1954-05-20

[Stage Direction]
Bill	No.	449,	for	the	relief	of	Francis
Walsh.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 450, for the relief of Hilda Anne Darke Marshall.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	451,	for	the	relief	of	Claude
Raphael Sacchitelle.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 452, for the relief of Isabel Mary Peebles Brown Macartney-Filgate.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	453,	for	the	relief	of	Wilfrid
Lavoie.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 454, for the relief of Joseph Edgar Emilien Landry.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 455, for the relief of Joseph Victor Gerard Fontaine.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 456, for the relief of Jeanne Robert Hotte.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 457, for the relief of Heneault Champagne.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	458,	for	the	relief of	Leopold
Ruel.-Mr. Hunter.


Mr. Nicholson:: What have been the expenditures per capita by tourists for each of the last five years by (a) Canadians in the United States; (b) United States citizens in Canada?


Mr. Lesage:: (a)	Average expenditure per visit by Canadian (long term-i.e. more than 48 hours) travellers in the United States.
1949, $65.94;	1950, $74.91; 1951, $85.08;
1952, $88.47; 1953, $85.87.
(b)	Average expenditure per visit by United States (long term-i.e. more than 48 hours) travellers in Canada.
1949, $56.89; 1950, $57.77; 1951, $53.12; 1952, $50.76; 1953, $52.06.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask
a question of the Prime Minister. Could he
say whether there have been any communications between the United States government and the Canadian government with respect to President Eisenhower's reference to a southeast Asia pact, without the participation of Great Britain? Can he tell the house what the attitude of the Canadian government would be toward such a proposal?
Right Hon. L. S. SI. Laurent (Prime
Minister): No, there have been no communications with Ottawa about that. I would not like to say there have not been any discussions between our delegation at Geneva and other delegations there. But there have been no communications sent us here in Ottawa; and unless and until there are communications the government is not going to make any decision.


Mr. J. H. Ferguson (Simcoe North):: In
view of the great importance of the statement of the President of the United States regarding the discussion of the formation of a southeast Asia bloc, irrespective of the attitude of Great Britain, I believe it is opportune for the Prime Minister-


Mr. Speaker:: Will the hon. member be
good enough to put his question?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Will the Prime Minister
let the house know whether any word has come from the European conference in which Canada is participating of any discussion of this matter?


Mr. St. Laurent:: Perhaps the hon. gentleman would indicate what matter he is referring to.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: I am sorry if the Prime
Minister did not hear me. But I emphasized the importance of the matter mentioned by the President of the United States in his statement on the formulating of a bloc for southeast Asia which would not include Great Britain. The statement was recently mentioned in the press that General Eisenhower, the President of the United States, had referred to that important matter. I was wondering whether the cabinet is aware of every step and every discussion regarding this important matter. If so, will the Prime Minister let the house know and see that we are constantly kept in touch with those discussions, even if they are being held in Geneva?

Inquiries of the Ministry


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: The Canadian government receives a lot of information, but I have not been in Geneva and I would not be prepared to say that we are informed about everything that is going on there. There is more going on in private discussions and private conferences than is going on in the public meetings, and there is perhaps more reported in the press than actually takes place. I do not think it would be at all helpful for me to try to express to the house my own personal views. This matter has not been considered by the government with a view to reaching decisions because we are not yet in a position where we are called upon to make decisions. If or when decisions have to be made, as I have already stated more than once in the house, if they involve further commitments recommendations will be brought to the house and the house will have an opportunity of discussing them before the government undertakes to commit the country further than it is committed at the present time.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: May I ask a supplementary question? Will it be in the hands of one minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), to decide that in his opinion matters are important enough to inform the government and possibly the people of Canada of what is actually being discussed? Will it be left to his discretion alone? Things seem to be important enough to inform us of what is going on.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I do not think there is anything I can add to that. The government has confidence in the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The Secretary of State for External Affairs is informing the cabinet of everything upon which he feels the cabinet should have information.


Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prince Albert):: wonder whether the Prime Minister will tell the house what attitude Canada has taken with reference to Mr. Eden's five-point policy in Geneva in connection with Far Eastern questions? Certainly the Prime Minister can give information like that to the house.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I am not in a position to give any information to the hon. gentleman. As I told him yesterday, the Secretary of State for External Affairs will be back here at the beginning of the week, and I think he is apt to suggest that he meet with the members of the committee on external affairs to inform them in confidence as fully as can be done of everything that has been taking place there. I think the hon. gentleman will probably feel, as I do, that there are at Geneva


situations of very great delicacy, and 1 am not at all sure that all the publicity that there has been in the newspapers and magazines and in the comments on the radio has been helpful in that connection. I think it would probably be agreeable to the hon. gentleman to- meet with the Secretary of State for External Affairs in an informal in camera discussion so that he might be fully informed without there being the occasion for these further comments. I do not think I should here add anything more.
Mr. W. M. Hamillon (Notre Dame de
Grace): Mr. Speaker, in the light of the Prime Minister's statement a few moments ago to the effect that the publicity on the Geneva conference has not been helpful could he explain to the house why he feels the public should not be kept informed of important happenings of this nature?


Mr. Si. Laurent:: I think, Mr. Speaker, the answer is obvious. They are all working at Geneva toward the same objective but unfortunately over quite a long period of time they have not been able to come to an agreement as to what would be the best method to reach that objective, and I do not think it is helpful to exaggerate the differences of opinion which may exist between them as to what would be the best method of reaching the goal each one of them is very anxious to attain.


Mr. Hamilton:: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask a supplementary question.


Mr. Speaker:: We have already had six or seven questions on the same subject and it seems to me that that is tantamount to debating the question. I would imagine that we could perhaps carry on with a different subject. I do not wish to curtail hon. members in asking questions but we have already had questions on this subject from the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles); two by the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker); two by the hon. member for Simcoe North (Mr. Ferguson); and one by the hon. member for Notre Dame de Grace (Mr. Hamilton). The Prime Minister has indicated that the matter will be dealt with on a future occasion, and I do not see what we can gain by asking further questions on the same subject at this time.



LABOUR CONDITIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. George H. Hees (Broadview):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask a question of

the Minister of Labour. Referring to the statement issued yesterday by his department and the dominion bureau of statistics, in which it was stated (1) that the number of those seeking employment had increased by 47 per cent during the past 12 months-


Some hon. Members:: Question.


George Harris Hees: -(2) that the number of those out of a job had increased by 80 per cent during the past 12 months-


Some hon. Members:: Order paper.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


George Harris Hees: -and (3) that of those who are working, 40 per cent are on part-time, working less than 35 hours per week compared to only 6 per cent on part-time a year ago-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. Perhaps the hon. member did not hear me calling him to order. I realize of course that there was some noise in the house. I was trying to make my voice heard to point out to the hon. member that perhaps he has forgotten that he should have addressed himself to the chair. Had he done so he would have seen me on my feet and would not have continued to read his long question, in which he was trying to give information rather than ask for it.
Now, I do not know that hon. members heard the question. Perhaps if we could have silence we would ask the hon. member to repeat it. He will have to rise again to do so; and I hope this time he will look at me.


George Harris Hees: Mr. Speaker, the second part of the question was-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I have not heard the first part up to this time. And I do not know that the minister, who may be called upon to answer it, has heard it either. I suggest the hon. member should repeat his question.


An hon. Member:: Order paper.


George Harris Hees: My question is this: referring to the report yesterday given by the minister's department and the dominion bureau of statistics referring to the unemployment situation in Canada, does the minister not consider this trend toward increasing unemployment to be serious; and what are the government's long-term plans to counteract this serious situation.


Hon. Milton F. Gregg (Minister of Labour):: Mr. Speaker, I think the first part of the question need not be answered at this time. And, as to the second part: I shall discuss that matter on my estimates.
Inquiries of the Ministry


Mr. Roland Michener (St. Paul's):: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the Minister of Labour a supplementary question concerning the same report. Does the government consider it to be the responsibility of the municipalities or the provincial governments to provide maintenance for a large number of those unemployed who are able and willing to work at this time but who cannot find employment, and whose unemployment insurance benefits have run out?


Milton Fowler Gregg: I will have to take that as notice. Perhaps I might add to that, however, that if my hon. friend will give me places and numbers it will help in answering the question.



CANADIAN NATIONAL RAILWAYS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Minister of Transport? In view of continuing lay-offs by the Canadian National Railways is there any statement the minister can make to assure railway workers that further lay-offs are not in prospect?


Hon. Lionel Chevrier (Minister of Transport):: Mr. Speaker, the last time I was asked to make a statement here I believe I said something to the effect that some 1,500 men had been laid off. Since then I know that an additional number has been laid off because of a decrease in the traffic on the Canadian National Railways. The reason is the same as that which I indicated before, namely, decline of traffic, that is, the interconnections which the Canadian National Railways make with United States railways in so far as traffic is concerned have diminished; but the position of the Canadian National is in no wise different from that of the United States railways. In fact, the employment position is far superior in the Canadian National to that of the United States railways. I have been so informed by our officers, and I think it compares favourably with if not better than that of the Canadian Pacific Railway.
Just as soon as traffic conditions permit, the men who have been laid off will be taken on again.


Stanley Howard Knowles: May I ask a supplementary question? Is the minister in a position to give the present figure that compares with the figure of 1,500, which he gave on February 11?


Lionel Chevrier: Yes, to that I think should be added another 600 men who have been laid off across Canada at the various regions in which the railway operates.

Inquiries of the Ministry


Stanley Howard Knowles: Does the minister feel that we are at the end of these lay-offs?


Lionel Chevrier: I hope we are.



INQUIRY FOR RETURN


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Clarence Gillis (Cape Brsion South):: May I draw the attention of the Secretary of State to sessional paper No. 191-A of May 18 which I consider to be incomplete? I asked a series of questions. I am not going to take the time to read them. Three of the questions that I asked are not answered except for the very brief observation: "Department have no information." I have had returns previously year by year on the same subject, and if the Secretary of State will look into the matter he will find that this return is anything but complete.


Hon. J. W. Pickersgill (Secretary of State):: I will be glad to do so, sir.



ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY INQUIRY AS TO EMPLOYMENT OF ENGINEERS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. K. Fraser (Peterborough):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Transport in regard to a radio broadcast this morning which said that some 50 or 60 engineers were required for the St. Lawrence ship canal project. Will the minister say where the head office and employment office of that project will be?


Lionel Chevrier: I am not aware of the report to which my hon. friend refers. Dealing with the last part of his question, the entity which has to be appointed by Canada has not yet been established, but the public projects branch of the Department of Transport having to do with the St. Lawrence seaway was moved many months ago to the city of Montreal, and an office has been set up there. I know that a number of engineers are required for assistance in connection with the Lachine, the Beauharnois and the international rapids section of the project, but as to the number I am unable to say at this time.



PARLIAMENT HILL


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Donald M. Fleming (Eglinton):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Acting Minister of Public Works? I do not

know who he is, but has it been brought to his attention that for some time a number of cars bearing diplomatic corps licences have been occupying parking space in the parliament grounds here, reserved for tourists and others.
Hon. W. E. Karris (Acling Minister of
Public Works): Mr. Speaker, it has not been brought to my attention but it might have been to the attention of the minister. I shall look into it.



ALLEGED INFRACTIONS OF PACKING REGULATIONS BY THREE TORONTO FIRMS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. C. W. Hodgson (Vicforia, OnL):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to direct a question to the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner) or in his absence to his parliamentary assistant. Has he or his department received a report from the mounted police on infractions of the meat packing regulations by three Toronto firms?


Hon. W. E. Harris (Acting Minister of Agriculture):: No, Mr. Speaker, 1 have not, but I shall look into the matter.

The house in committee of supply, Mr. Robinson (Simcoe East) in the chair.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE Defence services

239. To provide for the Canadian forces, the defence research board and other expenditures relating to defence, including contributions toward the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; to authorize expenditures in the current year out of the amount hereby provided, not exceeding $300,000,000, under the provisions of section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, and to provide that, notwithstanding subsection 3 of the section, where equipment or supplies acquired by the Canadian forces after March 31, 1950, are transferred, the estimated present value thereof shall, if the governor in council so directs, be credited to this vote instead of being paid into the special account mentioned in the said subsection 3, and when so credited may be expended for the purposes of the Canadian forces; and notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act to authorize total commitments for the foregoing purposes of $4,577,641,724 regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of which it is estimated that $2,711,822,159 will come due for payment in future years), $1,865,819,565.


The Chairman:: Hon. members will find the vote on page 36 of the blue book, and the details commencing on page 287. Vote 239. Shall the resolution carry?

Hon. Brooke Claxlon (Minister of National
Defence):	Mr. Chairman, in opening the
general discussion on this item I express the hope that hon. members will agree that following the conclusion of the general discussion we should proceed to the discussion of the details in the same way as has been done in previous years. Hon. members have already had placed before them a white paper called "Canada's Defence Program 1954-55" and it is not my intention to go into any of the details covered in that white paper which, I believe, gives more complete and detailed information about our national defence than we have ever had submitted before, and also I believe as complete information as has been made available in any country.
What I should like to do, Mr. Chairman, is to bring up to date the examination of the international position from the defence point of view which I undertook to set out, in my speech here on November 26 of last year. I should particularly like to consider, and endeavour to arrive at a clear meaning of some of the expressions which have been bandied about in recent months. I refer particularly to expressions such as "massive retaliation", "the new look" and the "long pull". It is very important, I believe, that as we consider these expressions in the light of recent events, particularly those relating to Indo-China, we should carry out these considerations against the background of the events of recent years.
We should remember that it is only six years ago that Czechoslovakia, that gallant country, was brought behind the iron curtain, and it was only five years ago that the free nations decided that rather than fall separately they would stand together and they entered into the North Atlantic treaty. During that period they have built up their strength and the progress made is indeed remarkable, whether it be viewed from the point of view of political organization, military planning, military command, or actual physical forces in the field.
The history of the world shows nothing to match it. Today we have in NATO a team of fourteen nations with effective forces trained and working together to improve their quality as well as their quantity. That this effort has succeeded is indicated by the fact that during that period we have had no general war, and one of the major contributing factors to that result has unquestionably been the steady progressive build-up of strength, actual and potential, by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This policy of playing it from strength, which was agreed to five years ago on April 4, 1949, has paid dividends in terms of peace and security. The cost has
Supply-National Defence jeen heavy but not heavy compared with even a fraction of the cost of a general war.
Now, sir, while this policy has worked, it cannot be said with any confidence that there has been any change in the fundamental objectives of the Soviet union and those allied with her, the satellite powers. There has been a change in attitude, in behaviour and perhaps in manners. People are now invited out to dinner, and Mr. Vishinsky may cross the floor of the United Nations and exchange a joke with our Secretary of State for External Affairs. It may not be a very good joke; however, the fact that he does it indicates a change of manner and method, but no change in fundamental objective is apparent anywhere, and the North Atlantic treaty nations at their meeting in Paris affirmed their decision to continue to build up their strength on the assumption that there was no change in the fundamental Soviet objectives of imperialism and aggrandizement.
Against that background the secretary of state of the United States, the Hon. Mr. Dulles, made a very important speech at New York on January 12, this year. In that speech he said:
Local defence will always be important. But there is no local defence which alone will contain the mighty land power of the communist world. Local defences must be re-enforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.
That expression "massive retaliatory power" or "massive retaliation" has been discussed and debated here as elsewhere ever since. I do not propose to follow the course of the debate we had on external affairs which was so largely related to consideration of this topic, but I should like in the first instance to refer to this from the military point of view.
Since that speech the world has become conscious of the fact that we now have a new and far more deadly and dreadful instrument of mass destruction, namely the H-bomb. This bomb has an explosive power which, it is estimated, may amount to five hundred times, or even more, that of the first A-bomb dropped at Hiroshima in 1945. Furthermore, this bomb is expensive but it is relatively easy to make. There is no reason why any powers having modern industrial know-how and engineering and scientific skills could not make the bomb.
We know that the Russians had an explosion of a thermonuclear character of a very advanced kind. In addition to the power of the bomb we know today that the United States has a stockpile of A-bombs which is equal in explosive force to the power of all the bombs and all the shells from aircraft or

Supply-National Defence guns used in every theatre of war in the second world war. We also know that the United States has aircraft-B-36 heavy bombers and B-47 jet bombers-with the ability to deliver these bombs in quantity. Likewise we know that the Russians have A-bombs. We know that they have had a thermonuclear explosion and that presumably they will go on-if they have not done so already-to have H-bombs. We know that they have medium bombers with the capacity to reach any part of North America, and we now know that they have jet bombers of medium and heavy types. Whether or not they have them in quantity remains to be seen.
We are therefore confronted with a relatively new situation in military affairs. The H-bomb is so much more powerful than was the A-bomb that it constitutes a weapon of a different character. Whatever one may think about its existence, we must recognize it. One may deplore the existence of the H-bomb. I deplore it. But the fact is that it does exist. One may deplore the fact that such a dreadful instrument of destruction has been brought into the world. But still, since the only potential enemy has within his control that destructive power and also has the ability to employ that destructive power, we can be grateful that our great, gallant and friendly ally, the United States, has it too- has it in larger quantities-and probably had it first.
I think there can be no doubt that the possession of this power of mass destruction is a powerful deterrent to war. There can be no doubt of that fact. Whether that will be the result remains to be seen. The consequences of the employment of an H-bomb or a number of A-bombs, with their destruction of the means of fighting, of cities and communications and the possibility that this rain of destruction may be launched on one's country, would certainly lead one to think a good many times before starting out on the course which would lead to thac employment. I therefore believe-and I think this is generally recognized-that the possession by the United States of both the new weapons and the power to deliver them is a powerful deterrent to aggression. That having been said, it becomes evident at once that the ability to deliver the bombs is something which is fundamental and essential to their deterrent character. Unless the United States can deliver the bombs they might just as well not exist. Hence the ability of the United States to deliver the bombs becomes a matter of the most urgent and primary importance in the preservation of peace. That ability must be protected. This consideration


brings into focus and gives new emphasis to the whole question of continental defence.
Before I go on to deal with continental defence I should like to make one or two further observations about the employment of the new weapons as a deterrent to aggression. It may well be that their destructive power is so immense that they would be of little or no use in a limited war, even as a deterrent; because once one side uses a new bomb-an A-bomb or an H-bomb-the other side will almost certainly be triggered to an all-out effort, not knowing what is involved. Hence it may well be that the existence of these weapons is not going to prevent limited or small wars or put an end to them. It is within the recollection of all of us that the possession of the A-bomb did not deter the North Korean invasion. It did not prevent the entry of Chinese volunteers into North Korea. It did not deter the conquest of China. It did not prevent the Berlin blockade. It has not stopped the war in Indochina. Consequently, it may well be that the very existence of these weapons, and the fact that they can be used only if you think an all-out war is about to begin, is begin-ing, or has begun, may increase the area in which we may have relatively small wars, pressure areas and the like-such as we have seen in Korea and Indo-China.
As I shall point out later, far from putting an end to the need for weapons of a conventional nature, I believe that the A-bomb and the H-bomb have if anything probably emphasized that need. We have just had a meeting of the chiefs of staff of all the North Atlantic treaty nations at Paris. Their purpose there was to consider the effect of the new weapons on all-over strategy and tactics. I know that I am breaking no confidence when I say that it was not suggested there that the existence of these new weapons would lead to any sudden reduction in quantity, quality or cost of conventional weapons. The fact is that we hardly have today in NATO the minimum quantity of weapons, planes, equipment, trained officers and men and communications to do the job of even enabling the employment of the new weapons through bold planning, and causing concentrations so that the new weapons would have a useful target, also of preventing the only potential enemy from overrunning Europe irrespective of where bombs were dropped.
I think I am right in saying that no nation, no national leader, no minister of defence, no chief of staff has so far suggested that the existence of and the ability to employ the new weapons should decrease

what we have of conventional weapons because what we have is the minimum required to enable us to do the job. That job is to permit the employment of the new weapons strategically and tactically and also to protect the ability to use them.
As part of that protection we have built up in North America a very important system of defences against air attack. This now goes under the name of continental defence, and you can see that with the Americans having bases in North America as well as elsewhere throughout the world they-or any other country that has atomic weapons and the capacity to deliver them-must be protected from air attack. This is becoming an increasingly important part of the joint activities of Canada and the United States in planning and carrying out our air defences. I dealt with this at some length on November 26 and I do not want to go over the same ground again, but I would remind hon. members that the components of any system of air defence consist, from the air force point of view, of radar to pick up and lead to the identification and interception of enemy raiders, a system of communications which instantly gives the intelligence received from the radarscope to fighter command, to enable the quick scrambling of the squadrons, and finally squadrons of fighter aircraft able instantly to get into the air and carry out an interception.
A good many hon. members visited St. Hubert R.C.A.F. station this session and saw there the air defence command headquarters for Canada. That command is operational today 24 hours a day. It receives intelligence of every aircraft coming under surveillance at any one of the radar stations. That aircraft is identified either as a friendly aircraft because it has filed a flight plan, because of its characteristics, or because we see it, or is not identified-in which event the fighters are scrambled and carry out an interception. Just last week at a radar station not far from here I saw interceptions carried out from the control room of the radar station to which had been hooked up the telephones of the pilots, of fighter command, of the radar operators, and of the plotters. These were hooked up to loudspeakers so that from the station we could hear the whole battle being carried out, and within a very few minutes the interceptions were successfully completed.
This system, as planned between the United States and Canada, is now more than 90 per cent complete and operational. These interceptions are carried out daily, night and day, in operations against B-36's and B-47
Supply-National Defence jets which have come over on simulated raids without the knowledge of the stations. The percentage of kills as they were counted in these exercises was extraordinarily high compared with any experience in the second world war. It was not 100 per cent but it was above 90 per cent indicating a very successful operational state.
This is, I say, in operation today and the whole system as planned between the United States and Canada will be in complete operation by late summer or early autumn. The communications are hooked up so that within seconds or a minute or so of an aircraft being found on the radarscope at one of the radar stations the intelligence of that is received at air defence command and at Colorado Springs where the United States strategical air force is located. Communications are in effect on a 24-hour basis.
It is very risky for people charged with defence to make a prophecy. All we can do is to give opinions and not give assurances, but this system of defence against air attack has reached the stage today where if I were in charge of the Russian air force and were aiming to reach important targets in the United States I would not go across the lines of these radar defences. I would go some other way, and there are other ways.
I have mentioned 90 per cent. That is a figure which I have cited for purposes of illustration, but that is not enough when you are dealing with A and H-bombs. We cannot get 100 per cent-I am sure of that-because of the size of the country, the difficulty of carrying out construction and the tremendous cost in terms of men, equipment and money. However, we do need more early warning. We need it not only in order to carry out interception but also in order to economize on manpower. The first step towards having additional early warning has been announced in the construction of a new chain across Canada, north of the existing one, to use equipment which has generally been known as the "McGill fence" equipment. The purpose of this is to give additional early warning.
We have also had under consideration by scientists and military experts in the United States and Canada additional means of having early warning, and no doubt additional steps will be taken from time to time. This is an exceedingly costly operation. When we were up in the Arctic four weeks ago I was astonished to find that to keep a weather station employing nine men going took 340 tons of supplies a year, and that involved 30 round trips of a North Star aircraft from Resolute Bay to wherever the station was. It
490B

