1958-06-10

FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION ACT


Mr. Samuel Boulanger (Drummond-Arlhabaska) moved: for leave to introduce Bill No. C-27, to amend the Financial Administration Act.


Some hon. Members:: Explain.


Samuel Boulanger: Mr. Speaker, the purpose of this bill is to provide that every cheque, draft, traveller's cheque, bill of exchange, postal note, money order, postal remittance and any other similar remittance of any department as defined in paragraph (f) of section 2 of the Financial Administration Act or of any crown corporation enumerated in schedules B, C and D of the same act shall be printed in both the English and French languages. This is in accordance with the principle established in the Bank of Canada Act where it is enacted in subsection 4 of section 21 that the notes issued by the bank payable to bearer on demand and intended for circulation in Canada shall be printed in both the official languages.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.



CANADIAN PACIFIC STEAMSHIPS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. Lionel Chevrier (Laurier):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Acting Minister of Labour. Have negotiations between the federal mediator, the Canadian Pacific Railway and the seafarers' international union, involving a strike of steamship services on the west coast, broken down as reported in yesterday's press? If so what action, if any, is now contemplated by the government to bring an end to this costly strike?


Hon. Ellen L. Fairclough (Acting Minister of Labour):: Mr. Speaker, I believe I have the same press clipping that the hon. member has. It is correct to say that negotiations
have not broken down. The hon. member will notice in the press release that the mediator is quoted as saying, "I am not abandoning my inquiry, but I am suspending it for the time being." That is the situation at the present time.



ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Harold E. Winch (Vancouver East):: Mr. Speaker, I desire to direct a question to the Acting Minister of Justice. Can the minister give the house any information relating to the recent death by drowning of five members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police? In addition, will the minister inform the house why five members of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were together in a small boat at night on what has been termed a routine lake patrol?
Hon. Leon Balcer (Acting Minister of
Justice): Mr. Speaker, I will take the question as notice and pass it on to the Minister of Justice.


Lionel Chevrier: May I direct a question to the Minister of Transport. Will the minister carry out an investigation under the Canada Shipping Act into the circumstances surrounding the unfortunate tragedy of the five R.C.M.P. officers who lost their lives on lake Simcoe, to ascertain amongst other things whether the small boat regulations of the Department of Transport were being adhered to?


Hon. George H. Hees (Minister of Transport):: I wish to thank the hon. member for his courtesy in advising me of his intention to ask this question. The answer is that such an investigation is already being undertaken.



ATOMIC ENERGY


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. L. B. Pearson (Leader of the
Opposition): Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs arising out of the announcement made in Washington today as to the date of
aH8	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry the forthcoming technical conference respecting measures to control a ban on atomic tests, and also in view of the statement made in the announcement that the United States, Great Britain, France and possibly other countries would be attending on the western side. My question is, has Canada received an invitation to that conference?
Hon. Sidney E. Smith (Secretary of State for External Affairs):: Mr. Speaker, I must reply in the negative. We have not received an invitation.



PATENT ACT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. T. Richard (Ottawa East):: I should like to direct a question to the Secretary of State, of which I gave him notice only late this morning or early this afternoon. Will he inform the house whether or not he intends to table the report of the royal commission on copyrights, which was completed last year and has been printed and sold to the public for quite some time?


Hon. Henri Courtemanche (Secretary of State):: I thank the hon. member for having given me notice of his question. Although there is no obligation on me to do so, 1 have no objection to tabling this report today. Copies of this report in French and in English, therefore, are being deposited with the Clerk of the house.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. M. W. Martin (Timmins):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of National Defence. I have rephrased the question slightly from what I sent the minister as notice in the interests of improving the grammar. The question is with reference to the mysterious object found near Timmins, which I described in this house on June 4 as recorded in Hansard. In view of the fact that another identical object was found in the Val Gagne area east of Timmins a few days ago, could the minister now answer the questions which I posed last week? First, what are these objects? Second, by what authority and by what agreement do the United States service police seize objects of this nature in Canada?


Hon. G. R. Pearkes (Minister of National Defence):: Mr. Speaker, when the hon. member reported the occurrence to which he has just referred, on June 4, I had inquiries made.


It would appear that near Timmins an object fell from the skies which could not be readily identified. A gentleman from Timmins telephoned the officer commanding the United States air force detachment at the nearest "Pinetree" station, which was Ramore. The officer commanding sent his security officer, not the police, to investigate the object. When the security officer arrived he was not able to identify the object immediately, and so asked permission of those who were assembled if he might take it back to his station to find out what it was. Photographs had been taken at the time, and the security officer asked the pressmen present if they would refrain from publishing the photographs until he had an opportunity of identifying the object.
Within an hour of his return to the station the object was identified as one of the United States weather bureau radiosondes, which is equipment released for the weather bureau in order to test the weather at high altitudes. The officer commanding telephoned the individuals concerned and released, or gave permission, I should say, for the publication of the photographs.
In answer to the specific question, of course United States air force personnel, police or otherwise, have no authority whatever to deal with any questions in contact with Canadians off their own particular bases. This base at Ramore is one of the "Pinetree" bases occupied by the United States air force. I would suggest to the hon. member that if there are any similar occurrences, he ask his constituents to communicate with the nearest base of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police rather than United States personnel.


Mr. Erhart Regier (Burnaby-Coquitlam):: May I ask the minister a supplementary question. Exactly what did the minister mean when he said the United States officer gave permission for the press to release the pictures they had taken?


George Randolph Pearkes: If I said "gave permission" I meant that having asked that the photographs be not published until he had an opportunity of identifying this object, as soon as he had identified it he released them from the promise which had been so readily granted by the civilians present.


Murdo William Martin: I have a supplementary question. Is it not true that when permission was given to show the film taken of this particular object, the permission granted was that only a certain portion of this object could be shown? In other words, it was not all of it but just a certain portion of the object that permission was granted to be shown?


George Randolph Pearkes: I have no information on that point.


Mr. Frank Howard (Skeena):: My question is a supplementary one arising out of the answer given by the Minister of National Defence with regard to these United States air force weather objects, whatever they are. Perhaps the question should be directed to the Minister of Justice or, in his absence, to the acting minister. I should like to know whether any study has been made of the position a Canadian citizen is in who may have been himself struck or have had his property damaged by the fall of one of these objects. What is his position with respect to a claim for damages?


An hon. Member:: Hire a lawyer.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. The hon. member will have to consult a lawyer and pay the usual fee.



DOMINION-PROVINCIAL RELATIONS NEWFOUNDLAND    INQUIRY AS TO REPORT OF ROYAL COMMISSION ON REVISION OF TERMS OF UNION

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. C. W. Carter (Burin-Burgeo):: I should like to direct two questions to the Minister of Finance which are related to the announcement he made yesterday. Has the minister now received the report of the royal commission on revision of the terms of union with Newfoundland? If not, is it expected that this report will be received before the budget is brought down?


Hon. Donald M. Fleming (Minister of Finance):: The answers to these questions, Mr. Speaker, are respectively as follows: No; no.



FINANCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Chesley William Carter: Question 2 is this. Has the tariff board now received the additional information required to complete its hearings on fluorspar? Is it expected that the tariff board's report will be received before the budget is brought down?


Donald Methuen Fleming: The answers to these questions, Mr. Speaker, are respectively as follows: Yes; no.
10. 1958	989
Inquiries of the Ministry EXTERNAL AFFAIRS



LAOS, CAMBODIA, VIET NAM    STATUS OF CONTROL COMMISSIONS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. Paul Martin (Essex East):: I should like to ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs a question, and he may take it as notice. Is it true that the Canadian government has authorized the Canadian representative on the international commission for supervision and control in Laos to ask for dissolution of that commission? When the minister replies, perhaps he could also give the house an indication of the status of the commissions in Cambodia and Viet Nam.


Sidney Earle Smith: I accept that question as notice, Mr. Speaker.



TRANSPORT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. H. J. Robichaud (Gloucester):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Transport. Is the minister now in a position to advise the house whether the study undertaken by the bureau of transportation economics operating within his department with regard to transportation problems in the maritime provinces is expected to be completed on time, so the report could be made during the present session?


George Harris Hees: Mr. Speaker, as no time was set as a target and as this investigation is a study, it will be carried on until conclusions are reached. It is impossible to give a direct answer to the hon. member's question.



ALLEGED USE OF FOREIGN PILOTS WITHOUT CLEARING CUSTOMS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. D. M. Fisher (Port Arthur):: I would like to address a question to the Minister of National Revenue. Has the minister taken any action on the charge forwarded to the Prime Minister by the great lakes pilots association that the deputy collector of customs is allowing strike-breaking pilots on foreign ships to leave those ships at Port Weller, Port Colborne and Sarnia without clearing through customs when the ships come from foreign ports?


Hon. George C. Nowlan (Minister of National Revenue):: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member was good enough to send me notice of his question, which I received just before I came into the house. I have no knowledge of

Inquiries of the Ministry any communication having been forwarded to the Prime Minister, and I have no knowledge of the facts to which he refers. Furthermore, I have not had time to communicate with the officers in the area specified in the short time which has been available since I received this question.
I will, however, take the question as notice and give the hon. gentleman an answer tomorrow.



ALLEGED USE OF DEPARTMENTAL FACILITIES IN GREAT LAKES PILOTS STRIKE

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Douglas Mason Fisher: Mr. Speaker, I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Transport. Would the minister comment on the press dispatch forwarded to him which indicated that he was misinformed in the information he gave the house last week regarding the use of departmental radio facilities to break the effect of the pilots' strike?


George Harris Hees: I wish to thank the hon. member for having advised me of his intention to ask this question. I have checked the information that was given to me last Friday and upon which I based the answer I gave in the house that day. I am confident the information given to me by my officials was, and is, correct.



ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Harold Edward Winch: should like to direct a question to the Minister of Justice. In the absence of the minister perhaps the hon. member would take it as notice if he does not know the answer. Has the attention of the minister been drawn to the news report that a person convicted as an habitual criminal and on ticket of leave was arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police under instructions from the remission service, without any charge being laid or opportunity given to the said person to learn of the charge or be able to present a defence?
Will the minister advise the house if the law of Canada or the administration of the justice department permits a person to be found guilty and reimprisoned without knowledge of the charge or an opportunity to present a defence?


Mr. Speaker:: Might I suggest that the hon. member reconsider that question and give notice of it, because it does seem to me to err in the same direction as a previous question, if not to the same extent, although parts of it might well be asked.


Harold Edward Winch: Mr. Speaker, I rose to ask this question because this occurred in Vancouver and the man appears before the court on Friday-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Harold Edward Winch: -so it is a matter of urgency.



UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Paul Joseph James Martin: May I direct a question to the Acting Minister of Labour. Is it not a fact that the practice has been that the figures on unemployment from the dominion bureau of statistics are given to the house and the country at the end of each month, based on a survey of unemployment conditions up to the middle of the month? If that is the case, will the Acting Minister of Labour explain why we have not yet been given the unemployment figures for the month of May?


Ellen Louks Fairclough: Mr. Speaker, I answered a similar question, I believe, the other day and I said at that time that I expected the figures to be available within a few days. They usually do come out within 10 days of the end of the month. I will make inquiries as to why they have not been placed in my hands before now.


Mr. Benidickson:: They are being held until after the budget, I think.



INCOME TAX


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
George Clyde Nowlan: On Thursday, June 4, the hon. member for Timmins (Mr. Martin) asked me two questions; one, as to whether my attention had been drawn to recent reports in the Toronto Star relating to income tax penalties paid by the Twin City Gas Company and the timing of the purchase of Twin City stock. The second question was whether, in view of the implications involved, I could inform the house if it was the intention of the government to investigate this matter.
My answer to the first question, Mr. Speaker, is yes, that my attention has been called to the reports to which the hon. member referred.
My answer to the second question is that under the secrecy provisions of the Income Tax Act it is improper and impossible for me to state in any way, shape or form

whether investigations into the affairs of any individual taxpayer are being carried out or whether they are not being carried out.



CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAYS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Lionel Chevrier: I would like to direct a question to the Minister of Transport, of which I did not give him notice because I have just received this telegram.
I have in my hand a wire from the international association of machinists concerning lay-offs by the Canadian National Railways at the Fort Rouge shops near Winnipeg. My question, based on this wire, is as follows. Is the minister aware of these lay-offs where men with upwards of 15 years' seniority are being severed from their employment? If not, will he inquire of the Canadian National Railways as to what are the reasons for the C.N.R. decision and will he ascertain whether they will reconsider the decision to sever these men from their employment?


George Harris Hees: Mr. Speaker, as I advised the house the other day and as I have done on many occasions, Canadian National Railways do not make lay-offs until they have investigated every possibility of keeping the men employed; and whenever such lay-offs have unfortunately been found necessary from time to time, every possible step is taken to re-employ the men as soon as possible. I am not familiar with the intimate details of this particular lay-off, but I am sure that what I am saying applies to this case as it does to others about which I have been asked in the past, and I feel sure that these men will be re-employed as soon as it is possible to do so.


Lionel Chevrier: May I ask a supplementary question. Is the minister aware of these particular lay-offs, and if he is not will he be good enough to look into them personally?


George Harris Hees: I was advised of lay-offs in two shops last week. I spoke to the management of the C.N.R. about them, and I was advised that every possible avenue for employing these men had been investigated before they were laid off. It was with great regret that these men were laid off, and they will be employed again as soon as humanly possible.



PRIVILEGE


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Leader of ihe Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to
Privilege-Hansard Report raise a question of privilege arising out of the statement on page 947 of Hansard.
The Minister of Finance is reported on this page as saying in connection with the session of the house held in honour of the President of Germany: "Your leader was not even in the chamber." That, Mr. Speaker, is an incorrect statement. I was in the chamber before 11 o'clock when the session was to be called to order.


Donald Methuen Fleming: The point I was trying to make is that the proceedings had started and the hon. gentleman, as well as a good many others, was not in his place at the time.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


Lionel Chevrier: I too, should like to raise a question of privilege, because when I was making a statement on this subject the Minister of National Defence intervened at one stage to say: "You were not in," meaning that I was not in the house. That statement was inaccurate, because I was in the house during the whole of this special session.


Mr. Speaker:: May I be permitted one word about corrections. It is in order, of course, to call attention to inaccuracies in Hansard but it is not in order in correcting the wording of Hansard to try to put right a statement that has been correctly reported. That should be done strictly immediately after the statement is made, and I hope hon. members will try to make corrections that refer to them not as a matter of privilege the next day but at the end of the speech in which the objectionable statement occurs.


Mr. J. W. Murphy (Lamblon Wesl):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to draw your attention to page 946 of Hansard, in the left-hand column, after the second statement made by the hon. member for Ottawa West, where the following remark is attributed to me:
Then it has been a little bit unusual for the last ten years.
That truthful remark should be attributed to the hon. member for Wentworth (Mr. Lennard).
But that is not the point I wish to raise. I looked over the typewritten pages in the Hansard office and I noticed that that interjection had been properly attributed to the hon. member for Wentworth. Yet in the printed Hansard today, the so-called correction- which, incidentally, was made by the hon. member for Ottawa West-is not correct.
We know that this is not the first time Hansard has been changed by members of the Liberal party.

NORAD-Canada-TJ.S. Agreement


Mr. Speaker:: Perhaps the hon. member misunderstood me. There is no objection to correcting errors in the text of Hansard, but what I was pointing out was that the accuracy of a statement correctly reported in Hansard, in so far as it relates to a member and is raised on a question of privilege, ought to be raised, if the member is present, at the time it is said rather than as an explanation the following day.


Mr. F. E. Lennard (Wentworth):: Mr. Speaker, I saw the blue typewritten copy of the Hansard reporter; as a matter of fact it was sent to me by the messenger yesterday after the discussion took place and I O.K.'d it. Now I find this morning that in the printed copy the name was changed and my remark was attributed to somebody else.


An hon. Member:: Who made the change?


Frank Exton Lennard: That is what I would like to know.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


Right Hon. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prime Minister) moved:: That it is expedient that the houses of parliament do approve an exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the government of Canada and the government of the United States of America concerning the organization and operation of the North American air defence command (NORAD) signed at Washington May 12, 1958, and that this house do approve the same.
He said: Mr. Speaker, in rising to speak to this motion I wish to say that in general I shall restrict myself to the motion itself without going into those areas that may conceivably be controversial on the basis of previous discussions. At the conclusion of the debate I shall endeavour to answer any criticisms or helpful suggestions that may be made.
In that connection I would mention as well that the Minister of National Defence will deal specifically with defence matters connected with this resolution, and if further elucidation is required as discussion continues the Secretary of State for External Affairs will also speak, though in point of fact he has dealt at length with this matter on a number of occasions and in particular on the last occasion when he spoke.
I welcome the opportunity to deal with this resolution and with the exchange which took place between the United States government and the Canadian government in connection with this matter of North American defence under the NORAD agreement. A joint announcement in connection with it was made in the month of August by the
[Mr. Murphy.1
Minister of National Defence, and since then there have been discussions from time to time. Finally there was the tabling of the notes which were exchanged.
I do not intend to enter into anything of a controversial nature in making this presentation, but I do wish to say that on the basis of both law and constitutional practice there was no necessity to present this motion. This, however, being a subject of first-rate importance and a matter concerning which an expression either of general agreement or disapproval would be helpful, in order to give those who hold views on this matter the opportunity of placing them before the house for the benefit not only of the house but of the country as a whole, this resolution is presented.
The matter of air defence is of transcendent importance. The Royal Canadian Air Force spends nearly a billion dollars a year. Success of our defences can mean a major reduction in the danger of war and, should war come, in the loss of life and property; for one of the major reasons for our survival under NATO has been the fact that we have had available to us throughout the years since its establishment that deterrent power that has indeed preserved the peace.
We require a strong air defence for that deterrent power as well as to protect the capacity of our country to retaliate if attacked. Indeed, to survive is actually the issue. The Leader of the Opposition has dealt with this on more than one occasion. I am referring now to a speech he made in the city of Philadelphia to the world affairs council on October 4, 1957, in which he set forth the logistics of our present situation and the necessity of a very strong and definite unity with the United States of America. He started off by asking a question:
What, then, is the best way, in present conditions to ensure our security-indeed our survival-for collective defence? There are, I think, two principles that must govern the search for the answer to my strictly military question. First, defence must be genuinely collective for national action alone will not be adequate. Second, recognition that only the United States of America has now resources to give the power and leadership that is essential for such collective defence.
Then a little later on, in the course of the same speech, he dealt with a matter so peculiar at an earlier date to the co-operation among countries in Europe. He went on to say:
How can the unity of the coalition be reconciled with the fact that any decision to retaliate with nuclear weapons is and, so far as we know, will remain' primarily in the hands of one government, that of the United States; with the United Kingdom now entering the grim picture through its hydrogen bomb and missile developments. This responsibility centered in the hands of one or at most two members of the alliance for the decision whether to

