1957-03-15

Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I am glad now to report that since I reported to the house on Monday on the disposition of the 14 specimens of the Canada medal, the two that were missing have also been found in the Department of the Secretary of State.


SUSPENSION OF STANDING ORDER 32(2)-DEBATE ON EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Hon. W. E. Harris (Minister of Finance):: Mr. Speaker, just by way of explanation of the procedure to be adopted today may I say this. When the orders of the day are called the order will be by unanimous consent that this house do now adjourn and that, in order to permit a debate on external affairs, standing order 32(2) shall be suspended in relation thereto. May I also add that the motion will be withdrawn at five o'clock by unanimous consent so we may proceed with the private members' hour.


Walter Edward Harris: the first reading of Bill No. 240 (from the Senate), to amend the Currency, Mint and Exchange Fund Act.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker (Leader of the Opposition):: I wish to direct a question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs arising out of a news dispatch from Washington to the effect that yesterday a United States
investigating committee released evidence allegedly accusing a Canadian diplomat of being a communist and seeking to link him with one of the principals connected with the Canadian spy ring case of 1946. I do not want to embalm the name in Hansard, because after all that would perpetuate it.
This matter was up on one previous occasion and I would ask the minister whether, if it is found that there is no justification for these allegations, the strongest possible protest will be made to the United States against this attack which is detrimental not only to the Canadian diplomat but to Canadian international relations.


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of Slate for External Affairs):: Mr. Speaker, two other hon. members of this house have already brought this matter to my attention and indicated they would be asking me questions about it. I am very glad indeed that the matter has been brought forward, as it gives me an opportunity of making a statement in regard to it. During that statement, Mr. Speaker, I will, I am afraid, have to mention the name of the Canadian official concerned.
I have read the record of the internal security subcommittee of the United States Senate judicial committee which concerns Mr. E. H. Norman, our ambassador to Egypt, and which yesterday was given in Washington to the press, though not to the Canadian government, and has been mistakenly, and unfortunately, referred to in the press and radio as evidence. The best commentary I can make on this procedure is contained in the remarks of Senator Jenner, a member of the subcommittee, when he said at the end of the particular session of which this was the record, and I am quoting him from the record:
I will admonish everyone here that this is an executive session.
So Mr. Jenner and his counsel, Mr. Morris, whose methods of investigation we already know about and for which we have very little respect, gave this record of an executive session of this committee to the United States press before passing it on to the Canadian government, though it made serious allegations against a Canadian senior diplomatic representative. We shall be making strong protests to the United States government in respect of this matter.
2350	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry
This record contains a great many innuendoes and insinuations that Mr. Norman was a communist. We knew all about these charges which were made years ago in Washington, as a result of which Mr. Norman was subjected, in his own interests and in the public interest and with his own approval and full co-operation, to a special and exhaustive security check, the results of which were announced in two press releases by our department on August 9, 1951, and August 24, 1951.
As a result of that check, Mr. Speaker, our confidence in Mr. Norman's loyalty was not weakened in any respect. Nothing he has done since has affected-unless to increase- the confidence we have in him as a devoted, efficient and loyal official of the government, who is doing extremely important work at a very difficult post in a way which commanded my wholehearted admiration and deserves my full support. These slanders and unsupported insinuations against him contained in this United States senatorial subcommittee report we can treat with the contempt they deserve.



VETERANS AFFAIRS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Elmore Philpoil (Vancouver South):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to address a question to the Minister of National Revenue. Is the minister aware of a serious error in the eleven o'clock C.B.C. television news report last night, in which it was inaccurately stated that the budget provides increases in war veterans pensions of $6 a month? Will the C.B.C. take steps to correct that mistake today and let all disabled war veterans know that the increase for a total disability pensioner is actually from $170 to $200 a month?


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I do not think this is the type of question that should be asked of the government. The hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre.



INQUIRY AS TO INCREASE IN ALLOWANCE FOR SINGLE RECIPIENTS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Minister of Finance. Can the minister say whether it is true that no increase is to be provided for single recipients of war veterans allowance?


Hon. Hugues Lapointe (Minister of Veterans Affairs):: There has been no increase in the rate of the single recipient of war
[Mr. Pearson.l

veterans allowance; there is a raise in the ceiling on permissible income; but I might point out that the rate is $60 at the present time, which was the amount asked for by the veterans organizations.



CANADA ELECTIONS ACT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. T. S. Barnett (Comox-Alberni):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Finance. Is it the intention of the government to introduce legislation at this session to reduce the voting age to 13 years in view of the removal of the tax on chocolate bars, soft drinks and chewing gum?


Mr. Pickersgill:: That was asked last night.


Stanley Howard Knowles: And we got no answer.


Walter Edward Harris: I know the question is half facetious, but I would point out that chocolate is considered a food by adults as well.


Mr. Sinclair:: And bubble gum also.



PENSIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the Minister of Finance a question. Is the government still considering doing something at this session for retired civil servants?


Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Speaker, the retired civil servants do benefit by the increase in the old age pension announced last night, if they are within the age limits referred to, and most of them are; but to answer the question directly, the answer is yes, we are giving consideration to all these questions and will continue to do so.



POULTRY


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Right Hon. J. G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture):: Mr. Speaker, yesterday the hon. member for Brant-Haldimand asked me this question:
Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the Minister of Agriculture a question. Is the minister aware that a Canadian company is importing from the United States turkeys packaged under a Canadian brand name?


James Garfield Gardiner: No, Mr. Speaker, I was not aware of that. I will make inquiry.
I have made inquiries and find that it is common practice for Canadian importers of food, and many other commodities for that matter, to have their products packed in the country of origin under the brand name of the Canadian importer.
Imported turkeys must have been processed under conditions approved by the health of animals division of the Department of Agriculture. They must also meet Canadian grade standards and, of course, pay the import duty.
There is, in short, no law or regulation which would prevent any importer from labelling imported goods with his own brand provided the goods pay the established rate of duty and meet the conditions applying to imported goods.


Mr. W. B. Nesbitt (Oxford):: Mr. Speaker, a question supplementary to the minister's reply: Does the minister not agree that this practice deceives the Canadian buying public?


James Garfield Gardiner: I understand it is the practice of the trade everywhere that when an importer does import goods, rather than have to repack them they are packed in the way the importing country requires before he can distribute them in the country to which they are imported.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. R. Pearkes (Esquimalt-Saanich):: May I ask the Minister of National Defence whether he would inform the house now what code of discipline governs our troops serving in the Middle East? Would a Canadian soldier accused of a breach of discipline be tried by a Canadian or a United Nations court?


Hon. R. O. Campney (Minister of National Defence):: I think, Mr. Speaker, I would prefer to answer the question when I have perused the relevant agreement which has been under negotiation for some months and which I understand has just recently been concluded.


George Randolph Pearkes: I asked the question some months ago.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Lester Bowles Pearson: That this house do now adjourn and that, in order to permit a debate on external affairs, standing order 32 (2) shall be suspended in relation thereto.
External Affairs
He said: Mr. Speaker, in recent weeks a great many questions, all of them without notice and many of them heavy with inference, have been addressed to the government dealing with the situation in the Middle East and it is with that situation that I propose to deal this morning as best 1 can and in the process I hope to answer the questions which have been addressed to the government.
This Middle East problem has been almost continuously before the United Nations Assembly since I spoke to this house on external affairs last November and that consideration by the United Nations I think has helped not only to bring the fighting to an end in that area but to prevent the conflict breaking out again or even worse spreading. That consideration by the United Nations, moreover, would have been impossible if the policy advocated last November by the official opposition in this house had been adopted at New York.


Mr. Fulion:: It would not have been
necessary.


Lester Bowles Pearson: The United Nations Assembly of course has its limitations as I have already shown and will try to show again in this discussion. There is no use asking it to do things it cannot do or for which it has no mandate under the charter. Therefore there is no use blaming it if it does not do the impossible. It is also wrong, as I have said before, to use the United Nations as an excuse for national shortcomings and hesitations or as an escape from national responsibility even though these should be discussed and when possible discharged through the United Nations.
The United Nations is no substitute for wise national policy or for close co-operation between friends and allies. It supplements, and essentially supplements, but it cannot replace these necessities. There is no particular value therefore in saying, "Let the United Nations do it", unless we accept the obligation to do our best to make that possible by wise national decisions inside and outside the United Nations.
Mr. Speaker, before dealing with some of the details of this problem I would like for a moment to endeavour to put it in perspective.
The problem we have been discussing and trying to solve in New York is merely one aspect of the whole problem of the Middle East. That general problem would be with us if there never had been any trouble over the Suez or over Palestine last October. It comes from the rise of nationalism in the Middle East and from what seems at times to be a morbid preoccupation and suspicion of the people in that area, a suspicion they have of the people who once ruled them; it comes

External Affairs
also from the impatience of these people in the Middle East to convert political freedom into economic and social progress and more fundamentally it comes from the pressure especially in Egypt of a rapidly growing population on the productive resources of the country which cannot keep pace with that increased population.
There is also, and we are now getting closer to the immediate difficulties, the bitter and at times seemingly insoluble problem of the relations between Israel and her Arab neighbours which came to a head in the explosion of last October.
Since that time the United Nations has brought about a cease fire and has established an agency for securing and supervising that cease fire. How that was done was discussed in the house last November. Since that time the United Nations has been considering the withdrawal of Israel from Egypt. There has been agreement from the beginning in New York with this withdrawal in principle, but it has been difficult to convert that agreement in principle into one of practice, whether the agreement should be unconditional or whether it should be conditional.
The house will remember that after the withdrawal of United Kingdom and French forces from Fort Said last December the forces of Israel also withdrew from all Egypt or Egyptian administered territories except the points Sharm al-Shaikh on the strait of Tiran and the Gaza strip. Israel for some time was unable to withdraw her forces from those two places without assurances, first, about navigation in the strait of Tiran and the gulf of Aqaba and, second, that Gaza was not to be returned to a situation where it could be used as it had been used previously as a base for attack on Israel.
Egypt and the other Arab and a great many Asian states refused to consider at the assembly any arrangement on these matters, or even at times to discuss them, until a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces had been effected. They refused to agree that the United Nations emergency force could be used in any sense as an occupation force, particularly India and Yugoslavia which were supplying strong and effective contingents to this force held strong views on that point and their views are important. The Arab-Asian group also refused to accept at the United Nations assembly any change in the armistice arrangements of some years ago between Egypt and Israel concerning the Gaza strip while permitting Isreal to benefit from other provisions of that armistice arrangement. As for the gulf of Aqaba and the strait of Tiran the Arab-Asian group, or most of them, felt that freedom of navigation

there would depend on the legal status of the gulf and the strait, the waters of which some of them considered to be not international but territorial.
Those two positions were far apart and it would have been difficult for the United Nations to reconcile them even if there had been a maximum of good will or mutual understanding between the conflicting sides, and it is an understatement to say that there was no such good will.
The Canadian position has I think been consistent from the beginning. From our very first statement at the United Nations assembly last November we took position then and we have maintained it since that the withdrawal of Israeli forces and arrangements following that withdrawal were related and that one could not be discussed or decided without taking into consideration the other.
For us it was not a question of rewarding Israel for something she might have done by force last October; it was not a question of allowing her to lay down formal conditions governing her withdrawal. It was a question of whether we should not take action in our own interest, and in the interest of the United Nations and of peace, to see that the former conditions in that area-conditions of fear, insecurity and conflict-were not restored.
Our delegation preferred a single resolution to bring this about, with provisions, first, for withdrawal and, later in the same resolution, for arrangements to follow withdrawal. We were trying to do that, to draft a program, and a resolution based on that program, which in our opinion would have been fair to both sides, but we were told it would not be possible to secure the necessary two-thirds majority of the assembly for any such resolution. The United States was particularly hesitant about the prospects of securing agreement with regard to a resolution of that kind, and we were warned that if we put forward such a resolution, and it failed to secure two-thirds of the votes of the assembly, the net result would be bad. We did not entirely accept that position, but we did agree that there was no possibility of securing a two-thirds majority for a resolution of that nature if the United States did not actively support it. And in the result, as hon. members know, on February 2 a second resolution, short and not too specific, was passed on arrangements to follow withdrawal.
Israel hesitated to withdraw her forces from Sharm al-Shaikh and the Gaza strip on these vague and somewhat ambiguous assurances

which could be and, indeed, were interpreted in different ways by different members of the assembly.
That delay after February 2 on the part of Israel to withdraw her forces occasioned by the causes I have indicated, was met by the tabling of an Arab resolution for sanctions, that is, for force to bring about withdrawal. Sanctions can be economic; they can be financial; and, indeed, they can be military. And we ought to know now from the lesson of the league of nations in the thirties, in connection with the Italo-Abys-sinian conflict, unless there is strong and general agreement to see sanctions through to the end, even if that end might be military action, and if there is not the necessary willingness to take national action to enforce sanctions, then it is idle, even worse than idle, to consider applying them.
Our position when the sanctions resolution was tabled at the United Nations assembly was that we were opposed to sanctions as being unjustified, as impracticable, as unlikely to accomplish the purposes which they had in mind, and as a recognition of the failure of negotiation, which we thought was premature.
And so we-our delegation-put forward our own proposals on February 26-certain positive proposals which we thought would accomplish the purpose we had in mind. I will come back to them later; what I am trying to give now is the chronological story of what happened in New York.
After this sanctions resolution was tabled, with no agreement on a resolution of the kind I have indicated with regard to arrangements to follow withdrawal, the matter was moved to Washington for discussions through diplomatic channels between representatives of Israel, the United States and France. As a result of those discussions, Israel was persuaded to withdraw her forces both civil and military from Sharm al-Shaikh and the Gaza area-not on assurances contained in any assembly resolution, except that of February 2, but on certain assumptions and expectations which the government of Israel made at that time and which were announced to the General Assembly.
What were these? They are very important in attempting to understand what is going on there now. They were put to the assembly in a statement by the foreign minister of Israel on March 1-these assumptions and expectations. One was that the gulf of Aqaba and the straits of Tiran would be considered as international waters, and that there would be free and innocent passage for all shipping through them, and that the United States government would support this
External Affairs
proposition. Second, that the United Nations emergency force would move into the Sharm al-Shaikh area and not be moved out of that area until the matter had been considered by the assembly advisory committee of seven. Then in respect of Gaza which was the danger point at the moment, Mrs. Meir laid down these assumptions:
(a)	That on its withdrawal the United Nations forces will be deployed-
That is the withdrawal of the Israeli force. -in Gaza and that the take over-
And I emphasize the words "take over". -of Gaza from the military and civilian control of Israel will be exclusively by the United Nations emergency force.
(b)	It is further Israel's expectation that the United Nations will be the agency to be utilized for carrying out the functions enumerated by the Secretary General, namely:-
They were enumerated in one of his earlier reports and he outlined them as follows:
"safeguarding life and property in the area by providing efficient and effective police protection; as will guarantee good civilian administration; as will assure maximum assistance to the United Nations refugee program; and as will protect and foster the economic development of the territory and its people".
And then said Mrs. Meir:
(c)	It is further Israel's expectation that the aforementioned responsibility of the United Nations in the administration of Gaza-
Not for the administration of Gaza but in the administration of Gaza.
-will be maintained for a transitory period from the takeover until there is a peace settlement, to be sought as rapidly as possible, or a definitive agreement on the future of the Gaza strip.
And she concluded by saying this:
It Is the position of Israel-
And this is important in the context of the present situation.
-that if conditions are created in the Gaza strip which indicate a return to the conditions of deterioration which existed previously Israel would reserve its freedom to act to defend its rights.
These were the assumptions and expectations laid down by the government of Israel on the basis of which they withdrew, and withdrew very quickly, all their forces, civil and military, from the Gaza strip. When I say they withdrew very quickly I mean that they withdrew with great speed after the decision was made.
The Canadian position with regard to this statement of Mrs. Meir was that, as we understood them, her assumptions and expectations were reasonable. The United States position, as stated by Ambassador Lodge on March 1, is as follows:
. . . For the most part the declarations constitute, as we understand it, restatements of what has already been said by this assembly or by the

External Affairs
Secretary General in his reports, of hopes and expectations which seem to us not unreasonable in the light of the prior actions of this assembly.
This 'statement of Mr. Lodge was followed by an extremely important communication of March 2 from President Eisenhower to the Prime Minister of Israel which may have been decisive in bringing about the withdrawal. I quote from that letter of President Eisenhower as follows:
It has always been the view of this government-
That is the government of the United States.
-that after the withdrawal there should be a united effort by all of the nations to bring about conditions in the area-
That is the Gaza area.
-more stable, more tranquil and more conducive to the general welfare than those which existed heretofore.
Hopes and expectations based thereon were voiced by your foreign minister and others.
Then said President Eisenhower:
I believe that it is reasonable to entertain such hopes and expectations and I want you to know that the United States, as a friend of all of the countries of the area and as a loyal member of the United Nations will seek that such hopes prove not to be in vain.
That is from President Eisenhower's letter of March 2. Mr. Speaker, those are the views as to what should be done. But the terrific responsibility of putting those views into action has been placed largely on the shoulders of the Secretary General of the United Nations. It is therefore important to try to understand what authority, under the resolutions that we have accepted, the Secretary General has for that purpose because very much indeed is left to him. We therefore are obliged to fall back on that resolution of February 2 which I have mentioned and leave it to the Secretary General to interpret that resolution and to implement arrangements based on it. That is going to be difficult for him to do. But if any man can do it, I think it is the Secretary General of the United Nations who is a man of devotion, integrity, amazing industry and diplomatic skill and fair minded. However, Mr. Speaker, this is not, I admit, too satisfactory a procedure though it may be the best possible that the United Nations Assembly was able to obtain having regard to the fact that a two-thirds majority of the assembly must be achieved for any resolution.
Let us then go back and see what are the responsibilities of the United Nations which the Secretary General is now to do his best to make effective; and I believe he is leaving tomorrow for the Middle East for that purpose. We stated in this house these responsibilities or these functions as laid down by
[Mr. Pearson.!
the general assembly resolutions, on November 27, beginning I think at page 61 of Hansard. We then pointed out in this house that these responsibilities were laid down or outlined in the Secretary General's report of November 6, which is the guiding document in this matter, especially paragraph 12 of that report. That report can be found on page 13 of the white paper dealing with the story of the Middle East already tabled in this house. Paragraph 12, the important paragraph of that report which contains the basic terms of reference for the Secretary General with regard to United Nations responsibility and particularly the functions of the United Nations emergency force, reads as follows:
. . . The functions of the United Nations force would be, when a cease-fire is being established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian government, in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of nonEgyptian troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the resolution of November 2, 1956.
It is therefore important to remember what were those other terms of the resolution of November 2. They were also given to the house by me in my statement on November 27 and 29 and they are also quoted on page 8 of the white paper. This resolution of November 2, which is basic in this connection- and it will be recalled that we were criticized by the official opposition for not voting against this resolution-includes the following provisions which should be recalled:
1.	Urges as a matter of priority that all parties now involved in hostilities in the area agree to an immediate cease-fire and as part thereof halt the movement of military forces and arms into the area;
2.	Urges the parties to the armistice agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines into neighbouring territory, and to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreements;
3.	Recommends that all members refrain from introducing military goods in the area of hostilities and in general refrain from any acts which would delay or prevent the implementation of this resolution;-
And finally:
-4. Urges that upon the cease-fire being effective steps be taken to reopen the Suez canal and restore secure freedom of navigation; . . .
These functions as outlined by the secretary general in his report and based on the resolution of November 2 were approved by a resolution of the general assembly of November 7; and that resolution reaffirms the necessity for a scrupulous observance of the Israeli-Egyptian armistice terms. That reaffirmation was given again by the assembly in a resolution on February 2, passed by a vote of 56 to nothing, including the votes of the United Kingdom and the United States. This resolution of February 2, this reaffirmation of the scrupulous observance of the

armistice terms, also included provisions that the United Nations emergency force was to be deployed on the Egyptian-Israeli demarcation line, and for the implementation of other measures included in the secretary general's report of a few weeks before, January 24, I think.
This report of January 24 by the secretary general, which was endorsed unanimously by the general assembly and is binding on the secretary general because of that unanimous endorsation including the votes of the United Kingdom and the United States, emphasizes that there can be no change in the legal situation under the armistice agreement until the parties to that agreement accept such a change. This report states also that the general assembly can only recommend; it cannot establish any United Nations administration of Gaza, and that that recommendation, to be effective, would require negotiations with Egypt. Now, there have been no further resolutions laying down the function to be performed by the secretary general in carrying out the earlier resolutions. Therefore, this one of February 2 is decisive in this connection.
Our own position in regard to this matter was made clear on February 26. At that time we took the position that an arrangement to follow the withdrawal of the Israeli forces should be spelled out in a resolution and not merely deduced from the secretary-general's reports. We put out in considerable detail what we thought should be included in any such plan or resolution. It should include, first, observance of the armistice; second, deployment of United Nations emergency force in Gaza on both sides of the armistice line; third, there should be no interference with innocent passage through the straits of Tiran pending determination of the legal position of those waters; fourth, we made certain proposals for Gaza. This is such an important point on the map at present that I should like to go into that matter, Mr. Speaker, in somewhat more detail in elaborating the proposals we made at the assembly. It will, I think, if I can go into it in detail, remove some of the misconceptions about this particular problem.
Legally, as I have stated, responsibility for the civil administration of Gaza, under the Egyptian-Israeli armistice agreement of 1949, lies with Egypt. However, in planning for the restoration of civil administration following the withdrawal of Israel forces from the area, we stated our views to the general assembly at that time-this view was shared by a great many other delegations and indeed I think by the secretary general himself

 that there were important practical considerations which qualified or should qualify this
External Affairs
legal position. We have an extremely explosive situation in a small and crowded area where there are about 300,000 people, and perhaps 260,000 of them are refugees. It should be recognized, we thought, that this situation might very easily get out of control, and accordingly we considered-this was also the feeling of other members of the assembly

that the United Nations should accept, and Egypt should agree to the acceptance of, responsibility to the maximum possible extent for establishing and maintaining effective civil administration of the Gaza strip. This arrangement, of course, would have to be without prejudice to the legal rights of Egypt in the territory under the armistice agreement, and would be provisional, pending final agreement on the proper disposition of Gaza which has never, since the creation of the state of Israel, belonged to the sovereign territory of any state.
The words we used in the assembly in putting forward this program are on the record, Mr. Speaker. Perhaps I could quote one paragraph from our statement. On February 26 I said at the assembly:
After Israel's withdrawal, the United Nations should, in our view and by agreement with Egypt, accept responsibility to the maximum possible extent for establishing and maintaining effective civil administration in the territory; in fostering economic development and social welfare, in maintaining law and order. The United Nations relief and works administration is already there, with an experienced and efficient administrative nucleus. The United Nations could also provide other help through United Nations technical assistance machinery, the resources of its secretariat, and expert consultants recruited for special purposes. In this way there would be built up in Gaza, in co-operation with Egypt and with Israel, a United Nations civil administration.
We had a resolution drafted which would have put that program before the assembly but we did not attempt to bring it forward because, as I have indicated, there was a feeling on the part of certain delegations that it would not get the necessary two-thirds majority.
It is my view, Mr. Speaker, and I hope that this view will prove to be well founded, that we have now entered a phase in which progress may be made towards the objective of finding a suitable balance between the practical position of the United Nations and the legal position of Egypt in the administration of Gaza, an objective which was sought but never found at the recent session of the general assembly. As I have said, the secretary general himself is going to the area tomorrow in search of such an understanding. It is a mission of great responsibility and delicacy, fraught with consequences for the peace of that area. So far as the

External Affairs
Canadian government is concerned, and I am sure so far as this house is concerned, we would not wish to do anything to complicate the secretary general's task by anything we might say here. I wish to reiterate, however, that our opinion is that, subject to the legal right of Egypt under the armistice agreement, and until those rights are altered, the United Nations and the United Nations emergency force have an important, indeed an essential role to play in the administration of that area.
Any policy or any action or any arrangement whereby the United Nations was refused Egyptian co-operation in the discharge of that role or in which the United Nations was denied a substantive responsibility for carrying out the purpose of ensuring peace and security in the Gaza strip, any arrangement of that kind which included non-co-operation on the part of the single government most concerned, the government of Egypt, would be doomed to failure.


