1956-06-21

LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT


Hon. W. E. Harris (Minister of Finance) moved:: That the report of the civil service commission respecting the position of librarian 5, library of parliament, laid upon the table of the house June 18, 1956, be now approved.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. W. Earl Rowe (Dufferin-Simcoe):: Mr. Speaker, in view of an article appearing in this morning's Globe and Mail to the effect that the supply of mortgage money from chartered banks and insurance companies for National Housing Act financing of new houses has almost vanished across Canada, with millions of dollars' worth of applications being returned unapproved in recent weeks, that the worst hit are Ontario and Quebec, and that the builders describe the situation as bad and rapidly getting worse and that building may be at a standstill in Windsor and in the Toronto district, I would like to ask the Minister of Finance whether this tight-money policy announced by Mr. Coyne of the Bank of Canada is the considered policy of this government?


Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Speaker, I think I answered on a previous occasion that I was informed of the increase in the discount rate which took place on, I think, April 4. The other features involved in the article referred to have to do with banking practice of the chartered banks.


William Earl Rowe: I should like to ask a supplementary question. In view of the fact that this increase was ordered by the Bank of Canada, have the Minister of Finance and the government abdicated their fiscal responsibilities to the governor of the Bank of Canada?


Walter Edward Harris: No, Mr. Speaker.


Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prince Albert):: Mr. Speaker, arising out of the last answer may I ask the minister whether or not there is any foundation for the press release of two days ago to the effect that within the next three or four weeks, or possibly in about six weeks, there will be a reduction in interest rates in the Bank of Canada? In order to relieve the situation to which reference was made by the hon. member who asked the question, what consideration is being given to meet this situation by bringing about a reduction in interest rates?


Walter Edward Harris: Well, Mr. Speaker, first of all there is no basis for the newspaper speculation that a reduction might occur; that is not to say that it would not, however. These matters are never forecast; they are only announced when they occur.
As to what the government is doing, since this question arose-I think it was brought to our attention about ten days or two weeks ago-my colleague the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters) has been carefully considering the housing situation in Canada and we have been consulting with him and with the banks with respect to it.
I understand, in addition to that, the hon. member for Parkdale (Mr. Hunter) has asked me to meet a delegation of the builders' association next Tuesday and we are looking forward to doing that for the purpose of finding out from their viewpoint how serious the situation may be in the city of Toronto. I presume there will also be representations from other parts of Canada.
I might also add, however, that I will be seeing the bankers' association tomorrow but nothing is to be read into that other than the statement that I am going to see them.


Mr. Donald M. Fleming (Eglinton):: Mr. Speaker, on the same matter, in view of the fact that there is a policy of restriction of credit involved here as well as a policy of increased interest rates, is the government attempting any consultation through the Bank of Canada in this regard with a view to alleviating some of the undue restriction of credit which seems destined now to curtail house building so seriously?


Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Speaker, we are, of course, keeping a very careful watch on the results
5238	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry of the policy and how it may be affecting particular groups of people and we shall continue to do so.


John George Diefenbaker: If I may carry on, Mr. Speaker, in view of the answer given by the Minister of Finance, I would ask him whether or not he has received representations from Regina and Saskatoon respecting the serious situation created for housing by the rise in interest rates and whether, in view of the latter words in his answer given a few minutes ago to the effect that he is going to meet with the builders' association and the bankers' association, he can hold out a little hope that there will be a reduction?


Walter Edward Harris: I said before that I merely made the bald statement I was going to meet with them. In answer to the previous question, I did not receive any representations from either Regina or Saskatoon. The only representations I received were from the city of Toronto and those the hon. member for Oxford (Mr. Nesbitt) sent me.


Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a supplementary question to the Minister of Finance. In view of the seriousness of this situation, will he consider arranging for an early discussion of the matter here in the House of Commons so that the views of hon. members may be communicated to the government?
May I also ask him if when he meets with the bankers' association and others he will give consideration to the changing of the government's policy from one of general credit control to one of selective credit control in order that such credit as is available might be made available for the building of homes?


Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Speaker, my colleague the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin) reminds me that he and the hon. member for Essex West (Mr. Brown) did forward to me representations with respect to the city of Windsor.
In answer to the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles), may I say that we would of course consider other questions that might affect the economy. Whether or not a general or a particular form of credit control would be desirable will be considered from day to day. I do not think I should go further than that except to say that I shall consult with my colleague the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters) with respect to the debate my hon. friend wishes to have.


Stanley Howard Knowles: May I ask a further supplementary question. Is the Minister of Finance aware that under the general credit control policy of the government money is available for speculative investment but not for the building of homes?


Walter Edward Harris: I would not want to admit that at the moment.


Stanley Howard Knowles: It is true nevertheless.


Mr. Erhari Regier (Burnaby-Coquitlam):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the Minister of Finance whether he would care to clarify what he said a few moments ago, that he had become aware of this shortage or apparent shortage only a few weeks ago. On January 19 the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters) in replying to a question said that there was no indication by prospective borrowers that there was going to be a shortage. Was it only a few weeks ago that the minister became aware of a shortage?


Walter Edward Harris: I think I can correctly say it was only about two weeks ago that I personally was informed of the difficulties.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Where has the minister been?



INQUIRY AS TO ALLOCATION, MOVEMENT AND SHORTAGES OF BOX CARS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. D. S. Harkness (Calgary North):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Is the minister aware that a considerable number of box cars loaded with grain are sitting on prairie sidings? Why are they not being moved forward to ports or terminal storage? When will they be moved?


Right Hon. C. D. Howe (Minister of Trade and Commerce):: Mr. Speaker, I was not aware that there were loaded grain cars sitting on sidings. I am aware that deliveries to terminals are running at a record rate and I am aware that movements for the past two months and for the current month are assuming record proportions. I can only assume that if the cars are sitting on sidings they are waiting for motive power to pick them up or they are waiting for their position in a schedule which corresponds with the capacity to unload at the terminals.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think perhaps I should ask the minister to look into this matter because I saw a considerable number of cars which I was told had been sitting there for quite a long time.


An hon. Member:: Idle rumour.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Speaker, I should also like to ask a question of the Minister of Trade and Commerce in connection with the shortage of freight cars, particularly on Canadian Pacific lines. Without prefacing my remarks by saying what is the situation I would ask the minister what

is being done-I read his statement yesterday-to correct what is almost a blight as against Canadian Pacific lines and the farmers on those lines. What is being done to assure at least a reasonably fair distribution of cars in those areas served by the Canadian Pacific? I saw it myself during the past few days and I know what is the situation.


Mr. Sinclair:: The Canadian National are doing a good job.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I announced
earlier in the session that it would be impossible to follow the policy of last year in maintaining uniform deliveries at all country elevator points. I pointed out that this is an exceptional year in the movement of grain out of Canada and the only way to take full advantage of it is to move to terminals the type of grain for which there is a ready sale. That policy has been followed and at the moment a very definite effort is being made to bring points which now have a low quota up to the average quota for the three prairie provinces.
I am aware, as I said yesterday, that the Canadian National have moved a considerably greater proportion of the grain on their lines to terminals than has the Canadian Pacific. In the light of that fact, arrangements are being made so that the farmer who formerly delivered to a Canadian Pacific point and who is within trucking distance of a Canadian National point will have the option of delivering to alternate delivery points. In other words, if there is a low quota on the Canadian Pacific point and a high quota on the Canadian National point within trucking distance, the farmer may deliver to the high quota point.
This is one step that is being taken. As far as Canadian Pacific lines are concerned, every effort is being made to favour the low quota points. I am hopeful that there will be a definite improvement before the end of the crop year.
It is touch and go to keep the right kind of grain at ocean terminals. Boats are arriving in great numbers and they are arriving out of order. We may plan on loading No. 2 northern the following week, and perhaps No. 5 northern boats that had been expected earlier will suddenly arrive and we must have that grade of grain as well. It is a tremendous job, and I should mention the fine work of the transport controller in that connection. To date, whilst there has been some small amount of demurrage paid, he has succeeded very well indeed in having the kind of grain in hand that the boats require. But we have a situation on the lower St. Lawrence today that there is not enough
Inquiries of the Ministry grain in the elevators to take care of one week's loadings. In other words, we are unloading canalers to provide grain needed to load waiting ocean boats. Whilst we have not the same situation on the west coast, there it is quite a problem of having adequate stocks of the grades required to fill the ocean boats.
I think my hon. friend would agree with me that in a year like this the principal objective must be to deliver grain to our overseas customers in the largest possible quantities. If we are not able to even out the deliveries at every country elevator, we can compensate after August 1, for this abnormal movement promises to continue. We shall try to see that in the long run every producer gets an even break.


John George Diefenbaker: That suggestion that
farmers on C.P.R. lines will be able to market at C.N.R. marketing agencies or local elevators will be helpful. I ask the minister also whether there is any available storage space at Churchill today. What is the situation there? If there is available space, has consideration been given to allowing wheat to be stored, at the moment not to be marketable -the grades that are not desired at the moment-at Churchill, particularly from C.P.R. lines which up to the present have been closed?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Churchill is filled to capacity. It was filled to capacity last fall. The season there will open about the middle of July, and that additional movement will be helpful, and at that time we can favour C.P.R. delivery points to some extent.



PIPE LINES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. W. M. Hamilton (Notre Dame de
Grace): Is the Minister of Trade and Commerce able to inform the house what amount has been advanced to Trans-Canada Pipe Lines up to this date by Northern Ontario Pipe Line Crown Corporation?
Clarence Decatur Howe: The amount of money advanced by the crown?


Mr. Hamilton (Notre Dame de Grace):: The
amount of money advanced by the crown corporation up to this date.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I cannot give that information. I shall be glad to look into the matter and give it to my hon. friend tomorrow, if any money has been paid.

Supply-National Defence


William McLean Hamilton: Is
the minister able to tell us how much money has been advanced to the crown corporation by the crown?


Clarence Decatur Howe: No, I cannot say that. I do not remember the figure, but I shall look into it and give the answer tomorrow.

The house in committee of supply, Mr. Robinson (Simcoe East) in the chair.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE Defence services-
235. To provide for the Canadian forces, the defence research board and other expenditures relating to defence, including contributions toward the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; to authorize expenditures in the current year out of the amount hereby provided, not exceeding $143,000,000, under the provisions of section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, and to provide that, notwithstanding subsection (3) of that section, where equipment or supplies are transferred, the estimated present value thereof shall be credited to this vote instead of being paid into the special account mentioned in the said subsection (3), and when so credited may be expended for the purposes of the Canadian forces; and notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act to authorize total commitments for the foregoing purposes of $3,470,423,461 regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of which it is estimated that $1,675,484,744 will come due for payment in future years), $1,722,797,717.


Mr. Gillis:: Mr. Chairman, I am sure that every member of the house who has read the white paper and realizes the importance of this debate wants to say something in the debate, and I am no exception. So far as information is concerned, the white paper leaves much to be desired. Practically all members of the house are in the position of having very little personal knowledge of defence matters or whether the money is being spent judiciously or otherwise. Of course, the Minister of National Defence, who presides over the three defence branches, is also in the position where he must accept the information given to him by the heads of the different branches. He is not in a very much better position than we are when it comes to analysing the expenditures that are made and the value we are receiving for the money spent.
I know that the minister has three very efficient deputy ministers. I have done business with all three and they are very courteous, fast in their work, and will give you any information you are looking for within reason. But at the same time I have always been of the opinion that one of the main needs of the defence department and

one of the greatest assets that the Minister of National Defence could have is a continuing defence committee of the House of Commons. They have one in Britain and they also have one in the United States. In my opinion, whoever opposes the idea is doing the Minister of National Defence a disservice. In this house there are approximately 100 members who are ex-servicemen, army, navy and air force, and they could be very helpful to the minister if we had a continuing committee before which the heads of the departments could be called, in camera, if necessary, in order that we might get all the information they could give with respect to defence spending, obsolescence of equipment, progress in the future and so forth. I think even the fact that such a committee existed would be a deterrent to those in the different branches of the department who might be inclined to spend recklessly. In my opinion the fact that there was a committee before which they could be called would act as a very useful brake, and I think the opinions of members of the house with experience in the services would be valuable to the Minister of National Defence.
I do not visualize the committee as a committee to get information for propaganda purposes or to make political capital. I visualize the committee as a responsible committee, one that would realize the implications of the international situation and whose members would use whatever knowledge they had for the purpose of assisting the defence department in the best interests of the country. I believe the cabinet should give serious consideration to the matter.
Of course, in 30 minutes one cannot go over the whole white paper, but in reading it it seems to me that the greatest difficulty facing the defence department today is manpower. I think that is pretty well pointed up on page 19 of the white paper, and I should like to refer to paragraphs 59, 60 and 61 where I find the following:
59.	During 1955 the R.C.N. enrolled 3,088 officers and other ranks and wastage totalled 2,671. . . .
60.	The army's total enrolments last year were 5,937; and net wastage, 8,222. . . .
61.	During 1955 the R.C.A.F. enrolled 8,153 officers and other ranks and wastage totalled 6,573.
I am sure the minister will agree with me that a system of enlistment or induction where the total enrolment for the year is fairly well offset by the wastage leaves much to be desired. To me it indicates that there is something wrong with the examinations and the aptitude tests that are given when these people are taken into the services. In the three services-army, navy and air force-your total enlistment was almost offset by your wastage or people

that are going out. I therefore believe that the government is going to be obliged to take a straight look at this question of manpower.
Comparisons are made all the time with respect to the progress made in the Soviet union, and it is closely related to this question of manpower. Of course, being a dictatorial set-up, the Soviet union call people in, set the courses and the period of enlistment, and I will wager that there is not much wastage in their forces. If we are going to take the Soviet union as the yardstick on the question of manpower and on other questions, we must rethink this whole question through as to how we are to be able to meet the efficiency of a country where two or three men make the decisions from which there is no appeal, where you do what you are told and where decisions can be made fast. That is the question we must face in the future and there must be a great deal of rethinking on the whole subject. As indicated by the white paper, I think this question of manpower is a fairly serious one. Of course, we must not forget the recommendations being made by General Simonds right across the country to the Legion and so on. Maybe he has something. However, I just want to leave with the minister the thought that he has on his hands a fairly acute manpower problem with respect to keeping the services up.
On the other hand there is a great deal of thinking we must do with respect to this whole international situation. We send visitors from Canada over to the Soviet union, including Mr. Duncan and others. They come back here and they write pamphlets and deliver lectures in which they point up the efficiency of the Soviet system, the progress they are making in the air, with respect to guided missiles, up-to-date planes and all that kind of thing. As I said before, if the Soviet union is to be taken as the yardstick in these things and if we are to be expected to compete, these people who are making these speeches and writing these pamphlets must go all the way with it. The apparatus of the Soviet union controls everything in the country. All of the profits of industry, agriculture and everything else in that country go to the state. Three or four men can blueprint what is going to be done and make the decisions, and they have the money to spend. The thing that Mr. Duncan and these other people are not telling us is that in the Soviet union the profits that go to industry in this country are available for distribution in the field of the development of armaments, social services, and all of these things. If we are going to take the
Supply-National Defence Soviet union as a yardstick and are going to try to keep up with them in the field of efficiency, then much of the profits that go into the coffers of industry in this country must be used for the purposes for which the Soviet union is using them. That is the thing they are not telling us, and that is the difference.
With respect to this question of war, may I say this. For the last three years I have been personally convinced that there is not much danger with respect to a global war. First, I am sure the United States will never start it and I am reasonably sure we will not and Britain will not, but we have to keep our guard. My belief is that the Soviet union is more afraid of war today than the western world, and she is afraid of it for this reason. The Soviet union has extended far and has taken over many countries. She has taken over the whole of Europe right into East Germany and she is tangled up with the Orient; she is mixing in with the Middle East. Today, the Soviet union is like the fly that captured the flypaper; she is there and she is stuck on it. She has to police and maintain armies in all of those satellite countries. I am reasonably sure-and I am sure she is sure-that if an over-all shooting war started tomorrow the same machinery would be underground in those captive countries that was there when Hitler subjugated them. A shooting war tomorrow would cause a revolution right from East Germany back into the Ukraine. I am sure she realizes that and she does not want a shooting war.
I believe the new look in Russia is a new policy. I do not believe it is a tactic this time. I believe we should recognize the fact that an over-all global war would mean a counter revolution as far as Russia is concerned, which might spread right through the whole of that country. That is the reason for the change from the cult of the individual to the collective administration that Bulganin and Khrushchev are setting up today. I am reasonably sure of that but, on the other hand, there is a new war and it is a trade war.
The Soviet union realizes that if she is to survive there can be no shooting war. She is doing her best to offset that at the present time. I believe her efforts for peace are legitimate and she means it. I believe she thinks-and I think she is on sound ground -that if she can put over this program of peaceful coexistence and go into a trade war with the west and use the weapons of economic development, mutual aid and social change, in time she is going to be able to beat us in that field unless we recognize the fact that we have to get into that field and match wits with her.

