1955-06-16

Mr. Knowles:: 1.	On how many occasions has there been radioactive precipitation or fall-out in Canada following experimental tests of atomic or hydrogen bombs or weapons by the United States or by any other country?
2.	What are the dates of such radioactive precipitation or fall-out and where in Canada did the same occur?
3.	What was the extent of such radioactive precipitation or fall-out in Canada on each such occasion?


Mr. Robertson:: 1,	2 and 3. The level of radioactivity is of interest to the Department of National Health and Welfare which has access to all data available to the Department of National Defence on this subject.
The defence research board does not systematically, or as a matter of routine, measure the extent to which radioactive debris, resulting from nuclear explosions, falls on the surface of the earth in Canada. The defence research board does measure, at various points in Canada, the radioactive content of precipitation in the form of rain or snow. While these measurements are made on a continual basis, they can only be made when rain or snow occurs. Complete data on the extent of radioactive fall-out in Canada cannot be obtained by this method.
Furthermore, the clouds of radioactive debris, which ascend rapidly into the upper reaches of the earth's atmosphere after nuclear explosions, drift around the earth, intermingling, and fall-out may continue in an irregular pattern for many months. Thus it is difficult during a test series to relate fallout on a particular day at a particular point to a specific explosion. Moreover, rain or snow is radioactive when it reaches the surface of the earth because of the natural radioactive particles always present in the atmosphere, although this natural radioactivity disappears fairly rapidly.
The important fact is not the occasion on which radioactivity has been noted at a particular location, but the total accumulated level of radioactivity resulting from all causes, including nuclear explosions. Defence research board data are incomplete on this
point but have recently been supplemented by information obtained from the U.S. atomic energy commission. At the request of the U.S. weather bureau, and on behalf of the U.S. atomic energy commission, certain Department of Transport weather stations have been making daily collections of fallout in Canada during the past year.
These collections have been measured by the U.S. atomic energy commission and, as a result, it has been determined that the highest measurement of accumulated radioactivity in the heavily populated zone of Canada, resulting from all nuclear tests carried out anywhere during 1954 was 80 millicuries per square mile on January 1, 1955. This corresponds roughly to a gamma dose rate of 3/10,000,000 of a roentgen per hour. Natural radiation corresponds to about 1/100,000 of a roentgen per hour and industrial workers are permitted to receive, if necessary, a constant dose of about 2/1,000 of a roentgen per hour.
As an example of specific fall-out at a location in eastern Canada, during the middle of March a measurement of 1,000 millicuries per square mile was made on the day of fall-out. Other studies have shown that the amount of fall-out which accumulates over a period of time is much the same in all the populated parts of Canada, the maximum being somewhat less than twice the minimum. In other words, the variation from point to point is not significant. This fall-out decays rapidly and the amount of radioactivity measured on the day previously mentioned will be only 5 millicuries per square mile on January 1, 1956.


AIRPORT SITE SURVEYS, EDMONTON
Mr. Holowach:: *?.ow "y sites were surveyed for the construction of a new airport at Edmonton, Alberta and what are the locations of these sites?
were these contracts for surveys let by tender?
3.	If so, what methods of advertising were used?
4.	Was advertising made through newspapers?
^ ' so' "n what dates and in what papers?
5.	What firms submitted tenders and what was the amount of each tender?
What firm pr firms were awarded the contracts?
/. When is it expected these surveys will be m<mced?d ^ construction of the airport com-


Mr. Langlois (Gaspe):: 1. Preliminary investigations have been made by Department of Transport inspectors

Inquiries of the Ministry and engineers of areas located as follows: Southwest of Ellerslie, northeast of Ellerslie, northwest of Leduc, northwest of Nisku, southeast of Ellerslie, northwest of Big Lake, northwest of St. Albert, northwest of Josephburg, southeast of Winterburn.
2.	No tenders have been called for and no survey contracts have been awarded.
3,	4, 5, 6 and 7. Answered by No. 2.



CIVIL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. George A. Drew (Leader of ihe Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, in view of the fact that during a continental civil defence test yesterday Canada's two largest cities and this capital were unable to take part because of lack of any effective organization, I wish to ask the Prime Minister whether he is prepared to consider having an appropriate inquiry conducted into the reason for this failure in our civil defence program.


Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I do not think there is any necessity for an inquiry. It was intended to have Ottawa participate in this function. However, it was found that, with parliament being in session, it would have taken a good part of the day and it was felt that it was not sufficiently urgent to have it take place at this precise time and to devote that good part of the day to removing us and the whole civil service from these public buildings.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, I would point out to the Prime Minister that the head of the government and the government of a country of 160 million just to the south of us thought it sufficiently important to take part in this exercise.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I would point out to the hon. member that it is Canadians who determine what will be done in Canada.


Mr. Hees:: In view of the fact that it is Canadians who decide these things for themselves, is it the government's plan that Canada shall carry out a similar civil defence exercise in the near future?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Canada will consider and act upon the advice received from those who have been organizing civil defence in Canada.


George Alexander Drew: There is no effective defence in the larger cities.


Mr. Martin:: To supplement what the Prime Minister has said, as he has indicated this matter is receiving consideration. It is the
[Mr. Langlois (Gaspe).l

intention to provide for a similar evacuation here. The exercise yesterday, in so far as Canada was concerned, was a success.


George Harris Hees: Does the minister have in mind when this exercise may be expected to take place?


Paul Joseph James Martin: Next Thursday the civil
defence director of the United States is coming to Canada-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


George Alexander Drew: You are going to get your orders then, are you?


Paul Joseph James Martin: I think my hon. friends had better listen to the rest of my statement before taking the satisfaction which this partial observation may have given. A representative from the civil defence organization in the United Kingdom is also coming.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


An hon. Member:: Laugh that off.


Paul Joseph James Martin: They are then going to discuss with us certain phases not only of operations in this country but elsewhere, and I think the fact they are coming to Canada indicates that they feel they can learn something from us.


George Harris Hees: Just how unprepared a country can be.


Mr. Rowe:: They would not learn it this morning.

The house in committee of supply, Mr. Robinson (Simcoe East) in the chair.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE Defence services-
236 To provide for the Canadian forces, tne defence research board and other expenditures relating to defence, including contributions toward the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; to authorize expenditures in the current year out of the amount hereby provided, not exceeding $175,000,000, under the provisions of section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, and to provide that, notwithstanding subsection (3) of that section, where equipment or supplies acauired by the Canadian forces after March 31, 1950, are transferred, the estimated present value thereof shall, if the governor in council so directs, be credited to this vote instead of being paid into the special account mentioned in the said subsection (3), and when so credited may be expended for the purposes of the Canadian forces; and notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act to authorize total commitments for the foregoing purposes of $4,269,726,540 regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of which it is estimated that $2,443,441,346 will come due for payment in future years), $1,729,285,194.


The Chairman:: May I inform hon. members that this resolution will be found on page

42 of the blue book and the details will be found commencing at page 306.


Hon. R. O. Campney (Minister of National Defence):: Mr. Chairman, all our thinking
about defence today must be profoundly affected, I am sure all will agree, by recent developments in the field of atomic and thermonuclear weapons as well as in the range and speed of modern jet bombers.
I am sure that all members will agree that this applies not only in the military fields of strategy and tactics but also in the wider fields of the defence of our civilian population and of the preservation of our industrial potential.
These new developments also give to our foreign policy a greater importance and a greater sense of urgency than ever before.
There is today no absolute defence against atomic and thermonuclear weapons in the quantities in which they could be aggressively brought to bear on this or any other country. That does not mean that we may not blunt and minimize such an attack. That does not mean that we could not survive such an attack. The powers of resistance and the ingenuity of human beings are very great indeed, as we saw in the last world war.
We may lessen the effectiveness of such an attack by such powers and measures as we can contrive, but we cannot wholly prevent damage to a country geographically as large as Canada. In other words, there is no 100 per cent perfect defence which will prevent such an attack from meeting with some degree of success if it is made.
It follows, therefore, that since Canada, by herself, can provide only a limited though substantial amount of defence, and since other free countries are in the same position, greater assurance against the risks of war can be attained only by collective security. That is, of course, the meaning of NATO-of fifteen nations working to one end-a great joint defence effort on the part of all for the protection of each.
I should like to say at this point that Canadians, generally, welcome the German people as our full and equal partners in NATO. The accession of the Federal Republic of Germany is important, not only because it will eventually strengthen the defence forces of the free world, but also because time may well prove that this enlargement of NATO is in itself a significant milestone along the path to the ultimate brotherhood of nations and the abolition of war.
Within this NATO team, Canada has the role of providing some measures of defence at home and some abroad. It is to this end that we are providing sea, land and air forces. But we do not, and we cannot, provide
Supply-National Defence weapons and forces of all types and in the numbers which might be required for the complete defence of all Canada in a global war, if that should come. It would be quite beyond the resources, both physical and financial, of a country embracing such a vast area as ours does, and relatively so sparsely populated, to carry out such a tremendous undertaking by itself.
One of the great advantages of the NATO alliance is that it permits each of its members to specialize in the roles for which it is best fitted, and, while providing such specialized help to other members of the team, to rely likewise on assistance from them in other fields of defence in which they are most proficient.
And it is folly in any event for us, or for a potential enemy, or for anyone, to talk today about "winning" a war. The tremendous powers of death, destruction and contamination of thermonuclear warfare today simply beggar description.
Our hope under such circumstances would simply be not to lose the war, rather than to expect to win it. And in this case there is a vast difference between "not losing" and "winning".
That is why the central concept of Canada's defence policy today is the maintenance of peace-peace assured by such overwhelming collective strength that no potential aggressor will dare to put the issue to the test.
We must seek increasingly, by every means within our power and in conjunction with our friends, to prevent the outbreak of a major war, which, if it came, could only bring chaos and catastrophe for everyone involved.
Together with our allies we must make it abundantly clear that violent aggression will be answered instantaneously by all-out retaliation throughout the homeland of the aggressor. And we must show as well our determination and our capacity to survive a sudden attempt at a knock-out blow and to fight our way back to stability and freedom as quickly as we can.
That is why we have the 1st Canadian air division in Europe with twelve squadrons of first-class fighter planes.
That is why we have the 1st Canadian infantry brigade there to help defend freedom in Europe.
That is why we have fighting ships and planes ready to patrol the North Atlantic sea-lanes against the submarine menace.
That is why we have here in Canada a mobile striking force of three airborne battalions ready to meet possible local attacks instantaneously.

Supply-National Defence That is why, working with the United States, we are extending a complex radar warning network across this land's vast distances, and out into the neighbouring oceans.
That is why, in the North American air spaces, Canadian and United States interceptor planes, aided by radar and ground observers, are constantly watching and checking unidentified aircraft.
And that is why, since NATO was formed six years ago, Canada has contributed military aid to our European friends to a value substantially in excess of one billion dollars, and is training year by year approximately 1,000 air crew for our allies.
All of these vital elements of our defence effort here and in Europe are to help make the nations of the north Atlantic community capable of checking an aggressor and of striking back so vigorously as to destroy his war potential.
The balance between our forces in Canada and our forces beyond our borders is based on the sound judgment of our military advisers as to where, in present circumstances, Canadian fighting men can best maintain our freedom and that of the free world.
While no special arrangements exist for provision of forces to meet commitments which may be made from time to time in support of the activities of the United Nations, we have, I think, demonstrated in the support given in the Korean war that we can, when the necessity arises, carry out our proper part promptly and effectively.
The great field of the United Nations, generally speaking, lies, of course, in the realm of negotiations, the development of understanding and the peaceful solution of difficulties, rather than in the provision of armed forces.
I said a few minutes ago that the central concept of Canada's defence policy was the maintenance of peace, and I said further that the best hope of maintaining peace lay in the maintenance by the free nations of overwhelming strength.
I am concerned, of course, with the military aspects of this strength, but there are, of course, other important ways in which we may make sincere efforts toward establishing permanent peace. Whatever we are able to do through the exchange of ideas, the development of understanding, the extension of friendly trade relations, the assistance rendered to underdeveloped lands, will cumulatively prove perhaps more important than we sometimes realize.
In recent months there appears to have been a lessening of tension in the cold war- certainly in Europe. We hope the friendly 

Supply-National Defence
This policy of employing civilians in support of the armed forces is one which is followed by most modern nations because it is a policy which results in substantial economies of time and money.
The average civilian salary today within the department is approximately $2,600 a year. The pay and allowances of an average uniformed man is of the order of $3,600 a year, or, if the cost of travel is included, about $4,000 a year.
I think it is obvious that it is very much in the public interest that civilians be employed, wherever possible, and subject to a limitation which I shall mention in a moment. As a matter of fact, our ratio is about 1 civilian to 2-1 uniformed personnel. This ratio follows closely the experience of the United Kingdom and of the United States. In the United Kingdom the ratio is exactly the same as ours. In the United States the ratio is slightly lower-1 civilian to 2-9 uniformed personnel. Unless our ratio is to change substantially, it is obvious, I think, that the number of civilian personnel will grow proportionately as the numbers of the armed services increase.
The limitation which I just mentioned regarding the rule of employing civilians to support the armed forces is this-the armed forces are organized to fight, if necessary, outside the territorial boundaries of Canada. In order to fight under active service conditions, supporting personnel-logistic, medical, etc.,-must be immediately available and they must be military personnel. This means that there must always be in peacetime a uniformed nucleus of the required supporting organizations ready to proceed into action.
Our aim is to keep a proper balance between military and civilian personnel within the department on the basis of the work being performed.
Perhaps hon. members would be interested if I were to refer briefly to the way we check the creation of civilian positions. To ensure that ample care is taken and the creation of civilian positions is checked, we have service complement committees which review periodically every position, existing or proposed, both military and civilian, and screen every application for additional staff as well. Membership on the service complement committee is an exacting and full-time job. As an added check the findings of the complement committees are further screened by the civil service commission and treasury board staff before approval of any new position is authorized.
I should like now to say a special word about the defence of the Canada-United States region-generally referred to as continental defence.


For nearly a century and a half, there has been no fighting of any consequence on Canadian territory; but we can no longer count on being an ocean away from war. Working closely with the United States we must now be ready to reckon with attacks right here on our own continent.
To meet this threat a closely integrated system of air defence, comprising early warning chains, a network of communications and intercepting forces, air and ground, has been evolved in full agreement with our neighbours to the south and is now being built up.
This is a huge, difficult and expensive task for the defence of both countries. As an example of the costs involved, I might say that the present estimated cost of the mid-Canada line, which will be wholly borne by this country, is approximately $170 million.
With this estimate for the mid-Canada line, and it is still only an estimate, and Canada's share of the cost of the "Pinetree" system, which will be approximately $151 million, it is seen that this country is contributing on these two counts alone nearly one-third of a billion dollars to the joint Canada-United States warning and control system.
In this task of continental defence there are those who urge that Canada should be wholly responsible for all defence installations on Canadian soil, and there are also those who argue that since these installations are largely for the benefit of the United States, that country should find the men and money to make them possible.
I should think that the right balance probably lies somewhere between these extreme positions. It is difficult to foresee the future nature and extent of these joint defences, but up to the present we have succeeded in finding a mutually agreeable basis for sharing responsibility in these projects as they arise.
I am confident, as in the past, the friendly co-operation between our two countries will continue to be an example to the free world -an example of great concern to the free world because in addition to our own immediate defence we must never forget that the safeguarding of the strategic air forces of the United States and the industrial potential of both countries is of vital importance to every member of NATO.
I feel that in our thinking about defence matters today, the crying need is for realism. Let us not fool ourselves: absolute security cannot be purchased, and any reasonable measure of security comes high. And Canada's defence program must be kept within some sensible money limits if we are to be able, year after year, to sustain it.
By further streamlining our administrative practices, we can also effect some economies,

but it is, let me assure you, quite illusory to think that very substantial cuts can be made in our defence estimates without weakening our defence effort.
We hear, almost daily, suggestions that Canada should undertake increased defence activities of numerous sorts, many of them, no doubt, desirable, if we could afford them. We rarely hear it argued, however, that we should spend more on defence than we are spending today.
In peace, and in our common pursuit of the abundance that science and human ingenuity and hard work can provide for the great masses of humanity, no thinking person wants to see war delay or turn aside mankind's long and patient pilgrimage towards a better life.
While our hearts cherish the hope of a world without war, in these uneasy years our defence preparations give the best substance to this hope.
The present climate of international affairs appears to be moderating, but we cannot be sure that the better weather of recent months will endure. Our objective remains fixed before us-to make peace permanent. With this in mind, the free nations are willing to negotiate with the U.S.S.R.-at the summit, at any level-but we must negotiate from strength.
Defence is costly and will no doubt continue so. But standing resolutely and together with the other free peoples, Canadians are willing to pay dearly to maintain their way of life.
To do this, we must go on so far as we can see, year after year, investing a substantial part of our national production in defence.
After all, the reward for our defence preparedness is immeasurable: for what we do to guard against the possibility of war is our best guarantee that our time will be a time of peace.


Mr. Pearkes:: In commencing a review of these estimates for national defence, Mr. Chairman, I would call attention to the fact that once again the appropriation for this department is the largest single appropriation in the whole of the estimates for the carrying on of the essential services of this country. There is some $1,775 million allocated for the Department of National Defence, to which must be added some $200 million which is the special credit accounts. We are asked, therefore, for some $65 million more than was actually expended last year. With the credits, as I have said, of some $200 million the estimates for this department amount in total to $1,975 million, to which
Supply-National Defence must be added the estimates in kindred departments such as the Department of Defence Production of somewhere in the neighbourhood of $23 million and civil defence of some $7 million. This makes a grand total for national defence and its kindred departments of over $2 billion.
We do not criticize the amount of money which is being allocated for what the minister has described this morning as the preservation of peace. This party never has criticized the amount of money which the government, over the past ten years, has been asking for that purpose. We are just as anxious as those who sit on the other side of the house for the preservation of peace and to make peace permanent.
Before I start offering some comments on the policy which is being adopted for the expenditure of these vast sums of money, I should like to extend my congratulations to the hon. member for Vancouver Centre (Mr. Campney) on assuming the appointment of Minister of National Defence. The present minister took over this portfolio on July 1 last year. Though we may from time to time differ on questions of policy, and particularly matters of detail, I can assure him that we all wish him well in his extremely difficult task.
I do want to say one word about his predecessor. Canada has been fortunate in the years gone by in that whenever there has been a national crisis we have found a man with the capacity to fill the important position of national defence. When the Hon. Brooke Claxton took over that responsibility there was a national crisis before this country. War seemed imminent, and war did break out in Korea very shortly. The defences of Canada were at a low ebb. They had been reduced to that low ebb by a policy of rather hasty demobilization after world war II. It was no light task which confronted the Hon. Brooke Claxton, and in that critical situation he was able to build up Canada's forces to meet that immediate situation and to lay plans for a three or five year defence program which, in large measure, has been fulfilled and which certainly met the needs of the intervening years. I think that the Hon. Brooke Claxton, although there were many times when I felt it was desirable to criticize his policy and the details of the way in which that policy was carried out, will go down in history with his name parallel with the names of other great Canadian ministers of national defence.
His passing from the house to take over a civilian position really brings to a close an era. He met the immediate situation which confronted the country at the time. He devised

Supply-National Defence a pattern of our defence forces which was designed to meet similar emergencies.
As I said, that program is nearly completed; that era is finished. The new minister starts off with a clean slate. He starts off to meet new and very difficult problems which face the country today. I say that an era has been completed, because there has been no event of greater importance during the last 12 months than the emergence of the thermonuclear bomb, and the knowledge we possess that other countries also have developed that bomb.
Therefore the new minister is posed with a set of entirely new problems the solution of which will require a great deal of courage. Such problems were reflected in the speech he made this morning, when he placed increasing emphasis on the part we must play in the continental defence of the North American continent, in the hope that world peace may be preserved. He emphasized the sentiments which were expressed by Sir Winston Churchill at Westminster not so long ago, when he expressed the hope that the emergence of the H-bomb would contribute more to world peace than to world war. We sincerely hope that that will prove to be the case. But we are not in a position at the present time to be lulled into any false sense of security, any more than we should be paralysed by fear that no absolute protection can be found against this terrible weapon.
In the white paper, to which the minister has referred, he mentioned on several occasions the appalling destructive power of these new thermonuclear weapons. At page 3 of the white paper, following the contents page, he refers to the fact that in addition to certain changes which had already been mentioned-
-appraisals of new weapons, new tactical and strategic concepts, and demands for increased mobility and flexibility of forces make it evident that changes in emphasis must be made from time to time within the defence programs of the NATO member nations.
Then he goes on to say:
Canada will continue to make such adjustments in her defence program. Current developments in the build-up of air defences on this continent, which are changes of emphasis of this order, enable Canada to make a highly important contribution to NATO as a whole.
And later on he says:
In co-operation with the United States we are providing additional warning networks and increasingly effective and co-ordinated air defence forces on this continent. By so doing we are of course meeting a common need for home defence and, beyond that, we are also assisting in the protection of the industrial potential of North America.
He has reiterated those principles during his remarks today. We concur in them. We


believe that Canada is making a contribution to NATO by taking part in the joint defence of this North American continent. We believe we must share in that team play- and it must be team play-for the development of the defence of this continent. We are not a country which can provide all the defences required. We are in partnership with the United States of America in providing defences here. But we do want to play our fair share in that team; we do not want to be considered as a very indifferent player. We feel we have as important a role in the defence and the protection of this North American continent as has any other country; and we cherish certain sovereign rights which we feel are ours, although we recognize as a fact that to a certain extent sovereignty must be surrendered in order to play our part in the continental defence of the country, and to expect the other country that is vitally interested in the defence of this North American continent to provide her part.
Those are the sentiments which were running through the minister's speech this morning, and they are certainly the principles and the opinions expressed in the first two pages of the white paper. As I say, in the main, we concur in those principles. But when one comes to look through the other pages of this white paper, one is appalled by their emptiness and by the barren attempts to implement the policies which have been described in the first two pages.
Canada's position is unique. Canada lies across approaches-and the approaches are only by air and by sea-to the great industrial centres of this North American continent. The minister said, in effect that it was more important that we should not lose the war rather than to win it, and that perhaps more emphasis should be placed upon not losing the war than upon winning it. The only place where a war against democracy could be lost is on this North American continent; and Canada is in the position where she must play her part in guarding the approaches to that one vital area.
The threat of course is that of an attack coming by air over the roof of the world, using the approaches from Europe across the Arctic and down through the eastern portions of Canada to the great industrial centres of eastern United States, and also that of using similar approaches in the west from Siberia to the great industrial centres of western Canada and western United States on the Pacific seaboard.
The only major threat which can come is an airborne threat. It is fantastic to think that large armies could be landed on the Arctic shores of Canada and advanced

through the barren lands of the great north, even though in the future those areas may carry a much greater population than they do today. The approach is by airborne troops, with a minor approach on the sea lanes leading to the east and west where perhaps some minor diversion might be carried out by submarines. But we have to be realistic, as the minister says.
The first thing that we must realize is that Canada's great role in the preservation of peace is guarding those air approaches to the only places where the war could be lost. The threat of airborne forces will be mainly directed against the centres of industry. It will very largely be an airborne bombing attack, but it is possible that attempts may be made to seize certain airfields in the north, or to hold for a period or to destroy certain vital centres such as important mining areas where vital minerals are being produced.
To meet that airborne attack we must have strong air forces to cope with the air forces of any potential enemy. We must realize the fact that Canada cannot produce by herself all these air forces. We must rely to a certain extent on the air forces of the United States because the United States are playing on this team with us. In the general plans it is not Canada's role to spend money-and I do not think we have the money to spend- on any fleet of strategic bombers; therefore, let us concentrate on the protection of those air approaches.
Oh, a good many statements have been made recently and in the past couple of years on the fact that greater emphasis is being placed on the air arm of Canada. It is well for us to take a look and see how much greater emphasis has been placed on the air arm of Canada. I looked at the distribution of the defence dollar in 1951-52 when this program was first brought into effect. In that year the proportion of the defence dollar allocated to the R.C.A.F. for air defence was 46.6 per cent. Today, after two years during which we have been told that greater emphasis is being placed on the air arm of Canada, the amount of the defence dollar devoted to the air force is 42.2 per cent. Is there any increasing emphasis being placed on defence in the air? Are we trying to fool ourselves and to believe that just because more men have been taken into the air force than there were previously there has been any considerable reorientation between the various services? Are we really being realistic? May I ask the minister, Mr. Chairman, is he really being realistic when he reduces the percentage of the defence dollar placed in the air from 46.6 per cent in 1951-52 to 42.2 per cent this year?
3,	1955	4869
Supply-National Defence Then there was talk about increased amounts of money. In this year's estimate there is the total sum of $880 million odd allocated to air. I think that is the figure the minister gave today and is the figure contained in the book of estimates. Last year's total amount allocated to air was $989,551,000, making a reduction of $109 million. I fail to understand what the minister was talking about when he said there was an increase of some $65 million. It may have been purely on equipment; I do not know.