use a weapon that can involve everybody in destruction is bound to impose some strain on and create uneasiness-
He dealt with that and finally said:
There is a second and related question. On what basis will the decision be made . . . for retaliation?
He deals with that at some length and comes to the conclusion that this indeed is one of those problems that are of paramount importance in the modern world. Today we in North America find ourselves in this position. While Canada and the United States have endeavoured to bring about a lessening of the fear that hangs over all of us, we in Canada, because of our position with the U.S.S.R. as our northern neighbour and the United States of America to the south, have endeavoured and are continuing in our endeavour to bring about a realization on the part of the U.S.S.R. and those associated with the Soviet union that it is necessary to bring about disarmament. As a preliminary step in that direction and as part of the general picture there should be areas in all parts of the world, if necessary, and provided the U.S.S.R. is agreeable, set apart for inspection either by the U.S.S.R. or ourselves to the end that the dread fear of sudden and unprovoked attack shall be removed from the hearts of men in the western hemisphere and in the U.S.S.R., in the event that similar fears are held there.
But the Arctic peril remains. At the United Nations the U.S.S.R. exercised its eighty-third veto to prevent the proposal put forward there recently from being adopted. Today we find ourselves in the position, as described by one writer, that what took place at the United Nations changed none of the facts of the world situation. Mr. Max Freedman put the matter in these words:
Peace continues to rest on the uneasy race between fear and hate. Over the distant northern reaches of this continent, once strange to geography and until recently unknown to history, there still broods the peril of military conflict.
In order to meet the situation, action had to be taken. It was realized by the former government that action was necessary. When this government came into power just a year ago we followed in its steps with respect to the stand taken by it on behalf of Canada, believing, as we repeatedly reiterated during our days in opposition, that the aim and purpose of members of the house were to endeavour to attain that measure of unity in external affairs which would assure a united front on the part of the people of Canada. We supported the stands that were taken throughout the years on every such matter that came before the house. We placed before the house, as I expect the opposition to do today, suggestions that in our opinion would be beneficial.
10, 1958
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement
Defence lines were established in northern Canada, but today the vital Canadian warning stations are dependent upon human intervention for their operation. Electronic equipment governs the detection of approaching aircraft and the navigation of the interceptors, but the connecting link is still human compulsion. We face today the problem of overcoming the danger that faces us and of establishing semi-automatic ground equipment in addition to the defence lines that were established. This course represents the wisdom of necessity.
Throughout the years, while the opposition was in power, these matters received their attention but there was one major difficulty. Within Canada there were those, perhaps small in number, who felt that Canadians might be able to maintain their own defences. On the other hand, the majority followed the leadership of the last government in the view it undertook to implement, whereby it was necessary to establish a system of integrated air defence as between our country and the United States.
Ever since 1951 it has been recognized that the air defence of Canada and the United States must be considered as a single problem. Arrangements between the two countries at that time provided only for the co-ordination of separate air defence plans and did not provide authority for joint action to be employed against any aggressor. With the advent of nuclear weapons and the technological advances that assure the very rapid rate of delivery of such weapons, quick decisions require to be made in order to maintain the effectiveness of our defence. As time would be inadequate after a sudden attack to determine such plans it was obviously necessary to have in existence in peacetime an organization, including weapons, facilities and command structure, which could operate at the outset of hostilities, these facilities to be provided in advance by the national authorities concerned.
I say that in recent years this matter has received consideration. I bring to your attention, sir, the steps in the development of integration of operational control of Canadian and continental United States air defence forces in peacetime going back to May 14, 1956, when the Canadian chiefs of staff and the United States joint chiefs of staff agreed to refer to the joint study group the integration of operational control of the continental air defence of Canada and the United States in peacetime. These deliberations continued and the then minister of national defence, Hon. Ralph Campney, on behalf of the then government outlined those considerations which were acceptable to the United States and Canada.
994	HOUSE OF
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement
Indeed, on March 11, 1957, 40 copies of a submission to the cabinet committee on defence were approved by the Minister of National Defence and forwarded to the secretary of the cabinet defence committee for inclusion on the agenda of the meeting of that committee to be held on Friday, March 15. No action was taken thereon. The agreement into which we have entered represents, in almost complete measure-when I say almost complete measure there are slight deviations in terminology and in routine matters-that which had been, to all intents and purposes, agreed upon by the former minister of national defence on behalf of the then government.
However, between March 11 and April 26 changes had taken place. An election was not far around the corner. For some reason, that election being set for June 10, a decision was made that further consideration would not be given to this matter until June 15. Oh, Mr. Speaker, that was more than a coincidence. On April 26 the secretary of the Canadian chiefs of staff advised the secretary of the United States joint chiefs of staff that the Canadian chiefs of staff had completed action on this matter and were awaiting governmental approval, but it was not expected that the Canadian government would be able to deal with this matter before June 15.
I mention these matters, sir, by way of answer in anticipation of some of the arguments that have been advanced in recent months regarding these questions; some of the criticisms that were made in the last election campaign. It was alleged on occasions that we had lost political control of our own forces. It was contended that what we had done breached Canadian sovereignty. What we have done has been done without diminution in any way of Canadian sovereignty, and without placing ourselves in a position whereby in the interests of survival we would fail on the North American continent to do that which is expected not only by Canada but the other nations within NATO on the European continent.
The result of Canadian participation in an arrangement such as this is not the loss of sovereignty or survival, it is survival with the maintenance of sovereignty. I underline these words as interpretative of what actually has been done. In other words, none of us in this house has any monopoly of the desire to maintain the sovereignty of this land. It has not, however, been accepted as any diminution of sovereignty that, under the NATO arrangement, our troops and our air force personnel in Europe are under the authority of the chiefs of NATO. We en-


tered into that agreement with that realization. If it is necessary, however, and acceptable under NATO, I ask you, sir, why there has been so much said regarding this agreement the purposes of which are, first and foremost and finally, the preservation and maintenance of survival itself within our country.
I want to mention something about NATO. In introducing this matter I should point out that article 6 of the NATO treaty provides;
For the purpose of article 5 an armed attack on one or more of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian departments of France, on the occupation forces of any party in Europe, on the islands under the jurisdiction of any party in the North Atlantic area north of the tropic of Cancer or on the vessels or aircraft in this area of any of the parties.
In other words, an attack on any of us in any part of the world defined by the treaty is deemed to be an attack on all. This was within the contemplation of the arrangement made.
Then article 3 of the treaty, and I refer particularly to article 3 which sets up in general the organization that prevails under NATO, provides:
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this treaty, the parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective selfhelp and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.
Then I would ask the house to take a look at chart No. 4 in the last issue of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization report, which sets out in detail the organization. I have had the chart enlarged, so it is apparent. The North Atlantic council is at the head of what I might call the pyramid. Under it there is the military committee. The military committee is divided into two parts, the military committee in permanent session and the standing group. This again is divided into the various organizations that actually constitute the effective part of NATO, into the supreme allied commander Europe, the supreme allied commander Atlantic, and the Canada-United States regional planning group. In other words, these three elements stem from the military committee.
Then in so far as the supreme allied commander, Europe, is concerned, he has under his authority the commander in chief, allied forces, northern Europe; the commander in chief, allied forces, central Europe; the commander in chief, allied forces, southern Europe; the commander in chief, allied forces, Mediterranean. The supreme allied commander in the Atlantic has under him the commander in chief western Atlantic; the commander of the striking fleet, Atlantic; the commander in chief,

eastern Atlantic area; the air commander in chief, eastern Atlantic area.
Then we come to the Canada-United States regional planning group, from which this coordination in North America stems. The commander in chief, north American air defence is a command in relation to the Canada-United States regional planning group which occupies a position similar in nature to that held by the various commanders in chief. In other words, sir, what we have done has been reported to NATO by the Canada-United States regional planning group. I can go further than that and point out the fact that everything that is done is being presented to NATO; and when it is said that this scheme has no connection with NATO I would point out that on December 21, 1957 when I reported on the NATO meeting with the heads of state in Paris I said, as reported on page 2721 of Hansard:
The United States particularly impressed upon the representatives there-
That is at the meeting.
-the necessity of co-ordination in defence production, the co-ordination of research and development. I pointed out in that connection something to which I now refer again in this house as a striking example of how the principle of co-ordination and interdependence within the alliance can be employed. I refer to the arrangements we made with the United States government for the integrated air defence of North America under what is called NORAD. I want to re-emphasize that I pointed out there, and it was accepted as a fact, that these integrated forces are an integral part of the NATO military structure in the Canada-United States region;-
I reiterate those words today; for when speaking there in the presence of my colleagues already referred to that was the statement I made, and there was at no time any suggestion of demurral respecting that conclusion. I continue with the quotation:
-that there is a committee of NATO dealing with Canada-United States relations in this regard, and that anything we have done has been reported to the standing group and that course will be followed in the future. The NATO council will have full reports on everything we do, similar to the practice followed in all other NATO military commands.
When you look at the plan, and when you see it again in detail in this report to which I have made reference, namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 1957, you realize how difficult it is to understand why there should be so much said about a matter such as this. As I said a moment ago, in Europe no question has been raised about placing Canadian forces under the operational control of NATO commanders. Survival knows none of the fineries of a nationalism that used to exist.
Moreover, I say this. As I said a moment ago this agreement represents the culmination of negotiations carried on by the previous government. What was done must have been
10, 1959
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement done with the knowledge of the Leader of the Opposition, whose departmental officials were actually and actively involved in the process. Furthermore, the substance of the military arrangements had been agreed upon, though I am frank to admit they had not received the final approval, which was allowed to remain in abeyance until June 15. The diplomatic steps to cover the military arrangements were not taken. Everything else had been done.
When we took office the government came to the conclusion that this integration of operational control of our air defence was important and should no longer be delayed, and authorized the establishment of the joint NORAD headquarters on a provisional basis pending the working out of some detailed minor terms of agreement between our governments.
I now come to a reference to the agreement in question. I am not going into detail because it is before you in Hansard of May 19. I will not recapitulate. I will summarize, however, and say that that agreement gives the background, purpose and nature of the joint air defence command. It sets forth the principles on which that defence command will operate. It emphasizes in every line its main purpose; not aggression but defence; the insurance of huge and complex air defence forces-in the nature of things huge and complex-which will operate with maximum effectiveness and on a moment's notice in defence of North America and its people and resources. It contains as well the power to retaliate against aggressors.
For this purpose the agreement puts these forces under the operation of a single joint headquarters, of which the senior official is a United States air force general and his deputy is a Canadian air marshal. I would point out this fact also. Just as some Canadian forces will operate under the control of a United States general, much larger United States forces for a considerable part of the time will operate under the control of the Canadian deputy commander. That fact was accepted in the United States as a reasonable feature of the agreement.
Recently I met with General Partridge, the commander in chief of NORAD and Air Marshal Slemon, the deputy commander in chief, together with the Minister of National Defence, and we were able to review the organization. We reviewed as well their problems and the plans they formulated to meet the changing circumstances, for as yet they are operating largely with the equipment, units and plans that were in existence when the joint headquarters took over. However, it will not be long before further developments will have to be considered in the

NORAD-Canada-XJ.S. Agreement light of the information and advice received from NORAD, and from the chiefs of staff to whom it reports.	.
I have seen these commanders. I was impressed with them, and I feel that the Canadian people and the people of the United States can have confidence in them. Over and over again they underlined the fact that the role of NORAD is defence, not attack; that its objective is defensive, not aggressive. It will not and cannot start wars. It can come into action only if potential aggressors are over our territory. That fact will be ascertained with the help of warning lines such as the D.E.W. line and the mid-Canada line, and also by the use of these radar communication bases. All this equipment and manpower must be kept in instant readiness. Let there be no mistake about that fact.
Somebody may say to me, "Well, we will be propelled into a war by the action of some commander". I went into this matter in great detail. I am not going to reveal anything that is top secret, but I am going to set forth what will happen in the event that the Canadian air officer at St. Hubert sees a situation developing that indicates not a mistaken destination on the part of an individual aircraft or a group of aircraft but that all may not be well. When he sees a situation developing that indicates that all may not be well he immediately acts under the rules of engagement to which I am going to refer in detail, which rules are so drafted and drawn as to remove, within the element of human ingenuity, the possible danger of war being brought about through the careless or indifferent action of one or other of the commanders.
Everything is subject to the rules of engagement. In 1951 those rules were determined when Canada was operating its air force under its own command and under its own direction without that unity which prevails today. Detailed authority was given for the rules of engagement, and those rules were accepted and adopted by the former government. Every one of those rules is in effect today, which means that in so far as the commencement of any action may be concerned the directions to that end, as they affect the Royal Canadian Air Force, will be in pursuance of the rules of engagement of 1951. In other words it will be a Canadian at St. Hubert who will give the initial directions to Canadians to meet a situation which, in the opinion of both those at St. Hubert and those at Colorado Springs, with the whole picture of North America before them, is of such a nature as to arouse suspicion.
Those rules were arrived at in 1951 and summarized in the house on December 5 by the then minister of national defence at page
1899 and 1900 of Hansard, when he gave a general indication of their nature. They are extensive and provide for almost every exigency; we believe they provide for every eventuality which could possibly occur at any time. The Canadian regulations were considered and approved by the cabinet defence committee on December 12, 1951 and were reported to and approved by the cabinet later in that same month. This matter again received attention in 1957, and for the benefit of hon. members, I would point out that is was published in R.C.A.F. orders on June 15, 1957.
I will now give to the house some indication of the nature of the authority to intercept and engage hostile aircraft:
It is necessary to take steps to prevent hostile aircraft flying over Canada in the period prior to a formal declaration of war or the declaration of a national emergency. For this reason it is desirable for the air defence commander to have powers to intercept unidentified aircraft and, under certain conditions, to engage them with fighters or antiaircraft artillery.
The purpose of this directive is to lay down the powers of the air defence commander and the extent and conditions under which he may delegate these powers.
Although it is necessary to ensure that any unfriendly aircraft entering certain areas of Canada is identified, it is also necessary to infringe as little as possible upon the operational freedom of civil aviation. Fighter interception should, therefore, be carried out only after all other methods have failed to establish identification.
That is the introduction, that is the purpose, that is the objective. Now, what are the powers of the air defence commander? The following are to be his powers prior to declaration of war or of a national emergency:
(a)	He may authorize the interception of aircraft in order to establish identification if other methods of obtaining identification have failed.
(b)	If the aircraft is identified as hostile by its appearance, or because it perpetrates a hostile act, or if its pattern of behaviour is sufficiently suspicious to justify a belief that it has hostile intentions, the air defence commander may authorize its engagement by fighters or anti-aircraft artillery.
(c)	If the aircraft cannot be identified by any means whatever, the air defence commander may, if circumstances warrant, authorize action to force the aircraft to land, or engage it with fighter or anti-aircraft artillery.
In all cases I am referring to the air defence commander who is a Canadian at St. Hubert in the province of Quebec. Responsibility is given to the air defence commander, under certain circumstances which determine the course of action and permit a decision, to engage any aircraft which appears to be hostile or which cannot be identified by any means; and the circumstances under which authority to order such action may be delegated by the air defence commander, which course must be determined


after consideration of many factors including the following: (a) the international situation;
(b)	the capability of the defence system for detecting and recognizing hostile aircraft;
(c)	the degree of importance of the target area threatened; (d) the standard of recognition training of the units; (e) the amount of control exercised over, and the amount of information available on, movements of friendly aircraft.
There follow provisions for all the precautions which have to be taken; and in order to make the assurance doubly certain that nobody is going to act in a detrimental way, a definition is given of a hostile act as follows:
(a)	An attack on friendly personnel, ground targets, ships or aircraft, with bombs, rockets or other weapons.
(b)	The opening of bomb-bay doors when the aircraft is approaching a vital area.
(c)	The dropping of parachutists greater in number than the crew of a similar type of friendly aircraft.
(d)	Mine-laying operations.
This list is not to be regarded as comprehensive and may be modified as circumstances warrant.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Would the Prime Minister mind identifying that document?


John George Diefenbaker: Oh, yes. As a matter of fact it is the authority to intercept and engage hostile aircraft dated November, 1951 and, as I said a moment ago, it is a document which was approved after having been passed by the defence committee of the then cabinet.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Would the Prime Minister table the document?


John George Diefenbaker: Oh, yes; I will be very glad to do so with the permission of the house.


Mr. Speaker:: Has the Prime Minister permission to table this document? I take it he is merely tabling the document, and not asking that it be incorporated in Hansard.


John George Diefenbaker: Whatever my hon. friend would like.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Tabling it would be sufficient, thank you.


John George Diefenbaker: My hon. friend has said he would like it to be tabled and there may be some consideration given later to incorporating it in the record; but if my friend says tabling is sufficient at this time that is what we will do.
I have mentioned these arrangements because they indicate, in a way which no equivocation can circumvent, that these provisions now effective under NORAD represent the quintessence of consideration
10, 1958	997
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement by those who now sit opposite and by the chiefs of staff. More even than that, the existence of the present collaboration under NORAD represents Canada's position in so far as Canadian aircraft and airmen are concerned, and thereby assures that the instruction then given, and embodied in the document I have tabled, represent the present position of Canadians under NORAD.
One cannot go further than that in maintaining the assurance that no precipitate action will be taken which would in any way endanger the peace of the world or of North America. In each case the rules of engagement which I have mentioned apply. I think the acceptance of these principles indicates the degree to which there has been that support of co-operation between the United States and Canada in defence which take full cognizance of Canada in every way.
I have pointed out, first, that the rules are just the same as they were before NORAD was entered into, and, second, that the plans for NORAD had been laid and carefully made, and required only the event of June 10 to assure their implementation.
Now, Mr. Speaker, because these air defence operations as contemplated under NORAD are purely defensive and will be over our territory, no war can be started by anyone connected with North American defence. Air defence commanders have been given adequate authority and instructions in advance, as I have said, in that document. Should the awful possibility occur and an attack be launched on North America it is necessary to give to the air defence commanders an authority which had already rested in our own commanders and which still rests there until actual hostilities begin.
The rules of engagements provide the authority and the special circumstances and manner in which they may be delegated to and exercised by subordinate officers. On the other hand, if an attack comes, if any of these hostile acts are actually committed, no one will say that any control-any civilian or political control-would in any way alter the inevitable. But when an attack is launched the provision is that the commanders will inform their governments immediately, having already taken those preliminary steps under the authority coming within the ambit of those regulations. From then on the two nations will have to make the decisions that are necessary. What we have done under this agreement is to provide for our defence without diminishing our determination for peace.
The ability to decide quickly, in agreement with our allies, requires close and frequent consultation. That is taking place, and I will