Supply-National Defence
I do not believe in this business Of giving away the resources of the country to other countries on a relief basis. I do not believe you can buy friends in that way. I do not believe that aid to any of the countries, including countries under the Colombo plan, if we are giving it away, is going to do us any good. I think the main question in the countries to whom we are giving aid is one of self-determination. I think that is the one disturbing factor in the world today. The whole continent of Africa is uprooted. Do not forget, it is not a new thing. The prejudice is there and it goes back for hundreds of years. They want to run their own show. The same thing is true in Algeria. That question is 125 years old and it is not going to be settled with guns. That is another point of unrest. It is true in Israel and in the Arab countries. That is another see-saw thing that will have to be settled. The giving of stuff to these people, in my judgment, is not going to buy the settlement; it is not going to buy them any more than it bought Tito. Today he has gone back to his blood brothers. I am not objecting to it. He has the right to make that decision. The fact that the west made loans to him and was good to him during his period of trial did not make any difference.
I believe the question of self-determination has to be settled. On the question of mutual aid, if those people want aid from us or from the United States, let them make application for it and it should be given on a basis of either a loan or an investment, and they should be allowed to run their own show in their own countries.
Of course, we have to continue our defence spending. One of the reasons why I should like to see a defence committee established is that we might be able to iron out those difficulties in that committee and send the collective judgment of a large group from this house back to the heads of the defence department. It would do the heads of the defence department good to talk to the members; it would do us good to talk to them. We would get much valuable information and when the minister's estimates came before the house next time perhaps that information would place us in the position where we in this house would be helping the minister to put over a program that we knew something about.
I am not going to speak at length on this particular problem, Mr. Chairman. I merely wanted to express these three or four points that I have made. Before I sit down I urge the minister to give consideration to the setting up of a parliamentary defence committee on a permanent basis with liberal
[Mr. Gillis.l

terms of reference and with powers to compel the attendance of responsible officials. At this very moment a United States senate committee has powers to compel responsible officials to testify and it is conducting a comprehensive investigation into certain aspects of the United States defence program. The Canadian parliament has always been denied this right despite the billions that have been spent for defence purposes. I know for at least four years on end previous to the minister's taking over, the Leader of the Opposition and I were two members of the house who hammered on this question of a continuing defence committee, and I think it would be one of the most valuable assets of the minister's department.
I am not going to go into the question of weapons. I do not think any of us knows too much about it, but I will say this. A plane on the assembly line today is obsolescent before it is off the line. That has been the history of development in the air.
Another point I should like to make is that Canada has not the kind of money needed to match an arms race with the United States and the Soviet union. We just do not have that kind of money, and that arms race is going to go on and on. The Soviet union does not have to tax its people for it. It takes over wealth-producing industry in the country and applies whatever comes out of it to whatever it needs in the country. The United States is a huge, rich country. It has a lot of money but it is finding it difficult today to keep up with the expenditures made in the Soviet union in keeping equipment up to date. Perhaps we wasted a lot of money in building the D.E.W. line and the other apparatus that is supposed to warn us when planes come over. If you believe what you read in the press-and the white paper commented on it -it will be a push-button war. Planes will not come over. They will push a button and a guided missile will come across and land wherever they want it to land. Therefore, we may be wasting a lot of money in the development of interceptors, and so forth, because you are not going to intercept those missiles. They go above the stratosphere and appear from nowhere; you hear a bang and that is it. However, I think the white paper itself indicates, in so far as this country is in a position to do so, that the defence department is aware of what is going on. They set out all of the new techniques and all of the new equipment, and we are attempting to match it as best we can. But, as I said before, we do not have the kind of money needed to match an arms race with the United States and with the Soviet union.
I know we cannot change what is in the book. The money has been spent. We are

going to spend so much next year. The government is going to do it with certain techniques and on certain strategic projects and that kind of thing. This house has not enough information to be able to argue about it or make recommendations concerning it but there are two things I would like the minister to think about arising out of this debate.
First of all there is the question of manpower and wastage in the methods employed in bringing people into the services. That wastage clearly indicates there is something wrong with the examinations; maybe it is a rush to get people but we must not forget we are getting our people on a voluntary basis. In the United States there is a draft board and when your number is up you simply go. There is no exemption for baseball players, boxers or hockey players. You simply go in and do your bit in the defence of the country. In the Soviet union they do not even draft their men, they simply shovel them in and then select them and when you are selected for a position it is a case of doing it or else. There is no wastage there. The defence department in this country is faced with the problem of having to send teams out to travel across the country recruiting people on a voluntary basis. By and large the people we are getting in the services are those who are unemployed. There are not many who are vacating attractive jobs and going into the services.


Mr. Byrne:: Oh no?


Clarence Gillis: The hon. member for Kootenay East says, "Oh no". How many are leaving the mines out in your riding to go into the services?


James Allen (Jim) Byrne: Lots of them.


Clarence Gillis: Not too many. We are getting our young officers from the universities and I might say to the minister that the officers' training course is an excellent way for young men to get university training. These boys are going through university and are being paid for it and at the same time they are receiving military training. They either stay in the regular forces or are potential material for the regular forces if and when they are needed. I am talking about the rank and file of the army, navy and air force. I think the air force does a splendid job. There is an excellent and efficient set-up at the main induction centre down at St. Johns, Quebec, and there is an excellent weeding out process. As the minister knows, young men go in there and take the basic training and write their aptitude tests. I think they have to write about 12 different tests during the two months they are there, and when the tests are completed it is possible to decide where
Supply-National Defence the young men should go, whether it be to the air crew, maintenance or the electronics field. In other words, no square pegs are being put in round holes; a very good job is being done there.
There was a considerable wastage last year however, as the minister knows, and I think it is due to the fact that when they go in most of the boys have never done much work. They are just not physically able to take the kind of training they are required to take during the first couple of months of their basic training, which is pretty tough.
I would like to see the minister make some pronouncement about a continuing defence committee. I think that is something that must be done. We should take advantage of the large number of ex-servicemen in this house and establish the kind of machinery that can scrutinize not only the expenditures that are being made but also the methods employed in building up the services. As I frequently pointed out to the Hon. Brooke Claxton when he was here, I think he made a big mistake when he did not enlist the support, aid and advice of the hon. members of this house who are available for a committee of that kind. I think it would be one of the biggest assets of the Minister of National Defence.
That is all I have to say at the present time of a general nature. We may have some more picking on the minister to do when his estimates are before us.


Mr. Mclvor:: Would the hon. member permit a question?


Clarence Gillis: Yes.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: Does this manpower question lead up to conscription and are you in favour of it?


Clarence Gillis: Well, Mr. Chairman, in reply to the hon. member for Fort William I would say, first of all, I do not make the laws and it would not make any difference what I thought about it. I mentioned the wastage of manpower and the difficulties encountered in building the services up and the fact that General Simonds was selling the idea of a selective service across the country to the legion branches. Now, whether or not I am in favour of it is not pertinent to the discussion at the present time, but if that question ever comes before this house I will state emphatically where I stand on it.


Mr. Blair:: Attaboy.


Mr. Brooks:: Very good.


Mr. Drew:: Mr. Chairman, this is the first opportunity we have had during the present session to discuss the most important subject

Supply-National Defence that will come before the house both from the point of view of the amount of money involved and also from the point of view of the purpose for which the money is being raised.
The statement made by the minister yesterday added very little to the white paper. The white paper has been very correctly described editorially as a paper which says nothing. It says it in good English and in good French, depending on which of the two publications one reads, but the fact remains that as for stating a policy for Canada at this time the white paper might just as well have been brought out of the records of several years ago.
It is difficult to believe we are now called upon to discuss national defence in, the atmosphere in which it has been presented by the minister. Just in these past few months sweeping reorganizations have been announced in Britain and in the United States as well as in Russia. In fact, there have been two stages of substantial reorganization mentioned in Britain in the last six months. First came the white paper on December 21 last when a very frank appraisal of the situation was made and a general reassessment of the role of certain branches of the services was presented to the House of Commons and the people of Britain. Then came sweeping changes in the United States to be followed by still further adjustments based upon the extended inquiries that have taken place there. The Soviet union reduced the number of divisions and streamlined its force generally with a recognition of the modern concept of war which has emerged from the thermonuclear age.
There is little here to suggest that we are preparing ourselves for the kind of war with which we would be confronted if that war should come. God forbid that it should ever come. No one is under any misapprehension as to the horror that would accompany a large-scale war under present conditions. The dreadful fact remains, however, that these preparations are made with a realization and recognition that there could be war. It is, of course, correct to say that what is being done here, as in other free nations, is to seek to build military strength in a way that will prevent a general outbreak. That, however, does not get away from the fact that military preparation recognizes the possibility of war.
The estimates now before us call for an expenditure of $1,775 million. Further amounts probably will be added by the supplementary estimates which will be presented later. What have we before us to really tell us whether this money is being properly spent or otherwise? We really have nothing

but bland assurances which were not substantiated by the detailed facts which would make it possible for us to pass judgment on this vitally important question. The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) warned us against a possible tendency to give credence to the smiling assurances which we are receiving. I should like to read his words. They express the view of the government in regard to the present situation, and I quote from page 5209 of yesterday's Hansard as follows:
To maintain the deterrent power of the free nations will not be an easy task, essential though it is to our survival. Paradoxically, as the existence of the deterrent continues to protect the peace, the continuance of that peace itself may tend to soften up the very deterrent force on which it depends, for it tends to give credibility to smiling assurances and friendly, folksy visits, all propagating the view that the day of world brotherhood has dawned at last, and suggesting that we can now safely set aside our defence programs, with their heavy costs, and concentrate on the much more pleasant task of raising our material standard of life.
Doubtless the statement that was made about the suggestion that we now disarm referred to a letter sent to the Canadian government by Premier Bulganin. I wonder if that was sent as a jest? I wonder what was the Canadian reply to the suggestion that we should disarm in the face of the massive forces possessed at this time by Russia. For a moment I was not certain what the minister was intending to imply when he spoke about giving credence to smiling assurances. What I think we should be on guard against is not only the smiling assurances from outside Canada but the smiling assurances from this government that all is well in our national defence preparations.
Let us examine what really are the facts. The only change of any significance that was mentioned yesterday was that the ten auxiliary squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force will no longer be part of our first line of defence. That probably is not very encouraging to units which had contemplated a role as part of the first line of defence. The reason for this decision is not made very clear, although the minister does say that the decision was reached reluctantly.
Let us see what has actually happened. Instead of ten auxiliary fighting squadrons which were intended to be part of the first line of defence in Canada and were intended, according to the statements made over and over again, to be equipped and trained for that purpose, we are now to have only six. One of the remaining four will undertake light transport duties. Another is to be used for the training of navigators. Another is

to be grounded and used for ground duties. The fourth is to be disbanded.
Instead of an increase in our air establishment this in fact means a decrease of four squadrons if the original intention of those auxiliary squadrons had actually been carried out. If special organizations were needed for the training purposes to which three of these four squadrons are now to be devoted those training units should have been organized for that purpose. It is true that the remaining six squadrons will be better equipped than they have been, but they are to be supplied with F-86s which are being withdrawn from first line use.
Why is this being done? This very question was dealt with on earlier occasions. The suggestion was made in earlier years that these auxiliary squadrons should be equipped with F-86s. I should like to read what the Minister of National Defence at that time said on April 15, 1953, as reported at page 3922 of Hansard. The Hon. Brooke Claxton, who was minister of national defence at that time, had the following to say by way of explanation as to why F-86s should not be supplied to these auxiliary squadrons:
The CF-100 was designed for the defence of Canada, and the F-86E was not. While the F-86E is unquestionably the leading aircraft of its type in the world today, it by no means follows that that is the ideal type of aircraft for the kind of operation we envisage as being necessary to defend Canada in the next few years. The range of this aircraft is not great, it has not full instrumentation and does not carry a navigator. Consequently anyone familiar with flying conditions in our north country would recognize that, while the F-86E would give a good account of itself, the losses would be high due to the fact that it might not be able to get back to its base again.
The subject came up for discussion the following year and at that time the Minister of National Defence, as reported on page 4991 of Hansard of May 21, 1954, had this to say:
There is another reason, and that is that these Sabre fighters are really not well suited for the air defence of Canada. They have a relatively short range, they have only one pilot: they have not a complete set of navigational instruments, and if they went into the air and got into a dogfight in Canada they might have great difficulty in getting back to their airfield. If we had our fighter defence in Canada staffed by Sabre fighters it would mean that we would have to have our airfields for fighter defence at least twice and probably three times as numerous as they are today because of the very much shorter range of the aircraft. Along with double or triple the number of airfields at present in existence we would have to have an increase in their attendant facilities, such as runways, oil tanks, hangars, married quarters, and everything else. An airfield costs about $30 million, and we would also have to double or triple the number of emergency landing fields.
If the Sabre fighters were not well suited for the air defence of Canada in 1954, what
Supply-National Defence has changed the picture today? If the F-86 was not suitable for the service referred to, why should that be the aircraft supplied to the squadrons which are to receive it according to the statement handed out yesterday by the minister? In an informative statement given to the press covering the statement made here in the house the minister said:
The Sabre aircraft which will be provided to 401 and 438 squadrons at Montreal, 400 and 411 squadrons at Toronto, and 442 and 443 squadrons at Vancouver will be the Mark 5. This aircraft is produced by Canadair Limited of Montreal, and has the Orenda jet engine. It is a high performance day fighter in the 600 m.p.h. class. It is expected that provision of the Sabres to the six auxiliary squadrons will begin late this year, and will extend through until next spring. The Sabres for the auxiliary will be flown back from the air division, where they are being replaced by the newer Mk 6s. All aircraft will be completely overhauled before being assigned to the auxiliary. In addition to the Sabres, these squadrons will receive an increase to the two T-33 jet trainers which they now have.
That statement by the Minister of National Defence indicates that aircraft which this house was informed in 1953 and 1954 were unsuitable for the service squadrons in Canada are now to be supplied under this new reorganization plan. Surely this present announcement indicates something of the confusion behind the announcements which have been made from time to time here in this House of Commons. In effect the minister says that squadrons which are not ready to take the air the moment an attack comes are going to be given aircraft which the Minister of National Defence who preceded him said were not suitable for the purpose for which they are to be employed. Then the minister said something else. The minister said that squadrons which are not ready to take the air the moment an attack comes will not get into active service. That in effect is what he said. In fact, his statement leaves the impression that those auxiliary squadrons are simply to supply the necessary replacement for the first line squadrons.
If that is so, then here is something that should be examined with the utmost care and in the utmost detail, and we should know what really lies behind this remarkable decision. Surely the Minister of National Defence is not making any suggestion that our over-all defence pattern is one that is ready for a full-scale war. He did say in his remarks yesterday that we were in a state of considerable readiness. These were his words, as recorded yesterday at page 5214 of Hansard:
Until recent years, we have never in our history had standing forces in peace time in anything like the numbers we have today.

Supply-National Defence
Then at another point in his remarks he said this, as recorded at page 5215 of Hansard:
Our services are well trained, well equipped, well disciplined. In character, in training and in resolution we have I believe as high a quality of serviceman as any country in the world.
I do not think that any hon. member of this house is going to raise any question about the accuracy of those statements, as far as the morale and as far as the standard of the men in our armed forces are concerned.
I have had the privilege, as have other hon. members, of visiting our air division in Europe. I have had the privilege of visiting our brigade in Germany. I have seen some of our naval units that visit other lands. Certainly we have every reason for pride in the young men and young women who are taking their part in those armed services. Our pride in their character, in their training, in their morale, should not, however, be used as an argument in any way to divert our attention from the basic considerations of organization, equipment and adequacy for the task in hand.
So far as the minister's statements are concerned, there is no evidence whatever of a truly Canadian concept of national defence related to the needs of defending this huge country of ours, the third largest country in the world, and at the same time accepting our share of the responsibilities under the United Nations and NATO.
There has been much public argument recently in regard to our defence forces. We have urged over and over again that the members of this house, through the proper channel of a committee of this House of Commons, be empowered to examine fully into this whole subject. I urged within a few days of the beginning of the present session that the whole question of national defence be referred to a committee of this house which would have power to call witnesses and to call for the production of documents and obtain other essential information. That request was flatly turned down. No explanation was given beyond the fact that the government had referred other matters to a committee on estimates.
Before I raised the question in this house,
I had written to the Prime Minister, making that proposal. His answer simply was to the effect that the government had already decided upon the four departments that were to be referred to the committee on estimates.
I made it clear then that the reference of the problems of national defence to the kind of muzzled committee on estimates with which this house has been provided would not in any way meet the situation. I pointed out that in Britain and in the United States,


the two countries with which we are most closely associated in problems of national defence, they are able to call senior staff officers and others before committees of the House of Commons and of the houses of congress, which obtain the facts upon which the members can then form judgments which are related to reliable information.
On the one hand we are told that we, of necessity, must follow in large measure the course that is followed in the United States as well as in Britain. We on the one hand retain organizational structures closely related to the British organization, and on the other hand are swinging substantially to equipment of the United States pattern. But one thing that is remarkable about this government and about the Department of National Defence is the measure of secrecy which they seem to think is necessary for the department of defence, which admits, quite frankly in this case, that its role is relatively much smaller than that of the corresponding departments in the United States and in Britain.
If it is possible in Britain to call senior staff officers before a committee there, and if it is possible in the United States to call senior officers before a committee of congress in Washington and have the most searching examination of the facts, then surely it should be possible for us to have a similar inquiry here which would give the members information to which they are entitled and which they have the right to demand.
Why all this secrecy? It is not to prevent the enemy from obtaining information. It is to prevent the members of this house from having the information that they should have. I should hope that the members on the other side of the house would exercise a belated measure of individual freedom and make some demand that they have the right to this information, because we recognize that it would be extremely helpful to have some indication from members opposite that they supported a demand that all of us have the kind of information we should have.
Do not let anyone suggest that information is not fully obtained there. I have in my hands the recent reports of the subcommittee on the air force of the committee on armed services of the United States Senate. I am not going to read from these reports, but just so that there will be no doubt as to the standing of the officers who are brought before committees for the purpose of inquiry let me read the list of officers who appeared before the inquiry as reported in part I between April 16 and April 20 of this year. Those officers were General Omar N. Bradley, Admiral Robert B. Carney, General Walter

