1954-03-25

[Stage Direction]
BEING THE 96th SESSION FOR THE PERIOD 1867-1954

[Stage Direction]
queen's printer and controller of stationery OTTAWA, 1954
[Stage Direction]
Thursday, March 25, 1354 HOUSE OF COMMONS

Mr. Speaker:: I think I owe the house an explanation as to why there is on the floor of the house at this moment what is called in technical terms a roving microphone. It is merely a duplication of the microphone which is suspended in front of the minister and through which he would speak if the floor microphone was not placed in front of his desk. This is merely an experiment for today.
Hon. members have complained about the insufficiency of the amplifying system. On March 12 the hon. member for Burnaby-Richmond (Mr. Goode) asked that something be done about it, and I promised him, and the hon. member for Ottawa East (Mr. Richard) and others who privately have made requests that I look into the matter, that I would do so. On Monday last Mr. Guy Fountain, the president of the Tannoy group of companies, was in Canada. I had a conversation with him and he sent me an explanation of what the system means. I think there are some misapprehensions as to what this system really is. Perhaps hon. members think too much of this system as a loudspeaker system; that it amplifies the voice, the moment the speaker utters words, to every part of the house including the territory surrounding him; but that is not so.
Around the speaker there is what is called a muted zone. A few members sitting around the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), for instance, would hear nothing else but the natural voice of the minister. We had an instance of that the other day when the hon. member for Bellechasse (Mr. Picard) pointed out to me that he could not hear anything while the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) was speaking. If hon. members will look at the chart -and I have asked the Tannoy company to prepare a printed chart so that we can circulate it among hon. members in order to inform them-they will see exactly what their position is.
When the Prime Minister speaks through the second microphone to my right his words are carried to all hon. members except to
those sitting around him, and the hon. member for Bellechasse, being in that muted zone, would not hear anything through the loudspeaker placed on his desk; whereas the voice of the Prime Minister would be carried through the amplifying system to the distant corners of the house.
With the permission of the house, I should like to read the prepared statement of Mr. Fountain. I quote:
The Tannoy installation provided to improve acoustics and enable free debating to be enjoyed with greater clarity and audibility comprises several important features and performs certain extremely useful, but limited, functions.
Unlike most "microphone systems" where the person using the microphone is on a rostrum, stage, or in a strategic visual position, and where only one microphone point exists with an array of loudspeakers operated from this microphone, the facilities in the House of Commons are designed to enable any member of the house to get up spontaneously and from his own desk address the whole house and be heard by all members in the house, regardless of where he is normally located and whether or not he is addressing his remarks in any particular direction. This versatility is achieved only by permitting certain restrictions, and calls for the constant operation of a control panel by a skilled engineer and his standby.
The devices which hang down on wires from the ceiling are the microphones, and the small cylindrical features on the members' desks and behind the seats in the galleries are the reproducers. The- can scarcely be called "loudspeakers", since they are not intended to make a person's voice appear to be louder than it is.
The microphones are devices which, whilst they can discriminate, within a controlled zone, in the amount of sound they pick up from any given direction,-in other words, they can pick up in a forward direction, but not necessarily in a rearward direction-they cannot, at any time and under normal circumstances, discriminate in the type of noise or sound to which they are sensitive. That is to say, if they hear a person speaking, they will also hear the noise of a dropping book or rustling paper, or any other extraneous noise, and these noises will be amplified proportionately with the person's voice. They will also pick up, in addition to the orator's voice and local extraneous noises, reproduction from any loudspeaker sufficiently loud in the vicinity of the microphone. It is for this latter reason that the whole of the system was divided up into zones, which are individually and electronically controlled by the operator in the following manner:
When a member of the house rises to his feet, the suspended microphone nearest to him is made "live" and sensitive, and simultaneously the remaining microphones are reduced in sensitivity. In addition to this, the small speakers on the desks in the immediate vicinity of the orator are muted, and are not permitted to radiate any amplified speech. The reason for this is twofold: Firstly, if they are left switched on, their output could easily be sufficient to operate the microphone as well as the
3318	HOUSE OF
House of Commons-Amplifying System orator's own voice, which would result in a "howl"; and secondly, there should be no need for other members with normal hearing, sitting in the immediate vicinity of the orator, to require any reinforcement since they would, under normal circumstances, hear him direct without difficulty.
It will be seen, therefore, by such switching, the sensitivity of the microphone in use can be increased to enable the orator's voice to be suitably amplified for the energizing of the remainder of the remote speakers.
When a member who has been speaking concludes his speech and sits down and another member in another part of the house gets up, the Tannoy operator follows the movement visually, and by an ingenious but complex switching arrangement, the operator merely depresses a small switch controlling the zone in which the new member is speaking, and this switch has the effect of unlatching all the previous connections electronically, and setting up a precisely similar set of operating conditions in the new zone.
It will be seen, therefore, that much depends not only on the desirability of a member to speak up and speak so far as possible towards his nearest microphone, but in order to enable the engineer/-operator to switch in the appropriate microphone in the member's zone as quickly as possible, he should see him rise to his feet, preferably pausing for a moment before speaking. Such a procedure gives the engineer/operator more time (a) to identify the member and his zone, and (b) to do the necessary switching (which is almost instantaneous) which will ensure that the microphone in that particular member's zone is made live, and the necessary muting completed. It will be seen that if a member who intends to speak commences his statement whilst he is actually rising from his seat, it is quite conceivable that the operator will not have seen him start to rise, nor be aware of his intention, until the member may have actually spoken two or three words.
A plan of the house is being produced upon which will be delineated the areas and zones which have their individual microphones and control systems. This should enable members to determine for themselves, by simple observation, not only which is the nearest microphone in their zone and to which they should address their remarks as often as possible, but it will indicate whether or not the speakers provided on their desks are operating or whether they are muted when a given microphone is selected.
The engineers will be very happy indeed, at any time, not only to explain to the members or those interested how the system works, but to give advice which would enable both the intelligibility and efficiency of the system to be improved.
As soon as these charts are available, one of which I have before me, copies will be distributed, to hon. members. It was discovered that facilities exist underneath the table for the installation of a roving microphone, such as the Tannoy company have installed in the House of Commons of the United Kingdom. When the president of the company informed me of that I suggested that, perhaps, if they had the equipment we might see what would happen if it were used in connection with speeches of hon. members seated in front rows on both sides of the house. The microphone which is now in front of the minister is merely, as I said, a duplication of the suspended microphone,


which is now dead. The minister will be speaking through the floor microphone in front of him, and we will see what happens.


Mr. T. H. Goode (Burnaby-Richmond):: Mr. Speaker, on a question of privilege. I was the one Your Honour named as having complained regarding the facilities. I was of the opinion that the system was not working as completely as it was thought it would when it was first installed, and that is why I raised my voice to make a complaint. However, I am sure Your Honour has the matter under consideration; and we will see what happens.


Mr. Winch:: Speak up; that is all that is wrong.


Tom Goode: No, it is not a matter of speaking up.



INQUIRY AS TO BROADCASTING OF DEBATES

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. H. Casileden (Yorkton):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration as the minister in charge of house procedure. Will the matter of having these house microphones connected to the C.B.C. be considered-


Some hon. Members:: No.


George Hugh Castleden: -so that such debates as we are going to hear today may be broadcast to all the people of Canada?


Some hon. Members:: No.


Hon. W. E. Harris (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration):: Mr. Speaker, I think my hon. friend's question was answered by the reaction of hon. members. In any event, the method of dealing with debates here comes peculiarly under the supervision of Mr. Speaker, in this particular instance aided by the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters).



COMMUNICATIONS


Hon. Lionel Chevrier (Minister of Transport):: Mr. Speaker, yesterday when the discussion took place concerning the transfer of the government telephone and telegraph services in British Columbia to the British Columbia Telephone Company and the Canadian National Telegraphs I was able to deal with the effective date of the transfer, together with certain of the conditions under which employees of the government would be

treated, in so far as the sale to the British Columbia Telephone Company was concerned.
However, with reference to the transfer to Canadian National Telegraphs I was unable to give any information to the house, because the departmental officers were in Montreal discussing the arrangements. These have now been completed and, in my opinion, they are as satisfactory as they were with the British Columbia Telephone Company. For that reason I am sure the house will be interested in knowing what are the terms of the transfer.
The plans of the Canadian National Telegraph Company for operation of the services which it is taking over, in conjunction with their present operations, would allow them to conduct the full operations with substantially fewer personnel. However, in an effort to be fair to federal employees, the C.N.T. has undertaken to provide employment to all present employees who have three years' service with the federal government and who have not reached the age of 65. In the case of those who have less than three years' service but who have not yet reached 65, the company is hoping to find alternative employment inside or outside the company.
Out of a total of over 60 individuals, five have reached the age of 65 and another 17 have less than three years' service. Those who cannot be absorbed will receive a month's notice as of April 1 and that includes mainly operators, messengers and clerks. I understand a few of these have been found, or will be found, other work, in some cases with the company. The situation is changing from day to day as further cases are solved.
Normal business adjustments and rearrangements may, in due course, involve further staff changes, particularly as service duplications are eliminated, but this is a longer term prospect and employees taken over will receive, in any case, equality of treatment with other employees, subject to the normal obligations of the company.
In the matter of wages, at two of the points where services are taken over C.N.T. union agreements will apply and employees will receive the standard negotiated wage rates applicable to C.N.T. employees. At other points the C.N.T. will continue the basic rate of pay presently in existence for federal employees.
In the matter of pensions, any employees taken over who have earned federal superannuation will, of course, retain this payable on reaching retirement age. In addition the C.N.T. pension plans will be made available to federal employees taken over, with the amount of the C.N.T. pension earned based 83276-2104
25, 1954	3319
B. C. Telephone and Telegraph System on service with the C.N.T. subsequent to transfer. In addition, since there are eligibility conditions for the C.N.T. pension plan based on periods of service, as a special concession to federal employees continuous service with the government telegraph service will be counted as C.N. service to establish eligibility.
As far as seniority rights are concerned, at the points covered by union agreement, namely Quesnel and Williams Lake, federal staff taken over will be secured against displacement so long as they remain in those positions. Since seniority is only involved at those points covered by wage agreements, it is not a relevant consideration at the other points where services are taken over. At such other points personnel will receive the rights and privileges applied to comparable positions and services throughout the C.N. system.



PRIVATE BILLS


[Stage Direction]
Bill No. 379, for the relief of Gerald Emile La Grave.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 380, for the relief of Rita Boucher Dufort.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 381, for the relief of Lucy Halga Saunders Gibson.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 382, for the relief of Antonie Lutz Jedrzejewski.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 383, for the relief of Jessie Clarke Thompson.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 384, for the relief of Dorothy Coughtry Paquette..-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 385, for the relief of Isabel Ruth Smith Newey.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 386, for the relief of Eugene Clifford Carbonneau.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 387, for the relief of Jean Antoine Francois Armand.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 388, for the relief of Maria Clara Anita Cauchon Quirion.-Mr. Hunter.


Mr. Thatcher:: 1.	What was the cost of producing the printed edition of the annual report of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1953?
2.	What printing firm received the contract?
3.	Were tenders invited, and, if so, was more than one submitted?
4.	On what basis was the contract awarded?
5.	How many copies were printed, and how many distributed?


Mr. McCann:: 1.	The complete price was $5,630, including art work and engravings.
2.	Might Directories Ltd., Toronto, Ontario.

Questions
3.	Yes; four quotations were received.
4.	The tender was awarded on the basis of the corporation's specifications and requirements.
5.	6,000 English and 2,500 French. These have all been distributed except about 200 copies of each edition required to meet casual requests.


C.B.C.  EMPIRE AND COMMONWEALTH GAMES
Mr. Fulton:: In connection with the contract between the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and the British Empire and Commonwealth Games Society:
1. Was any effort made to deal separately with the rights to make films for theatrical exhibition and the rights to make films for TV purposes?
2.	If not, why did the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation decide to interest itself in acquiring monopoly rights to make motion pictures for commercial theatrical exhibition?
3.	Does the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation intend to enter this field?


Mr. McCann:: 1.	Yes. The first offer of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was for sound and television broadcasting rights only.
2.	The corporation found that the British Empire and Commonwealth Games Society was offering world radio, television and film rights as a unit, and felt that it should bid for this in competition with private advertising interests in order to assure good sound and television broadcasting coverage in Canada and other commonwealth countries.
3.	No.



HERRING FISHING


Mr. Bell:: 1.	Has the government investigated the possibility of a subsidy for the smoked bloater (herring) fishing industry?
2.	If so, what were the details of the forms of subsidy investigated at both producer and exporter levels?


Mr. Winters:: 1.	Yes.
2.	The question of assistance to the smoked bloater industry has been under investigation by the fisheries prices support board for some months. The problem arose out of a substantial carryover from 1952 in the hands of private and co-operative exporters.
In order to clear these stocks and permit a more satisfactory outlook for the fishermen in 1954, the government has authorized the fisheries prices support board to offer to purchase, on or after June 30, 1954, up to
150,000	boxes of choice quality bloaters of 1952 production or standard quality bloaters of either 1952 or 1953 production, at 80 cents per box for choice and 55 cents per box for standard. A firm must elect to come into

the scheme before April 15, 1954, at which time the product will be inspected. No bloaters then below standard quality will be acceptable under the scheme. Any bloaters so acquired by the board will be the property of the board and will be disposed of outside commercial channels.
In authorizing this action, the government made it clear that, in future, the industry will be expected to adjust production to demand and to carry on its business without price support.



SALMON FISHING


Mr. Bell:: 1.	Has the government investigated the possibility of a reduction in the Atlantic salmon fishing season this year?
2.	If so, what are the estimated salmon losses to Saint John harbour fishermen for the reduced seasons investigated?


Mr. Winiers:: 1.	Yes.
2.	Because of year to year variance in time and size of salmon runs no estimate can be made of differences in catches resulting from any relatively small changes in dates of fishing seasons.



LABOUR CONDITIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day;
Mrs. Ellen L. Fairclough (Hamilton West):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to direct a question to the Minister of Labour. In view of the published statistics on unemployment, will the minister say just what steps are proposed by the government to remedy this situation?


Hon. Milion F. Gregg (Minister of Labour):: Mr. Speaker, I thought that question was quite thoroughly explored during the recent debate on unemployment in this house.


Ellen Louks Fairclough: I would like to ask a supplementary question. Did I understand the minister to say that the government does not propose to do anything?


Milton Fowler Gregg: Mr. Speaker, I did not say that.


Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg Norih Centre):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask a supplementary question arising out of the question asked by the hon. member for Hamilton West (Mrs. Fairclough), but I would like to direct my question to the Minister of Justice. Did the Minister of Justice, in his radio broadcast from Winnipeg last night, when he stated that 5 per cent of unemployment was agreed to be a good thing, speak for the government?


Hon. Stuart S. Garson (Minister of Justice):: Mr. Speaker, in my radio address last night I suggested that a great authority in the United Kingdom, Lord Beveridge, said that 3 per cent unemployment was proper, that it was equivalent to Hull employment in Great Britain and the Trades and Labour Congress and the Canadian Congress of Labour had indicated that anywhere from 3 to 5 per cent might be a corresponding percentage for Canada. I agreed, by implication, with both these labour congresses.


Mr. Angus Maclnnis (Vancouver-Kings-way):: Mr. Speaker, I would like to ask a supplementary question. When the minister says 3 per cent might be the proper amount of unemployment, what does he mean by "proper"?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: In relation to the context to which the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) alluded, Lord Beveridge's statement was that that would be the degree of unemployment in Great Britain which would indicate full employment and that there was not a shortage of labour.
LLater.l



INQUIRY AS TO FIGURES RELEASED BY DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Clarence Gillis (Cape Breton South):: Might I be permitted to direct a question to the Minister of Labour, arising out of the answer given by the Minister of Justice a few minutes ago and which could be misunderstood. Is it correct that the last figures released by the minister's department indicate that approximately 10 per cent of the working force of Canada are at present unemployed?


Milton Fowler Gregg: Mr. Speaker, the normal monthly release which was published yesterday indicated, as explained during the debate, the two sets of figures related to unemployment. One set consisted of those prepared by the dominion bureau of statistics showing those without jobs at a given time; the other set of figures showed the total of those at a given date listed in the national employment service offices across Canada as applying for employment. As I recall it, during the debate the announcement was made that the dominion bureau of statistics figure was 280,000 in round figures and that the other group of figures totalled 524,000 for January. The corresponding figures issued yesterday for February were 312,000 in the first instance and
559,000	in the second.
Inquiries of the Ministry



ROYAL CANADIAN MOUNTED POLICE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. R. Pearkes (Esquimall-Saanich):: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a question of privilege and I bring this matter to your attention because I feel an answer is called for from the ministry. I have already spoken to the appropriate minister about this matter. Last night I attended a film entitled "Saskatchewan", which is represented as being based upon historical facts. The story, besides being full of historical and geographical inaccuracies, is an insult to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, a force in which I once served and of which all Canadians are justly proud. This film is also an affront to the memory of certain great Canadians who, by their tact and good judgment, averted Indian warfare in western Canada. The whole sickly story is a travesty of the true facts and therefore its showing is highly undesirable because it distorts, for young Canadians, a glorious chapter in Canadian history.
At no time in the long record of the mounted police did troops of that force engage Indians in murderous battle, killing large numbers of natives, nor did mutiny or insubordination exist in that force. On the contrary, the relationship between officers, non-commissioned officers and constables has always been excellent. I therefore wish to ask the Minister of Justice if any public funds were expended in the production of this atrocious film.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member will be greatly relieved to learn that no public funds were expended in the production of that film. That is as one would expect, because we of course do not subsidize these Hollywood productions. I have not seen the film myself but I have received information from the commissioner which indicates that the remarks made by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Pearkes) are correct. The film is quite inaccurate historically and as regards the location in which it was produced; and, as the hon. member has stated, what is even more important is that it does very much less than justice to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, whose great prestige has always been peculiarly based upon its long and honourable record of having enforced law and order, not by gun-play, as indicated in this film, but with the minimum use of force.


