for the relief of Jean Claude Albert Leonard.
An	act	for	the	relief	of	Anne McCluskey
Templeton.
An act for the relief of Lillian May Seymour Perez.
An act for the relief of Lucille Esther Hudson Donnelly.
An act for the relief of Dorte Glahn Carnie.
An act for the relief of Marie Therese Carmen Pauline Legault Lortie.
An act for the relief of Joseph Leo Nolet.
An act for the relief of Naomi Ruth Wolf son Fischel.
An act for the relief of Florence Lillian Henderson Pinkney.
An act for the relief of Francine Major Daigneault. An act for the relief of Odette Lemay Dussault. An act for the relief of Joan Collie Showier.
An act for the relief of Johanna Hendrika Jilderda Haring.
An act for the relief of Patrick Charles Stanford. An act for the relief of Beryl Elizabeth Scrase Laliberte.
An act for the relief of Barbara May Ramsey Bryant.
An act for the relief of Joyce Sherman Fogel.
An act for the relief of Wilfred David Oliver.
An act for the relief of Joseph Urban.
An act for the relief of Olive Margaret Lester James.
An act for the relief of Florence Mildred Matthews Dawe.
An act for the relief of Marie Berthe Helene Guerard Maher.
An act for the relief of Marie Juliette Pauline Josette Beaudoin Said.
An act for the relief of Judith Margaret Bianchi Sartori.
An act for the relief of Clarabel Ellement Vaillancourt.
An act for the relief of Alice Elizabeth Edden Aumais.
An act for the relief of William Gordon Heughan. An act for the relief of Roland Doutre.
An act for the relief of Gerald Edward Burnham. An act for the relief of Ottilie Wilhelmine Auguste Stegelitz Carpentieri.
An act for the relief of Francine Josephine Ghis-laine Boisdenghien Lebrun.
An act for the relief of Doris Cahill Chabot.

An act for the relief of Ruth Marsha Yanover Caunter.
An act for the relief of Joseph Wilfrid Rene Fortier.
An act for the relief of Ingeborg Alves-Probst Wright.
An act for the relief of Paulette Priscilla Benning Buchanan.
An act for the relief of Irene Georgina Descyca White.
An act for the relief of Eszter Jeszenszky Tahy.
An act for the relief of Alice Latou Tubbs Wood Green.
An act to amend the Yukon Act.
An act to amend the National Parks Act respecting the boundaries of Cape Breton Highlands national park.
An act to provide for the resumption of the British Columbia coast steamship service operated by the Canadian Pacific Railway Company.



[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Smith (Hastings-Frontenac):
That items numbered 85 to 111, inclusive, item numbered 502, items numbered 542 to 549, inclusive, and item numbered 655, as listed in the main and supplementary estimates 1958-59, relating to the Department of External Affairs be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
At six o'clock the house took recess.

AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.
Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: Mr. Speaker, when the house rose at the supper hour I had been dealing with what I regard as a very important development in the power structure of international affairs and pointing out that no longer is a two-power world a valid concept. 1 mean by that the old east-west motion of power politics that prevailed after world war II. It seems to me that the rising influence of the neutral, uncommitted nations is the most significant development in international affairs in recent times. They have the legitimate desire to strive for a place in the sun.
As I understand the problem of the Middle East it would certainly appear that in the background, at least as the basic motivating force, is this desire for self-government, for independence, for a place in the sun on the part of an increasing number of underdeveloped regions. The Middle East situation has been at the boiling point for some years. As the house rose I was making a comparison with the events that took place at the time of the Suez crisis-this was referred to by the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon-

and was about to comment that in those events we can trace the growing wave of anti-colonialism.
I recall, for example, during the last war when I had the privilege of being in the Middle East in the uniform of the Royal Canadian Air Force that even as far back as 18 years ago that underlying hostility to the west could be felt on all sides. It is also significant that the mere fact that I and other Canadian servicemen were wearing the Canada badge at that time caused us to be regarded with special respect by the people in the city of Cairo, where we had contact from time to time during our visits to that area.
That spirit of anti-colonialism is present today in much greater intensity. It is generated by this striving toward nationalism. Certainly it has been encouraged by a political figure such as Nasser but it would be present even had Colonel Nasser not risen to a position of influence in the Middle East at the present time. Some one has said that no matter what attempts are made to the contrary, under the upsurge of interest in the United Arab Republic, federation will take place regardless of other considerations.
At the time of the Suez situation there was a fundamental difference from the condition prevailing at the moment. There was an unfortunate confusion and division in policy amongst the nations of the west. This prevailed in both the NATO countries and the countries of the commonwealth. To my mind that was the most unhappy aspect of the whole Suez crisis. I felt at the time, and I stated in the debate that took place on that occasion, that Britain's withdrawal from the Middle East would leave a power vacuum that was bound to create even greater trouble in the future. There is not a doubt in the world but that the present machinations there have been intensified and facilitated by the departure of British influence from that area. I believe this point was made this afternoon by the Leader of the Opposition, and I thought it was rather speculative, that if Britain had not gone through with its intervention in that area in that particular incident then Nasser would have been crushed by the Israeli forces. My understanding of the British intervention at that time was that it was a desire to stop hostilities in the fear that their continuation might precipitate a third world war which is feared so much in all parts of the world.
There is a very much happier note in the crisis we are facing today. There is a spirit of unity of purpose and unity of policy amongst the commonwealth nations as well as amongst the nations participating in the
External Affairs
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I should like to express a word of appreciation at this time to both the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefen-baker) and the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) for the important part they have played in making possible this present spirit of unanimity amongst the nations of the west. They have exerted initiative in exactly the right amount and at precisely the correct moment to make it possible for the western forces to rally around a common meeting point. In so doing for the first time Canada is beginning to enter into that long-desired role where she is initiating policy of her own rather than being a mere echo of either the British viewpoint or the viewpoint of our neighbour to the south, the United States of America.
It is a happy state of affairs when we see the commonwealth and western nations working together in a unity never achieved before to meet a common crisis. It goes without saying, too that we are all delighted that this problem is finding its way back to the United Nations and that the prestige of the United Nations is not being undermined by any attempt to institute deliberations outside the framework of that organization. A large part of the credit for the initiative in this regard, I feel, goes to the Prime Minister and our Secretary of State for External Affairs.
Having said that much about the note of unanimity I must add a further word concerning the general approach to the problem confronting us. It seems that the concept of power politics is still the basic approach of the west to the settling of these disturbed conditions. The very fact that we have had to adopt at least military acts by landing troops in the trouble area is a confession of our own failure to grasp the essential nature of the problem and to try to reconcile this growing spirit of nationalism with the interests of the western nations in the Middle Eastern area.
It does not need any emphasizing to make the point that in this hydrogen age it is no longer possible to maintain the balance of power by means of the old power politics idea. It is much too dangerous a balance to try to resolve on that basis. That is why it is so disturbing when we read remarks by the premier of the soviets as quoted in an editorial of the Globe and Mail today, as follows:
Let the imperialists beware. We are revolutionaries. We are Marxists and we are delighted when the colonial nations rise up and cast off their chains. The boot of the foreigner must be removed from their soil.
That is not the kind of attitude that is going to bring about the necessary reconciliation of viewpoint and interests at this time. There had been an encouraging indication,

