1954-05-21

MISCELLANEOUS PRIVATE BILLS

[Stage Direction]
Sixth report of standing committee on miscellaneous private bills.-Mr. McWilliam.

[Stage Direction]
A message from His Excellency the Governor General transmitting supplementary estimates for the financial year ending March 31, 1955, was presented by Hon. Stuart S. Garson (Acting Minister of Finance), read by Mr. Speaker to the house, and referred to the committee of supply.


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. C. E. Johnston (Bow River):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources of which I have sent him notice. As a result of having received many different complaints and many copies of an article published May 14 in the Crag and Canyon, one of which I have sent to the minister, respecting the wholesale destruction of fish in the channel below the Calgary power turbine plant at Anthracite, located in the Banff national park, would the minister assure the house that he will take such action as is necessary to correct this evil?


Hon. Jean Lesage (Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to thank the hon. member for having sent me notice of his question. The situation to which he has referred has already been drawn to the attention of the officers of the department here in Ottawa, who have requested a report from the field. I can assure the hon. member that as soon as that report has been received we shall take whatever remedial action is practical so that this situation will be corrected.



POLIOMYELITIS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. E. G. McCullough (Moose Mountain):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of National Health and Welfare. Has the minister received any letters or communications requesting financial assistance for the newly-formed association for the prevention of polio in greater Winnipeg? If so, will he tell us whether the government is prepared to assist in this research?


Hon. Paul Martin (Minister of National Health and Welfare):: I have received a letter in general terms from the organization to which my hon. friend refers but, as he knows, projects for assistance under the research grant of the national health plan have to be submitted first by the provinces, and an application from the province has not yet come in.


Edward George McCullough: I should like to ask the minister a further question in respect to the new vaccine being tried out in the United States. Can the minister inform the house whether or not the government feels that this vaccine may be sufficiently proved in the United States to be of use, and that we might have the use of it in Canada this year?


Paul Joseph James Martin: As I had previously indicated, my hon. friend has been informed of the government's interest in this matter, and just as quickly as it is possible, in the light of all circumstances, to take advantage of whatever may be thought to be useful in the matter, this will be done.	.
May I just add to what I said, because my hon. friend has asked a question that is of great importance, particularly at this season of the year, throughout Canada and particularly western Canada. The vaccine in question has been tried on many thousands of children in the United States. It is a vaccine that has been prepared in the Connaught laboratory at Toronto and arises out of an earlier research project by Dr. Rhodes
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Inquiries of the Ministry with assistance given to him under the research grant of the national health program. I indicated in what I said to the house earlier that it was not the intention of the Canadian government, in co-operation with the departments of health of the provinces, to engage in large tests such as were projected in the United States. This was a decision made primarily by the ten provinces. However, the head of the polio foundation in the United States, Mr. O'Connor, has recently notified us that there could be made available a limited amount of this vaccine for experimental purposes in Canada. This offer came to us during the past few days and as a result we communicated with the ten provincial departments of health. It may be that one province will take advantage of this, but the other provinces, in their best judgment, have at this time-and no conclusion should be drawn from their refusal-decided not to take advantage for the time being of the vaccine for this experimental purpose.


Edward George McCullough: Mr. Speaker, arising out of the answer given to my question in regard to polio by the Minister of National Health and Welfare, when the minister stated that one of the provinces indicated that they would take advantage of this-at least that is what I understood-can the minister say which province that is?


Paul Joseph James Martin: What I think I said was that one of the provinces was giving consideration as to whether it would take advantage of the offer, but I do not think I should state at this time which province that is.



PARLIAMENT HILL


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Maurice Bourgel (Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Public Works):: Yesterday, the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) asked if it had been brought to the attention of the Acting Minister of Public Works that a number of cars bearing diplomatic corps licences have been occupying space in the parliament grounds reserved for tourists and others.
The simple answer to the question is no, but perhaps it would help if I were to enlarge. It is possible that diplomats' cars park in the tourist area, but I am at a loss to know how this practice might be curtailed except through the co-operation extended by the diplomats themselves, in recognizing the need for tourists to be accommodated. There is no special area on the hill, however, reserved


for diplomatic cars, and members will understand that visits by diplomats to the east block are fairly numerous. Some attention is being given to developing a small reserved area, immediately adjacent to the east block, for such use.


Mr. Donald M. Fleming (Eglinton):: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the parliamentary assistant to the Minister of Public Works if he is not aware that the parking to which I referred is all-day parking by members of the diplomatic corps who are not engaged on business in the east block, and that this matter was some time ago the subject of representations by the Department of External Affairs to the diplomatic corps in Ottawa in precisely the same circumstances?


Maurice Bourget: That was the only information I could get this morning from the officials of the department and, as my hon. friend knows, the parking problem is one which exists everywhere. We are trying to do the best we can with the limited area at our disposal and I can assure my hon. friend we are looking into the situation to see if means can be found to improve it, and if it is possible we shall do so.



LABOUR CONDITIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mrs. Ellen L. Fairclough (Hamilton West):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask the Minister of Labour if he can now give an answer to the question asked yesterday by the hon. member for St. Paul's (Mr. Michener) with reference to the responsibility for the maintenance of unemployed persons?


Hon. Milton F. Gregg (Minister of Labour):: Mr. Speaker, I think the question asked yesterday by the hon. member for St. Paul's is a matter which affects government policy and which could not be dealt with during the short question and answer period in the house. As I mentioned yesterday in response to another question, I shall be glad to discuss the matter when my estimates come before the house during the next few days.
WAR VETERANS ALLOV/ANCES



REPRESENTATIONS FROM NEW WESTMINSTER BRANCH, CANADIAN LEGION

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. A. B. Patterson (Fraser Valley):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to direct a question to the Prime Minister, and I am sorry I did not have an opportunity of giving advance notice of this question. Has the Prime Minister received a telegram from W. Cross,

zone commander of the New Westminster and district zone of the Canadian Legion, with respect to the war veterans allowance? If so, would the Prime Minister care to comment on the matter?


Mr. Speaker:: Order. Before this question is given consideration by the Prime Minister I would like to submit to hon. members that it is not making full use of this question period in the house to stand up and ask if a cabinet minister has received a telegram, communication or representation about a certain problem. I think the hon. member's question could more properly be asked at the committee of veterans affairs or on the estimates of the Minister of Veterans Affairs (Mr. Lapointe) when that matter will be before the house. I do not think we should use up the question period for the purpose of dealing with such matters. The hon. member probably knows that whoever sent the telegram has advised him that it has been sent to the Prime Minister or someone else. What is the purpose of checking in this house as to whether or not that telegram has been received?


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.

The house in committee of supply, Mr. Applewhaite in the chair.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE Defence services-
239. To provide for the Canadian forces, the defence research board and other expenditures relating to defence, including contributions toward the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization:	to authorize expenditures in the
current year out of the amount hereby provided, not exceeding $300,000,000 of section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, and to provide that, notwithstanding subsection 3 of that section, where equipment or supplies acquired by the Canadian forces after March 31, 1950, are transferred, the estimated present value thereof shall, if the governor in council so directs, be credited to this vote instead of being paid into the special account mentioned in the said subsection 3, and when so credited may be expended for the purposes of the Canadian forces; and notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act to authorize total commitments for the foregoing purposes of $4,577,641,724 regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of which it is estimated that $2,711,822,159 will come due for payment in future years), $1,865,819,565.


The Deputy Chairman:: We were considering item 239. It is my understanding that we are still at the general discussion stage of this resolution after which it is proposed to discuss the item under the main headings appearing in the further details. Shall the item carry?
Supply-National Defence


Mr. Harkness:: Mr. Chairman, the purpose of our defence effort is to train, equip and in every way prepare our defence forces to meet the operational role which it is thought they may have to perform in order to carry out our defence policy and objectives. Consequently, like the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre who spoke yesterday, I was somewhat disappointed that the minister in his speech did not place more emphasis on the training and operational phases of defence, and seemed to be more preoccupied, shall I say, with the supply, construction, and general Q and A matters concerning defence.
Canada's defence effort from the point of view of the role which our forces are to perform or may be called upon to perform has many phases or facets which connect with and run into each other. In this regard our defence effort should be compared perhaps with a cut stone with its numerous facets each of which is separate but each of which is connected with several others. Now, just as a stone has these numerous facets, so has our defence effort; and I should like to examine the operational roles or facets of our defence effort from two points of view.
The first concerns whether, considering our resources, there are too many phases with the result that they cannot all be carried out effectively. In other words, are we scattering our shot too much and as a result failing to place the emphasis in the proper places? Secondly, how effective are our forces in each of the roles they are required or may be required to carry out?
Now, the phases of our defence preparations stem, of course, from the objectives of our defence policy which have been set out for the past few years in the annual white papers. With these objectives I think practically all of us in this chamber agree. The first of these objectives is the immediate defence of Canada from direct attack, and this, of course, is the primary and most important purpose of our defence, as it is in all other countries.
The defence of Canada from direct attack must also involve the continental defence of North America. I think also we all agree that the only probable method of attack, as was stated in the white paper on defence, is by air. Now, taking that as a premise, the first phase of our defence in the role of countering an attack on Canada by air is the provision and operation of a radar screen or series of screens supplemented by a ground observer corps.
Yesterday the minister spoke of the radar screen which is in existence. He stated that
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Supply-National Defence the radar and interceptor scheme of the United States and Canada was now over 90 per cent completed and would be in complete operation by late summer or early autumn. Then he went on to say that kills in practice had been 90 per cent. He went on to say that gaps existed and that more early warning was required, that the McGill fence was going to be gone ahead with, and that the provision of all these things is extremely expensive.
However, I notice that this morning's Gazette has as its chief headline in connection with the minister's remarks one to the effect that our radar screen is 90 per cent completed and that the interception is 9 out of 10. I am afraid that this headline gives an extremely misleading idea to the House of Commons and to the Canadian people as a whole. It was pointed out yesterday by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich that an American, the chairman of the joint committee on atomic energy, had pointed out that the early warning system, which was essential to the defence of both Canada and the United States, was not in existence. As a matter of fact, all that we have in the way of a radar screen, essentially, is a point system which protects us for only a short distance out. In view of the fact that enemy jet bombers would be on the targets probably within 20 minutes or a little bit more from the time they might be detected by many of the units of this radar screen, what we have gives little real protection.
There is no question that what we need is an early warning system far to the north. As was indicated in this article quoted yesterday by hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, there have been many press releases in regard to this matter, in which a great deal of information along that line has been put out, most of which-particularly that with regard to the statement made by the minister yesterday-are bound to give the public the idea that all is well from this point of view, that we are completely protected and that we have little to worry about. The average man in the street, if he reads that 9 out of 10 enemy bombers in these practice raids are being knocked out, thinks the thing must be exceptionally good and that he is quite safe. As a matter of actual fact, during the last great war in a small country like England, with a close-knit system of radar and large numbers of interceptors, the destruction of enemy bombers was approximately 1 in 10. Since that time, of course, radar has improved and jet interceptors have come into operation, and the performance is going to be considerably better. However, informed American sources
TMr. Harkness.]

whom I have seen quoted have estimated that the probable kill will be 1 in 4. The last thing I noticed in an American paper was a dispatch from Washington written by Lloyd Norman in which he says this:
Air force officials conceded that at best the air defence screen-
And this is in the United States where it is more highly developed than it is here.

could stop no more than 3 out of every 10 Russian bombers.
I think the Minister of National Defence does no service to the Canadian people by giving them a false sense of security with regard to the radar screen which exists or rather with regard to the one which does not exist. It is much better to give the actual situation in connection with the matter. I am quite sure that the Russians are not deceived in that regard. I am quite certain that they do not believe for a minute that only 1 bomber out of 10 is going to get through to the targets.
The next phase in this role of protecting Canada against air attack is the provision of interceptor planes. The minister did not say much about that matter, but we know that the number of interceptor planes in Canada is extremely small. The interceptor plane for use here is the CF-100. We know that the production of CF-lOO's so far has not been great. We know that the number of squadrons formed has been extremely small. I do not know what that number is, but I feel fairly certain that it is not more than three. That means, of course, that we have not the interceptor planes here in Canada with which to make effective use of the radar screen which does exist or the radar screen which we will have when the McGill fence and the other early warning system comes into effect. In other words, from the point of view of interceptors, at the present time we are not entirely helpless but we are very close to it, especially in large parts of this country.
The interception role in the future, according to what we have been told, is going to be carried on to quite a considerable extent by reserve force interceptor squadrons of CF-lOO's. So far these reserve squadrons have not CF-lOO's. If they had them, they would not have trained personnel who could man them and fight them effectively. One of the difficulties with regard to that matter particularly is the provision of navigators. In talking with some of the members of these reserve force interceptor squadrons which are to be equipped with CF-lOO's, I was told that they think they can train the pilots and keep them up to scratch but that it will be a more

or less impossible task for them to train the navigators and to keep them up to operational efficiency. In other words, it is the sort of thing which cannot be done by a man who spends his day working at some other occupation and does a certain amount of practice in the evenings, over week ends and so on.
It would seem fairly certain to me that if we are to have an effective interceptor force with which to make use of the radar screen, we must have in Canada considerably more regular force interceptor squadrons, whether they are CF-100 squadrons or those equipped with other planes. So far as this role is to be carried out by reserve force squadrons, they must be equipped to a greater extent than is apparently envisaged at the present time with permanent force personnel, particularly in the form of navigators.
A third phase of the defence of Canada is anti-aircraft defence to protect likely targets; that is, of course, in addition to the work of the interceptor planes. I have mentioned this matter for the last two or three years. As a matter of fact, on two or three occasions the minister has spoken of our anti-aircraft defence and I have pointed out-and I should like to do so again-that we have practically no ack-ack defence at the present time and have not had any, practically speaking, since the war. We have very few regular force personnel in active ack-ack batteries. While ack-ack defence is supposed to be carried on by reserve army anti-aircraft regiments, these reserve force ack-ack regiments have not the guns with which to do the job nor have they the personnel with which to do the job. If they had a full complement of guns they would not in most cases, in fact I think in all, even be able to look after them and man them. Apparently this situation continues to drift along from year to year. We have no "ack-ack" defence, and so far as I have been able to determine there is no improvement in the situation as time goes on. It seems to me that something definite should be done about the matter. The United States has now developed ground to air guided missiles, which are going to be the ack-ack weapons of the future, and I would hope that we might at least begin to train some people in their use and to get some of them into operation at a fairly early date.
When the minister is replying later to the various speeches that have been made, I should like him to say something about ack-ack defence and indicate what progress we have made, if any, with respect to ground to air guided missiles or even the ordinary type of rockets which can be used for that purpose. It seems to me that is one phase of the 83276-314
Supply-National Defence defence of Canadian cities and targets generally on which really nothing at all has been done so far as one can see.
The fourth phase in the protection of Canada is the provision of airborne army troops and, of course, the planes to carry them so that these troops can land at any place in the northern part of Canada where enemy landings happen to be made for the purpose of establishing an air base or something of that sort, and thus be able to wipe out an enemy effort of that kind. Considerable progress has been made in this regard. We now have three parachute battalions each with quite a large number of trained parachute troops. From what I have seen of them they are extremely good, well trained and effective battalions. However, in the event of an enemy landing anywhere in the north for the purpose of seizing a northern airfield or of establishing one, we have not got sufficient planes to transport these troops. The troops are not of a great deal of use in that particular role unless we have the planes to transport them to their targets.
In addition, they are not concentrated so that they can be operated as a brigade. I should mention of course that there are also airborne artillery forces and engineers who. I think, are also quite good, but they are scattered right across the country and it would be extremely difficult to concentrate them on a place that had been attacked. With the number of planes we have it would be a slow operation and possibly not effective. I think it was demonstrated during the last war that it is no use to move in a few plane loads of paratroopers piecemeal. By the time more plane loads arrive to reinforce them the first lot has been wiped out. It has to be done on a mass basis.
The fifth phase of the protection of Canada is the protection of coastal waters, harbour entrances and so on. I think probably this phase is more in hand than any other. We have a considerable number of naval vessels in commission that are available for this purpose, and they are probably reasonably adequate for it.
The sixth phase is the mobilization of our reserve forces for local defence and also to reinforce the regular army in the event that an enemy airborne landing is successful any place, and to guard against sabotage and so on. I am going to deal with the reserve forces later so I will not say any more at this point except to say that I do not think the reserve forces are up to this job. The reserve forces are too weak to carry out this role effectively.
Another extremely important phase of the defence of Canada is civil defence. It is
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Supply-National Defence not under the minister's department. He mentioned it briefly yesterday. I do not propose to go into the matter in detail at this time, but I see that the minister in charge of civil defence is present and I should like to say that certainly civil defence in Canada at the present time is not in any state to meet any form of attack on the country. It is perhaps the weakest link of all so far as the protection of Canada against an enemy airborne attack is concerned.
To summarize my views on the primary role of our defence forces, the direct defence of Canada, we have not got the minimum defences necessary to meet this first requirement. I think the phases of our defence effort that I have mentioned are all weak except the naval. It seems quite apparent to me that we should have put primary emphasis on these phases of our defence effort and that we have failed to do so. In other words, from both points of view that I said at the beginning I was going to discuss this matter, it is an example of failure to place emphasis at the right place and failure to succeed in the various phases or roles which I have indicated.
I have one general complaint with respect to the information given in the white paper, by the minister in his speech on these estimates and in various other speeches he has made on this matter. The public has been lulled into a false sense of security as the result of reassuring statements of every kind which do not represent the true facts of the case. I do not say that any of these statements in themselves are incorrect, but when you relate them to the general picture they give a totally false impression of what our defences are so far as the protection of Canada is concerned.
This form of misrepresentation has been going on for several years. Before the Korean conflict broke out the minister would assure the house in the defence debates that our defences were absolutely up to date-


Mr. Claxion:: When?


Douglas Scott Harkness: -and were quite adequate to meet-


Brooke Claxton: When?


Douglas Scott Harkness: -any possible threat.
When we were discussing the defence estimates in 1949, the year before the Korean war broke out, the minister assured us that the airborne brigade would be able to deal with any possible landing that an enemy might make in the north country. It subsequently developed-and I think a number of us knew it-that we had one battalion partially up to strength and partly trained


as parachute troops, but we did not even have the planes to transport them. Nevertheless the minister assured the house at that time that everything was fine and that we had no need to worry about any enemy landing in the north. The same sort of statements have been typical since, as was the case yesterday.
If there was any real purpose in making such statements at that time, perhaps because we were so weak, it seems to me that the time for that sort of thing has come to an end. We have improved a great deal since then. Our strength has indeed greatly increased since that period, and it would seem only reasonable to me that the house and the people of Canada should be given a true picture of the state of our defences. If they are inadequate in a particular phase or in any special way, I do not think that the minister should attempt to conceal it.
And now, the second objective of our defence policy is the implementation of the undertakings that we have made as a nation, under the United Nations and NATO, for the mutual defence of the western world. The first phase of that was our participation in the Korean war. The brigade we sent there did a magnificent job. I believe all of Canada was proud of the record that they established in Korea. Similarly, the navy did its part effectively. The air force played a part so far as the airlift was concerned, and a certain number of pilots also took part in operations with the United States air force. I feel our commitment in Korea, so far as the United Nations was concerned, was magnificently made. We were perhaps a bit slow in meeting it because of our poor state of preparation. We were able to send only one battalion at the start, but that was built up to a brigade and those who served there served well and enhanced the name of Canada in doing so.
Another phase of this implementation of our foreign commitments concerns the air division that is now in Europe and the army brigade that is in Europe. Now, that is a considerable commitment. As the minister told us yesterday the maintenance of this air division in Europe is extremely expensive, involving some $600 million. However, from an operational point of view it appears that it is an effective part of the force there, and contributes materially to the air defence of western Europe. Our army brigade is also well regarded. I shall return to these matters a little later.
Another aspect of our implementation of foreign commitments is the provision of mutual aid of various kinds, the sending of

arms to our allies and the training of NATO aircrew, things of that sort. All these things are excellent in their way, but it seems to me, from what I know of the armament of the forces in Canada, that possibly a mistake has been made by sending arms to our allies when our own forces are none too well equipped in many ways. This applies particularly to the reserve forces. It seems to me it would have been wiser, perhaps, to keep some of these arms at home until our own forces were adequately and properly equipped.
Now, to summarize, so far as the second objective of our defence is concerned, I feel our commitments have been met, and quite well met. So far as the personnel involved are concerned, I believe they are to be complimented for the manner in which they have carried out those duties. One big question arises and that is as to whether too large a proportion of the defence effort, relatively speaking, has been directed to this objective and therefore too little to the primary objective of the defence of Canada or to the third objective, the general build-up.
Yesterday two or three speakers questioned whether this division of twelve squadrons of fighter planes should be kept in Europe or whether a portion should be returned to Canada for the defence of this country, the primary role of our whole defence forces. I would question that very much, too. It seems to me that, with the speed at which these planes can be taken over to Europe, so long as the airstrips and installations to maintain the planes exist there, there is no real necessity for keeping those twelve squadrons in Europe. A good proportion of them might quite easily be kept in Canada, where they could operate in a dual role. They would be available here for immediate defence in an interceptor role of possible Canadian targets. Then, if they were needed in Europe, they could be flown over there in a matter of hours. Of course this suggestion is based on the assumption that the airfields, supply lines and so forth in Europe were kept in existence for these planes. The keeping of this full number of planes in Europe does not seem to me to be essential to carrying out our commitment to take part in the defence of western Europe.
Several speakers questioned whether the infantry brigade in Europe should not be an armoured brigade. I agree with that; I believe it should be an armoured brigade rather than an infantry brigade. It seems to me that the criticism made by the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre concerning the proportion of armour as compared to 83276-314i
Supply-National Defence infantry in the Canadian army was extremely sound, and that the lack of plans in that regard should be rectified.
The third objective of our defence policy is to build up strength for total war. All of the phases of our defence effort that I have mentioned previously, of course, enter into this and are part of it. But there are some which are perhaps more directly and entirely related to the build-up, as you might call it. One of these is the build-up of staffs and service units of all kinds. I believe that one of the mistakes that have been made is the multiplication of staffs. There has been far too great a multiplication of staffs and too much manpower has been devoted to staffs of all sorts. As I have mentioned here several times before in previous years, you have only to look at the telephone directory to see the various staffs at national headquarters, and you gain some idea of the tremendous number of people who are carrying on activities there, in some cases activities not very much greater than was the case before the second great war, but with a staff ten or twenty times as great as existed at that time. This is one of the places where I think the emphasis has been misdirected. At the same time the civilian staffs have greatly increased this year. They have been increasing year after year, and it seems to me far too much manpower is used in pushing paper back and forth. The paper war should be cut down to a minimum, but the multiplication of these staffs really increases it. The amount of office supplies purchased is an indication of the enormous amount of paper work, and I am quite sure much of it is not really necessary, in fact it cannot help but clog the defence effort.
Another phase is construction activities, the provision of barracks, married quarters, storage space, the building of airfields and things of that sort. Once again I believe there has been too much emphasis on this subject. It is a good thing to have good barracks, to have ample storage space, to have fine married quarters and so on, and I am saying nothing against it. It seems to me, however, that the emphasis has been misplaced and there are other things that are more important, such as the provision of tanks for our armoured corps, the provision of the most modern arms of all sorts, which have not been provided, although there has been this large expenditure on construction activities. These construction activities, the minister indicated, are tapering off. It seems to me that is one place where a considerable saving in defence expenditures should be possible. The amount of building for married quarters still to be completed under the plan
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Supply-National Defence is not so great. The major portion of that program is over. The major portion of the barracks building program is over, and the same applies to the building of airfields. So that I would hope much less would be expended under the construction program in the .years ahead, and the money so saved directed into other channels, if the general expenditures are not, indeed, reduced as a result.
Another phase is the build-up of mobilization stores. A great deal of the criticism of the Department of National Defence last year was in regard to the enormous amount of soft goods, as they are called, which were purchased. I think without question there are many examples of waste and extravagance in the amount of soft goods purchased, including such things as raincoats, boots and the like.
The minister said in his speech-or it might have been mentioned in the white paper, I am not sure which-that the build-up of mobilization stores of soft goods is almost complete. Well, I would think it would be complete, in view of the very large quantities purchased in the last two years or so. He has said that weapons, ammunition and equipment for mobilization have been built up. I notice that the amounts for these for the army, the navy and the air force are down this year in many cases from what they were last year. I would hope this does not mean that some of the essential armaments of modern warfare, which our forces should have if they are going to be able to discharge their function effectively, are not being purchased or secured. I would refer particularly to some of the later types of guns, both ack-ack and anti-tank, to tanks and things of that nature.
Perhaps the most important phase of the general build-up of strength is in the reserve forces. They continue to be, as they have been in the past, the framework upon which the mobilization of Canadian manpower, particularly in the Canadian army, must depend. It seems to me that the army reserve force, in particular, has been one of the outstanding failures of the defence department in recent years. We have heard complaints from reserve force officers and personnel, and there has been considerable discussion in the house in the last several years as to the poor state of the reserve forces. The government was sufficiently impressed with what was said to appoint a committee, known as the Kennedy committee, which spent a good part of last year investigating the situation in respect of the reserve army. That committee presented a report, and I am disappointed to find that the minister has not made that report public, so that we can find out what,