Bedell Smith, General Carl A. Spaatz. Then, in part II, covering April 25 to May 2, we find that the following officer appeared: General Curtis E. LeMay, commander in chief, strategic air command. He was accompanied by all his senior staff officers. In part III we find that General Earle E. Partridge, commander in chief, air defence command and continental air defence command, appeared. He was accompanied by his senior staff officers. In part IV we have the following officers who appeared: Lieutenant General Emmett O'Donnell, deputy chief of staff, personnel department of the air force. In part V for May 10, we find that Major General Lee B. Washbourne, assistant chief of staff, installations, appeared on that occasion. In part VI we find that Lieutenant General C. S. Irvine, deputy chief of staff, materiel, department of the air force, appeared, accompanied by his senior staff officers. In part VII we find that General Otto P, Weyland, commander, tactical air command, appeared, and he was accompanied by his senior staff officers.
These inquiries covered the period from April 10 to May 10, and in that time the most searching questions were asked these officers. In fact, there was hardly a single occasion when the plea of secrecy was raised in regard to the discussions as to the comparative strength of the United States air organization and the air organization of Russia. Not only that, but they discussed in the most exact detail the quality of aircraft, the development of guided missiles and other details of that kind. Similar hearings have been held with respect to the army and the navy.
There we have complete frankness, complete disclosure. The members of congress in Washington are going to make their decisions based upon knowledge and advice of senior officers fully equipped to express their opinions and to state the facts. All this has a direct relationship to the change that has come about as a result of the threat of thermonuclear war, to which reference has already been made by the Minister of National Defence. I want to quote two or three paragraphs from an article which appeared in Fortune magazine written by Charles J. V. Murphy with regard to the effect of this threat of thermonuclear war and the balance of terror created by the increased strength of Russia in this field. I do so because Mr. Murphy has been recognized ever since the early days of the second world war as one of the most competent military observers in the free nations. This is what he says in Fortune magazine for March of this year:
The 1953 decision to concentrate U.S. military resources behind the nuclear deterrent has automatically decreed a new order ol military priorities,
Supply-National Defence the full effects of which are only now being felt. Overriding all others are the priorities attaching to the development of massive delivery systems capable of decisive retaliation and an air defence system capable of effectively checking the Soviet capacity for counter-retaliation. Because these two tasks by themselves make heavy demands upon the national pool of technical talent, not to mention the budget, all other military tasks are being progressively subordinated to them.
How far that subordination has already progressed may be judged by the comparative budgetary allocations for the three services in fiscal 1957, which begins in July: for the air force $16-5 billion, for the navy $9-6 billion, for the army $8-6 billion. Thus the air force, as the all-but-exclusive deterrent agent, now costs almost as much as the other two services together. Thus the old 1:1:1 ratio of military budgeting, which gave rise to so much controversy in the late 1940's has been shattered beyond recognition.
That statement, Mr. Chairman, discloses a position in the United States similar on a proportionate basis in some substantial measure to what has been taking place here in Canada. Then Mr. Murphy, in a later article on the same subject that appeared in the May issue of the same magazine, had this to say:
Now the big question is not merely whether still more money should be poured into the air force; rather it is whether, in light of the increasingly clear logic of the new weapons, the traditional roles and missions of the army and navy should not be radically redefined and the investment in them still further reduced. With the expanding deterrent sucking more and more technical manpower and money into its support, the question of how much can be spared for the traditional functions of the army and navy becomes increasingly urgent. For their separate dilemmas are caused in no small degree by the shift in emphasis from a strategy anticipating a long-drawn-out struggle across the face of the earth to one mustering resources for an overawing deterrent, which, should it fail to deter, would presumably win the first and decisive air phase.
This is not to say that the Eisenhower administration has accepted the "30 to 90 day war" theory associated with the most extreme air force elements. While conceding that the opening air battle, if it should come, will rapidly determine eventual ascendancy, United States military policy also assumes that the course of battle thereafter is unpredictable and that extensive, if not decisive, ground and sea operations may well ensue. Nevertheless, the main United States bet already clearly rests on the first phase deterrent.
I have read this, Mr. Chairman, because there also emerges from this concept of the overwhelming importance of the air force the recognition of the fact that we must not minimize the importance of the navy and, above all, of the army, which in the end, even in a thermonuclear war, would be called upon to occupy and hold territory no matter how devastated that territory might be. As Mr. Murphy says in this article, the course of battle thereafter is unpredictable and it may be that ground and sea operations may well ensue. He leaves the very clear inference that we must not be forgetful of the

Supply-National Defence vital role played by the ground and sea forces in anything that may be done.
The minister has placed much emphasis upon the deterrent effect of a thermonuclear war. I think there is now general agreement in every country that the likelihood of the use of thermonuclear weapons decreases as the menace grows. Certainly only a madman would let loose thermonuclear weapons when the terror of retaliation is recognized. Today it is realized that if Russia started a thermonuclear war the retaliation would be so terrible that Russia itself would be devastated to an extent that, with whatever desires for aggression they may have, they would not lightly contemplate that prospect. The very scale of destruction which both sides now recognize as a possibility and reality will unquestionably exercise a substantial restraining influence. But, Mr. Chairman, that does not mean that there might not be war and serious war which did not involve thermonuclear weapons.
I think it is well for us to remind ourselves that during the second world war both sides possessed the most terrible poison gas, far more terrible than any which had ever been used at any time in warfare. Both sides could also have waged bacteriological .var. Both had that dreadful equipment. God knows the war was terrible enough but both sides accepted the reality that gas and bacteria would not only destroy human beings but would completely disorganize ordinary domestic society on both sides to an extent that would be mutually destructive for generations to come. It is granted that the terror of poison gas and bacteria does not compare, in extent or horror, with the terror of thermonuclear war. Nevertheless there was a balance of terror in those fields.
We have actually seen the result of a balance of terror of that kind. The fear of retaliation kept those terrible weapons on the shelf. It did not prevent the most bloody, the most terrible and the most brutal war in all history waged as it was with conventional weapons. Is it not true that, under the dark clouds of a mutual fear of the hydrogen bomb, some nations might attempt ordinary wars with very serious consequences? In fact, we do not need to ask the question. Already some of them have done so. Russia did not hesitate to launch the attack in North Korea at a time when the United States had an enormous advantage in atomic weapons. Other local wars have been fought since that distant day in August 11 years ago when a new and dreadful era of warfare began.
Just as it was necesary for the members of the United Nations to make their contribution to a joint force to halt aggression in

Korea, it could be necessary for conventional forces to be required at some other point under similar circumstances. We hope that situation will not occur. What happened in Korea and the promptness of the action there undoubtedly has been a very effective deterrent in many areas. The threat remains, however.
Only yesterday western observers were startled when they saw the great military parade in Egypt when the full extent of Russia's supply of weapons was disclosed to the western world. From what was seen there it is estimated that over a quarter of a billion dollars in weapons have been supplied by Russia to Egypt just in this past year. The observers on that occasion saw heavy tanks, the most modern aircraft and other equipment which indicates what is happening in Egypt as in some other areas where Russian equipment is being supplied. Who can possibly say what dangerous possibilities will arise from that continuing supply?
We know what the communists can do. We know what they have done. They have developed a new type of warfare. Surely it is recognized that nationalism alone is not behind the trouble in Africa and Asia which has reached such explosive proportions at different times during these past few years. Undoubtedly national aspirations in Algeria have much to do with the bloody fighting that is taking place there and that is occupying the attention of so many thousands of well-trained French forces which could be used very well elsewhere. But certain it is that, just as in Kenya and elsewhere, communist agents have been fanning the flames of nationalism and stirring up hatred and discontent. That is part of their military program. Nationalist forces in different countries, stimulated by communist propaganda and supplied with Russian weapons, may well become fifth columns such as those which destroyed freedom in the early days of the second world war. I am not now suggesting that there may not be a great deal of merit behind many of the arguments for the recognition of the nationalist aspirations of many of the peoples in those countries where nationalism has come to such a boiling point. But I do say-without any thought that the statement can be challenged-that communist agents in every one of those countries have been fanning the flames of discontent in every way they can. It is therefore a matter of concern to us when we see great supplies of arms going to any country where there is a known cause of possible disturbance, as there is in the Middle East today.
Mr. Chairman, all this involves a broad concept of defence which goes far beyond

weapons and which goes far beyond the ordinary functions of armed forces but which unites in a great co-ordinated effort all the activities of our military, diplomatic and other forces to combat this planned assault on freedom which is being carried out in this way by Russia at this time. The point I wish to make, however, is that in these areas conventional weapons are being supplied. If discontent were stimulated to a sufficient degree, there could be a repetition of what happened in Korea. Then the free nations might be confronted not with the immediate threat of a thermonuclear war but with the threat of a conventional war waged under the umbrella of thermonuclear danger.
We have urged that great effort be devoted to our air force. Over and over again we have urged that there be an organization of mobile hard-hitting forces available for service anywhere in Canada or throughout the world that they might be needed. But those mobile forces, no matter how new in form they might be, would require conventional arms. It is to be hoped that we shall not forget that just as we need a navy to defend us against the threat of the tremendous Russian submarine fleet, so we also need an efficient, well-organized army to meet the continuing danger of what may be regarded as a conventional war in which today Russia has the enormous advantage of by far the largest number of trained and equipped troops.
Mr. Chairman, we have been called upon to examine these estimates. The fact is that we have not been permitted to learn what really lies behind the figures. What are described as the details do not give us the real details. Above all, they do not give us what lies behind the details.
It is certain that if a major disturbance came suddenly upon us, it would be necessary to turn again, as we have in the past, to our militia forces. The statements made by the Minister of National Defence in regard to their state of readiness are simply without relation to reality at this time.
I have had the privilege of visiting many units across Canada, as have other hon. members in this house. I have been associated for a very long time with the activities of the militia in Canada. The work being done by volunteer officers, N.C.O.'s and men is splendid, but it would be dangerous folly to pretend that they are equipped either for quick mobilization or even as training centres for large numbers of men if a dreadful emergency arose. The fact is that, in spite of the billions of dollars we have spent in the six years since the Korean war, there is not a single militia unit in Canada fully equipped, even under the limited establishment laid
Supply-National Defence down for these militia units. The infantry does not possess modern infantry weapons; the armoured forces do not possess modern armour; the artillery does not possess up to date military equipment. To deal just with the artillery to which I have referred, the Minister of National Defence yesterday spoke about the replacement of the 25-pounder by the 105 millimetre and of the 5-5 inch by the 155 millimetre. Mr. Chairman, that reference of the minister yesterday simply underlines the seriousness of the situation with which we are confronted. Large numbers of 25-pounders, with their equipment, have been withdrawn from our artillery units and they have not been replaced by the 105 millimetre. The same is true of the replacement of the 5-5. Our artillery units are not ready for mobilization; our artillery units are not ready to carry out effective training of the larger forces, as they should be, to fulfil their role. This is a situation which is merely a repetition of what occurred on earlier occasions, but on those earlier occasions we had not spent billions of dollars on national defence. We have been spending money on the scale of modern warfare and yet we have not even the basic equipment required for our militia units in this country at this time for their ordinary needs.
I mentioned before that at the beginning of this session I urged that there be a reference of the subject to a committee on national defence. At a later time I urgently requested the reference of the whole problem of national defence to a select committee on national defence. I explained at that time that a standing committee would automatically have the right to call witnesses, to obtain information, and to call for the production of documents, just as do the committees in London and in Washington. Surely, if one thing is clear above all else at this time it is that such a standing committee should be operating at this time so that we could actually get the facts lying behind these bald figures which are presented to us. After all, if it is justifiable to take nearly half of all the money collected in taxes from our people for national defence it should be their right, and it should be the right of their representatives, to know what the facts really are.
Yesterday, the Minister of National Defence quoted Clemenceau's famous words. I quote from what he said at page 5215 of Hansard, as follows:
It was, I believe, Clemenceau who said that war was top serious a matter to be left to the generals. The fact is, today, that it is far too complex and too technical a matter to be left to the amateurs- only professionally trained and experienced servicemen can cope quickly with the weapons and tactics of modern war.


That is the most serious indictment that could possibly be directed against this or any department of government, Mr. Chairman. What it really means is that the action of the government is not even being communicated to the proper officials under the system that has been set up. In other words, it is a case of the blind leading the blind.


Mr. Campney:: Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. gentleman a question? I would like to ask him if he agrees with and approves of the quotation he has just read and of the views that have been so often expressed by General Simonds in regard to manpower and other elements of our defence?


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, I am not giving blanket approval to this article; I disagree with many opinions expressed by General Simonds. That does not get away from the fact that it is not an expression of opinion; it is a statement of fact by a former chief of the general staff who was proclaimed as one of our leading soldiers by the present Minister of National Defence. When the minister asks me whether I approve I might well ask him whether he approves, in view of the almost blanket approval he gave publicly to the chief of the general staff at the time of his retirement. This, however, is a statement of fact with regard to administration. Now, I do not know whether or not it is a correct statement, but when the chief of the general staff-until quite recently a man who has been accepted by this government and others as an outstanding field officer-says in the June 23 issue of Maclean's magazine there is in effect a complete breakdown at the administrative level, I say we should have the opportunity to call General Simonds before a standing committee on defence and find out what the facts really are. I am not in a position to know whether that statement is correct. It is a statement of fact by the officer who held the senior position in the defence forces of Canada until comparatively recently. It is a statement of fact which I submit should be examined by the hon. members of this house in the only way it can be examined. I make more than a request, I make a demand on the Prime Minister, in the light of the importance of this subject, that now at this stage a standing committee on national defence be set up so that General Simonds and other senior officers can be called before that committee, and we might find out what the facts really are behind the veil of secrecy which surrounds the activities of the Department of National Defence at this time.
It was not only General Simonds who left the impression that all was not well. Surely we cannot without some knowledge of what

the facts are behind it pass over the statement of a man who was in the best position to know what the facts were, that senior civil servants can by deliberate and unwarranted stalling defeat the recommendations of the armed forces even though those recommendations have been approved by the cabinet.
Mr. Chairman, I think the Prime Minister should want a standing committee on national defence to inquire into that. I think the Prime Minister should want to know whether decisions of the cabinet are being stalled in the manner suggested by General Simonds in this recent article. I also think, in view of the very close relationship between the defence organization of Canada and the United States which has brought on to Canadian soil so many United States personnel in the air force and technical services and otherwise, we should be given the opportunity to learn what the facts really are in the only way we can do so, and that is by questions and answers from the man who made the statement. I think we should have the right to know if a paralysing barrier has been set up by the permanent joint board on defence. Who are the members of that joint board on defence? Who are the men who are, according to General Simonds, acting as a barrier to direct contact between the United States and the Canadian chiefs of staff? With all the interlocking relationships, there would be one of the most damning indictments that eould be levelled against any official in Canada if it were true. I most certainly place a qualification on this. I say that with this statement before us we have the right to know what the facts are, and I repeat I should think the Prime Minister himself, without any prompting, would insist upon a standing committee on national defence being set up immediately to find out if the decisions of the cabinet of which he is the head are being disregarded and prevented in this way.
Nor was it only General Simonds who made these statements; other senior officers have made similar statements. General Macklin, speaking on March 27, made this statement:
Canada needs a first-class army capable of competing with any potential enemy. We haven't got it. Our army in Europe, right under the guns, is ill-organized and ill-equipped, much like it was before world war II. Our army in Canada is likewise.
Those are the words of General Macklin, until recently the adjutant general of Canada, which he spoke publicly. There again is the kind of statement that calls for inquiry. Do not ask me if I support that statement. I am reading a statement made by one of those experts to whom the minister says he must look for his information and to whom
Supply-National Defence he was looking until a short time ago. I want to know whether or not that is a correct statement. I should think the Prime Minister would also want to know. I believe the Prime Minister has a compelling duty to find out through the channels of a committee, and I believe we have a compelling duty to demand the right to know, and the only way we can is through an inquiry before a standing committee that will have full power to call witnesses and produce documents.
General Macklin, of course, went further and spoke about our Chinese-wall concept. He said we were building up a static defence concept that was entirely contrary to the real needs of our defence organization. That may be right or it may be wrong, but by the ordinary processes of inquiry such as have been taking place in London and Washington we have a right to demand that the procedure be adopted which will make it possible for us to know. Do not ask, "Do you accept those statements?" What I say is, these statements are made by the experts upon whom this minister and his predecessor were called upon to rely. They are made by experts who are now free to speak. They did not just form these opinions upon their resignation, I feel sure of that.
Then we also have the statement of General H. D. G. Crerar, the wartime commander of the Canadian army, who on March 16 described Canada's present army as an attractive show-window with nothing on the shelves or in the storerooms. Mr. Chairman, that is not the opinion of an untrained individual. That is the statement of a man with wide experience who has kept himself closely in touch with what is taking place.
Why are these things being done? Why, for the sake of argument, is this manpower situation being dealt with in the way it is? Do not ask me what the manpower need is. The government has it in its power to find out. It appointed a manpower committee years ago which has not been permitted to carry out the duties assigned to it. What is more, the government has just recently made a completely new appointment. At page 305 of the defence estimates will be found the appointment of a civilian superintendent of manpower. Mr. Chairman, in the name of all reason, why does the department of national defence need a civilian superintendent of manpower? If the minister is relying on the experts he has spoken about, why not have the ordinary military relationship between his department and those who are called upon to form their opinions? Do not ask us; we certainly are anxious to express our opinion based upon information but the government is denying