External Affairs
particularly since 1956, that the Russian emphasis on power politics, the effectiveness of power politics in the world struggle had diminished somewhat. They seemed to be backing away from a brutal power concept. For example, they had minimized somewhat their stress of the theory of the inevitability of war in achieving desired ends, and also there seemed to be a softening of belief in the necessity for civil war for the seizure of power in any outside nation. More recently, too, there has been the tendency to emphasize the economic struggle rather than the political or the military struggle. It is to be hoped that spokesmen of the U.S.S.R., when they come together in the contemplated summit conference, will adopt a much milder tone than in the statement that was released by the Russian premier in response to the statement of the President of the United States of America.
I cannot get out of my mind that in the background somewhere in the thinking of the soviets there might be mischief contemplated and I still remember the quotation of Premier Khrushchev when he said /'Always remember that the bear can crush just as effectively with a hug as it can with a blow." That is provocative language and it is language that should not be used if we are to have any success at all in the summit conference.
I say that the old concept of power politics is outmoded by the very nature of the world in which we live. We could not keep up to the soviet in adopting this technique even if we tried. The Minister of External Affairs (Mr. Smith) referred to the subtle intervention penetration of the soviets and the difficulty of analysing the nature of this subtlety. That is quite true. A monolithic state such as the soviets is always at an advantage in this regard. There are no democratic inhibitions, no rules to follow, and on top of it there is the strong outthrust in the cold war of communism as a new world religion. We just cannot compete in the same league with that kind of approach.
I feel, Mr. Speaker, that our approach at this time-and I am sure the sharp reaction of all the leaders of the west indicates that they realize the difficulty-toward a solution of the problem must be other than that of the outmoded power politics. Already we have made very remarkable forward steps in this regard, and I refer now to the attempts of the west to provide economic assistance to those under-developed areas in a gesture of good will and of understanding. It is a great step forward when we reach the point that we are more and more interested in

offering economic aid than we are in providing military aid to assist those new and developing neutral nations.
I could spend some time this evening, were time available, in analysing the role that oil plays in the present problem of the Middle East. There is not the time but I think we are aware that if we are to avoid further alienation of the neutral nations we must make it quite certain that we have only their best interests at heart, that we want to assist them in every way to achieve their legitimate desires for independence and self-government.
My final point, Mr. Speaker, is perhaps the main point that I wish to bring before the house tonight. It deals further with this subtle approach, this subtle intervention that is the growing influence in world affairs at the present time. I refer to the impact of psychological warfare, the psychological factors in the cold war, the role that values play in influencing world events. At the time of Suez the United States prided itself on the fact that it had struck the correct moral tone in its approach to that problem and condemnation was heaped upon Britain and France because they had acted independently of the United Nations, outside the moral framework of our Christian ethic. Well, as far as that went at the time I could agree with the United States postulate. It is very important that we exert a proper moral leadership. The difficulty was that having, as they claimed to have, achieved a position of prestige and world leadership in the Middle East, the United States did not move fast enough to consolidate that position.
We always have to look at these problems from two standpoints, the standpoint of political realism as well as the standpoint of idealism. We in the west are essentially idealistic. The Americans and Canadians are particularly idealistic but I am afraid there are times that our idealism is so badly adulterated by materialism that we cannot see the woods for the trees, as it were. President Eisenhower has said that in the end result there is very little difference between atheistic materialism and theistic materialism. The soviet system is quite unashamedly materialistic.
They believe in the efficacy of physical power, prowess and military force. We have depended upon these things only because we have felt ourselves forced by outside pressures and threats.
Yet as a theistic society, we too have become saturated by theistic materialism. Our symbols of democracy, those things that we would wish to bring before people who in the first instance actually receive their inspiration from the west through our missionaries, our religious missionaries, our

church missionaries, our political emissaries, our commercial salesmen, have been contused by these people with such physical achievements as skyscrapers, juke boxes, refrigerators and the like. Sometimes too it seems to me that the symbols of democracy are obscured completely by the very struggle for existence of these underdeveloped nations.
A truism that used to be preached by General Booth of the Salvation Army was that you cannot preach to a man with an empty stomach. I am quite sure that we cannot expect these nations, with their low standard of living and faced with very difficult economic circumstances, to understand our democratic ideas as long as all their time is consumed in the task of eking out a bare existence.
My time is expiring, Mr. Speaker, and I must bring these remarks to a close. I think we are in a much happier position in the present crisis than we were at the time of Suez. Canada has added laurels to the lustre that is already ours because of our participation in world affairs down through the years. The Prime Minister of Ghana paid us a generous tribute in speaking in the house last Monday when he said that he was greatly impressed by Canada's record in the field of international affairs in recent years. I believe firmly that at the summit conference and out of the present discussions and deliberations we will see a coming together of the leaders of the various nations of the world, a closer understanding of the basic issues and an attempt to get at the common humanities underlying the skin of each one of us. If we get the other man's point of view I think we can go a long way in helping to resolve the problem.
Mr. Speaker, I recall an interesting discussion at the United Nations in the fall of 1955. The very delicate and difficult race problem in South Africa was under discussion. I remember that the representative of Indonesia was speaking. He said that the white man believes that the only solution for the problem of South Africa is for all blacks to turn white. With a smile and with a good natured chuckle he went on to say, "I have got another solution for the problem. Why should not all white men turn black?" You see Sir it all depends how you look at the situation.
We have many problems to contend with but I think the basic solution is that we interpret correctly our way of life, the values underlying our way of life. As the United Nations charter so ably puts it, if wars begin in the minds of men it is in the minds and hearts of men that the defences of peace must be built. Canada has made a great
External Affairs
contribution to that great structure in the past and will make even greater contributions in the critical days that lie immediately ahead.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, I am sure that the debate that has taken place on the resolution proposed today by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) represents the common desire of all of us in the house to assist the government in the very difficult responsibilities confronting it at this time. At the same time each of us is anxious to bring forward views that we believe are directed towards that particular objective. We may not all agree on the details of foreign policy of the government of our country but I am sure that all of us in the house without exception are united by a common purpose on a common understanding of the difficult problems involved and confronting each country in the world at this particular moment.
Like my leader I should like to say to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that we on this side of the house, free from direct responsibility, extend to him, to the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) and to the other members of the government our best wishes for a satisfactory discharge of their responsibilities in respect of these matters, some of which in other days have engaged the attention of some who have spoken today. Possibly in my case I can say to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, remembering the period when I did have a status best described by saying that I was in statu pupillari, that I have for him nothing but best wishes in the discharge of responsibilities which are his for some months.
I echo at once the words of my leader who expressed his faith in the United Nations and in its charter. As one who has spent a good part of his life in a less effective way at the league of nations and at the United Nations, I feel that it is well that we should have had today, through one who has played such a great part in current events in our time, an expression of faith in the value of the charter and in the concept of collective security as a means of bringing about order in a disturbed world. I am sure that hon. gentlemen opposite will not begrudge me this opportunity to say that. We have been proud of my leader in his former capacity of secretary of state for external affairs and as a great exponent of peace in our time. But we thought today that in the bold initiative he took in his speech he lived up in an exceptional way to the high standards which he has set for himself in this important field of human endeavour.
He began his speech by suggesting to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that