Ralph Osborne Campney: That was on the actual
amount spent.


George Randolph Pearkes: On the actual amount spent; thank you. But in the actual amount allocated for last year and the actual amount allocated for this year-we trust that the amount allocated this year will be spent during the year-there is a reduction of $109 million,
I regret to say.
Regarding the strength of the air force, we have in the air defence command nine squadrons of regular R.C.A.F. squadrons for the defence of Canada, which are to be equipped by the end of this year with CF-100's. Today I believe there are only some three of those squadrons actually equipped.
Reference was made to the ten auxiliary squadrons. I am pleased that the minister acknowledged the difficulties. It was the first acknowledgment that has been made in this house, although I and others have pointed out the difficulties there would be in getting personnel of the auxiliary squadrons trained so that they could take part in the role which they were now called upon to fulfil, namely, manning modern aircraft for the defence of Canada to be ready at a moment's notice.
Last year and the year before I remember stressing the necessity of very considerably increasing the number of regular personnel who were attached to and carried on training with the auxiliary squadrons. If the auxiliary squadrons are to be the backbone of the defence of Canada, then we must have a very large number of permanent personnel attached to them. I do not believe it is practical for the auxiliary squadrons to carry out the role assigned to them. I think we had better be realistic. I think we had better say that we have to carry these ten auxiliary squadrons as regular squadrons in addition to the nine squadrons that we have.
We are told in the white paper that the 41 squadrons which were called for in the program are now being organized, and reference is made to the fact that they are being maintained. I am not at all clear as to what is meant by the words "being

Supply-National Defence organized" and "being maintained". They can be organized on paper and they can be maintained by skeleton crews. Are we to understand from the statement in the white paper that personnel ready to man these various squadrons are now available, in being and in uniform and that they have been allocated to the various duties which they would have to perform if they were going to operate these various squadrons? I think that that point must be cleared up because on it hinges a great deal regarding our manpower problem.
I would call attention to the fact that we feel-I feel anyway-that the greatest danger to this continent lies in the northern approaches by air and that we must meet that air threat with airborne troops. We only have four transport squadrons of the R.C.A.F. to carry out the tasks connected with the north in supplying not only the R.C.A.F. but any army troops that might be in the north, as well as to carry out necessary supply duties in Europe.
I feel that we have to be realistic again. The number of transport squadrons must be increased if we are to carry out those duties. A heavy burden will fall upon the transport squadrons of the R.C.A.F. when the mid-Canada and the D.E.W. lines are established and maintained. I have no doubt that they are now being used to carry out some of the construction work but permanent maintenance work will be required. If we have not the transport squadrons to do it then another country will have to supply them.
The minister referred to the army and outlined the army establishments. As an old soldier I was delighted to hear that he did not agree with the statements which have been made by his own department about scrapping the army. That is not a thought that has ever entered my head. No, the army should not be scrapped but the army must adjust its organizations to its principal role.
I do not believe in maintaining yesterday's establishments in order to fight the war of tomorrow. There is a danger that we keep to time-honoured traditions and formations which have now become time-worn. I have made similar expressions over the years. I was looking over some of my previous remarks which I had intended to read, but I do not think it is necessary for me to do so. In the debates of 1946, 1948 and 1949 I stressed the need for taking a new look at the army organization and organizing our army for the needs which confront it or for the role which it has to fill in the future.
We are told that the army consists of the 1st Canadian division, consisting of the 1st, 

2nd and 3rd infantry brigades, supporting arms and auxiliary troops, and a fourth brigade in addition to those three brigades. The order of battle of that division is very similar to the order of battle of a division which took part in the fighting on the Somme in 1915 or in the early part of world war II in 1940 and 1941. There is very little change in the proportions of infantry, artillery, engineers, army service corps and so forth. I wonder whether our organization has not been based more on tradition than on the needs of today.
We have a brigade in Germany which no doubt is carrying out the wishes of the NATO commanders that there should be an infantry brigade in Germany equipped with the most modern weapons to let the people of western Europe know that Canadian soldiers will if necessary be fighting in West Germany. That was all right four or five years ago and it is necessary for us to keep up replacements for that brigade, but does it fit into the new picture? When the divisions of West Germany are fully organized and equipped it is questionable whether we shall be required to keep one brigade there.
Even supposing one brigade is kept there we have three other brigades as well as a mobile striking force of the three battalions the minister mentioned in his speech here in Canada, plus all the divisional troops.
I do not believe that that is the kind of army which fits into our role of defending the air approaches to the North American continent.
I cannot believe that we shall be sending divisions of infantry, divisional artillery, divisional engineers and divisional army service corps into the north country to deal with the type of attack to which I have referred, that is airborne attacks with the idea of seizing some point of strategic importance.
The emphasis over and over again is that the principal role for Canada to play in this team for the preservation of world peace is to organize our army so that it can play that role. I think our whole army in Canada should be a straight airborne army, that our forces should not be built up on the establishments which were so valuable in world war I and world war II. They should be designed so that they can be rapidly moved from their home stations to deal with the problem of recapturing or defending some area which might be attacked.
Let us remember that if an attempt is made by an enemy, for instance, to seize northern airfields, the use of bombs by the R.C.A.F. and the United States air force will be more effective than an attempt to move mechanized artillery up there to support any

counter-attack. I am firmly of the opinion that if we are to keep any army there are certain things we must do. I believe we should keep it. I do not subscribe to the idea of scrapping the army but I believe you will find that the army will be scrapped if it is not brought up to modern conditions. I believe it will die because the average young Canadian, who is an intelligent man, will realize that he is being asked to serve in an army which was effective years ago but which is not designed with any realistic interpretation of the role it has to carry out today.
As to this talk of lowering the morale of the army because there is criticism of it, may I say that I do not believe a word of it. I believe that you will raise the morale of the army and that you will bring recruits into the army if you make it clear that it has a modern role to fulfil and not a role which is time-worn. There must be an entirely new concept of our army formation. In the British white paper reference was made to the army being organized along the lines of fire brigades. That is the sort of thing we want, namely fire brigade formations. I do not mean fire brigades to extinguish fire and I do not wish to equip them with fire engines, but I mean fire brigade formations ready and available at a moment's notice, as soon as the warning goes out, to concentrate from various areas with highly mobile airborne forces in order to destroy any enemy that may have landed from the air.
I was pleased to see that the minister is perhaps thinking along those lines when he stressed that our army was mainly an infantry army. I think it is becoming more and more an infantry army equipped with the latest possible weapons. I cannot see our army being employed in Canada on any large divisional formation basis. So much tor the army.
I turn now to the navy role to which the minister referred. He again, as was his predecessor year after year, was optimistic as to when the destroyer escorts would be available. In the white paper of 1951-52, published on June 30, 1951, we were told that the keels of four escort vessels had been laid, two in Montreal and one at each coast. The white paper goes on to say that these four vessels are expected to be launched in 1951 or early in 1952.
I am encouraged to hear the minister say that he hopes that by the end of this year they will be commissioned. I hope so too. I realize the difficulties which have confronted this shipbuilding program. I should like to refer to the Minister of Defence Production and tell him to use some of these powers that he has had for so long-
Supply-National Defence Mr. Howe (Port Arthur): That is why I need them.


George Randolph Pearkes: -to produce these vessels. However that may be, I realize that changes come about, and that alterations brought about by the changing role of the navy have caused delays in connection with the commissioning of these vessels.
I feel that there is a changing role. In 1951 I think our principal role was that of convoy escort and an anti-submarine role.
I do not place the same emphasis on the convoy role as I did in those days or as the government did. I cannot see the likelihood of large forces of Canadian troops or United States troops having to be convoyed during war across the ocean. But I do think that there is an important role, as far as antisubmarine work is concerned, in guarding our shores. We have sea approaches as well as air approaches to this continent. Modern submarines can come within a reasonable distance and from those submarines can be launched missiles or even aircraft which could carry some of these thermonuclear bombs. But encouraging experiments have been carried out elsewhere with atomic depth charges and perhaps the submarine menace may not be as great in the future as it has been in the past because these atomic depth charges may make it extremely difficult for a hostile submarine to come within our area. In trying to locate a target, the degree of accuracy required in the use of an atomic depth charge would not be nearly as great as that required in the use of an ordinary depth charge. I therefore feel that there is perhaps a new role appearing for the navy. I urge the importance of flexibility in that service and of making the fullest possible use of reconnaissance planes and helicopters working with the fleet air arm. Possibly the greatest danger we may have to face will be the mine of the future, and our efforts must be concentrated on meeting that danger.
So much for the general outlook and the sort of policy that I think should be followed in order to preserve the peace of the future. I believe we must face up to the problem now. I believe the minister must take into consideration now what the future pattern will be. I said he was starting with a clean slate and that we are starting on a new era. I believe we are starting on a new era in which there will be uncertain peace rather than cold war and the fear of outbreaks^ of small wars all over the world. It is going to be a long time before the final day of peace comes. We must now pattern our forces on a long-term basis. The problems which faced the minister's predecessor-those of having to meet the immediate future and
4872	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence to meet an emergency at once-have now passed. I referred to the army. We must give consideration to the size of the army for the reason if for no other reason than that we must consider the construction and housing problem.
In the white paper the minister referred to the permanent home stations. I notice that over the years some $800 million has been spent on construction, mainly for the provision of barracks and married quarters. According to the figures given in the white paper there are today something like 27,000 married quarters constructed, under construction or immediately planned. Are we going to keep up in peacetime this army of one division, plus one brigade, plus the striking force of three battalions, plus all the additional troops as well? Are we going to build permanent quarters for a force of that size? The amount of $161 million is allocated for construction this year. I believe it is imperative that we should provide proper barracks and accommodation for our regular troops but we cannot afford to build more accommodation than is required-not accommodation required for today but accommodation required for the future.
tha.t the Korean affair is over, now that there is a lessening of tension in Europe as the minister says, now that our attention has to be directed to the defence of this continent, I think we have got to re-examine our construction program. Reference is made to permanent stations at Chilliwack, Calgary Edmonton, Rivers, Shilo, Winnipeg, Borden Petawawa, Barriefield, Gagetown and many other places. Do we need all these? We do if we are going to maintain the kind of army outlmed in the white paper. From the manpower aspect I wonder whether we can maintain the army at its present strength. I have already raised the question whether the manpower requirements of the air force are actually being met. I am pleased to see that there has been a slight increase in the number of men m the R.C.A.F. since the 31st of December and that all the figures are reaching the ceilings that have been indicated. But I want to have the assurance that the ceilings, particularly as far as the air force is concerned, are realistic and that they provide the personnel to man the squadrons indicated in the blue book. I want to know whether "now organized and being maintained" means that these squadrons are actually in being with the personnel there and that the ceiling of 51,000 will actually meet the requirements at all times. I want to be assured that if there are not enough personnel to take over the ten 

auxiliary squadrons of the R.C.A.F. there are at least sufficient numbers to give them enough personnel to make these squadrons effective.
There is reason for some concern. I am not relying merely on rumours and statements that have been made outside the house, but we have been told that it has become necessary for United States personnel to man some stations on the "Pinetree" line, that they will be supplying the personnel to man in part, if not wholly, the D.E.W. line and the mid-Canada line. In the past I have emphasized the necessity of designing our forces to meet the needs of the defence of the country. I do not believe it would have been necessary for us to have imported 3,000 Americans to man these lines if we had trained soldiers for those particular duties instead of training them for a European campaign. I do not care whether these radar stations are manned by men wearing blue or khaki uniforms. It does not make any difference. You will find that there is going to be a much closer merging of the army and the air force than there has ever been before, and it may be that in the future they will wear the same uniform. A soldier can man a radar station just as well as an airman, and it is immaterial as long as the work is being done.
When it comes to the question of manning our own warning system I think that the principal responsibility should rest on Canadian rather than American forces. Yes, the growing need so far as this matter is concerned is to be realistic. Have we got enough men in sight to provide an effective air force, an effective army and an effective navy as designed in the white paper? We have heard statements made by various organizations pointing out the difficulty of raising the necessary men. The Canadian Legion has urged a form of national service in order to meet the needs. I have not heard the government declare its position regarding the desirability or otherwise of national service or a form of conscription. I do not believe it is necessary at the present time if proper application of the manpower available is made.
But we have got to face the fact that in order to raise the 117,000 men now in the regular forces the sum of $5,854,580 has been spent on recruiting during the past twelve months. That is a pretty large amount of money to be spent for that purpose.
I should like to say a word regarding the question of civil defence which was raised by the minister. I realize that the civil defence appropriations are not administered by his department, but civil defence is closely linked with the whole defence of the continent and, as it has already been referred

to, I trust, Mr. Chairman, that you will allow me to make a few observations regarding the matter at this time. I think that the armed forces must play an increasing role in civil defence and that you cannot divorce civil defence entirely from the rest of the defence of the country. I believe that part of the training of all regular personnel, and of all reserve and auxiliary personnel, should be in civil defence duties as well as military training. It should not necessarily take second place in their training. Due importance should be attached to the training of regular personnel in civil defence duties. After all, a lot of these men will be taking their discharges and then they will go into civilian life. If they have had a thorough training in elementary civil defence problems, they will be a valuable contribution to the civil defence organizations of this country.
Of course, many of the duties in which men in the forces are trained will be invaluable. One only needs to think of the valuable assistance that signallers would give, that engineers would give or that the army service corps units could supply to civil defence. The one thing about which I am surprised is that when our militia was being reorganized more emphasis was not placed upon retaining those units as a mobile civil defence corps. Last year when I was speaking on the civil defence estimates, I called attention to the fact that mobile corps were being established for civil defence in the United Kingdom. I believe that not only could many men have been retained in those units which were scattered throughout the country, which in many cases were disbanded or amalgamated with others, if they could have been allocated to civil defence duties, but a greater use could have been made of the training which these men had had in the past. By the very fact that in such localities there was an organization of disciplined men, even though they had been trained as gunners, infantrymen or in any other branch of the service, if they had been changed over to a militia corps for mobile civil defence, I believe it would have kept that organization alive and vital in these areas and they would have been of better service than breaking them up or disbanding them.
I think that in the future greater emphasis should be placed by the militia of today, as it is now called, or the reserve army of a year ago, in civil defence duties. I would go so far as to say that the prime role of the militia in the future should be civil defence. I do not know whether the minister will agree with that. I realize that certain of the
Supply-National Defence reserve army units may have to be earmarked to meet a strategic reserve or something of that nature, but in the majority of the reserve army or militia units I believe the primary role should be civil defence duties. I feel they should be worked into civil defence organizations. Their equipment should be allocated to them with that object in mind, and this would give some reality to the reserve army or militia training. Of course, I believe that these remarks apply not only to the army but also to the auxiliary forces in the air force and the navy. All men in the services from now on should receive civil defence training. We have got to raise the importance of civil defence. It must be realized that it is very definitely a part of our whole defence program.
Now, Mr. Chairman, that brings me to the end of my remarks on the general policy of this department. When we begin to deal with the various items there will be questions we shall require to ask. I have no doubt you intend to follow the procedure that has been followed in recent years of calling the various items as given in the details in the back of the blue book. This will enable us to have an orderly debate and an orderly question period. That, I believe the minister will agree, will save time.
I finish up where I started by again wishing the minister success in his great responsibilities. I hope he will, as a previous minister in another department used to say, take my remarks in a kindly fashion because they are intended to be constructive rather than critical. I believe we have got to work as a nation in order to carry out the very important role that we have. If I differ in some respects from the policy which he has outlined, I do so sincerely because I believe that he has a great opportunity and he has great responsibilities in a period of time when we face an entirely new set of conditions as a result of the introduction of these thermonuclear bombs. This has resulted in a greatly increased emphasis on the defence of the approaches to this continent. He starts with a clean slate, and I wish him well in fulfilling his important role.


Mr. Jones:: May we call it one o'clock, Mr. Chairman?
At one o'clock the committee took recess.
The committee resumed at 2.30 p.m.


Owen Lewis Jones: Mr. Chairman, I was very pleased this morning to hear the minister placing emphasis on collective security and on peace. He was followed by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, who pretty well

Supply-National Defence placed his faith in the same moral and physical features of our defence. I do hope the minister will continue to lay stress on peace as the only possible solution to the troubles of the modern world. I am satisfied that no other way can be found to have real and permanent happiness and security, except through our efforts on behalf of world peace.
Taking part in this debate, I realize the handicap that is common to all hon. members, namely the lack of information, intimate information particularly, about Canada's defence program. Therefore I must depend largely upon what information can be gleaned from the press, and some from the white paper-although I think they should have carried the theme right through and made it perfectly white, leaving the printing off. Had they done so, we would have had just as much information.
The estimates now before the committee are to my mind the most important that will be placed before us at this session. The cost of Canada's defence is almost 50 per cent of our total budget. It is the duty of members to see that such a vast sum of money is spent in an economical and practical way for the defence of Canada.
Some of us have wondered if we are getting value for our money. Others have wondered if Canada has a defence system worthy of the name. This group is prepared to support any realistic and practical program for the defence of Canada; but we shall take issue with the government if they continue the present policy of manufacturing, and training troops with, obsolete weapons. The need for defence is possibly as great today as at any time in our history. Indeed the Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe) indicated the other day that the situation is worse than it was three years ago.
The most singular and startling development since the defence estimates were voted here a year ago has been what all the experts call a technological break-through in the development of nuclear weapons. In the past two years, and more particularly in the last year, warfare has been completely revolutionized as a result of the sweeping technological changes in battlefield weapons. These weapons no longer exist merely in the minds of planners, nor are they still on the drawing boards. Many of them are in actual production, and some have already been used to equip American, British and Soviet armed forces.
Military experts indicate, as the minister and the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich indicated this morning, that with these weapons has changed the whole strategy of warfare. We are dubious if there are any trained


Canadian troops who could take part in warfare where these modern weapons would be used. There is no question that these weapons will be used in the event of another war.
The NATO council has already agreed that further military strategy is to be based on the assumption that atomic weapons will be employed tactically in the event of Russian aggression. Field Marshal Montgomery, deputy supreme allied commander in Europe, has declared:
I want to make it absolutely clear that we at supreme headquarters are basing all our operational planning on using atomic and thermonuclear weapons in our defence. With us it is no longer "They may possibly be used". It is very definitely "They will be used", if we are attacked.
The United States also has been outspoken regarding the use of thermonuclear weapons, should another war occur. I should like to quote Hanson W. Baldwin, the well-known military authority, who states in the New York Times of March 20 this year:
Washington indicated last week that American atomic weapons might he used like bullets against military targets in case of communist aggression anywhere in the world. This doctrine of so-called limited atomic strategy was first enumerated by secretary of state Dulles and was immediately supported by President Eisenhower. It follows earlier decisions by the national security council and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Taken collectively these decisions imply not an irrevocable and general decision to use atomic weapons under any and all circumstances, but it does show a very clear trend toward primary dependence upon atomic strategy.
We are told in the same article that in the United States the organization and tactics of the army, navy and air force are being changed to integrate these weapons into that country's offensive and defensive plans. For example, the United States army has already carried out tests of so-called atomic age divisions, both armoured and infantry, which streamline the present division, reducing it in size and making it more mobile, strengthening its communications and training it for quick dispersing and assembling.
The United States navy is also taking part in this development. They are commissioning at the present time two cruisers to be converted into guided missile ships. We are also told that the American air force is now organized and trained administratively and tactically, primarily for atomic war.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in the light of these revolutionary developments by our good neighbour to the south, how can any conventional weapons program play anything but a minor role in the new strategy of warfare? Yet, according to the little information that has been made available, Canada continues to follow such an obsolete program.

Let us try to examine what type of weapons Canada is now producing. The white paper recently placed in our hands does not assist us a great deal on this score. But in the Canada Year Book of 1954 we find more specific information as to the type of weapons program we have been following. According to this source of information our major production project has been the 3-inch 50-calibre naval guns and mountings. Browning 0-5-inch machine guns were produced for use in Sabre and CF-100 jet fighters. There are 3-5-inch rocket launchers for use by the Canadian army.
Arrangements, apparently, have also been made to produce 155-millimetre and 105-millimetre howitzers, the 105-millimetre recoilless rifle and 81-millimetre and 60-millimetre mortars.
Contracts for small arms were limited mainly, I understand, because these weapons have not yet been standardized.
Ammunition requirements altered with the change-over to the United States types of equipment. This made Canada decide to produce ammunition for the army's 155-mm, 105-mm, and 90-mm artillery.
According to this same year book, naval requirements to be met from domestic sources include ammunition for 3-inch 50-calibre 40mm Bofors guns, depth charges. That indicates a very conventional weapons program carried out by our defence department especially in comparison with the new weapons developed by the United States such as nuclear depth charges for use at sea, atomic shells for use with 280-mm guns with a range of about 18 miles, atomic war-heads, the army's guided missile with a range of about 75 miles, atomic war-heads for antiaircraft and air-to-air missiles, as well as the war-heads for the Matador and Regulus pilotless bombers.
The recent tests in Nevada have added another milestone to the development of these modern weapons, making our Canadian program that much more obsolete. The tests the United States conducted there have led to the development of a whole family of fission and fusion, and combined fission-fusion weapons of different sizes and shapes, designed for many purposes.
Strangely enough, the United States has been giving out this information on the development of modern weapons while our government has given parliament almost no information at all on the progress of our defence, using the pretext of national security, when, in fact, national security was not involved. For example, in reply to questions by the member for Assiniboia as to whether
Supply-National Defence Canada possessed atomic weapons of any kind, the Minister of National Defence stated, at page 1643 of Hansard of March 2, 1955:
The first and second parts of this question, dealing respectively- with the possession by Canada and the transportation in Canada of atomic bombs and atomic weapons, obviously cannot be answered for security reasons.	.
Such an answer serves no purpose unless it is to hide the weakness of our defence policy. It is well known and very widely publicized that the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet union are producing such weapons, and they make no effort to hide the fact.
Our neighbours to the south seem to delight in an almost daily bulletin reporting the progress of atomic weapons. Even Great Britain, in its statement on defence last February, was quite outspoken when it stated that the United Kingdom also has the ability to produce such weapons, after commenting on thermonuclear weapons in possession of the United States and the Soviet governments:
After fully considering all the implications of this step, the government have thought it their duty to proceed with their development and production.
But here in Canada it is totally different, as indicated by the answer given by the Minister of National Defence. To me, it would appear that the minister's answer confirms what has long been suspected, namely, that Canada's defence program consists of conventional, or perhaps I should more appropriately say obsolete, weapons. It also indicates that we have not begun to adopt the new weapons and the new strategy for fighting in the new kind of war that we may be involved in.
This appears to me to be an extremely serious situation, if for no other reason than that, for the past four years, more than 40 per cent of our total budget expenditure has been for defence. If this government continues to spend such large amounts for weapons that will never be used in any war because of their obsolete nature, then it is guilty of wasting the Canadian taxpayers' money for which we get no return in the form of effective protection. Much of our expenditure has been just pure unadulterated waste.
It seems to me that the government are relying for protection on the great distance between us and our potential attackers, the U.S.S.R. I would, however, point out that distance is no longer protection because fast Russian planes have the ability and power to deliver these devastating explosives on any Canadian or United States target.