Supply-National Defence us the essential information. The government says that all is well, and will not even bring these officers before a committee to find out what these facts are when the most challenging and damning statements are made by men in whom this government placed every confidence until a short time ago.
In the face of these positive statements by senior Canadian officers, can there be any doubt that those opinions are shared by other senior officers now in the armed forces who are not free to speak? Let us call them in, too. The officers who appeared before the committee in Washington are now in most cases serving with the army, the air force and the navy. Let us have the present chief of staff; let us have staff officers from the air force, navy and the army; let us have senior experts before that committee to find out what they say. Then we will have the kind of discussion in regard to national defence which is in keeping with the importance of this subject at this time.
The minister has said that there is no finality on this subject. There can be no finality. However, we want to be brought up to date; we are not being brought up to date by this white paper or by the bland assurances which we got yesterday. We know perfectly well that everything is not as it should be. We know perfectly well that our militia units have not the equipment they should have. We know perfectly well that we have not the kind of armed forces in being that are needed for the critical situation such as the world faces today.
It would be better by far to reorganize our forces and have every unit a unit in being, whether it be a permanent unit or a militia unit, than to have units partially equipped and in the same position they were in at the beginning of the second world war when in some instances it was necessary to wait for a couple of years before they were able to equip them.
We have had our lesson. Let us be done with smug complacency. We have the statement of the chief of the general staff, of the adjutant general and of other senior officers whose knowledge is very recent and who have made statements which should be examined without delay. We are not confronted with any question of Liberal or Conservative; we are not confronted with any question of government or opposition; we are not confronted with any question of mere debate or military estimates; we are confronted with the very survival of Canada, and nothing else. Uncertainty and half measures are not good enough. It is not good enough just to ask us whether we can make certain statements in
regard to requirements when we are not allowed to obtain information.
The government itself should take the initiative in this. The government itself should want information. If the government is really concerned to the extent which the minister has indicated, then there is no course open to them but to appoint a standing committee right now. We are going to be here several weeks and within the time that he will still be here every one of the senior officers could be called. We will call them before the committee and the government can call any experts it wishes to call and we will obtain the truth. We will obtain the facts. We will obtain what is really hidden behind the veil of secrecy at this time. Abstract figures are meaningless; figures and statements have meaning only in relation to the reality with which they must deal.
There is also for our consideration the wider concept of an entirely new type of war. The war which may take place will be, not only a nuclear war or a war of guided missiles but a war waged by conventional weapons just as was the Korean war, although there were atomic weapons always available and ready which could have been used. The day of the conventional weapon has not gone. The day of the infantryman, the artilleryman, the tank man and the other members of the armed forces in the army, the members of the naval units and the members of the air force, has not gone. There may be push-button warfare at some time and again there may not be, just as there was no gas warfare and no bacteriological warfare either in the second world war or in Korea.
We have a new concept of war. We have this new concept of the Russians' use of distant satellites armed in advance, not only from their own armament plants but from the great Skoda plant of Czechoslovakia and the great Teschen plant in Poland where mighty guns have been turned out for generations. The big berthas of the first world war were not made by Krupps, as was the general supposition; they were made by Skoda at Pilsen. So were many of the great guns that were used on the eastern front made in the Teschen plant in Poland. These great productive plants are available to Russia today and they are supplying deadly weapons of war to countries in disturbed areas where trouble may be caused.
Conditions in that kind of world add to the possibility of the new concept of war, and our thinking must be adjusted accordingly. We should have a Canadian concept, not a British or a United States concept. We need a distinctly Canadian concept suited for the real and immediate needs of the third largest

country in the world. No mere application of a British pattern or a United States pattern will suit a country of 3,750,000 square miles with only 16,000,000 people living in it. It must be the kind of force which will be suitable for immediate movement to any of the distant areas of this vast land of ours. It must be the kind of force which can move into the Arctic overnight, can move in there in a matter of hours. It must be a mobile, hard-hitting force making the greatest possible use of scientific developments of all kinds. That is the kind of force which would be the most helpful as a Canadian contribution to NATO.
I close these remarks by referring back to what I have said. I refer to the fact that it is not only in Canada that there is this tremendous demand for information. It is not very long ago that Field Marshal Montgomery, who has never felt unduly restrained in expressing his opinions, made this bold statement: Our organization for war is unsuited to modern times. We now have the statement of the chief of the general staff until a very short time ago; we now have the statement of the adjutant general until a short time ago; we now have the statement of the commander of the Canadian army in the last war who has had close and intimate contact with events since then. Their statements are all to the effect that there must be reorganization if our money is to be properly spent and if we are to have the kind of force we should have.
If there is one thing above everything else, in addition to what has already been mentioned, that should call for a committee of inquiry it is the surprising fact that exactly the same figure is used this year as was used a year ago as the requirement for national defence-$1,775 million. It just is not possible. Great Britain, the United States, Russia and other nations have carried out great reorganizations. For some reason they have been able to increase the efficiency of their forces with a decrease in expenditure. Yet we have exactly the same figure. We should not be asked merely to find out what particular items mean, we should be able to ask the staff officers why this situation exists. That would be the kind of debate that would be worthy of the urgency of this subject at this time.
I repeat to the Prime Minister, not a request but an urgent demand based upon the nature of these public statements, that there be a standing committee on national defence set up now. It could start to work immediately and we could have the essential facts in three or four weeks at the outside
Supply-National Defence and then the house would be able to continue a discussion of these estimates with the kind of information it should have. Whatever may have been the thoughts of the government before, when this government is confronted with the statement, by a man who was until recently its chief of staff, that the decisions of the government itself are being stultified by action within the department, then the time has come for this government to act in regard to the setting up of a standing committee which can really conduct an inquiry.
Again, however, let us remember this. It is not our support of a political party, whichever party we belong to; it is not the matter of an ordinary debate; it is not simply the figures that are before us; as the Minister of National Defence said yesterday, it is the survival of Canada that is under consideration, and I urge the Prime Minister to act in keeping with the solemnity of those words.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: I am not an expert like the Leader of the Opposition, but there is something that has not been said by those who have been taking part in this debate which I think is more important than the advice of what the former member for Fraser Valley used to call our chiefs of staff, the "brass hats". When I was a boy studying British history I was taught "trust in God and keep your powder dry." What I rose to say today is this. I think nobody has done any more important work, either in the past war or in the present kind of peace, than the chaplains in our forces. I think they are doing a great deal to build up our young manhood.
What was it that beat Germany? It was not that the Germans did not have the greatest army in the world, the best equipment in the world, the greatest air force and the greatest number of submarines. What beat them? It was because they left out the Almighty. They murdered Jews by the thousands. Why? For one reason, the Jews trust in one God. What beat the Germans in world war II? It was just that one thing. When the call came to Canada and the allied nations for a day of prayer, then three things happened rather quickly. First, the Germans at Dunkirk did not follow up and wipe England off the map. It was an outstanding military mistake. Second, Pearl Harbor brought the United States into the war with full forces. Third, the attack on Russia by Germany brought Russia into the war. Then they were beaten.
I ask my hon. friend from Cape Breton South if he considered conscription. I do not think that we dare plan conscription in Canada today. It would divide the country, and you have to have a united country.
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Coming back to our chaplains again, they are doing something to help build up the life of young manhood in our nation. We have to admit that there are certain customs in the army that do not tend to build up our young men, but the chaplain service in our army is doing much to build them up.
I take off my hat to their unselfish services. They are not a group of sissies; they are perhaps the best manhood in the army. We had one example of that at Dunkirk, where a member of the chaplain service won the Victoria Cross. He did not get it for nothing; he certainly measured up to his job as well as any senior officer who ever won the Victoria Cross.
The Leader of the Opposition says that what we want is a Canadian concept. I know that the word "Canada" is music for many, as it is for me. I was not born in Canada, but I came to Canada because I believed that it was the best country in the world for me. But I believe there is something better than the Canadian concept, and that is a Christian concept for our country. I take hope in this, that our church is as alive today as it ever was, Protestant, Roman Catholic and Jewish alike. That is the hope of our country. When a country like Russia treats God as a myth we know what is going to happen when war comes; what happened to the Midianites when Gideon with his 300 men wiped them out. I come back to this: trust in God and keep your powder dry.


Mr. Herridge:: Mr. Chairman, after the thunderstorm eloquence to which the leader of the official opposition has treated us for the last hour, my few remarks will seem like the whisperings of a gentle zephyr that follows a storm. In view of the constantly changing international, political and technological situation, I fully appreciate the heavy responsibilities the minister has to carry and the complex and difficult nature of the problems he is called upon to face almost from day to day under these Circumstances.
Before proceeding, I must express my appreciation of the minister's courtesy and his personal attention to any problem I have brought to his notice. Whether it involved the problems of an individual soldier, of a unit in which I was interested, or of equipment or buildings or other things in general,
I have always found the minister willing to discuss them, to investigate things complained of, to report and to do what he could to remedy the situation, and I appreciate that. I must say that I have had occasions when I have had discussions with ministers and quite got the impression that I was conducting a monologue with a totem pole, but I have not found the minister that way.


I read the white paper and listened to the minister's speech carefully and with interest. I was particularly impressed yesterday with his concluding paragraphs, when he said, as recorded on page 5217 of Hansard:
Surely no one could look forward, with equanimity, to year after year of uneasy expectation of that dread day when the first H-bombs might fall. However futile our best attempts may have proved so far, we must keep on trying for disarmament. And we must come to grips with some of those central problems that have led to war: ignorance and hate, disease, privation and poverty.
For it is clearly evident-and it is on this note, and not a defence statistic, that I want to end my opening remarks to this committee-it is clearly evident that, for us and for the generations that will follow us into the wonders and hazards of this thermonuclear age, there must be some surer guarantee of peace, some less uncertain protection against disaster, than military might can hope to provide.
Man's inventive genius, which has sought out and set free the power of the atom, can surely make it serve and not destroy us.
I must say that I for one very much appreciate that spirit and that approach to the difficult times in which we live. I might say that the minister, when speaking, made reference to the departure of two members of this house for the centenary in London of the establishment of the Victoria Cross. I suppose he overlooked that another V.C., who has not been in our sense a member of this house but has been a member of the staff of this house for a good many years, I understand, also left with them. I am sure we all wish him, with the others, a very enjoyable and profitable time.
In my opinion the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, whose opinions on these matters I respect very much, made a most constructive speech, and I intend to refer to a few of his remarks later. I always think the member for Esquimalt-Saanich has a balanced approach, and while I do not always agree with him I think he is usually quite fair when he is dealing with these problems. I also thought my colleague the hon. member for Nanaimo made a most lucid analysis of the situation from our point of view, and I think hon. members would be well advised to read his speech. I also listened with great interest to the remarks of the hon. member for Peace River, particularly when he said, as found at page 5231 of yesterday's Hansard:
I believe that if the government would enlarge its defence program by adding a great ideological offensive we might be able to forestall the awful possibility that the great arms race might lead to another terrible conflict.
I was rather surprised to hear the hon. member suggest this, as it would mean using

the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation as a propaganda medium for the government, and I am quite sure that no matter how carefully the government attempted to undertake that, it would very soon be accused of using the C.B.C. as an instrument of government policy. I do not think that is the right way to approach any of the problems to which the hon. member was referring at that point in his speech.
When I heard the hon. member make that proposal I could not help but think of my own father, who was a very strong Liberal. He disagreed with me politically very strongly indeed, but at the same time he was also, as a Liberal should be, a great democrat. He believed in freedom of speech and freedom of ideas, and he believed in the battle of ideas in a democracy. He was convinced that democrats could always win under those circumstances.
I remember one occasion just after the first world war when notices appeared in our village to the effect that a Mr. George Stirling, who later became a C.C.F. member of the provincial legislature, would arrive the next day on the steamer and would give a talk on the coming social revolution. Those words had a rather different connotation in those days than they have now. In any event, the local business people organized all the veterans in the district. They got about 20 veterans from the village and the surrounding country to march down to the wharf to meet the boat. The only means of access was by steamer, and they were going to give this gentleman two options. One was to proceed on his way on the steamer, and the other was to get off the steamer and be thrown into the lake.
My father heard of this incident, and at the time he was some miles out of town. He drove into town in his buggy, picked up another Englishman of a similar type who later became superintendent of marine affairs for the C.P.R. for the interior of British Columbia, and they went down to the boat. My father went after these chaps and the businessmen of the district. He said, "We live in a democracy. This is a country founded on British institutions. A man has a right to talk all the damned nonsense he likes as long as he keeps his remarks within the law. This man has a right to say what he thinks and he is going to speak in the village tonight." Everybody agreed with my father, as often happens in such cases.
The man got off the steamer. My father made arrangements for a hall where he could speak. Quite a crowd turned up, and before the meeting concluded the speaker had quite a time answering the questions that were
Supply-National Defence shot at him. But that is the spirit I think of when I think of how we are going to face the difficulties to which the hon. member for Peace River referred.


Mr. Martin:: Was his speech nonsense?


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I did not hear the speech myself, but I presume that it had a lot of sound material in it. My father told me what the gist of the speech was and, strangely enough, within 10 or 15 years the then Liberal government of British Columbia had written into the statutes of that province some of the revolutionary ideas the gentleman was advocating at that time.
I, together with my colleagues, agree with the Leader of the Opposition when he suggests that these estimates should go before a committee of the house. In my opinion we cannot deal with them effectively, as we are all in the dark under the present circumstances with respect to the details of the problem we are facing. In my view our ignorance and ineffectiveness can only be overcome by the estimates being referred to a committee, and I agree that there is yet time for that to be done during this session. We would have the opportunity to call witnesses, to examine them and to secure information. I think that would add a great deal to the understanding of the members of the house with regard to these very important estimates.
We are generally agreed, Mr. Chairman, that world tension has lessened considerably in recent months, though we know that this uncertain peace is, generally speaking, only maintained by fear of the destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, in the opinion of the members of this group the present situation does provide us with certain opportunities that we should take advantage of as soon as possible. We think it provides us with the opportunity, as the hon. member for Nanaimo so well stated yesterday, to reassess Canada's role in the defence of democracy. It provides an opportunity to eliminate obsolete methods, equipment and waste, and I know it is very difficult to eliminate waste from any defence force. I see things happening from time to time that irritate me very much indeed, because I was brought up in a very economy-minded home. My father and mother always told me that the two great sins in life were dishonesty and waste.
It also provides us with the opportunity to utilize the savings in manpower and money for constructive expenditures which will make a great contribution to the defence of democracy and to the winning of the battle of ideas. I suggest we could use these savings in public investment in utilities within this
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Supply-National Defence country, in increased expenditure on the Colombo plan, and possibly in some forms of economic aid that may be required as the result of the study of article II of the North Atlantic treaty by the three prominent persons who are now giving it consideration.
The former chief of the general staff has been making speeches and has written a most interesting article in a recent issue of Maclean's magazine. However, whenever I listen to a general speaking or read his articles I cannot help recalling remarks made by other generals. For instance, I never fail to remember the remarks made by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, as reported at page 2810 of Hansard of 1951, when he said:
I have never known an admiral, a general or an air marshal who did not begin by asking tor more than his share of anything.
I always think of that when I hear of generals criticizing public policy. Then I notice that yesterday afternoon the minister said in his remarks, as found at page 5215 of Hansard:
It was, I believe, Clemenceau who said that war was too serious a matter to be left to the generals.
When the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich referred in his speech yesterday to General Simonds' article in the last issue of Maclean's magazine he said, as found at page 5221 of Hansard:
Being a retired general myself I can perhaps discount the comments of retired generals to a greater degree than most people . . .
I have a respect for the contribution the generals have made to this country and for their knowledge in certain fields where I have very little knowledge, because my generalship has been mostly over a few cows and pigs; but when I consider the opinions of generals these views do condition my attitude toward the opinions of those who speak on these matters.
Before going on with the few remarks I wish to make in that respect, I should like to make a comment with respect to the present chief of the general staff. I have never met him and I would not know him if I saw him on the street, but I know a good many people in all the services. From talking to them- and some of them are of quite senior rank- I am distinctly under the impression that the present chief of the general staff is doing a good job. I say that for two reasons. From what I can gather, he has a good understanding of the psychology of the Canadian armed forces personnel in peacetime, and he has also a good understanding of the psychology of Canadians generally in peacetime. That is quite an advantage for a general. In the second place, I understand that his administrative and business ability have been of great
[Mr. Herridge.l


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, each year I enter this debate, like I believe every other hon. member who takes part in it, with graver feelings than possessed me the year before. As the minister said near the beginning of his remarks yesterday, no answer to the thermonuclear weapon has been devised and none is in sight. That is something by itself which I think must give us great cause to think. The fact that the manned airplanes that we have at the present time cannot guarantee that bombers carrying those missiles will not get over this country and be able to drop them, and the more fearsome threat which hangs over us that within a few years there will be intercontinental ballistic missiles for which there is no answer at all so far, I think combine to present a sort of frightening picture which makes it impossible to come to a discussion of the defence estimates in anything except a mood of some foreboding.
I should like first of all to say something about defence policy, as I did last year. Canada's defence policy is the basis on which our efforts must be, or at least should be, built. I have had, ever since the war, a very strong suspicion that the government was never very sure and definite what the defence policy is or what it should be. This feeling has, I must say, increased considerably in the past two years as a result of the fact that really very few changes have taken place in defence organization, set-up, and so forth; whereas the world has been in a great state of flux and what were valid defence concepts some time ago quite clearly


no longer apply. Now, defence policy, in so far as it is stated in any precise terms, is laid down in the annual white paper under "Defence Objectives". Prior to the last two years this statement was reasonably definite and straightforward, put down under headings 1, 2 and 3. The one for 1954 I have in my hand and it reads in this way:
The objectives of our defence policy remain the same as heretofore;
(1)	The immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack;
(2)	Implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the charter of the United Nations, or under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or other agreement for collective security;
(3)	The organization to build up strength in a total war.
As I say, that was a reasonably definite statement. One might complain a great deal of the fact that the means being taken in organization and so forth, as I think was the fact, were not adequate to meet those objectives. It seemed quite apparent that whilst these were the stated objectives, the government really had no definite ideas as to how they were to be carried into execution.
Last year these objectives had become much less definite; they were fuzzier and more ambiguous, perhaps I might say, and I should just like to read them. This is from the white paper for 1955-56. At page 3 we find the following:
Canada's defence program continues to be planned for the immediate defence of Canada, for co-operation with the United States-
The first one was the same, of course. I continue:
-in the joint defence of the Canada-United States region-
That was much the same. It goes on:
-for co-operation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization looking towards the provision of a collective force capable of deterring aggression, and for carrying out undertakings by Canada as a member of the United Nations Organization.
Well, as I say, these things might mean anything. They were fuzzy; they were indefinite. When we come to this year's white paper the fuzziness is carried considerably further and the amount of writing is very much increased, which I think is symptomatic of this year's white paper. As has been indicated by some other speakers, it is a well-written document. The contents are very good English, but this good English, in many instances, does not convey too much meaning. What we have this year on page 3, which again is really the start of the thing, is:
1. The aim of Canada's defence program and planning is to provide for the security of Canada.