External Affairs
as the general assembly would meet in normal session some time in the month of September, consideration might be given by the Canadian delegation to a strong sponsorship and initiative regarding certain matters that have a bearing on whether or not we are going to be able to ease current international tension and make a contribution in a positive way to the preservation of peace in the world.
He suggested we might take the initiative at the assembly in the matter of trying to bring about some agreement that would lead to the arresting or stopping of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, now confined to three powers; that secondly, we might put forward in a way acceptable to a wide number of nations an agreement that would lead to the suspension of tests, he suggested for a period of five years, under the supervision of the United Nations; and, thirdly, echoing one of his favourite themes, he urged that in the face of the current international situation we might find great encouragement for pressing forward with the establishment of a permanent United Nations police force.
I am sure that all members on all sides of the house, including the Prime Minister, whose interest in this matter was represented by the interrogation he levelled at the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson), will agree, at least in principle, that the principle of collective security as envisaged by its authors at San Francisco can be effectively realized by the acceptance of an additional principle of collective security and by doing indirectly what it has not been possible to do directly because of the intransigence of the Soviet union in respect of the implementation of article 43 of the charter of the United Nations. Whether or not it is possible to establish a permanent United Nations police force remains to be seen. But undoubtedly, if we are to pursue the original concept of the interdependence of the nations of the world as envisaged by Her Majesty's Prime Minister in the United Kingdom, this is the next phase towards which we must seek to develop the principle of collective security, attempted in 1919 in the covenant and so unfortunately rejected Anally in September of 1939 by so many members of the league of nations.
Then, my leader spoke of the importance of initiative, not irresponsible initiative but initiative on the part of nations who have won respect of their fellow members in the United Nations, capable of providing constructive solutions for difficult problems. Possibly no one had a greater right to suggest that we should pursue this tactic of initiative than my leader, who perhaps more than any other man in the last decade, has day in and

day out at the United Nations himself given an example of what responsible initiative can mean towards the achievement of good purposes amongst the nations. He expressed the views, and I think we all associate ourselves with this, that we are proud of the role of Canada in recent days. This does not mean that every particular act of the administration commends itself to us. Indeed, speaking for myself, it would be possible to argue that in the Arst few hours of this current situation there might be found occasion for justiAable wonder as to the actual course that the government of our country had in mind.
Whether or not that is right, the fact is that subsequent events, declarations of the Prime Minister in this house, statements of the Secretary of State for External Affairs at the United Nations, the reported meetings that he has had with his opposite number in the United Kingdom and the United States, all suggest that the role of Canada in the past few days has been such as to warrant the observation of my leader that we approve in a general way the role of Canada in these recent days. However, I wonder why the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when he spoke today about meetings in Washington on Friday of last week with Mr. Dulles and with Mr. Selwyn Lloyd, referred to the reports made in the United States press as to the nature of Canada's contribution. It may be that because negotiations on these matters sometimes obviously must be private at certain stages he could go no further. But it would have been helpful, assuming that under the circumstances it would have been desirable for him to do so, to have an account from him of precisely the position that Canada took in the conversations that were held at that time, prior to the conversation he had the following day on this crisis with the secretary general of the United Nations.
We had today from my leader, I think, a valuable historical statement of the situation in the Middle East, a historical narrative that puts its problems in prospective. Then, associated with that, was the concrete proposal made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs who spoke Arst. Speaking of the situation historically in the Middle East, my leader mentioned the constant strife that has prevailed in that theatre, without attributing to any particular source the cause of the strife, indicating the competitive forces that persist; the interest of the Soviet union currently and historically in the Middle East; the animosities that prevail between the various groups, and suggested that whatever kind of formula eventuates we must bear in mind these impotrant historical facts, amongst

which is the natural urge of the people of the Middle East, as well as other nations, for self-determination. We must note their desire to use whatever help they can get, from whatever quarter, to further their nationalist aspirations. We must recognize, too, that these aspirations, no matter what will happen within the next few months, are bound in the processes of human history, to assert themselves as they have asserted themselves in the past. I thought he left the implication that what we must seek to do is avoid creating any unduly lengthy breach of misunderstanding between the western nations and these nations in the Middle East.
It undoubtedly was because of considerations of this sort that the Secretary of State for External Affairs projected the idea that one way of bringing about stability in the Middle East would be to provide for some form of international guarantee of the neutrality of Lebanon. When I first heard the Secretary of State for External Affairs make this proposal, without in any way disagreeing with it, but reflecting on what it meant, I found myself hoping that the Secretary of State for External Affairs might have found it possible-he undoubtedly had his reasons for not doing so-to explain the reasons which prompted him to underline this very interesting suggestion, which I noted during the dinner hour was made in a recent issue of Le Monde.
The article in that newspaper called attention to the fact that Lebanon vis-a-vis the other nations of the Middle East for a long time has occupied a position of unofficial but acknowledged neutrality, a neutrality that was respected historically up until perhaps a year ago by the adoption of the Eisenhower doctrine, a position which the Secretary of State for External Affairs compared to the guarantee of neutrality given to Austria in the treaty of peace signed by the Soviet union and certain western powers four or five years ago.
I am sure there is much merit in the suggestion made today by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. However, I am sure that he would agree with me that the guaranteeing of the neutrality of Lebanon to preserve the national integrity of that historic little community and state could serve as a pilot project for guaranteeing the neutrality of other countries in the Middle East as well. One thinks, of course, immediately of Israel. Certainly to guarantee the integrity of Israel would be a stabilizing factor in the Middle East. But one should not even stop with Israel. Guaranteeing the neutrality of other nations of the Middle East by these nations themselves
External Affairs
and by other nations of the world might well prove to be an extremely important factor just as the neutrality of Austria in recent years has proved to be a valuable asset and as the neutrality of Switzerland for a long period now has served as an extremely useful facet in the conduct of international affairs.
I would hope that I do not misread the objectives that the government has in mind and particularly the Secretary of State for External Affairs in saying that not only would we want to guarantee the territorial and national integrity of Lebanon but we would also want to see the expansion of that principle in the wider theatre of the Middle East itself as a means of steadying and disciplining those forces that have existed and have contributed so much to the lack of order which has existed in those areas during the past decade and more. In any event, one can only hope that these suggestions will be pursued with vigour and initiative by the government of this country in the days and months ahead in order to achieve what we all so earnestly desire.
Immediately we are confronted with a proposal by which this problem in the Middle East is to be met and by which it is hoped tension can be eased not only for the benefit of this area but for other areas as well. The proposal has been made that the way in which to do this is for the heads of the governments of the great powers to confront one another and to deliberate on matters relating to the Middle East. This it is argued might have a steadying and'clarifying influence. I want to say first of all that as an individual I believe that nothing is to be lost in principle by those who have the responsibility in these matters in various countries getting to know one another in the hope that as a result of such acquaintance they will better be equipped and disposed to resolve the frightening problems that divide them. But I think we have to resort to the practice and the achievements of history in assessing whether or not this understandably good wish is practical in every circumstance. Argument, talks and articles about a summit meeting to end the cold war I think very often give one a feeling of unrealism, almost childishness, sometimes of nightmarish insincerity. The notes fly back and forth on who will meet, where, when, how, why, and with what; notes usually given to the public before they have been received by the person or the country to whom they are addressed. I think the former secretary of state for external affairs, my leader, properly