in the opinion of experts, are the difficulties in connection with the reserve forces, and the recommendations as to how those forces could be improved.
In his speech the minister said he would deal with the reserves at a later time, when we reach the item in the estimates. I hope when he does so he will place on record the results of the Kennedy report, and the recommendations made.
The figures given as to the numbers in the reserve force, so far as the army is concerned, are practically the same this year as they were last. The figures shown at page 84 of the report indicate that there were approximately fifty fewer registered in the reserve army in 1952-53 than there were in 1951-52. The figures also indicate that there has been a small increase in the navy, and a larger one in the air force where there has been an increase from 4,800 to 5,800.
I cannot speak with authority so far as the navy and air force reserves are concerned, but I would say that, with respect to the army reserves, these figures do not mean very much, and one cannot draw any conclusions from them. I do know that the units with which I am familiar-and I believe the same applies right across Canada-are fairly well up to strength in the matter of officers. As the minister indicated, there has been a big officer training scheme and the reserve units have no difficulties so far as the supply of officers is concerned. But they are woefully weak from the standpoint of the rank and file enlistments. As a result of that, they are not able to carry on their training effectively and could not undertake any operational role. In addition to that, they have suffered from lack of equipment.
In many cases the equipment they have had has been old and out of date. This has been discouraging to those who have been recruited, and it has prevented their remaining with the units. I have here a letter from a former non-commissioned officer of the Calgary Highlanders in which he makes a few comments concerning the reserve army which in my view indicate clearly the views of a large number in the rank and file of reserve units. It sets out the reasons why in many cases they do not continue. I should like to read a few excerpts from it.
He says:
The argument that there are not enough men serving with keenness is just a condemnation of the policies that have governed the reserve till now. Build up morale and the reserve will build up.
We have been trying to impress that upon the minister and the government ever since the close of the last war. Unless the young men of this country feel that there is a real

need for their services in reserve units, and that they are doing a real job in those units, we will not get recruits. There has never been any real effort to impress that fact upon the consciousness of the young men of this country. The letter goes on to say this:
Men join the reserve to work; take them at their word; I never heard a man complain about too much work at any time during my service. Idle periods spoil morale.
One of the reasons there are idle periods in the reserve forces is that there are not enough men to carry on training in many of the phases which should foe carried on. As a result of this, much time is wasted. The letter continues:
They have obsolescent equipment; nothing is more discouraging than to instruct or be instructed on equipment that we all know perfectly well we shall never use in earnest; just wasted time.
This comes back to the amount of equipment we have sent overseas to our allies. While I do not complain about that policy, as I said previously I think we should equip our own forces, including our reserve forces, with up to date equipment before we send equipment overseas. Certainly we should not have the situation we have had, where equipment was sent overseas and units in Canada have been left without it. This has been true particularly in the case of a large number of anti-tank regiments and batteries throughout the country.
Then the letter continues:
Pay should be free of Income tax. Often his reserve pay puts him into a higher tax bracket so he loses quite a proportion of his pay.
That is a matter we have discussed repeatedly. It was mentioned last night by the hon. member for Oxford, when he was referring to the naval reserve force. I do not think there is any question about it; it is one of the causes of discontent which has an effect out of all proportion to the amount of money involved. A large number of people serving in the reserve feel extremely keenly on this point. They do not think they should be taxed on the amount of money they get for the reserve force training. In many instances, the real advantage to them, the amount of take-home pay they get after taking part in various social activities in connection with their service, is very small. As I say, the amount of revenue which the government receives from it is small, and is out of all proportion to the discontent it causes. I would once more urge the government to give consideration to the matter of making reserve force pay exempt for income tax purposes up to a reasonable amount at any rate. The man in the reserve force who is on call-outs, or otherwise puts in a good portion of the year, say a quarter or a half
Supply-National Defence of the year, as some have done, makes quite an income. Then the argument in connection with collecting income tax on it is a different matter altogether; but the ordinary man in the reserve who draws 15 or 25 days' pay a year should be exempt.
The minister's general appreciation of the probabilities in the future-that there is no real change in the fundamental Soviet objectives; that the fear of mass destruction in the A and H-bombs is a powerful deterrent to general war; that the massive destructiveness of those bombs may be the opposite to a deterrent in small wars; and that the existence of those bombs does not remove the need for conventional arms-is an appreciation with which I think most of us will agree. However, once that is accepted, it seems to me that the general strategical thinking perhaps has not been geared to that. It is quite evident that we must be prepared to meet an A and H-bomb attack, and to meet that the chief features are the defence of Canada itself that I mentioned earlier. To meet our commitments under the United Nations and NATO we must be prepared apparently to participate in small wars with conventional weapons.
It seems to me that the general thinking in preparations which have been made by the Department of National Defence has given too little attention to the first of those roles which our defence forces have to take on, and too much to the second, namely, participation with conventional weapons in small wars. As a matter of fact, it would seem from the way in which expansion has taken place in the army that the thinking is almost pre-world-war II rather than up to date.
The minister stated that we now have fifteen battalions of infantry. We have of course still only two regiments of armour.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I am afraid that I must draw the hon. member's attention to the fact that he has been speaking for. forty-five minutes. Of course, with the unanimous consent of the committee, he may continue; otherwise I must see someone else.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I can finish in two or three minutes. Before Korea we had three battalions of infantry and two regiments of armour. In other words, the armour was in proportion of two to three of infantry. Now it is down to approximately one-eighth, two of armour as against fifteen battalions of infantry. In other words, the emphasis has all been along that line. It is completely out of balance.
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The hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre went into this in some detail yesterday, and since my time is up I will not say anything about it other than it seems to me the time is long past due when that lack of balance should be corrected. The emphasis is on infantry to the practical exclusion of armour, which the minister says is not taking place, but it is quite evident it has taken place from those amounts that we have in a force which must be capable of expansion. In case of general mobilization, or even for a small war where you are not in jungle conditions or something of that sort, we have not a force which is likely to be effective or adapted to that. We should certainly increase the amount of our armour as compared with the amount of infantry.


Mr. Herridge:: Mr. Chairman, I rise to make a few remarks on these estimates. They are the most difficult estimates that come before the house for an ordinary member to deal with, in my opinion. In my opening remarks I must say that I wholeheartedly support the remarks made yesterday by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar.
We in this group support all necessary expenditures to provide adequate defence for this country, but we are very much opposed to unnecessary expenditure in any respect whatever. We were told some three years ago that we would have a defence program for a three-year period, with an expenditure of about $5 billion. I am quite sure that at that time we got the impression that once we had the three-year program pretty well completed and the $5 billion expended we would then be over the hump and the people of Canada could look forward to some reduction in taxation as a result of the lessening of defence expenditures. The minister informed us yesterday that we have to be prepared for what I think he termed "a long haul" at about the present rate of expenditure. We in this group are not convinced that the present rate of expenditure is required to provide adequate defence for this country. We take that view for several reasons. First, I think we are on sound ground, because history proves that no general staff ever asked for a reduction of any defence estimates. It is only natural that those who are engaged in those activities are anxious to maintain their prestige, their positions and things of that sort. It is further proven by the remarks of the hon. member for Esqui-malt-Saanich, as reported at page 2810 of Hansard of 1951, when he said:
I have never known an admiral, a general or an air marshal who did not begin by asking for more than his share of anything.


Mr. Ferguson:: Send them to the cleaners.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: The staff at defence headquarters immediately sprang to the defence of the minister's trousers by issuing the following order, and I am now going to quote this order which was taken from the bulletin board in the national defence headquarters: All Officers, D Pers Carrying of Parcels
(1)	The Minister of National Defence has ruled that there will he no more carrying of large baskets or boxes of coffee or food in the buildings occupied by national defence headquarters.
(2)	There is no objection to the transportation of a single cup of coffee from one office to another when the need arises.
This was signed by L. L. Mathers (F. LeP. T. Clifford), Colonel, director of army personnel.
I understand that the result of the minister's order has been that instead of 10 cups of coffee being taken at the same time from the basement up to, say, the third storey offices, they have to carry one cup of coffee at a time. Now, just imagine an orderly going upstairs with one cup of coffee at a time.
My point is this, though this may seem only a minor incident, that if this is the general
Supply-National Defence staff's idea of the utilization of manpower when they issue an order, then it is a rather sorry one, because it means 10 times more labour is required than was required formerly for "Operation Coffee". Under such circumstances we have every reason and good grounds to suspect that we are not getting value for the defence dollar.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Perhaps you are not aware that they are forming a whole battalion of coffee carriers.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Then they will all have to work one at a time.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: That is the reason.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I would like to refer to another small incident. In answer to a question I asked in the house I was informed by the minister's parliamentary assistant that 36 pairs of skates were purchased for the College Militaire Royal de Saint Jean at a total cost of $1,224 or $34 per pair for the cadets in this military college. First of all I want to know why this government is buying skates for cadets who are reasonably paid by the Canadian taxpayer. Secondly, I want to know why they bought luxury skates. There are not very many people in Canada who can purchase skates at $34 per pair,
I think this is another illustration of a completely unnecessary expenditure in the Department of National Defence. Now, I want to mention one more incident, though I admit quite frankly it is a small incident. Nevertheless, it does indicate a state of mind, and disregard of economy.
Not long ago three generals came to the parliamentary restaurant to fulfil, I presume, a social engagement. I do not know whether it was for tea or dinner, but in any event the three generals came from defence headquarters in three beautiful and expensive cars driven by three chauffeurs. They all arrived in their grandeur complete with the three chauffeurs who had to wait outside the parliament building for about two hours.
My point is this. Ministers of the crown in a democracy are senior to the members of the general staff in regard to order of precedence and, in fact, members of parliament are senior in order of precedence to the chief of the general staff, and rightly so. But if our cabinet ministers, and I give them credit for this, can travel around in cars which cost a very modest amount without chauffeurs, surely we do not require such expensive cars for senior officers of the Department of National Defence often used unnecessarily.
I have mentioned three small incidents all of which indicate a certain trend and they

Supply-National Defence are only what we can see on the surface. We can only see the pimples of expense but therefore judge that the carbuncles are somewhat large in size.
I am not going to speak at length but I would now like to turn to something I think should be drawn to the attention of the minister. I am referring to the case of Kurt Meyer, whose kind treatment raised some objection in Canada recently. That matter is now closed. I think we had our legs pulled to some extent by the government in this case. This German general was found guilty of having incited and counselled troops under his command to deny quarter to allied troops and to be responsible for the killing of Canadian prisoners of war. The death sentence imposed by the court was commuted by General Vokes to life imprisonment. A reviewing board without any Canadian members has since granted remission of sentence which will mean that this nazi German general will be released in a few months.
My point is this. If this nazi general can receive that sort of compassion and his sentence can be reviewed by a board with the consent of the Canadian government, surely the same compassion should be shown to servicemen found guilty by courts-martial of far lesser offences during wartime and for which their punishment continues.
That is my argument, Mr. Chairman, and on that account I urge in all fairness and justice that there should be a review of these cases. Many servicemen are still undergoing sentence imposed during the war and they should be shown the same compassion as that shown to Kurt Meyer. Officers who were cashiered should have their sentences reviewed with a view to imposing a much lighter sentence than dismissal from the service.
Officers who were cashiered are now and will be forever barred from holding public office, which for any person is a terrible penalty. It must be remembered, Mr. Chairman, that these officers were volunteers who came direct from military colleges, from business life, or from the ranks, and they had little or no experience of the heavy responsibilities entailed.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that there are many men who are suffering today from sentences imposed during the war and whose cases now in all fairness should be reviewed. When our government can approve a remission of sentence to a general responsible for counselling the killing of Canadian soldiers, surely the government should in justice and in fairness review the cases of the men who are suffering at the present time for lesser crimes committed during the war. I urge a reexamination of these cases and consideration
[Mr. Herridge.l

on behalf of these unfortunate men who are still suffering and will continue to suffer unless something is done.
In concluding I want to make just a few remarks concerning enlistment and examinations for enlistment because I have knowledge of some unfortunate circumstances and cases. I have personal knowledge of an unfortunate case which would not have occurred, in my opinion, if the Department of National Defence had been more careful in examining the young man to whom I have reference, who was in Essondale for a number of years. I may say that Essondale is our mental asylum in British Columbia. He was enlisted in the army, later committed a crime in the United States, was sentenced to life imprisonment and is serving that sentence in the United States at this time. So far nothing has been done to restore that young man to Canadian custody. I mention this case because I think it is a most unfortunate one. I am not suggesting that there are many, but when cases like this one can occur I suggest that there must be something wrong in connection with the examination of men seeking to enlist in the armed forces.
In this connection I want to read briefly from an editorial in the Globe and Mail of Friday, April 2, 1954. It is headed "The Real Question" and reads as follows:
Parliament finally got around to the case of Private Walter Cierpisz on Wednesday, when a socialist member . . .
That is myself, I presume.
. . . asked whether the defence department took any precautions against the enlistment of mental defectives in the armed forces. (Cierpisz, now serving ten years for manslaughter, was described at his trial as having a mental age of ten.)
The answer given by Associate Defence Minister Campney suggests that, in his view, Canada's parliament and people are mentally defective. Certainly they would need to be, to swallow the miserable excuses he put forward. Claiming that each of the services gave careful mental and physical tests to prospective recruits, Mr. Campney continued:
"Those who pass them must be far beyond the mental age of ten. The tests are carefully worked out, and have resulted extremely well in most cases. Of course, there will always be borderline cases wherever the line is drawn. Some borderline cases turn out very well and some not so well. This is one of the unfortunate ones."
If Cierpisz, with a mental age of ten, was a borderline case, where is the border, and what is the line? Are we to assume that recruits with a mental age of 11 or 12 are considered safely past, or indeed "far beyond" it? In any event, was Cierpisz given the official tests, and by whom? Did he actually pass them, and by whose judgment? . . .
Parliament must look further up in the defence department. Who makes and supervises appointments to examining bodies of this nature? How is the screening of recruits checked, if it is checked at all? Not until these questions have been

answered can we determine who, and at what level, is responsible for the enlistment of men who should never have been enlisted.
I quote from that editorial, Mr. Chairman, because I agree with the suggestions contained in it. When the minister speaks in reply to the criticisms made from this side of the chamber, I should like him to inform the committee of the procedure in connection with examining a man on his application for enlistment into the defence forces.
Once again I want to say that we on this side of the chamber-with the exception possibly of the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich and one or two others-are at a great disadvantage in criticizing these estimates with knowledge and with certainty. We know this expenditure is a terrific burden on the Canadian people but we cannot discharge our duty adequately by a general discussion during the estimates, while the house is sitting. I certainly think we require a continuing defence committee composed of members of all parties, taken into the confidence of the Department of National Defence and having an opportunity to make certain that every dollar that is spent is necessary for the adequate defence of this country.


Mr. Shaw:: It is not my intention, Mr. Chairman, to occupy the time of the committee for long. However, there are certain matters on which I believe I should comment at this time. Yesterday the Minister of National Defence laid down, in clear and precise terms, Canada's defence policy. He dealt with internal defence and he dealt with our defence from the standpoint of our activities in association with our allies. What was said by him, supplemented by the white paper, gave us a reasonably clear over-all picture of policy. However, I think even the minister would agree that much detail was missing.
I want to concur wholeheartedly in the observation made by the hon. member for Kootenay West and by practically every other member who has spoken with respect to the necessity for the establishment of what I would call a standing committee on defence rather than a defence expenditure committee. Because of what has taken place in the past I fully realize that the name "defence expenditure committee" might cause the minister to bristle just a wee bit, but not if it were a defence committee, an all-party committee, charged with the responsibility of dealing with the estimates and of even dealing with expenditures. Where it seems, in the opinion of the committee members, that such examination is necessary-that is as to expenditure with respect to some specific matter-they should be authorized to pursue the study of that matter.
Supply-National Defence
Certainly practically all members of the House of Commons find themselves in a most unfortunate position when it comes to consideration of these estimates. Actually, if we were to do justice to these estimates we would keep the minister and the committee here for days, weeks and even months. After all, let us just consider for one moment what part of the total budget is devoted to national defence. If we look at it in no other way, from the taxpayers' point of view we would be completely justified in devoting, as I say, even weeks or months to the consideration of that department alone. I certainly suggest, for several reasons, that the minister urge the government to give favourable consideration to the setting up of that committee which would be a standing committee and which could sit almost continuously while parliament is in session.
After all, we have other committees. We realize that even though the Secretary of State for External Affairs from time to time makes comprehensive statements on the floor of the House of Commons, certain of his estimates are referred to the external affairs committee and witnesses are called before that committee. Those who are members of that committee will secure much information from the witnesses and we who may not be members of the committee will certainly have the benefit of the printed evidence. But possibly of even more importance than that, the Canadian taxpayers will have an opportunity of securing copies of that evidence.
Important as defence may be, I cannot lose sight of the fact that the Canadian taxpayers are bearing a colossal burden for defence. Times are reasonably buoyant now. Even though that is so, yesterday the minister stated that the burdens laid upon this country by national defence are heavy, even in relation to our immense resources. He might also have added "even in relation to the general economic picture in the country today". We have no assurance that the general economic picture will continue to be as favourable as it is at the present time. Yet the demands for adequate defence may make it completely impossible to cut back even though there may at some time be a general deterioration in the economic picture. My personal conviction is that as long as international tension continues, as long as the avowed purpose of the communists is what it is today, as long as their actions continue to give the lie to their words, we will not only have to maintain our defences at the present level but will most undoubtedly have to expand them as time goes on. I think it
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Supply-National Defence would give a good deal of comfort and satisfaction to the Canadian taxpayers, and certainly to a good many members of the house, if such a committee were set up.
May I suggest to the minister that I think the onus is upon him to give us reasons, if there are such, for not setting up a committee on national defence. Certainly he is aware of the widespread demand from this part of the house. With reference to the lack of information, may I say that it applies not only to members of the house but also to the Canadian people, and undoubtedly much of the criticism that falls upon the minister's shoulders from time to time results directly from the fact that the Canadian people are not as fully informed as they should be.
Let me give an illustration or two in order to be quite specific. There were two fires recently at Canadian air stations, and investigations were made with respect to them. May I clarify a certain matter right at this point. Members who were in the house prior to the last election will recall that from time to time I offered severe criticism of certain things that were happening with respect to defence construction at Penhold in my constituency. I am still absolutely convinced that I was completely justified in doing so. I do not have to go beyond the words of the present Minister of Public Works to believe that much good resulted from what I said on the floor of the house.
But this is what I want to point out. Last summer certain friends of the government went out of their way to create the impression that what I did on the floor of the house with respect to Penhold was to criticize the Royal Canadian Air Force as such. I say that accusation is wholly false. I have had the greatest admiration for the Royal Canadian Air Force both during the war and in the period subsequent to the war. As far as I am able to determine, the Penhold air station is operating in a most satisfactory manner. From what I have learned I am confident that the officers are carrying out their work in a most satisfactory way and are deserving of commendation. Let it not be said again, in the light of what I am going to say now, that I am offering criticism of the Royal Canadian Air Force. I realize fully that they operate under certain rules and regulations which at times may leave them in a position where it may appear that they may be responsible for things for which they are not responsible.
Having said that, may I refer to the rather disastrous fire that occurred at Penhold on April 10 which resulted in the destruction of a hangar in which there were a number of


service aircraft. All I have to go on of course are the press reports. It was indicated that it was a million dollar fire. That may be quite wrong, but that is the information I have and that is the information the public has. On May 3 I asked on the floor of the house if the investigation into the fire had been completed and, if so, whether the report would be tabled in the house. I realized when I asked the question that there was slight possibility of the report being tabled because apparently it is not government policy to do so.
I should like to ask the minister this question. Why should it be the policy not to table the report of such an investigation as that into the fire at Penhold? That is a question that a great many people would like to have answered. Why? When police investigations take place into certain things the information is made available to the public. Because of the fact that the people do not know any more than they saw at the time or read in the newspapers, two stories are current. One is that if the wind had been blowing from the opposite direction there might have been very little of Penhold air station left. I did not happen to be home at the time, but persons who were present have indicated to me that that might well have been the disastrous result. It was also indicated that at the end of the fire and before the hangar was destroyed the people fighting it were completely without water. If that is true it simply means that maybe we have not made adequate provision for fire protection.
I think these are things that the minister should clarify. I am not making these remarks in any critical sense. We have a wonderful station at Penhold. The Canadian taxpayers have quite a few millions of dollars invested in other air stations and installations across Canada. I believe it is the practice of the government to carry its own insurance with the result that a million dollar loss in a fire simply means a million dollars lost to the Canadian taxpayers. I trust the minister will be able to assure the house that adequate fire fighting facilities are established at these stations.
Even more important than that, I have before me a short editorial that appeared in the Albertan, a Calgary daily paper, the issue of April 13, and in it a few questions are asked. I suppose they probably would not have been asked if the answers were known. Certainly I cannot answer them on the basis of the knowledge I have now. The editorial reads as follows:
We would like to know what system of fire watches is maintained at R.C.A.F. stations.