Supply-National Defence also involved getting the supplies to Resolute by aircraft or ship. When we have to use 30 round trips of a heavy transport over these immense distances to supply a station employing nine men you can see how tremendous will be the task of increasing our defences in the far north. However, I am sure that more will have to be done and that it will be done.
I should add that to supplement the work of the air force against air attack we now have organizations of ground observers across Canada. There are now 65,000 volunteer members of this corps.
In addition to what is generally called active defence, that is defence by the armed forces against air attack, we have to consider also our position with regard to civil defence. The immediate responsibility for civil defence rests, of course, with the Department of National Health and Welfare, and the provincial and municipal authorities. There has been some tendency by some people here and elsewhere to take the view that the destructive power of the H-bomb makes civil defence measures futile. Nothing could be further from the truth. For one thing the number of targets sufficiently important to justify the use of the H-bomb is limited. Moreover, the new weapons put even greater emphasis on planned measures for dispersal and evacuation. Our plans must continue to receive the closest examination in the light of all the circumstances, but the planning and organization of civil defence measures must toe pressed forward.
To meet the situation that would be created by an H-bomb falling on a big city, there is no doubt that all the available civil defence resources must be developed and mobilized to the fullest possible extent. These local measures will have to be supplemented in turn by all the civilian resources and facilities of the surrounding area, and where those prove insufficient, by all the resources of our military personnel and equipment: navy, army and air force, active and reserve. So far as our military forces are concerned, if civil defence should need their help, the only higher priority demands on their services would be actual defence of the continent against landings by enemy forces, which are not now expected on any considerable scale. Training for action overseas would be of little use until the situation had been stabilized at home.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I have dealt with the question of massive retaliation, what is involved in it, what we are doing by way of continental defence, as well as what more is planned. May I now have a look at another of the phrases, "the new look". What
(Mr. Claxton.l

is meant here, of course, is that over the last year in all of the NATO countries there has been a re-examining of the defence programs in the light of our experience over the last three years, and also in the light of what is involved by the new weapons. I should like to go back and remind you that the first time that the North Atlantic treaty defence ministers arrived at a plan was in October 1950 when we met at Washington. We worked out an estimate of the potentialities of Russia, an estimate of the requirements to deter Russia from attacking, an estimate of the time that would be taken to build up those forces. We then agreed upon the allocation of those forces amongst the nations and we made military plans to carry through the whole operation.
Later, at other meetings of the North Atlantic council and of the NATO defence ministers and chiefs of staff, those plans were looked at and revised in the light of our experience. It is no secret that at one stage reference was made publicly to a force of something like 98 divisions and 10,000 aircraft. Gradually it was found that to have a force of anything like that character would be beyond the peacetime capacity of the allied nations, unless they were prepared to run grave risks of seriously injuring their economies and making their economic strength weaker than was necessary to support the military effort. At Paris, in 1953, this situation was examined in detail and the council members further adapted their thinking and their plans from the sort of "crash" thinking with which we had begun, to what would be involved in "the long pull".
In Canada, as in other countries, we have been carrying on this operation of review ever since the beginning. While the program I announced in this house on February 5, 1951 was a three-year program, and while that was the period adopted by all the NATO countries for planning purposes, that did not mean that our plans stopped as at March 31, 1954. We have planned right through for years ahead, and I shall make this evident in just a moment. We have had our plans under constant review ever since the second world war ended, and even before. Now that the three-year period ending March 31, 1954, has been completed, it becomes of interest to hon. members to look back over the three years and see what has been accomplished.
Let me indicate something of what is involved in military planning today. Last year, as in every year, we examined our aircraft requirements-but we have carried this through now until 1960, seven years ahead. The reason for doing this for so long a period ahead is that it may take about seven or

eight years to develop a new, supersonic aircraft of the type that will be needed to meet the threat of the attack that may be made in 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960 or 1961. We arrived at a list of the aircraft needed, at their specifications, their requirements in terms of altitude, speed of climb, radius, fire power, and then put a price on each aircraft needed.
In the year 1953-54, the financial year just concluded, we spent on aircraft for the R.C.A.F. alone a total of about $410 million. For the year 1954-55, the fiscal year in which we are now, the amount we will require to spend to meet our requirements on aircraft which we have ordered, and which are now well advanced in construction, will be over $425 million. The figure will increase, not decrease, year by year until it reaches a total of between $455 million and $460 million, then it will level off at about $450 million. Those figures are not to provide us with a complete new suit of aircraft; they are not to provide us with any additional aircraft of new types and for purposes not at present envisaged in our commitments; but those expenditures or expenditures of about that magnitude are necessary if we are to keep our air force at about its present strength in terms of quantity and quality, as judged by what is required' from year to year. In other words, this is to cover the cost of an air force having 41 squadrons, the necessary maintenance and operational capacity, with its aircrew and groundcrew training capacities, to carry on operations of about the present scale, with squadrons of first-class aircraft built up to war strength with modest reserves. It involves of course replacement at the appropriate time of the F-86E Sabre fighter with a supersonic fighter, and it involves replacing the CF-100 at a suitable time with a supersonic long-range all-weather fighter, an aircraft that does not exist today.
This will give hon. members some appreciation of the magnitude of the role undertaken by Canada in the air, both abroad and at home. To appreciate just what is involved in this in terms of money, I can tell hon. members that to equip, to train, to transport and to maintain overseas for one year the original Canadian infantry brigade of 6,000 men the approximate cost was $60 million.
We also have overseas the first Canadian air division of the Royal Canadian Air Force, with 12 squadrons of Sabre fighters. To do a corresponding operation for them-that is, train, equip, transport overseas and maintain them for a year-costs $600 million, or ten times as much as for the Canadian infantry brigade.
Supply-National Defence
If hon. members will look at the white paper they will see tables showing the proportion of the defence dollar spent, according to the different services. This information appears at page 56. It shows that for 1954-55 the navy would have 15-7 per cent, the army 23-6 and the air force 41 [DOT] 4, the balance of the defence dollar being spent on mutual aid, defence research and other purposes. Of the 80 per cent of the total defence dollar spent on the navy, the army and the air force, the air force is getting 52 per cent-a much higher proportion, very much higher, than in any country of the world. And this has been our policy, because we are a rich country, a country with great resources and with traditions of service in the air, as well as with the necessity for defending our country against air attack, and also a country with limited resources of manpower.
This plan we are working on is the deliberate policy started immediately after the close of the second world war, but accelerated greatly in 1950 when the new and expanded plan came into effect.
The effect of the figures I have just given on defence spending must be obvious instantly to hon. members. If we are to maintain our air force at about its present and planned strength, in terms of quantity and quality, it will require an expenditure of from $420 million to $460 million a year on aircraft alone. This means that 25 per cent of the defence dollar would be spent on aircraft, and that would leave 75 per cent for personnel, construction, equipment, operation and maintenance.
Of the $2 billion sought this year, $426 million will be needed for personnel costs, that is, the equivalent of civilian wages, $184 million for construction and $851 million for equipment of which, as I have indicated, half will be for aircraft. And for operations and maintenance the amount is $546 million.
So that it is all very well to talk about having "a new look" and facing "the long pull"; but "the long pull" and the "new look" are not going to result in very much in the way of economies or changes or savings or reductions, if we are to maintain our defence at its present strength and carry out our commitments. And the same is true of every country. So that when at the end of a three-year period the North Atlantic treaty nations have examined the results of their experience during those three years of rapid expansion and build-up, I feel sure that each one of them will reach the same conclusion we have-because it is inescapable-and that is that we cannot continue to expand indefinitely. Even to maintain our forces at
4303	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence their present quality and quantity will take about the same amount of money we have spent during the period of expansion.
It must be realized that apart from construction-and we are well advanced in our construction work-there really is not anything in defence which is of a capital character. Every item of equipment ultimately becomes obsolete and must be replaced. In the case of aircraft, apart from transport aircraft and similar types, certainly all fighters and bombers are-as is said so often -obsolescent before the first one comes off the main production line. This is so in the sense that there is on a drawing board somewhere an aircraft which is going to be better -so much better that it will pay countries to bring it into production.
I do not wish to delay hon. members much longer, but there are one or two general observations I would like to make about the services by way of summarizing the figures and facts given in the white paper. In the Royal Canadian Navy we have had under construction about 88 ships, practically all of them of quite new types. Like other countries we have not been able to complete construction in all cases in the time planned. I think the record with the new anti-submarine destroyer escorts is creditable, when it is considered that these are ships of an entirely new design, and of extraordinary performance and complexity. We are I think at least level with, if not ahead of, other countries in the production of these ships; and our time of bringing the ships into commission from the time the keels were first laid down will, I believe, be shorter than the time for similar ships in other countries that are undertaking similar types of construction.
At the present time we have 58 ships in commission, of which 36 are committed to NATO. We have over 100 ships today either in commission or in reserve ready for use in the event of war. Those in reserve, of course, would have to be commissioned and manned. But that is carrying out our undertaking as given to NATO, right up to date.
As hon. members know there is still the army brigade group in Korea. This is the fourth group to be there. Altogether some 32,000 Canadians have served in Korea, in the Far East, and one out of five members of the armed forces today wears proudly on his breast the ribbons of service in the Far East during the Korean war-one out of five.
We have the first Canadian infantry brigade in its new quarters in the neighbourhood of Soest, in four magnificent camps. That, by any standard, is a fine formation.
It may interest hon. members to know that in the first Canadian infantry brigade 27 per


cent are veterans of Korea, 35 per cent are veterans of the second world war, 16 per cent are trained and qualified paratroopers -although of course this is not a paratroop formation-and 40 per cent are married.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Mr. Claxton:: I do not observe any cause for levity in that; I think it is a very fine percentage. The reason I mention the figure, if hon. members would only be patient, is to indicate something of the problems that have to be faced by having over 20,000 troops abroad in seven different countries all the time. We have to provide in Europe, at nine different locations, villages for Canadian wives and children and service personnel, and they are not small villages, they are not poor villages. They must have married quarters, schools run according to Canadian standards, equipped with Canadian equipment and staffed by Canadian teachers recruited through the co-operation of the provinces. They must have chapels, gymnasiums, recreation centres, rinks, and also they must have stores.
All this construction at the different centres in Germany will be completed by the autumn of this year. When they are completed, with one single exception, we shall have overseas in Germany and France the finest living accommodation and other services for members of the armed forces and their wives and children that we shall have anywhere or that I believe could be found anywhere in the world. This will enable us to guarantee to married personnel that they can have a home abroad for their wives and children just as in Canada. If you consider it for a moment, that is the only way it should be, and that is the way it is going to be.
So far we have carried out rotation in Korea and Germany exactly as planned, and we intend to continue to do so, but to do it will require very considerable numbers of forces in Canada. Altogether, to provide for the brigade in Korea, the brigade in Germany and mobile striking forces and units for rotation forces with the forces necessary to make up a first Canadian infantry brigade, it will take a total of 15 infantry regiments. Those regiments now exist and they are well up to strength. They are well officered and well manned.
Hon. members have been interested in the study being made of the reserve army, and I propose to deal with that when we come to the item on the reserve in the detailed estimates. It is also proposed at that time to deal with a lot of other points which could more conveniently be dealt with at that time.

With regard to the R.C.A.F., I think I have described the situation so that you can see the picture. I should like to say a word about the F-86E and the CF-100. The F-86E is now being equipped with Orenda engines. Those provide at least 25 per cent more power than the F-86E equipped as formerly with the General Electric engines and are I believe by all odds the most powerful and effective aircraft in quantity production and in use by a number of squadrons in any country today; but they in time will be replaced by a new supersonic fighter. The CF-100 is now being produced in quantity in the mark 4 and it is being shipped to squadrons. They are being equipped and trained, and this has proven capable of meeting all our requirements.
Altogether we now have in the armed forces about 113,000 officers and men. The planned target was 120,000. We hope to secure that target shortly. If we do not, it is no particular cause for concern because we are at a very high proportion of our planned establishment. Most countries in peacetime do not go above 75 per cent of their planned establishments. We are well above that; and this last year we took into the armed forces about 25,000 officers and men, a very considerable proportion of the equivalent in terms of the 19-year-old age group in the total male population.
Some reference was made yesterday or the day before to our concern about wastage and re-engagement. The rate of re-engagement is satisfactory in Canada. It is more than twice as high as in the United States and much higher than in Britain. That is for equivalent personnel, voluntarily enlisted personnel. In the United States last year, one-third of the entire strength of the United States armed forces were separated from the forces last year. In Canada the equivalent figure was about one-seventh. We want to maintain our rates of re-engagement; we want to increase it if we can, but to say that it is a grave problem is a gross exaggeration. Relative to other countries we are in a singularly happy position. We would like to see it still better, because if we lose a man who has been trained, then of course we have to expend time and money in the training of a new one. However, there is one compensation. If a man leaves the forces after he has been trained, he remains potentially available as a fighter who can be retrained and brought to action much more speedily than a man who has had no training at all.
There are two further points I should mention about this as we approach our planned target strength for the navy, army and air force. The first is that wastage comes closer
Supply-National Defence and closer to the intake until, when you get your full planned target strength of let us say 120,000-though this is subject to change; it may be increased a bit-there should be a balance. If 15,000 of the men leave the armed forces in one year we only need 15,000 to join, so that wastage matches the intake and the intake the wastage. That is the ideal situation to which one should strive and there is no doubt that we shall be there very shortly.
But there is another result when you get close to your planned target strength, and that is that your requirements for manpower become quite difficult to meet from the point of view of selection. You need only, let us say, aircrew or tradesmen of a certain class and qualification, so that you must limit your recruiting to the men who can meet the requirements of the particular classes in which there are or are going to be vacancies. That makes planning very much more difficult. We are, generally speaking, not at that point yet and perhaps we may not reach it during the calendar year.
I should say that the commitments we have made towards the build-up of the NATO forces in peacetime have so far been met on or in advance of the planned date. We have formed and furnished all the units that we have agreed to do. We shall be adding to the number of aircraft in each squadron and also we shall be putting in some additional supporting activities for the air division in Europe. We shall also, beyond any question, be increasing our contribution and our work on continental defence.
To do anything additional in the way of continental defence it will be necessary for us to meet the additional cost, and the additional manpower requirements out of what we have today, or else seek increased defence appropriations. I do not think anyone in this country wants to see any increase in defence appropriation. I should like to see a decrease, and it may be that by a further shaving here and there we will be able to do these additional jobs without any increase in appropriation or manpower. Certainly that is what I am insisting upon in our planning and in our program and I believe it can be carried out because of increased efficiency due to the fact that we have a higher proportion of officers and men in the armed forces using the new equipment which has been acquired for them.
In the three-year period we have not done everything we set out to do. No country has or could do that, but we have done substantially what we set out to do, and one of the extraordinary things is that the amount expended is so close to the amount originally

Supply-National Defence planned. The amount originally planned was, as announced on February 5, 1951, $5 billion. The expression was, "about a $5 billion program" and the actual cash disbursements over the three-year period have been $5,005,479,000. But we have not got all that we planned for that expenditure. We have not all the ships, the construction, and the other types of equipment for which we planned, but we have done much more than four-fifths of what was planned three years ago for the estimated figure.
In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, may I say, first, that I do not believe we are going to have a war in the near future, but equally I do not see any sign of a change in the longterm objectives of the Soviet union.
Secondly, the planned build-up of strength of the free nations has been a major factor in preserving peace, and consequently it is only common sense that we should continue that effort for precisely the same reasons that five years ago led us to agree in common on this policy and plan.
Thirdly, we are nearing the end of the development of large classes of weapons. It is very hard today to build a gun better than the 25-pounder, or the 155 millimeter. The cost of any improvement in range or operational qualities is out of all proportion to the advantage gained in performance, and that is true of a very large range of weapons. We are entering into the era at last where there are already in operation guided missiles from ground to air and air to air, and their accuracy and efficiency will be increased. We may also be coming close to the time when the pilot of a fighter aircraft will not have much more to do than get the aircraft off and back on to the ground, so that by the time we have our supersonic fighters to replace the F-86E and the CF-100 it is at least possible that these will be the last aircraft to depend extensively on human beings, and we will then be in or very close to the age of the pushbutton. It has been a long time coming and it is still some distance off.
But we will never eliminate the human factor and that brings me to this point, that while the allies have made great advances, everything we know points to the fact that the Russians also have made great advances and we have no reason to believe that we can continue to be superior in science, research, engineering and production unless we continue to make even larger efforts in the field of research, development and production.
As we get into-to use a curious term-the very sophisticated types of weapons and aircraft, the cost increase is out of all proportion so that we must, while maintaining this effort,


strive steadily for simplification, economy, efficiency, and standardization. When you get into the field of bombers, fighters, guided missiles, radar, anti-aircraft devices and the like your equipment is no good if the enemy has something which is even slightly better. Consequently, as I say, we must keep up the effort in research, development, engineering, and production, and strive steadily for economy.
Fourth, we will certainly see a build-up in continental defence as the importance of this increases with the necessity of protecting the ability of the strategic air command of the United States to deliver the A and H-bombs, that ability being an essential ingredient in the capacity for massive retaliation.
Fifth, the economic and financial considerations involved in defence planning today are going to become steadily more important. Not that they have not been important throughout, but a steady drive must be kept up and maintained to achieve the greatest possible economy in terms of men and money. This means that in our planning we cannot afford to make mistakes, because if you start out to develop a new aircraft you may be in for an expenditure of $125 million before you have a second aircraft off the line. Consequently, everything must be done having regard to the long term effort, and it must be done in the closest possible co-operation with our allies, particularly Britain and the United States. There I am happy to say that we have the closest working co-operation, not only with those two countries but with every country in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Sixth, and this is perhaps the most important of all, in defence operation, possibly more than in any other operation mankind has to undertake, that operation must depend on the quality of the personnel, the quality of the leadership, and the quality of the men. We have been fortunate in having officers and men of good quality, but with the increasing complexity of weapons, the necessity for insisting on a high standard and getting it becomes even more urgent and important than ever before. So as we face the challenges of "the long pull," not the least important of these challenges is to find ways and means of maintaining the alertness, the professional skills, ambitions, and physical and mental abilities of the officers and men in our armed forces.
This becomes, as has been found in the United States where special studies have been made of it, a matter of their continuing to have the confidence and the respect of the civilian population. This is a matter of the

utmost importance if we are to maintain the strength of our armed forces; and that is something to which I believe they are entitled, by their records of service and by their records as civilians, judged by any standard you like. Their crime records are considerably lower than those for corresponding groups in civilian life; and that is as it should be.
Seventh and finally, this whole operation of facing the "long pull" under the threat of a war of total destruction requires stout hearts and a really great degree of understanding on the part of the civilian people. The Canadian Unionist published by the Canadian Congress of Labour in April, 1954 had this to say apropos of the H-bomb:
The task of the individual, in spite of the threat of world destruction is, in Carlyle's words, "to do the task which lies nearest to hand," and, in the present circumstances, this means that we must simply do our work as well as we can, and let it go at that. We must try to be guided by the lessons of experience and the dictates of reason.
If we apply that statement to the national and defence fields, it is obvious that there is no ground for despair or discouragement or for doing nothing. It is obvious that we must continue to follow what we and the other nations have agreed is the right course in order to preserve peace and to maintain our security. But the A-bomb and the H-bomb force the nations of the world to try to find means of ensuring that they will never be used. It has been said that war is a failure in foreign policy; and foreign policy-understanding between nations-has become of greater importance and greater urgency than ever before in the history of mankind. From time to time specific problems occupy the international stage, as we have seen at Geneva over Indo-China. This crisis or that fills the headlines and the newscasts but no particular crisis should outweigh the preservation of the great alliance of the free world which is the fundamental bulwark of our own security.


Mr. Pearkes:: Mr. Chairman, at the outset may I say that the official opposition will agree to the proposal made by the minister, namely, that after the general discussion on this department we shall proceed, as has been done in former years, to the discussion of the various details as shown on page 287 and the pages following, on the assumption that we take the main headings in each case, not every line of the details.


Brooke Claxton: That is agreed.