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement go no further than to say that the present provision for consultation makes consultation almost instantaneous. The consultation will continue throughout the days of peace which, we hope, lie ahead, and will also be available at all times if a crisis occurs. That is why the importance of consultation is written into the agreement, and why it is stressed over and over again.
With regard to the substance of air defence and its problems or policies, I have already said that the Minister of National Defence will deal with this question.
I have already mentioned the NATO aspects of NORAD. We in this country regard our forces in Canada as forces maintained for the purposes of NATO. Indeed, there has been recognition of that in the discussions that have taken place, in the consideration that has been given to this matter, and in the regular reports. We are partners under this agreement in North America because we are in NATO and because of our relative geographical position.
Some there are who feel that NATO is directed entirely to the defence of Europe. It should be recalled that there are substantial defence obligations outside of NATO in many parts of the world, and that NATO maintains forces in North America for this purpose too. NORAD is the nearest thing to a joint United States-Canadian headquarters established by the two governments acting through their chiefs of staff in accordance with the agreement recorded in the exchange of notes, coupled with the detailed terms of reference which cannot be published, because to do so would furnish military information of value. I know the Leader of the Opposition would be the first to say that such information should not be given.
All the NATO countries have been fully informed of NORAD's establishment. NORAD will keep the NATO military authorities informed of its activities by means of reports, and-I want to add this, and emphasize this-it will act at all times in accordance with the strategic objectives of the NATO council. It will do so under the authority of the organization to which I referred earlier -the Canada-United States regional planning group-and under the direction of the United States and Canadian governments.
Read those letters which were exchanged and you will find this; that NORAD is part of the NATO concept; that it is in Canada's interest within the alliance to regard it as such. But were it so characterized or not- and as to that it would be no advantage to determine in the years ahead-it represents thj achievement of the purposes and objectives to which the Leader of the Opposition

pointed in the speech to which I referred at the beginning of my remarks.
There is one other matter to which I should like to refer. I should like to point out that NORAD is not part of the strategic air command, which is the deterrent striking force of the United States. They operate under different organizations and for very different purposes, although both have the vital responsibility of protecting the SAC bases, and because of the need of that unity in our objectives, the maintenance of peace and of the lives and property of the people on this continent.
In concluding, I wish to announce a further development aside from NORAD, except in so far as NORAD and the strategic air command are joined together to protect the SAC bases, in co-operation, extended by Canada and Canadian forces to the strategic air command in order to strengthen the deterrent power of the free world as a whole. This development relates to a further strengthening of the deterrent to aggression. The Minister of National Defence informed the house on November 27, 1957, and again on January 10 of this year, that United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons are permitted to overfly Canadian territory from time to time but that each flight is given specific Canadian government clearance. I referred to that fact again on June 3. That course of action has been followed for almost seven years. In granting this permission Canada has been assisting in the continuing development of the strategic counter-offensive capability of the free world.
As a result of discussion with the United States government extending over more than a year the Canadian government has decided to co-operate in a further strengthening of the readiness capability of the United States strategic air command which, I think it will be generally agreed, constitutes the free world's main deterrent against aggression. The house will realize that the interests of national security impose certain restrictions, and I wish to say that the Canadian government has decided to permit the establishment of facilities at certain Canadian bases for use by tanker aircraft of the strategic air command. These refueling facilities will contribute to the effectiveness of the strategic air command, to its ability to react quickly in face of the reduced time of warning which must now be contemplated in the event of aggression by reason of the recent scientific and technological developments. These facilities will be used obviously in peacetime on a reduced basis but will be capable of immediate expansion under emergency conditions. The two governments are about to

complete a formal agreement on the conditions which will govern the form and use of those facilities, and the agreement will be tabled subsequently in this house.
As I informed the house on November 13, 1957, one of the great NATO objectives of the Canada-United States region is to provide an effective base and effective protection for the strategic nuclear counter-offensive capabilities until some sure guarantee against surprise attack can be achieved by international agreement. The nuclear deterrent must be preserved and effective deterrence depends on the instant readiness and availability to deter. I have indicated in correspondence with Mr. Khrushchev Canada's willingness to co-operate in a system of inspection of the Arctic region which would provide assurance against the fear of surprise attack, and Canada's readiness to bring about conditions in which the need for defence measures would be lessened. The aim and purpose of that suggestion has not received the favourable consideration of the Soviet government.
I said when I spoke on that occasion that the defence measures we have taken alone or in concert with friendly countries are the result of a conviction that such measures are necessary. The NORAD agreement is not concerned with the capabilities of the United States strategic air command. The commander-in-chief and the deputy commander of NORAD are responsible only for the air defence of Canada and the United States. There is a relationship, of course, between our defence and the retaliatory capability which will reside in North America. The strategic air command relies on the early warning system which is maintained by NORAD to alert those forces. We believe that our defence must be strong enough to make it highly unlikely that a successful attack can be made on North America's strategic counter-offensive forces. Pure defence, therefore, is an important element in the deterrent. We believe that that defence is materially strengthened by the establishment of NORAD.
X wish to re-emphasize what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said on May 19, that there is a determination, both here and in Washington, to ensure that consultations on matters affecting the joint defence of Canada and the United States take place continually but these naturally will be intensified in times of emergency. It cannot be overlooked that the advantages of surprise lie with the aggressor and that therefore the time available for consultation in an emergency may be very short. To that end we believe that every precaution must be taken to ensure that the Canadian govern-
10, 1958	ggg
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement ment is consulted concerning circumstances which could conceivably lead to this country being committed to war, and also to ensure the maintenance and preservation of our joint co-operation to the end that we shall, as a result of the achievement of this agreement,-again, as I said a moment ago, without the loss of the sovereignty in our country- be joined together for our preservation and the maintenance of those things which are our common heritage in this country.
To summarize, under this agreement the Canadian forces and the forces of our NATO allies operate in consultation and co-operation. Canadian air force personnel will not initially act under any other directions than those now in existence in the establishment of the air force headquarters to that end at St. Hubert. Our defence arrangements and allocation of forces to NORAD will be reported to NATO through the regional planning group. The maintenance of control and the assurance of the preservation of the concept that the military forces are at all times subject to and under the control of the representatives of the people will be maintained.
With respect to other matters that may arise during the course of the debate, I will reserve an answer to them and will not answer them by anticipation. I believe that these plans, as evidenced by the exchange of notes, are another step along the road to the assurance of our survival and the maintenance of our freedom. We know that the drain on our economies in the free world in consequence of maintaining our necessary defence forces is terrible to contemplate. For that reason we in common with all of the nations of the free world are determined to continue to work for the assurance of a peaceful future. We believe that our purpose should be in the emergency today that these things which are necessary to assure that freedom shall be maintained while continuing at the same time every effort to bring about a diminution in that feeling today that holds the heart and soul of mankind in a state of fear. To that end I offer this motion to the house hoping that it will receive that approval which is in keeping with our responsibilities as a nation, the maintenance of our traditions and, above all, our destiny.
Hon. L. B. Pearson (Leader of the
Opposilion): Mr. Speaker, in rising to say a few words on the resolution introduced by the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) I am very conscious of the importance of the matters we are discussing and of the desirability, indeed the necessity, for every member of the house wherever he may sit to exercise a sense of responsibility in respect

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement of the discussion. The Prime Minister indicated at the opening of his remarks that in this house over the years we have tried to maintain a maximum amount of unity in matters of defence and foreign policy. He went a little further, if I remember him aright, and said that on all occasions when we were in power the opposition of that day had supported the government on these major questions of foreign policy in an effort to maintain that unity.
I think those were the remarks he made and as he made them I could not but help but remember that while the record of co-operation over the years in my opinion has been praiseworthy on both sides and while we have managed to maintain a good deal of unity in foreign affairs and defence there certainly was one occasion when that unity was not maintained and when the government of the day was very bitterly criticized and attacked in respect of its policy on the Suez issue. I make that reservation as to what the Prime Minister said with regard to the invariable practice of support which the government of those days received.
But I agree it is important to try to keep the house united on these matters and on this particular issue of continental defence there should not be any division between the parties. Indeed perhaps there would not have been any necessity for a debate of this kind if we had heard many months ago the kind of detailed statement about what NORAD meant and the arrangements that were being made under NORAD that we received this afternoon, and if this discussion required any justification I suggest that the statement of the Prime Minister does provide that justification. But even without the Prime Minister's intervention there is no need for any member on this side of the house to try to explain why a resolution of this kind is required because, as the Prime Minister himself has said, in this resolution we are dealing with the matter of air defence which is, to quote his own words, "one of transcendent importance." If an agreement of this kind deals, as it does, with a matter of transcendent importance, surely such an agreement should be put before the house in the form of a resolution for discussion and decision.
The Prime Minister said that, strictly speaking, that is not necessary in law and that is quite true. That is the \egal statement of the case. But it has become a convention of our constitution-the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) will deal with this in more detail-that every intergovernmental arrangement of importance be submitted to the house for this kind of discussion, especially if it involves any commitment or imposes any obligations on our

country, as this agreement and the arrangements thereunder undoubtedly do. So far as we are concerned, and I think I can speak for all members of my party, our devotion to the idea of collective security is not at stake in a discussion of this kind, nor are we concerned with some slight loss of sovereignty in the interest of our security.
The Prime Minister said, and I agree with him, that we have already given up sovereignty in signing the NATO pact, which pact, after discussion and decision of parliament, required us to participate in NATO defence activities in Europe. I have said many times and my view has not changed that I for one have no possible doubt about the wisdom not so much of surrendering sovereignty but of making our sovereignty work for us, work for our security by pooling our sovereign power with our friends so that we can build up enough collective strength that no one will dare to break the peace.
Therefore the matter that has worried us in connection with this arrangement and agreement has not arisen out of any doubt we may have as to the desirability of continental defence rather than national defence of the North American continent, nor out of any doubt in our minds about the desirability of a collective arrangement; our doubts have arisen over the procedures which were followed in bringing this arrangement into operation. This debate was requested by us so that the doubts, ambiguities, confusions and contradictions in regard to these procedures, in regard to the meaning of what has been done, should be cleared up. If the debate will do that I think it will also have abundantly justified its purpose.
The Prime Minister's statement has undoubtedly clarified some of these points but it has also raised some new and very important points. I am sure that all members of the house heard with the greatest possible interest his announcement that another agreement had been reached between the governments of Canada and the United States in connection with co-operation between our air force and the strategic air force in the interest of our joint security. He indicated that the agreement covering this matter will be tabled and that we will then have a chance to ascertain its exact nature. In so far as that agreement helps to provide for our joint security and by so doing helps to maintain peace it should, I hope, receive the unanimous support of all members of the house.
Indeed, the intergovernmental agreement referred to in the resolution is not objected to by us. As I have said, it is the manner in which the agreement was brought into being that we have questioned and will question in

the course of the discussion. It is true that when the request was made the other day for a debate of this kind on this specific subject, to be brought before the house in the form of a resolution and not as part of the speech from the throne debate, the Prime Minister suggested that we desired to have such a debate-I am not misquoting him, I think-to show our opposition to the exchange of notes.
He welcomed it because, as he said at page 243 of Hansard, we would find out from this kind of debate exactly where the members on this side of the house stood. It is quite clear where we stand. We have not asked for this discussion, in order to show our opposition to the proposed agreement on continental defence, not at all. We have asked for this debate so we could find out exactly what was involved in this agreement and the manner in which these notes were exchanged. Only after we receive that kind of information can the house make the decision which it should make in the light of the facts.
I would suggest that a discussion of this kind could have two other advantages. If this is a good agreement, made within the spirit of NATO and embodying the principle of collective defence and strengthening the idea of collective security, then there are advantages to having parliament formally declare its support for this agreement and not to allow the matter to be left in the confused condition in which it has been for a good many months. The other advantage is that that confusion will be cleared up, in part at least, by the discussion we will have this afternoon.


Mr. Green:: Of course, you caused the most of it.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I hope that this afternoon I shall be able to convince even my hon. friend that the source of the confusion, the contradiction and the ineptness with which this matter has been handled has been on the other side of the house. The way in which this matter has been handled since the first press conference last August when the announcement was made to the people of this country might be characterized, if we were not dealing with such an important matter, as a comedy of confusion and contradiction. Perhaps the high point was reached the other day in the other place when the leader there, in answer to a question, did not recognize that the agreement had even been tabled.
Now having criticized the government for the procedure which was followed or lack of procedure which was followed, what should have been done? In trying to answer that 57071-3-64
10, 1958
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement question I hope to deal with some of the matters raised by my hon. friend when he discussed the procedure which was followed by the previous government in connection with this matter up to June 10, the anniversary of which date my hon. friends are celebrating with such great and understandable enthusiasm this afternoon. Surely the right procedure, and the one which has been normally followed over recent years in regard to matters of this kind, was to have had an arrangement of this importance considered by the cabinet defence committee. The Prime Minister has underlined the importance of the arrangement this afternoon. He has made us more aware than we ever were before of the importance of this arrangement, especially by the document he tabled and read to the house.
Surely, therefore, the proper procedure would have been for the cabinet defence committee of the Canadian government to have given consideration to it. Then after consideration by the cabinet defence committee the matter should have come before the full cabinet for decision. Then an agreement between the governments of the United States and Canada, embodying the principles under which this headquarters should act, should have been signed. After the agreement was signed between the two governments it should have been tabled in the House of Commons to afford the kind of discussion and decision which we will be taking this afternoon. After these steps had been taken NORAD should have been put into operation. This was the procedure followed in regard to the original North Atlantic pact, and in regard to our sending under that pact of forces to Europe.
However, this procedure was not followed in the case of NORAD. We know now what was done. NORAD was set up at once. The Prime Minister, indeed, has indicated this afternoon that after one discussion in the cabinet an order in council was passed immediately merely appointing a Canadian air marshal as the deputy commander of NORAD and fixing-this was the only concrete bit of information in that order in council-his salary. This was all that was done last August. Then there was a press conference during which the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes) announced this important development to the world; that is all we were permitted to know about it until we raised the question in the house last autumn.
It has been stated, indeed it was stated by the Prime Minister this afternoon, that the arrangement reached last summer was a provisional arrangement, an interim arrangement. But there was no mention of the interim or provisional character of this arrangement when the statement regarding the

NORAD-Canada-XJ.S. Agreement setup of NORAD was first made. The press release at that time merely stated that through NORAD, this new headquarters, joint plans of procedure would be worked out in peacetime for immediate use in an emergency. The word "emergency" was used.
I feel, therefore, we are justified in saying, as we have said more than once in this House of Commons since last summer, that this arrangement was brought hastily into existence and that there was no indication at that time that there would be an opportunity for the kind of discussion concerning it which we are, at last, having this afternoon. One asks oneself, why this haste? There was no special emergency at the time the arrangement was made. The arrangement for co-operation in regard to air defence between the air forces of the two countries was working very effectively. This afternoon the Prime Minister indicated that, in so far as the Canadian side of this arrangement is concerned, it is merely being taken over by NORAD. If I understood him correctly, it will continue to be exercised by the R.C.A.F. until an actual decision is made that hostilities have begun. If these arrangements which have been working effectively over the years were working all right last summer, there was no justification for the kind of haste, the kind of sloppy procedure which was adopted in respect of this very important matter.
Then there were some new developments which, far from justifying the haste which was shown, might have warranted more careful consideration and perhaps some delay. I am wondering, therefore, whether the original decision made last summer to establish NORAD did take into account the entirely new strategic situation created by the intercontinental ballistic missile.
The Prime Minister made an important point this afternoon, in explaining his procedure, of the allegation that the previous government had, in fact, considered this arrangement and that they were on the point of giving formal governmental agreement to it; that they were only prevented from doing that by the approach of a general election.


John George Diefenbaker: Only encouraged.


Lester Bowles Pearson: This was the inference
which one must draw from his observations, that if the result of that election had been different and the government had been returned, approval would have been given almost automatically to this arrangement which had really been decided upon before the election. There does not happen to be any validity whatever in that reasoning; not the slightest. I shall explain why. Naturally, I know something about the original discussions concerning this kind of arrangement.


I know that in national defence they were discussing the integration of air defence headquarters over months and over years with their opposite numbers in Washington. I know that officials of the Department of External Affairs were asked to attend these preliminary official discussions. But I also know-perhaps the Prime Minister does not know it and perhaps he should be informed of it-that this matter was never considered by the Canadian cabinet in any way, shape or form at any time before June 10.


John George Diefenbaker: Would the hon. gentleman allow me to ask a question?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes.


John George Diefenbaker: He was a member of the defence committee. Did that matter not get determined by the defence committee? His name is given, I understand, as one present on that occasion. I am just wondering whether he took any part in it.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I can easily answer that question. I do not think I am violating my oath as a Privy Councillor in attempting to answer it. I was present I think at all of the cabinet defence committee meetings of that time. There was no discussion in the cabinet defence committee of the North American air defence agreement at any meeting. The matter was put on the agenda by the Department of National Defence. It was not discussed. The reason why it was not discussed was indeed a very good one. There was in truth an election in the offing. I just wonder what my right hon. friends would have said if, with an election campaign beginning and with ministers scattered all over the country, the quorum of ministers in Ottawa had agreed to an arrangement of this importance on the very eve of an election. That was the main reason, of course, why the matter was postponed. We exercised a sense of responsibility which I hope my right hon. friend would have shown in the circumstances and we did not take action-we did not even discuss taking action-on the eve of an election. The Prime Minister shakes his head. However, I happen to have been present at these meetings and I know that this matter was not discussed by any cabinet committee or by the cabinet as a whole. Therefore to suggest that in all but name it had been approved by the previous government is not in accordance with the facts.
Another reason why it was not considered at that time is this. Even a cursory glance- and I think probably I was the only minister apart from the minister of national defence who even had a chance to know what was going on-at the documents, and that is all I had, was an indication of their importance.

I should like to think-and I think I have some evidence to make the statement-that if this matter had come before us after the election we would have acted in the way that I have suggested; we would have given this document the kind of consideration to which it was entitled; we would have worked out with the United States an agreement based on it and we would have brought the agreement to parliament before NORAD was set up, especially in view of the fact there was no emergency, as we saw it, which required this change at that particular time. Indeed, there had been developments in the field of air defence, arising out of ballistic missiles, which counselled caution and counselled the most careful kind of consideration. I suggest to my right hon. friend that this agreement did not get that kind of consideration at the meeting that he called to consider the matter.
Then the other reason given for acting in the way in which the government acted was that this is merely an extension of NATO, that it was a NATO agreement, that it was already provided for in NATO. I will come back to that matter a little bit later because I shall have something to say about it in detail. I also have the same books, the same charts and the same maps that my right hon. friend mentioned in the house this afternoon. I also have one or two other documents.
Whatever should have been done, the fact is that after NORAD was set up by an order in council appointing one of our air marshals as deputy commander and establishing his salary, then the government went to work to negotiate-I do not know whether or not this was an afterthought-an agreement with the United States government. The matter certainly had been brought into the House of Commons. There was every indication, certainly on the part of the opposition, that an agreement of that much importance would be very wrong indeed without that kind of governmental understanding behind it, namely an exchange of signed notes between representatives of the two governments. So last summer or last autumn negotiations began for the conclusion of this exchange of letters.
I cannot help but wonder-and I have had some experience in negotiating these documents-why it took ten months or almost ten months, I think it was, to negotiate an exchange of notes of the character of those which we have before us today in connection with this resolution. I cannot understand why the government initially refused our very reasonable request to submit this exchange of notes to parliament for consideration. It seemed to me to De a rather strange procedure that when this exchange of notes was finally signed it was tabled in this house 57071-3-641
10, 1958
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement as part of a speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) on the address in reply to the speech from the throne and that in that tabling no parliamentary approval was sought. Indeed when we brought this question up at that time as to whether there would be such a discussion and approval we were told that would not be done because it was not necessary, because it was part of the North Atlantic Treaty Pact.
Hence 1 come back to this particular argument concerning which the Prime Minister had so much to say this afternoon. There is no difference of opinion between us on the fact that NORAD has undoubtedly a connection with NATO. There is no question about that. Every military arrangement by two NATO governments or three or five NATO governments must have some connection with NATO because of article 5 and article 3 of the NATO pact which my right hon. friend quoted. There is no argument about that matter at all. But my hon. friends opposite went much farther than that. For some reason or other-perhaps to obscure the bilateral character of the agreement; perhaps because they were a little bit sensitive about the reaction in the country to the placing of part of the R.C.A.F. under a United States commander; or perhaps for some other reason-they went out of their way to emphasize that this headquarters was an integral part of NATO because it was made responsible to the Canadian and United States chiefs of staff who, in their turn, wearing different hats, are the Canada-United States regional planning group of NATO. However, the effort to create the impression that NORAD was a part of NATO in that organizational sense is not likely to succeed. Indeed, the Minister of National Defence went rather far this last November when he indicated that this combined headquarters and the forces under it were a NATO force. If you refer to the agreement itself you will find this paragraph:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States regional planning group of arrangements for the air defence of North America.
It states that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be kept informed of these arrangements. That is not the important part of the connection between the command and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; it is in the sense of responsibility to and authority from NATO headquarters that NORAD has no organic connection with NATO at all. The commander and the deputy commander were not appointed by any NATO agency; they have no authority under NATO and they are not responsible to NATO, and

