1955-01-20

FIRST REPORT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PROCEDURE

Mr. Speaker:: I have the honour to present the English and French versions of the first report of the special committee appointed to consider with Mr. Speaker the procedure of this house. If unanimous consent is obtained, concurrence might be asked later in this sitting.


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.



HOUSING


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. K. Fraser (Peterborough):: I should like to ask a question of the Minister of Public Works. Will the minister give the house more information with regard to the announcement that was in the press this morning that Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation is suspending all loans on housing that is within one mile of an airport? Does this mean government airports, all airports or just airports that jet planes will use or are expected to use?


Hon. Robert H. Winters (Minister of Public Works):: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Nipissing (Mr. Garland) asked that same question yesterday, at which time I replied that it was the policy of Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation to consider each of these proposed projects bn its merits. The whole situation with regard to property around airports is being kept under review for obvious reasons. I expect that later on I shall be in a position to make a more complete statement.



FARM SURPLUSES-REPORTED DUMPING OPERATION BY UNITED STATES

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. E. G. McCullough (Moose Mountain):: I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Trade and Commerce. Has the minister's
attention been drawn to a Washington dispatch appearing in the Saskatoon Star-Phoenix of January 15, stating that the house appropriations committee has recommended a straight, undisguised dumping operation to get rid of their large farm surpluses? Can the minister state the government's reaction to this statement?


Right Hon. C. D. Howe (Minister of Trade and Commerce):: I read the dispatch in the paper, and it is my personal view that there is nothing very alarming in the situation. The United States has had for some time a program of giving away certain quantities of wheat, and also accepting payment for wheat in local currencies. However, it is worth noting that the administration have been careful to consult Canada about the destination of these gifts and sales. I have great confidence that the administration will be careful in future not to interfere too seriously with Canada's normal markets. If that is done in future, I think Canada can live with the situation with which we may be confronted.



LABOUR CONDITIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. H. Dickey (Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Defence Production):: On
January 18 the hon. member for Quebec West (Mr. Dufresne) asked the Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe) if he was aware that 40 women had been laid off at the Valcartier arsenal the previous week and 22 at the Quebec arsenal at the same time. He also asked that the house be advised whether or not other lay-offs are to be expected at these arsenals.
In answer to the first part of the hon. member's question, I am informed that the lay-offs to which he refers occurred at plants of the small arms ammunition division of Canadian Arsenals Limited at Quebec and Valcartier. The total number of employees in these plants at December 31, 1954, was 2,258. A contract for the production of 9 mm. rounds on which 500 employees were engaged is at present coming to an end. Canadian Arsenals Limited are therefore under the necessity of laying off a portion of the employees who were engaged on this contract. Forty-six women were laid off
360	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry on January 14, a further 45 will be laid off on January 21, and it is anticipated that another 50 will be laid off during February and March. The balance of the 500 employees referred to will be retained in connection with the production of 9 mm. rounds at a lower rate to meet present commitments, and also in connection with current contracts for other types of small arms ammunition.
In answer to the second portion of the hon. member's question, I am informed by Canadian Arsenals Limited that very substantial contracts which have been running for some two years are now coming to an end. The volume of work available depends upon the ammunition requirements of the Canadian defence services and other countries. We have been fortunate in having large orders which have kept the facilities * of Canadian Arsenals Limited at both Val-cartier and Quebec fully occupied, and some additional orders are in sight. It is inevitable, however, that as contracts are completed there will be a reduction in both production and employment, and it may be expected that approximately 500 employees will be laid off during the course of the next six to eight months.



POST OFFICE DEPARTMENT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Leon Balcer (Three Rivers):: Mr. Speaker, I wonder whether the Postmaster General has had time to read the speech made by the hon. member for St. Boniface (Mr. Viau), and whether he can make a statement now?


Hon. Alcide Cote (Postmaster General):: Mr. Speaker, I had time to read the speech, and I read it. The only information I have received so far is to the effect that the appeal to the civil service commission is still under consideration. I am asking for and I hope to receive all the information with regard to this case. Eventually I will satisfy my hon. friend by giving the full details in a statement.
(Translation) :



COMBINES INVESTIGATION ACT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Gustave Roy (Labelle):: Mr. Speaker,
I would like to ask a question of the Minister of Justice. Is it the intention of the government to conduct an investigation, following what the hon. member for Gatineau (Mr. [Mr. Dickey.)

Leduc) said last week, as to the existence of a combine between certain companies to control the maximum price of pulpwood?


Hon. Stuart S. Garson (Minister of Justice):: Yes, Mr. Speaker.
(Text):



BRITISH COMMONWEALTH


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. W. Earl Rowe (Acting Leader of the Opposition):: In view of press releases by the Prime Minister of Australia, Mr. Menzies, and the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Mr. Holland, regarding the forthcoming commonwealth conference, stating that they may discuss the entry of communist China into the United Nations and other matters mentioned by Mr. Holland, would the Prime Minister tell the house if he has given any consideration as to what Canada's position will be on these matters?
Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime
Minister): Yes, Mr. Speaker. All suggestions as to what might be under discussion at the conference have been given careful consideration. I have had, with the Department of External Affairs, memoranda prepared on these different subjects. But as I said the other day the main purpose, as I envisage it, is to devote our efforts toward recommendations to our respective governments that would ease rather than complicate the international situation. It is in that frame of mind that I will be approaching all these questions. I think the commonwealth can be a very useful and effective instrument in furthering the consolidation of the precarious kind of peace in which we are living at the present time. We will be devoting our energies to trying to find a common approach to these problems that will be a contribution to the efforts to maintain, stabilize and improve the present situation.


William Earl Rowe: If I may be permitted, Mr. Speaker, I am in full agreement with the Prime Minister's objectives, and we can all agree with the generalities; but in view of the complexity of the problems and the trade situation, which is so vital and so important to Canada at this time, I would ask the Prime Minister if he would not give consideration to providing an opportunity for some discussion. It seems very strange and unusual that we do not have the opportunity to consider some of these problems now that parliament is in session. In view of the fact that the Prime Minister is leaving a week from tomorrow, I believe, I urge and

strongly recommend to the Prime Minister that the debate on the speech from the throne be adjourned long enough to have at least a day's discussion in the house on the issues that may come before the conference.
We are, I believe, to discuss the Paris agreements today, and I think the Prime Minister intimated yesterday that these other matters might also be discussed. I submit with all respect that there is no relationship whatsoever between the Paris agreements and the forthcoming commonwealth conference. We are quite satisfied to discuss the Paris agreements and their ratification. Everybody is keenly interested in that matter and is prepared to depart from the ordinary custom of proceeding first with the speech from the throne. But in view of the Prime Minister's coming visit to London and the fact that he is leaving in about a week, I ask and strongly urge the Prime Minister and his cabinet to give consideration to letting the house know something about these matters. We have many proposals we would like to make that might be discussed. I understand that Right Hon. Sir Winston Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain, has said that anything may be discussed-


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


William Earl Rowe: -and these other prime ministers are telling their people what is going to be discussed. I submit that now with parliament in session we should have a discussion of these matters, and I suggest that the No. 1 item we would propose for the agenda is trade.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.



NATURAL GAS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Trade and Commerce supplementary to the question asked yesterday by the hon. member for Calgary South (Mr. Nickle), when he asked whether it is now the intention of the government to facilitate the financing of the all-Canadian gas pipe line by a government guarantee of principal and interest of bonds issued by the pipe-line company. The minister will recall that he said the government has taken no action along that line. May I ask him whether the company in question has asked the government for such a guarantee?

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Clarence Decatur Howe: Mr. Speaker, I do not think I can add to my answer of yesterday. Government actions are announced, and until such actions are taken it is not usual to announce them. No action has been taken in the matter. There is nothing I can add to my answer.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Then we will assume that the company has asked for it.


Mr. Nickle:: Inasmuch as some consideration is apparently being given to the suggestion that the government guarantee the bonds of the pipe-line company, could the minister state whether or not any consideration is being given to making the pipe-line project east from Alberta more feasible by considering the revision of gas pipe-line design, route and markets?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Continuous attention is being given to the problem. We will be glad to look into the question raised by my hon. friend when we get around to it.



NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

[Stage Direction]
APPROVAL OF PROTOCOL ON ACCESSION OF FEDERAL REPUB: TC OF GERMANY
Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs) moved:: That It is expedient that the houses of parliament do approve the protocol to the North Atlantic treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed by Canada at Paris on October 23, 1954, and that this house do approve the same.
He said: Mr. Speaker, in rising to speak to this resolution-or rather I should say, in view of the state of my voice, in attempting to speak to this resolution-I am afraid I will have to crave the indulgence of the house in that, voice permitting, I think it will take me longer to go into this important matter than I would normally like to detain the house. But it is, Mr. Speaker, and I am sure hon. members will agree with me, a very important question indeed. I doubt whether any matter placed before the house this session will have greater long-range implications for our country and for peace. Because of its importance I should like to examine this particular protocol in its context.
What is that context? Part of it is the series of related agreements which were worked out at the London and Paris meetings last autumn, and which with this particular protocol make up a co-ordinated program. But more fundamentally the context in which we should consider this protocol is, I think, nothing less than the present position of the cold war and our chances for peace.

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Incomparably the most important political problem facing Canadians today is the danger of that cold war becoming a blazing thermonuclear one. We know that such a war, of course, would threaten the very existence of every nation, indeed of the whole human race. The supreme task of statesmanship today, therefore, is to act so that the fantastic physical power which scientists are placing at man's disposal will be used not for warfare but for welfare.
Related to this danger of thermonuclear war or thermonuclear annihilation is the problem posed by totalitarian imperialism. The communist dictators have already dragooned hundreds of millions of men into highly centralized empires which deny the dignity and worth of the individual except as a creature of the state. This imperialist and materialist conspiracy has recruited its dupes in the rest of the world and organized them into fifth columnists. It thereby seeks, through propaganda and subversion, to foster disunity in the non-communist world while it expands the area of its own direct control by coup d'etat or military forces around its periphery in Europe and in Asia.
Facing up to these fundamental problems, there are three main areas in which we must seek to advance. The first area involves a search for agreement on effective disarmament, substantial enough to lessen the burden of present defence expenditures and including the total and effective prohibition of all weapons of mass destruction. But such a program must be carefully balanced to avoid creating the incentive to aggression, and with reliable safeguards, inspections and controls to guarantee that it will be carried out.
For years, Mr. Speaker, the Canadian government has taken an active part in the search for such an agreement. Last autumn at the United Nations assembly the Canadian delegation, I think it is fair to say, took the lead in submitting proposals of certain principles and procedures with a view to further negotiations on this vital matter. These proposals, after arduous negotiations conducted on the western side, under the skilful and devoted leadership of my colleague, the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin), won the unanimous approval of all the governments represented at that world organization. We will continue, Mr. Speaker, to do all we can to pursue agreement on effective disarmament.
As I see it, there is nothing inconsistent between this policy and the agreements I am about to discuss. Indeed, if the communist powers would accept the level of armaments, as well as the limitations and controls, in these agreements, we would be well on our

way to a universal United Nations disarmament treaty which would make limited defence arrangements such as NATO and those under the western European union unnecessary. The limitations on national prerogatives involved in the provisions of the relevant Paris agreements, dealing with the maximum size of forces, with international inspections, controls and deployments are, I suggest, significant as a development illustrating to the world at large that international supervision and control of national armaments is possible, granted a genuineness of desire and a willingness on the part of nations effectively to harness and check the destructive potential of national forces.
It is true that the Paris agreements apply only to a limited group of nations. They are, however, not only consistent with but may some day be recognized as a useful precedent for an effective universal system. Meanwhile, Mr. Speaker, pending agreement on such a universal and therefore a better system, an essential step in maintaining peace lies in building and in maintaining controlled and defensive strength in the free world to deter aggression. That, I suggest, is the second area in which we must move forward.
The third area in which progress is essential, and this area is the most fundamental of all, lies in improving relations between states; in removing the causes of war and in the development of the international community, which involves fostering wherever we can an effective sense of co-operation and unity amongst the free peoples. We cannot do very much to promote this idea- amongst the unfree. It involves patient efforts to heal national rivalries, to heal the causes and tensions of war, and to bind the peoples together. Yet we cannot afford to be naive or unrealistic; so while we must do everything we can to make war impossible, through trying to resolve issues that divide, and promote co-operation through the United Nations and elsewhere and through seeking effective disarmament, we must, as I have just said, consolidate our deterrent strength and by removing the greatest temptation of all to aggression which, in the present circumstances, is weakness, strengthen the chances of peace.
I believe that our activities in the development of the north Atlantic community are a vitally important contribution to this specific purpose. For the time being at least, in this tense and dangerous world, the unity and strength of the north Atlantic nations unquestionably provide the most important and immediate existing guarantee of peace. But the north Atlantic community-this has been said many times before-is potentially

far more than a military alliance. These other non-military aspects of the development of NATO will, I think, grow more important as the military danger recedes, as we must hope it will in the course of time. The attitudes and agencies of co-operation among these free nations which NATO fosters can then remain to chart the way to a better state of society long after the present danger of military aggression has passed into the limbo into which history eventually tosses all tyrannies.
So, Mr. Speaker, I am asking the house today to approve the adherence of the federal German republic, not only to the North Atlantic defensive alliance but also to this north Atlantic community which we are seeking to develop, and to which the free and democratic Germany of today has the right to belong. The Soviet government and its satellite governments are seeking to prevent this development by an unparalleled campaign of intimidation, of cajolery and distortion, by the exertion of every kind of pressure through the lure of promises and the threat of punishment. In our own country the communists are doing all they can, of course, to further this campaign, by a propaganda barrage focusing on the statement that a vote for this protocol is merely a vote for German rearmament. Such an oversimplification is grossly misleading. It is, indeed, the most insidious type of distortion, a fractional truth.
Communists themselves, as agents of Moscow, have so far abandoned intellectual integrity and simple honesty that it is futile to try to enlighten them by discussing their charges. But in this case their campaign unquestionably strikes some response in the hearts of many honest and sincere Canadian patriots, who have good reason to remember and fear the dread effect of German arms. It must therefore be objectively and exhaustively examined.
There are several significant features of the Paris agreements which we have to consider today. It is I think reasonable to expect that in the long run the most fundamental and durable of these features will be, first, the restoration of German freedom and sovereignty-that is, freedom and sovereignty to the people of West Germany; second, acceptance of the voluntary adherence of these people to the western coalition. Those two features, as I see it, are fundamental.
The third feature of course is the provision that is being made for the federal German republic, in the exercise of the first right of sovereignty, to bear a fair share of the common burden of defence in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, through the western 50433-24J
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European union. In this connection I think hon. members would delude themselves if they conceived of the people of the German federal republic today as a nation of militarists straining at the leash for freedom to rearm, to tax themselves for weapons, and to conscript themselves for military service.
The fact is that in Germany, as elsewhere, there is revulsion against war and militarism from which Germans as well as the rest of us have suffered so much and so recently. In the Federal Republic of Germany today as elsewhere in free countries, rearmament, when it is supported-and there is a strong body of opinion in Germany which does not support it, some from good motives and some from bad motives-but where rearmament is supported in Germany today, as it is supported by the freely elected government of that country, it is generally regarded at best, as indeed it is here, as a tragic necessity.
In Germany as elsewhere moods and attitudes can change; but at present the situation is, I think, as I have described it. West German policies are of a kind which merit our support, and West German leadership is of a character that we should encourage. Indeed, Mr. Speaker, if that leadership had been in existence in Germany in 1914 and 1939 we would have avoided, I think, two world wars. Nothing, it seems to me, could be more calculated to discourage the development of healthy political forces in Germany, or to encourage a dangerous relapse into narrow nationalism and disillusionment with democracy, and ultimately into dangerous militarism, than a rejection by the parliaments of the west of the plans worked out by the democratic government of Germany and other western democracies for the integration of that people into the west European and north Atlantic communities, where they can play a proper and worthy role.
It is also a gross distortion to represent the London and Paris agreements as an aggressive move which threatens the people of Russia. It is too late in the day to be surprised by the falsity and hypocrisy of Soviet propaganda in this matter, but I am still sometimes astonished by the continuing gullibility of some who are taken in by it.
So let us not forget, and let us keep on emphasizing, that the defence policies of the west in EDC or in NATO or in these Paris agreements are not the cause but the result of the aggressive policies of Russian imperialism, and of the huge communist armies backing those policies; of aggressions in Berlin, Czechoslovakia and Korea. It was all this, with the fear that followed it, that forced