Mr. Speaker:: Perhaps I should say for the purpose of the record that I should have
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Inquiries of the Ministry much preferred to have seen this question debated on the estimates of the Department of Justice.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. H. O. White (Middlesex East):: X should like to direct a question to the government. Is the government aware of the failure of the Galt Knitting Company after 74 years of continuous operation? In view of the external affairs debate today, will the government assure Canadian labour and industry continuous prosperity so as to enable the government to maintain aid, through taxation, to less favoured nations of the world?


Mr. Speaker:: This question is so general in character-


Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I do not think it is possible to answer that question on the orders of the day. I think it would require more time than could be devoted to the answer to a question on the orders of the day.



FISHERIES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. Robert H. Winters (Acting Minister of Fisheries):: Mr. Speaker, on Tuesday the hon. member for Cape Breton South (Mr. Gillis) referred to a statement in the press captioned "Newfoundland Fisheries under Ottawa Ruling", and asked for certain information on the new arrangement.
The statement to which the hon. member referred was based on a press release issued on Monday, March 22, by the Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair). This release followed discussions between representatives of the government of Canada and the government of Newfoundland concerning the marketing of Newfoundland salted codfish.
Under the new arrangements, particularly those respecting NAFEL, the proposal is that the Newfoundland salt-fish merchants at the beginning of the season shall undertake to pay minimum prices to fishermen and to agree on a system of profit sharing dependent on the final outcome of export sales. This will be an agreement between merchants and fishermen and does not mean floor prices in the sense that they would be guaranteed by the government.
The statement also said that prices would be reviewed by the fisheries prices support


board at the end of the marketing year. This, of course, is in line with government policy and represents no change.



EXCISE TAX


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. F. S. Zapliiny (Dauphin):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Finance. Has the minister received representations from bottlers of carbonated beverages calling for the removal of the excise tax from their product? If so, is the minister taking these representations into consideration in preparing the proposed new budget?


Hon. Douglas Abbott (Minister of Finance):: The answer to both questions is in the affirmative, Mr. Speaker.



UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Milton Fowler Gregg: Mr. Speaker, may I refer to the question asked yesterday by the hon. member for Oxford (Mr. Nesbitt). Other members of the house have also asked me similar questions privately. His question was:
. . . would the minister take into consideration making either appropriate changes in the Unemployment Insurance Act or appropriate changes in its present administration in order that industrial employees working on a short day week may receive full benefits under the act?
My answer is as follows. One of the principles on which the contribution and benefit structure of the Unemployment Insurance Act is based is that the insured person assumes part of the risk, and no benefits are paid for short periods of unemployment.
In carrying out this principle, there are two provisions in the Unemployment Insurance Act. The first is the waiting period of five days at the beginning of every benefit year during which no benefit is paid.
The second provision is that no benefit is paid for any period of unemployment of one day, or for the first day in any period of unemployment, consisting of two or more consecutive days, subject to the following exceptions:
(1)	There will not be more than one noncompensable day in a week, and
(2)	No non-compensable day will be charged in any week in which the claimant worked for three days or less for an employer other than his regular employer.
In the case of employees who normally work five days a week, and whose work week

is reduced to four days, there is a loss of one day's employment each week and no benefit is paid. However, where two days' employment is lost in any week and only three days are actually worked, under the present provisions, the sixth day which is normally a holiday is treated as an unemployed day and two days' benefits are paid.
There is an anomaly, however, in the treatment accorded to a claimant who loses one day each week, and the claimant who loses two days every second week. This problem is being studied by the unemployment insurance commission, in an endeavour to find a solution which will conform with the underlying principles of the act and which will at the same time be equitable to the claimants.



CIVIL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Ambrose Holowach (Edmonton East):: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Minister of National Health and Welfare, of which I gave him notice, or in his absence may I direct the question to his parliamentary assistant? With respect to the announcement by the United States civil defence administration to the effect that the first continental defence tests will be undertaken shortly, in which the United States and the ten provinces of Canada will be taking part, would the minister make a statement to the house on this important matter, and advise whether any public participation in the tests is contemplated?


Mr. F. G. Robertson (Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of National Health and Welfare):: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member was kind enough to indicate his intention to ask this question. I regret that I am unable to make a statement at this time. Bearing in mind the nature of this question and the fact that there is no apparent urgency, I would suggest that this question might be placed on the order paper.



CUSTOMS ACT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Donald M. Fleming (Eglinton):: May I
direct a question to the Minister of National Revenue. What representations has his department received recently from police authorities in relation to the importation of slingshots and Malayan style throwing daggers, and what steps does the department contemplate to curtail the importation of these weapons?
Inquiries of the Ministry Hon. J. J. McCann (Minister of National Revenue): Mr. Speaker, I have not any knowledge of any such application as that to which the hon. gentleman refers. I shall look into the matter immediately and see whether it comes under the jurisdiction of the customs and excise branch of the Department of National Revenue.



ROYAL CANADIAN AIR FORCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. R. O. Campney (Associate Minister of National Defence):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to reply to an inquiry addressed by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) to my colleague the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) on March 12 which he said concerned 30 houses on Whyte-wold road in St. James, Manitoba. This area has been acquired by the Department of National Defence for the extension of the air force station at Stevenson field. When it was acquired there was a considerable number of shacks, shanties and some houses on the property. As a matter of fact I am informed there are about a dozen houses which are in a very dilapidated state. They are without plumbing and are a menace to health. Three of them are occupied. A survey is being made, and when the area is being cleared for use such of the buildings as appear to have any salvageable value will be declared surplus to Crown Assets Disposal Corporation for sale and removal and the rest will be demolished.



INQUIRY AS TO DIVERSION OF YUKON RIVER WATER

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Rodney Adamson (York West):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Trade and Commerce, but in his absence to the Prime Minister. It arises out of a secret meeting between the premier of British Columbia and representatives of the American Aluminum Company and the Frobisher-Ventures Complex at which the question of the diversion of Yukon river water into Taiya inlet and into the Sloko river to the Taku inlet was discussed. Before the government of Canada cedes any water power rights to the United States government or any agency thereof or to the Aluminum Corporation of America, known as Alcoa, for concessions or grants of United States territory, will the matter be brought before the house, and has there been any change in the basic policy on the export of primary power from the Yukon?

Inquiries of the Ministry


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I must confess that I know nothing about this secret meeting to which the hon. member refers. I am not in on that secret. There has been no change in the basic policy of the Canadian government with respect to the export of the primary products of its natural resources.


Agar Rodney Adamson: The meeting took place on March 17 and was reported in the Vancouver Province.


An hon. Member:: Not very secret.



POST OFFICE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, may I direct a question to the Postmaster General. Has the government decided to impose an extra charge of 5 cents, in addition to the postage already paid, on letters returned to the sender as undeliverable? If so, why was the house not informed of this intention when the bill increasing postage rates was before parliament?


Hon. Alcide Cote (Postmaster General):: I
wish to thank my hon. friend for having given me notice of his question. I may say that an extra charge of 5 cents, in addition to the postage already paid, is not being imposed. Letters bearing the return addresses of the senders on the outside of the envelope, if undeliverable, are returned without charge to the senders. Letters which prove undeliverable at the address given, and which do not bear the return address of the sender on the cover, must be diverted to the undeliverable mail office and opened there in order that the name and address of the sender may be ascertained so that the item may be returned. There has always been a charge for this service. On and after April 1 it will be 5 cents, corresponding to the charge for a "forward" letter.
As for the second part of the question, I do not recall everything that was said on the occasion to which the hon. member refers, although I remember that he certainly covered a lot of ground. But I may say that I myself said at the time that the increase would be all along the line, and I think the principle was certainly contained in that answer.



HOUSING


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. K. Fraser (Peterborough):: I should like to address a question to the Minister of

Public Works. As many of the people who are out of work are buying homes under Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, have the minister and the corporation given consideration to seeing that these people will not lose their homes while they are unemployed?
Hon. Robert H. Winters (Minister of Public
Works): Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation is a very sympathetic administrator of the terms of the National Housing Act.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: Did the minister see the press report this morning indicating that the Minister of Trade and Commerce had said that these people would not lose their homes?


Robert Henry Winters: No, I did not see the press statement.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of Stale for External Affairs):: Mr. Speaker, with the consent of the house I should like to move:
That items Nos. 84 to 103 inclusive, of the main estimates, 1954-55, be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
In the first place I think I should say, Mr. Speaker, that in spite of your clear and precise explanation I am not quite sure yet which of these mechanical instruments I am supposed to speak at. But I propose to follow the good Liberal middle of the course way, and I have no complaint against being an acoustical guinea pig on this occasion.
This resolution makes it possible not only to begin the work of the committee on external affairs but for a general discussion of international matters, and has customarily been used for that purpose. Today it has been thought desirable to .alter the procedure in one respect so that after I have completed a fairly general survey the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) may deal with one or two matters concerning the Far East which have arisen out of reports of his recent journey to that area of the world. It was felt that members opposite would like to have a full statement of government policy on all these matters and that therefore it might suit their convenience, as, indeed, it seems suitable to us, that the Prime Minister should follow me immediately. Then the debate would take its normal course.
The first matter with which I should like to deal, and I think the house will expect me to, is the result of the Berlin conference,

which was being held when we had our last discussion on international affairs on January 29. It will be recalled that the agenda of the Berlin conference was adopted quickly. It was a simple agenda of three items. The second and third items of that agenda were Germany and the problem of ensuring European security, and the Austrian state treaty. In respect of these two items, as the house knows, no progress was made at Berlin.
In so far as Germany is concerned, the Soviet delegation to that conference was unable to agree to the proposal for free allGerman elections as the first step towards unification and a German peace settlement; while the western foreign ministers on their part were not able to agree to the Soviet proposal, which had been previously rejected, that a provisional all-German government should be set up on a basis of equal representation of the freely elected government of the German republic and of the communist regime in East Germany. The result was, in this matter, deadlock.
Similarly, in respect of Austria, when the western foreign ministers, in an effort to bring a peace treaty to Austria at last, accepted the previous Soviet proposals the Soviet delegation then introduced new and irrelevant conditions, with the result that in this matter too there was deadlock. So the peoples of Germany and Austria must have felt, as indeed we felt, disappointment and disillusionment over the negative results of these items of the agenda.
The first item of the agenda concerned methods of reducing international tension and convening a five-power conference. Under that item a decision was taken, as the house knows, to hold a conference in Geneva opening on April 26 to discuss the question of a Korean peace treaty and the war in Indo-China. I will deal with these matters more specifically a little later.
On January 29, when we discussed international affairs, I told the house that in my view, despite some minor concessions and some reassuring words from the successors to Mr. Stalin in the U.S.S.R., nothing that had happened up to that time gave us cause to believe that the basic objectives of soviet foreign policy had changed or that soviet leaders were, in fact, ready to accept a reasonable solution to major international problems. After a careful examination of all the reports of the Berlin conference dealing with Germany, Austria and the general subject of European security, it seems clear that the conclusion I put forward on January 29 holds true today. There has been no evidence 83276-211
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of change in the basic foreign policy objectives of the Soviet union. At Berlin, Mr. Speaker, the same record was played, although it was played somewhat more softly and for that I suppose we should give thanks.
One of the foreign policy objectives of the Soviet union has been to split the European allies, and indeed other allies, from the United States of America; to crack the solid structure of western unity. Mr. Molotov at Berlin made it abundantly clear that this was certainly one of his principal aims. But we can all take satisfaction out of the fact that he failed in achieving that aim. Indeed, the Russian tactics served to strengthen, I think, the unified approach of the western delegation to international problems. The teamwork and the tactics of the western foreign ministers at Berlin, which were I think admirable in all respects, have quite possibly increased the sense of common purpose in the peoples of the free world. A stronger Atlantic community spirit might, I think, be listed as a positive achievement of that conference.
The attitude adopted by the soviet delegation, their refusal to agree to the unification of Germany with free elections or the peace treaty with Austria, has also served to remove-if we still had them-any lingering illusions about soviet policy. I suppose this also can be listed as a positive achievement of the conference. It is a melancholy fact, but a fact nonetheless, that in the world in which we live we must count as a step forward the removal or reduction of false hopes, because false hopes can be dangerous. Clearing the ground of illusions and facing the situation as it is makes, I think, more likely the formulation, and eventually the realization, of sound hopes and attainable visions of secure peace.
Since the Berlin conference some progress has been made by the countries of western Europe towards the establishment of the European defence community. In Belgium, for instance, the senate has approved a bill for ratification of the EDC treaty, which earlier had been passed by its house of representatives. In The Netherlands the final steps in the formal process of ratification have been completed. In the federal republic of Germany, parliamentary approval has been received for constitutional amendments which would put beyond doubt the right of the German republic to participate in western defence. In both France and Italy, however, formal parliamentary debate on the EDC treaty has not yet begun. We must hope that it will begin soon.

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The Canadian government, as I indicated in my last statement, has welcomed indications that our friends in Europe intend to unite their forces in the interests of continental defence and continental co-operation. We have not taken the position that EDC was the only means to this end, but we have stated our support for EDC as a satisfactory arrangement and indeed as the only one which has been put forward officially. Furthermore, as a member of NATO with which EDC if it comes into existence will be associated, we have expressed our satisfaction that the creation of the European defence community will strengthen the North Atlantic community and integrate the defences of the whole North Atlantic area.
Now, Mr. Speaker, those are no mean objectives and perhaps it was unrealistic to expect their rapid realization. But surely we across the Atlantic have some right to expect that if the pace has been slow, it should be steady. Certainly, if there were any lingering doubts that we were on the right path those were dispelled by the example of soviet policy at Berlin. We in Canada have, I think, felt and demonstrated sympathy and understanding for those in Europe who have demanded full time for consideration of EDC. In view of their history we have understood their hesitation. But while recognizing the necessity, the very real necessity, for caution and prudence, we may feel also over here that there comes a time when in certain situations failure to act may in the long run prove to have been the most dangerous of all possible courses, and that the greatest probability of safety may lie in decisive acts of faith.
At the Berlin conference the U.S.S.R. has made it very clear that they oppose EDC because they see in it a strong obstacle to their own policy. Their opposition is, perhaps, understandable, though it is based I think on false fears and false assumptions. The European defence community has been devised from the beginning to contribute to the defensive collective strength of western Europe, with which will be associated the United States and Canada. The men in the Kremlin apparently feel that continued failure to ratify the EDC project would tend to serve their purposes of keeping free Europe weak and divided. I agree with them, and that is one reason why we must hope that EDC or something like it will soon come into existence.
The other item on the Berlin agenda which was dealt with has resulted, as the house
fMr. Pearson.]
knows, in the calling of the Geneva conference. I believe this conference can be welcomed. But again, we should have no exaggerated hopes of success. We must, of course, do our best to bring about that success. We must refuse to give up the struggle if we seem to be having difficulty in the first week or two. But it is not going to be an easy conference, and indeed it is not going to be a conference from which we can be sure of constructive results. For one thing, we shall have new membership at that conference in the personnel of the delegation from communist China.
The Secretary General of the United Nations, whom we were happy to welcome in Ottawa only a few weeks ago, had this to say in London at a dinner on March 18:
Now, we are facing a new chapter in the Korean story. Next month in Geneva the nations who fought under the United Nations flag in Korea return to the conference table to seek peace. At this table the communist countries will be fully represented for the first time. The negotiations that will be undertaken in Geneva will be of extreme difficulty, yet it would be a serious mistake to allow them to lapse again should it prove impossible quickly to conclude that peace treaty.
He concluded this part of his remarks in these words:
It is inherent in the United Nations' approach that the western world and the communist world meet regularly around the conference table.
I was asked on Tuesday by the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) what would be our instructions as a Canadian delegation at this conference. Mr. Speaker, that can be stated in very general terms. We shall do our best to assist in the process of converting the Korean armistice, a somewhat uneasy Korean armistice, into a durable and satisfactory peace within the United Nations frame of reference which has been set down for this conference, and by which we as a government, indeed as a parliament, are bound.
The United Nations' resolution on this subject reads-at least the important sentence of it-that the objectives we are to seek are:
Achievement by peaceful means of a unified, independent and democratic Korea under a representative form of government and the full restoration of international peace and security in the area.
These are the goals of the Canadian delegation to the conference, and indeed -they should be the goals of each delegation whose right to participate at the conference stems from its military contribution to the United Nations' cause in Korea. I can see no obstacle that could not be overcome in the way of the realization of that resolution if there is good faith and good will on both sides; but that "if", Mr. Speaker, as we know from unhappy experience, is big enough to restrain undue