External Affairs
expressed the situation in this particular when at Williamsburg he recently said:
The best kind of summit meeting that I can visualize in present circumstances-and it would be no formal conference at all-would be a meeting of the heads of the American and Russian governments for a couple of days, without agenda, files, or crowds of experts; to exchange views informally and frankly; to try to get to understand each other and in the process perhaps to remove some misconceptions and even some fears. Then, the work of negotiation and diplomacy on a wider basis and dealing with concrete problems-the long, hard pull-could follow and in perhaps a better atmosphere.
Then he went on to say this:
The worst kind of summit conference that I can imagine is a meeting of the heads of a dozen or more governments, more or less evenly divided between communists, anticommunists and uncommitted, each with a staff of a hundred or so, and all surrounded by 4,000 journalists, photographers, radio and television commentators, crouching on any ledge they can find, however uncomfortable, providing it is on or near the summit. In this melange, there will be only one man who knows exactly what he wants to do, Mr. Khrushchev. He will submit ten propositions at once to the conference, full of such words as peace, co-existence, disarmament, prohibition, and ask that they be agreed to at once as being entirely consistent with the Sermon on the Mount and the U.N. Charter. He will have a wonderful time and the Asians, Africans and Arabs-and others-will blame everything on Mr. Dulles.
My leader has fairly good authority for this a priori view that not necessarily is related to the current suggestion that, in the face of exigencies as they are now presented, there is no alternative but to do what I think the Prime Minister so properly suggested the other day, namely that this meeting should take place. Sir Winston Churchill said as early as 1953:
This conference-
He was speaking of a summit conference.
-should not be overhung by a ponderous or rigid agenda or led into mazes and jungles of technical details, zealously contested by hordes of experts and officials drawn up in a vast cumbrous array.
The conference should be confined to the smallest number of powers and persons possible. It should meet with a measure of informality and a still greater measure of privacy and seclusion.
No one will deny that throughout the whole of his prime ministership during the period of war no one was more properly gregarious and more interested in meeting those in other countries who had to do with similar problems than was the prime minister of Great Britain. Indeed, Viscount Montgomery expressed the same view in this city only a few weeks ago when he said:
Two talking couldn't decide anything but at least they might find out what is the trouble.
In the preparations and the suggestions that the Prime Minister and his colleagues will be making about this summit meeting I think

they will want to bear in mind, as I am sure the Prime Minister is doing, the desirability of a meeting at the summit under circumstances the most practicable and in a form the most desirable to achieve the purposes that he and all others must at this time have in mind.
My leader suggested the other day when commenting on a statement made by the Prime Minister in this house and bearing in mind, undoubtedly, some of these particular situations which I have related, that a subcommittee of the security council might be devised to decide on the most effective way of bringing about what is commonly desired in this matter. This may not be possible and the Prime Minister has information, as has the Secretary of State for External Affairs, which is not available to the rest of us, but I think that this may be a valuable suggestion for the Prime Minister to bear in mind.
Assuming there is a summit conference and assuming that he will take responsibility, as head of the government of Canada, for sitting in the Canadian chair, and assuming that it should turn out-and I am not saying that this will eventuate-that the particular locale selected and the particular prearranged circumstances for the meeting prove not to be fully satisfactory, then this idea of a smaller committee could very well prove workable and it could be convoked at some subsequent date, possibly not too far removed from the date of the larger meeting but in another locale or even on another continent. This locale could be Geneva. We must not forget that in the month of July 1954 the heads of the governments of the United States, the Soviet union, France and Great Britain did meet for a week in Geneva. President Eisenhower, Premier Bulganin, Premier Faure and Mr. Eden were present and we all recall that at that meeting, when the agenda was not too carefully pre-arranged, the discussions resulted in the creation- perhaps it was a false creation but it nevertheless existed-of a measure of confidence and trust as between the four powers which had not existed for some time.
I suspect that in spite of the fact that there was a lot of publicity connected with that meeting the negotiations for the most part were held in private and it may be that this experience will prove useful when considering the events having to do with the setting up of the machinery and the decisions on the circumstances as to where and when the heads of the great powers or the members of the security council and certain other invited states shall meet. In any event, those are suggestions put forward without any background knowledge to the Prime Minister, who I know wishes to discharge, as do his

colleagues, his responsibilities in this matter in the interests of our country and in the interests of preservation of peace in the world; and as a private member of this house I give them to him.
I was very interested in what the Secretary of State for External Affairs had to say about the formula for the adjournment sine die of the international supervisory commission on control in Laos and Cambodia. These commissions, as I understand it, have now adjourned sine die-


Sidney Earle Smith: In Laos.


Paul Joseph James Martin: -in Laos and in Cambodia the adjournment has yet to take place. All I can say is that even though he did not say this, it seems clear that the adjournment sine die means that the commissions will not return, certainly not to Laos; and assuming the realization of the same position in Cambodia, it will not return to Cambodia. I am not quarrelling with that; I think this is a rather ingenious solution to a problem which has concerned the government of Canada for some time.
No doubt these two commissions as well as the commission in Viet Nam have served an outstanding purpose and, as the Leader of the Opposition said today, the fact that Poland, India and Canada are represented on those commissions is possibly demonstrative of what can happen on a much wider scale in a sphere in which there would be participation by nations of both east and west which would be designed, by employing the instruments of adjudication and conciliation, to ease tension and preserve peace.
It is right that the commission in Viet Nam should continue as a means of guaranteeing satisfactory conditions for the holding of an election in that country on terms which will permit the elections to be free and so that the people of that troubled country may have the opportunity of deciding whether or not they are to follow the leadership of that great liberal-minded statesman, President Diem, or to follow the dictates of the representatives of communist China and of the Soviet union in North Viet Nam.
I also want to pay tribute to the members of the international commission in the three countries I visited a year and a half ago, not only with respect to the military personnel but also those officials of the Department of External Affairs who under great difficulties and sacrifices have rendered a very distinct service to our country and to the cause of international peace.
The Secretary of State for External AfEairs concluded his statement with a recital of the problems of disarmament. Of course, as my
External Affairs
leader said, disarmament could begin with the suspension of nuclear tests. This could be the beginning of a solution for a problem which has confronted the United Nations since the first meeting of that body in Church House in London, in 1946. It has not been possible to achieve any success with respect to this matter, and I fully agree with the Secretary of State for External Affairs who believes that because of the tensity of the current international situation we should not prevent a discussion of disarmament. I am not going to engage in an argument as to whether disarmament is the cause of war or whether it is a reflection of international tension, but undoubtedly the very reasons that provoked the suggestion that there should be a suspension of tests are the same kind of reasons which should provoke civilized men and women to try and bring about in their respective countries policies designed to reduce the heavy burdens of armament in a manner consistent of course with national security.
We have always made it plain in this country-and this applies to this government as well as the previous administration-in our talks with the Soviet union and with our friends the representatives of the United States, of France and of the United Kingdom, that we are not engaged in a process of trying to bring about unilateral disarmament but that we wanted disarmament on such conditions that we would be certain both sides of an agreement were carrying out the various terms to which they had committed their governments. I agree that for us not only inspection and control are important. It is also important that we have a clear understanding with the Soviet union as to what we mean by the objectives of control.
The Soviet union has traditionally taken the position that this really does not matter but that what does matter is an agreement in principle, the matter of control could be decided or discussed later. That is a chance, obviously, which in the light of the current international situation no country could take. I was a little mystified, however, when the Secretary of State for External Affairs, referring to the disarmament program as revealed in the white paper which he tabled, described it as a package deal. If by "package deal" is meant that there must be an acceptance of all its provisions, then I must say I never understood that to be the position of the previous administration nor do I understand it to be the position taken by the United States, by France or by the United Kingdom. I have always understood that we were prepared to embark on a stage by stage program insisting only at the end of each stage that