North Atlantic Treaty
the world reluctantly to regather some of the strength it had thrown away in 1945, while Russia remained under arms on land, on sea and in the air.
It is also worth recalling in particular that the Russians began the rearmament of Germans in the eastern zone as long ago as 1948, when there was not a soldier in the federal German republic. The communists have made a transparent effort to disguise this by calling the armed forces in East Germany, which they had organized, barrack police. Quite apart from some 80,000 frontier and civil police, there are almost 100,000 more of these barrack policemen organized into army corps and divisions, and into air force and naval formations on Soviet lines. The East German army units have some 600 tanks, 250 self-propelled guns and 1,700 other pieces of artillery. Any ex-nazi who wishes to sell himself to communism is welcomed into these forces and into their leadership. Their strength would be even greater if the communist masters felt that they could count on the reliability of more of their German subjects, if they were given arms.
For many years the Russians have also been organizing military forces in other European nations, including those who were our fascist enemies in the last world war and are supposed now to be disarmed by treaty. There are, for example, about a quarter of a million Bulgarian troops, over
225,000	Hungarian troops and some 350,000 in the Roumanian forces. There are in all, 75 satellite divisions, some of them armoured, and over 2,500 planes. All are under complete Russian control, and in Poland that control has been carried to the point where the defence minister in that country is a Soviet marshal. But far more important even than these are some 500,000 Soviet troops in occupied Europe west of the Soviet frontiers, no less than 400,000 of whom are stationed in Eastern Germany, where they are the European spearhead of the 175 divisions of the Soviet army.
So much, then, for the absurd contention that the present western defence program is a hostile, aggressive move which threatens the Russians and their peace-loving friends, who have never had any policy or any plan, so we are told, except peaceful coexistence in a world without arms.
We should also examine the false assertion that the adherence of the federal German republic to the west European and north Atlantic communities would make the west responsible for perpetuating a partition of Germany, which the Soviet union would like to see ended. It is worth recalling in this connection that the original plan, which was

agreed to at Potsdam in 1945 among the four victorious allies, called for a peace treaty with a democratic, freely elected all-German government. Hon. members will recall, I am sure, the frustrating years when, despite western efforts to implement the Potsdam agreement in this regard, the Soviet government refused to allow their zone to co-operate, economically or otherwise, with the three other zones of Germany. The Soviet rulers had decided that unless and until they could ensure a united Germany which would do their bidding, they would make of East Germany a communist puppet state, which of course they have done. And so it was this policy that resulted, in September 1949, in the creation of the German federal republic, in order to achieve the maximum degree of democratic unity which was possible in the circumstances.
There are those today who are saying, some with sincerity but others, the communists, with calculated deceit, "Why do we not have one more conference with the Soviet on German unification and on a peace treaty before taking the final step to ratify these agreements?" Mr. Speaker, I would remind those persons that from October, 1950, until the present time there have been at least 16 occasions on which France, the United Kingdom and the United States, the occupying powers of Western Germany, have in notes to the Soviet government, or the government of the German federal republic, in notes to the authorities of East Germany, proposed, as a basic condition of agreement on German unification, the holding of free elections under a form of international supervision which would ensure that those elections were honestly carried out.
One of those occasions was the conference in Berlin among the foreign ministers of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet union, which took place less than a year ago. For 25 days every possible avenue of approach to a mutually acceptable solution of the problems of German reunification, and peace treaties for Germany and Austria, was exhaustively examined, but all to no avail. Surely that conference exposed in a clear-cut and unmistakable way the obstinate refusal of the Soviet government to allow any settlement of the German and Austrian problems except on terms which, regardless of the wishes of the peoples themselves, would in effect guarantee the continuation of Soviet control of those countries equal to, if not exceeding, that already obtaining in the areas which they were occupying. There is no reason I can see to believe that this attitude has now suddenly

changed, in spite of the honeyed but ambiguous words which are now issued from the Kremlin and other communist centres.
A reason for, if no justification of, the adamant stand of the Soviet against German unity on the basis of free elections is shown by the results of two recent elections in Germany and Austria. In certain Austrian areas under Soviet army occupation-and this of course is very significant-our type of free election took place in August, 1954, and the result was a resounding repudiation of the communists; right under the intimidating shadow of Russian military might. In the Austrian provinces, all or partially within the Soviet zone, the communist party won only 6 out of 100 seats in Vienna and 3 out of 56 in lower Austria. The overwhelming majority of seats were divided fairly evenly between the two government coalition parties. In the two other provinces where elections were held the communist candidates failed to gain any seats at all. In West Berlin only a month or so ago, in elections for the Berlin house of representatives, the communists, under free elections, again could do no better than poll 2 [DOT] 7 per cent of the vote. They got about
41,000	votes against 684,000 for the Social Democrats, 466,000 for the Christian Democrats and 190,000 for the Liberal Democrats. No wonder the communists shudder at the prospect of free elections.
The Berlin conference then made it quite clear that an honourable and acceptable basis for German unity could not be found. Therefore surely the only possible course that offered any hope of progress was for the west to make its own arrangements with the German federal republic, without losing sight of the essential objective of unification, because Germans rightly insist-and we certainly should support them in this-that unification must remain the essential goal of German policy.
It is well to keep this background clearly in mind now that we are being urged in some quarters to scrap our present policy and agree to another conference with the Russians immediately; a conference designed by Moscow not, I suggest, so much to achieve constructive results as to delay and prevent the ratification of these agreements, and to divide and disunite the west.
Experience surely shows that we should refuse to be lured into this false course, but should follow through with the policy charted in the Paris agreements for the restoration of sovereignty to the German federal republic, the integration of this sovereign Germany into the western community, and the appropriate participation of Germany in that community's common defence effort to deter
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aggression. Once that has been done conferences or diplomatic discussions with the Soviet union on Germany, on Austria or on any other subject can be resumed and the west can then talk from strength and unity.
It was hoped about a year ago that we would implement this policy of German association with the west through the European defence community. Those hopes, of course, have been destroyed. We supported the European defence community. We supported it in this house two years ago. So it was with deep concern that we watched the dramatic developments of last summer when Mr. Mendes-France undertook to obtain at a special conference in Brussels the agreement of the other signatories to the modification in the EDC treaty which he claimed would be necessary if that treaty, after two years of indecision, was to be approved by the French parliament.
As we all know, the Brussels conference did not succeed, and soon after EDC was rejected entirely. The resulting dangers were great. Western solidarity and unity of purpose were shaken. The hopes which EDC has aroused for closer European unity and Franco-German co-operation and friendship were in danger of being replaced by disillusionment and despair. In the German federal republic the unceasing effort of Chancellor Adenauer to rally the German people to support a close and lasting alliance with France and with her other free European neighbours might soon be lost in cynical and destructive nationalism. The danger also existed that the allies, short of patience and dismayed by the difficulties entailed in devising a new European system, might try to disregard France and work out separate agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany.
During those months which saw the end of the European defence community, and indeed in recent weeks also, there has been talk of a European and Atlantic security system functioning without France. In my view this is careless talk, or worse, as it ignores the great importance of France politically, strategically and industrially. I do not think any Atlantic or European system of security really could be satisfactory or effective to which France did not willingly contribute.
The importance of France to collective European security is not restricted to its strategic or economic role. We should be poorer culturally and weaker spiritually if we had to attempt to arrange our own defences or those of our civilization without the participation of the country to which we owe so much. Therefore a western alliance which excluded France or which was forced on

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France against the wishes of the majority of the population is not, as I say, a prospect which would be faced with any satisfaction by the Canadian government or people.
At this time it is well to remember that the danger last summer was not limited merely to the exclusion and possible isolation of France, fateful as that might have been. The very existence of NATO, the whole north Atlantic concept, was threatened. Just as there has been among some sections of Europeans an understandable, but in my opinion a superficial and mistaken, tendency toward what I might call continental neutralism or isolationism, so there has been among some North Americans a tendency to move toward either bilateral or continental defence arrangements. There was developing a few months ago a "go it alone" psychology in this part of the world, due in part to impatience with allies but rationalized by strategic theories, based on impregnable continental defences coupled with almost exclusive reliance for victory against aggression on massive retaliation by long range planes and missiles of intercontinental or global range. Certainly, as we all know, continental defences for North America are vitally important and may well become more important, but any implication that in themselves they would ever be an adequate basis for security is quite another matter.
I ventured to point out in an address to the National Press club in Washington last March that in my view any idea that the great coalition which we have formed for peace should be replaced by an entrenched continentalism would make no great appeal to Canadians as the best way to prevent war or defeat aggression. Nor would it be likely to provide a solid basis for good United States-Canadian co-operation.
Indeed the idea of continental self-sufficiency, in the military as in the economic or political fields, makes no appeal, I suggest, either to our sense of reality or to our deepest Canadian instincts as exemplified over the whole of our history. In 1914 and 1939 Canadians were quick to recognize that a threat to the democracies of western Europe was a threat to their own freedom; and subsequent events confirmed rather than upset this deep-seated conviction that it would not be safe or ultimately possible for us on this continent to stand aside from events in Europe. And so NATO, with the United Kingdom, the United States and France in it, is for us an indispensable instrument both for co-operation and defence. But last autumn NATO was in danger of being lost.
I may appear to be digressing, but certainly these thoughts were very much in the minds

of those of us who had the responsibility for action on behalf of the government during the rapidly moving events of last summer and last autumn. I think it is well that these considerations should be put on the records of this house.
In this situation so full of danger which followed the French rejection of the projected European defence community immediate remedial action was required to weld together the cracks which were appearing in the north Atlantic structure and to continue the progress toward European unity which had been interrupted. It was more important, we felt at that time, to look ahead than to indulge in recriminations as to who was responsible for the set-back. It was in that spirit that we took part in the developments of that time.
The initiative to restore the situation came from the United Kingdom, whose earlier refusal to join the European defence community had heightened French distaste for that treaty. Therefore I am sure it was with a profound feeling of admiration and relief that all of us in Canada followed the skilful and untiring effort of the United Kingdom foreign secretary, Sir Anthony Eden, as with the strong backing of the United States secretary of state he gathered support in the main European capitals for a new approach to the problems arising from the failure of EDC.
As we over here watched those developments, while we were happy over the Initiative taken in London, we were also concerned that any arrangement to replace the European defence community should not impair the strength and unity of NATO as the organization primarily responsible for defence planning and for co-operation in the non-military field, we desired that progress toward European unity should be made within the larger framework of the Atlantic community. We wanted all these things to be done within the framework of our north Atlantic organization to the greatest extent possible. For this reason we felt, and indeed we suggested, that the new proposals to replace EDC should be submitted initially to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization council for consideration. However, that idea did not command general support, and it became clear that the majority of the countries most directly concerned were in favour of the United Kingdom proposal for a conference in London of the countries signatory to the proposed EDC, along with the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada.
We were glad to support that procedure and to accept an invitation to attend the London conference as a country with a direct

and important stake in any arrangement to take the place of EDC, and as a member of NATO with sizeable forces on the European continent itself. As a participant in this conference we endeavoured with some success to stress the importance to NATO of the solutions which were discussed in London, and to ensure as far as we could that these problems should be discussed and solved within the NATO concept.
At these London meetings, which began on September 28, we were able to work out the broad lines of an agreement for associating the Federal Republic of Germany with the western community on a basis of equality, the only basis of course which was possible, and to further the aims of western defence and European unity within the North Atlantic alliance.
Moreover, it was recognized that these historic decisions together formed part of one general settlement which was directly or indirectly of concern to all the members of NATO. It was therefore agreed that the final act of the London conference, which outlined the main understandings reached, should be put into the form of more detailed agreements which would be submitted later, as appropriate, either to the four powers, the seven Brussels powers, or to the whole NATO council. That was done, and we met in Paris on October 22. All the resulting agreements were signed the next day, October 23.
I approach this result in no defensive, defeatist or apologetic manner. I think it was a great achievement. I can say that with more conviction because it was an achievement which others had far more to do with bringing about than we did. I think it was a great achievement, all the greater in view of the price we would have had to pay for the failure to bring it about, a failure which seemed so close only a few weeks before.
Mr. Speaker, I apologize for the length of time I am taking, but I believe the house would expect me to say a few words about the actual terms of the agreements, their general significance and also their particular relation to the question of German rearmament which is so much in our minds, as well as their significance to Canada itself.
These Paris agreements can be divided, for purposes of consideration, into four parts. There are the four-power agreements signed by the three occupying powers and the West German government, which provide for restoration of sovereignty to the German federal republic and for the present and future stationing of foreign forces on the soil of that
North Atlantic Treaty
republic. Then there are a series of seven-power agreements which provide for the reconstitution of the Brussels treaty organization to include two new members, namely Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany, into a new organization which we now call western European union. Then finally there are certain NATO agreements which include the protocol now before the house and certain resolutions designed to strengthen the NATO defence structure.
So far as the first series of agreements are concerned-and they are of immediate importance to Canada because we have troops in Germany-the special problem of the four powers was to determine how and when the federal republic should be given its sovereignty, in a manner which would permit it to function as an equal partner in the western coalition and which at the same time would not preclude eventual unification of all Germany. In addition, it was necessary to provide a legal basis for the stationing on German soil of foreign forces when the federal republic became a member of NATO.
In effect, what was done was to provide that the occupation regime, which was already pretty much of an anachronism, should be ended as soon as possible and that, in the meantime, until that regime ended legally and formally, the occupying powers would act in accordance with the spirit of the agreements under consideration.
Regarding disarmament and demilitarization, however, it was provided that the three powers should continue to exercise certain responsibilities until the federal republic became a member of NATO. Also the continuing responsibilities of the three occupying powers with respect to German reunification and a peace treaty are reaffirmed.
To answer the criticisms-and we hear criticisms-of those who might view the agreements as a deliberate step in the direction of the permanent division of Germany, the three powers issued a joint declaration during the London conference-to which later in Paris Canada and the other NATO members subscribed-which stated among other things:
A peace settlement for the whole of Germany freely negotiated between Germany and her former enemies, which should lay the foundation of a lasting peace, remains an essential aim of their (i.e. the three powers) policy. The final determination of the boundaries of Germany must await such a settlement.
And further:
The achievement through peaceful means of a fully free and unified Germany remains a fundamental goal of their policy.
That is the policy of the NATO countries. I am sure all hon. members would agree that

North Atlantic Treaty
this statement of policy provides a fairly clear response to any who may maintain that in their efforts to associate the German federal republic with the west, the western powers had lost sight of the ultimate aim of a peace treaty for a united Germany.
I now turn to the second series of arrangements, which are intended to associate a sovereign German federal republic with NATO and with the move toward European unity which has been interrupted. When these agreements go into effect we shall have a new organization which we now call western European union. That new organization is essentially a modified version of the structure based on the Brussels treaty of 1948, with this one important difference which I have already mentioned. To the original members of the Brussels organization are now added Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany. So western European union can be considered as an alternative method of achieving much the same purposes which the European defence community had been designed to achieve.
There are, of course, some differences. There are in particular two main differences: The first difference is the inclusion of the United Kingdom in western European union with that historic, courageous and, in my opinion, far-reaching pledge which she gave for the maintenance of four divisions and the second tactical air force on the continent of Europe for another 44 years. The second main difference is that the European defence community placed greater emphasis on supranational features.
Western European union will have a permanent council, an assembly and an agency for the control of armaments to be set up by and under the authority of the council. The council will sit in London and the armament control agency is to sit in Paris, where it will work in close co-operation with the NATO secretariat and for carrying out its duties will use to the greatest possible extent NATO personnel.
I now come to an extremely important part of the WEU agreements, namely that part which gives Germany the right to rearm. Much attention has been paid to this right which it is now proposed to give, but not so much attention has been paid to the way in which it is limited and controlled. I should therefore like to put on record, Mr. Speaker, what these limitations and controls are.
The first is that the maximum forces to be permitted to Germany under WEU are the same as those which would have been permitted under EDC, namely 500,000 men organized into not more than twelve divisions

with 1,350 fighter-that is defensive-aircraft. That number must not be increased except by the unanimous consent of the western European council. Second, all German forces, if and when they are constituted, are to be brought under the supreme allied commander in Europe, SACEUR, and are to be integrated into NATO forces. That means that there will be no separate German national army apart from NATO. Nor has Germany, under this agreement, the right to deploy her own forces. That can only be done by SACEUR, subject to political guidance from the NATO council. Furthermore, German forces-and I think this is extremely important-are to be dependent upon NATO rather than upon national logistic support.
It is worth remembering in this connection that the whole system of logistic support for forces in Europe, which includes such vital things as fuel pipe lines, transportation, communication facilities, air fields and other essentials for the conduct of modern war, has been organized on a highly integrated basis under NATO. As such it makes for economy and efficiency. But it would also- and this is probably more important in the context of the matter we are discussing- make it incomparably more difficult for any NATO country to operate its forces separately because they are mixed up, especially in such vital things as logistics, with the other NATO forces. In other words this provision involves important built-in safeguards against purely national action.
Third, Germany agrees unconditionally not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons and also not to manufacture long-range aircraft and guided missiles, mines, warships, except some small ones for coastal defence, or bomber aircraft; and she can only be relieved from these obligations by a request of the supreme allied commander, Europe, which received a two-thirds majority of the western European union council.
Fourth, certain other types of heavy armaments, a long list in fact, are to be controlled for all members of the western European union, including Germany, by the arms control agency of the western European union. There are other proposals for limiting and pooling the manufacture of arms which are at the moment under discussion in Paris.
Fifth, and I have mentioned this, there has been set up an arms control agency in Paris to work closely with the NATO authorities, and to use NATO inspectors to visit and check national plants for the production of arms whenever they see fit in order to see that the limits accepted are being observed.