optimism as to the results of the conference. Nevertheless, we shall do our part as Canadian representatives, I hope, to achieve a satisfactory result which may bring peace to Korea.
At the Geneva conference there will also be discussed the question of Indo-China. It was agreed on by the four foreign ministers at Berlin that this question should be discussed by representatives of France, the United Kingdom, the United States, the U.S.S.R., the Chinese people's republic and other interested states. As hon. members know, the problem of Indo-China, where bitter fighting has been going on for eight years and is going on today, has never been submitted to the United Nations for consideration, and for that reason Canada has not been as directly concerned with this matter as we were with the aggression in Korea. Nevertheless, I am sure we are all conscious of the critical significance of the struggle in Indo-China as it affects the aspirations of the people of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia in achieving and maintaining the independence accorded them by France, as it affects the security of the neighbouring countries in southeast Asia and as it affects the ability of France to make the maximum contribution to European and North Atlantic security and co-operative arrangements. And so, while we do not expect at Geneva to take any active part in discussions regarding Indo-China, we shall of course follow these talks with close interest and take advantage of any opportunity that may be afforded to us to help in bringing some satisfactory conclusion out of this particular matter.
There is another matter, Mr. Speaker, about which I think I should say a word or two. I meant to discuss this, as a matter of fact, when I was speaking in the house in January, but considerations of time did not then make it possible. I refer to President Eisenhower's proposals last autumn on atomic energy. During recent months, and indeed during recent days, a considerable amount of significant information has been made public regarding the terrible power of atomic weapons, particularly the new type of hydrogen atomic weapons which, and it is a horrible admission to have to make, have made the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima and killed 60,000 people obsolescent. There is no need for me to try to impress on the house the fearful power of these weapons and the awesome responsibility toward all future generations, which their recent development imposes on humanity.
In the face of the dangers which these developments involve, it is vitally important 83276-211J
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that no genuine opportunity for international co-operation in this field should be missed. In this respect the Berlin conference was disappointing and the Korean conference at Geneva may prove to be so, too. But surely we must never abandon the effort and the hope that sooner or later sanity and moderation will somehow prevail, and that man will exercise control over weapons, the use of which may destroy his little world.
While there are, as we know from long experience, many and bitter difficulties in the way of solution of this problem of international control of atomic energy, President Eisenhower's proposal does gives us some hope that progress can be made. That proposal is in many respects a modest one. For that purpose, it may be easier to implement it. You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that when this proposal was first mentioned in this house- the proposal refers of course to the collection of atomic stockpiles of uranium and fissionable materials under an international atomic energy agency-the Canadian government announced its unreserved support for it. The Prime Minister referred to it in the house at that time as an imaginative and constructive approach to what is perhaps the greatest problem of the day, namely, the effective control of atomic energy and its development for welfare rather than for warfare. But I think it is important that our strong support for this approach should be accompanied by a clear understanding, not only of what the proposal is but what it is not. For example, it does not of itself offer a solution for the terrible problem of the use of atomic energy for destructive purposes.
But while it is a relatively modest one, therein may, as I said, lie its virtue, or at any rate lie the possibility of its early and general acceptance. Furthermore, it could, if it were adopted, be the starting point for further progress and for reaching more important forward results. At this point it might be useful if I just said a word on the procedure being followed by the United States' government in making arrangements for discussion of this proposal by the nations principally concerned. Obviously-at least it seems obvious to me-it is of great importance that the Soviet union should participate fully in these discussions; and for that reason Mr. Dulles, the United States Secretary of State, had been holding, as the house no doubt knows, bilateral discussions with the Soviet ambassador in Washington, and during the Berlin conference with Mr. Molotov, with a view to making satisfactory arrangements for further and more general progress.
These discussions have now advanced to the point where, on March 19, the United States government presented to the Soviet

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government a memorandum outlining its views as to how President Eisenhower's proposal could be most effectively implemented. While that memorandum was sponsored solely by the United States government, which arose out of those bilateral conversations, the Canadian government was consulted in advance about the terms of this memorandum.
After consideration we were able to say that we were in general agreement in these proposals to which we have been giving very careful consideration. And in that consideration we have had to face a number of difficult questions. For example: should the international agency suggested by the President hold in its own possession uranium or fissionable material to be supplied by contributing nations; if so, where? Alternatively, perhaps the agency might itself hold little or no material, and be in a position to draw upon stocks held by contributing nations up to the amounts pledged.
Another question to resolve is whether the proposed international agency should itself construct, own or operate atomic reactors, or whether it should confine its activities to arranging for the provision of the materials and technical assistance required by countries wishing to undertake this atomic development program for peaceful purposes.
A problem of importance concerns the proposed international agency itself. Should it be associated with the United Nations? In what way would it be financed? What would be the basis for determining who should be represented on it?
Hon. members will note that I have framed my remarks on these matters as questions without answers. We are seeking for these answers, in consultation with our friends. But I think in view of our experience over the years that so much in the way of international discussion of atomic energy has been bedevilled by propaganda and frustrated by political fears-in view of that experience I think it is wise in the early stages at least to have these discussions conducted privately and confidentially.
And that is what has been going on. In due course, if these bilateral discussions about which we are talking turn out to be successful, then the discussions can be broadened to include other countries importantly concerned. I think in the privacy of discussions at this stage, however, lies the best hope that the talks will be used for serious negotiation rather than for propaganda.
But the more we study this question of atomic energy and its use, without control, for destructive purposes, the more important of

course become arrangements, and the necessity for these arrangements, for collective defence, for co-operation for peace among the free world.
The basis of the security which we are seeking in this field is of course international action-international collective action on the broadest possible front. Mr. Dulles himself, the Secretary of State, made that very clear in some very impressive words which appeared in an article which came out last week in Foreign Affairs, under his name. He wrote:
The cornerstone of security for the free nations must be a collective system of defence. They clearly cannot achieve security separately. No single nation can develop for itself defensive power of adequate scope and flexibility. In seeking to do so, each would become a garrison state and none would achieve security.
And he went on to say:
This is true of the United States. Without the co-operation of allies, we would not even be in a position to retaliate massively against the war industries of an attacking nation. That requires international facilities. Without them, our air striking power loses much of its deterrent power. With them, strategic air power becomes what Sir Winston Churchill called the "supreme deterrent". He

That is, Sir Winston Churchill.
-credited to it the safety of Europe during recent years. But such power, while now a dominant factor, may not have the same significance forever. Furthermore, massive atomic and thermonuclear retaliation is not the kind of power which could most usefully be evoked under all circumstances.
And he concluded this part of his article by saying:
Security for the free world depends, therefore, upon the development of collective security and community power rather than upon purely national potentials . . .
I am sure the house will agree that those are very wise words, indeed. Now the broadest base for the accumulation of this collective community power is in the United Nations itself. It is the only international organization we have which is universal in character. But now that very universality makes its deterrent value not as great as it should be, and makes it not very effective as an instrument for collective community power at the present time.
It can be effective, and it has been shown to be effective in Korea; and it could be more effective if we implement the "uniting for peace resolution" of the UN general assembly. But the fact is that, as the United Nations is now constituted, reflecting the cold war which is still raging, it cannot be a satisfactory and effective agent for universal collective security - not effective enough to remove our fears.

And so, as an alternative, we have fallen back on a regional basis for the collection of this community power; in the circumstances, an effective alternative through arrangements which include those states which are willing to accept firm commitments for collective action.
Above all, of course, there is NATO, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This regional collective security as exemplified in NATO is based on two concepts-not one but two concepts-the first of which is the importance of local defence, and the second, the importance of retaliation, especially from the air, on enemy nerve centres from bases which may be far removed from attack. Both these concepts are, of course, essential to the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Mr. Dulles, himself, talking about this at a press conference the other day, and referring to the necessity for local defence, but also to its inadequacy in present circumstances, said:
With the Soviet-Chinese-Communist world-with its 800,000,000 people occupying a central location; with its vast land armies-it would be utterly impossible to have local defences all around that 20,000-mile orbit sufficient to stop any blow that might come at wherever they might choose to make it. So that you have got to find some way whereby that type of local ground defence can be supplemented.
And he went on:
Now that doesn't mean that you eliminate wholly, by any means, land forces-it means you do not necessarily make them your primary reliance because, as against the kind of danger which threatens, it is impossible to match your potential enemy at all points on a basis of man-for-man, gun-for-gun and tank-for-tank.
And so, local defence, while important, has to be supplemented by this other concept of retaliation. And yet, if we relied too much on that and depreciated the importance of local defence, that would be interpreted in many countries as meaning that some countries were expendable. And I doubt if we could maintain a coalition, even NATO, very long on that basis. Inevitably there would be a retreat to isolation. There would be a move towards what sometimes is called continental security, both in North America and -and this is sometimes forgotten-in Europe itself.
But security of this variety, continental security, is a delusion, because, and I think the house will agree with me, there can be no continental security without collective security. And there can be no collective security without collective arrangements for collective action. And no such action can be effective without close and continuous collective consultation. There are then, as I see it, two deterrents against war, and we
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must be clear about them both. Certainly I believe we are clearer now about the importance, the significance, and indeed even the limitations of the deterrent of massive retaliation than we were a few weeks ago.
There has been a good deal of talk in the last week or two here, in the United States, and across the seas, about this new defence strategy, or new defence concept, that is sometimes referred to as the "new look". It was also referred to by the vice-president of the United States in his broadcast a couple of weeks ago as a "new course". On the other hand, it was described by President Eisenhower, in his press conference last week, as "no new doctrine at all."
Whether it is new or old it is extremely important. In the words of Mr. Dulles, it means "local defence reinforced by mobile deterrent power". It means refusal to be tied to any rigid strategy, to any fixed planning, and it gives the nations of the coalition, it is hoped, more freedom of manoeuvre.
This old, or new doctrine, whatever you wish to call it, was dealt with in considerable detail by the United States Secretary of State in his speech in New York on January 12. He confirmed his views on this strategy at his press conference on March 17 in Washington when he said, and I quote from his remarks as reported in the New York Times:
I have said that the capacity to retaliate powerfully and instantly is, in my opinion, the greatest deterrent, and that when you are faced with that kind of potential enemy, or with the assets that this potential enemy has, I believe that a deterrent of that sort is the most effective way there is of preventing a war.
So far as I am concerned I do not criticize the view that this kind of strategy is a valuable deterrent against aggression, and a shield for defence. In my speech in Washington last week I went out of my way to say that I did not criticize it as such because it might very well be the best deterrent against war at the present time. What I thought was important, however, was to clarify some of the ambiguities of this new strategy, and to make it as clear as possible to us all where we stood as friends and allies in relation to it.
Within the last few weeks some very important and reassuring clarifications have been made in Washington of what seemed to some of us to be obscurities. I believe that has been a good result. I know that personally I feel better after having heard some of these statements.
The sentence on which I concentrated my attention in Mr. Dulles' January speech, and it is a sentence which has become pretty well

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known by now, is as follows. I am quoting from Mr. Dulles' speech made in New York on January 12:
. . . before military planning can be changed the President and his advisers, as represented by the National Security Council, had to take some basic policy decisions.
Then he went on:
This has been done. The basic decision was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing.
Some weeks afterwards the vice-president of the United States spoke over the air on March 14 and said more or less the same thing. I quote:
Rather than let the communists nibble us to death all over the world in little wars we would rely in the future primarily on our massive mobile retaliatory power which we could use in our discretion against the major source of aggression at times and places that we chose.
From Mr. Dulles' speech, from which I have already quoted, I picked three words which I considered as being of special importance. These words were "instantly" . . . "means" . . . "our choosing". When I spoke to Mr. Dulles in Washington last week about his speech he said that he did not quarrel with my selection of words, as they were indeed key words. But he was of the opinion that I had excluded the most important word. That word was "capacity". Dealing with that point on March 17 at his press conference Mr. Dulles said:
If you will read my address of January 12, you will see what I advocated there was a "capacity" to retaliate instantly. In no place did I say we would retaliate instantly, although we might indeed retaliate instantly under conditions that call for that. The essential thing is to have the capacity to retaliate instantly.
I certainly accept the importance of that word, but I would suggest that the word "capacity" means not only military capacity but political capacity and that, as Mr. Dulles pointed out so clearly in his article in Foreign Affairs, includes the necessity of co-operation with other countries, especially in such things as the use of bases.
Mr. Dulles has pointed out, as did President Eisenhower in his address to the United Nations, and this has also been emphasized by the Canadian delegation to the United Nations assembly, that this aspect of the question, namely collective capacity and facilities, is in fact a safeguard against rash or provocative action, if such safeguard were needed, on the part of any member of the coalition. For action could only be taken by a joint or collective agreement.
There is a second word to which I devoted some attention in my Washington speech, and that was the word "instantly". That word, in connection with the strategy we are

discussing, involves no problem, as I see it, if there is a direct attack on your own territory, or indeed possibly on the territory of your neighbour, because then it becomes a question of self-preservation and quick, effective, and instant action is essential and would be taken by any country attacked. No one, I believe, would take exception to that.
But the situation is not always so clear as that, and not always so urgent. Sometimes we have cases of unclear or indirect aggression where the circumstances may be blurred and decisions cannot be so easily and quickly made. In that kind of situation a question at once arises as to the application of this doctrine. Against whom will the retaliation be made? Where, how, and when? The difficulty of course in getting out of that situation is that you cannot find any cut-and-dried formula to cover all these cases, and if you did have one you would not want to give it away by unnecessary publicity. Yet, having regard to that difficulty, there is the other difficulty, because this kind of blurred situation is exactly when co-operation and consultation with your friends is most essential and when it is of vital importance to act together as much as we can and plan as far in advance as possible.
Then there is the phrase "by means". That has been interpreted in certain quarters, and understandably so, to give some weight to the fear that the application of this kind of strategy might involuntarily convert small wars into a world war. The Secretary of State of the United States has been trying to clear up that misapprehension in recent days by emphasizing that "means" do not include any single means, let alone atomic means, that the means would have to be adapted to the circumstances and that there would be many occasions-indeed probably most occasions, even of aggression-when it would be unwise politically and strategically to use atomic means at all. Then there is this final word "our choice". Of course there were some worries about the interpretation of that word "our". Those who worried felt that they had some cause to do so because of the ambiguity of the language that was used and because it was felt-I think rightly -that if collective security is to work, the word "our" in that context must mean the free world coalition. Mr. Dulles, in his Foreign Affairs article to which I have already referred, agreed with this interpretation when he wrote:
The main reliance must be on the power of the free community to retaliate with great force by mobile means at a place of its own choice.

On March 19 this interpretation was made even clearer when Mr. Dulles appeared before the Senate foreign relations committee and was asked this question by Senator Smith of New Jersey:
As a result of your January 12 speech, that is when you first spoke of this capacity to retaliate, there have been fears expressed that the United States would not consult our allies in the event of an attack . . . These fears are based on the words in your speech "by means and at places of our choosing". Now X interpreted that when I read it to mean that you were referring to our choosing rather than to the enemies choosing. You would not say our choosing exclusive of our allies? I am correct in my interpretation?
Mr. Dulles replied in words which were very clear and to the point:
You are absolutely correct, Senator Smith. The emphasis upon "our" was in terms of the free world or whatever portion of it is operating in counterdistinction. to the Soviet world. I was pointing out that if we only respond at places and by means of their choosing then we do not exercise a maximum deterrent power, and that the differences between "their" and "our" was in terms of the free world and its potential enemy.
Mr. Speaker, I think the effect of this exchange of views, this conference, these statements and these clarifications has been that we now have a fairly clear and reassuring idea of what this new strategy and this new planning for defence is. One thing this interpretation does make clear is that diplomacy and consultation, which is part of diplomacy, is under this doctrine not less important but more important than ever before. Any decisions must surely be collective, whenever that can be done, before action has to be taken.
The New York Times in an editorial on March 20, commenting on this aspect of the question concluded as follows:
In discussing bipartisan foreign policy here at home-
This is in the United States.
-the idea of "being let in on the take-off and not the crash landing" is often mentioned. That goes for our allies, and it ought to apply with special emphasis to Canada.
I am sure hon. members will agree with me when I say that we want to be let in at the take-off so that we can do our part to help avoid a crash landing. I think this is especially true in the relations between Canada and the United States where consultation and co-operation are very essential not only in respect of security matters but also in respect of economic matters and every other matter.
We had a very good illustration last week in Washington of the importance and the value of consultation on economic matters
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when we met in Washington at the first session of the Canada-United States committee on economic affairs.
We in this country have already built up with our friends in the free world valuable habits of consultation and co-operation. We know now that our fundamental interests are identical. There is, of course, a long way still to go. We must, for instance, increasingly apply the realization of interdependence to our economic policies as well as to our defence policies. In respect of consultation for defence, defence planning and all that kind of thing, I suggest that we should try to use the North Atlantic council more than we have in the past. We have a permanent council in session in Paris. It is meeting every few days and I think this council should be an effective vehicle for consultation in this field. Next month, on April 23, we are going to have a ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic council. The only subject on the agenda of that meeting is exchange of views on the international situation between the foreign ministers of the North Atlantic countries, all of whom will be there and all of whom will be discussing the subject that I am discussing now. That is the kind of subject that should, I think, be discussed at the North Atlantic council not only at occasional meetings of ministers but continually through the permanent representatives so that in that agency of consultation we can clear our views on defence and foreign policy.
We must also constantly seek not only to preserve but to widen and develop still further our attitudes and habits of confidence, frank discussion and consultation, restraint and tolerance. Notwithstanding the importance of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which I have just emphasized, this must be done on a scale which is not limited to the North Atlantic alliance but which is as broad as the globe. Indeed, our cooperation, our friendships must extend beyond our western civilization. Improving the economic and social conditions under which the major part of humanity lives will not ensure peace but it will make peace more likely. More important possibly than even economic aid is the opportunity for understanding and for genuine friendliness between the peoples of Asia in their hundreds of millions and those of the western world. These Asians will form their impressions of our civilization and values above all by what they learn and sense of our real attitudes. That is only one reason, I think, why all members of the house have been so happy

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over the magnificent results of the journey of our Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) into that part of the world.
I would go even further and say that our sense of understanding must even extend to the very people who we think threaten our peace. We cannot be soft-headed about this matter for power in the hands of irresponsible rulers could be dangerous to our peace. But while we need not be soft-headed, we should certainly be clear-headed. I agree that we must be careful and alert. But also we must not let fear freeze our diplomacy into immobility or fire it into panic action. The purpose of Canadian policy-and I do not think there is any division of opinion in this country about this-is not merely to build up military collective strength, important as that is. Our purpose is to work together with our friends in solving our own problems and also, if possible, to negotiate with those whom we fear, in solving those other problems which now divide the world. Canada is anxious to play its part also in this form of collective security, anxious to play its part in seeking, by negotiation, international solutions to differences, to seek them by negotiation from the strength, which we are now collecting, and with strength but also with wisdom, with a full realization of the calamitous result of failure, and in the hope that one day security will rest upon a stronger basis even than the certainty of massive retaliation, atomic retaliation if you like, against anyone who would break the peace; retaliation which would certainly annihilate the enemy but might also destroy ourselves.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Mr. Speaker, I find myself at this moment in a position where 1 have to ask your indulgence and that of the house for a few minutes to speak of at least one of the unfortunate results of my trip around the world that has been referred to in so generous terms by my colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson). International affairs are of such importance that any imprecision or ambiguity in language used about any of their aspects is apt to have very unfortunate consequences. I have to appear at this time before my colleagues in the position of a repentant offender asking the indulgence of his colleagues for his regrettable transgression on the basis of a humble confession of his error or mistake or lapse and on the basis of his genuine desire to clarify the situation and to dispel any of the anxieties or undesirable consequences resulting from the interpretation of too loose language he was unfortunate enough to use.

