1956-11-27

Mr. Speaker:: May I be allowed to draw your attention to the presence in the diplomatic gallery of a distinguished visitor, Hon. S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon. May I add that although Ceylon lies many miles away from Canada cordial relations exist between our two countries. This is Mr. Bandaranaike's first visit to our country, and we hope that in the future he and his countrymen will find many other occasions to come and see us.
Mr. Bandaranaike is an accomplished parliamentarian.
(Translation):
Coming, as we know, from the parliament of a sister nation, he will be quite familiar with the procedure we are following here. We wish him a very hearty welcome.
(Text):
We wish him a very hearty welcome indeed and a most pleasant stay in our country, which we wish could be longer.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE


Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, as arranged yesterday I now wish to move a motion which comprises the four last paragraphs of the motion I read yesterday and which would now read as follows:
That the following changes be made in the procedure of the house for the present session:
1.	That the provisions of standing order 42 requiring unanimous consent for a motion in a case of urgent and pressing necessity be suspended.
2.	That standing order 65 respecting the appointment of standing committees be suspended.
3.	That the provisions of standing orders 75 and 78, restricting bills to a separate reading in each sitting be suspended.
4.	That standing orders 81, 85 and 120 respecting the presentation of certain reports and the printing and distribution of a list of statutory documents be suspended.


Mr. Speaker:: Have hon. members heard the motion?


Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, may I just say a brief 81537-4*
word? I am sure that all of us are prepared to support this motion, since its purpose is to make such changes as are necessary in order that we may deal expeditiously with the business that is before us. However, it seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that there is a joker in what was paragraph 4 of the resolution presented yesterday and what is now paragraph 1 in the motion made by the Prime Minister. I recognize that this is copied from a similar proposal made in 1950 and that that in turn was copied from a similar proposal made in 1939.
May I ask the house to note this fact. Standing order 41 requires 4C hours' notice of motions and so on. Standing order 42 is a relieving section which provides that in certain cases such notice is not required. It strikes me that if you suspend the relieving section that puts us back to standing order 41 and requires a notice in all cases. I do not blame the Prime Minister for the mistake, because he has copied what was done in 1950 and that was copied from what was done in 1939, but does it not defeat the very purpose of the motion which the Prime Minister has made? I can assure the Prime Minister that if the motion carries I will not insist that standing order 41 be followed in all cases but that, in my view, would be the technical position.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: The hon. gentleman seems to be theoretically right, Mr. Speaker, though in 1939 and 1950 it presented no real difficulty. It perhaps would be better, if I had the unanimous consent of the house so to do, to make it read that standing orders 41 and 42 be suspended for purposes where unanimous consent is required by standing order 42. I think if we inserted the words "standing orders 41 and 42" we would achieve the result which was practically achieved in 1939 and 1950. If that is agreeable to the house, perhaps the Clerk could modify the motion accordingly, and the precedent which was set in 1939 and 1950 would be completed this time and made to conform better with the text of the rules if ever there is another occasion where it is necessary for us to have an emergency session.


Hon. W. Earl Rowe (Acting Leader of the Opposition):: In view of the Prime Minister's statement yesterday, Mr. Speaker, and the fact that there is just one bill, we are quite prepared to go along with it.

Business of the House


Mr. Speaker:: Is the house agreeable to the amendment proposed by the Prime Minister?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Mr. Speaker:: Therefore the motion will read:
That the following changes be made in the procedure of the house for the present session:
1.	That the provisions of standing orders 41 and 42 requiring unanimous consent for a motion in a case of urgent and pressing necessity be suspended.
2.	That standing order 65 respecting the appointment of standing committees be suspended.
3.	That the provisions of standing orders 75 and 78, restricting bills to a separate reading in each sitting be suspended.
4.	That standing orders 81, 85 and 120 respecting the presentation of certain reports and the printing and distribution of a list of statutory documents be suspended.
I think that first paragraph should be further amended to read:
That the provisions of standing order 41 requiring 48 hours' notice and standing order 42 requiring unanimous consent . . .
Is that terminology agreeable?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Mr. Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the house to adopt the motion?


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. R. Pearkes (Esquimalt-Saanich):: May I direct a question to the Minister of National Defence which I think would help clarify the situation and enable us to have an orderly debate on the speech from the throne. Can the minister inform the house as to the composition of the navy, army and air force units of the proposed Canadian contribution to the United Nations emergency force?


Hon. R. O. Campney (Minister of National Defence):: As at present constituted, Mr. Speaker, the Royal Canadian Navy would be providing, if required, 600, and they would represent the present crew of the Magnificent. The normal crew of an aircraft carrier is substantially over 1,000, but there will be no requirement for a flight deck crew and various other elements in the Magnificent's present role. The crew has therefore been reduced to approximately 600, which would be ample for the purposes for which she would be engaged if used.
With regard to the air force, the over-all number contemplated is 599. This would consist of roughly 130 for aircrew and operational crew; 282 for aircraft maintenance; a

few administrative personnel; 60 supply and engineering personnel and a small medical and hospital unit. The total of the two services would therefore be approximately 1,200 of the 2,500 contemplated in the order in council. The remainder would be army personnel.
Perhaps I might give some breakdown of that element. The army personnel would amount to 1,257, which would be made up of the Queen's Own Rifles, totalling 952, and the Canadian base in the Middle East totalling 305. This base unit will consist of 53 engineers from the Royal Canadian engineering corps; 50 signallers from the signal corps; 63 from the army service corps; 58 medical and dental personnel; 22 from the ordnance corps and RCEME and a few provost, pay corps, etc.


George Randolph Pearkes: May I ask a supplementary question? The air force component is entirely for the transport squadron, and no other type of aircraft or air force unit would be sent other than the air transport squadron?


Ralph Osborne Campney: The transport squadron will be the air component of the force. A squadron is established at Capodichino near Naples, and it will be running a shuttle service for the United Nations to Abu Suweir in Egypt. In addition to that, the Royal Canadian Air Force will be running, for the present at least, and probably for some time to come, an extensive shuttle service between Canada and Naples with North Stars.


Mr. Alisiair Siewarf (Winnipeg Norih):: May I ask another question of the Minister of National Defence? With what uniforms are our forces in the Middle East supplied, with battle dress or with summer uniforms?


Ralph Osborne Campney: They will basically wear our army service dress. I am informed that all of the troops who go to the UN forces are being supplied with blue helmets, blue berets and flashes on their shoulders, as distinguishing marks.


Mr. Stewart (Winnipeg North):: Am I to
understand that at the moment the dress is battle dress, because that can be a sore affliction in the Sinai desert. I think they ought to be supplied with summer dress, if possible, which is needed there.


Ralph Osborne Campney: That is under consideration now.



INQUIRY AS TO COST OF PREPARING CANADIAN CONTINGENT

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. D. S. Harkness (Calgary North):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of National Defence. Could

the minister tell us what was the cost of airlifting the Queen's Own Rifles from Calgary to Halifax and what was the cost of refitting the Magnificent in order to transport them overseas?


Ralph Osborne Campney: No, Mr. Speaker, not at the
moment. Those costs are being computed but they are not available yet.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I wonder if the minister could obtain that information for us and perhaps give it to us tomorrow?


Ralph Osborne Campney: I shall endeavour to do so.



INQUIRY AS TO EFFECT ON CANADA OF CLOSER UNITED KINGDOM-EUROPEAN RELATIONS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Donald M. Fleming (Eglinton):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to address a question to the Minister of Trade and Commerce. In view of the current reports from the United Kingdom as to negotiations for establishing closer trade relations between the United Kingdom and countries of western Europe, what are the views of the Canadian government as to the effect upon Canadian trade with the United Kingdom, and what steps, if any, are being taken by the Canadian government to communicate those views to the United Kingdom in this matter?


Right Hon. C. D. Howe (Minister of Trade and Commerce):: Mr. Speaker, an official statement of the position of the Canadian government was published some two or three weeks ago. I have not it at hand, but I shall be pleased to obtain it and read it into the records of the house. The operation probably will not begin for 18 months and will be completed in 10 years. The purpose of the Canadian government will be to study the situation very carefully as it develops, and we are somewhat confident that the United Kingdom will recognize the Canadian position in case difficulties are encountered.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Am I to take it that there is something further to be communicated apart from the Prime Minister's statement published a few days ago? If so, was there any recent communication with the United Kingdom government expressing the views of the Canadian government in this matter?


Clarence Decatur Howe: As I understand it, the text of the statement that was published was the Canadian government's answer to the minister of finance of the United Kingdom.
Inquiries of the Ministry IMMIGRATION



INQUIRY AS TO X-RAYING OF HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. K. Fraser (Peterborough):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to address a question to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Has the Department of Citizenship and Immigration eliminated all chest X-rays of Hungarian refugees coming in to Canada to make it easier for them to come here, and will these refugees, if they are not X-rayed over there, be looked after by the federal government if they have tuberculosis when they come to Canada?


Hon. J. W. Pickersgill (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration):: The situation is this. Orders have been given not to allow the taking of X-rays to interfere with the flow of immigration. If there is time to take them, they are taken. If there is not time to take them a note is given to that effect, and arrangements will be made for the taking of the X-rays after the refugees get to Canada. We are seeking, in the usual way, to make arrangements with provincial and local authorities for the treatment of people who may need treatment, and I do hope in that connection we shall get co-operation in deeds as well as in words.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: I should like to ask one more question, Mr. Speaker. If those who are X-rayed over there have tuberculosis will they be allowed in as others will be allowed in who are not X-rayed?


John Whitney Pickersgill: They will be allowed in as quickly as arrangements can be made for proper treatment. If they are the kind of active cases that might cause trouble to other people we are trying to take sensible measures to deal with those cases.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: That is what I wanted to know. Thank you.



INQUIRY AS TO EARLY INTERIM


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. H. R. Argue (Assiniboia):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Will the minister say whether an interim payment on the 1955 wheat crop can be made at an early date in order to relieve the current cash shortage in western Canada, where a majority of the farmers have not been able to meet their 1956 operating expenses?
46	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry


Clarence Decatur Howe: In reply to the question, I cannot say.



REQUEST FOR CONSIDERATION FOR POINTS ON LOW QUOTAS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. W. M. Johnson (Kindersley):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to direct a question to the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Can the minister give the assurance that those marketing points that ended the last crop year on low quotas will be given immediate consideration for the supply of box cars to bring them up to those marketing points which ended with a higher quota, which was the assurance given by the minister?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Mr. Speaker, it is my understanding that that is and has been the policy of the wheat board. I have not followed the matter in detail, but I believe that policy is being attended to.
[Later:!


Hazen Robert Argue: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Trade and Commerce supplementary to the question asked by the hon. member for Kindersley (Mr. Johnson). I wonder if the minister would look into the possibility of ascertaining why a great many of these points discriminated against last year are still being discriminated against. Many points that wound up last year with low delivery quotas continue to have quotas this year which are lower than those at some other points.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Mr. Speaker, I will be glad to look into the question.



INQUIRY AS TO ALLOCATION OF BOX CARS

Willis Merwyn (Merv) Johnson: May I
direct a question, then, to the Minister of Transport. Can the Minister of Transport give the house any indication concerning when a transport controller will be appointed to carry out the recommendations of the Canadian wheat board in the allocation of box cars?


Hon. George C. Marler (Minister of Transport):: Mr. Speaker, there is a transport controller in office at the present time, and when the office becomes vacant consideration will be given to appointing a successor.



OLD AGE PENSIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister. Now that the Prime


Minister has revealed in a public statement a portion of what is in next session's speech from the throne having to do with the Canada Council and university grants, I wonder if he is prepared to make a statement as to what the government proposes to recommend to parliament with regard to increasing the amount of the old age pension?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: That is not something which has been revealed, and I am not in a position to reveal it at this moment.


Mr.   G.@: Will it be revealed before the election?


An hon. Member:: It is quite possible.



PEYOTE-INQUIRY AS TO USE BY CANADIAN INDIANS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. A. M. Campbell (The Battlefords):: Mr. Speaker, has the Department of National Health and Welfare received any indication that the use of peyote is spreading among Canadiah Indians? Does the department consider peyote to be a dangerous substance? I would also like to know if steps are being considered to ban the importation of peyote buttons into Canada or to otherwise control it?


John Whitney Pickersgill: Perhaps in the absence of the minister I might say that we in the Indian affairs branch are quite concerned about this subject, and there are consultations going on both with the minister's department and with the Department of National Revenue about this matter. Possibly the Minister of National Revenue (Mr. McCann), who also acts for the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin), will be able to say something about it before the session ends.



FINANCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Erharf Regier (Burnaby-Coquiilam):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Finance. Has the minister been made aware that because of the action of the Bank of Canada it is becoming exceedingly difficult for municipal governments to market bonds at suitable interest rates, and is consideration still being given by his government to the question of supplying the municipalities with low interest money for self-liquidating projects?


Hon. W. E. Harris (Minisier of Finance):: Mr. Speaker, the question indicates a complete misunderstanding of the money market at the moment. It is not the action of the Bank of Canada which is causing the rise in interest rates, it is the demand on the money supply both in business and in government circles; and the Bank of Canada interest rate is only a reflection of the increased interest rates in the money market.


Mr. J. M. Macdonnell (Greenwood):: Mr. Speaker, may I ask a supplementary question. Does the minister intend us to understand by that statement that the Bank of Canada has nothing whatever to do with the interest rate prevailing at the moment?


Walter Edward Harris: The answer, Mr. Speaker, was intended to dispel the notion that the Bank of Canada at some time in recent memory consciously raised interest rates in Canada. That seems to be the impression, and that was the impression I thought was in the mind of the questioner a moment ago.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Why do you not answer the last question?


James MacKerras Macdonnell: May I ask the Minister of Finance if he will answer my question?


Walter Edward Harris: As I understand it, the question was whether or not the Bank of Canada has any influence over interest rates in Canada. The Bank of Canada discount rate, as my hon. friend knows quite well, is the rate at which the Bank of Canada will lend money to the chartered banks upon request. It is true that they can maintain an interest rate if they like at a certain level, but on the other hand if it became profitable for the chartered banks to borrow from the Bank of Canada at a certain interest rate and then lend that money on short term to the government at a higher interest rate, it would appear that the Bank of Canada was not discharging its duties.
Consequently it has been the policy of the Bank of Canada not to have its discount rate lower than the going short-term money market, that is the 91-day treasury bill rate which is fixed largely by the law of supply and demand in that it is fixed weekly by tenders made by the financial institutions for the lending of an average of $100 million to $130 million to the government of Canada. As I have said, the Bank of Canada has maintained its rate higher than that weekly rate for the reason I have given, that it would be extremely unusual to have the bank lending money to the chartered banks which in turn would lend it to the government of Canada, making a profit thereon.
Inquiries of the Ministry
So to the extent that the Bank of Canada discount rate is increased it is a reflection of the higher cost of money in the financial market. When it is said that the Bank of Canada rate was increased and thereby other rates were increased, it is just merely putting the cart before the horse because it is the reverse.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I thank the minister for his dissertation, but I would point out to him that he has not yet answered my question.


Erhart Regier: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask a supplementary question, although I realize that the minister does not have to answer anything. Is it the policy of his government that municipalities are supposed to be discouraged from the building of schools, hospitals, roads and bridges in order that investment capital may be made available for the development of private industry in Canada?


Walter Edward Harris: We have no policy which would say to a municipal corporation, "You shall not construct schools, hospitals, sewers" and all those things which may be needed. As I said in the house last session and have said several times since, we have at the present time in Canada a greater demand for goods, services and labour than it may be within our ability to produce. I have cautioned in every speech I have made against that demand increasing to the point where we shall have inflation of a much more serious nature than we have experienced in recent times.
This has meant that in all sectors of the economy difficulty has been found at one time or another either to borrow money to the extent one would like or to carry on certain construction work. This has affected municipal corporations, as it was said last session that it had affected the housing industry. To some extent it has affected even the government of Canada, because the borrowings which we announced today are at a higher interest rate than we have paid before.
If a municipal corporation finds that as an elected body it has to choose between paying a higher rate of interest and postponing work it has in mind, that is simply a responsibility which comes to all of us at one time or another, whether it be the federal or a provincial or a municipal government, or indeed a business institution.


Mr. J. C. Van Horne (Resiigouche-Madawaslra):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Finance. Has he given consideration to the crippling effect his policy has had on the economy of the maritime provinces, one of the poorest areas of Canada?

Inquiries of the Ministry


Walter Edward Harris: I am not too sure about the precise status of the maritime provinces' economy, but I would not describe it as "crippling" or anything like that.


Mr. J. H. Ferguson (Simcoe North):: Is the
Minister of Finance aware that in the community I come from it is absolutely impossible to borrow one dollar from the banks to build a home, and that the banks openly and by letter have said that this is due to the ruling of the Bank of Canada or the government? You cannot borrow money in Collingwood today to build a residence, and the banks are openly saying that this is because of the government's action. Is the minister aware of that fact?


Walter Edward Harris: No, I am not, but I am always ready to learn from my neighbour in Simcoe North.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: It is time you were aware of it.


William Earl Rowe: I should like to ask the Minister of Finance if there is any truth in the rumour that seems to be current in business circles that interest rates will be lowered by some arrangement between the Bank of Canada and the government before next June.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Why next June?



PRAIRIE FARM REHABILITATION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. F. S. Zaplitny (Dauphin):: May I direct a question to the Minister of Agriculture. Is it the intention of the minister to recommend to the house at the next session an extension of the Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act, or to introduce a new act to take its place which will have wider application in Canada?


Right Hon. J. G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture):: Mr. Speaker, that matter will be given consideration between now and the time the session opens, and if there is any action to be taken it will be announced.



IRRIGATION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Willis Merwyn (Merv) Johnson: I should like to direct a supplementary question to the Prime Minister. In view of the statement the Prime Minister made on the rehabilitation of land areas of marginal productivity, can we conclude that an immediate start will be


made on the South Saskatchewan river dam to correct the situation in those areas?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: No, Mr. Speaker, that would not be a logical conclusion.

REQUEST POR PRINTING OP P.C. 1956/1712 AS AN APPENDIX TO "HANSARD"
On the orders of the day:


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Prime Minister. Will the Prime Minister consider asking the consent of the house to include as an appendix to today's Hansard the order in council he tabled yesterday, P.C. 1956/1712, which is the order putting certain troops on active service? Perhaps I should have made this suggestion yesterday, but in any event it seems to me this order is of sufficient importance that it should be more readily available than is the case at the present time. I have secured a copy myself, but it seems to me it might well be included as an appendix to Hansard of today.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: If it is felt by hon. members that it would be more convenient to have it printed as an appendix and I have the unanimous consent of the house to make such a suggestion, I will be glad to do so. It is possible to obtain copies from the privy council office, but if hon. members feel it would be more convenient for them to have it printed as an appendix to Votes and Proceedings-


Stanley Howard Knowles: Hansard.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: -to Hansard, the government has no objection to that being done. It will be only a very small item of expense and it can be done if it suits the convenience of hon. members to have it in that form. I suppose it would also be convenient for those who get Hansard to have it as an appendix. Perhaps the sense of the house would be that Your Honour would direct the editor of debates to annex it to today's Hansard.


Mr. Speaker:: If that is the sense of the house I shall be glad to do so. I am sure the Clerk has already taken note of this and the matter will be taken care of.
(For text of order in council see page 105.)



SPEECH FROM THE THRONE


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed, from Monday, November 26, consideration of the motion of Mr. Legare for an address to His Excellency

The Address-Mr. Green
the Governor General in reply to his speech Liberal newspaper, the Vancouver Sun. I at the opening of the session, and the amend- have here an editorial which appeared in that ment thereto of Mr. Rowe.	paper on November 19, 1956.
Mr. Howard C. Green (Vancouver-Quadra):: Mr. Speaker, before the house adjourned last evening I had pointed out how unfortunate it was that the Canadian government had been so little concerned about the situation in the Suez area early in the present year. I went on to trace the happenings in that area and had reached the unlawful seizure of the canal by Egypt. Today I should like to continue along that line by pointing out that throughout all this time and subsequent to the seizure there had been a steady buildup of Russian arms in Egypt. The Prime Minister did not attempt yesterday to deny that fact, and of course he could not. In today's press we read that a similar buildup is going on in Syria.
On October 29 Israel, fearful that she was about to be attacked on all sides, attacked the Egyptians. The United Kingdom and France warned both Israel and Egypt that they must stop fighting within a period of 12 hours, otherwise the canal zone would be occupied. The United Kingdom had a perfect right to occupy the canal zone in the event of it being endangered by war. It had that right under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement signed, I believe, in October of 1954.
What was the reaction of Egypt? She at once took steps to block the canal, a most irresponsible action. She sank many vessels in the channel, yet is now asking other nations, including Canada, to pay to have the canal cleared. It will be interesting to know how much money Canada is to pay to help in that work. It was very strange yesterday that the Prime Minister of this country did not have one word to say in condemnation of the action of Egypt in blocking the canal or her other actions. His whole attitude to Egypt is unbelievably soft. Yet the minute the United Kingdom and France moved, Canada rushed to condemn them.
The man on the street in Canada is asking today, and has asked ever since the Canadian government took such action, why Canada took the lead in the attack on her friends. The Prime Minister smiles. He seems to think this is a laughing matter.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I seem to think that the hon. gentleman is imagining things that never took place.


Howard Charles Green: Well, if the Prime Minister will not believe me perhaps he may believe the statement made by a great Canadian


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: That statement is also a laughing matter.


Howard Charles Green: Oh, I know everybody is wrong but the Prime Minister and his superman cabinet. The editorial is headed: "Ottawa Please Note. U.N. Must Face up to Russia or it has no Future." The Sun quotes a portion of the speech made by Sir Anthony Eden in which he uttered these words:
There is too much of a tendency in the world to hound the democracies because it is a safe thing to do, and to condone and even excuse dictatorships because they cannot be coerced.
Then the Sun goes on to say:
How true all this is. How fervently the nations, large and small, jumped on Britain and France. And Canada led the way with smug complacency. . . .
Judging from what Ottawa reporters are writing, Ottawa is filled with satisfaction with the eminence it appears to have attained by chastising its friends instead of standing by them in their attempt to save themselves and the free world from a great Russian conspiracy.
Surely the Canadian government could at least have waited. Australia waited in the security council. She abstained from voting. In the assembly Australia, New Zealand and South Africa abstained from voting, but not Canada. Canada had to be right up there in the front rank attacking the United Kingdom and France.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Tear your friends apart.


Howard Charles Green: In effect the Canadian government treated the United Kingdom and France as aggressors. When I mentioned last evening this vote that Canada cast with Russia and the United States in the assembly the Prime Minister blurted out with venom "We would do it again". That is his attitude today. It was not only his attitude a month ago but it is the attitude of the Prime Minister of Canada today.
It so happens that hundreds of thousands of Canadians have been associated with the people of the United Kingdom and France. They know something about those two countries and from personal experience they know a great deal about their people. They know that no other two countries have ever done so much to preserve our way of life. In the first war at Verdun hundreds of thousands of young Frenchmen gave their lives. At the Somme the very flower of the United Kingdom was wiped out in order to preserve the democratic way of life. In the second world war France and the United Kingdom stood up against the aggressors when other

The Address-Mr. Green nations who now talk a great deal were not sufficiently concerned to do the same thing.
France and the United Kingdom stood up against the aggressors. France unfortunately went down and suffered for years under the heel of the nazi hordes. The United Kingdom and the other nations of the Commonwealth stood alone for a whole year from June of 1940 until the summer of 1941, when Russia was shot into the war. They stood alone and saved civilization. The Canadian people know, even if the Prime Minister does not, that the United Kingdom and France have never been aggressors and are not aggressors on this occasion. Yet the Prime Minister yesterday had the effrontery to compare the actions of the United Kingdom and France with the actions of Russia in Hungary.


Mr, St. Laurent (Quebec East):: Mr. Speaker, I protest-


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I protest
against this statement, which is an entire misconstruction of what is the official record of the debates in this house. No hon. gentleman who wishes to remain such should make such distortions.


Howard Charles Green: The Prime Minister once again is attempting to prevent free discussion in this house.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Mr. SI. Laurent (Quebec East):: If that is
the kind of thing the hon. gentleman conceives to be freedom of speech, I must say that I disagree.


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


William Earl Rowe: The hon. member has the floor.


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra has the floor.


Howard Charles Green: Actually the United Kingdom and France by their action-taken, I am sure in the full realization of the tremendous risk involved-prevented a Russian-dominated Middle East, and prevented a major war. The United Nations could never have done it. The United Nations was taking no steps to meet that situation. Now the United Kingdom, France and Israel are co-operating with the United Nations and they are being kicked in the teeth for their pains. I will read again the first paragraph of the amendment:
That this house regrets that Your Excellency's advisers
(1)	have followed a course of gratuitous condemnation of the action of the United Kingdom and France which was designed to prevent a major war in the Suez area.
[Mr. Green.l
Could anything more accurately set out the actual facts or more accurately describe the action taken by this Canadian government? Paragraph 2 regrets that Your Excellency's advisers-
(2)	have meekly followed the unrealistic policies of the United States of America and have thereby encouraged a truculent and defiant attitude on the part of the Egyptian dictator.
In the last ten years this government has been currying favour with the United States. Ever since the second world war that has been the policy of the Canadian government. The Prime Minister realizes that the government is subject to attack on this point. Yesterday he made a great flurry about the matter. "Oh," he said, "we did not vote with the United States on two of these resolutions". No; they did not vote with the United States, but they carefully did not vote against them. Canada abstained. I wonder what would happen if the Prime Minister wanted to go and visit the posts on the D.E.W. line in northern Canada? I presume he, like other Canadians, would be obliged to get clearance at New York before he could visit those posts.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a question of privilege.


Howard Charles Green: I object.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: The hon. gentleman knows that is absolutely false. He knows that no Canadian is obliged to get clearance from the United States authorities.


William Earl Rowe: Page Blair Fraser.


Howard Charles Green: The Prime Minister is in the same kindly, friendly, Uncle Louis mood today that he was in last night.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: He will
remain in that mood as long as there is the occasion that the hon. gentleman is providing.