Then they refer to Penhold and ask this question:
... is there one man on duty at all times at each hangar, or does one man have to keep watch on several hangars? We gather from the news reports that the latter condition exists. Loss was at least a million dollars at Penhold when fire destroyed one of the hangars and its contents over the week end. It is reasonable to believe that if one man had been assigned to that building alone, patrolling all corners of it, the fire would have been detected in time to control it.
Any privately owned building worth a million dollars has a watchman on duty every hour of the day, every day of the year. Isn't public property worth just as much protection? Should the authorities take unnecessary chances just because the taxpayers can be counted on to make up the loss. There are reported to be about 3,000 men at the Penhold station. Surely it wouldn't be a hardship on the personnel to have someone in each hangar at all times.
What the policy is across Canada I do not know, but I think we should know. Of course, if it had been generally known at that time I doubt if these questions would have been asked by the Albertan in this editorial. I trust that the minister will bear that in mind. I am not concerned specifically with Penhold. That sort of fire could occur anywhere. As I say, I am concerned about the water supply. I know that we paid plenty for a water supply there. I am also concerned about the consequences of what the people who were there say would have happened if the wind had been in the opposite direction. I say to the minister that personally I cannot understand why reports of investigations of this kind should not be made public. I think it would ease the public mind. It is not just a question of trying to attach blame to somebody. I am not trying to attach blame to anyone. Whatever is done is done because of policy. The fire watch at Penhold, whatever it was, I asume must have been the same as that in existence at other air stations. It may be good, but we do not know what the general policy is.
There is another matter that I feel the minister should bear in mind. I can judge the importance of this only by the number of letters which have come to me from parents. The minister will understand that I am not in a position to table the letters, so I shall not quote them. They are from the parents of persons in the air force, and certainly I am not going to even run the risk of jeopardizing their welfare by naming them. Recently, while the minister was away, I asked the Associate Minister of National Defence this question. These are not exact words, but it was something like this: Does the government intend grounding all jet aircraft in Canada pending an investigation into the crashes that have taken place within recent times? The associate minister indicated that
Supply-National Defence there were several types of jet aircraft, and therefore it would be rather senseless to ground them all. Perhaps I should have been more explicit in my question and mentioned the specific type of aircraft or asked in my question that the particular type of jet aircraft that is causing the difficulties be grounded.
I am advised with respect to these crashes that we do not know about all of them. I should like to know the total number of crashes there have been in Canada of jet aircraft, say within the last six months. This seems to have been a particularly bad period.
I should like the information concerning accidents to jet aircraft, not only in which airmen have been killed, but accidents on the ground. I am told by the parents of young men in the air force, who were told by their sons, that the information is kept completely away from these young men. What they learn they hear over the air or pick up in the newspaper, even though it may be an accident in connection with their own station. They say it is extremely detrimental to morale. I can easily understand how it could be detrimental to morale.
I feel the minister should give this house a clearly-defined picture of the actual amount of training an airman gets before he solos in a jet aircraft. I am not suggesting for a moment that the information I have is correct, but once again it comes from parents whose sons have indicated to them that it is their conviction they are compelled to solo much too soon so far as these jet aircraft are concerned. They get a certain amount of training with Harvards. I am told that after they get that training with Harvards they are given six hours' dual instruction on a jet, and then they are on their own. That is the statement that comes from the parent of one of the boys who is flying a jet. I do not know enough about jet aircraft to know whether or not six hours' dual flying, even though they have had the training in the conventional type of aircraft, is sufficient. Certainly, something is wrong somewhere when one stops to contemplate the accidents that have occurred in connection with jet aircraft in Canada. I trust the minister will try to satisfy us with respect to this matter. These and many other things are based on the lack of specific information before me and before the Canadian public.
I think that probably even before now either the minister or the Associate Minister of National Defence should have been right up on his feet to make a statement with respect to these jet aircraft crashes. I think it would certainly result in much higher morale among the service personnel, more
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Supply-National Defence particularly among the younger lads. I know one parent wrote to me and said: For goodness' sake, until they find out what is wrong with these jets, put the older, more experienced pilots into them and not my young lad of 21 with the training he has had. He said he just sits in fear awaiting that telegram to come, and he would be much happier if he knew that for this period, while they are having some trouble, they would keep these young lads out of jet aircraft.
Actually, I did not intend to speak so long. I did not try to deal with defence policy. My colleague the hon. member for Wetaskiwin dealt with that. He made it abundantly clear to the house that we believe Canada should be as adequately defended as possible. As he said, it is not how much we spend, but how we spend it that counts. The government has had no trouble from us when it has come to securing support for defence appropriations. We do, however, feel that the greatest value should be procured for every dollar spent. We do feel, as other members have stated, that so far as we are concerned there is no justification for failure to set up that defence committee. After all, let me repeat, more than $2 billion has been appropriated for defence this year; that is a substantial part of our 1954-55 national budget. If we can take time to have other committees studying other aspects of government operations, then how much more important is it for us to have a defence committee for the purpose of examining into defence.


Brooke Claxton: I think it would be most unfortunate if I allowed a minute to go by without answering the questions raised by the hon. member for Red Deer concerning the accidents to jet aircraft, because to leave even those questions unanswered would have a most unfortunate effect both on the morale of the force and upon recruiting for the R.C.A.F., as well as on the comfort of mind of the parents.


Frederick Davis Shaw: It has already had a very bad effect.


Brooke Claxton: We do not find that within the air force, but I should answer the question.
I do not know what caused the hon. member's inquiry if it has not been principally the accidents that have happened to Comets. We have two Comets in the R.C.A.F., and at the moment both are still in existence. We have never had any serious trouble at all with them, and both of them are now undergoing modifications that have been suggested by the manufacturer.
In so far as jet aircraft in general are concerned, the only jet aircraft operating in



Canada of which I know are operated by the R.C.A.F. Any question that is raised concerning the accident rate, therefore, of jet aircraft in Canada must refer to the accidents suffered in the R.C.A.F. I should tell hon. members that the fatal accident rate, that is the total number of fatal accidents per one thousand hours of flying by R.C.A.F. jet aircraft, is lower than that for conventional types. The fatal accident rate for jet aircraft flown by the R.C.A.F. is lower than that for conventional types. What is more, the total fatal accident rate for the R.C.A.F. is lower than that for the United States air force or for the Royal Air Force. It is lower for 1953 than it was in 1952.


Frederick Davis Shaw: May I ask the minister a question? The minister mentioned fatal accidents. Does that information include the non-fatal accidents?


Brooke Claxton: No, just the fatal accidents.


Frederick Davis Shaw: I was interested in the other as well.


Brooke Claxton: The figures are comparable with regard to the non-fatal. It is difficult, however, to make a similar comparisan with regard to non-fatal accidents because different countries grade them differently.
I have not got the information here concerning the hours of training that Canadian trainees receive. I can get that information and the question can be answered later when we come to the air force estimates, if it is not available today. We have in Canada a vast experience in the training of aircrew. We gained it during the war in the British commonwealth air training plan when we trained
131.000	aircrew for the commonwealth,
71.000	of whom were Canadians. And Canada, I think, had a higher percentage of aircrew in her armed forces than any other country fighting during the war. Since that time we have kept our methods of selection and training up to date through developments here, and by following very closely the practices in effect in other countries.
I can tell the hon. member, from what I know about it, and from what I am told, not only by our own officers, but also by the officers of air forces in other countries-and we heard frequently from them because they visited their own trainees who were here with the NATO group-that our methods of selection and training are second to none. That is the way we want to have it.


Mr. Slick:: Mr. Chairman, when we come to the annual debate on the estimates for the Department of National Defence we cover a lot of ground from the personnel, strategic and tactical standpoints, so that one could

speak for a very long time on this aspect of our security. It is not my purpose to go into higher strategy-although I could-or the tactics we have developed to defend this country. That has been gone into by other speakers, and I shall not repeat it today.
However, listening to the minister yesterday one could not help being struck by the position in which this continent finds itself, when he described the terrific power of the A-bomb, and now the hydrogen bomb-and I suppose in a short time it will be the C-bomb. This power of destruction is so great, we have been told, as to stagger the imagination of the ordinary human being. But let me say immediately that all down through the history of war, its basic principles never change, although the means of waging it have changed.
This massive power of destruction which we have is only a continuation of the powers of destruction we have had in modern times. It is something to consider very seriously, and something to drive home in the minds of our people so that they will be fully informed of the dangers which lie at their door, if a third world war were to take place.
We all know that Russian aircraft can reach this continent. We also know that, with all our defences, some of the aircraft will get through. That is a serious situation for people living in the large cities on this continent. It is a situation which I know concerns the heads of our services, and one with which they are grappling all the time. It is a condition with which this and other countries are grappling conscientiously at all times. Nevertheless some of those aircraft will get through. And with that situation, I think we have to face up to the fact that our civilian population should be warned sufficiently so that they may take adequate steps to minimize this danger which confronts us today.
To bear out my point, may I quote from page 4905 of Hansard, what was said by the minister. He said:
It is very risky for people charged with defence to make a prophecy. All we can do is to give opinions and not give assurances, but this system of defence against air attack has reached the stage today where if I were in charge of the Russian air force and were aiming to reach important targets in the United States-
And I am sorry he did not mention Canada. -I would not go across the lines of these radar defences. I would go some other way-
And he ends with the words, "and there are other ways". That, to me, if it means anything, means that with all our defences-and they are good; I have seen them myself and I think they are manned by capable aircrew-we are vulnerable. Because if there
Supply-National Defence are other ways, we must be vulnerable. I do not want the minister to give any hint as to what the other ways are. I would not expect that. I do not want him to say it, and I do not want to know it. But that significant statement made yesterday by the minister is something which should be brought home to every man, woman and child in this country- that we are vulnerable.
I come from a province which is vital to the defence of Canada. This afternoon, if I may, I want to confine myself to a problem which, as I see it, confronts us on the eastern seaboard. It was only last Sunday that we, together with the armed forces, celebrated the anniversary of the battle of the Atlantic. We know that we won that battle only by a very short hair. Sir Winston Churchill, in his memoirs, has said that it was touch and go. And there is danger in the Atlantic today, just as much as there was during the second world war. I refer to the submarine menace.
Now, I know we have improved our methods of submarine detection. I also know that the menace is there today, just as much as it ever was. With the modern submarine, and with methods of detection, the menace still exists. Let me say right here and now that it is only two or three years ago that Russian submarines were in the bay of Fundy and around the coast of Newfoundland. I know the number that were there, but I will not mention it. However, I do know they were there-and they were there for no good, so far as we are concerned.
The latest development is that of Russian trawlers fishing on the Grand Banks. I wish to refer to this visit to the Grand Banks which took place a short time ago, because to me it seems that it shows a certain amount of slackness in our military forces in the province from which I come. I shall try to bring out this point.
In this connection I quote from the Evening Telegram of St. John's, which says:
U.S. Intelligence, the R.C.A.F. and "certain authorities" are expressing keen interest in the goings-on of two Russian trawlers on the Grand Banks.
U.S.A.F. and R.C.A.F. planes have flown over the trawlers-Odessa and Sevastapol, which are partially "manned" by women-and the R.C.A.F. took some aerial photographs of them.
Meanwhile captain of the Spanish trawler "Euskal-Erria" has taken sea-level pictures of the Russian ships and taken these photos to "certain authorities in Newfoundland" and to U.S. Intelligence at Pepperrell base.
It goes on:
F/O Lloyd admitted that most of the information available to the R.C.A.F. in Newfoundland and Halifax, maybe Ottawa, now too, was gleaned from Evening Telegram investigations and reportorial accounts.
4966	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence
In other words the first word our intelligence officers in Newfoundland had was this article in the Evening Telegram. It states further:
Commodore Gabriel Aguirre of the Spanish fishing fleet told the Telegram his subordinates reported to "certain authorities" in St. John's, giving those "certain authorities" photographs and getting in return (for better pictures) a better camera than that which they were using, so as to get more pictures of the Russians at the Banks.
And it ends in this way:
Russian trawlers aren't on the Grand Banks to fish. They're there for information relevant to our coastal waters, defences and the like, Commodore Aguirre said in an exclusive Evening Telegram interview.
W/C Pleasance, head over the R.C.A.F. here, said last night he didn't know too much about the Russian ships ". . . and I'd like to know more."
If that means anything to me it means that the Russian ships were fishing on the Grand Banks for some time before our authorities knew anything at all about it. The first intimation they had that the Russians were there was when this Spanish commodore came into St. John's, Newfoundland, for supplies and notified the authorities. That brings me to a recommendation which I intend to make now. In this fishing fleet on the Grand Banks, which is composed of Portuguese, Spanish, French and other trawlers those countries have vessels on patrol for their protection. I think the time has now come, indeed if it is not overdue, when we must have a warship of some form on the Grand Banks watching what is going on there. It would be useful to our own fishing fleet; certainly they need some protection in case of emergency, and to keep an eye on the Russian trawlers coming out fishing there. We know, regardless of how much we should like to think otherwise, that they are not there for our good. First of all we had a submarine, and now we have Russian trawlers. I am convinced they are not there to fish. They have plenty of places to fish without coming to the Grand Banks.
This brings me to another point. Newfoundland is, as all hon. members know, an island. It is also known, as I mentioned a moment ago, that the submarine menace is a serious one. If we do get into a third world war, which I hope we will not, there will be hell on the Atlantic. We had hell on the Atlantic before, and we in Newfoundland know it because hundreds of seamen who were rescued from the icy waters of the Atlantic were brought to our shores, and it was almost a daily occurrence. Furthermore, iron ore ships were torpedoed in Conception bay, not far from my home, with a great loss of life. They were torpedoed right in front of people living there. Only the other day it was reported in the papers


that a submarine in the English channel on manoeuvres had disappeared. An alarm was sent out that it had not reported for some time. They thought it was in difficulty, but later it surfaced. It had eluded all the craft that were searching for it. They were searching for the submarine with the latest modern submarine detection equipment. If that could happen on manoeuvres in the English channel it gives us some idea of the danger that the submarine menace is to our security today. I could give other examples of that but I do not want to do it here in the committee because I do not want to give any comfort to the enemy, no matter who he may be. It is my firm conviction that the submarine menace is a serious one. The position in which my province finds itself is this, if we should ever get into a third world war, we are dependent almost wholly on the sea for our supplies. If this menace is as bad or as serious as I think it is we shall have to supply our troops in Germany largely by air. We have not the airports in Newfoundland or Labrador to take care of the traffic that would have to be accommodated.
I was told about two or three years ago by those who knew that another airport should be built in Newfoundland. It was not built. I was at Gander at the time and I was told on very good authority that if we ever got into a war Gander could not carry the traffic and neither could Goose, and another airport was needed to carry the prospective traffic. It is a vital necessity. I bring it to the attention of the authorities. I do not want Canada to do it if she is not able to do it. She might make some arrangements with the United States. The United States already have two airports there, one at Harmon field on the west coast and the other at Marquise near the naval base at Argentia. We have Gander and Torbay, and Goose in Labrador. So great will be this traffic going by air that we will not have the facilities to carry it. To me it is going to be a serious thing. I think the time to prepare for it is now; therefore I bring it to the attention of the minister. I am not criticizing him or his department; I am just bringing it to his attention because if this happens, as I see it, then you will have to supply the people of Newfoundland by air. That is the only way you will be able to get the supplies in.
I could go farther and recommend where the airport should be, but I shall leave that to the people who are supposed to pick out the places and when they do probably I shall have something more to say on the matter. I do want to bring that to the serious consideration of the minister. It is serious to our people in Newfoundland and

it is serious to Canada. Newfoundland is the Gibraltar of the Atlantic. It played a vital part in the convoy system during the last war, and it will play a greater part if we ever get into a third world war. I want to bring that with all the emphasis I can to the attention of hon. members.
To bear out what I am trying to say and to try to emphasize it I am going to quote from the remarks of the minister which he made yesterday in a very frank way. He said, as reported at page 4905 of Hansard:
When we were up in the Arctic four weeks ago I was astonished to find that to keep a weather station employing nine men going took 340 tons of supplies a year, and that involved 30 round trips of a North Star aircraft from Resolute Bay to wherever the station was. It also involved getting the supplies to Resolute by aircraft or ship. When we have to use 30 round trips of a heavy transport over these immense distances to supply a station employing nine men you can see how tremendous will be the task of increasing our defences in the far north. However, I am sure that more will have to be done and that it will be done.
If it takes 340 tons of supplies to supply nine men, how many tons of supplies will be needed to supply the people of Newfoundland, to keep life in them, because you will not get supplies in by sea. The only way will be by air. I quote that statement to emphasize the point which I am trying to make here this afternoon.
Others have mentioned the tremendous cost of this defence, roughly $2 billion a year. We are all very much concerned with these tremendous expenditures. We are all very much concerned with the burden that our people have to carry by paying taxes to maintain it; but I say here definitely now, irrespective of anybody else's opinion, we cannot afford to spend less. We have vast areas to defend, and we have a small population. As I pointed out a moment ago, we are vulnerable. Not only are we vulnerable in the air, but on the sea. And the first duty of this government is the protection of its people. Although I regret the heavy expenditure, I say this, and I say it emphatically: We cannot help ourselves. Until such time as international tension eases we have to spend this money if our people are going to get the defence to which they are entitled.
I have no criticism of the Department of National Defence. Mistakes have been made; we all know that, but they are not vital mistakes. I have every confidence in the Department of National Defence and in the heads of the three services that they are doing everything possible to give us the defence which we need. But they have a tremendous problem. We have a vast area to defend, and we have to plan for defence
Supply-National Defence with a small population to carry it out, and with limited means. Therefore they have to plan in accordance with the problem as I stated it a moment ago, and it is no easy job. It is a difficult situation. Nobody knows what is going to happen next month or six months hence.
It has been mentioned here that it looks as if we are going to fight the next war as if it were a continuation of the last war. I do not know. The H-bomb has made a difference in our weapons; there is no doubt about that. There is no doubt that some of the weapons we have today will be obsolete. That is a problem that you have to face. And you get different opinions from the highest authorities. Until they have settled that it will be useless for us to spend vast amounts of money unless we know where we are going and why we are spending it.
I have nothing further to say, Mr. Chairman, except that I regret this emergency and I regret our having to spend this money on defence when it could be used for more useful purposes in the world. But while this threat is hanging over our heads-and it is not lessening; Geneva and Indo-China will tell you that-while this threat is there, we shall have to face it if we are to get the protection which we need. I think if the Canadian people, whom I believe to be the finest people on earth, second to none, are told the true hard facts they will face up to them as they have in the past, they will come through as they have in the past, and they will come through no matter what happens.


Mr. Diefenbaker:: Mr. Chairman, I do not intend to follow the arguments which have been advanced by the hon. members who preceded me, nor to repeat the arguments which have been placed before the committee by other members. I was impressed by the remarks of the hon. member for Kootenay West when, apparently in consequence of the words of optimism expressed by the minister yesterday, he pleaded for a reduction in the amount of expenditure for national defence.
The minister gave the house a very complete outline of the situation which, together with the white paper, revealed in some detail Canada's position. But I think the minister went rather far when he gave expression to the following:
It is very risky for people charged with defence to make a prophecy. All we can do is to give opinions and not give assurances, but this system of defence against air attack has reached the stage today where if I were in charge of the Russian air force and were aiming to reach important targets in the United States I would not go across the lines of these radar defences. I would go some other wav. and there are other ways.