I am sorry that any of the things I am reported to have said in the East about China have given concern and caused controversy in this country. I am not going to attempt to say that I have been misquoted. I know that the gentlemen of the press who were there were honestly doing their best to report accurately and objectively the many questions in many forms that were put to me, sometimes with almost machine-gun rapidity, at press conferences or at the airfields as I alighted from the plane or was walking towards the plane to re-enter it. I am sure that they did attempt to reproduce what they understood me to have given as my answers and what they understood those answers to mean. I must and I do take the responsibility for any misinterpretation or misconstruction that could be put upon them because of their imprecision or their ambiguity.
There is one thing, however, about which I do feel quite sure that there was an inaccuracy. There was one report that I had said that I was sure we would have to recognize the present government of China as the government the people of China wanted. I feel quite sure I never would use those words intentionally because I never had that feeling about the present government of China. But I must have used some words almost like them since so many of these reporters have come out with that as their version of what they heard and understood, that I felt we would have to be realistic and recognize the government of China "as the government the people wanted."
I should not have said "the government the people wanted". What I had in mind was that, in spite of our dislike of any form of communist or totalitarian government, we could not expect to have to deal with the kind of government, representing the people on the other side, we would like them to have, the kind of government we would want them to have, but that we would have to deal with the government they had as a matter of fact, the government that was in control of the forces that were participating in the happenings that were causing such tension and such anxiety in the international field. That is what I meant. That is what I should have said in words that could not be mistaken or interpreted in any other way because I think that with such a statement there would have been little or no concern and little, if any, controversy about it in this country or anywhere else.
I am not going to read to the house the many editorials that have been published, but I take one that appeared in the Ottawa

Journal of March 12, 1954, which, in part at least, I think would be fairly representative of what was and would be the feeling of the public generally in that regard. The editorial is entitled "About Recognizing China". It reads in part as follows:
A Tokyo dispatch now quotes Prime Minister St. Laurent as saying with respect to recognition of communist China that "it is only the common sense, realistic approach that allied countries eventually deal with communist China as the government in effective control of the China mainland."
This is better, more sensible, than what Mr. St. Laurent was reported to have said earlier at Seoul, namely:
"I do feel that some day we are going to have to be realistic. We are going to have to admit the present government of China as the government the people want."
I feel quite sure, in spite of my respect for the journalists who were there and who were doing their best to report what they heard and what they understood, that I did not put it that way because I never had it in my mind in that form. It was the contrary form I had in my mind, that in spite of our dislike of communist or totalitarian governments we could not expect to have the kind of government we wanted. It would be the kind of government-and I must have said this-that they wanted. I should not have said "they wanted". I should have said the kind of government they had actually in control of the forces we are opposing. The article goes on to say-and I think everyone would agree with this:
No country can ever know with certainty whether the government possessed by some other country is the government its people want. And the fact is that Canada now recognizes any number of countries without being at all sure that their government is what their people want. There is Russia, and Czechoslovakia, and Poland, and Spain; possibly others.
What Canada does, and must be compelled to do, and what all other countries must be compelled to do sooner or later, just because it is the only sensible practicable way, is to recognize the government of a country which is in effective control -which exists in fact.
I would not go quite that far because I would now be very chary about using the word "recognition". It has for so many different people so many different connotations. There is what is sometimes called the concept of legal recognition. Others refer to it as diplomatic recognition. I think perhaps it is better to use some other word that cannot have so many significations. When I was using it I was using it in its broadest sense, that we just had to avoid closing our eyes and had to see, to recognize, that the government that was in control, and with whom we had to deal if we expected to make any kind of arrangement that would be implemented,
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was the government that was in fact in control of the forces that we were opposing. But the article goes on to say:
We must and should recognize the present government of China, not because we approve of it, not because we do not detest and condemn some of the crimes it has committed, but simply because of the inescapable fact that it is the only government there-the only government exercising authority. Buch recognition need not come at this moment;
With that, I fully agree. I would even go so far as to say, instead of "need", we might well say "should" not come at this time. The editorial continues:
-perhaps should not come while Red China remains an aggressor, nor until we see what emerges from Geneva. We must respect-certainly not flout- the opinion of our allies. But for heaven's sake let us not take the impossible position that recognition of China cannot come while China has a communist government-
Then, the article goes on:
It is a pity-
I think it is a pity.
-that the question of Canada's "recognition" of China should have come up in the uncertain way of press conference statements. Mr. St. Laurent doubtless was asked the question in a dozen ways, and it is understandable that, in the east, he desired to indicate Canada's open-mindedness on this vexed subject. But upon his return to Canada parliament should be given a clearer explanation, though the shadow of the Geneva conference will compel restraint.
Of course the shadow of the Geneva conference not only compels restraint but I think is going to be something more than a shadow. It is going to be something that will, to a certain degree, project light into the future. At the present time I was not expressing government policy, but I was expressing frankly my own feelings about it. I was really happy at having heard that there was going to be a Geneva conference at which the government which in fact controls the forces whose conduct has had such a disturbing effect on world peace would be represented and would be talking over the possibility of removing the uncertain conditions of this cease-fire with two impregnable lines of soldiers opposite each other in Korea. Perhaps the conference would be able to do something about the situation which is of grave concern to the whole world, that is the fighting that is going on in Indo-China.
I had the distinct impression that most of the embarrassment felt by French leaders with respect to the European army was a consequence of the drain upon their human and material resources as a result of the fighting going on in Indo-China. I felt that these questions that were being thrown at me arose out of this invitation that had been extended by the four great powers to the representatives of the only government that

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exists on the mainland ot China to come to this conference. The invitation was coupled, of course, with a rider that it is understood that neither the invitation to nor the holding of the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case in which it has not already been accorded. But it does constitute an admission that that is the government that is controlling the forces that we have been resisting; that it is the government that can agree to and admit that we have demonstrated that aggression is not going to be allowed to be profitable and that they cannot impose their will upon the free world through aggression.
It may be that something more permanent than this cessation of firing across the no-man's-land between the two forces that are still there will come out of the Geneva conference. If that comes out of the Geneva conference, it may indicate that by negotiating with the same people other causes of world unrest and of uncertainty about the future can be eliminated. So long as that is the only government on the mainland of China, it is only through discussions with that government that any results can be achieved.
Now, when will there be sufficient results achieved to make it desirable to consider whether there should be what amounts ^ to diplomatic recognition? That is something this government is not considering at this time. When I say "at this time", I am not using evasive language. I am not trying to have my language just comply with the facts. I do not mean just at this moment. Under present conditions I do not see any reason why we should consider diplomatic recognition of China. But those conditions may change and I think it would be most unfortunate, just as the editor of the Journal feels it would be most unfortunate, to tie ourselves down by declarations and commitments that would make it impossible for us at any time to come to the conclusion that even the diplomatic recognition of China would not be helpful to peace and security in the world. We are not in that position at the present time, and when I said there was no consideration being given by the government to that kind of recognition at this time I did not mean, as I saw suggested in at least one newspaper, that it was just something that had not yet come officially before the cabinet as a cabinet. I meant that I was not thinking of it and I did not know of any of my colleagues who were thinking in terms of diplomatic recognition of China under present conditions.
But I felt that none of us were thinking in terms that would make it impossible for us to make the right kind of a decision when,

under changed circumstances, a decision had to be made. Of course, that decision would have to be made in such a manner as would not involve flouting the opinion of our allies. We have many allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and we have others whom we can, I think, regard as allies, in the United Nations. It would be something of world concern. I would hope the position taken by Canada would be a position that would be of benefit to the peace and stability of the whole world. We should not attempt to make decisions that do not have to be made. The position at this time is that we are not, under present conditions, contemplating diplomatic recognition of China. We have not, and I do not think we should say at this time or at any other time that there may not be a situation in the future when a government we do not like, a government the complexion of which is quite contrary to all our democratic ideals, and a government which according to the information we have obtained by hearsay-of course we have to rely for our information on what we get by hearsay-seems to have been guilty of many things that we would not condone, may nevertheless have to be recognized. There are other governments with whom we have at the present time diplomatic relations who, we think, have done things we could not condone. But they are the governments of those lands and the only governments with whom any dealings in respect of their populations can be had.
I think we all hope that there will be, even between these apparently incompatible worlds, the free world and the world made up of countries with communist regimes, some kind of a modus vivendi which will in fact allow us to live, and allow them to live. That would take place, without our interference, without our approval, without our responsibility in any way in the lands we regard as unfortunate, because they are under such regimes. If we do not look upon that as possible, we then have to look upon this state of cold war as something of very long duration, with always the possibilities of its flaring up into something worse than a cold war.
Once again I am sorry that I was not more careful in the language I used, and that it was the kind of language that could give rise to this concern and to this controversy; but as far as policy is concerned, I was not speaking about policy. And now I do venture to say that the policy of the Canadian government at the present time is to keep an open mind as to whether or not at any time, under any conditions which may develop in the future, there should be recognition of the government which at that time will exist as a matter

of fact in China. That again is something that I should not have put in exactly that language. We should keep an open mind as to when if ever conditions may be such that it will be in the interest of peace and stability in the world to recognize diplomatically whatever government happens to be in control of the forces of China.
That I think is the preferable position; but in the meantime whenever there does appear to be an opportunity to remove some of the tension from the international situation by discussions, by meetings and by discussions like that which are called for April 26 in Geneva, I think it is only realistic to feel that the government which is in fact in control of affairs in China has to be there if there is going to be anything accomplished that will produce beneficial results.


Mr. Coldwell:: Will the Prime Minister permit a question? There was one other matter which caused some concern when he was overseas and that was the reference to the armaments and the supplying of military aid by the United States to Pakistan. There seems to be a conflict in the reports and the inference there was that the Prime Minister gave his approval to United States military aid to Pakistan.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I refused to express any opinion. I said that as far as we were concerned no such cuestion could arise, because we had pledged to the NATO organization everything we could do in the form of aid and forces to maintain peace in the world, and that no government that expected to remain the government of Canada should ask for more than had been pledged by us to the NATO organization. I did also say that I felt quite satisfied in my own mind that the aid provided, or that might be provided, by the United States to Pakistan was not designed to be used against India, and that I felt quite sure that had there been any impression that it was going to be used against India there would not be one per cent of the United States people who would have supported it.
Perhaps there is one other point. I do not know that it was raised in our press here- I have not seen it-but there was a question put to me about conflicting reports on something I said in Tokyo as to the neutrality of India in the event of a war there. What I did say was that I did not know whether, in the event of a war, India would remain neutral or not, but that if they did not remain neutral I would expect that they would be on our side rather than on the side of our enemies.
Now, there was another report, and it was an erroneous one, possibly made in good faith. My hon. friends here know the atmosphere of
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press conferences. It was reported that I said I did not think India could remain neutral in the event of war. No matter what I may have been thinking, I did not say that. I said that I did not know whether India would remain neutral or not in the event of war, but if India found that she could not remain neutral I would expect that she would be on our side and not on the side of our enemies.


Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker (Prince Albert):: In
reference to the speaking appliance that is in front of me, I do hope that we in this parliament will not decide on broadcasting the sessions of parliament.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I do not think we ought to have the debate drift toward that particular subject, and I would ask the hon. member to please co-operate in helping the
engineers of the Tannoy company to see what the experiment is worth.


John George Diefenbaker: I do not think there would be very much debate on that subject, having regard to the reaction of the house.
I want to refer first to the debate that took place on external affairs on January 29 and which terminated at the close of the sitting that day. Because the debate terminated that day only six hon. members were able to participate in it. I do not intend to repeat the questions that were asked by me on that occasion, some of which were answered today by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), and some of which were not. The questions that were asked then were; first, what was the nature of the discussions, if any, that took place before the announcement by Mr. Dulles of the retaliatory policy? I think Canadians generally will agree with the attitude taken by the minister that we in Canada will not accept any policy automatically that another nation may enunciate unless we have been consulted. I believe that the minister's declaration that Canada is entitled to be consulted represents the attitude of the Canadian people. Canadians have a right to be consulted. The United States is in the position of a captain of a ship. As with a ship junior officers have the right to be consulted, and their views considered before decisions which may affect the crew as well as the captain are made. I think that with the rather lengthy summary by the minister of the effect of Mr. Dulles' speech on massive retaliation and in the explanation within the last few days, given by Mr. Dulles, many of the fears that were in the minds of Canadians have been removed.
Secondly, there was the question of the recognition of China, to which the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) made extended

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reference today. With regard to the admission of China to the UN, or the recognition of China, I think it is well to look back to what was said by me in the debate in January as to the viewpoint of the Progressive Conservative party. I read from page 1595 of Hansard where I said, referring to China:
Is she to be recognized? Certainly recognition will be hard to justify, however much it may appeal legalistically to students of international law, so long as the people's government continues its program of virtual annexation of North Korea, supplying arms in Indo-China and apparently doing everything it can to spread communism and disruption in other parts of Asia. While it is impossible to say with finality that China should never be recognized, a good case has not been made for recognition. I believe that if Britain and France had had before them in 1949 the situation that we have today, and the knowledge of events that have since taken place, recognition of China would, to say the least, have been delayed.
Personally I believe that we should not recognize China at this time. To say that we will never recognize her is to look too far into the future . . . In 1945 or 1946 we might have said that we would never admit Japan to friendship, and that Germany would never again be welcomed back into the family of nations. Events change thinking, but with the world situation what it is I believe that Canada would take a retrograde step should the government feel constrained to recognize China at this time.
That was our attitude then; that is our attitude on this problem now.
Many Canadians were concerned by reports of statements the Prime Minister was presumed to have made on the question of recognition on his world tour. Those words of his, as reported, were incapable of any other interpretation than that given to them by Canadians generally.
Referring to a press report, I find this:
"We are going to have to admit the present government of China is the government the people want."
Many Canadians took strong objection to that statement. The Prime Minister today has rather altered the interpretation of his remarks on recognition of Red China as spoken by him on two or three occasions during his trip. If his predecessor were in office, I presume, applying the words used on another occasion, the Prime Minister's stand today would be: Not necessarily recognition, but recognition if necessary.
I say to the Prime Minister, that in the words he was reported to have said he could not but have given encouragement to the forces in Red China. The expression of the hope that in the future recognition would be inevitable could not but have the effect of arousing hopes in the hearts and removing the fears of those in control in Red China that whatever their further aggressive action might be that ultimate recognition would be given.