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Speaker, I hope you will remember all these interruptions when you are checking my time.
United States policy in the Middle East, as far as anybody can tell what it is, has been this. In the first place, a few months ago they refused to finance the Aswan dam in Egypt. That was the direct cause of the seizure by Egypt of the Suez canal. At that time the Americans were being very tough with President Nasser. Now the policy has been completely reversed because they think he will play along with them, this stooge of the Russians. American foreign policy now is to build him up and presumably to get the United Kingdom and France out of the Middle East. Canada's policy seems to be the same. The Prime Minister yesterday made

no statement to show that Canada's policy in the Middle East is any different from that of the United States.
The situation is very clearly summed up in one of our British Columbia weekly papers, namely the Agassiz-Harrison Advance of November 15, as follows:
Canada and the United States would have been wise to remember that Britain and France were the best friends they had. They have gone a long way now towards destroying both the friends and the friendship, without gaining anything to replace them.
This policy of the Canadian government may well be disastrous to Canada. The United States would have far more admiration for Canada, Mr. Speaker, if this government stopped being the United States chore boy.
Then the third paragraph of the amendment reads:
(3)	have placed Canada in the humiliating position of accepting dictation from President Nasser:
Oh, the Prime Minister was so naive about that paragraph yesterday. Dear old Nasser, he would not do anything wrong. The Prime Minister said Canada has had no dealings with President Nasser. Then he went on to admit that the statements carried in the press about Nasser vetoing the sending of the Queen's Own Rifles to the Middle East were correct. He admitted that President Nasser had advised against it. Then he went on to say that we had to take time because these Canadian troops were going to serve in the Sinai desert. I thought they were going to serve in the Suez canal area, and that some steps were being taken by this United Nations emergency police force to settle finally the Suez canal dispute. Apparently the Canadians are to be sent into the Sinai desert.
All the way through his remarks about this paragraph of the amendment the Prime Minister had nothing but soft words for President Nasser. Why, he said, President Nasser had told General Burns, I think it was, that he was anxious to retain good relations with Canada. Why on earth would he not be; this tinpot dictator, to whom Canada has been a better friend than she has to the United Kingdom and France in this crisis?
This Suez crisis has shown once again very clearly that the present Canadian government has been too long in office. Their actions in connection with the amendment to the Defence Production Act in 1955 showed us how they thought they were supermen, that they had all the answers. This year there was a similar type of action during the closure on the pipe-line debate. Now this government, by its actions in the Suez crisis, has made this month of November, 1956, the most disgraceful period for Canada in the history of this nation.
The Address-Mr. Pearson


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Howard Charles Green: It is high time that Canada had leadership more in line with the forthrightness and the courage of the Canadian people. It is high time Canada had a government which will not knife Canada's best friends in the back.


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs):: May I begin, Mr. Speaker, by offering my congratulations to the mover (Mr. Legare) and seconder (Mr. Weselak) of the address. They are valuable members of our delegation to the assembly in New York, and if and when this debate is completed they will be continuing to perform useful service for their country and for peace at the United Nations assembly.
We are facing today a situation of gravity and danger, far too serious a situation to be dealt with from a purely partisan point of view. The hon. gentleman who has just taken his seat talked about Canada being the chore boy of the United States. Our record over the last years, Mr. Speaker, gives us the right to say we have performed and will perform no such role. It is bad to be a chore boy of the United States. It is equally bad to be a colonial chore boy running around shouting, "Ready, aye, ready". A well-known Conservative newspaper, the Ottawa Journal, in commending the policy of the government at the United Nations in recent days, a policy of care and restraint as it was characterized, a policy of consideration for its friends, ended an editorial on this subject on October 31 as follows:
At best, we are going to be In very great danger of all-out war for some time now. We must learn to think before we chatter.
Chattering instead of thinking-if we fail because of idle chatter and not enough thought in our efforts to resolve the problems that face us today in this country and in the world, it will not make much difference who has the halos or who has been humiliated.
Now, Mr. Speaker, we have an amendment to the motion. I might as well say at once- and this will be no surprise to the house -that I think it is an amendment worthy of no support at all. It is inaccurate in its facts, as I shall hope to prove, and it is wrong in its conclusions.
Before I deal with the matters referred in the speech and in the amendment on the Middle East, may I say just one word about Hungary. The Canadian government has already expressed its views in Ottawa and at the United Nations assembly on this matter. We have witnessed as brutal and as grim a betrayal of a people as history has ever seen,

The Address-Mr. Pearson a people who were asking only for freedom from communist colonial domination and the right to run their own affairs. The recent actions of the Soviet union in Hungary throw a lurid light on the protestations we have heard that Stalinism is now dead and peaceful coexistence is here. But there has been no more significant exposure of the underlying, and I am afraid enduring, purpose and methods of Soviet power. Soviet tanks and Soviet guns have killed Hungarian freedom fighters, but they did not and they cannot kill Hungarian freedom.
What can we do here in Canada and at the United Nations? Well, we can help the victims of this terror, and we learned last night of what we are doing in that regard. We can keep, through the United Nations as we are trying to do, the spotlight of world public opinion, the conscience of the world, the moral force of world opinion, on the savage actions of the Soviet union. We can do our best to help Hungarians in that way and to bring the United Nations into Hungary in the role of observers and investigators. We must continue our efforts toward that end; but we would not be helping the Hungarian people-I think we might be hurting them-if we held out promises of liberation by force which at this time we would not be able to fulfil. There is, however, I think, some hope in the growing evidence that eastern Europe is now beginning to free itself from the shackles of Russian slavery and oppression, and that development is expressing itself at the United Nations assembly at this time.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I come to the Middle East. The debate in this house-and we have been meeting for only a few hours- has already shown that a very real difference on policy has developed between the government and the official opposition. The speeches of the Acting Leader of the Opposition and the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra, who has just preceded me, have made that quite clear. The official opposition-and I think we can assume that the speakers in question had the support of all the members of the official opposition; they should have, to judge from the applause they received from their colleagues-now apparently support every move made by the United Kingdom and France in their intervention in Egypt after the attack on Egypt by Israel, an intervention brought about with army, navy and air forces after a 12-hour ultimatum. They claim, I have the right to conclude, that we as a government should have approved of those moves at once and should have backed up the United Kingdom and France at the United


Nations even on those matters and on those resolutions where not a single member of the United Nations supported the resolutions in question.


Howard Charles Green: Some abstained.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I gathered that abstention
was not very popular in my hon. friend's mind when Canada abstains.
Now, Mr. Speaker, we did not follow that particular line of policy in this matter, and I shall try to explain why. To do so it is, I think, relevant to give, as other speakers have given, some background which may help us to understand recent events. It is, for instance, important in order to keep things in perspective to understand the policy of the Egyptian government in recent months. That policy has been unfriendly to the western powers. It was arbitrary and was denounced in this house as arbitrary in the seizure of the Suez canal company. That policy has witnessed a gradual increase of Russian influence in Egypt and the Middle East, and it did culminate in the seizure of the canal. We recall that after weeks of effort and frustrations to bring about an international solution by international means no such solution was brought about.
It is quite obvious-it was quite obvious by the summer-that there was no meeting of minds between Washington and London and Paris in these matters. And, of course, the fault was not by any means entirely on the side of London and Paris, and no one on this side of the house has ever tried to take a one-sided view of this situation. The vital importance of the Suez to western Europe is perhaps not appreciated in Washington, and it might have been better appreciated there if this situation could have been related by them to the Panama canal.
Now, our own attitude in this matter was .-and we expressed this attitude in the House of Commons and in a good many messages to the United Kingdom government during the summer-that we did not stand aloof and indifferent, and we did appreciate the importance of this development not only to western Europe but to Canada itself. Our attitude was that this question should be brought as quickly as possible to the United Nations and a solution attempted there; that at all costs there should be no division of opinion, no division of policy, between Washington arid London and Paris on a matter of such vital importance, and that there should be no action taken by anybody which could not be justified under the United Nations charter; otherwise the country taking that action, no matter how friendly to us, would be hauled before the

United Nations and charged by the country against which the action had been taken. That is something that has happened, and it is something we tried to talk over with our friends before it happened.
It will be recalled that eventually the matter was taken to the security council of the United Nations, and it will also be recalled that not long before the use of force by Israel against Egypt certain principles for a settlement of the Suez question had been agreed on at the security council. One of those principles which had been accepted by Egypt at that time, was that the canal should be insulated from the policies of any one nation, including Egypt. Therefore at that particular moment, through those conversations at the security council, and what is more important through conversations going on in the secretary general's office, we had some hope that an international solution might be reached which might be satisfactory to all concerned.
At that time, and I am speaking now of a period of only a week or two before the attack by Israel took place, we had no knowledge conveyed to us of any acute deterioration of the situation, nor did we have any knowledge or information about anything which could be called a Russian plot to seize Egypt and take over the Middle East. At that moment, and against that background, the Israeli government moved against Egypt.
Here also, to put the matter in perspective, it is necessary to understand the background. The people of Israel have lived for years in a state of unrest and insecurity against this threat of extermination by their neighbours. With that unrest on their borders, with no stability of any kind, with a military balance changing against them, and in the face of those continued threats on October 29-and it is interesting to realize that that was less than a month ago; events have moved with such bewildering and dramatic speed-the Israeli government took the situation and the law in its own hands and moved against Egypt for reasons which seemed very good to it at the time.
I admit-and I am sure all members in this house must admit-the provocation which may have prompted this move. We in the government tried to understand that provocation; nevertheless we did at that time, and do now, regret that the attack was made at that time and under those circumstances. Then, as the house knows, the United Kingdom government and France intervened in the matter on the ground, so they claimed, that it was necessary to keep the fighting away from the Suez canal and thereby keep the canal open. They wished, so they said
The Address-Mr. Pearson in Paris and in London, to keep a shield between the opposing forces.
That was the only purpose they put forward at that time, or indeed have put forward formally since, to explain their intervention-to stop the fighting and put a shield between the opposing forces. No other purpose was alleged; and when the United Kingdom representative to the United Nations spoke at the first emergency meeting of the general assembly on Thursday, November 1, he explained the purpose of the United Kingdom and French action in these words:
The first urgent task is to separate Israel and Egypt and to stabilize the position. That is our purpose. If the United Nations were willing to take over the physical task of maintaining peace in the area, no one would be better pleased than we. But police action there must be, to separate the belligerents and to stop the hostilities.
That was their purpose merely to separate the belligerants and to stop the hostilities.
Well, to carry out that purpose, as we know, the French and British governments sent an ultimatum to Egypt and to Israel, a 12-hour ultimatum that was accepted by Israel whose forces at that time had come within ten miles of the Suez canal, but was rejected by Egypt which had been asked to withdraw its forces beyond the Suez canal; and following that rejection the United Kingdom and French forces intervened by air and later on the ground.
At that time far from gratuitously condemning the action the Canadian government said through the Prime Minister, and indeed through myself, that we regretted the necessity for the use of force in these circumstances; and these circumstances, I confess, included an element of complete surprise on our part at the action taken.
There was no consultation-and this has been pointed out-with other members of the commonwealth and no advance information that this very important action, for better or for worse, was about to be taken. In that sense consultation had broken down between London and Paris on the one hand, the commonwealth capitals and-even more important, possibly,-Washington on the other.
Nevertheless, instead of indulging then or since in gratuitous condemnation we expressed our regret and we began to pursue a policy, both here by diplomatic talks and diplomatic correspondence, and later at the United Nations, which would bring us together again inside the western alliance and which would bring about peace in the area on terms which everybody could accept.
Our policy, then, in carrying out these principles was to get the United Nations into the matter at once; to seek through the United Nations a solution which would be
54	HOUSE OF
The Address-Mr. Pearson satisfactory to all sides. In adopting that policy it was obviously impossible for us to act at the United Nations assembly in any way which we could not justify under our obligation as signatories to the United Nations charter.
Mr. Speaker, our policy at that time, at the beginning of this crisis, and which we have tried to follow since was well described by the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) as reported in the press on November 2 when he said, and I am quoting from the Montreal Star of that date:
Canada's attitude should be that of a member of the United Nations, "no more, no less".
Then the hon, member went on to say, as reported in this newspaper:
Canada has not had any part in the conferences preceding the sudden Middle East developments, nor are her interests directly involved. Her obligation, therefore, is that of another member nation of the United Nations, no more, no less.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Would the minister, in fairness, continue with the following sentences of the statement in which comment is made upon the minister's own statement of the previous night at a press conference here in Ottawa?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Well, Mr. Speaker, I have no text of what my hon. friend said or I would have been glad to read it all. I read the quotation from the Montreal Star. I will be glad to read the next paragraph of that quotation and this is all that is in the report:
He claimed-
This was the hon. member for Eglinton. -the United States had made no contribution of real value to settlement of the Suez question "since it was precipitated several weeks ago by Col. Nasser's action in seizing the canal. The weight of the problem has been thrown on the British and French".
But he doubted any permanent cleavage would result between Britain, France and the United States.
That is the full report that I have been able to receive.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Some papers carried a fuller and fairer report of that statement.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, if my hon, friend would be glad enough to send me the text of what he said on that occasion I will be glad to quote all the relevant parts of it when we get into committee.


An hon. Member:: Why not read it yourself?


Donald Methuen Fleming: I will be glad to do so in the interests of accuracy and your better understanding.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Our policy with regard to this matter as a member of the United Nations


was to try to stop the fighting through the United Nations. How could we follow any other course without betraying our obligations under the charter? But we were also anxious, as were many other delegates to the United Nations although not all of them, to avoid the creation of a vacuum of chaos in that part of the world after the fighting had stopped; and we realized if that test as well as the test of stopping the fighting could not be met, the United Nations would have failed.
Also at the United Nations we were anxious to make sure-we mentioned this in our
statements down there

that the situation
leading up to the aggression should be given due consideration and that constructive action should be taken to prevent such a situation recurring again, that we should go deeper into this matter than merely into the facts of military action. I hope that will be done quickly at the United Nations assembly. There are already two resolutions on the order paper for that purpose.
And then, Mr. Speaker, we were also anxious to do everything we could down there to prevent any formal condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors under the charter, any demand that sanctions be imposed against them, and also to do what we could to help repair the lines of communication and contact between Washington, London and Paris and restore some form of continuous friendly diplomatic consultation between the western allies on these matters after its breakdown last October.
It was certainly a matter of urgent and distressing importance, especially to a Canadian, and I expressed this also in public at the United Nations, that the United States shoulld be on one side of this issue and the United Kingdom and France, our two mother countries, on the other. We were especially distressed at this because there were people down in New York, and they are still there, who are gleefully exploiting this division.
Having mentioned the breakdown of consultation, I think it would only be fair to add that this breakdown of consultation and agreement was not the fault exclusively of the United Kingdom and France over the preceding months. No other member, indeed no member of the western alliance, is free of some responsibility and particularly the United States of America, which is the major and most powerful member of that group. Therefore we felt and we still feel that this is no time nor is this an occasion on which to adopt an attitude of superior virtue or smug complacency over the righteousness of our own position. We felt and we still feel that

the thing to do is to get out of this crisis without a war and without violating the United Nations principles and charter, and then to draw the necessary conclusions from the crisis so that the western coalition will not collapse again in the days ahead when other problems will arise, as they are bound to do.
Then also, and this was a matter which was very much on our minds, we were anxious to do what we could to hold the commonwealth together in this very severe test. It was badly and dangerously split. At one stage after the fighting on land began it was on the verge of dissolution, and that is not an exaggerated observation. The hon, member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) is reported as having said on November 17 that Canadian leaders should bend their efforts toward restoring and preserving the moral and physical unity of the commonwealth which, he went on to say, should have a common point of view on these matters. I could not agree with him more; but if we had followed at the United Nations the policy advocated by the official opposition we would have gone a long way not toward restoring and preserving the moral and physical unity of the commonwealth but toward breaking it up. I am quite sure this is a purpose which no one in this house wishes to achieve.
In trying to follow those principles of policy how were we, as delegates to the United Nations and as the government in Ottawa, to react to the critical situation which arose? We tried to maintain as objective an attitude as possible having regard to our charter obligations, and we certainly did try to maintain as close and as friendly contact as was possible with the United Kingdom and French delegations. We did not automatically support the United States in every move. We thought the United States was wrong at the very beginning of the assembly in rushing a resolution on the record at the outbreak of hostilities recommending that they should be ended at once. We thought they were wrong in trying to rush that through without sufficient consideration. We did not vote for it; we abstained, as I will explain later.
We thought the United States was wrong last Saturday, the last session of the assembly which I attended and which in some respects was a depressing session. A resolution was before the assembly at that time which, with a Belgian amendment, should have received the unanimous support of every member of the assembly. With that amendment the resolution would have received the support of the United Kingdom, but the amendment was defeated and the United States was one of those who voted against it.
The Address-Mr. Pearson
As I have pointed out, we were not able to support the United Kingdom in all the moves it had taken, in all the attitudes it had adopted at the United Nations assembly. Distressed though we were, we could not support the United Kingdom, and French stand on this matter although we did try, as Canadians should and as a Canadian delegation should, to give the most friendly consideration to the United Kingdom and French position.
As to the charge that we have been lining up with the Russians, that is just nonsensical chatter. If a resolution is right down there we vote for it whoever may be among our companions in the voting. That seems to me to be the only possible course for a Canadian delegation to follow.
There are those in this country and there are some whose views have been expressed in this house who feel that we should have automatically supported the United Kingdom and France, either because of the ties of friendship, indeed of kinship with the countries concerned, or because they were convinced the United Kingdom and France were right in the course adopted and in the methods followed. Those who feel that way will be disappointed at the action we have taken. We thought it was the right action for a Canadian delegation to take.
It was an objective attitude, it was a Canadian and an independent attitude. Believe me, the Arab and Asian countries, including the Asian members of the commonwealth, were watching us, as they were watching others, very carefully to see if our policy was based on those considerations I have mentioned or whether we were just following automatically any other power. If we had given any evidence that would have justified the impression that we were supporting without reservation the United Kingdom and France in all their tactics and attitudes toward this matter we would not have been of any help to our friends subsequently, nor would we have been able to play the part which we at least tried to play and which I shall refer to later.
If, for instance, we had voted at the first meeting of the special assembly against the proposal to put this item on the agenda when no other member of the assembly voted against it except the United Kingdom and France I think we would have lost any influence which we had at that time and which we may have hoped to use later on for constructive purposes.
Our purpose was to be as helpful to the United Kingdom and France as we possibly could be. Believe me, that attitude has been

The Address-Mr. Pearson appreciated in London even if it has not been appreciated by my hon. friends opposite. Far from criticizing us in private or in public in London or Paris for our gratuitous condemnation of their course we have had many expressions of appreciation for the line we have been trying to follow, and which has been helpful in the circumstances to the United Kingdom and France.
The sequence of events at the assembly and our relation to those events will show what we tried to do, and why. I should like to give that sequence, if I may, because I feel it will be useful to the house to know exactly what hapened and the attitude we took in regard to every stage of development at the assembly.
We met on Thursday, November 1, in the first emergency session of the general assembly under the uniting for peace resolution which had been passed in 1950 and which was designed to get around the veto in the security council by transferring to the assembly matters on which the security council could not agree because of the veto. When this assembly was called and this item was put on the agenda it was objected to on legal grounds by the United Kingdom and France, legal grounds which we did not think had very much validity, and so we voted for the assembly meeting.
That was the occasion on which we were attacked by my hon. friend as lining up with the Russians. We lined up with 62 members of the United Nations in agreeing to the proposition that the United Nations should try to deal with this matter. Immediately after that resolution the United States, without very much consultation or very much opportunity for consideration, introduced the cease-fire resolution.
We felt, as I have already said, that this had two defects. Of course it was designed to bring the fighting to an end at once and it was designed to prevent military aid going to either side in the conflict. It was designed, in one of its clauses, to restore freedom of navigation in the Suez canal for all governments. These purposes we, of course, supported; but we felt that there had not been sufficient time for consideration to force a vote through before others who wished to speak could speak. We also felt that it was inadequate for the purpose which we had in mind because it did not recognize the background, the previous problems which had brought about this situation, and made no provision for the absolute necessity of a peace settlement. Nor did it make any provision for a United Nations police force to supervise and secure the cessation of hostilities. We

were anxious not to give our support at that first meeting of the assembly to a resolution which might seem to bring the fighting to an end but to do nothing else, or even to recognize the importance of doing something else. We expressed that feeling in the first statement the Canadian delegate made.


Mr. Churchill:: After the vote.


Lester Bowles Pearson: After the vote because there was no opportunity to make a statement before the vote, in view of the fact that the rules of closure had been applied.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Would you permit a
question?


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Would you explain why you had no opportunity to express before the vote the sentiments you are now putting before us?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, that is an easy question to answer. When the assembly met that afternoon and we were shown this resolution, this being the first time we had seen it, I put my name on the speakers' list at once but I was not quick enough, because there were 21 others before me by the time I got to the secretary general's desk. I took my turn on the list and I spoke in turn. Unfortunately my speech came after the vote and I explained in my speech why I regretted that fact.


An hon. Member:: You are No. 1 down there. Would they not let you be first?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I am sorry my hon. friend has not the opportunity to go down there and replace me in that position which he has given to me. I know he would be a magnificent replacement. It is too bad he has not been given the opportunity.


An hon. Member:: He has not even got to be No. 1 on the other side.


Lester Bowles Pearson: In the first statement we made in New York around 2 a.m. that morning I ventured to suggest that we would not be completing our work at the assembly if we did nothing about the prevention of a recurrence of the violence which had preceded this outbreak and if we did nothing about the establishment of a United Nations force in this crisis.
This was an idea, Mr. Speaker, that we had discussed in Ottawa before I went to the assembly that afternoon. Indeed, it had been previously mentioned by the United Kingdom representative in his statement as something that might be desirable in the circumstances, and immediately after I made reference to it the United States secretary of state took up the matter and asked our

delegation if they would put this idea in the form of a resolution. I returned to Ottawa the next day to discuss with my colleagues whether this would be a desirable thing to do, having first had the opportunity of discussing the matter in New York with the secretary general of the United Nations.
We were anxious to keep in close touch with our friends in Washington and our friends in London on this matter, and as soon as it was decided here the next morning that this might be a useful and helpful Canadian initiative under certain circumstances we cabled London and Washington at once and asked them what they thought about the idea; because, while a good many of these things are desirable in principle, there is not much point putting them forward at the United Nations if they are going to be opposed at once by all of our friends or some of our friends. Therefore we were anxious to get the views of both London and Washington in respect of this particular matter.


Mr. Diefenbaker:: Would the minister say when Sir Pierson Dixon, the British representative, first mentioned this prior to the minister?


Lester Bowles Pearson: He mentioned it in the course of the debate in which I spoke, but he spoke before me and he made reference to the fact that Sir Anthony Eden had referred to a United Nations police force in the House of Commons the day before. I mentioned the fact that he had referred to it when I spoke.
Then on Saturday, November 3, Mr. Speaker, after consultation with my colleagues in Ottawa I returned to New York where the assembly was to meet at 8 p.m. that evening. On that occasion I did produce a Canadian resolution for the setting up of a United Nations emergency force for this particular situation. It may be interesting, though it does take a little time, to go into the background of this idea of a United Nations force. Of course there was nothing new in either this idea or in its proposal, and no one on this side of the house, I am sure, wants to take any credit for having put forward a novel and valuable proposal. I hope it was valuable but it certainly was not novel; except in the sense that it was adopted, but in no other respect.
As far back as October, 1946, the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), at the very first assembly of the United Nations, made a plea for the organization of enforcement procedures under article 43 of the United Nations charter which provides for such enforcement procedures through the security council. Nothing was done, as we know, and nothing
The Address-Mr. Pearson could be done in the security council under article 43 because of the disunity among the big powers.
Then four years later came Korea, and the Canadian response to this challenge to peace and security in 1950 reflected our desire to bring about something more permanent than merely collecting forces for an emergency. As hon. members who were here at the time will recall, a Canadian infantry brigade was made available for United Nations service generally, and I think it was the only force in the United Nations at that time which was offered in those terms, for general United Nations service and not merely for Korea. I do not think any other member of the United Nations went as far as we did at that time. Certainly no one went farther. As I said in the House of Commons when explaining our action in September, 1950:
"We hope that other countries will make their contributions to the Korean force in that form", that is, for use anywhere subject to constitutional procedures, "so that next time this kind of aggression takes place there will be forces in being to deal with it."
On October 11 of the same year I said before the general assembly:
The action of the security council in June showed how unprepared most members of this organization were to implement quickly the recommendations which they accepted. We were frankly not organized for this purpose. We had to improvise. We hope that next time we may not have to improvise.
No progress was made in bringing about this kind of organization for security. The security council frustrated all efforts to that end, and that was why in 1950 we passed a uniting for peace resolution which could transfer to the assembly the responsibility for collective security in these circumstances of frustration and failure in the security council. On that uniting for peace resolution we had this to say at the United Nations assembly on November 3, 1950:
It will not be enough for a few countries to take action. We must all, within measure of our capacities, contribute to imnlementation of this resolution.
Certain other smaller governments took the same stand but over the years nothing was done, and there was no real organization in being when we were faced with this most recent crisis. A collective measures committee was set up by the accembly but its activities were not very effective.
Then on January 31, 1956, the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) brought up in this house the question of an international police force and it was a very pertinent question.


John George Diefenbaker: Just for the Israeli-Arab situation.

The Address-Mr. Pearson


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, he was limiting the value of this force at this time to a particular situation on the Israeli-Egyptian border. In response to this intervention-I had just come back a few months previously from the discussions in Egypt-I said this in the house as reported at page 777 of Hansard of February 1, 1956:
As I said the other day. X have had talks with the leaders of the Arab governments and the Israel government, and I had talks with General Burns when X was out there and at the United Nations.
I think there is a great deal to be said for trying to bring that kind of police force into existence in this disturbed area at this time as a provisional measure to keep the armies apart while peace can be secured. If that proposal were made-and I know the Secretary General has been considering it, and from press reports to which my hon. friend has referred I understand that it has been discussed in Washington in the last few days-and if it became a matter for United Nations consideration, I am sure this country as well as other countries would want to do what they could to carry it into effect.
And following that-


William Earl Rowe: Mr. Speaker, would the minister permit a question?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes.


William Earl Rowe: In view of the fact, as our representative, did the minister not bring it before the United Nations for consideration?


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is just what I was coming to, Mr. Speaker. I have been looking up the record in the last day or two in order to see what we had been able to do in this matter. We did follow it up. We followed it up with the governments most particularly concerned, namely the Israel government, the British government, the French government and the United States government and with the secretary general of the United Nations and again with General Burns, the truce commissioner.


John George Diefenbaker: What date was that?


Lester Bowles Pearson: This began in February and went on for the next two or three months. These were ordinary diplomatic discussions to see whether it could be useful initiative on our part at that time to put forward a proposal for a United Nations force, not a truce commission, to patrol the boundary between Israel and her Arab neighbours in order to try to prevent the incidents which were building up and which had a great deal to do with the ultimate explosion last October. We were discouraged by the response given to this proposal. We received very little support for it from any governments concerned. Indeed, we received no active support from any of the governments concerned, because they felt it was not timely to introduce a United Nations force of that character


into Palestine when the boundaries had not been determined, when a political settlement had not been reached and when the parties to the conflict-and it was a conflict-were opposed to such a force.


John George Diefenbaker: What countries raised that objection?


Lester Bowles Pearson: There was not a country with which we discussed the matter that actively supported the idea. When we get into committee I will be able to give more details, I hope, with regard to this matter. Certainly in our view it was important to have a police force of that kind operate with the consent and the active co-operation of the governments most concerned.
That then was the situation, Mr. Speaker, when our United Nations force resolution was introduced, and that is the background to our initiative in this matter. At the time our resolution was introduced the 19-power Asian-Arab resolution had already been introduced, which reaffirmed the earlier United States resolution which had been carried by this time and which insisted on a cease-fire and a withdrawal of troops, and which asked the secretary general to report within 12 hours on the compliance with that injunction. That night of November 3 and 4-and the session went on all night-tempers were rather high. The talk was strong and the danger of a rash-as we would have thought it-condemnation of the United Kingdom and France as aggressors was very real. The situation was deteriorating and the communists were working feverishly and destructively to exploit it.
In these circumstances and having, as I have said, canvassed the situation carefully with our friends and having studied Sir Anthony Eden's speech, we moved this resolution concurrently with the 19-power Asian-Arab resolution which was an attempt to get British, French and Israel forces out of Africa.