Supply-National Defence
That statement, Mr. Chairman, has much in common with the Maginot-line complex of 1935 to 1939 and, having regard to what knowledge one may obtain by visiting various parts of northern Canada, to say the least it is based upon pious optimism. All of us hope that the minister's prophecy may be attained, but it does indicate an attitude of unreality and a failure to appreciate what I think the people of Canada must realize, namely that the danger to our survival is today as great as, if not greater than, it has been since 1945.
The hon. member for Kootenay West urged the establishment of a committee to investigate expenditures to ensure economic expenditure. All hon. members want economic expenditures, but I personally do not see

and I speak for myself alone based on my experience in this house-how such a committee having regard to its party complex can achieve what the people of Canada expect, namely actual production of armaments instead of a march of statistics based upon the amount of expenditures. With some Canadians already weary of the heavy expenditures and heavy taxation it is time our people were made fully aware of the dangers inherent in the world situation.
Recently I had the privilege of seeing something of the situation in Europe at first hand, and in this connection I would like to say that I was given every assistance by the departments of external affairs and defence. I had the privilege of an interview with General Gruenther, a man of masterful personality, tremendous capacity for leadership and with a knowledge of world events which fits him for the position he now occupies. I do not think those associated with him at SHAPE headquarters would express the hope that the danger is less than it was at any time during the last nine years.
Indeed, one of the greatest fears we face today is this, that nations will weary in welldoing and that the continued preparations for war will cause the feeling of apathy which, as one listens to the debate in this house, is not unrevealed in this chamber, if one can draw any conclusion on the basis of the attendance for this debate.
General Gruenther is coming to Canada early in June. He is a man who could give the Canadian people something of the picture as he sees it, and I hope that some time during his two-day visit he will be given the opportunity through the medium of the C.B.C. to place before the Canadian people the defence picture as he can reveal it from his position as supreme commander.
All of us hope for a reduction in war expenditure. We have the right to expect


that the government will institute what it has not heretofore instituted, namely a more meticulous and careful examination of expenditures so that unnecessary and wasteful expenditure will be abolished and the purchase of obsolete weapons will be discontinued.
The minister in his speech revealed a change in his thinking. I well remember some five or six years ago when his emphasis was not upon air power. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, with his unequalled experience and a knowledge of our problems gained during his progress from the ranks to the post of major general, in the infantry during two world wars, long ago indicated that in his opinion what was necessary was an intensification of air power and a lesser emphasis upon other means of defence. In 1949 he made a speech to that effect in this house and I shall read a portion of that speech. On November 18 of that year he said, as reported at page 1960 of Hansard:
Government policies are revealed in the estimates that are produced.
Then in the next paragraph he continued:
I have been an infantry soldier most of my life and 1 have all the pride and tradition of marching men behind me, but I say with that background that where we are spending under these items $1 on the army we ought to be spending $3 on the air force. One dollar on the army and $3 on the air force. I have not had the advantage of discussing this matter with the committee; 1 have not been able to prepare details of the estimates, but those are the proportions in which the money ought to be spent. That is why I feel in duty bound at this time to oppose the whole policy underlying the maintenance of our forces, because I do not believe the people of Canada are getting the proper amount of protection in return for the money they are providing.
That was his view in 1949. Events since 1949 indicate that his powers of anticipation and prophecy envisaged the world situation of today. The views he then expressed are the views which are accepted now by the general staffs of the various armies. In the British defence white paper of 1954, which to a degree represents the viewpoint of the British chiefs of staff, these words appear:
If by some miscalculation in communist policy or by deliberate design, a global war were to be forced upon us, it must be assumed that atomic weapons would be employed by both sides. In this event, it seems likely that such a war would begin with a period of intense atomic attacks lasting a relatively short time but inflicting great destruction and damage. If no decisive results were reached in this opening phase, hostilities would decline in intensity, though perhaps less so at sea than elsewhere, and a period of "broken-backed" warfare would follow, during which the opposing sides would seek to recover their strength, carrying on the struggle in the meantime as best they might.
Such a prospect emphasizes yet again the prime necessity of basing our defence policy upon the

prevention of war. It also makes clear the need to keep the lead which we now hold in technical development on which we must rely to offset the preponderance of the communist states in manpower.
Then it goes on to say this:
The basic one must be that by 1960-if not already-the Soviet union will be in possession of an ample stock of tactical atomic weapons, and she may strike in a very different manner from the sort of build-up and attack she would have launched in the pre-atomic days.
The views of the British chiefs of staff in 1954 represent in large measure the viewpoint expressed by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich in 1949. The government can learn much of benefit in the discussions in the House of Commons by members with knowledge and a realization of the issues as they are. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with available atomic weapons, apparently stands in a better position than at any time throughout recent years. We are in a position-and I quote the reference to General Gruenther to which I believe allusion has already been made-where the U.S.S.R. have nothing that would match the B-47 today. But with the expansion taking place in connection with atomic energy in the U.S.S.R., our great danger is that if we fail to continue to produce and to secure the largest possible return for the defence dollar spent, five years from now we shall find ourselves in a position where our relative strength in atomic weapons will be lower as compared with that of the U.S.S.R. One of the great deterrents to war is atomic power. Its influence for peace may be lost within five years because of our failure to place greater emphasis on air development and to spend a greater portion of our defence dollar upon aircraft capable of conveying atomic bombs to their destinations.
I well remember when in 1949 the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich advanced his arguments, on behalf of air power, the answer that was invariably given was in effect that his views did not represent the view of those in authority on the staff.
My friend the hon. member for Kootenay West indicated that some nations are reducing their expenditures. He mentioned the United States and he also referred to Turkey. Those reductions are taking place, not by reducing the amount produced but actually by savings and by economies, thus achieving the same return as the expenditure of the larger amount would have achieved.
I believe every facility should be provided to members of the House of Commons to see at first hand the situation in Europe as it is. I have never advocated junkets at the
Supply-National Defence expense of the state; far from it, but Canadian members of parliament should have the same opportunity that United States members of congress have to see what is going on over there. Such visits should be provided not at the expense, as I say, of the state but by utilizing the facilities that are available as the Royal Canadian Air Force engages in routine flights or other training expeditions. Only by first hand knowledge can members of parliament have a knowledge of conditions.
The minister mentioned the power of NATO. The progress that has taken place in the last three or four years has been tremendous. The results are a tribute to those who have given their devotion to the service of the organization comprising fourteen member nations who have been able to work together in a way that could not have been anticipated a few years ago. But certainly one of the great dangers in NATO is that discord and dissension will take place, similar to the divisions among the free nations as have been revealed in the Geneva conference. Disunity and division, confusion and cleavage. Ultimately disunity will result in the weakening of the western democratic and freedom-loving nations. Failure to agree is playing into the hands of the communists.
Two striking things during my trip come to mind. One was to see in France, a matter of but a few days ago, something of what communism can do. I was in the gallery of the chambre des deputes the day that Dien Bien Phu was captured. The communists there knew what had happened. They forgot the glory of France in their apparent joy at the fact that destruction had come to the French army that had so gallantly defended that outpost in Indo-China. A day later I saw something of the spirit of France when, in defeat, everywhere there was that attitude of mourning and courage which indicated that out of that defeat in Indo-China will come a new determination and a renewed power for greatness.
It has been said that in Europe communism is in recession. The answer is in the returns of the election which took place recently in northern France where the communists won a surprise local victory and the same in Italy where some 30 per cent of the people are voting communist. These things are of interest to us because to the degree that communism is able to establish itself, to that extent the possibility of the European defence community plan being passed and brought into being recedes into the future.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I am sorry to have to interrupt the hon. member but it

Private Bills-Divorce
is five o'clock and the house will proceed to the consideration of private and public bills.



PRIVATE BILLS

The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaite):: Hon. members will have noticed that there are several divorce bills on the order paper. Shall they all be considered in one motion?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.



SECOND READINGS


[Stage Direction]
Bill No. 449, for the relief of Francis Walsh.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 450, for the relief of Hilda Anne Darke Marshall.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 451, for the relief of Claude Raphael Sacchitelle.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 452, for the relief of Isabel Mary Peebles Brown	Macartney-Filgate.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 453, for the relief of Wilfrid Lavoie.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 454, for the relief of Joseph Edgar Emilien Landry.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 455, for the relief of Joseph Victor Gerard Fontaine.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 456, for the relief of Jeanne Robert Hotte.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 457, for the relief of Heneault Champagne.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 458, for the relief of Leopold Ruel. -Mr. Hunter.
The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaite):: The business for the hour for private and public bills having been disposed of, the house will resume consideration of the business interrupted at five o'clock.

The house resumed in committee of supply, Mr. Applewhaite in the chair.



DEPARTMENT OP NATIONAL DEFENCE

Edward Turney Applewhaite: The hon. member for Prince Albert. Item 239.


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Chairman, I was dealing in general with the NATO organization, the need of its preservation and the realization by all of us that criticism of other nations within NATO is a detrimental course and weakens that organization at a time that the communists are endeavouring to cause dissension, disorganization, disagreement, delay and deferment of decisions. When we sometimes feel prone to criticize the United States of America let us realize one
[The Deputy Chairman.]
fact, that of the $68 billion this year that is being expended through the NATO organization to maintain and preserve freedom almost 80 per cent is furnished by the United States of America.
The communists' aim and endeavour is to divide, to divide and rule because of the division. They adopt a different policy in every part of Europe to meet the circumstances of the country in which they are. In France they oppose EDC and say in effect that the 500,000 men that Germany would provide are unnecessary. They go back to the hundreds of years of difference and difficulty between France and Germany. In Italy they bring up the question of Trieste and contend that if EDC is ratified by Italy then in that case the hope of the Italians to retrieve Trieste will be gone.
In northern Italy they operate in the trade unions on the basis that they have achieved a great deal for the workmen. Among the farmers they say that there will be no rent. For every area they have a policy. Their purpose is to divide and thereby destroy the security which the unity of NATO alone can preserve. I hope that everything will be done by our leaders to bring home to the Canadian people and to the peoples of all the nations within the NATO organization the imperative need of preservation of the unity of NATO. Unity cannot be divisible and freedom survive.
Next, the maintenance of the spiritual things of free men is important. In that regard I think the recent judgment of the supreme court of the United States denying segregation is one of the greatest steps forward for democracy everywhere in the world in removing as it will one of those stumbling blocks with which communism has been able to block the roadway to freedom for the coloured races. I predict that magnificent judgment will take its place internationally in the years ahead in the struggle against communism to the same degree as Lincoln's emancipation declaration had its effective results in unifying the various states of the United States.
NATO is a tremendous project. Canada has made a worthy contribution. I bring you from among the NATO nations a message of the appreciation of the contribution of Dana Wilgress and those associated with him. I believe that if there had been a similar organization during the 1930's a second world war might have been averted. What NATO has done is to build a shield in Europe that could not have been foreseen two or three years ago.
The NATO nations possess 5,800 aircraft, of which 2,400 are jet fighters. In addition,

they have a thousand more based in Great Britain. Throughout Europe they have built up airports capable of accommodating 350 jets. They have forces which, while they will not stop the enemy if it moves, will nonetheless act as a deterrent. There are 500,000 on the German front compared with 400,000 in the armies immediately opposite them. Across Europe from West Germany to Turkey NATO today has 3,100,000 men under arms compared with 4 million in the Soviet.
NATO is doing something more. It is organizing the economic strength of these nations. NATO nations have 68 per cent of the oil in Europe, 76 per cent of the shipping, 66 per cent of the steel, 59 per cent of the coal and 62 per cent of the electric power. This has been achieved because there has been unity. I fear that the unity that built this great alliance for defence and survival is in danger of being broken by the disagreements that are taking place at Geneva and elsewhere. Divisions among the free nations help the communists. I believe that above everything else we of the freedom-loving parliaments must take a firm stand against unnecessary divisions, disagreements or cleavages among the free nations. We must realize that only in unity is there survival.
What can NATO do in Canada? One of its programs is called infrastructure. I do not know who invented that strangely sounding word. Under infrastructure NATO builds airfields, communication lines, oil pipe lines and so on. Accepting the general thesis, now accepted by the minister and rather disavowed five years ago, that the major element in our defence is air power, I believe that the nations of NATO and in particular the United States, in view of the fact she is our closest neighbour and realizes our vast mineral resources that are so necessary for the survival of NATO, should give consideration to assistance in building strategic roads within this country that are necessary to defence. Such roads, besides being of great defence value, would be useful at the present time in order to provide a means of ingress and egress of our northern areas.
The opposition of the minister has been expressed on a number of occasions, but he has changed his mind on the question of the need for the intensification of air development. His attitude in the past has been opposed to doing anything in this regard. Having regard to the position in the western provinces, the oil, uranium and other minerals there, I believe our present roadway situation is such that in the event of war many of these strategic needs would be denied to our forces. I believe that there
Supply-National Defence should be not only defence highways into the north, useful in time of war and in particular to provide a means of securing these necessary muniments of war such as uranium and oil, but additional to the trans-Canada highway a defence highway in the north is necessary through the Yellowhead pass. This suggestion is supported by the people of northern Saskatchewan and Alberta, and also by those living in the southernmost parts of these two provinces. The Edmonton Journal of April 29 set forth the situation regarding the Yellowhead highway in these words:
This much at least must be said for defence minister Brooke Claxton's attitude to the Yellowhead highway project, as displayed on his visit here this week; he does not beat about the bush. Questioned about the possibility of building the road as a defence measure, he stated that it would serve no useful military purpose. An attack on Canada in a future war, he predicted, would be by air, and highways would not be involved in the defence.
If one goes back to 1946 and 1947 and reads some of the speeches made by the ministers of this government at that time, one finds that the possibility of attack by air, now accepted as a possibility, was ridiculed and the need for the establishment of radar stations in northern Canada to effectively meet that danger potentiality was frowned upon.
Then, the editorial says this:
This will strike most westerners as a rash and hasty judgment. Under modem conditions, an enemy may well choose to attack Canada, and especially its northwestern regions, by air. But the repulse of such an attack may depend in large measure on speedy and reliable ground transportation, for instance in the case of bad flying weather. Moreover it would seem sound defence policy not to have all our eggs in airborne baskets.
Then, again, the Calgary Albertan dealt with the situation in an editorial of May 6 in these words:
When defence minister Claxton was in Edmonton a few days ago, he said that a first-class highway through the Yellowhead pass, affording direct connection between Vancouver and Edmonton, would serve no useful military purpose. He said that if Canada was attacked it would be by air, and "highways would not be involved in the defence."
The Edmonton Journal, tireless advocate of the Yellowhead route, took Mr. Claxton to task for that statement, and with justification.
The Calgary newspaper gives its support to this highway and to northern highways in general as part of our defence project. Speaking as a member from the province of Saskatchewan I say that today our situation is such, with the location of uranium and the potentialities of Beaverlodge in northern Saskatchewan, that all that vast area might well be lost to our defence effort unless something in the nature of a defence highway is provided. Indeed, a military man and scientist, Dr. Mawdsley of the University of
4972	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence Saskatchewan, has said that our uranium development might well he lost by the invasion of a few paratroopers. I ask the minister to reconsider his oft-repeated statement that these highways are unnecessary and to secure full information in this connection, from those who have some knowledge of conditions in northern Canada. I believe that from them he will secure a picture as to the need for these highways, which apparently were needed during the war or otherwise the Alaska highway would not have been rushed to completion as it was.
Then I come to one other matter in connection with NATO. One cannot separate the defence sections in NATO from those dealing with economic development. I am one of those who fear that you cannot hold an organization like NATO together by the simple expedient of continuing fear. In order to mobilize the peoples in the free nations there must be something in the nature of economic advantages to the peoples of those various nations. This was envisaged in article 2, which is the essence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Article 2 says:
They-
That is the nations comprising NATO.
-will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies, and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.
That section to date is a dead letter, excepting in so far as co-operation is taking place in any of the nations in Europe under the organization for European economic cooperation. Again I suggest that material defences are necessary, but that to hold this organization together the only means whereby freedom can be preserved is to have due regard for the economic features of this treaty.
These are but a few matters that have occurred to me, that I felt I could bring to the attention of the committee on this occasion. We will not preserve our freedom, we will not preserve our security, simply by vast statistics of expenditures without there being for those expenditures the best possible use made of the money expended. There will not be a building up of unity within NATO unless there is economic co-operation as yet nonexistent. There will not be available to NATO the vast resources of northern Canada unless and until the Department of National Defence realizes that highways north and south into those areas, which otherwise will not have such highways, are made available. In the event of war or attack through the north polar areas, or over the ice cap, we must be in a position to make available to our armed forces and to those of the other nations in NATO the vast resources of northern Canada.


Mr. Leboe:: Mr. Chairman, I shall not take much of the time of the committee but I would like to refer briefly to what was said by the hon. member for Wetaskiwin, and also just now by the hon. member for Prince Albert. In emphasizing the need for highways as a means of defence I would not have risen at this time had it not been for the fact that I think it is vitally important that great emphasis be placed upon defence highways in Canada. I believe those highways are absolutely necessary for the protection of our people, and as vitally needed as any other form of protection. I think of the Vancouver area and of the one bridge leading out of that city. I think of the many thousands of people who, as it were, would be cooped up without any way of getting out of the city because of a lack of highways and bridges.
It is time our government took a realistic view of what is needed by way of highways. It is time the government took another look, because in travelling across this country I have found that many people are becoming greatly concerned about the civil defence situation. Co-operation between the Department of National Defence and the civil defence authorities is an absolute must. Furthermore, certain civilian highways now in existence are inadequate.
Any expenditures made by the Department of National Defence in the building of highways would bring about something of a permanent nature which, in time to come, would be of real value to the people of Canada, and certainly would not, as occurs in so many cases, be lost to the civilian cause.
National highways for purposes of defence are fast becoming a national issue because the people are alarmed. It is only reasonable to expect that they would become alarmed- although perhaps the minister would not agree when I say they are. However I do travel around in various parts of the country and find that this subject is continually on their tongues and in their conversation. They point out that nothing is being done in the building of highways for purposes of defence.
Looking at the minister's speech as it is reported in Hansard, and particularly at the figures he placed on record, I note that more than $850 million has been spent for industrial equipment. Surely, looking at the over-all picture, in the light of that great expenditure for industrial equipment there must be some place in the plan of things whereby we can reach a balance and have some moneys allocated to the building of defence highways. I make this reference, Mr. Chairman, only for purposes of emphasis, and because I think it is very important.


Mr. Palleil:: Mr. Chairman, it is with a certain amount of timidity I rise to speak on a subject involving an expenditure of $1,902,823,500. Before coming to the House of Commons I thought that was a lot of money; but if I am to judge by the lack of concern of hon. members as indicated by the slim attendance in the house today perhaps the time will come when I will not consider this a large sum of money.
The fact is however that the amount I have indicated does constitute two-fifths of the budget for this country. I have been advised that if I inquire too closely as to how the money is spent I will be advised, in reply to certain questions, that it is not in the national interest to disclose the way those moneys are spent. It is for this reason I rise to point out to the committee that for any government of Canada, representing the percentage of population of the western democracies it does represent, as indicated by the vote of the electors, to suggest it has any secrets, the divulgence of which would have an adverse effect upon the forces of the western democracies is very close to ridiculous.
May I say with vigour that I am in wholehearted accord with every suggestion made in the house that a committee should be formed, or some other steps taken, to allow individual members to familiarize themselves with what is received in kind for the dollars and cents actually spent. We must not be content with merely a statement by a minister who expresses an opinion on information received, or something of that nature. As a member of the house I do not even know the source of the information on which his opinion is based.
With respect to this Gargantua in our midst, this defence spending, let me say I do not believe there is a taxpayer in Canada who is not prepared to spend his or her fair share for purposes of defence. I make that statement without qualification. But there is also an onus on the Department of National Defence to see that money is not spent needlessly, or that it is not taken unnecessarily from the taxpayers.
I suggest there are certain assets standing in the name of the Department of National Defence which are not serving the defensive system in our country. At one time they did serve the defence of the country and served it well. At the present time they do not. I refer to the fixed assets. One in particular to which I refer is the Long Branch rifle range. This property is situated in the township of Toronto, in the county of Peel. At one time perhaps it was used extensively as a rifle range and may have had some particular purpose. I am quite familiar with the area. It comprises several hundred acres
Supply-National Defence of land and is a sort of luxury gift to be used by certain non-permanent units a very few days in the year. It could now be used by the taxpayers of the municipality of the township of Toronto to bring in large industrial assessments which in turn would lighten the tax load of the taxpayers. Representations have been made over the years to the Department of National Defence to release these lands, and as of the date of my making this speech no action has been taken by the Department of National Defence to release those lands. I suggest to the minister that in all fairness to the taxpayers of the area this is an example of the Department of National Defence holding an expensive asset for no particular purpose.
The argument has been advanced that it is really for a rifle range. When one compares the distance from Toronto of the area when it was first created in relation to the method of transportation then in existence I suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that Camp Borden is as close to Toronto today to fill all the purposes for which this rifle range might be used, and that the land should be released.
As to other matters affecting the Department of National Defence, I suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that the minister might well concern himself with his program of advertising pensions. The average person who enlists in the navy, army or air force is probably concerned with the fact that a pension is offered. The minister may say that pensions are not his particular responsibility. Since they deal with the people whom he is hiring I suggest to him that they are in his department, and when I refer to him the treatment which his people and the widows of his people are receiving, he will observe the unfairness of the situation where no pension is received when death or accident is not due to service, although actually the individual is in service. The pension that is given, or rather not given, is, I suggest to the minister, creating a very definite hardship.
I refer particularly to a very recent example of Flying Officer Joseph Goldthorpe, who enlisted in 1940 and served with distinction in the Royal Canadian Air Force for five years. After the war he endeavoured to re-enlist in the air force, but I understand he was advised that he would have to reduce his rank. He enlisted in the Royal Air Force and was offered a permanent commission. Through good fortune, the Royal Canadian Air Force was able to secure him. He came back and re-enlisted in the Royal Canadian Air Force. I say to the minister that this flying officer, with distinguished service, died

Supply-National Defence one day at noon in the officers' mess. He was buried with full air force honours in North Bay, and his widow received the magnificent contribution in gratia of $100. I suggest to the minister that he might well consider the pension plan set forth in the advertisements and dispose of the pension suggestion in the advertisements because they are not all one might gather from reading them and people are being misled.
While we are dealing with advertisements I would refer the minister to an advertisement which appeared in this morning's Globe and Mail of Toronto, which I understand is fairly widely read in that area. It contains an advertisement of guardsmen marching, and the following:
Applications now being accepted for the new Regiment of Canadian Guards.
I have great pride in the name "guard". I had the honour of serving in a guards regiment during the war myself. I suggest to the minister that the advertisement is misleading in that it is an advertisement of guards and in the small print says:
Canadian guards qualifications may be obtained from any recruiting officer.
I suggest to the minister that perhaps he has not complete knowledge of the advertisement. It is to get people into the recruiting office under false pretences. They publish a nice advertisement and then they refer to the special qualifications of the guards in the righthand corner. I would ask the minister to deal with it later on in his remarks and tell us whether it is the intention of the Department of National Defence to discontinue the great tradition which put the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery on the right of the line and then the armoured corps next, and so on down the units; or is the suggestion in this advertisement that the guards will be second to none on the parade ground misleading, because as I understand the expression "second to none on the parade ground" means that you are on the right of the line. Is it the suggestion of the Department of National Defence that this Regiment of Canadian Guards shall be on the right of the line, or shall the Royal Canadian Horse Artillery and the armoured corps continue to occupy this position? It is a fair question to ask because it is causing quite a bit of concern to many people who are affiliated with those regiments.
In connection with the billeting of married men in married quarters in places such as ordnance depots and the like, I am advised that pressure is being brought to bear by Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation with respect to financing builders of rental units that they must allocate certain units
[Mr. Pallett.l

to service personnel, or that before they will finance certain individual houses they require the builders to build certain apartment houses. In certain municipalities this will cause great hardship. I would ask the minister to advise us whether any steps are being taken to give special grants to those municipalities who have to provide services and the like to those additional apartment houses and dwellings right within the municipalities.
The minister in his speech yesterday at page 4909 of Hansard said:
In the United States last year, one-third of the entire strength of the United States armed forces were separated from the forces last year. In Canada the equivalent figure was about one-seventh. We want to maintain our rates of reengagement: we want to increase it if we can, but to say that it is a grave problem is a gross exaggeration.
In fairness the minister should have continued to say that the bulk of the service personnel in the United States armed forces are draftees, and that the one-third who are leaving the army are merely leaving it at the expiration of the draft period. I would ask the minister if a better comparison would not be to give the numbers leaving the United States army who are volunteers, as compared with the figure in the Canadian army, which is a completely volunteer army. I think that would be a more realistic comparison than to say one-third in the United States and one-seventh in Canada. I would suggest to the minister further that perhaps the fact that only one-seventh are leaving the service in Canada indicates the general economic condition within the country. They are in the army and they do not wish to leave to take a chance on an uncertain employment field in industry at the present time.
I should now like to deal briefly with the problem of civil defence. It is a problem that the minister mentioned. At the outset I would say that the minister should either tell us that there is a threat or there is not, because civil defence in this country seems to be something patterned on the "after you, Alphonse" system. People are trying to throw the responsibility on others. I think that initiative and leadership must be shown. The Department of National Defence means exactly what it says, and I suggest to the minister that civil defence is a matter worthy of his very serious consideration. As he said himself yesterday, it does little to train troops for overseas if civil defence is not properly taken care of.
In that regard I would suggest to the minister that he should make a very careful reconsideration of what I suspect is his

attitude toward the reserve army in Canada. During the last war-and before that, of course, though I will confine my remarks to the present time-the reserve army units were very highly commended. In fact they actually produced a general, and I refer to the general commanding the fifth division in which I served. He was from the reserve army. The reserve army units responded tremendously upon the outbreak of the Korean war. They were given certain allocations and they filled every one of them.
I would suggest to the minister that he attend some evening parades of the reserve army and he will find that with very few exceptions-and I say with pride that one of these exceptions is the Lome Scots regiment which is the regiment from my own sounty-the officers on parade outnumber the N.C.O.'s and enlisted men. If the minister wishes to accept that suggestion then perhaps it would be better if he gave no notice of his intention but just dropped in to say "Hello".
I would suggest to the minister that the background for civil defence in Canada is the reserve army. They will be required for military duties, policing, and other duties following air raids and they will be the only force immediately available for such tasks. In view of that I would suggest that the minister should take that fact into consideration in his estimates, and make an honest effort to rejuvenate the reserve army.
Many hon. members have referred to the large amounts of money involved in national defence and in this connection I would like the minister to tell me if my understanding of what he said yesterday is correct. I refer him to his remarks as reported at page 4909 of Hansard where he said:
In the three-year period we have not done everything we set out to do. No country has or could do that, but we have done substantially what we set out to do, and one of the extraordinary things is that the amount expended is so close to the amount originally planned. The amount originally planned was, as announced on February 5, 1951, $5 billion. The expression was, "about a $5 billion program" and the actual cash disbursements over the three-year period has been $5,005,479,000. But we have not got all that we planned for that expenditure. We have not all the ships, the construction, and the other types of equipment for which we planned, but we have done much more than four-fifths of what was planned three years ago for the estimated figure.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to draw particular attention to the minister's statement:
But we have not got all that we planned for that expenditure.
In the final sentence I quoted originally the minister did not say nine-tenths or
Supply-National Defence seventeen-twentieths. He said "more than four-fifths" so I take it that that is the closest figure. The minister's estimate for the entire program was $5 billion but I would suggest in the light of these figures that the minister has made a billion dollar error at the expense of the Canadian taxpayer. He has received only four-fifths of the estimated goods for the full $5 billion disbursement, a loss of $1 billion.