NORAD-Canada-V.S. Agreement in that sense to attempt to assimilate their positions with those of the commanders of NATO commands is wrong and that attempt, of course, must break down.
As a matter of fact I wish this North American air defence command were under a NATO command, and I suggest to the government that perhaps this is something which might be investigated at a meeting of the North Atlantic council. It is certainly not now under a NATO command. General Partridge has no responsibility to NATO of any kind, and he has indicated that this is the position in some of the public statements he has made. He takes no orders from NATO as the NATO commanders take orders; he does not necessarily accept the policy laid down by NATO or by SACEUR and SAC-LANT and if there is any doubt at all on this matter that doubt must have been removed by a witness of unimpeachable information and objectivity, the secretary general of NATO himself.
I would like to quote, not from the press statement, because the Prime Minister has already intimated that the press report must have misinterpreted what Mr. Spaak said at his press conference, but from the verbatim record taken by tape recorder at this press conference, a record which I might say I did not get from any Canadian source but from Mr. Spaak's office. The questions as taken down on the tape recorder were as follows:
Q. Mr. Spaak, you said just now that NATO was looking with interest at NORAD. Do you consider NORAD part of NATO?
A. No, it is not under the command of NATO.
Q. Do you think of it as an extension of NATO?
A. Well, we are very interested in it but NORAD is not under the command of NATO. I think it is a very good experiment.
That is the verdict of the secretary general of NATO on the relationship between NORAD and NATO and surely there should be no further effort made by anyone to attempt to confuse that relationship by endeavouring to establish a stronger connection between the two bodies than in fact exists.
That is the background; now what about the agreement itself which we are asked to approve? Like other hon. members I have had the opportunity and the time to study this agreement and I repeat what I said a few minutes ago, that having read it over and having regard to its vague character and its generalities it is really as it has been described, merely an agreement to agree to do something. It is not easy to make any analysis of it. I find it very difficult to understand why it should have taken two governments so long to agree on this agreement which was made public after March 31, 1958.
As I understand it, in this agreement-and these are perhaps questions which my hon.

friends opposite may clear up during the course of the debate, and I hope they will because I am going to venture to ask some questions on this agreement in the hope of obtaining such clarification-there is no answer to the question how and under what circumstances the authority of NORAD is to be exercised. The exact function of the headquarters and its relationship to the two governments is not clarified. Though I certainly have no wish to be dogmatic because this is a very important matter and I have not had a chance to examine the Prime Minister's words with the care they deserve. I am not at all sure that the Prime Minister's statement this afternoon gave that kind of clarification. Certainly I do not find it in the agreement itself and, after all, the agreement is the document which is binding between the governments.
The commander of NORAD, General Partridge-and his words have been quoted before-said last summer, "The President has given his approval to use, without reference to anyone, any weapon at our disposal if there is a hostile aircraft in the sky." As I read it, this agreement indicates that that is his position with the qualification contained in the words "without reference to anyone", because surely under this agreement he must get his authority from the two governments. Certainly if that is the statement of the present position, if that is the situation under which General Partridge is operating, then it does not correspond with previous declarations by government spokesmen which have already been placed on record. They have been put on record and they serve to show the confusion and contradiction which has been developing with respect to this matter. They certainly are one of the reasons for the kind of discussion which has become necessary today.
On November 7, 1957, as reported on page 850 of Hansard the Minister of National Defence said in this house, "I must emphasize the fact that General Partridge does not in any sense command any Canadian armed force" I find it very difficult to reconcile his statement with the terms of this agreement because the commander of NORAD certainly does exercise control over Canadian squadrons which have been placed under his command. According to one part of the agreement he exercises control over their planning and over operations apart from operations in an emergency. The Minister of National Defence, on November 5, 1957, at page 758 of Hansard said in this House of Commons that General Partridge, after consultation with the two governments, could commit either Canadian or United States forces in the defence of this country. After consultation with the

two governments, and that includes the Canadian government, he could commit either Canadian or United States forces in the defence of this country. If that is not exercising control, I do not know what is.
On November 6, the following day, at page 812 of Hansard, the Minister of National Defence is reported as saying that such consultation could be by telephone or by other means, and then a couple of weeks later, on November 22, the minister said in this house that there would be governmental consultations in the planning stage of NORAD and clearance-that was the word he used-with the Canadian government in the operational stage. Consultation in the planning stage and clearance in the operational stage. Those remarks may be found at page 1411 of Hansard of 1957.
I have read this exchange of notes in the hope that they might throw some light on these contradictory statements. I must confess that they do not throw very much light upon them because I cannot find anything to confirm that any such clearance is required or that any such clearance is possible in the case of a grave emergency. Yet the Prime Minister this afternoon argued-and I think I am being fair to him when I try to paraphrase what he said-that there is little if any danger of NORAD involving Canada in war because its function is purely that of detection and defence. This argument has been repeated by others.
It must of course be very much in all our minds-and I know I am dealing with a matter of almost transcendental importance, to use the Prime Minister's phrase-that with regard to action taken in defence, if there should be one mistake in intelligence or in detection, it could be fatal. I derived some reassurance this afternoon from the words of the Prime Minister when he read the document he tabled, indicating that the Canadian arrangements with regard to this matter drawn up some years ago, which were designed to prevent, as far as human intelligence can prevent them, anything of this kind happening, are still in existence. But that possibility always remains, and so I mention it to underline the importance-perhaps, the critical importance-of the functions we are giving to this headquarters.
There is another danger which must always emanate from a situation of that kind, and that is the danger that an excess of force might be used which would transform an incident into a catastrophy. So we are dealing with very important matters when we talk about the functions, duties and powers of the North American air defence command.
I would not suggest, however, that because there is this kind of risk-and there is bound
10, 1358
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement to be this kind of risk; we have it in Europe in the NATO forces-we should not set up a headquarters of this kind. But I think we had better face the possibility, and face it frankly, that when we commit our forces to an arrangement of this kind, whether national or international, there is always that possibility. The fact that we do face it may help to ensure that caution is taken in so far as it can be taken to see that the eventuality I have mentioned does not occur.
There is another aspect of NORAD-the Prime Minister has already mentioned it- which emphasizes its importance not only in the scheme of defence but also in the scheme of deterrence and retaliation. That is the relationship of NORAD to the United States strategic air force which is not under NATO, which has no connection with NATO, but which is the main instrument of deterrence in the hands of the NATO states along with the British strategic air force, and which remains, I am afraid, at the present time our strongest protection against attack until we can find something better. But on what basis of information does the United States strategic air force operate? On what basis of intelligence information would it act in retaliation as a deterrent force? Surely it would act on the information it gets through NORAD which is the agency set up for that purpose.
There is, therefore, a pretty close connection between these two organizations. While the strategic air command is completely outside our control it gives us, perhaps, a feeling of increased gravity and seriousness when we realize that an agency inside our control could in certain circumstances, because of its responsibility to the Canadian and United States governments, determine the action to be taken by the strategic air force. I hope those circumstances will never arrive.
It was in the light of that background that I examined this exchange of notes. Early in the documents it is stated that the co-ordination arrangements referred to in paragraph 2 of the note were not adequate because they did not provide for the authoritative control of all air weapons that must be employed in an attack. The question I wish to ask with regard to that is: do the present arrangements provide such authoritative control? I do not get an answer to that question from the agreement itself. The agreement merely states, and I am quoting from paragraph 3 on page 2, that conditions make it essential to have in existence in peacetime an organization including the weapons, facilities and command structure which could operate at the outset of hostilities in accordance with air defence plans approved in advance by governmental authorities.

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement
And so I ask another question: has this air defence plan yet been approved? I got the impression from the Prime Minister this afternoon that perhaps this had been done, that the defence plan had already been approved, because he went into the matter in some detail in outlining Canadian responsibilities in connection with it, and he emphasized that these responsibilities remained Canadian up to a certain point. But then I recalled that the Minister of National Defence when he answered a question put to him the other day about the visit of General Partridge and Air Marshal Slemon to Ottawa answered by saying:
No master plan will be approved as a result of the consultations which are now taking place . . . they are preliminary consultations only.
And yet the Minister of National Defence speaking last November said that a series of plans were now being drawn up, and I should like to ask which indication of policy is the more accurate; that the plans were being drawn up last November, or that the meeting which was held here last week give no final approval to any plans, as I assumed from the statement which the Minister of National Defence made earlier, would have been done.
I do not expect-and I do not think any hon. member of this house will expect-that we should be given details with regard to plans of this kind because that would certainly be a breach of security, but surely we have the right to some information as to the principles and procedures under which our air force would operate under such a plan. We have not yet been given that information. We are merely told that the "problem of the air defence of our two countries could best be met by delegating to an integrated headquarters the task of exercising operational control over the combat units of the national forces made available for the air defence of the two countries."
We do not know officially what these forces are, but they have given out a lot of information about this in Washington, information which has appeared in official records there and also in newspapers. To give some indication of the magnitude of the operations which would be under the control of NORAD it is stated that 200,000 Americans and Canadians serve in NORAD with 2,000 aircraft-


John George Diefenbaker: What is the hon. gentleman quoting from?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I am quoting from an article in the New York Times of January 22 written by Mr. Hanson Baldwin, in which Mr. Baldwin also stated, on information he got from

Washington, that the force consisted of 75 United States squadrons of 25 interceptor planes each, and that the R.C.A.F. had earmarked six squadrons for air defence under NORAD. And we do know, because we have received information to this effect from the Minister of National Defence himself, that under NORAD headquarters in Colorado there are only eight R.C.A.F. officers-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the Leader of the Opposition, but it being five o'clock the house will now proceed to the consideration of private and public bills.



PRIVATE BILLS


[Stage Direction]
Bill No. S-2, an act respecting the Protective Association of Canada.-Mr. Boivin.

Mr. M. D. Morton (Davenport) moved: the second reading of Bill No. S-3, respecting the Mercantile and General Reinsurance Company of Canada Limited.
He said: Perhaps hon. gentlemen would like a brief explanation as to the purpose of this bill. The company is seeking to increase its authorized capital from $1 million to $5 million. When the company was incorporated under the Companies Act of Canada in 1951, chapter 71 of that date, the authorized capital was $1 million. Since that time it has issued $750,000 worth of the capital and at the present time $250,000 remains unissued. However, the company has now received the consent of the foreign exchange board of England to transfer further funds to this country, $250,000 of which will be used to issue the remaining stock for which it has authorization.
In addition to the funds which have been raised through capital stock, the company has to date transferred $750,000 to a capital surplus account. An additional $250,000, which now has been authorized, will also be transferred to the same account. The company will then have taken up all of its authorized shares. In order to meet the further expansion that is expected by this company they require the authority of this house to increase their capital stock to $5 million.
This company is a reinsurance company only. It has increased its business substantially since 1951, and anticipates further expansion and would require the authority sought in this bill now before the house. I might say that, if there are any questions in respect of this bill which require more

technical answers, the company's officials will be available when the bill is before the committee.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, bill read the second time and referred to the standing committee on banking and commerce.


Mr. Speaker:: Since there are several
divorce bills standing for second reading, is it the wish of the house that all these bills be taken in one motion?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Mr. R. J. McCleave (Halifax) moved: that the following bills	be	read	the second time:Bill	No.	SD-1,	for	the	relief	of	Valija
Zvirgzds Kazaks.
Bill	No.	SD-2,	for	the	relief	of	Joyce
Florence Taylor Larman.
Bill No. SD-3, for the relief of Kathleen Margaret Coffin Barre.
Bill No. SD-4, for the relief of Freda Bernadette Godin Headland.
Bill	No.	SD-5,	for	the	relief	of	Bruno
Bedard.
Bill No. SD-6, for the relief of Stefania Sobol Wojtowicz.
Bill No. SD-7, for the relief of Elizabeth Antonie Hartmann Elstermann, otherwise known as Elizabeth Antonie Hartmann Von Elstermann.
Bill No. SD-8, for the relief of Ruth Ellen McMullin Gosnell.
Bill No. SD-9, for the relief of Beatrice Bellamy Drysdale Scott.
Bill No. SD-10, for the relief of John Ronald MacCuaig.
Bill No. SD-11, for the relief of Edith Ann Van Horne Beattie, otherwise known as Beverley Ann Van Horne Beattie.
Bill No. SD-12, for the relief of Constance Lilias Crawford Booth.
Bill No. SD-13, for the relief of Henry Krupa.
Bill No. SD-14, for the relief of Ferenc Tamas Kalman Laczko.


Erhart Regier: Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to delay the house more than a minute or so on this matter. I realize that there are other matters of greater public importance before the house and on the order paper that we ought to proceed with without any undue delay. However, since this is the first group of divorce bills that we are asked to approve in principle, I should like to place on the record once again the fact that the group to which
Canada Elections Act
I belong in this house does not approve of the passage of divorce bills by the House of Commons. We are opposed to the principle. We realize that circumstances being as they are, hardship would be imposed on individuals if we were to exercise our rights in this parliament and therefore at this time we do not choose to exercise those rights.
We do not intend to block these 14 bills. However, I would remind the house of the expressed desires of Conservative members of parliament, when they were on the benches of the opposition several years ago, that the government of the day would find a way by which parliament might be relieved of this responsibility. All I will do at this time is express the hope on behalf of our group that the new government is going to indicate that its members meant what they said and what their party members said several years ago, and that it will at a very early date find a way to eliminate the need for the House of Commons to be dealing with this rather regrettable business.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, bills read the second time and referred to the standing committee on miscellaneous private bills.


Frank Howard: the second reading of Bill No. C-8, to amend the Canada Elections Act.
He said: Mr. Speaker, in rising to move the second reading of this particular bill, as I did during the last parliament, I might say at the outset that the conditions and the reasons for resubmitting it have not changed, nor have the arguments in favour of supporting the bill changed. First, it must be read in conjunction with Bill No. C-7, which pertains to the Indian Act. They both deal with the question of the right of our native Indian people to vote in our federal elections.
In years past I have paid a great deal of attention to the rights of Indian peoples, both as they are affected by federal jurisdiction and the jurisdictions of the various provinces. In all of the thought that I have given to the matter and in all of the material that I have read and the arguments that I have heard, I found there is still no justifiable reason in existence today why native Indian people should not be given the unqualified right to vote in our federal elections.
There are a number of anomalies in the Canada Elections Act relating to the rights of those people to participate in federal elections and to have a say in the selection of members to come here to represent them.

Canada Elections Act
The self-same elections act which prohibits the right of native Indians to vote in federal elections within the 10 provinces also gives them the right to vote in federal elections in the two constituencies of Mackenzie River and the Yukon. In addition to that there are certain other circumstances which can permit a native Indian person to vote in a federal election: one, if he was in the armed forces or if the person is the spouse of someone who is in the armed forces, or if they sign a waiver form waiving their right to income tax exemption on moneys earned from the use of reserve land.
Taking the whole act there is one part which says that Indians cannot vote, another part which says they can vote without any strings attached, without any qualifications, without any abridgement of their aboriginal or hereditary rights, and other sections which say they can vote under certain circumstances. I hope the house will give favourable consideration to the bill. I hope it will not suffer the fate of other private members' bills both in this and past sessions.
I think we must look first at the action taken by various provinces with regard to giving native Indian people the right to vote. In British Columbia, the province from which I come, the native Indian people have been able to vote in provincial elections since 1949. In Manitoba they have been able to vote since 1954 and in Ontario since 1953. I do not believe there have ever been any restrictions on their right to vote in the provinces of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland.
I know there are a number of objections that can be raised to the house taking the action I am asking it to take by passing the bill. In anticipation of such objections I should like to deal with certain questions that may be in the minds of some hon. members. With regard to one objection which may be raised I should like to relate the experience we have had in the province of British Columbia. When the legislative assembly of that province undertook to give native Indian people the right to vote in provincial elections- incidentally, the first election in which they participated was that held in 1949-a great number of them were quite reluctant to have anything to do with the idea, either to register for voting or to vote. There were a number who were absolutely opposed to participating in provincial elections and refused to have anything to do with the idea. They feared that by voting in what they called a white man's election they would lose something.
It was fortunate so far as they were concerned that one of the C.C.F. members elected to the legislative assembly was a native

Indian, Frank Calder, the member for Atlin. When the native Indian people saw one of their own people participating in parliamentary debates and in the affairs of the provincial government they came to realize that they lost nothing by voting and began to participate more fully. Because they represented a group of voters and because during election campaigns candidates are interested in meeting the voters and learning about their problems, candidates representing all parties took more interest in and paid more attention to Indian affairs. The government paid more attention to their problems even though the government's power to do anything about them was limited because Indian affairs are largely under federal jurisdiction. But the government of British Columbia, the legislative assembly and the various parties paid more attention to the problems and affairs of the Indian people for the one reason, if for no other, that they were a group of voters. Consequently improvements have been made in the status of the Indian people of British Columbia primarily because they have the right to vote and select those who are going to represent them.
If they had the right to vote in federal elections precisely the same thing would happen. There would then be a greater tendency for the parties, the candidates and the government to look upon the native Indians as a group of people having certain problems, as people who might vote for a particular party or candidate. As a result more attention would be paid to their affairs than has been the case in the past.
There are three arguments used to indicate why the native Indian people should not have the right to vote. The first argument, and the one that is probably raised more often than others, is that many of them do not want to vote. It is said that many of them do not want to participate in governmental affairs, that they are violently opposed to elections and the white man's government, that they have their own form of government and do not recognize the government of Canada. There is also another group, constituting by far the majority, who just do not care one way or the other whether they get the right to vote. It does not bother them too much. There is also another group who say they want the right to vote and primarily, although not wholly, they are Indians who live in provinces where they can vote provincially and have seen the effect of their having the right to vote upon the attitude of the government towards them.
Let us deal with the group who are absolutely opposed to voting and want nothing to do with it. They fear that they will lose some

of their treaty of hereditary or aboriginal rights. Of course we know that they will not, and to make it even more specific and clear that is dealt with expressly in the bill. There is absolutely no problem as far as that group is concerned. If they do not want to vote they do not have to. Their position would be no different from that of certain religious and ethnic groups in Canada who for one reason or another do not want to vote in elections. They have the right to vote. The act does not prohibit them but they do not feel they want to. If the bill should pass our native Indian people who, for one reason or another, object to voting will be protected in every way possible. They will not have to participate.
Those who do not care one way or another whether they do or do not vote are in no different position from other Canadian citizens who do not care one way or the other whether they vote, who do not want to participate in federal elections and who do not see the benefit of helping to select members of parliament and the government in a direct way through exercising the franchise. That group will likewise be satisfied. The attitudes of all these groups of Indian people will not be interfered with. The passage of the bill will not upset their present position except to advance it.
I do not intend to say much more. As I said in my opening remarks, I hope the bill will not be subjected to the fate that has befallen other private member's bills during this and the last session. I know that many hon. members have ideas, opinions and attitudes on the matter. I also realize that for some strange reason there is a general reluctance on the part of the cabinet to indicate acceptance of a private member's bill. Consequently, what happens is that regardless of how acceptable the idea is to the government, in past years and apparently it is no different now, they would rather have the bill put to one side and then at some future date bring forth the idea and say, "Look how fine we are; here is another little plank from some other party's platform." In my view this matter is important to the welfare of our Indian people. It would be a first step towards assisting them and our people to appreciate and understand each other's ideas and cultures to a greater degree than we have in the past.
I would have no objection if a government member were to suggest that this bill be not now read a second time but that the subject matter be referred to the standing committee on privileges and elections. I would, of course, be most happy if the charming lady under whose jurisdiction this matter would come, although not directly, were to make such a motion. However, if some government 57071-3-65
Canada Elections Act
member would undertake to do this, it would not hurt my feelings one bit. I am only concerned with getting the subject matter dealt with in some fashion. If it goes to a committee where witnesses can come, where the Indian people can voice their attitude, where officials of the department or any other interested citizens can express their ideas, and then have that committee make a decision one way or the other, that would be quite agreeable to me. The important thing is that some action be taken towards giving native Indians the right to vote. Naturally, I am biased in favour of adopting that principle, and I hope some government member will undertake to have the subject dealt with by the committee on privileges and elections.