Mr. Coldwell:: Out of Egypt.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, I am sorry; out of Egypt. It was a very short resolution, and it asked the secretary general merely to submit within 48 hours, something we had been unable to do anything about for ten years, namely a plan for setting up an emergency international United Nations police force with the consent of the governments concerned. If we had not put in that phrase "with the consent of the governments concerned" we might not have been able to secure a majority for our resolution. As it was, the resolution passed unanimously, as hon. members know. Steps were taken immediately by the secretary general to report

back what he was able to do in 48 hours in the setting up of this force to supervise and secure a cessation of hostilities in accordance with the terms of the earlier resolution of November 2, one of which was to ensure freedom of navigation in the Suez canal.
We obtained 57 votes as sponsors for the resolution. There were 19 abstentions. Nobody voted against us. The United Kingdom and France did not find it possible to vote for that resolution at that time but they have indicated, both privately and publicly, their great appreciation of the initiative which resulted in its being adopted and they have also stated their support for it since then. At the same time-and this is related to the first resolution-the Asian-Arab resolution was put to the vote and carried by a large majority, 59 to 5 opposed.


Gordon Minto Churchill: How did Canada vote?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Canada voted for that resolution asking for a cease-fire and a withdrawal of the forces from Egypt. There were 5 opposed. There were 59 in favour, including Canada. Then on November 4 we started to work, and we had something to do with this because we were the sponsors of the resolution and had a certain obligation in connection with helping the secretary general carry it out. We started to work on organizing a United Nations police force or at least to form the basis of the organization and report back in 48 hours.
As it happened the secretary general, who has played a magnificent part throughout all these difficult days, was able to make a first report within 24 hours. Offers of contributions to the force began to come in within that 24-hour period. That Sunday night when we were working on the establishment of the force the United Kingdom and French ground forces landed at Port Said. The situation at the United Nations immediately began to deteriorate. Things became very tense. The security council was called into emergency session and refused to consider a Soviet proposal for Soviet and United States intervention because the matter was before the United Nations assembly. Then in the midst of rumours of Russian intervention, rumours that there would be a determined demand by the Arab and Asian members of the Assembly to brand the United Kingdom and France formally as aggressors under the charter and to invoke sanctions against them, the assembly met on Tuesday morning, November 6. It had before it the secretary general's final report on the organization of the United Nations force. At that time he was able to report progress with regard to the composition of the force. He was able
The Address-Mr. Pearson to lay down certain principles and functions for that force but not to go into detail, for two reasons. He did not have enough time, in the first place; and in the second place if we had attempted to do it in detail, we would still be arguing about what those functions should be. There was however one important detail, namely that the force should exclude contingents from the permanent members of the security council. The significance of that detail is obvious.
A draft resolution was drawn up supporting this report and authorizing the secretary general to go ahead on that basis, to discuss participation with other governments. It set up also an advisory committee of seven members of the assembly to help him in this task. Canada is one of the members of that committee. It is interesting to note in passing that four members of that committee are members of the commonwealth of nations. While we were trying to get this resolution through and get it through quickly and with a big majority-it was finally passed unanimously-another resolution, in the atmosphere of the fighting that was going on at that time in Suez, was introduced demanding the immediate withdrawal of forces, and that the secretary general should report that this had been done in 24 hours. Both these resolutions were being considered together.
In so far as the force was concerned, as I said, the resolution passed unanimously after we had managed to vote down-and it was a very important vote indeed-an amendment to put Czechoslovakia on the advisory committee of seven. The resolution was then passed by 64 to 0, with 10 abstentions.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Would you name the advisory committee?


Lester Bowles Pearson: The advisory committee in this matter consists of Ceylon, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Colombo, Norway and Canada, with the secretary general as the chairman of the committee.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Is Iran not on that?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Iran had been nominated and withdrew in favour of Ceylon.
The same evening, Mr. Speaker, a 19-power resolution demanding immediate withdrawal was passed by a vote of 65 with only one opposed, Israel, and with 10 abstentions. The United Kingdom and France did not oppose that resolution, they abstained on it. We voted for that resolution after having stated our interpretation, which was accepted by a good many other delegations, of the word "immediate". If that interpretation had not been stated and accepted by many we would not have voted for it. By "immediate" we said we had in mind that the United King-
60	HOUSE OF
The Address-Mr. Pearson dom and French forces would withdraw from Egypt as soon as the United Nations forces had been moved there and were operating satisfactorily. By getting our United Nations force resolution through and by acepting this Arab-Asian resolution of withdrawal, which had in it no element of sanctions, we were able to reject extreme demands which were being made, and which would have led us into grave danger indeed.
We think that the resolutions that night were a wise move, and we think also that they helped the United Kingdom and France in accepting the cease-fire, which they did either just before or shortly afterwards.
Now, Mr. Speaker, there has been a good deal of talk, though not very much in this house as yet, as to whether the United Kingdom and French governments were pressed into the acceptance of this cease-fire by United Nations action, and whether we should not have let them go ahead, not pressed them and resisted moves to press them in respect of this resolution on cease-fire and withdrawal. If we had done that, and the United Nations had kept out of this at that particular moment, it is said the British and French forces would have been able to complete the military job of clearing the canal of Egyptian forces from Port Said to Port Suez.
I suggest with diffidence, beause this is a matter which is of primary concern to the United Kingdom and French governments, that they were very wise indeed in stopping military operations at the time they did. After all, they had indicated that they were going into that area to stop the fighting at the canal and to prevent the conflict continuing between Israel and Egypt in such a way that it would interfere with the operation of the canal.
By this time both Israel and Egypt had accepted the cease-fire. Therefore the original reason given by the United Kingdom and French forces for intervening had been removed. If the United Kingdom and French forces had continued fighting at that time, after the Egyptian and Israeli governments had accepted the cease-fire, I suggest that the commonwealth might not have been able to stand the strain; that the Asian members of the commonwealth might not have been able to remain in it in those circumstances. There is evidence from New Delhi, Karachi and Colombo to support that statement. I suggest also that a continuation of the fighting, even if it had immediately successful military results, would have created even a deeper and more permanent split between the western European and Arab world. It might well have led to the occupation of Egypt, which was not an original objective of


British-French intervention. It would have been a standing invitation to the Egyptian government to invite in at that time, when the fighting was going on, Soviet volunteers. Whatever the reasons may have been, and I think they were good ones, the United Kingdom and French governments did accept the cease-fire and we entered a new stage of developments.
There were only two more resolutions subsequent to the one I have just mentioned. The one last Saturday asked for withdrawal once again. We did not support it because we felt that the withdrawal had begun. We had confidence in the good faith of the British and French when they told us that the withdrawal would be completed. We felt at that time that to support another resolution of withdrawal would be to assimilate the position of the British, French and Israelis to that of the Russians in Hungary.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Did you vote or abstain on that?


Lester Bowles Pearson: We abstained on that, and the reason we abstained is quite obvious to anyone who has followed developments down there. The resolution in its terms was just the same as the previous one, that the forces should get out and they should get out- this time the word used was 'forthwith". As the British and French had already accepted withdrawal in principle it would not have been very reasonable for the Canadian delegation, which had previously voted for withdrawal, to have voted against withdrawal at this time.


William Earl Rowe: You have different conditions.


Lester Bowles Pearson: For the reasons which I have given we were not going to support this resolution, so we abstained. If the Belgian amendment, as I have said, to that resolution had been carried, the British and French had announced they would have voted for it. If my friends opposite get any comfort out of that course of action, they are welcome to it.
Then the final resolution carried Saturday night approved an aide memoire which gave the secretary general further authority to organize the United Nations police force. By a very important paragraph in that resolution he was told to get ahead with the clearing of the Suez canal. In spite of efforts by Soviet and certain Arab-Asian countries to hold up the work on political grounds, he has now authority to go ahead with the vitally important work.
Now, Mr. Speaker, we have the United Nations force in being and I am sure the

house, although I have exhausted my time, would like me to say something about the functions, operations and composition of that force, and Canada's contribution to it.
At one o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at 2.30 p.m.
Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I recognize that it is owing only to the indulgence of the house that I am permitted to proceed and finish my statement, because I am well beyond the time allotted to me. But if the house desires I shall be glad to complete the statement now and put on the record certain facts concerning the situation now before it, with which I was not able to deal this morning. I did try this morning to outline the policy that had been adopted by the Canadian delegation to the United Nations in the assembly which is now meeting, and I had reached the point where I was about to describe the operation of the United Nations emergency force which has been set up as the result of a resolution of that assembly.
The function of this force which is now in being is to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities, as I pointed out this morning, and carry out its task in accordance with directions received from the United Nations, not from any one member of the United Nations. The force-and it is interesting to recall that the resolution authorizing this force was passed not much more than three weeks ago-is now in being in Egypt where it will be stationed, or any place elsewhere the United Nations considers it necessary to be stationed, in order to carry out the functions which I have just mentioned. The most important function is, of course, the policing of the zone between opposing forces in Egypt in order to prevent the recurrence, if possible, of the fighting. At the present time the headquarters of the force is along the Suez, but it may of course be moved.
It is not a fighting force in the sense that it is a force operating under, say, chapter 7 of the United Nations charter, which deals with enforcement procedures. It is not a United Nations fighting force in the sense that the force in Korea was; it is operating under a different chapter of the charter dealing with conciliation procedures. Therefore the alarmist interpretation, the alarmist possibility, mentioned last night by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra that Canadian elements in this force might find themselves in conflict with British soldiers is, I suggest, merely a figment of his imagination.
The Address-Mr. Pearson It is not the purpose of this force to be used in fighting operations against anybody. It is not that kind of force. If the hon. member had read the United Nations document concerning the function and organization of this force, which have already been agreed on, he would, I think, have understood that.
This force will stay in Egypt until the United Nations decides that its functions are discharged, or, of course, until the governments participating in the force withdraw their contingents. It must, of course, not infringe on the sovereignty of the government of the territory in which it is operating. That is obvious. But the exercise of that sovereignty in the case of the government of Egypt where the force is operating now must be qualified by the acceptance by Egypt of the resolution of the United Nations concerning the force. Egypt has already agreed to the admission of this United Nations force to its territory; and it seems to me to be obvious, because it is not an enforcement action of the United Nations under chapter 7 of the charter that every effort should be made by the secretary general of the United Nations, and by the United Nations itself, to secure and maintain the co-operation of the Egyptian government in the functioning of this force, and the cooperation of the other governments concerned, including the government of Israel.
But that does not mean, as I understand it -and I assure you, Mr. Speaker, this has been made very clear in meetings of the advisory committee-that Egypt or any other government can determine by its own decision where the force is to operate, how it is to operate or when it must leave. Furthermore, the right of Egypt to consent to the admission of a United Nations force to its territory does not imply the necessity of consent to the admission of, or the right to reject, separate units or elements of that force. That is a stand, Mr. Speaker, which the Canadian representative on the advisory committee has taken. I have already made it clear to the other members of the committee and to the secretary general, and the secretary general has agreed to this statement. I said at the second meeting of the committee -and I quote from the record of the committee-
If their position-
I was referring to the government of Egypt.
If their position is that they at any time could decide that the United Nations force had finished its work and should leave, that, I think, would be quite intolerable; and there is also an interpretation of the United Nations resolution which says that the force must be sent to Egypt only with the consent of the Egyptian government which means that the Egyptian government would exercise a veto over every contingent in that force. That, I think, would be equally intolerable, because what

The Address-Mr. Pearson kind of a United Nations force would you have? What principle would you be acting on in the United Nations if that country-
I was referring to Egypt.
-which the United Nations was trying to assist in organizing and sending forward this force should decide who would take part in it? That is something, of course, that has to be worked out between the assembly and yourself-
I was referring to the chairman of the committee.
-as the representative of the assembly, and the Egyptian government, but to admit for a minute that the Egyptian government will decide that a force from country A is admissible and a force from country B is not is something, of course, that I could not accept.
We have made that stand clear at other meetings of the committee of seven, That, Mr. Speaker, brings me to the negotiations undertaken by the secretary general in regard to the composition of the force and particularly in regard to Canadian participation in it.
The first resolution dealing with this force was passed in the United Nations assembly on November 4. We had already said by the time that resolution was passed-and by "we" I mean the government in Ottawa- that we were in favour of it and that we would recommend a contribution to it. The day after the resolution was passed I met the secretary general as the sponsor of the resolution and discussed with him the question of putting some United Nations troops into the area at once. He considered it to be a matter of the most immediate urgency. So I said I was authorized to state that the Canadian government was willing to participate, and later in the day I wrote a formal communication to him to that effect, saying that we had decided to make an appropriate contribution subject to the required constitutional action being taken in Canada.
The next day I also talked with the secretary general about the force and he was then also emphatic, for the obvious reason that the situation seemed to be deteriorating, that we must proceed quickly. We discussed the nature of our contribution that afternoon, I by telephone with my colleagues in Ottawa, when the question of a battalion came up. Meanwhile General Burns had been appointed as commander of the force and he will do a distinguished job in that position, I am sure, as he has been doing so in that area in the last two years in the face of very great difficulties indeed.
General Burns was asked to come to New York, and those countries that had already announced their desire to contribute were asked to send military advisers to New York

to discuss the problem with the secretary general, his staff and General Burns. The Canadian Department of National Defence sent three officers down immediately and the next day, Tuesday, November 6, the Prime Minister announced that Canada would offer, and I quote:
Subject to adjustment and/or rearrangement after consultation with the United Nations commander-
-a self-contained battalion group with H.M.C.S. Magnificent as a temporary mobile base.
The consultations which we had had in New York up to that time led us to believe that would be a most welcome contribution, and we were urged to press ahead with it. The secretary general told me he was most anxious for us to get our battalion to a place where it could be embarked without delay.
General Burns reached New York a little later than we expected because he had to go to Cairo en route. The possibility then was mentioned that one country might provide all the administrative and air support at least in the initial stages. General Burns had found that difficulties were already developing because the infantry that had arrived, mostly from the Scandinavian countries and also from Colombia, were reaching the base without the necessary services and there was no headquarters organized to receive them.
These reports were sent by me to Ottawa. I returned to discuss them with my colleagues over the week end, and while I was in Ottawa the secretary general through his executive assistant phoned me on Saturday, November 10, about another difficulty that was developing and which has been referred to already in this discussion, namely that the Egyptian authorities were concerned about the possibility of Canadian troops being mistaken for United Kingdom troops and that incidents might take place especially if the proportion of Canadian troops to the total force were high as would be the case if the Canadian infantry battalion had arrived at that time.
We in New York, and indeed in Ottawa on advice from New York, felt that these difficulties would be overcome, and in discussing them with the secretary general he once again asked us to make no changes in our plans pending further discussions and he hoped satisfactory arrangements could be made. So the government went ahead with the arrangements as originally contemplated.
These difficulties I have been talking about, difficulties of administration and difficulties of composition, were not unique to Canada. Indeed they were not surprising, considering

the fact that the United Nations was starting from nothing in organizing this force; with the political situation so difficult both at the United Nations and in Egypt, and considering also the fact that under the resolution authorizing the secretary general to organize this force he was instructed to work out-the phrase that was used was a "balanced force"-a balanced force militarily for police work and a balanced force, as he interpreted it, geographically and politically, if possible.
Perhaps I should interject at this point, in connection with this particular difficulty, that among the countries that have offered contributions are Rumania and Czechoslovakia. Countries other than Canada have made offers of contributions which have not been dealt with, and they are waiting to hear from the secretary general also. The problem now was a very difficult and complicated one, all the more so as the greatest need at that time was to get more people to the spot.
Well, then, I think it was on Tuesday, November 13, when back in New York from Ottawa that I had another talk with the secretary general in relation to the new difficulties which had occurred, I emphasized to him at that time that we felt it absolutely esential to the success of this effort that neither Egypt nor any other country should impose conditions regarding the composition of the force. I told him that on this matter we would negotiate only with him, the secretary general, although we recognized, of course, that it was right and proper that he should discuss these matters with Egypt in order to avoid, if possible, subsequent difficulties.
Nevertheless, on that Tuesday I asked him again about composition in view of the developing difficulties and whether we should proceed with our plans for moving the regiment. The secretary general said-this was Tuesday, November 13, and I quote from his statement to me which I took down, that he hoped we would go right ahead with our plans.
He also discussed with me the question of composition on the next day, Wednesday. Then later we had a meeting of the advisory committee on the matter and I have already read from the minutes of that meeting. Following that the secretary general flew to Cairo. He left New York in the hope that these difficulties would all be cleared up before he had returned. As we were having diplomatic discussions about them and as it seemed that these discussions might end in a satisfactory way, we did our best, I quite admit, to discourage any premature publicity about difficulties which might be settled and
The Address-Mr. Pearson concerning which, if the publicity were inaccurate, we would have even greater trouble in clearing up. Therefore on Thursday, November 15, the Prime Minister said at Toronto:
Units of Canadian contribution to the UN force are ready and the order in council placing them on active service under UN command will be passed and parliament summoned as soon as we can ascertain from General Burns what elements he needs and cannot get from other countries.
During that week end when General Burns had reached New York and the secretary general was in Cairo I was in touch with the secretary general by telephone and cable through our embassy. I stated to him that I had had word about his discussions with the Egyptians; that while I appreciated the difficulties which had arisen and while naturally we wanted to help the secretary general, already so overburdened with problems, in any way possible, nevertheless we could not accept the principle that any one government could determine what contribution or whether any contribution would be made by a member state in connection with the United Nations force. I am glad to say that the secretary general has taken the same position.
Then we discussed the difficulty on the secretary general's return. I know my hon. friends want to have all the facts in connection with this matter. We have had wild rumours and exaggerations which have appeared in the press about Nasser's farce, as the Acting Leader of the Opposition called it yesterday.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Why keep on repeating those statements?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Why keep on repeating those statements? Because it was a matter of principle upon which we wanted to make our position absolutely clear. As a result of these discussions the secretary general had sent a communication to me from Cairo which I shall put on the record:
The question of when and where ground troops shall be used-
That is Canadian ground troops.
-can best be considered when the UNEF can assess its needs at the armistice lines. The present situation seems to be one where it is not a lack of troops for the immediate task but of possibilities to bring them over and maintain their lines of communication.
That was a message from the secretary general, not from the Egyptian government. He also emphasized that in sending it neither he nor anyone else was laying down conditions for Canadian participation because he felt that that would be improper. On his return and after further discussion with General Burns it was agreed that for the time

The Address-Mr. Pearson being we should concentrate on getting these other forces to Egypt and hold the infantry battalion in reserve. General Burns himself said he agreed that it was even more important at the present moment to have an air transport headquarters, administration units, signals, engineers, army service, medical units and forces of that type; which were later to be sneered at by some excitable persons as constituting a typewriter army, something that will not I think commend itself to the members of these very gallant Canadian regiments.
We agreed then to this change in plans, although regretting it. It is indeed our desire to fit in our plans with those agreed upon by General Burns and the secretary general and keep the rest of our forces available for transmission to the area; and on Tuesday November 20, the order in council was passed to that end. I ask whether we could or should have proceeded otherwise. I am sure that most members of the house will agree that we would have been wrong if we had not made the offer we did in the first instance without delay, an offer which at that time seemed most appropriate and was considered as such by the secretary general.
To have made no offers or to have made no plans; to have held back our offer until everything was cleared up; to have permitted no movement of troops of any kind, would I think have left us open to criticism, to the charge that we were dragging our feet in connection with a proposal which we ourselves had put forward. I think also that we would have been wrong to have interfered with our plans until we were certain that their implementation or the timing thereof was to be changed.
When we were asked to make that change, not by Colonel Nasser but by the secretary general of the United Nations and the commanding general of the United Nations forces, we could have either accepted or rejected the request. The latter would have meant delaying any action or, as has been suggested in a few extreme quarters, we could have withdrawn from the United Nations force completely. I am confident that if we had taken either of those courses, if we had delayed taking any action or withdrawn from the force, in view of the developments we would have been open to grave criticism and we would have got most of it from some hon. gentlemen opposite who have spoken already in this debate. I think the course we took was the right course, and it was considered the right course by the United Nations officials concerned.

It did not seem to me to be the time-I am talking now about the time we were confronted with the necessity of changing our plans, at least temporarily-or the occasion for national pique or peevishness or sneering at this new United Nations force as being Nasser's farce. It seemed to me that the situation was far too serious for that. What was required from every member of the United Nations was to back up the United Nations force to the best of its ability, after receiving the best advice it could. After receiving such advice from the United Nations itself we took that course, and as a result there is now a United Nations force which within between three and four weeks of the resolution authorizing it now includes on the spot-at least this was two days ago and there have been additions since that time-1,700 troops of which 20 per cent or 350 are Canadians. There will be soon more Canadians on the spot. Twenty-three nations have offered contributions to that force and eight of them including Canada, have seen their contributions embodied in the formations on the spot which are now working together under the United Nations blue flag of peace.
May this force succeed in its task. If it does we may have started something of immense value for the future. We may have taken a step to put force behind the collective will of the international community under the law. That is our immediate task, to make this force work, to prevent fighting in the area and to establish conditions there through the operation of this force so that the United Nations itself can work out speedily an enduring and honourable settlement for that area, including relations between Israel and her neighbours and the internatinoal supervision and control, if that can be done, of the Suez canal.
While that is our immediate objective we have another objective which is just as important and I suggest just as immediate, and that is to restore unity among the allies. The western coalition, which is essential for peace in these disturbed times and which requires close consultation and co-operation among its members if it is to succeed, especially among London, Washington and Paris, has been subjected to strains and stresses in recent months. This has caused all lovers of peace in the free world great anxiety.
May I in conclusion repeat something I said on this point the other night to the American assembly of Columbia University, when I said:
The inability to bring about a reconciliation ol interests inside a coalition has resulted in a collapse

of western co-operation in the Middle East; a collapse which has brought distress to everyone except those who see in such co-operation the strongest barrier to the attainment of their own imperialist and reactionary power objectives. This collapse is, I am convinced, only temporary; but temporary is too long.
It must be a primary obligation on all of us to speed and make effective the work of repair and restoration. Indeed, we must do more than this. We must strengthen and deepen the foundation for such co-operation, so that a collapse will not take place again in the face of the pull between the requirements of national and international policy. At the moment that is the primary task and responsibility of all who believe in freedom and security.
Then I went on to say:
It is less important at the present moment to dwell on the difficulties of the task than on ways and means of avoiding them in the future. A Canadian may, I think, be pardoned for emphasizing that this is particularly true in the case of consultation and co-operation between Washington and London and Paris. It is imperative, in our dangerous and disturbed world, that the lines of contact between these three capitals be repaired and renewed and reinvigorated.
Apart from the actual preservation of the peace, and indeed, related to it, there is no more important objective for western policy than this, and every possible effort must now be devoted, with understanding, with good will and with energy, to its achievement.


John George Diefenbaker: Would my hon. friend allow a question at this time? I have mentioned the matter to him in advance. It has to do with the grave situation that arose today in Jordan and also the even graver situation in Syria. Would he, before concluding, say something with respect to the situation over there which today has become so critical, and also whether in view of what is taking place there the United Nations force will have to be increased over and above the numbers provided for under the present arrangements?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, my hon. friend was good enough to tell me before I came into the house that this matter was very much on his mind and that he proposed to ask a question about it. I am anxious not to say anything, without pretty careful consideration, about a matter which is of immediate gravity because, as I understand the reports we have received, this is a matter of immediate gravity. I do not want to be panicky or unnecessarily alarming about it, but there are reports that Russian penetration is going on in Syria to an alarming extent and that there are moves inside Syria which might result in the domestic control of that country by a group which seems quite willing to work with the Soviets in this matter. That is not a prospect that can cause anything but alarm. There are the same elements in other Arab countries, but we must hope that these countries themselves will take some steps to prevent that kind of development.
The Address-Mr. Pearson
As for the other part of his question, whether the United Nations force should be increased to take care of a situation of this kind, the numbers of that force are not yet determined. I suspect that before long we will find it very greatly increased over its present number, but it has been set up to deal with a situation arising out of a cessation of hostilities between Israel on the one side and the United Kingdom and France and Egypt on the other, and its present terms of reference would not authorize it to intervene in any other dispute between any other two countries. But the United Nations assembly is in session, and if we can set up a United Nations force for one purpose surely we can extend its functions and activities for another desirable purpose. I would hope that if the situation began to deteriorate beyond the point which required that kind of extension it would be done at this assembly very quickly.
All I wish to say in my closing words is that the question of strengthening cooperation among the western democracies, especially among the United States, the United Kingdom, France and, of course, Canada, is one which must be deep in our minds behind all the present emergencies that have strained and weakened that cooperation. We must do what we can without recrimination to bring it back.
It is in that spirit, Mr. Speaker, that we shall continue our efforts at the United Nations to find solutions to problems which remain difficult and dangerous and have created situations which, if they are allowed to persist, can indeed be a very real threat to peace.


Mr. Speaker:: Do I take it that the hon. member of Oxford wishes to ask a question?


Mr. Nesbitt:: Yes. I wish to ask a question of the last speaker; I did not wish to interrupt during his speech. Is the Secretary of State for External Affairs in a position to give us any idea as to the extent to which Russian arms were accepted by Egypt prior to the immediate trouble, and also by Syria?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, I assume that when we get in committee I will have the opportunity of trying to answer a number of questions of this kind, but on the direct question I might say that we knew, of course, as was mentioned in the house last summer, that Russian arms and Russian equipment were going into Egypt. That was well known. It was also known they were going into Syria, though not in the quantities in which they have been going there in recent weeks. It was our impression at that time that the Russian arms going into Egypt were for the purpose of strengthening the Egyptian army.

The Address-Mr. Fleming It is probably also true that Russian technicians went in with those arms. We did not know and we had no reason to believe that these arms were going into Egypt for any other purpose at that time than to strengthen the Egyptian army for use in military operations.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Speaker, I shall have some things to say in the course of my remarks in reply to the speech just made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, but I make this observation now. I think one reason the house listened to him with interest today is the tone in which he addressed the house. It was in very marked contrast to the petulant, belligerent and provocative manner adopted by the Prime Minister yesterday in relation to this very important question.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Had the order been reversed I might have commended the example of the Secretary of State for External Affairs in this respect to the Prime Minister.
Sir, we are dealing with a matter of very great importance, a matter in which what we say here may have an effect not only within our own country but may be subject to interpretations outside. For my part I wish to follow as objective a line as circumstances permit. I am one of those who, throughout the length of my time in the house, have sought to encourage the idea of bipartisanship with regard to the external policy of the country, and I had hoped that the day would never come when deep differences of approach on external questions would develop on a party basis in this country. But, sir, it is quite evident that they have, for in relation to many features of the present situation it is evident that deep differences do exist.
We heard some gratuitous calls on the part of the Prime Minister yesterday for an attitude rising above partisanship in this matter. Indeed, he used that expression, that we should rise above political partisanship. I say to the Prime Minister: physician, heal thyself. If ever there was a partisan and provocative approach to a question under debate in the House of Commons it was on the part of the Prime Minister yesterday afternoon in this debate. On the one hand he appealed that we should rise above political partisanship, while at the same time he himself indulged in the most blatant kind of partisanship in his whole treatment of this question. His speech was deliberately provocative as any speech that I am sure any of us have listened to on the part of the Prime Minister in this house.