Supply-National Defence
In this connection, I would like to quote briefly from an article which appeared in the Ottawa Citizen on May 17, this year, written by Stewart Alsop, of Washington. He deals with the reaction in the pentagon after Moscow's May-day celebration:
For what really shook the pentagon was the two formation flights of apparently fully operational B-52-type heavy bombers. This means that we are at best neck-and-neck in the race for the intercontinental jet bomber, which will certainly be the decisive factor in the air-atomic balance until the arrival of the intercontinental missile. And what shook the pentagon even more was the appearance of the entirely new all-weather fighter.
For the existence of such a plane argues the existence of an immensely complex weapons system of which an all-weather fighter is only a part, including early warning and ground control systems. The intelligence confirms the probable existence of a fully mature Soviet air defence (which this country will not have at least until the summer of 1957). Against a Soviet air defence built around all-weather fighters, this country's reserves of comparatively slow B-36 heavy bombers must be virtually written off as a factor in the air-atomic balance.
The author goes on to say:
But the most disturbing aspect of the situation is the technical brilliance displayed by the Soviet air engineers. Both the type 39 and the type 37 do the same jobs as our B-47's and B-52's with half the number of engines. This means that the Soviet engineers have developed jet engines with twice the thrust of any jet achieved in this country. Moreover, their B-52 type plane took just four years from drawing board to operational unit, whereas our B-52 took six and a half years.
This article furnishes further evidence of how obsolete our defence equipment is.
Despite the accelerated defence program in the last four years, in which more than $6J billion were spent on the defence services, the defence of Canada is totally ineffective and only just begun.
I would point out that some of the best informed military experts cast grave doubt on the validity of air or any other defence in the present era. The Canadian and American military experts appear to be convinced of the need for radar fighter screens. For the moment, let us look at what has been accomplished to date.
The only completed radar screen in existence is the "Pinetree" radar line which straddles the United States-Canadian border. It was begun in 1950 and, I understand, is now completed. Canada contributed one-third of its total $250 million cost but, for the life of me, I cannot see how it affords much defence to Canada since any attack from Russia would come from the north. Indeed, its effectiveness, even in terms of United States defence, is often seriously questioned.

Time magazine, of December 20, 1954, commenting on this particular radar line, warns that its 200-mile range provides very short notice of attack. The air defence command will not now guarantee any warning time at all.
Coastal radar runs from Vancouver to San Diego in the Pacific, from Labrador to Savannah on the Atlantic, with navy radar ships patrolling offshore for added warning.
Some radar nets have been built around critical targets and large cities but mostly the radar line is very thin and sometimes stations are closed for repairs.
Another point that was recently made by military critics is that the radars are beamed high for maximum range, leaving gaps for low level attack.
Canada is now in the process of building the mid-Canada line of small semi-automatic, electronic-detection stations along the 55th parallel which is roughly 500 miles north of the United States border. Only last fall did Canada and the United States jointly decide to construct a distant early warning radar line, the D.E.W. line. This will be some 1,800 miles north of Chicago and is far enough away to give a three-hour warning. But unfortunately it will be another two years or more before this line is completed.
If such significance is attached to radar fighter screens against attacking bombers, why is it that Canada is only now beginning to construct such a defence, although the defence program has been under way for more than four years? To make these radar lines effective there should be sufficient modern guided missile-equipped jet fighters. And yet, Mr. Dave Macintosh, writing in the Montreal Gazette on March 30 last, has this to say:
A high government source says the federal administration must decide before long whether Canada will supply the money and manpower for a huge air defence build-up in this country or whether American forces will be permitted into Canada to do the job.
Mr. Macintosh, continuing I presume with information from the same high government source, said that by the end of this year there will be only some 200 Canadian fighter planes CF-100 all-weather jets ready to meet an air attack on this continent.
To all Canadians who have been relying on the efficiency of the radar fighter screens to ward off attacks it must come as a real shock to learn that after all these years of defence building we have only one screen, "Pinetree", which provides little warning before western or eastern cities are under attack, and also that the two northern lines which will give more warning are still

far from being completed. Even when completed, the prospect of having sufficient modern Canadian planes to give them effect appears remote.
We in this group claim that the high level of defence spending cannot be justified because of the obsolete weapons that make up our defence program. 1 have not referred to the reserve army because the effectiveness of this body has been reduced to a minimum because of their still more extremely obsolete equipment.
The Canadian defence program was originally determined in 1950-51 by the requirements of NATO in meeting the possible aggression by communist forces in Europe. Therefore let us briefly review what NATO has accomplished from a military point of view in the last four years.
When General Eisenhower assumed command of SHAPE in early 1951, he had command of 15 active divisions. Today, four years later, these have grown to 46 divisions whose fire power is much greater than the fire power of the best equipped division in world war II. This is largely attributable to the new weapons provided by the United States. Added to this, West Germany will add another 12 active divisions within the next two years.
The build-up in NATO's air strength has been just as significant. In 1951 NATO had only a handful of planes, some of them of doubtful quality. Today NATO has approximately 6,000 fairly modern aircraft. Now that West Germany is a member of NATO it plans to contribute an additional 1,500 planes to this total.
Impressive as this build-up has been, it is overshadowed by even more spectacular achievements by most of the NATO countries themselves. The real potential power of NATO lies in the total forces at the disposal of its member nations not necessarily assigned to the NATO command.
In this connection I would point out that the defence expenditure of the fourteen NATO countries totalled less than $20 billion in 1949, but since 1953 they have averaged more than $60 billion a year.
Probably the most powerful protection against communist aggression is outside of NATO. I refer to the United States strategic air command with long-range B-47 stratojets able to carry atom and hydrogen bombs to any target in the U.S.S.R. It is under the direct control of President Eisenhower.
The strategic air command of the United States has wings of B-47 stratojets in Britain and Morocco. While not under NATO's command, they are available to support NATO 50433-308
Supply-National Defence in the event of an attack. Possibly this is the strongest force for peace in the world today.
The sense of urgency which was responsible for our defence program following the outbreak of war in Korea no longer applies; for in the interim period Russia has been completely encircled by American air bases, manned with air power capable of swift retaliation against aggression. Such precautions, to my mind, have reduced the chance of a major war almost to the vanishing point.
The facts that I have just mentioned clearly indicate that the optimum military build-up has been achieved. The massive military strength of NATO, together with the individual NATO countries and especially the United States, is, according to military authorities, many times greater in terms of destructive potential than was ever arrayed against Germany at the peak of the allied power in world war II.
In view of these accomplished facts, it is extremely difficult for me to understand why the Canadian government is maintaining approximately the same high level of defence expenditures that it undertook during the period of the crash program when the western defence situation was entirely different.
Even the United States has reduced its defence expenditures considerably more than Canada, as the following comparison will show. Peak spending in both countries was for the fiscal year 1952-53. That year the United States spent on defence $43-6 billion. For the fiscal year 1955-56 the United States plans to spend $34 billion, or a drop of 22 per cent.
On the other hand, Canada's defence expenditure was $1,846,916,817 in 1952-53, whereas for the current fiscal year, 1955-56, we have budgeted an amount of $1,729,285,194 for our defence services, or a drop of 6 per cent. If we had undertaken the same reduction in our defence spending as our neighbours to the south, our budget would be reduced by a further sum of close to $300 million.
We are convinced that this country could reduce its defence expenditures by $400 million without in any way impairing the effectiveness of our present defence program.
In view of the statement I have made, that we are still stockpiling obsolete equipment and materials-equipment that will never be used in any war-we strongly recommend that the government make sharp reductions in defence expenditure, particularly the moneys now being spent on obsolete equipment, and that a complete reappraisal of our defence program be undertaken in the light

Supply-National Defence of the development of a new kind of warfare for which our present defence program is totally inadequate.
Indeed, we are still producing equipment that has been on exhibition in war museums across the country for several years. In fact, we have sufficient museum pieces in our stockpiles to supply more than all the war museums in Canada require.
We of this group also recommend that a greater percentage of our defence appropriations be allocated for research work. Canada is lagging far behind other countries in this connection. The Hoover commission in the United States, in a recent report on the research and development work carried out by the defence department in that country, goes to the heart of the matter when it says:
The armed forces are not sufficiently daring and imaginative in their approach to radically new weapons and weapons systems.
The commission concludes that the pace for applying new scientific knowledge to weapons simply cannot be left to the informal proddings of civilian technologists. It urges the creation of a committee of outstanding scientists to work continuously and closely with the assistant secretary of defence for research and development.
While what I have read referred to the need for research in the United States-a country that has already developed a whole family of nuclear weapons-just think how much greater is the need for similar research in Canada at once.
Finally, I would suggest that the minister explore the possibilities of co-ordinating the activities of the reserve army and the civil defence units. In my opinion, this would enhance the morale of these units and of the public as these activities would be directly related to the defence needs of the local region and local population.
The time has arrived when parliament- that is, we common members-should take a more active interest in defence matters. To my mind, there is only one way in which this can be done, namely, by the establishment of a standing committee on defence expenditure.
In view of the fact that parliament, to date, has been so ill-informed with regard to defence matters, also because our defence expenditures comprise over 40 per cent of our total budget, it is imperative, to my mind, that such a committee be set up immediately, to be in operation for the next session of parliament. I hope the minister will take the suggestions I have made as being made in the same good faith as those made by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, with

a view to being critically helpful to the end that we may build up the greatest defence we can possibly afford for our common protection.


Mr. Thomas:: Mr. Chairman, I should like to join with the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich in congratulating the minister on his appointment to the portfolio of defence. We realize that he has inherited a department which carries with it a tremendous amount of work and a tremendous amount of sacrifice. It is also a department which carries with it very little thanks. As a matter of fact, I think the Minister of National Defence takes more abuse and more criticism than does any other minister in the cabinet. While I am on the subject of congratulation I should like to do as I have done in the past and offer a word of congratulation to the armed forces of this country. Wherever they have gone, I think they have built up an enviable reputation, not only as fighting men but as men and gentlemen. They have always served with distinction in every field in which they have been engaged and in every battle in which they have fought. They have always been well known for their courage, their ability and their resourcefulness. In these times of at least partial peace I think that those in our services overseas have served as ambassadors of good will and have earned the friendship of people wherever they may be. I want to make it perfectly clear also that any criticisms I might have are directed not toward the personnel of the armed forces but toward the department and the policies of that department.
This morning the minister gave us a detailed survey. While I am on that matter, I might just ask the minister-as I did last year-whether he would consider, in future years, making his statement on one day and then adjourning the debate until the next day in order to give the members of the House of Commons the opportunity to make some sort of study of the subject matter of that statement. The minister spoke for about an hour this morning. He put forward a great deal of information. It is practically impossible for anyone to absorb all of it as it is being given and it is imperative that we have a fairly good understanding of what the minister is saying before we make any attempt to criticize or to comment on that statement. I offer that suggestion to the minister for what it is worth.
The minister indicated that the world situation and the tension is easing somewhat and that we probably now have a little bit more hope for peace than we have had in the near past. But let us face up to the fact that the situation is serious and that it will probably

continue to be serious for a good number of years. We hope-as does every member of the house and every person in this country- that we shall not be called upon to face another all-out war. But we always have that possibility hanging over our heads as long as the threat of communism is on the face of the earth.
As has been pointed out, any war between communism and the western democracies is different from any other war that has been fought. This is a battle between two ways of life: between communist dictatorship on the one hand and democracy on the other, between the forces of freedom and the forces of slavery. We must not under any circumstances be lulled by any peace overtures that are made by the communist countries. We must always remember that they have told us many times that world domination is their ultimate aim and that they will be satisfied with nothing else.
We certainly hope that the peace moves that have been made by the new regime in Russia in the last few years are sincere. But we must always keep in the back of our minds the fact that it has been made plain by the communists, ever since the days of Marx and Engels, that they intend to rule the world and to conquer it by one means or another. As I said, possibly the new administration in Russia has had some change in heart, some softening of attitude. We hope that they are sincere. But in the event that there is no sincerity, we believe that Canada should and must carry on a defence program to the very highest possible degree.
I think the minister will agree that we in this group have always supported defence spending in any amount that we felt was necessary for the conduct of our defence program. We have always done this and we shall continue to do so because it is allimportant. Any criticisms that we have had in the past or may have now or in the future come as a result of our disagreement with the handling of the department and the handling of the money rather than the spending itself. We think that the aims of the department are undoubtedly worthy but that the results sometimes leave much to be desired. We feel that, in many cases, the people of this country are not getting dollar value for the expenditures that are made. I think the defence expenditure committee that we had for two years in the last parliament did an inestimable job and proved that there were many ways in which the methods of spending defence moneys could be improved. In that regard I would urge the government to consider setting up the defence expenditure committee again early in the 50433-308J
Supply-National Defence next session so that we can continue the good work done by that committee during the two years of its existence.
I should like to join the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich and the minister in welcoming the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO. We think it means a whole lot more than the addition of a certain number of fighting men and equipment. It means that throughout the whole of western Europe we now have a unity among the people, a unity of aims, desires and defence. In my opinion it means a great deal, not only from the point of view of the manpower situation but with respect to the morale of all the peoples of the free world, to know that the Federal Republic of Germany has joined us and will give us the support that we feel we should get. In other words, the Federal Republic of Germany is now more than a buffer state. She is an ally and we welcome her.
There is one piece of information I should like to get from the minister. I know there is no possible way of obtaining the actual figures but no doubt approximate figures are available. I believe NATO headquarters have issued statements from time to time on the approximate strength of the Russian land, sea and air forces. I think such figures were put on the record in 1953, and if it is possible for the minister to do so I should like him to bring the figures up to date so that we can make some comparison, see the headway that the NATO countries are making in their defence projects, whether or not our defence program is sufficient and whether or not we are doing all that we should be doing in the name of security.
The minister said so much this morning that I had trouble trying to follow it all, but I think he said that we were maintaining our productive superiority as far as the arms race is concerned. I hope that is so. We must remember that Soviet Russia does have a tremendous productive potential. Unlike the western nations, Russia is not too interested in how well her own people are getting along, and they are quite willing to sacrifice the needs and wishes of their own people in order to advance their defence productive effort. I hope the minister is right in believing that we are maintaining productive superiority over the Soviet union and its satellites.
In referring to air attack on Canada, the minister indicated this morning that there was no sure defence against an atomic attack. I can certainly agree with him on that point. In my opinion we have too few industrial centres in Canada. That brings me to a point that has been raised on many occasions, the decentralization of industry. I think

Supply-National Defence that a dozen atomic bombs dropped on strategic positions in Canada could practically wreck our entire economy. The tact that could happen emphasizes the need for decentralization of our industries and spreading them throughout Canada so that there will not be such a small number of strategic targets. I would hate to see an atomic attack on Toronto or Montreal. Two attacks, one on each of these cities, would cripple us tremendously. In my opinion the minister and the government should consider strongly placing more of our defence construction and production in the maritimes, throughout the prairies and all across the country.
We must under no circumstances become complacent and feel that we are not going to be attacked but that if we are we can continue to carry on. The "it can't happen here" complex is a very dangerous thing, and I suggest that the only way we can overcome any concentrated A-bomb or H-bomb attack is by the absolute decentralization of our war industry. The question of decentralization also brings up a matter that has been mentioned in years past and debated many times in the house. In a day when warfare involves highly mobile and fast-moving fighting units, we definitely need a trans-Canada highway system across the country for the transportation of troops to any part of the country in a short time. We need a highway system that could substitute for our rail system in the event of our major rail centres being bombed. I do not refer simply to a trans-Canada highway but a trans-Canada highway system which would probably mean three or four trans-Canada highways right across the country, including, of course, the Yellowhead route to which many members have referred in the past.
On page 7 of the white paper the minister mentions that the navy now has 154 ships in commission, but I notice that of that number there are only 22 which can be considered first-line ships. Of that number nine are frigates which, unless they have been radically redesigned and re-equipped, would be absolutely inefficient so far as present-day anti-submarine operations are concerned. Twenty-two ships would of course give us something like three convoy escort groups. As the minister has often said, we would be primarily an escort or convoy navy.
I suggest to the minister it would be extremely unwise for us to allow our first-line ships to become so few that we could not handle more than three convoys going across the ocean. This morning the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich said that he could not see us convoying troops across the Atlantic in the same way as we did in world war II.

I took him to mean that he was presuming that maybe the next attack would be made on this continent. If that is so we would need our convoys not to take troops from this side over to Europe but to bring troops and supplies from Europe to this country, and I do not think that under any circumstances we should allow the strength of our first-line escort vessels to deteriorate. We must keep them up under any circumstances.
I should like to make an appeal again to the minister, as I have done in past years, to consider the construction of what, in the second -world war, we used to call merchant aircraft carriers. Without those small converted aircraft carriers, I doubt very much if we could have won the battle of the Atlantic. Many, many times those small reconnaissance planes took off from the decks of these carriers and discovered wolf packs of submarines far in advance of the convoy. We were able to dispose of them before the convoy went by. I cannot think of any cheaper way of assuring the safe conduct of a convoy across the Atlantic than by the conversion of some of these merchant ships into carriers that will carry a small, light plane capable of submarine reconnaissance. They did a marvellous job during world war II, and I see no reason why they could not continue to do just as effective a job under present conditions.
I want to say one word about the acquisition of submarines from the Royal Navy. I sincerely hope that the only purpose of those submarines is to train Canadian personnel. I would hope that the Department of National Defence would not consider trying to build up an operational fleet of submarines. I do not think they are necessary. We have a definite job to carry out in naval warfare and I do not believe the placing of men on submarines would further our defence effort in any way. So far as training exercises are concerned, it is the only way the personnel of the navy can be properly trained. I realize that. I have worked with some of the Royal Navy submarines during the war, and gained a great deal of invaluable experience as a result of those training exercises.
No matter how hard you try to simulate a submarine search it is impossible to get the real feel of it until you are working with an actual submarine. I do congratulate the minister on bringing these submarines over to train with the Canadian fleet. They are needed, and the training exercises we will get with those submarines will certainly be an asset to the Canadian navy. Under no circumstances, however, could I agree that Canada should ever have any submarines for operational work.

I should like now to mention the air defence plan to which reference was made by both previous speakers, our radar screens and our air support plan. I am going to agree with both previous speakers that, although the radar screens when completed will be an asset to the Canadian defence effort, I also agree that I do not believe we have the air power to back up any warnings we might get of mass air attacks across the polar regions. I wonder if we could stop a squadron or two of hostile enemy bombers before they could do a tremendous amount of damage to the productive capacity of this country. A while ago the minister mentioned that a great deal of experimental work was being conducted with guided missiles. He mentioned both air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles with which the Canadian forces were dealing.
I would suggest to the minister that is not the proper way of going about it. I would think that in view of the tremendous waste tracts across our north, and the fact there is a possibility of air attack across the north, it might be advisable if we were to specialize on ground-to-air guided missiles rather than the others. Such missile bases could be placed somewhere near the early warning lines and used to attack any bombing force which might endanger this country. 1 cannot think of a cheaper or a more reasonable way of assuring our safety against air attack than the use of these ground-to-air missiles.
One more thing, Mr. Chairman. I should like to agree with the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes) in his plea that the reserve units of this country be trained for civil defence. I feel it would be of great value to this country to have a group of men who are well trained and who could be mobile, to handle any emergency that might arise in the event of attack on this country. These men would be gathered in every large centre and could be moved to any other centre where their services were needed to supplement the civil defence portion that they have in most cities. It would be wonderful training for them. In addition, it would give the people of Canada a good deal of reassurance to know that trained civil defence personnel would be available as well as the civil defence people who are trained in these various cities.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I should like to say that many times in the last couple of years we have heard reports over the air or seen them in the newspapers that someone in the armed forces has been killed in an aircrash or an accident at some training establishment and the names are being withheld until the next of kin have been notified.
Supply-National Defence I know that the reason for withholding the names is undoubtedly to ensure that the department is the party that notifies the next of kin. This prevents the neighbours hearing the news over the air and running over with the story. But I wonder how kind that whole procedure is? It may be protecting the feelings of the next of kin, but how much agony is being caused to the relatives of servicemen who are at the base from which the report comes?
I have known of cases where accidents have occurred, shall we say, at Gimli or Camp Borden, and people who had boys at those establishments suffered the agonies of the damned while they were waiting to find out whether or not their boy had been involved in the accident. I am wondering if the minister could not ask the co-operation of the news services in withholding reports of fatal accidents until such time as the next of kin have been notified, because I think it is a shame that so many people should have to suffer from lack of knowledge in order to protect the next of kin of the boy who was killed. I do not suggest any type of censorship; I do not think that would be the answer. I think the news services would be glad to co-operate in withholding that news until such time as the next of kin had been notified. Then, the names could be published along with the news story clear across the country without causing worry to so many people across this country. I should like the minister to consider that phase of it, because I have felt very strongly in the matter. I have had many people mention to me, when they have heard this news, "I wonder if it is my boy who has been killed." It is a matter involving only a few hours, and surely the government and the news services could co-operate in withholding that information for the number of hours necessary to notify the next of kin.


Mr. Stick:: Mr. Chairman, I should like to join with hon. members who have preceded me in congratulating the Minister of National Defence upon the statement he delivered this morning. To me it was the most comprehensive statement on defence affairs we have had in the House of Commons for a number of years. Unfortunately, for security reasons, with which I have no quarrel, he could not give us all the details we want.
The defence of Canada and defence matters generally have been the subject of public attention in the last three or four years, and particularly in the last three or four weeks. The fear of atomic and H-bombs has brought to the attention of the public as never before the need for the defence of the people in this country.