Mr. Erik Nielsen (Yukon):: Canada Elections Act
despite the passage of the amendment. May I suggest that section 3 of the bill does not protect those rights of these Indian people at whom the amendment is aimed. I should like to draw the attention of the house for a moment to the Indian Act itself. In this act the word "Indian" is defined as a person who pursuant to this act is registered as an Indian or is entitled to be registered as an Indian. The word "registered" means registered as an Indian in the Indian register. The "registrar" means the officer of the department who is in charge of the Indian register, and he is an officer of the Indian affairs branch. These definitions are most important in so far as this amendment is concerned.
Then, section 5 of the Indian Act sets forth that an Indian register shall be maintained. Section 11 of the act provides a definition of the persons entitled to be registered. Section 12 of the Indian Act sets forth those people who are not qualified to be registered and so would not fall within the definition of "Indian". We must remember that section 3 of this bill is aimed at protecting the rights of Indians as defined in the Indian Act. The following persons are not entitled to be registered according to subsection (1), paragraph (b):
A woman who is married to a person who is not an Indian.
Section 14 of the Indian Act states:
A woman who is a member of a band ceases to be a member of that band if she marries a person who is not a member of that band-
There are other words in that section which are not applicable to this debate. An Indian, in order to be entitled to be registered, must be a member of an Indian band. We therefore have the anomaly that despite the suggested amendment in section 3 of this bill the very people we are aiming to protect are not protected at all. If an Indian woman who is otherwise entitled to be registered as an Indian marries a white person, and that white person subsequently dies or divorces the Indian woman, that woman, although she is still an Indian, is now disqualified to be registered as a member of the band. She is betwixt and between.


Frank Howard: I wonder if the hon. member would permit a question?


Erik Nielsen: Certainly.


Frank Howard: Is the hon. member aware that the design behind section 3 is not to protect all the rights of these people but to ensure that they will not lose those rights by reason of the fact they have voted?


Erik Nielsen: I am quite aware of the intended purpose of section 3 but I still maintain, with great deference to the hon. member for Skeena, that the protection is not available to the married woman under the circumstances I have just outlined. Certainly something more must be done before any effect can be given to the proposed amendment, having regard to the present sections of the present Indian Act.
Those are the technical objections. I recall the debate that we had during the last session on the estimates. Some of the debate concerned the enfranchisement of the Indians. On January 14 this bill or one similar to it was introduced by the same hon. member. Harking back to my remarks concerning the advisability of seeking advice from representative bodies of the Indian people across Canada, I cannot help but refer to the remarks of the hon. member for Calgary South (Mr. Smith). In his remarks commencing at page 3314 of Hansard of January 14 he set forth that the organization concerned with caring for the rights of the Indian people of Alberta had gone on record as being against the proposed bill. I am sure the hon. member for Skeena would not want this house to force upon those people the proposed amendment if they were at all against it.


Frank Howard: That is precisely why I want it to go to a committee.


Erik Nielsen: Not being as familiar with procedure as is the hon. member for Skeena, I will leave that matter to some of the more experienced members of this house.


Frank Howard: The hon. member is very gracious.


Erik Nielsen: The other comment I have to make is this, and I make it with great deference to the hon. member for Skeena. Just before he sat down he repeated the remarks with which he closed his speech on January 14 in this same debate. As reported at page 3310 of Hansard he said this:
I do urge the government to indicate its desire to accept this particular bill and take the first step toward bringing our native Indian peoples in Canada up to a decent educational, cultural and economic standard.
This step itself will not achieve that end. Indeed, it is not the first step. In Yukon and the Northwest Territories experience has shown that simply granting the franchise to the Indian people does not accomplish any cultural, educational or other advancement. As a matter of fact, a good number of the people there still wonder what the franchise really is. A unique experience in that regard was my own at the community of Old Crow

in Yukon which had not had the franchise until the byelection in that riding on December 16 last. They did not know what went on here. They did not know what our purpose was. Yet because all Indian people in Yukon are entitled to vote, certainly the people of Old Crow should not have been left out. That is the basis on which we proceeded. While I am sure these people appreciated the privilege of becoming, in a sense, first-class citizens, in common with other Canadians, they still wonder.
If I may I should like to refer to some literature I have received in the mail within the last day or two. Perhaps other hon. members have received the same literature. I should like to direct hon. members' attention to two very fine publications concerning this whole problem of Indian acculturation prepared by the Oblate Fathers in Canada. One from which I should like to quote is entitled "Residential Education for Indian Acculturation". In keeping with the hon. member's remarks concerning the first step in this direction, the publication on page 47, where it is discussing American acculturation, sets forth the following:
What was taken away from the American Indians was not only the land, but a way of life which for centuries, had met their needs and satisfied their wants. No wonder that the Indian hearts were broken for generation after generation. As John Collier notes, "their community and family life was completely disrupted, their traditions were suppressed, in a word, everything that penetrates and affects the deepest spiritual strata of Indian culture".
If the house will bear with me, I should like to read one other quotation from this fine work:
Oppression and bullying to which the Indians have been subjected have wrecked their personalities and characters. This tragic story of Indian community life was summed up in the following way by an old chief of the Digger Indians from California: "In the beginning, God gave to every people a cup, a cup of clay, and from this cup they drank their life. They all dipped in the water, but their cups were different. Our cup is broken now. It has passed away."
This is from a people whose problems, I suggest, are quite similar to the problems of the Indian people here.
I therefore say that the passage of this bill is not a means of accomplishing the objective which is being attempted by the hon. member for Skeena and his group. The passage of this bill is not by any stretch of the imagination even the minutest step towards accomplishing any cultural, educational or other advancement of the Indian people. That problem is much more deep-rooted than that and it will not be solved by a simple amendment which will allow the Indian people to vote.
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Canada Elections Act
Before I conclude my remarks on the bill I might just mention that it was indeed gratifying to me-and I say this because of my sympathy with the objective which is intended to be accomplished by the hon. member for Skeena who introduced the bill -that the Indian people of Canada have at least now, for the first time in history, achieved representation in the sense that they now have a voice in the other place. This situation indeed is unique and it sets a precedent which undoubtedly will be carried on for all time to come.
With these few suggestions and these observations concerning the technical defects of the bill as it has been presented, I conclude my remarks. However, before I sit down I wish to re-emphasize that I for one am in full sympathy with the right of the Indian people to vote. I think it is their right to vote and that they should have it. I am sorry that I cannot agree with the hon. member for Skeena. I do not think that his proposed bill accomplishes that objective because it runs directly contra to circumstances which can arise and raise a conflict with the provisions of the present Indian Act. Certainly further amendments would have to be made to that act in order to cover all situations. It would be my recommendation that a study be made along that line.


Douglas Mason Fisher: I must object, Mr. Speaker, to what I think is rather specious reasoning on the part of the hon. member who just spoke. If the appointment of an Indian senator is giving the Indians some form of representation, is it not logical, with the relative powers of this place and the other place, that they should be given a chance to speak in this forum through their electoral vote? It seems fairly obvious to me.
The other point I wished to make was with respect to the generalization in his observations on the Yukon to the effect that the cultural advance spoken of by the hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Howard) did not apply. One can generalize like that when speaking for the Yukon if one happens to come from there, but I would like to point out, as a member from another part of our country which has a considerable number of Indians, that we have seen a very great deal of interest on the part of Indians in the question of voting. I would just like to conclude by giving a few figures which might appeal to the self-interest of the gentleman in the government party.


Erik Nielsen: Would the hon. member
permit me to make an explanation apropos of his remarks?

Canada Elections Act


Douglas Mason Fisher: Would you mind waiting until I finish mine? The government party is known as the party of free enterprise. You may wonder why I should bring this point into discussion but you will appreciate that free enterprise represents a point of view of life which accepts the belief that people act in their own self-interest. I think perhaps the overriding consideration is that this gives the dynamic of life to society. I would, however, like to suggest that this is not so because I have some figures with respect to the Ontario elections in 1955, in which province the Indian has a vote, which may condition the approach of some of the gentlemen in the government party to this piece of legislation. At Lansdowne House in the electoral district of Port Arthur almost all the population with the exception of about ten people are Indians. They voted, I would like the house to know, and the Liberals got three votes, the communists got three votes and the Conservative candidate got 132 votes-


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Douglas Mason Fisher: The C.C.F. got zero.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Douglas Mason Fisher: On the Pic R. Indian reserve the Liberal candidate got six votes, the communist candidate no votes, the Conservative candidate got 35 votes and I am glad to say there was a little C.C.F. strength there and we got 13 votes. At Long Lac reserve the Liberals got seven votes, the communists two, the Conservatives 74 and the C.C.F. seven votes.
These are just typical districts in the Port Arthur area and I am advancing these figures in an attempt to appeal to the self-interest of the members of the government party. If this amendment is passed, look at the treasure house of votes, potentially at least, in northern Ontario. I think this is something which merits consideration and, having in mind the very high ratio of Indians who vote, I think we may take it that they have indicated a considerable interest in political matters. Surely this belies the argument of the hon. member for Yukon (Mr. Nielsen) that the vote has very little effect.
I understand in the last election on March 31 that there were over 40 Indians lined up and desirous of voting at one of the polling booths in my constituency, and that they were very disappointed that they were not allowed to vote. They apparently took a very much more strict view of the elections act on that occasion and I suppose I was rather disappointed myself that they could not, for it Was the C.C.F. who managed to get them all down there.
The fact of the matter is that the Indians are interested in the vote and I think the members of the government party should support this bill in their own self-interest. This may seem a callous and cold argument but it seems to me that it is one which should appeal to the members of the party of free enterprise.


Erik Nielsen: By way of explanation, Mr. Speaker, my hon. friend obviously misinterpreted my remark when I referred to the representation of Indian people in the other place. I want to make quite certain that all members realize that I take the stand of being in favour of representation in this house for the Indian people. It is only right and proper that they should have such representation.
I am only saying that the bill as it now stands is bound to come in conflict with provisions of the Indian Act, and I have pointed out one set of circumstances where that possibility might arise. Therefore I do not think the hon. member could have understood my remarks. I say again, and I believe this, that the Indian people have the right to representation in this house, and the only way they will get that representation is by having the right to exercise their franchise at the polls, but this bill will not accomplish this end.


Mr. A. R. Smith (Calgary South):: Mr. Speaker, I intend to enter this debate for only a very few moments in order to express what is perhaps not a new thought but one point seems to have been overlooked in considering the entire aspect of this matter when the objections of the hon. members of the C.C.F. group have been answered by other hon. members.
I think it is usual that we begin a discussion of this nature by complimenting the mover of the bill and then proceeding to spend some 60 minutes in telling him what is wrong with it. This, of course, is the democratic process at its best. I am also delighted that the Indians have shown such a high sense of understanding of our political future by giving such great support to this party and so little support to members of the C.C.F. group in the election campaign.
It has been suggested that this bill and the similar bill which has been put forward to provide a right to a very fine group of our citizens constitute a step towards integration and that a privilege is being given to this group which has only been enjoyed by them in a few sections of Canada, while it has been refused them in other parts of the country as a result of circumstances which are well known to us.

I mentioned during the last session, the twenty-third parliament, that the Indians of the province in my constituency have expressed great concern over the right to vote. This concern has perhaps been expressed in a way which to some is not too clear as to its logic, but I have, for instance, heard it said that the Indian believes that when the white man gives an Indian a privilege the white man exacts a fair price from the Indian at some time in the future. That, of course, is not the point and certainly does not illustrate the attitude adopted by any Canadian government of recent times, but we must accept the fact that in certain areas of Canada today there are many Indians who still distrust any legislation which might possibly infringe or encroach upon some of the privileges granted to them in the past.
I suppose it will be said that this bill, because of its nature, will protect those rights and will therefore neutralize this argument and that no longer need this fear exist.
For this I compliment the hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Howard) in that I feel it is indeed a step forward, and that conceivably a committee of the house could examine this problem to determine what effects his bill might have on our Indian friend and his right to vote.
I would like to read to you a resolution which was passed by the Indians of my province, which has been endorsed by the Canadian bar association and supported by the association of the friends of the Indians. It reads in part:
That no section of the Indian Act should compel an Indian to become enfranchised without his consent and that no power to compel enfranchisement should exist in the minister. The threat of compulsory voting rights is presently holding back the progress of the development of the Indians and, therefore, any compulsory section should be removed.
I do not entirely subscribe to the full meaning of that resolution.


Douglas Mason Fisher: I do not understand what it means.


Arthur Smith: It is probably not understandable from where the hon. member sits, but I will send him a copy and perhaps educate him. However, I believe the point is well taken that there is still some doubt, some question, as to what future status the Indian would have. While a committee would have the benefit of examining the problem as a whole, I rather like the suggestion which has been made many times by the Indian association, that an independent body should be set up by the Department of Citizenship and Immigration to examine the different relationships of Indians in one area as opposed to another, because, after all, the
Canada Elections Act
Indians of eastern Canada have been exposed for some three generations or more to the white man's way of life. What we require in the province from which I come in a way of bringing about more integration and greater hope for the Indians is more assistance on the reserves and a better standard of education and then, eventually, a resolution or a bill of this nature would indeed, in my opinion, have greater meaning.
I close by suggesting that the better approach would be by way of having an independent body, whether a royal commission or not, examine the relative merits of legislation of this type and the effect, not just on one area but of all the ten Canadian provinces. I support most of the principles of the bill introduced by the hon. member for Skeena, but I suggest he is premature in introducing his measure at this time. However, I would heartily subscribe to some forward step being made on the basis of the suggestion I have offered.


Mr. Arnold Peters (Timiskaming):: Mr. Speaker, I think we have discussed a great many things this afternoon in relation to this bill which the hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Howard) did not have in mind, and which he certainly did not expect to be solved by this particular measure. All he is asking, as I understand it, is that the Indian be given the right to vote.
When we give the right to vote to any of our citizens we obviously do not say: you must vote. They are given the right to vote if they wish, and I think we are sufficiently adult to work out a method in the parliament of Canada by which that right can be given to the Indians, while at the same time depriving them of none of the rights which they presently enjoy by treaty or otherwise.
It is quite true, as one of the previous speakers has pointed out, that this bill does not solve all the economic problems of the Indians, nor will it bring about many of the other things which I am sure we all hope the Indians will accomplish in the near future. With this in view, I move, seconded by the hon. member for Kootenay West (Mr. Her-ridge):
That this bill be not now read a second time, but that the subject matter be referred to the standing committee on privileges and elections.


Mr. J. S. Speakman (Weiaskiwin):: Mr. Speaker, may I say that I am heartily in agreement with the comments made by the hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Howard) because I, too, feel that the privilege of voting in federal elections should be extended to the Indians who are, after all, the first Canadians.
10*14

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement
In my constituency lie two reserves, that of Hobbema, with a population in 1956 of 1,786 people-


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order. I regret to interrupt the hon. member, but I must read the motion before I permit him to carry on. It is moved by the hon. member for Timiskaming (Mr. Peters), seconded by the hon. member for Kootenay West (Mr. Her-ridge):
That the bill be not now read a second time but that the subject matter be referred to the standing committee on privileges and elections.


James Stanley Speakman: As I was saying, the population of Indians at Hobbema in 1956 was 1,786, and at Ma Me O, 1,230. Both these populations have increased since that time. On the two reserves there are between 50 and 60 veterans of the two world wars, all of whom, with their wives, have this voting privilege. In addition, these veterans share the privileges given to their people namely the right to treaty exemption from taxation in various forms, free educational facilities and, in the case of these two reserves, an income from oil royalties in connection with two very productive oil fields situated on the reserves.
For too long the Indian population of Canada has been sheltered and protected as wards of the crown until their desire to make decisions on their own is almost gone. However, with better education facilities-


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order. It being six o'clock I do now leave the chair.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Diefenbaker:
That It is expedient that the houses of parliament do approve an exchange of notes constituting an agreement between the government of Canada and the government of the United States of America concerning the organization and operation of the North American air defence command (NORAD) signed at Washington May 12. 1958, and that this house do approve the same.
Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, at five o'clock when the debate on this resolution was suspended I had been attempting to deal with the terms of the agreement that is before the house and also to deal with some of the observations that had been made by the Prime Minister, more particularly the suggestion by

him that the previous government had in fact in all but name approved the setting up of the North American air defence command. And while I hope I was able to prove that this was not the case, nevertheless, Mr. Speaker, even if that observation had been accurate it surely would have been a strange thing for an incoming government, and perhaps a touching indication of confidence in the preceding government, if it had accepted an important arrangement of this kind without the kind of consideration one would normally give to something that had been worked out by a previous government.
I also was trying to show that there is no foundation for the suggestion that NORAD is in any way, shape or form a NATO command; and also that while NORAD, as the Prime Minister said, is a purely defensive organization in its functions and in its scope, nevertheless by the relationship which it has to the strategic air command of the United States and by the information it can give to that command on which that command would act and only on that information, it has some very far-reaching functions indeed. In the kind of emergency which we hope will be avoided-NO RAD will, strictly speaking,- have far more than air defence functions.
Then, I was looking at the agreement itself and the principles which are outlined in it. I dealt with one or two of them and I come to page 3, which has this paragraph:
The two governments consider that the establishment of integrated air defence arrangements of the nature described increases the importance of the fullest possible consultation between the two governments on all matters affecting the joint defence of North America, and that defence co-operation between them can be worked out on a mutually satisfactory basis only if such consultation is regularly and consistently undertaken.
The Prime Minister referred to the necessity for such consultation this afternoon. I, of course, join other members of the house in agreeing that consultation between the two governments is now more important than ever in view of the integration of our air defence commands and I ask the government, had there not been such consultation before the signing of this agreement and have new procedures for consultation been worked out consequent upon this agreement, reflecting perhaps the increased necessity for that consultation. Could they enlighten the house as to what they are?
The next paragraph of this agreement outlines the principle that should govern the future organization and operations of the North American air defence command and the first principle, which is a very vital one, is that:
The commander in chief of NORAD will be responsible to the chiefs of staff committee of

Canada and the joint chiefs of staffs of the United States, who in turn are responsible to their respective governments.
That, certainly, should clear up a lot of the ambiguity and confusion which was created last autumn in the previous session as to the exact responsibility of the commander-in-chief of NORAD. He now, it is clear, according to this agreement, has dual responsibility and I assume, arising out of that dual responsibility, the commander-in-chief of NORAD will be approved by both governments to whom he is now responsible. I hope also it has been made clear to the commander-in-chief; that he has that dual responsibility and that he is in that sense as much a servant of the Canadian government as he is to the United States government. This applies also to the deputy commander. The deputy commander is a Canadian air marshal and he has been given greater responsibility I suppose because of his relation to this command than any Canadian air marshal ever had in peacetime because he has now in his hands not only a responsibility from his own government but responsibility from the United States government, something I suspect that no other Canadian commander ever had in peacetime.
This afternoon the Prime Minister said- and I think I remember his words accurately -that for a considerable part of the time NORAD will be under the command of a Canadian air marshal. This is a point that perhaps we have not sufficiently considered in our approach to this problem, the additional responsibility that a Canadian is taking on vis-a-vis the United States government, something I think unprecedented in our history. Then, the paragraph goes on to say that the commander-in-chief:
Will operate within a concept of air defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two governments.
Of course, we do not know-at least I do not know, and I do not think I secured the knowledge this afternoon from the Prime Minister's statement-what exactly that concept of air defence is. Perhaps we will get some clarification of that during the course of this discussion.