After that the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), leading the C.C.F. party in this house, did make a feeble appeal to the house, as he put it, to rally behind the government. What an extraordinary appeal that was, an appeal to rally behind a government which had just expressed itself through the mouth of the Prime Minister in deliberately partisan, provocative and belligerent terms!


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Donald Methuen Fleming: As long as the government is going to be wrong, as long as the government is going to be partisan, you may be very sure, Mr. Speaker, that there is going to be no rallying behind this government. We have no wish to follow this government into error. This is rather a time, Mr. Speaker, to rally to truth and clearheadedness with regard to a very important issue before the house and before the country. I can assure hon. members that there will be no yielding to any attempt on the part of the government or their allies to stampede the members of this house. With regard to so important a subject the Canadian public is entitled to calm and deliberate consideration on the part of the House of Commons. We have indicated our concern in this matter, and our willingness to sit long hours in this house day by day. But this subject is something so transcending other matters that we propose to give it clear and ample consideration.
Yesterday afternoon the Prime Minister opened on the subject of the reasons why the government had not called parliament together. He talked about everything but the real issue in that respect. He said, of course -and this is undeniable-that it is the government's responsibility to take the decision as to whether Canadian forces shall be sent abroad. But that was not the issue. The issue as to calling the house at a particular time or at an earlier date was not touched by that consideration. All that the Prime Minister was saying in effect was that the government had to take the decision and then refer to parliament within ten days. But that is no reason for not calling parliament together in the days of a critical international situation, when surely there was need for an opportunity for the elected representatives of the people to meet and to deliberate. So we have much to say about what occurred prior to the final passing of the order in council to authorize the sending of Canadian troops abroad, as is seen already in the course of this debate.
Our amendment has pinpointed the matters at issue between the government and Her Majesty's loyal opposition. There are four of them in number and I propose to deal with each in turn. In the first place we condemn

the government because it followed-and I am now quoting-"followed a course of gratuitous condemnation of the action of the United Kingdom and France which was designed to prevent a major war in the Suez area." The declared purpose of that intervention on the part of the United Kingdom and France was to prevent a major war and to contain the hostilities that then raged between Israel and Egypt. That was the declared purpose of those countries in relation to that intervention; and no one dare question those motives of the governments of Britain and France unless he is prepared to accuse those governments of bad faith.
The Prime Minister yesterday did not come out deliberately and say that he accused them of bad faith, but he did say that this was aggression on the part of Great Britain and France. If it was, then it seems to me that the Prime Minister has not accepted the statement of the declared purpose on the part of the two countries that carried out that intervention. That is the kind of mentality that goes with the other suggestion that Britain and France were acting in collusion with Israel in this matter, a false and baseless suggestion which has received the most forthright refutation on the part of Sir Anthony Eden.
Here is an area of the world in which Britain's lifeline is located. Sir Anthony Eden had told Bulganin and Khruschev a year ago during their visit to the United Kingdom that Britain would fight if necessary to maintain her position on that lifeline. Unless, as the government at some stages seems to suggest, Britain and France were not acting in good faith, then certainly the action that was taken was in itself nothing but police action, for the fighting between Israel and Egypt had already come within sight of the Suez canal, that vital lifeline.
I ask the government these questions. Does the government doubt that police action was necessary under the circumstances? Second, does the government doubt that the intervention of the United Kingdom and France was intended as such? It is quite true that that action was taken without the declared approval of the United Nations, but there was the immediate offer on the part of the United Kingdom and France to hand over that police action to the United Nations if and when the United Nations were prepared to take effective police action.
What is the issue before this Canadian House of Commons? I listened with much interest to the speech last evening by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar. He went about this matter as though this were the parliament at Westminster, and as though we 81537-5*
The Address-Mr. Fleming were debating this issue in the same sense as that in which the parliament at Westminster might have debated it. Mr. Speaker, we are not debating this issue in that sense at all. We are debating here the attitude of the Canadian government with respect to action taken by the United Kingdom government in the name of the United Kingdom and by the government of France in the name of France. We are not debating an issue as between political parties in the United Kingdom. We are discussing the action of the Canadian government with respect to an action taken by Britain and France through their governments. If anybody is interested in the relationship between the action of the British government in this matter and the sovereign parliament at Westminster, he had better remind himself that the government in that country has been sustained by the House of Commons a number of times already over this issue at its various stages. But that is not the point. The point is that this was an action taken by the British government. It was an action binding the United Kingdom.
With regard to the attitude of the Canadian government, we are then discussing a declared attitude with respect to an action taken by the United Kingdom. Did the Canadian government have justification for the critical attitude that it has taken toward the action of the British and French governments? We say emphatically no. It did not take government spokesmen very long to express in public their criticism of the action of the British and French governments. It was on October 30, within a matter of hours after the issuance of an ultimatum by Britain and France, to Egypt and Israel that, in the course of a press conference here at Ottawa, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when asked if he thought that the urgency of the situation warranted the British and French action, said, and these are his words, that he "regretted" that they-that is Britain and France-"found it necessary to take this action while the security council was discussing the matter". That was a public expression of regret over the action taken by Britain and France. Within a very short time that was followed by a similar expression on the part of the Prime Minister.
Mr. Speaker, let us recall that here we are dealing with diplomatic language. The language of diplomacy is not the language of the man in the street. He is much more direct. It is not the language of debate in this house. We are much more direct in our statements here. But when a government, through its accredited spokesmen, says of the action of another government that it regrets that action, that statement in diplomatic

The Address-Mr. Fleming terms is very strong language, and immensely more so when language of that kind is used by spokesmen of the government of a nation of the commonwealth with respect to the action taken by the government of another nation of the commonwealth. So, Mr. Speaker, his language was in itself a strong condemnation of the action taken by the British and French governments.
We say that condemnation was gratuitous, and we say that it was gratuitous for many reasons. What was the juridical position of Canada when the Secretary of State for External Affairs embarked upon his condemnation of Britain and France on October 30? It was this. This Liberal government has been in office now throughout this long period. This government had assumed no obligation in the Suez area. The only obligation or commitment resting upon Canada was such obligation as rested upon her as a member of the United Nations; that was the extent of her juridical obligation in that situation.
Bear in mind, sir, also that Canada, whether by her own choice or the choice of others-
I think it is not unlikely Canada could have had a part in those negotiations if she had pressed to do so-did not take any part in the negotiations and international conferences following Nasser's seizure of the canal last summer. The Canadian government, when talking in this house or when its ministers were talking outside the house as to the extent of this government's concern with respect to the great dangers that threatened in the Suez area, always disclaimed interest in it and said in effect that Canada had no interest involved in that situation. Bear in mind as well, sir, that the British government did not ask for any aid from Canada. Neither Britain nor France asked for aid from any other country in this intervention. Canada, therefore, when on October 30 her spokesman undertook to speak, was not dealing with any request from the United Kingdom or from France for aid from this country. It was, therefore, a completely gratuitous statement that the Secretary of State for External Affairs delivered on October 30.
This morning he read a brief newspaper report of what I said on October 31 in Hamilton at a press conference when I was asked for a comment upon the statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs the night before. I should like to give the house a more ample statement of what was said on that occasion. I am quoting now from the fuller account in the


Hamilton Spectator of November 1. I shall read several paragraphs.
Any Canadian declaration on the Suez crisis ought to be confined to that of a United Nations member, said Donald Fleming

And so on.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Donald Methuen Fleming: If you want the words I was omitting, they are these:
. . . Donald Fleming, 51-year old contender for the national leadership of the Progressive Conservative party . . .
I was going to spare the house those words. The next paragraph reads:
"Canada has not had any part whatsoever in any of the conferences preceding the sudden, recent developments in the Middle East," he said. "And until the present confused situation has been fully unravelled, I think Canada should be cautious on what she has to say officially." The Toronto Eglinton member said in a press interview that he considered the United States had thus far made no contribution of real value to the settlement of the Suez question since it was precipitated several months ago by President Nasser's seizure of the canal.
As much of the problems had largely been thrust upon Britain and France, Mr. Fleming thought the Washington administration should be slow to condemn others-"until it has brought forward some worth-while contribution to a constructive solution."
"I cannot believe, however, that there can be any final cleavage between Britain and France on one hand and the U.S. on the other", he added.
Britain and France, he thought, had long standing interests and were closely interwoven-"and Canada should not undertake at this time to read any lecture to any of the parties involved."
You will see, Mr. Speaker, that in commenting directly on the statement made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs in Ottawa the night previous I was saying, in effect, that the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in my opinion, had no right to make the comments he made. In the language of the amendment that is before the house now that was, on the part of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, a gratuitous condemnation of the British and French action.
Now, the action that was taken by Britain and France did involve risks. It was taken by those two countries on their own responsibility. The risks were serious. The results are not all as one would wish, having regard to the high purposes of Britain and France in intervening there. The issue, of course, was bound to come before the United Nations sooner or later. I say it should have not have come there, so far as Canada was concerned, after Canada had already delivered a condemnation of the actions of Britain and France. The Canadian government had prejudged the action of Britain and France before that issue came before

the United Nations. When Canada appeared before the United Nations and opened her mouth on this subject, it was as a nation that had already acted as censor and judge upon the action of the British and French governments.
I have said that in many ways the results are regrettable. However, that is not to say that the action was not justified. It was known when Britain and France took that responsibility that there were very serious risks involved. We have seen a number of results. They were catalogued yesterday and are well known. But, sir, one thing that has not been acknowledged as it ought to have been by those who have been taking the government line on this matter is, first of all, the price that has been paid by Britain and France for the action they have taken. Countries, and they include Canada, which had not, through the United Nations, instituted effective police action at an earlier date before this crisis reached its present proportions, must bear their share of responsibility for the results that exist today.
Further, they ought to acknowledge several results on the positive side that have flowed from that intervention by Britain and France and are of the highest importance in reference to the whole world situation today. The first is this, that undoubtedly that intervention by Britain and France did avert the spread of the conflagration. The intervention did head off, it is quite clear, any direct Russian intervention. It may well have avoided a third world war. It is significant also that the intervention exposed the extent of earlier Russian intervention and penetration in the Middle East area; that is something that those who are today speaking for the United States of America at the United Nations ought well to bear in mind. Third, the United Nations assembly has been moved to establish a police force.
With all the opportunities the United Nations had in the face of the great danger, threats and warnings from that area of the world as to the necessity for police intervention, and they having taken no such action, it is very doubtful, if Britain and France had not intervened as they did, whether the United Nations even today would have intervened and taken police action. If the United Nations now is making a belated effort to establish a police force in the Middle East area, then undoubtedly much of the credit should be given to Britain and France for the intervention they made in that area.
We may deplore, sir, the fact that police action was necessary. But we must, in frankness, at the same time deplore that there
The Address-Mr. Fleming existed in that area of the world a vacuum with respect to police action. Police action was necessary. The subsequent developments have demonstrated that beyond all question. Let us be frank and honest with, ourselves with regard to the United Nations. All of us had high hopes for the United Nations. All of us have subscribed firmly and cheerfully to the policy of maintenance of the United Nations and the discharge of our responsibilities there, and attempted to make the United Nations an effective instrument for the preservation of world peace. All of us hoped it would be that.
But, sir, the fact of the matter is that the United Nations had been so reduced to im-potency in that area that a vacuum did exist. No police action had been taken. The security council, which was established for that purpose and was given powers intended to enable it to take the necessary police action in such circumstances has, as we know, been frustrated and reduced to impotence by the Russian use of the veto on 78 occasions.
As for the assembly, while the veto does not exist in that body, there is, as all know, no standing machinery there for the application of police action when any situation requiring it arises in the world; and in the midst of the abundance of dangers and warnings in the Middle East, with the fires of hostility burning there in recent years and fanned to flames in recent months, the United Nations, whether the security council or the assembly, still found themselves unable or unwilling to take effective police action in that area. Had effective police action been taken a few months ago, as was advocated in this house by members of Her Majesty's loyal opposition, sir, there is every reason to believe that the present crisis would not have arisen, that it would have been prevented. But there was not enough determination in this matter-and this includes the Canadian government through its representatives at the United Nations-to press for effective police action in the Middle East. So the danger was allowed to grow until it burst into hostilities, as we know, in those fateful days of late October.
Now, sir, as to the discussions that have occurred since in the United Nations assembly, let us recognize this fact, that to the extent to which the United Nations assembly takes upon itself the task of acting as spokeman of the conscience of the world, that forum is acting far in advance of police power. That form of expression of the attitudes of the world has far outrun its police power, and dangers result.
70	HOUSE OF
The Address-Mr. Fleming Now, sir, the idea of a police force there, belated but commendable, has to be regarded in the light of the responsibilities that have already existed for a long, long time and have not been discharged by the United Nations or by its members, including the Canadian government. We have to recognize as well, in weighing the value of the position of the United Nations here, that the United Nations has faced a very supreme test in recent times in the face of the plainest and most brutal kind of Russian aggression in Hungary. Apart from some talking in the United Nations assembly, it is evident that the United Nations has proven utterly impotent in the face of the plainest of all breaches of the charter of the United Nations. Russia is evidently too strong for the United Nations to handle, and the United Nations has unhappily betrayed the hopes of the Hungarian patriots in the process.
Sir, Britain and France, in the course of the action they took, expressed their willingness to co-operate with the United Nations in withdrawal of their own police force as soon as the United Nations would station effective police forces in the area. The Canadian government has chosen to align itself with those who are not satisfied with the plain statement of purpose and the expression of good faith on the part of the governments of Britain and France in this matter.
The house ought to be aware by this time, I think, that much of the impatience shown by the Prime Minister yesterday over criticism of the government's behaviour in this matter stems from the fact that there is in Canada and in other countries of the western world a growing sympathy with the action that Britain and France felt compelled to take in the situation that arose. There is a growing recognition of that fact everywhere except, apparently, in the minds of the Canadian government; and if they have not yet come to recognize that growing sympathy, then it is because they are so far out of touch with the feelings of the Canadian people.
Now, sir, this amendment of ours-again I stress the issue-condemns the government because it followed a policy of gratuitous condemnation of that action of Britain and France which was designed to prevent a major war arising in the Suez area. A gratuitous condemnation, yes! The Prime Minister yesterday in his remarks derided the suggestion that there had been on the part of the government a gratuitous condemnation. If anything was lacking of gratuitous condemnation on the part of the Canadian government in relation to the action of Britain


and France it was supplied in abundance by the Prime Minister yesterday in his speech.
Now, we have watched the Prime Minister for many years. We have known that he never was an enthusiast for the commonwealth. We remember-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Yes, it is a fact. It will be remembered that when he came back from his commonwealth tour two years ago he delivered to the house a report lasting for over an hour. Read that record today and you will not find him saying one word by way of tribute to the commonwealth of nations, or the purpose that this beneficent institution serves in the world today. He went to the commonwealth prime ministers' conference last June. He did not want any discussion here before he went about matters that might be brought before that conference, and when he came back it was quite evident that he had not contributed anything to the agenda for discussion at that conference. We should not have been particularly surprised at the attitude taken by the Prime Minister when this matter arose and when he was expressing his regret at the action by Britain and France.
But let us come down to yesterday. What he said yesterday was as bitter an attack, I am sure, upon Britain and France and upon the leaders of those countries as will ever be heard in the Canadian House of Commons. Listen to these words as they appear on page 20 of Hansard. This is in discussion of the very item in our amendment to which I am referring now in relation to the gratuitous condemnation by the Canadian government of the action of Britain and France. In relation to that subject the Prime Minister in his reply said:
I have been scandalized more than once by the attitude of the larger powers, the big powers as we call them, who have all too frequently treated the charter of the United Nations as an instrument with which to regiment smaller nations.
Is that not a gratuitous condemnation of Britain and France?


Some hon. Members:: No.


Donald Methuen Fleming: It was in a passage relating to the action of Britain and France that the Prime Minister uttered these words. And further, sir, in the next paragraph he went on to talk about the era when the supermen of Europe could govern the whole world and said this era is coming pretty close to an end. That was uttered in the same context. This is, I think, a reference that the Prime Minister of this country ought to repent in sackcloth and ashes, a reference to the leaders of Britain and France in the action that they felt compelled to take.

Let this be remembered. We are not sitting here as political parties in the British House of Commons; we are sitting here as parties dealing with expressions of censure by the Canadian government of action taken by Great Britain and France, and I say that the Prime Minister of this country ought to repent in sackcloth and ashes for making such references to a man like Sir Anthony Eden, who showed that high courage on some very conspicuous occasions, when he was prepared to make great sacrifices for the belief he had in the position he was taking when he stood firm against the appeasement of dictators in the world.
This government, apparently, has not very much appreciation of the fact that here was a situation in which, by their actions, they were contributing to the appeasement of the Egyptian dictator, and I do not think the Canadian people will very likely or soon forgive the Prime Minister of this country for bracketing Britain and France with Russia in the references he made in his speech yesterday to powers taking aggressive action.


John Whitney Pickersgill: He did no such thing.


Donald Methuen Fleming: He certainly did. There is the babbling brook from Newfoundland again.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: It is another brook which has been babbling now for the last half hour.


Donald Methuen Fleming: The Prime Minister babbled yesterday, and is intervening today. Mr. Speaker, when we are talking about maintenance of the rules of this house I draw your attention to the fact that the Prime Minister considers himself not bound by those rules, because he is bobbing up and down as he sees fit without regard to the rules, not asking questions but throwing in interjections all through speeches that have been made by members from this side of the house throughout this debate.
Now, sir, I come to the second paragraph of our amendment, in which we ask the house to condemn the government for "having meekly followed the unrealistic policies of the United States of America and thereby encouraged a truculent and defiant attitude on the part of the Egyptian dictator". Now, the Prime Minister tried very adroitly yesterday to sidestep this issue by saying that we have had no direct dealings with Nasser. That is not the point, sir. The point is this, that the Canadian government, which should be acting like an independent government in this matter, has chosen to be too closely associated with the policies of the United States; and I say, while we are not the United States congress, nevertheless we are entitled to say of
The Address-Mr. Fleming the policies of the United States that they are responsible to a very considerable degree, a regrettable degree, for the trouble that exists in the Middle East today, for those policies of the United States have unquestionably encouraged Nasser to take the defiant attitude that he has adopted.
It is evident that right from the start the United States curried favour with Nasser in the incident of sending a special representative over from the United States president to make a personal present to the dictator of Egypt; and then the expressions that have come from very high quarters in Washington about driving the vestiges of colonialism out of the Middle East and the well known fact that the United States itself has a very small stake in the Suez traffic. These are factors that ought to have put the Canadian government on its guard against meekly following the policies of the United States government; yet the Canadian government has preferred, when it came to an issue between Britain and France on the one hand and the United States on the other, to go along with the United States policies.
As to the boasted historical role of Canada as the bridge between the United States and Great Britain, the Canadian government as I say has lamentably failed to discharge its responsibility in that regard. The Canadian government has taken sides, and it must bear the responsibility for widening the breach between Great Britain and the United States, a breach one conspicuous feature of which is that the United States and the U.S.S.R. have been aligned in votes in the United Nations. It has not come about suddenly. This is something that has been developing for a long time, and we are now seeing the fruits of a policy on the part of this government opposite of associating itself too closely with the political and economic policies of the United States. And now the United States is wielding the big stick in reference to oil deliveries over the heads of Britain and France.
I say, Mr. Speaker, that we have come to this pass in the world. The United States is in no small measure responsible for it and the Canadian government in following the policies of the United States government must bear a shameful share of the responsibility.
In the third place we ask the house to censure the government for having placed Canada in the humiliating position of accepting dictation from President Nasser. Yesterday the Prime Minister, as I said, endeavoured adroitly to sidestep this issue by saying that the government had had no direct dealings with Nasser. That is not going to meet the issue here at all. The fact is that the Egyptian dictator has been laying

The Address-Mr. Fleming down terms for admission of the police force of the United Nations to Egyptian soil, and if the Canadian government has not had direct contact with President Nasser in regard to this matter at least the Canadian government has had its contact with the secretary general of the United Nations who has had his contact with President Nasser. It is he to whom President Nasser has been laying down conditions in regard to what nations shall contribute and what nations shall not contribute to the United Nations police force, how long that police force shall be permitted to remain, what it shall do while there, what territory it shall occupy and when it shall go out. We did not hear from the Prime Minister yesterday and we have not heard previously from the government any word of complaint about this dictation President Nasser has conveyed through the secretary general of the United Nations.
The Canadian government has claimed some credit for initiating the proposal for an emergency police force in the Middle East; yet when President Nasser tells the officials of the United Nations on what terms the police force shall be permitted to function on Egyptian territory we have not heard protests from the Canadian government that this would be an intolerable weakening of the authority, prestige and dignity of the United Nations.
I say, sir, that if the Canadian government participates in this attempted appeasement of this Egyptian dictator then surely we shall pay a price, as every nation has paid that has attempted to appease dictators. Yet the Prime Minister told the House of Commons yesterday, as recorded at page 24 of Hansard that President Nasser-
-was most appreciative of the suggestions the Canadian government had made to deal with this situation.
This dictator in Egypt has reason to appreciate the attitude of the Canadian government. I do not know any more effective condemnation of the attitude of the Canadian government than that this Egyptian dictator appreciates that attitude. What we should be doing is strengthening the United Nations, not contributing to the weakening of the United Nations by accepting for ourselves or as a member of the United Nations dictation of this kind from this dictator.
My time is just up. I had hoped to say something about the fourth paragraph of the amendment, in which we ask the house to censure the government for "having failed to take swift and adequate action to extend refuge to the patriots of Hungary and other lands under the cruel Russian yoke". I have time only to say this, sir, that it will take

a lot more than the attitude shown by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill) in his remarks last night to convince this house and the Canadian people that the Canadian government has done all it could do to afford sanctuary and refuge to these Hungarian patriots who are seeking to flee the terror of the Russian yoke. His attitude was a condescending, superior attitude, and he needs to rouse himself from the easy nonchalance that he seems to adopt with regard to his responsibilities. Humanity and justice demand that Canada do all it can to succour these refugees from the Russian yoke.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, I wonder if the hon. gentleman would permit a question?


Donald Methuen Fleming: The attitude of the Canadian government has been marked by its confusion and uncertainty-


John Whitney Pickersgill: Would the hon. gentleman permit a question?


Donald Methuen Fleming: My time is just up.
This country must either strengthen the United Nations to take action with adequate police power to keep peace in the world and to deter and punish aggression, or we must cease to depend largely upon the United Nations to prevent and punish aggression in the world.
I believe that the people of this country wish to see the United Nations strengthened, and it is going to take a lot more in the way of effective action on the part of the Canadian government to that end than has yet been taken. The Canadian government is deserving of censure on the four grounds we have set out with full particularity in our amendment, and I hope the house will express its condemnation of the government for its failures in this regard.
This is a matter of extreme importance. The government's failures are obvious. These failures are not the results of sudden indecision or sudden error. These are the results of policies that the government has been following. They are the results of the failure of the government, of its closing its ears to warnings of danger in the world. These are the inevitable results of the government's own blindness and obstinacy.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Mr. Speaker, I wonder if the hon. member for Eglinton would now permit me to ask my question?


Donald Methuen Fleming: With pleasure.


John Whitney Pickersgill: I would like to know
specifically what the hon. gentleman thinks should be done about these Hungarian refugees that has not already been done;

The Address-Mr. A. Stewart because if he has any good suggestions I am action limped for so long, and why they are sure the government will accept them at so anxious now that their failures hitherto once.	should be forgotten. I will assure them that


William Earl Rowe: 
Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Speaker, that is a long story and I am not going to attempt to give a full answer at this time.


Mr. Cavers:: Put it in writing.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, Oh.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Speaker, if the vocal
gentleman over here wishes to give the answer I suggest he give it. I thought the minister was asking me for my answer. Now, if it is my answer he wants, I can assure the hon. gentleman opposite that I do not ask for his assistance.


William Earl Rowe: You had better stand up.


Mr. Brooks:: It would be the first time he ever did give an answer. Get up and say something worth while.


Mr. Habel:: If the hon. gentleman wants me to give the answer in his place I can do so.


Mr. Speaker:: May I ask hon. gentlemen to please conduct an orderly debate.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Speaker, I am not going to attempt a full answer to this question by the minister, but I will say in reply at this stage that whatever has been done could have been done earlier, it could have been done more swiftly and effectively, and more could have been done.


John Whitney Pickersgill: What do you suggest we should do now?


Donald Methuen Fleming: That shows the attitude of this government all the way through. They want the House of Commons to forgive the government for its failures in the past.


John Whitney Pickersgill: We want to get on with the future, not worry about the past.


Donald Methuen Fleming: I can well understand why the minister wants the Canadian people and the Canadian House of Commons to forget the sorry past and the failure to recognize the seriousness of the situation in Hungary. Let me give him another example of the attitude of this government. We saw the patriots of Hungary rising almost with bare hands in an effort to throw off the Russian yoke. How were those patriots described in broadcasts by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation? They were described as "Hungarian rebels", but I choose to call them Hungarian patriots who are striving to throw off this Russian yoke. It is just that kind of attitude on the part of this government that explains why they were so slow to take action, why their 81537-6


John Whitney Pickersgill: May I repeat my question. I should like to know what more the hon. gentleman thinks should be done now? What more does he think should be done now? He has no answer. He is giving no answer.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Of course the minister is exercising the prerogative claimed by all ministers of speaking as often as they wish in a debate. The rules do not bind them. The minister has gone far beyond asking a question; he has attempted to make another speech. There is one very good thing that could be done immediately-change the government and get a new minister of citizenship and immigration.