George Randolph Pearkes: That will be a perfectly satisfactory way of proceeding.
Supply-National Defence
I appreciate the minister's comprehensive background statement and review of the international situation which he said at the commencement it was his intention to give to us in order that we might see the defence viewpoint. He has dealt with a great many of the different problems. The statement he has made, coupled with the document "Canada's Defence Program", consisting of some 58 pages, copies of which were issued to us a couple of days ago, make it rather difficult to condense a reply into a comparatively few minutes. However, I made such notes as I was able to make during the minister's speech and I shall endeavour to follow the general broad lines upon which he presented this subject. Again I repeat that I think the committee will appreciate the time the minister has taken to give us this review and to make us aware of the difficulties which face his department. I am fully conscious of many of those difficulties. The magnitude of the problem has perhaps been driven home to us today by the astronomical figures announced by the minister from time to time. I feel almost as though I am endeavouring to reply to a budget speech right after the budget speech has been delivered instead of having a week in which to prepare a reply.
However, to deal with this general background, may I say this. It seems to me that at the beginning of this year we welcomed an armistice in Korea and felt that there was a slight improvement in general international affairs, with the result that we were given some hope that perhaps the strength to which the forces of NATO had been built up was really acting as an effective deterrent to any Soviet aggression. However, the events which have occurred more recently in IndoChina and also the difficulties which have been experienced in the international conferences which have been held at London and at Geneva underline the necessity for Canada to maintain an adequate defence program. The very successes which were achieved in the international field towards stability enhance all the arguments in favour of our continued participation with the other peace-loving countries in an effort to try to ensure that a lasting peace is brought about.
This party therefore will continue to support government programs to maintain adequate forces and effective measures for the protection of our country and for the fulfilment of our commitments abroad. Of course our concern must be whether or not the Canadian taxpayer receives full value for the [DOT]huge sums he is being asked to provide for national defence. In his speech the minister referred to the fact that the cost of this insurance has been heavy. It has indeed been.
4912	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence heavy. We have been able to bear that heavy cost in recent years because Canada has been enjoying good harvests; there has been a ready demand for our surplus agricultural products up until now, and our industry has expanded its productive capacity to new records. The result has been that the burden of these defence appropriations has been less onerous than it would otherwise have been had Canada not been enjoying that degree of prosperity.
It has frequently been said, both in the house and by well-informed persons outside, that Canadian industry today is faced with more intense competition in the domestic and foreign fields than it has been in recent years, and demands for our surplus agricultural products are certainly less urgent than they have been in former years. Therefore for these reasons defence expenditures must be examined with the utmost care.
The burdens laid upon this country by national defence are heavy, even in relation to our immense resources. I think all of us would welcome some reduction in the amount of money voted for national defence. We would like to see some of this $2 billion utilized for other purposes, spent perhaps for social services and other purposes more attractive than armament. However, no degree of social welfare, no amount of education nor health services nor pensions is of the slightest use to the people whom they are intended to benefit if these very people are plunged into war.
The government's program for national defence is not perfect. But there can be no question of Canada abandoning her efforts, nor is it the intention of the official opposition to attempt to whittle down these estimates. However, the taxpayers' money may not be spent to the best advantage if wrong types of organization or equipment are adopted and if, of course, there is waste and unnecessary expenditure in the projects which are undertaken. Following what the minister has said this afternoon, this year seems to be a very appropriate time to examine whether the program which has been followed since it was announced in February of 1951 has fulfilled the purpose for which it was designed, has accomplished at the least cost possible :he purposes for which it was instituted, and is in a position to be projected into future years.
In general terms there has been no major war and therefore we may assume, as the minister has assumed, that defence plans have been successful to the extent that they have deterred the enemy from going to war. I rather doubt whether they are in a position


to be projected forward into the future. I question whether we have jockeyed ourselves into the best possible position for the next few years to come, and I will deal with that point in a few minutes.
When we entered into this defence program in 1951 it was then assumed that Russia would not know how to manufacture, let alone stockpile, the A-bomb. The only threat to Canada, as was mentioned time and time again, was some diversionary raid. I must call the attention of the house to the fact that time and time again we on this side stressed what is now referred to as the importance of continental defence. It seems to me that, putting aside the possibility that Russia could manufacture the A-bomb, we were rather prepared to say that United States bombers, having the A-bomb at that time, would be able to deal with any threat anywhere in the world which Russia attempted to initiate and which in any way resembled a world war.
The failure to appreciate the fact that Russia would have the A-bomb in a very few years led us into the policy of crash thinking of the past few years. The minister used the term "crash thinking" this afternoon. We built up what were then considered conventional forces to meet other commitments than the danger of continental attack. Because the emphasis in the past few years has been along the lines of crash thinking I suggest we are not in a good position at the present time to project our defence programs into the future.
To emphasize that point I should like to call attention to the fact that all through these years only 2 per cent of the total defence appropriations have been allocated to defence research. We have been crash thinking. We have been building up for the moment without projecting our defence plans into the future because we believed that Russia could not have the A-bomb. We failed to take the long pull three or four years ago. Now we are asked to have a new look and to take the long pull. Had more money and a larger percentage of our defence estimates been devoted to research in those years which we are considering I think we should be in a better position today.
Today the Kremlin does possess, not only the A-bomb but even more advanced forms of what I will call nuclear bombs because it does not matter whether they are H-bombs, N-bombs or something else. They have a stock of bombs and they also have the heavy bombers so that they can deliver those bombs to this country. I think the TU-4's constitute the backbone of the Russian air force bombers and at the present time they are

being replaced by more modern jet planes. The result is that, in spite of wishful thinking, such cities as Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal, Vancouver and so on are now exposed to attack, as has been admitted today. It is of little comfort to those cities to know that if they are attacked United States bombers are available to retaliate. I certainly hope that this threat of massive retaliation will deter the would-be aggressor, but there are other strong deterrents the knowledge of which would, I think, make the would-be aggressor think twice, particularly if he realizes that any attack on a Canadian target would be extremely costly in terms of the results that he would be likely to achieve.
Now, a second strong deterrent has been referred to today, and I would describe it as an aggressive defensive measure, an adequate civil defence. The minister touched on the question of civil defence, but I am not going to say much about that. It seems to me that at the moment the trend is towards evacuating many of the larger cities if they are threatened as a target. I want to emphasize the importance of the time that is required in order to evacuate a city. Only a few days ago a test was carried out in a United States west coast city, and the thing that was driven home as a result of the test was the importance of plans made ahead of time and opportunities for warnings to put those plans into effect. However, there will be opportunity to discuss civil defence under the estimates of the Minister of National Health and Welfare.
It is only if we do have these strong local deterrents and the means of receiving the warning that the effect of any future atomic Pearl Harbor can be neutralized. An aggressive defence will become a fact only when we have immediately available, at or near Canadian targets, interceptor aircraft at all times and a generous distribution of the newest weapons such as guided missiles operating air to air and ground to air and the latest atomic devices that science can evolve. I am not sure, in spite of what the minister has told us today, that we do have a warning system in as effective a stage as he would indicate.
Let me just emphasize the importance of this early warning by calling attention to the fact that a bomber formation, which we will say has been located 100 miles away from here, would be over this very building in a matter of a few minutes. I think you will, therefore, realize the futility of relying solely on any local or point defence. I am pleased that the minister gave us some information regarding the McGill fence, which is an indication now there is some attempt 83276-311
Supply-National Defence being made to get a warning system farther away than what might be described as the point defence or the inward and outward policy to which reference was made a year ago.
Last year when the estimates were presented the minister did indicate there was going to be a substantial increase on the emphasis which would be placed on the defence of the North American continent. I am glad he has re-emphasized that this year. It will be recalled that when the President of the United States, General Eisenhower, was speaking here on November 14 he said that our security plans must now take into account the Soviet ability to employ an atomic attack on North America. Later in his speech he said that now is the time for action on all agreed measures.
The minister spoke on November 26 in the throne speech debate, and I replied on November 30, calling attention to what appeared to me to be the lack in that speech of any assurance that action was really being taken. My anxiety in that respect has now been renewed by a speech that was delivered on April 29 of this year by Mr. Sterling Cole, a representative of the state of New York and chairman of the joint committee on atomic energy. In dealing with the question of a radar screen or early warning device across this continent, he said:
. . . and yet four years after the need for such a warning line was pointed out, and two years after our scientists developed the equipment which would make such a line possible, it is still not in existence. Negotiations with the Canadian government on the subject of where, how. and by whom the first of such early warning lines would be built and operated have been in progress for nearly two years. Scarcely a week goes by that we are not reassured, through optimistic press releases, that these negotiations are proceeding harmoniously, satisfactorily and with the sense of urgency which the situation requires. We cannot detect enemy planes with press releases and comforting reassurances.
Then, a little later he said-mind you this is the chairman of the joint committee on atomic energy:
. . . and with all the earnestness at my command, I urge that we immediately cease studying the early warning problem, and immediately begin the actual construction of an advance warning line.


Brooke Claxton: Will the hon. gentleman permit me to interrupt, because this is a rather important question. I should like to say one sentence, that is that there are no negotiations pending between the United States and Canada about this now or for one or two years or for any other time. There are none.


George Randolph Pearkes: There are none?


Brooke Claxton: None.

Supply-National Defence


George Randolph Pearkes: I do not understand. I was going to ask a question about that, but no doubt the minister will enlarge upon it. I agree with him this is an important statement by someone who would appear to be an authority on this subject.


Brooke Claxton: In fairness, I believe he is thinking of the scientific and military discussions at their level to see what should be done, but there are no negotiations.


George Randolph Pearkes: In this year's white paper the following statement is made at page 6:
In the past year considerable progress has been made in the construction of the joint Canadian-U.S. network of radar stations to provide early warning and communications facilities for directing squadrons of fighters. New radar installations of the most modern and powerful type have replaced practically all of the temporary mobile facilities which were in use since the second world war.
Then, this statement is made, and in the light of the remark the minister has just made I hope he will explain still further:
United States authorities have been kept fully informed of this project from the beginning.
I am rather at a loss to reconcile those two statements. I hope the minister will take the opportunity to further inform the house, because on the one hand we have a seemingly important United States official referring to the fact that the line is not in existence and urging that actual construction of this warning system be now started.
I am further perturbed on this particular subject because I do notice at page 44 of this year's white paper the appropriation for electronics has been reduced from an estimate of $114,799 last year to $65,666 this year. In this respect the difference between the estimate for 1953-54, and the probable expenditures in that year, are explained in this same white paper as being due to the difficulty of forecasting accurately the rate of expenditure on a large number of production programs in varying stages of development for complicated equipment that is subject to change and modification, in order to assure that the end product is the most useful for the job to be done and the money expended. The paragraph in the white paper goes on to say:
This applies to all types of production but is especially true of contracts which entail quantity production of many components as in the case of electronics-
And so on.
We are told that 90 per cent of installations are complete-I believe that is the figure the minister mentioned this afternoon. Does that refer to the protective screen around certain selected targets or does it refer to the more general line scheme which


would give early warning? It would seem from the statements I have read that, while making progress, our warning system is probably not being developed as rapidly as we would wish. Complaint is made in the white paper as to the difficulty of getting production in the materials required. Therefore I repeat the question I asked on November 30, and which perhaps the minister will consider he answered a moment ago. I think, however, some further explanation should be given. My question is this: Are there any agreed measures between the United States and ourselves that are now being held in abeyance for any reason whatsoever, and are there any measures which are now held in abeyance upon which agreement should be reached without further delay? I think we should have an answer to that question.
Leaving for the moment the question of early warnings, I return to the question of this rapid build-up program of our forces, the crash program to which the minister referred today. That has been based upon the kind of organization which proved successful in the second world war, armed and equipped with the weapons used in that conflict. Well, since formations of the ground structure after world war II ceased with the demobilization program of this government, new units did have to be created; and there were hasty improvisations in many cases during the emergency of 1950, with of course the subsequent expansion which made this method extremely expensive to the taxpayer. Russia did not launch a major war; she resorted to other strategy, the type of strategy to which the minister referred, when she engaged in these wars of limited objectives, the small wars he mentioned such as the Indo-China operation. When the government initiated its three-year program it was estimated that, as the minister said, the cost would run to $5 billion. This amount, plus additional millions, as he explained this afternoon, has been expended. But the program has not been completed.
As he has explained, the manpower targets as set out in 1950 have been reached for all practical purposes. I think that is an achievement for which credit must be allowed. But in reaching those objectives it has been done with a lavish expenditure of money on advertising, and the holding out of many inducements to attract men into the services. But, if we have the bodies, we are still short of much equipment-even equipment along the conventional lines of 1945.
I admit freely that in my opinion at no time have the defence services been faced

with decisions of more extreme difficulty than they are today. Scientific research has opened the way to the development of new weapons of enormously increased effect. We are, as it were, in an interim period between the propellor and the guided-weapon age, or, as the minister referred to it this afternoon, the push-button war of the future.
Furthermore, at the present time the services have to be organized to support a foreign policy which at the moment is hesitant and uncertain.
A real danger does exist from communist-sponsored and communist-supported wars of limited objectives, such as the one in Indochina. In the future these may not be entirely confined to the continent of Asia. Today we are contributing toward a ground screen across Europe, with its air component, in order to check a Russian advance through western Europe which, I suggest, if undertaken would plunge us at once into another major war. But is another major war in western Europe the strategic plan that Russia will necessarily adopt?
The maintenance of these large conventional ground forces in western Europe rests on the assumption that vast quantities of supplies will flow from the American continent to Europe and, from the Russian point of view, from their industrial bases beyond the Ural mountains, to sustain the embattled armies in western Europe. Yet this very supply flow must pass through the very few large ports in western Europe, and through a limited number of great railway centres in eastern Europe. All these ports, all these railway centres will be very vulnerable targets for the atom bomb. They could be destroyed easily in this way. And I think it is for that reason, as much as any other-that is the danger of the ports being destroyed-that Great Britain and the United States are taking this so-called new look, and are placing greater emphasis on air atomic power, and the revolution in warfare that has been brought about by these new weapons.
In a third world war there is no doubt about it that atomic air power will be the ultimate weapon. It is the belief that those who use the atomic bomb will perish by the atomic bomb that leads to the theory of massive retaliation and instant reprisals. Thus we have the concept of a deterrent force rather than a defence force. We ask, how does Canada fit into that picture? In part the minister has explained the role this afternoon, but I do suggest that defence planning today is indeed at the crossroads. Are we to adhere to the conventional methods 83270-3114
Supply-National Defence of the first half of the twentieth century which are fast becoming obsolescent in terms of nuclear weapons? It seems to me that we should retain the greatest possible flexibility in our organization and in the disposition of our forces. A year ago I commented upon the fact that all our Sabre fighting squadrons were already committed to the European theatre. I still question the wisdom of this commitment when we are so pitifully short of fighter squadrons for home defence.
Mistakes have been costly in the past and can be costly again. It is for this reason that we of the opposition feel we have a right to inquire into government policy, even though opposition members do not have the opportunity of attending chiefs of staffs' conferences and receiving all the technical advice that the government has.
In the past in connection with this I have-frequently advocated the importance of the air arm. I am pleased to see the increase in the proportions of the appropriations allocated to the R.C.A.F. I have also in the past emphasized the importance of the air arm in connection with the naval services. Several years ago, in speaking on these estimates, I stressed the importance of having additional aircraft carriers. Now the whole trend in both the United States navy and the Royal Navy is toward greater use of helicopters and reconnaissance planes from carriers in all escort and anti-submarine operations. I know the Magnificent is to be re-equipped with Banshee aircraft. The Banshee of course is not a reconnaissance plane; it is essentially a fighter plane and is more to be used in driving off hostile reconnaissance planes than in actual reconnaissance work itself.
Dependence upon the air for escort work and anti-submarine work is brought about very largely by the increased range and effectiveness of the modern torpedo. Escort vessels protecting a convoy operate on what one might describe as a perimeter a considerable distance from the convoy, sufficiently far out to keep the submarine away from the merchant vessels for effective torpedo range; but as the range of the torpedo increases, so must the line of escort vessels be pushed farther out from the actual merchantmen that they are convoying. The type of escort vessel that we are building in Canada is an extremely expensive one. We were told in 1951 that each of the escort vessels would cost over $8 million. I imagine the costs have gone up considerably since 1951. We are going to have 14 of those vessels. According to the white paper of 1951, four out of the 14 were to be launched in 1951 or at the beginning of 1952. This year's white paper tells us that by

Supply-National Defence March 31, 1954, a total of five escort vessels were launched. That program seems lagging very far behind, if in 1951 it was expected that the first four of the 14 were to be launched that year. It is disappointing to realize that only five have been launched to date. But I am questioning really the soundness of pursuing this plan of developing the very expensive escort vessels. With the increased effectiveness of the torpedo and the increased range we must have more escort vessels for any convoy. The increased effectiveness of the torpedo, which not only is equipped with a homing device, but is able to run on a patterned course, zigzagging or circling after a certain distance, means that any surface ship is extremely vulnerable. Helicopters or reconnaissance planes have an advantage in that they are not vulnerable to torpedoes.
I turn to the other point which I mentioned at the beginning, namely, the guarding of the taxpayer's money and ensuring that there is no unnecessary extravagance or waste. With respect to the elimination of unnecessary waste in the defence department, while, I am very pleased to say, no glaring instances of wrongdoing are disclosed, yet the searching examination to which the defence expenditures committee of a year ago subjected the department, and the investigations resulting from the Currie report of a little over a year ago, show that there was a general tightening of efficiency in the administration throughout the services. Last summer I expressed the opinion that with careful administration the defence estimates could be reduced by 10 per cent without in any way affecting the efficiency of the forces or the pay and allowances of the personnel concerned. I notice that this year the minister has found it possible to reduce his estimates by approximately $100 million, or 5 per cent of last year's estimates. I am sure he does not consider that the efficiency has been sacrificed, and I am equally certain that another $100 million could have been cut off this year's estimates had there been throughout all the services a genuine desire to economize. This reduction cannot be made by the elimination of any one item. It is, however, in my opinion, essential that all commands in all the services should be imbued with the sense of their responsibility in the expenditure of public funds. The economy of the country is not as strong as it was a year ago, and, therefore, the strictest care must be exercised in all defence spending.
When we come to the details of the estimates we shall feel it our duty to examine, and if necessary to criticize, the amounts allocated in the various items of expenditure,

and we shall offer such comments as we consider may be necessary. However, the rules and procedures of this house do not provide opportunities for any really thorough examination into the administration as to its effectiveness or efficiency. Therefore I repeat the suggestion which has been made before. In view of the results which were obtained through the medium of Mr. Currie's investigation in a very limited field of inquiry, would it not be advisable for the government to initiate now another investigation of the whole field of the department's administration with a view to introducing substantial economies without affecting the efficiency of the services? I believe that owing to the magnitude of the task which confronts this department the minister would be well advised to call in some expert assistance to review the general expenditures and go into this whole matter to see whether further economies can be effected. I feel that the officers concerned are too busy with their own legitimate work to be able to spare the time which is required for such a thorough investigation.
In closing, I repeat that we on this side of the house appreciate the difficulties confronting the minister and his department in these very uncertain times. We urge caution in accepting new commitments; we stress the importance of continued emphasis on the defence of the home front, the North American continent; we urge care in all expenditures, but forward looking so that full advantage may be taken of the new weapons of warfare which science is now producing.
A revolution is actually taking place in the theory, strategy, and tactics of warfare brought about by these new weapons. The Department of National Defence and our military leaders must come to grips with this revolution in warfare in order that they may be certain they are following the right approach.


Mr. Coldwell:: Mr. Chairman, in following the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, who has long experience in military affairs, I do so, of course, merely as a layman but one who has paid some attention to the military commitments and expenditures over the last few years. I shall try to discuss the estimates now before us in the light of the new developments in international affairs, and in the light of methods that might be used in the event of an attack not only on our country but on the countries with which we are associated.
Of course, throughout the country the easing of international tension, to which the minister referred and to which the Secretary of State for External Affairs has on occasion referred, and the desire for the control of

these new and terrible weapons, about which we heard this afternoon, have led people to hope that we might be able, through agreement, to engage not only in the control of these weapons but in progressive disarmament.
At the moment the world is obsessed with fear. Fear, of course, is not a good motive for the promotion of international peace; but, as a matter of fact, fear is forcing millions of people everywhere to look for peaceful settlements of current difficulties and disputes.
The terror of the new weapons was outlined by the minister in his speech this afternoon, and as I listened to him I wondered if his department has reviewed the commitments of Canada and the policies of the department in the light of these new and terrible developments.
The white paper indicates the amount of money the people of Canada will be called upon to expend on the army, the navy, the air force, and defence in the year 1954-55. The estimates amount to $1,908 million plus $102 million, which is expected to be a net charge on the special account, or a total of $2,010 million, which is an increase of $208 million over the forecast gross disbursements of $1,802 million for the year 1953-54.
May I just say in passing that I have noted there has been some discussion and indeed some dispute, or so the newspapers tell us, between the Department of National Defence and treasury officers about items which should be charged to this special account. What seems to have happened is this, that when the department has some weapons which are obsolete they are sent to one of our allies as mutual aid, and that enables the department to draw on the special account to pay for new equipment and in that way, incidentally, to escape to some degree control of this house in respect to those expenditures.
The figures in the white paper are stupendous and would be stupendous at any time, but they are certainly stupendous in peacetime; and when I look back over the years and think of the first budgets I saw introduced in this house in 1936 and 1937, budgets of around half a billion dollars, and when I remember how Mr. Dunning used to impress upon the house that it was impossible to raise another ten, fifteen, twenty or one hundred million dollars to give the relief which was so necessary and which was called for at that time by our suffering population, I cannot but regard this figure for defence as stupendous.
Because of the fact that these figures are so stupendous I think it is the duty of this
Supply-National Defence house to see whether they are justified, and if justified, how it is proposed to spend the money.
The minister told us this afternoon that these new estimates come at the end of a three-year period, the period which three years ago we were told would require an expenditure of $5 billion to bring us up to the point where we would be moderately secure, the point where, in co-operation with our friends in other countries, we could expect to feel a measure of real security. But this afternoon the minister told us that we have got to expend this huge amount again this year, and indeed he told us we would have to spend the same amount probably for years to come.
Consequently, it is the duty of this house at the present time to see if the Department of National Defence is really doing the job we expect of it when we appropriate these huge sums of money.
The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich said a few moments ago there had been a revolution in warfare in the last few years. That was pointed out in a very interesting address given over the B.B.C. a short time ago by no less a personage than Sir John Slessor, G.C.B., marshal of the Royal Air Force; chief of the air staff, 1950-52; commandant, Imperial Defence College, 1949; and member of the air council, 1945-47. I would like to quote briefly from what he said at that time:
For the first time in hundreds of thousands or millions of years that man has existed he can carry or propel through the air for thousands of miles, ... a missile that by itself can destroy a city. It is silly to behave as though this revolution had never happened. Actually it has completely transformed the whole complexion and dimension of the problem of peace and war. All previous conceptions have become obsolete.
Let me hasten to say that I am not here to tell you that we can now scrap the navy and disband the army and put all our money on a new model push-button air force. But if there were another major war it would not remotely resemble the last one.
Then in another place in the same speech he emphasized this point when he said this:
I believe the first and most far-reaching consequence of this revolution is that total war as we have known it in the past forty years is a thing of the past. That may sound a pretty rash statement. But I believe it to be true. War is a matter of wills: nations or coalitions went to war to impose their will on an opponent. You started off by trying to do it by persuasion, that is, by diplomacy, and if that was no good you tried to do it by force. At a given moment-the "declaration" of war-you turned over from an interchange of notes between men in top hats to an interchange of bullets between men in tin hats.
The next rather obvious thing I must say is that you did not take the initiative in forcing a war unless you thought you could win it. And (this is
4918	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence the important point) we now know to our cost that winning a war does not mean just forcing an enemy to lay down his arms and accept your terms: it means creating world conditions more favourable to oneself than could have been brought about if there had not been a war. Today there is not the remotest chance of anyone winning a war on that definition. A world war in this day and age would be general suicide and the end of civilization as we know it.
Consequently it seems to me that while we are considering expenditures for the defence of our country against the possibility of war, our government, our external affairs department and all the rest of us should be doing everything we can to try to find ways and means of negotiating the difficulties that exist between the nations and of eliminating the possibility of another general war. The world is still trying, of course, to comprehend the tremendous power of the hydrogen bomb as revealed publicly, following the recent tests in the Pacific. Rear Admiral L. L. Strauss, the chairman of the United States atomic energy commission, in a statement made on March 31, 1954, disclosed that one hydrogen bomb could wipe out any city on earth. The power of the atom bomb was measured in kilotons, equivalent to thousands of tons of TNT. The power of the fusion bomb is measured in megatons, equivalent to millions of tons of TNT. The explosive power attained in the March 1 Eniwetok test was estimated at 600 to 700 times that of [DOT]the bombs that destroyed Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These statements are from the New York Times.
Then in a statement issued recently in England by a group of scientific workers- and incidentally they were scientific workers in whose area will be found the great atomic pile of the United Kingdom-they estimated that two to six hydrogen bombs would be enough to break British resistance in any third world war. As the hon. gentleman who preceded me stated, the vulnerable spots- the ports, railway centres and so on-are few in number, and a few of these bombs getting through could put out of the war any country engaged in it.
Then the other important development, of course, is the development in the U.S.S.R. We have been told authoritatively that United States success in producing the hydrogen bomb was largely owing to the material that flowed through the ether from an explosion of such a bomb in the U.S.S.R. and that it made a change in the manner in which United States scientists were working in order to discover that dreadful weapon. Soviet spokesmen have been at pains recently to underline the point that they had these powerful weapons. I should like to put on the record a comment by
[Mr. Coldwell.l

Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times on April 4 of this year. He says this:
The intended import of that (Soviet) warning is simple, that the Soviet union is capable of winning a nuclear war with the United States. This was what Premier Malenkov meant when he said last Monday that any future atomic war "would inevitably lead to the ruin of the capitalist social system," a theme repeated also in communist party secretary Khrushchev's speech the same day.
It is generally agreed that while the existence of the H-bomb is a very real deterrent in so far as an outbreak of world war is concerned, its deterrent effect is much less in relation to small wars, limited wars or struggles such as those in Indo-China, Malaya, street fighting in Trieste, Israeli-Arabian border clashes, etc.
Thus we see that the obligations of Canada and the other countries in connection with the requirements of the United Nations, NATO, and so on, are not altogether eliminated by any deterrent effect the H-bomb may have. However, I believe an examination of the estimates now before the committee will show that little heed has been taken of what Sir John Slessor called this "revolution in war".
It seems clear that the estimates are based upon the second world war conceptions and that the minister has accepted uncritically the huge demands for weapons and equipment that are either already obsolete or become obsolete even before they are provided. I think that point was well illustrated and emphasized this afternoon by the minister himself when he spoke of the huge expenditures for the production of planes in this country and said that they are obsolete before they come off the assembly lines. One wonders whether we would not be far better off by co-operating more closely with the United Kingdom, for example, and by assisting the United Kingdom and allowing the United Kingdom to proceed, for according to published reports she is the foremost aviation nation in the world in the designing of planes. One wonders whether we would not be better off by co-operating with her so that we both might benefit, without our undertaking, on a much smaller scale and in smaller numbers, the building of planes which may become obsolete even before they come off the assembly lines.
Of course military men have always been prone to ask for more than is necessary, and parliament is inclined to grant all their requests because, as laymen, we are not sufficiently informed to refuse their requests. Indeed, if we did, public opinion might view us with suspicion. The public view with suspicion any suggestions-and perhaps properly so-that seem to jeopardize

the national defence against any possible aggression. A prominent member of this house, as reported at page 2810 of Hansard of 1951, said this:
I have never known an admiral, a general or an air marshal who did not begin by asking for more than his share of anything.
That of course was said by our distinguished friend-himself a major general

the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich.
Thus, all too often, not only the size of the total allocation for defence but its distribution among the armed services depended more on the bargaining between the heads of the three services than on anything else. With today's developments, the dangers of this kind of uncritical, unquestioning acceptance of defence requirements is more dangerous than ever.
The London Economist had something to say about this matter concerning the British estimates when they were introduced into the house. I am quoting from the London Economist of February 20 of this year. It said this:
The danger is frankly that, while the backroom planners are busy working out the strategy of the new look, the authorities that really matter may succumb to the temptation, in this period of uncertainty, merely to pass round the money among the different claimants in very much the same proportions as they have been allowed to enjoy in the past; and then to leave each claimant to decide how he will spend that money in the new circumstances now emerging.
There are two reasons for fearing-the layman can, of course, never be sure that this may have liapoened in the estimates for 1954-55. In the first place, not only is the total defence estimate remarkably similar to the estimate for 1953-54; the different components are suspiciously similar too.
How well that applies to these estimates that are now before the house. There is a similarity to the components of a year ago before the explosion of a hydrogen bomb.
That this has been true in other countries is borne out by numerous articles that have appeared in the press of the world, articles by people who have made a study of defence and military affairs and who may be regarded as authorities. Walter Lippmann, I suppose, is regarded as one of the outstanding commentators on military affairs in the world at the present time. In his column of January 8 of this year he criticized the Truman administration and its attitude to some of these matters. He had this to say:
To put it bluntly, but I believe truly, the Truman administration lost control in the constitutional and meaningful sense of that word over the war-making powers of the United States. It lost control over the size and the character of the military establishment, over the high strategic planning in which statesmen, not soldiers, must have the last word, and over the theatre commanders abroad.
Supply-National Defence The visible consequences of all this were, for one thing, a gigantic military expansion which became all the more gigantic because it was regulated not by a lucid strategic policy but by the pressure of the military bureaucracies of the three services. Another consequence of the loss of control over the military power was the irreparable political errors of the Korean campaign, particularly the failure to halt at the 38th parallel, or at least at the waist of Korea, before the Chinese intervened.
Leaving out the reference to Korea, how can we in this parliament exercise our constitutional obligations with regard to this department? None of us knows what the requirements really are. None of us knows just how this money is really spent. I say to the house and to the minister that, although I have never been in favour of the proposal made from time to time that a royal commission, an outside body, should inquire into the Department of National Defence, I think we could appoint a competent committee of this house which could go into the affairs of the Department of National Defence and bring back to the house an assurance if it should prove to be so that the money is being well spent, that we are getting what we are paying for in this department.
At the moment there is not one of us who can say whether this estimate is right or wrong. There is not one of us who can say with certainty that the amount is adequate or that the amount is excessive. I think, and I hope to show in a moment, that if the matter is looked into in all probability it will be found that the amount is excessive and, as the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich suggested and as I suggested in the address, that it could be cut by at least 10 per cent. I believe it probably could be cut by more than 10 per cent if the matter were investigated thoroughly by the house.
To put it bluntly, we believe these estimates indicate that parliament has lost control of the Department of National Defence, and we believe that a thorough and careful investigation of the estimates now before the house should be made by the house or by a committee of the house before they are approved at this session of parliament. As I said a moment ago, I do not care to hazard a guess as to what savings could be made or the amount by which these estimates could be cut. As I pointed out in a former debate, the United States is reducing its appropriations by about 10 per cent and the United Kingdom by a lesser amount, and I believe that Canada could make a similar reduction in the defence appropriation.
I believe a thorough investigation of these estimates would confirm this view, and I want
4920	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence to cite some oi the details which to my mind help to confirm the statement I have just made. Of primary importance of course is that we shall be prepared to implement any undertakings made by this country under the charter of the United Nations, under the North Atlantic treaty or under other agreements that we have made or may make for collective security. In common with other western democracies, our defence program should no longer be geared, as the minister said today, to what has been termed "the crash objectives" of 1950 when war might have been imminent, but rather to what has been called this afternoon the long haul of future defence and peace or the long pull, whatever you care to call it.
I should like to remark right here and now that the North Atlantic treaty is more than a military alliance. It is more than a method of giving obsolete equipment to some of our allies, but as yet we have not begun to fulfil article 2 of the treaty. I want to say quite plainly and frankly that we of this party supported the North Atlantic treaty because we had the assurance that article 2 would be regarded as of fundamental importance. However, virtually nothing has been done to assist the economies of these countries. We have emphasized wholly and solely the military end of the agreement, and that is not good enough when we are fighting a cold war against a communist aggressor who uses economic distress as his principal vehicle of propaganda. It is time that we paid some attention to article 2 of the treaty for our mutual aid and prosperity.
A study of the United States and United Kingdom estimates for defence indicates that those countries have been moving quite rapidly into the new defensive position necessitated by considerations of the long haul while Canada's armed forces are still geared to the weapons and tactics of world war II. I have a number of quotations here from their estimates, statements and white papers which I could quote this afternoon, but I do not intend to do so because I have already quoted sufficiently.
As I said earlier, I am not suggesting that the new and terrible weapons of war make armies and navies unnecessary. Certainly they do not make the air force unnecessary. Quite the contrary, but I am suggesting that we could effect savings by reducing the stockpiling of weapons, planes and equipment which are either obsolete now or are certain to become obsolete in a comparatively short time. We do not know what stockpiling there has been, but if the figures in the previous estimates indicate the purchases that have been fMr. Coldwell.l

made there must be considerable stockpiling by the Department of National Defence.
It seems to us too that there is one branch of the Department of National Defence that is well worth supporting and even expanding. The field of electronics was referred to this afternoon and yet there is a reduction in the estimates for that branch of research, research carried on through the national research council and through our own defence research board. During world war II those organizations gave very significant aid in the achievement of victory. I agree immediately that such research should be undertaken by co-operation with those who will co-operate with us. That means to a very large extent, and in some fields almost exclusively, the United Kingdom and other members of the commonwealth. This should be done so that research efforts can be coordinated and duplication and waste among us avoided and, indeed, because we do cooperate, the program can be speeded up.
As an example, I mentioned a little earlier and I might mention again what might be done in this field. Instead of Canada embarking at great expense upon the production or experimentation of certain new types of planes, we could I think co-operate with Britain more fully. It is generally admitted that Britain leads the world in the development and production of aircraft. Why should we go to the expense of building and equipping new plants, designing new planes when we could co-operate with Britain and together work out the designs for planes, thus saving us both a great deal of expense?
Then, it seems to us that reconsideration should be given to the proposals for defence construction for all three services. We are told that this program of construction, building and so on across the country has now passed its peak. Apparently a further wave of expenditures in this field is foreshadowed in the estimates. I feel the department should be called upon to justify those expenditures. So far as housing for our married men is concerned, yes; but after all that is only a comparatively small part of the appropriation. The need for the other facilities should be carefully examined by this house before the appropriations are approved. If they were scrutinized I believe reductions could be made in that field.
I suggest that to continue to stockpile weapons and ammunition on a large scale, at a time when revolutionary changes are being made in weapons and armaments generally, is nothing but the greatest wastefulness. Apparently, expenditures for such weapons and ammunition as may become obsolete are

to continue on a fairly large scale under these estimates. I feel that should be reviewed by this house or by a committee of this house. Then we have noted, too, that the United States is contemplating a reduction of its armed forces in Korea. We maintain a brigade in Korea, and if the United States can withdraw some forces why could we not bring back at least a battalion? The maintenance of troops in Korea is a costly undertaking because we ship supplies not only by sea but by air. While we do that with some of our own military transport planes, we also hire planes from a private company, the Canadian Pacific Air Lines.
It seems to us that if the United States can withdraw some of her troops from Korea, we could withdraw some also. It might be possible to place in reserve some of our ships, our cruisers for example. They are costly to maintain at sea, and they are costly to maintain in port. I have noticed the whole emphasis in the United States and in the United Kingdom, so far as their navies are concerned, is to get away from battleships and cruisers in favour of anti-submarine vessels and aircraft carriers. I saw the other day that the United Kingdom has suspended building activities on three new cruisers, the Tiger, the Defence, and the Blake.
Then, as the minister has already said, we have a large air force in Europe. I believe there are 12 fighter squadrons there. Until recently there were few such squadrons in Canada. We were almost defenceless in the air. I want to say to the minister that no other country had denuded itself of air protection for the common effort as completely as Canada did. The minister told us it costs over $600 million a year to equip, transport and maintain an R.C.A.F. division in Europe. Even if we returned six of those fighter squadrons to Canada a substantial saving would be made, and there would be at least a more efficient fighter protection in Canada if that were required. Certainly no one could accuse us of not contributing equitably to the NATO effort if we did that.
We should review carefully Canada's expenditure for aircraft, which is given on pages 44 and 45 of the white paper. The estimate for 1954-55 is for $430 million, and that represents 43-5 per cent of our air force expenditures. This is a far greater proportion of the expenditure for aircraft than the proportion I noticed in the United Kingdom estimate, which I believe is in the order of 29 per cent or 30 per cent. Other items of the estimates that require scrutiny are numerous, but I am going to give only a few examples. In the details we are told that 83276-312
Supply-National Defence we have 1,000 inspectors of stores, in addition to the inspection staffs of each of the services. These 1,000 inspectors cost $3,500,000. I am not going to deny that adequate inspection is necessary, but the present estimates provide for no less than $12-5 million for all the inspection services compared with only $10-5 million at the height of our war effort, 194344. How could that be justified? Perhaps the minister can justify it when he speaks.
Even the Currie report of the investigation into the forces did not indicate losses as high as the cost of these inspection services. These and other savings run into many tens of millions of dollars when you add them all up. I did a little arithmetic the other day and was amazed at the total I got. I am not going to name it because some of my figures were the result of looking into the estimates and endeavouring to estimate what the totals would be. I am not going to do that at the moment; but, when we have heard from the minister further and we have gone into these estimates further, we may come to a conclusion as to just what savings could be effected in this department. I say tens of millions of dollars but I believe the savings would run into hundreds of millions of dollars -not many hundreds, but hundreds of millions of dollars. Please do not misunderstand and think I am making a plea for a reduction in income tax as a result of defence savings; not at all.
As I said, I should like to see more emphasis on article 2 of the North Atlantic treaty, mutual economic aid, which would be perhaps costly to us. I should like to see Canada take more of a leading part in urging and providing technical aid for the underprivileged nations of the world. I know that is limited by the facilities of the technical aid organization, the Colombo plan facilities and so on, but we could do more than we are doing now, so some of those funds could be used for that. If we improved the living standards of these underprivileged parts we would be doing much to make inoperative the propaganda of totalitarian agitators, whether they are of the fascist or of the communist variety. We have sometimes overlooked the fact that the danger of totalitarianism does not come only from communism but comes equally through various forms of fascism across the world.
Then some of the savings could be used effectively in Canada. We could use them for our social services, in part for a national health plan, for improving the amenities of life in this country. I have always been a very warm advocate of doing something for the cultural life of Canada. I like to see

Supply-National Defence the national gallery buying a few pictures; I like to see the suggestion made that we should encourage a national drama, a national opera, national ballet, national music in the form of symphonies, and the like.
But, first of all, of course, we should see that we have those facilities in the social services for health and well-being as well as the cultural things. The hon. member spoke about aircraft carriers, and that has reminded me that the other day I read we were going to replace the Magnificent with the Bonaventure-in fact, we were told this in the house-and that the Bonaventure would operate off the east coast.
What are we going to do with the Magnificent? Here I am suggesting an expenditure of money.	Why not remodel and
modernize the Magnificent and make her suitable for what the hon. member suggested, namely the carrying of helicopters-indeed, why not redesign the Bonaventure to do the same thing? Why not use one of them on the east coast and the other on the west- because if aggression should come we cannot be sure that it will come on the east coast; neither are we sure that it will not come on the west. It would be well if we had an additional ship-and this of course would entail additional expenditure. However, that is the kind of expenditure of which I am sure the House of Commons would approve, because hon. members would understand the purpose of it.
From reports that have been made, I do not know to what extent Canada's forces are receiving adequate training for atomic warfare, if such should come. I do not know what they have learned about the use of atomic weapons, guided missiles and the like. Are our forces being trained as are the armed forces in other countries? It does not mean that they have to use those weapons, but they could use weapons simulated to meet training requirements. Is this being done?
If my information is correct the Canadian army has not yet been given training in airborne operations at the brigade level. So far that has not been done, according to my information. Yet we hear a great deal about the necessity for having airborne troops. Of course, in our country air defence and the ability to cope with a group of enemy soldiers parachuted into northern Canada is of primary and fundamental importance. Our forces may have to be flown quite a distance to fulfil this task, and might be required in brigade strength.
I am told, too, by military men that much of the army training is obsolete, and that in this respect to a great extent the money
[Mr. Coldwell.1
is wasted. But whether that is true or not, I think emphasis should be placed on research; and as I said earlier, in that field all the co-operation possible should be undertaken with the United Kingdom and other commonwealth countries. And if the United States wishes to co-operate with us, well and good; we would be prepared to cooperate with them. If this co-operation were complete, as it should be, we believe it might effect very substantial savings in our estimates.
As I have said, these savings should be diverted into channels which would be beneficial to the world and to ourselves. Our plea is for a reconsideration of the estimates that have been presented to us, in the light of recent developments. And should this be done thoroughly we believe very substantial reductions can be made in the total estimates of the department, without impairing its efficiency and without jeopardizing the security of our country.
I am not going to discuss the problem of civil defence in relation to new weapons. That will come under another heading. Suffice it to say that we are now told by experts in the United States in this field that only the mass evacuation of populations of our larger centres would suffice in the event of raids bringing hydrogen bombs. What a prospect the world faces, if that is so! And I fear that it is so.
The minister told us that our radar defences are 90 per cent complete and in operation. Well, it is good to know that, but in collaboration with our radar defences we should have adequate fighting air and ground forces in this country. I have noted that recently some CF-lOO's have been located and are being used in Canada. But, as I said earlier, until very recently we had denuded ourselves of air defence through our contributions to NATO. I am not complaining about contributions to NATO; but I think we also have to think about our own defences, as well as the defences of western Europe, in the event of war.
I do not wish to say anything further, except to express the hope that the House of Commons will examine these estimates. It is true that in the main estimates information is given in great detail, and that they are set out very carefully indeed. I hope hon. members will see to it that, so far as we are able to bring it about, any wastes will be eliminated. But I think most of all we require, first, a thorough investigation into the activities of the department, and its estimates, by a committee of the House of Commons.

All of us are anxious to give our support to any necessary defensive plans for our own country, and to assist those who expect us to give assistance through the United Nations, NATO and the like. But the difficulty in which most of us find ourselves-and I fancy this includes hon. members on the government side as well as in the opposition-is that this department is a law unto itself. And because of the secret nature of many of its operations it is protected against thorough inquiry by the elected representatives of the people.
The age-old struggle in the British democracies has been to make certain that the civilian arm of government can and does control the military. And upon my soul, I think at the present time this House of Commons has very largely lost control of the defence department and the military arm of the nation; and I think we should do everything we can to restore a control that is properly the function of this parliament.