John George Diefenbaker: What was the concept that Mr. Campney had of it?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I am not called upon to tell the Prime Minister what was in the mind of a man who was minister of national defence in a previous government. My responsibility is as a member of that government and notwithstanding everything that the Prime Minister has said that government never gave consideration to NORAD or to the concept behind NORAD. If we had, we
10, 1958	1015
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement would have spent more than 20 or 30 minutes in one cabinet meeting on it, and given prior consideration by the defence committee of the cabinet, before we gave agreement.


George Randolph Pearkes: That is not correct, as you know perfectly well.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Very misleading speculation.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Subparagraph 2 of this paragraph on page 3 says:
The North American air defence command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two governments.
Perhaps in view of all the information that has appeared in the press and in congressional committees in Washington, some of which was mentioned this afternoon, the Minister of National Defence will tell us exactly what is included under NORAD, at least in so far as the Royal Canadian Air Force is concerned. Then, the next paragraph on this page has this to say:
"Operational control" is the power to direct,-
And this is the operational control which is exercised by the commander-in-chief of NORAD. I continue:
-co-ordinate, and control the operational activities of forces assigned, attached or otherwise made available.
But, on April 29 of this year the Minister of National Defence, speaking in New York, went a little farther than the words of this agreement when he said, and I quote from the speech he made to the overseas press club in New York on that date:
This command will be responsible for the development of plans and procedures that would be followed in war and these plans will be immediately implemented in such an emergency. It will also be responsible for the general pattern of training and supervision of practice exercises in order to ensure the readiness of our forces if hostilities should ever break out.
If this paragraph means anything it certainly means that NORAD does have control over the forces assigned to it in times of peace, so far as practice exercises and training are concerned. I am not quarrelling with that but I should certainly like the Minister of National Defence to reconcile that statement with what he had said in the house previously that NORAD has no command over Canadian air squadrons. Then there is another sentence in this paragraph:
No permanent changes of station would be made without the approval of the higher national authority concerned. Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, Including the crossing of the international boundary, to meet operational requirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control.
That paragraph has been interpreted in the press, and if the interpretation is wrong spokesmen for the government will correct

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement it, as meaning that the commander of NORAD can move reinforcements across the border to meet operational requirements and that this power would be at his discretion. We have had a good deal of discussion in the house as to whether United States aircraft carrying nuclear weapons can cross the Canadian border and, if so, under what conditions. It has been made clear in the house by the Prime Minister and by the Minister of National Defence that on every such occasion permission has to be secured from the Canadian government.


George Randolph Pearkes: May I raise a point there? The Prime Minister indicated this afternoon that in defence United States aircraft armed with weapons can cross our border. I have invariably stated that when United States air force bombers require to cross the border they have to get prior permission. The Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) knows perfectly well that arrangement existed when his government was in power. There has been no change whatsoever in any way.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, if this agreement means anything there has indeed been such a change because there was no such agreement when we were in power and therefore no such general permission was given to a United States commander in chief of an integrated command to move his forces across the border to meet operational requirements as is specifically set out in this paragraph that he has the authority to do that. We are not talking now about the atom bombers of the strategic air command; we are talking about aircraft under the command of NORAD.


George Randolph Pearkes: You were confusing the issue by referring to the fact that I had said they had to get prior permission for the bombers to cross over.


Lester Bowles Pearson: All I ask the minister is
whether, when aircraft under the control of NORAD cross the border armed with atomic missiles, and interceptors can carry atomic missiles, the authority given in the exchange of notes requires the qualification given by the minister when he said that aircraft carrying atomic weapons can cross the border only after permission has been obtained in each case.


George Randolph Pearkes: That question was always
asked with respect to the strategic air command bombers. It was never asked with reference to the air defence of this country.


Lester Bowles Pearson: If in the past this question has always been asked with respect to strategic air command bombers, I am asking it now with regard to United States aircraft under NORAD crossing the border in accordance

with this paragraph of the agreement which has been signed by the two governments.


George Randolph Pearkes: The regulations are exactly the same as they were when the Liberal government was in power.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That may be a satisfactory answer to the minister but it is not going to be a satisfactory answer to parliament or to the country. While, of course, I accept without qualification the statement made by the government that this permission has to be obtained in each case, now we are told that it applies only so far as strategic air command bombers are concerned and is subject also no doubt to the qualification the Prime Minister made this afternoon in respect to the forthcoming arrangement in regard to tanker refuelling planes. While that is undoubtedly the case, it is unfortunate that this is apparently not recognized by people across the line who should know exactly what is the situation and who should not in their statements mislead the public as to what is that situation. There is other evidence, but I refer specifically, for instance, to an article in the U.S. News and World, Report of May 2, 1958 written after an interview with General Thomas S. Power, commander, I believe, of the United States stragetic air command. This article has been given great publicity and it would be useful if it could be denied by the government in so far as Canada is concerned in a debate of this kind. Under the heading "Action Over Arctic" there is the following:
From bases far to the north, in Alaska, Labrador. Greenland-
From bases far to the north in Alaska, Labrador, Greenland, this strategic air command which has been referred to-


Mr. McPhillips:: You gave them to them.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That interjection does not indicate that my hon. friend knows very much about this situation. If he did he would know that the bases in Labrador to which I am referring were handed over to the United States by the United Kingdom government under a 99-year lease before Newfoundland and Labrador became part of Canada. Perhaps it was a very wise thing for them to do in the circumstances of that time. I continue with the quotation:
-there are frequent, dramatic flights. Sometimes the distant early warning line, the DEW line, across northern Canada and Alaska picks up approaching objects on its radar screens that cannot be readily identified. SAC bombers are then sent roaring towards the Russian frontier. They know their destinations and targets. They carry atomic or hydrogen bombs, with the nuclear warhead detached from the remainder of the missile. They fly to a prearranged point. If by that time

they have not received positive instructions to proceed they turn back. This is called the "fail safe" system. It was flights of this sort that led Soviet Russia to make its protest to the United Nations.
This was the article that appeared in this magazine after an interview with General Power and, as members of the house know, a United Press dispatch of April 7 from the strategic air command base in Nebraska, an article which must have been authorized by that command under that dateline, also gave some pretty alarming information even if it is wrong, and I hope it is, which resulted, of course, in this whole matter being brought before the United Nations security council. The article talked about radar under NORAD picking up unidentified objects and thereby giving information which results in planes being sent into the air headed toward the target for retaliation and, according to this report, this has taken place not once, not twice, but many times. So I hope a spokesman for the government will take advantage of this opportunity to deny in effect that this happens in so far as the use of Canadian bases is concerned and in so far as Canadian air space is concerned, and will confirm in a way which will get the maximum of publicity that the arrangements already stated by the government, and which require the consent of the Canadian government for each flight across the border of bombers carrying atomic weapons, are still in effect.
I hope also, because I think this has a bad effect on NORAD, that stories that have been appearing recently that NORAD is not operating effectively will be denied, perhaps by one of the members of the government. A story appeared in a United States and Canadian weekly with a very wide circulation, indeed it is Time magazine, based on an Associated Press dispatch from Colorado Springs of May 19 which said that NORAD, instead of being a model of interservice cooperation within the United States services had become a classic example of interservice rivalry and quotes a NORAD officer as calling it a monstrosity.
I would hope perhaps that story could also be denied. It might be useful to try to counteract the impression stories like that are creating in respect of functioning and operation of this joint air command, which is now just as much a Canadian command as it is a United States command.
I think the importance of this agreement has been abundantly shown. I think the justification for this discussion has already been made abundantly clear. We certainly know now, after the speech of the Prime Minister, that NORAD's responsibilities are very great and very far-reaching. We hope that later in this discussion the questions
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement that have been asked and will be asked from this side will be answered by representatives of the government as completely as security considerations will permit. Nobody asks the government to go beyond that. We hope, finally, that NORAD's activities in the future will inspire more confidence than the method adopted by the government to bring it into existence.


Mr. H. W. Herridge (Kootenay West):: Mr. Speaker, first of all I must mention that I am sure we all regret that the hon. member for Assiniboia (Mr. Argue) had to leave unexpectedly and hurriedly last night because of the serious illness of his wife in Regina. He is not able, for that reason, to be present during this most interesting and important debate.
I listened, like other members of this group, with a great deal of interest to the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) and, I should say, very carefully indeed. From our point of view he raised some very interesting questions that will have to be answered satisfactorily when we give final consideration to this agreement. We also listened very carefully to the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson), and what we thought was his very clear exposition of the difficulties that are involved in this agreement and the obvious dangers involved in this arrangement unless this type of defence is undertaken through the proper procedure.
Now, what I have to say this evening is the result of the very serious concern of this group over this very important problem. It is the result of information received in the house, considerable research, reading, and also frequent consultations and discussions between the members of this group as well as the result, to some extent, of reflections on my part in solitude on this very serious question. Before I proceed further, I might say that owing to the number of references I will make and the quotations, as well as the nature and importance of the topic, I shall stick closer to my notes than is usual. My remarks will represent an analysis of the situation from the point of view of this group. I shall be followed by other speakers who will deal with various statements made by the Prime Minister and by the Leader of the Opposition, and those to come later from the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes). Finally, one member of our group, towards the conclusion of this debate, will make a summary of this group's opinion.
What I am going to aim to do tonight on behalf of the group for whom I am speaking this evening is to give an honest appraisal and analysis of the situation from our point of view. I wish the hon. member opposite

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement would not attempt to relieve his political .flatulence by making the rude verbal remarks he makes when I am speaking.
The Canadian government's formal acceptance of the integration of the air defence of North America under a United States military commander is of historical importance. I think we all can agree on that. For the first time in our history during peacetime a Canadian government has placed units of our armed forces under the direct command of a single foreign power. The gravity of such a step alone would warrant a most careful investigation and discussion of the facts by members of this house. It is for that reason, that we in this group were very pleased when the Prime Minister agreed to have a debate on this most important resolution. It was unpardonable, in our opinion, that the government in the first instance refused until they had been subjected to pressure from the opposition benches to permit a discussion of the exchange of these important diplomatic notes with the United States. I do not wish to dwell further on this point since it is the intention of one of my colleagues to discuss it at some greater length later in the debate.
I do want, however, to discuss the government's pretext for saying that a debate on NORAD was not necessary because it constituted an amplification of and extension under the North Atlantic Treaty. I am referring specifically to a statement made in the house on May 19 by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith), who declared that the government regards this as an amplification of and extension under the North Atlantic Treaty. This statement can be found at page 192 of Hansard for May 19, 1958.
In the first place, even if these arrangements were only an extension of the North Atlantic Treaty, this house would still be entitled to debate them in the same manner, for example, as the extension of NATO to include Greece and Turkey was subject to the approval of this parliament. However, the highest civilian official of the NATO organization, the secretary general, has been quoted by newspapermen to the effect that the North American air defence arrangements are not part of NATO. The Prime Minister has suggested or inferred that the secretary general was misquoted by the press. The truth of the matter was established when the Leader of the Opposition placed on the record this afternoon some quotations from the tape recording taken of the interview with the secretary general of NATO. These prove that the newspaper statements were, in substance, correct.
[Mr. Herridge.l
However, be that as it may, it is quite clear from the wording of the diplomatic notes that the NORAD command will not report, at least directly, nor will it have to answer to the North Atlantic Treaty military command. The note from the Canadian embassy in Washington speaks for itself. It speaks most clearly in dealing with this point, and I quote:
The North Atlantic Treaty organization will continue to be kept informed through the Canada-United States regional planning group of arrangements for the air defence of North America.
I do not think, under any circumstances, in view of that statement one could claim that this organization was integrated or a part of the structure of NATO.
Mr. Pallet!: What about the fourth paragraph of that note?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Another speaker will deal with the fourth paragraph and you too, if you say too much.
I suggest that there is a major difference between keeping the NATO command informed as such and in reporting directly to and being responsible to that command. In this note there is nothing to indicate that the NORAD command will be in any way responsible to the NATO command. Indeed, the note simply states-and I quote again- as follows:
The commander-in-chief NORAD will be responsible to the chiefs of staff committee of Canada and the joint chiefs of staff of the United States, who in turn are responsible to their respective governments. He will operate within a concept of air defence approved by the appropriate authorities of our two governments, who will bear in mind their objectives in the defence of the Canada-United States region as a NATO area.
Nothing in my opinion, could be plainer than that this is nothing more than a bilateral arrangement, an arrangement between two countries which are members of NATO, exclusive of all the other partners of that multilateral organization. That is one reason why we in this group had certain misgivings with respect to this NORAD agreement and the NORAD arrangement. NORAD has been represented to the Canadian public as a purely defensive arrangement, an integration of Canadian and United States service units for the purpose of defending this continent against assault on the polar regions. United States military authorities, however, have never tried to hide the fact that NORAD is an integral part of a larger military organization which includes offensive as well as defensive arrangements.
The United States strategic air command, popularly known as SAC, is a powerful offensive weapon capable of being employed

for instantaneous retaliation. General Partridge, the United States commander in chief of NORAD, has stated in more than one published interview that if the NORAD facilities detected an air attack, they would immediately alert the strategic air command so that instant retaliation could be made against the whole country of the attacking planes. It is no secret that there are close working relations between the detection and defensive facilities of NORAD and SAC which provides the United States with its massive retaliatory power.
Nor, is it any secret that the United States strategic air command has always operated entirely independently of the NATO command. As a matter of fact it is under the direct control of the President of the United States. It is capable of carrying both nuclear and thermonuclear explosives. It has been built up for the sole purpose of providing the United States with a means of massive retaliation in the event of war. It is a well known fact that it is SAC, equipped with the heavy B-52 jet bomber and the medium B-47 jet bomber, and not NATO, which supplies the west with its most potent and effective means of deterrence against attack. Only recently, in an interview with the United States Secretary of Defence Neil H. IVIcElroy, U.S. News and World Report of April 25, 1958 quotes the secretary as follows:
Certainly, our NATO allies know that, without the protection of the very major-sized deterrent force of this country, the NATO countries would T>e in a bad way to defend themselves against a power of anything like the capability of Russia, especially if we were knocked out.
I think that they would be the first to say that the keystone of the force that deters Russia is right here-sits right here on this continent. It's our heavy-bomb wings, It's the 1,500 B-47 bombers and the refueling that we have that can take many of them to their targets and get them back.
Some of the most able and well informed military minds of the west have been deeply concerned with the procedures followed by the strategic air command-reference to them has been made in a good many publications over recent months-in implementing the *distant early warning system. They have expressed fears that these procedures are inherently dangerous and might set off a world catastrophe by sheer accident. Indeed, these fears have been expressed in forthright terms by Britain's eminent military critic and historian, Captain B. H. Liddel Hart, in an article entitled "The Perils of Alertness" published last January in the New York Herald-Tribune.
Captain Hart was commenting on the facts disclosed last fall by General Power, the *commander of the strategic air command, that his force of over 2,000 jet bombers
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement equipped with nuclear bombs was in a state of constant readiness. Captain Hart pointed out the grave possibility of human error, of misreading the radar screen, of becoming trigger-happy under the intense strain of misgauging imminent peril, and of misinterpreting a code. In addition, the syndicated columnist, Dorothy Thompson, commenting on these observations of one of the most acute military minds in the west, says this:
Certainly those who designed it (the alert system) and the governments that have accepted it will deny danger.
But Captain Liddel Hart, with long knowledge of men and war, who is no hysteric, sees grave dangers in a system under which a decision of life or death might be made by one man, or a few whom he informs, in minutes.
That is from the Globe and Mail of April 25, 1958. Therefore, in the opinion of this group it would be the epitome of folly to ignore the sober observations of a man of the background and calibre of Captain Hart. It is therefore of the utmost importance that Canada, as a member of NORAD, which will work hand in hand with General Power's strategic air command, examine with complete thoroughness the ominous implications of the alert system cited by Captain Hart. No government is justified in asking parliament to ratify an undertaking of such sweeping implications without first giving the members the opportunity to make a careful study of what is involved.
In that respect I should like to quote from a portion of an editorial that appeared in the June 7, 1958 issue of Saturday Night, and which deals with some of the dangers we face. This is part of the extract:
A while ago, for instance, Walter S. Robertson, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, was testifying before a congressional committee. He was asked: "Did I correctly understand you to say that the heart of the present policy towards China and Formosa is that there is to be kept alive a constant threat of military action vis-a-vis Red China, in the hope that at some point there will be an internal breakdown"?
His reply: "Yes, sir. That is my conception."
That was the conception of the assistant secretary of state of the United States. We can well understand the tension that is the result of military alertness of the dangers inherent therein. But in addition to that we have the tension and the dangers of tension that are constant and developing as a result of the foreign policy of another power. That gives us some cause for concern in this group. I just want to mention this matter and to bring it to the attention of this house.
We in this group believe in collective security. NATO is a form of collective security, a regional pact within the terms of the United Nations charter. This will be a