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I do not want to enter into a discussion of one service as against another, but I should like for a few moments to deal with one or two aspects of the naval service, and possibly the army, and then I shall confine my remarks chiefly to the air force.
At page 6 of the white paper under the heading "Royal Canadian Navy" the minister has this to say:
On the west coast the 2nd minesweeping squadron and a reserve training squadron were formed last year.
. There is no mention in this white paper as to what reserve squadron or what minesweeping squadron we have on the Atlantic. I would ask the minister to give that information, if he can, when he replies.
Much has been said today about the need for Canada's defence. I believe we will all agree that the first duty of the government and of every member in the house is the defence of Canada and the protection of her people. Mention has been made by one or two previous speakers about the Atlantic, and I wish to touch on that subject because I come from an Atlantic province.
As hon. members are no doubt aware, the last war was very nearly lost on the Atlantic, and it was just touch and go as to whether we would win. No one has paid greater tribute than has Sir Winston Churchill to the work of our naval and air forces, which contributed to the victory on the Atlantic. In his war memoirs he was most emphatic in saying that if we had lost the battle of the Atlantic we would have lost the war.
In the last three or four years I have drawn the attention of the house to the need for protecting our convoys on the Atlantic. I have drawn the attention of hon. members to the up to date submarines the Russians possess, and the doubtful defences we have to combat those modern submarines. I would not want to say anything in the house that would give comfort to the Russians or to any potential enemy. I do want to say, however, that three or four years ago manoeuvres took place between Bermuda and Newfoundland in which 14 surface vessels were pitted against three submarines. Quoting from a memorandum appearing in the New York Times of that date it was demonstrated that at the close of this exercise all 14 vessels had been destroyed, though they had not even contacted one of the three submarines.
I believe that since that time we have developed better devices to combat the submarine menace; but I have seen nothing and I know of nothing even up to this time which would lessen that danger. It must be kept in mind that I come from a province which is open to submarine attack, and that to

obtain supplies the shipping lanes must be kept open. Two or three enemy submarines around the coast of Newfoundland would close off supplies completely. In this event Canada would be placed in the position that she would have to supply Newfoundland by air. That is a possibility that must be taken into consideration, and I stress it here today.
We know about the submarine menace in Newfoundland because we had submarine warfare right at our front door. We feel strongly about it because it was brought home to us with great force. With this in mind I advocate now, not in any political sense whatsoever but strictly from a knowledge of our requirements as a province of Canada, the building of another airport in Newfoundland. Whether it be a joint effort between Canada and the United States or an effort on our part alone is immaterial. Such airports should be built, however, to take care of the air traffic which will flow back and forth across the Atlantic in the event of hostilities. This is a vital necessity. Gander, big as it is, cannot handle the traffic. Harmon Field cannot handle it; neither can Torbay; neither can Goose.
The possibilities involved should be taken into consideration immediately, and I believe our American friends would be receptive to the suggestion. While stalled at Gander for 24 hours some two or three years ago because of weather conditions I discussed the possibility of increasing the facilities, as I have indicated, and it was urged upon me by many people there. Just as Gander was established before the last war to take care of the possibilities the British saw coming, I say we must now take into consideration the building of another airport to take care of the air traffic. It would be too late to make such arrangements after hostilities began. That is all I am going to say on the subject of airports.
Mention has been made of the need for greater protection for our convoys. May I say to the hon. member who last spoke that convoy protection by air during the last war was carried out principally from Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Iceland and Northern Ireland. Our bombers, having a greater range, permitted us to have cover from Halifax right across the Atlantic. I have one suggestion to add, and it is that we need not only closer protection than we had before, but we shall need protection for convoys in all kinds of weather. This cannot be supplied from the points I have just mentioned. May I suggest to the Royal Canadian Navy, in all humility, that what we need are helicopters to be carried on the decks of merchant ships, from which they can take off,

go aloft and land. These helicopters could give air protection to convoys when weather conditions were bad and when the long-range bombers from Newfoundland and other places would not be able to afford that protection. In my opinion that is a necessity. As I said, I offer the suggestion in all humility. I believe it could be carried out at very limited expense, and that preparations should be made for it.
I do not want to get into any controversy as to which of the services should have priority. I believe that in the last two or three weeks irresponsible statements, which do not make for partnership in the services, have been made in the press. When one reads that the army should be abolished entirely and all our efforts devoted to the air force, one wonders just why such statements are made.
There is no doubt about it; under modern conditions the army has a limited role to play. There is no doubt that the air force is the predominant force in Canada today; but to say that the army is finished, that it is obsolete and useless, is going too far. The army will have a part to play, even if it is only a subsidiary one. I say that quite frankly. I said it here four years ago. If any priority is to be given to one service it must be given to the air force. I said that four years ago, and it is more evident today than ever before.
I hold in my hand a book entitled "Air Power and National Security", from which I should like to quote a few passages. The parts I wish to quote bear out the point I am trying to make. Usually I do not quote very much. The reason I am quoting today is that I find the quotations in this book very pungent and very apropos of the times in which we live. The writers of these articles have put their points in much better language than I could. Let me quote from an article "Some Fallacies concerning Air Power":
In the air are no streets, no channels, no point where one can say of an antagonist, "If he wants to reach my capital he must come by here." In the air all directions lead everywhere.
And again:
It must seem strange that the sky, too, is about to become another battlefield no less important than the battlefields on land and sea. But from now on we had better get accustomed to this idea and prepare ourselves for the new conflicts to come.
The struggle for the command of the air will be bitter; and the so-called civilized nations will strive to forge the most telling means to wage the conflict.
I think we have reached that stage today. For the first time in the history of Canada and the United States we are vulnerable to
Supply-National Defence attack from the air. That is the opinion of military-minded people today, and also of civilians who follow this reasoning. Today air power will either win or lose a war. We could not have won the war of 19391945 if we had not air predominance. The battle of the Pacific was decided by air power. Japan was brought to her knees by air power. We could not have landed on the Normandy beaches if we had not air power and a predominance over the enemy.	This air predominance finally
brought down Germany. It is more important today.
Air power is more in evidence today than ever before because of the hydrogen and atomic bombs. We are living in fear of a nuclear war which threatens us today, and every precaution must be taken to guard ourselves against it. We have no defence against it except the warning lines we are building and our own air force, and possibly guided missiles.
It is a recognized fact that if the enemy attacks us in force a certain proportion of his bombers will get through. If they carry the hydrogen bomb it will take very few bombs to destroy the war potential of this continent. That is the danger under which we live, and we have to face it whether we like it or not. Therefore when we are appropriating money for the services we must of necessity give priority to the air force. We must build up our defences so we can protect our cities and our inhabitants against this potential attack.	There is no doubt
about that in the minds of those who have spoken here today, and there is certainly no doubt in my mind that this potential for destruction faces us today as never before.
May I quote further from this book. During the first war Great Britain set up a commission to study air power. This commission was set up in 1916-1917 by Mr. Lloyd George, who was then prime minister. The head of the commission was the late Field Marshal Jan Smuts. In the official report, which was called by some the magna carta of British air power, we find the following:
The day may not be far off when aerial operations with their devastation of enemy lands and destruction of industrial and populous centres on a vast scale may become the principal operations of war to which the older forms of military and naval operations may become secondary and subordinate.
It is important that we should not only secure air predominance, but secure it on a very large scale; and having secured it in this war (1914-18) we should make every effort and sacrifice to maintain it for the future. Air supremacy may in the long run become as important a factor in the defence of the empire as sea supremacy.

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Further on it says:
For good or ill, air mastery is today the supreme expression of military power, and fleets and armies, however necessary and important, must accept subordinate rank. This is a memorable milestone in the march of men.
That statement was made by Sir Winston Churchill when he spoke in Boston in 1949. It was seen by men of vision and men who looked toward the future. The thing we have to remember, so far as this world is concerned, is the dominance of air power. Since we have developed the atom bomb and the hydrogen bomb the powers of destruction have increased tremendously. We have to take every precaution we possibly can to keep such bombers away from our shores. It will be too late when it happens. Military strategists say that whoever gets in the first bombing attack will do much to win the war. In talking about home defence and beyond that, the white paper says on page 4:
We are also assisting in the protection of the industrial potential of North America and the retaliatory capacity of the United States strategic air force, both of which are of the greatest significance to all nations in the free world in the deterrence of aggression.
The only force the free nations have to deter aggression is the United States strategic air force. I am glad the minister put those remarks in the white paper and said we are assisting in the development of that strategic air force about which we have heard so much and about which so much comment has been made in the capitals of different countries. The potential enemy has been getting his propaganda going, decrying the potential retaliatory effects of the United States strategic air force.
Along with many people I believe that if we did not have this strategic air force we would not be in a position to talk to Russia on anything like equal terms. Second, we would not be in the position in which we have been lately in seeing Russia take counsel of her fears regarding this air force and meeting together in conference with our statesmen to work out some conclusions for peace.
Since the Austrian peace treaty, Russia has gone to Yugoslavia, and has extended an invitation to Chancellor Adenauer to visit Russia. All this has come about because of the air power we have. We are in a position to hit back, and that is the only thing deterring the Russians today. It is the greatest guarantee we have today for peace in the world. I shall elaborate on the statement of the minister by quoting from this book again:
Today we live in an age in which force has become the determining factor in international relations. Wars that once were considered a contest between professional groups and forces, suddenly have completed the evolution to total

war between civilizations. Air power has broken down cultural and national barriers and becomes increasingly important in everyday life.
In other words we are living in a time of total war.
The future-peace or chaos-is man's choice. Within one hour of detecting red bombers in free-world skies, the west's nuclear-armed strategic bombers would begin taking off from bases all over the world, hundreds of them, with one destination -Russia. Attacking Soviet aircraft would find the west's bases empty. No international conferences, not even a quick general staff meeting. The gun is loaded. It is as automatic as pushing a button. It could take even less to set it off; an accident, for example. An unavoidable risk.
That is the power we hold to deter Russia or China or anyone else from starting a third world war. It is our great safety valve, and we must support it by every means in our power.
This is the ability of the west. It is costly. It is unavoidable. For until the politics of reason finds the way to peace in the world, the politics of power is the only known means of a stalemate. The central force of that power today is air power.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, this is the first opportunity we have had during the current session to discuss at any length the problems of defence. Already the minister and others who have spoken have given full emphasis to the importance of this subject to every Canadian and to all people living in the western world. So far as we in this house are concerned, we have the responsibility not only of attempting to assure in every Way we can as members of the House of Commons the maximum efficiency of our armed forces to meet whatever responsibility they must accept, but also to make sure in every way we can that the money spent on national defence is well spent and to the best effect. Some $2 billion goes from the public treasury to meet the requirements of this single department; therefore we must look at this both from the point of view of the effectiveness of our defence and the possibility of any practical economy which would be consistent with the demands made upon us.
I do not think it is necessary to emphasize that we all proceed from the same basic assumption in dealing with this matter. On whatever side of the house we may sit, and to whatever party we may belong, there can be no difference about our desire to see that our defence forces are as effective as possible and that those who are in the uniform of those forces are well trained, are well treated, have a feeling of confidence in their leadership and also have the assurance that they will be as well equipped as it is within the power of this nation to equip them.

However, it would be inconsistent and in fact it would be a neglect of duty for any hon. member of this house to refrain from making any comment which may be directed to the increase of efficiency and effectiveness, or to withhold any criticism that may appear appropriate in relation to any aspect of this great problem.
Before I proceed to deal with national defence as it has been set before us today and as it has been outlined in the white paper, I wish to deal with a subject which has been under discussion and which was mentioned in the house as recently as yesterday. It is necessary that it be mentioned because of the way a recent announcement was made which was designed to create uncertainty in the minds of the people of Canada generally and those in the armed forces particularly, in regard to certain steps that had been taken by the Department of National Defence.
It is only natural when discussions of this kind arise that there can be misunderstandings about what is at issue. May I make it perfectly clear that there can be no question about the right and duty of the government to decide what officer shall occupy any particular position at any time. If there is one principle that should not be changed it is the supremacy of the executive over the armed forces and the right and duty of the government of the day to determine what course will be followed, what plans will be made and what political decisions are appropriate, using the word "political" in its widest sense.
It would not be appropriate nor would it be in keeping with the best traditions of the armed forces if we were to precipitate a debate in this house in regard to the comparative merits of any officers of the armed forces. However, that does not preclude the desirability of making sure that whatever is done in connection with members of the armed forces is done in a way that neither creates unnecessary uncertainty in the mind of the public nor in any way creates an atmosphere of uncertainty in the minds of those in the armed forces about the way in which decisions are made.
The announcement a short time ago of the retirement of the chief of the general staff was no ordinary decision. It came at a time when there had been a good deal of speculation about various questions which had been disturbing the government; it came at a time when the government itself had taken under consideration certain statements that had been made; it came at a time when the role of senior officers in the matters under public 50433-309
Supply-National Defence discussion was very much in the thoughts of the members of the House of Commons as well as of the public generally.
That being so, it was most desirable that when an announcement was to be made that could only cause speculation, an explanation should have been given to the members of this house and through the press gallery to the public, which would have avoided any uncertainty. There was also a precedent because the very day before the announcement was made with regard to the retirement of the chief of the general staff, it had been regarded as desirable to make a statement in the House of Commons with regard to certain other matters under consideration.
It is perfectly true that the statement made was in response to certain comments which had been made in the house. Also, of course, questions have been raised in the House of Commons with regard to the circumstances under which the announcement was made with regard to the chief of the general staff. The point I made when this happened was, first of all, that while the house is sitting it is important that hon. members have these important subjects explained to them; and second, that the explanations given shall be understandable explanations which in themselves do not create further uncertainty.
I submit that the statement that the retirement of the chief of the general staff was merely in the course of ordinary rotation of appointments is hardly adequate under the circumstances. General Simonds is unquestionably the outstanding field officer produced by Canada during the last war. That was a matter of common agreement amongst senior officers in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and other allied countries. That being so, there was in the minds of hon. members a natural question as to why the services of a man who is still comparatively young, who is in the full vigour of excellent physical condition, and who has a great accumulation of experience, were not being employed in one of the several posts where skill of that kind and the experience he had acquired could be made use of in full measure.
There is no suggestion that anything General Simonds may have said at any time is in issue on this occasion. That cannot be so. Any of the things he has said which have perhaps had some controversial content were said sufficiently long ago that they could not possibly be the basis of the action which has just been taken. I think that consideration should be borne in mind. The government would have been remiss if they had not acted much earlier, if in fact their decision was in any way related to anything said by this very distinguished officer on an earlier occasion,

Supply-National Defence whether or not the government or anybody on this side of the chamber may disagree with what he said. After all, he would not be the first senior officer who has made statements that perhaps have gone slightly beyond the bounds of rigid military restraint. I think there have been cases when Field Marshal Montgomery has been known to make statements which went slightly beyond the narrow limits ordinarily imposed on senior officers in such a position.
Unquestionably such statements can be and are embarrassing. The best way to avoid that situation is to make perfectly clear what statements can and cannot be made. If any embarrassment has been caused by any statement made by any officer, I submit that the government itself must accept responsibility for the situation which has developed. On too many occasions it has encouraged, from senior officers as well as from senior civil servants, statements which would be helpful when certain subjects were being discussed. When encouragement or silent acquiescence leaves the impression that statements of that nature are welcome, it is only natural that they are bound to proceed from one stage to another and ultimately become embarrassing to the government itself.
Some of those statements-I am not referring to General Simonds in this case- undoubtedly have been embarrassing to the government. I would suggest, however, that the government look back over some statements that have exceeded the bounds of proper restraint which have been made and which were employed with some measure of satisfaction by the government when subjects of a controversial nature were under consideration in this House of Commons and elsewhere.
I suggest that the way to avoid anything of that kind in future is to have a clear understanding that senior officers should confine their remarks to the discussion of the non-political aspects of military affairs. I suggest that this can be done without any implied criticism of any officer; because if criticism is due, I repeat that I believe that criticism should be directed to the government itself which has encouraged the situation. Clear instructions along that line will avoid future embarrassment either to the government or to any officers. Also instructions to the effect that the government no longer encourages statements by unnamed or "highly reliable" sources would be very helpful. How often have we had read statements in the press from "reliable sources" dealing with some subject that is under active


discussion at the time. It is not possible to deal with those statements because no name is attached.
We had one of those statements just the day before yesterday. I repeat what I said before. Whether orally or in writing, a statement was certainly given to the Canadian Press, because the Canadian Press is not in the habit of giving in quotes statements that are a figment of somebody's imagination. There may be uncertainty about statements that are simply speculative reports, but I do not think there is one of us who believes that the Canadian Press, with its great traditions, would place in exact quotes statements of some military official unless they had received them from a military official to whom they had reason to look for an authoritative statement.
I can only express regret that the minister's inquiries brought him so little information. I even wonder whether he was as persistent as he might have been in his inquiries, because there are those who are rather under the impression that they have an idea where that statement came from. Perhaps a little further inquiry would inform the minister as to where that statement came from. I realize that it perhaps would not be appropriate to ask the Canadian Press from whom it came, because they undoubtedly were following a practice that has grown up. However, I think it would be a healthy thing if the words of the Prime Minister were observed, when he said the day before yesterday that he greatly deprecated statements of this kind given without the name of the person making the statement.
It should be understood that this will not be repeated, and that instructions will be given to that effect. There should be clear instructions to senior officers, as well as to senior civil servants, that while their statements are welcomed with regard to the subjects with which they are well acquainted, it is not appropriate for them at any time to cross into the realm of what are regarded as political decisions by a government.
Before I leave this subject, may I simply express the hope that General Simonds' training will be used in some capacity where it will be available to the public. It is not enough to say that a young officer at the age of 52 now automatically comes to the point of retirement. Other officers have continued in employment of different kinds. General McNaughton, who was at one time chief of the general staff, has been in the public service in different capacities for many years. General Foulkes on his retirement as chief of the general staff became the chairman of the chiefs of staffs committee. General

Worthington, who was not a chief of the general staff but a very distinguished staff officer, has been in the public service in different capacities since then.
I only mention these as examples. I would point out that the younger an officer is, the more reason there is to employ his services. After all, there is a very practical, material aspect to this. We are informed that General Simonds' pension will be in excess of $10,000 a year. His life expectancy would be in the neighbourhood of 25 years. That is a substantial sum involved in pension payments. Therefore both from the point of view of his skill and from the point of view of the two-thirds of whatever is paid by way of pension which will come out of the public treasury, because officers pay approximately one-third, I think we should all hope that the opportunity will be sought to use his highly skilled services in some capacity. In any event, I know all hon. members will join in expressing their admiration for the high standard of service which has always characterized General Simonds' service in the armed forces.
I want to deal now with the white paper even more than with the statements that have been made today, because the fact is that the minister's statements have not added anything to what he has placed before us in the white paper. He did emphasize again today a statement made in the white paper which reads as follows:
. . . appraisals of new weapons, new tactical and strategic concepts, and demands for increased mobility and flexibility of forces make it evident that changes in emphasis must be made from time to time within the defence programs of the NATO member nations.
Then the white paper goes on to say on page 4:
During the past year the United States has made considerable progress in the production of atomic and thermonuclear weapons. The U.S.S.R., after carrying out hydrogen bomb tests, has indicated that production of a stockpile of nuclear bombs is under way. More recently the government of the United Kingdom has announced its decision to proceed with the development and production of thermonuclear weapons.
Then I quote paragraph 7 on page 4:
For North America the possibility appears for the first time of an attack that could cripple the military and industrial potential of Canada and the United States. Should we ever be attacked with thermonuclear weapons, it is plain that our immediate problem would be national survival. Everyone not directly involved in an urgent military role would immediately be caught up in the problems of rescue, rehabilitation, and the maintenance of essential services.
It seems, Mr. Chairman, that this ominous and forceful statement with regard to the circumstances with which we are now confronted will not be seriously challenged by 50433-309}
Supply-National Defence any hon. member. I ask hon. members, however, if the statements in the white paper or in the house seem consistent with the warning given, and particularly with the emphasis on the need for appraisal of new weapons, new tactical and strategic concepts. All our thinking about defence has been changed by recent events. Now we know that we may be attacked here in our own homeland. That has created the fundamental change which the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich pointed out this morning, and the younger members of the house may not fully recognize the change.
In the days before the first world war even the remote possibility of an attack on the North American continent was never contemplated. The whole idea of military organization and preparation was based on the idea that Canadian forces would be a segment of European continental forces. Our divisional organization contemplated our participation in an army organization that might be engaged on the European continent.
In very large measure that frame of mind continued after the first world war. As has already been pointed out, there was not much difference in the general organization of the units employed in the great battles of the first world war and the units employed in the second world war, except for the enormous changes in equipment and in the emphasis, to some extent, on certain types of weapons.
Until quite recently, and in fact still, in the minds of many people there is the thought of large mass formations of which we form simply an integral segment. I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that to an extent we have not yet been prepared to accept it as necessary for us to break away from that idea and have a distinctly Canadian concept of the organization of defence forces. We are the third largest nation in area in the world. Only China and Russia are larger.
Russia, with a land area nearly twice ours, has a population of some 220 million people. China, with nearly 500 million people, is only a little larger than Canada. We are the third largest land area with 15 million people. It is unwise and impractical for us to approach the problems of military and defence organization generally from the point of view of countries in Europe of the same population but with very small land areas, or of countries such as Britain, France, Germany, Italy or any of the other European countries with larger populations but with land areas only a small fraction of ours.

Supply-National Defence
Surely if our thoughts are now directed to the defence of Canada and our participation primarily in the defence of the North American continent as part of a general defence plan, then our thoughts should be directed to the method by which we can, with the utmost speed, bring to bear whatever military power is necessary at any given point, whether it be by air forces, by units of the army or by naval units, It is obvious that a country the size of Canada already so dependent on air transport through much of its great, developing north, cannot hope to provide the necessary military services by any conventional method.
This does not mean the abandonment of conventional forces. When it was said not long ago that we would be better off if the army disappeared entirely and those now in the army were put in the air force, I wonder if there may not have been a misinterpretation of what was said, or perhaps even the speaker may not have made sufficiently clear what he really intended.
There is some confusion in many people's minds between the air forces and forces carried by aircraft. Already today the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich has pointed out to us the immense importance of extreme mobility for all our armed services. I believe Canada should have a type of army organization that is unique in the world today. I believe our enormous land area and our small population call for the organization of an army in which every single unit will be airborne.
Suppose, for the sake of argument, there was a landing of paratroops at the radium mine on Great Bear lake. It would not be much use to start planning for the movement of land forces by train to Edmonton, then from Edmonton to the railhead on the Peace river, and from there by boat down the Mackenzie and across the Great Bear river to Great Bear lake. This would be a long, tedious and ineffective movement of armed forces.
The kind of armed forces we would need for a situation of that kind would be the type of units that could be transported immediately-when I say "immediately" I mean exactly that-to Great Bear lake where the necessary units made up of such services as would be required for the task could deal with whatever forces had been reported by wireless at that particular point.
The same thing would be true at the mouth of the Mackenzie, at the mouth of the Coppermine, on Hudson bay, over in the mines in eastern Quebec or in Labrador, at Whitehorse or anywhere in the Yukon.