Mr. Drew:: Mr. Chairman, it seems to me that the thing that must impress itself most on the mind of any hon. member who has been in this house, and certainly on anyone who has come into the galleries this afternoon, is the spirit of utter unreality in which the material survival of Canada is being discussed. At 3.40 this afternoon, at a time when we were discussing the expenditure of $2 billion in a single year and, far more important than that, the means by which we can defend our freedom, there were 11 Liberal members in the house and not a single cabinet minister.


Mr. Nicholson:: There are not many Conservatives here now.


An hon. Member:: How many were there on your side of the house?


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, there have not been many on either side of the house and the reason is because of the soporific speech by the minister which left the impression that we are in a satisfactory state in the defence of this country after having spent more than $5 billion. We must measure that in terms of what we have in reality.
We have been told of the fighter squadrons in Europe. Those squadrons are well equipped, well trained and unquestionably equal to any that are ready for service in that area. We know of the standard of excellence of the members of the armed forces, the infantry, artillery and other branches of the service which have been in Korea and which are there now. We know of the high level of training in the permanent units.
Nevertheless, that is the only final product of the whole defence plan of Canada. It might well be that if we were drifting along in a period of easy assurance and there was no danger of war we could look with some measure of satisfaction, with some measure of complacency at the actual situation in which the reserve forces of this country now find themselves. Every hon. member in this house who has followed the debates, and most certainly every hon. member who has served in one of the armed forces, knows that the reserve units are the backbone of Canadian defence. No one will question that,

Supply-National Defence least of all the Minister of National Defence. Therefore, as we examine our position, as we come close to four years since the outbreak of a very real and very deadly war in Korea, let us see with just what measure of reality we have brought our reserve units up to a position in which they could occupy the field if that dreadful necessity arose.
Either in a direct capacity or some other capacity I have been associated with the reserve forces of Canada since 1910. That is a long time. I say without any hesitation that in spite of the improvement of equipment and things of that kind the reserve units of this country are less able to go into the field today in the event of an emergency than they have been at any time within that 40 years.
Just a moment ago the hon. member for Peel in his speech, and an excellent speech it was, placed before the house the dreadful warning that is to be found in the unchallengeable fact that in many parts of this country, where units with long historic pasts gather to train, there are more officers on parade than other ranks. That illustrates a condition which is behind the statement I have just made with regard to the readiness of reserve units to be mobilized and to be employed.
Let us go back to the days of the first world war. For some that is almost getting back to the Crimea. Nevertheless for some of us those days are still very fresh and real. Just prior to that war the reserve units went into camp at close to full strength, whether they were infantry, artillery, cavalry or other branches of the service. That year I saw infantry units that were well up to the full authorized establishment for camp. That year I saw artillery units some of whose men had to be paid from the pockets of the officers because they had more than were authorized. That is something that happened on other occasions.
Those units were horse units; they were artillery units. They moved their own guns and they moved complete complements of guns. They took them to camp and they carried out their manoeuvres in camp. Infantry units carried out training of a nature that is only possible where you have a complete unit in form. So it was with the cavalry and with other branches of the service at that time. War broke upon the world with a suddenness far more unexpected than in 1939 when, on August 4, 1914 we were confronted with something utterly unexpected at that time by people who had basked in the sunshine of peace for so long. Nevertheless, although that situation arose unexpectedly, less than eight weeks after the sudden outbreak of war the first Canadian division sailed


for Britain ready to take their part. I grant you that there were long months of training before they went into the field, but it was not so many months later that those men, who had left Canada less than two months after that sudden outbreak of war, were taking their place against the most highly trained troops the world had known up to that time.
Another war came. There was not the comparative readiness then, although the equipment had advanced so much. Not by any manner of means were the units as ready as they were in 1914, in comparison to their needs. Nevertheless most batteries of artillery, infantry units, cavalry units and other units of the reserve forces had equipment that could be used for training immediately.
Now let us see where we are at after having spent some $5| billion. Let us see where we are at almost four years after the outbreak of another real war, namely that in Korea. Let us see exactly with what reality the reserve forces have been prepared to be the backbone of our defence. Mr. Chairman, the situation is rather similar in many cases; but let me deal with one branch of the service. What is substantially true there is substantially true in a great many other cases.
Last year at Petawawa-the great artillery camp not so far from here-one of the groups of artillery, that had one of the best firing records last year, consisted of two medium regiments of artillery and five field regiments. That group, which was rated fairly highly, was probably at best at about one-quarter of the strength that was actually authorized. When it comes to the firing that was done- and that was after more than three years had elapsed since the outbreak of war in Korea- may I say that the five field regiments of that particular group that were in camp at the same time at Petawawa last year fired 24 guns instead of the 120 guns authorized for the number of batteries that would be included in that group. This year at best, those five regiments amongst the better regiments in this country at the present time will perhaps fire 28 guns instead of the 120 guns which would be the number of guns fired by five regiments according to their ordinary strength. Last year the total number of guns fired by five regiments was exactly the number of guns alloted to a single regiment up to strength.
Then when it comes to these units going to camp this year, only one of those regiments will have two batteries, although regimental strength is three. The rest will have only one battery and in most cases only a single troop of guns. That, Mr. Chairman, is the

state of readiness of one of the better groups of artillery of the reserve force at this time.
Last night, in one of the most accurate and comprehensive descriptions I have heard of the position of the armoured forces, and given to this committee by a gallant officer of the armoured corps, we were told of the ineffectiveness of the armoured training at this time. We know that the same thing is true with regard to the most historic infantry units. This is the situation in which we now find ourselves after the expenditure of this enormous sum of money. We are therefore confronted with the fact that it is not dollars that count, Mr. Chairman, it is what we have obtained for them. The time has now come for everyone to ask, in more detail than has been given, what has happened to that money and why it is that we have not obtained better results for what we have spent.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at eight o'clock.
George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, the subject that we have been discussing is one that transcends all others in importance both as far as the money and the result of the expenditure of that money are concerned. In a large measure members of this house must be called upon to bear responsibility for what is or is not accomplished as the result of that expenditure. In some substantial measure we are in the same position as a board of directors representing shareholders who are the people of Canada. As a board of directors it is our duty to consider the way in which management has been doing its job. In this case management is the government itself, and I think that parallel can be extended to the point that we should ask ourselves how likely it would be that any board of directors of any large company would accept the responsibility of making decisions if they were given the kind of information that the government in this case gives us.
Of course we are dealing with something far more important, far larger in its significance and more far-reaching in its ultimate consequences than any board of directors can ever be called upon to deal with. I mention that particularly because the management in this case have sought the advice of certain experts regarding the organization and effectiveness of the reserve forces. Three very competent officers of long experience were called upon to examine the situation and to make their recommendations. It 83276-315
Supply-National Defence would be extremely helpful if we, who represent the responsibility of a board of directors, had before us the findings of that group of experts. Possibly there might be some explanations found in that report for some of the things that are otherwise unexplainable. Possibly we might have information as to recommendations that have been made which would in themselves deal in a large measure with the subjects that we are discussing here in the house.
We do not know. We have not seen the report. I submit, Mr. Chairman, there can be no reason of any kind for that report not being before the house. In the past other reports of a similar nature were available; other reports of a similar nature were made public. All those who have followed the development of the reserve or militia training, as it was called in earlier days, will remember the famous Otter report. That was made public. It was discussed publicly and it was acted upon with full knowledge of the recommendations that were made.
The next substantial reorganization of our reserve or militia forces that took place occurred some years before the last war. That was the result of discussions which took place openly in the early 1930's. Decisions were reached by officers of the non-permanent forces. The recommendations which they made were substantially accepted. A plan of reorganization was approved by the council of defence associations at a time when the relationship of the non-permanent forces to the general staff and to the Department of National Defence was somewhat different from what it is today. At that time the reorganization that was carried out, and which made it possible to mobilize with reasonable effectiveness in 1939, was very largely the result of the recommendations of the nonpermanent officers whose experience was employed for that purpose.
Now a new examination of this subject has been made. There is not one word in that report that should be kept from the house. There is not a word of that report that relates to anything that would give aid and comfort to any enemy. It would give much aid and comfort to the people of Canada if they knew what these highly competent officers had recommended, and it would assist the board of directors representing the shareholders if we had that recommendation before us so that our discussion could be directed to the same kind of information that is in the possession of the minister and his officials as well as the general staff.
It is largely because of the withholding of reports and information of this kind and the withholding of basic facts which are essential to the satisfactory discussion of this

Supply-National Defence subject that we find ourselves today in this atmosphere of unreality. When I spoke this afternoon of the small numbers on both sides of the house attending the debate I was not forgetful of the fact that important committees are sitting and that many hon. members were attending committee meetings. The very fact that I am called upon to mention that emphasizes one of the reasons why the discussion of these important subjects in the house is so unsatisfactory. Important committees are delayed until the very last minute. We only started a few days ago to deal with veterans affairs although we have been sitting since last November. Even now there is still extremely important legislation to come forward. Members are called upon to attend these committee meetings and generally the whole atmosphere is such that for those members who are concerned about this subject there is great difficulty in finding the time to attend the discussions which should take place and which should be listened to here in the house.
It was not because of any lack of interest, Mr. Chairman, or positive suggestion in the speeches that were made that there was any atmosphere of unreality. The member for Esquimalt-Saanich yesterday made one of the best speeches on national defence that has been made in this house, since I came here, at any rate. The hon. member who made that speech is the best qualified officer in Canada to make a speech of that kind. He is a man who has been through every rank in the army from private to major general, from carrying a rifle in the rear ranks to the command of a division, and after that to the Pacific coast command during the last war.


Mr. MacDougall:: Speak up so the general can hear you.


George Alexander Drew: The comment that is made, of course, would display something of which the hon. member who interrupted would not be aware, that is that he may have some modesty. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich has had an experience which qualifies him to make a statement in this house about national defence in a way that is not equalled by any member on either side of the house. When he speaks of training for battle, and the needs of battle, he speaks as an officer with unequalled experience in battle. Other officers have made similar contributions, officers who are now members of this house.
Nor have these speeches been confined to those in the officer rank, by any manner of means. We have heard speeches from those who served in other ranks, and in doing so


that, no matter how much we may respect the earnestness of the minister in relation to his responsibilities, we have to take his statements at their face value. His statements at their face value give us very little real information, give us very little of practical value in relation to the problem we are called upon to judge at this time. Let us remember that it is the private members on both sides of the house whose responsibility is represented in the request for some $2 billion for national defence in the current fiscal year.
Let the minister tell us what has gone wrong instead of telling us that everything is the best in the world, or imitating the very famous literary expression, that all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds. Let him tell us why there has been this inability to get the reserve forces up to a level where they could be mobilized in the event of hostilities. Let him tell us why it is that the equipment is not adequate. Let him answer the question that has been raised in regard to the armoured forces, in regard to the infantry, in regard to the other units which are short of equipment at this time. We will be ready to listen to that; we are not ready to be told that all is well when we know all is not well.
No matter what might have been possible two weeks ago, Mr. Chairman, the loss of Dien Bien Phu ushered in a new period of military appreciation. Whatever may have been valid before that is not valid today unless it is examined in the light of that experience. Brave, well equipped, well trained units were overrun in a fortress that had been prepared with great care. I have no doubt every hon. member heard the description of the bombardment which preceded the final overrunning of that fortress. Those who were there in that earlier experience said that there had not been any barrage like it since the drumfire of Verdun.
That is the kind of thing that has emerged in this distant jungle and in these plains in distant points throughout the world, where Russian guns in the hands of Chinese troops moved from Korea after the armistice now mass their strength against the scattered outposts of the western world. That is the reality we face, and we must face it in terms of cold reality. We must reassess our position. We must examine the kind of forces that are needed to meet that kind of situation. Do we believe for one moment that we are going to meet manpower with manpower on the plains of Europe, if the necessity should come to meet the teeming millions of Russia? I do not think that anyone does. We know perfectly well that under no circumstances

can the western world mass forces in the distant jungles and plains of Asia on equal terms.
These call for a new assessment; these call for a new type of organization; certainly, at least they call for the examination of that possibility. Those who remember what happened in Burma during the last war will recall the successful unconventional forces that were organized to fight a different type of enemy through the jungle with great success. Is that the kind of force we need? Instead of heavily equipped paratroops, do we perhaps need some new type of very informal mobile force? We do not know unless the discussion is opened up, with all the information available to us that is available to the government. Certainly the only thing that will give comfort to the enemy is our failure to examine these things in terms of stern reality.
We have another problem before us in Canada. We are the third largest country in the world with fifteen million people. What kind of armed force do we need that will be most effective both in this large area and for overseas service? We have a navy, a well trained navy; we have highly trained and well equipped air units in the permanent units of the R.C.A.F.; we have excellent infantry units in the permanent branch of the service. I repeat, our reserve units are keen and anxious to do their job, but are severely limited both by numbers, by equipment and by the opportunities for training under those circumstances. What do we need? I merely put this forward as a suggestion, but it is one of the things that would be put forward if we were really able to have the recommendation before us that have been made and other recommendations as well.
Is it not possible that we should concentrate entirely on air units of different kinds, except for fairly limited naval and other units? Is it not possible that we should have all our artillery, all our armoured forces, all our reconnaissance forces, all the engineers and all the other forces-we are not including the medical forces-airborne ready to be moved by air transport to any distant point? Certainly that would be the thing that would be most effective to meet a possible threat to this country, and it certainly would be the thing that would be most effective to make our strength felt at distant points throughout the world. I do not put this forward as any dogmatic suggestion; I merely say it is one of the kind of things that should be considered as an alternative to the continuous training of units that are essential segments of the old type of continental force.
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We are still training with the same mentality we had when we believed that our units were going to be parts of divisions and army formations in Europe or in some other great mainland, but particularly Europe. Let us with all the ingenuity we have-and we are an ingenious people-devise the kind of force that will be best for Canada and at the same time serve our purpose within the framework of NATO and of the other organizations. Probably there are hon. members who have read the most interesting and illuminating book of all time-I hope they have all read it-under the title "The Reason Why" based upon that classic poem:
Theirs not to reason why,
Theirs but to do and die.
Well, anybody who is prepared to accept the proposition that it is not for hon. members to reason why, but just to accept the statement of the government, and particularly the Department of National Defence, should read "The Reason Why" and find the reason why we should accept nothing but full information in regard to every aspect of defence here in this country.
The minister spoke of civil defence. It is appropriate that he should speak about civil defence because that is the department under which it should be. Since he spoke on that let us see what he says, as reported at page 4906 of Hansard:
There has been some tendency by some people here and elsewhere to take the view that the destructive power of the H-bomb makes civil defence measures futile. Nothing could be further from the truth.
Then, a few sentences later he said:
Our plans must continue to receive the closest examination in the light of all the circumstances, but the planning and oganization of civil defence measures must be pressed forward.
I refer to that because I make this recommendation to the Prime Minister tonight, as I have this opportunity to do in the committee. Civil defence can no longer be regarded as something remote from national defence generally. We had a statement about three weeks ago by the Minister of National Health and Welfare that this subject is now too serious to permit any argument as to whether this is a problem for the national government, the provincial governments or the municipalities. Certainly it is. The H-bomb, which may embrace in its destructive power several communities, has rendered meaningless this division of responsibility, and what the Minister of National Health and Welfare said should leave no doubt that the government should now transfer this subject to the Department of National Defence and bring the whole matter of civil defence under the government here in Ottawa.
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The municipalities simply cannot accept the financial responsibility of preparing themselves for this effort. I agree completely, and agree with the utmost earnestness, with what the minister said that under no circumstances should we accept the proposition that these frightful weapons have now rendered civil defence measures futile.
Who knows where the outlying limits of the destructive area of a new bomb of that kind would be? It might only partly encroach upon any municipality, but the municipality which did not prepare for destruction of that kind would simply find people uncared for and no plans made for their removal, for their care, and for their medical treatment. The greater the area of destruction the greater the need for civil defence and the greater the need for a unified command, and for a centralized authority over something that is of national concern.
Arguing as I so frequently do the importance of the decentralization of authority in regard to local affairs, I believe implicitly that national defence is a strictly national affair and civil defence, as part of national defence, should be under the government here at Ottawa and financed by the dominion treasury.
The need for a recognition of what has been said by the Minister of National Defence is all too apparent, Mr. Chairman, and I hope that the government will take heed of what he has said and what has been said by the Minister of National Health and Welfare. This is a subject which cannot be left where it is. One day we were told there was an agreement on a broad scale with the provinces and next day we had a statement from the minister responsible in Ontario to the effect that there was no agreement at all.
I hope no one will say they are not particularly interested in civil defence in Ontario. After all, Ontario has close to a third of the population of Canada and it does so happen that the number of other provinces, which bring up the total to a majority of the population of Canada, have not entered into any agreement. Surely this cannot be a satisfactory situation in the face of this threat. Surely there can be no better way of meeting whatever was said by the Minister of National Defence, or the emphasis placed upon this subject by the Minister of Health and Welfare, than to change the pattern and bring this within the authority of this department, and to integrate these activities with other activities and other branches of the service where undoubtedly there could be a greater economy in the use of their forces, and undoubtedly the medical 

services of the army, navy and air force could be embraced in new plans for civil defence.
Then, Mr. Chairman, there is the question of the whole approach to the items that are going to come before us. Any hon. member who looks at the large figures embracing the entire military service will realize how impossible it is to go into these details.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I have been critical, and critical particularly of the complacent suggestion that has been made that all is well. All is not well; all is far from well. Ask any member of the conference of defence associations which met here in Ottawa during the past winter if all is well. They will tell you what the finding of that conference was. Ask any member who has attended the annual meetings of the artillery association, infantry association, the engineers' association, the signals association, or any other military association if all is well, and they will tell you it is not. They have been making vigorous and repeated recommendations.
Having said that, I say without any hesitation that the minister will find us anxious to co-operate and anxious to offer any encouragement we can. But after all why should that encouragement not be given, because most of these hon. members who have already spoken on this subject are men who have themselves had reason to know the importance of adequate equipment and adequate training on the field of battle.
The test of that co-operation, the test of our ability to unite behind a vigorous national effort which embraces an all-understood foreign policy and an all-understood defence policy would depend entirely upon the extent to which we are taken into the confidence of the government. Let the government appoint a committee of inquiry similar to the Currie committee to make an all-embracing report in regard to the army organization and to see how our dollars can best be used. Such a committee need not decide policy. But in so far as policy is concerned let us have the report of the three officers who inquired into the situation affecting the reserve forces; let us have any other recommendations in the possession of the government; and then this government will find us ready to go out along the highroads and byroads to any part of this country and be just as vigorous as any government would want anyone to be in the build-up of the defence of Canada with full knowledge of what the facts actually are.


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman, the Leader of the Opposition began his very interesting remarks with a kind of roll call covering the

people in the house. I followed that with interest but I found that at about 5.50 there were 10 Conservatives and 34 Liberal members, and since the Leader of the Opposition was speaking at that time one might have thought there would be a proportionately larger attendance of Conservative members. The Leader of the Opposition referred to the apathy in the house, but I think hon. members know that the discussion on the estimates is very largely a matter during which the opposition has a field day. That is traditional in England, it is traditional here, and the opposition here have usually used it as they did today. During the two-day debate which has taken place so far they have had about nine and a half hours.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: The rubber stamps would not be interested.


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: They are all rubber stamps and you know it. You cannot open your mouth.


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman, it is very
interesting to see the hon. member-


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: They are rubber stamps.


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman, there is a rule in this house that one should address you. However, I must say it is very nice indeed to see the hon. member for Simcoe South here.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: North.


Brooke Claxton: Yes, North. At one time
during the course of the debate this afternoon, I think it was about 4.25, the time referred to by the Leader of the Opposition, I think there was just one single member of the opposition present, namely the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich.


George Alexander Drew: The minister must have got that information from someone else because he was seldom here.


Brooke Claxton: No. The Leader of the Opposition said that I was seldom here. I was out of the chamber on three occasions for less than two minutes on each occasion in order to secure information so that I might make a reply which I am about to make. I had hoped that I might have made it before now.


Mr. Fulton:: 4.25 was before the Leader of the Opposition started to speak.


Mr. Knowles:: Big salvos from both sides.


Brooke Claxton: I do not think that a debate on national defence involving $2 billion and the future security of the country is particularly dignified by this kind of reference.
Supply-National Defence But since it was made, I must say that it was quite interesting to see that when the Leader of the Opposition started to speak tonight three Conservatives were present-


George Alexander Drew: I assume that what is now being said is very dignified.