Sixth, and finally, there are also certain political controls and limitations written into these agreements. Germany solemnly pledged at the London conference that she would conduct her foreign policy in accord with the principles of the United Nations charter and the North Atlantic treaty, and in particular she undertook:
. . . never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German federal republic -and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the federal republic and other states.
If Germany should violate these undertakings a special provision contained in the joint declaration of the three powers, to which the other members of the NATO council later subscribed, would come into play. The pertinent paragraph of that provision, by which we would all be bound, reads as follows:
They-
That means the NATO powers.
-will regard as a threat to their own peace and safety any recourse to force which in violation of the principles of the United Nations charter threatens the integrity and unity of the Atlantic alliance or its defensive purposes. In the event of any such action, the three governments-
Now it is 14 governments.
-for their part will consider the offending govern-me lit-
It might be the German government; it might be any other government.
-as having forfeited its rights to any guarantee and any military assistance provided for in the North Atlantic treaty and its protocols. They will act in accordance with article 4 of the North Atlantic treaty with a view to taking other measures-
That is, against the offending member of NATO.
-which may be appropriate.
Now, sir, I submit that it would be difficult to devise a more impressive set of safeguards than these. But I know that when I say this I will be asked what guarantee there is that they will work. Can we expect these limitations and controls that Germany has accepted to be of any value? Will she throw them aside whenever she feels like doing so? We are conscious of the fact that this has been done in the past.
Well, Mr. Speaker, all international agreements, even those we make with our friends and neighbours, have this element of risk and uncertainty. It is inherent in international arrangements; but some of those who now are stressing that element and challenging the value of these agreements with Germany are, however, quite ready to take the same risk in making another effort
North Atlantic Treaty
to bring about an agreement with Russia which they think would remove all our fears and uncertainties about Germany.
I frankly admit, however, that we have every right to be concerned with German good faith in this series of agreements. Many Canadians, including many of us in this house, and even more of our allies who are taking this decision with us and with all its consequences, bear on their bodies and in their minds scars from the German war machine. We remember how Hitler, with shocking and unscrupulous design, and with Soviet connivance and assistance, started world war II in 1939. We do not forget how the nazis conducted that war with savage brutality, and how the German people supported it.
While we do not forget that and cannot forget it, it is my considered view that support of these agreements with the safeguards I have described is both wise and farsighted, and of all the courses that are open to us this is the best course to follow in our effort to shape a better future.
I do not suggest that we should ignore the lessons of the past. Indeed, as George Santayana has said, "Those who will not learn from history are condemned to repeat it". But we should draw the right conclusions from the past, and we should also not ignore the vision of the future. Indeed, experience of the past teaches us that if a nation only looks backward to justify its fears of the future, it is likely by that very fact to suffer again the same tragedy which in the first place caused that fear. The past must influence but, I suggest, it should not determine and distort the future.
So, Mr. Speaker, it is because of my appreciation of history and not in spite of it that I believe the safeguards which we have worked out in these agreements within our North Atlantic community organization against unilateral abuse by Germany, or any other member, are of real value and make even stronger the case for a coalition which will include the Federal Republic of Germany with its sovereignty restored and on an equality with the other members. I also believe that the institutions and habits of co-operation which our Atlantic community is developing, and with which we now desire to associate Germany, may well be of even greater value than military safeguards in removing the risk that might follow from putting arms in the hands of Germans.
In the very nature of things there can never be on this earth, as I see it, absolute assurance or safety for anyone, individual or nation, because the future will depend among

North Atlantic Treaty
other things on attitudes and choices which we shall have to adopt from time to time. But there are good grounds, I think, for reasoned confidence in this matter. Moreover, whether this confidence will be justified will depend upon our own policies as well as upon those of Germany.
We now have a type of government and a political system in western Germany which are democratic and European-minded. Surely -and I mentioned this a few minutes ago- we should do what we can to encourage and strengthen that type of government, not weaken it by suspicion, mistrust and rebuff. That government, moreover, is led by a man who believes in freedom, peace and co-operation, a great European and internationalist, Herr Adenauer.
It is also, I believe, reasonable to believe that national self-interest will counsel the Germans to stand by these agreements, which are not imposed on them but which have been freely negotiated with and accepted by the government which they have chosen for themselves. Surely in that respect the situation is very different from that of the 1920's, when relations of the victors in the war with Germany were characterized by uncertainty and vacillation. We never did make up our minds then whether to treat Germany as a new friend or an old foe, and as a result we got the worst of both worlds.
Quite apart from the pressing fact of the Soviet threat to western Europe it would, I submit, be wrong and foolish to deal with Germany now as a rejected, unequal people in international society. If we do so they will soon conclude that their choice lies only between isolation and a brooding introspection, or seeking domination and aggressive strength on their own. Surely the sensible course, even if the threat of communist aggression were removed, would still be to bring the Germans into the west European community, which includes the United Kingdom, and into the North Atlantic organization where they would only be one of 15 members, including the United States, and which they could not hope to dominate. It is precisely by such participation in partnership that nations as well as individuals learn to prefer co-operation and good will to domination and submission.
Though I can certainly understand and deeply sympathize with the hesitation and soul-searching which I know are involved for very many in the issues we face, it is nevertheless my conviction, I repeat, that the course of wisdom is to bring about German participation in the western coalition where we can work together for the common security and welfare.

I believe, Mr. Speaker, I should take enough time to examine another aspect of the matter. What are the alternatives? There is a good deal of criticism of this course, part of it sincere and genuine criticism, but very rarely do I ever read or hear of any satisfactory or better alternative than the one which is before us. What are the alternatives which would produce a better policy?
Well, the first-these are the only ones I have been able to think of, but there may be others-is to keep Germany disarmed and neutralized as at present. This might seem to many people an appealing course, and would indeed be so in a world where all arms were limited and controlled. But it is impossible under present circumstances. It was impossible in the twenties. How then could it be done now with the victors of the last war divided and bitterly hostile and in the face of the control of a rearmed communist East Germany by an aggressive, mighty Russian imperialist power? Is Russia likely to give up that control for a genuine international system of supervision of a disarmed, neutral and united Germany which, in its turn, assumes a situation in which the east and west would work amicably and altruistically together for a common peaceful purpose?
The question answers itself from the history of the last ten years. Even if it were possible, how long would a dynamic, powerful and proud people like the Germans-fifty millions in the heart of Europe-be willing to accept a position of this kind? In short, the neutralization or disarmament of Germany, as I see it, would be difficult under any conditions, impossible under present conditions. It would, in any event, leave a vacuum right in the heart of Europe. A vacuum may be regarded by nature as something to be abhorred, but it is regarded by -the communists as something to be filled.
A second alternative would be to do nothing, continuing as long as possible the present occupation arrangements and hoping that something would turn up. As I see it, that would be a futile and negative course. What turned up would probably be a Germany increasing in strength, with a growing national feeling, taking advantage of every opportunity to end or whittle away the occupation and determined to remove restrictions on her sovereignty as she grew stronger. At best such a policy would lead to an increasingly resentful and unfriendly Germany. At worst the result would be reminiscent of the thirties, with extremists in control.
A third alternative which has been suggested would be to give West Germany back

her sovereignty unconditionally, but without making any arrangements for associating her with the Atlantic system or the western European union, and again hoping for the best. That might be followed by a separate alliance between Germany and one or more of those western powers which desired it; or the Federal Republic of Germany might remain outside any collective arrangement while we merely hoped, in our turn, that if there were aggression against the west she would line up with us. We would also hope, and I do not know what basis there would be for our hopes, that under such circumstances Germany would not move east or, even more likely, play the east and west against each other to her own advantage.
Any of the above courses I believe, especially in view of the declared United States policy, would mean the end of the Atlantic alliance we have been building up and which is now our greatest deterrent against aggression. It would also end the move toward European unification, which through these dreary post-war years has been a bright hope for peace and prosperity in free Europe.
We return, then, to the only possible solution in my view, bringing a free Germany into closer association with a group of other free countries in an alliance through which Germany may contribute to collective security, but which will be so constructed that no one member can possibly dominate the others.
Now, Mr. Speaker, before I resume my seat, I did indicate that I would say something about the effect of these agreements more particularly on Canadian policy and what, if any, the effect will be on Canadian commitments or obligations in Europe. I should like to apologize for the length of time I am taking.


Mr. Gillis:: You are doing a good job.


Lester Bowles Pearson: So far as the NATO resolutions passed last October are concerned, those resolutions have strengthened SACEUR's powers and have increased the mutual interdependence of NATO forces. So far as those resolutions are concerned, they will not make any significant change in the position of Canadian forces in Europe, because our forces are already closely integrated with those of other NATO countries. They are subject to the over-all authority of SACEUR in military matters. Their movement in Europe would take place only as part of agreed NATO strategy. Therefore the new arrangements- and they are outlined in the documents before you-merely set down in writing and make generally applicable the arrangements by which we are already bound.
North Atlantic Treaty
With respect to the new territorial commitments involved in the protocol before us on German accession to NATO, the situation so far as Canada is concerned is similar to that which arose in June, 1952, when this house approved the NATO protocol extending to all members of the European defence community the assistance guarantee of the North Atlantic treaty. I pointed out in this house then that since the Federal Republic of Germany was the only member of the European defence community not a member of NATO the effect of the protocol, if it came into force, would be to extend the obligations which Canada had undertaken under the North Atlantic treaty to the Federal Republic of Germany.
I emphasized then, as I should mention now, that this extension of our obligations was more theoretical than real, because under article 6 of the North Atlantic treaty, by which we are bound, we were already under an obligation to come to the assistance of the NATO forces stationed in the territory of the German federal republic. The situation then, Mr. Speaker, is substantially the same under the present protocol in so far as extending our territorial guarantee is concerned.
While I am on the subject of commitments -and there has been some discussion about this previously outside the house-I should like to assure the house that the Canadian government took no new commitments in London or in Paris to keep Canadian forces in Europe at any given level or for any given period. What was emphasized at the conferences was our determination to continue to play our full part in the North Atlantic organization. As I stated to the nine-power conference in London last October-and this statement was made public immediately-
As I see it, European unity cannot be effectively secured unless the lines not only across the channel but across the Atlantic are strong and unbroken. My country has a part to play in this Atlantic aspect of the problem. Therefore, we accept the continuing obligations arising out of our membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and we are resolved to continue to do our best to discharge them.
Also at the same time I declared to that conference:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization remains the focal point of our participation in collective defence and of our hope for the development of closer co-operation with the other peoples of the Atlantic community. As such, it remains a foundation of Canadian foreign policy. Indeed_
I hope I was correct in saying this; I think I was.
-enduring and wholehearted support for NATO is for us a policy above politics on which I think our friends can rely.
As regards the proposals for an arms pool, which my hon. friend from Prince Albert

North Atlantic Treaty (Mr. Diefenbaker) brought up the other day, these proposals, which as I mentioned a minute ago were submitted originally by the French government, are now under active discussion among the European governments concerned. We are being invited to send an observer to those meetings when matters come up which are of interest to us. As this matter is under discussion it would be premature for me to comment on it now. But our direct interest in the arms pooling proposals would of course relate only to the allocation of Canadian arms made available through our mutual aid program to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I may say that we are quite satisfied with the present procedure, and we are not anxious to have it changed-the procedure under which recommendations for the allocation of these arms are made by the standing group of the NATO organization. But if a proposal emanated from the conference which concerned our allocation of mutual aid, then of course we would give it consideration.
Now, finally-and this is final-I wish to come back just for a moment to the argument, the most impressive one to my mind advanced against this policy, that these agreements will not make for peace but will make for division and controversy and renewed trouble in Europe; that they will provoke the Soviets into violent reaction, and will drive that country into intransigent Stalinism again at a time when its government, under new leaders, seems to be getting somewhat more co-operative and less hostile.
As to the first, I do not think there is cause for undue alarm over Soviet threats to retaliate-and we have heard these threats in strong language-by forming a heavily armed eastern European alliance. While we should never dismiss pronouncements from Moscow as unworthy of serious examination, I do not think we should become unduly worried by Soviet "kicks" any more than we should become unduly elated by Soviet "carrots". Both are often offered for the same purpose, to weaken our resolve and confuse our purpose.
There is certainly no reality behind the threat of an eastern NATO, because they have now a military alliance system, as I have tried to show, which is already more heavily armed than NATO, and under complete Soviet control. There are certainly no limitations or controls over armaments or men or anything else in that line. They could hardly go any further. As to the second point, there is no possible validity to the contention


that these agreements justify or make inevitable an intensification by the Soviet union of the cold war, at a time when it seemed to be lessening.
I point this out because in the harsh and unreasonable things which the Soviet government has been saying recently about western policies, there is the constant accusation that western nations respond to offers of peace and friendship from the Soviet union by the warlike action of arming Germans for an eventual attack on the Soviet union. It is hard to believe that Soviet leaders can make these claims seriously.
The Soviet government has never shown any inclination to discuss these agreements on a rational basis, or to take any reasonable attitude toward Germany or Austria. It has avoided constructive discussion and made no attempt to find out about or to seek reassurance on any point about western policy toward the German federal republic which it regarded as menacing to the Soviet union.
No one of course would deny to the Soviet union, which suffered so cruelly from German arms, the right to issue warnings about German militarism. But we cannot regard Soviet judgments on this subject as superior to those of other nations, which also suffered from the same source.
The logic of the Soviet position on this matter seems to be either that Germans in the German federal republic, regardless of the prior rearmament in East Germany, must never possess the right to carry arms, even within a defensive association which imposes controls, or that any arming of Germany can be carried out only on Soviet terms. Looking back a few years this logic seems pretty strange. According to it the western powers had no right to feel alarmed when the Soviet government, contrary to agreements with allies about the occupation of Germany and without any regard for the wishes of these people, armed its eastern satellites and bound East Germany into the monolithic unity of communist Europe.
The Soviet government now claims the right to regard almost as a provocation to war the culminating act of a slow process whereby the German federal republic, with the consent of its freely elected government and that of 14 other free nations, enters into an association which has as one of its chief purposes the prevention on a permanent basis of German militaristic nationalism.
So we would be unwise and shortsighted if we yielded to Soviet threats about what will happen if these agreements are ratified. Nor in my view will that ratification provoke

warlike retaliation, unless the Soviet government, for other reasons, desires to pursue such a belligerent policy.
I think myself, Mr. Speaker, that the chance that such retaliation will happen and war might follow are less now than they were last summer after EDC was rejected. On our part we have made it abundantly clear that NATO policies in Europe are defensive and pacific. Among many others, President Eisenhower and Mr. Dulles have both recently emphasized that the aim of the west is to be strong enough to defend itself, to be moderate in responding to the provocations of others, and to be active in seeking every means of easing tensions and ensuring peace.
We know that the political and moral values which we cherish and the political system on which we rely do not thrive in conditions of war or continued tension. Our preparations are made for defence only, and war is for us not a means of combating ideologies which we do not like. Therefore any genuine Soviet move to lessen tension, even if it affects only a limited area of international relations, should be welcomed by us, and we should be willing to go half way at any time to meet it.
There is, of course, the constant danger of conflict from a misunderstanding on both sides of each other's motives. In the west we remain with good reason alarmed by the threatening and aggressive policies of the U.S.S.R. in recent years. In turn I think it is not inconceivable, given the atmosphere of totalitarian isolation and ignorance in Moscow, that the Soviet people, and even certain Soviet leaders, may at times consider 

sincerely consider-that they are threatened by the west. One of the great tasks in the next few years in diplomacy is to try somehow to bridge this gap in misunderstanding, to build what His Holiness the Pope recently so aptly described as "a bridge of truth" between east and west.
I wish in closing to reaffirm my confidence that we are on the right path, and that the agreements we drew up in London and Paris will make an important contribution to security and peace. From the foundations of defence strength and constructive unity, which they will provide the west, I sincerely trust that it will now be possible to convince the Soviet leaders of our firm intention, and indeed determined resolution, to defend ourselves without in any way menacing them, or without rejecting any opportunity to ease a state of international tension which is both sterile and dangerous.
North Atlantic Treaty
For all these reasons, Mr. Speaker, I hope this house will give strong support to the resolution which is before it.


Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prince Albert):: Mr. Speaker, I join with hon. members who applauded the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) on a speech, powerful in its delivery and cogent in its lucidity. He drew a dark picture. He produced a calm in this house that I have never before witnessed.
As he spoke, hon. members in all parts of the house listened with that seriousness that is justified by the motion that is now before us. Was it a picture known in mythology as the analogy 'of Scylla and Charybdis? There seemed to be that alternative as the minister spoke and developed his forceful argument.
I doubt whether in the years since the second great war there has been a more momentous debate than the one before the house. It is the first time in the history of Canada that the House of Commons has been in a position where an adverse vote would not only defeat the motion before us but would render nugatory and ineffective the favourable decisions by parliaments in Britain, West Germany, France and the other members of this union. The defeat of this motion in this parliament would have the effect of putting an end to the agreements that have been entered into which become Effective only by unanimous decision.
The international chain of collective security among the free nations depends on the individual links, and if any one of these links breaks the chain is destroyed beyond repair. I believe that was the reason for the seriousness displayed by members in all parts of the house as they listened to the revelation of the occurrences of recent days, detailed by one who by personal participation is aware more fully than the rest of us can hope to be of what took place during the days that followed the defeat of EDC.
There are many people in our country, Mr. Speaker, who while realizing the need for unity in defence measures in the forces of freedom because of their memory of two world wars, view these agreements with the fear that comes from their experiences of recent history. Only the other day Arnold Toynbee when asked "What is the future of coexistence?" replied "It is indefinite, uncomfortable, anxious and frictionable".
As the minister said, the free peoples have not forgotten. They cannot forget so soon after war. Because they cannot forget while the leaders of democracy ask for the mobilization of the forces of freedom based on faith,