Alistair McLeod Stewart: Mr. Speaker, having listened for some time to the hon. member for Eglinton I think one could say in baseball parlance, "one up and one away". We have heard from the Warwicks of the Conservative party and now we have heard from one of the aspirants to kingship. But still we do not know what the Conservative policy is with regard to the Middle East. There seems to be some conflict, because I recall hearing members of the Conservative party asking for police action. What the government has suggested to the house is that we should pursue police action. Apparently there are members of the Conservative party who really do not like police action. Apparently there are those Tories of the old school who would gird themselves with the Union Jack and tear off anywhere to the assistance of England, bellowing loudly, "Ready, aye, ready."
We have heard these colonially-minded people in this country for a long time, but I should like to recall to them that the first leader of their party would not have much to do with that sort of attitude. About 70 years ago, in 1885, England found herself in a bit of a mess in the Sudan. There were Conservatives in this country who thought that, willy-nilly, Canadians ought to give immediately all the assistance they could to England and its problems abroad. Sir John A. Macdonald wrote a letter to Tupper on March 12, 1885, in which he said:
Why should we waste money and men In this wretched business? England is not at war, but merely helping the Khedive to put down an insurrection, and now that Gordon is gone, the motive of aiding in the rescue of our countrymen is gone with him.
74	HOUSE OF
The Address-Mr. A. Stewart
It is the next sentence which perhaps should be directed to the attention of my hon. friends:
Our men and money would therefore be sacrificed to get Gladstone and Co. out of the hole they have plunged themselves into by their own imbecility.
Sir John A. Macdonald being dead yet speaketh, and I think speaketh quite loudly.
I shall let the matter rest there, but I do hope that some of the other members of the Conservative party who speak will be prepared to lay before this house and country the program which they themselves believe should be followed in the Middle East.
The people of Canada are interested, and one reason they are so interested is due in no small measure to the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, which performed a public service when it brought into the homes of the people of Canada by television and radio what was happening at the United Nations. The corporation's was the only network of any size in North America which provided that public service, and I think we have reason to be grateful to them for giving it.
It not infrequently happens in the history of mankind that out of crisis an opportunity is given to take a great step forward in human progress. I am convinced that this is one of those times. We have again arrived at one of the crossroads of civilization as we did at the time of the Manchurian crisis, when we deliberately chose the wrong road, as we did at the time of the Ethiopian crisis when we again chose the wrong road, with consequences which were only too clear in 1939.
As far as we of the C.C.F. are concerned there is only one road to follow, and that is the path of collective security. It is only by pursuing that path that we feel there can be any salvation. Without whatever instrument of collective security we can build up in the United Nations, we shall be faced with the inevitability of war in perhaps the predictable future.
In this world we must have either the rule of law or chaos. We either have order in international dealings or we have anarchy. The history of the past 30 years has proved that abundantly. We as a party want to see law and order maintained in this world. We believe that law and order is more important than peace, because peace may be illusory and peace can be negative. Law and order implies that we shall use force if necessary to maintain it. Having maintained it, then peace is a by-product.
We are convinced that our hope lies in collective security. We are a most fortunate country. We are wealthy and our standards


of living are extraordinarily high. We have the confidence of a substantial number of nations in the world and we have no acquisitive aims.
We can afford on occasion to be disinterested, but not too much so. There was a tendency when this crisis broke out at the end of October to be too disinterested. It was thought by some that we had no material interest in sight as far as Suez was concerned, but there was something else. We have to be interested because this is becoming an increasingly smaller world. At the time of the Fathers of Confederation it took longer to go from Ottawa to Toronto than it now takes to go half way around the world. The miles are still there but the time has been cut down to a few hours.
Our neighbours are not only those who live in the house next to us or in the street next to us. Our neighbours are those who live in countries far away and of whom perhaps even yet we know nothing. We are not isolated any longer on this continent by mighty oceans nor are we insulated any longer by the Polar icecap. The world is much too small for that. It is a world which is fast becoming a community, and so we had a very vital interest, if not a material one, in what was happening in the Suez area. I take it for granted that the vital interest of this parliament and this country is the maintenance of peace in the world. Anything which threatens that is a blow at our own vital and national interests and peace was threatened there. In marked contradistinction to this lack of action of 20 years ago we have taken action which perhaps may yet lead to the salvation of the whole situation.
There are those who regret collective action. There are those who feel we should still stand by the side of the United Kingdom even at the cost of sacrificing the United Nations. These are men and women who have learned nothing from history. If we destroy the United Nations what are our alternatives in this country and, indeed, in other countries in the world? What would our commitments for defence be, for instance, in a world which would deny law and order, in a world which would scorn justice, in a world which would prefer the barbarism of the jungle to what I consider to be the sanity of co-operative and collective action? The price would be incredibly high, not only at first in terms of money but ultimately in terms of the lives of another generation of Canadians. It is a price which we as a party are certainly not prepared to pay, and we insist that the authority of the United Nations must be maintained.

We in Canada, along with other nations, have, by our sins of omission and commission, helped to undermine the United Nations. We have gone far on the road. Now we have the opportunity to rebuild it and to give that collective security which the world needs if it is going to survive. For that reason we support this policy which the government is presenting to us. We support it because we believe it to be right. That does not mean to say we are going to refrain from criticism when discussing details but in principle we support the policy because it is correct.
It would be a very easy thing to rake over the past and try to assess the blame for what has happened in the last few weeks. It would be very easy but it would be very fruitless. No good could come out of it. Rather I concentrate on what I said earlier. Here we have an opportunity to do something, to build something. What should we be doing? We have got to consider the facts, of course, as they existed in the last few weeks and in the last few years, and one of the most obvious facts which has been clear for centuries is that in a world where jungle law prevails, when a nation feels its vital interests are at stake, that nation is going to fight. Unfortunately there are still those who believe that this is nothing but a world of power politics, a world of the jungle, and there are those who have resorted to force because they felt that the United Nations could not protect their vital interests.
But I call you to witness, Mr. Speaker, that if the United Nations is weak it is precisely because these nations themselves have weakened it. The instrument was there. It is an instrument where for once we see a whole which is greater than the parts but the nations which are members of the United Nations have not used it as the people of the world hoped they would use it when the war ended in 1945. We know because we have virtually been told by the United Kingdom that if they feel their oil supplies are threatened they are prepared to fight to maintain them. Therefore it would be the better part of wisdom, I submit, to use the United Nations to see that as far as possible these oil supplies are maintained.
We have known quite a number of things about Colonel Nasser, especially those of us who have read his short philosophy of life which he published a few years ago in which he told us that there was a role in the Middle East looking for a hero. Unquestionably Colonel Nasser feels himself to be that hero. Unquestionably his aspiration is to lead the people of the Arab world. He has got a right 81537-6}
The Address-Mr. A. Stewart to his aspirations but that right ceases when his actions run counter to the welfare of other peoples.
We have also known the fact for the Arab states have declared it as a matter of policy that they intend to destroy the state of Israel. That was not hidden at any time. We have known also as a fact that the Arab nations would not enter into peace negotiations with that little democracy in the Middle East. So Israel felt itself in danger, and I think understandably so, because we have also known for a number of years now that the fedayeen, inspired in no small measure by Egypt, have been going into Israel murdering and marauding. I had personal experience of this just a little over a year ago. Every night for the first two weeks that I was in Israel some innocent villager, some member of a kibbutz, was being killed by the fedayeen, and the temper of the people there began to make itself felt. They wanted this stopped because it had not been going on just for a few weeks but had been going on for months and, indeed, years.
Finally, one night when we were in Tel Aviv, five Israeli villagers were murdered in the coldest of cold blood only 15 miles away by Arab marauders. The temper of the people could then be almost physically felt and no government could ignore its people when these indications were abroad. Action was taken, swift and condign. In the Gaza strip Khan Yunis, which was an Egyptian military base, was attacked and wiped out, and for a few hours there were many of us who thought that this was perhaps the beginning of the war which we feared. But no war came of it. We had a cessation of these attacks for a while and then once Nasser felt the Suez was his they started again and the situation became even worse until, with a policy of what I consider to be calculated desperation, Israel went into the Sinai peninsula.
Without question Israel was guilty of aggression, but without question in my mind there are excuses there which are very powerful indeed, and the most important is that time after time cases of aggression-and Israel had been guilty quite frequently as well as the Arabs-had been taken to the United Nations starting with the preventing of Israeli ships from going through the canal, and the United Nations had not acted. So Israel acted on its own and I think in error because small nations cannot afford to indulge in power politics. Even bigger ones cannot afford it, as the United Kingdom and France have found out. Only the biggest nations can afford that sort of luxury.
So we have the situation which confronts us today. The operation conducted by the

The Address-Mr. A. Stewart United Kingdom and France has been a fiasco. It has been a failure. One good thing which has come out of it is that both the United Kingdom and France have been inhibited by an age-old sense of law and order from going further and defying the United Nations further. I think that is one of the most encouraging aspects of the whole situation, but encouraging though that may be the fact remains that the commonwealth has been rocked to its foundations. NATO has been shaken and two nations which ought to have the regard of the world have now been condemned by it.
Another factor in the situation today is that Russia is now a power of some magnitude in the Middle East and, dependent upon western diplomacy, may become dominant. It has been said, and I concur, that the United States has got to take much of the responsibility for the shambles which exists in that part of the world, but again I say it is fruitless to try to allot the blame.
What can we do to rescue ourselves and the world from this mess that we are in? What are the requisites for peace in that area? The C.C.F. has suggested six points which are proposed as being worthy of consideration. My leader covered them yesterday. The first is that we extend United Nations police action to cover the borders with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon as I for one am convinced that we shall have to do yet if we want to maintain peace in that area. Second, there must be a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab states. This would imply, of course, Arab recognition of Israel, the guarantee of Israel's borders and the lifting of the blockade in the Suez and the gulf of Aqaba. The third suggestion is that a solution to the Suez problem can be found along the lines of India's proposal to the 18-power conference of which the minister and hon. members are aware. The fourth suggestion is resettlement and rehabilitation of the refugees. The fifth suggestion is that a Tennessee Valley Authority type of program be instituted for the Nile valley to replace the scheme for the Aswan dam. The sixth suggestion is a general United Nations economic program for the whole area, providing for the use of such waters as the Jordan to increase the fertility of the desert. The desert can be made very fertile and can be made to blossom as the rose. That is a statement from the Old Testament and not one of mine, although I have heard it attributed to somebody much more recent than an Old Testament prophet. You have two types of sand in that area. You have the sand of the seashore which is disintegrated rock and you have the sand of the desert which once upon a time was the most fertile of earth but which

has been allowed through the years to go to waste and to ruin. The desert once again can be made to blossom, but it needs water; and so far as Jordan, Syria and Israel are concerned, that water is going to come in no small measure from the river Jordan. It is a pity that both Syria and Jordan have adopted in the past such a dog-in-the-manger attitude towards the utilization of that water because by using it as other rivers have been used in Israel, great numbers of people could have been fed who today I fear are in desperate circumstances.
So far as Suez is concerned we ought to have some more definite ideas in mind. I think, of course, that it is the duty of the United Nations to get that canal cleared. But after that has been done, I cannot see where the responsibility of the United Nations lies for protecting the Suez from then on. Surely the Suez canal is something which, rightly or wrongly, Egypt has taken over and which lies entirely in Egyptian territory. The duty of the United Nations force, in the long run has to be to guarantee the borders of the countries in the Middle East, not to protect the Suez canal unless it appears to be completely convinced that Colonel Nasser and the Egyptians cannot protect it. But there are other things which should be done. I believe the United Nations should offer to Colonel Nasser the technical help of men and women who can help him, if necessary, to run the canal. I believe, of course, that when Nasser takes it over, as he has done, he should pay those who are the owners of the canal, and pay them an amount to be agreed upon by some international board or by some board of conciliation. But I think that we must then be in a position where the United Nations can help the Egyptians to run that canal. There ought to be a convention open to all the signatories of the United Nations charter, and to other nations for that matter, guaranteeing freedom of access at all times to the canal; and where there are any disputes or differences, there must be agreement that those disputes or differences be referred to the international court of justice. In return for the promise of peace by these countries in the Middle East, a massive scheme of social and economical rehabilitation should be entered into by all the nations of the United Nations. That will be expensive but it is going to be much cheaper to prevent a war than it is going to be to stop a war after it has started. Of this much I am certain, and I think I know a little of the temper of the people in that area. Unless there is international action, violence is going to start again.
The world cannot afford it and we cannot afford it in this country. We cannot afford

the threat and promise of war if there is no international action. I therefore say it is going to pay us to play our part in policing these borders. As far as Israel and the Arab nations are concerned there must be, of course, agreement about borders. If possible, that result should be arrived at on a basis of mutual agreement. If it cannot be arrived at in that way, if there is intransigence on one side or the other, I think the United Nations will be obliged to impose an agreement on the recalcitrant countries in that area. Israel must be prepared-and they have said they are-to pay for whatever Arab property they have taken. They must be prepared to pay their share-and a substantial share-in the rehabilitation of the Arab refugees.
Those of us who know of the situation there know how desperate is the plight of the refugees in the Arab countries surrounding Israel. The Arab nations have done little to help their own kinsmen but the world must take it as part of its responsibility. Then as I said, there must be found an answer to the problem of the distribution of water resources. With that water the refugees can be resettled in neighbouring countries and given a chance to earn a living or to obtain a living which is the right of every human creature. But these things are going to cost money; and that money must come, in no small measure, from the nations which have it. I suggested earlier in this house, namely last January-and my leader suggested it yesterday-that since the root of the trouble in the Middle East is oil, we ought to expect a substantial amount of money from this resource to help to resettle and improve the conditions of the Arabs in the Middle East. If I were an Arab living in Saudi Arabia, I would be quite incensed at the thought that some $500 million of profit each year was being taken out of my country, half being given to a dissolute monarch and the other half going to private companies in other parts of the world. I made a suggestion earlier. I do not know any other answer. There may be one. If the minister has it, I should like to know it. I suggested it would be in the interest of world peace if the nations which have the companies in there would nationalize these companies, pay the owners of the companies a reasonable sum of money and then say to the United Nations, "We are prepared to give the proceeds from the selling of the oil to the United Nations so that it may be used for the rehabilitation of that part of the world". I admit that it would be expensive to buy out the owners. But nevertheless there would be some $800 million to $900 million revenue each year which could be
The Address-Mr. Pearkes used for the rehabilitation of which I speak. There are no courses of action we can suggest to settle this problem which do not have dangers. However, I am convinced that we have less danger when we face up to our responsibilities and are prepared to act. I hope that this leadership which is being given by Canada is not temporary because "temporary" is not long enough. This must be permanent. Under the threat of tragedy we have been prepared to take leadership. There is no reason why we cannot continue to take that leadership and assume the responsibilities which leadership will thrust on us. I agree and concur that there will be danger. But I think of what Shakespeare said, "Out of this nettle, danger, we pluck the flower, safety".


George Randolph Pearkes: Mr. Speaker, I had hoped that the Minister of National Defence would have risen in this debate and given us a clearer picture of Canada's contribution to the United Nations emergency force which is being assembled for operations in the Middle East. The only accurate information that we have been given since this debate started was in reply to a question that I asked this morning with regard to the numbers which were going to make up the components from the Canadian navy, army and air force, contingent, and the rather vaguer information which the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) gave to the house in his remarks yesterday when he made certain references to the battalion which was to be sent and to the ancillary forces which would be accompanying that battalion. I want to make it quite clear at the outset that I realize this United Nations emergency force is going to the Middle East for police duty, but I am not at all clear as to exactly what is meant by police action.
It seems to me this term, which has come into more frequent use during recent years, applies to the sort of garrison duties which the scarlet coated soldiers of the Queen, during Queen Victoria's reign, carried out policing the world and maintaining the pax Britannica. I do recall that when the operation commenced in Korea it was stated in this house on numerous occasions that it was a police action and that there was not war in Korea. That may be so, and the brigade which we sent to Korea may have gone out there believing that they were to carry out police action to stop the fighting or to assist in stopping the fighting between the north and south Koreans, the former receiving assistance from China and Russia. These men soon found they were fighting for their lives and that the police action in Korea had become a very dangerous operation.
78	HOUSE OF
The Address-Mr. Pearkes
I think, with that experience behind us, we should examine very carefully to see that these forces which we are now intending to send to the Middle East are so equipped that, in the event of the situation developing in the Middle East into one similar to that which developed in Korea, they have at least a reasonable chance of survival. I also recall the expedition which was sent to Hong Kong in the early part of the war. Japan was not at war at that time. These Canadian battalions were sent to Hong Kong for garrison duty, police duty perhaps, and we know the tragic fate of those battalions because they were not equipped when they arrived in Hong Kong to carry out modern, warlike operations, be they described as police operations or actual fighting.
Well, we will accept the statement that these troops are not going to Suez for the purpose of fighting, that they are not a fighting force as the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) said today. But these men are soldiers, airmen and sailors-[DOT] men of the Royal Canadian Navy-who have been trained to fight and, if necessary, are prepared to do so. They are going to the Middle East for the purpose, as was said this afternoon, of separating the opposing forces of fighting men. I feel that it is imperative this government assures the country that the force it is sending, and the forces with which it will be co-operating, is an efficient force capable of carrying out the assignments which the United Nations have given to it. It is essential for us, and for the United Nations, to make quite certain that the forces are not only adequate but also thoroughly efficient and capable of doing the task they are called upon to do.
It might be worth while to remember that even a modern police force today is an extremely mobile force. You see the cruiser cars patrolling around any city, equipped with the modern means of communication, because they realize that the gangster of today is also an extremely mobile individual. These remarks apply just as forcibly to the international gangster or the gangster nation as they do to the individual. No longer does the bandit of 100 years ago, who was then merely armed with clubs and spears, represent the international gangster of today. These armies which are now opposing each other in the Middle East, we know, are equipped with modern aircraft, modern tanks and a generous supply of the most up-to-date arms which can be manufactured and bought from the various nations in the world.
It would be well for us, I think to examine for a moment the geography of the area in which our forces will be operating. The


Suez canal, roughly speaking, is about 100 miles long, running through Egypt from north to south. The approaches from the Egyptian side are extremely limited. They are practically confined to two main roads running into Ismailia and to Suez, with a lateral road running parallel to the canal. The greater portion of the western or Egyptian side of the canal is marshland through which it would be extremely difficult for a force of any size to move. In the past two wars we have seen how difficult it was for the forces who were there to defend the canal, to operate and manoeuvre on the western side. But on the eastern side of Suez is the Sinai desert. As everybody knows, that is a rolling, sandy strip of country with comparatively few obstacles in it, and providing forces can move through the desert, they can reach the Suez canal at almost any point.
It will be recalled that in 1914 a mobile force of Turks crossed that desert, reached the Suez canal and even had some of their men get to the western side of the canal. During the years which intervened between the first and second wars much of that desert land was watched by the Royal Air Force and the armoured corps regiments of the British army. During the second war, if there was one lesson which the armies of the world learned, it was that extreme mobility was required in any desert fighting. You had the examples in Africa, both of the German-African corps and of the British eighth army, both extremely mobile forces, and so I was rather surprised when I heard the Prime Minister indicate yesterday that the contributions that were to be made by the United Nations contributing to this United Nations emergency force would be the sending of a battalion or a self-contained unit. That, apparently, is the suggestion which has been made.
Then, we heard today that the main composition of the Canadian contingent was to be an infantry battalion. Therefore, it seems to me that those forces which are to operate in this desert country, watching a frontier of a thousand miles or so, are to consist of infantry battalions operating in the Sinai desert, apparently based on the various oases that there may be in that sandy stretch of country. It does not seem to me that experience has shown that that is the right type of force to be used.
Reference was made this afternoon to their being a balanced force, balanced from the military point of view and from the geographical or, I suppose, political point of view. But a force composed almost entirely of infantry battalions certainly does not seem to me to be a balanced force. The one type of troops or police force which would be able to carry

out most effectively the duties of patrolling that frontier and of seeing that the forces of the two opposing countries did not clash would be light armoured formations, or reconnaissance units, backed up by squadrons of an air force, with a limited number of men distributed either along the canal banks or throughout the desert.
I saw one statement made by what I consider to be an authoritative source that two armoured divisions would be required to patrol effectively the frontier, with a number of reconnaissance squadrons of an air force. Now, it is all very well for the government to shelter behind General Burns and the United Nations. When I heard the Prime Minister making his speech yesterday I wondered whether he was not attempting to create a scapegoat in General Burns in case things went wrong, and to push the responsibility of having provided an adequate force upon him and to make it possible for the government to say that General Burns asked for this, or did not ask for that.
We are not in the position to know what General Burns has asked for; we have to take that secondhand from the government. There is no possible chance for General Burns to come here and to express to us what he considers is the right type of force that he should be equipped with. We do not know whether he is satisfied as to the contingents which are being supplied. He will not grumble about the type of men which is going, and I am certain that the nations will send him their best young men; but whether they are going to be equipped, whether they are adequately trained and whether they have the means of seeing what is going on and of striking back, should it be necessary for them to use force if they were attacked in their duties of trying to separate the contending forces, we do not know. We cannot know unless there is some committee of this house appointed before which General Burns might appear. We are not likely to get that. Therefore, the government does have to assume the responsibility of sending men to join an international force which they must determine is or is not an effective force, and of giving the men that they send every chance of survival. If there is any doubt in the minds of the government, or of the people of this country-and there is doubt in my mind-that this force which is now in being, we were told today, in Egypt, is an efficient force, or if its composition is likely to be able to perform the task that it has been assigned. If the government is not satisfied, then it is the responsibility of the government to make that known quite clearly
The Address-Mr. Pearkes to the United Nations and to ask for certain changes; in fact, to demand such changes as it may consider necessary.
This government will not be allowed to hide behind the United Nations, or General Burns, in the execution of its responsibilities to give its soldiers, sailors and airmen a reasonable chance of carrying out the duties they are asked to perform.
We were told by the Secretary of State for External Affairs today that this force is in being in Egypt. I wondered whether the Secretary of State for External Affairs meant that the force was on paper and ready to go to Egypt. And when he told us that that force was composed of 1,700 men-I think he said made up from eight different nations of which 20 per cent was supplied by Canada -I wondered whether he really meant that the force was in being. Now, a force of
1.700	men, even though there may be other forces ready in other parts of the world, can hardly be considered an efficient and effective force to stop the fighting between two opposing countries, unless those two countries are perfectly prepared to stop all operations of raiding, commando activities, and so forth, in which case there is no need then for a police force. If there is need for a police force, then the force must be an effective one. A force of 1,700 men made up of various detachments and services from many countries certainly cannot be considered an effective force to patrol a frontier of 1,000 miles or more and to intervene in that very difficult country.
I would like to know if France and Great Britain have indicated to the United Nations what they would consider an efficient force to take over the duties that they are now carrying out and which they say they are prepared to abandon as soon as this effective force reaches the Middle East. They have already made token withdrawals. Are they prepared to make further token withdrawals on the strength that this force in Egypt of
1.700	men is now available? I wonder.
I would like to know what Great Britain and France consider is a force, adequate to do the task, which the United Nations has told Great Britain and France they will supply and for which Great Britain and France have both agreed to withdraw their own forces as soon as the effective force arrives.
Turning to Canada's contribution, I gather that at present there are only a few hundred men, engineers, signallers, ordnance, army service corps, R.E.M.E., the administrative element of the force, which have actually reached Egypt. We have not been told the exact number of Canadians who have actually

The Address-Mr. Pearkes arrived but obviously it is the administrative force to provide the headquarters which is necessary for General Burns in order to assign the other troops to their allotted tasks, plus the navy with the Magnificent.
For the life of me I cannot understand why it was considered desirable to take the armaments off the Magnificent. I admit that the anti-aircraft guns which were on the Magnificent were not the most up-to-date antiaircraft guns which are available but they did offer some protection, protection perhaps against training aircraft and that sort of thing; but to strip the Magnificent of all its armaments seems to me to have been carrying things too far.
I know it can be said that they required the ammunition bunkers perhaps for the accommodation of troops, but troops are troops whether they are being carried on an armed or unarmed battleship or on an ordinary commercial liner, and of course could be attacked should anybody try to interfere with their movement.
Then we come to the question of our air support. It is not air support to the force at all. It consists merely of transport planes being used to move the forces into the area in which they are to be stationed. There is no indication from what the minister said this afternoon that any reconnaissance aircraft would be made available in order to watch the movement of the forces and to alert the ground troops of any possible impending danger or any disturbance into which they might be required to move rapidly in order to carry out their police actions. Surely some reconnaissance squadrons of the R.C.A.F. or of some other country-and we have no indication that any other country is supplying them-would be absolutely essential.
Regarding the army contingent which is being supplied there is a reasonable distribution of those services such as the engineers, signals, the army service corps, medical, ordnance and R.E.M.E. The bulk of the force is to be made up of the first battalion of the Queen's Own. I know what the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) said regarding the Queen's Own. He said, as reported at page 20 of Hansard;
. . . that battalion having been groomed and being on the point of being called upon to replace another battalion in Europe would naturally be the one which we would consider and which we would think of first to take on this new duty in pursuit of the objectives of the United Nations.
I would like the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) when he introduces his estimates to tell us how that first battalion of the Queen's Own was made up. The impression has been given in this house in the last two days that the Queen's Own were

ready at a moment's notice to go and carry out their duties, that it was the first battalion which was going.
I happened to say goodbye on the docks at Victoria to some 240 officers and men of the second battalion of the Queen's Own Rifles which were hurriedly dispatched in order to bring up to strength the first battalion of the Queen's Own Rifles which was stationed in Calgary and concerning which the Prime Minister certainly gave this house the impression they were ready to go.
I saw those men leave. Every able-bodied rifleman who was medically fit and who had reached his eighteenth birthday was taken away from the second battalion. There were only the seventeen-year-olds, the medically unfit, the officers and non-commissioned officers left in the second battalion. The second battalion has been cannibalized in order to bring up to strength the first battalion.
It has been stressed here that we have forces ready to move wherever they are required. Here the first battalion which is on the roster for location duty had to be augmented, to my personal knowledge, by something over 240 men and some of those men had been in the unit for only a few short months, less than six months. A large number of them were under nineteen years of age.
Now, I do not know what was the condition of the first battalion of the Queen's Own but I would like to know how many men in the force are under nineteen years of age because it has always been the practice in the past that men who were under nineteen would not be allowed to leave Canada; and mind you, these youngsters, mere boys, are not hardened veterans nor are they men with long training. They are being sent into the desert where conditions will be entirely different from anything they have experienced in Canada.
I feel that this country has been misled as to the efficiency of our forces if the situation as apparently existed in the Queen's Own regiment exists in the other units of the regular army here in Canada. We were led to believe yesterday by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) that the first battalion of the Queen's Own was ready to move to Germany, that it was first on the rotation list. Yet when the call came it had to send a large number of 18-year-old recruits with only a few months' training and also had to draw over 240 men from another battalion. I do not know how many other units were called upon to supply drafts in order to build up the strength.
Those are the types of troops which Canada is sending. Are we certain that they are

going to operate with other efficient units? Are we certain that the contributions being made by some of these other countries are in the form of efficient units? The secretary of state did not give us the names of the countries which were contributing contingents, although he did refer to Colombia, Rumania and Czechoslovakia. We know that there have been 100 men or so from Norway, a few Danes and a few Swedes, according to press reports, but I have seen no indication that there has been one single efficient unit sent to this force as yet.
I do feel that it is the duty of this government to assure us that the men being sent out of Canada are capable of surviving the hardships of this police duty in the Middle East, in the desert country, and whether there is an organization behind them to ensure that their welfare will be looked after, and mainly that they will be co-operating with other efficient units and that this force will be capable of carrying out the task to which it has been assigned.
I am by no means convinced and I do not think the country feels happy at the present time or that there has been any assurance that this United Nations force is an effective and efficient force. From what we have been told today, 1,700 men have arrived and are referred to as a force in being. That certainly shocked and surprised me. I am delighted that it has been considered wise to hold back the Queen's Own for the time being. We do not want to see them let down by this government; we do not want them to arrive in difficult country with an extremely difficult task to carry out and be unsupported either by other services from the Canadian army or by the armies of other countries which are co-operating.
I feel that before this debate is over we should have a statement from the Minister of National Defence or the Secretary of State for External Affairs as to the type of force with which our troops are to co-operate. There should be assurance that it is a balanced force, as referred to by the secretary of state, not merely from the geographical point of view but from the military point of view as well.
I repeat what I said at the beginning. I am perfectly conscious of the fact that they are going out there as a form of police force, that they are not to be considered at the present time as an expeditionary force. It is devoutly hoped that they will not have to carry out military operations; but soldiers cannot survive on pious hopes, they have to be prepared for whatever may happen.
The Address-Mr. J. B. Hamilton