Mr. Thomas:: Mr. Chairman, this afternoon the minister gave us a comprehensive survey of Canada's position, so far as our armed forces are concerned. He went into some detail in regard to the international situation, the military aspect of NATO, and some other matters. As a matter of fact his speech was so comprehensive and detailed that it was almost impossible for one to absorb all he said merely by listening. But I would make a suggestion to the minister. I do not know what he will think of it, but it would certainly simplify matters for those who have to speak immediately after him if it could be arranged in the future that he give his statement, and then allow the item to stand and continue the debate the next day or the day after in order to give hon. members an opportunity to study his statement in detail before speaking.
At the outset I should like to pay tribute to the members of the armed forces. These men of all the services have built themselves an enviable reputation wherever they have gone. They have served with distinction in every theatre of war where they have been called to act. Certainly, they have become well known for their courage, ability and resourcefulness in the field. More than that, the members of the Canadian armed forces have been well liked everywhere they have gone in other than official capacities. In other words, practically without exception they behave like gentlemen, regardless of where they are serving.
On many occasions, Mr. Chairman, we have been critical, and sometimes extremely critical, but that criticism has never applied to the members of the armed forces. We
83276-312^
Supply-National Defence have criticized the department for some of the policies they have brought down, and undoubtedly we shall continue to do so. But our criticisms have always been against the department, against the government and never against the armed forces or any of the individuals of the forces.
The situation in the world today, as the minister indicated, is extremely serious. I go along with the minister and hope also that in the future we shall not find ourselves embroiled in another all-out war. But we cannot allow ourselves to become too complacent. Things look bad. As a matter of fact, I picked up today's Journal and on the front page I saw the headline:	"Geneva
looks hopeless." I do not know what the article contains because I have not had an opportunity to read it.
With things stacking up the way they are, in every effort that has been made to bring the two opposing sides together, we cannot afford to relax our vigilance even for a moment. We are not actually engaged in a hot war at the present time, but we are in a war. It is not war as wars have been known down through the ages, which were brought about by trade wars and so on. It is a battle between two ways of life, between communism and democracy and between freedom and slavery. We must never forget that the forces of international communism, have no regard for life, or the individual;, they have no regard for promises made and they have no regard for any treaties that they may have signed. They are vicious. We must never forget also that world domination is their ultimate aim. They have made that known all through the years from the time of Marx and Engels right down to the present regime. I hope, and I know every hon. member hopes, that the peace overtures they are making at the present time and have been making recently are sincere. It is possible that the new administration in Russia has had a change of heart, but I would not bank on it too much. In other words, we have to take every opportunity afforded to maintain peace, but at the same time we must always be prepared for the worst.
We in this group have always supported defence spending. We feel that as long as a large defence program is necessary we should keep at it, and I can assure the minister he will have our wholehearted support in every expenditure that we feel is necessary for the carrying on of our defence program. We realize that with the situation the way it is today defence is all-important. We have been critical many times, not because the government is spending money, but of

Supply-National Defence how they are spending it. We have often maintained, as speakers who preceded me said today, there is no economy in the Department of National Defence. As a matter of fact, I have not found it in any department of government. The aims of the department undoubtedly are very high and to be commended, namely, the protection of our country. But sometimes the results leave a great deal to be desired. I cannot believe, Mr. Chairman, that we are getting a dollar value out of every dollar spent on defence. I think we discovered quite a bit in our defence expenditure committee last year, and in a small way the Currie report proved that there is waste and extravagance in the Department of National Defence.
I regret very much that the government did not see fit to set up the defence expenditure committee during this session. After all, we touched only the surface of defence spending during the last session. We covered a great deal of the ground as far as construction is concerned, but we did not get into the production of aircraft, arms or ammunition, or any of the things that we should like to have made a complete investigation into. I only hope-and I would ask the minister to discuss it with his colleagues-that a committee will be set up again next year, as early as possible in the session, and that it will be allowed to dig into the entire regime of defence spending.
May I say a brief word on fires at some of the installations? The minister made a statement in the house the other day in which he said that compared with civilian fires the percentage of damage was very low. I realize that, and well it should be, because in no other place do they have the facilities for sentries or fire protection and so on concentrated in such a small area. It is hard to believe that if the sentries are being posted as they should be a large blaze could develop before it was discovered. I realize that it could probably happen in some instances, but I cannot see how for example at the air station at Penhold, with the number of personnel there, a fire could get a good start and destroy a hangar, when one takes into consideration the facilities and the personnel there, particularly since they have sentries posted at all the hangars to see that such a thing does not happen.
The minister went to great length this afternoon to show how NATO had been built up to strength, not sufficient to defeat the communists, but strong enough to hold the line until the air power and the atomic power of the NATO countries could be used to interrupt any attack that might be made. I do not think they have the minimum that


the minister mentioned this afternoon. The aim for NATO as it was set down was for 90 divisions by 1954, or something like
1.350.000	men.
Perhaps the minister told us this afternoon the extent of the manpower within NATO forces at the present time, but if so I missed it and in any event I do not think it will amount to the figure I have mentioned. At any rate, the estimated power of the Russian forces alone, and in this connection I am taking the figures given by General Gruen-ther two years ago, amounted to 175 divisions, or something like 4 million men. That takes no account of the satellite forces, and they can certainly muster a great many more men in a hurry. In view of that, it is difficult to see how the NATO forces could hold the communist hordes for even a short time.
I have mentioned the Russian figures relative to about two years ago, and I would like the minister to bring us up to date on the estimated force the communists have at their command at the present time. I would like to know how much they have at their command in terms of land, air, and sea forces. In regard to their air power I would like to have some sort of resume as to the number of first-line bombers, light bombers, heavy bombers, and fighter planes they have at their disposal. As regards their naval power I would like to have a resume of the estimated number of first-line submarines, battleships and so on up the line. I do not know whether the minister has these figures, but I have no doubt he has some knowledge.
I paid particular attention to the minister's statement this afternoon to the effect that it was only as long as the NATO nations could maintain their productive superiority that we could hope to deter the communists from attack. I am not sure that we have that productive superiority.
Speaking on the defence estimates in April 1952 I quoted from a technical and trade magazine called Aviation Age giving some figures of Russian productive capacity as far as the air power is concerned, though that was two years ago. That magazine estimated that Russia had about 85 aircraft factories, more than 28 engine plants, and produced something in the neighbourhood of
22.000	aircraft during the past year. That, of course, would be in 1951. Perhaps I should quote briefly from my speech at that time as reported at page 1100 of Hansard for April 3, 1952:
I should like to refer briefly to six points which were dealt with in that magazine under dateline. Washington, March 13. The first is that there are about 15 large. 30 medium, and 40 smaller plants producing airframes within Russia.

That is in addition to the engine plants and aircraft factories I mentioned a moment ago. The quotation continues:
The Russian ministry for the aircraft industry supervises 360 factories which do all or most of their work for the red air force. Then they have a number of contributing industries such as 20 rubber factories and 15 to 18 aluminum plants.
The magazine goes on to mention that each plant is capable of producing something like 3,600 engines; and, except for the fact that there is a bottleneck in the aluminum industry, the output could be raised to 50,000 or
60,000	Russian planes per year.
It was pointed out that during the same period the United States had 27 airframe factories, about 15 smaller ones, and some 30 other companies building major subsections, etc. In that speech I added:
To get back to the claimed production of 22,000 aircraft for Russia, it is believed that about 10,700 are fighting planes, 539 reconnaissance planes, 3,060 light and medium bombers, 1,246 heavy bombers, 1,430 transport planes and 5,000 trainer and liaison planes. The production last year in the United States was something like 5,000 planes.
Now, I do not know how authentic these figures are, but the magazine Aviation Age is considered a pretty reliable sort of publication, and the figures given would indicate that our productive capacity, at least as applied to aircraft, is far below that of the Russians, at least in 1951-52. I hope the minister can assure us that we are now far ahead of them in production in the NATO countries.
The minister indicated this afternoon that we have very few targets in Canada which would attract-but before going on with that, Mr. Chairman, perhaps I should call it six o'clock.


William Alfred Robinson: Is it agreed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at eight o'clock.
Ray Thomas: Mr. Chairman, when the committee took recess at six o'clock I was about to say that this afternoon the minister indicated that there were in Canada few targets that would rate an attack by aircraft carrying either the atomic or the hydrogen bomb. In that statement I can agree wholeheartedly with the minister. There are in Canada very few centres that are highly industrialized and that would therefore make a good target. But that very fact brings to mind the question we
Supply-National Defence have raised many times in this chamber-
I know I have raised it on many occasions- namely that of decentralization.
The minister knows that if about half a dozen of the cities in Canada were to be wiped out by a hydrogen bomb attack, our industrial potential would be practically wiped out. He knows that it would take very few bombs to absolutely ruin our production. We in this group particularly, as well as many of the other members, have constantly asked the government to put more and more essential war production centres in the prairie provinces, inland somewhere in British Columbia or in the maritimes, so that even if the larger centres here in Canada might be bombed we would still have sufficient productive capacity to carry on.
That suggestion brings to our minds another consideration, namely that of transportation. If the larger railway centres in this country were put out of action, our entire transportation system would be at a standstill. As the situation is at present, if a concerted attack were made on any part of this country outside of the highly populated areas, we have not the facilities by means of which to carry to the field of action the necessary men, materials, armaments and so on. I know that in a statement not long ago the minister said that we in Canada were not in too much danger of a concentrated attack, that any attack on this country would be spotty and of a minor nature, and would probably be made by paratroopers or something like that. However, we cannot allow ourselves to become complacent. We do not know what is going to happen. If the communists should decide to make an attack on the United States rather than on some other part of the world, Canada would be the logical jumping-off place. We cannot allow ourselves to get the "It Can't Happen Here" complex.
In order to facilitate the transportation of ground troops, materials and so on that cannot be carried by air, I think we need an adequate highway system throughout this country. I can think of one good instance, and it is one that has been mentioned in this chamber many times. If an attack should be made somewhere in the north central part of British Columbia or at least if there should happen to be a concentration of troops there, we have no way whatsoever of transporting materials and men through the Yellowhead pass and into British Columbia. I use that as an example because, in my opinion, that route is absolutely necessary. In view of that necessity, I think the government should take greater action and should co-operate more fully with the provinces in setting up
4926	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence not a trans-Canada highway but a trans-Canada highway system that will be adequate.
When I came back to Ottawa after the Easter recess, I was on the train with a considerable number of service personnel coming back from Korea and I had a rather interesting talk with some of them during the train trip. I asked one sergeant what was lacking in Korea as far as the Canadian soldiers were concerned or what they needed most in Korea that they did not have. I was rather surprised at his answer. What he said was this:	We have good equipment; we are
-among the best equipped men in the field in Korea. Our food is good. We cannot complain on those grounds. The medical equipment is good. The dental equipment is good. But what we need in Korea more than anything else are some service canteens.
I know that we went into that matter about three years ago and that the minister claimed there was no necessity for them. I know that on that occasion 1 protested quite strongly as did other members of the opposition and some members on the government side. The sergeant to whom I was talking said they lacked that little touch of Canada while away from home. They obtained ail their canteen supplies and so on through NAAFI.
I do not think I need to say too much about NAAFI. The returned men here all know of the complaints-at least I do-that we all had against NAAFI during the second war. For one thing, they rely a great deal on the profits they can get. The men could not get their Canadian cigarettes, chocolate bars and so on. The tea was undrinkable and the coffee was worse. But even of more importance, it was a fact that the men could not walk into a canteen and be greeted by Canadians. The man to whom I was speaking said that the recreation facilities in the matter of canteens and so on were the greatest lack as far as operations in Korea were concerned.
I would therefore urge the minister to reconsider the stand he took at that time and to allow these various service clubs to go into Korea in the same way as they travelled all over the world with the boys during the last two wars.
In my conversation with the boys I also found out something else that was rather interesting. It had to do with the accommodation in Korea, particularly around the brigade headquarters. During all of the campaign the boys had been billeted in tents, but by sheer coincidence a few days before the Prime Minister's visit the tents suddenly disappeared and a profusion of quonset huts came on the scene. There was no shortage of them but they had not been able to get them for three years prior to that. For


example, after the radio station had appeared to be at a standstill for quite some time it suddenly went on the air just three days before the Prime Minister arrived. At about the same time sudden, feverish activity with respect to the large recreational centre resulted in quite a definite change taking place a few days prior to the Prime Minister's visit.
After the minister and others have visited some of the overseas bases of the Canadian forces they return with glowing tales, but such things as I have mentioned make us wonder whether or not these stories are perhaps a little rosier than the situation is in reality. I urge the minister once more, as I have done on other occasions, that when he or his parliamentary assistant or other officials make their tours of the Canadian overseas establishments they should take at least one or two of the opposition members with them. If things are as good over there as the minister says they are, then he should be only too glad to have opposition members come back here, stand up in the house and say how good things are. On the other hand, if things are not as good as he says, then it is time that the Canadian people found out.
I have a couple of other brief references. I notice that the minister makes reference on page 11 of the white paper to the fact that nuclear information is being distributed among the NATO forces to enable them to take full advantage of these weapons. I should like the minister to elaborate on that slightly and tell us the extent of that information. I should like to know whether it is merely information as to the method of detonating the bombs or whether it goes a little further and gives information as to the set-up, the means of production and so forth.
To come to the navy, I note that the minister has indicated in the white paper that within a few months of the outbreak of hostilities the Canadian navy would have a hundred ships in action. I should like to know how many of these ships could be considered first-line ships, how many could be used for convoy or escort duty in the Atlantic or Pacific, how many could be used as coastal escort vessels and how many would have to be sunk to form barriers to keep the enemy from getting into our bays. He also said that there were 58 ships in commission at the present time. I should like to know how many of the 58 can be considered first-line ships. I should like to know whether or not they are capable of carrying out anti-submarine warfare as it is known today or whether they are the old, cumbersome, corvette-type escort vessel that was obsolete before the end of the last war.

The Canadian navy has always been engaged primarily in escort work, and once again I should like to ask the minister to give serious consideration to the production of small aircraft carriers, possibly a modernized version of the merchant aircraft carriers of the last war, a ship that is not too fast but will carry a small reconnaissance plane that can search the area immediately around the convoy in order to discover the presence of enemy submarines. In my opinion the aircraft launched from the small converted merchant aircraft carriers won the battle of the Atlantic for us. The cost is not great. They are not an expensive ship, and so far as escort work is concerned they are worth their weight in gold.
The minister referred to the air defence plan, the radar screen and so on. Like the minister, I visited one of the radar stations in the screen some time ago, and I too witnessed the interception of so-called enemy planes by fighter aircraft. I was impressed this afternoon by the figure given as to the high percentage of kills made in the air exercises. But I am wondering just how effective the air defence plan would be against highly modern, fast, high-altitude bombers. As was pointed out by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar, no matter how efficient the radar screen may be it cannot do us any good if the air power behind the screen is insufficient. We have to have enough modern, well-equipped aircraft here in Canada in order to back up that screen. As the minister says, with the type of aerial bomb being constructed today, not many aircraft would have to get through the screen to wreck absolutely a good many of the larger cities of Canada.
As I mentioned at the outset, we in this group will continue to support any necessary defence expenditures or defence effort. The only stipulation we put on our support is that we get value for our dollars, that for every cent that goes into our defence effort we get a cent's worth of value in return. We can only hope that by negotiations or some other means the international crisis will be solved before too long and people will know once more what peace and security are.


Mr. Churchill:: Mr. Chairman, we listened with interest this afternoon to the minister's review of world conditions. I thought it was a typical statement by the minister, a general review with a touch of the external affairs debate in it; some comment about the amount of money that Canada is expending on preparations for defensive purposes; some comment on the navy; slightly more extensive comment on the air force; some mention of
Supply-National Defence the army, but no close attention to the question of detail. The minister started off by suggesting that a clear meaning should be given to some of the expressions that have been used recently in international affairs, such as "massive retaliation", "the new look", and "the long haul". I had hoped he would have taken my advice on an earlier occasion and dropped the use of the word "aggression", and used instead the simple word "war". It has a very clear and well understood meaning. However, he has not come around to that yet.
I agree with the minister that the development of nuclear weapons affords a great deterrent to a major war, but that there is no evidence yet before us that small wars will not occur, that is, the wars of limited objective. For that reason we still have to place reliance on the so-called conventional weapons. To the extent that the minister and his department are maintaining our forces along conventional lines, I think that they are right. We have not yet reached, as he stated, the push-button warfare stage. However, I thought that there was a weakness in the minister's statement. I thought it was more a quartermaster general's review of the situation, mentioning supplies, accommodation, equipment and things of that nature, with a little word from the adjutant general's branch concerning personnel. We did not hear much, if anything, from the point of view of the general staff, those who are responsible for strategy and tactics. I had hoped the minister would apply his mind to the fighting effectiveness of our armed services.
I think that over the years his attitude has become the infrastructure approach to the problems. He likes to tell us about the camps, the accommodation and so on, for the forces. I have no objection to seeing the services properly housed. I believe that is a good thing. It is good for morale and it is good for health. There is no reason why they should not be well looked after. It is the question of emphasis about which I express some surprise. For example, the minister gave us one of those typical sentences of his in respect of our service people in Europe. He told us that they had the finest living accommodation for the men, their wives and children anywhere in the world. Well, that is interesting and we are glad to hear that they are being well looked after.
But I do not think that strikes at the root of the problem in respect of defence. My interest is, what are we getting for our defence dollar in fighting effectiveness? To that question, over the last two or three
4928	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence years, no satisfactory answer has been forthcoming. The minister said nothing or next to nothing concerning weapons and ammunition; nothing about artillery or tanks and very little about rockets or new weapons. He did not even make any statement or announcement to us about the possibility of the Canadian army adopting a new rifle. Perhaps that will come later when we get to the second item of these estimates. I thought it was of sufficient importance for an announcement to be made during the course of the minister's major speech. On this subject he said nothing about the need for increased mobility of our forces, and that is a matter of considerable concern to those who are in charge of the NATO forces in Europe.
I thought the minister might have gone a little further into the problem of what warfare might be like in the future in this atomic age; that he might have pointed out to us that atomic weapons might be used on the battlefield as between two opposing armies; that they would cause a greater area of destruction; that they would prevent the massing of troops in a leisurely way as has been done in other wars; that heavily populated seaports and vast assembly areas would constitute a grave hazard with atomic weapons available. I thought he would go on to point out that under circumstances such as those, the need to assemble forces rapidly to launch an assault and to disperse them rapidly in case of an enemy attack with atomic artillery would require greater mobility than our army possesses today.
We do not want to be prepared merely for the last war or the one that preceded that. We have to keep in mind that other changes are in the air. It would have been very useful to the house to have had some statement from the minister along those lines.
I admit that it enters the realm of tactics, perhaps of strategy, but it is only if we understand what we are up against that we can give full accord to the plans of the minister for his preparations. It is only then that the people of Canada would continue unanimously to provide the money necessary for the equipment and expansion of our forces. We surely must know how they are going to be used, and what our plans are with regard to future developments in warfare.
If we are going to have mobility for our army, tracked vehicles for cross country movement are essential and air transport for troops and supplies is essential. The use of the helicopter is a development that is proceeding apace with some armies in other parts of the world. Surely the minister


might have dwelt upon this subject, and shown us whether or not our army was up to date in its planning and in its training. In a recent interview with the press, General Montgomery said that the requirement for the troops under his command was mobility and more mobility. What are we doing about that? I shall refer to that a little later.
I want now to just touch on the minister's speech of last November, to which he referred two or three times. I recall, and Hansard records, that last November the minister entered the debate on the speech from the throne and expressed surprise that nobody had mentioned the subject of defence. I shall just quote his words as reported at page 358 of Hansard for November 26. He said:
Mr. Speaker, this debate opened two weeks ago today, and a most extraordinary thing has happened which X must confess surprises me very much, that is that during this whole period the subject of defence has not so far been mentioned.
The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich and myself undertook to deal with the subject later on in that debate, in answer to this challenge of the minister. Of course there was no opportunity for him to reply at that stage, and he has not taken the opportunity now to answer some of the questions we raised on that occasion.
I was suggesting to him that it would be a fine thing if the Minister of National Defence were to interest himself in the development of the armoured corps, and in the development of an armoured personnel carrier for infantry, in order that the lives of our Canadian soldiers might be saved, in the event of their being engaged in battle under conditions such as occurred during the last war in northwestern Europe. I had hoped the minister would say something about that today, although some interval has elapsed since I posed the questions to him.
I asked him this:	Why is the Canadian
army as a whole not being brought up to the standards required in modern warfare? Why is the armoured corps not being enlarged and returned to strength and, most important of all, why is not armoured protection for our infantry being provided?
To the last question I find what is perhaps a partial answer as it is set out at page 39 of the white paper. Paragraph 147 says:
The army is also developing a new tracked carrier for the infantry.
I think the sentence, however, is rather carelessly written. The word "carrier" has been used in the past to refer, not to a troop-carrying vehicle but to a machine-guncarrying vehicle. It will be recalled that we had Bren gun carriers in the second

world war. Who is to tell what this is? If it is to be an armoured personnel carrier, or a troop carrying vehicle, why not say so? But simply to say that a new tracked carrier for the infantry is being provided is not clear enough.
However, I will assume that the minister and his advisers have now come around to the view that the vehicle which was so effective in the second world war in the saving of lives of Canadian soldiers is now going to be used in the present Canadian army, and incorporated in their training. It will be a major step forward if that is done; and I will simply assume that that is now part of the policy of the department.
During the course of my remarks last November, and on other occasions, I have dealt with this topic. I have also dealt with the armoured corps and have lamented the position to which it has fallen within the Canadian army. I said it had become the Cinderella of the Canadian army.
Just a year ago, when I was discussing this matter, the minister said in reply, on April 16, 1953, as reported at page 3981 of Hansard:
The hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre again referred to our playing down the armoured corps. There is no intention of doing that and there is no indication of that being done. Everyone appreciates the great importance of armour and its proper place in any fighting team.
Well, what has happened in the course of the year? If everyone appreciates that, and if the armoured corps is not being played down, then why is it not being enlarged? Why is it not being utilized effectively? I made considerable reference during the course of that speech in the house to how well the Canadian infantry corps, as well as the artillery and the engineers, had been trained, due to the campaign in Korea and to the stationing of troops in Europe, as well as to the rotation of units that had occurred. 1 dealt at some length with the number of senior officers in those corps of the army who had received training. There were certainly four infantry brigadiers, and a score or perhaps a dozen or more lieutenant colonels, and over a score of majors, and more than that, of company commanders and seconds in command-men who under actual service conditions received training in the command of those formations of troops. The result has been that the Canadian infantry corps, as well as the artillery and the engineers, under this process must have become a very effective fighting team.
But in the same interval what has happened to the armoured corps? This question may be of no importance, until one recalls
Supply-National Defence the status of the armoured corps in the second world war, when it constituted about half of the Canadian army-two armoured divisions, two tank brigades, and so on. But what have we now? Well, we are reduced to two regiments. What training have they received during the Korean war or while the brigade has been stationed in Europe? One squadron only is serving in Korea and one in Europe, and being rotated. The tanks of those squadrons are apparently being farmed out to the infantry regiment. Perhaps they operate now and again, or have operated as squadrons. But I doubt it in Korea. There has been no opportunity for a major in command of that squadron to exercise his squadron as a whole, and there has been no competent training for majors commanding squadrons in the armoured corps. There is no training for seconds in command of armoured regiments. There is no training for lieutenant colonels of armoured regiments. So that at the conclusion of this period during which the Canadian infantry corps as well as the engineers and artillery have become fully trained under conditions of warfare, the armoured corps has been only partially trained. And no plans have been announced to us at the present time indicating any extension of the training of the armoured corps.
The result is that the officers of this part of the army simply cannot be promoted. There is no expansion of their opportunity because there is nowhere for them to go. I do not know whether the present lieutenant colonels of the armoured regiments will become brigadiers in command of infantry brigades; I do not know that. But I think that those men who have had service as lieutenant colonels overseas would take precedence over those who have had experience only here in Canada, with a reduced force under their command.
I pointed out at that time that this is a bad thing for the Canadian army. It is out of balance in relation to the way in which armies are formed elsewhere. The British army, for instance, is not neglecting its armoured corps. I believe they have three armoured divisions in Europe. The Russians have not neglected their armoured strength, nor have the Americans. Why have the Canadians-and particularly when we were experts in the use of armour during the last war?
The minister mentioned economy in men and money as one of the essential points in the defence program. Well, I would point out to him that you have economy in the use of men when you use armoured vehicles. You can have a much greater fire power with several hundred fewer men by using
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Supply-National Defence an armoured brigade instead of an infantry brigade. And if they happen to be engaged in battle, you have a very much smaller casualty list. This has been proved time and again. I have advanced evidence before to this effect in the house.
In the face of these facts, why is the armoured corps in the Canadian army neglected? The minister rejected our proposal last year for the maintenance of an armoured brigade in Europe and an armoured brigade in Canada, with rotation between the two. If he will not accept that suggestion, then I put forward this. Why not constitute an armoured brigade here in Canada? Activate another regiment. Let us have three regiments and an armoured brigade headquarters, and train the personnel and the senior officers in the use of armour. It goes farther than just that.
Let me look for one moment at the training program of the Canadian army as I see it in the white paper and from reading the newspapers. The brigade in Europe participated in an exercise not so long ago and was pitted against a British armoured division, and of course acquitted itself nobly. It was a good exercise for the brigade commander and his subordinate commander, a good signal exercise, good for the transportation of the troops, for the supply of them in the field. It would be splendid for the men themselves participating in the open and simulating modern warfare, but quite unrealistic, of course. An infantry brigade versus an armoured division just would not survive under actual conditions unless it had superior artillery, because what effective fighting strength has an infantry battalion against an armoured regiment? They could put out mine fields, use a few bazookas, but under shellfire, under cover of darkness, they have no effective protection against tanks.
I notice on page 30 of the white paper we are informed in paragraph 115 that brigade groups will be assembled for collective training at Camp Wainwright and Camp Gage-town during the summer of 1954. It also says:
A signal exercise will be conducted by headquarters first Canadian infantry division at Camp Borden in 1954, in which the divisional headquarters, headquarters second and third Canadian infantry brigades, headquarters of supporting arms and services, and signals units will participate.
That is a typical signal exercise, where officers operate from vehicles or at desks, use the wireless and simulate attack and withdrawal and so on. There is no use of troops under those circumstances.