That does not mean anything. If we had an army of cross-bow men here their purpose would still be to look after the security of Canada. If you have any defence forces their function naturally is the security of Canada. Therefore that first statement is, as I say, just a statement of the obvious and for any practical purpose it is meaningless and useless. It goes on:
Under present and foreseeable conditions this can be done most effectively by close co-operation with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and especially with the United States in relation to the North American area. Our defence plans must also include a capacity to carry out obligations that may arise out of Canada's membership in the United Nations Organization.
I have no quarrel with all these what you might call ideals, but I do wonder very much what definite plan or definite organization there is to carry them out. It is my contention there is not too much.
When we come to No. 2 of these objectives we have something that is perhaps a bit more definite. I am not going to read it all; but what it means in effect, I think, is that the Canadian government has accepted as its basic policy massive retaliation by the United States in the event of a full-scale war breaking out. I presume as a result of that its chief policy, as far as our own forces are concerned, is to tag them on to the military effort of the United States so they may be assisted in carrying out this policy of massive retaliation.
I agree that the threat of retaliation is a great deterrent to war, and I sincerely hope, as I think all of us do, that that threat, or at least the existence of an air force in the United States at the present time and one in Great Britain of bombers which have supplies of atomic and thermonuclear bombs, will serve the purpose of preventing any war taking place. Of course if the worst comes to the worst, it will mean that we are in a position to cripple the enemy at least as seriously as he has crippled us, and thus prevent the possibility of him overrunning the western world.
The rest of the white paper does not indicate, to my mind, any means by which we are going to be able to carry out this general objective, nor does it indicate what you might call any specific changes in military thinking, organization, and so on, which the complete change in the concept of modern war naturally forces upon us.
One subject in particular about which nothing was said is manpower. I think it is quite clear, from what little is contained in the white paper and from the little the minister has said at this time and previously, that there is no clear-cut plan as to how 67509-333
Supply-National Defence manpower requirements are going to be met. We have had a statement that there would be a maximum force of 120,000. The government has not explained why the figure was not set at 100,000 or 200,000 or at any other figure. In other words this apparently was just a figure decided upon for the sake of convenience because the government knew there were about that many men a year ago.
We have had no information concerning the allocation of the manpower as among the three services. We do not know whether the present allocation is correct or if it bears any relationship to the real need for manpower. I think the government owes it to the country and to this house to give us more definite and precise information concerning its manpower policy and how the present needs are going to be met.
The next matter concerning which we should have information is what reorganization of our defence forces is necessary to meet the three kinds of war into which we may be forced. The first is an all-out atomic war; the second is a conventional war, such as that fought in Korea; and the third is what the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich referred to yesterday as a bush war, small, punitive expeditions in which we may have to take part.
I must admit that in his speech yesterday the minister did give us more information than is contained in the white paper. As was described in one editorial I read, the white paper might just as well never have come out as far as adding to our information with regard to our defence situation is concerned. The minister gave us some additional information, particularly concerning what changes would take place in the air force, the air crew, and projected changes in the army and so on. We are, however, still very much in the dark with regard to many of the important aspects of national defence.
As I said previously, this is a period of flux and change and it necessitates changes in military thinking and organization. The minister recognized that to some extent in his speech, because he said a committee composed of senior army officers was examining the organization of field formations for the army in order to make them more mobile and flexible. I am extremely glad that inquiry is taking place.
I do not share the view that has frequently been expressed in this house that military officers are always ready to fight the last war. This business of attacking the brass hats is almost a cult in Canada, you might say, the uncrowned king of which for many
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Supply-National Defence years was the former member for Temis-couata who has now been translated to the other place. This subject constituted the major part of his stock in trade. I was disappointed that the hon. member for Fort William brought out the subject of brass hats this afternoon and scoffed at them. I was also disappointed about the doubt as to their thinking ability which was expressed by the hon. member for Kootenay East.
Having met a considerable number of generals both during the war and since, I remain convinced that the majority of them are very able men. I would mention only two who I think prove the point very well. General Eisenhower, I think, is now acclaimed throughout the entire free world as one of the greatest men of this age. General Gruen-ther, I think, more or less commands the complete confidence of all NATO countries with respect to his ability and integrity. I mentioned these two men as examples. I think this matter of speaking contemptuously of brass hats and trying to convey the impression they are always thinking back to the last war and are not really intelligent people, and so on, is a pretty tawdry sort of thing and completely at variance with the facts.
As a matter of fact I think a good many generals and other senior officers in our armed services have been much more forward looking than the government, but they have been prevented from carrying into effect many of the changes they would like to have made. I believe that is indicated by the statements and articles we have heard of today, written by some of the senior officers who have recently retired.
As I said, I am glad to learn that the reorganization of the army is at least being studied now. I think the time is long overdue for us to take a long, hard look at our entire military set-up and organization. I do not believe the present organization is constituted to meet present threats. I do not believe the responsibility for that rests with the officers serving in the forces, but that it rests squarely on the shoulders of the minister and the government. They are the only ones who can make extensive changes.
The Leader of the Opposition has called for the immediate setting up of a committee of this house in order that we might have the actual facts placed before us by senior officers and others concerning our military situation as it exists at the present time. That is something I think should be done in the interests of Canada and in view of the responsibility of the government to this house.
In addition to that, as far as the long range improvements in our defence set-up and


organization are concerned, I think something else is necessary. I suggest a committee of inquiry or a royal commission-whatever you want to call it; some similar body at any rate-should be appointed and given some months in which to study the whole question of the organization of the Canadian armed forces, and that it be charged with the responsibility of collecting evidence not only in this country but in other countries in order that there might be some definite body of information on which this government and this house could base their thinking with regard to what our military organization should be.
This is the sort of thing which has been done frequently in the past as far as Great Britain is concerned, and it has been the means by which the whole military organization of that country has been changed from time to time. Perhaps the most famous military commission was the Esher commission as a result of which, I believe, the present general staff set-up in the United Kingdom came into existence.
There have been several other commissions in Great Britain. In every case it was found necessary, sometimes because of opposition on the part of people in the services or the general public, to appoint a commission to study the question thoroughly and for the commission to make its recommendations to parliament before any widespread changes could be put into effect.
We have had the same thing in this country to a limited extent. We had the Otter commission which studied the Canadian defence set-up and made recommendations which were adopted and upon which our military set-up prior to the first world war was really moulded or built. I would earnestly recommend or suggest to the minister that a commission of that sort be set up in order that the whole question of our military organization, in view of the great changes which have taken place in the world, may be studied and something better put in place of what is really a second world war organization which we have at the present time.
I would suggest further to the minister that in setting up that commission there are possibly three men who would make excellent members. I refer to the last three chiefs of staff of the three services, who have been retired. There could be two or three other men, such as Mr. Gordon who is heading the present Gordon commission. In other words there could be two or three civilians who had extensive experience in organization and in what might be called general business administration and things of that kind.

I should like to say something about the general organization, as I see it, of the Canadian defence forces at the present time. To begin with, headquarters is top-heavy, and by that I mean national defence headquarters in Ottawa. We were told in this article by General Simonds that defence headquarters would not work in the event of war. I shall come back to the general matter of the reorganization of national defence headquarters later. Before I do that I should like to say something about the three services themselves.
I do not feel particularly well equipped to deal with the navy, but I have done a considerable amount of reading on this subject. The chief function of our navy is antisubmarine. I think we all agree it should play an anti-submarine role. I have not heard or read of anyone advocating any other role for our navy. I have heard a considerable amount of questioning as to whether the set-up for this anti-submarine role, which is essentially the same as the set-up in the last war with the addition of an aircraft carrier, is adequate to carry out that role.
I think there is universal agreement that the new destroyer escort of the St. Laurent type is an extremely good ship, but it is a very expensive craft to build and therefore production is slow; it takes considerable time to produce these destroyers. This is indicated by the fact that this program was laid down some years ago but the first destroyer was several years late in getting into commission, much later than was projected when the plan was announced. Others will be later still.
I have heard it said quite frequently that while these are extremely good craft and the fact that we have a certain number of them is all to the good, they are not sufficient. It is said that in addition we need a number of smaller, fairly inexpensive craft which could be built rapidly as losses were experienced in the event of war. It is said also that there should be a more extensive use made of helicopters, perhaps both in connection with the smaller ships and the destroyer escorts. Surface craft alone are not going to be able to detect submarines as well or as satisfactorily as helicopters or ships aided by helicopters.
I have heard the fear expressed that with the type of navy we have the loss of a few of these exceptionally good but expensive and slow to build destroyers would cripple our navy to such an extent that it would be unable to carry out its role. It is for that reason particularly that a considerable number of more quickly built ships are necessary. Having had no naval experience I do not 67509-333i
Supply-National Defence feel competent to say whether these criticisms are correct, but they sounded reasonable to me. I think they should receive a considerable amount of study, not only by the minister and his naval advisers but by the commission which I have indicated should be appointed.
I come now to the army organization and the arms of the army. These are almost the same as they were during the last war. The minister made quite a point about the 105 mm. gun replacing the 25-pounder and the 155 replacing the 4-5 and 5-5 guns. However that does not readily improve the artillery of the army in the slightest degree. A number of gunnery officers-I understand some of them in the United States; in fact I was talking to one from the United States- believe that the 25-pounder is a better allround weapon than the 105 mm. They claim it is a more flexible and handier weapon. The 105 takes a little heavier charge and produces a little more punch at the end, but many gunnery officers consider that it is not likely to be as good a general, all-purpose gun as the 25-pounder. So the substitution of the 105 mm. for the 25-pounder has made no real improvement in the arming of the Canadian army. The only thing it has done has been to make it possible for the Canadian army to ride on the United States supply line rather than on the British, as has been the case heretofore. Whether that will be an advantage or disadvantage only the future will tell.
The Centurion tank is a new and approved weapon. I am glad they were secured and a considerable number are in use in our army. The only other improvement in our arms is the use of some mortars and rockets and the FN rifle. So it can be said that by and large, except for a limited number of improved weapons, the Canadian army in its organization and its armament is essentially the same as the army we had in the last war.
I do not think that is good enough; I do not think the minister thinks it is good enough, as is indicated by his speech. I am surprised that the situation has been allowed to go on as long as it has without any improvement. During the last three or four years we on this side of the house have called repeatedly for the use of more mobile troops, airborne and in armoured vehicles. Apparently there has been some advance in the thinking of the minister and the government, as the minister indicated in his speech that there was a new armoured vehicle of an amphibious nature which was going to be secured. When he comes to reply, or when we are dealing with the army, I should like

Supply-National Defence him to tell us how many of those vehicles it is proposed to secure, how soon they will be in the hands of units, and also if any of them will be given to the reserve army for training purposes.
Many people at one time or another have spoken of the army as being obsolescent, and so on. I do not believe there is any validity whatever in that contention. I do not think the army is obsolescent, or that it will ever be obsolescent as long as wars are going to be fought. As far as our defence thinking in Canada is concerned, we should work on the basis that it is going to be essential to maintain an army. At the same time I believe there is no question but that the old form of division such as we had in the last war and such as we have at the present time is not adapted to modern requirements. I believe that all the troops in an infantry division, or whatever kind of division you call it, should be carried either by air or in armoured vehicles. I think we must work in that direction as far as our army is concerned.
The information I have read in connection with the new German army is that it is all going to be either armoured or carried in tracked vehicles which will have good crosscountry performance. Whether you admire the Germans or not, you must admit that they have been extremely good military thinkers and organizers. The fact that they are going into a set-up of that sort should be sufficient to cause us to examine our position very carefully, where we still have our infantry battalions on their flat feet, in the same position they were in during the last war, with a certain number of trucks without crosscountry performance to transport them on roads. We must realize that in any future war there probably will not be roads on which to transport them. We must have vehicles with cross-country performance.


The Deputy Chairman:: I am sorry to advise the hon. member that his time has expired.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I can either go on at the present time or come back to it later; I do not care.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: With the unanimous consent of the committee, of course, the hon. member may continue.


An hon. Member:: Go ahead.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Is it agreed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Douglas Scott Harkness: To return to this matter, Mr. Chairman, I believe it is fairly generally accepted that in the event of an atomic war troops have to be in fairly small formations. I think also it is going to be


essential that units, sub-units and even single detachments must be in a position so they can move rapidly about the country and be selfsufficient for, say, at least a week. Even in the last war we got to that, as far as antitank gun detachments were concerned. They had a ration box, sufficient petrol, a certain amount of water and all the ammunition they could carry. They could be set down and left for a week, and one did not have to worry about supplying them. It was probably only a small detachment of seven men to which that applied, but I think that will have to apply to other detachments, down to the infantry section and half-section. They will need to be carried in a vehicle which is armoured to some extent to give them protection against small-arms fire, and they will have to be equipped so they can live for a week or more by themselves without being supplied, because it is very doubtful whether the great supply trains of the last war and of previous wars-army service corps columns occupying miles of road, bringing up ammunition, food and all the other supplies- will be possible. As a matter of fact, most of the supplies will probably be air-dropped. Therefore the reorganization of the army, I think, makes it essential, to begin with, that these very small detachments, units, subunits and so forth, can each operate more or less independently. If most of a unit is wiped out, what is left can still operate without having to be supplied every day or two days.
That type of army organization is essential, I think, for atomic war, but also I believe it is a much better type of organization for any kind of war, whether it is conventional war or whether it is one of these bush fire wars. It is the type of organization which will be more mobile, more flexible and will give a better account of itself than the old type to which we have been accustomed is likely to do. In other words what I think we need, as far as the future is concerned, can be summed up in a few words: mobility, Are power, armoured protection for vehicles, and staying power, the ability to stay for a week or more without having to be resupplied. These things, I think, will be much more important in the wars of the future than numbers, and are what the reorganization of the army should aim at.
Now I turn to the air force. I think it is generally accepted by military thinkers of every country that it is in the last phase of its existence as a bomber-fighter force. In our case, of course, it is purely a fighter force. We have no bomber force. The general thinking is that in five to ten years the guided missile will have taken the place of the manned aircraft and, therefore, as a fighter-bomber force the air force will no longer have

a role to follow, though it will have that role for the next five to ten years, or something along those lines. As a result, I think the long-range thinking has to be directed toward the role which the air force is going to be assigned. What is going to happen, as far as it is concerned, when this five to ten year period is over? What has been its primary role no longer exists.
In the United States there is a very unseemly row going on between the air force and the army as to which one is going to look after guided missiles. I can quite understand that. The air force officers there see what the future holds and they want to retain their place in the sun and have control of the guided missiles. The army says they are just a form of artillery and belong to them. So the fight is on. Fortunately we have had no fight, in the open at least, in this country, as far as that is concerned; but it is one of the major matters of defence policy on which a decision needs to be made.
I think this house has the right to be informed as to what may be the thinking of the government, its military experts and others in regard to this very important matter. Whatever it may be, the air force, instead of having its present strategic and tactical role, is going to have quite a different place and a different role than has been the case so far. It is either going to have these guided missiles and thus become in effect the artillery of our armed forces or it is going to become a transport force to move men, supplies and so forth from place to place. Of course a change of that magnitude means that some forward thinking in preparation for it should be under way at the present time.
In any event, whatever is done as far as the air force is concerned-I have no fixed ideas on what should be done in that regard, but I am certain that these changes I have indicated are coming-whatever is done, as the strategic and tactical reasons for the separation of the air force and the army will have ended by that time, I do not think there is much question that there is no good reason to maintain that separation.
That leads me to the numerous suggestions that have been made, particularly by Field Marshal Montgomery but by many others too, in regard to the unification of the armed services. There has been a good deal of thinking about this matter by some eminent military men, many of them in the United States, including the present chief of their air force, who believe there should be complete unification of the three armed services and that there should be one service head. I think a move in that direction is probably inevitable in the course of time in order to
Supply-National Defence secure an efficient and effective defence force and, as I have indicated, I think we should perhaps be taking some steps toward it.
I find, Mr. Chairman, that I have taken about 15 minutes longer than I expected on this portion of my remarks. My remarks are more extended than I thought they would be from my notes, and as I do not wish to trespass on the indulgence of the committee I think I will give place to someone else and come back to this other matter later. It has to do with the reorganization of defence headquarters.


Mr. Dinsdale:: Mr. Chairman, during the years I have had the privilege of taking part in the discussion of the defence estimates I believe I have always begun with the complaint that we must deal with the important subject of Canada's defence preparations largely in a vacuum so far as detailed information is concerned. That has been true in the past and it is again true with respect to official sources of information. However, as other hon. members have stated during the discussion, considerable information has been placed before the public of Canada in recent years from certain high military sources, even though those sources are not quite official. Some of the information that has appeared in magazines such as Maclean's and Saturday Night, for example, has indeed been rather disconcerting.
I want to spend most of my time dealing with the air force aspect of defence, but before going into the details I should like to suggest to the minister that the stock answer we get from time to time, "not in the public interest", when we ask for specific information on certain aspects of military activity, the progress in recruiting, the new developments that are taking place in the various branches of the armed forces, is in my opinion a little bit overdone. I say so because I feel that if as the House of Commons we took the public of Canada into our confidence our armed forces would be much more efficient and our state of preparedness would be further advanced than at the present time.
To justify the assertion that we are adequately prepared to meet any emergency, we often refer to the continuing high level of expenditure which during the past few years has averaged some $2 billion a year. I am afraid that as a result of sloughing off responsibility in that way the ordinary citizen, when he writes his income tax cheque, which is quite substantial for the average Canadian, feels that he is making all the contribution that is necessary to the defence of Canada. It is the same sort of

Supply-National Defence situation that develops with reference to charity today. People who make contributions in response to various charitable appeals feel that they have discharged their complete responsibility by the financial contributions they make.
In my opinion the state of world politics today is such that the Canadian public should be made completely aware of precisely how inadequately we are prepared as a nation to meet an emergency, and also how inadequately the western powers as a group, particularly those associated with NATO, are prepared. The minister began his remarks yesterday in a rather ominous tone by referring to the threat of nuclear warfare, the threat of total warfare, for that is obviously what nuclear warfare means. If we are faced with any potential situation of total warfare that situation must be met by total preparation. We cannot have total preparation unless the people of the nation are prepared in every respect. We must not only be prepared by having a professional armed force, but the people must also be prepared psychologically, spiritually and from the standpoint of morale and esprit de corps in order to meet any possible emergency.
I think the real reason the answer "not in the public interest" is almost invariably given to questions that penetrate too closely to the heart of defence problems is that as a nation we lack any comprehensive policy. This year, as in previous years, I have searched the white paper in vain for any complete statement of Canadian policy in the face of the continuing world emergency. That is not merely conjecture on my part, because some of the statements that have appeared in articles in magazines have also suggested the same thing, that there is no co-ordinated effort to evolve a sound and comprehensive defence policy. That statement was made by General Simonds in his recent article in Maclean's magazine.
My suspicions in this regard are also aroused by the fact that defence expenditure for this year has continued at precisely the same level as last year, $lf billion, exactly the same figure as last year, which more or less suggests that the minister and his officials have made a rough guess as to what our defence expenditure needs might be for the next year and have decided to perpetuate the status quo so far as the estimates for the ensuing year are concerned. The charge of no policy is not new. As a young nation Canada has found itself in the same situation throughout our whole military experience.
I have been reading that very excellent history, "Six Years of War", by Colonel

Stacey, the first volume of which was published last fall, I believe. It deals with Canada's effort in world war II, and the point repeatedly emerges in Colonel Stacey's analysis of Canada's participation in the war and the period immediately preceding the war that there was no policy. There was no comprehensive planning. There was a hope and grope approach to the problem of defence. Perhaps that might be excusable in the period before world war II because we were living in a fool's paradise so far as our attitude toward any possible threat of war was concerned, but certainly we have had the harsh realities of the world political situation brought home to us in the years since the end of world war II.
I have here a few interesting observations by Colonel Stacey in this regard. For example, he refers to the minister of national defence during that period, the late Ian Mackenzie, at the imperial conference of 1937 opposing any extraneous commitments so far as defence expenditures were concerned. I came across this interesting tidbit. In 1936 the military chiefs of that day requested $250 million and received $36 million. Hitler was already on the rampage but we had our heads in the sand. In the appropriation in 1939-40, the year world war II broke out, the amount was precisely $60 million and Colonel Stacey in rather quaint language says that this produced a strong protest from the army. Of course, as I have hinted, the explanation was that we were still in the throes of a depression. Unemployment was still widespread. The public accounts still showed a regular deficit.
It is interesting to note that in 1938, on this same matter of defence policy, the then prime minister, the late Mr. Mackenzie King, wrote to all his colleagues in the cabinet reminding them of the recent deficits and emphasizing the importance of achieving a surplus and, if possible, some reduction in taxation before the next appeal to the electorate. I was most interested to find that any attempt by the military advisers of that day to set up an armament industry was turned back by the administration in those immediate pre-world war II days. Requests went forward from the chiefs of staff for the establishment of an armament industry right up to the outbreak of war, and those requests were continually turned back by the government. Of course, had the government accepted the recommendations of their military advisers the Canadian land forces in the second world war could have been armed with modern weapons from the outset. As it was, they made do for many months with the equipment of 1918.