If we were to deal with such a situation we would have to have extremely mobile, hard-hitting infantry, engineers, medical services, artillery units and other forces that could be moved without delay by great transport planes which can now carry units of that kind.
Let no one be in any doubt that transports adequate for that task already exist. At Farnborough last September I saw the new Blackburn transport actually carry two 25-pounder field guns and all the essential equipment that went with them. I also saw a fully loaded lorry driven into that huge transport. Whether or not that is the appropriate design, the fact is that transports of a size adequate for the purpose of carrying tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery weapons or anything of that kind are now available. They could be obtained or built here in the aircraft factories we already possess.
I would go so far as to say that this should apply not only to the permanent army but to the militia as well. I do not believe we have had enough information placed before us concerning the present position of the militia. It is far from satisfactory. The enlistments do not tell the story. The number of men on the roll do not tell you how effective militia training is. It is the number of days trained and the number of those trained at local headquarters who go to camp that measure the effectiveness of our militia units. Under all the circumstances it is really remarkable that our militia units have retained the keenness which has been shown by the officers, N.C.O.'s and men who have been training.
I do hope no hon. member is under the impression that our military training today is adequate, or that our military units are training in the way they should train in the face of the kind of emergency which has been impressed upon us by the Minister of Defence Production in the past few days. Let us take the case of artillery units which must train at camp if their training on the guns is to be really effective. Throughout Canada this year the average regiment of three batteries will not train more than one battery at camp. That is far from a satisfactory situation, at a time when we are told that we must contemplate the necessity of being prepared to meet an urgent situation of this kind.
In substantial measure the same is true of the training of other units, particularly units of a technical nature which require skill in handling vehicles and instruments of various kinds. The minister has mentioned figures that apply to the permanent force. We have before us also figures relating to the militia. Mr. Chairman, those figures have a meaning that can be interpreted in practical

terms only if, with the militia units, we are told accurately what training those units have which would fit them to accept the responsibilities that might be imposed upon them in a very short time, in the event of difficulties.
Much has been said about the problem of manning these units. Much has been said about the problem of raising the necessary manpower for the different branches of the service. I am convinced that the thing which will best assure an adequate enlistment in the different branches of our service-particularly the militia, which is still the backbone of our general training and which must be the pool from which a permanent force in the end will always be drawn-is to give to the training a sense of reality which it does not possess today. Give to the young men in the infantry, in the armoured force, in the engineers, in the artillery, in the army service corps, in the medical service, in the reconnaissance units and in the other units of our army, the knowledge that they are really taking part in a modern, up to date force, and you will see them flocking to the units in the way they have done on other occasions.
I do not believe there is any difference in the attitude of our young people toward the military services. Like many other hon. members in the house I can recall times when our problem, upon going to camp, was not that of not having enough men but what we would do with the extra men we found on the train when we were leaving for camp. And I can tell you there was a lot of very ingenious work done in order to work that out without too much financial strain on the officers involved.
That was actually the problem, and the reason was very simple. There was a sense of reality. I am speaking with direct knowledge of the artillery more than of any other branch of the service; but what 1 say with regard to the artillery was equally true in regard to other branches of the service. One of the main reasons for the desire of young men to go to camp with those units was the opportunity for competitive firing and competitive training; and that competition was between all units in the whole of Canada. The spirit of competition appealed greatly to young men and they really worked to win one of the numerous prizes open to units right across Canada. It was very noticeable that the units which won most of the prizes were those with the largest enlistment.
Unfortunately, though it is now ten years after the last war, competitive firing of that
Supply-National Defence kind has not been instituted in the artillery; nor has similar competitive training been instituted in the other branches of the armed services. This is the kind of thing that appeals to our young people. Give them a sense of reality. Give them a sense of competition between the units, and I think you will see plenty of young men enlisting in those units and the problem of manpower met adequately and satisfactorily in that way. You will find the young men anxious to take part if there is reorganization that recognizes the need which has been stated in the white paper where, on the first page, it refers to "new tactical and strategic concepts".
Make all our army units airborne units, and young men to whom the appeal is made will know that they are taking part in the most modern force that is in training anywhere. We do not need to look to any other country to devise the most effective use of manpower for the kind of force that will be needed for Canada. This statement applies to the militia as well as to the permanent force. Nor need this involve enormous expense in the first instance. Special transport aircraft would be required for the permanent force; but so far as militia units are concerned, these mock-ups of transport aircraft, made simply by joining the frame to the body of the aircraft, would be adequate for the purpose of giving training of that kind. Then selected units could be given training in regular transport aircraft of the type required.
I submit that, having regard to the imagination, having regard to the new concept required, as stated by the minister, what he has said to us today and what is said in the white paper is not only noncommittal but is extremely uninformative from the point of view of what we may hope for in the future.
We are still going to require conventional units in the Canadian army. We need conventional units, used in an unconventional way. With all earnestness I urge the minister to contemplate the possibility of giving immediate instructions to organize the army completely so that this huge country, with its 15 million people, may have the kind of hard-hitting, mobile airborne army units which could be put down at any point in Canada to meet whatever demands might be imposed upon them.
Then the question arises as to what the situation would be as a member of NATO. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that our most effective contribution to NATO will be to have the kind of combined force that is most effective for Canada. We are building an air force, not yet on the proportionate basis that would seem to be required for the

Supply-National Defence special position Canada occupies. But we have an air force of which every Canadian can be proud. I do want to say that twice in the last two years I have seen our squadrons overseas, and I can testify to what the minister has already said about their high standing among the squadrons now in Europe.
At Zweibrucken last summer I saw Canadian squadrons that were not only equal to but I think a little better than any other service squadrons in Europe at that time. It is unquestionably true that the new Sabre V jet with the Orenda engine, which gives that Sabre a higher speed than its corresponding United States counterpart, has not only given our squadrons an enviable reputation over there but has also given a very high morale to all the members of our air units in Europe at this time.
Nevertheless, the situation is changing rapidly over there. Germany's entry into NATO is soon going to change our requirements. It was essential that Canada should take its part in sending air and army units to Europe during the period Germany was disarmed completely and while there were uncertainties as to the course Germany might follow. Certainly, at a time when Russia was seeking to win Western Germany over to her point of view, it was essential that the people of West Germany be offered positive evidence that the nations united in NATO were joined in their determination to protect the soil of Western Germany from Russian invasion.
However, it will not be long before Western Germany will be rearmed to such an extent that she will be able to assume full responsibility for her own territory. In fact, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer only last Saturday stated in Bonn, just before his departure for Washington, that one of the three main objectives of the German government is to reach a point where it will be possible for the United States forces to withdraw from Germany. Obviously when he spoke of the United States forces he also had in mind the forces of Great Britain, France and Canada as well. Therefore our plans should be made with the knowledge that not only the army brigade now in Germany but also the air force units now in Germany may in the not too distant future be withdrawn.
Whether they are or not, the fact remains that stage by stage the need for Canadian army units in the protracted period of unsettled peace before us which, please God, may merge into a period of stable peace, is going to require fewer and fewer units from the North American continent. We therefore

can begin now to plan the type of units that would be needed. What, then, of our obligations to NATO?
I submit, Mr. Chairman, that if we organized here in Canada a unique Canadian army set-up of small, hard-hitting, compact units, able to move with the utmost speed to any threatened point, we would not only be devising the kind of unit best suited to meet any threat to this huge land area of ours, but we would also be devising the best type of force needed in the years ahead.
I am one of those who find a great source of confidence in the extent of the mutual danger which now threatens the nations on both sides. The extent of the destruction that would come from any thermonuclear war in itself offers the greatest possibility of avoiding a general world conflagration in which the main antagonists would be Russia on the one hand and the western nations on the other. We all recall the typically imaginative words of Sir Winston Churchill only a few months ago when he placed before the House of Commons in Great Britain all the menace of thermonuclear destruction, and then said, "By a strange anomaly it may appear that peace is the sturdy child of terror." That is a possibility.
After all, we have certain things in common with Russia. One of these is the desire to live. Not long ago in New York I saw in a great photographic exhibition there a picture of a Russian family gathered around a table, and at the end of the table there was a picture of a young man in uniform with a black border around the frame. There in an exhibition that had photographs from all over the world I could not help thinking that there were similar photographs from France, from Germany, from Italy, from the United States and from Canada.
We all like to think of our young people growing up and living normal lives. Whether they may place the same value on life as we do is only a comparative question. The Russians want to live and they want their children to live. The mere knowledge that their precipitation of a thermonuclear war would mean devastation of their own country and the death of their own children will be a deterrent even to the most terrible dictator in the Kremlin. For that reason I share the opinion of those who see great hope of the avoidance of another world war in the very fact that there is this terrible fear of destruction which could in fact end human life on this globe.
That does not end the possibility of war. At the time the war broke out in Korea all the terrible, destructive power of the atomic bomb was already available. At the time the

Russian-supported attacks in Indo-China were being carried on by the Viet Minh forces there were atomic bombs, as there were atomic bombs while there was fighting in Malaya, in Kenya and elsewhere throughout the world. The existence of these terrifying weapons has not stopped fighting with conventional weapons in Gaza; nor has it stopped fighting in other isolated areas in other parts of the world. Nevertheless it would appear that there are those who think they can afford the privilege of a war of their own without the danger of precipitating the use of those terrible weapons.
Let us hope that up to a point this is true. Whatever any of us may think about the decision not to bomb the Chinese bases from which the Chinese air force was attacking the troops of the United Nations in Korea, let us be quite sure of one thing. The fact that they were not bombed has undoubtedly encouraged the thought that it is possible to wage conventional war without inviting retaliation by these terrible weapons. For that reason there must be conventional units, and we must have our own type of conventional units for the future.
Therefore the thing for us to do to the best of our ability is devise the kind of force that would meet not only our own requirements but could play its part as one of the members of the United Nations in an outbreak of that kind. How best can Canada be a partner in dealing with one of these conflagrations? Will it be by the slow movement by rail and ship of old-fashioned army units or by the sudden movement, perhaps within 48 or 72 hours, to Asia or Africa or Indo-China of the kind of hard-hitting mobile units we have been suggesting? I am satisfied that when it came to a discussion of Canada's participation, if we said we were concentrating on army units of that type and that we would assume our responsibility within the NATO organization by the movement of units of that type, they would welcome the possibility and possibly other countries might themselves follow the same course.
The picture before us is by no manner of means dark and hopeless. There are great reasons for hope. There are reasons for hope that under the overhanging threat of mutual destruction the largest nations may not precipitate the kind of war that would make that kind of destruction a reality. Perhaps we may be moving closer than we think to the very time when the threat they face will impose some measure of sanity and frankness and honesty upon the representatives of communist Russia. Perhaps the very fact that they realize the danger to their own homeland will give us some reason to hope that
Supply-National Defence beyond the doubtful gestures we have already seen will be real gestures toward mutual disarmament which will end this mad race which is costing Canada over $2 billion a year, and which is imposing such heavy burdens upon the whole world. In the meantime let us be sure not only that we have the most economical force but that we also have the most efficient force for our own requirements.
I regret that the minister has made no positive statement which would offer a new understanding of the intentions of the department. They have had such a statement in Great Britain. When the white paper was placed before the members of parliament in Britain a very dramatic statement was made with far-reaching significance. It was said there that they have decided definitely that battleships are now primarily launching bases for guided missiles. That revolutionizes the movement of naval forces. After all, the huge battleships simply provided a necessary metal base for the large rifled guns that would be fired. It needed enormous ships to carry 15-inch and 18-inch guns. Guided missiles will require a much smaller base; therefore we may look to the time when the most effective ships will be fast, lighter ships launching guided missiles, not only against other ships, not only against aircraft, but also against such targets as they may be called upon to engage on land. That would revolutionize naval warfare, and bring us perhaps to the time where our own particular role would be much less costly than it is today.
Let us know in Canada if Canada accepts the same concept. I wish the minister had told us something about the fact that Canadian artillery has already fired a controlled missile. I would like to know what the concept of the army is in regard to land-to-land missiles and land-to-air missiles fired by artillery units. Already the Canadian artillery has accepted the guided missile as a future weapon. Undoubtedly the conventional artillery weapons will remain for some time, but these are things that should be discussed step by step. We are moving to a completely new concept of weapons and the employment of the different technical services within our army. Step by step the air force is moving toward a greater mobility and a greater carrying power.
Let us in Canada have an army of the future. Let us be no mere reflection of the armies either of the United States, of Great Britain, of Germany, of France or of any other country. Let this be the army of tomorrow. I urge the minister to challenge the imagination of young Canadians by offering them a picture of a force which will be
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Supply-National Defence designed particularly for the needs of Canada. When that is done I submit that we can expect with confidence that young Canadians will man the weapons and join the forces required for that service.


Ralph Osborne Campney: Mr. Chairman, I do not rise at this time to answer all those who have spoken already. It is probably much too early for me to do that. But I do rise to make some observations about the first matter discussed by the Leader of the Opposition, namely the retirement of General Simonds. I must say that I was pleased that the Leader of the Opposition was very mild and generous in the statements he made today.
The reason I am intervening in the debate is that, unfortunately, because of the fury and dust which has been created in the last week-I think I must say mostly by the activities of the Leader of the Opposition-I think I should say something in relation to the retirement of General Simonds, as his responsible minister and in view of the fact that he cannot speak here for himself.
I think quite a residue of doubt has been left in the public mind and a great deal of embarrassment and confusion must also obtain in respect to General Simonds, his position and his retirement. I suspect also that perhaps the Leader of the Opposition started out to ride a political horse and fell off or possibly was pulled off. In any event he may have read the editorial in the Ottawa Journal about the danger he might encounter in-


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, on a question of privilege-


An hon. Member:: Sit down.


George Alexander Drew: I rise on a question of privilege.


An hon. Member:: There is no privilege.


Ralph Osborne Campney: What is the question of privilege?


George Alexander Drew: If you will permit me to state it.


Mr. Sinclair:: It was not a horse he was riding, it was a jackass.


George Alexander Drew: I would think the hon. member who has just interjected that asinine comment would have made enough such comments to-


James Sinclair: It was not a horse you were riding, it was a jackass.


George Alexander Drew: I would point out that I have asked for information. The first comment I made in regard to this matter was in this house, after the whole problem had been precipitated into the open by a statement issued by the Minister of National Defence


an hour before we met in this chamber. Nothing I have done has contributed in any way to any uncertainty.


Ralph Osborne Campney: That probably is a matter of opinion, but in any event I still suspect that the Leader of the Opposition has had second thoughts, which probably were best thoughts. I do not know that any good purpose would be served by continuing the debate on that point. I think most hon. members realize that the change was made and announced in the normal way. Yet the Leader of the Opposition said, in a statement which he issued to the press outside of the house:
Parliament and the people of Canada have a right to demand that so important a subject should not remain shrouded in a cloak of mysterious secrecy.
That is what he said, if he was correctly reported in the Globe and Mail.


George Alexander Drew: I am hoping the minister will remove it.


Ralph Osborne Campney: There is no mysterious
secrecy in the matter whatever.
I think I might make a few observations in the interests of the chief of the general staff, myself, the public and everyone in the country who may have an interest in this matter. The chief of the general staff, as the Leader of the Opposition has said and as we all realize, is a very distinguished soldier. He is a very brave and able officer and had a splendid career throughout world war II. He was appointed chief of the general staff on the 1st of February, 1951, and when he retires he will have been chief of the general staff for four years and seven months.
There has been some discussion about the four-year rule, as it is called, and the rotation of senior officers. I think the simple fact is this. Although there is no law or no regulation, it is generally regarded in the Department of National Defence that senior officers -and certainly the very top ones-should be retired on approximately a four-year rotation.
There is a reason for this feeling. The goal of any career military man, if he goes up the ladder sufficiently fast, is some day to be chief of the general staff. If you keep men for long periods in top positions, you naturally hold up promotion or rotation. Therefore, in the department it is generally agreed that four years is a good tour of duty. From such experience as I have had in the department, I agree with that view. I do not think there is any doubt about it.
On February 1 last General Simonds had been for four years chief of the general staff. Some time after that date-that is, some time in February-I discussed with him the matter

of tenure of the position of chief of the general staff, and I expressed the view which I have expressed here, namely that four years was a reasonable period, as far as you could establish a general rule, and that such was my feeling in respect of all chiefs of staff. General Simonds expressed the view that he thought it would be unquestionably in the best interests of the service that no chief should exceed five years.
We then discussed the most suitable time at which a change might be made, and we agreed that, as the end of August or the first of September marked the break between the carrying out of the operations of the previous summer and the planning for the next year, August 31 would be the most suitable date. We therefore agreed on that date. This was in February. It was a very frank and pleasant conversation. There was no mysterious veil of secrecy surrounding it or anything of that nature.
The reason the retirement was announced at the time it was announced was that the newspapers were starting to speculate and were beginning to name successors and fix dates of retirement. As we were making another important announcement we thought it might well be made at the same time, and that was done.
I want to make it clear that the timing of the prospective retirement of General Simonds on August 31 had nothing to do with any of the subsequent events to which the hon. member has referred, and subsequent events have had nothing to do with that retirement. It was a normal and orderly discussion of retirement at the conclusion of his period as chief of the general staff. I may say that General Simonds has been a very able, loyal, helpful and co-operative chief of staff. At the end of his tour he will have served four years and seven months. I do not know whether the Leader of the Opposition sees anything mysterious in these events. In any event I can assure him that there was not any element of secrecy or mystery about it.


George Alexander Drew: Then, Mr. Chairman, may I ask the minister whether there is any intention of employing General Simonds in some other capacity?


Ralph Osborne Campney: That you will have to wait and see.


George Alexander Drew: There is no decision at the moment?


Ralph Osborne Campney: There is no decision at the moment.
Supply-National Defence


Mr. Enfield:: I want to take this opportunity to address a few remarks to the committee, particularly on the question of defence research. Before I continue I want to congratulate our Minister of National Defence. I feel that he has achieved a fine grasp of the details of his department; and as we have seen, he is ready to take prompt executive action whenever he feels the need for it arises.
A further point I want to mention is that as associate minister of national defence and also since he has become Minister of National Defence he has always shown a conscientious and considerate interest in members of parliament in respect of the arrangements he makes for our visits to defence establishments. I am sure these visits have broadened the knowledge of members with regard to defence to a considerable degree.
Looking at the figure in the estimates we see that there is a total of some $1,769 million appropriated for defence generally. Of this a sum of $52 J million, in round figures, is set aside for the defence research board. The latter figure represents almost exactly 2-9 per cent of the total figure to be budgeted for in respect of defence expenditure. Although we in this country are, of course, still extremely vulnerable to enemy attack, international tensions have eased to a certain extent, and perhaps it might be an appropriate time to examine the money spent on research in relation to total defence expenditure, taking a realistic view.
We have here a country with a very large land mass but comparatively thinly populated, backed by a more than adequate storehouse of natural resources. Although we can contribute our fair share to any joint defence effort by the free nations, we cannot obviously supply sufficiently large armies, navies and air forces to undertake continental defence on a large scale independently of the other countries, involving huge areas of land and for a long period of time. Perhaps our most effective contribution to defence would be to specialize in some particular field, and this course has been suggested by many of those hon. members who have spoken in this debate today.
Whatever we may conclude in that respect -and one is tempted to conclude that we certainly could look twice at specializing in air power-we can arrive at this conclusion. There is one field to which we are perfectly suited in this country, and that is the field of research as applied to our defence effort.
I am more particularly interested in two fields, namely atomic fission and electronics. As to the first, the field of atomic energy and atomic fission, presumably most of our research is carried on by Atomic Energy of
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Supply-National Defence Canada Limited, operating at Chalk River under a budget of some $18 million. This program is carried on under the aegis of the Minister of Trade and Commerce.
I thought perhaps we might consider a parallel program carried on under the Department of National Defence to study a different though related field. For example, we do not appear to have done much, if any, work in the field of propulsion of vehicles, both on land and on sea, by atomic energy. The United States has had some experience in this field. We know they have constructed a submarine powered by an atomic engine and have another one under construction. We also know they are contemplating the construction of a freighter to be propelled by atomic energy.
It would seem from the white paper that our research is limited to a study of the effects of thermonuclear explosion, and it would not appear that we have undertaken any separate or distinct attack on this field by way of atomic research other than studying the effect of the explosion of atomic and hydrogen bombs. Perhaps we should broaden our base. If we could achieve success in the field of propulsion of vehicles by atomic energy, certainly the effect on our defence forces would be very salutary indeed, and would give us a tremendous advantage in so far as other countries are concerned.
Let us look at the field of electronics. In this respect the white paper indicates on page 37 that the defence research board's program of grants in aid at Canadian universities continues at a scale that has levelled off at $1 million annually. Again, on page 38 the white paper indicates that the board's support of physical electronics research at universities continues. In other words, it would appear that electronics research is confined to work at universities supported by grants in aid totalling $1 million annually. The white paper goes on to say that a comparatively small scientific staff at the defence research telecommunications establishment is doing research in special fields, particularly with regard to the application of electronics to the mid-Canada radar warning system.
From a casual perusal of the estimates and the white paper it would appear to me that the sum of $1 million annually devoted to this wide and complicated field of electronics research as applied to defence measures is quite inadequate to press forward the advance of pure knowledge. I would suggest that the minister give some consideration to that situation.
Of the $52 million appropriated for research, $28 million is for the construction of buildings and the acquisition of equipment. Apparently


this will provide the necessary space in which people may work. It does not look as though that would be a continuing expenditure on research. The money is to provide space where people can work and will not necessarily be applied to the actual work of research. The money actually going into the work of research would therefore be somewhat less than the $52 million indicated in the estimates. We must take this into consideration.
Looking at the comparison between expenditures on research and total defence expenditures we should also consider one further point. Money spent on research brings a double reward. On the one hand it contributes to the security of the country by assisting the fighting forces. On the other hand it provides knowledge which, when made public-and it is made public-creates opportunities in civilian fields of endeavour. Thus, while on the one hand providing security and hence the opportunity to go on living, through research you also bring about a situation whereby further opportunities are created, resulting in the long run in paying the dividend of increasing the standard of living. That is extremely important.
A concrete example of this sort of thing was made apparent on our visit to Fort Churchill. We were shown the research work that had been done by the branch of the defence research board there. Investigations had been made into conditions of life in an Arctic environment. Types of clothing were devised. Methods of constructing buildings with a permafrost foundation were worked out. Investigations were made into the type of food one should eat and how to heat buildings. All this material was the work of the defence research board at Fort Churchill.
On the other hand, when private companies go up there for the purpose of constructing such installations as the D.E.W. line, all the material collected through careful research by the federal government is available free of charge, I was told, to these private companies in order that they may carry out their work to the best advantage. Therefore the research undertaken provides information for private civilian organizations, and we reap a double reward from the money spent. I think that is an extremely important point. It is a chance to more or less have our cake and eat it too, something we do not encounter too often.
I therefore submit respectfully that at this time we can afford to perhaps change the emphasis on our defence planning to the point where more money will be channelled into the vital field of research. My submission, and I ask the minister to consider it, is that

if the money spent on research were tripled, increased to say $150 million, it would not involve too great a departure from accepted principles. It would not impair the present defence effort; it would give impetus and breadth to our research program, and it would still amount to less than 10 per cent of total defence expenditures.


Mr. Hamilton (York West):: Mr. Chairman,
I find myself in the rather unusual position of being an army veteran and having the job of speaking more specifically today on questions involving the Royal Canadian Air Force and defence requirements from the air standpoint. However, before I limit myself to that aspect of defence I do have a few general observations I should like to make.
1 do not think anyone seriously questions the trend toward the proportionate increase in the size of the budget for the defence of the country by air as compared with defence by land and sea. Frankly, however, I believe some surprise might be occasioned by the fact that the increase dollarwise, as indicated in the minister's white paper, is only very slight percentagewise in the money being spent on the air force for the coming year as compared with the past year. Those figures are 414 per cent for last year, 1954-55, with a projected 42 2 per cent for 1955-56.
This may indicate one thing, especially in view of the fact that air force personnel has now increased to the point where it outranks the army. It may, in fact, indicate an actual decrease in the amount allocated for the purchase of strategic materials and newly developed weapons of all kinds, at a time when every indication would appear to point to the necessity of Canadians leading in technical developments.
In the over-all picture of the services it would appear that this is an increasing trend, according to the estimates. I do not think I need to refer to them specifically, but in the estimates dealing with all three service departments there would appear to be a decrease in expenditures in connection with the procurement of materials of a strategic type and otherwise. While personnel costs are rising, and while the numbers are rising, there seems to be a fairly drastic reduction in the amount of money being spent on technical equipment and improvements. This, I believe, is contrary to the establishment of a good defence program. It is essential that we keep in the forefront from the scientific standpoint. I mention these cases specifically as I note them from the estimates.
I would think as well that there could be considerable savings in the defence estimates. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich said that at no time did we advocate
Supply-National Defence a cut in defence expenditures at the risk of our national safety, but we appear to be continuing the well-defined program that is ever present in the defence services. In looking over the estimates it would appear we are holding the line on top level appointments, but the empire builders are still at work. The estimates disclose a continual increase in the number of office boys, stenographers, cleaners, helpers, clerks of all grades, chauffeurs and messengers. In one place I even noticed an increase in the helper column from 422 to 1,220.
Surely if it is the intention to replace army service personnel with civilians on the basis suggested by the minister, that is a civilian employed at an average of $2,600 a year, while $3,600 is the cost of service personnel, with a rise to $4,000 including travelling expenses, we could expect a significant reduction in travelling expenses and items of that kind throughout the services. I am thinking that if the policy is to replace army personnel in the various districts with civilians there should be a consequent reduction in that type of expenditure, but apparently there is no such saving. I can only suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we must conclude that the civilians being hired are not in fact replacing service personnel but are in addition to service personnel.
I feel that a real determination of the efficacy of a ratio as between civilian and military personnel can only be ascertained if the percentage is in fact related to a figure indicating the number of people in the services who actually could be placed on the firing line. Otherwise it becomes a totally misleading figure. I am willing to chance the statement that in the case of the United Kingdom the percentage, which was indicated as being the same as in Canada, would produce a greater number of personnel who might be released for front line service as a result of the employment of civilians than is the case in connection with our own services.
I am particularly interested in the estimates as they relate to the procurement of essential aircraft and supplies for the air services. When I think back to the time when some of these programs were outlined initially, I wonder if the people of Canada would have been happy if they had had any indication that during this period, in so far as defence requirements are concerned, we would only be able to build up three squadrons of CF-100's as of December 31 last year. I am quite sure that if such an indication had been given to them at the time of the introduction of such a program back in
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Supply-National Defence 1950, they would have been very dismayed that this was going to constitute the main line of our fighter defence.
As I look at the program I find it very difficult to believe that, in fact, it is the intention to complete, and to equip with CF-100's before the end of the year, all the squadrons listed for home defence. This statement certainly does not seem to tie in with the indications given by the production schedule of the company which produces the planes. I believe it indicates also that we may have missed the boat in connection with the savings we might have secured by a steady and constant program of fighter plane production.
I think people in business in Canada are justified in saying that for each dollar spent they expect to get a dollar of value. In an article in the Toronto Telegram of April 21, 1955, I notice that Mr. J. A. Calder, president of the Canadian Manufacturers' Association, indicated he felt that a penny's value for every penny spent by the government was needed. He went on to say that the objective of the government, to lower the relation of taxes to productivity, can be accomplished by a reduction in government expenditures or an increase in industrial productivity. I do not think it is necessary to detract in any way from our air defence in order to save money in connection with some purchases of aircraft and materials.
According to an article in the Globe and Mail of May 13, 1955, it was indicated in reply to some questions asked by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre that the contracts with Avro are on the basis of a fixed fee plus an incentive bonus on savings under a target arrangement, with a total profit limitation of 10 per cent of target. The article goes on:
A departmental official-
That may be a very dangerous type of person to quote in this debate.
-said later this system means that apart from a fixed fee, the price of each plane is determined on the basis of production cost plus a certain proportion of the amount by which the cost is reduced under a fixed target cost.
Under those circumstances it would appear that we are buying planes on the basis of a cost plus contract.
My reason for stating that I have doubts as to whether there is any real intention to complete the program involving ten squadrons is that we have continual information from the A. V. Roe plant indicating slowdowns in production, or a stretching out of the production of those planes. At the same time there have been lay-offs in employment which, apparently, are building up to a point where they involve almost 3,000 people.