North Atlantic Treaty others demand the permanent quarantine of Germany because of her record in history.
People are fearful. The course to follow deserved greater consideration than it will receive after the agreements have been signed. It would have been well if last September or October we in parliament had been given an opportunity of discussing the situation following the defeat of EDC. Today we find ourselves in a position where, the agreement having been achieved without consultation, we are faced with a decision based on an accomplished fact without having had an opportunity to discuss the terms of this decision made by Canada.
Parliament was convened to discuss the railway strike, a serious matter affecting our nation. Was there any less reason that the representatives of the Canadian people should not have been convened last fall to enable a discussion to be held on this problem, and to permit them to obtain information such as parliament has received today, which I hope even at this stage will remove many of the fears of thinking Canadian people?
I hope we shall not return to the practices of the former prime minister of Canada, the late Right Hon. Mackenzie King, who seemed to believe that restricted discussion of foreign affairs was of the essence; that only the cabinet had the right to know what was going on, with parliament being called in and the story of events placed before parliament in a restricted manner that limited discussion and denied parliament the opportunity to offer alternative suggestions or ask for clarification of the things which should be clarified. If the speech which my hon. friend has made today and the details which he has given had been given to the Canadian people earlier, much of the feeling that has been aroused would have been allayed, diminished or eliminated.
I do not want to bring in other subjects at this time, but I think that this should be an object lesson to the Prime Minister. He is about to attend the meeting of the commonwealth prime ministers. He should not go over with the secrets locked in his soul, but should notify Canada through its representatives in parliament of the attitude he intends to take at this conference, so that when it is over we will not be faced with accomplished facts about which we have not had an opportunity to even offer an opinion.
I approach the discussion of this motion on behalf of my party in an objective way. I am going to restrict myself to some matters to which reference was not made by the hon. gentleman. It would be an easy course to
[Mr. Dlefenbaker.l

follow for the members of the opposition to stand in this house and place the responsibility for this measure upon the government, hoping thereby to take advantage of some of the honest fears of former members of the armed forces and their dependents who are concerned over the eventualities which may occur. That is not the course which the Progressive Conservative party intends to follow. We desire to be objective. I desire to discuss this matter in a nonpartisan spirit, for after all this is a measure upon which the future and the freedom of our country depends. Partisanship has no place in frank discussion.
I hope that we shall not be mistaken in the course we shall take and that what has been done will be a triumph for faith rather than a victory for doubt; that we will prove that the soul of freedom is strong enough to meet the needs of the turbulent present; that out of the agreements that have been made, out of the ashes of frustration in the negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to which the minister made reference will rise a new world achieved by the extension of the area of collective security.
The Canadian people are interested in foreign affairs, as is evidenced by the fact that editorials in our papers and observations of those who write on the subject of international affairs are receiving more and more attention. I believe a greater dissemination of information on international affairs should be made to the Canadian people than is furnished by the magazine External Affairs. Useful as it is, in recent months it has betrayed evidence of self-congratulation of those associated with the Department of External Affairs.
We are now in a period of coexistence. Recently the minister gave a description of coexistence which I thought was particularly appropriate. He said that the U.S.S.R. idea of coexistence was that of Jonah and the whale. There is no denying the fact that the U.S.S.R. has adopted a new strategy of sweet words, a coaxing attitude and a smiling Molotov. This change of attitude has become the unsecret weapon of the U.S.S.R. The Soviets smile, but at the same time they try to create and foster discord among the members of the United Nations. Coexistence is a seductive word. One of their smartest pieces of propaganda ever developed is the use of that word.
We believe in coexistence. Coexistence means to us the handshake, but not the embrace. The U.S.S.R. has shown the smiling face lately while it continues its aggression by proxy. It has rejoined the international labour organization; it has joined UNESCO; it has offered a conducted welcome to those

who visit the U.S.S.R.; it has allowed the wives of diplomats to migrate; it has joined in the unanimous votes in the United Nations on disarmament, and in the setting up of an international atomic energy agency. It has been sweet and conciliatory; it has practised flattery and blandishment. It even offered to join NATO, which was analogous to Satan joining the anti-hell society. It is trying to coax by promises and to threaten by intimidation.
There have been tremendous changes since parliament last met. There has been the settlement in Trieste and the Saar; there have been the Anglo-Egyptian settlement and agreement and the Persian settlement. But the U.S.S.R. has not changed its objective. Nothing has been more serious than the revelation that for the last six months the secretary of the defence council in France each day delivered to the U.S.S.R. copies of the minutes of the meetings of the national defence council of France, and minutes which revealed the strategy of NATO.
The objectives of communism are unchanged. This is revealed by the declarations of the governments of the U.S.S.R. and the so-called republics of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Ukraine, the German democratic republic, Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria and Albania. It takes courage to be a member of parliament in any of those countries. In the 1950 election, of the members elected to the Volkskammer, in East Germany 49 have been shot and 59 have had to leave that country as refugees. I am just going to give one or two quotations from the declaration. It gives evidence of care in its preparation, power in its vision and deception in its concept. It states:
The Paris agreements are directly at variance with the possibilities for further relaxation of the international tension which has come to light of late.
Later:
Not only are these agreements alien to the interests of the German people, but they are directly spearheaded against the German working class, are designated to suppress democratic forces in western Germany.
These agreements create a military bloc of aggressive circles of U.S.A., Britain and France with German militarism.
It maintains that the agreements are the product of great monopolies.
Then it says further:
Rejection of plans for remilitarization of western Germany and her integration in military alignments, which would remove the main obstacle to the reunion of Germany on peace-loving and democratic principles;
And still further it says that the real security of Europe can be assured if instead of following this course we operate in co-operation with all European states irrespective of
North Atlantic Treaty
their social and state systems and thereby make possible by combined efforts of European states the safeguarding of peace in Europe.
My hon. friend has stated that meetings with the Soviets seldom lead to agreement. A simple example of ineffective negotiation is what has been done on the Austrian peace treaty. There were 352 meetings without settlement. Finally-and the threat is at the end-it says:
Our peoples are confident In their strength, in their inexhaustible resources. The forces of peace and socialism are stronger and more solidly united than ever before. Any attempts to attack, to unleash war and to disturb the peaceful life of our peoples, will receive crushing rebuff.
First there is the cajolement and then the threat. They fear rearmament in West Germany, with 175 divisions of their own under arms and 80 divisions in their satellite countries.
Is German rearmament a new idea? It was first brought to the attention of the world by Ernest Bevin, who used these words some four and a half years ago:
If West Germany is to be defended it seems to us only fair and reasonable that the people of Western Germany should help in their own defence.
On September 14, 1951, the three foreign ministers made the following declaration after the Washington conference:
The three foreign ministers declare that their government's aim is the inclusion of a democratic Germany on a basis of equality in a continental European community which itself will form part of a constantly developing Atlantic community.
Out of that declaration grew the European defence community. It provided for the mobilization of 500,000 men and other forces to which the minister made reference. It provided an executive cabinet of all the member nations, a court of justice, an economic and social council, a house of parliament with two chambers, a senate and a house of representatives. It assured effective control of any German army that might be mobilized, because such an army would be part of an international army. The armed forces from Germany would find themselves not allocated to their own units but placed indiscriminately among the forces of other nations in an international army in much the same way as foreigners who join the French foreign legion lose their national identity in a common loyalty. France defeated that plan, the great concept of 500 years. It was defeated by France whose statesmen first gave it outline. As the minister has said, a vacuum was created at that time, and then the NATO defence system was put in a position to take its place. Mr. Dulles has set forth the basic

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and stubborn facts with regard to what followed the defeat of EDC last September.
Effective military defence of Europe called for a substantial military contribution by Germany; Germany could not be subjected indefinitely to discriminations relating to her sovereignty and her right of self-defence; the prevention of war between neighbouring nations with a long record of fighting could be dependably achieved only by merging certain functions of their governments in supranational institutions.
Out of those views and out of the wise leadership of Sir Anthony Eden, to which tribute was paid by my hon. friend, and the leadership of Sir Winston Churchill, out of what appeared to be the degradation of defeat of collective security for generations, grew the inception of the present system which, imperfect as it is, represents in my opinion the best of any of the alternatives that are offered.
NATO has been a pronounced success when the situation in Europe four years ago is compared with today. When you visit the headquarters, and when you see that leader of the democracies, General Gruenther, you realize the difficulties that he must have had in bringing together the clashing elements of national jealousy and the formidable developments that have taken place. Indeed, when General Montgomery was in Canada a little over a year ago he said this:

Canadians recognize NATO as one of those things that was evolved out of a Canadian concept.
-is the strong right arm of UNO. Without NATO, UNO would achieve little. Together they can achieve much. Both are necessary. If NATO had come into being earlier there would have been no second war. In the strengthening of NATO lies the best hope of preventing a third world war.
I consider that the strengthening of NATO on the political side for purposes beyond those of defence is all-important.
The minister said the same today. I ask him now, to say when he replies, what has been done to make NATO an institution that can be held together only if we realize that we must merge some of our economic problems within the purview of its concept. What has been done and what is being done to make NATO an institution not altogether military in its concept? General Gruenther said this, and I think his statement is worthy to be quoted. He shows no aggressiveness in his attitude to the U.S.S.R. He shows firmness and statesmanlike vision. He said this while the London meeting was under way:
West German armament and the tactical use of the atom bomb would produce in three or four years a reasonably good chance of preventing the Soviet union from overrunning Europe. West German rearmament was necessary because the western powers needed a shield strong enough to hold

while reserves were being mobilized. Tactical atomic bombing was needed to compensate for the immense numerical superiority of the Soviet bloc.
There is the background. The discussion of these agreements and protocols falls, I believe, into the ambit of four or five subjects with which I am going to deal now in somewhat lesser detail than I had expected, in view of the explanations given by the minister. What is the essence of the terms of these agreements? What are the safeguards against the resurgence of German militarism? What are the dangers if the projected course contemplated by these agreements is followed? What are the alternatives to these agreements?
The minister reviewed the agreements, and I am not going to do so again except to make one or two references. He set forth what the agreements provided for and he set forth some of the safeguards. The western European union will set up an, agency for the control of armaments. The council will make an annual report on its activities setting out the statistics of the various countries and the land and air forces necessary to be provided after consultation with each of the countries. The supreme allied commander in Europe will have entire control over the armies that will be raised, their deployment, their use, and above all, as the minister said, the logistics, which is simply a term that implies and contemplates those things upon which armies march. Particularly, as I see it, the gas and the oil necessary for the instruments of war will be entirely under the control of the general commanding in Europe who can turn the tap either on or off as need requires.
The minister then mentioned the fact that Germany agrees not to manufacture atomic, biological or chemical weapons except with the unanimous agreement of the other members of the organization. For some reason the minister left out three very important words. The undertaking of Germany is not to manufacture these things within its own territory. I am going to ask the minister a question later as to why it was necessary to permit Germany to manufacture these things outside her own territory.
The agency that is to be set up to control rearmament will appoint a director who will gather and examine national statistics and budgetary information, and have before him also a full record of the types of armaments being produced. All forces, as I said a moment ago, will be under the supreme commander. The location of all forces will be determined after consultation with NATO. These, in short, are the safeguards, coupled with a declaration by Germany that she will

do nothing of an aggressive nature, and that she will live true to the principles of the United Nations Organization, in particular article 2 thereof. She undertakes also that she will never do anything to retrieve her lost territories or to reunify Germany. Of course these declarations, without safeguards, could well prove in the future to be hollow promises, unkept as were some other promises and undertakings of Germany in the past.
Britain made a great sacrifice in order to achieve this agreement. To keep the United States in Europe, to maintain the hopes and faith of France, Britain departed from her position of several hundred years and entered into an undertaking to remain in Europe for a period of some 40 years. Some of us were given to understand by the press of our country that this undertaking had also been given by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) on behalf of Canada. The minister has stated today that he did not go that far, but what he said in effect, as I understand it, is that Canada will make the necessary contribution in order to live within the concept of the agreement entered into.
For 500 years Britain has always been of Europe and yet not in Europe. Now she becomes both, in the interests of world peace. Will' the controls work? Will the annual review protect from resurgent militarism? All that we can do is to believe that the agreements will be carried out, policed as they will be by full inspection and reinforced by careful examination of the budget of West Germany. Lord Ismay, speaking in London last November, said that the annual review has been effective in so far as the nations now members of NATO are concerned. He went on to say:
It is extraordinary, when you come to think of it, that countries should be prepared not only to lay the details of their national military production and fiscal programs before their partners, but also to be cross-examined upon them. Never has the principle of alliance been carried to such a pitch.
If the U.S.S.R. would accept similar inspection, might we not hope to achieve what the minister stated was the first aim and purpose of the democratic nations of the world today, namely, the abolition as an instrument of war for all time of atomic and hydrogen bombs? What are the dangers? The minister has pointed them out-Scylla and Charybdis. Lord Ismay, when he affixed his name to the agreements, used his personal seal upon which was inscribed this motto:	"Have no fear". We have fears.
While every eventuality cannot be covered by an agreement, I believe with the minister that what the agreement does is to cover
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everything within the contemplation of the nations who fear a resurgence of militarism, everything within the limitations of the sovereignty of another nation.
I cannot believe, sir-and I am leaving my own country now when I say this-that Sir Winston Churchill, after all the years that he warned of the dangers of militarism in Germany, can now be appeased by an uncertain agreement. I cannot believe that Sir Anthony Eden, who gave two brothers in the first great war and his son in the last, is going to be deceived into entering into agreements that have in their being the germ of another war. This is what Eden said:
There are In these agreements all the safeguards it has been possible for human ingenuity to devise.
Then he went on to say:
Out of these agreements France and Germany may work together in the confidence that can breed peace, instead of the suspicion that can breed war.
Have they not gone far in the Saar agreement? Germany gave up a great deal there in return for what was given up by other nations.
What of Herbert Morrison, the former foreign secretary, who said that this is the only alternative? I return now to the question I asked in all seriousness. Why was article I of part I of the nine power conference agreement worded as follows-I am going to take the time of the house to quote the entire section:
The high contracting parties, members of western European union, take note of and record their agreement with the declaration of the chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (made in London on 3rd October, 1954, and annexed hereto as annex I) in which the Federal Republic of Germany undertook not to manufacture in its territory atomic, biological and chemical weapons. The types of armaments referred to in this article are defined in annex II. These armaments shall be more closely defined and the definitions brought up to date by the council of western European union.
Why were those words "in its territory" put in the agreement? Does that open the way to the building of armaments in the Saar once the Saar becomes internationalized? There must have been a reason for those words. On the face of them, they appear to leave the door open to the manufacture elsewhere of atomic and other weapons. These are striking words. What was the reason for this qualification? Certainly there must have been much soul-searching before those words were added to an absolute ban that could be lifted only with the unanimous consent to the agreement of the nations.
We ask ourselves, will this agreement turn into bitter disillusionment? We remember

North Atlantic Treaty
the treaty of Rapallo in 1921. We recall the Hitler-Stalin pact of 1939. Will the decisions reached by this agreement ultimately become solutions? Those are questions, Mr. Speaker, that only time can answer. Whatever the answer may be, I believe that in those agreements the free democracies of the west have spoken with a free and united voice rather than in the uncertain babble displayed in the months prior to the defeat of the European defence community.
Will the agreement protect? I cannot believe that France, having suffered from militarism as no other nation has suffered, would have voted approval of the agreement unless she believed that. France knows from personal experience. France feels. France cannot forget. Yet when this question came before the assembly, they voted for it. When properly evaluated, it was a large vote. The vote was 287 to 260, which seems a very insignificant majority for such a tremendously important matter. However, if you count out the 99 communists who could vote only one way, you find that the actual vote of those who were free to vote as they would was 287 to 161. France took the view that failure to approve and adopt these agreements would indeed exact a terrible penalty.
The minister asked, what are the alternatives? That group of communist nations who met in Moscow on December 2 said: Just wait and see. After all, we have discussed this matter for only three and a half years. We have had 16 conferences, I think the minister said, but if we have the opportunity of having just one more, who knows but that we shall establish peace in Europe?
While they talk and prate and counsel "wait and see", they pile up 175 divisions and 80 in the satellite countries. As the minister said, they mobilize in East Germany armed forces to the extent, as I recall it, of 180,000 men.
What are the alternatives? I dislike quoting from what the leaders of other nations have said, but I cannot forget that when this matter was before the British House of Commons Clement Attlee asked in effect: in view of Germany's past actions should she not be disarmed? He answered by saying that it was a logical position, but not a practicable one. Eden said this:
The failure to ratify the pact with West Germany would bring about consequences fearful to predict.
He said also that it would drive Germany once more along dark and dangerous paths. Where is she going if you create a vacuum, a no-man's-land in the centre of Europe? Do you not place that country in a position where, sooner or later, it will fall under communist control?

Sir Winston Churchill saw the danger long before anyone else did. I heard him in the British House of Commons in 1936 when he pointed out that his own party was wrong because they were not mobilizing in the face of rising nazism. I saw Churchill in 1916 when he was in disgrace, when he came back from France wearing the uniform of the armed forces. The house emptied because Churchill was still in disregard, if not disgrace, over Gallipoli. I saw him in the role of a Cassandra in 1936 in the British House of Commons. Yes, he was right then, and others were wrong. We remember Eden when he refused appeasement. Has he changed?
On October 8, at a Conservative party conference, Churchill used these words:
It would be disastrous to the human race to judge the Germans or any other peoples by past crimes committed in their names by dictators. Let Hitler take his name to hell. Let the peoples extend the hand of friendship and forgiveness to each other and walk together through the mysteries of life to freedom, justice and peace.
Scylla and Charybdis agreements are only as strong as the soul and the heart of the nations that enter into them, but the terms impose the greatest control ever imposed on any nation as a result of a conference.
What can Canada do? Well, Canada's contribution to NATO has been an outstanding one. I believe that we must maintain the strength of NATO, and that we should give Canadians a greater opportunity to understand NATO than ever before. Speak to the service clubs and to the public organizations of this country: how many of them have any realization of the responsibilities that NATO imposes upon our country?
I ask the minister this: under this agreement as it now stands, if a number under arms in Germany endeavoured to retrieve their ancestral capital of Berlin and if, as a result, the U.S.S.R. moved in, would we, under the agreement of NATO, find ourselves at war? The minister says no. There are conditions that place a different interpretation upon our responsibilities, qualified as they are in the manner indicated by the minister. I think Canadians as a whole will ask the minister to give that assurance in even more clear and unequivocal terms than he did today.
Believing that NATO should be strengthened, I am one of those who believe-and I speak only for myself in this-that a consultative assembly of NATO parliamentarians from each country might meet from time to time for a discussion and for an exchange of opinions, so that we in Canada would have a fuller realization of our responsibilities in the world of today.

The minister mentioned the contribution of Mr. Dulles of the United States. When and if these agreements are ratified, would it not be an impressive action on the part of the President of the United States if he were to reverse the order of things we have had in the last few years when Sir Winston Churchill has come to America? Because of his position as general commanding the forces of freedom in the last war, he still carries prestige that few possess. Would it not, I say, with the impact of the President's personality and of his persuasive powers, have a tremendous effect if, following the ratification and the approval of these agreements, he were to reverse the order and, himself, go to Great Britain and to France, and give them the reassurance of his presence?
Finally I make this appeal once more to the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent). It was made today by the Acting Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Rowe). Let us, while maintaining these international organizations, be assured as well that our commonwealth will be able to speak with that degree of authority and power that its greater strength, its defences, its development and its economic possibilities will assure. Let us have that opportunity. We are not here to prejudice the Prime Minister, but we do want to have some idea, regarding these international matters affecting Canada and the commonwealth, as to what stands Canada will take before they are taken, rather than after they have become accomplished facts.
And now, fully aware of the dangers inherent in any agreements entered into, I should like to see this parliament, moved as it is by emotions consequent upon two world wars, make a decision with courage, wisdom and infinite compassion. Replete as it may be with danger, it is nevertheless circumscribed in such a way and to such a degree as human ingenuity can make it.
We are going forward. We failed after the first war. We were guilty of withdrawing and leaving Europe isolated. The United States never entered the league of nations. Canada and other nations treated their obligations with almost shameful triviality.
The aim is peace; the means, through strength. We have learned that peace cannot be achieved by chance. This is not an ideal agreement, but we must accept the world as it is. With world conditions as they are, these agreements may not achieve the world of our dreams. But I hope that they can assure a better and a safer world.
How many of us would have thought five years ago that the time would come when an
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implacable foe would join with us? The minister has said that history is a great teacher. History does teach the fallacy of finality. I believe that, subject to human frailties and human errors, these agreements represent an advance. Perhaps it is old-fashioned to hold this view, but I think the world contest will not be determined by nuclear weapons. I think we need faith. When there is a contest between good and evil, that is important.
Fears we have. For generation after generation men have faced the challenge of freedom. Those without faith have concluded that freedom was about to be destroyed in a glacial avalanche. But faith has always triumphed; and faith will triumph again unless we allow it to die in the grave of doubt and fear. As I see it, this is a step forward to justice under law. It has its dangers. It arouses its fears. But the stakes are high. The failure of this momentous scheme will exact a terrible penalty.
In that spirit, Mr. Speaker, it is the intention of Her Majesty's loyal opposition to support the motion.


Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Roseiown-Biggar):: Mr. Speaker, the motion moved by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) reads as follows:
Resolved, that it is expedient that the houses of parliament do approve the protocol to the North Atlantic treaty on the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany, signed by Canada at Paris on October 23, 1954, and that this house do approve the same.
I rise to support the motion. Of course, in saying that, I recognize that hon. members are faced with a decision, in common with the rest of the country, which is not easy to make. I agree with the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) when he said it is rather regrettable that we had not an opportunity to examine the proposals earlier. I should have liked to see the protocol, and the agreements which are involved in the adoption of this protocol, referred to the committee on external affairs so that there might have been a discussion there, and so that hon. members might have been better informed. Even those of us who have taken the trouble to do a good deal of reading in connection with this matter would still like some of the questions in our minds answered. In a discussion of this kind we are not in committee; we cannot question the minister. All he can do is to reply to the debate. It would have been very much better if these agreements and this protocol could have been referred to the committee on external affairs. That committee could have

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been set up and perhaps we could have had an examination and the terms of the treaties involved explained to us, and then had the protocol before the house for approval.
As I have said already, I know from personal conversations, both in Canada and abroad, that there are widely held and genuine fears and misgivings concerning the rearmament of Germany. The hon. member for Prince Albert and the minister himself recognize that this is so. Let it not be said that those who conscientiously oppose the proposals are sympathizers either with the communist bloc, because they are so violently opposed to it, or those who are opposed to it are treating what we hope is an emerging democratic Germany as a permanently outcast nation.
I am certain that most members of the house know, as I know, that misgivings are shared by patriotic and peace-loving persons in all parties, in all walks of life and in all the NATO countries. In France, for example, the de Gaullists, the M.R.P., that is the Roman Catholic party, have on the whole bitterly opposed the present proposals for German rearmament, and these are not influenced by the communist party or by communist propaganda.
For my own part, I have given long and anxious thought to the protocol and to the problems of a rearmed Germany under certain conditions and limitations. So have all my colleagues, and I hope that all other hon. members have done likewise.
That we may come to different conclusions may be. a matter of regret, but, certainly, under the circumstances, not unnatural or to be unduly disturbing. For my part, I believe that the best interests of the democratic world will be best served by admitting Western Germany to NATO-that is the purpose of the protocol before us-and then, under the guarantees set forth in the London and Paris agreements, agreeing to the suggested limited and supervised rearmament of the Federal Republic of Germany. But I respect the views of those who arrive at a different conclusion, and those views I hope will be put before the house by my colleagues, perhaps the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles).
In coming to a conclusion to support the protocol before us, I neither minimize widespread doubts and fears nor misunderstand them. What those of us who support the protocol are doing is to take, as I believe, a worth-while-if calculated-risk.
I said in a previous debate that it was unrealistic to believe that the democratic countries could undertake the defence of
[Mr. Coldwell.l
Western Germany in the event of aggression without the participation of German troops. I said that only within NATO and without establishing an independent German general staff should this be done. I believe the protocol and agreements provide these safeguards. Others may not think they are sufficient. But I do not dispute the contention that there are great risks. There are memories, as the hon. member for Prince Albert said, bitter memories, sharp memories of the horrors of two world wars, provoked by German aggression.
These memories make acceptance of any proposal for German rearmament difficult. But let me remark that the leaders, including the socialist leaders of all the democratic countries which were subjected to devastation and attack, have given public support to this protocol. I should say, lest there be any misunderstanding, that a majority of those attending our convention last summer and our national council more recently were fearful of and opposed to German rearmament before a further attempt had been made to negotiate a satisfactory agreement with Russia on German reunification. That the risks associated with German rearmament are recognized by the sponsors of the proposals is evident in the lengths to which they have- gone to restrict the size of the armed forces Germany may recruit and the weapons she is allowed to manufacture and use. That was quite evident in the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) this afternoon. Those who think that even these are insufficient point *to the former nazis who may be given influential positions in the new German army. That is something that the western powers must watch and resist.
Our preoccupation with aggressive international communism-and it is international and aggressive-must not blind us to the dangers of admitting a sovereign Western Germany into the family of nations. To my mind, however, refusal to do so would cause bitterness and might have the effect of causing them to look behind the iron curtain for support. After all, Germany has looked in that direction before and could do so again, particularly as her economic interests have been largely centred in eastern Europe in the past.
Many who oppose these proposals point this out with the added fear that since Russia alone can satisfy Germany's demand for a revision of her present boundaries, she may, when rearmed, use her stronger international and military position to bargain with the east as well as with the west. That has to be watched.

In 1939 Hitler and Stalin made an unexpected agreement which touched off world war II. We must beware lest the reunification of Germany, the revision of boundaries and German economic interests cause her to take the other side in the cold war if we rebuff her now. Hatred of communism did not prevent the nazis from coming to terms with the soviets in 1939.
Many undoubtedly fear that the safeguards and the pledges made by Herr Adenauer may be ignored by a strengthened Germany which in the past has been and may be again the dominant power in central Europe. Care must be taken that the provisions of the Brussels treaty controlling the level of stocks and the production of armaments as well as the prohibition of atomic weapons, chemical weapons, naval and military aircraft and so on, are not circumvented. I noted the words that were drawn to the attention of the house by the hon. member for Prince Albert, to prohibit the manufacture of these things within Germany's own borders.
For example, our newspapers carried a dispatch on December 9 which said:
The Dornier organization has established a branch in Spain and has built its first aircraft there to get around the ban on Germany's aviation activities.
Many persons reading this doubtless had their opposition to German rearmament considerably strengthened.
Then again many wonder why, if Liddell Hart, General Montgomery and others are correct in stating that atomic weapons and not large armies are now the basis of western defence, the arming of 12 German divisions is so pressing and important. Those who oppose the proposal think that more importance should be given to the effect of rearmament on the future of Germany, the future of Europe and future relations with the Soviet union.
I understand this position and respect it, but my experience at United Nations meetings leads me to believe that world tension has decreased as the western allies have achieved greater unity and strength. That unity and strength must be maintained by the democratic nations.
Fear there is that the rearmament of Germany will result in the irrevocable division of Germany with a revival of the kind of reaction which gave Hitler his opportunity in the 1930's, the kind of reaction there was against the Versailles treaty.
But no proposal for the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections has been accepted by the Russians. Some believe, quite sincerely, that if pledges were given that a reunited Germany would be a disarmed Germany for a period of time, say ten
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years, Russia might agree. That proposal might have been made and might have been worth trying but I doubt it would have changed the Russian view. It is too late to suggest it now.
But may I add here that no opportunity for the negotiation of outstanding problems with Russia should be neglected. I was very pleased to note that the minister of external affairs in the course of his speech this afternoon made exactly that point, that even on minor issues, when the opportunity to negotiate settlement occurs, those negotiations should be undertaken in the hope that if we can negotiate some of the minor issues we can ultimately negotiate major ones. If after the ratification of the protocol four-power negotiations are undertaken, we should support them wholeheartedly. I hope and indeed believe that ratification will promote negotiations rather than hinder them.
Perhaps the most potent argument against the proposal is that there is a sharp difference of opinion regarding rearmament in Western Germany itself. The trade unions and the social democratic party are unitedly against it. Those of us who read the reprint of an article from the New York Times in this morning's Montreal Gazette saw that the non-communist youth of Germany met a few days ago and strongly opposed German rearmament. So there is no doubt that there is opposition to rearmament in Germany itself. We must beware lest the sympathies of this large section of German opinion are alienated from the west. They fear a resurgence of militarism as a result of rearmament-hence every precaution must be taken by the supervising authorities to see that the German divisions are organized and officered by men who are entirely free of nazi predilections.
It seems to me, then, that hon. members of this house must weigh risks and advantages and make their decisions on the balance they achieve. This I have tried to do honestly and conscientiously, with the result that, as I said at the very outset, I shall rise in my place and vote for the motion, approving of the protocol.
Many of my friends will arrive at a different conclusion. That I regret, but I can respect their judgment because I understand the basis for their opinions.
The overriding consideration which has governed my own decision may be briefly stated. It is that the failure of Russia to co-operate in the United Nations with a view to setting up the military staff committee, and to participate in the security measures provided for and envisioned in the United Nations charter, made the organization of the regional defensive alliance known as NATO

North Atlantic Treaty necessary and inevitable. I was present at the United Nations when the present Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) placed the alternative before the United Nations assembly. I approved of what he said at that time and I have not changed my opinion since.
The gradual national disarmament which we envisaged at San Francisco has not been achieved. On the contrary, Russia maintained its armies and strengthened them as we demobilized and turned our airfields back to pastures and our factories to the production of civilian goods. True, a change came over us in 1950 because of the Korean war.
Now the time has come when a proposal is before us for recognition of the partial sovereignty of Germany. As the minister said this afternoon, sovereignty surely involves the right of a nation to defend itself against aggression. How shall that be done?
The alternatives as I see them are to drift along until Germany rearms of her own volition and without supervision or control, or to see her rearmed with the support of one or more friendly powers, perhaps the United States, or to recognize her right to limited rearmament under safeguards and supervision outlined in the treaties. To my mind the limited and supervised rearmament within NATO is the alternative I must support.
The indefinite occupation and defence of Germany by the NATO powers is, of course, another alternative but one which no country is prepared to undertake indefinitely or even in part, without German participation in her own defence.
May I say one further word regarding NATO. I feel very strongly, as I have said so often in the house and wish to reiterate this afternoon, that we in the western alliance would be in a much stronger position in the world if we had paid more attention to article 2 of the NATO agreement. Had we given as much attention to the integration of the economies of the NATO countries as we have to military arrangements, our European allies would have been more stable, more secure against communist infiltration, and this very strength and stability would have minimized the danger of communist aggression against which the NATO treaty was originally formulated. May we take this lesson to heart and in formulating future plans for the maintenance of peace in Europe, Asia and indeed Africa or the rest of the world, give more heed to economic aid as a means of promoting freedom, democracy and world-wide peace and progress.


Mr. Solon E. Low (Peace River):: Mr. Speaker, I must say at the outset that I too look upon this debate as perhaps covering the most important matter to come before


parliament at this session, if not at many other sessions. I listened carefully to the speech given under great difficulties this afternoon by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) who, by the way, seemed to grow stronger as the minutes passed. For that I was glad. I must say that he presented a sombre picture, one which certainly confirmed my own feelings as to the whole world situation that we face. We are now discussing a matter of tremendous importance, and I believe that each person in this house must look into his own conscience and decide whether or not he has been able to give it adequate consideration. As for me, I have devoted a great many hours of study and contemplation to this whole matter. I have read every single thing that I could get hold of with respect to it in an effort to try to make up my mind on the basis of the fullest knowledge which I was capable of obtaining.
Over the past several weeks, Mr. Speaker, I have noted the intensive campaign of opposition, I must say, carried on by the communists in this and other lands. I must say that, in my judgment, they have overplayed their hands. However, as a result of their overplaying their hands, I believe that a good many serious-minded, loyal citizens of this country have possibly been silenced for fear that they might be classed as communists or communist sympathizers. When I say silenced, I mean in their criticisms, if they have criticisms, of the protocol and the agreements that have been entered into at Paris and London. We in the Social Credit group have all given many hours of study to this complicated group of interrelated protocols, annexes and treaties because it is not easy, in my judgment, to get them all separated and put into their proper perspective so that they can be understood.
The minister's speech this afternoon-and it was an excellent one, I may say-helped us greatly to get a better understanding of this whole complex. But what makes complete understanding much harder to get is the fact that there are so many implications in what was done at both London and Paris. Here we are dealing with matters of power politics, a field in which we can never be quite sure that we have caught the full picture because every move that is made can be understood only against the background of decades of history and against a great many shifting alliances.
In the light of all the complexities and problems associated with the protocol now under discussion, we think that it would have been wiser if the government had brought the resolution before the house so that it

could have been considered in committee of the whole where the members could have asked as many questions as they liked and where they could have made every effort to get a complete understanding of the whole serious situation. However, that has not been done. I do not know what else to suggest to the minister. I know that there are serious misgivings in the minds of many people because we have not brought the protocol in for consideration in such a way that questions can be asked. The only other thing that I could possibly suggest might be reference to the external affairs committee. I would not even do that if it were to be interpreted to mean that what I was seeking was delay, because that is not my object at all. But let us keep in mind the fact that history will judge us with some harshness if it ever takes the view that we have made a decision on this extremely important matter without the fullest possible measure of consideration and study. If the minister can see his way clear to refer this protocol to the external affairs committee for study, I should like to see that course adopted because I would not want anyone to feel that this house took a measure of this great importance and dealt with it summarily without having every opportunity to get at the root of every single thing that a member wants to investigate.
From talking with people and from receiving communications from them I have discovered that a good many of our good, loyal, serious-minded citizens throughout Canada have in their minds many misgivings about the rearmament of Western Germany. Let me hasten to differentiate between the protocol and rearming Western Germany, because there is a difference, in my judgment. I must confess that I have some serious misgivings about the rearmament of Germany myself. The misgivings of serious and good and loyal people in this country revolve around what will really be the result of ratification of the protocol rather than its major purpose. I think that most people feel that the thing that is uppermost in the whole business is the rearming of Germany, with all the possible consequences and dangers that attend that business.
I have received quite a number of communications about the matter. Some I have not placed at a very high level of worth; others I have. I cannot help paying attention to the things that are brought to my attention by people who I know are loyal citizens of this country and are serious-minded people. I have in my hand a letter from one
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such person; and by the way it is from a man who professes adherence to the Conservative party in my own part of the country. I want to quote from it as being typical of the attitude of quite a number of Canadian people. I propose to read briefly from the letter, Mr. Speaker. I may say that I am quite prepared to table the whole letter if it is desired that I do so. In fact, I will do so anyway because I think this house is entitled, whenever a member quotes from a letter, to see what is in it. This is what this good man says:
It has occurred to me that whereas in a democracy we are all responsible for the actions of our governments it is proper for us to express our opinions when we think they are doing wrong.
I agree with that statement 100 per cent; and I am glad this man had the courage and the anxiety about the whole matter to write to me. He continues:
I am much worried about the rearming of Germany and more particularly our alliance with Germany even though it is only a part of the country. It seems to me to be morally wrong.
We have had no reliable evidence of any repentance on the part of Germany for all that they did, and thus our acceptance of them now really implies condonement of their wickedness. We are being unjust to ourselves and we are failing in a sacred duty to our brothers who were slain by their hands.
No emergency can truly justify saving ourselves at the expense of honour. God always provides a better way if we look for it. Mr. Pearson asked if anyone could suggest a better way. I say let us face the situation squarely as we did after Dunkirk, looking for help neither to right nor to left but only up. In that way only will we be worthy of that help that comes from above
Then in another part of the letter he goes on to say this:
If we do have to come to blows with Russia, which I think we won't, will the acceptance of German help do us any good? I think it will do harm. History has shown that battles are not always won by the side with the biggest army, but by the side with the best will to fight. The will to fight goes with the most righteous cause. We may find many such cases in the Old Testament. Even a dictatorial government must have the will of their people behind them to successfully wage war. We must try to imagine what the feelings of all people of eastern Europe must be in the present case. They undoubtedly will have a horrible memory of German occupation. Our alliance with Germany will associate us in their minds with all that they dread. It will fix their will solidly behind every action that their government takes against us. This I think will more than offset the advantage of having Germany on our side.
I do not wish to quote any more at this time. This man has written me in good faith and said that I might quote from his letter if I wished. I did so because it is typical of of the attitude and feelings of a great many people who are loyal citizens of this country