Mr. John B. Hamilton (York West):: Mr. Speaker, I do not think there has been a more important occasion during which I have had an opportunity to speak in this house than that which is offered today. I remember the crowded galleries with almost every seat filled when only a few months ago we debated the trans-Canada pipeline. This is a problem which affects not only our pocketbooks but our very lives, but it seems to have created far less interest than did that previous debate.
There is nothing to be gained at this time by wrangling over what was done or should have been done. Nothing that we can say in this house can remake the past. The problem that we face today is what can this country do to serve the cause of peace in the world now, today, on this 27th day of November, 1956. This is not to say that we on this side of the house should agree with what the government has done, but I do believe that the gravity of the situation is such that this matter should be discussed in a non-partisan atmosphere.
If you should say to us that we have contributed in some way to creating an atmosphere not of that kind, then I say to you people opposite that in the first place the propaganda machine which you have used, the attempts which you have made to create the impression that you, the members of the Liberal party, have been the saviours of the world in this instance, have been the causes of any disagreement which may exist. Had you approached this problem as being one where Canada was going to make a great contribution to world peace I am sure there would have been very few differences of opinion in this house today.
Having said that, may I say that for myself there would have been no question about where I thought this country should have stood on October 29 at the beginning of the crisis which we now face. But I do say as well that many people sincerely believe that a larger and broader based organization such as the United Nations was absolutely necessary to deal with this particular question.
I sympathize with their views but I cannot help but think that over the last 20 years the planned program of this government has cut us off completely from the commonwealth. If I needed any support for my views in that connection, I need only remember the questions which I asked the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) when he returned from London a few months ago. I could only get one impression, that he regarded the commonwealth now as being some type of very fine social club. No, this is not the kind of attitude that will go towards solving the situation with which we are faced today. Neither

The Address-Mr. J. B. Hamilton will we solve it by the ivory tower outlook that I have heard expressed today from my left. I do not think that I need to refer to the question of appeasement, which has taken place so often in the past. What difference is there between a Nasser in 1956 at the Suez and a Hitler in the Rhineland or a Mussolini in Ethiopia? Had these first steps been taken by our friends in those days, as they did at Suez, we might have avoided world war II.
What is to be accomplished from the practical standpoint now? There is no easy way out of this problem, no way of just stepping in between two opposing forces, because the major problems will still exist. First of all at this time we must ensure that the international canal users association is made a fact, is made an effective contribution to solving the problem in the Middle East. Second, there is no use talking about this problem unless at the same time we insist that there is a permanent guarantee of peace between Israel and the Arab states. Third, we can accomplish all other things but I say that as long as the present dictator of Egypt remains in his place we will not have really solved any problem.
I gathered from the remarks of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) that there is an indication in one of the resolutions before the United Nations that this force at the same time that it is to implement the guarantee of the cease-fire is also to ensure that a solution is obtained covering the international use of the Suez canal. That resolution was referred to but we have heard little since as to what plans this government has to ensure that that matter of principle is attended to at the same time that the belligerents are separated. Can it be accomplished with the type of force that we are sending there?
These are questions, sir, that still remain unanswered even after the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and, with the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes), I am still awaiting word from the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) about how he feels about the composition of his forces being able to carry out that duty in addition to the initial duty they are called upon to perform.
But perhaps the most important problem of all three is the question of a permanent peace between Israel and Egypt. What we seem to fail to recognize is that an actual state of war has existed there now for almost ten years. I think we may say that we are fortunate that in this case we have a country believing in the principles of democracy which has the will to resist. In this instance we do

not have a country entirely surrounded by unfriendly states. We have a country which has the ability to get the supplies of war and preserve its sovereignty and contribute to preserving that sovereignty itself. I think we should be thankful that in this instance a country such as Israel is willing to fight for its own freedom. If we are not prepared to contribute to maintaining peace between Egypt and Israel we will have made a mockery of our work in the United Nations. We will have let the world believe that we, as others, think that passing resolutions alone will do the trick.
It seems to me that the third problem, that of Nasser, could be solved. I think that it might have been solved some time ago by other means but it could be solved now. If we openly insisted that the other two matters referred to be dealt with at this time and that there will be no fooling around with this force unless these things can be accomplished, I think that the dictator of Egypt would be removed by his own people without force from outside.
But what is our force being used for? Last night I listened to a news round-up broadcast on the C.B.C., and I think we can believe the report from Cairo that the Egyptians are adopting the international army as their own. Along with their own forces they are taking them as an indication of their strength and their power to have Britain and France move out of this area. What a mockery it is to the position that this country holds in the commonwealth that such a thing could happen to troops sent from these shores, that they should be used in a force which will remove British and French troops from Egypt!
What are we going to do about it? I heard someone on my left say again today that he did not know what we thought should be done about it. I say first of all that it is still not too late to reinstate behind the commonwealth front the moral and spiritual fibre that this country once contributed so generously. Second, no matter what we thought in the first instance about the policy of the commonwealth or of the United Nations, let us be realistic enough now to know that without British and French intervention nothing would have been done in the United Nations permanently to solve this problem except the passing of resolutions. Third, let us ensure that the force that we are sending is the effective force which the British and French have requested be put into this area. I need say nothing further about that matter because the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes) described fully what an extremely capable army man thinks about the force at

the present time. Let us not put our troops in as a sham. If the principle is important enough to put troops in at all, the principle is important enough for us to say that we want those troops in under the control of the United Nations, not under the control of Nasser. It is vital for us to put them in on the basis that they will solve not only the problem of the separation of the two combatants but also the problem of the Suez canal. At the same time they should help ensure that these nations can be got together and that a permanent peace may be arranged between the two countries.
Here at home, Mr. Speaker, what can we do? Let us realize that we have moved into one of the most critical times in the history of this country again, I think, unprepared physically, from the standpoint of our armed forces, to take care of an extremely serious situation and unprepared from a moral and spiritual standpoint to put behind the forces the power that is needed. Let us ensure that right away-there is no time to lose-a complete survey of the manpower of this country be made in order that, if crises such as this should arise in the future which may spread into world war III, from the physical standpoint, from the army and the navy and the air force standpoint, this country will be prepared. In addition we must know if we can be prepared from the technical standpoint as well. Let us get ready by seeing that the component arms of our army are mechanized, well equipped, mobile and able to handle situations like this in a hurry. As was said by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, this is no job for infantry men. I rather imagine that at the present time we do not have even one Recce regiment around. Let us get ready by seeing to it that our forces can be airlifted in a hurry not simply from Calgary to Halifax, and then on the basis that we may be obliged to call in the United States Air Force to do the rest of the job but on the basis that when a large force must be moved we have the wherewithal to do it.
I think at this time we might be preparing in one other way. We discussed this matter with the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) during the consideration of his estimates. We have a crisis facing us right now. I should like to know from him how well prepared he is to bring back to Canada the dependents of his forces abroad. If this condition continues it may even be wise for these people to be started home now; because if anything worse could happen to us, it would be to involve the civilian wives and families of the servicemen abroad.
The Address-Mr. Michener
These are the ways in which we can start doing something now to ensure that a permanent solution is arrived at for this problem and in the future be ready to play our full part in world affairs.


Mr. Roland Michener (SI. Paul's):: Mr. Speaker, parliament has been called to consider matters which affect our international relationships in all of their important aspects. Briefly, those aspects are our relationships with our neighbour the United States; our relationships in the commonwealth; our relationships as a member of NATO; and our relationships as a member of the United Nations.
The debate to this point has indicated that there are areas of difference and that there are areas of agreement. I propose to begin by dealing with an area of agreement. In his closing remarks the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) indicated that the great need at this time was to close the ranks of the western alliance and to restore and to present a solid front. I heartily endorse that statement and I wish to reinforce it by a brief account of a recent experience which has indicated to me the importance of the restoration of that understanding and co-operation particularly between Canada and her two most important associates in the world, namely the United Kingdom and the United States.
With other members of this house I have just returned from a conference of NATO parliamentarians which was held in the city of Paris at NATO headquarters, Le Palais de Chaillot, at one time the seat of the United Nations before it moved to the United States. Throughout five days some 200 parliamentarians from 15 NATO countries considered the present world situation, problems of defence and international co-operation just as we are considering them in this house today but in perhaps a slightly different context. Those delegations were, I think, reasonably representative and important delegations and give some indication of the attitude of the parliaments from which they came. There was a large delegation from the United States, many of the members being recently elected senators of both parties and congressmen. One of the congressmen was chairman of the conference. I refer to this matter because there-and I think my colleagues who were there will agree with me-the keynote of the discussion, which was at many times frank and pointed, was that although the actions of Britain and France, two of the members of NATO, had involved all of the members of NATO and their international relationships, the time was not one for finely-drawn criticism or recrimination but rather one for the

The Address-Mr. Michener restoration of complete accord among the NATO countries so that they could proceed to deal with the very real problems that confront the western alliance today. Those problems are not simply military but they have become economic in a very real sense when one considers that gasoline rationing is already a reality in western Europe and that these countries are entering winter with a possible shortage of fuel oil for heat and for industry. It was that note which was concurred in by all parliamentarians from all countries which appeared to develop in recent weeks, and it is that note which I say is the important note for us in the consideration of our international relations in a broader sense at this time, and in the immediate future, because there is the greatest urgency for the restoration of, and the perpetuation of, cooperation not only in the military sphere as we have it in NATO, but on the political side and to some extent in the economic and cultural fields as well.
I was impressed by the fact that NATO, Mr. Speaker, possesses the only international police force in the world today which has a chief of staff, headquarters staff and forces, naval, air and army, capable of dealing with a situation such as that which exists in the Middle East today. Of course, NATO is a regional arrangement under the charter of the United Nations. It is part of the United Nations concept and is not inconsistent with it. This point is made in the charter itself, at the very commencement. If the United Nations were capable today of fielding and using a force such as NATO has, instead of the improvised force which my colleague the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes) has been reviewing and analysing as to its capacity to deal with this problem, we would have a great deal more confidence in the immediate future than we have with the plans which are now laid before us.
We all know in this house, of course, that NATO is a purely defensive alliance which is limited to the defence of western Europe and the North Atlantic area. This was its purpose and will, presumably, continue to be its purpose. It has no power to enter into arrangements or to undertake commitments which are not defensive or which involve territories other than those of the western European countries, the North Atlantic countries and only that part of North Africa, Algeria, which is part of continental France.
It is a matter of conjecture, which is perhaps out of place in this rather specialized debate, to consider NATO as the keystone of our defence: it is the keystone of our defence by the general accord of all parties in this house. We know where the greatest danger

to our safety lies in the present world. We know that the way that danger has been restrained has been by a defensive military alliance which we call NATO, and by the power of NATO forces combined with that of its members to retaliate in the event of a breach of the peace; that is the real assurance for the peaceful existence which we enjoy and which western Europe enjoys and which, for that matter, the world enjoys.
While that clears the main line of defence, it does not deal with the sort of problem which we experienced in Korea and which we now have to consider in the Middle East. It is a problem involving the taking of responsibility for police action by some country or organization of countries in the situation which I think is bound to arise, which has arisen, and which will arise again. I think we must face the fact that in different parts of the world military action will be taken. There will be conflict on a limited scale which does not involve the two great major powers in the world directly but perhaps is the result of the indirect action of one of them acting.
This kind of local disturbance which we have in the Middle East must be dealt with by some effective force if order and peace are to be maintained. It was into that situation that the British and French stepped, in the way they have been accustomed to do, and in the way in which the world has seen such problems dealt with in the past. Whatever may be said or whatever may be thought of the action that was taken, it is the sort of action that was necessary. I believe we are all agreed upon the fact that some kind of police action in that area, not only the policeman who sits in the sentry box but the policeman who is capable of enforcing the law, was necessary. Now, we have departed into an alternative course from the one which was initiated by Britain and France after Israel had attacked Egypt and thereby precipitated the war.
We have before us for approval another sort of police action, and the problem which disturbs me and which I wish to present to the house is whether in changing horses, or in changing policemen in this case, in the middle of the action we are going to achieve the results which we all hope will be achieved, or whether we are not likely to fall between the two concepts of the remedy which could be applied to a solution of this problem in the near East. I think that everyone appreciates this is not a new question. Certainly the government appreciates that this is not a new question. The Canadian government, and it is the same government, has been a party for some eight years

or more to the action in the U.N. which set up the state of Israel and which has permitted the uneasy armistice or cease-fire to exist beyond the toleration of the Israelis themselves. Such a question cannot be left indefinitely. I think the government is open to censure on that score, but certainly no more than any of the other governments who were a party to the creation of this situation. They must take responsibility for allowing this thing to come to the point where police action on an individual basis of selfhelp, if I may put it that way, was necessary.
Now, self-help is not an unknown concept to private law. We know very well that our orderly society exists today only because there is a policeman. We know that there are always disorderly elements, human nature being what it is. Once the restraining force is removed the law is broken. In fact, the law itself, if you are an Austinian as I am, depends for its validity on there being sanctions. The law is not a custom which everybody observes by consent. It is something which is agreed upon and which must be observed under the compulsion of some method of force; that is the situation in local and municipal societies. Even there, it is well known that if you are attacked and a policeman is not around, you have the capacity and the right to defend yourself. You also have the right to come to the rescue of a fellow citizen who is attacked by a law breaker, and the idea of self-help is not one which any reasonable person would repudiate, because it is human nature to help and it is not expected that people will stand idly by when they can help themselves, and when there is no other effective means of preserving their helping rights.
Now, what are we supplying in the place of the self-help which 1 say was being applied by Britain and France in this area? As help, we are to supply a force which is under the command and direction, not of the security council but of the assembly of the United Nations. That in itself creates problems of organization which we see only too well. We have had explanations in a very clear way from the minister on how those negotiations have been proceeding in the past few days, but it is apparent from the difficulties that arose one after another that without any military organization to begin with the assembly, which is no more than a collection of nations, as we are a collection of members here, will find the greatest difficulty in acting, just as we would find the greatest difficulty in acting if we were not organized into parties and if there were not a government commanding the support of the majority in this house.
The Address-Mr. Michener
Now, that is the problem that the United Nations is attempting to deal with. The assembly have authorized a force and the security council, as I understand it, is not carrying out the decision of the assembly as its executive. The assembly itself, has to attempt to maintain the cease-fire which it has called upon its members to observe and which they have agreed to observe. It has the responsibility of maintaining that ceasefire. Perhaps the force will be adequate and the action will be successful. We all sincerely hope that it will, but we at least have taken the responsibility, and we must bear the responsibility, of having substituted this sort of undefined, novel, international policeman for a force which was certainly competent, at least at the stage that it had reached, to deal with the Egyptian dictator and his forces and to separate the Israelis and the Egyptians and to occupy the canal zone.
The problem for western Europeans is to see that the canal zone is occupied and the canal cleared and that the resumption of traffic enables them to get their supplies through it. That is one of the problems. If no action had been taken by Britain and France, presumably the fighting would have enveloped that area and the canal might not have been simply blocked by the sinking of ships, which the Egyptians were very ready to do, but the installations themselves might have been destroyed to the extent that they could not be rebuilt for years, and that may still happen. The point I am making, Mr. Speaker, is that we have taken the responsibility, and we are taking the responsibility of sending Canadians as an integral part of this amorphous force, this novel and newly created force, to undertake a task which had been undertaken by others, and substituting that force for the efforts of Britain and France. We have undertaken the responsibility to see that it is effective and competent to do the job. There are very grave doubts in our minds that such is the case.
Now, I for one certainly approve the attempt to bring an international solution to bear on these problems. We have been an active member of the United Nations. We played our part there, and I think we played an honourable part, and we have acquired a reputation for being objective in our thinking about international problems. But we are embarking into new waters; we are trying something that has not been tried before, and if the government has thought through this problem, and sees where this international force will go, what its effect will be and what it will accomplish, then I think we should hear more about it in this debate.

The Address-Mr. Michener
We know that there is a small force of
1,700	men already in the zone; we know we are now asked to commit ourselves to the total of about 2,400, some of them now and some later. We do not know what the total will be, but if this force is to do anything more than to act as a sort of referee among parties who are prepared to conciliate and agree, then it seems to me it is entirely inadequate; and, if it is going to be put in the position of trying to operate in this very difficult and explosive situation, it should have the authority and power from the United Nations to call for all the help that it needs to keep the peace. That may involve the use of the very forces of Britain and France which the U.N. force is attempting to displace, and it is not by any means clear that that may not be the turn of events as time goes on.
We have no word from the minister as to this force except that it is not a fighting force. That is all very well. It is all very well to send Canadian troops and other troops under an international banner and under the orders of the assembly to perform some function between combatants; but suppose they are shot at, are they not to become a fighting force when they are involved in hostilities? My colleague has dealt with the problem adequately and I am not going to do more than raise these questions and these views that I think are pertinent to the action we are taking in this house.
I sincerely hope that this action will be successful. It seems to me that it should not be undertaken unless it is undertaken in the expectation and determination that all of the problems which require settlement in this area to maintain the peace in the future are dealt with before the force is required to return.
Two of those problems have been discussed. One is the use of the canal, the clearance of the canal and its use as an international channel of trade. The other is the very difficult question of the relationship between Israel and the Arab states. Now, Mr. Speaker, I do not believe that the problem of drawing the boundaries and settling these peoples in a permanent way so that Israel will not be subject to attack in the future can be solved by any such force as has been sent and is proposed to be sent to the Middle East under the plans which the government has laid before us.
I do feel a good deal of sympathy for the line of action that has been taken in the sense that it has been obvious to all of us, as we look at the effectiveness of NATO, with its organized international military force, and as we look at the ineffectiveness of the United

Nations, without any organized international force, that there is a vacuum in the world today, a vacuum which it has been beyond our power to fill. It has been beyond our power for the very simple reason that you cannot have agreement to use an international force when you cannot get agreement within the government itself. Now, I am not speaking of the government in this house; I am speaking of the government of United Nations, which is a government comprising two incompatible powers in the world, namely, the United States and Russia. Unless they can be brought into accord you cannot create and use an international force under their joint direction. You cannot imagine the United Nations attempting to police the United States nor can you imagine them attempting to police Russia. It is equally difficult to imagine either Russia or the United States attempting to police each other under the aegis of the United Nations or in any other way without involving the world in a third war of a character that we simply refuse to contemplate.
To my mind these are the realities of this problem of attempting to deal with the trouble spots of the world; that is to say, leaving out the attempt to police either Russia or the United States, attempting to deal with the trouble spots of the world by international action and by an international force. If this action does point the way to an improvement in the United Nations through some means by which the problem of the basic ideological conflict within the United Nations organization itself can be removed, that is to a removal of the problem which has made the veto necessary, if it shows even with some faltering the direction in which we can move to fill the vacuum I have just mentioned, then our action will not have been useless. But in the meantime, in drawing attention to the hazards and difficulties of this course which our government has elected to take by substituting an uncertain and not yet organized international force for the action that was being taken by Britain and France, I wish to say that in doing that we have to take the responsibility for the possibility of its failure and for the necessity of a return to the action which we have disapproved.
In this situation and in a world of the kind we live in I think we are right in drawing the attention of the government to the necessity of preserving at all times the closest of good relationships with our friends.
We know who our friends are. As I said at the beginning, our relationships in NATO are basic to our defence and our friends in NATO are Britain, France, United States and other western countries. In another circle of friends we have Great Britain again in the

The Address-Mr. Nesbitt
commonwealth and these friendships born of history and tradition are perhaps in the long run the best, the truest and most reliable of friendships.
Although we have two cultures in this country, one composed of people speaking the English tongue and the other composed of people speaking the French tongue, we both come naturally by these same friends because they are of the same race and the same European origin and background.
When we speak of the British people I frequently like to think we are speaking not only of the English, Irish and Scottish but that we are also speaking of the people descended from the Norman conquerors who came to England from France. Basically our two peoples are the same and that blood relationship has had its part in history; and, in the course of our long tradition as British people, we have had to acknowledge that our French compatriots played a great part in the preservation of the independent status of Canada not only in the American revolutionary war and in the war of 1812, but today in maintaining Canada's status as an independent country of British association on this North American continent.
These are relationships which we cannot lightly disregard, and in drawing attention to these relationships and the need for preserving them, while we do not take the position that anyone should be asked to approve of actions that are wrong, we do believe that we should remember who our friends are and look upon their actions with every sympathy and should give their actions every possible support.
Various points of view have been expressed here concerning this and I am not going to proceed further with that line of argument, but I intend to close by expressing the hope that a little more light, if possible, will be thrown by the minister concerned and by the members of the Canadian government on how they expect this difficult and large problem in the Middle East to be dealt with by a small force of the proportions which have been suggested.
If the force is inadequate, will we have to have another session of parliament called to permit another force to be sent? I have been looking at the order in council and I observe that it authorizes the commitment of not more than 2,500 men. I do not want to raise legal technicalities-parliament is sitting and parliament has the power to act-but I have been looking at the National Defence Act and I notice that section 32(1) provides:
The Governor in Council may place the Canadian forces ... on active service anywhere in Canada, and also beyond Canada, for the defence thereof.-
We have not been told that this action is for the defence of Canada. I am not going to argue that point. This action is in response to our duties and our participation in the United Nations as a member. We have taken this action as a member of the United Nations and we have committed ourselves to supply a force and we have also passed an order in council for 2,500 men. If that is insufficient, must parliament be reconvened to approve the commitment of a larger number? To my mind that number may very well be found to be unsufficient in the course of a very short time.
Let us deal with the problem as a whole while we are dealing with it and let us hope that as we are confirming our participation in this action the government will not be again caught in a position of this kind, that it will see to it as a member of the United Nations that the difficulties of the Israeli-Arab armistice which have been outstanding far beyond any reasonable limit will be cleared up without delay. Let us also hope that by having taken this action which is unusual and pathfinding in a way, it will have set a precedent or found a means by which an effective police force for the future can be established either by an extension of NATO or by some other means within the charter of the United Nations. I do not propose to suggest the means but I do say the obvious vacuum in the world which we are trying to fill is a problem for which I hope a right solution will have to be found because of the experience of these unhappy weeks.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Mr. Speaker, there have been a great many remarks made in the debate thus far and I do not care at this time to make any attempt to repeat anything that has already been said and therefore I shall make my remarks as brief as possible. I would like to say, though, there are some things which I think in all fairness ought to be brought to the attention of the government because they reflect the opinions of a great many people in this country.
It would seem possible that the government has been somewhat shielded from the viewpoint of many Canadians, and I mean by that the government has been shielded particularly from the up-to-date viewpoint, because I think there is little doubt since this unfortunate affair of the Suez canal developed as well as events in other parts of the world that public opinion has changed very greatly in the last few weeks despite a recent editorial in the newspaper known as Le Devoir, which says everybody in Canada is 100 per cent behind the present government's policy. I do not believe that is so. I am the first member

The Address-Mr. Nesbitt who has spoken in this debate coming from western Ontario, a very populous and important part of this country. During the last couple of weeks I have inquired on numerous occasions into public opinion in regard to this matter and I must say that I have had expressions of opinion from members of the party to which I belong, from those who belong to no political party and also from those who affirm allegiance to the Liberal party.
The thing which seemed to bother people most in this regard, and I think this is something the government should have brought to its attention, is the apparent anti-French and anti-British attitude of the government. This has caused considerable concern in the part of the country from which I come. I must say that the very capable and able remarks this afternoon of the minister of external affairs somewhat reassured me and I am sure reassured the people in the part of the country from which I come, that this attitude is not what the people thought it was. The minister's remarks will be very helpful in that respect. Unfortunately the explanatory and conciliatory remarks of the minister of external affairs did not seem to be borne out by the somewhat more inflammatory remarks yesterday by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent). However, there may be further explanations forthcoming.
Of course, in all matters such as this, hindsight is always better than foresight, but I cannot help but feel that the government has a considerable responsibility for some of the unfortunate events which have taken place in the Middle East and Suez. The government is in a position, through its Department of External Affairs and other advice which it receives, to know things which the rest of us do not know. I contend that the government should have known or ought to have known what was going on in the Middle East, during the last year at least. The government should certainly have known that the situation was dangerous, particularly after the deal Colonel Nasser made with the Soviet union in 1955 to receive arms. It should then have become apparent that Colonel Nasser was a dangerous enemy of the democratic countries. I bring these things to your attention, not necessarily in any mood of recrimination over what has gone on in the past but as a warning to the government that better attention should be paid to these facts in the future so we will not have a recurrence of what is happening at the present time.
We all recall that at the last session of this parliament there was considerable debate and many questions were asked with regard to arms shipments to Egypt and Israel. Without

wanting to rehearse the events of those days I think all hon. members will recall that the government seemed to be vague, to say the least, about what was going on. Apparently some ministers did not know whether arms were going to Egypt or whether they were not. Other ministers seemed uncertain as to whether the arms that were going were dangerous, it being contended that they were only training planes. As this went on we had various changes in government opinion. I believe it was on January 24 last that the minister of external affairs pointed out that if we sent arms only to Israel and placed an embargo upon arms to the Arab nations that would be considered an unfriendly act toward states with which Canada normally had friendly relations. That was the reason given for arms going to both places. Under normal conditions that would be a reasonable explanation but I cannot but feel that, in view of the soviet arms deal with Nasser, with Nasser's avowed intention of exterminating Israel and driving the French and British out of the Middle East and Africa, a continual supply of arms was a very dangerous thing indeed.
Later on March 9 the minister of external affairs stated that the situation in the Middle East had eased and that Mr. Hammarskjold had said, "We have moved away from the brink". No one would suggest that the arms which Egypt received from Canada could affect the military situation in any way. Apparently what arms Egypt did get from here were given away because last fall the French government seized a shipload of arms going to Algeria from Egypt and among them were Canadian rifles. But the fact remains that Canada, the senior member of the British commonwealth, provided arms to Colonel Nasser whose avowed intention was to destroy Israel and to drive the French and British out of the Middle East. I cannot help but think that Colonel Nasser could not have received anything but moral encouragement for his activities when he received arms from this the senior member of the commonwealth.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.
Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Mr. Speaker, before the dinner recess I had made a number of remarks to the effect that I was a little concerned that the former policies of the government, well meaning as they may have been, were responsible to a considerable extent for the present unfortunate situation in the Suez.