I refer to these interesting extracts from the official history because they point out that we in Canada have never had a comprehensive policy toward military preparation. If it had not been for the quality-which we have heard mentioned in this debate several times -of Canadian young men who have volunteered for service in the two wars and in the Korean period of crisis, we would never have made such a magnificent showing as we actually made in the defence of Canada. It is quite true that Canadians have a strength of character that seems to bring out the best in periods of crisis.
If the world situation is as difficult and as black as the minister outlined in his opening statement, as is referred to in the white paper, and as is mentioned from time to time by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, it is not enough to hope that Canadian citizens will rise to the occasion to meet any potential crisis that might be just around the corner.
Having had the experience of lack of preparedness for world war II and the unhappy state of affairs in the world that emerged following the collapse of the German reich, one would have thought we had learned our lesson. But we find that immediately after the cessation of hostilities the administration tried to revert to the pre-world war II period. We withdrew our forces from Europe and from Germany. We would not participate in the occupation of that country.
According to the official record, on October 1, 1946, the regular forces had been reduced to a figure below 50,000. The defence commitments for the fiscal year 1950-51 were $420 million. That was the year the Korean crisis commenced, and we made a complete somersault in defence plans. Panic ensued, and we embarked upon a period of defence build-up that has been referred to in this house from time to time. It was referred to by the former minister of national defence as "crash planning".
I think that just about describes all the contribution this country has ever made toward military preparedness. We have waited until a crisis was upon us; we have panicked; and we have indulged in crashplanning preparations. That is something which is tremendously expensive and tremendously wasteful; it is the sort of planning that produced the unhappy state of affairs outlined in the Currie report and which placed the armed forces of Canada in considerable bad odour for a long period of time. We are still not quite sure of where we are going, if we are to accept the opinion of the unofficial sources that have been discussing this situation in recent months.
Supply-National Defence
Just before calling it six o'clock, Mr. Chairman, I should like to place on record a summation of the contemporary situation by the retired former chief of the army staff. He says:
Thus little dodging expediencies grow into vast incubuses and huge sums of money are committed on a "defence policy"-
Those words are in quotation marks.
-that has never been thought through in all ramifications and consequences, and is no more than a ramshackle expensive patchwork.
If I may call it six o'clock, Mr. Chairman, I shall continue after the dinner recess.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at eight o'clock.
Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: Mr. Chairman, at six o'clock I was making the point that this question of lack of policy in defence matters is not a new thing in Canada. Actually, as a young nation we have never arrived at the position where we have met in a comprehensive way our defence responsibilities that have been increasing as Canada has assumed a role of increasing importance in world affairs. During the post-war era this particular aspect of public affairs has become a matter of extreme urgency.
The suggestion has been put forward, Mr. Chairman, that one of the reasons for our inability to outline a comprehensive program is the difficulties at the upper echelon of administration. It has been pointed out, for example, in recent statements by those who have occupied important positions in Canada's defence department that there is a bottleneck at the top; there is a break down in communication between the ministerial level and the level of chiefs of staff; there is a lack of liaison between senior civil servants and the other higher levels of command.
I recall that on former occasions during debates on the departmental estimates it was suggested that perhaps we should relieve the minister of some of his responsibilities by appointing a minister for air. That suggestion was made during the critical Korean build-up period. Following the Currie report discussion in the house there was an assistant minister of defence appointed. Now, these matters are in the realm of speculation, and I think the only way we can come to grips with the difficulty is by establishing a committee of the house that could meet from time to time and try to open up channels of communication and
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Supply-National Defence endeavour to bring our defence policy, which is a very important thing, into proper perspective at this time.
I do not want to spend all my time on policy; I want to deal specifically with the air force, as I indicated in my opening remarks. In matters pertaining to the air force I am glad to see in the white paper there is an indication that we are moving toward a semblance of a policy. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, before his departure from the house yesterday, congratulated the minister in this regard and indicated there is some evidence that the suggestions of the opposition have not been entirely without result; because the new policies, if you can call them that, that are outlined in the white paper are definitely based on suggestions that have come from this side of the house during discussions in former years.
The air force in Canada, because of the very nature of our geographic position, occupies a position of utmost importance in any Canadian defence policy. This is being recognized by the Department of National Defence, it is encouraging to note.
First of all, of course, there is the matter of personnel for the air force. Any branch of the service requires suitable personnel. I am not going to dwell on this problem. It has been mentioned by other speakers, but the white paper does indicate a high level of wastage which is not in the best interests of building up a strong, effective air arm. There appears to be a shortage of air crew. We have been trying to form additional squadrons for a couple of years now, and there seems to be a lack of the necessary trained personnel to equip those squadrons.
In passing, may I say that perhaps one of the reasons for the lack of interest of Canadian youth in the air force might be the relatively low level of incentive pay. This is a matter that has been mentioned in the house before. I believe it remains at the world war II level of $30 a month, regardless of the number of hours flown. Whether you are a chairborne pilot or a full operational pilot, you still qualify only for the additional $1 a day flying pay, which compares with something like $175 a month for the United States equivalent. Even in the R.A.F., where the service rates of pay are lower than the R.C.A.F., the flying incentive pay is at a much higher level. That, of course, is not the only factor, but it could be one of the reasons for the lack of incentive.
The main difficulty so far as personnel is concerned seems to be in the shortage of maintenance personnel. This is indicated by the increasing use of civilians to fill maintenance positions. In the realm of electronics,
[Mr. Dinsdale.l

private industry in Canada is growing by leaps and bounds. There is difficulty in retaining the personnel in the electronics field in the air force. The air force has tended to be a source of supply of qualified technicians in this particular area.
The problem of course, relates itself to the whole problem of personnel in Canada, where we are short of technicians of all kinds, where we are short of scientifically trained personnel. The difficulty comes up in almost all departmental discussions, and it is definitely sufficiently acute to require urgent joint action on the part of educational authorities and on the part of industry in co-operation with the government. If we are to have a comprehensive air policy we must meet the demands of personnel requirements.
Now, there is the matter of weapons. We have been discussing radar development on the North American continent. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, there is considerable misunderstanding concerning the function of our radar screen, which has been compared with the Maginot line complex, and so forth. There has been some criticism that unnecessary expenditure is going into the establishment of our three radar lines. Well, I should like to suggest that we have an excellent example of the function of a weapon of this kind-if you can call it a weapon; it is a defensive weapon-in the experience of the battle of Britain. Had it not been for the foresight of the pioneers in this field-they called it radio location in those days-the first of the few would not have succeeded in practically destroying the power of the Luftwaffe and winning the battle of Britain. They were able to do so only because they worked in close conjunction with the radar network that had been established around the United Kingdom.
Therefore I am one of those who believe that the radar installations are a very necessary and important development in any comprehensive program of air defence at this time. True enough, there are defects that cannot be overcome. We cannot detect highflying aircraft; we cannot detect low-flying aircraft. These defects were present during world war II, yet they did not offset the overall effectiveness of the screen.
The main criticism in this regard has been brought to bear because of the feeling that we have reached an era when we are faced with the immediate prospects of intercontinental ballistic missiles. But so far as any information I have been able to get is concerned, it would appear that the I.B.M. warfare, as it is called, is some 10 years away. I do not know whether the minister will agree with that figure; but if it is so you

have a 10-year interval in which the more orthodox air force defence is going to be required, and particularly the policy emphasis today on massive retaliation.
Massive retaliation seems to be the strategy of the west. If that is so I would agree, Mr. Chairman, that it is essential that Canada make its maximum contribution in fighter aircraft, because in the massive retaliation strategy it is going to be necessary for any potential bomber threat to penetrate deeply into the North American continent. Even a flying time of two or three hours makes it possible for conventional fighter aircraft, if we can call the CF-100 and the CF-105 conventional aircraft-the latter is not off the assembly line but it is more or less a conventional type-to intercept a considerable number of attacking bombers. Perhaps the best argument in support of our radar program is the fact that the D.E.W. line in particular would make it possible for our retaliatory forces, the strategic bombers, to get airborne and attempt to break through the enemy defences and at the same time give us time to get the fighters airborne to meet any onslaught from the enemy. I think we are moving in the right direction so far as our air defence policy is concerned. The CF-100 and the F-86 are admittedly obsolete and the sooner we can get the CF-105, which will be in production shortly, off the assembly line the better will be our defence position air-wise.
This leads me to make just a brief comment on the importance of the air industry to Canada. Canada is a natural country for the development of a strong air industry. We are a young nation and we are on the verge of tremendous development, particularly in the northern regions. In similar manner air power is just in its infancy. We are on the threshold of tremendous achievements in the air.
In the past the advances in aviation have come largely from the impetus that has been provided by military development. We in Canada have been gently ushered into the air age. We have the nucleus of an air industry, but I think there is a fundamental weakness in our approach to the establishment of an air industry in that our emphasis has been largely on the military aspect. Admittedly, as I have already indicated, that is where the initial impetus comes from; but the very nature of the Canadian problem, with its huge distances and with its potential in the north, suggests that we should be developing an air industry which provides a nice balance between military and civilian needs.
Supply-National Defence
As I see the situation we are very deficient in the civilian aspect of this particular development. Even in the air force, as far as I have been able to determine, we are not moving forward too vigorously in developing a strong transport command; in fact we have been marking time in recent years. Perhaps that is because we are waiting for new types of aircraft to emerge; but it seems we are in an ideal position, Mr. Chairman, to combine a military production program and a civilian production program with a modified form of the Bristol Britannia type of aircraft that will be in service in a comparatively short time. This Bristol Britannia is primarily a civilian transport which is being modified for military purposes. I have the specifications here but time will not allow me to discuss them in detail. I would, however, point out that the Britannia has proven itself a very economic and effective interim transport aircraft. As we move toward the jet age, it is a transport aircraft that could serve in various capacities in Canada on the transcontinental route. Its runway requirements are relatively limited as compared with the pure jet transport, and certainly it could play a major role in the opening up of the north, particularly with the establishment of the numerous airfields in connection with the D.E.W. line.


The Chairman:: Order. I am sorry to interrupt the hon. member, but I am obliged to advise him that his time has expired.


Some hon. Members:: Go ahead.


William Alfred Robinson: Has the hon. gentleman unanimous consent to proceed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesy.
I believe we were caught short in the D.E.W. line development. My colleague the hon. member for York West will be dealing with this in greater detail later on in the debate; he has a much wider grasp of this problem than I have. If we had planned very carefully, taking into consideration the special needs of Canada, we would have been in a position to have a very strong civilian air industry at this time.
There is another aspect of the necessity of co-ordinating civilian and military needs. The minister spoke of a mobile striking force as one of the objectives of air policy. That is another suggestion that has been put forward repeatedly by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich. He is one of those retired generals with a very flexible attitude toward the changing demands of defence today. Any effective mobile striking force, in addition to being transported across the ocean by
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Supply-National Defence means of Bristol Britannias-if that were the type of aircraft adopted-would require air transport facilities to make it possible to deal effectively with any enemy lodgments in isolated areas of this country. That would demand a smaller type of aircraft, and again we have an industry in Canada producing an aircraft very suitable for that purpose. I am referring, of course, to the Beaver and Otter produced by the de Havilland Company. These planes have established fine reputations in the field of small air transports.
As has been said repeatedly, we have to balance the demands of total nuclear warfare with the demands of conventional warfare, and if we are going to have an effective air defence policy-we are moving toward it timidly-we are going to have to think in terms of completely air portable-not airborne but air portable-mobile striking force, as we on the side of the house have continually indicated. That, of course, is going to mean a much more effective and comprehensive transport command operation than we have at the moment.
One further thought on this matter of a Canadian air industry. It is a subject which I bring up regularly. I am not alone in harping on this theme; it is a theme that has been picked up in many areas in Canada. The most recent exponent is another retired general who has been making statements that should be listened to with considerable interest by the government.
I refer, of course, to General Worthington, who is in charge of our civil defence organization and planning. He has been saying repeatedly in recent days that we must avoid the building up of these huge city areas which are flowing over and absorbing the surrounding rural areas like the tentacles of an octopus, swallowing up the fruitful agricultural land as in the Niagara peninsula, for instance. This is occurring at such a rate that according to a C.B.C. program last Sunday evening-"In the Shadow of the City," I think it was called-if it continues to absorb fruitful agricultural land at the present rate there will be none left in that area in 10 years. There are 50,000 acres left now and we are absorbing it at the rate of 2,000 acres annually. That of course is due to the high concentration of industry in certain areas.


Mr. Hellyer:: Two times ten is not fifty.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: I am out somewhere in my statistics, but the increase was large enough to absorb 50,000 acres within a 10-year period. I am told that the aircraft industry in Canada employs between 35,000 and 40,000 people. This industry is concentrated


in the urban areas and involves the expenditure of tremendous sums of money. I believe that if we are going to have an intelligent and logical defence policy we must have an air industry which can be defended and protected in the event of hostilities. That can be done only by dispersal across the country.
I have suggested on many occasions that we have lots of room in western Canada for such dispersal, and we also have all the necessary ingredients to make a worth-while contribution to this important aspect of Canada's economic life. The argument is always raised that dispersal is uneconomic, but when survival is at stake-I am quoting from the A. V. Roe brief to the Gordon commission-economics are of secondary consideration. So I raise this matter of dispersal and hope that those responsible will give it urgent attention as we move toward a more comprehensive air policy generally.
I do not want to impose upon the patience of the committee too extensively at this time. I intended to speak on the reserve and auxiliary problems, but that would require a longer time than I think I should take now. Perhaps I can come back to this particular aspect later on in the debate.


Erhart Regier: Mr. Chairman, in making my contribution to the discussion of the estimates of the Minister of National Defence I must at the outset plead guilty to a lack of technical knowledge which some hon. members seem to possess. I do not think I have ever seen one of these famous CF-lOO's, nor would I recognize it if I did. However, the Department of National Defence takes almost half the income of the federal government; therefore I am pleased to see more members taking an active interest in exactly what is happening to this vast expenditure of public money. As an ordinary citizen of Canada I am interested in what will be the effects of government policy in relation to the subject of world peace.
I am often asked back home to give some measure of explanation as to what the government actually uses this almost $2,000 million for, which they supposedly spend for defence. I do my utmost to explain that it is the responsibility of the Minister of National Defence to do everything possible to protect us from whatever hostile action we may be called upon to endure as a result of the activities of another nation.
I was a little disappointed the other day when I read the British United Press dispatch which reported that the people on the west coast of Canada had been subjected to radioactive rainfall. On the orders of the day on June 15 and June 19-I did not

f)Ut this question to the Minister of National Defence because I thought the matter was so important that it should receive consideration at a higher level of government than the head of one department-I asked by whose authority Canadian citizens were subjected to what might have been a dangerous radioactive rainfall, and I asked also what measures were being taken to assure Canadian citizens that things of this nature would not happen again. We did have the assurance in a news dispatch that the amount of radioactivity in the rain which fell was not harmful, but we have no assurance that on another occasion in the months and years ahead we might not be faced with disaster from other explosions which could be harmful. I say this because of the reports by scientists as to what may happen, and I look to the Minister of National Defence to supply me with an answer to the problem.
I feel it is the primary responsibility of the minister to protect the Canadian people from the actions of another nation. The Minister of National Health and Welfare replied that the Canadian government had not participated in any decision in regard to the thermonuclear explosion which took place about a month ago. If the Canadian government did not take part and was in no way responsible for that incident, then I feel it is up to the Canadian government to make representations to the authorities who were responsible in an effort to avoid what may some day be a serious situation. I am told that the scientists themselves are never sure at the time of one of these explosions how far-reaching the consequences may be.
Before saying anything more about the department I should like once again to place on the record my attitude toward the Department of National Defence. I made the following statement to the house on November 19, 1953, as reported on page 164 of Hansard of that date:
For the record I should like to make it perfectly clear here that at this stage I do not oppose but rather endorse the use of force which may be necessary for the maintenance of law and order. But such force must be exercised by some authority which is higher than those who are involved in the argument. As long as the United Nations is the United Nations and not the Soviet union or the United States I am in hearty agreement with the use of military force by that body for the maintenance of world peace.
Recently there occurred an incident in connection with which we felt most keenly the lack of a United Nations defence force, and I refer to the severe tension which obtained, and to a great extent exists even today, in the Middle East. At the height of that crisis the leaders of Canada, Great Britain and the United States seemed to be at a complete loss as to what action they should 67509-334i
Supply-National Defence take if the situation became worse. I am sure we are all glad that a conflagration did not take place at that time, but that incident revealed the urgent need for some plan of action on the international level being established before we are in the middle of a crisis.
The minister and the member for Esqui-malt-Saanich referred to that incident. However, the member for Esquimalt-Saanich also pointed out that when the Korean incident occurred we were really not prepared, and the United Nations as an international force was really not prepared and not in a position to meet the situation. It was only because we were fortunate enough to be able to engage in some delaying action that the forces of the supporting members were rallied and a longterm defence against aggression was undertaken.
If we are spending almost $2,000 million for our national defence we might as well give some serious consideration to having at least some of that money devoted to an international police force whose responsibility it will be to be ready for any little emergency that may arise; and little emergencies, as we know, can sometimes involve the whole world in armed conflict.
I also realize that Canada as a nation is too weak to have a defence policy of its own. We cannot act unilaterally; it would simply be a complete waste of public funds. If we are ever involved in a major world struggle, Canada alone cannot even defend her own shores. Therefore military organizations may be necessary. I have indicated that I would prefer to see that military co-ordination under the auspices of the United Nations. That may not be entirely realistic in the world in which we live, and we therefore have our NATO organization.
As I observe what is happening in the Department of National Defence, I get the feeling that Canada even today is still pursuing, for the major part, a unilateral defence policy. I will admit that there is some co-operation with our neighbour to the south and some of our NATO allies. However, the basic assumption still seems to be to build up a national defence force. I feel that the major emphasis should rather be on making our fair contribution to a united effort on the part of the western democracies, and making our fair contribution to world effort on behalf of maintaining peace.
Then I think the shift from the military to the economic front in the so-called cold war has particular significance for a country such as ours. I believe that in this shift may well lie not only the salvation of world peace but