On page 7 of the white paper we find some mention of the mobile striking force consisting of an infantry battalion with airborne units of artillery, engineers, signals, army service corps and medicals. There is no suggestion there that they have been formed into a brigade, or that it has been exercised as a brigade, and there is no mention of armoured formations at all.
I was saying that this reaches farther than simply the provision of armour to balance the army. It reaches farther than that in this way. We must assume that if we are engaged in a war of limited objective, it might be in terrain where armoured forces could be used. We must assume that if we are engaged in a somewhat larger war, armoured forces will be used. The enemy have armoured forces. Therefore the point is that unless we train the high command in the Canadian army in the use of armour we shall be in a very serious position in a state of war.
I say that it is just nonsense to be preparing simply infantry forces-and we are talking about forming a division of infantry -unless we balance against that the necessary armour to give them protection and support. If we do not provide the armour for the Canadian army, we do not train the senior officers. If we do not train the senior officers, we face a serious situation in time of war. I stood in awe of senior officers for a large portion of my life; but with the passing of the years that awe has diminished very considerably. I have the greatest respect, of course, for my distinguished colleague, the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, but he will agree with me it is essential for the high command, for divisional and corps commanders, to understand the use of all arms within the army. We had many experiences in the second world war of that where people unfamiliar with armoured formations were not able to use them effectively. Repeatedly I told men under my command when we were engaged in exercises in England at which they grumbled: "Put up with it; do anything that you are told to do under these conditions because we are training the high command, and you may live a bit longer if the high command gets trained."
I am a bit worried about the Canadian army. We have a great number of experienced senior officers still with us in the service, and all credit to them for staying in the service, and all honour to them. I respect them. A great many of them have active service experience and understand conditions, but a new crop of officers is being

produced, and I doubt whether that new crop of officers is being thoroughly trained. How can they be thoroughly trained unless the armoured corps is brought back to its position within the Canadian army that it occupied heretofore? It simply means that the experienced senior officers in the Canadian infantry corps, in the engineers and in the artillery, are going to rise to the top. They will become the major generals and lieutenant generals; they will command the divisions and the corps and they will not know very much about armour. No armoured corps officer is going to reach high position because no senior armoured corps officer is being fully trained at the present time. We have no armoured brigade; we have no armoured division, and there, Mr. Chairman, is a weakness in the Canadian army which I think should be corrected.
I had hoped that the minister would deal with some of these pressing problems instead of giving us just that quartermaster general's view of the situation. It is an effective fighting force that we want. We want to know how our defence dollar is being spent. Is it producing effective fighting forces? Are we producing with that defence dollar the means for protecting the lives of our men? They will fight gallantly under any conditions. They will die as gallantly as the defenders of Dien Bien Phu, if placed under similar circumstances, but that is not war; that is suicide. The Canadian soldier, who is a first-class soldier, if well trained, should never be subjected to conditions under which he is placed at a disadvantage. My hope is that the Canadian army will become the most effective fighting force available within the NATO countries, and that it will have the full equipment for modern conditions; that it will have the mobility that is required for modern warfare, and that it will have the trained staff that is required in order to utilize to its fullest effect artillery and armour, infantry and engineers and so on. Equipped with the best of weapons, equipped with track vehicles for cross-country purposes, equipped with those protective troop carrying vehicles for the infantry, and equipped with transport aeroplanes and helicopters, if those are found to be satisfactory for use in the field, equipped in this way, brought up to date, modernized, the Canadian army would be something of which we would be prouder than we are at the present time, although we are very proud of it. It would then be an effective fighting force and there would be protection for our men if they were ever placed under modern conditions of warfare, for they would be an integrated, coordinated force which would serve to train the high command, and if we were ever
Supply-National Defence called upon to undertake war in future we would achieve the success which has been granted to the Canadian soldiers in the field in other wars in which Canada has been engaged.


Clarence Gillis: Mr. Chairman, coming into the chamber this evening I noticed that the committee on procedure was sitting. It struck me at that time, after listening to the Minister of National Defence making his comprehensive statement, then listening to the official spokesmen on defence matters for the Conservative party, our own chief spokesman and the member who spoke on behalf of the Social Credit party, that if this general debate on the defence estimates stopped right there, so far as general statements are concerned, it would be much better, and we could then go into the estimates in detail, thus saving a lot of time. To my surprise, when I was upstairs in the cafeteria, the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre, who is a member of that committee, pretty well expressed the same opinion, so we may be getting around to the time when we can avoid duplication in debate.
Listening to the Minister of National Defence this afternoon, one was struck by the fact that defence today is perhaps the biggest business in the world. The attention of the world is focused on the possibility of war, making preparations for war, and spending huge chunks of national income to that end. The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar this afternoon dealt in detail with the defence program as set out in the white paper and I am going to try to avoid any duplication of his remarks. But, as I have already said, the thing that struck me was the difficulty of anyone in or out of the government estimating exactly what the cost of defence might be under the circumstances which today confront the world.
We are in that position simply because our program is defensive, and because we are on the defensive. The people against whom we are arming to defend ourselves are on the offensive, and they are in a position to choose their own battleground and time their attack, when it is going to be and where it will be, and there is no one either on that side of the house or on this in a position to say just when that attack will come. That is what makes the problem not only of estimating the cost but of criticizing the cost so very difficult, because the whole thing is merely a guess based on a hypothetical war. You cannot estimate that cost down to the last dollar, though you can probably make some good guesses.

Supply-National Defence
I could make a speech with a lot of words that would sound all right but which would perhaps not read quite so well, and after I had finished I would not have said anything. But what I am going to try to do is to pinpoint the two things which stand out in my mind in relation to the defence program, and I think they are pretty clear.
The first of these is Canada's defence objectives as set out on page 5 of the white paper, and I think we should keep these in mind. Anything we do in this chamber, particularly of a national or international character, should have a very clearly defined objective, and the first objective set out there very briefly states:
The objectives of our defence policy remain the same as heretofore:
(1)	The immediate defence of Canada and North America from direct attack;
That is set down as our first objective, to see that this country is sufficiently prepared in the event of a direct attack to resist that attack. And then it goes on to say:
(2)	implementation of any undertakings made by Canada under the charter of the United Nations.
And so on. That is our second objective. And again, in section 9, on the same page, prominence is again given to the first paragraph under those objectives, namely defence against direct attack. That should be the first consideration as far as Canada's national defence program is concerned, and that is the thing to which we, as members of the opposition, should be directing our attention in order to see that the objectives set out by the government are properly planned.
The minister this afternoon did not say anything about what in my judgment is one of the first requirements in any defence program, and that is that one of the first things we should do, if we expect the support of the people who pay taxes and thereby provide the wherewithal for this defence program, is to make it very clear to the general public, and particularly to service personnel, why we are arming ourselves, against whom we are arming to defend ourselves, and what we might expect in the future.
Hon. members will no doubt recall that Bill Boss wrote some very critical articles from Korea early in the Korean war and he said that as far as Canadian soldiers were concerned the thing they did not understand and which was never made clear to them was what they were fighting for. The minister neglected to deal with that particular side of the defence program.
However, I have an editorial in my hand which indicates that the defence department is working on that problem. This editorial states that at Acadia University and McGill


University in Montreal a series of lectures on that subject is being given which will eventually be put into book form to be distributed among service personnel. I think that is something which is badly needed because we cannot keep on telling the people of Canada, the United States, or any other country that a continuous war is necessary in order that they may live. We must not forget that we have had practically nothing but war during the lifetime of the present generation, and it must be made clear to them exactly why we are carrying on this huge defence program. I am glad to see the department is doing something about bringing that aspect of the situation to the attention of service personnel, and I think these matters should be more widely publicized so they will be brought to the attention of the average Canadian citizen.
The second thing about which I should like to say a few words is this question that has been referred to by practically all those who have spoken, namely that of the danger of an atomic war, of the throwing of the hydrogen bomb, the possibility of setting the world afire and all that kind of thing as related to our present defence program. As far as I am concerned, I am not afraid of the throwing of the atomic bomb or the hydrogen bomb. I do not think that there is anyone in Russia, the United States or Canada who does not realize that if either the hydrogen bomb or the atomic bomb is thrown, there is not going to be anything left. I do not think there is any country in this world today that wants to commit either national or international suicide. In the event of either Russia or the United States deciding to throw that bomb, all I can say is this. Planes will load up in Russia with bombs for the North American continent. We will load planes in the United States with bombs for Russia. Each group will arrive at their destination, will bomb their targets and return; and when they get back home there will be nothing to land on. Where do they go from there? The situation is as fantastic as that, without any doubt.
I do not think there is anyone today in any kind of a position of authority to give an order to begin that kind of action who is foolish enough to do so, because nobody can win. A great deal of that propaganda, of course, may be coming from certain sources for the purpose of mixing people up on this question of defence. I do not think any such order is going to be given or that any such action is going to take place. In my opinion we are in for a long siege of the kind of thing we are getting in Korea and Indochina. I believe we are going to get a great deal more of that kind of thing.

I am convinced-as I have been for a long time-that the objective of Russia today is to take control of Asia and that she is not going to do it with atomic bombs or hydrogen bombs. The pattern has already been set. With all due respect to everyone who has expressed the opinion that there is a danger of this other thing happening, I would suggest to them that with all of this talk of new weapons, the only practical demonstrations we have had during the past few years have been in Korea and Indo-China. In both of these actions, manpower was the decisive factor. In my judgment, for some considerable time to come the decisive factor will be manpower with ground weapons. I agree with the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre that we are not placing enough emphasis on armament. I am convinced that is the kind of thing for which we must be prepared for a long time to come.
This afternoon the Minister of National Defence said that the policy of the communist party in the matter of world domination has not been changed. I agree with him. It has not been changed. But they are not guessing about anything. They are on the offensive. They mapped out their objectives a long time ago and the way in which they were going to achieve them. The period they are in now is that of promoting national revolutions from country to country. We started to lose this war at Yalta, Teheran and Casablanca when we granted all of the concessions that were granted for jumping-off places all through Europe. That is where we began to lose it. These contributions they are making, without using their own forces but by supplying material, advice and that kind of thing, are things that we are going to have to contend with for a long time to come.
As to Europe, I agree with what was said by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar this afternoon. We have twelve squadrons over in Europe. From the standpoint of defence for Canada, I believe that we could take six of them back. If we save some money through the process, that is all to the good. I believe that six of them could be back here. Instead of there being a brigade of foot soldiers in Europe, I think the forces there should be, to the extent of at least 75 per cent, armoured forces. I think at this time the real purpose our troops in Europe are serving is that of morale-boosters. If the Russians, with the forces at their disposal, wanted to move there, I do not think there is much there to stop them. However, I do not think they intend to move there; I do not think they have any such intentions. But if they did move, it would be much better to meet them with
Supply-National Defence armour than with foot soldiers. In terms of defence for Canada, I think that these squadrons should be back home. I agree with the observations in the white paper, supported by all of those who have spoken, namely that what we should be thinking about is a mobile striking force; that is, in terms of defence for Canada. The minister himself pointed out that we have a large country with long coast line. We do not know where anything may happen. It could happen anywhere. But we should have in Canada a trained airborne force that we could ship from place to place in a hurry, and it should be at the brigade level. I again agree with the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar that at least a brigade of well-trained airborne troops, with sufficient aircraft in the country to move them from one place to another, is something that is absolutely necessary in Canada if we are thinking in terms of defence for Canada. With our population and our resources, as far as a fighting force is concerned that is about all we can do having regard to the international picture that exists today.
This afternoon nobody said much about the reserve army. The last time the defence estimates were before the committee a great deal was said about the reserve army. I myself said a great deal as did the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich. At that time, in my opinion, the limiting factor in developing a proper reserve army was the lack of barracks in which to train the men and the lack of equipment. Since that debate took place there has been a big improvement in the barracks and in the equipment. I cannot speak for the whole of the country but I know that in my own end of it there has been a 100 per cent improvement and that, with the improvement in the training facilities-new barracks, in fact, and proper equipment-there are a great many boys interested in taking part in the reserve army today who would not do so previously because there was not available a proper place in which to take instruction. Under our system of voluntary enlistment, I think the reserve army is something that is absolutely necessary. It is the mobilization centre of any future army in Canada. It is the place where we get a great deal of basic training done anyway; and it is much easier to put in the permanent force or in the special force troops who have had some basic training and who have some idea of discipline than it is to pick them raw off the street and out of the ranks of the unemployed and expect them to be good soldiers. I think any money we are spending on the reserve army is well spent. In my end of

Supply-National Defence the country the reserve army has been improved 100 per cent since we last discussed the matter here. I also agree with the statement of the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar this afternoon that the "Maggie" should be re-equipped so that we might have an aircraft carrier on each coast. I think that is necessary not only for training but for many other purposes, and I support him in that contention.
One could go on for a long time in summing up the whole problem, but as I said when I started, it is difficult to criticize the estimates just as it is difficult to estimate what the requirements are going to be with respect to a matter that is purely hypothetical so far as we are concerned. If we were preparing for a war and knew where and when we were going to be hit we could sit down and make our estimates accordingly; but when the initiative is in the other person's hands and he has the world in which to choose his battleground, then we have got to anticipate where and when the outbreak may take place and what type of war it is going to be, and it is pretty hard to sit down and estimate exactly what your requirements are in such circumstances.
I think we have to begin to think in terms of priorities. What are the first priorities? I think our first priority is set out in the white paper, namely, the defence of Canada. Thinking in terms of the defence of Canada, the main emphasis of the Department of National Defence should be on a mobile striking force that can be moved quickly from one section of Canada to the other. I think that is our main concern, and I believe that one-half of our air force in Europe should be brought back to Canada for that purpose. I do not believe we need twelve air force squadrons in Europe as Canada's contribution. I think the minister should give serious consideration to that.
I am convinced that so far as Canada is concerned we should not be thinking about taking part in the kind of show that took place in Korea in the future. We should be building for something bigger than that. We should realize that so far as any of these sideline wars are concerned the battlefield is not in Korea or Indo-China. I think it is pretty nearly time that the free world gave our potential enemy to understand that there is only one battleground and that we are not going to continue to allow ourselves to be dragged into sideline skirmishes in the four corners of the world, skirmishes that only create confusion, at the beck and call of someone whose aim is world conquest. I think it should be clearly understood that
{Mr. Glllis.]

there is only one battleground, and that is the centre from which the whole world disturbance is being promoted.
I believe our build-up should be along these lines, and it should be clearly understood that we recognize what the situation is. If one sifts out what is being said in the United States, I think one can say that that country is beginning to think along those lines. We are in a very difficult position to estimate what our future is going to be. I believe the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich will agree with me that one of the main things a good general will do if he is planning an attack is to choose the battleground upon which he is going to fight. He has a lot in his favour if he can succeed in doing that.
Since the end of the last shooting war we have been in the position of being tossed around like a small boat on the sea because someone who really has a fixed objective, an objective fixed a long time ago, and who has satellites all over the world promoting his aims, is calling the shots in this struggle for world power. It is pretty difficult to sit back on the defensive as we have been doing for a long time and estimate what our future is going to be. First of all, I think we should take care of the defence of Canada and make sure that if anyone does succeed in getting through to us we will be able to give a good account of ourselves. In the second place, we should serve notice on those who are disturbing the peace of the world that they cannot go on forever.
I am not and never have been afraid of Russia starting a world war. She does not have to. She has got the kind of war going today that she wants. This is the kind of thing that she has planned for a good many years. I am convinced she also recognizes that in the countries she has subjugated since the end of the last war there are underground movements waiting for relief. The day an atomic bomb is dropped somewhere in Europe will be the day that Russia will be pushed back within her own borders. She has expanded into Germany. In that part of the world she is like the fly that has captured the fly paper. She is there and she is stuck, and when that paper is disturbed we will have a whole lot of allies in these countries.
That is why I am not afraid of Russia starting a war. She does not need it. She has got the kind of war she wants now. She has been able to drag us to Korea where we have a supply line three or four thousand miles long in order to keep the troops in the field, provide them with munitions and so on. On the

other hand Russia has millions and millions of people to throw in there as cannon fodder, people who can live on rice, and thus she can gain her objective of taking control of the whole of Asia. That is the kind of war she wants. She does not want the other kind.
I said, Mr. Chairman, that I was only going to make a few rambling remarks. I should like to suggest that the committee on procedure give consideration to making provision for four main speeches in a debate such as this, one from each group in the house. Such speeches would really express the opinions and thinking of the other members of the groups, and when they were over we could get down to the estimates and do the job of getting them cleaned up as quickly as we can.


Mr. Nesbitt:: Mr. Chairman, my remarks on the opening item of the estimates will be concerned chiefly with the Royal Canadian Navy. I think every hon. member is justifiably proud of the Royal Canadian Navy, its great expansion in the last war and the work it performed then and the work it has done since in Korean waters. From any observations I have made of naval personnel since the close of hostilities, I can only say that naval personnel at present and during the last few years are in every way a credit to Canada both at home and abroad.
Like many other hon. members who have already spoken, I thoroughly agree that we cannot discard the so-called conventional weapons at the present time simply because new advances in the field of warfare have been made such as the hydrogen bomb, the atom bomb and so on. I agree with the last member who spoke, the hon. member for Cape Breton South, that Russia will probably attempt to hold piecemeal wars here and there, and try to gain control over more territory by the bits and pieces method. We have seen it in Korea, although they did not get too far there. In Indo-China, however, they have been doing fairly well so far. From reports received today, I understand they are very close to Hanoi and are still going. The Russians have been able to succeed in other parts of the world without war, for instance in Czechoslovakia. I rather feel, as many other members have already stated they feel, that this is the kind of thing we are going to have to put up with for a long time.
We may have many localized actions all over the world, and we will not be using nuclear weapons. We shall have to use the more conventional weapons. For that reason, I am quite in accord that the naval forces, with conventional weapons, should be maintained at the highest peak of efficiency. I am
Supply-National Defence glad to see in the estimates put forward by the minister this year that the navy is going to receive its fair share of the funds available. I was pleased also to observe that gracious living is not being taken from the navy. This year 267 chauffeurs are to be maintained as compared with 216 for last year.
The matter with which I should like to deal in some detail concerns the Royal Canadian naval benevolent fund. I mention this because I have received many inquiries about it from naval personnel, so I can only presume that there must be very little general knowledge about the fund. I bring it up at this time because this fund was set up originally by order in council in 1942, P.C. 1067. In due course the fund was incorporated under the dominion Companies Act, and I understand makes an annual report to the Secretary of State. The president of this fund at the moment is an engineering rear admiral, G. L. Stephens, retired. I should like to mention just a few of the directors. They are Commander A. C. Bethune, O.B.E., RCN, retired; Captain J. Jeffrey, O.B.E.; Commander K. Maclachlan; Commodore P. E. Earl; Captain P. B. German; Commander R. P. White, and many others. I just mention those names to illustrate the high qualifications of those who are administering this fund.
The fund has had a rather interesting history, but I intend to deal with it only briefly. I have mentioned already that it was set up in 1942 and was duly incorporated in 1945. I recall very well that at the close of hostilities a signal was sent out by naval service headquarters announcing that the canteen funds of naval ships were to be turned over to this fund. I might say that most of us considered it rather arbitrary at the time because these funds actually were derived from the small profits of ships' canteens and were normally returned to naval personnel on the ships in the form of a bonus when they went on leave or a little extra party at Christmastime if we were in harbour. However, these funds were turned over to the R.C.N. benevolent fund. I believe that at the end of 1945 the fund received $33,000 from the ships that were afloat and $386,000 from shore naval establishments.
Towards the end of 1949 the sum of $1,460,287.25 was contributed to this fund from the prize money that was owing to Canadian naval personnel as a result of the capture of enemy merchant ships during the war. Normally, these moneys would have been distributed to the various former naval personnel, but I am informed that the cost of distributing them to the ex-naval personnel would have been very high and would have used up most of the funds. For this reason, it