External Affairs
there would be set up the kind of international control and inspection which would guarantee the fulfilment by both sides of the features of the particular stage to which agreement in principle had been accorded.
In any event, if we have not succeeded in bringing about some progress in a measure of disarmament the fault lies at the doorstep of the Soviet union because of its reluctance to accept these elementary guarantees of control and supervision which are inherent in the character of nuclear weapons of war now in the possession of at least three of the great powers.
I hope the government will persist in this matter of disarmament, and I believe it will, no matter how frustrating it becomes and no matter how much patience it takes, remembering as the Leader of the Opposition recalled today one of his own initial participations in the field of international affairs at a disarmament conference long before the outbreak of the second world war. We all remember the long periods of discussion from 1922 on under the chairmanship of Mr. Henderson toward conditions which ultimately led to a form of unilateral disarmament which placed many nations of the free world in a disadvantageous position visa-vis Hitler's Germany. That shall not occur again, that is clear. And once the deliberations of the scientists at Geneva have been concluded, once it is determined that it is scientifically possible to supervise the suspension of these tests, it may be hoped that will be a strong stimulant for agreement in the first stages covering conventional arms and leading ultimately down to the prohibition of the manufacture and use of atomic weapons along the lines indicated by my leader this afternoon.
I fully agree with what was said about economic assistance to other countries. The role of Canada in the Colombo plan is well known. Now we have to envisage a wider form of assistance, either bilaterally or through the United Nations toward countries in the Middle East or countries already begun through the form of limited technical assistance thus far in the Caribbean and, let it not be mistaken, apart from Ghana, assistance to other theatres, including Africa itself.
This will place great obligations on the citizens of individual countries where the governments of those nations have to make policies that lead to the act of giving. That will place not only upon the people but upon those of us in political parties the responsibility of realizing that in urging these things in parliament we are in honour bound precluded from using them in inverse manner when we come to face the electorate which so often happens and has happened in this

country. The Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs may be assured that they have from us on this side of the house, as my leader said with much greater authority than I, nothing but good will and best wishes in the prosecution of their difficult responsibilities.
We are not the leading power in the world. That is a self-evident statement. But we are a nation that is respected. We are a nation which, because of the achievements in this field during the past decade, has won for itself an honoured place among the nations of the world. We have an opportunity of taking initiatives not open to every other country, not only among the smaller and middle but among the greater powers, initiatives which still rest within the power of any government of our country. Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, writing in the Ottawa Journal of May 15, 1958, said:
The more intransigent the Soviet union the more important it is for us constantly to put forward proposals which demonstrate our willingness to settle, but which also define the issue for which we are prepared to contend. We should make no proposal we are not willing to see accepted but by the same token we should not refrain from making proposals simply because we believe they may not be accepted. We are under no obligation to frame proposals we are sure the Soviet union will accept. To do so would invite the U.S.S.R. to drive us back step by step. We are under an obligation to make responsible proposals which are not designed to undermine legitimate soviet interests.
These are words to which I am sure all of us will subscribe and which I commend to the Prime Minister at this time. I take my seat by simply saying to the Prime Minister on one occasion when my leader as then secretary of state for external affairs asked me to go to the United Nations to head our delegation, the right hon. gentleman served on that delegation as an observer. He will recall our pleasant and what I think I may describe as a useful association. As I now look at him sitting in the seat-my leader said in the seats of the mighty, and it is true,- occupied by the first minister of this country, I recall that association and I know that now occupying a post of even greater responsibility than that which he occupied in 1955 the right hon. gentleman will go to the United Nations bearing in mind the tradition in the field of foreign affairs established by others and to which this house has contributed in its discussions, and he will do his utmost not only for the honour of Canada but for the peace of the world.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, this is indeed an occasion, one of those that occur from time to time, when this House of Commons becomes a cathedral in devotion to great principles. I am sure every hon. member of this house

was moved by the power and eloquence of the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) as he revealed his views in connection with the seriousness and in keeping with the seriousness of the situation which has been the basis of our discussion today. Indeed, from the time the debate started this afternoon one could be very proud of a House of Commons which produced the contributions that were made here as hon. members on both sides of the house spoke, beginning with the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) and followed by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) in what I may be allowed to say was a masterful analysis, and finally now concluding with the speech of the hon. member for Essex East. I am not going to bring into this discussion any of those things that are past. Once or twice the Leader of the Opposition went back two years ago, almost to the crisis at the time of Suez. On this occasion I do not intend to return to those events, nor to deal with them again.
Today we are faced with a situation, and have been during the last two weeks, serious in its import, challenging in the opportunity that comes to those of us in office who have responsibility. We hope we may discharge those duties that are imposed upon us by virtue of the position we occupy in keeping with the nature of the challenge that is ours. We find, however, that there are bright sides. Today we find the United Kingdom and the United States in a degree of unity which is necessary if freedom is to be preserved. We realize something of how fearful the prospect would be if the United Kingdom, the United States and France found themselves in disagreement at a time like this.
As the hon. member for Essex East said, whatever the results of the summit conference, should it be convened-and I am implying no doubt by placing my remarks in that form-mankind and free men everywhere must never place that degree of faith in the conference which would remove the realities of the future or the realization of the fact that the division as between the forces of freedom and the communist world will still continue, not I hope in the same attitude of mind as has prevailed recently but certainly let no one carry in his heart the hope that all will be solved.
In the last two weeks the communist world has shown its point of view again on more than one occasion. Mr. Khrushchev has spoken in words that cannot be misunderstood regarding his relationships with Tito and with all communist nations that believe that communism can be a matter of nationalistic concern alone.
External Affairs
When my hon. friend mentions the needs of disarmament-and all of us in the free world hold that view-and of the hopes that he has that out of the conference in Geneva will come a measure of agreement that will permit of disarmament, I can only bring to his attention the fact that on the twelfth day of July Mr. Khrushchev said that the hope to work out a system of complete and fool-proof control over disarmament is unfounded. That is the atmosphere today in the communist world. 1 believe that the dynamism of the communist world will not be met by frozen negativism, and it is because I believe that that I took the stand in the House of Commons on Monday last when I set out something of the point of view of this government, something of our ideas and of our concepts of our responsibilities. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, the members of the government and myself agreed that whatever the purpose that Khrushchev may have had in mind in suggesting a summit meeting, for any of the nations of the free world, and in particular for the United Kingdom or the United States, to turn down that invitation preemptorily and without the fullest consideration of its import, the realization that it might convey a new hope for mankind, would be acting in a way detrimental to world peace.
I am very pleased this evening, as I have been throughout this day, as I have listened to the hon. members on the other side of the house join in their words of commendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, for after all, just as the Leader of the Opposition at one time occupied that position and at another time the former prime minister, Mr. St. Laurent-and generally through those days we in the opposition endeavoured to join as Canadians to achieve a degree of unity in foreign affairs-so on this occasion members of the opposition in generous terms have followed that course which is representative of true democracy within our country.
The hon. member for Essex East stated that in everything he would not agree. I would not expect that because after all there are bound to be disagreements as to the means being adopted, while agreement as to the objective is being maintained. It is because of that fact that a few days ago I stated I would welcome this debate with a view to having the views of the members of this house expressed on a matter that far transcends party affiliations or political consequences.
The stand that we as the government of this country take on this question is one that we hope will command the support of Canadians as a whole. Certainly the members of