Those words could not have failed to be effective in arousing hopes in Red China that, however unfair and unjust her aggression has been-and is-in Indo-China and elsewhere, ultimately recognition would be granted. And we cannot separate recognition from admission to the United Nations. For, after all, once recognition by Canada takes place, according to the juridical principles of international law, Red China will then be in a position where she will be able to demand admission into the United Nations, or at least anticipate the support of Canada for admission.
My belief is that no international thug should be allowed to shoot its way into the United Nations. Apparently, today the Prime Minister now has taken a stand that is more generally in line with the view that we in the official opposition have taken in the past and adhere to still. No one can say that never will any eventuality take place. As the Prime Minister said, every possibility must be exhausted to the end that peace be achieved. But certainly such possibilities should not contemplate anything in the nature of raising hopes in the hearts of an aggressor nation like China that ultimately out of victory may come admission to the United Nations.
The Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) will deal with this question at greater length when he speaks in this debate. But the views that I expressed in a previous debate on behalf of this party in respect of the recognition of China have not changed, namely that we do not believe there is any case made out for the recognition of China. As future events occur, they will be dealt with as occasion arises. Sufficient unto the day-and we do not intend to hold out any hope to Red China that at some time in the future we will support recognition.
We believe that in a changing world there is no justification for dealing with future eventualities which may be years ahead of conditions prevailing now. We believe that no recognition should be considered, much less contemplated, by the Canadian people now.
I shall now refer to various matters raised by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I shall deal with them in the order in which he did as closely as I could follow them. Before doing so I wish to make reference to the Prime Minister's trip. I did hope that he would have dealt with the eastern situation; and I would hope that at an early date he will place before parliament his considered opinions regarding eastern questions in general rather than restricting his remarks to the question of the recognition of China.

In my opinion the pilgrimage of the Prime Minister was of unique significance. He went with the good wishes of the House of Commons; he has returned with the same good wishes. He met and talked with leaders in various countries of the commonwealth. He represented Canada, and placed before various nations of the world a concept of the responsibilities and mission of Canada in the world of today.
I think trips such as he took, and as have been taken by other prime ministers in the commonwealth, have an abiding effect in the world in which the major strategy of the U.S.S.R. is to undermine the objective unity of the peoples of the commonwealth, and to drive a wedge between some of them and the United States of America. Without regard to party considerations, when he pointed out the contribution of the United States of America, and when he endeavoured to counteract what has become a strong antiAmerican feeling in some parts of the world, he performed a service worthy of this parliament.
I refer particularly to the words he used when he spoke before the parliament of India and said:
We who live alongside this great and dynamic nation know from our own long experience that the United States is the most unselfish country ever to play this role, and that it has no other ambition than to live, and let others live, in mutually helpful international intercourse.
As their neighbours, we have special reason to know and appreciate the qualities of the American people. We in Canada see millions of good people who are working hard and unselfishly to build a good and free society in a world of peace. These people differ little in their essential qualities from the great majority of people in your country or in mine . . .
I believe that that message is necessary. Sir Winston Churchill expressed analogous views when he spoke in the British House of Commons on February 1. There are some "who are always looking around in every controversy. . .to find fault with the Americans".
That type of anti-American attitude is a detriment to the maintenance of world peace. I do not mean that we should agree with or accept everything the United States may do. Indeed, in so far as Mr. Dulles' declaration in regard to retaliatory action is concerned, that declaration, in my opinion, was dangerous in its implications, and I am glad to learn from the Secretary of State for External Affairs that Canada has taken a firm stand against the automatic reflex policy that was enunciated by the Secretary of State of the United States.
Canadians will not consent to be committed to war on any snap decision made by another
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country. The Dulles' statement that communism should be met "instantly" with weapons at the place of choice seemed to me to be dangerous in its implications. However, these implications have been watered down by the President's statement that congress must decide, and by Mr. Dulles' statement at a recent press conference which interpreted the meaning of that policy. The secretary of state has said that consultation is necessary. We have learned that within the commonwealth, and that is something that must be learned by the free nations of the world, joined together in a common endeavour and in common ideals.
As the Prime Minister travelled throughout the commonwealth I am sure he must have been impressed by the tremendous power for good inherent in this commonwealth, by the bridgehead it constitutes in Asia against communism, and by the contribution being made by the United States of America in co-operation with the countries of the commonwealth in the preservation of peace.
I came on a constitutional document recently which represents a condition of affairs which is of interest. Our commonwealth is built on a concept of generations of political wisdom based on the trial and error of experience and culminating in the Statute of Westminster. Few Canadians- indeed few Americans, realize that in the year 1775, on July 3, the first pronouncement ever made in all history of the spirit of co-operation and unity with independence then contained therein the embodiment of the commonwealth principles of this day.
In the course of casual reading I came upon a document which was presented to George III in 1775. After the battles of Lexington, Concord, and Bunker Hill, a document was signed which,- as Mr. Butler, late president of Columbia University, said, is not known to one out of every million inhabitants of the United States. That document represents the attitude of the American colonies. They sent representatives to Britain to present this document to George III. It is rather a lengthy document and I do not wish to quote from it, but in it they asked for the very principles which were ultimately achieved in the Statute of Westminster. They asked for the right to legislate for the 13 colonies without interference by the mother country; they contended that taxation should be applicable to the 13 colonies only if passed by their governments. That document was signed by 45 of the representatives who one year later

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signed the Declaration of Independence, with the exception of George Washington.
The British king refused to see these representatives and subsequently they went before the colonial office, but because it had not been presented to the king they refused to see the representatives of the 13 colonies or give any consideration to that petition. What these representatives, headed by John Hancock who was the first to sign, petitioned for is what has since been achieved within the commonwealth, under the crown:	a
unity, based on a common heritage, and a common dedication to democratic principles, and the acceptance of the principle that each of the member nations would be master in its own house. When considering the "ifs" of history, if that petition had been accepted the history of mankind might have been very different, for in the year 1775 there was embodied in that petition to the king the vital principles upon which the commonwealth is now based, and the principles upon which we are joined together in the common pursuit for freedom.
The Prime Minister in the statements he made, when speaking in India and in other parts of the commonwealth, asking that the United States be fairly judged, performed a function that only Canada could perform.
The Prime Minister made an explanation of some of his reported remarks during his tour. I hope he will explain what he had in mind when speaking in Bonn. He went further, I believe, than any prime minister has ever gone, and suggested that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization countries might join together in a political organization. I would ask the Prime Minister to advise the house and the country at some time during the debate what, if any, negotiations have taken place to this end, and what ideas he has as to the machinery of government which would permit political collaboration as between Canada and the other NATO countries. These are his words:
More particularly, many of us believe the peoples living about the great basin of the Atlantic ocean might well seek the solution to their problems of economic betterment, political stability and selfdefence in this closer integration of their national resources and of their machinery and government.
Parliament has discussed integration of economic resources and the pooling relationship of member nations in NATO. But until the speech delivered by the Prime Minister nowhere have I heard it suggested that the NATO organization might lead to political integration. I feel that his remarks are somewhat ambiguous in their nature, and

deserve to be interpreted and explained so that we may understand exactly what are the implications in that statement.
I return to the matters dealt with by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. He dealt first with the Berlin conference and pointed out his apparent disappointment at its failure to agree to do anything but disagree and to convene a conference in Geneva. I feel that Molotov, by the propaganda speeches he made, succeeded in part in achieving what the minister stated above everything else should be prevented, namely, the driving of any wedge of disunity between the members of the NATO nations.
Each of the free nations must realize that the price of survival for each of us is the unity of all of us. Today, according to the press, the effectiveness of the U.S.S.R. propaganda would appear to be achieved to a degree for France, reliant, powerful and vital at the Berlin conference, as represented by Mr. Bidault, being fearful of a rearmed Germany, is in a position where the European defence community treaty, which has been ratified in recent weeks by several countries, stands in grave danger.
The New York Times service today says that France's foreign policy in Europe and Asia appears to be stalled because the French government feels unable to bring the European army treaty to a vote with any chance of success and that the supporters of General de Gaulle, most of whom oppose the European army, have acquired a virtual veto power over any action that might be taken by the present government. France fears, and rightly, from the experience of eighty years and three wars, the rearmament of Germany. United States and Britain favour Germany entering the plan and in order to arrive at a compromise suggested that the rearmament clause should not come into effect until each one of the signatory nations had signed and agreed to the treaty.
Suggestions are being made-and I think the Secretary of State for External Affairs used words that indicate that alternatives are being considered-that there are alternatives to the EDC which are available and ready to meet the contingencies which will arise in the event that EDC is not ratified. The secretary of state said in effect that we hope ere long the EDC or "something like it" will come into existence. It might be well for the minister, when replying, to place before the house and the country something of the nature of the alternatives which will be available to the nations joined together under the European defence community if and provided that ratification by France and

by Italy of the present plan does not take place. Two months ago the minister spoke with a degree of hope that the Berlin conference might achieve something worth while, but his speech today indicated the failure of that conference. It seems that in the last year there has been a softening of the probability of war in a defrosted stalemate of the cold war.
What is the alternative to EDC? The New York Times has referred to an alternative plan to EDC on a number of occasions, but that alternative has not yet been placed before this House of Commons. I would ask the minister to set out in detail the meaning of the words he used this afternoon wherein he indicated that if EDC failed, some alternative would be available.
I come now to the question of atomic energy. The minister's remarks with regard to atomic energy indicated that no decision has been arrived at; he posed questions that indicated that the whole question is in a state of "questions unanswered". All of the nations have expressed a desire to do everything possible to avoid the possibility of atomic war. The powerful potentialities inherent in the explosion that took place in the Pacific within the last few days, and which apparently frightened not only the peoples of the world but the scientists as well, demand action in connection with atomic energy.
I should like the minister when replying to answer certain questions. What are our international obligations at the present time with regard to extending present knowledge of atomic energy along the lines of making industry a partner in its development? What are the terms under which an atomic pool is to be set up? What agency is to control the atomic pool? Is that agency to be within the United Nations? Is it to be a veto-less agency so that it will not be emasculated before it is set up? Who is to determine the nations that are to contribute to that pool? Those are questions to which I think the people have a right to have answers even before the general set-up enters the blueprint stage.
Is Canada giving consideration to the British plan as an alternative to the Eisenhower plan whereby an international bank would be set up in which materials and scientists would be available in every country possessing fissionable materials and scientists? Would such an organization be set up separate from the United Nations or within its ambit? These are questions which today exercise the hearts and minds of men, realizing as they
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do the terrible possibilities of that new hydrogen bomb with the explosive capacity, according to press reports, of four million tons of TNT. Is the minister in a position to say the degree to which the U.S.S.R. has tentatively agreed with Mr. Dulles to certain principles being accepted and adopted to the end that mass destruction of mankind will be avoided and prevented?
One other question was dealt with in January to which the minister has made no reference and which I think comes peculiarly within his competence. It is one that has been spoken of spasmodically in the house, namely, to what degree is Canada willing to trade with the U.S.S.R.? The minister stated today that no possibilities for peace should be denied. I think that Canadians will be in agreement that the proferred hand of friendship in trade should not be turned down without reason. But the experience of the last few years is bound to raise in the minds of those to whom the hand is extended the fear that deception and fraud and not honesty are behind the moves being made by the U.S.S.R. in offering to trade.
There has been little change in the attitude of the U.S.S.R. in the last year. Many felt that after Malenkov came into power things would change for the better. Purges are taking place today on an even greater scale, so far as their leadership is concerned, than during the last several years of the Stalin regime. Stalin's summary of diplomacy still remains as true under Malenkov as it did when he stated that "sincere diplomacy is no more possible than dry water or iron wood."
The people in the western provinces and farmers generally in this country are asking what are the possibilities for agricultural trade. Some argue trade with the U.S.S.R. would afford a means of getting rid of our surplus farm products. What is the attitude of the government with regard to this question? Has the government ascertained, through its representatives in the U.S.S.R., that while industrialization has proceeded apace under the five-year plans agriculture has proven to be a failure? Collectivization in agriculture, according to opinion worthy to judge, has failed in the U.S.S.R. because the vitality of individual effort has been squeezed out by communization.
Records published within the last four or five weeks show that between 1945 and 1952 industrial production in the U.S.S.R. has multiplied. As examples of this, pig iron has increased from 9 million metric tons to 19-4 million; steel from 11 million to 27-3 million tons; coal from 14-9 to 26 million tons, and

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oil from 19-4 to 37-8 million tons. While all these advances have been taking place industrially agricultural production has fallen to a level below that of 1928. In the U.S.S.R. cattle production is at least 13 million head below what it was in 1928, and sheep production is approximately 80 million head less than in 1928. So diminished has agricultural production become that at the present time the U.S.S.R. is mobilizing manpower in order to farm an additional 30 million acres.
These statistics indicate that one of the reasons the U.S.S.R. is so anxious to trade is on account of the difficulties inherent in potential hunger in that country, for not only is production far below the 1928 level but the population during the same time has materially increased. I hope and trust that in return for the benefits of the present that are apparent in finding markets for surpluses Canada will not rush into trade with the U.S.S.R. and will give every consideration to the perilous possibilities inherent in contributing in meeting ferment in the Soviet Union to which the Kremlin has found no better answer than more repression and the tyranny of purges.
Summarizing what I have endeavoured to place before the house, I agree with the stand taken by the minister that no nation among the free nations should take a stand which will in any way detrimentally affect any of the other nations in the partnership without consultation, and without full consultation. Canada has a right to have an assurance from Mr. Dulles and the government of the United States more definite and more complete than the conclusions to be drawn from the words used by him regarding mass retaliation instantly to be applied, during the occasion of a press conference.
I think Canadians will expect that the minister at the Geneva conference will not in any way indicate to Red China the hope of early recognition, but will demand the fullest assurances that aggression will be banished by it. As to the question of trade, I fear that the economic advantages of the present will lure many to believe in the necessity or at least in the attractiveness of trade with the U.S.S.R. on the assumption that we can restrict the things in which we trade to nonstrategic commodities. In my opinion there is no more strategic commodity in the world than the production of agriculture, for after all, as I am sure the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) found as he travelled in Asia, the H weapon of communism in Asia is hunger.
Finally, I think the house and the country will agree with the view expressed by him with respect to the need of extending economic aid. Canada's record in this regard

under the Colombo plan has not been as extensive and complete as the challenge of the times demand. Twenty-five million dollars is scarcely in keeping with the challenging possibilities in Asia. Twenty-five million dollars is but a drop in the bucket. It is a token amount and does not indicate the necessary degree of comprehension of the possibilities of economic aid in halting the advance of communism.
So far as the other matters dealt with by the minister are concerned, several members of this party will speak, and in particular the Leader of the Opposition who will speak with the authority of his position. Let this be clear that upon one thing we are agreed, that this is no time to play with the problem of recognition of China. This is no time to give a fillip to communism in Asia by giving communism to believe that aggression will, if not rewarded, at least will be considered as worthy of recognition in the international world of the present.


Major James William Coldwell: Mr. Speaker, this debate has given hon. members the opportunity this afternoon of hearing both the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) and the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), and I feel that a debate of this description, when the external affairs estimates are being sent to the committee, serves a very useful purpose. In the debate which took place at the end of January various groups in the house were able to express some of their opinions. I am quite sure the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Prime Minister are cognizant of these facts.
All parties in this house believe that we must continue to co-operate with our friends to promote collective security in every sphere possible. I join with the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker), the Secretary of State for External Affairs and I am sure the Prime Minister as well, in saying that if we are to have collective security and are going to have collective action following that collective security, whether it be economic action or any other form of action, then that collective action must be preceded by comprehensive consultation.
It is for that reason that I think most people in this house and in the country who were following international affairs closely were alarmed at the statement attributed to Mr. Dulles. I join with others in saying that the clarification the Secretary of State for External Affairs has been able to place before the house this afternoon is encouraging and helps to remove some of the misgivings. It sometimes seems to me in dealing with our powerful neighbour to the south there are

so many views expressed by so many different people it is difficult at times to tell what the view of the United States government really is. Fortunately, we have not the same system in our country. Here, we have collective responsibility on the part of the cabinet and consequently we know from time to time where the government stands on these important matters.
I, too, join with others in regretting that the Berlin conference was not more successful in bringing about a peace treaty for Germany and in bringing peace to Austria. I agree that it is essential that Germany shall sooner or later be unified. I agree also it could not be unified on the basis suggested by the Soviet union. One of the first prerequisites to the unification of Germany is that the German people should be able to choose their own government freely in a democratic way. I believe that goes almost without saying. I hope that the forthcoming conference at Geneva will bring some real results. My criticism of the government from time to time has been one that I am going to repeat this afternoon.
I feel that from time to time the government does not take a sufficiently positive attitude in connection with some of these matters. We seem to drift along. Before the first world war, and at least to some extent before the second world war, we rather blindly followed the foreign policy laid down in the United Kingdom. It seems to me we have got to beware now lest in our friendliness for the United States and our admiration for the people of the United States we allow ourselves to be in the position of a follower of United States external policy. I believe we have to beware lest we fall into that trap. It is so easy, with a country with contiguous boundaries and in some respects with the same kind of institutions and approaches to problems, to follow along rather than from time to time take a positive position and be outspoken. The Secretary of State for External Affairs did perform a useful service both to this country and the democratic nations when he spoke at Chicago recently and made the statements and the criticisms that he made there.
May I come at once to this question of the recognition of China. Hon. members know that in 1949, before the Korean aggression, our view was that we should have recognized the fact there was a government in control of the mainland of China. It was at that time the United Kingdom and India both recognized that fact. I was under the impression then we were about to do the same thing, but we did not do it. Then aggression occurred in Korea a few months later. I quite agree that when there was a Chinese army
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actively fighting in Korea the recognition of the government at Peking was out of the question at that time. Now, however, an armistice has been signed and we are going to negotiate with that government. We are going to negotiate with their representatives.
If I had been building up the case for the recognition of this new government of China, I could not have done better than the Prime Minister did this afternoon. He marshalled all the arguments in favour of the recognition of the government of China because as he said, whether or not we like that government -and I do not like its ideology-we have to recognize as a fact that is the government with which we have to do business. It does control the mainland of China. How it controls the mainland of China is a different question. From time to time we have recognized revolutionary governments. Some of them have been communist governments, and as an example I cite the government of the Soviet union.
You have a government in control of the Chinese mainland, with its teeming millions, with whom we are going to negotiate at Geneva, and yet we say we do not recognize the fact that government is there and in control. While I think we should make it abundantly clear that we do not agree with the ideology or the method of achieving power adopted by that government, nonetheless we recognize we have to negotiate with it and we recognize that government is a fact, whether or not we like it. Consequently, without approving of the government, its ideology or anything else connected with it, and having to negotiate with it, I think that by inference negotiation is a recognition of the fact that it is the government of the mainland of China. I thought this afternoon the Prime Minister built up a very strong case for recognition and then he rather shrugged his shoulders and backed away from it.
Let us hope that the danger of the extension of the war in Asia is lessening. Let us hope that the tension in the world has decreased. I believe there are signs that it has. It seems to me that anything Canada can do to reduce the remaining tensions, and they are many, we should undertake. It was for that reason that I rose this afternoon to ask the Prime Minister about the reported statement he had made concerning United States military aid to Pakistan. After all, the position in India was quite clear. Mr. Nehru and the government of India were alarmed lest this might be an armament of Pakistan that would cause greater tension between the two countries, though not necessarily leading to hostilities between them.