Supply-National Defence was turned over to the benevolent fund. I am informed also that there was some little difficulty as to how the money would be paid out, if it had been decided to distribute it. Some of the senior officers thought they should get more than the lower ranks, while other members thought everyone should be paid the same. Since no one could agree, this was one of the contributing reasons for turning the money over to the benevolent fund.
Since that time many other donations have been received by the fund. There have been gifts from private individuals, money from ships' canteens, money from the navy league, and things like that. The last audit statement, December 31, 1953, showed that there was $2,627,509.79 in this fund, largely in dominion government bonds. Since there is all this money in the fund, many people are naturally curious as to who is eligible for assistance. Very briefly and without going into any detail, all members or former members of the naval service are eligible for benefits, as well as their dependents. There is a long description of the dependents, such as widows, wives, children and so on.
The next question is, what type of assistance is given by the fund? Normally, payments out of this fund are apparently in small denominations up to $150 in one class and then up to $300 in another class, and, in certain exceptional cases, over $300. The assistance under this fund is never in the nature of continuing assistance, but rather in the nature of assistance for some unforeseen difficulty such as illness. It is not used for helping people to build homes, to pay business debts or anything like that. I should like to mention that these loans are approved by an executive committee of the board of directors if they are for more than $300. If the loans are under $300, they are approved by one of three claims committees. One of these claims committees looks after the Atlantic provinces, another looks after Ontario, Quebec and the three western provinces and the third looks after British Columbia.
In cases of extreme emergency concerning requests for less than $150, the nearest naval division may authorize payment. The financial statement issued by the fund last year showed that some $629,126 were paid out in grants and $85,281 were advanced to persons in the form of loans. The balance sheet shows an excess of income over expenditures of $11,548. The income consisted of $75,000 from bond interest and $70,000 in donations, funds from ships' canteens and various agencies interested in the navy.
There is one thing that has come up as a result of investigations by the directors of


this fund that directly affects naval personnel and is directly related to these estimates. In a report by Rear Admiral Stephens, who is chairman of this committee, it is pointed out that the directors of this fund are increasingly concerned about applications for assistance from young naval personnel in the active service. Apparently these young people have been getting themselves into debt through buying furniture in an extravagant fashion. They have married while young, and they have not been accustomed to looking after homes. The result has been that they have spent far too much money in trying to keep up with the Joneses, so to speak. Applications of this type have caused the fund considerable worry, and I think the directors of the fund hope that the Minister of National Defence might authorize some sort of brief training course instructing sailors who come to the service in how to run their homes, and how to avoid running up large bills.
The only criticism I have to offer in connection with the benevolent fund is as to the personnel of the board of directors. It would seem to me that it is a bit top-heavy with what might be called the top brass. There are a lot of admirals, captains and commanders, but there do not seem to be any others on that board. It might be helpful if there were one or two able seamen-not too many, perhaps, but just one or two.
In addition to this, people who wish to make applications to the fund might be permitted to make those applications to the local branches of the Legion. The astonishing thing to me is that the ordinary person does not seem to know about it. I feel some effort should be made by the directors of the fund to bring to the attention of the public information as to how one can get at it and how to make application for the benefits it offers. There are a number of naval divisions scattered across Canada, as we know, but they are a long way from the homes of the people requiring assistance. There should be some method of publicizing the fund which, I believe, would be of great assistance to those requiring help from it, and would improve public relations with the fund. Because, from what I have been able to observe, it is being ably run; but because the general public does not know about it, it is not used to the best advantage because people are always suspicious about those things with which they are not familiar.
I should like to leave this point and proceed to another matter. This afternoon the minister mentioned that he was very well satisfied with the naval program, and felt that it was going ahead as well as could be

expected. While there were certain shortcomings, he indicated that he was very pleased with it. This however does not seem to be quite in accordance with the view expressed by Vice-Admiral Mainguy, chief of Canada's naval staff, in a speech delivered not long ago. On March 25 Vice-Admiral Mainguy made a speech in Vancouver. The newspaper article commenting on that speech is as follows:
Vice-Admiral Edmond Mainguy, chief of Canada's naval staff, said Wednesday the navy is "behind" on its 1954 recruiting and expansion program.
He said at a press conference here that the 1954 target is 100 commissioned ships and 21,000 permanent force officers and men.
While the program was behind, recruiting had surged this year, and intake for the permanent force was "slightly more than we can handle" at present, because physical establishments were not big enough to handle the flow.
The shipbuilding program was behind because of a lack of certain technicians, strikes in some cases, and holdups in certain equipment production.
According to the white paper issued by the minister the strength of the navy on March 31, 1954, was 16,955 officers and men, a net increase over last year of 1,409. It is rather interesting to compare these figures with the net increase in previous years. From 1951 to 1952 the net increase in naval personnel was 2,423. In the period from 1952 to 1953 it was 2,041 and in the period 1953 to 1954 it was 1,409.
In other words there has been a steady decrease in the net increase in naval personnel for the last three years. At that rate it seems to me hardly likely that by the end of 1954 the objective of 21,000 officers and men will be reached. The question naturally arises in most people's minds as to the methods used in recruiting, and the advertising costs in connection therewith. In the estimates this year there is a sum of $360,000 as the amount indicated for advertising. Presumably this is for recruiting purposes. I would point out that in the same period last year the amount was $358,000, or about the same as for the coming year.
During the period last year, with a net increase of 1,409 personnel the approximate advertising cost per person on the net increase in personnel was more than $250 each. It would seem to me that at that cost we should have obtained better results. The actual cost of advertising for recruits in the period from 1952 to 1953 was $398,000, for a net increase in naval personnel of 2,041 thus making an actual cost in that period of $188 per person.
As I have said before, advertising costs seem very high, per person, when one considers the number of people coming in. What can we do about it? I would suggest to the
Supply-National Defence minister that he might take certain things into consideration. First of all the obvious thing would be to investigate the type of advertising and publicity that is being used, to see if some improvement can be made. It may be that this is possible, and that we would gain more recruits per advertisement.
On the other hand there is another way that I believe would be more effective-and I have three suggestions in mind. First of all I believe the best results would be obtained if the naval reserve were increased. I would direct the attention of hon. members to page 21 of the minister's white paper where under the heading "Reserve Forces" we find this, in connection with the navy:
A new command was established during the year past to administer and train the R.C.N. (R) and plans are now in progress to increase the total strength of the naval reserve.
Apparently the minister is of the opinion that the reserve force ought to be increased; and I quite agree with him. If the naval reserve is not increasing at the desired rate, one method that might help out would be to make tax free the pay received by members of the naval reserve. I have talked to a number of people who were interested in joining this force, or one of the other services, and they have told me that they would have done so had it not been for the fact that the money they received for their period of training one night a week is subject to tax. This very often puts them in a higher income tax bracket, and they have felt that the amount they have left is not sufficient to warrant the time involved. I have been told on various occasions that if these payments were not taxable they would have been glad to join the reserve units. It is true that some who would join might be somewhat beyond the age of usefulness. But there is certainly an intangible value in having a strong naval reserve. One advantage is that the people see parades; they see the navy turning out. People talk about it, and it is brought to their minds more than it would be in the newspapers or in movie trailers. People can see the name as the personnel come down the street in a church parade, or they have the chance to see them take training courses. That helps to bring the navy to people's minds, not so many advertisements in the paper of two sailors with great big smiles going on leave from a ship, or more often one advertisement which shows sailors with a big smile going back on board after leave, which is very unusual.
Then there is the matter of sea cadets. If you want to get people in the navy you should get them in when the'- are young, because at that time they are more easily
4S38

Supply-National Defence moulded. They are not settled in their ways as some of us are here. When people are young is the best time to get them in the navy. Sea cadets do a wonderful job in this way. When they join the sea cadets they wear a uniform and they get a certain amount of training. It brings the navy home to them. The advantages of the navy can be pointed out to the sea cadets, and when they are through with the sea cadets they can join the navy. When the public sees the sea cadets it also brings the navy to their minds and impresses them with the fact that the navy is a great service to belong to.
Another branch along the same line would be the naval veterans association. Apparently a number of naval veterans associations have sprung up in Canada during the last few years. One was formed in my riding last fall and it has been a great success. A church parade was held, and it brought the navy home to the public. To use the vernacular: "Talk up the navy". It is such things as these that would help in recruiting. It is much more effective than a great deal of advertising. Some of the money that has been spent in advertising could be better used to assist the sea cadets and the small branches of the naval veterans association. If that were done the recruiting program in the long run would be much more successful.
The next item I should like to touch on is the matter of some of our new ships. Last fall I, along with other hon. members, had the opportunity of seeing some of our new destroyer type of escort ships which are in the process of construction. From my little knowledge gained in past years I would say that these ships appear to me to be well designed by Canadian personnel, I understand, and are indeed a credit to the navy. However, I agree with the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich that these ships are a little expensive for the type of work they will be doing. Perhaps some other method, as the hon. member pointed out this afternoon, would be better. The question also arises in my mind: Is the construction of those ships proceeding as fast as it should? This afternoon the minister said that construction was proceeding as fast as similar construction in other countries, but I do not think he intimated it was proceeding as fast as he would like to see it. I am informed that shortly before last Christmas there was a hold-up in the construction of those new destroyer escort type ships and this hold-up was due to shortages of materials that had to be ordered from abroad. When the minister replies he may enlighten us on whether


any hold-up in construction has taken place, and whether construction has resumed or is still held up.
The information I received is apparently substantiated by the chief of naval staff in the speech that I referred to earlier. He said that the shipbuilding program was behind because of lack of certain technicians and was held up for certain equipment production. These remarks of the chief of the naval staff seem to substantiate the statement made to me that the construction of those ships was not proceeding as fast as it should.
Another type of ship that I had the opportunity to observe at the same time last fall was the new type of minesweeper which was under construction. This minesweeper, unlike the ones used in the last war, was designed largely for minesweeping purposes. It seemed to be an excellent ship indeed with the one exception. A gun was mounted on the ship aft the funnel. It appeared to me to be a type of gun known as a pom-pom. In the last war those guns were not particularly effective against enemy aircraft, and I doubt very much whether this gun would have very much effect against a modern jet aircraft, which certainly travels a great deal faster than the aircraft used in the last war. I made some inquiries at the time and it was indicated to me that this gun was placed there largely for morale purposes and not for any destructive purposes. That is all very well. It is pleasant to keep up morale, but when you have to put heavy gun mountings away above the water line on the ship you have increased the amount of ballast that has to be built in in almost geometric proportion. It would seem that if those ships are going to be used for minesweeping they would be much better protected by supporting aircraft than by a single pom-pom.
There are two other items which I should like to touch on before concluding. The first is the matter of officer training in the navy. This matter is of some interest to me because during the last war I was at one time largely connected with officer training. I understand that at the present time for the first two years the embryo naval officers, along with embryo officers from the other services, attend those tri-service colleges and they all get the same training. That is all very fine, and it may have certain economic advantages. It may serve to get one service more familiar with the activities of another, but on the other hand I wonder whether it is just the wise thing. In the minister's white paper, which he set out very well, he said

that the main object of the Canadian navy is to protect convoys and the secondary purpose is harbour defence. Accordingly the inference is that we are not going to be concerned with large combined operations in landings, and so on, as the British navy and the United States navy are. Our purpose is designed peculiarly for convoy work, as we did in the last war. If that is so, it would not indicate that this tri-service training is particularly necessary. If we are not going to be in combined operations, what is the purpose? In my opinion this tri-service training that we are undergoing at the present time causes a great many things to be sacrificed that are peculiar to the navy. I do not use the word "peculiar" in the sense of being strange; but it is in particular, shall I say, the habits and customs, the methods of discipline, all of which tend to engender pride in one's service and increase morale. I think there is a great tendency to lose some of this in having the three services all training together, and nobody knowing whether he is fish or flesh, so to speak. I mention that for the minister's consideration. Has the tri-service college worked out as well as it was supposed to?
A matter that I should like to touch on, which does not concern the navy, was mentioned by the minister this afternoon, namely, the joint United States-Canadian network of radar defence stations in northern Canada. To date we have not received any figures as to what it has cost. It is my understanding that these sums are of a confidential and secret nature. There is very little doubt that the costs of those radar defence stations are very high indeed. It cannot be otherwise. Every hon. member will agree that Canada should do her bit in helping to defend this continent. We are very glad to do our share. There seems little doubt in my mind that these radar defence stations are really far more for the protection of the United States than they are for the protection of Canada. There are far more targets in the United States which would be apt to be the subject of H or A-bomb attacks than there are in Canada. But the minister has not told us what these stations are going to cost and what relative proportion of payment has been worked out. Is the United States going to pay the entire cost or are they going to pay only a part?


Brooke Claxton: If I may interrupt the hon. member, I would point out that that has been put on record through an exchange of notes.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: Perhaps I could shorten my remarks if the minister could tell us the proportion of payments.
Supply-National Defence


Brooke Claxton: It roughly works out at two-thirds by the United States and one-third by Canada.


Wallace Bickford (Wally) Nesbitt: I had heard rumours to that effect, Mr. Chairman, although I did not realize they had been made official. However, it would seem to me that since the population of the United States is more than ten times that of Canada and their wealth and resources are vastly superior, and perhaps 10 times more than that of Canada-possibly, Mr. Chairman, I had better correct that statement. I would say that American resources and wealth are considerably more than 10 times that of Canada and her population is certainly more than 10 times that of Canada. It would therefore seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that Canada's share should not be one-third but perhaps nearer to one-tenth. As I said earlier, we want to pay our share but we do not want to be goats for the United States. These defences help the United States as much as or more than they assist Canada, and I cannot see why a country smaller in both actual wealth and population should have to pay such a high percentage.
It is true that we have vast wealth and resources which are as yet undeveloped, but at the present time American resources and wealth are infinitely superior to our own and I cannot feel that we should pay one-third of the cost of these stations. It seems to me to be quite ridiculous.
I know these matters are international in character and that we have to play along with the United States. In fact, I would be the first to agree with that, but I still feel that Canada is paying far too much in this regard, and I hope the minister, perhaps through the Secretary of State for External Affairs, might be able to make some other arrangement in future whereby we can pay a little less.


Mr. MacLean:: Mr. Chairman, at the outset I wish to remark that I do not share the optimism expressed by the hon. member for Cape Breton South when he suggested that modern atomic and H-bombs were so horrible that they would probably never be brought into use and that we could work on that assumption. I can well imagine that after the terrible slaughter at the battle of Crecy it was observed by the people on the scene, and the opinion held by many thereafter, that another war would be impossible when one contemplated the horrible slaughter caused by the blunderbuss against which there was no defence.
I therefore think we would be deluding ourselves and falling into a state of mind which

Supply-National Defence might give us a false sense of security if we were to suppose that that was so.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I noted with satisfaction in the introduction to the white paper which was tabled by the minister the other day these words:
It is appropriate now to provide the fullest possible information on our defence activities and plans in order that this program can be understood in the light of Canada's over-all defence policy.
Having read that, I am going on the assumption that the minister will welcome a close questioning on the activities of the Department of National Defence, and I assume that the more penetrating the questions are the happier the minister will be.
Now, the question of national defence in this country has become a colossal one. It is a department which spends much more of the national budget than any other department, and indeed a very large proportion of our total budget is now spent on defence.
Our defence effort has many new phases. There is the defence of this continent and this country; there is our contribution to NATO; there are the three services to be considered; the reserve forces, and the question of research on methods of defence, which is now the responsibility of the defence research board; and there are many other phases in this vast program of national defence. I therefore consider, Mr. Chairman, that it is impossible and perhaps inadvisable for me to attempt to give even a cursory view of the whole question of national defence because by so doing I could only skim the surface in the 40 minutes at my disposal. Therefore, I intend to confine my remarks to two subjects only which are of special interest to me. However, since it is practically ten o'clock, I do not think I should continue meantime but should ask you, Mr. Chairman, to call it ten o'clock.


The Deputy Chairman:: I was given to
understand unofficially that some arrangement had been arrived at between representatives of the parties whereby the house would sit beyond ten o'clock tonight. I would be glad to hear from those who were parties to that arrangement and whether that is correct.


Mr. Lennard:: It is ten o'clock.


John Angus MacLean: Mr. Chairman, I would be quite happy to carry on if that meets with the approval of the committee.


Brooke Claxton: Go ahead.


Frank Exton Lennard: Mr. Chairman, it is ten
o'clock.


Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Chairman, before you call it ten o'clock may I point out that it was my understanding that it was a matter of convenience to all hon. members that we should continue this debate in order that we might get on with this work, and I understand it was suggested we might make better progress by taking the hour between ten and eleven o'clock tonight.


Frank Exton Lennard: It is ten o'clock, Mr. Chairman.


Mr. Green:: May I say that we have been trying to work out some arrangement in order that it would not be necessary to start morning sittings next week, and it was my understanding that the estimates would be under discussion tonight until eleven o'clock. I have no control over other hon. members but I hope that some arrangement of that kind can be worked out. That certainly is the understanding of the Leader of the Opposition and I hope that can be done.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Is that agreeable to the committee?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Frank Exton Lennard: It was not my understanding.


John Angus MacLean: Mr. Chairman, when I was interrupted I was saying that there were two subjects to which I wanted to confine my attention. One of them is the reserve forces of the army and navy in the province from which I come, and in the course of my remarks in that connection I will probably be paying particular attention to the reserve forces in my own riding.
We in Prince Edward Island are very proud of the history and record of our reserve forces which have been built up over the last 150 years. They have a very proud record of service both in peace and in many wars. I think you will pardon me if, in that connection, I quote briefly from the Prince Edward Island magazine for April, 1900, over 50 years ago. Even at that time a record of excellent service by the reserve forces of that province had already been built up. At page 40 in this article I note the following:
In 1812, we find the "garden province" sending her sons to battle in the war of that date. In that year 100 volunteers left Queen's wharf on one of H.M. ships-of-war en route to the scene of conflict.
And so on. Then again they go on to say:
In the Crimean war, quite a number of Islanders fought in the British ranks; some went from the Island and others enlisted from different parts of the world. In fact, wherever Britain's battles were being fought, whether in the Crimea, beneath the walls of China, or the battlefields of Europe and

America, there might be found the sons of the "Garden of the Gulf" fighting valiantly for their sovereign and the empire.
I cite that merely to point out that it has been traditional in my province for young men to take a keen interest in the reserve forces and to serve in them if at all possible. They automatically considered that service to be one of their responsibilities. In that connection may I say this. Even before the province entered confederation it had a very fine record of service in that connection. In order that my remarks will not be classified merely as an opinion, I should again like to read a quotation. I am quoting now from the report of the inspecting field officer of militia for the year 1868. He had this to say:
I have dwelt at some length on this portion of the militia because it is the effective force of the island, and too much attention cannot be given to the maintenance of its efficiency as it appears a matter of certainty that the Imperial troops are no longer to hold garrison here. The "material" is unexceptionable and only requires steady instruction, good organization and discipline to render it a force second to none. They are most eager to obtain the means of training, and were the staff of instructors twice as numerous as it is, it would be insufficient to meet all the demands made upon it. The Queen's County Regiment of Volunteer Militia is well commanded by competent field officers.
He goes on to say, in that connection, that during that year 9,178 men in the reserves received instruction. As a matter of fact, Mr. Chairman, in that year in the one county alone, with a population of only 45,000, the colony had 5,213 trained reserves before confederation.
I have a purpose in making these rather ancient quotations, and I hope it will become more evident as I go along. It goes almost without saying that in the later wars-the Boer war, the first and second great wars and now more recently the Korean war- recruiting and volunteering for active service have been highly satisfactory indeed in the island province; and I believe this situation is owing to the fine record of service achieved and the interest which has been kept up by the reserve units over the years. During the South African war there were 75 men who volunteered, mostly from Prince Edward Island. That is not a large figure but it is a large percentage in relation to the population, considering the numbers who saw service in South Africa. In the first world war there were almost 4,000 recruits in the army alone from that province or who were recruited in that province, not taking into account men who served in the navy and men who enlisted in the neighbouring provinces for service in that war. In the last war the total enlistment was much greater.
Supply-National Defence The army had about 6,500, the air force had nearly 2,000 and the navy had 1,500. That makes a total of approximately 10,000. That does not take into account considerable numbers of men from that province who served in the merchant navy and who enlisted in the neighbouring provinces for service.
I think that this record is not accidental, Mr. Chairman. As I have already stated, I think one of the reasons for it was the fine degree of interest in military service which has been kept up in that province over the years by the active reserve units of the army and latterly of the navy in that province. Between the two wars these units included the Prince Edward Island Highlanders, the P.E.I. light horse, two old established medium batteries of artillery and other units such as a company of signals, medical corps and so on. Since the second world war the tradition of these regiments is now being carried on by the P.E.I. R.E.C.C.E. regiment, the 28th light anti-aircraft regiment, a unit of signals, a medical corps unit and so forth. The R.C.N.V.R. reserves in that province have the record of being one of the earliest units of the R.C.N.V.R. organized in Canada. I think it was either the first or the second unit. During the last war, personnel who had served in that reserve unit created a proud record of service for the area, especially the city of Charlottetown. In the last war there were over 100 commissioned officers serving in the Canadian navy from the small city of Charlottetown with a population of only about 15,000. I think that result amply justifies many times over any expenditure which may have been made on behalf of that small naval reserve unit before the last war.
I should now like to consider for a few minutes the difficulties under which these reserve units are working. Last year I put on the order paper a question with regard to the armouries in Charlottetown. It was a very simple question and read as follows:
When were the armouries in Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, built?
I received this rather amazing answer: No information. The reason there is no information is that the armouries in Charlottetown are so old that you would have to dig into the archives to find out when they were built. I therefore took it upon myself to attempt to supply some of the information. I find that the armouries in Charlottetown were built by the colonial government well prior to Prince Edward Island entering confederation. In the report of the inspecting
4942	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence officer of militia for 1867-and he was Colonel A. Douglas Smith-I find this statement:
Three drill sheds have been erected. Their erection was a matter of absolute necessity and will confer positive important benefits on the inhabitants of Charlottetown, Summerside and Georgetown.
That was the beginning of the present Charlottetown armouries. I find in the public accounts for the same year a reference to warrants which were paid toward the construction of that drill hall to the amount of 1,671 pounds, 11 shillings and 11 pence. That will give some indication of the age of the building. It is an old, inadequate wooden building. True, there have been some modifications and additions.
In that connection I find that the armouries, which are now called the "drill hall"-the two terms are synonymous-were opened on the 15th of January, 1867. A new drill hall at the west end of Kent street was opened by the commander in chief, Lieutenant Governor George Dundas. I find too that the drill hall was widened a little bit on the west side prior to the first great war. Here is another interesting note:
The new artillery orderly rooms facing Government Pond were opened on the evening of the 8th of April, 1897.
When anything in my province is less than 55 years old it is new as far as accommodation for the reserve force is concerned. I should like you to pay special attention to this point, that these rooms were largely paid for by the officers of the artillery units themselves out of their personal incomes. I believe that should give the committee some indication of the inadequacy of the accommodation provided for the reserve forces in the capital city of Prince Edward Island. Prior to confederation a wave of interest in national defence seemed to sweep over the colony. No doubt this was partly due to the threat of war between the colonies and the United States. Possibly the fervour of patriotic zeal may have been fanned by the excitement caused just a few years prior by the "Charge of the Light Brigade", but in any event the colony saw fit to build a drill hall and we are still getting by with substantially the same building.
I think I should also refer to the accommodation provided for the naval reserve unit, now known as H.M.C.S. Queen Charlotte. As I have already said, it has a very fine record of service but it is housed in a building which is over 100 years old, a building which was first used as a furniture factory, then subsequently as a candy factory, then for a while as an emergency hospital for the insane because of a