John George Diefenbaker: Will the minister allow a question? Does the government of Canada recognize the sovereignty of Egypt over the Gaza strip?


Lester Bowles Pearson: No, Mr. Speaker, I have already stated that no single power has sovereignty over the Gaza strip. Under the armistice arrangement between Egypt and Israel, which was endorsed by the United Nations, the responsibility for the civil administration of that strip was placed in Egypt's hands and that is where it is now legally, under the armistice agreement which has been endorsed unanimously by the recent assembly of the United Nations. Any effort, however, on any government's part to interfere with the practical necessity of United Nations action in the Gaza strip at the present time would, I think, be inconsistent with the basis of free co-operation which must underlie the discharge of United Nations responsibility in that area. It would deny to the area, and indeed to the people of both Egypt and Israel, the great practical benefits which could develop if the United Nations and its agencies were given a fair chance to make their contribution to the welfare and security of that unsettled region.
This situation, Mr. Speaker, in the Gaza strip points up, I think, the importance of a clear understanding of the relationship between Egypt and the United Nations emergency force, and I should like to say a few words about that.
There have been a good many questions in this house. It is true, I dealt with this matter at some length in the house on November 27, and I also referred to it in the white paper, at page 13, which I have mentioned.

We have from the very beginning, from the first statement of the Canadian delegate in New York on November 7, underlined the difficulties as well as the importance of this first United Nations emergency force. There is great hope in it for the future if it succeeds on this occasion, but it is an experiment and new ground, hard ground at times, is being broken. We have no illusions, and have had no illusions about the problems it would encounter. Cynicism has been expressed by some members in this house about this force and there have been jibes from some quarters in this house about the nature of Canadian participation in the force. But whatever the future may hold for this force, I think it is fair to say that the United Nations emergency force has already performed an absolutely indispensable role in securing and supervising the cease-fire, in preventing a recurrence of conflict, or the spreading of that conflict when it began.
Some weeks ago, General Burns wrote me a personal letter from his headquarters acknowledging a further contingent of supporting units that were going forward from Canada for the United Nations emergency force. In that letter he stated that the Canadians already in the force had made "all the difference in the world in the efficient operation of the administrative side of the military effort." He added that he "just could not have done without them." He also said, Mr. Speaker, that the R.C.A.F. element in his force had worked long hours in arduous conditions and deserved very great credit for its efficiency and devotion to duty.
There has been some argument about the status of this force. The government from the outset has accepted the guiding principle, included in the secretary general's report of last November, and specifically endorsed by the general assembly, that the United Nations assembly could not request the force to be stationed or operate on the territory of a given country without the consent of the government of that country. The rights of sovereignty of the country in the circumstances under discussion could not be infringed upon by other states, even acting through the United Nations assembly, which has no power in fact so to infringe in contrast with the security council, when actions are being taken by the security council under chapter VII of the charter.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: 'Will the Secretary of State for External Affairs permit a question? Is this resolution not based on the "uniting for peace" resolution, part A?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, Mr. Speaker, all of our action in the United Nations assembly at the special emergency session dealing with this

Middle East crisis was based on the uniting for peace resolution of 1950, which gave the assembly certain functions, and indeed duties in case of deadlock in the security council; but while that is true, it does not alter the fact that under the charter of the United Nations the assembly can do nothing but make recommendations which have to be carried out by the member states after those recommendations have received two-thirds support in the assembly.
Last November 5, Mr. Speaker-and this is important in qualifying what I have just said-the Egyptian government formally conveyed to the secretary general explicit acceptance of the general assembly resolution of that date, which established the United Nations force to perform the tasks which I have already outlined. Egypt's acceptance of this resolution was a voluntary act, by which the Egyptian government imposed on itself a qualification upon the exercise of its sovereignty.
This decision was formally conveyed in an aide-memoire on the basis for the presence and functioning of UNEF in Egypt, an aide-memoire submitted to the general assembly by the secretary general in his report on November 20, and subsequently noted with approval by the assembly. In this aide-memoire, which is also in the white paper to which I referred, I think on page 20, and therefore before the house for some weeks, the terms of which had been agreed between the secretary general and the Egyptian government, the government of Egypt declared:
When exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided, in good faith, by its acceptance of the general resolution of November 5 1956.
This is a quotation from the Egyptian communication. And that declaration was balanced in the aide-memoire by a declaration on the part of the United Nations, through the secretary general, and I quote, that "the activities of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task established for the force" in the resolution of the general assembly, and that-again I quote-"in particular, the United Nations, understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the government of Egypt reaffirms its willingness to maintain the UNEF until its task is completed."
This, then, Mr. Speaker, is the nature of Egypt's consent to the presence and functioning of the United Nations emergency force on Egyptian territory. There has been no infringement on the sovereignty of the government of Egypt by the action of any other government or governments. But in
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the arrangements made and in the agreement which I have referred to, the United Nations, which established this force to do certain tasks, clearly has a right to be consulted as to whether and when these tasks have been discharged, as it would if they were to be extended. From this, it follows in our view, and this is the view of the secretary general also, that if Egypt should at any time make a request for UNEF's withdrawal, the appropriate procedure would be for that request to go first to the advisory committee on UNEF through the secretary general. There it would be discussed by the committee which was set up for that purpose by the assembly, and if necessary and desirable the whole matter could then be referred to the full assembly for decision. And therefore any question of whether UNEF should be withdrawn would become a matter for discussion with and decision by the United Nations. This is this government's understanding of the procedure which should be followed.
Having said that, however, I should add that if Egypt refused to accept the United Nations view that UNEF's task was still unfinished, and that UNEF should not be withdrawn, Egypt would, in our view, be nullifying its acceptance of the assembly's basic resolution establishing the force and laying down its function.
Nevertheless, the assembly does not have any authority under the charter of the United Nations to create binding legal obligations on member states, and Egypt, therefore, could not, in the last resort, be compelled by the United Nations assembly to continue to accept any resolution or to co-operate in carrying it out. The assembly cannot force its view on any state although in certain contingencies the security council can attempt to do that.
Mr. Speaker, the Canadian position on this matter has already been stated to the general assembly, to the advisory committee, on more than one occasion and was given to the house on November 27. In case there is any doubt as to what our position is on this matter I will have another opportunity to state it to the secretary general and the advisory committee either late tonight or tomorrow morning before the secretary general leaves for Egypt. These statements which we have already made of our general position should make clear that this is the stand we are taking and will take in respect of the reinforcements from Canada to UNEF which have recently gone forward. Although I know I am taking up a great deal of the time of the house perhaps I should go into the question of this

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request for reinforcements which was made some weeks ago, because it is a matter of interest to the house.
The first mention of a reconnaissance squadron for UNEF was on December 4 when our ambassador in Cairo reported that General Burns was sending a message to the secretary general making proposals relating to the Canadian contribution to UNEF. We were told then only that General Burns would find it desirable to have as a combined unit an additional armoured reconnaissance unit or squadron of company size of about 200 men.
Shortly afterwards our permanent mission in New York reported that a representative of the secretary general had informed them that General Burns had urged that a request for a reconnaissance unit from Canada be pursued, that the reconnaissance squadron was urgently needed to supplement the two mechanized companies from Yugoslavia and would be deployed in Sinai. In the second week of December the Canadian permanent mission in New York received a letter from the United Nations formally requesting this additional contribution of the reconnaissance unit to UNEF.
There have been a great many reports of Egyptian objections to the arrival of these Canadian reinforcements. The reports and rumours of these objections will, I feel confident, prove entirely unfounded. I have every hope based on the assurances we have received as recently as the last 24 hours that the Canadian reinforcements will join UNEF in Egypt for duty in the normal way, as indeed I indicated would be the case, I think on March 7, in this house. No interference in this move by any government could be accepted by us as valid and if any attempt to so interfere were successful this would have serious results so far as any further Canadian participation in UNEF is concerned, and therefore it would have serious results for UNEF as a whole. There should be no doubt about this in anyone's mind, but it is a contingency which as I have said I have every reason to believe will not arise based on assurances which have been received.
In taking this position, which I think is a reasonable one, we are concerned about the whole future not only of this particular force but of the United Nations itself as an agency to facilitate and increase international peace and security. I am sure all of us have nothing but good will for the Egyptian people; we are not participating in any manoeuvres of any kind against them; we are not influenced by anything but a desire to make the United Nations and its agency the United Nations emergency force effective for achieving the objectives of the assembly, the objectives of securing and supervising a cease fire and
TMr. Pearson.]
facilitating the establishment of peaceful conditions. In the policy we have been following at the United Nations in these matters our motives are above reproach. Any imputation to the contrary is false and unfair. UNEF is no cloak and will be no cloak for the plans or ambitions of any state or states, and there is no foundation whatever for any suspicions from any source that anyone wishes to use it in that way.
Mr. Speaker, questions have also been asked about the progress of the clearance of the Suez canal and I should therefore say something about that. While our attention has been concentrated for several weeks past on efforts to arrange for completion of the withdrawal of Israeli forces and on UNEF this other major enterprise, the clearing of the Suez canal, has been going forward. The clearing of the Suez canal under United Nations supervision has been proceeding in accordance with the most optimistic time estimates of the technical officers responsible for its progress. We do not know yet exactly when the resumption of a full flow of traffic will be possible but we are informed that if the present rate of progress is maintained a channel capable of taking ships of more that 25 feet draught will be opened very shortly, in a matter of days. We are told also that the clearing of marginal obstacles and restoration of full navigational facilities has made much better progress than had been originally scheduled, in spite of political difficulties which have understandably attracted so much attention.
As the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) told the house last Monday, Canada has acquired a special interest in the steps being taken to reopen the canal by virtue of the advance-not the gift but the advance on good 'security'-that the government has made toward the financing of the United Nations clearing operations.
Canada, of course, is not a large user of the canal but we are naturally anxious, as a trading nation, for the earliest possible resumption of the Suez traffic which is so vital to the economies of the many user states. Our participation in the advances made to the United Nations and the work that this interim financing has made possible was also of particular assistance to the United Kingdom and France at that time, and that was the main reason why we participated in that interim financing; and that is a reason which presumably should commend itself to hon. members opposite.
As hon. members know, certain proposals for provisional operating arrangements for the canal pending the working out of a permanent regime have been agreed upon

between the governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, France and Norway and these proposals have been passed on to the government of Egypt through the secretary general. They are to the effect that the international bank or the United Nations itself should act as a neutral agent for receiving canal tolls of which 50 per cent should be paid to Egypt immediately and the balance held pending determination of its disbursement under a definitive Suez settlement.
As far as I know, the Egyptian government has not yet given its reply to these proposals but the secretary general is in touch with them on the matter and I have no doubt that is one of the questions he will be discussing on his visit to Cairo.
While Canada of course was not involved in the discussions which led up to the formulation of the proposals now before the government of Egypt, I may say we consider that these proposals are sound and offer a reasonable basis for agreed arrangements under which regular canal traffic might be resumed, and we hope that early agreement on such arrangements will be possible. The importance of that to us all is obvious. The arrangements that were agreed last October at the security council provide for the free and non-discriminatory and secure transit through the Suez canal for ships of all states, and in all states I include the state of Israel. We indicated our support for those arrangements in this house last summer.
From what I have said I think it will be clear that our general policy on these matters at the United Nations and elsewhere has been based on the negotiation of differences. Success in such negotiation is not of course possible if through timidity we give in to unwarranted pressures, but on the other hand it is not assisted by abuse of or hissing at any of the governments or personages involved with whom we have to negotiate. Such abuse is an easy escape for emotions, but it hinders rather than helps the search for acceptable solutions which will avoid the use of force. Indeed it often helps to make force unavoidable by provoking wild and angry reactions. Nor is the use of violent language necessarily an indication of either strength or conviction on the part of the person who uses that language.
To state, as has been done, that this gov-erment has said anything or has done anything which would condone the use of force in this or any other matter unless that force is justified as self-defence, individual or collective, under the charter of the United Nations, is a misrepresentation of our position and is denied by every act and every
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statement on the record of the United Nations or elsewhere. To attempt to explain some alleged and imaginary change in Canada's attitude toward the use of force in the Middle East by tying that fictitious change to the new Eisenhower doctrine for United States policy in the Middle East is a misrepresentation not only of Canadian policy but of the Eisenhower doctrine itself.
It has been stated over the air by the hon. member for Digby-Annapolis-Kings (Mr. Nowlan) that the United States policy to which I have referred is, and I quote from the text of his broadcast which I have received:
If there should be communist aggression in. the Near East, American troops-acting on their own- would intervene.
That is the end of the quotation. That is also a distortion of the meaning of the Eisenhower doctrine and it does no good to co-operation between friends or to the effort to avoid conflict. I am sorry the hon. member is not in the house but I suggest he should read the congressional resolution on the subject, the pertinent paragraph of which is as follows:
The United States regards as vital to the national interest and world peace the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. To this end, if the President determines the necessity thereof, the United States is prepared to use armed forces to assist any such nation or group of such nations requesting assistance against armed aggression from any country controlled by international communism: provided that such employment shall be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States and with the constitution of the United States.
That is a paragraph from the resolution. How will the President of the United States determine this necessity? What measures will he put into operation after the determination is made, and how will he do it? Well, the president has already made himself perfectly clear on this point, and I commend his statement to hon. members opposite. Here is his statement to congress when he submitted his resolution':
These measures would have to be consonant with the treaty obligations of the United States, including the charter of the United Nations and with any action or recommendations of the United Nations. They would also, if armed attack occurred, be subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations security council in accordance with the charter.
To say that that doctrine, as stated by the president and accepted by congress, would justify unilateral action by the United States in the Middle East under the circumstances suggested by my hon. friend is not a correct interpretation of the United States doctrine. It may have its weaknesses, but that is certainly not one of them. That is one charge, that we have abandoned our earlier position

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because of an alleged new United States doctrine. This criticism is of course linked with the more general allegation made by some hon. members opposite that at the United Nations and elsewhere we have been the chore boy, the satellite, the follower or whatever you wish to call it, of the United States. Well, the record can speak for itself and it is far more impressive as evidence than any gibes can be.
For instance, on nine important substantive resolutions concerning the Middle East at the current United Nations assembly we voted with the United States, or perhaps I should say the United States voted with us six times and they did not vote with us three times. That does not indicate that we were a very docile satellite. In addition we rejected a United States invitation to sponsor a resolution on February 2 because we thought it did not go far enough in providing for United Nations arrangements after the Israeli withdrawal. We let the United States delegation know quite clearly that we would vote against the Arab resolution of sanctions against Israel, whatever they might do.
So let some of those who charge us with tagging after Washington at the United Nations and not co-operating with the United Kingdom go down to New York and talk to the members of the United States and United Kingdom delegations to the assembly, or go to Washington and talk to the state department or to members of the national press club.
The fact is that the policy which this government formulates and follows in foreign affairs is a Canadian policy determined by Canadian interests and Canadian considerations, the greatest of which is peace. When I say that, I do not mean that our policy is or can be an exclusive or isolationist policy. The greatest Canadian national interest, as I have said, in this thermonuclear age is peace and we know that there can be no guarantee of peace through national policy alone or no assurance of security from national isolation. So we have to work with our friends and we try to do that.
The third charge, which has been dealt with previously in this house and which has been repeated lately by the official opposition and therefore I think should be mentioned, is that because of our actions in recent months we have indicated we are no true believers in the commonwealth associations because we did not go "down the line"-that was the phrase used-with the United Kingdom last autumn, the consequences of doing which I have mentioned already in this house.

The hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green) accused us the other night-my notes have an interesting misprint because they say "The hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra accursed us the other night"-I certainly would not accuse the hon. member of that because he is always courteous in his accusations-over the air, and I quote from the record of his broadcast, of "knifing" Britain-


Mr. Green:: That is exactly what you did.


Lester Bowles Pearson: -and France and Israel in the back last autumn.


Howard Charles Green: That is exactly what you did.


Lester Bowles Pearson: We will see about that. And of jumping in to attack the mother country when we tried to bring about a solution to the problem through United Nations action and particularly through setting up the United Nations emergency force.


Howard Charles Green: On a question of privilege. I do not mind the minister quoting what I said, but I wish he would do so correctly. I did not say that about the United Nations emergency force. As he knows, we supported the sending of it.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member merely said we knifed the United Kingdom and France in the back last autumn by the policy we adopted at the United Nations.


Mr. Hodgson:: That's right.


Howard Charles Green: If the minister wants to quote me, let him quote exactly what I said.


Clayton Wesley Hodgson: Tell the truth.


Howard Charles Green: I said that Canada's action by jumping into the lead-


Lester Bowles Pearson: Very well; I accept that correction, and say that the hon. member accuses us of knifing the United Kingdom and France in the back by jumping into the lead to adopt the policy we followed. The hon. member has also indicated his support for the United Nations emergency force, but I point out once again that if we had adopted the policy advocated by his party last autumn there would have been no United Nations emergency force.
The reason for that is perfectly clear, because we were accused, by the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton), for instance, of lining up with the Russians because we voted against the United Kingdom when they tried to get this matter off the agenda. And if it had been got off the agenda, how could there have been a United Nations emergency force?


Mr. Ferguson:: Does the minister agree with the attitude of Australia and New Zealand on the subject, or does he disagree?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I am dealing at the moment with the Canadian attitude. I will come to the attitude of the other governments in a few moments.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, the version of this matter given by the hon. member for Digby-Annapolis-Kings (Mr. Nowlan)-and I am quoting from his broadcast-was that we had seriously damaged our commonwealth of nations. Well, Mr. Speaker, the house knows what happened, and I will not repeat the details because they have been given in the house. The United Kingdom took certain military action which seemed completely justified to it, and which we have not condemned but which we have regretted-certain military action which came as a complete surprise, and which was taken without any advance notice to other members of the commonwealth or to the United States.
And now I am dealing with the division of the commonwealth, and the accusation that we seriously damaged the commonwealth by bringing about this division. Three Asian members of the commonwealth strongly opposed this action from the beginning, and therefore the commonwealth was, in truth, seriously split and damaged. There is no doubt about that. This is a fact, incidentally, which would have made it somewhat of a feat for the Canadian government to support the commonwealth on this issue, as we have been criticized for not doing, except on the assumption, which we, at least, will not make, that four-fifths of its population should be excluded.


Howard Charles Green: You could have waited.


Lester Bowles Pearson: The division of the commonwealth on this issue is shown by the voting on the basic resolution of November 2 which urged a cease fire in the Suez. Three of the 64 members supporting that resolution were from the commonwealth; three of the six members opposing that resolution were from the commonwealth, and two of those abstaining were from the commonwealth. We were split all right, Mr. Speaker.
And what did Canada try to do?