Supply-National Defence our own economic salvation. We are producers of many of the basic needs of the world, and some of them we have in excess. We do not know what to do with the surpluses we have. If the cold war were really fought on the economic front, we would find ample markets for all the products that Canada is now producing and also for those we would be able to produce if we made a sincere effort to produce to win, as some years ago we made an all-out effort to produce to win the war.
We have the Colombo plan, to which we make a contribution. We make a contribution to the refugee assistance program, the United Nations technical assistance organization, the world health organization and various other international organizations. However, our sum total of contributions on the economic front thus far has been most insignificant when placed in relationship, first of all, with our ability to donate and, second, with the expenditures on the military side of the battle for men's minds.
We have at the present time a department of national defence which spends over $100 per annum for every man, woman and child in our nation. The ordinary people of Canada have a right to know something of what they are getting for this continuous, heavy expenditure of public funds. We had an explanation given us by the minister the other day in regard to the radar lines, which are among the most expensive of our defence expenditures. As recorded on page 5211 of Hansard, he said:
These are projects of great difficulty and magnitude-costly, but we believe worth the cost. For they will buy us time-time to get the big United States deterrent force of bombers with their nuclear weapons winging away on their missions should the need arise, time to get our defences activated, time to prepare our people for impending attack.
I must agree with the first reason the minister gave for the existence of radar lines. Anyone knowing the world situation and looking at the globe will have to admit that. However, I must take exception to the last part of his sentence, when he says these radar lines will give us time to get our defences activated, time to prepare our people for impending attack. I believe the minister is not telling the whole story when he says that. I believe that when these radar lines were first initiated that was possibly the greatest reason for initiating them. However, if the minister has, as 1 am sure he has, read the statistics on the performance of modern aircraft, of the Russian accomplishments and so forth, I think he will have to admit that none of our radar lines-the mid-Canada line, the "Pinetree" line or the distant early warning line, will in any shape or form, for any practical purposes, be able to warn our people to


prepare themselves to resist the effects of an attack. That has become outmoded. A sentence like that five years ago might have been acceptable to this house, but in 1956 it is no longer valid.
With many other members of this house I went to the military installations at Fort Churchill; I believe it was a little over a year ago now. There is one recommendation I should like to make in connection with that. Wherever possible I think the efforts of the Department of National Defence should tie in with the national life of Canada, so that more Canadians will know that we actually have a department of national defence and so that as many Canadians as possible will at least receive some of the benefits of this large expenditure of money.
When I refer to Fort Churchill, what I have in mind is this. Here we have the military camp supplied with purified, running water, all the sanitary services you could wish for, hydroelectric energy and so forth. Yet only a very short distance away we have the old Fort Churchill where the ordinary civilians live, and they have no sanitary facilities, no water supplied to them. None of the amenities that are available and supplied to the armed forces there are extended to the civilian population. I feel that with a little bit of extra money the people living there in Canada's north could receive some of the benefits of having the military camp next door.
I heartily endorse the need expressed by my colleagues and also the members of the Conservative party for a committee on national defence. I think the Canadian people and the members of this house in particular are not nearly well enough informed about what is happening, what is being done with the money. I realize there may be need to maintain some of these expenditures on the secret list. However, when you look at what is happening in other democratic countries of the world I doubt very much whether you will find another western nation where the minister in charge of defence is given authority to spend $1,700 million odd and nobody is able to investigate to find what is actually being done with the money.
Furthermore, I maintain that there is great need for more public relations efforts on the part of the minister's department. The ordinary taxpayer back home sees only the advertisements inviting him to don a uniform. He sees very little else of what is being done by the Department of National Defence. I think a percentage of the money could very well be devoted to an explanation to the public, in ways by which other departments of the government well know how to obtain


public sympathy and understanding, of what we ought to be doing; and if the public find out we are not doing what ought to be done they will be able to do something. No one wants to be responsible for endangering the safety and welfare of his own nation, yet people are not supplied with the information that is needed. Therefore one can sympathize with people when they begin to raise serious questions.
Finally may I say that my main purpose in rising tonight was to say that I believe that unilateral defence for Canada as a nation is outmoded, useless and a complete waste of money. In my opinion we must collaborate with the other nations of the western world, and especially must we bear in mind that at no time shall we harm the possible collective security that may well be set up some day for the safety of the world by the world-wide organization, the United Nations.


Mr. Green:: Mr. Chairman, this evening I should like to deal briefly with three different subjects coming up or not coming up under the estimates of the Department of National Defence. The first is the program of defence research and development. If hon. members will turn to page 339 of the estimate book they will find that the minister is asking for defence research and development in the current fiscal year the sum of $79,032,389. Last year he asked for $52,578,000, so there is an increase in that particular estimate of practically 50 per cent. Of that increase of over $26 million, more than $21 million, according to the estimate book, is for the acquisition and construction of equipment, the total amount required for that purpose, including the increase, being practically $50 million. That is by far the largest part of the defence research and development vote.
Incidentally, it is interesting to recall that in the fiscal year 1954-55, two years ago, the amount asked for research was $50,400,000, and that in each of the two preceding years it was only $42 million. Therefore we are now being asked to vote almost twice as much for research and development as was voted in the years from 1952 to 1954. This amount of $80 million is a very large sum of money. I remember sessions just before the war when $65 million was voted for the whole Department of National Defence, and everyone thought that was a very big expenditure. Now we have $80 million for this one particular portion of the work.
I suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that parliament should have some check on this expenditure for research and development. This session we have set up a committee on nonmilitary research, but so far as I know there has never been any committee of the house
Supply-National Defence with the power to inquire into the ways in which the money voted for research was being expended by the Department of National Defence. I realize that some of the work must of necessity be secret, but even in the days of the war there were committees with the power to go into many expenditures of a similar type, and I see no reason why there should not be a committee of the house at the present time. Probably the committee on national defence suggested by my leader this afternoon would be the one to undertake that work. We have the position today that very large sums of money are being sought for defence research without any adequate check whatever on the part of the members of the house.
In connection with the research and development program I ask the minister to tell the committee the cost to Canada of the "Velvet Glove" project. We find it referred to on page 35 of the white paper. It seems to have been at least one of the main projects of the defence research board, and the white paper has this to say:
Shortly after the inception of the defence research board in 1947, a small group of the board's scientists began studies in the guided missile field. In recognition of future Canadian needs for special air defence weapons, and under arrangements with United States and United Kingdom authorities, the board concentrated on the family of air-to-air missiles.
Apparently that was to be Canada's field, air-to-air missiles.
In 1950 it was decided to undertake a practical but experimental Canadian project. The prime purpose of the project was to build up within the board's staff and throughout Canadian industry a team of scientists and engineers capable of developing and producing guided missiles in this country, while familiarizing officers of the Canadian services with problems and techniques involved in using such weapons.
Then the report goes on to say this:
126. Known as the "Velvet Glove", this project has resulted in the training of some 400 specialized personnel in Canada, and has been accompanied by the development of facilities for research, testing and evaluation of guided missiles. A limited number of missiles are being produced, particularly for testing and training purposes at the R.C.A.F.'s establishment at Cold Lake, Alberta. Canadian industry has made progress towards developing design and manufacturing capability in this complex new field.
By the way, earlier in this particular section of the white paper it is stated that the principal increase in the vote for research and development is directly related to anticipated expenditure in connection with the CF-105 airplane, and the guided missile program. Hence even in this vote that we are considering tonight there is a great deal of

Supply-National Defence money presumably for this guided missile project. Then the white paper goes on to say this:
127. On the basis of this preliminary work Canada is now working out arrangements for the production in this country of a United States type of air-to-air missile, in order to make Canadian interceptor aircraft better able to perform their role in the air defence system.
That white paper does not make it clear that the "Velvet Glove" project has not been successful. The minister did that when he spoke yesterday. As reported at page 5214 of Hansard he said this:
The pioneer work was done on the "Velvet Glove", which so far has fully come up to its original specifications, However-
And this is a very big "however"; this is the part that indicates that the whole project has not been a success.
-because a somewhat similar United States missile is of more advanced design, it has been decided not to adopt "Velvet Glove" for operation use, but to modify the "Velvet Glove" program and go into production of one of the Sparrow series for use with the CF-100 and the CF-105.
It would appear that at least some and probably a great deal of the money that has been spent on the "Velvet Glove" project has gone down the drain. I ask the minister, when he replies, to tell the committee just what amount of money has been spent on this "Velvet Glove" program.
Again, another point in connection with research is this. What consideration is given to long-term defence requirements before any particular research project is authorized? I ask that question because General Simonds raised it in his article in Maclean's magazine. I do not know whether or not General Simonds is right in all his statements in this magazine, but in any event he is one of the most distinguished soldiers this nation has ever produced. Probably we have never produced a finer field commander. He has served as chief of staff and, as we all know, he served with distinction. His statements must carry weight. Even if they do not carry much weight with the government I am sure they do with the Canadian public as a whole. These statements he has made should be answered by the Minister of National Defence in the course of this debate.
General Simonds has this to say. He refers to the navy and the air force. I do not know whether he left the army out because he is an army man, but at any rate in this particular part of the article he says this:
Thus the navy and the air force, which sustain a large sector of the shipbuilding and aircraft industries (the latter existing almost entirely upon defence expenditures for research, development and construction), are encouraged to embark on new projects, without too searching a consideration of whether what is being researched, developed or


constructed necessarily represents the most valuable contribution to defence in the longer term.
Then he gives two examples. He says:
Thus, having regard to its timing, the wisdom of embarking upon the development of the CF-105 fighter is open to serious military objections. It should be abundantly clear by now that the ground-to-air missile offers the only prospect of eventually counterbalancing the existing ascendancy of the offensive in terms of aerial warfare. If, as many believe, there may be a dangerous time gap to be covered by some form of defence, after existing fighters are obsolete and before a really reliable ground-to-air guided missile is available in operational quantities, then it would have been both more sensible and economical to have adopted a prototype fighter developed by the U.S. or Britain as a gap-filler rather than to embark on an expensive venture of our own, the product of which at best will have a very short, if any, useful operational life.
I stress these next words:
The combined vested interests of the air force, the aircraft industry and defence research scientists, burning with zeal to participate in a project they could call their own, coupled with the known desire of ministers to maintain a defence effort with a strict manpower ceiling, swept aside any opposition to this venture.
He also has a similar criticism of the mid-Canada line. He says this:
The mid-Canada line with its "McGill fence" equipment could be justified as a stop-gap measure if there should occur an appreciable time lag between its completion and the completion of the D.E.W. line. It is difficult to understand what useful part it can fulfil in a defence system based upon guided missiles, which is a "must" of the not-distant future, if an even adequate defence is to be provided against offensive air power. The United States has pressed the construction of the D.E.W. line with such vigour that it is for serious consideration whether the arguments for construction of the mid-Canada line were not powerfully influenced by a desire to put to use gadgetry-
He uses this word "gadgetry" several times throughout the article, presumably referring to the defence research board.
-evolved in Canada at considerable effort, rather than considerations of what would provide the best defence, most capable of adaptation to new weapons as they evolved.
Those criticisms may or may not be justified, but they should be answered fully by the Minister of National Defence. It just may be the case, Mr. Chairman, that in our defence research effort we are spreading the money over too many projects. It might be better to concentrate and also to be a little more careful about giving directions for the start of any particular project.
The second subject I should like to mention tonight arises also out of the article by General Simonds. I refer to the present status of the permanent joint defence board. The general points out in the article-and correctly, I think-something in connection with the permanent joint board on defence;

that is, of course, the Canadian-United States board. He points out as follows:
The existence of the permanent joint board on defence adds further confusion to the direction of our military affairs.
He seems to think it is a fifth wheel to the coach. He continues:
This organization came into being during the period of world war II when Canada was a belligerent and the United States was still neutral, and at that time was a useful instrument for obtaining some co-ordination of measures for North American defence. Now it simply acts as a barrier to closer liaison between the Canadian and U.S. chiefs of staff, and is redundant in so far as its military activities are concerned.
That is a very serious charge in view of our association in the defence field with the United States. Then General Simonds goes on:
But the chairman has a more ready access to senior cabinet ministers than have the chiefs of staff. Whatever the terms of reference may be, many of the expressed views of ministers bear the unmistakable imprint of the influence of an intellect more remarkable for its bias toward pseudoscience and gadgetry, than for its record of sound military judgment.
These are rather harsh words about the Canadian chairman of the joint defence board; but what is the function of this board today? Why is there need for a permanent joint defence board working on its own when we have such close liaison between the two countries in military affairs? Surely that work should be done by the Canadian chiefs of staff rather than left in the hands of any outside board. What useful purpose is this joint defence board serving at the present time?
Then my third and final subject is this, Mr. Chairman. We read in the very first paragraph of the white paper about Canada's defence objectives. These are the broad defence objectives. This is the way the paragraph reads:
The aim of Canada's defence program and planning is to provide for the security of Canada. Under present foreseeable conditions this can be done most effectively by close co-operation with our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and especially with the United States in relation to the North American area. Our defence plans must also include a capacity to carry out obligations that may arise out of Canada's membership in the United Nations Organization.
I point out that there is not one word in this paragraph, or in any other paragraph in this whole white paper, about the commonwealth, not one word about co-operation with the commonwealth in defence matters. Surely one of the main objectives of this nation in defence matters should be co-operation with the other nations of the commonwealth. Young men from these commonwealth nations fought side by side in two wars. In
Supply-National Defence the first war we had Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, we had troops from India, beside us time and again in France; and you could have no finer troops beside you, as I think the minister will admit.


Ralph Osborne Campney: That was also true in Korea.


Howard Charles Green: Even Field Marshal Rommel, in the second world war, repeatedly expressed his great admiration for the New Zealand division, and considered them the finest troops facing him in North Africa.
In the second world war our young men fought and died beside young men from the other nations of the commonwealth. I saw, and probably the minister did too, the first young air force recruits under the commonwealth training plan go through Vancouver from Australia. Many thousands of them came that way, trained here in Canada and then flew their machines with our own Canadian pilots and navigators. Young men of the commonwealth saved civilization just a few years ago, and for a year they stood alone to do it. In 1941, with the exception of the short time that Greece was able to stand up against the nazi hordes, the British commonwealth stood alone and saved civilization.
And, by the way, things might have been different if it had not been for the young men who were trained in Canada in the air. It might also have been a great tragedy if the original plan of this government not to allow any British or other commonwealth airmen to come here and train had not been changed, and changed very suddenly.
This was what happened just a few years ago. Just 11 years ago these young men from the different nations of the commonwealth were fighting side by side and saving civilization. A few years ago in Korea we had the commonwealth division; yet today co-operating with the commonwealth is not even mentioned as an objective of the Canadian government in defence matters. I suggest to the minister that the present is a very appropriate time for something to be done about this failure. The Prime Minister is going to London within the next day or two to attend a meeting of the prime ministers of the commonwealth. Let him at that conference raise some of these defence questions.
For example, why should Canada not extend her present air training plan to include young airmen from other parts of the commonwealth, from the nations of the commonwealth that do not belong to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the South Africans, the Indians, the Pakistanians and the Ceylonese; any member nations of the commonwealth
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Supply-National Defence that wish to participate in this training plan. At page 14 of the white paper I find the following:
At December 31, 1955, under the NATO air crew training plan carried out at R.C.A.F. establishments in Canada, a total of 1,741 pilots and 2,130 navigators, including observers, had graduated and a further 939 trainees were on course. These trainees have come from Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey and the United Kingdom.
Why not extend that scheme and allow young men to come from other nations of the commonwealth?
Why not co-operate with the other nations of the commonwealth in the guided missile field? The British have proving grounds for guided missiles in Australia. They have done a great deal of work in that field. Why should not our Prime Minister suggest at the conference that all nations of the commonwealth which wish to do so should participate in a common guided missile project? These are the type of things which will have to be done. If they are not, if we just allow the commonwealth to drift along without facing some of the realities in the world today, I doubt very much whether it will continue in existence for a great deal longer.
Our defence effort and our defence expenditures are designed to prevent world domination by the communists. That is the one reason we are spending all this money in Canada for defence. If war comes, we all know that it will not be only in the North Atlantic treaty area; it will be a global war. It will be just as hot on the Pacific as it is on the Atlantic, and perhaps quite a bit hotter. Some of these commonwealth nations will not co-operate with NATO, but I believe they would be willing to co-operate with the other commonwealth nations in the fields which I have suggested. Co-operation of the commonwealth nations in a third world war might well be the deciding factor.
I urge upon the government, particularly on the Prime Minister and on the Minister of National Defence, that in our own interests we should leave no stone unturned to further co-operation among the commonwealth nations in defence matters at the present time. Some may not be willing to go very far; others might be willing to go the whole way, but let us at least do our part to further that type of co-operation among this group of nations which give allegiance to a common sovereign, our gracious Queen Elizabeth II.