serious fire in that institution, then was vacant for a number of years, and then H.M.C.S. Queen Charlotte fell heir to it. It is rented from the provincial government at considerable expense, and the building is utterly unsuitable for the use to which it is put. It is in such bad condition that I understand it is not safe to allow more than 60 people on the second floor at any time because it may collapse.
It was also found impossible to instal the training equipment supplied for the division because it was too heavy to be set up in the building. I am happy to have read that the commanding officer of the naval reserve units, Commodore Adams, recently inspected that division, and it is referred to in the press as follows:
A strong recommendation for better training facilities for H.M.C.S. Queen Charlotte will be made by Commodore Kenneth F. Adams, C.D., R.C.N., commanding officer, naval division, Hamilton, Ontario.
I am confident that this strong recommendation will go through, and when it does I hope it will be sympathetically dealt with because I think the minister will recognize that I am not pleading for any special handout for my riding. Neither am I pleading for any unjustified expenditure of public funds. I think that adequate facilities for the reserve units in the city of Charlottetown are completely justified. It would be good business and in the long run would effect economies in defence expenditures.
That of course is predicated on the supposition that in the future pattern of defence there is a place for the reserve forces. I feel strongly that there is. I should like the minister to clarify the position of our reserve forces and the role they will play in national defence in the years ahead. I think there is considerable demand throughout the country that the role of our reserve forces be clarified so that not only they but the general public will know what the policy is regarding them.
There is another facility used by the reserve units in my province to which I want to refer very briefly. It is the rifle range just outside of Charlottetown at Squaw Point. I understand that the butts there are being eroded by the sea and it is necessary either to move them or to protect them by some sort of sea wall. I hope that the need for maintaining a standard rifle range in that area will be recognized and that at an early time the required attention will be given to that project. That is all I want to say in that connection except to appeal to the minister to see that this ancient injustice is rectified. I do not want to make any special criticism of the present government because the facilities

of the reserve forces are so unsatisfactory inasmuch as it is the fault not only of this government but of every government for the last 50 years that the accommodation for the reserve forces in my province is so inadequate.
I want to turn for a few moments to an entirely different subject. I refer to aircraft procurement for the Royal Canadian Air Force. In the white paper tabled by the minister the other day there is the statement that several CF-100 all-weather squadrons are already operating in Canada. I should like some clarification as to exactly what "several" means. I know that the dictionary meaning of "several" is anything more than two. But by using that term, people might be led to believe that it is considerably more than two. I have a suspicion that the number is three, and I should like the minister to say definitely whether or not my assumption on that point is correct.
With regard to the equipment with which these squadrons are supplied, and the people of our air force squadrons as well, I note this statement in the white paper:
A. V. Roe (Canada) Limited has completed delivery of the Canuck (CF-100) Mk 3 aircraft and delivery of Mk 4 version has started. The Canuck is powered with the Canadian designed and built Orenda engine and will include a new type of autopilot which will be coupled to the fire control system.
Then, a little further on the white paper states:
Canadair Limited of Cartierville, near Montreal, is making deliveries of Sabre 5 (F-86) aircraft with the Orenda series 10 engine, according to schedule. The latest model, the Sabre 6, also has an airframe similar to that of the American built F-86E but will be powered with the Orenda series 14 engine. It will be superior in performance to the Sabre 5. Sabre 5 and 6 aircraft will meet R.C.A.F. commitments overseas and will eventually replace the Sabre 2s which are now flown operationally by the R.C.A.F. air division in Europe.
I have no desire, Mr. Chairman, to cast any reflection on the excellent work that has been done by the designers of the Orenda engine or any other designers and engineers concerned with the development of the Orenda engine and the CF-100. My first concern, and my chief concern, is to do anything I can to ensure that the R.C.A.F. is equipped with the best possible equipment. I am especially anxious that it will be equipped with the best possible fighting equipment. In that way, the Canadian taxpayers will get the best value for their defence dollar. After all, money which might be spent for equipment which is obsolescent or even obsolete, or too little or too late, is a complete waste. In this connection we should set ourselves the highest possible standards because nothing but the best is
Supply-National Defence good enough in the position that we find ourselves in so far as the aerial defence of North America and our contribution to NATO defence are concerned.
In that spirit I want to draw to the attention of the committee what I consider to be the nub, the starting point of any fighting equipment for an air force. I refer to engines. In that connection I think my thoughts are very well expressed in an editorial appearing in Flight magazine for April, 1954, on page 445. They have this to say:
Though the statement may seem a truism, engines really are very important-more so, in certain aspects, than the aircraft they drive. A good modern aero engine is an immense national asset; it is the result not only of a multi-million-pound development but the focal point of aircraft development programs costing many millions more. Everything that is done by the aircraft of the future- stratospheric reconnaissance, short-haul transport, supersonic combat or jungle warfare with helicopters-will be vitally dependent upon the provision of engines of the right sort at the right time. All kinds of engines are needed: for fighters, the requirements are thrust, high-altitude performance, low frontal area, reliability, economy and durability, approximately in that order of importance; . . .
Now, this article goes on to make this observation. They have been speaking about the requirements, the vast requirements necessary, such as electronic computing equipment and that sort of thing, in the development of new types of aircraft engines. The development of a modern engine is really a colossal undertaking. This article observes that in the United States great use is made of modern equipment of this sort, and then goes on to say:
With such tools, there is no reason to doubt that our position as the world's top-ranking designer of aero engines will be maintained. Already our gas turbines are in production, under licence, in Sweden, Switzerland, Italy, France, Belgium, Argentina and the U.S.A.-and, without a licence, in Russia.
I might add that the Avon engine is now in production in Australia.
Production, too, is going very well, and more than one aircraft factory is probably finding storage of delivered engines almost an embarrassment. (The same sort of situation has, we hear, arisen across the Atlantic.) In fact, our superpriority engines-the Avon, Sapphire, Olympus . . . etc.

are without exception progressing well and showing every indication of forming the backbone of our civil and military power for years to come.
I would be the last, Mr. Chairman, to prejudge any Canadian effort in the field of design or production of aircraft engines. No one will be more delighted than I will be if the minister can inform the committee that Canada has already the lead in that connection, and that the great advances which have been made since the last published figures put Canada in the forefront in this field. But I am not confident that is so. I should
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Supply-National Defence like, however, to refer to a comparison of published information regarding modern aircraft engines.
The Orenda is a good engine. It was well designed but it has taken considerable time to get it into large-scale production. It should be remembered that this is a highly competitive field and that time is of the essence. One must not only design good engines, but one must get them into production quickly or they will be obsolescent. As has already been noted, the main characteristics of interest with regard to aircraft engines are thrust, that is to say the power of the jet engine, frontal area, fuel economy and so on. Those are the things of paramount importance.
I should like to put on the record some figures relating to modern British aircraft engines. The Bristol Olympus, for example, is 40 inches in diameter, has a weight of roughly 3,500 pounds. It has a thrust of 9,750 pounds and has a specific fuel consumption of -766. I will not take up the time of the committee to quote other figures with regard to the Sapphire and the Avon, because they are roughly in the same bracket.
I do not want any comparison to be considered unfair. I believe the comparisons I make are as nearly true as they can be made. I note that the engines I have already named are now powering, without exception, some of the best aircraft in the world, so far as operational aircraft are concerned. Among them are the Vulcan, which is powered with an Olympus. And that engine, by the way, is being manufactured in the United States by Curtiss-Wright, and I believe also by Buick. Others of these aircraft are the Vulcan, the Gloster Javelin, the Victor, the Hawker Hunter, Republic F-84F, Martin Canberra, the de Havilland-110 all-weather fighter, the de Havilland Comet 3, the Canberra, and the Australian version of the Sabre.
When one contrasts those figures with the latest data available on the Orenda engine he finds that, as compared with these British engines with a thrust up to 9,500 pounds, the Orenda has a thrust of 6,500, at least in the earlier marks. The really important thing of course with modern aircraft engine design is the specific fuel consumption. To put it in everyday parlance: How far will you go on a gallon? Because the higher the fuel consumption, the lower will be the radius of action, and the less will be the range of the aircraft in which the power plant is installed.
In the case of the Olympus, the specific fuel consumption in pounds per hour of pounds thrust is -766; in the case of the Sapphire it is '85; with the Avon it is [DOT]84, and with the Orenda it is one. That is a colossal difference. Those early marks of


Orenda compared very unfavourably with the most up-to-date British designs. The only consolation I find in these figures is a brief reference to the later marks of the Orenda.


Brooke Claxton: Those are the marks now in production.


John Angus MacLean: Yes.


Brooke Claxton: And also the hon. member would agree that the most important question is what engines are being flown today, and what the performance is in the aircraft today.


John Angus MacLean: That is true. I have tried to make my comparisons as fair as possible. For instance, I have taken the Avon engine which is now powering the Australian version of the Sabre. I will admit that some of the most up-to-date aircraft I have mentioned are just coming into production in England. They have super-priority, and they will be the aircraft with which the forces of Great Britain and of other countries will be equipped in the very near future.
The consolation I find in these figures is that, having reference to the later models of the Orenda-I refer to mark 11 and mark 14, with the after-burner-we get a thrust of as high as 8,500 pounds, and I believe the specific fuel consumption is well under one.
I just wish to make the point, though, that there are two considerations to be met. One of these is whether national prestige in the aircraft industry is of first importance, or whether the best possible equipment for our air force, regardless of where it can be obtained, is of first importance.
In that connection I will grant you that, if at all possible, the equipment should be manufactured on this continent. But that is already being done. Some of the most up to date engines are already being manufactured in the United States, under licence and, as I have already said, in France, Australia, and the Argentine and many other countries. Canada is the sole exception to the manufacture of advanced designs of British aircraft engines, under licence. I am just a bit doubtful if the fact that we are that exception can be entirely justified. I would ask the minister to reassure us that we are following the correct course in that regard.


Brooke Claxton: We are producing the goods in the most efficient and formidable fighting aircraft in the world today in quantity production.


John Angus MacLean: I am glad to hear the minister say that. But I am thinking not only of today but of the very near future. Because

we know that modern aircraft become obsolete extremely rapidly in this very competitive age. I imagine this question has been carefully considered. We know that the Minister of Defence Production has already said that if the Minister of National Defence asks him for a gold-plated piano, it is his duty to supply it. I would hope that if this is considered justified-and I am not putting it in the same bracket, at all-consideration might be given to equipping some of the aircraft made in Canada with the most up to date and the best engines in the world, under licence, if they are not already designed in Canada for that purpose.
I have almost reached the conclusion of my remarks, and the time at my disposal has almost expired. But I do note that in the white paper the minister has tabled it is observed that members of Canada's armed forces are serving on the staffs of nine principal NATO headquarters and large agencies, including Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, commonly known as SHAPE, as well as Headquarters Allied Air Forces Central Europe-and several others.
As already noted, Canada is contributing a very large air element to the NATO defence of Europe. I am just wondering where Canada fits in, from a military point of view, with regard to the tactical use of the air force, if war should come. I am wondering if consideration has already been given to the possibility of, if not command of the air force, a position of deputy commander, and that if for a time such position might be held by a Canadian. I am curious to know if that suggestion has been made and, if it has been, how it has been looked upon by the Canadian government. Because if that suggestion were ever followed it would give Canada an appropriate command of the situation to which it is contributing so heavily in armament. And when I say "heavily", I mean that we are spending a great deal in national defence, especially in connection with the equipping of our air force.
In connection with the Orenda CF-100 project, I think it is fair to say that more money has already been spent on that-and I am not suggesting it was not justified-than it will cost to build the St. Lawrence seaway. Therefore, I think it is only fair that we should examine very carefully all expenditures which are made in this connection. I have some other questions, but I shall ask them when the particular items are up later on. At this point I shall conclude my remarks on the first item.


Mr. Fraser (St. John's East):: I have listened with great interest to the eloquent plea of the hon. member for Queens on behalf of
Supply-National Defence the need for a new armoury at Charlottetown. I hope it will be possible at the same time to provide an armoury for St. John's, Newfoundland. Charlottetown has at least an armoury, old though it may be. St. John's, unfortunately, has none. I would therefore strongly urge that the minister give favourable consideration to the establishment of an armoury at St. John's, one that will be worthy of the historic traditions of the Royal Newfoundland Regiment.


John Angus MacLean: Just in case I have been misunderstood I should like to correct one thing in connection with the armouries in Charlottetown. Perhaps I did not make myself clear, but they were not built by the federal government; they were built by the colonial government and given to the dominion government at confederation.


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Chairman, the minister has been listening to a lot of speeches this afternoon and this evening. I have not got a speech prepared but I do have a couple of questions I should like to ask him. Perhaps he can deal with them this evening. The first has to do with the policy of the R.C.A.F., with regard to commercial work. I got a return, which was dated April 13 of this year, in answer to several questions. The questions which are apropos are as follows:
During 1953, did the Royal Canadian Air Force engage in any flying within Canada except for the Department of National Defence or other government departments?
If so,
(a)	For whom:
(b)	What types of aircraft were employed, and how many hours on each type;
(c)	How many passengers and pounds of cargo were carried in each case?
Was any remuneration received for such flying?
(a)	If so, from whom and how much in each case;
(b)	What was the rate charged per mile, per hour or per ton mile?
The answers to these questions showed that the air force had been doing commercial flying, and in particular they had flown for the Iron Ore Company of Canada a matter of 181-15 hours and carried 121 passengers and about one million pounds of cargo. The actual figures were 989,432 pounds. They had been paid for this work as follows:
The Iron Ore Company of Canada paid $39,473.52 calculated at the rate of .42 cents per ton mile and $1.56 per ferry air mile.
I understand that there were civilian flying companies in a position to do that work. The minister should explain why the R.C.A.F. was in effect competing with civilian flying companies in work which was obviously of a civilian nature. I am informed that such a policy is directly the opposite of the policy adopted in the United States. I believe that
4946	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence the United States air force fosters the development of civilian aviation and in fact employs civilian firms to do some of the United States air force flying in the continental United States but not abroad. Overseas the flying for the United States air force is all done by air force planes.
There seems to be a difference of policy in the two countries. The United States believes in taking every step to build up a healthy aviation industry; whereas Canada, in this instance at least, has been interfering with the civil aviation industry. I believe the only way we can hope to maintain and build up a strong civil aviation industry in this country is not to have their potential work taken by the R.C.A.F. Certainly parliament is not voting funds for the R.C.A.F. with the idea that air force planes will be used on civilian work.
I understand also that the air service to the meteorological stations of the government is being done by the R.C.A.F., and presumably that comes under the defence vote. It seems that some argument could be made for that flying being done by the civilian companies. Why would it not be a wise plan to encourage civilian companies by giving them work of this type?
Then, there is the flying in connection with the ice patrols on the Atlantic coast and out of the port of Churchill on the opening of navigation. Apparently this work is done by the R.C.A.F. Why could it not be done by civilian flyers? It does seem to me that here is a way in which civilian aviation in Canada could be fostered, if a proper government policy were adopted. I have one other question on another matter. I wonder whether the minister would deal with these questions of the R.C.A.F. doing what is in essence civilian flying?


Brooke Claxton: Am I to understand that the general discussion is completed and that I can reply to all the questions that have been put? If so, I would be very happy to do so right now and as long as it takes.


George Randolph Pearkes: Other hon. members are anxious to speak, and I am afraid we cannot consider the general discussion terminated.


Brooke Claxton: This is a special interpolation by the hon. member.


Howard Charles Green: Just an interpolation for the minister.


Brooke Claxton: I do not know what the purpose of it is. The information might be more readily and more accurately given, no doubt, when the item for the air force comes up for consideration, but I can speak now from my recollection of what happened many months


ago. The Labrador iron ore development had a deadline to meet that was in the interests of the national defence of Canada and of the United States. I was told by the general manager of the concern that they did not have an airlift to meet their deadline. I was told that over the long distance telephone. I asked the R.C.A.F. if they had an airlift. They said that by diverting aircraft from other important air work they could do it, if necessary. I said: "Clear this with the air transport board and make sure that we are not treading on anyone's toes." They did. We carried out the airlift. It was carried out successfully in the national interest. It was not any part of the national policy except to get on with the job of completing the Labrador iron ore development in the time that was necessary. If, in consequence of that, the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra has any complaints, then I shall be glad to answer them when the item in the estimates comes up for the air force. My recollection, speaking as I say from telephone conversations, is that there were only two of them, one from the general manager of the company, and one to the chief of the air staff. When the request was made the general manager of the company said he had no other airlift available and said he had cleared the other air commitments. I informed the chief of the air staff that he must clear this with the air transport board. He did that, and he provided the airlift. I do not know why anyone should have any reason to complain.
With regard to the supply of weather stations, there you go into a very complicated field in which you have to have the men, the special types of equipment, the gasoline and the aircraft capable of doing long range flights. Generally speaking, with the long range operation we find it has been a good thing to employ R.C.A.F. aircraft.
But finally, in answer to the hon. member, may I say that it is just as important that the R.C.A.F. should have and be maintained in the capacity to deliver long lift air transport operations as much as it is to maintain civilian transport companies. Our idea is that we work together. We do not compete, and where a civilian operates and the job can be done by a civilian we never enter into it except in circumstances of extreme urgency such as I have described.


Howard Charles Green: The minister did not deal with the difference in policy between Canada and the United States.


Brooke Claxton: There is no difference.


Howard Charles Green: Does the minister say that the United States air force is not now engaging civilian firms to do some work for the air force in the United States?


Brooke Claxton: There is no difference at all. It the United States air force is the only air force to provide an airlift on an essential operation in the national interest they carry out that operation, but if there is a civilian source to do a civilian job then they leave it to the civilians, just as we do. We employed civilians on the airlift to Korea and in fact the C.P.A. has done a magnificent job supported by us. We employ civilians all over the place when they are the best agency to do the job, in the same fashion as the Americans.


Howard Charles Green: What about the ice patrol, and the patrol out of Churchill?


Brooke Claxton: I would have to look up the record about that. I have not heard anything about it except for some details a few months ago, and I would have to look into the facts. But I would think that was probably an operation which could best be conducted ordinarily by service aircraft because they would have to do a patrol in any event for surveillance purposes.


Howard Charles Green: But I suggest to the minister that in the case of the Iron Ore Company of Canada it is going pretty far to act on the basis of a call from the general manager of that company.


Brooke Claxton: No, no! We cleared it with the air transport board which has control over civil aviation and they assured us that it was the right thing to do and we did not undertake-


Howard Charles Green: I understand that at least one member of the air transport board protested against that and considered it an unwise policy-


Brooke Claxton: Then you must talk to him.


Howard Charles Green: Whether the air transport board approved that or not is not very important. The question is-


Brooke Claxton: What was important was to get the job done.


Howard Charles Green: But it is not the minister's business to use the R.C.A.F. to get civilian work done, and why the Iron Ore Company of Canada should be in such a great hurry to meet a deadline when they are a civilian firm opening up their own iron mine I simply cannot understand. I do not see why the manager of that firm or any other firm should be able to pick up the phone, call the minister, and ask him to turn over R.C.A.F. planes to carry freight for them. I suggest, Mr. Chairman-


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman-


Howard Charles Green: I have the floor.
83276-313i
Supply-National Defence


Brooke Claxton: -the manager of the company-


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Chairman, I have the floor.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: I would suggest that you both cannot have the floor at the same time. If the minister is not rising on a point of order I think the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra should be allowed to complete his statement.


Brooke Claxton: I thought he had finished.


Howard Charles Green: Well I was still on my feet talking and I do not see how the minister came to the conclusion I was finished.


Stanley Howard Knowles: At this time of night you can come to any conclusion.


Howard Charles Green: I do not finish quite that easy. I do suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the minister's answer shows that the government was wrong in this case. Why should an official of the Iron Ore Company of Canada be able to ring the minister and say, "Here, Mister, send me R.C.A.F. transports. I want to get some cement"-or whatever it was-"carried from Sept lies into the district where we are developing a mine, and I want to get it done in a hurry. I have a civilian deadline to meet." The minister acts on that and turns a North Star over and now comes in here and tries to justify that on the ground that it was for the defence of Canada. I suggest that this is really going beyond all reason, and it is all rather far-fetched.
I merely bring this up to point out to the minister the need for being a good deal more careful in the use of the R.C.A.F. for civilian purposes. I know he is very proud of the R.C.A.F., and quite properly so. We are all proud of it and we have very good reason to be not only for what it did in the second world war, but also during the postwar period, and of course the exploits of our airmen during the first world war. But the time has surely come in Canada with the development of the north country, and the attempt to push our borders in that direction, to do everything possible to foster civilian flying. After all, that has been the basis of the R.C.A.F., and Canada has been the leader in the development of northern flying. Here is a case where a company should have been told to look after its own business, hire planes on its own, and not come running to the Minister of National Defence in order to obtain R.C.A.F. planes to do work so obviously of a civilian nature.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Eleven o'clock.


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman, if the hon. member has finished, then I might comment on the fact that he has expressed surprise
4948	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence that the general manager of the Iron Ore Company of Canada called me up. Almost everyone calls me up about one thing or another, and often about airlifts.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Some people call you down.


Brooke Claxton: Yes, that is quite true, but on this occasion there was nothing wrong about his calling me up, or in my answering the phone. There was nothing wrong about my asking the chief of air staff if he could deliver an airlift, and if that would be the proper thing to do under the rules of the air transport board. That was done and it was in the national interest. They were paid at commercial rates and the national treasury did not lose a nickel. As far as I knew there was no aircraft of similar capacity

available to carry out this work. I was assured on that point and if that assurance was wrong then it is not my fault.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: It being ten o'clock standard time shall I report progress and ask leave to sit again?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
Item stands.
Progress reported.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Walter Edward Harris: Mr. Speaker, I move the
adjournment of the house. Tomorrow we shall continue with the program I outlined last night.
Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at eleven o'clock.
494a

Friday, May 21, 1954