An hon. Member:: Nothing.


Lester Bowles Pearson: We tried to bring the commonwealth together, and played our part in preserving peace by initiating a proposal for United Nations action on which all members of the commonwealth and of the western coalition could agree, and did agree; and in doing so to prevent a widening and deepening
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of the breach between the members of those two groups on whose unity and strength today peace so largely depends.
To the Conservative party, however, this is taken as seriously damaging the commonwealth. They opposed this policy of ours at the United Nations last autumn, and we accept their opposition as an important division between the two parties on this point.


Mr. Fleming:: Hear, hear.


Lester Bowles Pearson: But before I conclude, let us see how our policy is regarded in other countries. In the United Kingdom it has been warmly praised by such organs of opinion-and none of these reflect the views of the Labour Party, whose position on this matter is well known-it has been warmly praised in the Manchester Guardian, the London Times, the Spectator, and the Economist, to mention only a few.
As recently as yesterday, the Daily Telegraph, a newspaper which strongly supported the United Kingdom government's intervention last October, had this to say editorially, and I quote:
No country has grown in international stature so swiftly and markedly as Canada has done during the Middle East crisis. Her role in the United Nations has been of dual importance. At the outset, she assumed there a commonwealth leadership that Britain, as a party "in the dock", was temporarily debarred from exercising. In the subsequent shaping of United Nations policy, Canada tried to temper with realism the legalism into which the assembly was forced by Afro-Asian rigidity and United States timidity. Hers has often been a lonely voice of reason, crying in a wilderness of fantasy, "expectations" and "assumptions".
That, Mr. Speaker, is from the London Daily Telegraph.


An hon. Member:: A leading Tory paper.


Clayton Wesley Hodgson: You certainly have been a voice crying in the wilderness.


Lester Bowles Pearson: We shall hear your voice later. As for the suggestion that we "knifed France in the back", this is what the Prime Minister of France, Mr. Mollet, had to say here in the House of Commons a week ago last Monday, and I quote his words:
Whatever may have been our disagreements at one moment, I must underline the positive character and extreme usefulness of the initiatives taken by the Canadian government, how its interventions, always animated by the most friendly spirit, have often been decisive.
And then, Mr. Speaker,-


Clayton Wesley Hodgson: Why don't you explain the "superman" speech?

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Lester Bowles Pearson: Then in his final speech before the assembly on March 9, the Israeli spokesman, Mr. Eban, said this:
Our admiration goes out to the delegation of Canada for constantly focusing the attention of the General Assembly upon its affirmative and constructive tasks.
These three countries, Mr. Speaker, do not seem to have realized that they have been "knifed".
I could, of course, quote many expressions of favourable opinion, official and unofficial, from the United States, but they would be suspect in the eyes of hon. members opposite.
Our policy has, I admit, been strongly and, I think, unfairly, criticized from two quarters only: the Egyptian government of Colonel Nasser, and the Conservative party in this House of Commons.
Mr. Speaker, in closing I would just like to say that since last October we have done what we could to secure a peaceful, honourable settlement of immediate issues which would pave the way for the solution of the political problems between Israel and her neighbours-a solution which is essential if further conflict is to be avoided, and which seems so terribly difficult to achieve, unless, of course, one has no direct contact with the problems themselves. At the present moment, as I see it, the essential thing is that both Israel and Egypt should exercise restraint and moderation, and that Egypt should co-operate and not obstruct the United Nations in its efforts to secure and supervise peace and order in the Gaza strip. That is the immediate point of crisis.
Therefore, the government of Egypt is, I think, in honour bound to co-operate-


An hon. Member:: Honour?


Lester Bowles Pearson: In honour bound to cooperate with the United Nations in this task. It is to its own interest to do that. If it does not do that-


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Do what?


Lester Bowles Pearson: -co-operate with the United Nations in this task. That co-operation is essential because the United Nations is operating in a territory in Gaza which legally is under the administration of the government of Egypt. Try to accept that fact.


Clayton Wesley Hodgson: It did not belong to Egypt
a few years ago.


Lester Bowles Pearson: If the government of Egypt
does not so co-operate, then it may prevent the United Nations not only from taking on new responsibilities for peace and security but from discharging those which the United Nations has already taken on in respect of 250,000 refugees dependent entirely on the
IMr. Hodgson.]
United Nations and those which it has already taken on in respect of security at the demarkation line. From every point of view, therefore, the government of Egypt should in its own interest as well as in the interest of peace and security give the maximum amount of co-operation to the United Nations in this effort. If it does not do so, I repeat, its action could result in the dissolution of the United Nations emergency force entirely and even in the dissolution of the United Nations relief works agency in Gaza, and that would mean chaos. It could result in the Israeli and Egyptian armies facing each other once again in bitterness and hostility, with nothing between them.
Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe that Egypt -even Egypt, let alone any other country- desires that result. I therefore hope that those powers which have the greatest influence-and I am thinking particularly of the United States-will use that influence forcefully through diplomatic channels and any other channels which may be open to them in Cairo and wherever else is necessary, to help avoid such a disaster. So far as this government is concerned, we will continue to do our best in helping to find a peaceful and just solution for these dangerous and difficult problems.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, many of the questions that were to be answered have remained unanswered in this speech delivered by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson). As he rose to such heights of modesty a few moments ago, I wondered what the other 79 nations at the United Nations had been doing in recent months. There he stood, the boy upon the burning deck, the world situation fraught with fear as it is. There he stood and as he spoke today I could not but think of Chanticleer. You will remember him, Mr. Speaker. He believed that it was his crow that caused the sun to rise. I have listened to my hon. friend through the years and I have regarded his opinions with that measure of responsibility which his position deserves. But in the light of subsequent events I think the remarks that he made today are ones that he will live to regret.


Mr. Mclvor:: No.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


John George Diefenbaker: I would ask my hon.
friends to maintain themselves in silence. We sat here in silence, and I would ask them to maintain silence unless they have questions to ask. Today Nasser once more receives from my hon. friend the accolade which was originally conferred upon him by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) and

the Secretary of State (Mr. Pearson) last fall. What is the situation over there today? All the world is very fearful. The nature of the world situation deserved a less politically partisan speech on the part of the minister.


An hon. Member:: What is yours?


John George Diefenbaker: He seemed to fail to realize how dangerous the situation is although, in one of those perorations which are designed to erase everything, he finally returned, in the last paragraph, to the world situation, dangerous and foreboding as it is. He did not discuss the situation as to whether or not the United Nations should remain in Gaza. He destroyed most of his argument when he said that Egypt had no sovereignty over the Gaza strip. If it has no sovereignty over the Gaza strip then I ask him this question: Why should there be on his part an attitude of tacit approval of the entry of Nasser and his legions to take over the civil administration of that area?
Only yesterday in the House of Commons at Westminster Mr. Lloyd, the foreign secretary, stated that if the Egyptian government intends to take over the administration immediately, there will be fearful results-that by implication-and his suggestion was that the United Nations administrative force remain there. Was there any suggestion on the part of the minister in that connection? Not at all.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Mr. Martin:: It was the whole thesis of his speech.


John George Diefenbaker: It was always Nasser, the man who since last fall has dominated the world as has no one else since the days of Hitler.
My hon. friend sank to a new low when he said that, had the attitude of this party been adopted last fall, the situation would be different for world peace. I say to him this. That statement is false and he knows it.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. I never made any such statement.


John George Diefenbaker: All right.


An hon. Member:: It is on Hansard.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, even a
withdrawal and retraction now is beneficial.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


John George Diefenbaker: Oh, yes. That is the statement. Over and over again we from this part of the house advocated, from January, 1956, the setting up of an international patrol force in the Middle East. That was nothing
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novel when it was introduced by the Secretary of State at the United Nations. It was advocated in the House of Commons in January, 1956, from the official opposition. There was nothing original in that suggestion either; for, when I happened to be there in the Middle East two and a half years ago, on every hand the request was made, not only from those living in Israel but also from those living in Jordan-it being contended that such a force would prevent the forays which were taking place and which would inevitably lead to conflict between the armed forces of those nations. If the United Nations had set up such a body at that time, it might have prevented a continuance of those things which ultimately brought about this terrible situation of last fall.
I am going to refer to the record; for after all, the record since November 26 last, in the answers given in the House of Commons, even as late as last week, reveals a succession of hopes expressed and of statements not in keeping with the facts. Indeed, my hon. friend mentioned the praise that he and this government had received from various sources. Last week several editorials in Britain and in France praised the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) for having stated that if force became necessary it would have to be used.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I never made any such statement.


John George Diefenbaker: I will quote the Prime Minister. Yes, he did. He had to have that revised by my hon. friend the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson).


Mr. Howe (Port Arthur):: Go ahead, quote him.


John George Diefenbaker: I intend to quote more than the right hon. gentleman will like to hear. He received praise for that on his fine statesmanship. He received condemnation for the first time from Nasser. Then, there was the revised statement. There was my hon. friend's speech in Toronto, many sections of which found their place in his speech today and in which the Prime Minister's remarks, while not quoted, were revised in the light of public criticism.
My hon. friend says, let us have the record, and I intend to give him just that. This morning, on the basis of the records of Hansard, my hon. friend tried to leave that -oh, I could designate it-that innuendo, that if our attitude had been adopted, the situation would be different today. Never, never was there a more improper suggestion made by anyone occupying a position of responsibility. Let us go back to November 26, 1956. The question was raised in this

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house about the forces that were going to be set up by the United Nations. We said Nasser is going to determine the membership of those forces. Nasser is going to determine their tour of duty. Nasser is going to determine the length of the tenure of their duty. In the light of subsequent events, Nasser has done just that. Did the Queen's Own sail? Nasser said he did not like their appearance.
On November 26 last the Prime Minister stated, as recorded at page 22 of Hansard for that date:
It is the United Nations that is going to determine the composition of the force going there. It is the United Nations that will determine where in that country the force will be stationed and when and how long it will be there.
This statement has been proven wrong, Mr. Speaker, in the light of experience. All the way along Nasser has said, this we will do and that I will accept; whatever he has chosen to accept has finally been the determinant.
Next, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, speaking on November 27, 1957 as recorded at page 61 of Hansard had this to
say:
This force will stay in Egypt until the United Nations decides that its functions are discharged or, of course, until the governments participating in the force withdraw their contingents. It must, of course, not infringe on the sovereignty of the government of the territory in which it is operating. That is obvious.
This statement has no application to Gaza because today the minister stated there was no sovereignty in Egypt in the Gaza strip.
But the exercise of that sovereignty in the case of the government of Egypt where the force is operating now must be qualified by the acceptance by Egypt of the resolution of the United Nations concerning the force . . .
But that does not mean, as I understand it- and I assure you, Mr. Speaker, this has been made very clear in meetings of the advisory committee-that Egypt or any other government can determine by its own decision where the force is to operate, how it is to operate or when it must leave.
In the light of subsequent events, Nasser has done those three things and done them effectively. He has done them to a degree that we have not seen since those days of the League of Nations when contemptuous disregard was shown to the orders and directions of that body. We found then, and we found subsequently, what will happen in the event a world organization finds itself challenged by the actions of one man.
Then, on November 29, page 168 of Hansard the Secretary of State for External Affairs said:
Those functions under that earlier resolution were to bring about a cease fire, and that has been done; to bring about the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice lines; to desist from raids across the armistice line into neighbouring territory;

to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreement, and to take steps to re-open the Suez canal and to restore and secure freedom of navigation.
In the light of subsequent events, is there anyone who will tell me that Nasser has lived up to these terms? In so far as clearing the Suez canal is concerned, he has been dragging his feet, to use Mr. Dulles' expression. He has been determining who should operate there and when it should be opened. All along the line, Nasser has been in the position of a victorious wrongdoer and, having the U.S.S.R. behind him, has been able to treat the forces of freedom with contempt that amounts to a disgrace.
Then, finally I come down to 1957. On March 6, various questions were asked in this house regarding the situation and the Prime Minister gave answers. The first of these answers is at page 1924 of Hansard for that date, when he used those words which a moment ago he denied:
The Canadian government's demands are being made through the United Nations. It is quite true that unless there is acquiescence-and there should be acquiescence-in the attitudes adopted by the majority of the members of the United Nations the only alternative would be the use of force to overcome resistance, and that is an alternative which I hope it will not become necessary to consider.
There was the statement on the part of the Prime Minister that unless action were properly taken by Nasser force was contemplated. What happened? How was it interpreted? Does a constitutional lawyer have to have a secretary of state for external affairs to interpret the meaning of ordinary words? However, that is exactly what took place. All over the world those words were interpreted as a statement on the part of the Prime Minister that the Canadian government had adopted the policy that, in the event the United Nations orders were not met with, force would be used. The Cairo newspaper stated that the Prime Minister had become an imperialist. Various newspapers across Canada interpreted these words as they could only be interpreted. The Montreal Star, which, over the years, has not been an uncomplimentary supporter of the Prime Minister has an editorial on March 11, headed, "Force at Suez". The only interpretation that could be placed on those words he used here in the house, and which had a very serious effect, was given to them. Here, I have the Prince Edward Island Guardian and the Edmonton Journal. The British newspapers complimented him.
What was the meaning of this statement? There was only one meaning that could possibly be taken from those words, and that was the meaning that was taken by every newspaper in all parts of the world.

The record of the government on this matter in the answers that it has given in the House of Commons has been a hodge podge of inconsistency. The government had one policy one day and a different one the next day, and the answers given to parliament were totally removed from the realities of the situation. On March 6, when asked this question, at page 1928 of Hansard:
May I ask the Prime Minister whether the United Nations force going into the Gaza strip and to the shores of the gulf of Aqaba will be subject to being ordered out by Egypt at any time?
The Prime Minister replied:
That is a question I cannot answer.
Nasser has the 'last word just as we in Canada have the last word about the placing of any armoured forces of other nations in our territory.
With that statement I am not in disagreement, but the Gaza strip is not the territory of Nasser, and has not been at any time. It is territory that was occupied during the war; it was the territory whose boundaries were drawn for armistice purposes, and at no time was there any recognition that the Gaza strip was in fact Egyptian territory.
The Prime Minister's answer continued:
This is something upon which we are very insistent, and I am not surprised that the government of Egypt would be just as insistent.
What is going to happen there? Well, all of us can pray that the optimistic hopes expressed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs that Egypt is suddenly going to become repentent and will adopt a reasonable attitude are true. He says he hopes that Egypt will do that. Is there anything in the record of Egypt particularly since Nasser took charge that in any way would lend credence to the idea that from now on Nasser will become a docile lamb instead of a ravenous individual to whom appeasement is simply support and encouragement to a further challenge of the free world.
I also wish to quote from some of the subsequent answers that were given, indicating the attitude of the government day by day. On March 8 the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green) asked this question, as reported at page 2006 of Hansard:
What is the position of the Canadian government? What does the Canadian government think should be done about this question?
The first question asked by the hon. member was as follows:
Will the Prime Minister tell the house the stand of the Canadian government on the latest blackmailing move by Nasser that only ships paying toll to Egypt will be able to use the Suez canal?
The Prime Minister's reply was:
I do not believe that what the Canadian government thinks matters very much until some Canadian ship is required to pass through the canal. The Canadian government does think that the 82715-150
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proposal made by the principal users is a reasonable proposal. It is now before the Egyptian government and there has not been any answer yet from the Egyptian government.
The Prime Minister gave further answers, but none of the answers to the questions asked were given today as to the current situation. What right has Nasser to determine the question as to whether or not ships shall be permitted free passage through the canal? What stand has Nasser taken relative to the attitude of Egypt since 1949 in refusing the use of the Suez and Aqaba to Israeli ships? These things have not been answered. These were the questions that were asked the other day; these were the questions that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, with evasive agility, managed to back away from in not answering them. These are some of the things we want to know. What are the assurances that have been given in recent days that bring about the hopes of the hon. gentleman that changes will take place on the part of Nasser? We have heard nothing of that, nothing to indicate this change of heart, this contrite attitude, this decision on the part of Nasser to become a responsible member of the United Nations and to live according to international law. Has he given any such representations? Has he made any such promises? And yet, day after day, we hear expressions in the house of the possibility that all will ultimately be well there. It is because of that that I ask the minister to answer this question unequivocally. Has Nasser been given to understand by the United Nations, has Canada taken any stand in that behalf, similar to the stand taken yesterday by the foreign secretary of Britain, that in the interest of maintaining peace and preserving the situation that now exists in consequence of the cease-fire, the United Nations civil administration will continue to occupy and maintain the administration of the civil responsibilities until such time as, in the light of circumstances, the free world may conclude that the challenge by Nasser will indeed have ceased to exist? Yet, we have no such representations and no suggestions. There has been no communication.
When the Prime Minister was asked what representations were made to Nasser the answer was that none had been made.
Then, on March 7, the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra asked the Prime Minister this question, as recorded at page 1958 of Hansard:
May I ask the Prime Minister whether the Canadian government agrees with the stand taken by the Egyptian government or whether it does not?

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That was relative to Egypt's moving into the Gaza strip. The Prime Minister said:
The Canadian government does not agree with that stand taken by the Egyptian government. As I stated yesterday quite clearly the acquiescence of the Egyptian government was obtained for the stationing in Egyptian territory to do a certain job of an emergency force raised by the United Nations.
Pressed over and over again as to what he meant, the answers were continuously indefinite, and those questions have not been answered today. Those questions were the basis upon which the request was made for the debate that is taking place today.
Then, the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) asked a very challenging question. He referred to the statement made by the Prime Minister the day before relating to the use of force, a statement from which the government has been running with hideous abandonment ever since. The hon. member asked this question:
May I direct a question to the Prime Minister supplementary to his exchanges with the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra? In view of some of the press interpretations that have been placed on what the Prime Minister said yesterday with regard to the situation in the Suez, will he make it clear to the house and the country as to what he meant when he referred to the possibility of the use of force to overcome resistance? Was he referring to collective action by the United Nations or to action by individual nations on their own?
The answer was:
No, Mr. Speaker; I was not referring to collective action by the United Nations.
Well, if he was not referring to collective action by the United Nations he was referring to what had been interpreted as the meaning of his words, namely, armed force, action by other nations designed to preserve and maintain the peace in that area. There can be no other meaning or no other interpretation of these words. Then, the Prime Minister went on to say this:
I thought I made it quite clear that the United Nations effort was all directed to preventing the resumption of the use of force in that area. What I was pointing out in answer to the question that had been put was that the only alternative to obtaining the acquiescence of the government of the area where the force was to be placed would be a resumption of the use of force, and I was putting it forward as an indication that the United Nations had no other method but that of trying to prevail upon the governments interested to follow the courses indicated by the views accepted by a majority of the United Nations in the resolutions adopted.
At one o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 2.30 p.m.
John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, prior to the luncheon adjournment I was reading quotations from the record to indicate the degree

to which this house has been carried along the trail of contradiction when information respecting the situation that prevails ought to have been furnished by the government. The most recent example of that was in an answer given on March 12 by the Minister of National Defence as reported at page 2111 of Hansard when he was asked the following question by the hon. member for Calgary North (Mr. Harkness):
Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a further question to the Minister of National Defence. Was no definite plan put up to the Canadian government in regard to the employment of this reconnaissance squadron by the United Nations and by General Burns before it was dispatched? In other words, is it not a fact that a definite plan of some kind was put up?


Ralph Osborne Campney: Mr. Speaker, the reconnaissance squadron, which is the subject of the hon. member's question, was requested through the United Nations by the commander in chief of the UNEF in Egypt, and the request was acceded to. There was no specific plan involved as to where it would go or when it would go. We are simply complying with the request made by the commander of UNEF through the United Nations.
That answer was incorrect in the light of the statement made today by the Secretary of State for External Affairs when he stated that the dispatch of Canadian forces had as its destination the Sinai desert. That is another indication of the course of action on the part of this government which seems to believe that parliament is to be denied information or given only such selective information as it may be in the interests of the government to give. That is not a proper attitude to be adopted at any time and in particular with regard to a matter as serious as the international situation.
It was interesting to listen to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) giving appropriate praise to the Prime Minister of France. I intend first to quote what the Prime Minister of France had to say on the occasion of his visit to Canada because he has now been made an authority regarding Nasser. The statement he made respecting Nasser was this:
The Suez canal Is also one of the "geographic" causes of tension. Its sabotage by Egypt without any military motive to justify it, and the blackmail exercised since then over the pace of clearing and opening the canal, shows the little confidence merited by the government of Egypt.
That statement was made by Mr. Guy Mollet, President of the Council of Ministers of France, as reported at page 1871 of Hansard of March 4, and yet today the Secretary of State for External Affairs still places abiding confidence in the future stands of one who has for many months torn to shreds every suggestion of international responsibility.