William McLean Hamilton: Mr. Chairman, this house is fortunate in that its membership includes hon. members with great experience in all branches and at all levels of the armed services. I have personally met among its members those who


have held ranks ranging from general down the line to buck private. They probably bring to bear on the problems of national defence as much personal experience and knowledge of these problems as any group of men anywhere in Canada.
Many of the matters which are discussed under the estimates of the Department of National Defence do require a high degree of technical knowledge and practical experience in one field or another of the armed services. Those of us who may not have had such extensive experience in that field are well advised, I think, to leave to the experts commentary and discussion in their field of special knowledge. On the other hand, there are many things which affect the Department of National Defence and many matters which come under its control which are reasonable grounds for discussion, comment and examination by anyone in this country, whether he be a civilian or an armed forces expert. The very extent of the department's budget, the amount of money it spends, would seem to bear out the truth of that statement.
I remember reading not so long ago that it takes the wool from 20 sheep, I think it is, to clothe a soldier; and I thought to myself at the time that to keep that man in the field it also takes the hides of about 30 taxpayers. I do not think, Mr. Chairman, any citizen of Canada objects to the expenditures on national defence where they are justified and properly made, but I do think every citizen of Canada and every hon. member of this house has ample justification for questioning certain of those expenditures and for feeling at many times that these expenditures are made without proper explanation to this house and sometimes, when we do find out how and why they have been made, without sufficient justification.
We must remember it is extremely likely the world will remain in a state of armed preparedness during our generation. There seems to be little likelihood of any major change in international relations in the foreseeable future that would permit us to beat our swords into plowshares. If, then, we are to remain in a state of armed preparedness, and if we are to be asked year in and year out to spend millions of dollars for national defence, we will have to adjust our thinking and approach to the subject of these expenditures to a peacetime concept rather than a wartime concept. By that I mean that a certain attitude of mind toward such expenditures which may be allowable and understandable in time of war should not be carried into peacetime. In brief it is the attitude that says, "Hang the expense. We must do the job at any expense and

immediately, even though we are not absolutely sure the job needs to be done immediately".
That is the attitude one expects when one is under the gun, but it is not necessarily an attitude that is justified when the world is in a period of cold war, of planning and preparing for what at any moment may break out into a hot war but a hot war which certainly has not arrived as yet.
Second, in this matter of changing our attitude, Mr. Chairman, it would seem the necessity for the wartime attitude that everything connected with national defence, defence expenditure and all varities of activity in that field should be cloaked in secrecy may have to be altered. I do not think it is quite reasonable to expect the people of this country to continue year after year to willingly vote any amount of money requested by the Department of National Defence unless that department is prepared in peacetime to go further than it has to date in co-operating with this house in laying before it the details of many aspects of its operations.
It has been pointed out, and rightly so, that there are some things which should not be made public; but let me ask, Mr. Chairman, is there some marvellous capacity residing only with the armed services of this country which makes them the safe repositories of restricted information and renders a small committee of this house a doubtful repository for the same information?
Within this field of restricted information it might very well be said that all the details cannot be brought into the house and laid on the table in the full sight of every hon. member of the house and the press gallery. Through those channels, and correctly so, the information becomes the property of every resident of Canada no matter where his national or international sympathies may lie. But surely the type of committee which it has been suggested should be set up on an allparty basis could be taken completely and absolutely into the confidence of the Minister of National Defence and given all the information it required. Surely there are many, many aspects of national defence now kept under this cloak of secrecy which could easily and properly be brought into this house, explained to us and, if necessary, the accompanying expenditures defended before us. The best evidence of the government's unwillingness to do this has been their recurring refusal to refer the estimates of the Department of National Defence to the committee on estimates. Without labouring the point may I say that I hope the government will see fit to change this attitude at the next session of this parliament.
Supply-National Defence
Having made these general remarks I should like to deal for a few minutes with some of the expenditures of the Department of National Defence very much as a taxpayer of this country might see them. Of course I cannot touch on every individual item, but there are a few which seem to require some explanation. In one field, for example, the department seems to be engaging in operations which could be carried on quite successfully by private enterprise. Indeed, I think this is one of the weaknesses of any over-large government department. Eventually they come to the conclusion that as ancillary operations to their main purpose they should carry on a multitude of functions. They are quite sure they can do these better than private enterprise, and they insist on carrying them on without any attempt whatsoever to divest themselves of the responsibility.
As examples selected from the last report of the Department of National Defence we find that they are in the restaurant business in a reasonably sizeable way, in that in the year under consideration they sold over $64,000 worth of meals. Then we find that they are in the photographic business, because they sold over $81,000 worth of photographic supplies. Then we find they are in the laundry business, because they took in over $160,000 for doing laundry. I am quite sure that if I were prepared to dig a little further I could find a list of other items, but I give those as typical examples; the restaurant business, the photographic business and the laundry business.
Let us realize that these three things are by definition not operations which are carried out for the Department of National Defence as such, because had they been these sales would not have been made. What I have just quoted indicates the actual dollar revenue received by the Department of National Defence for sales under these various categories.
This raises two points. First there is the whole question of the propriety of the Department of National Defence carrying on functions which might very well be carried on by private enterprise. In isolated cases there may be some justification for this particular course of action, but I am not at all sure that it exists everywhere it may be pleaded. It is very easy to claim that one must operate a restaurant and serve meals, for example, if one has not gone out and made a series of honest attempts to find somebody to come in to operate that particular restaurant for the Department of National Defence.
Second, and this is perhaps even more basic, there is a difficulty, under this system

Supply-National Defence with the government engaging in operations of this kind and with their cloak of secrecy draped around them, of establishing whether the various activities of the department are really being effectively and efficiently and economically operated. I find amounts coming into the department under the various categories I have mentioned, but nowhere in the departmental estimates can I find any corresponding expenditures. I hope when the minister replies he will give us a little breakdown of what the costs were as opposed to these various sales. If we are going to be in business, if we are going to sell merchandise, if we are going to sell supplies, I think we have every reason in the world to know the details of the business we are operating. I suggest that by no manner or means is this classified information.
When we go on a little further we find that although education is completely a provincial matter the Department of National Defence is very actively engaged in educational activities, presumably at the grade school and high school levels, not only for their own personnel, although they have that too, but I submit specifically for the education of dependents. It may come as a surprise to many people that there are some 17,000 children attending schools operated by the Department of National Defence, and that those schools employ some 668 teachers from coast to coast in this country.
It must be admitted that if we set up a defence post in some completely inaccessible part of this country and ask men to go there with their families and there is no educational system in the area the government has a responsibility to provide educational facilities for those children. That I am quite prepared to admit. But where are these schools? Many of them are in major centres. In Calgary there is a school with 876 pupils; in Edmonton there is one with 303 pupils; in Shilo, Manitoba, not far away from a major centre- there are those from Shilo who would be offended if I did not indicate that Shilo itself was a major centre-there is a school with 648 pupils.
I come on down the list and find that at Petawawa there are many children of nonmilitary personnel who go to the regular schools of Ontario, but the army has set up a school with 34 teachers and 884 pupils. I could go down the list indefinitely, which I shall not do, and point out the major centres in Canada where these schools have been set up.
It may be argued that the department might suddenly develop a base and find that the educational facilities provided by the province are not sufficient, and they then

have to move in to meet the demand which they have created. However, I suggest that is exactly the type of mentality to which I have referred before, the mentality which says, "We will do it ourselves under federal government auspices rather than to seek the solution through the normal channels of free enterprise and the governmental system of this country at the provincial and municipal levels." If the government has a school to accommodate 800 pupils, they must have built the building. It seems to me that whether that building was built directly by the federal government or whether the federal government turned over the necessary funds as a municipal grant and had the building built by the school authorities of that area, it would have cost approximately the same amount.
It seems to me that the teachers who are teaching those pupils might just as well have been hired by the educational authorities of the province as by the federal government. It seems to me, and I think to a great many people in this country, that if the second course of action had been followed, the one which fitted this type of operation into the normal structure, the structure that Canadians as a whole would like to have in this country, rather than having the domineering and dominant control of the Department of National Defence we would have had a system that would be more satisfactory and that would better meet the needs and the demands of our Canadian civilization and economy as we know it.
Without going into details, although I have them, I would point out that the Department of National Defence is also in the housing business in a big way. It seems possible for all other areas of Canada, and all other segments of the economy, to build their own houses-very often, admittedly, with government loans.-but it also seems that the Department of National Defence for some reason must produce some 15,000 houses across this country rather than letting the free enterprise system, through the normal channels which are available to it, do exactly the same job.
We find the department in a number of other fields, and it shows how this mentality can gradually develop. Without going into the details I could tell the minister, for example, that his department needs many bookkeepers for the Montreal area, I imagine, for stores and so on. Did they think of arranging a contract with a local business college or anything like that in order to train these people? No.
I have here the civil service notice advertising for an instructor in bookkeeping to work for the Department of National Defence. His duties are exactly the same as those which

would be carried on by an instructor in bookkeeping in any commercial college or business school in this country. I shall just read the first part:
Under direction to instruct naval personnel in the principles and practices of bookkeeping; to assist in the preparation of training syllabi in the above subject; to draft and mark interim and final examinations . . .
I suggest that this type of thing is much better carried on through the normal processes. There are tens of thousands of bookkeepers in this country who received their education and training without the blessing of the Department of National Defence. If the department wants bookkeepers, it seems to me that the course for it to follow is to arrange with a school already set up to do the job for it.
Then you can go one step further and see again how this mentality expands and develops and moves ahead. I hold in my hand two pamphlets. They are interesting. They are well printed and effective. Inside the cover is the following statement:
The kind permission of the Royal Canadian Air Force to make the text of this training pamphlet available to the public is gratefully acknowledged.
I presume the pamphlets were previously restricted information. The title of one is "Beginning Hockey", and the title of the other is "How to Play Better Hockey." I am not opposed to the Department of National Defence encouraging its men to play hockey. It is a wonderful sport. It is a very good idea that the men should be encouraged and that they should be properly trained. But I suggest again that without the help or cooperation of the Minister of National Defence, there are tens of thousands of youngsters and young men across this country from coast to coast who have learned to play hockey and learned to play it extremely well. There are possibly thousands of those who also have read about hockey in pamphlets or books which they have bought at the corner bookstore, but here we have the Department of National Defence invading the publishing field and the sports field with their own pamphlets on how to play hockey.
Then we may go one more step, and perhaps this is the most interesting one of all. I hold in my hand a very well taken photograph of some 40 Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps cadets. They are in uniform, and parading in front of them is a man who would make a very good toothpaste advertisement, a very handsome man and well qualified man for his job. The reason he would make a good toothpaste advertisement is that he is smiling broadly. These Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps cadets are attending the Rosita and Deno dance studio in Montreal for dancing
Supply-National Defence lessons. As far as I can find out they are doing so under the aegis and blessing of the Department of National Defence. They certainly are in uniform, and they are certainly there in a body and, according to my information, they are certainly there as a national defence project. I think the minister could very well tell us something about this particular aspect of national defence work-dancing lessons for the cadets-and whether he plans to extend it into other fields and, if so, what those fields may be.
Let me make it very plain that I have no objection to ordnance corps cadets or any other men in the armed services taking dancing lessons. I. have no objection to them taking lessons in playing hockey. I have no objection to them having all the amenities open to them, because they have a hard, exhausting and demanding job; but I do object, first of all, to the government getting into so many of these fields itself as part of its defence operations. Second, I object to, in other cases, the government sponsoring certain types of activities-and I think perhaps the dancing school is a very good example- which are hardly a proper part of the work of the Department of National Defence.
I may be criticized across this country. There may be those who feel that we now have a government which must cover all these fields and even extend as far as that. Perhaps I am just a hard-shelled, unregenerate Tory, but I cannot bring myself to believe that there is any point in the Department of National Defence lining up its cadets of a morning and marching them down en bloc in uniform for dancing lessons.


Stanley Howard Knowles: The government could give lessons in fancy skating; it has done a lot of that itself.


William McLean Hamilton: I will just touch on one other point in the moment or two that is left to me. There is a feeling on my part, and I think on the part of many Canadians, that this tremendous emphasis on security, necessary as it may be, may eventually find its way, as it has done in some instances already, into an invasion of our personal freedoms in this country as a whole and in this house.
I have already said that, as I see it, we are going to live under the shadow of war for this generation. I say also that the new weapons, the new concepts of warfare, have fundamentally changed the whole problem of security in our time and increased, in certain restricted areas, the necessity for information to be withheld from general consumption. But above all, Mr. Chairman, even though this is so, we must realize that these
5278	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence measures are being taken for one purpose and one purpose only. These measures are being taken to protect our freedom as individuals, not our freedom as a state; because when we begin to argue that the state is superior to the individual we have lost sight of the whole concept of democracy.
These measures are being taken to protect our freedom as individuals, and we must never sacrifice that individual freedom nor must we ever allow that individual freedom to be taken away from us under the pretext that the Department of National Defence, or any other department of government, needs that measure of control over us on a broad, inexplicable and indefensible basis.


Mr. Trainor:: Mr. Chairman, in common with the hon. member for Fort William I cannot lay claim to any particular aptitude to discuss the estimates of the Department of National Defence. However, unlike the hon. member, I do not share his distaste for those whom he regards as brass hats, and I would remind the hon. member that he comes perilously close to the crime of lese-majeste inasmuch as he has nearly criticized a minister, and I am sure he could not possibly tolerate that particular crime.
I think every member of the house would be interested, as I was, in the remarks of the hon. member for Cape Breton South and his admiration and approval of the Soviet economic system. That was extremely interesting to me, because it indicated a tacit recognition of the fact that the system of democratic socialism is bankrupt and that the only way in which it can possibly function is by adopting the principles of communism.


Clarence Gillis: You ought to get a good doctor to look at your ears.


Owen C. Trainor: I heard it.


Clarence Gillis: You read it tomorrow.


Owen C. Trainor: Mr. Chairman, one particular point that struck me in this debate was the demand made by my leader for a parliamentary committee to examine these estimates, because it becomes very obvious to everybody as the debate proceeds that nobody has the slightest knowledge of what these estimates are all about. Nobody is in a position-I was going to say "including the minister" but possibly I might make an exception in his case-to know what they are all about. Therefore I suggest to the minister and to the Prime Minister particularly that it is difficult to see how this suggestion or demand can possibly be ignored, and I trust that we will have this opportunity. Those members of the House of Commons who have some conception of military and 

defence affairs generally would have an opportunity to examine these estimates and present a report to the rest of us.
I think this is an extremely reasonable request or demand, and I would certainly urge it on the Prime Minister as almost a necessity; because I do not think the people of this country are going to be satisfied if they know that about half the annual budget is being passed without anybody having a critical look at it, and that is exactly what is happening under present circumstances.
If the government will not accede to this demand, I believe the people of the country will make their wishes known in no uncertain terms. My final word is an appeal-I put it on those grounds-to the Minister of National Defence to use all his influence with his colleagues, particularly with the Prime Minister, to see that this aim is achieved. I am quite certain that in the long run he will be very much the gainer.


Mr. Hamilton (York West):: Mr. Chairman, I think the thing that strikes me most about the position I am in tonight is that again I am the last speaker in this phase of a debate. I do not mean to imply to the minister that he is not going to have any trials or tribulations tomorrow, but for tonight I will be the last speaker to whom he will listen.
I cannot help but remember that only a few short days ago I was the last speaker in the pipe-line debate. At that time the galleries of the house were filled, members of the press were most interested in the activities in the house, and almost every chair in the house was occupied. Yet we were talking about the expenditure of something like $200 million in total, most of which the government contended they were going to get back, if not all. Today we have been talking about the expenditure of $1,775 million, and as far as I am aware the only one who has spoken on behalf of the government, in addition to the minister, has been the hon. member for Fort William, who told us to trust in God and keep our powder dry.
It is a sad state of affairs, Mr. Chairman. Are none of you gentlemen over there interested enough in $1,775 million to have a few questions to ask the minister?


An hon. Member:: Give us a chance.


John Borden Hamilton: If you are waking up you will have a chance tomorrow. We on this side of the house certainly hope you will take advantage of it.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder how this white paper is drawn up. Is it drawn up for the purpose of precluding one little peek at the expenditure of this money? I have ten full pages of notes on the minister's statement,

but after listening to him I ask, has his statement been designed to preclude, if at all possible, a single question about this blank cheque the government wants?
Oh, Mr. Chairman, let us not make any mistake about it. It is a blank cheque, because it is the identical amount that was signed last year in this very house. When you arrive at the figure, Mr. Minister, I wonder how you do it. To these men who go to work on that budget of yours do you say something like this: "Last year I got through $1,775 million, and if I could get it through last year I think I can do it again, and you will have that much money to play with. Put it together and come back and see me." There is every indication that this was the method used to arrive at this total. Let there be no mistake about it, Mr. Chairman; there is evidence of that kind in this book.
We complained about certain things last year. We brought them up in connection with the examination of these estimates. As an example we say, "How is it that when you are employing more civilians, your travelling costs are higher?" You say that is the reason you employ civilians, because then you do not have the additional expense of moving personnel. There does not seem to have been an explanation for it last year. This year you bring in the book and you make sure that on one page here it is mentioned that travelling costs are down $1 million. But at the same time you make up for the saving because you go on hiring messmen, runners, stenographers and clerks, and you ensure that the total comes out just the same.
When I look at these estimates for further proof of what I am saying, I see in here-and this is to be found at page 337-an item for repairs and upkeep of motors or engines for aircraft. Last year the amount was $119,344,000. This year your experts sit down, Mr. Minister, and they work with their sharpened pencils; and what do they come up with? They come up with $119,292,000.
It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that is the reason it is not deemed advisable for this house to have a committee to look into these expenditures. Maybe in connection with the work sheets, they work from bottom to top instead of from top to bottom. Maybe they take the total they are sure could pass this house and they work it back until they get to the top of the page. Oh, Mr. Chairman, there is plenty of reason for the committee that my leader has asked for today. Here we have estimates making up almost one-half of the total expenditure in the budget for this year, with not a chance for an itemized statement to be examined by people who are
Supply-National Defence qualified, or to examine people who are qualified to give the answers.
Mr. Chairman, I recall that last year I read an editorial which said that the opposition must break through. I am not exactly sure what we are going to break through. This is the most illusory opponent that any opposition could grapple with. When I say that, Mr. Chairman, I am not referring to the minister personally in any way, but I say I am sure that he is surrounded by the hard crust and the hard core that Lieutenant General Simonds referred to in his article in Maclean's magazine.


Mr. Pickersgill:: How can you be surrounded by a hard core?


John Borden Hamilton: You ought to know, because you were fortunate in coming up from that hard core and landing in the seat you have now. You ought to try the other way of getting into this house; then you would find it a little more difficult to make the quips and cracks that you make.
But I say this, Mr. Chairman. I agree with my leader that we do not adopt these charges and say they are true. But when the ex-chief of your army staff makes charges like these we say it is time we had a committee appointed to investigate and find out as to their truth. I might say tonight, Mr. Chairman, that for my own part I would prefer it if perhaps some of the generals said these things before they retired.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Hear, hear. So would I.


John Borden Hamilton: I would prefer it if perhaps the principle were great enough for them to say these things; if perhaps the principle were great enough for them even to risk the position they held, because there is no doubt about it that these things need saying. But let there be no doubt about it, Mr. Chairman; the evidence is here which requires an answer in only one way, and that is by a review of these expenditures before a committee of this house.
Mr. Chairman, that is all the time I have tonight. May I call it ten o'clock?
Item stands.
Progress reported.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Speaker, tomorrow we shall take interim supply and then continue with these estimates. On Monday we shall move to go into supply.


[Stage Direction]
At ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
[Stage Direction]
Friday, June 22, 1956