It is well known that production costs of all types are tied down to production schedules. My understanding is that in a plant of the type operated by A. V. Roe we could count on a production of about 25 aircraft per month from the production line. Using as an example an over-all cost figure of $275,000 for each plane produced, we find that the ratio of administration and overhead to the cost of plane production would be about $1 for plane production to $1.75 for administration. I believe that is a fairly sound proposition on a production line of that kind.
Then if we reduce the production schedule-and I understand it has been reduced-of course the proportion of administration expense as against production cost or aircraft dollar becomes something entirely different. We are then placed in a position where we may have to increase the ratio to a point where instead of having $1 as opposed to $1.75 it might be $1 as against $3. And with a plane which might have cost $285,000-that would be the stripped-down figure, without engines or accessories-such a figure could easily be increased by about $150,000.
If the contract is as I see it, then any tendency to slow down the production line would result in an increase in the cost of a plane of that type amounting to about $150,000, such cost having to be borne by the people of Canada. I believe if there were a little more planning, a little more foresight in connection with the over-all air program and the procurement of various types of aircraft, this kind of wastage of money- and that is the only way to describe it-could be avoided.
Therefore, what type of program should be recommended? Well, most certainly in this country we should have a considerable increase in the number of our transport type aircraft. As has been suggested by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, I believe it is necessary in planning to integrate the new types of forces he envisages with an expanded program of transport type aircraft. It is understood, of course, that we require this type of aircraft for commercial purposes as well.
At the present time we have going on in northern Canada the largest mass airlift of equipment that has ever taken place in the world to date. At the same time we must realize that type of airlift may become common procedure in the future. Nor is there any indication that the various warning lines, in themselves, will do the job we expect them to do for more than a few of

the years ahead. We must face the fact that flights into the northern area of this country will continue to increase.
It happened that at the time of the institution of the operation of distant early warning lines we found ourselves in Canada with about two aircraft of the Bristol type, but with very few other multi-engined transport planes available. The air industry and the air transport association certainly did their best to bring together the various civilian operators into a working force capable of carrying out this great project. Notwithstanding their efforts, and the fact that many planes were brought into the country under a leasing arrangement, as recently as two or three days ago the association had to send a telegram to its members stating-and I believe this is the wording-
Memo re our aircraft for eastern section D.E.W. Urgent requirement for Beavers, Otters, Norsemen or Cessna 180's on floats for mid-Canada and D.E.W. Wire association office if you can commit any of these types for full summer contract, stating date available, minimum guarantee and tariff rates.
Obviously this is an indication of the great need in this country for transport type aircraft. In other words we are getting pretty close to scraping the bottom of the barrel. In the United States they have made use of service requirements in that respect to build up a reserve of transport aircraft. This would seem to be a move that might be followed logically here in Canada. As a matter of fact I have here an extract from the American Aviation Daily of June 6, 1955, stating:
Air co-ordinating committee made its long awaited report on the navy cargo aircraft lease plan to commercial carriers on Friday, following a special meeting called by chairman Louis S. Rothschild. The report affirmed a previous one that the rates would be set high. It states: "The lease arrangements should . . . provide for rental rates in line with costs of commercial ownership, based on reasonable estimates of acquisition price (including all necessary equipment), accepted rates of depreciation, rates of return and allowances for taxes."
Reasons set forth are to "avoid any element of subsidy"; to avoid making lease preferable to ownership; and to avoid generating cargo expansion "on an unstable basis by facilitating the development of a substantial volume of cargo lift capability with minimum financial commitment" . . . It proposed that allocations go to carriers who have shown "an historical interest" in air cargo operations by: (1) actual participation in air cargo carrying; (2) air cargo promotion, advertising and solicitation; (3) possession of, "or earnest efforts to secure", certificates authorizing cargo carrying; (4) "substantial participation" in cargo charter or irregular air cargo operations; and (5) "demonstrated requirements for additional commercial cargo". Preference should be given to domestic operations.
Here is a plan whereby the armed forces in the United States take advantage of an opportunity to build up a reserve of air transport cargo planes. These aircraft are
Supply-National Defence not mothballed, but are made available to commercial air carriers on a leasing basis, thus providing a number of air transport cargo planes which most certainly would become vital in a time of emergency.
The indications of the requirements for the D.E.W. line certainly show a far greater need in this country for that type of plane. I believe they indicate an opportunity as well for the Department of National Defence and perhaps the Department of Defence Production to ease the hills and valleys of a production schedule which is devoted entirely to the production of fighter or bomber type aircraft. This may be old history, but the facts are that we are facing a serious problem in those aircraft plants which are devoted entirely to the type of production to which I referred. We had an opportunity to go on with work of that kind, an opportunity to provide a production line type of aircraft which might have been used under the exact conditions which have arisen in connection with the construction of the D.E.W. line. It is brought very forcibly home when we read in the Globe and, Mail of June 1, "Obsolete Jetliner probably will be Flying Testbed". In the Globe and Mail of June 8, one week later, we read "Douglas plans swift Jetliner".
At Canadair we are embarking on limited production of a plane which I believe, with very little modification, would meet ordinary commercial air cargo specifications. There is an opportunity to let that type of contract, whether it be with that particular firm or with others, to cover the interim period until the production line slows down on the fighter type of aircraft and before development work on a new type brings the production line back into being at an accelerated rate. That interim period does two things. It brings about the laying off of skilled workers, some of whom have been trained at great expense, who will not return to the production line. I submit this very sincerely. It also means that if we are buying planes on a cost plus basis-and that seems to be indicated from the information we have-the people of this country are paying much out of proportion for the product they are getting.
If we are talking about air help and air assistance, we should also be considering what help we are giving to those outside our own country along those lines. Actually it is very difficult to understand the statements one gets from the department. In connection with procurement of aircraft and items of that kind for supply to NATO countries, the estimates indicate that there is a reduction in the amount of money being spent for that purpose. I am not exactly sure what the true plans are in that respect, or what is the
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Supply-National Defence intention. The various pronouncements from three ministers, sir, the Minister of Defence Production, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence, seem to go along different lines.
In the first instance we were told there was every indication that the plane which was being produced here was required and desired by countries in the NATO group. The Secretary of State for External Affairs said in the house that he did not know of any country that did not want or could not use this type of plane, but the Minister of Defence Production said that there were no orders for such a plane. If aid to others is an essential part of our air defence program, here again was an opportunity of making use of our defence production line so our factories did not lag. If these planes were suitable for the purpose, then obviously there was a place to put them to work.
I am indeed surprised to find that the indications here, as in other respects, are that we plan to spend less money on that type of assistance. Indeed, they indicate that there is no intention of making use of the products of our factories in the production of aircraft for that particular purpose.
I would think there might be one or two other observations in connection with the R.C.A.F. relationship to the estimates that might be given consideration. The indication here, as in connection with the other services, is that we face a tremendous turnover in personnel. As a matter of fact last year there were enlistments of approximately 11,000 and discharges of approximately 5,000. But by far the most serious aspects were shown in the answers to my questions concerning the actual recruiting program for air crew. You will recall, sir, the figures which were given to me. We had 5,570 applications for air crew in 1954. We had 4,121 rejections. I gather that somewhere in the neighbourhood of 1,400 were acceptable applicants for air crew in the R.C.A.F. On the basis of total enlistments this would approximate 10 or 12 per cent. That seems a very small figure when we compare it with the well over $2 million that was spent by the service on a recruiting program. There must be an underlying cause for the failure of the service to obtain more than that number of suitable young men.
I am wondering also whether it means that because of specializing in the production and flying, or the putting together of squadrons of the fighter type, as against the opportunity for young men to become qualified over a period of years to fly the latest and best types of transport planes and thereby refit themselves into civilian life, young men


are not coming forward. Certainly it would appear that some new type of approach must be used to justify the expenditure of that amount of money as against the number of air crew recruits obtained.
In the over-all picture Canadians have always responded very quickly to the call of the air force, and the Minister of National Defence is a shining example of that statement. There seems no reason, if the program can be outlined to the young men of this country in a manner which indicates that it is not only a job from the patriotic standpoint in connection with the defence of our country, but also an opportunity to fit themselves into the over-all air picture where their services will always be required, why there should be any failure to obtain the requisite numbers. Again, that seems to be a reason why we should pay some attention to expanding the force on the basis of the straight transport requirements which exist today in the country.


Mr. Nesbitt:: Mr. Chairman, in the white paper issued by the minister's department there are set out on page 3 the objectives of Canada's defence program. I presume they are set out there in order of importance, and if I am incorrect in that assumption I know the minister will correct me. First is the defence of Canada; second is co-operation with the United States in the joint defence of Canada and the United States; third, cooperation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, looking toward the checking of aggression; and, fourth, the carrying out of undertakings by Canada as a member of the United Nations. Bearing those in mind as the general defence objectives of Canada, I should like to relate my remarks for the next few minutes to the defence objectives of Canada with particular relation to the navy.
It will be recalled that in the days of world war II the emphasis with regard to the work of the navy was on escort and convoy work, and hon. members know that in that war the Canadian navy did the great bulk of escort duty in the north Atlantic. Since world war II it has become rather apparent that the objectives and purposes of the naval program have been directed along these same lines, and unless I am badly mistaken it would appear that the emphasis is still largely on this objective, namely escort work. I would refer hon. members to page 15 of the white paper, paragraph 47, which reads:
In January, 1952, for the protection of vital sea communications between Europe and North America, a supreme allied commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), was appointed and headquarters established at Norfolk, Va.

That particular item refers to part 3, Canada's role in defence abroad. I gathered from the minister's remarks this morning that the work of the Canadian navy was largely anti-submarine work in particular relationship to escort duty. Another objective of Canadian navy policy has been the defence of Canadian waters and harbours. While this has been an important aspect of the work of the navy in the past, I think somewhat less emphasis has been placed upon this aspect of naval work more recently. My feeling is that at the present time this is in a somewhat secondary position to the escort and convoy work.
Due to modern and changing conditions since world war II I think the emphasis on the work of the navy should be re-examined. It was pointed out this morning by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich that conditions in the world have greatly changed, and that our whole policy could quite properly be re-examined. My view is that emphasis should be placed upon the defence of Canadian waters, Canadian harbours and Canadian inland cities. This may seem a rather strange job for the navy to be doing, that is protecting Canadian inland cities and the industrial heartland of Canada, but I shall elaborate on this a little more in the next few moments.
On page 4 of the white paper and also in his remarks this morning the minister has brought home most forcefully the danger of nuclear war, and there is the plain statement that if such an event takes place there is no real defence against it, that the only thing we can hope to do is minimize the results of such an attack. I think there is little doubt in the minds of most people that if war of this type takes place it will occur very suddenly and unexpectedly.
A great deal of emphasis has been placed in the last few years, particularly this year, on the danger of an attack on North America by aircraft coming in over the north pole or from the north Atlantic or from the Pacific. In view of this the "Pinetree" and mid-Canada defence lines, and now the D.E.W. line, have been set up as radar warning systems to warn the industrial heartland of Canada and the United States of the approach of enemy aircraft.
While these are extremely important, we all know there is another way by which aircraft and missiles could be directed at the industrial heart of North America. This would be quite apart from direct attacks by any enemy craft based in Europe or Asia. I refer to the possibility of the launching of guided missiles or even small jet aircraft from
Supply

National Defence submarines. I do not thing there is any argument that this possibility is great; but because of the emphasis placed upon possible attacks by aircraft from bases in Europe or Asia it is possible that this matter has been overlooked or has not been emphasized as much as it should be.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at eight o'clock.
George Randolph Pearkes: Mr. Chairman, I rise on a question of privilege or a point of order. I do not think we should go on with this discussion until the minister arrives. I believe we should wait until he is here to hear the discussion on his estimates. I think we must object to going on with the discussion without the minister being present.


Mr. Harris:: I think he will be here in a moment, Mr. Chairman.


William Alfred Robinson: I might point out that the parliamentary assistant to the minister is here.


Some hon. Members:: Carried.


George Randolph Pearkes: No, Mr. Chairman. We are not prepared to go on with the discussion without the minister being present.


Walter Edward Harris: I am informed that he is on his way here.


William Alfred Robinson: The minister is now in the chamber.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Mr. Chairman, prior to the recess I pointed out that, in the work of the Royal Canadian Navy, I believe the emphasis should be shifted from escort work to defence of our home waters, for reasons I shall outline in the next few moments.
I agree with the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich that, because of changes in the world military situation owing to nuclear weapons and other advances, our whole defence concept ought to be changed. I also agree with the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich that the only effective enemy attack on Canada or on the United States or both would be made by air. But at present all the emphasis is on the fact that this attack might be made by land-based aircraft coming from either Europe or Asia.
We have, of course, the three radar defence lines that have been much discussed in the last day or so, but attacks by air can also come from other sources than land-based aircraft in Europe or Asia. By that I mean there is a fairly strong possibility-indeed a probability-that an attack could be made on
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Supply-National Defence industry in the heartland of North America by either guided missiles or jet planes launched from submarines.
We have been accustomed to thinking, for example, of Hudson bay and James bay as a large, cold, inland sea belonging to Canada, and a very innocuous place; but I should like to point out that I believe Hudson bay and James bay could very well be the dagger pointed at the heart of Canada and North America generally. We have had samples of things such as this in the past. I think every hon. member here well remembers that England built a mighty fortress at Singapore. They were sure an attack would be made by the Japanese fleet. Great guns 18 inches in diameter were set up to repulse any such attack. As nearly everyone remembers, the Japanese captured Singapore, but they never used their navy. They used small numbers of troops landed behind, where nobody thought any attack would come from.
We may have a D.E.W. line, a mid-Canada defence line and a "Pinetree" line to warn us of attack by land-based aircraft, but I do not think sufficient emphasis has been placed on the possibility of attacks being made on our heartland by submarine-based aircraft or guided missiles coming from submarines that could easily invade certain strategic waters around Canada.
First I mention Hudson bay, just as a matter of interest. The distances I shall give are only approximations. They may be a mile or two out one way or the other. I also mention a submarine in James bay launching guided missiles or aircraft. I also put in a further qualification. While we have heard of guided missiles that may be able to travel from one continent to another, I am assuming that guided missiles can travel only from 300 to 500 miles. I have no doubt they can travel much farther, but I am basing my assumption on the smaller guided missiles and from experience of the last war.
We know that guided missiles undoubtedly exist. If they were launched from a submarine in Hudson bay they could certainly hit important areas in Canada. I would point out that the cities of Port Arthur and Fort William are only approximately 350 air miles from James bay. The Sault Ste. Marie canal area is only 300 miles away. Sudbury, with its great nickel mines and refinery, is only 300 miles away, and Ottawa about 400. The great dam at Des Joachims, up the Ottawa river, which furnishes the power for a great deal of the industrial area of Ontario, is about 400 miles distant. Montreal is 450 miles away, and the Toronto, Hamilton, Niagara area is approximately 500 miles away, or slightly better. The new St. Lawrence seaway will be 

about 400 miles away. I think these thoughts are at least worthy of note, and to my mind and the minds of other people with whom I have discussed the matter they are disturbing.
Another body of water from which attacks of this type could be made is the gulf of Maine. I know full well that the defence of the waters of the gulf of Maine is primarily the responsibility of the United States government, but because Canada could be affected too I feel that we also have responsibilities. Some of the air distances from the gulf of Maine to central Canada are not too great. Montreal is about 300 miles away, the seaway project about 300 miles away, Ottawa about 350 and the Toronto, Hamilton, Niagara area about 450 miles away.
I have often heard people say that if submarines were to get into the gulf of St. Lawrence they might, by attacks such as I have already outlined, cause a great deal of destruction. That is no doubt true of certain areas, but I think the Hudson bay and gulf of Maine areas are much more likely because they are closer. The gulf of St. Lawrence is about 400 miles away from Montreal and about 300 miles away from Quebec and Arvida with its aluminum plant. There are also other areas in Canada that could be attacked which are very obvious. In the east there are the cities of Halifax, Saint John and Moncton and on the west coast there are Vancouver and Kitimat, though I understand the Kitimat project is supposed to be proof against attacks such as these.
Another interesting fact is that the radium mines at Great Bear lake are only about 300 miles from the Arctic ocean. In certain months of the summer the Arctic ocean north of Canada is ice free and quite navigable by submarine. In these strategic waters, and I refer particularly to Hudson bay and the gulf of St. Lawrence, there are narrow entrances. Hudson strait, the entrance to Hudson bay, is about 100 miles wide. While the strait is about 400 miles long, it could well be defended. The distance across Cabot strait and the gulf of St. Lawrence is somewhat less than 100 miles. Of course the gulf of St. Lawrence can be entered by way of the strait of Belle Isle, but it is very narrow and would not present too much difficulty from the point of view of defence.
I have already mentioned the coastal waters off the maritime provinces, Labrador, the gulf of Maine, and the west coast. The question arises, can we defend these areas adequately at the present time? With respect, Mr. Chairman, I think not. In order to guard these coastal waters against sneak attacks by submarines I think some type of patrol would have to be established. When I think of

patrols first of all I refer to the navy and its ships, but one has also to think of air patrols.
To deal first with ships, with our present and contemplated navy I think it would be very difficult to patrol all these areas adequately with our own ships or even with ships which no doubt would be available to us from the United States. On page 5 of the white paper I notice a reference to home defence and Canada-United States co-operation. Certainly nothing specific is mentioned about joint operations between Canadian and American ships for this purpose, although I am sure it must be in mind and ships are probably available for this type of work.
On page 7 of the white paper I see that at the present time we have in commission ten destroyer escort ships, one undergoing conversion and 14 under construction. Those under construction are of course the new St. Laurent class, the first of which I understand is to go into commission probably late this year. That will eventually make a total of 25.
There are also a number of frigates in commission, though there seems to be a slight discrepancy as to the actual number. On page 7 of the white paper it is set out that there are nine in commission with eleven in reserve and one undergoing conversion, but on page 41 it says that there are ten in commission. I dare say this minor discrepancy can be explained. In any event, the fact is that we have very few ships in commission, held in reserve or under construction to deal with the very large area to be covered.
In addition, certain areas from which submarines might launch attacks, such as the bay of Fundy and the gulf of St. Lawrence, are difficult areas for technical reasons from the point of view of anti-submarine protection. There are currents in the waters and temperature changes that cause some difficulties in certain types of detecting equipment. At least they did in the last war and immediately afterward. These difficulties may have been overcome, but if they have no doubt it is secret and of course could not be told.
Regarding patrols by aircraft, as every hon. member knows weather conditions necessarily limit the type of patrol work that can be done adequately by aircraft. It is true that we have aircraft equipped with radar and other devices, and that in very bad weather patrol work can be done by helicopters and other types of reconnaissance planes such as the new Neptune to be used by the air force, which I had the pleasure of seeing at a distance recently, but despite this the
Supply-National Defence major proportion of the work of patrolling strategic waters will have to be done by ships of some sort.
There are of course other dangers. There is what I consider the relatively minor danger of mine-laying in certain waters by enemy submarine. However, I see we have eight new minesweepers and six more under construction. No doubt these may be adequate for the purpose for the immediate future. I was very glad to note in the minister's comments earlier today that the Royal Navy had lent us two submarines to carry on antisubmarine detection exercises. I am glad to hear this because it is certainly difficult for crews in training to know how to operate their instruments if they do not have the real thing to work on.
However, I have one reservation. I rather imagine the submarines that have been lent us for this purpose by the Royal Navy are not of the newest variety. They are probably somewhat ancient, and not the type of submarine the Canadian navy would be compelled to deal with in the event of an attack. Undoubtedly the submarines Russia or any other potential enemy might have would be much larger and speedier. While exercises in detection using what I imagine are older types of submarine are better than nothing at all, they are necessarily limited by that fact.
I should also like to touch briefly on the question of manpower and recruiting. On page 22 of the white paper we see in the first paragraph that the maximum strength for the navy is 20,000. At present, as the minister informed us, and as I also learned from the answer to a question that recently appeared on the order paper, there are approximately 19,000 men in the Royal Canadian Navy. The question arises in my mind, in what way is the figure of 20,000 men related to the ships and equipment planned at present and to be completed within the next few years? That seems to me rather vague. Are these 20,000 men designed to equip the ships and shore establishments we have at the moment, or are they designed to equip the ships we will have within the next three or four years when the new St. Laurent class destroyers are added.
I might point out when these 14 new destroyers are added they will have approximately 270 to 300 men each. Is this figure of 20,000 men also related to these frigates which are held in reserve or in dehumidification, I think the term is in the white paper? As I recall it, frigates formerly had a complement of 150 to 160 men. No doubt with all the improvements more will be required. If 10 or 11 of these are to be kept in reserve,