Why, I seem to remember that last fall the Prime Minister spoke of Nasser. My hon. friend the Secretary of State for External Affairs visited Nasser but we have not had a report on that visit. When the Prime Minister spoke of Nasser he said there was some divergency of opinion regarding him; some thought he was pretty good and some had a different opinion, and as for himself he had not arrived at any final conclusion.
Sir, what reliance is to be placed on Nasser? Today he and his forces have already entered Gaza. They have already taken over part of the civil administration. What will be the result?
The Prime Minister alluded to force on one occasion to which I have already made reference when he spoke in this house. What will happen if Nasser orders the United Nations emergency force out of Egypt? That is the question that is actuating the hearts and minds of men and women everywhere. Wait and see? Are we to wait and see? That is insufficient. Canadians representing as they do one-fifth of the entire force have a right to know exactly what is to be done. What course is to be followed? Is it to be one of vacillation? Has the experience of the past not been that uncertainty in so far as dictators are concerned has always been an invitation to disaster for the forces of free men?
What is Nasser going to do? The March 15 issue of U.S. News and World Report states that the situation is very serious and sets out in detail what is actually happening: that communism has moved in to a degree that few realize; that communist control in the Middle East today is beyond anything that existed a year ago; that the Egyptians today realize there is a pay-off in defiance and they are not going to back down on any of the big issues; that the men around Nasser believe that they hold all the cards and plenty of them and are aware that they have nothing to lose by playing them.
On page 85 of the current issue of the magazine to which I have referred the article also points out:
Egyptian officials will tell you that Egypt, not the United Nations emergency force, should be in charge in the Gaza strip-and that this should start happening in short order. They tell you that the gulf of Aqaba and the Suez canal are territorial waters of Egypt, and then ask: How can you let ships of a nation that is at war with you go through your territory?
They regard the situation as beneficial to themselves and regard the future as holding a continuance of the advances they have made in recent days. They believe that, whatever stand they take, triumph will come to them. That is the attitude which they are taking. Indeed the article states that the Egyptians are confident. Reports that are generally 82715-150J
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authentic state that Russian influence is much more in evidence than it was a few months ago, that the news from Moscow is that whatever the Egyptians do they will have the U.S.S.R. behind them, and that Soviet Russia has entered into Egypt's way of life.
Indeed that summation indicates that what has happened is that communism has extended the boundaries of its iron curtain and now comprises a considerable portion of north eastern Africa and the Middle East.
The premier of France warned this house and this country regarding this matter. My hon. friend spoke in the most glowing terms of the words of the premier of France regarding this government. I wonder whether the secretary of state brought to his attention the superman speech? I wonder whether the premier of France would have appreciated the welcome he received here when he and the British leaders were joined together last fall as those supermen whose days of power are about over. That speech and that reference to supermen did not receive much commendation in this country. Whatever the view of the people as a whole may be, to refer to them in those disparaging terms, to say that the era of the supermen in Europe was over, was a revelation of the attitude of mind on the part of this government to an extent that few could have realized. There is no question of misinterpretation. There is no need of an interpreter or a reviser such as the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Those words stand out and the interpretation given to them by the Chicago Tribune was as follows:
Those words are an encouraging growth of isolationist spirit in unexpected quarters. An American official could not have put the case better.
Nobody could have put it better, nobody could have put it clearer. That statement, regardless of what the merits may have been regarding occurrences in the Middle East, was one that did create disunity in parts of this commonwealth. Ever since we have witnessed a parade on the government side of the house of hon. members speaking in such feeling terms of the commonwealth as were never before witnessed. As far as we are concerned, we believe in a Canadian policy but we do not believe that that Canadian policy should consist of casting disparaging remarks at the leaders of France and Great Britain and placing them in the same category as Hitler, Mussolini, Bulganin and Khrushchev. On November 27 the secretary of state deprecated chattering instead of thinking. I redirect those words to him and to those with whom he is associated.
The situation is such that we have a right to information. The information furnished today does not cover the questions which

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have been asked. The answers given were selective answers. We want to know what is the truth of the situation. There was no mention of the fact that today Egyptian civil administrators are entering Gaza to enforce President Nasser's demands for the immediate cessation of United Nations rule over that controversial strip. There was no information regarding the appearance of the government meaning an end to the United Nations' attempt to set up its own civil administration. Then there was no answer to the despatch, which has been reinforced by repetition in several news agency reports, to the effect that General Burns was confused by the vague directive from United Nations headquarters which assumed that he could administer the strip without Egypt during the first part of the take-over from the Israelis.
How long is General Burns to stay there? What plans have been made? Why was this information concealed from us? I ask further if it is true that President Nasser's reassertion of Egypt's rights in Gaza obliged the United Nations to capitulate, as is stated in this morning's New York Times'! If so, what is this debate about?
If once more Mr. Nasser is able to say that which is in accordance with his own desires and which represents a contemptuous disregard of United Nations wishes, why do we prate of peace having been achieved? Why do we say that what has happened has prevented a world conflict? If this be true, all that has taken place in the last few months is that Nasser has retreated from power to power and today is in a position where he can challenge the integrity of Israel and achieve the culmination of the threats he has made in the last few days.
Only recently he stated, as reported by a news agency, that his aim is still to destroy Israel. What is to stop him when the United Nations force removes itself? Who will stand against him? Those are questions which have to be answered. Those are questions that affect the lives of Canadians who are over there. Their people at home have the right to know the degree to which they will be in jeopardy as a result of the action being taken.
This is no longer a subjective matter. One-fifth of the force is Canadian. A further force has arrived over there. One minister has said that they do not know where they are going but they are on their way, and another has said that they are there as a result of a plan. Are they in danger? What is the situation there? What does the minister consider will be the course taken in the event that tomorrow Nasser says "Get out." What then?
[Mr. Diefenbaker.l
My hon. friend laughs but these are questions to which we have a right to have answers. Indeed the collective wisdom of this cabinet as evidenced by the answers that have been given in the last few days indicates that there is no direction, that there is confusion as between ministers, and that except for a generally pious statement as to the hope for peace none of the ministers has any idea of the situation in the Middle East.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs made a lengthy speech clothed in melodious language-for a phrase-maker he is-but scan that speech and find, if you can, the answer to the matter that brought about this debate, namely, at what point must the United Nations force get out. Must it get out when directed to do so by the dictator? And if it does not go out when directed by him, then what are the plans for the future? It was interesting to hear how delightfully vague the minister was in that regard. He said that Mr. Ham-marskjold is going abroad tomorrow, and is going to visit the Middle East, and that we should not in advance prejudice the probability of his mission being successful.
Would that prejudice it? Must it all be done in silence? Is not the fact that so many deals were apparently made outside the United Nations between nations making one promise to Israel and another to Egypt-is not that fact one which more than anything else has brought about the uncertainty and the dire peril to peace which now exists?
This morning I mentioned force at the Suez, and I referred to an editorial in the Montreal Star. I am not going to quote the editorial which deals with the vicissitudes of the answers we have received, but it ends this way:
With these statements, not all of which can be easily reconciled, we must be for the moment content. If things go smoothly in the Middle East, if the canal is reopened on terms satisfactory to all, and if stability is restored to the area as a whole-two very big "ifs"-the Canadian position will not be important enough to worry about.
I emphasize those words.
But if all does not go smoothly, then further government statements will have to be made.
Today things are not going smoothly. Today, the forces of this dictator-the civil administration force if you will-and all of us know what civil administration forces are-are marching in. All is not going smoothly. And yet all we received today was a march of words to official confusion.
Sir, what about the Suez? That was left as delightfully vague as everything else. On the 13th of October last the secretary general's formula was that the Suez was to be free and open without discrimination; that the matter of fixing tolls and charges should be decided

by agreement between Egypt and the users. To all this, Nasser says now: "Nothing of the kind-all of that is past. I insist on the tolls. I insist on the right to say to any nation in the world 'You shall not go through this canal for, after all, it goes through the political boundaries of Egypt.' "


Lester Bowles Pearson: It does.


John George Diefenbaker: The maritime powers have suggested a plan whereby Egypt would get half the tolls and the other half would be held by the world bank pending settlement. What is the latest information on this? Is the gulf of Aqaba to be left open? Are the Israeli people who relied upon the world conscience to be deceived? Did they not, from individual nations including Canada, receive unofficial promises that while there would be nothing official in the declaration made by the United Nations, if they would withdraw from this area the United Nations forces would enter and they would be protected from the raiding operations of the Egyptians?
After a long delay they withdrew, and today unless there has been an assurance as to future action in the event that the area in Gaza is again chosen as a base for reconnaissance raids on Israel, then all this discussion today regarding the possibility of peace will be as fatuous as many of the resolutions which have been passed in recent months.
As far as the United Nations is concerned, all of us hope that it will achieve the aims and purposes it was intended to achieve. But the last few months, because of uncertainty, have brought about a situation whereby, if the great and the powerful are under the tutelage of the U.S.S.R., they have nothing to fear from any resolution that may be passed. In the Middle East crisis the assembly's action against Britain, France and Israel was effective. It has not been effective against the U.S.S.R. or, indeed, against India.
Nasser has held out for everything, and has achieved almost everything he said he was going to do. To too great an extent he has been treated as the innocent subject of aggression. He has been encouraged by the statements made by some of the statesmen of our freedom-loving nations that he had a right to take the action he did relative to the United Nations forces. I was surprised to hear the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) saying the other day that he had that right in so far as the Gaza area is concerned, if I understood him correctly.
I know of no rule of law, international or otherwise, which allows an aggressor who enters into an armistice agreement, and
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who is the de facto occupant of an area by reason of that fact, to be elevated to the position of one whose wishes must be accepted and whose desires must be considered before any international action can be taken.
If you accept that doctrine, then indeed you have placed upon the aggressor the seal of approval. Nasser has achieved beyond his fondest expectations, first the humbling of the great powers, the so-called "supermen", and second, suzerainty over the Middle East, with communist assistance or, certainly, with their active approval.
Why, only yesterday there came to hand some of the literature that was found in that area of the desert when Israeli arms were successful there. Everywhere was Hitler's picture-everywhere were copies of "Mein Kampf" as part and parcel of the supplies each officer had; everywhere were copies of Lenin's life in three languages. Nasser has dominated. He has been successful. He has done that which Hitler did not achieve against the league of nations in the one area in which there was a bastion for freedom in the Middle East, and that the state of Israel. The Israelis find themselves in a position today of having accepted the promises unilaterally given by various members of the consulting states; they find themselves in a position today when their hope for existence as well as their integrity as a nation is dependent upon the whim of one who has treated his promises as disdainfully as scraps of paper and who has been successful in dominating the Middle East because of the fact that the free world became divided and, becoming divided, the aggressor has taken the laurels.
I summarize shortly, Mr. Speaker, the stand that we believe should be taken. It is first, that the right of free and innocent passage of the gulf of Aqaba and of the Suez canal must be assured for the ships of all nations. Without that, the world has gone through six months of travail, uncertainty and confusion and nothing will have been achieved. I should like to know whether the secretary general will be able to speak for the heart and conscience, of the free world and demand that when he again consults with Nasser tomorrow.
Second, we believe that the United Nations must assume direct responsibility for the Gaza area in order to preserve and maintain that area from actions on the part of Nasser which will contribute to, if not assure, a world war.
I cannot express the extent of my fears when I see that area as I saw it and realize that Nasser today enters Gaza with all the emotion of nationalism that will be aroused.

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I cannot help wondering how long it will be before those who are from Canada and other parts of the free world in that United Nations force may find themselves, because of the failure to have plans in advance, challenged by a power which up to the present time has shown no appreciation of international responsibilities.
Finally, while the minister has spoken almost with adulation of the speed with which the Suez canal has been cleared, I should like to know the degree to which Nasser has agreed to provide assured transit to all nations. Anything less than acceptance of two of these suggestions I have made will mean that the world will face a situation where dictators or those dictator-minded will believe that all that a wrongdoer has to do is to be courageous, to be arrogant, to break his word, so long as behind him stands the U.S.S.R. If that doctrine is accepted, the peroration of the minister in drawing a picture of the peace of mankind for which all of us strive will be nothing but oratorical.
Those are the questions that I place before you, Mr. Speaker, that we wish to have answered. We want peace. We realize that if war comes, as was said the other day by one of the leading officials of the atomic energy commission of the United States, from 60 million to 75 million people in the United States will be killed shortly after the outbreak of hostilities. Making due allowance in Canada for the lesser concentration of population, we as Canadians know that 1J-million Canadians will die. That is why we on this side of the house believe that anything in the nature of playing politics with the freedom of the world and the future of our country should be avoided. It is a course that we do not intend to follow with regard to external affairs.


Mr. Alistair Stewart (Winnipeg North):: Mr. Speaker, before I get into the burden of my remarks I should like to associate the C.C.F. with the statement the minister made this morning concerning Mr. E. H. Norman. An outrageous attack was made on the integrity of this Canadian civil servant. While the people of the United States may perhaps be prepared to see their own public servants defamed, we in this country are not going to tolerate these venomous and scurrilous charges against our own people, especially when they are levelled by those who are themselves illiterate. I hope that the minister will make his protest in the most vigorous way possible.
As to the debate in which we are engaged, the Leader of the Opposition has advanced two points as a policy. The first is the right of passage through the gulf of Aqaba and the

Suez and the other is that the United Nations must assume direct responsibility for the Gaza area. I am not quite sure why my hon. friend took over an hour and a quarter to make his speech, interesting though it was, because that is obviously the policy of the government. I see no distinction at all between the two parties in this respect.
This morning we listened with interest to what the minister said and we found ourselves in substantial agreement with regard to what he presented as a policy. However, we regard it as a minimum policy, no more and no less. Since in the past we have been in the unhappy position in which we have had the minister rising in the House of Commons and enunciating a certain doctrine and then finding later that the government had ignored it, I hope that the minister or whoever winds up this debate will give us complete assurances that the policy stated today by the minister is the policy of the government and that it will be the minimum policy continued until we have another opportunity to debate external affairs in general. We desire these assurances because we think that the country would like to have them.
It appeared to me, Mr. Speaker, that the sum and substance of the minister's statement this morning was simply this. The United States, one of two great world powers, has moved into the Middle East. It has filled a vacuum which was obviously there; and the United States must not only accept leadership in and responsibility for what happens in the Middle East but must give leadership in the United Nations.
Unfortunately, when a nation achieves the status of an important power, its policies are going to be dictated by its own circumstances. If the United States is going to fulfil its mission, which only it can fulfil, then 1 think that the strongest pressure has got to be brought to bear on Washington to see that those things which we hope will be done will, in fact, be achieved. If the United States fails in this great responsibility which has been partly thrust upon it and partly acquired, then without any question the United Nations will have been destroyed. But I hope the people of the United States are prepared to assume that responsibility so, for the time being at least, I am not prepared to make a funeral oration over the demise of the United Nations. Granted it is not all we would like it to be; granted, it has failed in many things where we should have liked to see it succeed. But I think it can be argued that it succeeded signally in one very significant area in the last few weeks. It succeeded when the United Kingdom, even although the United Kingdom felt its own vital interests were at

stake, felt morally obliged to accept a decision of the United Nations, proving beyond all doubt in my judgment that amongst civilized countries there is a moral force In the world which has got to be observed, which should be obeyed.
In the past, we in this group have been critical of British foreign policy when we thought criticism was demanded. At this moment, we have nothing but the greatest regard and indeed admiration for the very wise decision which was made by the leaders of the British people in accepting the request of the United Nations. The British government showed world statesmanship in the best sense of the word. It is possible, however, that that moral lead which was given by the United Kingdom is being dissipated by what appears to be United States pandering to the leaders of the Arabs in the Middle East.
Let me make it clear again-we tried to make it clear throughout the years-that we support the principle of the United Nations just as we support the United Nations. We are convinced that the alternative to collective security is collective extinction. We are convinced that if we destroy collective security, the probability is that there will be none left to inter the bodies of the next generation. So we think that this whole problem has to be tackled, in so far as it can be, through the aegis of the United Nations.
Last November I presented to the house the position of this party. We see no reason to retract in any way whatever from what we said then, but perhaps I could summarize briefly what our policy was. First, we said that if necessary we should extend the United Nations police action to cover not only the borders between Egypt and Israel but also the borders between Israel and Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, because we believe it is of the greatest importance that peace must be maintained in that area. We asked that there be a peace treaty arrived at between Israel and the Arab states, and we know the extraordinary difficulties which lie in the road of that. We are convinced also that no matter how annoyed we may feel at certain individuals in the Middle East, no matter how angered we may be by their actions, it would be folly to let either annoyance or anger change us from a settled course. This course must be to secure a settlement in that area, through peace treaties arrived at between the opposing countries.
The third suggestion was that a solution must be found under the United Nations, to the Suez problem, a solution which will be just to all concerned. Then, we asked
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that there be a resettlement and rehabilitation of the refugees. Those of us who have seen these refugee camps, as I have said in the past, realize the horrible conditions under which these people have to live. They are human beings and we have a moral obligation to them as human beings, even although we realize they are being used by the Arabs as pawns in the game of power politics. We cannot leave them forever in the wretched condition in which they are. There is an obligation on us, as there is on Israel and to some extent on the Arab countries, to help these refugees become rehabilitated.
Another suggestion was that there should be a Tennessee valley authority type of program instituted for the Nile valley to replace the scheme for the Aswan dam. My own feeling is that Mr. Dulles made a great mistake last year when he summarily cut off any hope Egypt may have had for financial assistance with the Aswan dam. The minister himself said that in Egypt there were serious population pressures which could only be an embarrassment to Mr. Nasser. These create economic problems which have to be confronted. While I admit that the situation which faces us now is primarily political, nevertheless we should not forget the underlying economic problems which have to be solved if security and peace is going to be maintained in the Middle East.
Another suggestion was that there should be a general United Nations economic program for the whole area to provide for the use of such waters as the Jordan so that the desert in that region could become more fertile. There is still another one. While the threat is obviously shelved for the time being, we in this party will not be prepared to submit to the imposition of sanctions on Israel. Now, despite the fury of the last few months, one thing is manifest and that is that no problem has been solved in the Middle East. We have not returned to the status quo, that is true. Changes have occurred, but we have almost returned to it and I fear if the return is completed then we shall be faced again, without any question, with a further outbreak of war.
At the moment, no matter how much we may dislike it, it is obvious that in some ways Mr. Nasser has got the whiphand. As I say, whether or not we like it, it is one of the facts of the situation. Dependent upon his particular needs of the moment, dependent upon his whims, Mr. Nasser is either the victim or the victor, and to the Arab people I suppose he is both. Very few of the Arab people in the Middle East realize the magnitude of Nasser's military defeat. They have

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not been informed about it because censorship is very strict, and so the thrashing he took in the Gaza strip and in the Sinai desert at the hands of Israel is not widely known. On the other hand, he is held out as being the victor over western imperialism. We have to realize that there is more dislike for what is called western imperialism in the minds of the Arab peoples than there is fear of soviet aggression or soviet imperialism. The Arabs simply do not see the soviet threat as we do.
We in the C.C.F. have no illusions whatever about Russian policy. We believe that this era of coexistence in which we are living has really given the soviet the opportunity for even more aggressive policies in many ways. We are not deceived by them. But at this precise time, we are convinced that an intransigent and ambitious Nasser is more of a threat to world peace than are the soviets. Mr. Nasser has played his hand very skilfully.
He has played on the fears of the western world about the threats and promises of Russian help-call them what you will- whether it be economic or military. And, of course, he has substantial allies in his campaign, the allies being particularly the great oil companies in the Middle East who are very, very rich, and who would have no objection to the obliteration of Israel. And so the belief is spread about that if the west shows favouritism to Israel, then we shall automatically throw the Arabs into the arms of Russia. We do not ask that favouritism be shown to Israel. I know of nobody who asks that favouritism be shown to Israel. Certainly I am convinced that the Jewish community in this country does not ask for that. All we are asking for is that there should be justice to Israel, neither more nor less.
Let me quote here part of an article by Monsieur Paul-Henri Spaak in Foreign Affairs of January of this year where, at page 185, the Belgian foreign minister says:
In the present United Nations set-up, which is not what its founders wished and hoped it would be, everything short of war is allowed. Treaties may be violated, promises can be broken, a nation is licensed to menace its neighbour or to perpetrate any sort of trick on it, just as long as there is no actual war. The attitude of Egypt during the last few months is a case in point. While Egypt denied transit through the Suez canal to Israeli ships, sent death commandos onto Israeli soil, violated the treaty of Constantinople, sent arms to be used against the French in Algeria and made preparations to attack its neighbour, the United Nations was powerless to intervene. Such intervention would not come within the scope of the charter as at present interpreted. But let Israel in desperation send troops into the Sinai peninsula and let Anglo-French forces land at Port Said, and they are sure to be condemned. Meanwhile, those who

were looking on impassively at the brutal repression of the revolt in Hungary could not find words harsh enough to damn them.
This brand of justice, I repeat, is nothing but a caricature.
We do not want to see a caricature of justice in the Middle East. Israel has got the right to live and has got the right to exist in as much peace and security as is shared by other countries, and we are going to insist that that be a cardinal point of this country's policies. And so I say, while we have no illusions about Russian policy, neither have we any illusions about the policy which has been carried out so consistently through the years by the oil companies which have been making such fantastic profits in the Middle East.
Aramco, through its publicity agents has its tens of millions of dollars which it can spend sedulously to foster fear of Russia. It tries to persuade us that Russia is the immediate enemy when, in fact, what it really means is that the Shell Oil is the enemy in that part of the country. Why Aramco should be so concerned about Shell Oil I do not know, for it is winning. It is interesting to realize that there has been a vast change in the ratio of oil production in the Middle East as between the United Kingdom and the United States. Whereas in 1945 the United Kingdom produced roughly 80 per cent of oil to the American 15, now that has been changed, and in no small measure with the assistance of the state department, to a British production of 30 per cent as against the United States 55. It is obvious that the United Kingdom is being forced out. Aramco is paramount, and this is being done under the guise of fighting the menace of the infiltration of communism.
We know the high profits which are made in oil. I wonder how much Aramco had to do with the recent visit of the King of Saudi Arabia to the United States. Few potentates, certainly few kings or few leaders of any country, have received such a royal welcome, at least in Washington, if not in New York, as the king received from the President of the United States, who went to the airport to meet him.
Perhaps the President of the United States had seen the statement the king was going to make in the United Nations and concurred in it, for before the United Nations the King of Saudi Arabia said:
We believe in human and spiritual values. We stand on moral principles, on the freedom and dignity of human beings.
Well, let us consider that, in view of the facts of the situation. His Majesty states that we believe in human values. That being so, why does he throw workers who