External Affairs
the opposition on this occasion in the contributions that they have made have shown that realization of the gravity of the occasion and the necessity for closed ranks. In other words, each of us realizes that the events of the next few weeks may indeed have a tremendous influence not only on the future of our country but on the welfare of mankind.
I am going to refer to one or two suggestions made by the Leader of the Opposition this afternoon. One of the things that he suggested was an international police force and, as he said, that is no recent inovation or suggestion. Indeed, as I listened to him my mind went back 350 years in the reading of history to when the concept of an international police force was first brought to the attention of mankind by Grotius. The hon. member for Essex East referred to the league of nations and its failure in 1939. I think it failed prior to that when, in spite of the need of the establishment of an international force being generally recognized, it failed to secure the necessary support for the setting up of such a force, that aside from the fact that the restriction of the membership by the actions of one or two nations made it almost impossible for the league of nations to be a success.
I remember on one occasion hearing the late John W. Dafoe say that the only way in which mankind can preserve peace will be through the instrumentality of an international organization having the power to command respect and obedience to its commands and its determinations. The Leader of the Opposition has suggested that the general assembly might take steps towards the establishment of such a force. Under the uniting for peace resolution the general assembly has recognized the need for the existence of an armed force which could be used collectively notwithstanding the failure of the security council to discharge its responsibility. Article 43, to which reference was made by the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Essex East, is as follows:
1.	All members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the security council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2.	Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3.	The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the security council. They shall be concluded between the security council and members or

between the security council and groups of members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
As the Leader of the Opposition said this afternoon, that has been the aim and purpose of successive meetings of the assembly but the achievement of that aim and ideal is still far removed. The general assembly has indeed recommended that states members maintain national armed forces elements for service as a United Nations unit or units upon recommendation by the security council or the general assembly.
Similar considerations which led to the enactment of the united for peace resolution or a development of the recommendations in that resolution might indeed lead to the establishment of some kind of permanent United Nations force, but there are, as was recognized here this morning, this afternoon and this evening, immense practical and political difficulties before agreement between the nations can be achieved. I am not going to give quotations this evening of some of the stands over the years in that behalf that have been taken by various members in the house. Suffice it to say that in March of 1945, prior to the convening of the United Nations conference in San Francisco, in common with other members of the house I advocated the need of the establishment of such a force. Later on in 1946 in the United Nations assembly Mr. St. Laurent advanced the proposition as one worthy of support.
But unfortunately as we look back on the perspective of events those who were in a position to bring about the achievement of that desirable end, without which peace under an international organization is founded on a slender reed, have made no great advance towards the attainment of this objective.
The Leader of the Opposition mentioned disarmament. I am going to refer to that a little later. He also dealt with the economic phase, as did the hon. member for Essex East, the need of assistance being given to underdeveloped countries. In that regard there are no boundaries to the attitude taken in support of that proposition by members in all parts of the house, and in the last year or so there have been material increases but that of itself is not sufficient.
One of the most serious challenges today is the challenge of the U.S.S.R. in its economic warfare, and in 1955 Khrushchev said, "We value trade least for economic reasons and most for political purposes." Everywhere in the world today the U.S.S.R. and the communist world generally are expanding their

trade relations without regard to profit considerations and Russia is measuring its success on the basis of the degree to which it is able to achieve control of the minds of those who for the moment trade economic advantage and ultimately lose their freedom. Only recently the New York Times made a survey of the trade offensive of the communist world and indicated that in 1955 communist trade exceeded $6 billion, that the communists have achieved footholds in 19 countries and that the increase in trade is double that of five years earlier. Indeed, at this very moment China is engaged in a trade offensive in Asia and Europe involving farm products, cement, textiles, manufactured products and the like. It affects us here. The U.S.S.R. is engaged in similar conduct with respect to aluminum, rails and general production.
I place before the house as worthy of attention that one of the courses we must take is the reconsideration of the resources of the international monetary fund and the international bank to the end that we will be able to achieve that degree of economic stability within the free world which will permit, indeed encourage the expansion of trade so that we can meet this offensive. For as the Leader of the Opposition said this afternoon, this is one of the major means being used by the communists today to undermine the stability and strength of the free world. The Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out in a similar statement that the economic stage is one of the most important today, and one that challenges the free world by the tremendous danger that faces our trade and economic welfare by reason of this communist campaign.
I suggest that the international monetary fund, having played a useful part particularly in the last two or three years in helping countries tide over the rough spots in any balance of payments by making available short term loans in foreign exchange, mainly United States dollars, Canadian dollars and deutschemarks, deserves further assistance at this time. The fund has resources in gold-based currencies amounting to about $2,750 million, more than half of which are already committed in stand-by credits. I believe that consideration must be given to an increase in quotas of 50 per cent which would bring in an additional $3,000 million in gold and useful currencies, the result of which would be, according to the economists, substantially to increase the liquid assets underpinning world trade and give confidence to members of the fund that help would be available in case of need, so that they would not have to impose fresh import restrictions to deal with a temporary balance of payments problem.
External Affairs
In so far as the international bank is concerned, that position is also one that deserves attention. All the uncommitted countries of the world today look to the international bank for help in their development programs. The bank has become the main source of dollar capital for this purpose, with loan commitments now approaching $4,000 million. The main source of funds for lending is now the sale by the bank of its debentures to private investors. These debentures can be sold readily on account of the guarantee provided by the United States, and by other financially strong countries, of 80 per cent of their capital subscriptions. I suggest that if the bank continues to lend at the current rate it will, within a couple of years, have to issue additional debentures, which would bring its obligations within sight of the amounts guaranteed by the United States and Canada. In other words, by an increase of the guarantee from 80 per cent to 160 per cent of national capital subscriptions, there would be an increase in the banks borrowing power by several billions of dollars. Such action at this time would assure the less developed countries of the possibility of further assistance and would build a bulwark against the communist advance in the uncommitted countries. This would shore up those countries economically and give them new hope to meet the economic challenge of the communist world.
I mention this because the Leader of the Opposition dealt at some length with the need for economic action in the Middle East. His plan was a United Nations plan, as I understood it, the contributions to which were to be made by all countries, including the U.S.S.R. While naturally any step in that direction would be welcome, I am sure that the experience of the hon. gentleman in the past does not lead him to look too hopefully on the attainment of the objective that he mentioned, however desirable it might be.
Those were two of the matters to which the hon. gentleman gave particular attention. I come now to the question of a summit meeting. I betray no confidence when I say that the Secretary of State for External Affairs did, in the last week or ten days, give the leadership to break the deadlock which seemed to result from the original letter from Mr. Khrushchev offering a summit meeting. The press of our country have been generous, and have been mindful of his contribution and of the action taken, which I am glad, in general terms, has received the support of the opposition. The fact that we believe there is a responsibility in Canada in the Middle East as a threat to the world, is indicated by certain courses that are about to be adopted.