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It seems to me we have got to pay all the attention we can to the opinion of some of these Asian countries. It is there we find the teeming millions for whose minds, and whose souls if you like, there is a struggle going on in the world today. Anything that the United States or any of the western powers do that alienates public opinion amongst these teeming millions in Asia, and perhaps particularly in India, is a danger to the future welfare of mankind.
I want to say a word about something mentioned by my hon. friend and the Secretary of State for External Affairs, namely, the alarm that has been caused generally all over the world by the events of March 1, when this great new hydrogen bomb was exploded in the Pacific ocean. Indeed, we are told that within the course of the next month or so it is planned to explode a hydrogen bomb with power some four times as great as the bomb that was exploded on March 1. Editorials are appearing today-one of them was mentioned over the air-in some of the great British papers as well as in Bonn and in France and in our own papers, pleading with the United States not to carry out that plan. Already the view is taken that the United States' scientists should know enough about this terrific weapon, which in the words of Mr. Eisenhower yesterday seems to have got out of hand, to be warned that dreadful results might follow the explosion of a bomb four times as powerful as the one that was exploded less than a month ago.
In the Globe and Mail of today there is a very significant editorial; in fact it is one of the strongest editorials in its language that I have read in any Canadian paper for a long time. While frequently I disagree with the editorials in the Globe and Mail, yet I feel that this editorial does bring before the government a problem upon which the government might feel constrained to speak, I mean to speak through the usual diplomatic channels to our friends in the United States. I say: "Our friends in the United States". I do not think that some of the people in the United States who are so outspoken and belligerent represent the people of the United States. In the main the people of the United States are, as the Prime Minister said in Pakistan, a friendly people, generous in every particular, and they are no more desirous of causing international tensions, difficulties and war than any of the rest of the peaceful nations of the world. We owe a great debt to that type of United States citizen, who from time to time has taken the lead in relieving distress here and there across the world.

I do not regard Senator McCarthy and some of the other people in the United States as representatives of that great country, but I say to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, since we have a long coast line on the Pacific we should be interested in what is going on in that ocean. I propose to read just a paragraph or two from this editorial to indicate the things that I think are pretty widely held, following the events of recent days and the explosion of this powerful weapon. This is what the editorial says. Incidentally, it is headed: "Not an American lake", and by coincidence, I am sure, the London Daily Herald, so the radio said today, has a front-page editorial headed with exactly the same words: "Not an American lake". The first paragraph reads:
It is no doubt necessary and desirable that American technicians should discover by trial or error the explosive power of the latest type of atom bomb or hydrogen bomb. Science, if the invention of these new atrocities can be dignified by the name, must proceed without interruption even though it may cause discomfort here or there. Still, it seems reasonable to suggest that the American experimenters should pay some regard to the lives, health and livelihood of people who may be within range of their infernal machine, an antique phrase which has acquired a new aptness.
Then the editorial goes on to outline the effect of this new bomb upon Japanese fishermen in the vicinity, 70 miles away. Some stories tell us today that the lives of these men are in danger. After going on and outlining what happened to the Japanese the editorial says this:
It is reported from Washington, and to a large extent confirmed by President Eisenhower himself, that something went seriously wrong with the Bikini experiment; that the results of the blast were much greater, and extended much further, than anybody expected. How long can the world tolerate these lethal antics?
These are strong words but they are words that are deserved. Then, after explaining that some warning was given to ships in the vicinity, it says this:
Since when has the Pacific ocean become an American lake?
I am not going to read much more of it. It is all along the same line, and it ends up in this way:
It is fantastic that in peacetime the United States should expect other countries to concede an American right to rope off a vast section of the high seas, in the Pacific or anywhere else, for the purpose of producing explosions.
The editorial also draws to our attention that even in the heyday of British naval power, when people used to sing with gusto: "Britannia, rule the waves", never did they try to rope off an area of the great oceans for any of their purposes.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs and the government should make

immediate representations to the United States, urging the United States not to undertake these experiments in the Pacific ocean. The editorial suggests that other areas of the world might be found; for example, the Antarctic region or the far-distant Arctic regions, and it says that perhaps it might serve some useful purpose in melting some of the ice in these regions. But in any event it is certain that the world is revolted by what has happened in the Pacific ocean and is alarmed lest a further experiment with dire results should be undertaken.
This brings to my mind the peril to the world that a new war would bring. That is why I suggested when I spoke in the external affairs debate in January that no matter how small the area of negotiation would seem to be that was possible upon which to negotiate with those behind the iron curtain or in the communist countries, we should negotiate with them. I was very glad indeed, although the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) spanked me for saying that on January 29, that the hon. member for Prince Albert made the suggestion in another form when he said that if the hand is stretched out we should grasp it to the extent that we can do so. That was a good way of putting it. I think we should.
As far as the areas of negotiation are concerned, they may be very small, but every small dispute that is settled may be a step toward a better understanding. Let us remember that over the centuries our forefathers faced situations of this sort. You have only to read the speeches in the Hansard of Britain, following the French revolution, to learn that very much the same kind of things were said then that are being said today in relation to recognizing and trying to negotiate with iron curtain countries. When Cromwell was in power in England, and executed a British king, some of the things that were said at that time by the countries adjacent to Britain of the regicide and of all that he stood for could be used today in this house very much along the lines that such words were used at that time.
So we must not forget that we have to view these events somewhat in the perspective of history. We have got to try to settle disputes; we have got to live with these people-or we have got to exterminate them, or they have got to exterminate us. I say we have to live with them. And, step by step, perchance, as in centuries before, gradually they may come to a more reasonable attitude and a more democratic way of doing things. We may be able to associate with them on a better footing.
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I wanted to say those things this afternoon. Then, as I said a moment ago, we have to think of what war would mean to this country, if it came. We hear the belligerent statement made at times:	"You must not
deal with these people, under any circumstances; you must keep them apart." What is the effect of that? Well, the end of that, I suppose, is war. And if there is one country just now which has a stake in the peaceful negotiation and peaceful settlement of differences between these giants, if you like, the United States and the Soviet union-the two sides in this cold war- certainly it is Canada. We lie between them. With the dreadful weapons of war now available we know what the end would be of some of our Canadian cities.
This is not the place for me to question what means of defence we have. I do not know. This House of Commons does not know. We do know we are spending great sums of money on defence, but we do not know what those defences are. I am one who believes that under certain circumstances either the House of Commons or a committee of the House of Commons should sit in camera and be informed. I do not know whether we have an effective radar screen; I do not know whether we have effective interceptor aircraft. I know we have sent a lot of them overseas; but what have we here in Canada? What would we have if there were an outbreak of hostilities?
It may be said that I do not expect an outbreak of hostilities. No, I do not; but, like everybody else, I am human, and my judgment may be at fault. It has been at fault before, and it will be at fault again. That applies to every human being in the world; and we cannot pass up any opportunities to see that our country is properly looked after.
This afternoon the Secretary of State for External Affairs mentioned the European defence community. I, too, am disturbed by some of the reports coming out from Paris respecting the political difficulties in that country, and the fact that the government is unable to get any decision one way or another from the legislative arm of government in that great country. But, Mr. Speaker, I have a very considerable amount of sympathy with France in the position she is taking at the present time. For after all we have to remember that in the 25 years between 1914 and 1939 or 1940, France was invaded twice by Germany. She was overrun twice; the flower of her manhood was destroyed in war. Her age-old monuments and many of her churches were destroyed;

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her countryside was ravished. Her people were brought into subjection by a powerful Germany.
I can understand the French position. I can understand the French, when they see these pressures put on them to co-operate and to allow Germany to rearm. I can understand their being in mortal terror of what may come to them in the future if Germany does rearm. And when we read, as no doubt they have read, that many of the leading nazis are taking active parts both in government and in urging rearmament in that country, we can understand why it is so difficult to achieve this European defence community.
I am personally of the opinion-in fact I believe I speak for my colleagues in this regard-that we cannot see an independent, rearmed Germany. We cannot see a German army, under a German general staff, not only because of the danger to France but because of the danger to the world-and because of our experience in two wars.
Of course we cannot forever expect the western powers to defend western Germany. If plans can be devised to integrate German manpower into a western army, but not under German military control or under former nazi officers or non-commissioned officers, then of course there is a possibility of finding a way out. But so far as we are concerned, there can be no question that we do not go along with the idea that there should be a German army, under German control, integrated into the European community defence system.
That, I think, is the fear of France. And I think France has another fear, too: that if you build up a German army in western Germany, the day may come when the army that has been built up in eastern Germany may join with the one in the west and, once again, we will see a powerful military machine in the very heart of Europe, ready to take sides, and, perchance, to take sides with the nation that will give the best deal, if that best deal would promote the interests of a new German nation. So when we are talking about the European defence community do not let us be impatient with France. Because, as I said, I have very considerable sympathy for the French point of view in this regard.
Then I should like to say just a few words about trade. Mention has been made of this subject this afternoon. I think whenever opportunities for trade present themselves we should take those opportunities, provided, of course, that it is not trade, from our side at least, in strategic materials. I was surprised to hear the hon. member for Prince
[Mr. Coldwell.l
Albert at least by inference describe food as a strategic material. I would not deny the people of Russia food, if they were starving; neither would I deny food to the people of any other country. Food is a strategic material-and perhaps the hon. member meant it this way-in the sense that we should be using our great surplus of food so that it can be placed in the Far East, or elsewhere, to help assuage the hunger of the people in those areas.
But, in the connection in which it was used, it certainly gave me the other impression. I think whenever we can trade with China, or with the Soviet union, or with Czechoslovakia, or those other countries, we should do so. We trade with Spain, and Spain is a pretty complete dictatorship, achieved by revolution. There is very little freedom for the people in Spain, but we do not hear much about that. There is very little freedom of thought in that country under General Franco. But we trade with Spain. Indeed, we do not ask, in many parts of the world, when it comes to a matter of trading relationships, what kind of governments they have. After all, trade may lead us to a better understanding.
And I am not afraid of these people. I think that if democracy means anything to me, then it means that we have something better than communism can ever offer us. I am not afraid of it. I am not afraid when it is suggested that we get a few musicians in here to play their music in Canada. Surely to goodness we need not be afraid of a few musicians who would bring their instruments into this country. In Great Britain they are not afraid. Surely, with the same type of democratic institutions and the same type of democratic people, we do not have to be afraid of allowing a group of musicians into our country to play for us or to dance for us, or something of that sort.
Indeed, cultural relationships may assist very greatly in bringing about understanding, because art and music are not things of a national type. These are international things and perhaps we can speak, through music and art-


Angus MacInnis: You know what the Scots did to the English with the bagpipes.


Major James William Coldwell: Well, of course, under our old Tariff Act the bagpipes were never regarded as an instrument of music; they were regarded as an instrument of war. At times, I believe, they were a very effective instrument of war. I see some Scotsmen in the house looking rather sternly in my direction. I can assure them that if I said anything offensive I quickly apologize and withdraw, because I have a very great admiration for my Scottish

friends. After all, they have ruled my fellow countrymen for some generations and we have not done too badly under their rule.
But I wish to say, as I have so often said in the past during debates of this kind, that I believe the most potent weapon we could use in defeating totalitarianism, whether of the fascist or communist variety, is the weapon of technical and economic aid. I believe we can do more through these channels to raise the standard of living in many countries than we have done in the past. The hon. member for Prince Albert recognized this afternoon that poverty provides the seed-bed for communism, as it did for fascism between the two wars when fascism gained control in Italy and nazism gained control in Germany. They gained control in these two countries largely because of the mass unemployment, and the suffering and poverty which existed in these countries. History can repeat itself in many parts of the world, and in these countries again, not so much in Germany now, but particularly in Italy. And it can certainly repeat itself in the Far East.
I believe more can be done through the United Nations organizations in giving technical aid. I would like to see our appropriation much greater than it is at present. After all, the total appropriation for the United Nations technical aid is less than the appropriation we make under the Colombo plan. That is not a reflection on the United Nations, but I believe we are not appropriating enough even under the Colombo plan to do the kind of job we are doing.
I have said this so often that I hesitate to repeat it. But in this battle for the minds of men it is vital that human welfare and human freedom should be safeguarded, for in this battle the hydrogen and atomic bomb will not settle the matter, nor will it be settled on the battlefields of the world by armies with tanks. It will be settled ultimately to the extent that we can bring not only Christian principles to bear, but the principles of all great religions, the principle that this is a great human brotherhood and that it is our duty to raise the standard of living and to assist the welfare of mankind wherever mankind may be.


Mr. Low:: Mr. Speaker, do you wish to call it six o'clock?


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaife):: Is
it agreed that we call it six o'clock?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
At six o'clock the house took recess.
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The house resumed at eight o'clock.


Solon Earl Low: Mr. Speaker, on January 29 I spoke at some length in the external affairs debate that was launched by the minister on that date. I then gave a fairly full statement of our position with regard to the important issues confronting Canada and the free world. Consequently I would not feel that it would be necessary for me to speak at any length tonight. Nor do I propose to repeat the things which I said on that earlier occasion. There are, however, some matters that have been raised by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) today, one by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) and some by the leader of the C.C.F. with which I should like to deal briefly.
I always hesitate, Mr. Speaker, to speak on some of the complex international problems because most of us really know little about them except, of course, what we read in the papers and magazines; and if we followed them too closely I suppose we would find ourselves in the same kind of trouble as that in which the Prime Minister found himself, and more often. I look upon the views that we read in the papers only as the expressions of opinions of men. They are not supposed to be facts. One of the best evidences in the world that they are not facts is that I find them to be so much at variance with one another; and because they are at variance it is dreadfully hard to get at the truth. The situation is so confused and so full of emotional hysteria that one is apt to find himself blown this way or that by the winds of controversial doctrine into worse confusion if he is not on his toes.
We ordinary members of the house have not much fundamental and reliable information upon which to base judgment about some of the complicated phases of world affairs. We can hardly be expected to have those facts until we are given a chance to question the minister and his officials from the external affairs department who are called before us in the external affairs committee. That is why I welcome the reference of the departmental estimates to the committee. In that committee we have a chance to get some facts, explanations and expert opinions to go on. I only wish we could have these debates after we have finished with that committee. However, on an occasion like this when it was necessary to create an occasion on which could be made an important statement like the one made by the Prime Minister today, I cannot blame anyone for bringing on the debate.