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement bilateral arrangement. Instead of moving forward to the ultimate United Nations conception of an international police force, in this arrangement, from the point of view of this group, we are moving backwards to a bilateral arrangement; and in addition to that, another danger is that the strategic air force of the United States is completely under the command of the President of the United States.
You will recall, Mr. Speaker, as will hon. members, that at the time of the attack on the Suez canal Mr. Dulles was most insistent then and later that before any action was taken in Europe there must be consultation within NATO, and correctly so; but at the same time or very shortly afterwards he expressed the opinion that the United States would not submit to similar consultation before it took action in the Pacific region. That situation causes this group very considerable concern.
There is another very important implication underlying the diplomatic notes exchanged between Canada and the United States. These notes provide for the placement of Canadian service units under United States General Partridge and thus Canada has already taken a major step leading to the surrender of her sovereignty to a single power. It is one thing to surrender sovereign rights under a multilateral organization such as NATO or to such a body as the United Nations, but in our opinion it is an entirely different matter to surrender sovereign rights to a single country under a bilateral agreement which is what will be accomplished, in our view, in the case of Canada's position under the NORAD arrangement. Because a Canadian will act as deputy commander to the chief of NORAD does not in any way alter this fact.
Canadian air units will be submerged in the over-all offensive and defensive North American organization which is to be directly controlled by United States commanders. Futhermore, the growing integration of Canadian and United States air defence has an important economic implication in addition to the more obvious political implication of the loss by Canada of sovereign rights and control over certain of its service units. Defence integration is forcing Canada to become more and more dependent upon the technological skills and economic abilities of the United States in connection with the design and production of military equipment. The effect of this is to accentuate the general economic dependence of Canada upon the United States. This is one thing in connection with the NORAD agreement which gives this group, and I think a great many of the people of Canada, cause for very serious concern. For
[Mr. Herridge.l

example, two days following the tabling of the notes on NORAD the Secretary of State for External Affairs made another important announcement relating to the defence of North America as recorded at page 309 of Hansard of May 21, 1958. He said:
-the Canadian government has granted permission to the United States government to conduct surveys in Canada to determine to what extent, if any, the ever-increasing speed of air weapons has created special communications requirements, including the improvement of existing facilities which may be needed to perfect the flow of detection and warning information for radar warning of ballistic missiles.
Reports indicate that the result of this survey will be the introduction of United States semi-automatic ground environment, known as SAGE, for the making automatic of ground control operations in Canadian air defence. The same system is being installed in the United States and it has for some time been suggested in United States quarters that the same would have to be done in Canada if successful air defence integration of the two countries is to be achieved. An integral part of the SAGE system is a ground-to-air guided missile known as Bomarc, which is capable of being fitted with an atomic warhead. While the SAGE Bomarc system may well provide the means of intercepting the latest manned jet bombers, it is a well known fact that it would be entirely impotent against the intercontinental ballistic missile. We are already hearing, therefore, of the additional need for some yet undeveloped anti-ballistic missile system.
In our opinion it is a certainty that our technical and industrial abilities are not nearly sufficient to meet the present requirements of the design and manufacture of highly complex electronic equipment and intricate missile systems. Furthermore, the rapid rate of obsolescence of such equipment and the consequent need to replace it at frequent intervals creates an impossible situation for a country of our small capacities.
The implications for the Canadian economy are becoming increasingly apparent. As defence requirements become more and more complex it would seem that our economy will become more and more interdependent with that of the United States. Already one hears suggestions of the need to integrate our defence production with the United States economy, with Canadian industry manufacturing component parts for United States assemblies. The future pattern may be that Canadian industry, if it is to get any share at all in the production of new and complex equipment needed in the air defence of Canada, may have to be satisfied with participating as subcontractors in large United States

production programs. This also causes us some misgivings and concern.
We feel, therefore, that parliament is confronted with the fact that integration of defence with the United States involves not only loss of control over certain Canadian defence units but may also mean an even closer interdependence, from an economic point of view, with that nation. It is precisely because of the seemingly inevitable tie-up with the United States at the economic level that it is all the more important to avoid putting ourselves in a politically subordinate position to the United States. Whereas we may not be able to avoid becoming more and more economically dependent on the United States if we are to meet our air defence requirements, we can avoid making bilateral political concessions.
It would seem imperative from the point of view of preventing the loss of our political sovereignty to a single power, or any part of that sovereignty, that ways and means be explored to make those carrying out North American defence arrangements directly responsible and subordinate to the NATO command. This point of view has been ably stated by Le Devoir in an editorial which was reprinted in the Ottawa Journal on May 26, 1958, as follows:
Canada, as a member of NATO, shares in the defence of western Europe. Would it not be wiser and more logical to place the defence of our tremendous territory in the north in the framework of the Atlantic pact? The protection of our Arctic region is important not only for the United States but for the whole Atlantic coalition.
To instal radar posts in the north, we have negotiated directly and only with the U.S. The DEW line is already out of date, for its equip-men cannot disclose ballistic projectiles travelling at high altitude. Probably therefore this network will have to be amplified and improved which will accentuate the intervention and authority of Washington on Canadian soil.
For our air defence, we have negotiated an agreement which is already in force, it seems, and in this system installed at Colorado Springs there is an American commander who has authority over the air forces of the two countries. Are we in the same way going to negotiate directly with Washington a bilateral pact for bases of nuclear projectiles?
We ask the same question in this group. We want to know where we are going in this respect. Supersonic jet bombers and intercontinental ballistic missiles have made the Canadian north a key area in the event of war with the Soviet union, perhaps just as important strategically as any area in Europe. An attack over the Canadian north would involve western Europe in the same way as an attack in western Europe would involve Canada. It would therefore seem logical that the defence of the Canadian north should be brought within the framework of NATO
10, 1958	1021
NORAD-Canada-XJ.S. Agreement in the same manner as is the defence of western Europe. In our opinion, for Canada to negotiate defence through bilateral arrangements and, in the process, risk the loss of certain sovereign rights over its forces to a single power seems a retrogressive step. As I mentioned previously, we fear that this might be an ominous forewarning, a portent of still more of such arrangements to come, which will further impair the sovereign rights of this country in relation to the United States.
Furthermore, such a step is entirely unnecessary in view of the fact that this country is already a member of a multilateral organization whose objective is the defence of all member countries. We should hope, indeed, that even the multilateral organization of NATO is but a transitional step to the ultimate attainment of a truly effective universal police force under the United Nations.
A lead in that direction was given, by the former secretary of state for external affairs. It is the firm belief of this party that the security of any nation can be maintained only through the gradual surrender of some of every nation's sovereignty in the world today, and not through what Mr. Spaak called, I believe, an interesting experiment.
Because we have such serious reservations about these proposals, we believe that members of parliament should be given an opportunity to study them with greater thoroughness. We therefore request that this matter be referred to the committee on external affairs of this house and, furthermore, that members who serve on that committee should be given access to all the information necessary for them to make a sound judgment. Accordingly, Mr. Speaker, I wish to move, seconded by the hon. member for Port Arthur (Mr. Fisher):
That the said resolution be referred to the standing committee on external affairs.
There may be some question as to our motion being in order, but this house is master of its own procedures and it can, by unanimous agreement, waive the application of its usual rules. I urge the Prime Minister to give consideration to the suggestion I have made and, if the motion is not in order, to consider a suspension of the rules in order to meet this proposal made by members of this group who are seeking information on this very important matter.
As I said when I began to speak, this is a brief analysis of the situation from our point of view as a result of our gathering information from every corner and after discussions between ourselves. Other hon. members of this group will no doubt deal with the remarks

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement of the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition and the coming remarks of the Minister of National Defence. Later in the debate, as I said before, one of the members of this group will summarize our opinions and our views.


Mr. Speaker:: If any hon. member wishes to address himself to the question of the regularity of the proposed amendment, I would be glad to hear him before I give my own views.


Mr. Walker:: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Kootenay West, with his great wealth of experience in parliament, must be aware that it is quite out of order, that it is impossible, when a motion is before the house, to move another motion. He must know there is no possible way of doing that, and to ask that the house should give unanimous consent to its being done is almost a travesty.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: From your point of view.


David James Walker: In reply to the hon. member, I do not mind his reading his speech, but when he reads a speech by the C.C.F. ghost writer, David Lewis, that is another question. And I see it is going to come in instalments. The other speakers are going to give David Lewis part two-


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I take strong exception to that remark. I am not in the habit of reading speeches, but I explained I was going to follow notes very closely because of the importance of this question-


Mr. Speaker:: We are getting into a side issue, here.


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Mr. Lewis had nothing to do with my speech. I wrote my notes myself, and the other members of this group have done the same. I suggest that the hon. member for Rosedale should withdraw his unsporting implication.


Some hon. Members:: Withdraw.


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member has contradicted the allegation that he did not write his own speech. The suggestion that a speech was written by someone else is not a reflection on character, or there would be a good many points of privilege taken in this house. So I cannot require the hon. member for Rosedale to withdraw that statement.
As to the correctness of the proposed amendment, standing order 44 says:
When a question is under debate no motion is received unless to amend it; to postpone it to a day certain; for the previous question; for reading orders of the day; for proceeding to another order; to adjourn the debate; or for the adjournment of the house.

The only category under which this motion could come is that of an amendment, and it has been held in the past that a motion to refer a question to a committee is not a proper amendment. One reference is the fourth edition of Beauchesne, citation 202, at page 169:
It is not an amendment to a motion to move that the question go to a committee.
The matter is also dealt with quite thoroughly by the Speaker in the Journals of May 21, 1951, page 400, so I am afraid I must rule the hon. members motion out of order.
Is the house ready for the question?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, I was about to inquire of the Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) whether it is the intention of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes) to follow his suggestion that he take part in this debate. It would seem that if the Minister of National Defence and the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) are to take part it would be normal for members of the ministry presenting the case to speak first. Perhaps we might inquire whether the Minister of National Defence proposes to take advantage of this opportunity of participating in what obviously is, for him, a very important discussion.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, a decision as to the order depends after all on the hon. gentleman. If he is ready we want to hear the viewpoint of the opposition, and there is no reason at all why the Minister of National Defence should choose this moment to make his contribution.


Some hon. Members:: Question.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On a point of order, I would point out that a great many questions have already been addressed to members of the government, and perhaps they will be good enough to reply to them at this time.


Some hon. Members:: Question.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, I am sure that the Prime Minister, who has been a member of this house for a good number of years, will agree with me that we have just witnessed one of the most extraordinary spectacles in parliament when a minister charged with a department in respect of which a most important matter has been debated has not taken advantage of the opportunity of participating in a discussion concerning his department, particularly after the remarks made by his leader, the Queen's first minister in this house. We can only conclude that the reluctance of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Pearkes) to take part in this debate following the normal arrangement of alternate speakers between government and

opposition is because this government is still confused, as it was last fall and as it was last August, with respect to this most important intergovernmental agreement between the United States and Canada.
The Prime Minister (Mr. Diefenbaker) said today that this matter did not have to be referred to parliament. I think that was a rather unusual observation to be made by a man who is regarded by his colleagues as a champion of the rights of parliament, and yet one who as Prime Minister takes few advantages of living up to the reputation asserted by the members of his own party.
This is one question which surely is properly within the rights of parliament. The Prime Minister surely will not contest the fact that acts and policies of the executive, particularly in matters of this importance, must be submitted for approval or disapproval to the parliament of this nation in accordance with the practice that is now well over 50 years old. The Prime Minister says no. I propose to show him that that is the case. As a matter of fact, we have the unusual situation of having been told on November 4 last by the Minister of National Defence, in answer to a question which I put to him, that parliament would be given the opportunity of discussing this very matter. Then, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith), speaking in the address in reply to the speech from the throne, informed the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) that notwithstanding what his colleague had said there would be no opportunity for discussing this matter in the way suggested by the Minister of National Defence. Then, the day after the Minister for National Defence was asked by the hon. member for Kootenay West (Mr. Herridge), whether or not an opportunity would be given pursuant to the assurance given by the Minister of National Defence on January 4, and the Minister of National Defence referred the hon. gentleman to the reply made the day previous by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
But the Prime Minister, who by this time was aware of the dangerous implications of this course, and who always has his ears close to the political sensibilities of the nation, apparently did not agree with either the Minister of National Defence or the Secretary of State for External Affairs and, in the absence of a denial, repudiated these two ministers by accepting at once the proposal of the Leader of the Opposition that the customary way of presenting a specific resolution should be the basis for discussion of this matter in the house; but,
10, 1958	1023
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement unfortunately, the Prime Minister, in acceding to the request, gave a most unusual reason. It was not because parliament had the right to discuss this matter; it was because the Prime Minister wanted to know how hon. gentlemen opposite were going to vote on the question. Rights of parliament; civil liberties, what do they mean? I want to know how hon. gentlemen opposite are going to vote, and that is the reason and the only reason why the Prime Minister has given us in the opposition the opportunity to exercise our duty of discussing this important matter.
Why was this matter not discussed by way of resolution in October? It was said by the Minister of National Defence that it was an interim arrangement. That was all that was before the house at that time; but other interim measures, all involving our relations with other countries, have been discussed in this house by way of specific resolutions. As the Leader of the Opposition said, when the Minister of National Defence announced in the month of August the decision of the government regarding the formation of this continental air defence command, there was no suggestion by him that this was an interim arrangement. There was no suggestion made by him in his press conference that this was an arrangement of a temporary character. He said that this was a decision of the government of Canada without any qualifications being given. The announcement was made by him as a member of the government without that government first of all having come to and asking parliament to pass on the policies of the executive.
There is no question, as the Leader of the Opposition said, that the issue before us today is not whether we agree or oppose this particular arrangement for continental collective defence. All hon. members accept this in principle. What we are seeking to elicit from the government-and tonight we have had some difficulty in doing that because of the reluctance of the Minister of National Defence to speak-is more information about this particular measure, and also to take this occasion to insist on the right of parliament to express approval or disapproval of this particular act of the executive arm of government.
The Prime Minister said it was not necessary. In almost the first remarks he made in his speech he said it was not necessary really to submit this matter to parliament. Of course it is not necessary. There is no legal requirement which compels this government to submit the question to parliament for approval or disapproval. Of course, there is no legal obligation on the government to
1024	HOUSE OF
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement do this, but it has been the practice of Canadian governments since at least 1926, and I submit even before that, to ask parliament to approve the most important treaties, or those of a politically contentious nature, before their ratification is authorized by the governor in council. Such instances have been the peace treaties of 1919, and we all recall the insistence of Sir Robert Borden that the tri-partite arrangement between the United States, France and Great Britain, in so far as Canadian participation or involvement was concerned, should first of all be decided by the parliament of Canada. Then, of course, there were the North Atlantic Treaty and the recent amendments to the extradition treaty with the United States. It has been the custom in this house to obtain this approval in the form of joint resolutions introduced in the commons and the Senate to give an opportunity to both houses to debate and approve whatever arrangement has been made by the government of the country.
There have been many examples of this practice. In 1945 the Bretton Woods Agreements Act was referred to parliament by way of resolution; the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Act; the Canada-United States treaty for extradition of criminals; ICAO and the two interim arrangements in connection therewith; all of the ILO conventions of that year were submitted to parliament in the particular way in which this particular matter is referred to parliament for its approval or disapproval in 1946 the UNESCO agreement; the world health organization, the Canada-Mexico trade agreement; the Canada-Colum-bia trade agreement; the Canada-United Kingdom financial agreement; in 1947, the peace treaties with Italy, Roumania, Hungary and Finland; in 1948, GATT was submitted to this parliament for approval; in 1949, in the first session, NATO, and the representatives at Washington were empowered to assist in the completion of the treaty. Then, later, the treaty itself was submitted to parliament for approval. Likewise, in that year the international wheat agreement was submitted to parliament, and so on year after year. It is clear that various treaties, conventions or exchange of notes on important matters in which this country had contracted important obligations have been submitted to parliament in accordance with the traditions [DOT]vyell laid down in this house even before 1926. We have the statement of Mr. Meighen, a former leader of the Conservative party and a former prime minister of Canada.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.
[Mr. Martin (Essex East) .1


Paul Joseph James Martin: Hon. members applaud. I hope they will applaud what he said. Here is what he said regarding a prospective imperial conference in the matter of imperial defence. Mr. Meighen said, as found at page 2641 of Hansard of April 27, 1921:
I can give the assurance, with all the emphasis that I can command, that no step whatever will be taken binding this country-indeed, no step can be taken, whatever might be the will of the representative of Canada, which would have force or effect before ratification by the parliament of this dominion.
Those were the words of a former leader of the Conservative party and if they were applicable in 1921 it seems to me that they have strong application at the present time particularly in a matter so important as that now confronting us.


Albert DeBurgo McPhillips: How about the troops you sent to Hong Kong?


Hédard-J. Robichaud: You should be on your way now.


Paul Joseph James Martin: It will also be remembered that in 1926 the government of the day presented to the house a resolution in the following words:
This house approves of the procedure proposed for the negotiation, signature and ratification of treaties and conventions, and considers further that before His Majesty's Canadian ministers advise ratification of a treaty or convention affecting Canada, or signify acceptance of any treaty, convention or agreement involving military or economic sanctions, the approval of the parliament of Canada should be secured.
That resolution was passed by the house and I propose to quote some words of some hon. gentlemen at that time who sat on this side and who were spokesmen of the Conservative party at that time. In proposing the resolution, Mr. King, the then prime minister, said, as found at page 4768 of Hansard of June 21, 1926:
What I wished to make clear, however, was that all treaties or conventions involving military or economic sanctions must come before parliament, and where military or economic sanctions were involved I wished to make the terms broad enough to include agreements, so that in referring to treaties or agreements of any kind we would not have a difference over the mere use of words.
Then he said on April 12, 1928, when introducing the international sanitary convention, a convention that certainly did not have the implications of the international agreement before us, as found at page 1955 of Hansard:
I might say to my hon. friend first with respect to the course of procedure that is being adopted of having parliament approve this convention, that that course is in accordance with the principle underlying a resolution of this house which was introduced by myself a year or two ago and at

the time unanimously adopted. The resolution provided, so far as Canada is concerned, that important treaties should be approved in the first instance by this parliament. That is the reason why this convention, which to all intents and purposes is in the nature of a treaty between different countries, is being submitted to parliament. The purpose is to secure in the last analysis the control of parliament over any agreements of international significance which may bind the people of this dominion.
These words, taken with the principle enunciated by Mr. Meighen, with the attitude of Sir Robert Borden in 1919 and the words of the late Lord Bennett surely stand as precedents which should have guided the Prime Minister not a few weeks ago but last fall when the Leader of the Opposition suggested to him that this matter was one which should at the earliest moment be submitted to parliament for ratification or for rejection. Here are the words of Mr. Bennett in the same debate, as found at page 1968 of Hansard of April 12, 1928:
The ratification of a convention is, of course, as the Minister of Justice has said, a prerogative of the crown. The crown acts on the advice of its ministers, and in this instance the ministers from Canada will advise the crown that the convention is a sound one in which Canada concurs, if the Canadian parliament, comprising both the Commons and the Senate, approves of it. I wholly agree that it is desirable-indeed I have always so held-that both the Commons and the Senate of parliament should be asked to approve of conventions or treaties that carry international implications or responsibilities. That, I think, is clear.
We on this side of the house say to the Prime Minister, "that, we think, is clear." The prime minister in closing the debate added these words, as found at page 1974 of Hansard of April 12, 1928:
I submit that the day has passed when any government or executive should feel that they should take it upon themselves without the approval of parliament to commit a country to obligations involving any considerable financial outlays or active undertakings. In all cases where obligations of such a character are being assumed internationally parliament itself should be assured of having the full right of approving what is done before binding commitments are made. I would not confine parliamentary approval only to those matters which involve military sanctions and the like. I feel parliamentary approval should apply where there are involved matters of large expenditure or political considerations of a far-reaching character.
Now the Prime Minister will not deny that this particular situation involves political considerations of a far-reaching character I am sure that the Prime Minister on reflection will, as the leader of this house, true to its traditions as he asserts he is, be the first to say after thinking the matter over that the wise course for his government would have been to submit this matter to parliament last fall. In answer he might say that there was no agreement between the United States and
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement Canada. Even if there had been no long term agreement, there was time from the middle of August until October 14 last to have some kind of exchange between the governments of the United States and Canada which could have been submitted to the house, and there surely would have been no doubt at that time about what parliament would have done in principle with respect to the resolution which I suggest might well have been presented then.
But there are reasons, I suppose, why this was not done, and perhaps we find some evidence in the attitude taken by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the standing committee on external affairs last fall when he said in answer to a question put to him as found on page 20 of the proceedings of the committee on Thursday, November 28:
So far as this department is concerned-and X say this very emphatically-so far as this department is concerned we have not been brought into this picture whatever. This has been a discussion on a military basis. This department deals with the political aspects of it.
Then he went on to say:
This department knows nothing more than that; and when these military communications have been digested we are ready to help in the preparation of those notes and to provide for their exchange through diplomatic agencies, diplomatic media.


Sidney Earle Smith: Mr. Speaker-


Paul Joseph James Martin: I am coming to the point you have in mind. Then the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) said:
Along the lines of that question, it seems to me quite unusual that in a matter of this kind, which has political as well as military implications, there should not have been interdepartmental consultation, as there was previously, and in which the Department of External Affairs should participate.
Now, in fairness to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the next day he did correct the impression he had left by using the words I have just quoted.


An hon. Member:: Then why read them?


Paul Joseph James Martin: I shall deal with them, but I want to state that the first day the Secretary of State for External Affairs used those words. I suggest to the Prime Minister that in a matter of this sort-


John George Diefenbaker: Will you read what he said the next day?


Paul Joseph James Martin: I will read it in my own time. I will make my own speech, just as the Prime Minister is accustomed to doing when he makes a speech. I will deal with these things in the order which I believe is best.
I submit that the reason no resolution was presented to this house last fall was because

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement this matter was one that was conducted almost entirely by the Minister of National Defence and possibly by the Prime Minister. I am sure that, otherwise, those in the Department of External Affairs would have come to the assistance of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, who had recently taken up his assignment, and would have seen to it that in matters involving Canada and another power the Secretary of State for External Affairs would have been entrusted with the political arrangements between Canada and that power.