go on strike into pits with scorpions? That has been documented by the international labour office. His Majesty may talk of spiritual values, yet obviously he has some concern, too, for material values; for while he spends $23 million a year in the royal household on Cadillacs, concubines and other chattels, some $10 million a year is all that is devoted to the health, the education and the welfare of the people of Saudi Arabia. His Majesty may stand on moral principles. I am sure he stands very firmly on them because in his country an attractive young female slave can be purchased for the sum of $500. Since $500 is beyond the dreams of avarice to the vast majority of his people, I suppose he is keeping them out of temptation by keeping them impoverished. He speaks about the freedom and dignity of human beings. He stands on the freedom and dignity of human beings; he stands very heavily, for 40 per cent of his people have syphilis and 70 per cent have trachoma, and most of them will die before they reach the age of 33 years.
Last year the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) said that on occasion he was scandalized by the attitude of the large powers. I hope he feels scandalized by this, as do we. That is one of the reasons why we are opposed to this pandering to Arab monarchs and we should be wise indeed not to be deluded by the propaganda of the oil companies which keep those monarchs in office. But despite the oil companies, despite the Arab nations, despite the hatred which exists there, Israel, as I said before, has got the right to live and live without the steady threat of strangulation being held against her; and yet, for several years the country was forbidden, in defiance, I am certain, of international law, to use the gulf of Aqaba.
Perhaps the Egyptians themselves have some doubts about the legal position, but at one time they had no doubts. As a matter of fact, seven years ago, in January, 1950, the Egyptian government reaffirmed its recognition of the straits of Tiran. Let me quote from the Egyptian government submission:
Exactly seven years ago, on the 28th January, 1950, the Egyptian government reaffirmed its recognition of the straits of Tiran as an international waterway.
In a note to the American ambassador in Cairo the Egyptian foreign minister declared that the occupation of Tiran and Sanafir, the two islands guarding the entry into the gulf of Aqaba, "being in no sense intended to interfere in any way whatever with innocent traffic through the stretch of sea separating these two islands from the Sinai coast of Egypt, it goes without saying that this passage, the only practicable one, will remain free, as in the past; which is in conformity with international practice and the recognized principles of international law".
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Therefore, if this was good law seven years ago, possibly it is good law today, and I hope very much that the whole matter will be taken before the international court of justice and there decided, and that when the decision of the court is made-and I am sure it will be in conformity with this earlier Egyptian statement-that right of access to this waterway is guaranteed to all.
The gulf of Aqaba, of course, is vitally important to Israel. At the head of the gulf, at Eilat, a new city is being built. The Israeli have built it because they are finding that their best customers are going to be probably in Asia, and rather than load ships in Haifa and send them around the cape of Good Hope, which puts them competitively into a very bad position, they want to load those ships at Eilat and send them down through the Indian ocean.
I was there myself a year and a half ago, and I found it very difficult to understand why people want to live there except out of a great sense of devotion.
The temperature was 130 and the humidity was about 15; it was utterly impossible to perspire. The dehydration was so great that the average per capita consumption of liquid in that area was some 16 pints a day.
We had our meals with the residents there. It was significant that even at mealtime the men sat with rifles between their knees ready for any attack, because Israel only extends for about eight miles in that area; there is Egypt, then Israel, then a strip of Jordan and then of course Saudi Arabia. Within a few years I think Israel intends to have approximately 10,000 people in this new city of Eilat. But Eilat poses a threat to the Egyptian economy. Obviously if it becomes the sort of port the Israeli visualize, then it means that not so many tolls from ships going through the Suez canal will be collected. It is the hope of Israel that a 32-inch pipe line can be built from Eilat to Haifa, which in the course of a year will transport some 25 million tons of oil which will be carried for much less than the tolls that are charged for similar amounts of oil going through the Suez canal. Therefore the Egyptians can see a threat to their own welfare here.
That is still another reason, an economic reason for trying once more to impose a blockade on this most important port, which as I say is vital to the welfare and the future of Israel. If a blockade is once more imposed, what is the situation? If the United Nations accepts it, then what the United Nations is doing in effect is acceding to another act of belligerence; and if it is accepted Israel is going to fight-we may

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just as well make up our minds to that- and one can never tell if the fighting will be localized.
Then we have the situation in Gaza, which was taken by Egypt in 1948. It is true that Gaza is not a part of Egypt proper. It is a territory; in fact it is a colony. I am surprised that the Arabs who oppose colonialism so much should have supported Egypt in its maintenance of such a colony, where the standards of living are very much lower than those which prevail in colonies of the western countries. The people in the Gaza strip of course are not accorded the rights of Egyptian citizens; they are not helped or provided for in any significant way by the Egyptian government; they are not allowed to partake in the government of the country, and they are not allowed to travel to Egypt. They are virtually prisoners, and that is why I say although the Gaza strip may nominally belong to Egypt, it is nevertheless a colony of that country. Through the years, as this house well knows by now, the Gaza strip has been used as headquarters for the fedayeen in their marauding and murdering raids across the border into Israel.
There was the greatest objection taken when Israel saw fit to stop these raids by destroying the nests of the murderers and the United States, as did other countries, described it as an act of aggression. Let me read a part of the note I hold in my hand. I am not going to read it accurately the first time, but when I read it the second time I shall be most accurate. I think it is quite conceivable that Israel might have sent this note to Egypt had there -been diplomatic relations:
It would be tedious to recount instance after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity after atrocity, to illustrate the true nature and exent of the widespread conditions of lawlessness and violence which have prevailed. During the past nine months in particular the frontier of Israel along the Gaza strip has been thrown into a state of constant apprehension and turmoil because of frequent and sudden incursions into Israeli territory and depredations and murders on Israeli soil by fedayeen bandits, who have taken the lives and destroyed the property of Israeli citizens . . .
In the face of these depredations Israel had no recourse other than to employ force to disperse the bands of fedayeen outlaws who were with increasing boldness systematically raiding across the international boundary.
As I have said, Israel did not send this note. I changed some words in it. This note was sent by the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Robert Lansing, to the government of Mexico in 1916. I shall now read it accurately and perhaps one can see a most interesting parallel, Mr. Speaker. In its proper form the note reads:

It would be tedious to recount instance after instance, outrage after outrage, atrocity after atrocity, to illustrate the true nature and extent of the widespread conditions of lawlessness and violence which have prevailed. During the past nine months in particular the frontier of the United States along the lower Rio Grande has been thrown into a state of constant apprehension and turmoil because of frequent and sudden incursions into American territory and depredations and murders on American soil by Mexican bandits, who have taken the lives and destroyed the property of American citizens . . .
In the face of these depredations . . . the United States had no recourse other than to employ force to disperse the bands of Mexican outlaws who were with increasing boldness systematically raiding across the international boundary.
American forces were in Mexico, and they were not taken out until the United States was satisfied that a regime of peace would ensue. I think it would be a pity if the United States in its might and power today forgot its own position when it was perhaps not quite as strong, and I would hope that the United States even morally might have a little more mercy in dealing with the transgressor. But what appears to be certain, as far as a great power is concerned, is that there are certain dangers when a great power tries to decide foreign policy with the help of a board of evangelists at the top. I do not think evangelism really has any place in international diplomacy. What I do know is that no nation can allow itself to be continually attacked with impunity. That was what was happening to Israel and what she endeavoured to stop.
It is transparently clear that what Nasser wants is leadership of the Arab people. I disagree with the Leader of the Opposition in this respect, for I do not think Nasser is going to achieve suzerainty over the Middle East, because the Arab people are not as homogeneous as many might perhaps think. They have their own rivalries, their own hatreds, their own aspirations and their own ambitions, and these things keep them more apart than together.
It is also abundantly clear that what Israel wants is the right to live without the constant daily threat of incursions and alarms that were being waged against her, the right to live with some degree of peace and security. In my judgment only the United Nations can provide these things, which are a basic right of any nation, if the United States will play its proper part. As far as we are concerned the UNEF must stay in the Middle East until a permanent settlement has been arrived at; if it leaves, as I said earlier in another respect, that will be another deadly blow to the United Nations.
By and large Israel has obeyed the United Nations, and by and large Egypt has not. In fact Egypt has hindered the United Nations

on occasions and denied the request of that organization to facilitate the speedy clearance of the Suez canal. That is one instance where there was hindrance and defiance on the part of Egypt. Pressure has been brought to bear on Israel to accede to the request of the United Nations, and a similar sort of pressure has to be brought to bear on Egypt to also accede to the request of the United Nations. We have asked Israel to jeopardize its own security; therefore I maintain that we owe Israel something in return for the security which it feels it has given up.
I agree with the Leader of the Opposition when he says he has no confidence in Mr. Nasser. I do not think very many people have, especially when one recalls recent history. In 1954 Mr. Nasser's great ambition was to get the British out of the Suez canal zone, and to achieve that end he entered into negotiations with the United States which in turn brought pressure to bear on the United Kingdom. The United States was led to believe that as a result of the British leaving that part of the Middle East the opportunities for peace would be that much greater, and of course there would be in all probability an abandonment of the blockade.
That was a piece of calculated deception, for instead of the blockade being abandoned it was tightened; instead of peace becoming obvious the raids increased in numbers and violence. Now that all the one-time invading forces are out it is possible that Nasser is once again showing his hand. He wants a civil administration to go back into the Gaza strip. From there it will be but a step to wanting military forces back in the Gaza strip. Then what happens to the UNEF; then what happens to the United Nations if it admits that? If he could do so I should like to have the minister give us some indication of what government policy would be in that event.
The situation at this moment is most critical, and it is most unfortunate that in the most powerful nation in the west, the United States, we find the President once more at sea, going on a trip to Bermuda for his health, which I hope improves. We have the secretary of state in Asia, out of this hemisphere, and at times I think he is out of this world. Who is responsible now for policy in the United States? There is no one I know who can be said to be directly in charge. Therefore I fear, having regard to the ability of the oil lobby,that it will be a predominant influence in Washington just now, and that I regret.
We must induce Nasser and the representatives of the other Arab states to renounce the state of war they are maintaining against Israel. The minister posed some interesting questions when he spoke at the United 82715-151i
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Nations on November 2. I quote from page 10 of the white paper entitled "The Crisis in the Middle East" as follows:
The armed forces of Israel and of Egypt are to withdraw or, if you like, to return to the armistice lines, where presumably, if this is done, they will once again face each other in fear and hatred. What then? What then, six months from now? Are we to go through all this again? Are we to return to the status quo? Such a return would not be to a position of security, or even a tolerable position, but would be a return to terror, bloodshed, strife, incidents, charges and counter-charges, and ultimately another explosion which the United Nations armistice commission would be powerless to prevent and possibly even to investigate.
Those fears are well founded. By now the minister may have found some answers to those fears, and if he has done so we will await them anxiously and with the greatest interest.


Mr. Solon E. Low (Peace River):: Mr. Speaker, I hope that in the time I intend to take this afternoon I shall not repeat too many of the things that have been said here today during this most interesting debate, which has continued since shortly after eleven o'clock this morning. There are a good many things hon. members have said with which I can agree, and there are other things that have been said with which I cannot agree.
I was surprised to see so few people present in the chamber during this debate, which is of such grave importance. I would have thought the chamber would have remained full for the entire duration of this debate. When I looked around this morning and saw that only the two smaller groups in this house were fairly well up to strength my heart sank, because I could not bring myself to feel that a sufficient number of people are taking this Middle East situation very seriously.
One thing about which we have complained in this house and outside the house for some months past has been the lack of reliable information. We have been subjected to all kinds of reports, propaganda, misstatements and that sort of thing in the press. Members of the official opposition particularly have asked questions practically every day and have tried to get information. One trouble was that they did not give notice of those questions, and as a consequence the Prime Minister or the acting Secretary of State for External Affairs was not able to supply the specific information asked for. As a consequence things were further confused. I am sorry that has been the case, but I do not believe anybody can be blamed more than the members of this house who have failed in their duty to give sufficient notice of

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questions, especially when they were loaded like the ones we have heard during the past few weeks.
I think hon. members of the house will have noted that members of the Social Credit group have not indulged in that sort of thing, especially with regard to Middle East affairs, because we felt it was too serious, that the gravity of the situation demanded a more serious attitude. I feel somewhat let down today because, as I said, there are not more people here to participate in this debate, to listen through its duration and get the information which has been given to us by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
I listened to the minister's speech this morning, and he has cleared up in my mind quite a number of things about which I had felt some misgiving. One of them was the position of the United Nations emergency force in Egypt. I had wondered about that and about the legality of the situation, but the minister cleared it up pretty completely for me this morning. I cannot help but agree in principle with his analysis.
There would appear to be some difference of opinion between the minister and the Prime Minister, something which has been exploited fully by the Leader of the Opposition, and as a consequence we have been led to believe that the government has no policy. I suppose the government has no one to blame but itself if we sometimes feel that way.
I should like to deal briefly with one or two things the minister mentioned this morning before launching into an analysis of the situation as I see it. The minister gave it as his opinion that the United Nations had put a stop to aggressive action and had prevented the spread of trouble in the Middle East. I am not trying to discount for one moment what the United Nations have done, as I am quite ready to grant that they acted as quickly as they possibly could under the circumstances and with the equipment they had with which to act. But there are some other opinions as to who did stop aggressive action in the Middle East and who prevented a further spread of trouble. I should like to quote from a speech delivered in the British House of Commons by Peter Smithers. I intend to quote only a small portion of the report of this speech which appeared in the Fundy Fisherman, as follows:
We now know from the Egyptian chief of staff himself that on October 29 he had issued instructions. as he was entitled to do as commander in chief of the joint Arab forces, for the other Arab states to move against Israel. We guessed correctly, as it turned out. that we were faced with

a general war in the Middle East in which the Soviet union would certainly take a hand to prolong the hostilities.
And then he goes on to say:
May I say on behalf of my country that it is time that our service to humanity and peace by stopping the war in time was recognized by some of those who stood by, inactive, or joined the Soviet union in condemning us.
I believe that is true, and in any analysis of the situation in fairness we must give credit for this effort to put an end to the conflict at a time when no one else seemed to be ready to do so. I think that is only fair, and I point it out merely to indicate that it is morally wrong not to recognize the service that was rendered to the world by Britain and France and-if you want to get down to it-by Israel herself.
There is no question but that when Israel moved into conflict with Egypt she was doing so because she had information concerning the Russian build-up, the accumulation ol vast stores of arms in the Sinai peninsula and elsewhere; and her service to the world has certainly been to destroy a great deal of that equipment and to retard the build-up, perhaps for no less than 12 or 14 months, if not for an even longer period. We must bear these things in mind in any assessment of the situation.
This afternoon the minister told us something about the Washington diplomatic conference. I think he said representatives of the United States, France and Israel held discussions, as a result of which Israel decided to withdraw her troops from the Sinai peninsula and from Gaza. He mentioned what I think he called "understandings", or "hopes"-


Lester Bowles Pearson: Assumptions.


Solon Earl Low: Assumptions on the part of Israel. It seems fantastic to me that Israel, with her very life at stake, would agree to move her troops and supplies out of these two areas without having some definite commitments from somewhere. I would like the minister to go into this a little more fully. Is it not possible that the United States did, in fact, make some specific commitments? If so, what were they? I find it difficult to believe that Israel, smart as she has proven herself to be, would move out on the basis of assumptions alone.
I would not like to claim in anything I say, Mr. Speaker, that the government of Canada, in anything it has done or can possibly do, has contributed to the cause of the trouble in the Middle East. But, as I said a moment ago, a good many people will be impressed by the fact that the government seems to be following no definite policy. I hope I am wrong in that, and if I am I would like the minister, when he replies, to lay down

lor us definitely the policy the government is following and intends to follow with regard to this whole Middle East situation.
I know the minister analysed the situation pretty well this morning, but he did not commit himself or the government to any procedure for the future. As a consequence of the fact that the government has not seemed to have any policy, we can be excused for thinking it has none. I must say that the lack of ability to lay down and follow without equivocation a definite policy based on high principles always results in moral bankruptcy, and I am afraid that the western nations during the past few months especially have been singularly lacking in the courage and boldness that can only be born of high and honest purpose and strict morality.
I think all the policies of all the governments interested in the Middle East situation have to be measured against the backdrop of communist global strategy, and I would like to take a quick look at that strategy. I believe every thinking person, every person who has studied the evidence of the last few years, must be convinced that it is still Russia's aim to dominate the world and impose communism upon the peoples of the world, either by subversive action and the instruments of the cold war or by force, or a combination of the two. We would be utterly stupid if we failed to keep this world objective in mind.
Russia is becoming daily more conscious of the rising power of another communist state, China. That country is building up very rapidly. Its industrialization program has proceeded with amazing rapidity. No doubt Russia is measuring this fact most carefully, together with the somewhat alarming increase that is taking place in an already overwhelming Chinese population. I believe Russia fears that China will soon outgrow her position as a satellite state, and will once more attempt to spill out over Asia and Europe as orientals did in the middle ages under Genghis Khan.
Russia has four compelling reasons for the earliest possible build-up of her strength and prestige in the Middle East. She does not want to build up only prestige and strength, but every indication points to her determination to possess and control that area, not only for the sake of what is there but also to give her a stepping stone for the eventual encirclement and control of the 200 million people of Africa.
What are these four compelling reasons? Mr. Speaker, I believe that in the first place Russia wants to control the huge oil reserves of the Middle East. Her industrialization program is increasing so rapidly that her 82715-150
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present supplies of oil are going to be completely inadequate in the immediate future. The Middle East offers the best and most accessible source of new supplies. At the same time, Russia realizes that if she gets control of the oil of the Middle East, cutting off that supply to western Europe will unquestionably help to weaken, and possibly destroy, the North Atlantic treaty countries. NATO has been the chief stumbling block in Russia's way for some years in western Europe and she will do anything to destroy it.
The second compelling reason for Russia's effort to build up in the Middle East is that she hopes to be able to destroy American,. Eritish and French bases in that area. They constitute an ever-present danger to Russia, because she knows that as long as those bases remain in the hands of the western, powers swift retaliation can be launched against Russian states and bases if she should take or provoke aggressive moves of any kind. Russia has made it abundantly clear in her declaration-made on several occasions -of the Middle Eastern policy that she will do everything she can to get these bases out of the hands of the western powers.
Russia and her allies, including Egypt and Syria, are determined to destroy the Bagdad pact because it represents a stumbling block to communist plans in the Middle East. Destruction of this pact would be a means of getting at Turkey, which is a party to the North Atlantic Treaty, and Turkey has about the only stable position in that whole area with the exception of Israel. That, Mr. Speaker, is the third reason.
And, finally, the fourth reason Russia feels compelled to build up in the Middle East and, as I have already said, to encircle and control Africa and its millions of population, is that she fears an eventual contest with China for the leadership of the Asiatic countries and, perhaps, of the communist movements of the world.
Where does President Nasser fit into all this background? What is the secret of his power? I think everybody has been amazed at the speed with which Nasser has put Egypt in the position where she could fling a challenge to the United Nations and to the free nations of the world. There is no questioning the fact that he has thrown down the gauntlet in connection with the Suez canal, the Gaza strip and the gulf of Aqaba. President Nasser has been guilty of the same kind of dissembling utterances and confusing actions that were used by Hitler before the outbreak of the second world war.
It seems perfectly clear, to me at any rate, from his own writings and his own actions

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that he is prepared to exploit any weaknesses or indecisions of the United Nations or of the free nations of the world. He has already allied himself with the peace-disturbing nations because they have promised him aid. What he does not seem to understand is that any help that he accepts from Russia or her satellite nations will be at great risk to the freedom and the future well-being of Egypt and Egyptians. There is now no doubt that the source of President Nasser's confidence and belligerence is Soviet Russia; and of course in anything that is done by any group of nations to meet the challenge Mr. Nasser has thrown out I think it would be well to bear in mind the fact I have just stated. It is an extremely sinister fact.
Of course it is necessary, I think, in any analysis of the situation, to dig back to the roots of the trouble in the Middle East if we are to understand fully the feelings and objectives of President Nasser. Unquestionably the attitude of Egypt is traceable, at least in part, to the action of the United Nations in establishing the state of Israel in 1947 out of territories which for many centuries the Arabs had looked upon as belonging to them. The people in Palestine, it is true, had been under the control of Britain since 1920; but Britain since 1920 had been carrying on the administrative jurisdiction over Palestine as a mandate, and in no sense did she have legal sovereignty over the area. But when, as a consequence of continuous and voluble Zionist demands, the United States took the lead in 1947 and pressured the United Nations into establishing the state of Israel without granting the people in that area the right of self-determination, which is the very cornerstone of United Nations policy, all Arabs united in their determination to destroy the new state and to exercise against it such sanctions that its destruction would be assured.
I took the position prior to 1947 and in 1947 while I was at the United Nations that it would be unwise, under the circumstances and at that time, to establish the Jewish state, because we said it would doubtless bring the world to the verge of a third world war. Our view was based on the feeling that the new state would doubtless attempt to expand its territory, and would thus come into direct conflict with Arab interests. We also took into consideration the expressed determination of the Arabs-which was quite common knowledge at that time and had been for months and months before the action of the United Nations to set up the state-never to recognize the new state, or to tolerate it even if it should be set up by the United Nations.