An hon. Member:: It is just as dignified as what the hon. member said.


Edmund Davie Fulton: The hon. gentleman cannot count.


Brooke Claxton: Let us forget about it.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I think the time has come when I should perhaps remind the committee that at the moment the Minister of National Defence has the floor. We have endeavoured to see that those who were speaking previously in this debate were not interrupted without their consent. We shall expect the same treatment for the Minister of National Defence.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Let him be accurate, Mr. Chairman.


Brooke Claxton: I would not have referred to these rather minor things had they not been referred to by somebody else.
At the beginning of his speech the Leader of the Opposition referred, in terms which were eloquent and fair, to the work of the permanent forces. I have not a full note of what he said because time has not permitted me to get Hansard, but he said that our fighters in Europe were unquestionably equal to any, and that the state of the infantry was excellent. He referred to the high level of training of the permanent force. Then he made a most curious remark when he said "That only is the final product". What kind of product do you want except something that is unquestionably equal to any, is excellent, and has a high level of training? That being the objective of our defence effort, to have it recognized by the Leader of the Opposition-as it must be recognized because it is true-I must say will give great satisfaction to the officers and men who have done the job.
Then the Leader of the Opposition went on and dealt with the actual situation of the reserve forces and made a number of remarks that I shall not examine in detail at this time. But at the end he asked this question: Why is the reserve not up to strength? It has never been planned in the history of Canada that the reserve army should be up to strength. That is not its purpose. It has never had any such program. The fact is that at the present time the strength of the three reserve forces is about 57,000, a figure which is the highest it has ever been in a full year of peacetime.
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George Alexander Drew: That statement is not correct. The reserve units have often been up to the full authorized strength.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Brooke Claxton: Full authorized strength, as the Leader of the Opposition knows, is not war establishment at all.


George Alexander Drew: Of course it is not. Nobody suggested it was.


Brooke Claxton: I should not like to have the impression left that it was. I am glad that the Leader of the Opposition has not left it that way.
Then as to accommodation, may I say that it has been doubled for the reserve forces. As to equipment, if they lack anything all they have to do is to tell the general officer commanding in the district and he provides it. We have ample equipment of every type needed to train the reserves. The reason why the reserves are not stronger numerically than they are today is plain to see. Whereas at the time when he was an active and good leader of an artillery unit before the war or between the wars, the strength of the active forces was about 8,000 or 9,000 officers and men; and I think one must assume that that figure plus the reserve force included a big proportion of the people in Canada who aimed to have a full-time or part-time service career.
At the present time the strength of the active force is 112,000 and in the active forces today there is a big proportion of the same kind of chap as the Leader of the Opposition and others like myself who, for a time, served in the reserve forces. The reason why they are not in the reserve force is that they are in the active force serving Canada full time. I can perhaps bring that point home by mentioning the fact that from March 31, 1951 to March 31, 1954,-that is just three years-we have taken into the regular permanent force of Canada a total of about 100,000 officers and men. Had we not done so they would have been available for the reserve. As a matter of fact, the reserve has contributed a considerable proportion of that group, just as they should and as they are glad to do. But they cannot help feeling that this fact cuts down their own effective numbers of the most active, keen and interested kind. That is one reason. There may be others.
To look into all of this matter we appointed this committee. As I indicated in my preliminary remarks at the beginning of this debate, when we come to the item dealing with the army reserve I propose to go 

into this matter at greater length or my colleague the Associate Minister of National Defence will do so then.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, by that statement do I understand that the minister is going to make the report available at that time?


Brooke Claxton: Oh, no. A report by a board of officials to the chief of the general staff, so far as I know, has never been made available. There is every reason for not making it available. Here there would be every reason for making it available except that it would create the kind of precedent that the Leader of the Opposition and others would make use of in the future. So far as I am concerned, that procedure is not proposed. We propose to make a full report of what is recommended and of what has been done, but the report itself will not be made available because such reports are not made available in this country or in Britain. A minister of national defence, any minister of the crown or any chief of the general staff is entitled to have the confidential advice of a group that he appoints to give him that advice. Unless they can give that advice in confidence, and unless he can take it and act on it or not as he sees fit, we cease to have responsible government.
I shall not go into any of the other matters mentioned by the Leader of the Opposition, Mr. Chairman, because they can be taken up later. I should like to compliment the hon. member for Peel on his maiden speech and to tell him that some of the questions he raised will be mentioned later. He as well as some other hon. members made reference to not having enough information with which to consider these estimates. I have said- without ever having been contradicted, I think-that in this parliament the members have been given, year after year, more information about defence than is given in any other parliament in the British commonwealth.


Edmund Davie Fulton: The minister's saying so does not make it so.


Brooke Claxton: I think the extraordinary thing is that having been given information and not having found what they want- something of a scandalous nature that they could use-they then forget the fact that they have been given information and continue to protest that they have not been given any information. But we have given so much information in the defence expenditure committee meetings, with over forty sessions during three years,

that quite a few hon. members have protested that they are unable to absorb and assimilate the quantity of information they have got.
Another hon. member referred to the fact that he would like to see the product of our defence effort. The product can be seen in Korea, in Germany, in Canada. On every occasion when you see the defence forces you can see the product. That is the kind of thing we are producing, not paper, not words, but trained officers and men equipped and qualified to do the job, and second to none. You know, Mr. Chairman, one of the extraordinary things is that year by year we give opportunities to senators, members of parliament and others to see what is actually going on. We arrange for visits. This year there were visits to the air defence command at St. Hubert, Canadian Vickers Limited, No. 25 central ordnance depot, Canadair Limited, the naval supply depot and to the five major establishments at Kingston, namely, the national defence college, the army staff college, the Royal Military College, the Royal Canadian Electrical and Mechanical Engineers and the Royal Canadian Corps of Signals. Then there was the visit to Churchill, Manitoba.
A total of 129 members of parliament have taken part in a total of 240 visits during this session of parliament, and I have not had one of them report to me anything wrong about anything he saw.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Did he see anything except what you showed him?


Brooke Claxton: I was not on most of the trips.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Or what was showed him on your instructions?


Brooke Claxton: They could see anything they wanted. As the hon. member for Kamloops knows, that was dramatically shown on the occasion when the hon. member for Winnipeg North felt that he had not seen everything he should have seen at No. 25 ordnance depot. He went back. He is a chartered accountant, he saw everything he wanted to see and came back and reported to the committee on defence expenditure that he did not know of any way in which the system could be improved.
The hon. member for Peel asked me a rather detailed question about the guards, but I shall be very pleased to answer it quickly. The guards are on the right of the infantry but they do not change the infantry's place with relation to other formations. I will have something more to say about some of the points he raised.
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I thought the hon. member for Prince Albert gave a magnificent and moving account of the progress made by NATO and I do express to him most sincere congratulations upon having made such good use of his time and having given us such a useful report. However, he did talk about strategic roads which seemed to me to have a slightly remote association with NATO. It seemed to bear rather on Prince Albert, The Battlefords and some of the other constituencies in Saskatchewan. With respect to what I said in Edmonton, I have nothing to take back. Roads and communications all help defence. Of course they do. But defence planning and defence appropriations are a question of making the best use you can of the money you have available. No defence minister, no chief of staff ever has enough money available to do all the things that are waiting to be done, and roads come toward the bottom of the list.
He also suggested that at some stage I had indicated that we would never be attacked by air, that I had ridiculed the idea of air attack against us. I have said a great deal in the house and outside about defence but I doubt if I ever made such a statement. In fact I can point to statements from 1946 onwards in the directly contrary sense, statements indicating that we had to build up our defences against air attack, and ever since 1946 the objectives of our defence have been about the same as they are today. Then he also charged me with not agreeing with the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich when he suggested that we should spend $3 on the air force for every dollar on the army. That was said on the 18th of November, 1949.
I have looked up the discussion and I remember it very well. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, or the hon. member for Nanaimo as he was better known to us, did say that, but I did not make the reply that the hon. member for Prince Albert said I made. What I said was, and my reply can be seen in the discussion at that time, was that at that time we could not do it because we were spending only $195 million on defence. Therefore if we had done what the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich wanted us to do we would have had to wipe out the navy and the army, and I was not prepared to do so that day.
But since then events have changed, and I hope a lot of us have changed our thinking because the change has been a very dramatic and considerable one. Since then the extent of our defence expenditures has increased tenfold, I regret to say, from under $200 million in 1948-49 to something of the magnitude of $2 billion in 1953-54 or 1954-55. A

Supply-National Defence very great part of the increase since the beginning of the build-up in 1950 after Korea has been due to our increased effort in the air. The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich can accept my full congratulations on having the right idea but not the right kind of money with which to afford it at the time. Since then developments have occurred as I have mentioned.
The hon. member for Prince Albert also said that he did not see how opposition members could appreciate the defence effort unless they were shown the actual production. Well, I say to hon. members: Go to No. 25 Canadian ordnance depot and see the tanks lined up in rows. Go to St. Hubert airport and see the Sabre fighters bound for overseas, more than a thousand delivered, on the way to the places where they are needed. Go to Avro and see the CF-100's and then move around the country, as I hope you all will, and see the radar stations with the latest in electronic equipment. Go and see it. I invite you, as I have repeatedly done in the past. There is nothing to prevent any member of parliament from going anywhere to see our defences. I encourage it. If you will only let the commanding officer of the district, air command or myself know, we will facilitate the arrangements either for groups or for individual members at any time. Let us make sure that you really do see what is going on.
Now, the hon. member for Kootenay West referred to a number of matters, including skates for College Militaire Royal de Saint-Jean. He expressed some concern about our spending $34 a pair for skates for the teams. Apparently he is in the same position as I am-he has not bought skates for his children for a long time. These skates were purchased through the Department of Defence Production for the use of the team, in the same way as every other college- Saint Jean's is a college-does. It seems, however, that we did not pay quite as much for them as some colleges do. I made inquiries during the dinner hour, and I found that an Ottawa school paid $40 to $45 a pair for skates. These are about the quality of skates that are used by junior teams. It is the practice now for our colleges to be provided with some funds with which to buy sporting equipment in the same way as other colleges and schools have that equipment supplied. Some of these funds for that purpose apparently were used for these skates, but they got a little cheaper type than a local school does here.
Then he referred to the case of Kurt Meyer, and suggested that all Canadians convicted by courts-martial during the war, and still undergoing sentence, should be released.


There are no Canadians still serving sentences arising out of offences committed during the war. He then referred to the case of Private Cierpisz, which was referred to in the Globe and Mail. He should accept such statements, made in the course of the defence of that young man who was tried for his life, at something less perhaps than their full face value. This young man applied to join the armed forces. He gave a misstatement as to his age. He passed the aptitude test; he was taken in and he served. Then, he committed this offence for which he was sentenced to ten years. If any further details are required, I shall be glad to give them to the hon. gentleman outside the committee. I do not think it would be doing the case any particular good to go into it in great detail here.
Then, the hon. member for Calgary North said that I had been saying that our defences were grand, that our defences were adequate, everything was rosy, and that this had been my stock tactic throughout the years. I always asked the hon. member for Calgary North-I hope he will excuse it because we are very good friends-when I said those things; when I said them, where I said them, and what are the quotations,-


Douglas Scott Harkness: And I always indicated them.


Brooke Claxton: -and he has never indicated them yet.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I always indicated them; I indicated them this afternoon.


Brooke Claxton: He said we had no antiaircraft defence. Here, I am inclined to agree with him up to a certain point. At the present time, as I have indicated before, we are in a stage of transition. We have in Canada the latest anti-aircraft guns that there are. They are very expensive and the equipment, the predictor, the director, the tracking equipment and the firing equipment are very expensive. When you confront these guns with low flying high-speed jets or very high altitude jets, then their efficiency is much less than 100 per cent, let us say. We have been deliberately, as a deliberate calculated risk, not buying more of these guns and more of this equipment, but have that quantity which we think essential pending the arrival of ground-to-air rockets or guided missiles.
In that connection, of course, we have been following the United States and British work in this field. We have people working with them, and we have teams actually training with them. But there is not that type of equipment available yet in quantity for delivery.
With regard to airborne troops and aircraft, we have the aircraft necessary to carry

out the kind of lifts we consider is necessary to meet the kind of attack that might be made. This mobile striking force of three airborne divisions, artillery, engineers, medicals and the like, is not a brigade. It was originally planned as a brigade, but the concept changed and now it is planned to operate its units as three separate battalions. They are trained, and the exercises have shown that they do the job. In this connection, and in connection with civil defence to which other hon. members referred, I wish they could see and compare what we have in Canada with what there is in the various countries on the other side of the Atlantic, where the threat of an immediate attack and the consequences of an attack are far more imminent than they would be in our country.
I wish hon. members could compare our position with regard to defence against air attack, either by radar backed by fighters and anti-aircraft guns, civil defence and ground observers and so on, with the state of organization that there is on the other side of the ocean. They would be surprised at the considerable progress made on this side relative to the other.
Then the hon. member referred to the build-up of staffs, and so on. We set out in the white paper the distribution of the Canadian armed forces. I doubt if you could get this information for any other country, as between the various components engaged in defence operations. They are to be found there, divided among the effective fighting forces, the administrative and training staffs; those in Korea, Germany and the like. It is extremely difficult to generalize about these things. We strive continuously to cut down the overhead, the staffs, and to make continuous comparisons with the corresponding picture in the United States and Britain. So far as I know the results are generally favourable, despite the fact that we have relatively smaller forces. Still, this is a thing that I agree must be fought for steadily, to reduce the overhead, to reduce the cost and reduce manpower.
In this connection, we are faced with the perplexing problem of having adequate staffs to answer the questions on the order paper.
I might mention one in the name of the hon. member for Calgary North, which appears on the Routine Proceedings and Orders of the Day for this day. I refer hon. members to page 11, order No. 10 in the name of Mr. Harkness, as follows:
What percentage of national defence buildings, on a space basis, are heated by fuel oil and by coal respectively?
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And then No. 3:
How much oil is used per one thousand feet of floor space where oil heating is employed, and how much coal is used per one thousand feet of floor space where coal heating is employed?
Well, that is a nice one! I asked the department to find out how many buildings we had in national defence. They have made a survey and have found that apart from married quarters there are about 11,000. And we have about 20,000 married quarters. Married quarters are fairly standard, so we will place them to one side. But in order really to arrive at an answer to this question we would have to have a team of people go about and measure the cubic contents of each building, ascertain the square footage of space, and then-if we could possibly find it out-relate to that the quantity of oil and coal used to heat a particular building. And then we could give an answer which might mean something to someone, but certainly would not mean anything to anyone with whom I have discussed the question. But, as it is, we will try to do the best we can, and give the hon. member a fair answer.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I would like to say to the minister, and I think he will agree, that in connection with any question I have asked that involved an undue amount of time to answer I have always been quite willing either to modify or to drop the question.


Brooke Claxton: I think that is right, yes.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I thought the information I asked for would be available in the minister's records. If it is not available, then I am willing to drop it.


Brooke Claxton: Thank you very much. I
shall give answers to questions two and four, and give some indication with respect to the rest of the question, as well as we can. And we can talk it over. However, I do appreciate the hon. member's attitude.


Edmund Davie Fulton: When you buy a building do you not know how many thousand cubic feet of space there are in it?	,


Brooke Claxton: Yes, we do; but quite a few of our buildings go back to the French regime, and we have no accurate information about them.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Some of your methods go back to the French regime, too.


Brooke Claxton: Now, the hon. member also referred to our purchase of mobilization stores in excessive quantities. A good deal was made of this during the recent event in August. But I must say very little reference-was made on that occasion to the information
4S88

Supply-National Defence that had been brought out by the defence expenditure committee of the House of [DOT] Commons. However the fact is that we have ' had brought to our attention no example of excessive purchases of soft goods or hard goods for mobilization stores, with the single exception of those two dreadful things, serving forks and coffee pots. I admit guilt : cn both counts.


Douglas Scott Harkness: And for the first time.


Brooke Claxton: Oh, no. As I have told hon. members, and as they must know, I suppose this resulted from someone fairly well down . in the echelon applying the same multiplier to troops we would have on mobilization that = was in effect at the end of the second world war, when we were feeding the troops at tables of six, and had not yet adopted the cafeteria system, which is now practically . universal throughout the armed forces. That : cut down the number we needed of serving ; forks and coffee pots very greatly.
However we are taking these into stores, and before very long they will all be absorbed, and nobody will be out a nickel. No doubt the defence estimates for the next year will be reduced by the amount of the forks and the coffee pots we have not had to buy.
The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, as usual, made a very constructive, helpful and moderate speech. As he and others proceeded to speak in this debate I could not help : recalling the time up to seven years ago when . the government and the Department of .National Defence and the armed forces were being accused of doing too little and too late. Then as this debate has gone on it became ;pretty clear that the burden of the main opposition speeches was that we were doing too much, too soon. And then we could find *a kind of antiphon; "Too little, too late, too much, too soon; too little, too late, too much, too soon", almost being said at the same time.
We did not as was suggested enter this operation of planning the post-war program, beginning in 1950, as a "crash" operation alone. We did not do that. But what I do suggest is that at that time, in 1950, with the outbreak of the Korean war, and with Czechoslovakia just having been brought behind the iron curtain, there was, generally speaking, throughout this country, as in every other country, a feeling that war was likely to come upon us at any time. And we had to prepare *for that kind of emergency, as well as "the ilong pull". So we had to do a great many (things as fast as we could, and also at the .same time not do more than we felt we could [DOT]support over "the long pull".

And Canada in this respect was somewhat unique. In the United States they have a system of government under which the administration can put forward estimates and requests for money which ultimately have to be dealt with by congress and which very frequently are changed in congress. In the other countries of our alliance there was always the certainty of mutual aid from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from Canada. However in our case if we put anything down as a commitment, as a planning figure, we had to be prepared to carry it out as a government and as a party, or else we would cease to be a government, and cease to be the party in power.
Everyone dealing with us knew that: We told them. Consequently every figure we put down had to be tested and tried by the standard: "Can we do this, not only this year, but next year, and the next, and the next?" And so our plans were realistic and, as it turned out, our calculations were quite surprisingly accurate. And we have done what we set out to do.
But I must say that the suggestion that we failed to anticipate that the Russians would have the atom bomb and jet aircraft really surprised me. Of course the plan was based on the assumption that they would have the atom bomb, and jet aircraft bombers, capable of delivering it. We worked out, on the basis of the intelligence information available to us, what the likely date would be at which each step would occur; and I must say we are still doing so. Whether or not we are proved right in our present planning for 1957, 1958, 1959 and 1960 will only be established if there is another war. I hope there is not another war; and we will never know if we were right, unless there is another war; but if we pass by the date for -which we planned forces suitable to meet the threat at that time, then I think we have done the job that planning should do

match the plan to the estimated capacity of the potential enemy at the time. If he does not deliver the goods at that time, then we are one year ahead. We have bought one year of peace. That is the way military planning must and should work, but it has got to stretch forward almost indefinitely into the future, so long will be the time necessary to make this terribly complicated and complex equipment.
There was some suggestion about our still continuing to plan to fight with the equipment of the last world war or some other world war. At the present time there is no country on the face of the earth that has aircraft in the field to the extent that Canada has, competent to meet the Russian threat

at this time. If we had bought, as was suggested by one hon. member, Meteors and Vampires from the British we would have planes that would be at least a whole series back from the present planes we have.
On the other hand, the hon. member for Queens was comparing our aircraft, the Sabre with the Orenda, with some others, and I must say the figures he gave surprised me.
I have had them checked and they surprised our people; but what I am sure he is comparing is an estimate of future possibilities with what we have in the field today. We have something coming along better than that estimate-we hope we have. That is what our plan is, to have the supersonic fighter to replace the F-86E and the supersonic all-weather fighter to replace the CF-100, some years ahead. Whether or not we can get them I do not know, but we are investing money so that we stay on top of this job, and have at the time when it is necessary the kind of equipment to down any enemy that comes. And that is the job of military planning. It is related to time, and the time today has to be a long, long way ahead.
Here I would like to correct one impression which apparently the press took from something I said, which was not intended at all. This was with regard to the results of an exercise that we had on air interception. I quote from what I said at page 4905 of Hansard:
The percentage of kills as they were counted in these exercises was extraordinarily high compared with any experience in the second world war. It was not one hundred per cent but it was about ninety per cent indicating a very successful operational state.
Then, I went on and said that I gave those figures by way of illustration of an operational state. I do not want to suggest for a second that if the enemy came over tonight our aircraft could get into the air and knock down nine out of ten. Nobody could say that; until the battle occurs you cannot say; until you know the conditions you cannot say. The enemy might come over on a night in which fighters could not get off the ground.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Can the minister give us a rough estimate of what they might do from the knowledge he has of the enemy and our defences? Can he give us that?


Brooke Claxton: I cannot.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Give us a rough estimate.


Brooke Claxton: I gave it just as fully as possible in the statement I made yesterday.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: The minister cannot tell until the war is over. That is some answer.
Supply-National Defence


Brooke Claxton: That is right.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: That is not what the people of Canada want.


Brooke Claxton: Not "until the war is over",-but until the attack occurs you cannot tell and nobody can tell how successful the defence is going to be against that attack. If the attack comes over at night and your aircraft are frozen to the ground with freezing' rain the attack is going to be completely successful unless you have ground-to-air radar-guided missiles that will go up irrespective of conditions and no country has those in quantity yet.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: If you had an earthquake that might help.	.


Brooke Claxton: That is right.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Under ordinary conditions what could happen?