To recapitulate what I have already said, I should like to point out that in the past we have often referred to the United Kingdom foreign policy as "muddling through", but I rather think that in some respects at least the foreign policy of this government has been a case of "blundering along". As I mentioned before, it was well known after the Egyptian-Soviet arms deal in 1955, and if it was not it should have been, that Colonel Nasser, this would-be two-bit pharaoh, was going to be a very violent enemy of the democratic countries. Knowing that full well, Canada, the senior member of the British commonwealth, last January and on into the spring, sold arms to Egypt.
As I pointed out, these arms probably had little or no effect on the military situation but they certainly could do nothing but give Colonel Nasser the greatest possible moral encouragement. It was the avowed intention of Colonel Nasser to overthrow Britain and France and throw them out of the Middle East and Africa and here he was receiving at least moral encouragement from the senior member of the commonwealth. In addition, I say that at the same time it was well known that Colonel Nasser was doing his very best to defy the United Nations: he had not allowed Israeli ships to go through the Suez canal for some time.
Another thing that I think should be brought to the attention of the government is something that is also worrying a great many people in Canada; in fact, I would say the majority. That is the attitude of our neighbour to the south of us, the United States. This attitude has been the cause of considerable dismay to many people in Canada. You know, there is a well known advertisement "even your best friends won't tell you". I think we are about the best friend the United States has. I certainly consider myself a very good friend of the United States. But sometimes you have to be frank even with your best friends and I think that the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) might be well advised to pass on to the United States government the attitude which I know is in the minds of many Canadians with regard to the smug piety exemplified in certain United States publications and again reflected, I am sure, in the government of that country.
I refer particularly to an editorial in a well known United States periodical which has a wide distribution in this country, Life magazine. The editorial appeared a week or two ago. I believe it was under the title, "Eden's Tragic Blunder in the Middle East", and the sum and substance of it was that when the United States was faced with a choice
The Address-Mr. Nesbitt between its friends and principle it chose principle. The words were very high sounding indeed and I am sure many of us would agree with the sentiment expressed, but I am also sure that a great many people in this country have asked themselves this question. What would the United States government have done if an anti-American government had seized control in the Republic of Panama, had conspired with neighbouring South American states to cut off oil to the United States, had received Soviet jet bombers and, to cap it all, had seized the Panama canal? I wonder whether we would see such pious sentiments reflected in the attitude of the United States government. I do not think so, and I do not think that anybody here seriously expects that the United States would not have taken very prompt action if such a situation had arisen in Panama.
For that reason I say that I think some of the sentiments expressed publicly by the United States foreign office have a certain hollow ring. Apparently it seems that the United States is trying to ride three horses at once. She is trying to be friendly with the Arabs and to be friendly with Britain and France and her other friends and allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and apparently some people also seem to think that the United States has a more than casual interest in the oil in the Middle East. I think it would be well if the United States government would decide which horse it in going to ride.
There is one thing about which I think the Secretary of State for External Affairs might have been a little more explicit today when he was making his very long and most informative address. I refer to why there was such a one-sided line-up in the United Nations opposed to the United Kingdom and France. On the face of it this line-up seems very imposing indeed, but I think there are one or two things that should be remembered. First of all, the greatest evil to all the Asian and African countries, the only bogey they are really afraid of, is western colonialism. Indeed, I emphasize the word "western" because some of the activities of some of these countries are rather devious. The path India has followed indicates somewhat less concern about Soviet colonialism, particularly in Hungary. It is true that just recently a certain group of southeast Asian premiers condemned the Soviet union for its activities in Hungary but they certainly did not act that way in the United Nations on various occasions.
In addition to the fact that the Asian and African countries, which constitute a very large number in the United Nations, have

The Address-Mr. Nesbitt this great bogey and fear of western colonialism, which they consider to be the only danger in the world, when the United States votes in the United Nations she usually takes along with her all the Caribbean and South American countries. On practically every occasion they vote with the United States. Therefore when you take out these two groups there really were not many other countries in the world to vote any other way. I draw this to your attention, Mr. Speaker, because I think it is something that may not suggest itself to many members and which might bring about a different impression when it is given consideration.
It would appear that Britain and France are indeed vindicated in the action that they took. In fact, more and more every day this appears to be the case. It would seem that it was not necessarily the Egyptian activities or the stopping of the Israeli-Egyptian war which was the chief concern but that possibly the main objective of Britain was to scotch a Russian plot in the Middle East, a plot to satisfy what was an ambition of the old imperial Russia and is now an ambition of Soviet Russia, namely to control the Middle East and its oil. In this regard I was very interested today in the reply that the Secretary of State for External Affairs made to a question of mine concerning the extent of Soviet arms in Egypt and Syria. I was particularly interested when the minister said that until recently it had been thought that Soviet arms in the Middle East were being supplied only to strengthen the Egyptian army. I would be delighted if the minister would elaborate further when we get into committee, if not now, but the implication was quite obvious that the Soviet had sent arms to Egypt not only to strengthen the Egyptian army but for possible use no doubt by Soviet volunteers in the future. Apparently it was just this about which Britain and France had warned.
I think all of us in the house will agree that the police force is a very fine thing provided of course, as has been well pointed out by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes), that the force is effective and is independent so far as orders are concerned except from the United Nations itself, and also provided it is properly composed. Assuming these qualifications, I think that probably we will all agree with it.
Finally, I should like to refer briefly to a small portion of a recent editorial in the New York Times with reference to the present Suez situation. The editorial reads in part as follows:
No doubt two wrongs do not make a right. But when the judge has no means to enforce his judg-

ment the aggrieved party is tempted to take the law into his own hands. And the United Nations has been unable to enforce its decisions because one of the principal provisions of the charter, calling for a ready United Nations force under a military staff committee, has consistently been blocked by Soviet opposition.
It may be, Mr. Speaker, as I believe the Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested earlier, that possibly the present dark cloud may well have a silver lining and that because the situation in the Middle East has been brought to a very acute crisis something at last may be done. I think people are beginning to realize just what has been pointed out so effectively by the New York Times, namely that the United Nations is not effective unless it has means of enforcing its decisions. You can pass all the resolutions you like but if large powers are intent on going their own way, and often with every reason for doing so, unless there is some method of enforcing its decisions the U.N. is not accomplishing very much. It is to be hoped that out of this extremely dark and indeed extremely dangerous situation at the present time we may get in the future a permanent force of some sort or other.
(Translation) :


Mr. Raoul Poulin (Beauce):: Mr. Speaker, I shall not delay the house very long, and shall be content to make, as simply as possible, a few brief personal remarks on the events being reviewed in this debate.
First of all, I believe that an act of faith in Providence would be fitting under the circumstances, and would surely help nations if only they would do so in true humility and sincerity. Indeed nations, like individuals, must recognize that God is their supreme master and that it is never good to forget the changeless principles which derived from His sovereignty over mankind.
The great Bossuet once said:
Man frets and God leads him.
If that great sacred orator could now come back and see how men are acting today, he would undoubtedly paraphrase his own words as follows: "Man is still fretting but God no longer leads him".
In fact, it may be that the great tragedy of our times is that God seems to leave man to his fate, allowing him perfect freedom to indulge in all imaginable errors, so that man may be made to realize for himself the immensity of his aberration, if not his stupidity.
In my humble opinion, after we have put our confidence in God, we must base it on a man-made organization, that is the UNO as a means reasonably capable of insuring the happiness of mankind. In spite of its shortcomings, its errors, its weaknesses, its

delays, which all can be explained by the fact that this organization is made up of very imperfect human beings, this association of nations has helped humanity. As long as we cannot find anything better, I am ready to support it.
I therefore approve the decision of the United Nations to send, in the troubled area, a police force which will try to re-establish order; I am glad that such a proposal was made by a member of the government, the hon. Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson).
I am just as much in favour of our contribution to an international police force as I was against our sending troops to Korea in 1950, and I can tell you quite frankly that I have never regretted the stand I took then. That is not to say that we do not run the risk of bringing a hornet's nest about our ears later on, but this, to my mind, is a calculated risk, and much less dangerous than letting the great powers act in the way we all know and which was so well branded by the right hon. Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) in the speech he made yesterday.
I also approve, not with pleasure but out of duty, the hard, tragic and painful move of the United Nations in reproving the action of our allies, Great Britain and France. There is no justification, at least I do not see any, for the action of those two friendly countries. If the action of Nasser in taking over the Suez canal was ill-advised, childish, provocative and dangerous, the action of England and France was also unjustifiable, arbitrary and no less dangerous.
Nothing, either in the spirit or the letter of the United Nations Charter, or in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, justified such action which I do not hesitate to brand as aggression. Is it possible in all decency to condone in our friends and allies what we condemn in our opponents? Oh, far from me the thought of drawing a comparison, which, besides, would be most odious, between the action of our friends in the Suez area and the hideous crime committed by the Russians in Budapest and throughout Hungary. To condemn the latter, we have only to let our feelings run free; it is so easy that we deserve no credit for doing so. But to deprecate the former's behaviour, we have to bottle up our feelings and listen to reason; to do that is a meritorious deed that makes all the difference between man and beast.
It has been asserted that the entry of Israel, followed by the entry of Britain and France, into Egyptian territory, was intended to prevent the arrival of the communists.
The Address-Mr. Poulin
Fortunate are those who can read the mind of the Kremlin leaders, or who are able to draw such correct conclusions by merely watching their actions. Could this statement be based on the fact that the Russian communists have supplied Egypt with arms? What about Canada who did the same thing, in a smaller way, with regard to Egypt and Israel? Could it be that our country has been scheming and preparing a landing somewhere in the Middle East? It would be pure folly to deduct anything of the sort, and we have here merely an excuse after the deed.
However, while approving Canada's contribution to the patrol force which is being organized, I consider this contribution too extensive. The maximum possible figure of 2,500 men, against a total of 8 or 10,000 or so, is, to my mind, not in keeping with our population, nor with the fact that we have quite a few other international commitments.
I refer to the expeditionary force and to the equipment we maintain in Europe. It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that we can reasonably say that there is danger of a world war in the situation created on the one hand in the Middle East by Egypt, Israel, England and France, and on the other hand in Europe by the actions of Russia in Hungary.
What then would befall our troops in Germany? Despatches sent out by various press agencies these last few days, and to which I refer from memory, quote General Gruenther, retiring NATO commander in chief as saying that should Russia attack, Europe would be invaded. It will readily be realized that, if this should happen, our Canadian soldiers and their families would be the first victims of the onslaught of barbaric hordes descended from the Russian steppes. We must not forget either that, in such a case, hostilities would not be limited to Europe, and that all our trained personnel would be required at home to see to our own defences.
Therefore while it is only fair and reasonable to take part in the formation of an international police force charged with the responsibility of keeping peace, it seems to me to be no less fair and reasonable to bring back immediately the whole of our expeditionary force at present in Europe.
As regards the million dollars that the government is asking us to vote in order to help the unfortunate Hungarian refugees, I do not think it is an unduly large amount. Canada is bound to do all in its power to relieve the martyrdom of that people. Let us not forget that all men are brothers and that Christian charity commands us mutual assistance. I know that some people in Canada, including a few in the fine constituency I represent, will

The Address-Mr. Girard hold that we must first relieve the hardship of our own people. They are right to a certain extent. However, as one writer stated in the Gazette this morning "charity may begin at home but it should not end there". Besides, could there really be found in Canada a few dozen individuals in a state of physical or moral destitution comparable to that of the Hungarian refugees?
I do not think so. If such were the case, we would have to admit that we are failing lamentably in our Christian duty towards our own people, but we would not be justified just the same in failing in that Christian duty towards other populations.
For the reasons I have just mentioned, I will vote against the amendment moved by the hon. member for Dufferin-Simcoe (Mr. Rowe).


Mr. Fernand Girard (Lapointe):: Mr. Speaker, after the remarks of my colleague from Beauce (Mr. Poulin), may I add a few words to explain other reasons why I cannot support the Conservative amendment.
We are sending today a corps of Canadian soldiers to Egypt to serve on the international police force of the United Nations.
Following the tragic events of the last few weeks on the international scene, the Canadian move was made necessary in order to stop the threat of a third world-wide conflagration.
I believe it is my duty to support the government for having thus given the United Nations their first opportunity to play a truly efficient part.
It is not however without deep misgivings that we are making this move, especially if we attempt to explore the uncertainties of the future and the possible consequences of the presence of our forces in the Middle East. It is dangerous to do the policing when you are weaker than the delinquent who needs to be brought to reason. To police anything where Russia is involved may often mean an attempt to wed decency to bad faith. The prominent part Canada is playing in this police force may appear honourable, but our country may thus become the main victim if the situation deteriorates. It would seem wiser that each country make a smaller contribution, but that participation be extended to more members of the United Nations.
Since the beginning of this short session, several hon. members have tried to impress upon our minds that the regrettable intervention of England and France in the Middle East was meant to prevent a larger conflict. If by this action, those two nations had tried to step legally between the two conflicting parties, i.e. Israel and Egypt, we might have tried to forget their interests in the canal

and in the oilfields of Iran, and to credit them with generous intent.
As a result of their inconsiderate action, France and England must now withdraw from their own canal, at the risk of being thought aggressors, and they have almost immediately thrown the Arab nations into the arms of the Russians.
Their gesture provided the barbarous Russians with an excuse to order the Hungarian massacre. True, the Russians do not need any invitation to wholesale murder. Communism is revolution-born and is maintained by bloodshed.
The aggression committed by France and Great Britain has set to say the least, a very bad example to these Asian and African nations which hesitate between our democratic regime and Russian dictatorship. It has also caused the leftist commentators on the C.B.C. to make preposterous and cynical though misleading comparisons.
Let us hope that Canada's intervention will help great nations to understand that colonialism is dead and that they must gradually extend self-government to these small nations before the Russians manage to extend their own terroristic regime over the whole Orient by exploiting the nationalistic feelings of those people who are looking to self-determination.
In the numerous speeches heard in this house since the beginning of the debate on the address in reply to the speech from the throne, it has been clearly indicated that imperialism is not dead in this country. It is no proof of love of the mother country to condone her mistakes, unless one is still a very small child, tied to its mother's apron strings, and incapable of independent action.
There was talk of president Nasser's rebuffs in connection with our troops' uniform and their flag. It was not the first time that Canada was mistaken for England in the military field. Such incidents teach a good lesson to Canada. If we play a foremost part on the international scene, such considerations show other nations that we still lag far behind in our awareness of national entity. If Canada does not hasten to assume a truly Canadian look, other countries will still have serious reasons to mistake its true identity. Besides, after listening to some speeches made in this house, one could still be readily mistaken.
The tragic events in Hungary have opened the eyes of those nations which were inclined to be the pawns of hypocritical Russian diplomacy.
Let us hope also that those events will serve as a profitable lesson to those democratic peoples on our side of the fence who

too often speak of co-existence with those murderers and who seemed too ready to accept the dominion of the red star over millions of human beings, claiming that some nations might well have freely chosen to live under the barbarian dictatorship of communism.
In this cold war Russia has an advantage over us, because in addition to providing millions for economic aid to certain nations, she also works in the ideological sphere, which democratic nations do not do. If we extolled our Christian civilization, we might be able to succeed better. But how can we do that when the United Nations has omitted the name of God from the charter of the organization?
However we must support the excellent work of the Canadian representatives to the United Nations because truly, there did not appear to be any other means of avoiding a world war.
(Text):


Mr. W. G. Dinsdale (Brandon-Souris):: Mr. Speaker, I have followed this debate with extreme interest, as have all other hon. members in the chamber. I feel that we are dealing with the most critical situation in international affairs that we have had to face as a nation since the end of hostilities in 1945. I have been of two minds whether I would take part in the discussion, but since I have come some distance to attend the special session of parliament I would be remiss in my duties if I did not explain my own attitude on this problem, inadequate as it might be.
We all hesitate to enter into a discussion in a situation that is so fraught with dangers, particularly when we have not been as close to the circumstances as we feel we ought to be. I waited until the Secretary of State for External Affairs had made his presentation today before I decided to make some small contribution.
I detected in the minister's observations a tendency to regard the attitude of this group as a ready, aye ready policy so far as the intervention of the United Kingdom and France in the critical Middle East problem is concerned, and I rise mainly to refute that suggestion made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
The immediate world reaction when France and Britain took it upon themselves to try to localize the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East was one of moral shock. Since the end of world war II we have been obsessed with the notion, particularly since Nagasaki and Hiroshima, that it was one
The Address-Mr. Dinsdale world or none. We have seen the thought constantly brought home in the responsible press of the world that today there is no alternative to peace; and whenever hostilities threaten or, in this case, when hostilities had actually broken out as a result of the action of Israel, with all that preconditioning in the minds of the public, namely, one world or none, the danger and the threat to civilization in the event of warfare, the immediate reaction of the public was one of moral shock.
Of course, this sentiment goes back much farther than the end of world war II; it actually goes back, I suppose, to world war I and the feeling that arose out of world war I that it had been a war to make the world safe for democracy and freedom, and never again would we suffer the horror of modern full-scale war. That attitude was widespread in the 1930's during the rise of Hitler, when the spirit of appeasement almost paralysed the western world into a state of inactivity. Young men, particularly in the mid 1930's -and I was young in those days-without any reservations, without any hesitancy at all, subscribed to resolutions that under no circumstances would they take up arms. I remember the famous Oxford resolution of those days that circulated through the universities and colleges to the effect that under no circumstances would we take up arms for king and for country. That was in 1936, and many of the young men who conscientiously and sincerely signed that resolution found themselves projected into world war II in 1939.
There is a moral problem involved in the issue that we have before the house at the present time; but unfortunately there is also another aspect to the problem. There is the moral issue; there is the issue that stems from the idealistic approach, and there is also the issue and the aspect that stems from the realistic approach. There are the circumstances of practical power politics operating in the world at the present time. I do not think it is possible to suggest that anybody in this house or, for that matter, in the western nations involved in the present critical circumstances, would try to justify their action from the standpoint of high level idealism and high level morality and adherence to the principle of collective security as they are spelled out in the charter of the United Nations. Not even Britain and France themselves view the problem from that point of view. It is not a black and white problem, and as I listened to the Secretary of State for External Affairs this afternoon give the comprehensive view of the events that have

The Address-Mr. Dinsdale taken place since the outbreak of hostilities in the Middle East I readily saw that he himself was aware that there were two aspects to this matter.
He was very careful to explain for example, Mr. Speaker, that when the United Kingdom delegation at the United Nations first explained its stand in this situation it emphasized that its sole purpose in going into the Middle East with a military force was to stop hostilities, and as soon as Israel and Egypt agreed to a cease-fire then the United Kingdom and France likewise were willing to agree to a cease-fire. They had no other purpose than to attempt to stop hostilities before they could get out of control in that part of the world. In other words, it was a police action unauthorized by the United Nations. In the circumstances they felt there was no other possible course whereby the threat of world war III could be stopped. Well, now the immediate moral shock, the moral reaction, the shock to the violation of the principle of collective security that swept upon the world, that was indicated in the press observations of that time, has modified somewhat. It seems that public opinion today, again as reflected in press comments, is swinging to the viewpoint that from the standpoint of pragmatism, from the practical standpoint, from the standpoint of power politics, this was the only possible course of action. The United Nations was helpless to deal with the situation.
Here was a situation in the Middle East that has existed as a powder keg for the past few years, that has been under discussion constantly in the United Nations, and it seemed impossible for that body to take any real or positive action that would bring the threat of renewed outbreak of hostilities- because there already had been a war in that area between the two sides involved-to an end.
Actually the principle of collective security that is supposed to have been violated in the action of the United Kingdom and France has never really operated through the United Nations on a world-wide scale. I think the fact that we had to establish a regional defence alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, is very eloquent testimony to the fact that we in the West realized there was no safeguard of the principle of collective security being observed within the framework of the United Nations and we had to move toward a regional alliance where we tried to get this collective security principle operating at least so far as the western powers were concerned.
We tried to organize a western alliance and unfortunately in recent months particularly in reference to events in the Middle East the


western alliance, rather than assisting in the stabilization of the power situation as between Israel and Egypt and the other Arab nations, has wasted its potential through disunity, confusion and a lack of cohesion.
As a result of the vacuum existing in the Middle East, as it now appears with the further information that has become available since the United Kingdom and France moved into that area, the Russians were moving in very rapidly, far too quickly for the security of the West; to occupy the power vacuum that had been created by the confusion in policy of the western powers.
It seems obvious to me, as I read of the reports of the situation, the Soviet was deliberately fanning the ambition of Nasser to a fever pitch until within a very short time it was anticipated that Nasser would have moved to take over the whole Middle East area with the assistance of Soviet arms and, as he had threatened, completely wipe out Israel as a nation.
I have said-let me repeat this-that the unilateral action on the part of the United Kingdom and France cannot be justified from the standpoint of high moral principles. But, facing that situation as it now becomes evident, world opinion is beginning to realize there was no other practical alternative.
I would like to suggest that the real criticism which can be thrown at the government in this respect is not necessarily sins of commission but sins of omission, particularly in reference to the confused situation that had prevailed in the western alliance. It is becoming increasingly obvious, for example, that United States policy was placing the western alliance in a very embarrassing situation. There has been a lot of criticism thrown in the direction of France and the United Kingdom, but actually very little criticism has been directed toward the United States of America.
The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), for instance, yesterday said the United States was not without blame in all these matters but he left it there and said there was not time to enlarge upon that aspect of the problem.
The Alsop brothers in a very recent editorial-and they have been rather critical of United States policy in the Middle East- made the observation that highly placed United States officials had expressed the thought that they were glad to see the United Kingdom and France out of the Middle East. That, of course, leaves a vacuum and the question automatically arises, who is going to fill the vacuum?
Perhaps the United States should have filled that vacuum but it was paralysed dur-

ing the critical period by the fact that it was in the throes of a revolution-or rather an election.


An hon. Member:: You were right the first time.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: In that country, it seems to me, they are torn between the double appeal of the large Zionist vote on one hand and the situation where they have a huge financial stake in the oil of Saudi Arabia on the other. As a result, after assisting in minimizing the influence of France and Great Britain, who had acted as a stabilizing force in that area in recent years, they did nothing to fill the vacuum and the Russians, of course, like nothing more than a power vacuum of that kind and were moving in as rapidly as they could to take over the situation.
The kindest thing you can say about the United States in this regard, I think, is to realize in world affairs they are always motivated more by ideologies than by the implications of power politics or the implications of the political situation.
The great American ideal is to spread the principles of freedom and the principles of democracy that have been so highly developed in that great country since it was settled some few centuries ago. Since its settlement the great purpose of the people of the United States has been to spread that democracy throughout the world. Unfortunately there has been a somewhat naive attitude in the ability of the United States to export their particular brand of democracy. They look at a situation and they make a judgment off the cuff and place the finger of moral scorn upon the powers in the western alliance which seem to have ignored the high and exalted principles of democracy as they exist within the confines of the United States.
But on the other hand it would be possible for us to suggest that there are some circumstances and situations to which the United States have given assistance where perhaps the same high moral principles which they demand from other nations have not been necessarily adhered to in their own international policy. For example, their attitude towards Spain might come under criticism if we were to apply the judgment of high moral principles.
I do not know how far Canada went in attempting to sort out the differences of opinion which obviously existed among the members of the western alliance. Today the minister of external affairs told us that since the idea of a United Nations police force had been suggested in this house last January various attempts have been made to negotiate
The Address-Mr. Dinsdale with governments in an effort to interest them in implementing that suggestion. It is one of the big weaknesses of maintaining the principle of collective security in the United Nations. We have received no details of the nature of those negotiations. Perhaps when we get into committee we may have a further explanation as to exactly what Canada attempted in practical terms, in concrete terms, not only to deal with that situation but also to try to heal the breach that was growing wider between the western alliance and which unfortunately has grown even wider and dangerously so during the events of the past month.
There is another aspect to which I should like to refer briefly. The minister of external affairs hinted that that commonwealth association was seriously threatened by the recent events. I can well imagine that that was the case. Unfortunately there has been confusion in our commonwealth policy. If we are really serious in our desire to maintain high principles of morality in our external affairs policy there is no better framework, there is no more effective framework within which to carry out that particular policy than the framework of the commonwealth of nations.
The commonwealth of nations has tended to be minimized in Canada. Since 1945 we have given precedence to NATO and to the United Nations, whereas it seems to me that with the new and broader concept of the commonwealth which contains voluntary members from the Asiatic nations we have something which we have neglected to use to full effect in carrying out our external affairs policy.
Here we have a group or community of nations trying to carry out their respective national affairs on the basis of democratic ideals, on the basis of parliamentary systems, on the basis of free institutions which have their sources in the mother of parliaments at Westminster. If during this critical period the commonwealth almost foundered because of the cracks which appeared in the policies of the participating members, perhaps one reason was that we have not emphasized the commonwealth idea as we should have since the end of world war II. We have not seized upon the opportunity which is provided by a situation where we have eastern and western nations within the framework of a voluntary association of commonwealth nations working toward the preservation of the democratic ideal.
Democracy, as we all know, is a difficult form of government to sustain and particularly difficult to enlarge in the kind of world we have at the present time. This is perhaps hindsight and perhaps not very helpful in

The Address-Mr. Dinsdale dealing with the contemporary situation, the situation that we have at the moment, but I do hope that if we are going to meet the upsurge of the power of world communism in a realistic way we close the ranks of the western alliance as quickly as we possibly can. Certainly we have to see to it that the commonwealth becomes a vital force in world affairs, able to withstand the impact of crises as great as the one through which we have passed.
This brings me to my final thought. In recent years Canada has played the role of mediator in world affairs. We like to regard ourselves as an intermediary power between the great world powers. We regard ourselves as a mediator between the United Kingdom and the United States. We also have had a certain beneficial role to play in preserving the bridge that connects the commonwealth east, the commonwealth of Asia, with the commonwealth west. I think one of the lessons which come out of the recent crisis is that for the first time Canada was faced with a choice at the United Nations which she hoped she would never have to face because it meant an intolerable choice. When acting as intermediary between so many diverse forces she had to choose between the United Kingdom and the United States on these basic issues. That placed Canada in an intolerable position. I also think it is reasonable to suggest that we moved much more rapidly to support the United States viewpoint. Notwithstanding the manner in which it has confused the situation in the Suez and the Middle East from the standpoint of the western alliance, we moved to aid and abet the United States much more quickly than we did the United Kingdom. We are swinging back towards the commonwealth viewpoint now in the light of second thought.
Another tragic aspect of this whole business, and we might have been carried away by the idealism that I outlined in my opening remarks, is that it would almost seem that we had tried to mediate between Russia and the western world too because the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) told us yesterday that he sent a letter to Mr. Bulganin, the premier of the U.S.S.R., and had received such a reply as could only be expected from that source. That is, I think, carrying idealism a little far when we think that we can negotiate with a dictatorship as cruel and as amoral as the communist dictatorship has proven itself to be not only through the evidence that has accumulated from the western nations but from the evidence that has accumulated particularly since the de-Sta-linization program.