My position at that time was interpreted by many people, particularly political enemies, as stemming from anti-semitic sentiments. At that time I declared most solemnly, as I still maintain, that that interpretation was not so. I think I have proved beyond question through my actions and utterances since then that it was not so. As a matter of fact, for many years I had nourished the hope that a national home for the Jewish people could be found and established in a peaceful manner. My concern was based entirely on the belief, which has turned out to be quite correct, that the establishment of the state at that time and under the conditions in which it was established would inevitably lead to conflict and perhaps the third world war. Nobody can deny that what we foresaw and foretold at that time was true, and it did not take a prophet to do it.
However, Mr. Speaker, the state was established by the United Nations. An overwhelming number of members voted for it, amongst them Canada. The new state was immediately, in 1948, forced to fight a war for survival against a league of its Arab neighbours. The Jewish people have been returning to Israel in great numbers from all parts of the world ever since 1947. They have been building up and developing the country; and they have succeeded, with the help of many people in other lands, in establishing a strong government and a determined and willing people. It is the only stable position in the middle East today outside of Turkey.
It would seem to me therefore to be morally wrong and strategically senseless to allow this stable position to be undermined or destroyed. Since the United Nations established the state, it seems to me that the sensible position to take is that it should be allowed to work out its destiny as long as it does not interfere with the same rights of its neighbours. And, what is more, if any force or combination of forces engineered by Soviet Russia or President Nasser and any of their friends should threaten the destruction of this state or undermine its present stable position, then in my judgment it quite clearly would become the duty of the United Nations to come to its assistance and prevent the consummation of designs against it. It seems to me that is fundamental, and it seems only right and just that we look at it in that way.
When I say these things, of course, I am looking at the situation just as coldly and unemotionally as is possible. It would seem to me that there is no room here for emotional consideration, except a feeling of sympathy and understanding and charity towards a suffering people gathered from more than 60 nations of the world, who are trying to the

best of their ability to establish homes where they can be free from persecution and free to carry on in their own way without molestation.
May I repeat, Mr. Speaker, that we ought to lay it down as a definite principle that it is the United Nations' responsibility to do everything possible to prevent the destruction of any stable position in the Middle East area-in the whole of the Middle East area, as a matter of fact-that is essential to the realization of Russia's objective. As I have already said, the two stable positions there are those of Israel and Turkey.
I should now like to say just a word about the Eisenhower doctrine, that apparently had as its objective the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East. There appears to be a rather dangerous and mistaken idea abroad that shortly after President Eisenhower declared this new doctrine its purpose had been fulfilled, that tension had eased and the power vacuum had been filled. Mr. Speaker, this is the very kind of idea that Russia would like to have abroad, because she wants to divert attention now from the Middle East while she proceeds once more to build up Egypt and Syria in preparation for a new outbreak in the months ahead; and that outbreak will come just as sure as we are alive unless we take counteraction now and assure that the problems of the Middle East are solved once and for all.
There is also abroad the mistaken idea that the Middle East crisis can be resolved by making concessions to the Arabs. That is a mistaken idea. There are certain basic facts in this whole situation that I think must continue to receive the earnest consideration of Canada and the other nations of the United Nations in the efforts the United Nations or any group of them might take for the settlement of this dangerous and explosive situation. The first of these facts is this. The Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, still desire the complete destruction of Israel.
I am positive in my own mind that that is so. That is the only thing that will finally satisfy them. Evidently Israel was convinced against her better judgment that she should withdraw from the Gaza strip and the Sinai peninsula.
It is clear now that that is not enough, because already Egypt has moved to take over the administration of the Gaza strip, and the Arabs are demanding not only that but continued Egyptian civil administration in Gaza. My own judgment is that unless the United Nations toughens up in its attitude, Egypt and her allies will put themselves once more into the position where they can
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use the Gaza strip as a means of achieving their final objective, which is the destruction of the state of Israel.
I think the fact Canada should bear in mind while she is dealing with this whole problem is that Russia has promised aid to the Arabs, all of them, but particularly Egypt and Syria, to help them achieve their objective of driving the Israeli out and cancelling out the bases of the western nation in that area. The western powers are not in a position to make similar promises to the Arabs. This is where I disagree with my hon. friend who spoke just before me. I say the western powers are not in a position to make the same kind of promises to the Arab states, and for that reason the Arabs are going to continue to turn to Russia, where they know they can get help for the eventual destruction of the state they do not want in their midst.


Thomas Speakman Barnett: Will my hon. friend permit a question?


Solon Earl Low: Yes.


Thomas Speakman Barnett: Would he say, on the facts, that Russia has the physical capacity to supply all these things?


Solon Earl Low: I am not sure that Russia has the physical capacity to supply all of them, but I do know from reliable reports that Russia and her satellites are now pouring arms in great quantities into Egypt, and have been for days. These are known facts, not guesswork. I presume, from past history that when Russia starts pouring these arms into Egypt she will continue to do so as long as Egypt has any cotton to load on the vessels going back to Russia, and that would be for some time, it would seem to me.


Thomas Speakman Barnett: I am just wondering whether there would be more promise than performance.


Solon Earl Low: No, I would not say that. These promises are being fulfilled at this moment, and that is why I cannot go along entirely with what was said by the hon. member for Winnipeg North. The western powers, of course, are not in a position to make the same promises, and for that reason the Arab states will continue to turn to Russia for every possible assistance they can get, no matter what they might receive from the western powers. They will take all they can get from them. This fact alone makes it dangerous for anyone to assume that the Eisenhower doctrine has achieved its purpose, and that tension has eased as a consequence.
The third fact is that Russia wants to dominate the whole of the Middle East and North Africa for purposes which the Russian

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leaders claim are vital to their very survival. I have already dealt with that, so I do not intend to say any more about it.
As we face the necessity of finding some solution to the confused and dangerous situation in that part of the world, I think as a nation we must resolve to act with high morality and strict adherence to principle in all relations and with all nations, whether it be the Arabs or the Jews. The western world has not always done this. There has been too much intrigue and expediency. Nations have been put into pawn to other nations, and it is not difficult to understand why there are millions of people throughout the world who distrust the west and fear and hate us. There is great bitterness. I have seen that, and I have felt it in mingling with many of these people.
If we as a nation act in strict accordance with moral principles in anything we do from here on, we probably will be able to give leadership in this field. Leadership is the crying need of the free world; moral leadership. X hope we can, by our actions, influence other western nations to adopt similar attitudes. If other nations follow this lead it should not take too many years to break down the fear, the suspicion, and the bitterness that have grown up in the past.
This morning the minister spoke of impatience amongst the Middle Eastern nations; impatience with the very slow progress that is being made toward the economic betterment of their people since they achieved political independence. This is where the abundantly blessed western nations must come in to help these people improve their chances of widely spread economic security and well-being.
I agree quite fully with the concluding words of the Leader of the Opposition, when he spoke of the necessity of demanding in the United Nations that conditions be laid down so there would be no doubt about the right of free passage of ships of all nations through the Suez and the gulf of Aqaba. I agree with that, and I think everybody agrees with it who has thought about the situation at all. The Leader of the Opposition also said the United Nations must assume direct responsibility in the Gaza area to preserve that part from aggressive action on the part of Egypt. Again I thoroughly agree.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask my hon. friend a question? How would he enforce the demand that these things be done through the United Nations assembly?


Solon Earl Low: That is a right good question. I was just coming to that, Mr. Speaker. I was saying that I agreed that those things

are the ideal and we should be making strong representations, but the big problem is how to get those things done without interfering with the sovereignty of other nations or resorting to force. This is what I wanted to draw to the attention of my hon. friend the Leader of the Opposition. It is one thing to say let us go out boldly demanding these things, but it is another thing to know how to do it without getting ourselves into armed conflict, the very thing we want to avoid.
This was exactly the conclusion I wanted to reach. I cannot make any suggestion at this moment other than what is already being done, and that was the reason I could not find it possible to be very critical of what the minister said this morning. I believe that Canada, and her representatives at the United Nations, have been doing pretty well in this regard. Certainly if we have not achieved all we had hoped to achieve through the United Nations it has not been their fault. It is a difficult situation, and I stand with the minister and the government in the declaration that we do not want the United Nations, under any circumstances, to be guilty of overriding the sovereignty of any nation in which the forces of the United Nations happen to be placed. I think that is important. We will continue to support him in that regard, and we will support him and the government in every effort they make to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem in the Middle East without resort to force.
Of course sometimes this demands some boldness of action. It demands also attention to a number of other things besides those that were mentioned by the Leader of the Opposition. I think we have to do what the hon. member for Winnipeg North said in speaking about a solution of the outstanding problems between the countries in the Middle East. They are not just those two we have mentioned thus far, but include water-power development in these countries, and the refugee problem upon which I shall not expand at all. But we do have a moral responsibility to try to mobilize the moral powers of the world in every way we possibly can.
I think that the strongest force in the world today is a moral force; that is the thing we want to bring to bear upon this whole problem. I think we must, to that end, fortify as far as possible the friendship amongst the western powers, Britain, France, the United States and the others who are free nations and who have something to contribute in a responsible fashion. It seems to me that united action by these nations on

a highly moral plane, according to sound moral principles, is the best way to try to achieve our aim.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, when this debate began I did not think it would be desirable, or that I would want, to participate in the discussion, particularly because we have had from the Secretary of State for External Affairs a review of this matter which has been not only comprehensive but I am sure has impressed most hon. members as few of his statements on international affairs have during the past two or three years.
Perhaps no better tribute to the objectivity of what he said this morning could be found than that paid by the hon. gentleman who has just taken his seat. If anyone wanted a stamp of approval of a policy or of a statement I am sure few in this house could have done it as well as it has just been done by the hon. member for Peace River, particularly in view of the fact that in the past he has not always shared the view of this government, or of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in matters of foreign policy. Certainly his views on the United Nations on some occasions in the past have not harmonized with those of us sitting to your right, Mr. Speaker. Therefore I attach great importance to what the hon. gentleman said when he observed that after listening to the Secretary of State for External Affairs he could not in all conscience find any cause to disagree with the general basis of the policy which the Secretary of State for External Affairs enunciated so well today.
I agree with the hon. member for Peace River, too, that in a matter of such delicacy, with so much depending upon the kind of solutions reached, having in mind the complexities of the issues involved, we ought to be more concerned about making constructive contributions than making debating points or, as the result of our debating efforts, seeking to gain political advantage. This is not the kind of question on which political motivations should influence the course of any hon. member.
I wonder whether the Leader of the Opposition will pardon me for saying that although I carefully followed his speech I formed the impression-and I may be wrong [DOT]-that it was not so much that he and the Secretary of State for External Affairs were in fundamental disagreement as that he was seeking perhaps to take political advantage of a situation which I do not think, in the interests of a proper solution, lends itself to that kind of an attempt.
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He made two points. He said the strait of Aqaba and the Suez canal should be open to every nation. He spoke about that objective with great emphasis and at great length; and then he also said that the United Nations should administer the Gaza strip. He could not have followed carefully the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs when he sought to give the impression that these were objectives to which we should address ourselves, implying that because he was addressing himself to these two objectives the government, and in particular the Secretary of State for External Affairs, had completely overlooked them. No one in the United Nations, no individual and no country, has more vigorously pursued those objectives in the general assembly than has the Secretary of State for External Affairs. That has been the basis of all his activities and of the policies of the government almost since the beginning of the situation that provokes this particular debate.
He asks, as does the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra what are we doing to see that the Suez canal is kept open; what are we doing to see that United Nations administrative processes and power are maintained in the Gaza strip? The hon. member for Peace River has given very effective answers to these rhetorical questions.


Clayton Wesley Hodgson: Tell the truth.


Howard Charles Green: Rhetorical questions?


Mr. Marlin:: To these rhetorical questions. To suggest that Canada, merely by a debate in this house or by a speech in this house, could cause the freedom of the Suez canal to be guaranteed is, of course, not to be taken too seriously. During the past several days the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra several times has asked the Prime Minister what the government is doing to keep open the Suez canal-


Howard Charles Green: No, I did not ask it in that way.


Murdo William Martin: -thus leaving the impression, because no one could give a definitive answer to that question in terms of achievement, that we were doing nothing. When the secretary general of the United Nations asked a number of countries to provide money to make it possible to free the Suez canal from obstructions, we were among the first nations to join in acknowledging the request of the secretary general. One cannot easily forget the debate in this house when the Minister of Finance presented some estimates, including $1 million for the clearance of the canal. He was subjected to all sorts of interrogations. Whether or not they were meant to be obstructive, they certainly gave indication of a concern as to whether or not this

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money should be provided at all by the government of Canada for the purposes the secretary general had in mind.
Mr. Speaker, with regard to the two points which the Leader of the Opposition laid down as the objectives, as he said, of relentless pursuit, I say the Secretary of State for External Affairs, by his outstanding efforts during the past few months at the United Nations, has been directing himself and likewise the policy of the government toward these very purposes.
There is one point I think deserves mention at this time, because the Leader of the Opposition spent some time in dealing with it. I think the question put to the Prime Minister on March 7 by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre put the matter in proper perspective. The question was as follows:


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I ask a supplementary question. Does the Prime Minister think the situation in the Suez has reached a point where even such a possibility should be suggested by one such as the Prime Minister?
There are several implications in that question, one of which is that the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre was expressing what everyone in this house knows, and what everybody in this country believes, namely that the Prime Minister of Canada is not the kind of man who was anxious to see force used in the suggested manner as implied by the Leader of the Opposition in his speech this morning.


John George Diefenbaker: Not prescribed.


Murdo William Martin: This is what the Prime Minister said in reply:
I am not suggesting anything. I thought I was pointing out to the house that that was an alternative that could not be considered. Therefore when the words "is the whole thing subject to the whim of Mr. Nasser?" are used, there is no other way of obtaining the acquiescence of the governments concerned that can be resorted to unless fighting is to flare up again in that region.
This indicates clearly what the Prime Minister had in mind, a plea for negotiation, not a plea for the use of force.


John George Diefenbaker: Twenty-four hours later.


Murdo William Martin: One thing I would like to say as a member of this house is that I was a little surprised this morning when the Leader of the Opposition began his speech. It was a good debating speech. He referred to the fact that the Secretary of State for External Affairs had quoted from various publications in the United Kingdom and elsewhere indicating the high regard in which current Canadian foreign policy was held by those who wrote those articles or who expressed those views.

I can well understand why the Leader of the Opposition, having in mind his particular assignment, should do all that he could to find weaknesses in government policy, and to oppose them with all the vigor at his disposal. But in the matter of foreign policy, where the reputation of the country is at stake, where the good name of Canada is involved, and where the prestige of the nation is the subject of concern and attention, I should think the Leader of the Opposition would be almost the first man to rise in his place and join with the Secretary of State for External Affairs in applauding the tributes paid to the government-to the people of Canada.


John George Diefenbaker: The government of
Canada.


Murdo William Martin: Yes, to the government-


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Paul Joseph James Martin: -and to the people of Canada and, if I may say, in particular to my colleague the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
One would gather from what the Leader of the Opposition said this morning that Canada had developed a policy which had greatly contributed to the complications of the situation, when the fact is that from the 2nd day of November until recent days in the general assembly there has been no country-and I am sure on reflection my hon. friend will agree with me-which has been in such great demand in the role of mediator, in the role of collaborator with the officers of the United Nations, in association with other powers who are anxious to see peace restored in this troubled area, such as the United States and the United Kingdom.
I find it difficult to understand what my hon. friend can gain by deprecating the statements that had been made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs as to the role Canada has played at the United Nations in recent months. Why has Canada received these tributes? Why have our actions been applauded? It is because right from the first days when this problem initially arose we did apply a policy-the hon. gentleman may say a mistaken policy-which we honestly believed to be in the interests of all concerned and in the maintenance of peace.
That is why that policy was pursued, and that is the reason most nations in the United Nations look upon our efforts as intended- as the hon. member for Peace River said a few moments ago-for no other purpose than to ease international tension. It is

for that reason that the tributes referred to by the Secretary of State for External Affairs have been paid.
I should have thought that the Leader of the Opposition, having found that he and the Secretary of State for External Affairs were in agreement on the objectives, would have found it possible at least to recognize that Canada was deserving of the tributes which I think have not been overdone, because I happen to know of some of the things that have not yet been published and cannot be published for some time, concerning the work carried on both by the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State for External Affairs in the past few months.
My hon. friend spoke of the United Nations. No one for a moment can fail to recognize the limitations of the United Nations. When my hon. friend asked where its sovereignty lay in the Gaza strip and what power the UNEF has in relation to Egypt, provoking the reply of the Secretary of State for External Affairs as to the role of the advisory committee and then possibly of the assembly, my hon. friend in those questions was merely indicating what we all know, that the United Nations does not provide every answer to every situation. And because it has obvious limitations the Secretary of State for External Affairs postulated this morning that at the present time notwithstanding all its accomplishments, the United Nations cannot be regarded as a substitute for wise national policy. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs said this morning, in whatever assessment we make of the United Nations we cannot help but recognize that this particular problem of the Middle East, as discussed at the United Nations, is only one aspect of the whole Middle East problem itself.
The hon. member for Peace River said he felt in a matter of this sort we ought to recognize the great potential power of moral force in the world. I am sure we all agree with that. I am sure that back of the resolution which the Secretary of State for External Affairs introduced immediately following the proposal for a cease-fire in November was a recognition of the value of moral force as expressed in the decisions of the United Nations, a decision which by the way was recognized by Great Britain and France although at least 10 resolutions have not moved the Soviet union to recognize the implications of the resolution passed by the United Nations in protest against aggression by the Soviet union in Hungary.
Mr. Speaker, this whole matter has been a complicated one. It is one to which most members of the United Nations have contributed their honest efforts over a period
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of months. If solutions have not been arrived at to the satisfaction of every hon. member of this house, and in particular to the Leader of the Opposition, that is not because of any failure on the part of Canada or of its delegates or of the Secretary of State for External Affairs who have sought to bring about by wise negotiations settlements that might lead to satisfactory conclusions.
During the course of the last 10 days or so in this house we have seen a practice develop which I do not believe is in the interests of the development of good foreign policy, which I do not believe in matters of this great importance should be recognized as the traditional manner of debate or of interrogation in the House of Commons. I doubt if in the United Kingdom parliament, to which the Leader of the Opposition directs our attention so frequently, it would have developed into a tradition that questions having to do with relationships with other countries would be projected before the responsible ministers without adequate notice being given, so that full consideration of all the implications of replies could be considered.
My hon. friend has asked me such questions on several occasions during the absence of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and when I said to him I thought these were matters I would like to look at again he has rather given the impression that a reply should have been made at once. When delicate negotiations are under way, such as those in which the Secretary of State for External Affairs has participated in the last few months, I am sure no one recognizes better than the hon. gentleman how important it is that there be time for the exposition of the results of such negotiations. Negotiations when in the process of being developed or proceeded with are one thing; whether or not there should be a divulging of those negotiations at a particular moment is another. There can be no question that the policy following negotiations must be made known and debated. But to expect that when nations are engaged in matters having to do with the security of all nations and the peace of the world quick answers should be given to quick questions is, if I may say so with the greatest respect, not a responsible way in which an opposition should conduct itself.
I want to make one more point. The suggestion was made by the Leader of the Opposition today, as it has been made several times during this session by interjections which one hears from those who sit behind the Leader of the Opposition, that the policies of the government as prosecuted by the Secretary of State for External Affairs during the past few months were directed

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against our friends in the United Kingdom; that we were anxious to carry on in an unduly friendly way with the United States; that the integrity and unity of the commonwealth was injuriously involved, as a result of our interventions at the assembly of the United Nations.
I think the secretary of state indicated clearly this morning that what we had done, instead of in any way destroying the unity of the commonwealth, had greatly contributed to its strength, to its unity and to the opportunity afforded to be a continuing and useful instrument for the preservation of peace among the nations of the world. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs said, that attitude was shared by the Asian members, representing as they do a most important section of the commonwealth.
It is interesting to note that the quotations referred to this morning by the Secretary of State for External Affairs were not from people in Canada or Asia, but for the most part they were from journals or publications in the United Kingdom. The course we have taken has been the course of an independent sovereign nation within the commonwealth of nations, not one that was calculated to destroy our unity. It is a course which events have proved has made the commonwealth as unified and as strong as before.
Then again, does it contribute to peaceful relations to suggest that our understanding of the attitude of the United States is not to be pursued by Canada when we agree with certain policies of the United States? Because we have agreed on a number of occasions with the United States in some recent matters does not mean, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs said, that we have agreed with them on all matters. The strength of Canada's current contribution internationally is that most nations recognize that we are close to the United Kingdom and to other members of the commonwealth, and also that as a North American state we understand the meaning and implications of our relations with the United States. On account of this background and by these affiliations nations have come to know that we are capable of asserting our own judgment honestly, as we in this country, in this government and in this parliament do in an objective and unselfish manner. That is the strength of foreign policy in Canada today, at the United Nations and elsewhere.
To sit in my seat and have the Leader of the Opposition give the impression that the Secretary of State for External Affairs had to rise and record his own achievements is something that I cannot let pass by. I want

to say that as one who has followed international affairs for some years long before I came into this house; as one who has had something to do with recent events as a member of the government, I would have thought that because of the role my colleague has played this would have been an occasion for the Leader of the Opposition to join with the hon. member for Peace River, the hon. member for Winnipeg North and other hon. members and to have said that this was the kind of question on which we could be united, thus giving expression to the common denominator that prevails in Canadian thinking at this time.
If my hon. friend, who now understandably smiles, will really reflect on what I have said, he will find that the kind of speech he made this morning is so out of touch with Canadian public opinion at the present time that at the earliest moment he will want to revamp his thinking and his ideas.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: May I ask the minister a question. The mail we get from the United States at this time is marked "Pray for Peace".