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The only alternative, oi course, that we ordinary members have-and I say "alternative"-to the inquiries that can be held in the external affairs committee, would be to travel widely, to go to the countries involved in the world problems and have firsthand inquiry to find out for ourselves if we can. But we cannot all go on extended journeys. Consequently we are obliged to depend on the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and his officials to give us as truthful a picture as they can of affairs so that we can form some kind of balanced judgment when it comes time to make decisions.
I listened attentively today to the minister as well as to the Prime Minister, the hon. member for Prince Albert (Mr. Diefenbaker) and the leader of the C.C.F. I am not being overly critical at all when I say this, but as I listened to the minister's speech I certainly could not help feeling that it was a very melancholy one. In fact, he used that very term to describe the outcome of the Berlin conference. There seems to be little light at the other end of the tunnel when the minister, to use his own words, feels it necessary to warn the Canadian people that it is a melancholy fact that in the world in which we live it is a step forward to remove false hopes. When we have to restrain undue optimism-and there again I think I am using a term that the minister used this afternoon-about a conference like the Berlin conference about which very few thinking people, if any at all, had any optimism, then I think that things are not very bright, to put it more conservatively than even my friend the leader of the official opposition would express it.
There seems to be little or no change in the basic foreign policy objectives of the Soviet union. The minister reiterated that statement this afternoon. On the earlier occasion I think he made the statement almost in the same words. As a consequence, I think we should never lose sight of that important fact. We should also never lose sight of the fact that the objective of the Soviet union is to confuse the nations of the world; to break up alliances of free nations; to turn allies against one another; to sow the seeds of suspicion, hatred, bitterness, strife, discord and hysteria amongst people everywhere and to promote conditions which would make it possible for them, when they think the time is right-and when I say "they", I speak of the communist imperialists-to walk in, take over and dominate the world by force. Let us

never forget that purpose that was described to us by the minister on other occasions and reiterated this afternoon.
I think we must also always bear in mind the fact that there are in the world only about five million members of the communist party. Sometimes we overlook that fact. There are not more than five million, at any rate, if there are that many. They think they are working for communism. They are dominated, led and trained, not by communists but by diabolical fascist dictators who are nothing but imps of satan who have convinced their followers that men are gods and that, as gods, they can remake the world. That fact accounts for the zeal they portray. That fact tells us why they are ready to work twenty-four hours a day if need be in order to achieve their ends; and they do it in many countries, including our own. Just think of it! There are only five million communist zealots but there are hundreds of millions of freedom-loving people who are carrying the yoke of these evil men; and these hundreds of millions of freedom-loving people are living for the day when they can once more be free. Let us never overlook that fact.
This afternoon the C.C.F. leader said that we have got to live with the communists. I ask, "Is that right"? He says that the only alternative is to exterminate them or to be exterminated. In the light of these things, what should our policy be? Should it be our policy to resign ourselves to the hopeless future of trying to live with the devil himself? Or should it be to take the view that we must keep alive everywhere the spirit and the will to freedom and to look forward with faith and confidence to the day when the people of every subjugated nation will rise up and throw off the yoke of bondage.
Of course it would mean the extermination of the venal tormentors and betrayers of humanity. Certainly it would, but better a few men should perish than that the whole earth should waste. We have to keep that in mind. I have not heard any sorrow expressed over the fact that the present regime in China has exterminated so many helpless freedom-loving Chinese people. I have in my hand a copy of the March 20 issue of the Ensign and I should like to quote one or two extracts from an article entitled "Reds See China as Springboard" specially written for the Ensign. I particularly want to quote some words of Dr. Stephen C. Y. Pan, who is director of the institute of Far Eastern studies at Seton Hall College, New Jersey. I take it that a man who is director of Far Eastern studies in a university of the calibre of Seton Hall

would know something about the Far East and would have some idea what he is talking about. At any rate, he said:
The bamboo curtain is not too impregnable and those of us who have contacts inside China today do not have too much difficulty in knowing what is happening there, even if one cannot do much to help the people at the moment.
He went on to say:
The reasons why it is obvious that big things are planned for the very near future in China are ten in number and are based on the most recent information from China itself.
Then he lists the ten reasons, but I am not going to weary the house by repeating them. I was more interested in two or three very short extracts concerning conditions inside China. He said:
North America is still dreaming that time is on the side of the United States and Canada. It is definitely on the side of those who can use it and every indication exists that Moscow is using every second in really building up one of the world's most formidable military forces ever in existence in Asia.
He went on to say:
To talk of a defection of Mao Tse-tung from Moscow is another dangerous dream and delusion. Mao has to go with Moscow because he has betrayed his people and therefore can no longer go with the Chinese. Besides, he is a sick man and of comparatively little importance except as a figurehead. The real power is the viceroy of Moscow in Manchuria, Kao Kang.
Then I should like to read the final paragraph, and I want hon. members to listen to it particularly. Dr. Pan said:
Incidentally, the figure given by the United States state department that the communists have killed 15 million Chinese since taking over is an understatement. Why not take Chou En-lai's own figures? He stated last year that no less than 30 million "imperialists, landlords, counter-revolutionaries, spies and the like" have been liquidated. He should know.
I quote these words of Dr. Pan to indicate to the house the kind of liquidation that goes on within communist countries. When we think in terms of what the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) said this afternoon, that we have to live with them, I ask hon. members whether the alternative of liquidating those who are perpetrating this thing upon mankind or to be liquidated would be such a terrible future to contemplate compared with the future that these Chinese people have to contemplate. I repeat that we must keep alive the spirit of freedom everywhere, and by everything we do and say to hold out hope that one day men in these subjugated nations can again be free. We may have to bide our time in some respects, but the issue is as clear as day and the outcome, in my judgment, as sure as life itself.
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There are flames that can lick the iron curtain and the bamboo curtain and any other curtain that may be put up by evil men. All men of good will readily admit that they are against grafters, gangsters and communists. They will admit that, but I say that it is not enough just to be against evil. I am with those who say that the only thing for us to do is to be for the answer to evil. If we are going to be for it we cannot just sit by and say: Oh well, we will have to live with it. Not by any means.
To me the answer is not one great big blazing action, such as might be brought on by atomic war, but many little actions, perhaps millions of them, fought on many different fronts usually by little fellows; the little, unsung, individual people like you and me who are given to faith and who think like giants. These are the people who are going to fight these actions. These are the people who are going to save this old world. If there is anything that we should remember at this time when we are talking about China it is what one old Chinese philosopher said, that if there is righteousness in the heart there will be beauty in the character; if there is beauty in the character there will be happiness in the home; if there is happiness in the home there will be strength in the nation; and if there is strength in the nation there will be peace in the world.
The Chinese philosophers can teach us a good many things. From them we certainly can learn that if we want peace in this old world we have to start right here in each one of us and each individual has to take his share of responsibility and do his best. The important best that he can do is to keep alive the spirit and the will to freedom and independence, not to talk as if we have no hope left.
Speaking of Chinese philosophers brings me to China and the question of the recognition of China. I felt sorry for the Prime Minister this afternoon. I think he was thrust into a very difficult position by the newspaper people who all too often thrust men into almost impossible positions by their thoughtlessness. I am not saying that they were entirely thoughtless in this case but they are not careful enough to get at the truth.


Edmund Davie Fulton: I think it was the Prime Minister who was thoughtless in this case.


Solon Earl Low: I am not even trying to come to the defence of the Prime Minister on this occasion, but I am saying what I believe. As a consequence of quite long experience I believe that if newspaper people would make a little more effort to be accurate and truthful they could save these waves of hysteria and

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misunderstanding, but they are too anxious to get there first with the most startling and sensational. That is the trouble. I think we have to understand that.
I have expressed our view on the matter of recognition of the communist regime in China on several different occasions, and I am going to express it again tonight. I do not agree for one second with the leader of the C.C.F. party. He softened considerably in what he said today compared with what he said over the air on the 23rd of March. If we were certain that the people of China wanted the government they have it might put a different complexion on the matter. So far as recognition is concerned, I do not consider that it is recognition in any accepted sense of the word to negotiate with them as we must negotiate at the conference in Geneva.
Why, of course, we have to negotiate. In my opinion recognition means exchange of diplomatic representatives. It means allowing them to send their diplomats into this country and, if they wish, to set up consulates in every city, town and village from St. John's, Newfoundland, to Victoria, from which they can launch their nefarious practices of propaganda and espionage if they so desire. That is what diplomatic recognition would convey.
I believe, Mr. Speaker, that the time may come, and probably will come, when we will have to recognize the government of China. I am not speaking of the present regime, although even if that regime were there and the people of China indicated that was the government they wanted and were determined to have, then of course I do not see that it would do any good for us to stand up in this house or anywhere else and say we would not recognize them. We have to be sensible about it in every respect. But certainly we should not at this time think of exchanging diplomatic representatives with them and giving them de jure recognition. I am speaking, I believe, for the group which I represent in saying that.
Here again, Mr. Speaker, one of the considerations that we ought to keep in our minds is that we owe something to the people of China. You know, for a great many years the people of China were our friends. I have strong feelings today they are still our friends, if they could get through to us and we to them. We did not do our duty by the Chinese people. We stood by while venal men pushed China into the control of the communists. In many ways we have condoned the actions of these men. Our newspapers, for example, have done their level best over the years, all the time that action of pushing China into the arms of communist Russia was taking

place, to tell the people of Canada and the United States that Mao Tse-tung and his people were not communists but were merely agrarian reformers. They did their level best. Of course, everyone with a lick of sense today knows that is not true, and they have known it for some years. We still have some of these editorial writers, however, who act as if they do believe it.
In my judgment what we must do today is to make certain that by no action of ours do we contribute to the sense of hopelessness in these people in China, that sense of hopelessness that destroys the spirit and the will to freedom. I am satisfied that they will react to sympathetic understanding from us. They will react favourably to any help we can extend to them in even a small way. Some day they will rise and throw off their yoke. The seeds of self-destruction are inherent in evil things, and they certainly are in communism.
I was in Washington in early February, and listened to a speech made by Walter Judd, a member of the United States congress. He told of a journey he had just completed around the world. He had gone into practically every one of the Asiatic countries, and had talked to the people on the street wherever he could go. He brought back some very interesting convictions. He said that the Asiatic peoples expressed gratitude for the things the western world has done for them and particularly the many material things the United States has sent to them. However, they hesitated to accept other offers of assistance because they were afraid the West might want to help them to death, as they so often had.
Too often when we have moved in to try to help these people we have been like the camel who drove the Bedouin out of his tent; that is our trouble. As a consequence, these people feel they have been betrayed; they feel they have been let down. They are just a little wary of expressing faith in us and our good intentions. It is quite true, Mr. Speaker, that so many times we in the western nations have used the peoples of Europe and Asia as pawns that they have lost faith in us. I say we must regain that faith by establishing that our word is as good as our bond and that when we undertake to do a thing we will fulfil our commitment 100 per cent. That is the only way we are ever going to regain their good will and their faith, and they must have faith.
I should like to say just a word about the Geneva conference. I do not know how much hope can be placed in it, but I am willing to put every bit of faith I have in the outcome. I do hope that something can come

out of the Geneva conference, and particularly that things can be clarified. I sincerely hope that France will be able to go to that conference with considerably more strength than she seems to have now. If she is in a position of strength to negotiate, perhaps we might be able to see peace in Indo-China. We sincerely hope so.
With respect to the matter of the European defence community, the minister said this afternoon that the UN is not effective enough as a deterrent to aggression and as a consequence we have had to fall back on regional pacts such as NATO, EDC and others. I believe that is right. It is unfortunate that the UN has been ineffective as a deterrent to aggression. I believe such things as NATO and EDC are things we must support. Let us sincerely hope that EDC is ratified by France. There is one thing I should like to say by way of warning. As we develop NATO and EDC, let us never fail to keep in mind some of the dangers into which we, in Canada, can get ourselves.
Here is a situation that perhaps the minister can explain to us. This afternoon he did not say anything about the Middle East, and today the Middle East holds a tremendous amount of interest for the world. If he had time one could speak of the difficulties between the Arab world and Israel. Upon the outcome of that problem hangs some measure, it seems to me, of the peace of the world. The thing that is in my mind at the moment is this. Pakistan has been having trouble with India for quite some time over Kashmir. I understand the situation there is not quite as acute as it was, but it has been fanned into something like acuteness of late by the fact Pakistan has accepted arms and assistance from the United States. India does not like that. In order to strengthen herself Pakistan has recently concluded a non-aggression pact with Turkey.
Turkey is a partner in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I am just asking what would happen in case something flared up between Pakistan and India over, let us say, Kashmir, and Pakistan called on Turkey to fulfil her obligations under the non-aggression pact between them. If Turkey did, where would Canada be? What kind of decision would we have to make? We would be under the obligation of deciding at once whether we would abide by the terms of the NATO treaty and thus come to the help of our ally Turkey, and in that case probably be fighting our sister in the commonwealth, India, or whether we would forsake the NATO alliance and stand by India.


Mr. Philpotl:: Will the hon. member permit a question?
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Solon Earl Low: Yes.


Elmore Philpott: Surely he knows that one of the very specific terms of NATO is that the obligation under NATO is confined to territorial attacks in European areas of NATO, as the Prime Minister made very clear in India.


Solon Earl Low: I understand that perfectly, but do the people in Turkey, and do the people in Pakistan understand it? That is the question. To get them to understand is quite a problem. Those alliances within alliances have the habit of expanding, being misunderstood and being interpreted in different ways. I say that while I do not see any immediate danger, I am just pointing out by way of argument and warning what could happen if we continue to expand these intra-nonaggression pacts and all that sort of thing as a substitute for the United Nations. These are important things for us to keep in our minds. I just want to say at this point, also, as a substitute for the British commonwealth which has over the centuries been the greatest force for peace that the world has ever known.
I hope that it will be possible for EDC to be built up and to be ratified, because it is one of the only guarantees we have for western Europe to be able to defend itself against the clangers that threaten from the east. Before I conclude, Mr. Speaker, I should like to say a word about a matter that was raised in this house by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar. He raised a question about the withdrawal of certain pamphlets that were put out by the United Nations in the province of British Columbia. He said that he was disturbed to see that one of the departments of education, that is in the province of British Columbia, had withdrawn from circulation among the schools the United Nations' association monthly bulletin. He continued:
The bulletin, which has been circulated in all the provinces, including British Columbia, is now being withdrawn, according to a statement emanating from Victoria.
Well, as usual, some of the members of the press picked that out and played it up. One of them was a man by the name of John Stevenson. I do not believe I have ever seen the gentleman, but writing under the heading: "Ottawa Letter" in Saturday Night of March 6, he had this to say about it:
Nor has the prestige of this party been enhanced by the silly performance of the Social Credit ministry of British Columbia, in giving vent to the party's traditional dislike of international organizations of all kinds by banning from circulation in the province's schools literature of Canada's United Nations association.

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That is a fair example of what I was talking about a few minutes ago. Here is a man who did not take the slightest trouble to find out the truth. He did not make the slightest effort to get at the truth of the matter. He simply picked out something that he saw somewhere in the press and then wrote it up as if it were fact, and used some very strong words which were not true. I want to give the facts about this just to show how wrong these men were. I hold in my hand a statement of the minister of education from British Columbia who says that the-
-charge that United Nations bulletin banned in schools in this province is completely false. No such ban exists. During the current year ending March 31. 1954 educational estimates did not make provision for furnishing pamphlet to schools as in previous years but schools and teachers were advised of subscription rates and have been free to subscribe to this as they are to any other publication. Current estimates have been considered in the light of the United Nations association's request to make provision for bulletin during next fiscal year.
It is signed by R. W. Bonner, minister of education. I felt it was desirable to correct that unfair and incorrect statement on the floor of this house, and the statement in Saturday Night, and since it deals with the United Nations 1 felt that I was perfectly justified in doing so. I abhor these senseless attacks that indicate the writers do not take the trouble to get at the truth.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, may I just say one word in regard to assistance to people in other lands, to underdeveloped countries, to underprivileged peoples. I am in sympathy with the idea of enlarging as far as we can the contribution which we make. I have supported the contribution Canada has made to the Colombo plan and the Point Four program and the technical assistance program. I feel that these things are justified, but there is one thing I believe we have to keep in our minds. It is not the material assistance that we can give to the people in other lands that is going to count in the long run. The best help that we can possibly give to these people is that which will help them to help themselves.
What we have to do is to get across to these peoples the idea that what we in this part of the world enjoy today, we enjoy very largely as a result of the philosophy we follow. I am not speaking now of any particular political party's philosophy at all, I am speaking of the philosophy we follow as free people, the free enterprise type of philosophy that we have followed and are now following, however many its shortcomings may be. If we can get over to them that we do enjoy the material things we have and the standards of living we enjoy very largely because of the philosophy we

live by, if we can get them to see that and to start following similar philosophies I am satisfied that they will in time, with some assistance in a material way from us, and some encouragement from us, be able to put themselves in a position to help themselves.
I am all for every bit of help that we can possibly get to them, but particularly that kind of help I have just mentioned.