Brooke Claxton: The full story that can be told I gave yesterday and today, and I do. not propose to make any prognostications' about it at all.
I have indicated the results of an exercise which we held under fairly realistic conditions. No exercise can be under completely realistic conditions. I do want to make it plain that that was what I was doing.
The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich then referred to the expenditures on research and development. I am very glad to see that he would like to see those increased. We are getting, we feel, about as much money as can be usefully spent on this operation at. the present time. It must be remembered that our research work and our development work, particularly research, is carried on in. close co-operation with the national research council, with the universities, with industry,, but also in the closest kind of partnership with our allies, particularly Britain and the United States. We aim not to overlap except in fields where it is really desirable that two or three approaches should be made to one problem at the same time. Altogether, I do not think it is possible to suggest that this co-operation in this field could be improved in any way.
But that brings to mind the importance of emphasizing that this whole business of defence planning is not carried out by the Minister of National Defence, the chiefs of staffs of Canada, the cabinet defence committee or the cabinet alone. It is carried out after close intimate discussion and consideration with our partners in the alliance. This is an alliance, and we have with the standing group in Washington a permanent representative in the person of Rear Admiral De Wolf,
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Supply-National Defence head of the Canadian joint staff in Washington, sitting in with the permanent representatives of the chiefs of staff in consultation with the standing group. We have at Paris Mr. Dana Wilgress, our ambassador to NATO, with a military staff sitting in there. We have integrated officers, integrated as part of SHAPE, as part of SACLANT, as part of the standing group staff, and so have other countries, and we are all doing this job in cooperation. Therefore, if we arrive at a major plan it has usually had the advantage of discussion with representatives of other countries, and it is designed to fit in with what they are doing. Our aim is to have an over-all balance of forces, without each country having to have something of everything. And our balance of forces of course is related to our particular roles in the air and on the land in Europe and in Canada, and at sea in the anti-submarine escort work.
That brings me to references that have been made to the speech of Representative Cole. In this connection I must say I feel that Representative Cole, when he said that some delay had occurred-not two years' delay-in negotiations with Canadians over continental defence, must have had in mind that some time had been taken by various groups of military personnel, scientists and others, to arrive at a plan of what additional steps should be taken. There has been no delay in this consideration that has been caused by Canadian participation. The problems involved are new; the magnitude of the task is formidable, and anything that has been decided upon would be expensive in manpower to make. It would only be chosen if it meant a series of continuing requirements, so that we here have had no recommendation from Canadian or American or joint groups that has not already been acted upon. There are no negotiations pending. There are no negotiations that have been pending for two years, and there are no negotiations that have been delayed as the term "negotiations" is ordinarily understood.
T feel that what the representative must have had in mind was consideration by military and scientific teams as to what was the best thing to do.
This question of continental defence was dealt with in a joint statement by both countries, which was tabled in the house on April 8, 1954, and it appears as an appendix to Votes and Proceedings of that day.
With regard to recruiting the hon. member referred to expenditure, and I would like to emphasize a point I have made repeatedly, namely that to maintain our forces at their present quantity and quality requires a continued effort. We estimate it would require
[Mr. Claxton.l

about a 15,000 intake a year, of which about 10 per cent would be officers. That is a very considerable figure in this country in peacetime, and in order to get officers and men of the required quality we require a continuous effort and strong support.
Then the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich spoke, as did the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar, about the desirability of our having an additional aircraft carrier. Well this would be desirable, but what would we give up? It would cost from $50 to $100 million to begin with for an aircraft carrier, and whatever else would be involved including the modification and renovation of an airfield, the special type of aircraft, training facilities and the like, and the question is how that $50 or $100 million could be found out of the present defence appropriations. It is a question of priority.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask a question. Does the minister believe this would be a necessary adjunct at the present time?


Brooke Claxton: No, I do not.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Then the answer is that we will not get one because you do not think it would be necessary. But if you thought it was necessary would you see that the money was raised for that project?


Brooke Claxton: Unfortunately that is not the way in which defence planning works.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Even if it were necessary we would not have it, is that the answer?


Brooke Claxton: No, that is not the answer, and the hon. member ought to know that.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: I do not know anything about your way of thinking. One would have to be a mindreader, a soothsayer, and everything else to know that.


Brooke Claxton: I think everyone must know that there are a lot of things we would like to have and which I would consider desirable in the interests of our national defence. If, however, the defence appropriation is fixed by parliament at $2 billion then we must see what is most necessary to have out of that $2 billion. Defence planning is not a question of what is necessary or desirable; it is a question of what is most necessary and most desirable. In other words, it is a question of priority.
The hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich referred to the cost of an escort vessel. I agree that these escort vessels are very expensive. They are very complicated and they will have great speed, as we hope to find out when we get them into operation. They have qualities of all kinds which make

them very suitable indeed for catching and killing the modern high-speed submarine, and indeed that is their purpose.
Now, the high speed submarine is a threat, and the extent of that threat was made clear by the hon. member for Trinity-Conception when he spoke this afternoon. It is a very serious threat and the type of equipment needed to meet it is, we believe, this particular type of vessel, and that is the belief of the British and Americans and of course we must have aircraft.
Consequently since that is part of our job we are going in for the construction of 14 of these vessels and, of course, as I said before, they are very expensive indeed. We have plans under way for the construction of a ship which would be very much less expensive and easier to build, and which might come close to doing as good a job. We probably will not begin construction of this type of ship until we have the first trials of the first of the destroyer escort vessels so that we can learn from their actual operation what they can do.
As regards the use of helicopters, they are, of course, becoming increasingly important for the army, navy and air force, though they are relatively expensive in view of the light load they can carry. However, we are getting more of them for all three services.
Then the hon. member and others referred to our contribution of 12 squadrons of Sabre fighters to NATO, and the suggestion was made that we should bring 6 of these back. That suggestion I think was made by half a dozen hon. members and consequently I must deal with it. In the first place, the United States and Canada are the only two North American nations contributing forces to NATO. Without the United States, as was so well pointed out by the hon. member for Prince Albert this afternoon, it would be very difficult indeed to conceive of NATO being in existence at all, and it is of vital importance that the other nations continue to feel that in the build-up of their own forces they have the strong support of the United States and Canada.
I do not suggest that it would be fatal from the psychological or the political point of view for us to withdraw forces from NATO, but it would be a course I would hate to see followed by any Canadian government because I believe it would be the trigger which would start a general decline of the whole grand alliance. When you speak about those 6 squadrons not being important, that is not the view of General Gruenther or General Norstad. These squadrons form an important element in the total defence there, and to withdraw them would mean leaving
Supply-National Defence a gap which could not be filled by the air forces in being or planned by other countries, and that gap would be a very serious one indeed.
There is another reason, and that is that these Sabre fighters are really not well suited for the air defence of Canada. They have a relatively short range, they have only one pilot; they have not a complete set of navigational instruments, and if they went into the air and got into a dogfight in Canada they might have great difficulty in getting back to their airfield. If we had our fighter defence in Canada staffed by Sabre fighters it would mean that we would have to have our airfields for fighter defence at least twice and probably three times as numerous as they are today because of the very much shorter range of the aircraft. Along with double or triple the number of airfields at present in existence we would have to have an increase in their attendant facilities, such as runways, oil tanks, hangars, married quarters, and everything else. An airfield costs about $30 million, and we would also have to double or triple the number of emergency landing fields. In addition to that we would be faced with the necessity of maintaining Sabres and Sabre crews and training them for use in Canada as well as on the other side.
Therefore, from the point of view of our own defences this would not meet the need. The CF-100 does meet the need, and by the end of this year we will have all our regular squadrons, airfields, and radar stations operating on continental defence, which is the thing we have planned, and we will do it by about the time planned. That is the best and most economic way of carrying out this operation.
The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar at one stage, I believe, asked whether the success of the H-bomb was due to the atomic dust which drifted across from Russia. I have never heard that suggestion. He asked about our expenditure on electronics being cut down. This does not mean any less interest in electronics. Last year we had in the estimates a considerably larger figure because we were building up a radar defence and we were transferring a good deal of electronic equipment abroad as mutual aid. He asked about the withdrawal of troops from Korea. It would certainly be most unfortunate if Canada or any other country made any effort to withdraw its troops from Korea until there is some further development in the discussions at Geneva. After that we can all have another look. He spoke about putting cruisers into reserve. The cruisers are used largely for training purposes. You cannot have a sufficiently large number of
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Supply-National Defence men on a destroyer, a frigate or a destroyer-escort to meet training requirements; but on a cruiser you can provide training, and that is what they are for. He referred to 1,000 inspectors of stores. As reported at page 4921 of Hansard, he said:
... we have 1,000 inspectors oi stores, in addition to the inspection staffs of each of the services. These 1,000 inspectors cost $3,500,000. I am not going to deny that adequate inspection is necessary, but the present estimates provide for no less than $12-5 million for all the inspection services compared with only $10-5 million at the height of our war effort, 1943-44.
The peak wartime year was 1943. The total staff of inspection service was 19,000. The cost was $30 million. The value of the goods inspected was $1 [DOT] 5 billion. For the fiscal year 1953-54 the total staff was 2,295; the value of the goods inspected was $1-1 billion-almost as much as during the wartime peak-with one-eighth of the staff and the cost was $12-5 million.
Then he also talked about our transferring obsolete equipment to NATO. I do not know what he had in mind. There is nothing obsolete about the aircrew that we are training for NATO, and that is the largest single item of mutual aid. We have trained altogether 2,682 and the cost has been $228 million. Then the next largest single item has been the transfer of 370 Sabre fighters to Britain, and the Canadian components in that item represent about $100 million. The rest is divided up between new and old items, none of them obsolete. Otherwise they would not have taken them and we would not have given them. He also seemed to suggest that we should procure aircraft from Britain. We are going to get the design for some Britan-nias, but as will be seen from what I have said we have been supplying aircraft to Britain, not the reverse.
The hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre made statements about armour and the like. This matter has already been dealt with in the house on April 15, 1953, on December 1, 1953; and on several other occasions we have gone over the same ground.
I should like to point out that it is impossible to work our present armed forces, with their commitments in Korea and in Germany and the requirement of having a mobile striking force of airborne troops, and still have two armoured regiments rotating abroad. You just cannot figure out mathematically a way of using the same manpower to do that complicated operation. Once you train a man for armour, you do not want to use him in the infantry and vice versa. Also, of course, an armoured brigade would cost about $100 million more than a corresponding infantry brigade.


The hon. member for Cape Breton South made some interesting remarks, as he always does, and I appreciate what he said about current affairs. I think I have covered the other points he mentioned, and also those of the hon. member for Queens. His question as to whether we would have a deputy chairman of NATO for air is one which will be up for consideration whenever somebody has to be appointed. If we have the right man for the job, I hope they will consider a Canadian. We hoped to have a suitable officer to go over there at that time.
The hon. member for Oxford referred to the representation on the naval benevolent fund and questioned the absence of other ranks. There are sixteen other ranks in the voting council.
I think that covers all the points except the questions by the hon. member for Wetas-kiwin about fires. Perhaps I can deal with them later when we come to the appropriate estimates. However, I would say that the cause of the fire at Penhold appears to have been a spark setting fire to fuel that was being poured from one tank to another. The loss by fires of hangars in the air force averaged about $700,000 a year. The cost of the interest on the amount necessary to replace the present hangars with fire-resistant hangars would be $5 million a year. We have a program of hangar replacement, but these two figures would indicate that it was not economical or financially desirable that we should change the present policy. I can tell him that we know nothing other than what I have mentioned.
I think I have covered the points sufficiently, Mr. Chairman. If I have not done so, I know that hon. members will bring them to my attention as we go through the details.


Mr. Macdonnell:: Mr. Chairman-


Brooke Claxton: Excuse me, but there is one correction I should like to make. I find that when I answered the hon. member for Red Deer today about fatal casualties on aircraft,
I said that the fatal accident rate on jets was lower than that on conventional aircraft. On checking over the figures again-at the time I was answering the hon. member quickly because the matter was urgent-I find that the actual number of fatal accidents or fatalities caused through jets has been lower than the number on conventional aircraft, but the rate is higher.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a few remarks on the general debate, and particularly on what the minister has just said. The minister's speech has made me rather uneasy. It has been too much of

a success story. If the minister had indicated some other mistakes beyond serving forks and coffee pots or teapots-I forget which it was-I should have been more reassured. But as I said, we have really had a success story. I do not propose to try to assess some of the answers the minister has made, because others here are more competent to do so than am I; but I want to indicate my objection to the answer which was made with regard to the reserve army. If the other answers were comparable to that which was made with regard to the reserve army, then they must be highly unsatisfactory indeed.
What the minister said about the reserve army, in answer to the damaging criticisms made by the Leader of the Opposition and others, was that it was not planned to be up to strength. He gave us some figures pointing out that when we had the reserve army up to or nearly up to strength was when our active army was small and negligible. I think that is a fair statement. But there are two comments which may be made on it. Incidentally, I can bear out fully what the Leader of the Opposition said about the adequate equipment of the artillery in the years just before the first war. As I say, if you go back to that time you will find that we were then fully equipped. The minister excuses the present situation by pointing out that we have the active army.
But when the minister says that it was not planned that the reserve army should be up to strength, I imagine he would also agree that it was not planned that there should be parades where the officers on parade would outnumber the non-commissioned officers and other ranks. While that may be an extreme case, I think any of us who know anything at all about the reserve army know that those working in it and taking it seriously are terribly disturbed about the conditions under which they are working.
I have a young friend in the reserve army, an engineer, who works at it very hard indeed. I have a letter from him which I do not propose to take the time of the committee to read, but it indicates that he is extremely disturbed about the whole situation. I am disturbed too that the minister should have sought, as he did, to leave with us the impression that there was nothing to worry about with respect to the reserve army, that it was true it was different from what it used to be but the conditions were different.
I maintain, as I said a moment ago, that the reason he gave as an excuse for the condition of the reserve army, viz. the fact that we have an active army, is utterly invalid. First of all we have got, as I said,
Supply-National Defence a far larger population, but second and far more important is the fact that we are now in a condition of danger where, if we had the right spirit, we ought to be able to have young men crowding into the reserve army.
There is just one other thing before I go on. I want to refer to the minister's answer to the hon. member for Calgary North who said that we had no anti-aircraft defences. The minister passed over that very lightly by saying that we were in a transition. How long does the transition go on? We have been getting ready for three or four years. How long does the transition go on? After all we are not considering a condition which may arrive ten or fifteen years from now. We do not know when it may arrive. We do not know when the need may arrive.
I want to say a word about what was said this afternoon. It seems to me this debate is probably the most important debate of the year. It is not merely that we are considering such huge amounts of money but that we are considering our very existence. Either we take these things seriously or we do not take them seriously. Either there is danger or there is no danger. To see the attitude that is widespread in our country and not absent in this house, one might imagine that the danger threatening was threatening somebody quite different from us, that it did not come very close home to us, or that if there was any danger it was not going to come for another five, ten or fifteen years.
I think anyone looking about this country and coming into this house would think we were taking things very nonchalantly. We all know how easily the abnormal becomes the normal, but I take it it is our job as serious citizens and presumably leaders of thought to see that that is not allowed to happen. Is there or is there not any sense of urgency? I listened to the minister's speech yesterday. It was a good speech as far as it went, giving us an account of things. Someone said it seemed to have more to do with A and Q than it had with G. He discussed supplies. The minister was very pleased to tell us how well supplied the troops are, and that is well, but what we are interested in knowing is what they are going to be able to do and what the position is with respect to the dangers which may arise.
The minister's speech has been criticized by competent men with experience in the last war, the hon. members for Esquimalt-Saanich, Winnipeg South Centre and Calgary North. They have brought searching criticisms and the minister has answered tonight. I make two comments. First of

Supply-National Defence all the answers seemed to me inadequate. It seemed to me that he utterly failed to answer particularly what had been said by the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre in respect of armour. Again I say that if the answer with respect to the reserve army can be taken as a sample of the validity of the other answers then I repudiate them entirely.
I come back to the question of the sense of urgency. I sometimes wonder whether it is not easy for freedom to degenerate into irresponsibility and whether we are developing the self-discipline which surely is necessary if we are going to meet the imposed discipline of the communist countries. If we had the self-discipline that is necessary we should not have to lure people into the forces by all the means we are using now, urging them to come in and get in on the ground floor of a good thing. Yet it is not fair to place the criticism on the young men because as they look around what sign do they see of the older people making any sacrifice? We cannot blame the young men. We must blame ourselves primarily, and while one does not want to blame the government for everything, weather included, it does seem to me that the sense of urgency which I believe is necessary was lacking from the minister's speech yesterday.
I got no sense of urgency from it. It might have been a progress report on the construction of some civilian enterprise where we were told that it was pretty well up to time and the excess costs were not any more than we had expected they would be. That was the impression it left with me. Since then we have had, I submit, valid and searching criticisms of it. When the minister came to answer tonight I hoped we might have answers which would carry conviction, that we might perhaps have some of the sense of urgency which was not there yesterday. I failed to find it entirely. If we really believe that it is not all a form of words when we talk about the danger we are in, then all I can say is we seem to be handling the situation very trivially both in this house and outside.
We are not going to save ourselves merely by the expenditure of money. In times of danger when emergency really arrives and we know it is here there is nobody better than ourselves in rising to meet a crisis. We have done that in two different wars, but as has been said already we were always late and we were lucky to get through. At the present time we of course are much further advanced in respect of material preparation. We have never done as much before in peacetime, but I suggest again that unless we have that spirit which will only come


from a sense of urgency then all the money we spend may not produce the results that we want.
I am not going to take up much of the time of the committee to discuss the question of some body, presumably a committee of this house, which shall review the matter. I do point out, however, that at the present time a terrific responsibility is resting on the minister and his associate, who are both men of military experience, but it so happens that there are in this house a good many other men of more recent military experience. I am not suggesting that members of parliament are going to set themselves up as experts, but I do suggest that you have got to have somebody to deal with the experts. It is no disrespect to any soldier, sailor or airman to say that their job will be to get as much as they can. Why would they not? If anything goes wrong they are going to be held accountable. Why would they not get every nickel they can get? It takes a lot of courage, it takes judgment to know the point at which you are going to stop giving them money. From this side of the house men have spoken who have had experience. There are men on the other side of the house who have had experience. It is a pity we do not have more speeches from the other side but that is the rub of the green. I have no doubt there are just as many on the other side of the house, but I say most earnestly that it is a great pity that such men have no chance to do anything except, after the policy is determined, to either approve or to criticize.
We are deprived of the judgment of these men. I think that is a great loss to the welfare of the state. I do not want to press the question of information but I want to say this. You can be fairly submerged with information of all kinds. You can go and look at things. It is no good for me to go and look at an aeroplane. All I know is how to get into an aeroplane and ride in it. My opinion on technical questions is of no value whatever.
We have people whose opinion would be of value. As I say, it is not a matter of the quantity of the information. The minister says, and I have no doubt correctly, that he has dished out information in great quantities. What I am suggesting is that we fail in this house, we entirely fail, to avail ourselves of the judgment of some of the best-informed and experienced people in this house on both sides. That is a great loss if we are losing that because of some blind worship of some technical shibboleth. I think it is a great pity.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I said I was going to be brief, and I shall be brief. I take

it at the moment, in spite of the billions we are spending, we cannot pretend to ourselves that we have any sense of urgency or widespread sense of public responsibility that we should have in order to meet this situation, and I think while that condition exists the government had better not take credit to itself and plume itself on the situation which exists.


Edmund Davie Fulton: I should like to bring just a few matters to the attention of the minister and the committee at this stage of the discussion. Before coming to the particular subject I want to mention that perhaps a comment or two on the minister's recent remarks might be in order. I was interested in the matter referred to lastly by the hon. member for Greenwood in that the minister said that he had given this parliament more information than any similar legislative body. This was in reference to a committee which might get at the root of the problem so as to enable parliament to deal in a more intelligent way with the problems of defence in Canada. I wonder if the minister really expects us to swallow that generalization?


Brooke Claxton: Yes, I do.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Well, I do not intend to swallow it because some of us have made a study of what happens in other legislative bodies. I do not agree with the minister, to put it at its mildest, that this house gets more information than the United States congress does when it calls the secretary of defence before a committee, and not only the secretary of defence but the officers and the chiefs of staff. These people are subjected to questioning and the committee does not let them go until they answer the questions satisfactorily, questions of policy as well as masses of statistical information. The minister, I must admit, is prepared, and his department is prepared, to flood any committee we set up with a mass of statistical information. They bring it in in reams, and they are prepared to justify it. They justify their contracts. It does not matter if they have spent twice or three times the original estimate, they say that was inevitable and was all right because they got value for the money.
They are prepared to bring in all kinds of that information and to set up their experts to justify it. However we are not allowed to get at the type of witness the United States congress or British parliament brings before committees and compels to answer questions, the sort of questions on defence matters upon which we want information.
I take issue, too, with the minister's refusal to make available to this house the report of the three distinguished officers who have recently been making a survey of the situation with respect to the reserve army. The
Supply-National Defence minister said that would be, to paraphrase his words, a denial of the whole system of responsible government. We have heard some half-baked arguments on that subject before from such experts as the Secretary of State, whose job it was to keep information from parliament before he became a member. The justification in the past for that sort of refusal of that type of information which did not properly come to parliament was that it was confidential reports of civil servants to their ministers. There may be an argument -I am not admitting that I go along all the way with everything that is said in defence of the government there-but there may be room for argument or room for enormous difference of opinion.
However that is a very different thing from the minister spending public money, over and above what is called for by the estimate, or for civil servants who are on the staff of the department and who are of course the confidential advisers of the minister and upon whose advice he relies-it is a different thing from saying that we are not satisfied with the situation in the reserve army and so take it upon ourselves to obtain outside advice. Then, having set up this special committee, to say that the information derived as the result of the expenditure of public money shall be denied to parliament is, itself, a denial of responsible government. Yet, that is the sort of generality and absurdity with which the minister expects this committee to be satisfied in connection with the study of his estimates.
There can be only one reason why this report is refused, and that is that the government knows that it reveals a situation in connection with the reserve forces that is not satisfactory. Why does the government not admit it, and just tell us where it is not satisfactory and what efforts they intend to make to deal with the situation. Then, we would know not only where the cause for dissatisfaction lies, but what remedies were being proposed and instituted to deal with it. How much longer does the minister expect us to go on being satisfied with his general assurance that they are taking action to deal with this situation, when the situation in fact in the reserve forces is such as we have had revealed tonight by those with knowledge of the situation. The minister expects us to swallow too much if he expects us to swallow that whale.
There were one or two other perhaps minor points in the statement the minister has just delivered with which I suggest he has affronted this committee, and they are typical of the arguments which he uses all the way through. I feel that a reference to

Supply-National Defence them may illustrate the weakness of his whole position. He referred to the suggestion which had been made regarding bringing back some of the F-86 squadrons from Europe so that they might assist in the process of continental defence. Now, I do not go along completely with the suggestion that these squadrons should be brought back, although I do go along with the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich in his criticism in which he questioned the wisdom of denuding the defence of Canada, from the point of view of fighter aircraft, at the expense of building up strength overseas. The reasons given by the minister as to why it would not be appropriate to bring back these squadrons are so absurd that, as I say, they serve as an illustration of the whole statement with which he affronted us a few moments ago. He said they are not satisfactory for Canadian defence. They have only one pilot and if they get into a dogfight, with the prevalence of cloud and so on, it would be very difficult for them to find their way down again. I have never heard it suggested, Mr. Chairman, there is more cloud in Canada than there is in Europe.


Brooke Claxton: There is more space.


Edmund Davie Fulton: More space, yes, there is more space. What does the United States rely upon for continental defence? Do they use the CF-100? Are they not as concerned as we are about the matter of continental defence? That is the sort of half-baked, half-reasoned argument with which the minister-


Brooke Claxton: No part of the United States corresponds to every part of Canada, nor does the continental-


Edmund Davie Fulton: What did the minister say?