Some hon. Members:: Order.
The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaiieh
Order. The hon. member for Fort William indicated that he wished to ask a question. I think he should ask his question.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: Is the government of Canada considering doing anything like that in connection with our mail?


Paul Joseph James Martin: I will see that it is brought to the attention of my colleague the Postmaster General.


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Speaker, we have just listened to a speech which shows more clearly than anything we have ever heard before in this chamber the God complex which has settled upon the minds of the supermen in the Canadian cabinet. The attitude of the government toward the questions which have arisen in the Near East has been expressed by the two ministers to the United Nations. Of course they have had great experience in making long speeches designed to make the people of one nation think one thing and those of another nation think another, speeches which along with many others made in the United Nations sometimes result in resolutions which nobody can understand. These resolutions have been interpreted in different ways by the different countries involved. One good example is the resolution of February 2 which is now being interpreted in one way by the Israelis, in another way by the Egyptians, in another way by the Americans, and possibly in another way by the Canadians and so on.

We have listened today to speeches of this kind. I wonder what the Canadian parliament has come to when a minister of the crown will get up, as did the Minister of National Health and Welfare and in a pious, unctuous way complain that the opposition should have the nerve to ask questions on the orders of the day about the Near East situation.
Neither he nor the Secretary of State for External Affairs nor the Prime Minister can quote one question asked last week which was out of order or which was not properly asked of the head of the government. The trouble was, Mr. Speaker, that on each occasion when the Prime Minister was asked a question about the Near East he lost his temper and made statements which he subsequently regretted, one of them being the statement about the use of force in the Near East which the two ministers connected with the United Nations have tried to explain and twist in their speeches today.
We have a right and a duty in the opposition to ask questions on the orders of the day on subjects which are of urgent importance; and may I point out to you, Mr. Speaker, and to all the hon. members of this house that there have never been more important subjects in so far as the Canadian parliament and the Canadian people are concerned than the subjects about which questions were asked here last week. Rightly or wrongly this government-and at the moment I am not taking any stand as to whether they were right or wrong-have placed Canada in a position where she is deeply involved in the Near East-


Lester Bowles Pearson: The Middle East.


Howard Charles Green: Very well; the Middle East. We all know the area to which I am referring. We have about one-fifth of the troops engaged in the United Nations emergency force; we have far more troops in that force than any other nation. We have lent, or more likely given, $1 million to start the work of clearing the canal. The United States lent only $5 million, so we have given far more than our share. This government has got the country into this problem far more deeply than any other country in the world, and the situation as it exists today may result in young Canadians losing their lives. This is a matter on which the people, and certainly parliament, are entitled to the fullest information, and we have not had it. All the Prime Minister needed to do last week was answer those questions frankly as they were asked. But he did not do that; as I said a few moments ago, he lost his temper on each occasion and made no proper answer to most of those questions.
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On one occasion at least he resorted to a subterfuge. He said, "I only know what I have read in the papers". We have an ambassador in Cairo, and there is an Egyptian ambassador here in Ottawa within a few yards of this parliament building. Yet the Prime Minister told the house he could only tell us what he had read in the papers. If that was an accurate answer there is something wrong with the Department of External Affairs, because in a situation such as the one which is facing Canada today the Prime Minister should have up to the minute information.
Mr. Speaker, the reason we get answers like that, and the reason we have had speeches like those we have heard from the two ministers today, is that this government has been so long in power, supported by so large and subservient a majority, that it has become contemptuous of parliament. This government has completely lost its sense of responsibility to parliament and to the Canadian people.


James Garfield Gardiner: You have lost your sense of humour.


Howard Charles Green: May I give notice today that when we consider questions should be asked on the orders of the day or at any other stage of the proceedings we propose to ask-


John Whitney Pickersgill: Whether you are in order or not.


Howard Charles Green: Oh, the minister of immigration had better keep out of this.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I suppose no one has the right to an opinion except the hon. gentleman.


An hon. Member:: He hasn't any.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaile):: Order.


Howard Charles Green: We propose to follow our own sense of duty in asking those questions, and if the ministers cannot answer them, or refuse to answer them, that will be their responsibility.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Regardless of the rules?


Howard Charles Green: They will be responsible for following that course.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Turning parliament into a quiz program.


Howard Charles Green: There was one other statement made by the Minister of National Health and Welfare which intrigued me, and that was his reference to the power of moral force in the world. He went from there into an argument that because of this power of moral force the Conservatives should keep still in the House of Commons.

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Murdo William Martin: That may be an additional argument.


Howard Charles Green: The trouble with the power of moral force in the world today is that it only applies to those nations which "play the game". The power of moral force has been applied to Israel within the last few weeks, but it certainly does not apply to Egypt; it has not been applied to Egypt during those weeks. Egypt pretended she would comply with what she knew perfectly well were the intentions of the nations at New York, but the moment the Israeli forces had withdrawn from the Gaza strip she moved in, completely ignoring any moral force, in exactly the same way Russia did in Hungary. I do not mean in so far as troops are concerned; that I presume is still to come. But Egypt ignored the power of moral force entirely, and it is about time the freedom-loving people, including hon. members of this government, woke up to the fact that that is the way in which these nations still function. The present situation, Mr. Speaker, cannot be glossed over by fulsome statements by the minister in the House of Commons; and as to the Suez canal-


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaite):: It
is five o'clock. It has been indicated to me from various quarters that it is the wish of the house, by unanimous consent, that this debate should be continued. Is that agreed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaite):: business reserved for private and public bills having been allowed to stand by unanimous consent, I call on the hon. member for Van-couver-Quadra (Mr. Green).


An hon. Member:: Changed your minds.


An hon. Member:: The Conservatives have no minds to change.


Howard Charles Green: Perhaps I could get into this act.
The Suez canal has now been partially cleared. We understand it will be open some time next month. The cost of clearing that canal is to be paid by the United Nations and, as I pointed out some moments ago, Canada has already advanced far more in proportion to her population than any other nation. Egypt blocked the canal by a piece of malicious sabotage; it could not be described in any other way. Now she is demanding that all ships passing through that canal shall pay the full tolls to her.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs made one of his covering-up statements on this point today, when he intimated that the United States, the United Kingdom, France

and Norway many weeks ago had made to Egypt a proposal under which the tolls would be paid to the world bank, one half to be remitted to Egypt at once and the other half to be held pending a settlement. I also understood him to say that Egypt has not yet given a reply to those suggestions.
May I say that Nasser gave a reply to the public. I suppose the minister thinks that does not count, and that just because there may not have been any formal letter therefore there has been no reply. But the press of March 10, just five days ago, had this to say under the heading "Nasser Insists Egypt be Paid All Canal Tolls". Referring to Nasser it states:
He also told an Indian newspaper editor that British and French ships would be allowed through the Suez canal if they paid the entire tolls to Egypt. No decision has been reached yet, he added, on whether Israeli ships also would be allowed transit through the canal.
There seems to be a grave danger that Israeli ships will not be allowed through the canal. The dispatch goes on to say:
Col. Abdel Hatem, Egyptian information minister, announced that western proposals for 50-50 payment of tolls to Egypt and the international bank violate the 1888 convention of freedom of navigation through the canal.
There we have a definite rejection of the proposal. Egypt's action with regard to the canal certainly amounts to blackmail, as was stated by the premier of France in this chamber just a few days ago. But, so far as one can find out, Mr. Speaker, Canada has made no protest whatever to Egypt about this situation. That, I submit, is condoning this blackmail. Canada should have protested to Egypt.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs told us last November that one of the objectives of the United Nations emergency force was to see that the Suez canal problem was settled. I have here Hansard of November 29. At page 168 he is reported to have said:
Those functions-
Referring to the functions of the United Nations emergency force.
-under that earlier resolution were to bring about a cease-fire, and that has been done; to bring about the withdrawal of forces behind the armistice line; to desist from raids across the armistice line into neighbouring territory; to observe scrupulously the provisions of the armistice agreement, and to take steps to reopen the Suez canal and to restore and secure freedom of navigation.
Our complaint about the stand of the Canadian government is that in the first place Canada did not protest to Egypt about the delay in opening the canal.


Lester Bowles Pearson: They are ahead of their schedule in desiring the canal. I told you that this morning.


Howard Charles Green: Then the minister disagrees with Mr. Dulles who a few days ago accused them of dragging their feet.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I am giving you General Wheeler's report. He is the officer in charge of operations.


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Speaker, I think the minister is the only one in the world who believes that Nasser has not delayed the clearing of the canal; and if he is that naive I am sure I cannot convince him that he is wrong. No stand has been taken by the Canadian government, as expressed to the Egyptian government, that the canal must be free to all shipping of the world. For some reason or another the government is extremely reluctant to make its position known to Nasser. It must be afraid of offending this dictator. We believe that Canada should be perfectly frank and straightforward in telling Mr. Nasser, just as in telling other people, exactly what she believes.
As to the Gaza strip, that matter has been discussed at length today and I have no intention of repeating what has already been said. It has been used as a base for attacks on Israel. I do not think that statement can be questioned-and, I may say, attacks of the most vicious kind. Then the Israelis struck and drove the Egyptians out. In the last few days the Israelis have withdrawn, and they have done so on certain assumptions which were certainly given them by the United States if not by the United Nations. I believe this deal was made outside the United Nations, between Israel and the United States. One of those assumptions was that the United Nations emergency force would administer the Gaza strip.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs today also skated around that matter. He had a most amazing explanation of it. He said the United Nations agency was to carry out certain work in Gaza, and then he said "not for Gaza but in Gaza", thus trying to explain that it was never really meant that the United Nations was to take over the full administration of the Gaza strip pending a peace settlement.
That is the sort of quibbling which has been going on throughout this whole picture, and the sort of attitude that is so unfair to the Canadian people. Certainly the Israelis understood that the United Nations emergency force or some other United Nations agency- I believe the minister himself suggested a United Nations commissioner-would be administering the Gaza strip. The United Nations emergency force went into the Gaza strip in good faith. Our own General Burns, in command of that force, led it into the Gaza
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strip in good faith and with great hopes that the result would be a final settlement of this difficulty.
Right from the start Nasser has inspired agitation in that strip. The minister had nothing to say about that matter today. He did not admit that such was the case. But we have been reading in the press day after day of these large mobs with their signs which were brought in from Egypt. They were freshly painted signs; there was nothing spontaneous about them at all. Right from the start that action was taken by Egypt. Now, within the last 24 hours, Egypt has sent in a military governor.
What has the United Nations done? On March 9 press dispatches stated that the secretary general said the emergency force has assumed responsibility for civil affairs in the Gaza strip. That was on March 9. But on March 13 we find Dr. Bunche reported as having been conferring with Nasser in Egypt. This is the dispatch:
Bunche talked for one and a half hours with Nasser, then told reporters the United Nations emergency force would co-operate fully with the Egyptian administration in the Gaza strip.
Bunche said United Nations emergency forces would turn over the Gaza administration to Egypt in the same way it returned control of Port Said to_ Egypt after the Anglo-French invasion.
"However, it is up to Egyptian authorities to announce when the take over will take place " he said.
The United States, which had these dealings direct with Israel, took this position yesterday. I have last night's Citizen and the heading is, "It is up to Dag, Eisenhower View . This is a dispatch from Washington:
President Eisenhower's reaction to the latest trouble in the Gaza strip is to "leave it to George"-George in this case being U.N. secretary Dag Hammarskjold.
then this dispatch contains this little interesting paragraph:
Wednesday night Israeli ambassador Abba Eban conferred with U.S. officials, reportedly to urge the United States to keep Egyptian administrative units out of Gaza. But at his press conference the president, asked if he wouldn't like to see Egypt delay moving in its new governor and civil administration, would take no stand, merely a wait and see attitude.
That looks very much as if the United States is just washing its hands of this situation, at least for the time being. In my opinion Israel has been betrayed. This morning the minister said he hopes the United States will use its influence in Cairo. If the United States is not going to go any further than President Eisenhower went yesterday there is not very much chance of the influence of that great nation being used in Cairo to settle this problem.
Then there is the question of the position of the United Nations emergency force.

External Affairs
Apparently now it is being deployed along the border between Israel and Egypt. Dr. Bunche made a statement to that effect as reported in the press yesterday. I quote:
He added that UNEF's principal responsibility is to deploy along Gaza's border with Israel to maintain peace.
In other words, it is to be largely a borderline organization. That seems to be the fate now destined for this force. If this will help to stop the raids, then it will certainly serve a useful purpose. Egypt has made her stand clear on the use of this force. On March 11 Hatem, to whom I referred a few moments ago, said this:
Egypt has agreed to the stay of the UNEF within the limits fixed by the United Nations, that is to enforce the cease-fire and follow the withdrawal of enemy (Israeli) forces to the armistice lines.
Egypt will not accept that the UNEF performs other functions than these.
Of course that was simply carrying out what they had said on February 4, after the resolution of February 2. The foreign minister at that time said that following Israel's withdrawal the United Nations force is to take a position exclusively on both sides of the armistice line. The entry, stationing and deployment of the force must be with the consent of the Egyptian government. The United Nations force is not in Egypt as an occupation force, not as a replacement for the invader, not to resolve any question or to settle any problem, be it in relation to the Suez canal, Palestine, or the freedom of passage in territorial waters.
There is the position in which the United Nations emergency force stands at the present time. I feel that the Secretary of State for External Affairs should have taken some time to clarify just what that force can do. There have been disturbing reports, too, that the Scandinavian troops in the force are to be withdrawn within the next two months. I hope that is not correct. The Prime Minister of Denmark was quoted as saying in New Delhi on March 7 that the force is a financial burden on the smaller countries, and that the United Nations members not contributing to the Middle East unit now should assume a share of the work. He said that the four Scandinavian countries have decided eventually on withdrawal from the United Nations emergency force, perhaps within a few months. This is another question the minister should have faced today. There is also trouble about the Yugoslav portion of the force. A press dispatch indicated that at one stage they were being withdrawn from the Gaza strip. Are they to participate to the full, or what is the position with regard to that force?
fMr. Green.]
Then the most important question of all is whether the force will have to leave if Egypt so ordered. The minister had very little comfort for us today. He said the United Nations could pass a resolution that the force should remain in the Gaza strip, but then he said that Egypt would not be bound to accept the United Nations resolution. In my opinion that means, in effect, that the troops would have to be withdrawn if Egypt decided she would not comply with the resolution of the United Nations. Did the minister say something?


Lester Bowles Pearson: What would you do in that case?


Howard Charles Green: It may be that is the only thing that can be done, but I think the government should be frank with us and say that such is the case. In effect Egypt could successfully demand the withdrawal of that force. I do not know how the government can rely so much on the good faith of Nasser. The minister said today that Egypt would be honour bound to comply with the resolutions of the United Nations. Thus far she has not been honour bound to do so. The New York Times had an editorial on March 12 entitled "Nasser Challenges U.N." It reads:
The threat of a new crisis hangs over the Middle East today as a result of President Nasser's repudiation of his private assurances to the United Nations and the United States. He is now attempting to restore the status quo ante, which would permit him to resume his war against Israel and to hold the world at ransom by his unrestricted control of the Suez canal.
Today in this house the minister lectured Egypt, but it would be far more effective if the Canadian government were to make formal protests to Egypt when attitudes are taken by that nation which are not in compliance with the resolutions of the United Nations or with what Canada finds should be a proper stand.
As I have said before, Canada is very heavily involved in this question. We have troops there; we are on the advisory committee to the United Nations emergency force, which has a Canadian commander, and we are incurring very heavy expenditures. The bills for what we have done so far are not in yet, but I do not doubt for a minute they will run into millions of dollars.
I think that throughout the Canadian government has made two fundamental errors. One has been in following the United States policy much too closely. The United States policy, it is now so clear, has been to appease the Arab nations. In recent months the United States has been moving in that direction, taking many steps to try to gain the support of the Arab nations, including Egypt, and doing it at the risk of losing her best


[Stage Direction]
friends, the United Kingdom and France. She has been brushing those two nations aside.
Certainly one is entitled to wonder to what extent the oil interests are involved in this policy adopted by the United States. Whatever policy she adopts is her own business, not ours; but the Canadian government should recognize United States policy for what it is, and I think should be far more careful about supporting the United States so fully in her moves in the Near East, as this government has been doing in these recent months. Certainly I do not believe the United States and Canada have been facing reality in the Near East. They are about the only two nations in the world which have not been looking squarely at what is going on in that area, and it is about time that the Canadian government, at least, opened its eyes.
The other error has been for Canada to allow Nasser to humiliate her. Whether or not the government admits that we have been humiliated, the fact is that the Canadian people believe that has been the result. We know about the Queen's Own Rifles. I do not need to repeat that. The government has not yet admitted that the Queen's Own Rifles were sent home because Nasser would not have them in Egypt. The government alone apparently does not think that is what happened, but the actual fact is the government simply will not admit it for fear of the criticism that would result. Indeed, they are only now getting reinforcements into Egypt after the Egyptians have held up that movement for some days, and after there have been great parleys going on between the two countries in order to get Egypt's consent. I can well imagine how feverishly the Canadian ambassador and the officials of the United Nations in Cairo have been trying to persuade Nasser to allow those 120 troops to go into the Gaza strip. This amazing softness toward Nasser, which has continued right through the piece, will never get this country anywhere, and it is entirely out of line with the character of the Canadian people.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, we make no apologies for having these questions debated on the floor of the house. The whole British parliamentary system depends on robust debate. Our parliamentary system does not consist of having the government make all the decisions and all the announcements, with everybody else accepting them and keeping still. That is the Russian system, and this government has moved too far in the direction of this system of a one-party government and a one big "yes" vote.
We make no apologies for raising these questions. We believe parliament can only function properly in that way, and we believe
External Affairs
the Canadian press and the Canadian people are entitled to the benefit of a debate on this question and on all other questions, as a result of which all sides of the story can be brought out. Then it will be much more likely that policies will be adopted which will be in the best interests of our nation.
Mr. Colin Cameron (Nanaimo):: Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to talk for very long, because I wish to give an opportunity to the Secretary of State for External Affairs to answer; but there are one or two things that I think need to be said.
Perhaps, like most hon. members, I have listened with great interest to the speeches from the official opposition, and I was particularly interested in them in view of something which took place last year when, as you may recall, Mr. Speaker, the official opposition presented a motion amending the original motion in the external affairs debate on January 31. At that time the C.C.F. group, through the hon. member for Rose-town-Biggar, produced a subamendment. The Conservative amendment at that time deplored the approval of the government's policy of authorizing the shipment of munitions of war to countries in that area not within the NATO alliance; and also condemned the government for the lack of candour with which the matter had been dealt in the house. The C.C.F. subamendment, sir, read as follows:
That the amendment be amended by inserting therein immediately after the word "alliance" the following words:
"without at the same time making sure that peace in that area would be guaranteed either by the United Nations or by the powers that signed the tripartite agreement of 1950, namely the United States, the United Kingdom and France."
Now, sir, I find this particularly interesting because on February 1 a vote was taken on the subamendment, and I find in the list of hon. members who voted against having the United Nations or the tripartite powers, guarantee peace in that area, the names of the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Die-fenbaker) and the hon. member for Van-couver-Quadra (Mr. Green).
I think most of us realize, sir, that there is no simple solution to this problem. In fact I think that is the explanation of what I have considered in the last few weeks to be the rather regrettable irascible answers the Prime Minister has given to questions asked on the floor of the house. That is one point on which I do agree with the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra. I think it was regrettable that the Prime Minister was so extremely irascible when he answered those questions. I can understand that the cause was the uneasy consciousness of the

External Affairs
fact that the government's policy does not in itself contain a final solution. I am quite ready to admit immediately that I do not know where the final solution lies.
In discussing the relationships of nations it is very easy to pick up one link of the chain of cause and effect and say it all began there, but unfortunately each link is connected with the one before, and we find as we go back that that was not where it all started; it all started somewhere farther back. I think with regard to the Middle East this is particularly the case, and that no matter how much we may dislike the actions of Mr. Nasser, no matter how much we may deplore the actions of various other powers in that area, we have to relate those actions and those attitudes to the very long and deplorable history of those people.
It is quite unreasonable, I submit, Mr. Speaker, to expect people in the position of President Nasser of Egypt to be open to sweet reason. They have a long history, and we may as well admit it, of quite callous exploitation by other peoples. We cannot avoid facing that fact; and in the present age, when they are now coming up under that upsurge of nationalism that President Sukarno of Indonesia pointed out last year, we can only expect one unreasonable attitude after another. It is in fact, sir, a case of the skies being very dark with the fluttering wings of chickens coming home to roost.
I believe, sir, that the answer to this problem can only be found in one direction.
This afternoon my colleague the hon. member for Winnipeg North made reference to the situation that existed some 40 years ago between the United States and Mexico. When he mentioned that I recalled at that time there had been for many years continual border incidents and constant turmoil; and they were attributable I think, sir, to the deplorably low economic standards prevailing at that time among the Mexican people.
Since that time the economy of Mexico has been built up and we have had no further incidents of that sort, because people have been too busy developing their own lives there to engage in that sort of banditry. I suggest that from now on our policy must be directed entirely toward getting at the root of the trouble in the Near East, and I think that also can be attributed entirely to the deplorable economic standards of the vast majority of those people.
It will do us not the slightest good in the world, sir, to get rid of Colonel Nasser, because the moment he goes another Nasser will rise to take his place and there will be a succession of Nassers until the economy of Egypt is built up and the people there can

develop a living standard upon which some measure of democracy can be based; because it is one of the inexorable facts of life that democracy can be based only on at least a relative measure of economic prosperity.
I would hope the Canadian government will adopt a policy of which there should be two parts. One would be the development of a plan of economic aid to that area under the auspices of the United Nations. The other would be to exert all the influence we may have on the United States government to play their part in that economic rehabilitation.
I certainly subscribe most heartily to the criticisms made this afternoon by my colleague the hon. member for Winnipeg North with regard to the dealings of the United Nations with the more disreputable ruling groups in the Middle East area. I do not think that is a contribution to the stabilization of the area. I believe that the people of the developed economies of this world will have to speak very bluntly to those people, offer them our fullest co-operation and economic aid of every sort but on certain terms, that it must be devoted to raising the living and educational standards of those people.
In the meantime I can see no alternative to this uneasy process of trying to deal with unreasonable people, and I would suggest to my friends in the Conservative party that the hard truth of the matter is there are no alternatives to these uneasy negotiations than force of arms; and we should face that fact. If that is the alternative we want to adopt; if we must proceed with an armed attack upon Mr. Nasser and the elements in the Middle East which have been disturbing the peace, then let us do so openly and frankly.
I do not think anyone in this house actually wants to do that. I believe everyone in this house realizes that is an alternative we should accept only if it is forced upon us, and in the meantime we shall have to endure what the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra referred to as humiliation. I personally believe that we in Canada should surely now be of sufficient maturity not to indulge in that sort of emotional reaction to an insult or rebuff from another country. I think we should be prepared to say, "Okay, rebuff us if you like and insult us if you will, but we are not going to be foolish enough to involve the world in war because our feelings have been hurt".