External Affairs
At the present time we have an ambassador in Cairo who is accredited to Lebanon, with Lebanon being in charge of a charge d'affaires. We have an ambassador in Athens who is accredited to Israel, and a charge d'affaires in Tel Aviv. With the problem of the Middle East so much in our minds, and the need of having the closest relationship with those countries so that we may be assured that our views shall receive full consideration and also to strengthen our relations both politically and commercially and, as I said a moment ago, through our missions, to increase our knowledge and understanding of the area, and of our confidence in its future, we intend within the next few days to initiate negotiations with the governments of Israel, Lebanon and Iran, with a view to setting up full, permanent diplomatic missions in the capitals of these three countries. These countries represent to us the standard bearers of freedom in that section of the Middle East which, up to the present time, have not received the diplomatic representatives which they had been desirous of having and have been entitled to have.
Having mentioned that, I now want to say a word in regard to the general question of a summit meeting, and some of the ideas and views that were held by the government with respect to this meeting. I think in the last few days events have moved very quickly. Mr. Khrushchev, having first advocated the necessity for a summit conference outside of the United Nations, finally agreed that the summit conference might be called in connection with the United Nations. It is the United Nations aspect of the forthcoming meeting that I think deserves the most serious consideration at this time.
I want to give you something of the thinking of the government on this matter for this meeting may well constitute a precedent for similar meetings in the future. Generally speaking, Khrushchev's prompt acceptance of the suggestion that the discussions between the representatives of the great powers should take place before the security council, not at a separate meeting at Geneva or elsewhere, does underline the authority of the United Nations. It was my view that any attempt to deal with the subject of the Middle East, with which the United Nations was seized, outside of the security council at this time would derogate from the real authority of the United Nations.
I think generally speaking-and it has been evidenced here today-there is reasonably general agreement that the proper auspices for the holding of this meeting should be under the aegis of the United Nations. There, there are rules of procedure which provide

for the calling together of a special group of nations as has been suggested, and any additional nations upon which the security council agree. In the interests of continuing peace which, after all, is the supreme purpose to which this country is dedicated, we believe there is being offered an opportunity to strengthen the security council and the United Nations by demonstrating that the rules that already are in existence which govern its activities are effective to deal with present problems. To have a separate meeting of nations to deal with specific problems which the security council itself has been discussing would, I repeat, be nothing less than a declaration to the whole world that the security council is incapable of carrying out the duties and responsibilities for which it was created.
We took a lead in this regard because while from the point of view of population we are still one of the smaller nations, we believe -and I think the belief is held generally throughout the whole world as the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Winch) said -that smaller nations must be recognized and their rights upheld in the United Nations and the assurance of their viewpoint being placed before the United Nations maintained. It is for this reason that we take the view that a formal council meeting to initiate the talks between the heads of government concerned, after the procedure has been determined by the security council regular membership, should be attended by the heads of government able to be present. For it is in the full security council that the heads of government of the major powers, in whom our destiny rests in such large measure, can best explain their policies and having done so obtain the moral support needed to carry them out in accordance with the rule of law as symbolized in the charter of the United Nations.
It may not be possible for all heads of government to attend the special security council meeting of which I am thinking but I hope as many as possible will attend. I believe that they should request the great powers to meet and after quiet and reasoned discussion-the four powers to meet in private -to report to the security council on the issues. To this end Canada is prepared to take all necessary steps. Instructions are therefore going forward to our permanent representative to the United Nations to consult immediately with the secretary general, and with other delegations to the end that urgent consideration be given to the further steps necessary if this heads of government meeting of the security council is to pave the way for practical discussions and hoped for solutions of the problem which beset the

Middle East area. To that end we believe that some preparatory meetings of the security council, as I said a moment ago, in regular session will have to be held within the next few days to work out the details, for all of us must appreciate the fact that a top level meeting of that body, to the success of which mankind attaches such great importance, may take some little time to arrange.
In achieving this purpose and laying the proper foundation, we will be guided by the wisdom and experience of the secretary general in setting the necessary procedures in motion and a broad pattern will be sought. The procedure is something as follows. It will be first necessary to inscribe on the agenda of the security council in regular session an item sufficiently broad to permit not only a discussion of the problems of Lebanon and Jordan, of which the council is already seized, but to move on to those more deep-rooted issues which affect the area as a whole and of which, as the Leader of the Opposition said this afternoon, the Lebanese and Jordanian crises are but a manifestation.
When my hon. friend spoke this afternoon of the rise of Arab nationalism I thought of the book by Nasser entitled "Egypt's Liberation". That little book of 120 pages or so is the blueprint upon which Nasser has proceeded. He set the course out as clearly as ever did Hitler whose viewpoint in Mein Kampf few regarded seriously until it was too late. Indeed as one reads this book and sees something of the psychological influences which were referred to by the hon. member for Brandon-Souris (Mr. Dinsdale) this evening he realizes something of the tremendous forcefulness and tenacity of purpose which Nasser has exhibited in bringing about first among the peoples in that area a realization of their nationalism and also using that nationalism under the activating influence of the U.S.S.R. for purposes which brought about the conditions existing today in that area. After dreaming his dreams, giving his viewpoint, revealing his innermost thoughts, he says:
The pages of history are full of heroes who created for themselves roles of glorious valour which they played at decisive moments. Likewise the pages of history are full of heroic and glorious roles which never found heroes to perform them. For some reason it seems to me that within the Arab circle-
This book was written or published in 1955.
-there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search of a hero. And I do not know why it seems to me that this role, exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled down, tired and weary, near the borders of our country and is beckoning to us to move, to take up its lines, to put on its costume, since no one else is qualified to play it.
External Affairs
There is the story. He took the role. He did what the Leader of the Opposition said today. He fomented. He aroused. He inspired. That is why, because of this matter of nationalism, the Arab countries cannot be taken for granted. It is one of the questions that deserves the most serious consideration by this summit meeting.
As far as the inscription is concerned, perhaps the item need be no more specific than "The Question of the Middle East", and I would hope that all members of the security council would find it possible thus to set the stage for discussions of an area which has been the focal point of so much strife and international tension in recent years. The heads of government when they meet at the special session of the security council, as I hope they will-and everything I have said is based on that meeting taking place- would address themselves to this broad problem and would express their concern and make available their ideas to those nations both in and out of the council whose interest in the Middle East is of a more direct nature. All of us recognize the primary responsibility of a few in this matter but the manner in which they discharge that responsibility is of vital concern to all nations great and small, both inside and outside the area concerned. Canada as a middle power occupying a strategic position wants the right to speak on this occasion.
As far as Canada is concerned, we believe that after the general discussion and after the opening statements, if that viewpoint is accepted in the security council, those principally concerned with the Middle East, namely the four or five powers mentioned by the Leader of the Opposition would be able to carry on their deliberations in private. I could not be more in agreement with the member for Essex East with respect to his remarks when he described what a conference of this kind might be if it were conducted under the glare of klieg lights and transmitted to all parts of the world by television. I believe we must free those at this meeting from the temptation to use it in order to turn it into a propaganda agency, for to do so would indeed be to hold back the advance of what I hope will be a reasonable degree of security in the Middle East and a realization, through discussion of the problems, by all parties, of the need for a decision to be arrived at.
If this were generally agreed Canada would be prepared to introduce a resolution at the special session of the security council calling on the permanent members most directly concerned with the Middle East to meet at the heads of government level in order to