Supply-National Defence are they to be manned? Will there be adequate personnel available to man these ships included in the 20,000 figure? Those are questions about which I am curious, and I should like to have an answer from the minister later.
I come now to the question of recruiting and recruiting costs. I notice that again these costs are related to this figure of 20,000. I see that the estimates for recruiting costs are slightly less this year than last. As hon. members know, each year a certain number of men leave the navy for one reason or another. At this point I should like to refer to some figures contained in an answer to a question put on the order paper on February 28 last by the hon. member for Calgary North. According to this answer the naval strength on December 31, 1954 was 18,806. Enrolments during 1954 were 4,703 and releases were 2,262, making a net gain of 2,441 men. This would appear to be quite satisfactory.
The costs of recruiting were also shown in the answer to this question placed on the order paper by the hon. member for Calgary North. The cost of recruiting for the navy last year was $943,300. This amounts to approximately $200 per man, but I think this is a rather misleading figure and illustrates the story about the statistician six feet tall who drowned in a river whose average depth was four feet.
These figures can be misleading, because I suggest that a large number, perhaps more than half, of the men who enlisted in the navy would have enlisted without any costly advertising. This figure probably includes the cost of recruiting centres and so on, which are constant costs. I am considering such things as advertising costs and teams going around recruiting people. A large number of the recruits probably would have entered the navy without any of that. Actually the high cost of recruiting is related to the amount expended for the last 30 or 40 per cent of the recruits you get each year.
So far as the actual costs of advertising are concerned, the total cost last year was $290,000. This works out to about $60 per man, based on 1954 enlistments. Again I suggest this is misleading, as a large percentage of these people would have entered the service anyway. The advertising costs per man are probably related to the last 30 or 40 per cent of your recruits. The cost per man, therefore, would probably be closer to $125.
My suggestion is that a lot of the advertising in the newspapers might very well be cut out. It is very expensive, and I think it can be done by other methods. A great many people do wish to join the navy. It is a very [Mr. Nesbitt.1

fine service, as some of us know personally and others know by repute. People who wish to join can obtain information from the numerous divisional headquarters which are scattered around the country.
I think the best type of advertising for the navy is the type of advertising illustrated not very long ago in the city of Peterborough. The hon. member for Peterborough may wish to make some further remarks about this, so I hope he will pardon me for bringing it up at the moment. The naval veterans' association held a meeting in Peterborough. There were over 2,000 naval veterans present, representing nine of the ten provinces of Canada. There was a very fine program for two days, to which a great deal of free newspaper publicity was given. The event was talked about by everybody, and it was very successful.
I feel this is one of the best types of advertising. Instead of spending a lot of money on newspaper advertising which, like election advertisements, a great many people do not read at all, the money might very well be spread out over some of these naval veterans' associations for Sunday church parades, financing naval bands and that sort of thing. Everybody likes a parade; and while I would probably receive some challenge on this, I believe the naval service and the naval veterans certainly march as well as any of the other services. I believe that from the point of view of the naval bands it would be good for their morale to get a chance to go around and play for the public more than they do. I think this is a more effective type of publicity than any newspaper advertising, and more recruits might well be gained.
Another thing that might well be considered are these travelling teams who go around trying to get recruits for the navy. I see that last year the cost of these travelling teams amounted to $138,091, and other costs of recruiting for the navy amounted to $499,683. Apparently some of these amounts were joint costs which had to be shared with the army and air force recruiting teams. It seems to me that while we might run into objection in some quarters, some of these recruiting teams explain the advantages of naval and other service life to students and those in industrial plants. It should be a good way of getting the first-class recruits who are necessary to maintain the present high standard of the naval service.
There is another suggestion I should like to make in this regard. It concerns the number of people who are expected to come into the navy, who belong to the university naval training division. There are a great

many students who take this university naval training who get summer cruises and have a pleasant time. This is a good way to absorb the atmosphere of the navy and no doubt acquire a certain amount of valuable training. Perhaps I have been misinformed on this and if I have I am sure the minister will correct me, but I wonder if those summer cruises could be confined to those who intend to make a career of the navy rather than include those who might be going along for the ride, so to speak.
The last item upon which I should like to touch very briefly is this matter of naval research, referred to on page 39 of the white paper. This is the part of the white paper which deals with defence research generally, and there is one very small paragraph touching on naval research. No doubt some of the other types of research will directly affect the navy, but this small paragraph indicates there is very little research being conducted directly for the navy.
I see according to a newspaper dispatch that the new St. Laurent class of destroyer escorts are costing about $15 million each.
I am not suggesting we are not getting value for what is being paid out. So far as destroyers are concerned the cost of the prototype or first destroyer in the class is great because many alterations have to be made.
But it would be a pretty sad thing, after building ships costing that much money and manned by about 300 men, to lose such ships and men. It would be a heavy loss of men and material. It seems to me naval research might very well be directed to finding out if there is not some less expensive but equally effective device for detecting submarines in the strategic waters surrounding the Canadian coast, particularly those I mentioned earlier in my speech.
Possibly this would involve some small vessel which could carry adequate detecting equipment, but which would not be expected to destroy enemy submarines. Larger ships or aircraft could be used for that purpose. Possibly use could be made of modified or advanced types of detection cables. Hon. members know these were used in the last war to protect the harbours. These could be used to good effect, it seems to me, at the entrances to such waters as Hudson bay or Cabot strait.
Canada is not a country that can afford much higher defence costs. If naval research could find approved methods of protecting ourselves, without greatly increasing the cost, it seems to me something that would be desirable. We all know the extent to which the income tax dollar is eaten up for defence
Supply-National Defence purposes. For this reason I am not advocating greatly increased expenditures, unless they are absolutely necessary. It seems to me a substitute method of protecting our waters might very well be found through increased naval research.


Mr. Churchill:: Mr. Chairman, it is not easy to discuss matters of defence at a time in the history of warfare when things are changing as rapidly as they have in the last few years. Modern scientific inventions, new types of weapons and the growing effectiveness of air power are making it very difficult for those in charge of defence matters to keep abreast of developments. The minister is aware of that fact, of course, and his advisers know it only too well.
Nevertheless I thought in the course of the minister's statement earlier today he showed some lack of imagination with regard to the present state of affairs. It was a cautious statement; perhaps it had to be. On the other hand I thought the problem might have been approached a little more vigorously. The minister has had two years of experience in the department. Before becoming minister he was associate minister for a year, so he is not unfamiliar with the task. What struck me was that too much of what he had to say closely resembled what was said by the previous minister the year before.
Incidentally, unless I heard the minister incorrectly, I thought he was out a bit in his history when he was talking about the importance of defence in Canada. I understood him to say that for a century and a half there had been no fighting on Canadian soil. If he said that, I hope he will not object to my reminding him that there was considerable fighting on Canadian soil between 1812 and 1814. Then there was some fighting in 1837 and 1838, with rather serious casualties among the forces involved. The Fenian raids of 1866 and 1870 caused great disturbance among people engaged in defence in Canada, and rather serious casualties were suffered. As many as from 10,000 to 20,000 militiamen were called out and put under arms for varying periods of time during those troubles. So we have not been altogether free from disturbances on Canadian soil.
I have noticed, in reading the history of that period, that the problem of defending Canada loomed as large to the men of that day as the present problem does to us. For those who are interested I would recommend a book by a most competent historian, "Canada's Soldiers, 1604 to 1954", which

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gives the picture of the early days in Canada's defence. This book is written by Professor Stanley of the Royal Military College at Kingston.
A hundred years ago people examining the problem of defending Canada estimated that because of the size of the country-and it was much smaller to them than it is to us-and the long border between Canada and the United States, 150,000 men would be needed effectively to man our defences. So the problem has been a pressing one throughout the greater part of Canada's history. It is only since our relationship with the United States has become very friendly that we have been able to ignore the southern border.
Other members speaking in the debate have pointed out how our thinking has changed to the point where we are now stressing a more complete defence of the North American continent, which is open to attack both by air and by sea. As the hon. member for Oxford pointed out a few moments ago, even in the Hudson bay area submarines might launch missiles against our cities or other places.
So we have to take a new look at Canada's defences. For several years members of the official opposition have been advocating greater mobility of Canada's forces. This applies at the present time, when you are thinking only of the Canadian scene. And it is here I believe the minister lacked imagination. Several members who have spoken have drawn attention to the possibility of air attack and the means that should be taken to meet such attack. For several years we have had a mobile striking force which from time to time has been exercised in part in its peculiar role. But I do not think it is a complete mobile attacking force. I believe it needs other arms added to it. In addition to infantry, artillery, and engineers which are now dropped by parachute, along with their artillery and other weapons and supplies, I wonder if thought has been given to carrying by air small tanks to assist a force which had to land and dislodge an enemy. The minister has not dealt with that. I do not know whether the glider has passed out of use, or whether it has been developed beyond the excellent stage it reached during the second world war. Helicopters, for carrying supplies to forces, have come within the ken of the defence department, because I see that some have been purchased and are going to be used on these northern radar lines for carrying supplies. So perhaps experience will be obtained there.

Considerable mention has been made of the radar warning lines now under construction. The minister has drawn our attention to the fact that dependence is being placed on the interceptor planes of the air force, rather than on ground-to-air missiles which, I judge from what I have been reading, have not reached that stage of development where they could be safely relied upon in time of emergency. I find that many United States cities are ringed with batteries of these ground-to-air missiles, which prompted a competent observer to say that it is the last defence weapon. The range is limited, and the attacking bomber might be destroyed too close to the populated area to afford any effective defence.
In considering the defence of Canada along those lines, I think we would find more satisfaction here had the minister given us a better picture of the defence of Canada. As far as I can remember, the situation is exactly the same as it was several years ago. We are to have a mobile striking force with an increased number of planes. We are now placing our dependence on the radar warning lines. Last year, when we heard about the one that was in existence, we made some inquiries of the former minister of defence in regard to the effectiveness of that warning line. Now we are to have three. I do not recall that the present minister was overly confident as to the value of radar defence lines.
That is the great problem. No sooner are these things constructed and put into operation than they become obsolete. The same thing applies to the planes and the guided missiles that are developed. However, in addition to considering the defence of Canada along those lines we have other commitments. Our commitment overseas with NATO involves the use of conventional weapons. We also shall not be free from responsibility,
I suppose, if some war breaks out after the fashion of Korea, in which case the United Nations would expect member nations to participate. Despite the fact that we are living in this atomic era, conventional weapons may be required in conflicts of that nature.
The minister has indicated to us that the formation of the defence force is still just about what it was a year ago, two years ago, three years ago. The hon. member for Esqui-malt-Saanich has pointed out that it is largely an infantry force that has been provided. During the time I have been in the House of Commons I have done everything in my power to urge that armour be given more prominence in the Canadian army, so long as we have to prepare to use an army such

as we know now and have known in the past. My remarks along that line were not received very acceptably by the present minister's predecessor; but I hoped we would have a new look at the problem with a new man on the job. Imagine my disappointment to find that in the minister's statement describing our present forces he devoted one sentence to mentioning that we had two armoured regiments, and that was it. In the white paper I do not find much mention of armour except under the heading of militia, so there we are.
The great demand of modern times in the type of force that is in Europe is mobility, and you get mobility from armoured vehicles and from tracked vehicles, which can go across country. I hope ten years after the second world war we are not still depending on wheeled vehicles tied to the road for the forces in Europe. But I judge that the Canadian brigade is. Wheeled vehicles tied to the road extend for such an immense distance, are so easily blocked and pile up so easily behind one another that it is very hard to keep an army supplied. Modern thinking on forces such as we have in Europe is that supplying should be done by way of helicopter or some type of plane that can leap over and drop those supplies, or land with them in the area where they are most needed, rather than get them only from the wheeled vehicle in the supply column.
Of course I have time and again suggested that supplies, particularly of ammunition and petrol, might well be taken forward in a tracked vehicle which would have crosscountry performance. Despite this emphasis on armour; despite the fact that leading generals continue to comment on the need for mobility, as General Montgomery did last year-and I have an article here by General Gale also emphasizing the same point -the Canadian army is out of balance with regard to armour. The armoured corps, which was of such great importance in the second world war, and continues or should continue to be of great importance at this time, is suffering from neglect in the Canadian army.
I notice that in the tests carried out in Nevada, upon which the minister did not dwell, armour including tanks and armoured personnel carriers were used much closer to ground zero than the infantry troops who were sheltering in trenches. Those armoured vehicles were just 12,000 feet away from ground zero, if the diagram in the Globe and
Supply-National Defence Mail of April 25 is correct. In the report of that experiment in the same paper I find this statement:
On the military side, there was staged the first atomic-explosion exercise by an armoured task force. It involved 450 men, 57 tanks and 24 armoured personnel carriers.
The task force executed an 8-mile breakthrough manoeuvre in an hour immediately after the detonation.
This indicates, Mr. Chairman, that armour has a place even on the battlefield where atomic weapons have been exploded, and that it will provide safety for the gunners, the drivers and the infantry in those vehicles.
In view of the continued importance of armour, I cannot understand why the Department of National Defence neglects it in the Canadian army. I am not going to repeat the arguments I used last year, but to my mind they are the most effective of all. One of the arguments I used last year was that unless we build up the armoured corps within the Canadian army, and train the high command in the use of armour, we shall pay a very severe penalty sometime in the future if we are compelled to engage in war; for as I said last year, the training of the high command is of greater importance, in my own experience, than almost anything else.
I notice we are informed in the white paper that the tank is to play the anti-tank role, and in the militia the artillery is being accordingly reduced. If that is being done in the militia why is it not being done in the regular army? There is no mention of that in the white paper.
The tank is considered by the Canadian army to be a difficult offensive weapon against which infantry may have to defend themselves, and a new type of infantry anti-tank weapon has been designed under Canadian direction. Credit is due to those who have effected that improvement. It is an improved version of the Piat or the Bazooka and is called the Heller, which indicates a surprising lack of vocabulary in naming a new weapon. But it is considered a much more effective anti-tank weapon for infantry than its predecessors.
I am always amazed when I see pictures of these anti-tank weapons in the hands of infantrymen. The infantryman is shown as either standing or kneeling. That is a good way to go underground permanently, to stand or kneel when using an anti-tank weapon if there are tanks in the vicinity. I think the public are confused by pictures of that nature. I believe with a little imagination the people who display weapons like that for the information of the public might show a picture of the weapon by itself, or show the men in a

Supply-National Defence trench with a bit of concealment or cover. Don't fool yourself; you can have an antitank weapon twice the size of the Heller, and if you stand or kneel to fire it, a little speculative firing from the machine guns on the oncoming tank will wipe out such infantrymen.
The defence department considers that the tank is still going to be used, because it has provided a weapon against it. It has indicated that it would use tanks against tanks, so the tank is not an obsolete or outmoded vehicle. Yet the defence department fails to give the importance to armour in the Canadian forces that it should. Other countries have built up their armoured forces and are continuing to emphasize their importance.
This brings me to a topic on which I have spoken frequently in this house, the armoured personnel carrier. I do not want to cover again ground that I have covered before, but I do want to ask the minister the same question I asked his predecessor. If you are going to fight with conventional weapons, if you are visualizing an army engaged on a battlefield as in the second world war; if the terrain over which the army is going to be engaged will permit the use of tanks, which means you are not fighting in a swamp or jungle, then we should provide armoured personnel carriers for the infantry. Do not repeat the experience of the first and second world wars by condemning infantrymen to walking across open ground to take up a position. I regret to^ say that I think that is the type of training still being given in the Canadian army.
I raised this question with the minister's predecessor on more than one occasion, and I always received the customary brush-off. The armoured personnel carrier was mentioned on page 39 of the white paper of last year, where it was stated that the army was developing a new tracked carrier for the infantry. I questioned whether that was really an armoured personnel carrier. In the white paper of this year, on page 42, they have come up with this statement:
In addition, the Canadian army is conducting trials on British and United States army types of armoured personnel carrier to determine their suitability to meet the needs of the Canadian army.
It is only ten years since the last war, and perhaps I am getting a bit impatient. The armoured personnel carrier was the product of Canadian ingenuity, and credit is generally given to General Simonds for conceiving the idea. It was developed by Canadians to a certain pitch of efficiency and it saved hundreds and hundreds of lives in the second world war. My plea is, can we not continue 
that type of training in the Canadian army? I had hoped that, with that experience, within this ten-year period Canada would have been foremost in the use of that particular vehicle.
It was not fully developed in the second world war. There were other ways of making use of the armoured personnel carrier. For the information of those who are not familiar with it may I say that in the second world war it consisted of the Ram tank, which was made in Canada, with the turret removed. The interior could then take a section of eight infantrymen with their weapons, and they could be carried from the concentration area to the assembly point, the starting line or right to the enemy's position without any casualties whatsoever. The proof was in the second world war.
I read many interesting stories of the second world war, and I wonder why with that type of vehicle available the high command has been a little slow in making use of it. There was a good story in the Legionary of March, 1955, dealing with an attack on the Hochwald forest. This particular battalion crossed 500 yards of open ground. It was a brilliant and courageous attack, but a very costly one because of heavy casualties involved. We were there; I know the ground, every inch of it. We were there with armoured personnel carriers and they were not used. Of course the reason was beyond my knowledge because I was not sitting in the seats of authority of the corps or the division or the army. But that is the type of story you read about the second world war and the first world war; gallant actions, but so wasteful of life.
I urge the Minister of National Defence to investigate again this problem of the armoured personnel carrier. The British are using them and so are the United States.
I do not know the particular types and they may not be effective, nevertheless they are using them. The United States used them at the recent exercise in Nevada with apparent success and I think we should have them.
The minister drew our attention to the great exercise last year in Germany, the "Battle Royal" it was called, at which our brigade acquitted itself admirably, as Canadian troops do on all occasions. He did not say whether they just walked on their flat feet as their predecessors did in the second world war, in the first world war and in the Boer war. Let us advance with the times.
The armoured personnel carrier can be used for battalion work; it can be used for company work; it can be used for a mopping-up action by a platoon. My contention is that the army should give close attention to this. I fear they have not done so, because

I read in the white paper that they are just investigating to see whether these United Kingdom or United States vehicles may be suitable for Canadian conditions.
I do not like to appear too critical of the service in which I spent quite a bit of my life, but I do draw attention to this lapse in the thinking of the Canadian army. We all know that it is important not to prepare for the next war on the basis of the last one and without any new ideas, but at the same time it is essential to draw from experience and make as effective a fighting force as you can with the knowledge you have.
I appreciate the immense problem there is in these times. The hydrogen bomb and the smaller atomic weapons seemed to change things so completely and make them very confusing. But it is not beyond the capabilities of our experienced army commanders to devise ways and means of coping with these new problems.
After all, when we are discussing national defence we are thinking of two or three things. We are thinking of the defence of our own country. We are thinking of cooperative defence under the NATO organization. We must think of how efficient our navy, army and air forces are, and we must think in terms of the men who man the ships and the airplanes and who serve in the artillery and the armoured formations of the infantry. We must think in terms of ensuring their effective training so they will be competent fighting men, and we must also think in terms of saving their lives by every possible known device.
It is only for that reason that I have taken the time of the committee to stress once again the importance of armour as protection for our fighting men.


Mr. Harkness:: Mr. Chairman, we have had today a considerable amount of discussion of many of the important aspects of defence. I do not wish to be repetitious; therefore I shall say little or nothing about many of these matters as to some of which I hope the minister will provide answers.
In the four years previous to this, Canada's defence objectives were stated in the same terms. They appear in last year's white paper -that for 1954-55-at page 6, and read in this way:
The objectives of our defence policy remain the same as heretofore:
(i)	the immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack;
(ii)	implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the charter of the United Nations, or under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or other agreement for collective security;
(iii)	the organization to build up strength in a total war.
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Those objectives were absolutely definite. They were clearly stated. There was no ambiguity about them. Anyone could read them and be sure what was meant. This year there is a change in these defence objectives. To begin with, I should like to make it clear that I am not against change, and that I am not necessarily against this particular change. However, I should like to know what the explanation is and what the change in this year's objectives really means. I will read this year's objectives from this year's white paper. They appear at page 3 thereof. You will note the difference, Mr. Chairman. The objectives are stated to be as follows:
Canada's defence program continues to be planned for the immediate defence of Canada-
That was the same as last year, but now we begin to get into the differences:
-for co-operation with the United States in the joint defence of the Canada-United States region, for co-operation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization looking towards the provision of a collective force capable of deterring aggression, and for carrying out undertakings by Canada as a member of the United Nations Organization.
Instead of having objectives numbered 1, 2 and 3, absolutely clear and simple, we have one long sentence this year in which the objectives are not set out very definitely and in which they are merged into one another.
I should like to consider just what some of these changes are in detail and ask the minister about them. When he comes to reply he can perhaps answer the questions. I should like to ask what these changes mean and why they are there. Why is it that, instead of having as the first objective, as we have had for several years previously, "the immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack", we now have "the immediate defence of Canada"-that is the same-and then "for co-operation with the United States in the joint defence of the Canada-United States region"?
We all realize that co-operation with the United States in the defence of North America is essential. We cannot defend the continent by ourselves. We cannot defend our own country from air attack by ourselves. We must do it in alliance and in co-operation with the United States. We all agree with that. However, does the change in these objectives and stating them in these terms indicate, shall we say, a quiet way of introducing into our defence objectives and defence policy the idea that we are to be more dependent on the United States? Is that the implication or the meaning of that change?
As was stated by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich this morning, we already have in this country some 3,000 United States troops and, judging by what we have been
4908	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence told, we are to have many thousands more to man this distant early warning line which is now under construction. As 1 say, is this change in our defence objectives or in the way they are stated an indication of increasing dependence on the United States and on their defence plans and so on? Is it, shall we say, a first indication of an over-all command which Air Marshal Slemon in his speech not long ago indicated was a necessity as far as North America's air defence was concerned?
Perhaps most Canadians are not going to be too much opposed to these things if that is the case, but I think it is up to the Minister of National Defence to tell us. I do not think we should be left in doubt as to what is the situation, or as to what are the plans in that regard at the present time.
The next phase in these objectives for this year is this:
-for co-operation within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization looking towards the provision of a collective force capable of deterring aggression,-
Previously this objective was not "cooperation within NATO" but it was "implementation of any undertakings made by Canada . . . under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization". Does this change indicate our commitments under NATO have now changed? Does it indicate that rather than having commitments under NATO which it is one of our defence objectives to implement, it has now become a matter of no commitments but that we are merely going to cooperate with NATO in regard to our joint defence? That change in wording may mean nothing or it may mean a good deal. I think the minister should tell us what it means, particularly as there is no such change as far as the United Nations is concerned, because our present objectives go on to read in this way:
-and for carrying out undertakings by Canada as a member of the United Nations Organization.
In other words, one of our objectives is still to carry out undertakings under the United Nations; but whereas the objective used to be "the implementation of undertakings under NATO", it has been changed to "co-operation within NATO". It seems as though a distinction has been made between our position under NATO and our position under the United Nations, which was not there previously. It was "implementation of" in both cases previously.
We now come to what was the third of our objectives previously, namely "the organization to build up strength in a total war". What has happened to that objective?
It has disappeared altogether. I do not think the minister would say that objective has


been reached. I do not think he would say that we have built up all the organization required to meet the demands of a total war. I therefore wonder why that has been dropped as one of our objectives. As a matter of fact, I would say you never really reach that objective. It is one you keep working toward constantly, but you never actually reach it.
It seems a little peculiar that this objective, which has been there for the last four or five years, has now suddenly been dropped and does not appear any more.


Mr. Philpott:: Why put it in if you cannot reach it?