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker-


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Mr. Speaker-


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker-


Howard Charles Green: Oh, no.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I rise to answer the questions addressed to me by my hon. triends on the other side, and as there are only 25 minutes left before the conclusion of the debate this will be the only chance I will have to do so.


Stanley Howard Knowles: You are assuming that they want the answers.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Do I understand there is consent that the minister shall answer at this time?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I have been asked-


Mr. Churchill:: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order, there is not unanimous consent.


Mr. Stuart (Charlotte):: Do you want to hear the answers? Are you afraid of them?


Mr. Lesage:: Afraid again; always afraid.


Mr. Cardiff:: Don't get too cocky.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: If there is not
unanimous consent I cannot grant the floor to the minister.


Mr. Gauthier (Porlneuf):: They do not
want the answers.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Mr. Speaker, it appears that some wrath has been engendered on the other side of the house because the sacred cow has been kicked, and I mean by that the Department of External Affairs.


An hon. Member:: That must be the answer.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: I have no doubt that because of what has taken place there will be numerous interruptions by hon. members opposite, and I should like to tell my hon. friends that they cannot shout me down and I will talk for the entire balance of the time if that is their wish.


Mr. Robichaud:: You are afraid of an
answer; you do not want an answer.


An hon. Member:: This is the proof of fear.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: It seems that the Secretary of State for External Affairs and his seatmate the Minister of National Health and Welfare, together with their cohorts on the government side of the house, have been severely disturbed because the hon. members
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in the official opposition have dared to criticize the activities of the Department of External Affairs.
We all know, Mr. Speaker, that hindsight is much easier and very often better than foresight. Of course we know this to be true; but on the other hand the suggestion that it is a kind of lese majesty to even think of criticizing the Department of External Affairs is not in keeping with the parliamentary system of a democracy. I realize that because of the great length of time the present government have been in power they have developed this attitude that no one should criticize them, that they are always right and everyone else is always wrong. Surely, as has already been stated by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra and others, it is the right of the official opposition and other opposition parties to criticize the government if they have made errors, and it is our right even to criticize the Department of External Affairs without having it implied by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and more strongly by the Minister of National Health and Welfare that one is disloyal if he does such a thing.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a
question of privilege. No one has suggested in this debate today-


John Whitney Pickersgill: Or at any time.


Paul Joseph James Martin: -or at any time that it was not open to any hon. member to criticize the government on any question. The only suggestion I made today was that in the matter of foreign affairs, and particularly on a question so delicate as this, it was not in keeping with parliamentary tradition to put important questions concerning foreign policy without giving notice. There was no suggestion that there should not be the fullest debate. The Secretary of State for External Affairs is now trying to engage in a full debate, and the hon. gentleman opposite obstructs.


Gordon Minto Churchill: You are making another speech.


Hédard-J. Robichaud: You are afraid to hear the answers.


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Speaker, on a point of order I submit to you that the Minister of National Health and Welfare should withdraw that last remark. He said the hon. member for Oxford is obstructing. The hon. member for Oxford has a perfect right to speak, just as much right as the minister; and for the minister to get up and make that statement just because the hon. member is exercising his right to speak is quite improper. The minister's statement should be withdrawn.

External Affairs


Paul Joseph James Martin: If it is offensive to the hon. member for Oxford I will be glad to withdraw it, but I do say that as a result of what has gone on the Secretary of State for External Affairs is prevented from giving answers in connection with this matter about which we were urged to permit further debate.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: The government instituted this debate, and I see no reason why it could not have it continued on another occasion, thus giving the Secretary of State for External Affairs ample opportunity to answer any questions which have been put to him. If the government wish to have the Secretary of State for External Affairs answer these questions I do not see why they could not do what I have suggested. However, I shall endeavour to give the minister a certain amount of time. As I have already mentioned, the more I am interrupted by backbenchers on the other side-I say this as a backbencher to backbenchers-the longer I will have to continue.
I am glad the Minister of National Health and Welfare has corrected the impression and has indicated that he does not object to hon. members of the official opposition offering certain criticism on foreign policy. I am glad that has been cleared up, because that was certainly the inference I drew from his remarks and those of the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I am glad that has been fixed up. While the minister denied it, I still cannot help feeling that the government is upset over anybody deciding to criticize what has been regarded as a sacred cow for so many years, namely the Department of External Affairs.
It is easy to offer criticism of what has already occurred, but sometimes it is a good idea to offer something which may act as a guide in the future. Unlike my hon. friends opposite I do not think the Department of External Affairs is always right. I submit that this department must bear a considerable share of the responsibility for the conditions which led up to the present unfortunate situation in the Near East. I should like to explain this and it may take a little time, but I shall try to cut my remarks as much as possible so I will not be accused of precluding the Secretary of State for External Affairs from answering the questions which have been asked.
There has been a great deal of discussion about the inclusion of the phrase "consent of Egypt". In reply to a question of mine earlier today the Secretary of State for External Affairs stated that the particular resolution sending the UNEF to the Near East was based on the "uniting for peace" resolution which was passed in 1950 during the time of the
[Mr. Green.1
Korean war. I do not intend to take up the time of the house by reading all of that particular resolution, as I am sure hon. members either know what it is or can easily look it up.
The resolution was divided into two parts, part A and part B. Part B provided for the setting up of an observer corps which could go into a place with the consent of the country concerned if some future breach of the peace was to be expected. Apparently the United Nations emergency force was not set up under part B, but was set up under part A of the resolution. That part of the resolution reads as follows:
-the general assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or active aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or restore international peace and security.
There is nothing there about the consent of the country being required. Various viewpoints have been expressed in various publications. A confidential publication of the commonwealth	parliamentary association
points out that those words were certainly not in the resolution, that the reason they have been used is rather vague, something to do with generally recognized law.
I suspect that the reason the words "consent of Egypt" were put in was that it was necessary to have the support of two-thirds of the general assembly in order to pass that resolution, and that would not have been obtained without the support of the communist nations in the United Nations, of which there are 10 approximately; and without the support of the group of Asian countries generally known as being strongly nationalistic, of which there are approximately 20. At that time there were 80 countries in the United Nations; today there are 81, and a two-thirds majority would mean 54 votes. If one adds up the countries which would have supported the resolution without the term "consent of Egypt" in it he would have found that no more than 45 at the outside would have voted for the resolution.
It will be asked what Canada has to do with this. A year and a half ago there were 60 members of the United Nations, and since that time 20 more countries have come in, 14 of which are Asian nationalists or communist countries. Canada was largely instrumental in bringing in those new countries. I had the privilege of being an observer with the Canadian delegation at the time this went on. I think at that time everyone felt encouraged with what was being done. Perhaps ignorance was bliss in that case, because some of us were quite inexperienced and did not know what was going on. It seemed to be a good idea, a very idealistic way of adding

to the membership of the United Nations, because it was felt that if that organization was to succeed all countries must be members.
What we did not realize at the time was that the timing was bad. It is well known that the United States objects to communist China coming in, as do the rest of us, I think, because it is realized that that would affect the balance of power in the United Nations. I think we all realize that the United Nations is not the idealistic affair that it should be, but is rather a cynical group playing power politics, which I am afraid seems to be necessary at the present time.
When those 20 new countries were brought in the membership was raised from 60 to 80, with 14 of the new members being communist or pro-Asian countries. That upset the whole balance of power in the United Nations. When we look back at it I think we must realize it is most unfortunate that those countries were brought in at that time. I realize it is quite easy to see that now, but I maintain also that the Department of External Affairs, with its knowledge which the rest of us do not have, with its confidential information, with its great experience, with its head being the Secretary of State for External Affairs who it has been said so often is a great authority on world affairs-and I do not say that with my tongue in my cheek because I think he is a most capable man- should have realized the consequences of this move. Those consequences should have been foreseen by the Department of External Affairs with the knowledge it had at its disposal, knowledge that the rest of us did not have. It should have been foreseen that these Asian countries would side with Arab countries and probably with the communist countries who like to stir up trouble.
I think it is common knowledge that at the time the United States were not anxious to have a number of these countries admitted. Apparently the United States state department may well have envisaged such a situation as has arisen. But Canada had her way, the countries came in, and in the long run I think we would all agree that it might have been unwise for a number of those countries to have been accepted at that time because it has upset the balance of power in the United Nations and put the western nations in an inferior position.
Mr. Speaker, there are a number of questions I would like to discuss further, but I would not wish to deprive the Secretary of State for External Affairs of some opportunity to reply.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Is it agreed that the minister should now conclude the debate?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
External Affairs


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, during this debate the Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Yancouver-Quadra called attention to the seriousness of the situation in the Middle East. Indeed, it was referred to by them as being dangerous and critical; and they complained, as they had the right to complain, that I did not deal with many of the more important points related to that situation. They demanded further enlightenment in regard to these important matters, and said the answers to those questions should be given, and given at once.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I have six minutes in which to do that unless the house is so anxious to get this information, to which it is entitled, that it will agree to sit after six o'clock for that purpose.


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Not necessarily. We will see what sort of answer you give, first.


Lester Bowles Pearson: The hon. member for Van-couver-Quadra said he had no apology to make for participating in this debate, and I am sure no apologies are expected of him or of anyone else, because this is an important subject and it is well that we should debate it, and debate it at length.
He did, of course, in the course of his remarks accuse us on the government side of arrogance-this has been referred to by other hon. members opposite, so I have to mention it-because of our reluctance to deal with questions asked in the house. But our reluctance, Mr. Speaker, is only with regard to attempting to answer questions on important and sensitive international matters without notice when notice, even of two or three hours, could easily be given which would make it possible for the minister in charge to get the desired information.


Howard Charles Green: That objection was never raised by the Prime Minister.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Because the Prime Minister is a very courteous member of this house and tries to answer questions even when he has not been given notice. The Leader of the Opposition, and I regret to have to mention this, said with reference to myself:
My hon. friend sunk to a new low when he said that had the attitude of this party-
That is, the Conservative party.
-been adopted last fall the situation would be different for world peace.
And then he went on to say:
I say to him that this statement is false, and ask for a withdrawal.
I said at the time that I had made no such statement. I have had the opportunity to go

External Affairs
very carefully through the record in Hansard, and I did not make any such statement. I hope the Leader of the Opposition will be satisfied when he reads Hansard that this is so and, therefore, that my "decline to this new low", as he put it, has no validity.
The Leader of the Opposition spoke at some length this morning and this afternoon. He spent a great deal of time, and that is his right and privilege-we should not complain about it-in criticizing the government on the policy we have been adopting in the Middle East. He also spent a good deal of time abusing Colonel Nasser, the head of the Egyptian government. I would just say to him in this regard, Mr. Speaker, that whatever one may think of Nasser, who is the dictator of Egypt, abuse of Colonel Nasser is no substitute for wise Canadian policy; and I cannot, myself, think it adds anything to the formulation of Canadian policy.
He mentioned this morning that the Egyptian government was falling increasingly under Russian influence, or words to that effect, and that Russian help and Russian arms were pouring into that country. If that is the case, Mr. Speaker, I suggest that we would not be following the course of wisdom-and by "we" I mean the western powers generally-by attacking him in such a way as to drive him irrevocably into the arms of Russian communist imperialism.


John George Diefenbaker: What do you mean by "attacking"?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I mean abusing him and driving him into a corner by condemning him for things which, perhaps, he has not done; and using language that is too extreme and abusive to suit the situation. I do not see any value in that kind of thing in diplomatic relations, no matter what one may think about the man or the government with whom one is dealing.
The hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra made two points very clearly in criticism of the government. One was-and this also relates to what I have just been saying- that we cater to Nasser, as he puts it, too much. That seems to me, Mr. Speaker, a strange criticism in view of the knowledge I have, and which he must have, too, of the reaction of the Egyptian government and the Egyptian people to the policy we have been adopting in the United Nations. Certainly no Egyptian down there would agree that Canada has been "catering to Nasser." His other criticism was that we have been following the United States too closely.


John George Diefenbaker: Would the minister allow a question at this point, arising out of a press dispatch today stating that the Egyptian government having read the qualifications is

no longer too disturbed by recent statements made by the Prime Minister of Canada and the Secretary of State for External Affairs? What were those statements that proved disturbing?


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is an easy question to deal with because, if the hon. member had had the advantage that I have had of reading the reports in Egyptian newspapers of statements that were made in this house, and of seeing the distortion of those reports that appeared in Egyptian newspapers, he would know that it is understandable that Colonel Nasser might have been even more disturbed about Canadian policy than he was at the United Nations.
As the hon. gentleman himself said this morning, the Egyptian press has been accusing our Prime Minister of being an imperialist, a warmonger, and things of that kind. Anyone reading those reports might well have a distorted view of Canadian policy, but I do not think we should distort that distortion into a charge that we are catering to Colonel Nasser.
Now, Mr. Speaker, at the end of his statement the Leader of the Opposition did mention two items of policy which the Conservative opposition put forward in respect to Middle East questions. One of these was that the right of free and innocent passage in the gulf of Aqaba and through the straits of Tiran must be assured. Well, there is no difference between us on that, and if the hon. gentleman had listened to my statement this morning he would have realized that I said exactly the same, and I have said it more than once at the United Nations Assembly.
His second item of Conservative party policy in this matter was that the United Nations should asume direct responsibility in the Gaza area to maintain that area against aggressive action by raids across the border and that kind of thing. Here again there is no difference between us. If he had read the documents and if he had read the statements that have been made by the Canadian delegates-


John George Diefenbaker: I have read every word, and they have been evasive on that point.


Lester Bowles Pearson: We have said exactly that more than once at the United Nations-


John George Diefenbaker: No; with much equivocation.


Lester Bowles Pearson: -and in this house; and if the hon. member reads Hansard tomorrow he will probably find that I said it during my statement this morning. Hence there should not be much difference between us on that point.

In so far as the United Nations emergency force is concerned, the Leader of the Opposition this morning said his party put forward this idea a year or so ago, and that is true. I acknowledged that in statements I made in this house in November. I would remind him, however-I said this in the House of Commons last November and I call it again to his attention-that this government-and we take no special credit to ourselves for this-had been putting forward the idea of a United Nations force for years, and in this particular case a United Nations force for the Middle East. At the opening meeting of the committee on external affairs last summer, I think it was, when I appeared after my hon. friend had mentioned this matter in the House of Commons, I put this idea before the committee, because it had been the subject of discussion here in the house, in the hope that the committee on external affairs might go into it in more detail. That was not taken up in any way, shape or form by my hon. friends who were members of the committee, or by any member of that party. No mention was made of it.


John George Diefenbaker: I brought the matter before the house and you ridiculed it.


An hon. Member:: Six o'clock.


Lester Bowles Pearson: There was no ridiculing. The committee on external affairs spent their time on general policy, and we talked about the Middle East. I have mentioned these things-


Gordon Minto Churchill: Six o'clock.


Lester Bowles Pearson: -because of what my hon. friend said this morning.


Gordon Minto Churchill: I rise on a point of order. The agreement was that the minister should go on past six o'clock if he answered questions. He is not answering any questions at all. He is just making a rebuttal. It is now six o'clock.


Mr. Garson:: A great sport is the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre (Mr. Churchill).


Mr. Speaker:: I understood that an arrangement was arrived at earlier, by unanimous consent, that the house would go on after six o'clock. Now the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre, rising on a point of order, says he is withdrawing unanimous consent as
External Affairs
far as he is concerned. If we are sitting after six o'clock there must be unanimous consent. It takes just one hon. member to withdraw that consent.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Maybe the hon. member should withdraw.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have three more questions which were asked and which I should like to answer.


John George Diefenbaker: Answer the questions and stop making your political speech.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Six o'clock.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I am sorry, but unanimous consent has been withdrawn.


An hon. Member:: He can't take it any more.


Mr. Speaker:: As it is six o'clock this house stands adjourned-


Edmund Davie Fulton: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. In order that the record may be clear-


James Sinclair: Six o'clock.


Some hon. Members:: Six o'clock.


Edmund Davie Fulton: On a point of order-


James Sinclair: Your man called it six o'clock.


Mr. Speaker:: I do not know why a point of order should be raised at the moment. I am simply announcing that we are through for the day. This house stands adjourned-


Stanley Howard Knowles: Who are "we"?


Mr. Speaker:: -until Monday at 2.30 in the afternoon.


Howard Charles Green: Could we have the business for Monday?



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, the Minister of Finance asked me to announce that he would like to take the final supplementary estimates for the current fiscal year on Monday and, after they were completed, any item that suited the general convenience under government orders; and that on Tuesday the budget debate would be resumed.


[Stage Direction]
It being seven minutes past six o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
[Stage Direction]
Question

[Stage Direction]
The following answer, deposited with the Clerk of the house, is printed in the official report of debates pursuant to standing order 39:

Mr. MacEachen: 1.	How many institutions in the province of Nova Scotia have received assistance from the federal government under the hospital construction grants?
2.	What amount of assistance did each institution receive?
Answer by: Hon. Paul Martin (Minister of
National Health and Welfare):
1.	33.
2.	Amount of
Name of hospital	grant
Bayview Memorial Red Cross hospital, Advocate	$	3,609
St. Martha's hospital, Antigonish ..	122,000
Victoria County Memorial hospital,
Baddeck	 17,358
Western King's Memorial hospital,
Berwick	 28,333
Nova Scotia Institute, Brookside ...	74,761
Eastern Memorial hospital, Canso ..	5,472
Halifax County mental hospital,
Cole Harbour	 300,000
Nova Scotia hospital, Dartmouth ..	533,080
Glace Bay General hospital, Glace
Bay	 10,000
Guysborough Memorial hospital,
Guysborough	 15,000
Amount of
Name of hospital	grant
Children's hospital, Halifax	 177,530
Dental building, Dalhousie University, Halifax	 15,000
Grace Maternity hospital, Halifax..	85,000
Provincial Polio clinic, Halifax ....	27,770
Victoria General hospital, Halifax	252,464
Blanchard-Fraser Memorial hospital, Kentville	 21,000
Nova Scotia sanatorium, Kentville	7,000
Queens General hospital, Liverpool	41,667
Lunenburg hospital, Lunenburg ..	38,667
Musquodoboit Valley Memorial hospital, Middle Musquodoboit ....	5,349
Twin Oaks Memorial hospital, Musquodoboit Harbour	 11,000
Buchanan Memorial hospital, Neil's
Harbour	 17,000
Aberdeen hospital, New Glasgow ..	251,000
St. Elizabeth's hospital, North Sydney	 188,333
Eastern Shore Memorial hospital,
Sheet Harbour	 17,161
St. Mary's hospital, Sherbrooke ....	10,113
St. Rita hospital, Sydney	 199,000
Sydney City hospital, Sydney 

 153,667
Harbour View hospital, Sydney
Mines	 49,667
Cape Breton County hospital, Sydney River	 510,000
Colchester County hospital, Truro 60,000 Point Edward hospital, Westmount 22,005 Payzant Memorial hospital, Windsor 45,667



$3,315,673 END OF VOLUME II