Brooke Claxton: No part of the United States corresponds to the area across Canada, with our northern territory-


Edmund Davie Fulton: There is Alaska and the American bases in Newfoundland and Labrador. Why, good heavens, you would think the minister did not know that the United States has the far northern bases. They have a number of bases all over the world.


Brooke Claxton: Their airfields are close
together there.


Edmund Davie Fulton: We have airfields in Canada.


Brooke Claxton: Not nearly as many or as close.


Edmund Davie Fulton: I suppose the minister could go on-


Brooke Claxton: I could elaborate on that, yes.


Edmund Davie Fulton: It comes back to the fact that the minister said they might get lost in the clouds.


Mr. Mcllraiih:: He did not say that.


Edmund Davie Fulton: He most certainly did. I think the hon. gentleman was not in the house when he said it.


George James McIlraith: He was in the house
throughout the whole of the minister's speech and he listened carefully to the minister's speech.


Edmund Davie Fulton: That was what the minister said, and the hon. member is not going to change it by shouting. Because I say that was one of the main difficulties to which the minister referred.
Then the minister did not deal adequately -indeed, he hardly dealt with it at all- with the very thoughtful and excellent speech delivered last night by the hon. member for Queens. The hon. member made certain criticisms of the expensive policies followed by this government in connection with the building of jet engines. I think it should be emphasized that the suggestion of the hon. member for Queens was in no way that we should not build jet engines in Canada; in no way did he suggest that it was not desirable for us to have an aircraft engine industry. His suggestion was rather that, as has been done in the United States-and that is a particularly notable example where they desired to obtain experience in the building of jet engines-we should build under licence, from designs of countries which had already had experience in that work. Indeed experts in the field of aircraft engineering have told me that the main reason the Americans are now able to produce excellent jet engines in large quantities is because of the experience they were willing to acquire in the first instance, by building engines under licence.
And the point is that they acquired that experience at far less cost, and went into large-scale production in a great deal less time than would have been possible had they started from scratch, as we did here. And I do not think anything the minister has said thus far has even begun to deal with the points made last night by the hon. member for Queens, to the effect that engines are available to be built in Canada, under licence, capable of delivering a far greater thrust, and with far lower fuel consumption ratio, and waste ratio, than in respect of those being built in Canada at the present time.


Brooke Claxton: May I just say this, that assuming what the hon. member says is correct-and it is not-it would take eighteen

months to two years from now to get into production of that type of engine; whereas we are probably producing as many jet engines as any country in the world today, except the United States.


Edmund Davie Fulton: But this by no means is the first time it has been suggested. This is not the first time the suggestion has been made. It was made more than eighteen months ago.


Brooke Claxton: No.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Yes, indeed, it was, and not only publicly but privately. As the minister well knows, that criticism has been made privately; but it was not regarded because of some fetish they had-


Brooke Claxton: Fetish?


Edmund Davie Fulton: -that they had in mind in the government and the department.


Brooke Claxton: All we want is good engines.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Well, again that is the sort of generalization in which the minister indulges, but it does not deal with the statistics produced last night by the hon. member for Queens. Certainly the hon. member dealt with those statistics in an intelligent manner. The inference in the minister's last remark simply does not stand up, because the inference in that remark is that the engines described by the hon. member for Queens were not good ones. Well, the statistics he produced indicated that they are better than the ones being produced here. And I say those statistics should be dealt with before we are asked to accept the general assurances with which the minister expects us to be satisfied.
I think, Mr. Chairman, that there should be some further reference to the speech delivered on April 29 by Representative Sterling Cole to which reference was made last night by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich. This speech was delivered in New York at the 135th anniversary banquet of Colgate University. As has been pointed out, and should be emphasized, Representative Cole is chairman of the joint committee on atomic energy of the United States congress. The minister has given us the assurance that, notwithstanding what is contained in the remarks of Representative Cole, there are no negotiations between Canada and the United States which are now pending and, further than that, as I understand him, that there is no suggested construction in connection with the continental defence system and radar screen which is being held up by current negotiations, and by failure to pursue and to conclude those negotiations.
Supply-National Defence
Well that is in direct conflict with the statement contained in this speech. It is obvious from the terms of the speech and the occasion of its delivery that Representative Cole took this opportunity, on April 29, to lay before his country what he considered to be a grave and acute problem arising out of shortcomings in the continental defence effort of Canada and the United States. So these were not any passing or careless remarks.
I have the text of his speech here, and the whole of these seven single-spaced foolscap pages is devoted exclusively to this subject. I wish to make that clear, because I think it should be emphasized that this was a careful, considered and reasoned discussion of the subject of continental defence. And there are some very disturbing passages in this text. Reading now from the third to last paragraph on page 2 I find this:
The grim statistics are these: Today, the Soviet dictators are capable of manufacturing nuclear weapons of such destructive power that a single bomb could destroy the heart of New York or Chicago or Washington. Today, the Soviet union has planes capable of delivering such weapons- even if on one-way missions-against the majority of our critical target areas. Whether the Soviets could now mount an attack of such intensity and scope that our ability to retaliate would be eliminated may be open to debate. But three or four years from now, the Soviets will be able to launch a saturation attack against our nation-an attack so massive that our ability ultimately to prevail may be open to grave question.
Were an attack to occur this week, or this year, we would have no effective way of repelling it.
I would ask hon. members to contrast this paragraph with the statement made by the minister concerning a test he observed-a statement he has now modified to some extent, but which now stands on the record-concerning the ability of our defensive screen to deal with attacking enemy aircraft. I quote the minister as follows from page 4905 of Hansard:
It was not one hundred per cent but it was above 90 per cent indicating a very successful operational state.
And then, here is what Representative Cole said:
Were an attack to occur this week, or this year, we would have no effective way of repelling it. At best-and this is very optimistic-we might intercept as many as one out of every four Soviet bombers.
One out of every four, or 25 per cent success, is a very long way from 90 per cent success. And yet this speech is dealing with the very interception and defensive screen the Minister of National Defence was discussing yesterday.


Brooke Claxton: No.


Edmund Davie Fulton: "No"? What one does this deal with, then?

Supply-National Defence


Brooke Claxton: No; that is dealing with air defence of the United States, which not only includes the part of it that goes through Canada, but also both coasts.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Well, now, that is very interesting. I shall read on and see if hon. members take the same interpretation from this speech as the minister does. He says:
At best-and this is very optimistic-we might intercept as many as one out of every four Soviet bombers. It is entirely possible, however, that the ratio of interception would be much less-and I assure you that in saying this I am not revealing any secrets to the Soviet union. The rulers of Russia are probably better aware of our present inability to defend ourselves adequately against an atomic attack than are the American people themselves.
Then going on to page 4:
If we are to defend ourselves against the planes of today and tomorrow, rather than the planes of yesterday, our first requirement is for advance warning of an impending attack. Today we would have no more than a few minutes prior notice of approaching bomber formations.
Well, I assume that the representative must know that they have this screen in Canada to which the minister referred. He goes on:
My own belief is that we imperatively need at least six hours of advance warning.
Then, a further paragraph:
Space, sheer space, can be-if it is wisely used, an ally of untold worth in creating an effective continental defence system. Almost four years have passed since our scientists first proposed putting space to work by establishing an early warning line across the north of Canada and extending it seaward to the east and the west by means of patrol aircraft and picket ships. More than two years have passed since the formidable technical problems involved in making a distant warning system both effective and economical were surmounted. And yet, four years after the need for such an early warning line was pointed out, and two years after our scientists developed the equipment which would make such a line possible, it is still not in existence.
Now, sir, relating that fact to the earlier paragraph where he says we might intercept as many as one out of every four Soviet bombers, I suggest it is absolutely impossible to conclude that the representative did not have in mind the defence screen line in Canada when he made that statement. He concludes the paragraph from which I was last quoting with the quotation already placed on record by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich:
Negotiations with the Canadian government on the subject of where, how and by whom the first of such early warning lines would be built and operated have been in progress for nearly two years.
Representative Cole went on to point out -and I am just going to summarize the rest of his remarks-that Canada and the United States have a joint stake in this matter of


continental defence. That of course has been recognized in principle by the remarks of the minister not only in this debate but in others, and that view is of course shared also by all hon. members. But the whole point of the speech made by Representative Cole is that as yet.-although he comes fairly close to suggesting that we are to blame; he does not say so specifically, I think for obvious reasons-we have not even really begun to build up an effective radar or early warning system on this continent. This committee and the country is entitled to know that, and the situation indeed simply demands a much more complete statement from the minister of the situation than that with which we have so far been furnished, because there is too big a contrast between the statement emphasized, the facts outlined and underlined by Representative Cole, and the possibility that we would be lucky if we could intercept one out of every four enemy bombers, and the statement of the minister last night and modified to some extent this afternoon that our early warning device would enable us to intercept approximately nine out of ten aircraft. In the absence of anything further than what we have heard so far, Mr. Chairman, I am afraid that this is another of the minister's vague general assurances.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Is it the view of the committee that we shall now proceed to the estimates by subheadings?


Mr. Pearkes:: During the remarks I made yesterday I called attention to the fact that the white paper of 1951 forecast that there would be some of the four escort vessels launched by the end of 1951 or at the latest the beginning of 1952, and that the white paper of this year gave the fact that five had actually been launched by March 31 of this year. I ask for some information as to what seems to be a very considerable delay and a very considerable difference in the forecast of 1951 and the results of performance as shown by the launching of the five vessels by March 31 of this year. I presume that the four which were intended to be launched in 1951 are included in the five which have actually been launched.
I wonder whether the minister could give the committee some idea as to the reasons for that forecast which proved so inaccurate in 1951, and the reasons for the very long delay there has been in producing more than five of the fourteen vessels. I must call attention to the fact that these vessels are not commissioned now; they have merely been launched, and there is a long period of many, many months usually between the

launching of a vessel and its commissioning. I would ask the minister whether he would give some idea-I hope a fairly accurate forecast-of when those five vessels which have now been launched may be commissioned and when the remaining nine which he has given a forecast of being launched by the end of this year may expect to be commissioned so that we may see when the fourteen escort vessels which were included in this three-year plan may really be ready to take their places with the Royal Canadian Navy in its duties either of escort, or of employment with Canada's forces with NATO.


Brooke Claxton: I have that information
though not in quite as full detail as the hon. member has asked for it. I wonder whether we can take it up when we come to the navy headings, but in a general way I can tell him that the main reason, as I have been informed, for the delay in the construction of those vessels was, as I said the other night, that they are a completely new type, new design, and have a power plant which is quite unique. We wanted to produce the power plant in Canada, but in order to get on with the job we bought the first one in Britain. There was delay in securing delivery, and in installing it there was further delay. Now we are well advanced, and I think the delivery dates for all fourteen will be compressed, so that instead of spreading them out as would have been the case fairly evenly at the beginning we shall begin commissioning the first next year, and the others will follow quite rapidly afterwards. The anticipation is that we shall commission those ships probably about five or six years after laying down the keels; whereas, as indicated in the case of corresponding ships in Britain and in the United States, they have had similar delays and will take a bit longer.
One of the reasons for this is that the type of vessel, the electronic equipment, the guns, the antisubmarine equipment, the wiring and the power plants have all been under process of design throughout the period of construction in order to get on with the job, and this proved to be a very complicated operation.


George Randolph Pearkes: Have you plans so that you will have the crews available next year when these ships are commissioned? According to the last figures of the naval enlistment strength of the Royal Canadian Navy, we are rather short of the target which has been set, and I presume that would include these crews.


Brooke Claxton: We will have the crews. The most difficult element in the crews are the engine room staff, electronics, wireless and
Supply-National Defence so on, but these key men have been undergoing training in the United Kingdom as well as here.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Hon. members will find the details start at page-


George Alexander Drew: Just one moment, Mr. Chairman. I regret to find it necessary to rise again before we pass on to the details. We had a detailed analysis of the defence situation by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saan-ich yesterday, and we had a detailed analysis in regard to the armoured units by the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre, and we have had a very exact statement in so far as anti-aircraft are concerned by the hon. member for Calgary North. But the minister has completely skirted around these statements.
In answer to a statement that with all this expenditure we have practically no anti-aircraft, except possibly two batteries, one on the east coast and one on the west coast, equipped with, so far as one knows, weapons far from the description given by the minister, we are told about our having the best antiaircraft guns in the world. But where are they? Where are the units? That is what we want to know. We have spent $5,500 million, not since the end of the war but during this period. Now, where is the defence in Canada representing that money. Where are these anti-aircraft batteries at a time when they are an essential part of our defence? What are the use of radar screens unless they bring into action not only the aircraft but the anti-aircraft gun at the appropriate point? I am not going to go into further details in regard to these anti-aircraft guns lest it be suggested that asking more questions might involve some secrecy. But I am going to say they are not in a position to feed those guns at the moment.
In so far as the units of the reserve forces are concerned, instead of dealing with a specific statement that these units are not up to their authorized strength, the minister sought to convey the impression that the only thing that was wrong was that they were not up to their full strength. No one at any time in this debate suggested that we expect the units to be up to full strength. There is a strength laid down by the Department of National Defence. Either they come within striking distance of that figure or there should be a general readjustment of the general training plan. Either that is the figure that is going to be employed or the training plan defeats itself. If you only have a quarter of those who are expected to carry out a certain training program then that training program becomes nearly wholly ineffective in so far as the original purpose is concerned.

Supply-National Defence
To give an illustration and only an illustration, .seven artillery regiments will be kept as one group at Petawawa this year. I pointed out this was no mere case of not being up to the authorized strength. I pointed out that of these seven regiments only one of these trained two batteries instead of three, which would make a regiment, and that so far as the other batteries are concerned some would train one battery instead of three, and some only a single troop and that represents one of the better artillery groups in the country. What is the answer to that?
It is not enough to say we are not up to full strength. The very inequality of these units makes that training extremely difficult to carry out. How can regimental headquarters be trained if they never have one troop of a battery in training? The whole thing is so disproportionate in cost, in training, and in the result of that training. I pointed out that so far as the batteries actually in camp are concerned that these batteries would have a complement of possibly 120 guns and they fire 24.
Either we really mean business about the training of the reserves or we do not. If we do not then let us admit it. If we do then let us establish a training plan that can actually be carried into effect. That is all that is suggested. The officers are keen, the N.C.O.'s are keen and the men are anxious to do their job. But the plan obviously is not working, and it is in relation to that plan that there is a report from three competent officers. The answer given by the minister that this is a confidential report to the staff is really not describable in terms that would be permitted under the rules of this house.
That is a report that really challenges the responsibility of the members of this house. It is in relation, I believe, to this very breakdown in the pattern of our reserve training that these officers were appointed. How can we pass on any details, how can we say that a certain estimate of money for the training of reserve units should or should not be allowed when we cannot see the reports of the officers appointed to examine into this and to make their recommendations?
The idea that this is something confidential which should not be shown to the public is such nonsense that no such statement should have been made in this house. I cannot help going back to the time when there was not this pretence about the secrecy of recommendations. There was a very interesting report by Sir William Otter dated January 27,


1912. As those who have followed the training for some years will remember, General Otter was largely responsible for the reorganization of the reserve forces before the first world war. It was largely because of the fact that his recommendations were followed, his recommendation on a sixth divisional organization of balanced complement of infantry, cavalry, engineers and artillery, that it was possible for Canada to send the first division, not a division alone, but over 30,000 men, overseas no less than two months after the sudden and unexpected outbreak of that war. I would like to read the closing paragraph of that particular report by Sir William Otter. I might add that I am quoting from sessional paper number 35 of this house for the year 1913. The closing paragraph of that report is paragraph 197, and it reads as follows-but might I ask hon. members to listen to how up-to-date the wording sounds:
Have not the plaudits awarded for a church or ceremonial parade lulled us into the belief that we are fit and capable for any military strain coincident with invasion, and in the continuance of that assumption, are we not encouraging a rude awakening some day, to find ourselves far short of such a consummation, with the result, irreparable loss?
Mr. Chairman, that was a warning at that time. The warning on that occasion was acted upon, fortunately for the capacity of this country to meet the test at a time when that contribution was extremely important.
The repetition by the minister of statements already made by every hon. member who has spoken, to the effect that our men on active service, in the permanent force, have a type of training which gives us reason for pride as does the manner in which they are conducting themselves, must not be allowed to divert the attention of any hon. members from the fact that the central feature of this discussion has been the reserve training which is recognized as the backbone of our defence and without which the forces now overseas or the forces in the permanent army, air force or navy could not hope to carry out their responsibilities.
Certainly it stirs us to speak with pride of these young Canadians. Those on this side of the chamber speak about it with just as much feeling, confidence and admiration as does anyone on the other side of this chamber. After all, there are members of the family of those on this side of the chamber as well as those on the other side who share that experience. There are a number of us who have had the privilege of visiting these establishments away from Canada and of seeing what is being done there. The very

fact that we can produce units like that is all the more reason why we should decide to get down to brass tacks with regard to the reserve army.
Not one word the minister has said tonight has offered an answer or has given any explanation of the failure of the plans of this government, except one; and if that is the answer, then it is time the minister made another speech to outline completely new plans. What he said was-this is the only point on which he came close to reality with regard to the reserve army-that there is a different situation today from that which was in existence at the time the reserve or militia units, as they were then called, were really up to authorized strength. There is a different situation today. Let us make no mistake about that.
Pie said that the difference now is that we have a large regular force instead of the few thousand that there were at that time. That is true. We might also recall that this is a much more populous country today. We also might recall that the number of men in the actual service units is only a fraction of the figure that is constantly put before us of the total in the regular force. Let us grasp that fact. The number of young men in the permanent force who are actually in service units is only a fraction of the total that is put before us as the evidence of our contribution in this field. In fact, on the basis of any explanation given, it is still impossible to understand why we need such an enormous staff and training organization for the number we actually have. We are still waiting for some explanation of that situation.
I must say that there is one place where we do not fail, namely, in the spending of money. For instance, we have just learned that Canada is going to spend large sums on a military building in Washington. I do not know whether there is any arrangement by which we are going to have an army of occupation there. Certainly it is difficult to understand why we need to spend more than $2 million for a building down there unless we are contemplating a substantial movement to the United States of armed forces to be served by those who would be going there. Even at present rates you can build something fairly substantial for $2 million; and it is not likely that that figure will be the real one.
Mr. Chairman, not one explanation that has been given has gone to the core of this problem, namely that whatever plans are made should be realistic ones and that there is no reason why this country cannot maintain the reserve forces at the full strength now authorized. May I repeat that I am not
Supply-National Defence saying it should be "at full service strength"; I am saying "at the full strength authorized by the Department of National Defence" and presumably at a figure that they believe will be in camp or will be trained locally. In fact, there could be no justification for carrying out this training on this basis unless that is the intention of the government.
Let us have some explanation of why we carry on with these ineffective plans. Let us find out why it is that there are these discrepancies. Let us know not that there are a number of tanks that can be seen lined up in the way the minister has described tonight. Let us have an answer to the explanation given by an experienced tank officer that there is wholly inadequate armoured training in this country at the present time. It is not tanks in mothballs that we want. It is armoured units trained to use the tanks. That is what we are not getting at this time.
Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that this committee should proceed to the detailed estimates until we have from the minister an answer that does not skirt around this vitally important problem of the training of the reserve and recruitment for the reserve. In spite of what has already been said, I also think we should have before us the report of the three officers who have considered this subject. In this matter I think hon. members opposite have the heaviest responsibility, because they are the ones who can demand it. I would urge them to consider the responsibility of every hon. member in this committee in passing on detailed estimates with regard to reserve training and other training when we do not get the report which every one of us knows deals with this very problem and which in itself may give the answer to this question.
I would hope that the minister wou'd consider this matter over the week end-it is now eleven o'clock-and that when we meet on Monday he will have reconsidered the question of this report which justifies no such secrecy as that with which he is surrounding it. Moreover, I would hope that he will take us sufficiently into his confidence to justify the belief on the part of hon. members that they have at least the basic information required to approach these detailed items with some knowledge of the facts.


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman, the Leader of the Opposition has repeated once more what he said earlier and what was said by other hon. members. I repeat what I said, namely that it was my hope that we would have the consideration of this report sufficiently advanced that we could study the reserve

Business of the House
army when we reach the details which appear at page 308 of the estimates. That is what I said and that is what appears in Hansard. I repeat it.


George Alexander Drew: Does the minister now mean that we are going to get the whole report?


Brooke Claxton: No. Of course not.


George Alexander Drew: We are going to get the report according to the revised version of the Minister of National Defence.


Brooke Claxton: What you are going to get is the decision of the department of the government.


George Alexander Drew: Which tells us nothing.


Brooke Claxton: No, no. It just tells you what we have decided. We take the responsibility of acting on the advice. We take the responsibility of asking for the advice and I take the responsibility of not giving the source of information that is given to me, not on a confidential basis but what is actually marked "secret".


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


George Alexander Drew: Every hon. member who is now applauding this evasion-


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


George Alexander Drew: Every hon. member who is now applauding this evasion is going to be asked-


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


George Alexander Drew: -to pass on these statements without any of the basic information, and we do not know whether or not that report is marked "secret".
Item stands.
Progress reported.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Harris:: Mr. Speaker, we have made good progress this week and I think we can make better progress next week. There is on Votes and Proceedings notice of a resolution
having to do with the Public Service Superannuation Act. It will be called for His Excellency's signification of his consent on Monday and we would like to proceed with it on either Tuesday or Wednesday so as to have second reading and refer it to the banking and commerce committee for consideration on Thursday, if possible. Subject to that, the business on Monday and Tuesday will be as follows: Second reading of an act respecting inventions by public servants; the resolution with respect to crown corporations; second reading of an act to amend the Radio Act; second reading of an act to amend the National Harbours Board Act; second reading of an act to amend the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act; the resolution with respect to disability pensions; continuation of the debate on second reading of an act to amend the Research Council Act.
When we conclude those items we shall take the budget resolutions, and if all this is concluded before Tuesday night we shall move to go into supply. On Wednesday it will be the intention to take the bills reported from the banking and commerce committee, namely, the Bank of Canada Act, an act respecting banks and banking and the Quebec Savings Banks Act. On Thursday and Friday we shall take interim supply to begin with and then the departments of transport, justice, secretary of state and agriculture.


Stanley Howard Knowles: While we are on the business of the house, may I say a word or two. I hope that the leader of the house will not take it from the fact that we did not draw attention to the fact that it was ten o'clock sixty-five minutes ago that we will adopt the same attitude all next week. Some of us feel that if it is the desire to extend the length of the sitting day it should be done by a proper motion, and speaking for those of us in this group we would rather see that extension in the morning than at night.


Walter Edward Harris: I move that the house do now adjourn.
Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at 11.05 p.m.

Monday, May 24, 1954