External Affairs
carry forward the discussions initiated, in the council in full session, with the secretary general present in an appropriate capacity.
Some reference was made to the need for other nations to be called in, in particular India, and I am one of those who believe, with the Secretary of State for External Affairs that Mr. Nehru has a contribution to make at this time. Provision has already been made by article 31 of the charter which provides as follows:
Any member of the United Nations which is not a member of the security council may participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the security council whenever the latter considers that the interests of that member are specially affected.
Finally I would suggest that our resolution should call upon the secretary general to report the results of the private deliberations to the end that the people in the various countries concerned would have some knowledge of the discussions taking place. The question arises as to where to hold the meeting and much has been said about New York being the United Nations headquarters. Others have pointed out the possible dangers of holding a meeting in that city but there is naturally preference for New York out of regard for the necessity of preserving and consecrating, if I may use that word, the United Nations aspect of the proceedings which is of paramount importance. It would therefore seem logical on the whole to hold the initial high level security council meeting in New York but, if as a result of the general discussions or the full consideration of the problem in all its ramifications, it was decided that the meeting should be held elsewhere, I would remind the house that when I wrote to the Soviet union leader on January 18, 1958, I said:
You may be aware that there has been a suggestion in the Canadian House of Commons that the government might invite the participants in such a meeting to consider holding it in Canada. This suggestion was undoubtedly prompted by the consideration that Canada is the next-door neighbour of the United States and the U.S.S.R. and has a special relationship to commonwealth countries and to France. I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that when the participants decide that they are ready to call such a meeting and should they decide to hold it in Canada, they will be welcome.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


John George Diefenbaker: There are several other matters with which I wanted to deal on this occasion, including the matter of disarmament, but I think I have covered in general the immediate problem, namely that of the meeting and the attitude of Canada
towards that meeting. I repeat what I said originally that I believe Canadians as a whole are proud of the fact that Canada took the initiative in bringing about the attainment of this meeting in which the hopes of mankind will indeed be reposed.
In conclusion, I remember well, in April of 1945, at the United Nations meeting in San Francisco, seeing the beginnings of that organization and feeling the hopes then held for the success of a world organization which would preserve and maintain peace. The United Nations Organization has had its ups and downs since 1945. It now has what I believe is its appointment with destiny and I hope-and I am sure this hope is being expressed throughout the world not only in the free world but behind the iron curtain- that if the summit conference takes place, in good sense and with appreciation of the awful consequences of failure, the participants, through the security council, will go forward with the feeling that whatever the cost we must endeavour to attain at least some degree of assurance of security which has not existed in recent years. It is almost too much to hope for, but while there are some who say "why discuss these matters when past discussions have not been successful," I would like to remind the house that it has also been said, "While they are talking they are not fighting." One has only to go back to the remarks of Lord Grey in his memoirs when in reference to 1914 he said that if the nations in Europe had continued to talk rather than arriving at the conclusion that further talks were useless, world war I could and would have been prevented.
This meeting can be the crossroads for a new future. That is my hope and that hope has been shown in abundant measure today in the opening speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and in the contributions made by the Leader of the Opposition and the other hon. members who have spoken here.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.

Lionel Chevrier: Mr. Speaker, I presume the business for tomorrow is as announced last night?


Howard Charles Green: Yes, Mr. Speaker, the estimates.


[Stage Direction]
It being three minutes after ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to the order of the house passed on July 14.

Questions
ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS	CONSUMER PRICE INDEX VARIATIONS
The following answers, deposited with the Clerk of the house, are printed in the official report of debates pursuant to standing order 39:

Mr. Robichaud: 1.	Have public tenders been called for the motor transport mail route from Pokemouche to Bathurst, Gloucester county, New Brunswick?
2.	If so, what are the names of those who submitted tenders, and what was the amount of each tender?
3.	To whom was the mail contract awarded?
Answer by: Hon. W. M. Hamilton (Postmaster General):
1.	Yes.
2.
Leon J. Boudreau, Maisonnette	$ 8,000
Alfred John Daigle, 956 avenue St.
Peters, Bathurst	 8,000
Herbert Wilson Savoy, Pokemouche 8,000
Vincent Savoie, Evangeline	 8,700
Clifford Boudreau, Bathurst	 8,990
Mederic P. Chiasson, Bathurst	 9,490
Adelbert Landry, Ste. Anne du Bocage 9,949 James Landry, Ste. Anne du Bocage .. 11,600
Leonard Doucet, Bathurst	 12,000
Herbert Allen Branch, 222 St. George,
Bathurst	 14,000
3. Herbert Wilson Savoy.

Question No. 161-Mr. Deschatelets:
1.	What was the variation of the consumer price index for the following commodities in the months of June, 1957 and May, 1958, on (a) food; (b) shelter; (c) clothing; (d) household operation; (e) other commodities and services?
2.	What was the variation of price index on farm machinery in the months of August, 1957 and January, 1953, for (a) eastern Canada; (b) western Canada?
Answer by: Hon. Gordon Churchill (Minister of Trade and Commerce):
1. The variation of the consumer price index for the following commodities and specified dates is:
				Per-
June	May	centage1957	1958	change(a)	Food 	117.7	122.7	4.2(b)	Shelter 	134.8	137.9	2.3(c)	Clothing 	108.4	110.0	1.5(d)	Household	operation ....	119.1	120.7	1.3(e)	Other commodities	and services ....	126.5	130.6	3.22.	The variation of price	index	on farmmachinery for eastern and	western Canada	for specified dates is:	Per-August January centage	1957	1958	change(a)	Eastern Canada	225.1	237.9	5.7(b)	Western Canada	224.2	235.4	5.0
Saturday, July 26, 1958