Douglas Scott Harkness: It has been in for the past four years. It is just the same as complete air defence of the country. You can never achieve complete air defence of the country. On the basis of your argument we should not have a plane, we should not man a radar station, we should not have any defence at all. I think that interjection is an indication of the type of thinking of some people with respect to defence matters, and it is extremely shallow. I should like to ask the minister particularly about the dropping of this third objective, the organization to build up strength in the event of a total war. Does this mean less interest in the reserves?
I am going to come back to the reserves later and have something more to say about them, but in the white paper and the minister's speech I noted that not very much was said about the reserves. After all, the reserves are one of the big factors in what has been called the organization to build up strength in the event of a total war. They are one of the big factors in that field in all three services, navy, army and air force. I hope this does not mean the reserves are going to be sort of gently pushed aside and there is going to be far less interest taken in them. We have reason to fear that from the fact that so little has been said about them in the white paper and by the minister in this debate.
In the white paper the emphasis has been placed on the danger of thermonuclear attack. Every member who has taken part in the debate has referred to that. Every speaker has stressed it, and I think properly so. I should like to read part of what is said in connection with this matter. On page 4 of the white paper there is the following:
For North America the possibility appears for the first time of an attack that could cripple the military and industrial potential of Canada and the United States. Should we ever be attacked with thermonuclear weapons, it is plain that our immediate problem would be national survival

I agree with the latter part of that statement only too fully. However, I must point out that the government has been extremely slow in coming to a realization of the danger facing us. This is the first white paper in which any real cognizance has been taken of the danger of atomic and thermonuclear attack. As far as thermonuclear attack is concerned, the possibility has been there for upwards of two years. As far as atomic attack is concerned it has been there for considerably longer. This is not a new thing at all. For several years past it has been quite possible for us to be attacked with atomic weapons. The government should have realized this fact long ago, and attempts should have been made to meet the situation long before now. It is only this year that any real attempt is being made to meet the extremely great danger.
It is quite true that an atomic attack would not have been as bad as an attack by hydrogen bombs. However, it still would have more or less crippled our military and industrial potential, inflicting damage which would have required quite a long time to repair. It is quite true that the hydrogen bomb is much more destructive. It is true that the Russians have jet bombers that are faster and capable of flying greater distances than they had two, three or four years ago, but it is really a matter of degree more than anything else. The basic danger is greater but it existed before and, as I say, I think the government is culpable in that it did not take the necessary steps earlier to meet the danger.
The belated recognition of the danger of this country's entire life being crippled by atomic and thermonuclear weapons has apparently led now to a realization of the necessity for a change in defence policy. It is quite apparent from what the minister has said that the government believes greater emphasis must be placed on the air arm, and especially on radar warning screens and fighter aircraft to back up the screens. I should like to point out to him that a great deal of the discussion last year was on these very points. We pointed out that the existing radar screen, the "Pinetree" line, really constituted only point defence and was far too close to targets to be of any real good. We also pointed out that our fighter defences to back up the warning screen were almost negligible, and that what was required was an extension of the screens and a very considerable increase in our fighter strength.
As a matter of fact, some of us suggested last year that until the fighter strength in this country could be built up, some of the fighter squadrons then in Europe should be 50433-310
Supply-National Defence brought back here to look after the defence of Canada. In my opinion that is something that should still be given serious consideration, because it is going to be a considerable length of time before our fighter strength is built up sufficiently to give us even a semi-defence, may I say.
As the minister said several times this morning, complete defence is impossible. Everybody recognizes that, but we certainly should have the best defence against atomic and thermonuclear attack that the economy of the country can provide and that our whole defence activities can make possible. The unfortunate fact is we have not got it. In fact we have, and have had right along, lamentably little.
Last year and in previous years the former defence minister always attempted to lull the country into a false sense of security by assuring us that everything was pretty well all right and we did not need to worry. I am sorry to say that a certain attempt along the same line still seems to be apparent. I had hoped the present minister would not fall into the same great error of trying to lull the house and the country into a false sense of security, but from some of the statements in the white paper it would appear that the temptation was a bit too much for him. For example, on page 5 we find the following:
Nine regular squadrons and ten auxiliary squadrons of the Royal Canadian Air Force are maintained in Canada to provide fighter aircraft for interception duties. By the end of 1955 all nine regular squadrons will be completely equipped with long-range, all-weather CF-100 jet aircraft.
I think that gives the casual reader a totally wrong impression. We of course have not nine squadrons now. I hope the minister is right in saying that by the end of this year these nine squadrons will be completely equipped with CF-100 jet aircraft, but if so it will be a different story from what was the case with the promises we received with respect to naval vessels, referred to this morning by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, which we were promised first in 1951 and have not received yet.
Unfortunately that has been the case with respect to many of the promises contained in white papers and ministerial statements on defence. The promises were not lived up to. Things came along later than we were led to expect they would. The real difficulty involved in the statement I have read is the fact that the ten auxiliary squadrons are not effective squadrons, and of course the minister knows that quite well. They really should not be counted as part of the fighter defence of Canada at the present time. The aircraft they have are obsolete. The number
4910	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence of aircraft they have is limited. In many cases their establishments are below strength, and so on. In other words, they are not effective fighter units which could go up and meet jet bombers.
The minister recognized this in the statement he made this morning, when he said that the position of these auxiliary fighter squadrons was being reconsidered, and the question of supplying them with the CF-100, about which we were told last year and the year before, was being reconsidered. Perhaps it was not feasible for these squadrons to handle the CF-100.
I should like to strongly reinforce what was said by the hon. member for Equimalt-Saanich and by the leader of this party, that if these ten auxiliary squadrons are not to be supplied with the CF-lOO's, if they are not to be supplied with sufficient regular air force personnel to make it feasible and possible for them to operate as CF-100 squadrons, then there is a strong necessity to have them replaced by or converted into regular air force squadrons.
What the minister said this morning, and the way the white paper reads, is a sufficient tacit admission that nine fighter squadrons are not sufficient to back up the radar screens and defend some of the likely targets, such as the big cities and industrial areas of this country. Since this reconsideration is taking place, I would hope it might result in something definite that would provide us with at least ten additional effective squadrons.
Now,. Mr. Chairman, the question arises, what is the present defence policy? We have not been told either in the white paper or in what the minister has said. We have heard and read a great many words, but we have not been definitely told what the defence policy is. The white paper contains a very apparent truism on page 3 in connection with policy:
A central problem in all current military planning is the nature of the balance to be maintained between conventional forces and weapons and those for atomic and nuclear warfare.
I think we could all agree with that. It is certainly a very critical problem. How does the government propose to solve it? We have not been told, and I think perhaps that is the crux of the whole defence policy. We are still in complete ignorance on that very important point. We know, of course, that changes in emphasis are necessary. The minister has said that, and we have been saying it for years. There is nothing new in that. The big question is, what are these changes? What is the general concept to be. I think the minister should suggest that, but he has not done so thus far.


I think there is no doubt that great differences of opinion have existed on the part of the senior officers of the three services, and they have been in the process of being threshed out lately. It would be extremely peculiar if there were not these great differences of opinion. The speech I referred to earlier, made by Air Marshal Slemon, and the speech made by Air Vice Marshal Plant, I believe are indicative of the arguments that have been taking place and the differences of opinion with regard to policy which must necessarily exist in a time of change such as this. It would seem to me that the retirement of General Simonds and the other personnel changes which have taken place recently are probably indicative of the same thing. What we would like to know is, have these differences been resolved? Has any clear, definite policy been decided upon? If so, what is it? That is what I should like to hear from the Minister of National Defence before this debate concludes, and particularly before the consideration of the estimates is finished.
It has been apparent for years that we needed greater air defence for Canada. The minister mentioned that. A considerable improvement along this line is apparently now under way through the provision of these radar screens and the increase in the number of fighter squadrons. As has been stated, our first defence responsibility is to prevent, so far as possible, air attack on our cities with thermonuclear and atomic weapons. Everybody agrees with that. We agree that the only practical means are the radar lines and the fighters, and, we hope, ground-to-air guided missiles.
The minister spoke briefly about those, and I thought somewhat discouragingly. From what I had read of the experience in the United States and Great Britain these ground-to-air guided missiles had been reasonably satisfactory. A considerable number have already been installed, particularly in the United States. It would seem to me that unless there is some serious difficulty in connection with them, about which we have not heard, we should be getting some of them around our most important targets in Canada.
Connected with this prime danger which faces the country, of course, and the prime responsibility of defence, is that of warning the population of this country of any impending air attack, to have a civil defence organization and plans for the evacuation of our large cities. Of course there should be plans for handling and feeding of the population of these cities once they are evacuated. I was very glad to see the emphasis that was placed on civil defence

in this white paper. I hope that much more of a concrete nature will be done so far as civil defence measures are concerned than has been the case in Canada up to date. We have chiefly talked about civil defence and done very little about it in a concrete way. The dominion government has refused to face the situation, and has refused to meet its responsibilities along that line.
When civil defence was moved from the Department of National Defence to that of health and welfare a few years ago, many of us hoped it might result in a considerable improvement in civil defence measures. This hope has been to a large extent unrealized. As is stated in this white paper, the present threat is the complete crippling of the military and industrial potential of this nation. It would appear to me that possibly a serious mistake was made in moving civil defence from the Department of National Defence to health and welfare. It seems to me now that civil defence is an integral part of defence, and there is just a difference between military defence and civil defence. The two are tied so closely together that military personnel are perhaps going to have to take a large part in what is called civil defence. Probably we should move the civil defence section back under the defence department, and have all our defence activities thoroughly integrated.
After providing for the prime need of defence against air attack-and this, of course, in close co-operation with the United States, which is essential-we might ask, what else is required in our defence? Many people, including Mr. Churchill, who is a most eminent authority, have stated that they believe an atomic stalemate may have been reached.
I hope that is correct, and I think there is a fair amount of reason for that hope, that we have reached a situation where both sides have a large atomic and thermonuclear stockpile, the use of which, so far as each side is concerned, would be so totally destructive that neither would use it.
The hon. member for Okanagan Boundary who spoke for the C.C.F. quoted Mr. Hanson Baldwin and others, including General Montgomery, to the effect that in the event of war it was definite that atomic weapons would be used. He said we must take it for granted that this is so. I would point out, however, that those statements were made some time ago; they were not made within the last few months. I would be much more inclined to accept the appreciation of the situation by Sir Winston Churchill, who says there is a good chance of reaching at least an atomic stalemate, and that as a result we will never have the wholesale 50433-310}
Supply-National Defence destruction of the world which would follow an atomic or hydrogen bomb attack by one side against the other.
Nevertheless that is a prime danger. That is the thing we must guard against; and I do not for one moment suggest that we should relax our defence efforts in the slightest degree. That is the thing, above all others, which we must guard against and must be prepared to meet. However, if Sir Winston Churchill's appreciation of the situation is correct, what it means is that future wars may be small wars, such as we had in Korea. Or it might amount to a third large world war, but fought with conventional weapons, fought to a great extent with armies, navies and air forces using older types of bombs and the like.
It seems to me quite apparent that so long as that possibility exists to any great extent, this country must continue to be equipped with an army and a navy along somewhat conventional lines. No country has done away with its army and navy. We have seen no evidence of the push-button warfare which some people have been talking about. I take it that our commitments to the United Nations and to NATO require us to have a certain number of these conventional forces.
As the leader of this party said this afternoon, what we need is conventional forces used unconventionally. It seems to me that what has been said by other members in this party is correct when they point out that the organization of our conventional forces is out of date and should be brought up to date. We must improve their mobility and their hitting power.
The hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre has spoken this year and in other years about a greater use of armour. Tests which have been made with atomic weapons indicate that armoured vehicles give a very high degree of protection. If we are going to have atomic warfare, probably the only troops who will survive anywhere near the point where the atomic bomb is dropped will be those protected by armour. The hon. member has pointed out that the use of such armour would have the effect of saving the lives of troops using conventional weapons such as machine guns and rifles.
It seems to me quite apparent that in our present armed forces we place far too great dependence on straight infantry of the old style. It is true that we have one airborne brigade; but the rest of the army, including the division and the other brigade, are the conventional 1939-45 style of infantry | to a large extent armed with the same or
4912	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence similar weapons. There have been some changes, of course, but the weapons are very much the same. This is out of date and should be changed so we would have mobile forces, which would be better protected and would hit harder.
Let me say something with regard to the manpower question. The maximum strength of our forces has been set at 120,000 and that strength has been almost reached, with an enlistment of 117,000. It is evident from the white paper and from what the minister has said that the air arm is going to need more men. It will not be able to man these additional squadrons and the increased number of radar stations without a considerable increase in the number of men. From what the minister said I take it there is no idea of securing these men. He did not admit that more men would be needed, but that seems evident. He did not say they were going to be taken from the army and the navy, and that those services were going to be reduced in order to provide the increased number required by the air force, but I am wondering if that is not so. I wonder if that is not the point to which we are moving.
I suggest it is quite evident that with this
120,000	men we have not enough manpower because, to begin with, we have several thousand Americans in Canada at the present time, and many thousands more are coming when the D.E.W. line is built. There is no question that the Americans will get the greatest benefit from these radar lines because they are farther away from the possible enemy than we are. Therefore they will have a longer period of warning than we would have. It is clear therefore that their proportionate benefit is greater than ours, because they will receive a longer period of warning. And of course these warning lines are just as essential to them as they are to us, in fact even more so.
I think everyone would agree they should pay the major portion of the cost of those lines, and apparently they are going to do so. As I understand it, they are going to construct this D.E.W. line pretty much at their own expense, and will man it. They have also paid a good proportion of the cost of the "Pinetree" line.
I believe there will be no argument as to the equity of that arrangement. They are getting great benefit from these lines and should pay a major portion of the cost. But I submit that is a totally different matter from having their troops man these lines. That would not be consistent with our sovereignty and our independence as a nation, unless it were a matter of absolute necessity. I understand one of these lines will not be
[Mr. Harkness.l

ready for a long time, and we could probably have men trained to man it. Once we have the trained personnel it seems to me we could man those lines ourselves. It is not consistent with our general national pretensions to do otherwise.
It seems to me peculiar and rather unreasonable that while the United States and most of the other NATO countries have a greater proportion of their manpower in the services than we have, at the same time we are asking one of these countries, namely the United States, to bring in men to man one of the radar lines in our country. I should like to ask a general question, Mr. Chairman. What relation do the 120,000 men in our forces actually bear to our real defence needs? It seems to me that is an arbitrary figure. I cannot see any real relation of that figure of
120.000	to our defence needs. It is a figure we have had now for some time. I should like an explanation from the minister as to how that figure is arrived at. Why not
110.000	or 150,000? It seems to be purely arbitrary, as I say, and it needs to be explained.
I should like to say something about our reserve forces. They continue, as was stated by the leader of our party this afternoon, to be one of the chief bases for the recruitment of the regular forces. People are attracted into the reserve. As they become interested, many of them go on to recruit into the regular forces. It is most important to carry on our reserve forces. They are the basis on which we must organize in the event of a total war. As was stated in all previous white papers, they are the basis upon which we must mobilize, and it does not seem to me that nearly enough attention is being paid to them.
As I indicated earlier, I am afraid the general idea is getting around: oh, well, the reserve forces are all right, but still we have the regular forces and therefore we do not need to worry too much about the reserves. If they gradually wither away it is too bad, but it is not too important.
I would be afraid, even from what the minister said about reassessing, that these ten auxiliary squadrons are going to do that. Perhaps they have in mind just to let these auxiliary squadrons run downhill, shall we say, or disintegrate. Therefore I should like the minister to make a more definite statement than has been made in regard to policy so far as the defence forces are concerned.
I think the defence forces are very necessary from another point of view. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich indicated that they could be tied in with civil defence. It is essential that they should be tied in with civil

defence, but there is another feature of civil defence particularly. Perhaps it should not really be called civil defence, as it is. If we had an atomic bombing attack on this country one of the greatest dangers, as far as survivors are concerned, would be the matter of panic, chaos and so forth. It would give an opportunity for enemy agents, saboteurs, fifth columnists, and so forth, to go ahead and destroy what was left, and it would also provide opportunity for the criminal fringe of the population, which is normally held in check by the police force, to indulge in what would be their normal activities if we did not have the usual police and security forces to stop them.
Therefore under these circumstances a very considerable security force would be needed, and that is a job which the reserve forces, if they were in good shape, if they were in any sort of reasonable numbers, would be admirably equipped to do. It is a job which would be necessary if complete chaos were not to continue for perhaps quite a long time in the terrible event of an atomic attack. Therefore, from that point of view alone, the providing of security forces which would be scattered throughout the whole country, the reserve forces should be maintained, should be brought up to strength as far as possible, should be encouraged in every way.


George Randolph Pearkes: Might I suggest that this
would be the proper time for the minister to reply to some of the questions. We might then be able to start on the more detailed questioning later.


Ralph Osborne Campney: At the outset, before trying to answer at least some of the questions and points which have been raised, I should like to thank hon. members on the other side of the house for the helpful remarks they have made today, for the way they have approached this debate and the keen interest they have shown, which of course one would expect, in our national defence effort. It has been a first-class debate. I think I have learned some things; I hope we all have.
If I might, without making an invidious comparison, I should like particularly to compliment the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich on the excellemt speech which he made this morning. There is not too much I can disagree with in his speech, but there are a couple of points I might possibly refer to. One had to do with a remark he made, if I took him down correctly. He intimated that the only place in which the war could be lost was on the sea and air approaches to this continent. He was developing, I think, the importance of continental defence. He developed it in this way. He said our entire
Supply-National Defence defence effort should be designed from now on with one point in mind, namely the defence of the approaches to this continent. He may not have intended to emphasize that phase of it so much, but I should like to remind him and the committee that this of course minimizes, if not ignores, the concept of NATO.
Our position would be very difficult if, with our immediate sea and air approaches guarded strongly, we were confronted with a western Europe in enemy hands. It is a vision that we would not like to contemplate. While it is true that the last battle in any future war would certainly be fought for the control of this continent, I think we cannot for a moment in our defence effort consider leaving western Europe inadequately defended, because we all know that we are one organization, and the protection of each is of course for the benefit of us all.
There was one other point which was also mentioned by the hon. member for Calgary North with respect to the first Canadian division. He referred to the nature of its composition and training as not being suitable for the defence of this country. I should like to point out to hon. members that the first Canadian division is, of course, a division under NATO primarily for the defence of Europe. Our own mobile striking force is the primary force for any diversionary attacks on this country. It is highly trained, well-equipped and airborne. It is a strong hitting force that we would utilize in this country.
The Leader of the Opposition, the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich and the hon. member for Calgary North made very proper inquiries as to whether or not the internal organization, the functional set-up of the army, is such as to be in touch with modern developments and to meet new situations. I might say that considerable studies are going on here and, also, there is a good deal of cooperation with military authorities in the United States and in the United Kingdom who are making intensive studies of the set-up of army units and army formations in the light of modern conditions and the new types of warfare. This summer at Gagetown our own troops will be trying out new dispositions and new tactics in the light of our present knowledge of the use of atomic weapons.
The changes that are taking place and that will take place are bound to be of a gradual nature. I think I can say that we are keeping reasonably well abreast of developments as they are being worked out in other countries and as new conditions make it necessary for our services to meet them.
The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, the hon. member for Okanagan Boundary, the hon. member for Wetaskiwin, the hon.
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Supply-National Defence member for Calgary North and possibly some others referred to the utilization of the forces, particularly the militia, in connection with civil defence operations. We are in fact co-operating to an increasing degree. The G.O.C.'s of all our army commands have formulated plans for each of their units to render assistance should need arise. Arrangements have also been made for personnel from the civil defence college at Arnprior to visit the militia units and conduct courses in civil defence for militia officers.
The army, and indeed all the services, are stressing the need of being in a position to render whatever assistance we can, without of course intruding on the primary functions of the services. I think the experience following "Hurricane Hazel" and the other major disasters show a disposition on the part of the services to be most co-operative.
The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, the hon. member for Trinity-Conception and, I think, the hon. member for Wetaskiwin expressed some worry about the role of the navy; as to whether it was to be simply a convoy navy in the narrow sense of the phrase. I should like to tell the hon. members that while convoy duty is one of the navy's important functions, it is also trained and organized for the hunting and killing of submarines apart from convoy duty.
I think it was the hon. member for Oxford who referred to helicopters, and I might tell him that we have an experimental squadron of helicopters in the Royal Canadian Navy which is developing suitable tactics for submarine hunting.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: I said I was glad to see we had that.


Ralph Osborne Campney: I have it here that the hon. member asked if we had it. The hon. member for Oxford and also the hon. member for Trinity-Conception asked for additional information with regard to the mine-sweeping activities of the navy. I might tell them that there is a mine-sweeping squadron on the Pacific and on the Atlantic coast whose duties are tied in closely with harbour defence activities, protecting the main ports on each coast.
The hon. member for Okanagan Boundary seemed to have the idea that all our equipment was obsolete or obsolescent. On listening to him I gathered that he had obtained his information from a variety of sources, and there seemed to be some confusion as to the weapons he was discussing. At one point he mentioned a weapon which I happen to know will not be coming into use until 1960. He mentioned also as being obsolete, among other things, the 3-inch 50 calibre


naval gun which is now actually in production simultaneously both for the Royal Canadian Navy and the United States navy. In the view of the United States navy this gun is certainly not obsolete.
While I would not say that all our weapons are the very latest, any more than those of any other country, still I do not think the obsolescence factor which the hon. member alleged is anything like as prominent as he sought to make it. I am afraid also that
I	cannot agree with the hon. member that the chances of war have been reduced almost to the vanishing point. I think the danger of war is still very great, and this is a pertinent factor in our thinking. It is only as long as we are able to continue to lead from strength, and with all our fellow nations in the free world working with us, that we can hope ultimately to remove that danger.
I should like to say to the hon. member for Oxford and the hon. member for Wetaskiwin that we have no intention of establishing a submarine arm in the Royal Canadian Navy. We have, however, made arrangements for training with submarines for personnel of the Royal Canadian Navy. I think it was the hon. member for Oxford who wondered whether the submarines we were getting from Great Britain were old and antiquated. I understand that those now serving with the Canadian navy were built since world war
II	and are considered to be modern and up to date.
The hon. member for York-Scarborough is to be commended on his interest in electronics research. I have noted with interest the suggestions he made. I think his suggestions are rather ambitious, but I do appreciate his interest in the subject.
The hon. member for York West made many helpful comments with regard to the air force. I think I should read his speech in order to follow his formula for cost figures in producing aeroplanes under different conditions. I shall be glad to study his plan. I must admit that I perked up my ears when I heard him say, or at least thought I heard him say, that the alternative method would save about $100,000 a plane. If I find that I did hear him correctly I shall certainly pass that on to the Minister of Defence Production.
The hon. member for Oxford raised the question whether the figure of 20,000 officers and men for the Royal Canadian Navy took into account the personnel requirements for the 14 destroyer escorts. The answer is yes.
I always listen with interest when the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre produces his favourite military child. He always puts

forward his case with great feeling and persuasiveness and I think he has almost persuaded me to look at it closely again.


Gordon Minto Churchill: That is the most remarkable change that has happened since I came here.


Ralph Osborne Campney: The hon. member for Calgary North seemed to be unduly exercised when he analysed the objectives set out in the white paper and compared them with the objectives set out in the previous white paper. I think the changes are merely changes of phraseology made in the hope of approximating a situation which has changed somewhat. I think there is no basic change in our objectives; I certainly am sure there is no basic change in the NATO relationship and in the NATO set-up.
He referred to the fact that the build-up for total war had not been mentioned, but I should suppose that by now would be understood. After all, the whole objective of our defence effort is to build up strength, not necessarily strength that we along with our NATO allies will use, but nevertheless sufficient joint strength to make it unnecessary to use.
There are a number of other points which I have noted here but on which I have not specific information.
However, perhaps I could keep a note of these matters and deal with them on the detailed estimates. Most of them are smaller points. I could do that if it would be satisfactory to hon. members.
Supply-National Defence


George Harris Hees: Will you call it ten o'clock, Mr. Chairman?


The Deputy Chairman:: Shall I report progress and ask leave to sit again.


Ralph Osborne Campney: Could we call the first item?


George Harris Hees: No; we will call it ten o'clock.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Before calling it ten o'clock, may I say that we have called the first item in the committee. It is item 236. My understanding is that we shall now start calling that item for question and discussion purposes only under the five major headings which appear in the details, it being understood, of course, that item 236 must be put to the committee as one resolution.


George Harris Hees: No, Mr. Chairman. I have a few views that I should like to express when the debate goes on. I should like to have the privilege of doing so.
Item stands.
Progress reported.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Speaker, in order to facilitate the progress of this debate, perhaps we could confine the other work tomorrow to third reading of the C.N.R. bill.


[Stage Direction]
It being four minutes after ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
[Stage Direction]
Friday, June 17, 1955