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and who can by no stretch of the imagination be called communists or fellow travellers. I say it is typical, and we must not brand these people as communists.
When EDC was being promoted and before France turned it down we were told that the revival and use of the German general staff would not be allowed. That assurance did set some of our very deep misgivings somewhat at rest. But since EDC was scotched and these new proposals were adopted at London and Paris there has been some evidence and quite a good deal of prospect that the German general staff will not only be revived but that members of it will be given a big part to play in rearming Germany. We know that many of them are nazi sympathizers, outright nazis or some other form of extremists, and people generally are fearful that the German general staff, who were mainly responsible for the brutal and bestial acts of the German army during world war II, will soon come to exercise far too much influence not only on military life in Germany but also on the political and social life of the German people as a whole. I think we ought to be given every assurance that this will not be so and that they will not be allowed to do so. What assurances can be given I do not know, but certainly we should be given assurances that they will not be allowed to do so.
I recall that when I visited Germany in 1948 there was an intensive effort going on then on the part of the occupying powers to condition the German people out of their uncommonly strong bent towards militarism and at the same time to encourage and help them to establish a real democracy deep-rooted in their country. These were the two major objectives in the intensive educational campaign that was started by the occupying powers soon after they went into Germany. They realized what a terrific task it would be because for centuries the German people had never taken their individual responsibilities of citizenship. They had let Adolf do it until it became instinctive for them to look for a fuehrer instead of the practice of individual responsibility and taking their fair share in their own government.
Of course the German general staff and the military junta have exercised undue influence over the people since the time of Bismarck, and so it was not surprising to me that for a great time the German people had been developing a national character that leaned heavily toward militarism and war. But during the past ten years the intensive educational campaign of the allies in Germany has taught the younger people to hate militarism and the people as a whole have adopted

democracy as their form of government. It is not deep-rooted, as we know, and perhaps will not be deep-rooted for a good many years. It is quite true it will need a long time to become firmly established, but my opinion is that the younger Germans as a whole bitterly hate even the appearance of a uniform and they have given Theodor Blank, the man who undertook to publicize the new army, a pretty tough time in many areas of the country. In one place I understand they even threw a wine glass in his face when he attempted to speak to them. That is an indication of how they look at it. Does it not seem tragic and ludicrous that we would now turn completely around and plead with the Germans to think in terms of militarism, even if it is limited? It would be especially ludicrous if we did not take every precaution against the revival of the German general staff.
A good deal has been said this afternoon about the dangers involved in German rearmament, and there are dangers. Other speakers have pointed them out. Indeed, the minister himself did so and suggested that in all of these international agreements there is a risk we have to take. I am glad he did not use the term "calculated risk" because a good many people in this country look upon it as more or less a useless term. Certainly any risk is calculated. You never take a risk unless you feel you can get away with it. We know that there are dangers, and I think we should always keep those dangers in mind. If the protocol is ratified, as I hope it will be, then we should never relax in our efforts to prevent the dangers from being realized.
There are dangers we can see and there are dangers that will not become evident for some time after we have begun to gain experience in the practical working out of the protocol. I do not believe I should take the time here to point out too many of these dangers. There are some I shall suggest to which reference may have already been made. A rearmed Germany might try to seize East Germany by force. The minister set some of my misgivings at rest in that regard when he said that there could be no deployment of forces within Germany except at the command of the supreme commander of NATO, which I admit is in itself some control. But still it is not airtight. If a rearmed Western Germany should attempt to seize East Germany by force, thinking perhaps that with the 12 divisions the minister spoke about, the 1,350 airplanes and a naval force of a sort, they would be the strongest military power on the continent with the exception of Russia, what kind of predicament might that plunge us into? That

is the point. It is not whether or not they would be able to accomplish their task, but it would of course intensify the risks of war.
So we have to be very careful to see that there are safeguards against any precipitous action for unification that may be in the minds of a frustrated people who for years have been thinking in terms of unification and who seem to be willing to give their lives for it. I am not one who overlooks the fact that unification of Germany has only been a matter realized in comparatively recent times, and in the long run it is not an important consideration by any means. It is important, but certainly not the most important.
Another rider to this danger might be if the Western German people became frustrated in their desire for reunification and a strong wooing movement on the part of Russia conceivably induced a rearmed Germany to make a deal with Moscow. I wonder what result that might have. We have to look at that possibility. If we had to face a resurgent Germany allied with the imperialist bolsheviks from the east we would of course have our hands more than full, even with NATO.
I might also mention the possibility that ratification might intensify the arms race. That has been suggested, and it is possible, although I do not look upon it as a grave danger by any means. I might suggest, as has already been suggested, that ratification of the protocol might harden the present division of Germany as well as the situation of the east versus the west blocs of the world. It might do that. I do not know. It is something concerning which we have to wait and see. I do not like to think that it will. I hope it will not, but it might put an end to any possibility of achieving success in the drive for disarmament. However, we have to take the risk.
These are the dangers, and there is one other. The complex of protocols, agreements and annexes does set up, I understand, a system of interlocking controls that are expected to operate successfully against the dangers I have mentioned and any others that may be seen. They might work well but it will only be so if all the parties to NATO, the western European union and the Brussels pact continue to act in the very best of faith and if the German people continue to root their democracy deeply, resisting the influence of the German general staff as well as any extremists in other places.
Now, I have faith in Adenauer. So long as Adenauer is there, I think that he could successfully lead Germany along the path of 50433-25
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rectitude. I believe that, but we must remember that President Adenauer is getting older. Of course, we sincerely hope he will be around a long time to see this thing through. We must not overlook the fact that he is not expected to be around all the time. I am wondering what would happen if the western European nations decided later that it would be wise to raise the ceiling on West Germany's military strength. They could not order an increase; that has to be done voluntarily. I understand that under the treaty the western nations could not force it, they would have to negotiate for it. It is conceivable that in the negotiations Germany might bargain for a relaxation of some of the controls. If a dangerous east-west situation were to arise, a situation of real urgency, the western powers might yield to Germany's desire in order to get the increase.
What would happen then? Away would go the system of controls, and I do not know where it would end. I point these things out, Mr. Speaker, more to indicate what is in the minds of those people who are thinking this thing through very carefully. Certainly a lot of these things were in my mind, although I suppose I must have given thirty or forty hours of study to this whole question since we were told this debate would take place. There are some things that I cannot understand fully even yet, and I suppose a good many people would be in the same position.
As we study this whole complicated series of documents, this protocol, I feel we should do so against the background of two very important things. We should never lose sight of what happened at Munich, and how Munich contributed to the terrible things that eventually took place in world war II. In my judgment it would never do for us to let down our guard for one moment. At the same time, I must say we should do all we possibly can to spread the gospel of love, charity and good will to our fellow men wherever they may be, behind the iron curtain or in front of it.
The second consideration I feel we should always keep in mind is what the bolshevik imperialists are trying to do, and in fact, I think, are determined to do. I believe I understand what it is. I believe that, just as it was true that Hitler and his objectives were made clear by his own publication, "Mein Kampf", today the objectives and determination of the leaders of the bolshevists are made quite clear by the things they do and the documents they publish. Back in 1923, that is a long time ago, Lenin set out a blueprint for communist action over the years. He said;
First we will take eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia, then we will encircle the United States.

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which will be the last bastion of capitalism. We will not have to attack. It will fall like an overripe fruit into our hands.
We must secure the good will of teachers and professors in schools and universities, of liberal ministers of religion and of the pacifists and reformers of the world in order to create a mental barrage in the minds of the capitalist youth, which shall forever bar them from participating in a carnal conflict with the communist order.
This man Lenin was one of the architects of the communist conspiracy. Coming closer to modern times, I quote a man whom I met at the United Nations, a man by the name of Manuilsky. At one time he was the head of the Comintern and, by the way, was the man who betrayed the Ukraine and led that section into a trap. He said:
War to the hilt between communism and capitalism is inevitable. Today, of course, we are not strong enough to attack. Our time will come in 20 or 30 years.
That is approaching.
To win we shall need the element of surprise. The bourgeoisie will have to be put to sleep. So we shall begin by launching the most spectacular peace movement on record. There will be electrifying overtures and unheard-of concessions. The capitalist countries, stupid and decadent, will rejoice to co-operate in their own destruction. They will leap at another chance to be friends. As soon as their guard is down we shall smash them with our clenched fist.
He was speaking on behalf of the Comintern. What else do we need with that blueprint and the knowledge of events that have been happening in the world since that time and what is happening today? An attempt is being made by the communists now with a bit of a peace movement, overtures and all that sort of thing. We have to beware. That is why I say we have to watch these blueprints very carefully.
A NATO letter for May, 1954, sets out on page 25 a statement showing current Soviet military capacity. I believe the minister described that this afternoon in adequate terms, so I will not need to repeat it. Anyone who wants to see the strength of the communist countries today has only to turn to the NATO letter for May, 1954, page 25, and take a look at it. If you do not get shocked into a sense of reality, then I miss my guess. I should like to ask why in the world Russia has built up such a huge armament in relation to the other parts of the world. Why have her satellites followed suit, as the minister said this afternoon? Why have they allowed Germany to continue divided for all these years? Why have they refused to help bring about a peace treaty for Austria? All these things we have to try to keep in our minds.
I believe fully that the division of Europe was brought about by Russia and her close 
allies through their refusal to take even a good look at suggestions for the reunification of Germany on the basis of free elections, and also because they have constantly refused to co-operate to the smallest extent in trying to solve the many problems that are causing tension in the free world today. Now, Mr. Speaker, I have only a few remarks left, so may I continue and try to conclude before the recess?


Some hon. Members:: Go ahead.


Solon Earl Low: It is clear to me at any rate that Western Germany would not be able to defend herself against an already armed Eastern Germany without having some military strength with which to do it. In addition to that, I feel quite certain that Europe could not possibly defend itself against a possible communist aggression without German manpower and German arms. Just here let me say that in case of trouble between the eastern powers and the western powers, I am sure that the Canadian people would not want Canadian boys to give their lives defending approximately 30 million people who were not taking any part in the responsibility of defending themselves. That is one of the most serious considerations. I feel that such considerations must enter into the minds of the Canadian people from one coast to the other. I would not want that, and I believe I am about average in that respect.
1 believe that the free nations of the world must be strong and be able to withstand the forces that are arrayed against them. I believe that the only thing the communists understand and respect is strength. I feel we have reached a point where we must take a stand to prevent any further communist victories and so that we will not have to continue with any kind of policy of salvage out of our international conferences. We have lost too much already. I think now is the time to take that stand. We have to take it whether or not we want to do so. Perhaps the most important deterrent to communist aggression is the knowledge of the unity of western Europe. For that reason I believe it is wise, very wise, to admit Germany into the North Atlantic community, and I say "the North Atlantic community" rather than NATO, advisedly, and into the western European union.
While I realize that the controls that are set up may not work, I believe there is much less danger to the free world from a possible gradual break-down of controls over a period of years than from a determined adversary sworn to destroy all the free nations of the world, and that maintains a strong fifth column in every country where

they are pledged now to lull the citizens of those countries to sleep with that peace opiate about which I spoke, and who would like to sabotage their efforts to defend themselves if it becomes necessary to resort to armed defence. We do not want to forget quickly how much influence that fifth column had at one time in many countries of Europe, and some that are now far from us.
I am certain in my own mind that NATO has prevented a western push by the communist imperialists before this, and that is why I have supported NATO right from the beginning. And I want my hon. friend who spoke last evening before six o'clock to hear what I am now saying. I say to him, the hon. member for Iles-de-la-Madeleine (Mr. Cannon), that I have supported NATO right from the beginning, because I have felt that Canada must be strong, and that Canada must stand with the other free nations of the world to resist communism. I believe we must continue to spend for defence purposes and keep ourselves strong and, certainly so long as the present situation continues, we must give high priority to defence. That is where I stand.


Mr. Cannon:: I am glad to hear the hon. member make that statement. As a matter of fact I was going to ask him that question.


Solon Earl Low: I took a note of what the hon. member said last night and I felt that under the circumstances I was obligated to state where I stand. And by the way I am speaking at this time for the Social Credit association of Canada, of which I have the honour to be leader. I am sure all the members of that association, and those affiliated with it, will stand by what I have to say.
The possession by a united west of atomic weapons, and at least a measure of western solidarity, have been I am sure great deterrents. Divided and weak, all the negotiations and peace conferences we could think up would be useless in the face of communist blueprints and determination to reach their goal.
We in this group would like to see a general disarmament. We pray for it and will work for it, but I hope we are not unrealistic enough to believe that we in the free nations of the world, in spite of our great military inferiority under the east, should start disarming unless Russia and her allies give undoubted evidence of their readiness to go along with us in disarmament. I think that we should pursue every effort and take advantage of every possibility to get world-wide agreement on disarmament 50433-254
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and effective international control of atomic weapons to ensure that they will never be used in war.
If I thought the ratification of the protocol would destroy our chances of achieving general disarmament and effective international control of atomic weapons, I would vote against it, and I would use every ounce of my energy to persuade others to vote against it. But I am convinced that the only thing that will ever bring Russia's communist imperialists seriously to consider disarmament will be the realization on their part that they can never become strong enough to whip us all, if we stand together.
Consequently if we stand together and keep our unity solid and keep ourselves strong, I believe that we will have a much better opportunity, and a much better chance of negotiating for world peace and disarmament, so as to usher in that time for which we all long, the time when "every man may sit under his vine and fig tree and none shall make him afraid." I feel at the present time that we should support the protocol that has been placed before us, give it every possible chance to work, and show unity in the face of the difficult situation which obtains throughout the whole world.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.
Mr. L. T. Stick (Trinity-Conception):: Mr. Speaker, I have heard the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) on many occasions in this house when he has given us a review of the international situation, but I do not think I ever heard him to such advantage as I did this afternoon. He was lucid, he was clear and he gave us facts. I think that those facts showed us the motion which is before the Chair and the ratification of this protocol of NATO to be one of the most important pieces of legislation that has ever come before the Canadian parliament. I know he has been suffering from a sore throat, and so on, but he did so well this afternoon that I hope the next time he speaks he has another sore throat. I am not wishing him any harm, but I think the speech he gave and the way he put it when he answered all our fears augurs very well for the future. I cannot help paying this tribute to the speech which he made this afternoon and usually I do not pay compliments.

North Atlantic Treaty
There are two or three things that I want to touch on tonight in regard to this protocol and the questions raised by the speakers this afternoon. After listening to the minister there is not very much a backbencher can say about this protocol. But I think it will be understood that whenever we negotiated with the communists, when we sat down with them, we always did it not being sure of our position and through a sense of weakness, in that the communists had this advantage: they knew that we did not desire war nor did we have any intention of attacking them. But we did not know what they were going to do to us. That gave them an advantage and a great advantage in their negotiations. The result was that many times we came off a bad second. The Geneva conference last summer demonstrated this weakness. I am glad to note that out of this weakness came the realization that if we had continued with any more Genevas we would be placed in such a position that our chances of maintaining peace would be very small indeed.
It was the failure at Geneva and the failure of France to ratify the EDC that awakened people to the sort of danger into which they were drifting. Then Sir Anthony Eden and other statesmen realized it and got together with the people behind them and worked out this protocol which we have before us tonight.
Sometimes out of weakness comes strength. We have been negotiating for years through weakness and it is only when we negotiate through strength that we seem to make any deal with the Russians at all, or make any impression upon them. We have now reached the stage that with NATO we are building up the strength to negotiate. We are in a position to sit down on equal terms with the Russians and negotiate through strength on equal terms. The value of this protocol to me means simply that.
I said that in this house two or three years ago and perhaps I was the first to enunciate the policy of peace through strength. I am convinced-others may have different opinions -that peace never came through weakness and it will never be maintained through weakness. If we are to have peace we must be strong enough to see that we can keep it; therefore tonight we are debating this protocol binding the NATO nations together so that we may negotiate with the communist powers in the future on equal terms.
This afternoon the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) strongly supported the motion before us and raised one or two questions. One of his questions had to do with our troops in Germany and the position in which they would be placed if this new
[Mr. Stick.!
German army took it in their heads to try to get back Berlin. I am not going to try to answer the question for the minister because he is well able to do so himself, as you all know. It was a hypothetical question, of course. But if the German army is to be integrated into NATO, with all the safeguards which were outlined to us this afternoon, I cannot for the life of me see, from a military standpoint, how the German army on its own is ever going to take Berlin without orders from the supreme commander of NATO.
The question was also raised: what is the position of the Canadian troops under this arrangement if they do not get sufficient safeguards? Well, if I know the Canadian troops and the spirit of the fighting qualities of the Canadian troops, I do know this: If *a fracas takes place in Europe, they are not going to sit on the sidelines; they are going to take part in it. That is what they are there for. There are under this protocol risks which we have to take. There is no treaty today, however much you may bind it with safeguards, that is going to be kept unless the will behind it is to keep it. It has been demonstrated often enough in the last five or six years that treaties are kept by certain powers only when it is convenient for them to keep them. We therefore must accept certain risks when we ratify this protocol. There has never yet been an airtight treaty, Mr. Speaker, so my position tonight is to rise and support this protocol, fully accepting the risks which I know I have to take. I am sorry I have to ratify it, but because we have no choice I ratify it and am going to vote for it, for this very simple reason. The general welfare of this country is wrapped up in this treaty, and possibly the peace of the world.
When the hon. member for Prince Albert emphasized the importance of this protocol coming before this parliament and the duty of each member of this parliament toward the treaty, he brought out a very good point. It is the duty of hon. members to safeguard the welfare of the people of this nation and to try to maintain peace. That is why I am supporting it, with all its drawbacks and with all its risks.
I am going to support the protocol, Mr. Speaker, because I am here to safeguard the general welfare of the people of Canada and to try to maintain peace. That is why I am going to vote for it and that is why I hope all hon. members will make up their minds on that basis and not on the basis of party. This is beyond party. It is the national welfare that is before us, and if we vote on that basis there will be no doubt of this

protocol being ratified in an overwhelming manner. I am voting for it for the reasons I have stated.
I do not want to take any more time because I know many hon. members want to express their thoughts. I simply wanted to express mine and to say once more that in voting for this treaty I am voting on behalf of the general welfare of the people of Canada and for the peace of the world.


Mr. G. R. Pearkes (Esquimali-Saanich):: Mr. Speaker, it is my intention to confine my remarks this evening to the aspect of this problem referring to the rearmament of Germany. If my remarks should savour somewhat of a military appreciation, you, sir, know my background, and I have no apologies to make.
As has been stated on several occasions during the debate already, it is not unnatural that many people view with apprehension the rearming of Germany. The wounds inflicted during world war I and world war II left deep impressions in the hearts and homes of thousands of Canadians. These wounds are not yet healed. On the other hand, it would be senseless for us deliberately to keep open the scars and to continue the hatreds cultivated during the war years. It is difficult for the ordinary mortal to follow the divine injunction to love one's enemies, but if what we choose to call common sense indicates a similar course then perhaps we may be capable of rising slightly above the implications and emotions of frail human nature.
The fears which have been expressed might, I think, have been to a certain extent relieved had it been possible for the government to have given an opportunity for a full discussion on this problem before this. But, even now, I will endeavour to remove some of those fears which beset the people of Canada. In order that we may have a correct approach I will review quite briefly the events surrounding the background of this problem.
You will remember that during the period of happy optimism which followed immediately after the cessation of hostilities at the end of world war II, the hope expressed at Potsdam persisted for a short time that the German people might remain unarmed for many years because all the great states adjacent to the reich were on seemingly good terms so that the chances of war in Europe were regarded as remote.
It was not until the four-power pact of 1946 failed in the face of the Russian demand for the control of the Ruhr that the western
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powers found it necessary to build up the economic life in their respective spheres of Germany in order that they might relieve the burden on their own taxpayers. From that date on the division of Germany became more and more clearly defined and we also witnessed the miracle of West German resurgence.
Then followed the Soviet rejection of the Marshall plan, the Czech-communist coup of 1943, and the Russian blockade of Berlin countered by the airlift on the part of the western powers. These events eventually drove the western powers in self-defence into the Atlantic alliance. Even then no serious consideration was given to the creation of any German contingents although it was known that Russia had equipped the police forces of Eastern Germany with tanks, artillery and modern arms at that time. Therefore the blame for the failure of the Potsdam agreement lies squarely on the shoulders of the U.S.S.R. It was not until operations were started in Korea in 1950 that Europe really became alarmed. The fear that an invasion similar to that which took place in South Korea might be launched in central Europe became great, that is an invasion by proxy. It was then and only then that Mr. Winston Churchill, as he then was, advanced a suggestion to the council of Europe that West German troops might be integrated into the defence system of NATO.
The various plans which culminated in the European defence council failed to materialize after the rejection of that European defence council by the French chamber last year because of its supra-national character. Now, it seems to me that the west has but three choices. I put these three choices in slightly different language to that voiced by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) this afternoon.
The first choice is to act on the assumption that Russia will never attack through West Germany and therefore we can leave the Germans unarmed and undefended. In other words, let us turn back the clock to the Potsdam period. That is just not practical- you cannot turn clocks back.
Secondly, to assume full responsibility for the entire defence of West Germany by the western powers. The adoption of such a policy would mean much heavier commitments in arms, money and manpower by the western powers. In order that Canada might bear her full share of any such program she might easily be asked to station a much larger force in Europe than the one brigade we have stationed over there at the present time.