Sidney Earle Smith: We have nothing in the department with respect to any military arrangements. I crave-


Mr. Speaker:: If the hon. member is not asking a question, he may find that he has made his speech on this motion.


Paul Joseph James Martin: I would have been very happy to allow my friend to intervene in a matter of such importance. It is only fair to any member who believes he has a contribution to make, to allow him to make it. However, the Secretary of State for External Affairs more than likely will have an opportunity later to participate in the debate.
We come back to last August and the announcement by the Minister of National Defence that Canada had agreed to an arrangement under which a distinguished United States air force officer was to be given command of the defence of the North American continent and a distinguished Canadian air officer was to be second in command. This arrangement involved the possible dispatch of Canadian forces outside Canada. It may be said that these forces will be confined to the continent of North America, but it is difficult to conceive that any such limit is as defined in the statement originally made by the Minister of National Defence. In any event, this does involve the potential use of Canadian forces outside Canada, and because of this the matter is one which, at the earliest moment, should have been submitted to parliament for its consideration.


Albert DeBurgo McPhillips: How about Hong Kong?


Paul Joseph James Martin: My hon. friend says, "What about Hong Kong?" I say, what about this particular agreement which likewise involves the lives of Canadian men and women?
Now, General Partridge, the commander, had a concept of his obligations and on September 6 in an interview, which by the way was shown to the Department of National Defence according to a reply given me by

the Minister of National Defence last November, indicated that as a result of an arrangement he had with the President of the United States there would not be any obligation on his part to consult with the government of the United States before pushing the button. The Minister of National Defence likewise said that General Partridge would have command not only over United States personnel but Canadian forces as well. Would General Partridge, the Minister of National Defence was asked, have a like authority in terms of Canadian forces? Would he be able to push the button without consulting the government of Canada? The Minister of National Defence replied there would have to be consultation with the political authority in Canada. How can that reply be correct? How could the statement of General Partridge be correct? Either the statement of General Partridge was wrong or the statement of the Minister of National Defence was inaccurate.
If General Partridge does not have to consult with the government of the United States, how could it be argued with any measure of success by the Minister of National Defence that the government of Canada, in such circumstances, would have to be consulted by the NORAD commander? In the absence of General Partridge, would the No. 2 in command have the same authority as General Partridge? The answer of the Minister of National Defence was yes. Would Air Marshal Slemon be able to act with respect to the United States forces just as General Partridge said he could, without consulting the government of the United States? Could Air Marshal Slemon act in that way with regard to the United States forces without consulting the government of the United States, but be unable to commit Canadian forces without consulting the government of Canada? Those are questions that have not yet been properly answered by the Minister of National Defence, indeed they were not even referred to by the Prime Minister today. Those are the kind of questions that are involved in the agreement that is before us now.
No one insists that the full terms of this agreement should be made available to the house, because obviously there are questions of security involved. However, questions of the sort to which I have referred surely are not in the realm of security. We ought to know now whether General Partridge was stating the correct position in so far as the government of Canada and the government of the United States are concerned or whether his statement does not harmonize with the policy of the government of Canada. Obviously, that kind of inconsistency must be

cleared up by the government, either during the course of this debate in order to give the country the confidence they are entitled to have in a government that has entered into an agreement in respect of a matter so important to the defence of this continent and nation.
The agreement is not an elaborate one; in fact, it is not an agreement at all. The material before us does not represent an agreement, it represents an agreement to agree on something. It is no more than that. Unless there are in the clauses not made available to us certain arrangements inconsistent with my last statement, then, as the Leader of the Opposition said, the simplicity of the agreement makes it one that could have been drawn up and signed nine months ago. Why all this delay? I suspect that one of the reasons is that this government took the view from the beginning, as taken by the Prime Minister this afternoon, that after all this was not the kind of question that really had to be submitted to parliament at all.
As the Leader of the Opposition pointed out today, in spite of the delay, the principle of the arrangement, of this agreement to agree, does make good sense. The point of the agreement, presumably, is to define how it will come into operation in an emergency. The agreement merely says that the plans and procedures to be followed by NORAD in wartime shall be formulated and approved in peacetime by the appropriate national authorities and shall be capable of rapid implementation in any emergency.
It is apparent that these plans and procedures have not yet been drawn up by NORAD or approved by the United States and Canadian governments, as they must be before they can be put into effect. One naturally asks the question: How do we pass from peace to wartime? Yet, last November the Minister of National Defence said that General Partridge in an emergency would be able to commit either Canadian or United States forces after consultation with the Canadian government and with the government of the United States. This would be done, he said, by telephone or other means. Later he amended the statement and said, as reported at page 1409 of Hansard, of November 22, 1957:
-a series of plans are now being drawn up which will be approved by the governments of Canada and the United States. If the situation were such that United States air forces would be required for a particular operation over Canada, it may be assumed that that has been included in the preliminary plans and therefore it would merely be a question of advising the government of Canada that such a situation had arisen and such and such a plan should now be put into force.
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement
That also represents a situation that requires on the part of the Minister of National Defence some clarification. "But these plans do not exist," would be the obvious comment to the Minister of National Defence. Without them perhaps NORAD is nothing more than a group of United States and Canadian officers in Colorado Springs with no authority to take necessary steps to defend this continent. If that is not the situation, I am sure that the Minister of National Defence when he speaks, will provide a satisfactory answer.
I say to the Prime Minister with regard to the document that he tabled today-a document formulated I think in 1951-that it does no more than what the Leader of the Opposition said. Its terms can now be integrated into NORAD or if that is not the situation one may well ask what is the reason for NORAD. Those are questions which I am sure the Prime Minister will agree require reply and further clarification. The agreement does not cover the point mentioned by the Minister of National Defence at all and this points up further deficiencies.
There are many questions, some of which have already been put by the Leader of the Opposition. Does NORAD mean, for instance, that Canada might have to defend the United States from attack from countries in other parts of the world other than the Soviet Union; for instance, from China or from South America? Does the agreement deal with potential situations of this sort which cannot be laughed out of court in the kind of world in which we are living? Is it true that Americans will concentrate on missiles to intercept invaders and that the only piloted aircraft will be manned by Canadians? I do not know whether that is the case, but surely that is the kind of question to which an answer should be furnished.
The Leader of the Opposition referred to the number of personnel at NORAD headquarters who were Americans and the number who were Canadians. The Minister of National Defence, by his manner in the house this afternoon, indicated that he did not accept the particular figures quoted by the Leader of the Opposition. If this matter does not involve questions of security, perhaps he would give us some indication as to the relative strength of the Canadian forces in the United States under the command of General Partridge along with the numbers of Americans serving under him in this particular category.
Is it true that various service chiefs can pull units out of NORAD when they see fit to do so? Is the command of General Partridge absolute or does he find himself in

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement competition with the members of other departments in the armed forces of the United States? Does he have full control over the forces under his command? Does the agreement involve us in any action outside of North America? Will Canada continue to contribute its air division to the defence of western Europe? Does this mean that there is to be a lessening of our contribution to the defensive arrangements provided under the auspices of NATO in western Europe? The Secretary of State for External Affairs said that NORAD will be Canada's contribution to NATO. Does this mean the withdrawal of Canadian air fighter forces from Europe?


An hon. Member:: How silly can you get?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Someone says, "How silly can you get?" That is a good question. How silly can the hon. gentleman really get? What will be the basis of financing the operations of the integrated headquarters of the command? Why could this not be decided on now and be included in the agreement? This is going to cost money. It could cost a very considerable sum of money. Should we not know in the agreement what are going to be the respective financial obligations of the two governments?
It seems to me that these are some of the questions which we have a right to ask in order to give a full appreciation of the measure before the house.
On January 4 the Minister of National Defence said a draft note had been submitted to Washington. Why was this not tabled in parliament before the middle of May? If that note was submitted in the middle of January, surely the very character of the document before this house indicates that it should have been tabled in this house at the earliest possible date.


George Randolph Pearkes: Before it was received back from Washington?


Paul Joseph James Martin: If it was not
received back from Washington, my hon. friend has an answer. But it would be interesting to know whether this government sought to obtain from the government of the United States a quicker response to a document that had been submitted to them in the month of January last.


Sidney Earle Smith: It did.


Paul Joseph James Martin: The Secretary of State for External affairs says it did. In any event the same arrangements might well have been submitted to the government of the United States last autumn and have been presented to this house before the prorogation of parliament.


Mr. Palleil:: I wonder if the hon. member would permit a question? His time is almost up. I wonder whether he would now or before he finishes his speech put on the record the statement of the Secretary of State for External Affairs which the hon. member undertook to put on the record when he read the first statement.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Before I have finished I shall be glad to do that.


John Cameron Pallett: The hon. member has about one minute left, I believe.


Mr. Speaker:: I must inform the hon. member that his time has expired.


George Randolph Pearkes: Mr. Speaker, I would have risen and spoken as soon as the hon. member for Kootenay West (Mr. Herridge) sat down had I not been informed that the hon. member who has just taken his seat was anxious to speak,-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


George Randolph Pearkes: -and I was advised that he had a number of intelligent questions that he wished to ask. It therefore seemed to me that the only gentlemanly thing to do was to give him an opportunity to ask those questions. As we are not in committee, I therefore would not have had another opportunity to speak. Had I realized that he wanted to take up half an hour of the time of this house in giving us a lecture on parliamentary history I certainly would have seized the opportunity to speak. However, he did ask some questions which I shall endeavour to answer.
He referred to the question of consultations. Over and over again I have explained that consultations take place prior to the emergency which may possibly occur. Those consultations are going on today. Those consultations have been going on ever since August 1 of last year. Those consultations have been going on ever since August 1 last year and only a few days ago General Partridge came up here and consulted with the Canadian chiefs of staff. He consulted with me and he discussed matters with the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. Diefenbaker). Those are the kinds of consultations which are going on continually.
The Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Pearson) asked whether there was a master plan drawn up during the two days when General Partridge was visiting Canada. Plans for the defence of this country-complicated plans such as those which must be eventually completed-cannot be drawn up in a few hours. I explained that they were preliminary discussions leading up to a plan which

is continually being evolved. He also questioned the fact that last year I had said there were a number of plans. Of course there are a number of plans; there may be a number of different situations arising, all of which may have to be met at any time. Of course we have a plan upon which we can work today, but it is by no means the final plan which will eventually be agreed to by the governments of both countries.
The hon. member who has just sat down wanted to know why we did not bring this note before the house last October. He gave the answer himself-the note had not been completed, it had not been worked out, and what is the use of bringing a half-baked scheme before parliament and taking up the time of the house before it is completed?
The Leader of the Opposition asked a number of questions earlier today and he was concerned this evening about the exercises to which he referred as "fail-safe" exercises. This is the code name given to certain exercises which are carried out in order to test the strategic air command of the U.S. air force. They are carried out at very short notice and the bombers of that force take to the air on a definite course which has been pre-arranged, armed and equipped as though they were carrying out an operation of retaliation, but before they have reached a given point at which they are to get further orders they are instructed to return to their bases.
I have stated over and over again that the bombers of the strategic air command of the United States fly over Canadian territory only when permission has been obtained and the routes have previously been described. It would not be possible for the United States to test their strategic air command by this particular form of exercise if permission to fly over Canada had been previously obtained. Therefore, all these flights have taken place in other directions than across Canada. Never once has the United States asked permission from Canada to carry out this particular form of exercise over our skies. I am, furthermore, confident that they have not done so because our radar system is sufficiently efficient for us to have been able to pick up unidentified aircraft had they been flying over this country.
I can therefore assure the Leader of the Opposition that none of these "fail-safe" exercises have been carried out over Canadian territory or through Canadian air space. The Leader of the Opposition also asked questions about exercises carried out by the aircraft of the United States air defence command and whether they fly
10, 1958
NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement across the international boundary. I interjected to say that the arrangement which exists today is exactly the same as that which existed during the regime of the previous government. I would refer the hon. gentleman to the remarks of the then minister of national defence, the Hon. R. O. Campney, when he was replying to the then member for Winnipeg North Centre, Mr. Stanley Knowles, as recorded at page 1506 of Hansard for February 21, 1957. A question had been asked by Mr. Knowles as to a permit given to the United States jet planes with nuclear weapons on board to fly over Canadian territory, and I quote Mr. Campney's reply as follows:
Mr. Speaker, perhaps I should make a short statement on the implications of the United States statement as far as we are concerned. It should be clearly understood that the weapons dealt with in the Washington announcement are to be deployed within the United States. Nevertheless, as we all know, the air defence of Canada is closely related to the air defence of the United States. As a result of this there has been the fullest consultation, as I mentioned, between the two governments concerning the possible use of these new air defence weapons.
The principle weapon about to be brought into use by the United States which has implications for Canada's air defence at the present time is an air to air rocket launched from interceptor type aircraft. Such Canadian interests as may be involved in the use of these weapons have been fully taken into account in the course of the consultations which have taken place between the two governments. As I said earlier, the Canadian government shares the view of the United States government that continuous improvement of the continental air defence system is very essential.
That is quite an interesting remark in view of the debate; however, 1 continue to quote:
It is a fact that the nuclear air defence weapons which have been developed will improve that joint defence capability. It is also clear, I think, that use must be made of the best means at hand to deter and if necessary to repel aggression.
Coming now to the specific question asked by the hon. member, I think it must be noted that the use of the weapons under consideration by the United States, which as I have said are supplemental and not to replace existing weapons, will be confined to situations of grave emergency.
There is no question of their use in other circumstances, only in circumstances of immediate danger would there be any question of aircraft armed with these weapons flying over Canadian territories. I may say that arrangements have been made for very close consultation in that event, that is in the event of grave danger or emergency. The Canadian authorities have satisfied themselves that the safety hazards involved in the use of these weapons are not great, and that safety devices to prevent premature or accidental discharge are entirely adequate. Exactly the same arrangements exist today as were described by the former minister of national defence.

NORAD-Canada-U.S. Agreement


Lester Bowles Pearson: Would the hon. gentleman permit a question. Would he, then, explain the meaning in paragraph 3 of the agreement -and I ask merely for clarification-of the word "temporary". I quote:
Temporary reinforcement from one area to another, including the crossing of the international boundary to meet operation requirements will be within the authority of commanders having operational control.


George Randolph Pearkes: Certainly. That might be interpreted as one of the cases where a squadron of the United States air force might move across the Canadian border and operate temporarily, for a short period during an emergency, from an airfield in Canada.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Only during an emergency?


George Randolph Pearkes: It might be done by arrangement between the governments on an occasion such as an exercise which is being carried out by joint arrangement.
Some question has been raised regarding a statement I made in the house about the means of communication, when I said "by telephone or other means". Perhaps I should have enlarged upon that. I can tell the house that I have on several occasions taken up the telephone in my office and by calling a definite number I have been able to talk to the duty officer or to General Partridge himself at Colorado Springs, and it has never taken me more than 40 seconds to get that connection. So there are no great difficulties presented in that respect. As I have emphasized frequently, consultation must take place beforehand, and there would be little more than clearance given during an emergency. The hon. Leader of the Opposition suggested during the course of his remarks that the SAC air force would act on, and I think he said only on, the advice or information obtained through the warning systems of this continent. Of course, there are other means and other circumstances that might well arise which might permit the President of the United States to use those forces.
The Leader of the Opposition quoted a press dispatch regarding the number of Canadians who are employed at Colorado Springs, and the number of squadrons which would be made available to NORAD. The number of squadrons or units which can be made available to the NORAD command is laid down definitely in paragraph 2 of the note, and it says there:
The North American air defence command will include such combat units and individuals as are specifically allocated to it by the two governments.
No squadrons of the R.C.A.F. have yet been allocated to NORAD. The Leader of the Opposition quoted the number six. He knows

as well as I do that there are nine fighter squadrons in the Royal Canadian Air Force air defence command. I do not know how he produced this magic number of six. As I say, no squadrons have yet been definitely and specifically allocated to NORAD, nor would it seem likely that any such squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force would be allocated in that way. The hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) suggested that possibly Canadian squadrons might be sent to the assistance of the United States in order to take part in some operation in Mexico or over the Mexican border. He mentioned other places, too. It would be practically impossible, on account of the location of our fighter squadrons and the type of aircraft that they have, for Canada to render that sort of assistance to the United States air force.
May I call it ten o'clock?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Before the hon. minister resumes his seat I should like to take advantage of the suggestion of the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Pallett), and in accordance with what I told the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Smith) I would do, I now put on the record-


Mr. Speaker:: Has the hon. member for
Essex East the consent of the house to answer the question?


Some hon. Members:: Yes.


Paul Joseph James Martin: -what the minister did say the next day. As reported on page 34 of the transcript of the proceedings of the external affairs committee on December 5, 1957, the Secretary of State for External Affairs spoke as follows:
I said on Tuesday-and I quote from the minutes, the typewritten script, as follows:
"So far as this department is concerned-and E say this very emphatically-so far as this department is concerned-we have not been brought into this picture whatever. This has been a discussion, on a military basis. This department deals with the political aspect of it. I could argue that it is clear in the context; but to make it abundantly clear, I say to the committee-and I offer this ini all frankness-that I mean it in the military context, and in the military context it is true.
Military matters have been the responsibility of the Minister of National Defence and I have no knowledge of them. But regarding the political context in August or earlier, my department's, involvement indeed goes back for two years under the former government. My department had at the time when the decision with respect to NORAD was taken-it had as its minister the right hon. the Prime Minister and he, in the Department of External Affairs and the government were seized of it, and they acted on the political aspects. That is the clarification I would like to make in that context.


Sidney Earle Smith: Thank
you, that was the question I was about to-ask.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Lionel Chevrier: May I ask whether we will go on with this debate tomorrow?


Howard Charles Green: Tomorrow we shall continue with this debate, and when that has been concluded take the resolution dealing with
Business of the House
hospital insurance, and then the resolution concerning the Cape Breton Highlands national park and finally the resolution of the Minister of Finance concerning an amendment to the Canadian Farm Loan Act.


[Stage Direction]
At ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
[Stage Direction]
Questions

[Stage Direction]
The following answers, deposited with the Clerk of the house, are printed in the official report of debates pursuant to standing order 39:

Mr. Mcllraiih: 1.	How many inquiries have been directed to the tariff board by the government for study and report under the Tariff Board Act since June 21 1957?
2.	What was the subject matter of each such study?
3.	Which studies are (a) completed; (b) still before the board for hearing; (c) not yet started?
Answer by: Hon. Donald M. Fleming (Minister of Finance):
1.	Three.
2.	Reference No. 121-waterproof footwear and rubber-soled canvas footwear.
Reference No. 125-textiles; 126-fluorspar.
3.	(a) Part of No. 125-wool fabrics; (b) one-No. 125; (c) none.
Note: Public hearings relating to waterproof footwear and rubber-soled canvas footwear and fluorspar have been completed but reports have not yet been made. In addition two references made prior to June 21, 1957, have not been completed.


HIGHWAY, SUNSHINE VILLAGE, ALBERTA
Mr. Hardie: Has the government included in its public works program the development and year-round maintenance of the road leading from the trans-Canada highway to Sunshine village, near Banff, Alberta?
Answer by: Hon. Alvin Hamilton (Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources):
Provision for year-round maintenance has been made in the 1958-59 estimates. It is hoped that it will be possible to include funds in the 1959-60 estimates to permit certain reconstruction works on the road to be undertaken.


END OF VOLUME I