I remember reading a book-I have forgotten the name of the author-"The Crimes of Stalin" and discussing it some few years ago. Those with whom I discussed it said that it was to a certain extent fictitious, but the Soviet leaders themselves have demonstrated the amoral nature of their imperialistic power. I think that one of the unfortunate emphases that have come out of this thing is that we have had a naive attitude. It might have been the Geneva spirit. It might have been that we were fooled by the smiles and chuckles of recent months, but I think it is unfortunate indeed that Canada, through its Prime Minister, has given the impression that we were equating the United Kingdom and other European powers who might have been involved in an aggression which was precipitated by the delicate situation in the Middle East with the barbarous aggression carried out bv the dictators of the Kremlin.
I am all for collective security, Mr. Speaker. It is the only way that our modern world can be preserved. It is the only way that we can avoid the horrors of world war III. Unfortunately we have not been able to obtain collective security on a world-wide scale through the instrumentality of the United Nations. You do not have to be at the United Nations very long before you realize that there is no common morality motivating the various delegations there. One of the tragedies of the United Nations as an organization is that the old game of power politics is being played within the framework of that organization.
The United Nations has been described as the world's best hope for peace. It is the world's best hope for peace, and it is the earnest desire of the members of this group that the emergency police force that has come out of the recent crisis will be continued to meet any contingencies or emergencies that may occur in the future. We hope too that it will be able to stabilize the situation in the Middle East long enough so that we can really deal with the vital problems in that area. The United Nations police force can do nothing towards ensuring peace or bringing the conflicting groups together. That has to be worked out through the United Nations organization itself. But at least we have the police force, and if the United Nations is going to mean anything as an organization that can actually preserve peace it must have some teeth of this kind in the machinery.
While collective security has broken down on the United Nations level, we have the possibility of getting it within the western alliance. We have the possibility within the

commonwealth of nations. It needs enlarging. It needs the enthusiastic and not the grudging support of this government. The problem that Canada as a nation must set its hand to now is to restore the unity of the western alliance just as rapidly as we can and to do away with prevailing confusion. Only the present Canadian administration can do that.
I repeat that our criticism, at least as far as I am concerned, is more from the standpoint that we have been guilty of sins of omission rather than sins of commission. Canada has an important part to play in world affairs. Let us carry it out on the three levels I have indicated with the utmost enthusiasm and the utmost vigour.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Mr. Speaker, I should like to take part in this debate because of the importance of the subject. I should like to draw to the attention of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) for the third successive year that this is the type of debate for which his department should provide in advance that very useful compilation of material called a white paper setting out the chronology of events, setting out the various resolutions passed at the United Nations and the background of the Suez crisis. The production of a white paper preceding a debate of this nature would be of immense advantage to members of the house. Without a white paper the minister has to read off dates to us. On Thursday, such and such a date, something happened, on Saturday, such and such a date, something else happened, and so on, whereas a proper chronological statement issued in a white paper would have saved him a great deal of trouble and would have made the matter much clearer to the rest of us. But a fog was produced rather than a clear statement.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs is of course in a very difficult position. He has observed the collapse of his policy with regard to Israel and Egypt. We discussed this subject last winter at some length and the minister advanced his plan for maintaining peace between these two countries. He now has seen the collapse of that plan.
It has been a long dispute between the two countries whose action has brought us to the present crisis. The dispute between Israel and Egypt has been going on certainly for eight years following the war between those two nations, and the problem of the Suez canal has been a matter of serious concern to the state of Israel for all that time because Egypt has refused Israel the passage of ships through the canal. What 81537-7
The Address-Mr. Churchill has happened to correct that situation in all these years? The security council has had about 200 meetings in the last eight years to discuss the problems between Israel and Egypt. Resolutions have been passed condemning Egypt for this, that and the other thing as well as resolutions condemning Israel. Yet despite all that and despite an observer corps under General Burns for the last two years and under other people before him, war broke out between those two nations. Yet the most important purpose of the United Nations is to prevent war. It did not prevent war on this occasion.
The importance of this issue was clear much earlier in this year, as we pointed out in the house. The Christian Science Monitor on January 20, 1956 indicated what was being done. The heading says this:
UN Censure of Israel Spurs Drive for Peace in Mideast
That censure came about by a unanimous vote on January 19 of the security council condemning Israel for an attack against a Syrian military post. Second, there was a diplomatic move. The Secretary General of the United Nations arrived in the Middle East to begin, so the article says, a period of intense exploration of the possibilities of a peace settlement. On February 7, 1956, the Winnipeg Tribune published a Canadian Press dispatch with regard to the conference that was held with Prime Minister Eden who in that conference suggested as follows, and I quote from the article:
... if the 50-man truce team in Palestine under Major-General E. L. M. Burns of Ottawa is enlarged, it is the British view that the observers be recruited from "all sorts of nations".
He thought that an enlarged observer corps might be of some value. On February 8, the Winnipeg Free Press published an article dealing with the meeting between the English and the Americans concerning the trouble between Israel and the Arab states, and that conference led to an agreement on two broad policies for preventing the present unrest from exploding into war. Here are the two broad policies, and I quote:
Under the first principle, Egypt and Israel would each withdraw its armed forces for one kilometer to create an agreed demilitarized zone.
The second policy was this:
In this demilitarized zone would be assembled an enlarged corps of observers . . . These observers would be unarmed and therefore would not be regarded as a force capable of turning back any military assault. However, they would be able to fix the guilt of aggression promptly, and in addition the very presence of this enlarged corps might produce greater restraints in the troubled area.

The Address-Mr. Churchill
So much for that. Then the Secretary of State for External Affairs, speaking here in the house on February 7 in discussing the question of Israel and Egypt, laid down the policy of the government at page 942 of Hansard, and this is what he said. He was speaking of the policy followed with regard to arms shipments by the big three who are now under condemnation, of course, by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent). However, he said this:
We will continue to follow the policy that has been outlined previously, and to follow it in a way which will not be conducive to aggression or conflict but which might help, by the way it is controlled, to preserve peace by removing the temptation to an aggressor to attack an unarmed country opposite or close by. There is no greater temptation to aggression than the certainty of an easy victory. A policy, if it were adopted by all free countries, of refusing to send any arms to any country except under the conditions which have been outlined by hon. members opposite, would leave some countries weak and defenceless, and other countries which did not have any scruples about receiving arms from behind the iron curtain in a position to attack those countries. If we had followed this policy, we might very soon have cause to regret it.
So the Secretary of State for External Affairs thought it wiser to supply munitions of war to both sides in order to maintain a balance and thus keep the peace. I suppose he is now aware of the fact that the peace was not kept.
Following that endeavour during the winter and early spring to preserve peace in the Middle East came rather alarming events this summer. We recall that about two years ago Britain was persuaded by the United States to vacate the Suez canal zone, thus leaving a vacuum in which in this troubled world anything might happen. This summer Nasser seized control of the Suez canal and Britain and France reacted vigorously immediately to that threat to their lifeline. Let us never forget that that international waterway, as it was always considered to be and should be, represents an economic lifeline to Britain, France and western Europe. It is not just a mere matter of keeping open a canal for commercial advantage or anything of that nature. Britain and France, for their very existence, are dependent upon the fuel supplies which have been shipped through that canal. It strikes me as odd, Mr. Speaker, that a few years ago, after the second world war, it was considered to be advisable to rehabilitate western Europe and, through that magnificently generous Marshal plan, to provide aid for countries that had fought during the second world war and had suffered

so severely. If it was advisable to build Europe up again at that time and if it has been wise-as I think it has been-to protect western Europe by NATO forces during the last few years, why would it not be wise at the present time to continue the support to western Europe by protecting their economic lifeline through the Suez canal? What has happened now to change the picture? Is it no longer advisable to keep western Europe strong? Is it no longer advisable to maintain NATO at great strength or must we now, for some reasons not yet disclosed to us, cut away the ground from under western Europe and particularly those great allies of ours in the past, namely Great Britain and France?
Britain and France were not greatly encouraged by what happened during the course of the summer and early fall; and when they attempted, through the United Nations, to get a resolution passed with regard to the Suez canal, brought forward by the users of that canal, the resolution was vetoed by Russia. What hope did they have, in any future emergency or crisis, of getting consent from the security council to any move that they would have to make? So things drifted on towards a crisis, obscured naturally on this North American continent by the elections in the United States. Unfortunately the world cannot stand still while elections are being held in the United States, although it would seem to some of our good friends there that that would be a wise course to follow. However, the world still continues to move, and the crisis mounted very rapidly just about the time that the critical period occurred in the United States election.
It was because of that I imagine, with attention being diverted to these stirring events south of the border, that people were not as well informed with regard to what was going on in the Middle East. Hence, we were taken by surprise. Even the Secretary of State for External Affairs, when interviewed by the press early in this crisis if I recall the interview correctly, expressed surprise; asked for time, and wanted more information. Well, I would have thought that his department, which has burgeoned out into an immense organization all over the world, would have supplied him with sufficient information about what was going on in one of the sensitive areas of the world. He has 34 sensitive areas marked up on his chart, and this was one of the worst.
The minister was very well informed concerning this sensitive area in January and February, but at the end of October and the

early part of November he wanted more information. Apparently, he wants more information now about Syria, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon. I do not know what his sources of information are, but I think they should be improved if he cannot give us quick accounts of what is going on in these troubled areas of the world. The policy of the government with regard to keeping the peace between Israel and Egypt collapsed.
Now, Mr. Speaker, what about the United Nations? I think everybody has been looking hopefully to the United Nations for many years to maintain the peace of the world just as, for many years, we looked to the League of Nations to maintain the peace of the world. It has been a discouraging outlook for mankind for these many years. This 20th century is exceeding in bloodshed, in my opinion, any preceding century, and the history of the world has been a history of much bloodshed. But in so far as I can recall during the course of my life we have had nothing but wars in this world.
I have some faint recollection of the South African war and the Russo-Japanese war, succeeded by the Balkan war and then the first Great War. After that was over Turkey attacked Greece; then the civil war in China lasted for a generation and in 1927 British troops crossed this continent to go to Shanghai to protect their holdings there and in Hong Kong. There was the Spanish civil war in the thirties; the attack by Italy on Ethiopia and the outbreak of the second World War. In the 11 years that have succeeded that there have been wars or rumours of wars all the time. Someone may be able to remind me of some period in the last 56 years in which men have not been engaged in war or have not been killed by bullets, but at the moment I cannot recall what particular year or years might be mentioned in that connection.
It has been a shocking century of turmoil and upset. No wonder we have looked to organizations like the League of Nations and the United Nations to save us from this terrible blood letting. I think that we must profit by experience. We found during the twenties and thirties that the League of Nations, lacking the support of that great power the United States and having plenty of trouble amongst those who were members of the League, failed to maintain the peace. Then, after the second world war our hopes were raised once again by the formation of the United Nations, comprising in its membership the great powers of the world. We 81537-7i
The Address-Mr. Churchill thought this time we were assured of peace because this time the United States was a member of the United Nations. I think that we have been justified in having hopes that peace would prevail in the world and that war would subside and disappear. Our hopes have been disappointed year after year. By the time the Korean war broke out we saw clearly that the aims of Russian imperialism were the same as they have been for centuries and that Russian imperialism was causing the trouble and the upset in the world and was bringing about war, not a third world war in its great magnitude but these smaller wars.
Little by little this Russian imperialistic policy has increased the control of that country. The United Nations has been relatively helpless under this strain. We cannot now be soothed any longer by resolutions passed at the United Nations or by speeches there breathing fire and brimstone and condemning this country or that and numbering the number of nations who vote in favour of a resolution. You cannot get peace by resolution or by resolutions at the United Nations-at least, we have not reached that stage yet. We have had experiments made with corps of United Nations observers scattered here and there in various parts of the world. In this difficult area of the Middle East we have had a very efficient corps of observers, but it has not resulted in the prevention of war.
I say then, Mr. Speaker, you cannot keep peace merely by an observer corps. You have to have something else. Plenty of experiments have been tried. I think a great deal of patience has been used in the United Nations in these years. I will give credit to our representatives who have been there trying to exercise the power of moral suasion in these difficult times. I am not here to condemn them for everything that has been done. The effort had to be made. Everyone wanted that effort to be made, and even now people say, do not relax your efforts but sit down and bargain with these people who are proving so difficult. Whatever you do, try to stall for time and perhaps world war III will be avoided. A great deal of that has been done through the United Nations. It has been a worth-while effort, a very frustrating effort, but all credit to the world's statesmen who have laboured so long and so hard at the United Nations.
But let us not be too sure that we are not being lulled into a state of inefficiency through false hope. These resolutions of the United Nations are, I imagine, now innumerable. I

The Address-Mr. Churchill do not think we could begin to count up the resolutions that have been passed during the last 11 years in an endeavour to maintain peace. Many of them have been ignored. They have been like the peace treaties and agreements that Russia has executed with the various countries of the world during the last 39 years. It is estimated, I think, that 1,000 such arrangements have been made between Russia and other countries and most of them have been broken. It is a long, difficult and tortuous path that mankind is taking in these days to profit by experience. But, profiting by experience, we know that the League of Nations failed because it did not have an effective force behind it, and the United Nations has been failing because it has had no effective force behind it. The smallest attempt to form that effective force has now been made in the suggestion of this emergency force to serve in the Middle East. Well, Mr. Speaker, when the crisis developed and when Canada was faced with the necessity of reaching a decision at the United Nations just a few days ago, what was the reaction of our government as reflected by the votes or the abstentions by the Secretary of State for External Affairs? We are critical of the action of the government in those circumstances. Here was a crisis which involved the link between the members of the western alliance; it involved Britain and France, other members of the commonwealth, Canada and the United States. Those countries have been united together against the Russian menace. In this critical moment, when war broke out between Israel and Egypt and Britain and France intervened and the United Nations considered the matter, Canada was faced with the most serious decision that has faced the government in recent years, and certainly the Secretary of State for External Affairs was placed in a very embarrassing position. Because it happens in any assembly that the time comes when you have to stand up and be counted or abstain. To abstain from a vote in the United Nations is a much more serious matter than to abstain from a vote in the House of Commons and so at the crisis Canada abstained from that vote with regard to the cease-fire and left Britain and France, Australia and New Zealand on the one side and those other nations on the other. We found ourselves then with this great western alliance split by a vote and an abstention at the United Nations.
No matter what fault can be found with Britain and France-and I for one do not

think they always make correct decisions; I think they are subject to criticism from time to time-when an issue develops to this extent at the United Nations, of all places, where we have been hoping and trying to present a united front of the western powers as against Russia and the communist bloc, why in the world should we not have stood by our friends and allies and those two great countries from which Canada has sprung? But no, in their hour of need we stood on the sidelines.
I think that the stand the Secretary of State for External Affairs had to take on that occasion was unfortunate for Canada. I would have liked the minister to have made his speech on that occasion before the vote was taken. He can correct me if I am wrong. If he had declared at the United Nations that he was going to vote he would have had a place on the program, but since he was among those who were going to abstain there was no opportunity to make the speech before the vote; it had to be made in the wee small hours of the morning after the vote was all over. Had he made the speech before, had he indicated that he was going to vote, he could have introduced his suggestion of an emergency force and it might have affected the position of the powers there and it would have raised the stature of Canada. But no, he was instructed, I presume, to abstain, and let public opinion be marshalled against Britain and France. And yet, he should have known, the government should have known, as a great many people did know, that the situation in the world would require quick and effective action, and from past experience no action could be expected from the United Nations except action by resolution or action by an observer corps, and both of these had failed to prevent war or stop war when it had begun.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask the hon. gentleman a question? Is he suggesting that I should have voted against the cease-fire at the opening session of the assembly?


Gordon Minto Churchill: Well, he abstained. I myself, in similar circumstances, would vote against a thing like that, along with the members of the commonwealth, when I was faced with the terrible dilemma. I admit it was a dilemma.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Three members of the commonwealth on one side and four on the other side.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Well, the commonwealth, of course, is a difficult problem for all of us to understand, and I know the activity

of the minister in trying to link together the various parts of the commonwealth. I wish he would speak more frequently on the commonwealth in the House of Commons. I have examined the number of times the Secretary of State for External Affairs has dealt with the British Commonwealth of Nations in the House of Commons. He has been goaded into making statements by people mentioning the subject here or asking him questions; but he has not, certainly in recent years, himself made a speech on the British Commonwealth of Nations. I do recall when the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) made his great world tour. He received great acclaim and public recognition and gave an hour-and-a-half travelogue in the House of Commons two or three years ago. He did not mention the British Commonwealth of Nations.


Mr. Lapointe:: How childish can you get?


Gordon Minto Churchill: I suggest, in these circumstances, the British Commonwealth of Nations is not foremost in the mind of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and when he was on the horns of a dilemma-


Lester Bowles Pearson: It is in my mind all the time.


Gordon Minto Churchill: When he was on the horns of the dilemma at the United Nations he chose to abstain instead of choosing to remain beside Britain, Australia and New Zealand.


Alfred Johnson Brooks: He likes the new friends in the commonwealth better than the old ones.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I like them all.


Alfred Johnson Brooks: He does not indicate it.


Gordon Minto Churchill: I noticed yesterday when the Prime Minister was speaking-I regret he is not in his place tonight; I do not like to refer to his remarks when he is not present-and was asked to produce the message to Sir Anthony Eden which had been described in some circles as a scorching condemnation, or something to that effect, he denied that it was so; he did not produce it but he produced for our enlightenment the message that he had exchanged with Mr. Bulganin concerning the atrocities in Hungary. If this message to Sir Anthony Eden was not a message of condemnation, why could it not have been produced and read out to us? He mentioned his message to Mr. Bulganin on page 24 of Hansard. Well, he leads up to it on page 22. He said:
The Address-Mr. Churchill
Events In the Middle East made it more difficult to marshal world opinion in unanimous and vigorous condemnation of what was taking place in Hungary at that very moment.
He was annoyed that the Middle East was in trouble when there was trouble elsewhere. There may be trouble elsewhere tomorrow, so he would have many more places to be annoyed about than the Middle East and Hungary. But that led him to reciting to us his letter to Mr. Bulganin, and he mentioned the profound shock that the government of Canada felt at the reports received of the action of that government in Hungary.
And then he says he wants that government to comply with the resolutions which had been passed by the United Nations and he uses these rather odd words:
* * [DOT] for a display even at this late date of moderation toward the unfortunate victims of these tragic events.
Moderation, when people are being murdered, run over by tanks, cut to pieces by machine guns and driven out of their country by the thousands. Moderation? Why not a complete cessation of such atrocities? But, oh no, he speaks of moderation toward the unfortunate victims of these tragic events. And then he went on to say:
It is not, however, my present purpose to attempt to pass judgment on the actions that have been taken, . . .
Et cetera.
Why not pass judgment on the actions taken by Russia in Hungary? Quite prepared to pass judgment on Britain and France but reserve judgment with regard to Hungary. It is like the United Nations passing a resolution asking for observers to be admitted into Hungary to find out what was going on when at' that time 50,000 eyewitnesses had already left the country and could have told everybody everything about it. Well, the attitude of the government toward the British Commonwealth of Nations does not meet my requirements, anyway.
However, the Secretary of State for External Affairs can speak about the British Commonwealth of Nations elsewhere than here in the House of Commons. On April 30 of this year he spoke in London, England to the English-speaking union. These are fine words which he used and I want him to repeat them here in the House of Commons month after month putting them on Hansard. In fact, I will put them on Hansard for him:
Our commonwealth of nations-
He said.

The Address-Mr. Churchill -for instance, has evolved from an imperial centre through the transformation of colonial dependencies into free states who have chosen to remain in political association with each other and with the parent state. Evolution without revolution has been of unique value not only to the nations most directly concerned, but to the world at large. That world should not forget what it owes to the United Kingdom for originating and directing this process- which, of course, has not been completed.
Just imagine the applause in London in response to those words.
I can assure you that Canada is happy about its position in the commonwealth and has no desire to see that position weakened. To us it means independence to which something else has been added.
And yet, in this recent crisis, although I do not think he has been happy to see the commonwealth weakened, he has been a laggard in strengthening the commonwealth as we would like to see it strengthened.


Alfred Johnson Brooks: It is the company he keeps.


Gordon Minto Churchill: In the two or three minutes left to me I would just like to say this. My good friend and colleague, the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes), dealt very effectively with the military aspect of the emergency force in his speech this afternoon and he dumped a bucket of cold water on the head of the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney), who should have entered the debate at that time and made some reply.
The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich pointed out all the weaknesses and the ineffectiveness of the type of force that is being produced at the present time. Even if it is raised to 6,000 men they have to guard a frontier of 1,000 miles and we would have approximately one man per mile and no armoured force, no airborne force and no artillery; and yet do we think that men armed just with rifles are going to be able to effectively defend themselves against any raiding force employing armoured cars or tanks or an attack by aeroplanes?
It is a great risk that is being run and I hope the Minister of National Defence will deal with this problem in order to assure us that our Canadian forces will not be endangered unnecessarily.
Mr. Speaker, I would close with these words. I think we are living in a state of fear and I am tired of this state of fear that is being held over our heads day after day. We live in the fear that we must not say a harsh word against Russia and we must not criticize the United States with regard to its


policies because there will be a third world war.
We heard about the fear of a second world war all throughout the thirties. We were treated to pictures showing the destruction and horror of the first world war and men with torn bodies hanging on barbed wire.
I can see those ghastly pictures even now. Book after book told us what would happen if the second world war developed and we were told how poison gas would ruin every nation of the world and the cities would be blotted out in 24 hours. We lived in that fear and the fear resulted in the rise of dictators, in a weakening of the democracies, and brought about the second world war.
At this present stage we are living in fear of a third world war. We are told that if we do anything to annoy Russia she will rattle the rockets and we will have to scurry for cover. And yet, at the same time, I do not think Russia is going to risk a third world war. However, with the democracies shrinking back in fear Russia can gain more power here, there and elsewhere and in another ten years we will not require a third world war to drive us into subjection.
We are selling our souls. We are selling our birthright at this time just through fear, fear, fear. This fear is being produced by statements all the time and we have to be mollified. Our leaders of the government here from time to time in response to queries have to say, "We do not think there will be any war this year," and then we are greeted by a great headline in the press and we relax.
But, Mr. Speaker, when the crisis comes we have to be ready and the time has come for us to stop living in this state of fear and prepare for the worst and stand fast on all occasions and keep strong the British commonwealth of nations and by force of argument to compel the United Nations to become an effective force in the world for peace. Let us not be deluded by resolutions and by observer groups. We must have some power and some sanction behind the United Nations if we are going to prevent the small wars that occur from time to time and if we are going to prevent even greater wars.


Some hon. Members:: Time.


William Earl Rowe: You do not like that because it is too true.
(Translation):


Mr. J. Wilfrid Dufresne (Quebec West):: Mr. Speaker, I have no intention of delaying this

important debate by discussing the situation in the Middle East. On the government's side, we have heard speeches from the right hon. Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) and from the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), while on the side of the opposition, several members more qualified than I am in the matter have spoken, and others will probably follow. I shall therefore limit my few remarks to the recent tragic events in Hungary.
Mr. Speaker, the free world was horrified during the past few weeks by Russia's cowardly and treacherous attack against the valorous Hungarian people. In Canada, we live in a country where liberty and democracy still have a meaning. We have been particularly dismayed on reading about the bloody events which have happened to this heroic people whom the Russians are trying to destroy because it has long rejected communist slavery.
I believe that we cannot but be moved by the nameless atrocities indulged in by those who would like to destroy forever the freedom of nations and to trample people under their infernal domination.
When the happy survivors of this agonizing drama and this indescribable butchery will be able to tell us in detail all that the Hungarian people have had to suffer in those tragic weeks, I am convinced that Russia will go down in history as the most barbarian and the most dissolute nation that we have ever known.
I hope that those who offered themselves as victims for the cause of freedom have not done so in vain and that their supreme sacrifice will serve as a salutary lesson to all those who possess enough influence to achieve, in all the countries of the world, the restoration of true peace and of human freedom.
I do not think it is necessary to remind this house of the different phases of the Hungarian revolt, and of the bloody results that followed. But let me say this. The military intervention of the Kremlin was aimed not only at preventing the formation of a democratic Hungarian government, but more particularly at destroying all those who believe in the divine power of a Supreme Being.
On that subject, I would like to repeat a few sentences from the speech I had the honour to make in Paris last Wednesday, November 21, at the second conference of the
The Address-Mr. Dufresne parliamentary members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
This is what I said:
The greatest danger facing us today, the free people of the West, is to witness the realization of the ambition of the communist conspirators of the Kremlin, which is to conquer us and to destroy our democratic freedoms. They seek to destroy our basic principles: patriotism, loyalty, family life. Above all they wish to remove from the face of the earth the teaching and practice of religion, which is the very basis of our civilization. The basis of our life as Christians is the worship of a Supreme Being. You will understand that when I speak of "Christians" I refer to the various teachings concerning a supreme deity-by whatever name it is called by our various peoples-imply, in their broadest acception, all the virtues that in my own country and many others are designated by the word "Christianity". This general term comprises the two great principles: "Love one another" and "Do what is just". It is the cornerstone of my own faith, a faith which is shared by a large number of citizens of those countries represented today in this assembly.
Quite probably, it is also the cornerstone of other beliefs prevailing among us. And that cornerstone of all our beliefs is the basis of our free and democratic way of life.
Because religion is the foundation of our civilization, the Soviets want to destroy it in all our countries, and wipe it off the face of the earth. That is the foundation which, as we have seen, was purposely destroyed in Hungary in the last few weeks, because the communist conspiration led the Hungarians to cease loving one another and, instead of love, to kill one another. And, in this same Hungary, those who fought for freedom had nothing but their naked flesh to oppose to Soviet steel. Then, when, unavoidably, they were crushed, these soldiers of freedom were deported to Siberia. Do the Soviets respect the religious principle of "Doing what is just", when they intervene with force in the affairs of another country?
In this cold and brutal war against Christianity, NATO acts as a shield against Soviet imperalism. I believe that NATO is the only organization in the world to offer this protection. The United Nations has failed to halt the progress of communism. Individually, our nations, lacking unity among themselves, have likewise failed to stem the tide of communism. Wherever we look in the world today, we see that communism is openly trying to permeate everywhere, by force or otherwise. Even in the Middle East, under the very eyes of the United Nations cease fire commission, Russia made plans, and prepared to bring in a vast new territory within its sphere of influence.
In the world today prospects are deceiving and alarming. But there is one and only one shining star before us. It is NATO. Not only is there no communist infiltration in NATO, but in several of those nations that make up that great alliance, communism is rapidly dying out. In many of our countries, citizens who have long been active in local communist cells, now disillusioned, are resigning from the party.
That is what I said at that time.
Mr. Speaker, with the unanimous consent of the house, I could finish my remarks in about three minutes-


Mr. Dupuis:: What does the hon. member for Quebec West think about the intervention of England and France in the Middle East?

The Address-Mr. Dufresne Mr. Dufresne:	In answer to my hon.
friend's question, if I may be allowed to answer, I shall repeat what I said at the very beginning of my remarks, that I did not intend to deal with this subject since other members, more qualified than I am, have spoken on the matter. However, if the house wants to know my personal opinion, I am ready to express my views. As it is now ten o'clock, I reserve my answer for tomorrow morning.
(Text):
On motion of Mr. Dufresne the debate was adjourned.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Howard Charles Green: Would the Minister of Finance tell us the business for tomorrow?


Walter Edward Harris: I had hoped that tomorrow we would be in committee of supply with this debate concluded. Apparently the official opposition do not feel that way about it so we will continue this debate.


[Stage Direction]
At ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.

Order in Council P.C. 1956-1712


[Stage Direction]
Tuesday, the 20th day of November, 1956 present:


[Stage Direction]
Whereas by a resolution dated 4 November, 1956, the general assembly of the United Nations established a United Nations command for an emergency international force to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East:
And whereas member nations were invited to contribute self-contained battalion groups to which Canada agreed, as a result of which preparations were made to assemble such a force for dispatch in part by air and in part by H.M.C.S. Magnificent:
And whereas the United Nations commander has now indicated that the most valuable and urgently required contribution that Canada could make to the force at present would be to supply an augmented transport squadron of the R.C.A.F. and administrative and technical elements of the
army contingent to help in organizing the administration at the base of the force in Egypt;
And whereas the United Nations commander has also advised that the dispatch of the battalion should now be deferred until consideration of the detailed requirements of the force permits him to determine where and when the battalion can best be used.
Therefore, his excellency the governor general in council, on the recommendation of the Minister of National Defence, is pleased, hereby, to make the following order:
Order
Authority is hereby given for the maintenance on active service of officers and men of the Royal Canadian Navy, the Canadian Army and the Royal Canadian Air Force, not exceeding 2500 in number at any one time, as a part of or in immediate support of an emergency international force organized by the United Nations to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities in the Middle East.
Certified to be a true copy.
R. B. BRYCE Clerk of the Privy Council.
107
[Stage Direction]
Wednesday, November 28, 1956