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I do not think that anyone suggests seriously that Germany could be occupied indefinitely by the allied forces. It would be repugnant to all the principles of democracy. Such an idea would be politically impossible and furthermore could easily ruin the economy of the western powers.
The third alternative that it has been suggested we adopt is to give West Germany the opportunity to contribute to the maintenance of the forces now being built up by the NATO powers in the hope that those forces will be sufficiently strong to deter Russia from committing any overt act which would lead to war.
The choice really lies between linking the federal republic of West Germany strongly with the west or allowing her to drift about in the centre of Europe, eventually and inevitably to be sucked into the Soviet system.
I think a neutral and defenceless Germany simply does not make sense. The days when any country could remain in splendid isolation are, I think, past forever.
It seems to me that the question we must ask ourselves is whether we really need a German contribution in order to offer a strong deterrent to possible Russian aggression. I am fully aware of the risks we run by rearming Germany. Is it possible for the west to prevent war without German manpower? That is the question I ask.
A few years ago General Eisenhower said that German manpower was essential to stop Russia from overrunning western Europe. Up to now German manpower has not been available, nor have the Russians attacked in western Europe and overrun western Europe. Why is this? The answer to that question is that up to now we have held the lead with the atomic bomb. But today the Russians, too, have the atomic bomb.
So before answering my question as to whether we really need German forces I think we should assess the opposing forces as we know them to be.
From the most reliable information available it is indicated that the U.S.S.R., Eastern Germany and the eastern European satellite states today have over six million men under arms, of which number four and a half million approximately are in the army. Mr. Harold Macmillan, the minister of defence in the British house, on November 18 during the debate on a motion similar to this one, stated that well over 100 divisions could be made available by the Russians in 30 days and that their total forces numbered over 400 divisions. More than one-third of these Soviet divisions are tank or mechanized divisions armed with modern equipment. Russian tanks today stand on the line of the

Elbe. They dominate the central plains of Germany and within a few hours' run could be on the Rhine.
The precise figures given for the forces of the western powers have not been made public, but the figure which is generally accepted is a little short of 50 divisions, with another 50 divisions in reserve. That, Mr. Speaker, is the measure of our disadvantage. Surely another 12 divisions from West Germany will help us to offset that disadvantage. The Soviet air force seems to have been stabilized in the last few years to a figure of about 20,000 aircraft of which more than half are modern jet types. Perhaps half that number of aircraft are available under the command of the supreme allied commander of the European forces. The German contingent is limited to 1,350 aircraft of which I understand some 10 units are to be of tactical bombers and 4 units are to be fighters, while the other 2 units are to be made up of reconnaissance aircraft. I think the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) made a slip of the tongue this afternoon when he said they were all fighters.
The Russian navy comprises some 20 to 25 cruisers, 100 to 150 destroyers and at least 350 submarines. I think the navies of the west are at least as strong as that. However, with regard to this problem we are dealing particularly with armies and air forces.
There is little doubt that the Soviets have stockpiles of atomic and thermonuclear bombs. It is, however, by no means certain that the Russians would use those terrible weapons at the commencement of any aggressive action that they might plan; for there is no real defence against strategic forces armed with H-bombs. The western powers also have their long-range bombers widely distributed throughout more than 150 airfields in Europe and Africa, all within bombing range of the principal Russian cities and their principal centres of communications. Since both sides have many airfields from which their bombers, armed with H-bombs and A-bombs, - might take off, I therefore suggest that it would be the wildest gamble for either side to count upon its ability to knock out or to neutralize the other's power to retaliate. A war fought with H-bombs could only result in mutual destruction of the nations concerned. Both sides may therefore hesitate to use the H-bomb, in much the same manner as both sides in world war II refrained from using poison gas.
The large Soviet forces with more or less conventional arms to which I have already referred, however, constitute a threat if we do not possess a deterrent; and I do not see

how we can rely solely upon a weapon such as the H-bomb which quite possibly we might never dare to use. We are therefore obliged to provide ourselves with the means of defeating, with conventional arms, an attack by conventional arms as well as retaining the power to retaliate against thermonuclear attack. By maintaining powerful and conventional forces armed with modern weapons for use in the field, the NATO powers hope to deter the Soviet from using their armies.
We have been told over and over again that the west does not have sufficient manpower to provide an effective deterrent against the Russian armies without a contribution from Western Germany. Furthermore, if war broke out, whatever might be the final outcome Western Germany would be the first country to suffer. All the cities of the Ruhr are within range of rockets of the V-l or V-2 type now in positions occupied by the Russians today. In short, western Europe and Great Britain cannot be defended without including in their defensive zone the territory of West Germany. It therefore surely makes sense for us to defend West German territory and to have that defence provided with rather than without the assistance of West German manpower.
A great many people from one end of Canada to the other are apprehensive, as I have already said, about rearming Germany and they have expressed great anxiety over the steps which are now being taken. Many fear that the German army, once formed, may get out of hand. These fears exist in West Germany itself. As has already been done by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker), may I call attention to the safeguards which are included in this agreement. While EDC sought a complete surrender of national sovereignty to a supra-national organization and was rejected on that score, the new plan still demands a partial surrender of sovereignty by all western powers. The maximum size of the armies and air forces of all powers is laid down. For Germany, as we have already been told, the forces laid down are 12 divisions, 1,350 aircraft and a navy designed solely for coastal patrol. Only by unanimous vote of NATO can these forces be increased. Another safeguard is this. So far as is practical, these forces are to be interlocked. The degree of their integration is to be left to the supreme allied commander in Europe. But the important feature of that integration will be the allotment of German staff officers to the supreme headquarters so that those staff officers will be in constant touch with the thoughts, opinions and philosophy of the
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allied staff officers. I believe that a great responsibility will be placed upon the staff officers of the western powers, including Canada, who will be serving on that headquarters staff, to imbue the officers of the German general staff with the spirit of the proper position of an army in a democracy.
The forces will be allocated and deployed under instructions from the supreme allied commander. Once deployed they cannot have their positions changed or be redistributed by any national authority without the consent of the supreme allied commander. As has already been said this afternoon, Germany cannot manufacture in her own territory atomic, biological or chemical weapons, nor make certain other types of weapons, except on the recommendation of the supreme allied commander. He also has control of the supply of petrol and so forth, the so-called logistic support as described in the articles of the agreement.
NATO is also provided with the authority to conduct rigid inspections. But probably one of the best safeguards in keeping the German army within its proper sphere of activity is the feeling that exists among the people of West Germany themselves as to the relation of their army to the state. There is by no means a unanimous desire on the part of the Germans to make a contribution to the common effort. The main argument upon which this reluctance is based is not dissimilar to the fears held by many people outside of Germany and in this country. I think the first and foremost one is based upon the traditional position held by the German army in German politics during the past century. Hon. members who have read "The Nemesis of Power" by Mr. Wheeler-Bennett will realize the political influence which was in the past and might in the future be exercised by a German army on German foreign policy.
There is an old saying that Prussia was not a country with an army but an army which ran a country. The question which is now being asked both inside and outside of Germany is: Can a German democracy exist side by side with a German army? Under Kaiser Wilhelm II and under Hitler it could not. Nor could it exist under the regime of the Weimar republic. Under Kaiser Wilhelm and under Hitler no democracy existed in Germany. During the days of the Weimar republic the army, by the sheer strength of the personality of the army commander, dominated the foreign policy of that republic. The question asked is: Will conditions be different now? I am pleased to say that western statesmen believe that they will be.
In the first place, Germany today is divided. I think we hope, in exactly the same

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way as Germany aspires, that eventually some day, perhaps in the quite distant future, Germany once again will be united when it is possible for the German people to express their desire freely as to the type of government which they desire. However, Germany is divided today and we notice that the more warlike Prussian states and Pomerania are in East Germany. They are already armed. The more democratically-minded and peaceful peoples of Hanover, Schleswig-Holstein, Hesse, the Rhineland states and Bavaria form the great majority of the inhabitants of the federal republic.
Furthermore, Germany will have a democratic constitution at the same time as she will have an army based on compulsory military service. During the days of the Kaiser and of Hitler they had an army based on compulsory military service but they did not have a democratic government. The new German army will be a conscript army and it will be controlled by a parliament alive to the dangers of the political influence of the army in the past. It will be very close to the army because, as I have said, the army will be a conscript army drawn from the youth of the country in all walks of life.
If I may digress for a moment, I think it would be of interest for us to look at the personalities who are at present controlling or will in the near future control that army. At the head of the organization will be Theodor Blank, director of the federal German office of security and defence, which is similar to our Department of National Defence. Herr Blank very recently stated:
The only man who can be entrusted with the defence of a system is the man who believes in it.
Thus, writes the special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian on Thursday, January 13, 1955, Herr Blank "has summed up his determination to make sure that the new German soldier should be regarded as a citizen in uniform." How very different that philosophy is to that of the old Prussian regime. Herr Blank has been appointed by Chancellor Adenauer to head the shadow ministry of defence in the federal republic of West Germany. He is a former trade union leader and is a member of the Christian Democratic party. The army officers who have been mentioned prominently in the German press as the most likely leaders of the West German army are first of all General Ludwig Cruewell, a Rhinelander, not a Prussian, who hails from the Ruhr valley. He was born at Dortmund in 1892. He was not a professional soldier. He was educated at the universities of Grenoble and Munich. In fact he had a comparatively short military career before he was captured in Africa on the 1st of June, 1942, and he re-
[Mr. Pearkes.l
mained as a prisoner of war until the end of the war. Press reports indicate that he will be the commanding general of the new German army.
The other name that is prominently mentioned, and is perhaps better known, is that of General Hans Speidel, who was chief of staff to Field Marshal Rommel in army group B. He is mentioned as being the chief of the German delegation to NATO. He is not a Prussian. He is a Wurttemberger, born in 1897. These men, as I have said, are not Prussians, nor did they at any time hold any blind unreasoning devotion to the nazi regime. In fact, Speidel risked his life to free Germany from nazi tyranny through his connections with Rommel and the revolt against Hitler. If the government of the federal republic therefore enforces its constitutional authority, the army will not be in a position to usurp that authority. There would seem little doubt in my mind that Herr Blank, who is responsible for the build-up of the German army, has any illusions on the dangers that exist.
I believe that here is a place in which Canada, the western powers, the Canadian officers and the officers of the western powers stationed in Germany have an important role to carry out. They could explain to the new German army the right position which any army occupies in the organization of any democratic state. Again, I feel it will depend on the attitude which is taken by the Deuts-chen Soldaten Bund, that is the German exservicemen's league. Will these men confine their activities, as the branches of our Canadian Legion do, to looking after the welfare of their old comrades or will they advocate the erection of some new military caste? These men have fought one or two wars, and many of them through both. I cannot believe that even our late enemies will want to see the creation of a military caste again.
On the other hand, as opposed to the possible attitude of these veterans, there is a strong element of pacifism existing in Germany today which is not likely to permit the new army to get out of hand. There are so many visible reminders in Germany, and I have seen them myself, of the price Germany paid that it is not surprising that strong elements of emotional pacifism exist in practically all social groups in Germany today. I should like to read a brief quotation from the special correspondent of the Manchester Guardian Weekly, which appeared under date of Thursday, January 13, of this year when he was discussing West German defence and democracy. He says:
One favourable factor is the difference of outlook between young Germans and the older generation. Most observers would probably agree that

the young Germans who have grown up during and since the destruction of the nazi regime present one of the most heartening features in the country. They are open-minded and are far more sensible and realistic than one had reason to expect. They are certainly not inclined to submit to indoctrination or to accept authority as blindly as their elders have done.
Therefore, in spite of all the powerful arguments which may be advanced against German rearmament, I feel forced to recognize the necessity for a German contribution towards western defence. As stated by the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefen-baker), with the other members in this party I will support the resolution which has been placed before us by the government. I have reached that decision, not with enthusiasm but as the choice of a lesser evil. I recognize the risks involved, not only to the free institutions of Western Germany itself, but also to the peace of the world, should the German army at some far distant date be in a position to make war contrary to the wishes of the North Atlantic powers. But I have to be realistic. I cannot see a force of 12 divisions launching an offensive against 100 Russian divisions. It does not make sense to me. I am not elated at the prospect of seeing this field grey army once again in existence. But if the participation of Germany in the western European union will make that system effective, I am prepared to accept the risks. I believe we all pray that there will be no war. Just because we offer prayers, however, we are not absolved from the responsibility of taking whatever action we can to ensure that there is no war.
In conclusion, I should like to ask the Secretary of State for External Affairs to give us a little more information regarding the precise position of the Canadian forces now in Europe. The United Kingdom, as is well known, has made a commitment of four divisions and their second tactical air force. She is also very heavily committed financially. Just what is the status of the Canadian brigade and the air division in Europe? The minister referred to it today, but we do know that for operational and training purposes heretofore the Canadian brigade has been under the command of the British commander on the Rhine. We are vitally interested in this problem. Any further explanation that he can give us regarding the system of command would be beneficial to the country.
We have heard of the increases and further commitments which have been made by the government of the United Kingdom. This afternoon the minister said he had given assurance that Canada would play her full part in the new defence organization. Is he satisfied that Canada is playing her full part in relation to what the other NATO powers
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are doing? While he has made no commitment to the other powers as to whether Canada is to give any guarantee that her forces will remain in Europe for any definite period or whether there is to be any increase in these forces, perhaps he would inform this house as to whether it is the intention of the government to make any further commitments in that respect.


Stanley Howard Knowles: In rising at this time, Mr. Speaker, I am deeply conscious of that sense of appreciation which I am sure is often felt by every member of this House of Commons. Differ though we may on major or minor issues-and we now have before us one of major importance-all of us are extremely grateful for the fact that we in this country are the proud possessors of free institutions including, in particular, this free parliament, where it is not only our right but our obligation to express our firm convictions. That, Mr. Speaker, is what other members taking part in this debate are doing, members from all sides of the house, and that is what I propose to do at this time.
As my leader the hon. member for Rose-town-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) indicated this afternoon I would do, I rise at this time to oppose the motion. I do so, Mr. Speaker, for three reasons. First of all, I shall register my opposition from a deep personal conviction. It is my judgment that the rearming of Western Germany at this time is a step we should not now be taking. My second reason for rising to express this opposition is that I am satisfied, as other members are-indeed as other members have said-that there are thousands of good, solid, patriotic Canadians -never mind the others-from one end of this country to the other who are concerned about this step. Indeed there are many who feel it should not be taken,, and I believe their view should be expressed in this debate as early as possible.
I also take this position because, as my leader pointed out this afternoon, it is the position of the movement to which 24 of us in this house have the honour to belong. As my leader pointed out, at our national convention in August 1954 a decision was taken against the rearming of Western Germany at this time.
Further, as my leader pointed out in his address this afternoon, the matter was under very serious consideration at a meeting of our national council this past week-end. That meeting of course was held with the knowledge of the debate to be undertaken in the house this week; and the view of that council by majority vote was that we should oppose the rearmament of Western Germany at this 50433-26

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time. And so I say it is for those three reasons I rise now to state my opposition to the motion presented to the house this afternoon by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson).
All of us recognize, and that recognition has been stated by every member who has spoken, that this is a very difficult question-perhaps the most difficult one that most members in this present parliament have had to face. Everyone will agree that, at best, the proposal to rearm Western Germany at this time is a calculated risk fraught with very real danger. Indeed the Secretary of State for External Affairs said this afternoon that at best it had to be regarded as a tragic necessity.
A while ago the hon. member for Trinity-Conception (Mr. Stick), in indicating that he would vote for the motion, said, if I heard him correctly, that he was sorry that he had to vote for it, but he felt from conviction that he had to do so. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes), who has just spoken, expressed similar sentiments.
In other words everyone recognizes that the risk being taken is fraught with danger. Those who support the taking of that risk feel that it has to be taken because of the menace of Soviet imperialism. Some of us feel that it is precisely because of that menace-and it is a menace-and that it is precisely because of the seriousness of the world situation at this time, and that it is precisely because the division of our world into two camps should not be pushed beyond the point of no return, that Western Germany should not now be rearmed.
I wish to say very clearly that I do not impute to any of those in the house who support this motion any militaristic or warmongering motives, and I abhor the fact that there are in this country those who do impute such motives. That is not the way to deal with an issue of this kind. There are too many members in the House of Commons who, themselves, have suffered at the hands of German militarism for anyone to think that there is any member in the house who likes the idea of putting arms back into the hands of Germans.
We in the House of Commons, and the people of this country from coast to coast, will never forget the names Dachau, Buchen-wald and Belsen. We will never forget those six million Jews who were slaughtered during the Hitler regime in Germany, an awful blot not just on those who perpetrated such a crime but on our times. There is no doubt about it that no one, not even the most ardent advocate of the motion before

us, wishes to put arms back into the hands of the Germans. Those who are making the decision to vote for the motion are doing so as a result of applying their best judgment to the problem, because they feel it is the best way out of a dilemma and the best solution of some of the most difficult problems now confronting the world.
By the same token I ask that no one say of anyone in any corner of the house who rises to oppose the motion that he is a communist stooge, that he is playing the communist game, either wittingly or unwittingly, or that he is trying to undermine the strength of the west, or that he is unwilling to take steps to bring Germany back into the family of nations. Thank God, Mr. Speaker, we have a parliament where we can discuss these issues on their merits.
I have been delighted at the level of debate thus far, even though I disagree with the conclusions reached. I have listened with deep respect to the arguments put forth and I rise confident that, though my position may be different from any that has been expressed thus far today, the same respect will be shown for my position which, as I say, I believe is shared by a great many people in this country.
What we are seeking to do is to bring to bear on the problem before us the results of our best judgment. It is my judgment that the position taken by the movement to which I belong, at its national convention and national council, is the correct one, and that we should not rearm Germany at this time.
Not only is the question in itself a difficult one, fraught as it is with memories and emotions, and all the rest of it, but it is a difficult and tangled question procedurally. So far as most of us are concerned, so far as the people of Canada who are watching this debate are concerned, this is a debate on German rearmament. The Secretary of State for External Affairs could point out that that is not the motion he has proposed, but that he is proposing a motion for the approval of a protocol admitting the Federal Republic of Germany to NATO.
He will readily admit of course that the rearmament of Germany is involved in the other agreements to which he referred this afternoon; so that in fact, tangled though it is, we do have involved in the proposition that is before us the fundamental question of German rearmament.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs, if I may say so with deep respect, I think confused that issue this afternoon by having quite so much to say about the right of a free and democratic Germany to be brought

into the western community. I agree with that and I want it to take place, but the difficulty that confronts us is that what we have before us is not just a motion that German sovereignty be restored; that Germany be brought into the orbit of the west. We are confronted with a multiple proposition, including some things that are good, but including this one element which some of us feel is exceedingly dangerous. Because of that one element, the proposal to agree now to the rearmament of Germany at this time, I for one cannot support the motion. My vote, Mr. Speaker, which will be against the motion presented to the house by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, will be a vote on my own behalf and on behalf, I believe, of many thousands of Canadians against rearming Germany at this time.
Since I have taken that position the obligation rests upon me to say why I think this step should not be taken, particularly in view of the well-thought-out arguments that have been presented by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and by others, including the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes) who just preceded me with an analysis of the whole situation from a military point of view.
I think everyone will recognize that basically my reason-and I am sure that goes for others in the house who no doubt will join with me in opposing the motion-is that some of us have come to the conclusion that in view of the type of armaments that are available for modern warfare we simply cannot permit the world to go to war again. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich dares to hope that the hydrogen bomb is so terrible that it will not be used; therefore we must have conventional armaments upon which to rely. We all hope that is true, but I wonder whether in our heart of hearts any of us really believes that a third world war would go very long without the use not just of the now obsolete atomic bomb but of thermonuclear weapons. No, Mr. Speaker, I feel we have to start from that premise and somehow we must take the kind of steps which will make sure that war will not break out again.
I liked the challenge the Secretary of State for External Affairs threw out this afternoon -often when he makes speeches with the conclusions of which I do not agree I find that they nevertheless contain many sentences I enjoy, sentences that get quoted by those of us in this group-I liked the challenge he threw out when he suggested that it is up to us in this day and age to see that the tremendous forces and powers that are being given to us by science are used not for warfare but for welfare. It is no longer 50433-26^
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a dream, no longer something we must hope for. It has become a necessity for us to do so. If we use these things for welfare, we are blessed with a glorious future. If we use them for warfare there is no future.
Therefore, Mr. Speaker, starting from that basic position that we must expect a third world war to result in the possible end of civilization, so that it is to be avoided if at all possible, I come to the immediate question as to whether or not Western Germany should be rearmed. I feel it should not be rearmed because by doing so we run a greater risk of war breaking out than would otherwise be the case. I see that greater risk in two ways. Gn the one hand, I frankly admit that I am afraid, as are a great many people, of what a rearmed Germany herself may do.
I congratulate those who devised the controls that are written into the agreements that are behind the motion before us. They are the most effective controls of that kind we have ever seen. I recognize the statements that have been made by others, that for the first time there is a Germany in which the political arm will be superior to the military. But, Mr. Speaker, we are not far enough away from what the Germans have done in two world wars to be sure the same military aggressiveness that broke through the controls, lesser though they were, which were set up after world war I, will not break through again. One thinks of the complications that arise because of the various ways in which changes can be made. Some things can be changed only by unanimous consent; some things can be changed only by a two-thirds majority, and some things can be changed by a simple majority. Some of the controls are simply guarantees based on the pledge of the present German chancellor, Dr. Adenauer. When one realizes that in all these things are certain economic compulsions, he realizes that those controls, strong though they are, well worked out though they are, can be broken through.
My leader this afternoon quoted that dispatch from Reuters concerning the Dornier organization which has already established a branch in Spain for the production of aircraft to get around the prohibition of manufacture of that type of aircraft in Germany itself. We know the ingenuity of these people. The fact of the matter is that though certain non-Prussians, as the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich said, may in the immediate future be in high positions in the German army, they will have to rely on men who had military experience in world war II. I suggest that there is very real danger that it will not be long until those same people will again be in charge of
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German troops, with all the compulsions, the compulsion particularly toward German unification, that are there. I need not drive home the point that the danger is very real.
As for German unification, I do not want to misquote the Secretary of State for External Affairs, but I believe he said this afternoon that would of necessity or inevitably be a major factor in German policy, the desire to reunite the two parts of that country of so many millions of people. Therefore, Mr. Speaker, because of these underlying compulsions, it is my fear, and the fear of a good many people, that we might find in the not far distant future we would ourselves be the pawns of the militarists who have been our enemies in two world wars. Remember that it will not be long under this arrangement until the German military people will be the largest single group in the European continental part of NATO. They will be newcomers. They are like the new members in the back row of this house; it does not take long for new members to get down to the front. It will not be long before this newcomer to the North Atlantic partnership will have a major voice because of its strength on the continent of Europe. I suggest we have to think very carefully before we agree to the arming of Germany at this time.
As I said earlier, and as my leader said this afternoon, those of us who take this view must not be regarded as opposed to the idea of bringing Germany back into the family of nations. I would go further than bringing her back into the western group; I look forward to the day when Germany might be able to take her place in the United Nations, and to the day when that organization might be enlarged to take in all the nations of the world. I know there are those who will say "There is a dreamer", but I submit that in the light of thermonuclear warfare the dreamers have become the realists. There is no future unless we get rid of war itself.
As I said earlier, the rearming of Western Germany would increase the danger of war rather than decrease it on two counts. My first point was that I would be afraid of what would be done by a rearmed Germany herself. My second point is that this step will increase the danger of war, because, if I may use the very language the minister used this afternoon in trying to set the argument aside, it is in the nature of an irrevocable step in the further division between east and west. I know that east and west are divided; I know that the Soviet union has played a major part in bringing about that division, not only in drawing the line of division but pushing it as far west as she can.


I know how obstinate the Soviet union has been; I know too that one must not think of West Germany as far as we are concerned as being any different in a military sense than the placing of arms in France or any other of the NATO countries. But let us face the fact that this has become a fetish; this has become a point which seems to the other side to be a case of our taking an offensive step.
There is no question, no matter what our philosophical views of war and peace may be, that we are in the kind of world where you have to be in the position to negotiate from strength. But there are two kinds of strength; there is not only military strength, but moral strength. As for military strength I listened with interest to the exposition made by the hon. member who preceded me as he made the point that from the military point of view we need the extra 12 divisions and extra German aircraft in order to achieve a balance. Suppose that takes place and that so-called balance is achieved. Is that the end of it or does the other side then decide it has to get more? Then where do we go from there? Is Spain next? I hope not. I hope there is some point where we will realize that we in the west not only need military strength but that we need moral strength.
I think that our moral strength is weakened if we at this time put arms into the hands of ex-nazis. I want the west to be strong. I accept the proposition, whether I like it or not, that in the world today we have to be in a position to negotiate from strength; but I think there comes a point where you will push that building of strength beyond the point of no return, where there is nothing left but an arms race which can have only one end, an explosion into a catastrophe that can mean the end of civilization.
I believe that in this world today we are playing for time. We need it terribly. There are things that we can do if we are given the time. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, as I have already suggested, referred to the tremendous forces being made available to us as science gets down to the power of the atom with its tremendous peacetime uses. If we had the time I think mankind could yet turn this world from one of recurring wars to one of permanent peace and human accord, with a high standard of living for mankind the world over.
I think we can yet achieve the dreams of the religionists and poets of days gone by, yes our own dreams and hopes, but we need time. Let me get specific rather than poetic. We need time to push the Colombo plan, and to push it a lot more than the Secretary of State for External Affairs is proposing that we

push it by increasing our contribution by only a million dollars. We need time for tremendous advances on the economic front.
This afternoon the minister mentioned the need for solving the basic causes of war, for getting down to the roots of things. We need time for that. If we had the time 1 think we can do it. Given the time I think we can remove some of the causes of the world's ills. We can change the picture so that instead of two-thirds of the world's people going to bed hungry tonight, as they do every night of their lives, there might be some sharing of the food and good things that we can produce.
We need time for these things. My fear is that if we take the wrong step we may throw time away. We need time for further diplomatic efforts. This afternoon the minister said, in response to the suggestion that still further efforts should be made to get together with the Soviet union to solve the problem of Germany, that sixteen attempts had been made during the last several years. The inference was this: Is it fair to ask for another attempt to be made?
I would rather that we made 16 more attempts than go to war. Almost everybody who ever discusses the United Nations when some heated discussion is going on says that it is far better that they should be calling each other names and fighting with words than that we go into the catastrophe of a hot war.
I think we should continue the efforts to obtain the reunification of Germany even if it does mean multiplying the efforts and multiplying the attempts. I was going to say, multiplying them times without number.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs suggested this afternoon that one of the cornerstones of German policy will be the reunification of that country. He talked about giving Germany sovereignty. Even this set of agreements does not give her complete sovereignty. So far as military matters are concerned she surrenders sovereignty in the same sense that France and other nations in the agreement do, but in addition she has no sovereignty over her relations with East Germany or in the making of peace with her enemies in the last war.
So the German problem is still there. It is not solved by the arrangements that are now suggested. I think the Ottawa Citizen is right in its editorials when it suggests that the possibility of negotiating the reunification of Germany after we have armed West Germany is not as good as it would be
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if we were not to take that step, which I am afraid is going beyond the point of no return.
So I urge in all seriousness and in all earnestness that the house give a great deal of consideration to this matter. It may be said, and said rightly, that whichever step we take we will really never know whether we are right or whether the other step should have been taken. Of course, if we take the wrong step, whichever one it is, and the result is a third world war with all its catastrophic consequences, it will be known that it was wrong only if there is anyone left to know it. Let us avoid that situation, Mr. Speaker. Let us use the time we have to push for the settlement of disputes along the lines outlined in the charter of the United Nations. Let us use the time we have to get the rest of the world into that world organization. Let us pursue our economic attacks on the problems connected with war. Let us try to remove the causes of war. We have time to do these things. Let us not throw away our opportunity by taking the wrong step.
At the outset, Mr. Speaker, I said that I rose to make these remarks particularly conscious of the great possession that is ours in this free parliament, in which we have not only the right but the obligation to express our convictions and what we believe to be the convictions of the people who sent us here. Having been able to make these remarks without some of the interruptions that I thought might come, I now want to express my appreciation of the respect that has been shown for my views by those hon. members who I know do not share them. I trust that the debate will go on in that vein and that we shall have discussion of this important question on the basis that it is our job to bring our best judgment to bear on this question.
As my leader said this afternoon, we in this group regret that in our attempt, as a group of 24 members, to bring our best judgment to bear on the question, we have not all come out with the same conclusion. Regret that fact though we may, I think I can say for my leader as well as for myself that we are proud of the fact that, so far as our party is concerned, we feel that it is our right and our duty to express our personal convictions on this issue and to vote on the motion in the way that each of us feels is best for the future of this country and best for the future of mankind. I hope that members in all other parties will do the same.


Mr. L. D. Creslohl (Cartier):: Mr. Speaker,
I know of nothing more tormenting or more

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responsibility. What I did find, however, was that the spokesmen were notorious leaders of communism and communist propaganda. These are the same men who have consistently over the years followed the Moscow line and who are known to be violent, active and unscrupulous agitators for communism. They have previously headed countless delegations to pressure members on a multitude of issues, but all of them pivoting around what would please the Kremlin rather than what is important or basic to the welfare of Canada, its people and the democracies.
The literature they have left convinced me that their concern was more for world communism than for world peace. They made me wary of the classical enjoinder to fear the gifts that the Greeks bring. Their presentation lacked sincerity and was altogether too colourful for me or anyone else to be impressed by their recommendations. It would be folly to be guided by their concern in the matter. Have these selfsame communists who invaded Ottawa ever raised a protest during the past three years, during which time they knew that Russia was arming East Germany to the teeth? Have they condemned the Kremlin by protest meetings, petitions, delegations, and telegrams for the alliance between the Russians and the eastern section of Germany? Are not the Germans in the east the very same type of Germans as in the west? Would it then be healthier, Mr. Speaker, for the preservation of peace to have a strongly armed East Germany and a completely unarmed and defenceless West Germany? This would bring Russian military might to the borders of France. Is that what they would like to see?
What would these selfsame communists do if they were to hear that Western Germany is entering an alliance with Russia and that Russia is arming Germans in the west with every conceivable form of weapon and instrument of destruction? That would certainly please them and I am sure that we would not hear from the infamous peace congress a whimper of protest against Russia for doing exactly what the democracies are now planning to do. To them, what is sauce for the goose is obviously not sauce for the gander.
How stupid and how inconsistent is their position! How effective a case indeed they clearly make out for the approval of the measure before the house! Their vociferous protests and anxiety convince anyone who may be in doubt, and who may be torn between his emotions and his reason, to promptly realize how fatal it would be to follow Moscow's desire in this matter. They help, therefore, provide the answer to the dilemma in which many of us find ourselves.
tMr. Crestohl.l
As I said a moment ago, Mr. Speaker, to my knowledge there was not, in all the delegations that came to my office, a single person in a position of responsible leadership. I thought it my duty, however, to seek guidance and I carefully canvassed the opinions of the recognized leaders in my own ethnic group across Canada. Nowhere in this responsible leadership was there an opinion other than to uphold the position of our government in its all out effort to halt the advance of communism. But at the same time we should like to caution our government and the democratic leaders of the world that this alliance should not be made without the greatest measure of controls, and safeguards being provided against any possible abuse of the weapons placed in German hands.
In order to achieve this, Mr. Speaker, I should like to call on the government to make certain that, in addition to the safeguards contained in the protocol, there should be further provision that the new German republic should be bound by the genocide pact and the human rights charter under the United Nations Organization. In this way inhuman or discriminatory laws enacted by the republic could be brought before the tribunal of the world, where they could be declared illegal and expunged from the statutes.
We recall, during the Hitler regime, the cries from world Jewish leadership to the democracies that inhuman laws were being enacted and implemented in Germany. The world remained silent. This silence encouraged the horrible legislative process of exterminating millions of innocent people. Under international law, very little else could then have been done. There could be no interference in the domestic affairs of a sovereign state. What a tragic situation that was!
Under the ties presently being established between the NATO countries safeguards must be taken against a possible repetition of such a condition. I should, therefore, like to see either enactments or obligations contractually undertaken that would make it possible to bring before the world tribunal for examination any doubtful law enacted by any member state. The international tribunal could then, if it so found, declare it a contravention of human rights and therefore illegal and inoperative.
With Germany as a member of the family of nations, she would be bound to abide by the decisions of this world tribunal, and could never again enact inhuman or discriminatory laws. She would likewise be obliged to observe and respect the four freedoms, as well as the contractual obligations she will undertake concerning the

limitation of her armanments as set forth in the protocol now before us.
With regard to the sure and careful control of German arms and munitions, as set forth in this protocol, I have every confidence that our military experts have provided adequate safeguards. But more important even than contractual arrangements, in my opinion, will be the assured maintenance of a strong allied land force on the European continent. This will be the best guarantee that the German army is not left free to run havoc with its own resourcefulness. Any complete autonomy given Germany should, therefore, only be agreed to with the proposed limitation of German arms. On that issue I agree completely with the people of France.
In other words, complete autonomy can cover everything with the exception of autonomous control of its army, air force and navy, as well as the extent of its armaments, all of which should remain constantly under the supervision of the western powers in conformity with the terms of the protocol.
Germany should not hesitate to yield to the western powers the fullest long-range guarantees to ensure against a resurgence of her militarism. In fact, Germany should not object to anything that will give the utmost confidence to her allies that she will comply with her obligations. This will also show that she consents to be placed in a position where she will not be able to use her armaments for her own military adventures, either now or in the future, if a changed leadership in Germany should at any time have such notions.
This procedure would also show a measure of atonement for the shameful performance in the past, and would be a genuine earnest of her humility in asking to be admitted to the family of nations once more.
I know, Mr. Speaker, that all my colleagues in the house will bear with me if they find that I have spoken with some emotion on
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this subject. If I did so,' it is perhaps due to the fact that, to a greater extent than anyone else in the house possibly, I have personally been a victim of nazi cruelty. My rather distressed feelings result not only from the fact that I belong to that ethnic group which suffered most, but also because my own uncles, aunts and cousins, consisting of a family of over 60 persons, were tormented and put to death by the nazis. Hon. members I am sure can therefore appreciate that notwithstanding the over-all record of nazi cruelty and my own personal grief, I am still led to the conclusion to vote in favour of this resolution, I do so only because, to paraphrase a Shakespearean line:
Not that I dislike Berlin less,
But because I fear Moscow more.
By your leave, Mr. Speaker, I would like to make one more personal remark, and it is this: as I stand here before my colleagues on the floor of this house, and as one of the spokesmen of my ethnic group, I most solemnly declare that I vote for the resolution, but not without a deep ache in my heart caused by my grave doubts, apprehensions and misgivings; and I therefore accompany my vote with a most fervent prayer that, in the wisdom of Him who guides the destiny of us all, this vote may be for the betterment of all mankind.
On motion of Miss Aitken the debate was adjourned.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Harris moved: the adjournment of the house.


William Earl Rowe: What is the business for tomorrow?


Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Speaker, we shall continue with this debate tomorrow.
Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at 9.55 p.m.

Friday, January 21, 1955