Mr. Alan Macnaughlon (Mount Royal):: Mr. Speaker, I need hardly say to hon. members that it was certainly a great privilege for me to be one of the alternate Canadian delegates at the eighth session of the United Nations, but I hasten to add that I am well aware it takes quite a bit of study and certainly a lot of experience and at any rate more than a three-months' apprenticeship in New York city to qualify for the title of amateur statesman. I did have the opportunity, however, of seeing at first hand just how the Canadian delegation operates, and I can report to you that, under the leadership of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) and the Postmaster General (Mr. Cote), the delegation demonstrated the greatest possible co-ordination, co-operation and team spirit.
At all times and under all circumstances we worked together. I do think that this is the proper time and the right place for me to make a few observations about the leader of the Canadian delegation to the United Nations, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Here in Ottawa we know of his ability; but I am afraid that there are a great many inside of Canada who do not know of the great regard in which he is held outside Canada. He is the only Canadian to have been president of the United Nations assembly and at the same time chairman of the North Atlantic council. But these two high honours, in themselves, do not it seems to me fully illustrate the magnificent job he is doing in conducting and in explaining Canadian foreign policy to other countries.
As the leader of the Canadian delegation at the United Nations, he not only gives active counsel and advice to the members of his own delegation, but I want to testify that his advice and counsel and direction are actively sought by delegates in other delegations. It is no flattery to say that he has a certain genius for finding a common-sense solution, for finding a formula, for arriving at a compromise in a tense situation.
As evidence of that I would cite the fact that the United Nations will not soon forget the great work he did-and largely personally -in the creation of the new state of Israel. The point I wish to make is that these useful behind-the-scenes negotiations bring a great

deal of prestige to Canada. I think the time has come to say openly that the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) of this country have done more than any other Canadians to bring Canadian foreign policy out of the filing cabinet, and put it where all Canadians can see it.
It is estimated that the population of the world is approximately two and a half billions of people. If we are generous and give Canada fifteen million, I think we are somewhat struck by the fact that our international influence is out of all proportion to our numbers. In many respects, in the councils of the world we rate just as high as the United Kingdom and the United States. Why is this so? Well, one of the reasons is that the Department of External Affairs contains men who are trained in the intricacies of international negotiation. They have men of not only scholarship but men of action, and the two working together speak at the United Nations and elsewhere throughout the world sensibly and clearly on behalf of all of us. Because, in essence, our foreign service is really a form of defence. Oh, I admit it is less dramatic than the army, the navy or the air force; but it has tangible qualities, nevertheless.
Our foreign service is a defence against evil ideas which must be fought before they put on armour and before they take up guns. And the best place to do this fighting is at the United Nations. The main battleground where this war of ideas can be won or lost is in the assembly hall and in the various committee rooms of the United Nations.
What exactly is the United Nations? It is two things, it seems to me: It is the sounding board of world opinion, and it is the instrument by which the world seeks to survive. If one examines the preamble to the charter he will see it lays down two basic points. It declares that the peoples of the United Nations are "determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and "to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights."
Some among us say that the United Nations has failed. But I would remind you that the United Nations was not born in Utopia, but in San Francisco in the year 1945, and at a time when human society was certainly in a most insecure position and certainly fearfully divided.
The hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) made the statement to the effect that the United Nations is ineffective in preventing aggression. Well, I admit that the United Nations is not one hundred per cent perfect; but I would point out to him that the fighting between Israel and the Arab states was, at 83276-2124
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the very least, lessened, and that the occupation of Greece was prevented, and that the trouble between Pakistan and India, if not solved, was certainly eased. And, last, but by no means least, aggression in Korea was met, and is certainly halted at the present time.
I think we should not forget that the United Nations is only eight years old, whereas the problems it is tackling are almost as old as human life itself. It takes time for an eight-year-old infant to find a formula for relieving centuries-old conflicts and prejudices. I think it is remarkable that the United Nations has done as well as it has. We will not get rich quick in creating peaceful international relations. But we must keep our minds on the long pull; and perhaps in the long run we will get more peace than we think possible at the present time.
I think hon. members are entitled to ask me this question: And what of the cost, in dollars and cents? The total annual budget of the United Nations is approximately $41 million, and the Canadian share of this budget is 3-3 per cent or $1,350,000. That is to say, the annual cost of Canada's participation in the United Nations is about ten cents per Canadian, per annum, or the equivalent of two daily newspapers or one bus ride each year.
If you add to the United Nations the cost of the specialized agencies, such as the world health organization, UNESCO and ICAO- which is located in Montreal-the annual budget is approximately $80 million, and Canada's share is $2,650,000, or less than twenty cents per person, per annum.
May I ask you this question: Is that too high a premium to pay for a chance of security? Compare it with the cost of defence. One Sabre jet costs $300,000; one bomber costs $1,500,000; one escort destroyer costs approximately $14 million, or $1 per person per annum. Therefore, for the cost of one bomber we pay for our contribution to the United Nations and a chance at peace.
In wartime the sword is mighty, and certainly Canadians know how to use it. In peacetime, however, we want our problems discussed and concluded in a reasonable way under the rule of law, and not under the rule of force.
The United Nations provides a world forum where problems can be exposed and discussed, and arrangements or solutions attempted. Even Mr. Dulles, that frequently-quoted gentleman, said only the other day that but for the United Nations we would at the present time be involved in a third world war.

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There are a lew questions I should like to put. How many people in Canada appreciate the value of the United Nations? How many people in Canada know what goes on there? I am afraid the number is comparatively small. I am afraid that Canadians, as a whole, are unaware of the United Nations, although it is very important to them. And why? Because no one takes the trouble to tell them what goes on at the United Nations.
Let me give the house some examples: There is no permanent representative of the Canadian press at the United Nations. There is no permanent representative of any Canadian newspaper or periodical at the United Nations. The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation covers the United Nations activities on a part-time basis and, on the whole, does a good job. We all know Peter Stursberg, Herbert Desaulniers and Walter O'Hearn who, up until recently, were there. These three gentlemen do a fairly good job-I should say they do a very good job-in so far as they are able, in reporting the activities of the United Nations over the radio and through comment in the press. But of the three of them, only two are left. I am here to say that, after having examined the situation slightly, I admit that in my view the C.B.C. could be more aggressive. I think they could bring United Nations programs more to the attention of the private stations and the Canadian people generally.
I am well aware, for example, and I am told by my C.B.C. friends and my friends who are connected with the press that Canadians are not particularly interested in the United Nations. Well, I put that to the test. At Christmastime, and since, I have been attending meetings of clubs and other societies, particularly schools, delivering speeches. And on every occasion, when the facts have been brought to the attention of the people concerned, they have shown a great deal of interest and that they are hungry for information. This makes it clear, to my mind, that if we go out and bring the facts to the attention of the people, in due course they will respond.
Surely that is the job of the C.B.C. and other organizations. Occasionally some other wealthy Canadian newspaper may send down a reporter or feature writer to New York for two or three days. But what are two or three days when one is trying to interpret the making of history? It is not sufficient time for the reporter or feature writer to get the background of the question under discussion, to meet the people concerned, to get the know-all, and to get the views of other correspondents and of the 60 other member nations.
[Mr. Macnaughton.l
I can speak from personal experience because I was fortunate enough to be designated the Canadian representative on committee No. 6 which, as you know, is the legal committee. Hon. members will recall that the general assembly deals with its business under the heading of six main committees. These are:	The political and security committee;
the economic and financial committee; the social, humanitarian and cultural committee; the trusteeship, including non-self-governing territories committee; the administrative and budgeting committee; and finally, as I say, the legal committee.
Only to mention these names shows, it seems to me, the importance of the subjects discussed. I admit the political and security committee puts on the best show because there you see the clash of personalities and of nationalities, but I maintain that long after the effervescent activities of the political committee have faded away, the good that the United Nations will accomplish will be put down in conventions and treaties drafted and examined by committee No. 6. In any event the purpose of the United Nations, it seems to me, is to reduce tension, to iron out friction through discussion, to secure the rule of law in the relations between states, and not to resort to war.
Like the other delegates on the other committees, it was my job on committee No. 6, the legal committee, to speak on certain subjects of direct concern to Canada. For example, on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, the revision of the United Nations charter, and the proposal dealing with arbitrarial procedure which, as hon. members will readily realize, is a new branch of international law under which two nations to a dispute resolve to arbitrate and refer their dispute to, shall we say, the international court of justice; also to discuss the interim report of the international law commission which v/as dealing with the regime of the high seas, which in turn can be broken down into territorial waters, the continental shelf, and fisheries.
I do not imagine that what I said at committee No. 6 will find any permanent place in any anthology of famous prose, but I do feel the question of, for example, the continental shelf and fisheries would prove of great interest to the citizens of Newfoundland, the maritimes, and British Columbia.
What of the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf? Will we find oil, coal, and minerals in the subsoil? How far does Canada extend into the high seas? Who will regulate our fisheries? Should they be regulated at all? It seems to me that these are practical subjects of great economic import and of great interest to Canada, and if

you multiply these few examples, along with those dealt with by the six committees and covering the whole range of the other subjects I have already mentioned, then it is perfectly obvious we are neglecting a very great deal of valuable information. Yet only one Canadian newspaper carried the slightest reference to any of these topics. Mr. Walter O'Hearn of the Montreal Star highlighted some of the implications of these topics, but for the rest, silence. Every day something like that is happening at the United Nations, something which concerns Canada directly. Why do we not hear about them?
I would be unfair on this point if I did not admit that the government itself must accept part of the blame for this shameful condition. The office of the consul general in New York -city does lend its press attache or information officer to the permanent Canadian delegation at times when the United Nations is sitting, but that poor information officer with two jobs, one at the consulate and one at the United Nations, is swamped with work and so the stuff gets out in little quantities and certainly too late.
Is it possible to improve conditions? I say it is. I say that in the first place the Canadian press should have a permanent fulltime United Nations correspondent in New York city and he should be a Canadian. I say that the wealthy Canadian newspapers should also have correspondents at the United Nations. The system today is such that the news we get in our newspapers, at least it seems so to me, is largely a rehash of American news prepared for the American or British public and then sub-edited for the Canadian public with a new title and the first two paragraphs re-written. That may be an exaggeration but it certainly dramatizes the point.
It seems to me we know much more about what Mr. Cabot Lodge and Mr. Dulles say than what Mr. Pearson says, and I do not believe that is right. Let me give some evidence of that. In a dispatch from the New York Times service datelined United Nations, New York, February 17, 1954, and headed: "News Sources Are Criticized by UNESCO", the article states:
UNESCO raised these prospects in a 232-page report, entitled "News Agencies: Their Structure and Operation," made public today here (New York) and in Paris. In it UNESCO maintained that the six "world" news agencies are not truly international since their financial support, their directors and most of their staff members are drawn from four countries: from the United States, in the case of the Associated Press, United Press, or International News Service; or from Britain, France or the Soviet union in the case of Reuters, Agence France-press, and Tass.
Referring to the personnel of such agencies UNESCO said "however impartial they may be,
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however strictly they may comply with the professional code of ethics, they will inevitably judge and present news from the viewpoint of the country of which they are citizens."
Moreover, it declared, the current trend by news agencies toward a "free-for-all struggle" for the sale of news runs counter to the trend toward increased international co-operation in political, military, economic, educational, scientific and cultural matters."
Also, while in New York, I had a little memorandum prepared for my own use, because in dealing with the press one tries to be fair and to be accurate. That being the case I believe if I put this on the record it may help hon. members to understand the situation. This memorandum states:
On the press side, I have been informed that no full-time Canadian correspondent is at present assigned to the United Nations. Canadian Press, until fairly recently, had as a member of its New York staff a young man who specialized in coverage of the United Nations and devoted most of his time to it when the assembly was in session. Recently, however, the news agency has not assigned a member of its New York staff to the United Nations on a regular basis. British United Press, the other agency serving Canadian newspapers, is not represented at the United Nations by one of its own correspondents. Canadian Press coverage is based on reports of the Associated Press, and Eritish United Press reports are drawn from the service of the United Press. Until fairly recently, the Montreal Star maintained a correspondent in New York to specialize in coverage of the United Nations. He was recently transferred to Montreal and was not replaced. Other Canadian newspapers periodically assign writers to the United Nations on a temporary basis but none is represented by a fulltime correspondent. Some use the special services of the United States and British newspapers for the purpose. No Canadian periodical maintains a fulltime correspondent at the United Nations.
It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that Canadians are entitled to know from the great news agencies, co-operative or selling, what goes on at the United Nations. These reports should be written by Canadians for Canadians, reporting United Nations activities and decisions affecting Canada.
But if the newspapers have a duty, so has the government a duty to provide the facilities, the information and the help to the free press of Canada. I say that the information section of our Canadian consulate in New York city-and I mention New York city because it is the centre of the press, of periodicals, of communications; it is the largest centre for that sort of thing in the United States-should be reorganized in such a way that it could co-ordinate the news distribution of the Department of External Affairs in New York and in the United States, of the Department of Trade and Commerce, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, the national film board, the travel bureau and in fact all the other government agencies. It seems to me to be incongruous that here we have a travel bureau spending

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millions ol dollars in the United States on publicity, at the same time getting good co-operation because they are spending good money for it, while at the same time we have external affairs, who need a little bit of publicity, a little bit of contact, a little bit of help here and there, having a struggle to get it.
I see no reason why when you give out with one hand you should not receive back with the other. It should be a two-way trade. I think that if we had a senior man down there who could co-ordinate these activities our press distribution in the United States would be a great deal better than it is at the present time. I could develop that subject further, but I will not do so tonight. It seems to me that in the news distribution at the United Nations, the government itself has to improve its services, step in and take the lead.
To this end I suggest that the government should appoint a top level information officer to the United Nations permanent delegation. There is a precedent for this procedure. May I remind you that a great Canadian newspaper editor was chosen to fill just such a role for NATO in Paris. One should be fair and one should agree at this time that the Canadian Press is a news gathering organization and that even if it did have a correspondent at the United Nations he would have no time for interpretive writing. His job is simply to go out and get the facts.
It seems to me that a government top level information officer-and he must be top level; otherwise the reporters will not bother too much with him; and he will not have the authority with which to speak or the knowledge with which to speak

could do some of the following things. First, he could give the story behind the story to the press. He could arrange interviews for the members of delegations and for visiting V.I.P's. He could prepare background material. He could release bulletins, pamphlets and brochures so that the newspaper editor gets the full story at a glance. Hence when something of interest to Canadians takes place at the United Nations, this information could be put out in a brochure which would be timely and useful and would attract attention. If we make an effort to help the free press of Canada, it can be relied on to do the rest.
It seems to me that the great problem is how to get across to the Canadian public the magnitude of their stake in the United Nations. A basic factor of any foreign policy, in order for it to be enduringly successful, is that it must be understood and accepted by the people.

Do Canadians know the full story at the United Nations? How could they, when nobody tells them? What is needed is full coverage of United Nations activities, particularly those activities which concern Canada. In wartime we had reporters and feature writers travelling all over the world, telling us what was going on at the fighting fronts. Surely today we can spare a few reporters at the United Nations in New York city for the purpose of telling us what is going on at the most important fighting front of all, namely the front where we are trying to prevent war.
In the United States in 1952 there was a sudden upsurge of interest in Canada. You read about it in magazines; you heard about it over the radio. In 1954 in Canada could we not have an upsurge of interest in foreign policy? We may be diffident about telling the rest of the world what we are doing but at least we could tell ourselves.
Make no mistake about it, the United Nations stands between us and international anarchy. The United Nations stands between us and the extinction of human freedom. Some of us have lived through two world wars; but if a third world war came some of us would get hurt and we might be back in the bow and arrow era. The United Nations is the place where millions of people, differing in a thousand ways, act through their various delegates to reach a common goal. That goal is survival. We want justice and security in international living. The United Nations provides us with our best chance of getting that.
It seems to me that Canadian foreign policy brings out this simple truth. We in Canada have created a foreign service to which our citizens can belong with honour. As a result, our external affairs are managed by well prepared, honest, astute and respected professional men and women who keep Canada's prestige at a high level throughout the world. I think it is time that the Canadian public were told what these men and women are doing from day to day and from week to week. I think specifically that it is time Canadians were told the story of our foreign service's important work at the United Nations.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Speaker, the house has waited with keen interest for today's debate. That interest was largely attributable, I think, to the statement in relation to China that came, through the press, from the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) on his world tour. As to the statements made in the house this afternoon by the Secretary of State for External Affairs

(Mr. Pearson) and by the Prime Minister, I think it is not unfair to say that the statement made by the Prime Minister in disavowing the interpretation put on his statement in the Far East has taken much of the interest out of this debate. One may say also that as to much of the statement that was made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, one had the feeling that it was directed largely at Washington.
I must confess to not a little surprise and considerable regret that the Prime Minister, having now addressed the house twice on the subject of his tour of the world, including many of the important nations of the commonwealth, said not one word about the vital and beneficent role that the commonwealth is playing in the struggle for world peace today. Not one word was said on that subject. I must say that I for one was startled by that fact.
To what goal does Canada direct her external policy? Obviously, Mr. Speaker, if we are to give the answer in a word, that answer must be "peace". The goal is peace in a world which this very week has read of the explosion of a hydrogen bomb six hundred times more powerful than that bomb which claimed 60,000 lives when dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. Consequently in pursuing the goal of peace we must be realists.
There are three statements that the Prime Minister has made in various places in relatively recent times which I think are worthy of the attention of the house. In speaking at Midland on August 29, 1952, he said this:
. . . whenever there is a big war, we cannot keep out. We are inevitably drawn into it. Consequently, we must do everything we can to keep peace in the world.
Then, on his tour he was reported from Rome on February 13 as saying:
If we really want peace we must be prepared to undertake war to protect it.
On the same tour at Soest, Germany, he is reported as saying on February 11:
"No potential aggressor must feel it healthy to start aggression", the Prime Minister said in a brief speech. "During my lifetime we have had too much war. We have learned that the only way to avoid war is to be prepared to wage it."
These indeed are strong statements made by the Prime Minister, Mr. Speaker, but I do suggest that, if logically and sensibly interpreted and applied, there is realism in them.
In what I have to say tonight I should like to direct my remarks to four subjects: first, our relations with the United States; second, some aspects of our external relations so far as Europe is concerned; third, the same as far as Asia is concerned, and fourth, the subject of trade.
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Our relations with the United States are of first importance. There are three matters in this regard on which I should like to dwell briefly. The first thing, I think, that we wish to make abundantly clear both to our American cousins and to the world, for it is just as important that the world should understand this as that our cousins south of the border should, is that Canada's foreign policy will be made right here under this roof. There were long years when the world did not understand, for instance, that Canada's foreign policy was not made at London but was made here. Now we seem to be in danger of having the world or at least some parts of the world think that our foreign policy is made at Washington. Sir, we must be very firm on this subject, and we must tell the United States and the world firmly and clearly that if there is to be any thought of committing this country in advance to any policies that call for collective support with Canada as a participant we must first be consulted and Canada must determine her course.
The second aspect of this matter is the way in which Canada seems to be coming into the role of interpreter of the United States in those quarters of the globe where the United States and her policy are not well understood. Indeed, the Prime Minister in at least a part of his tour, particularly in his visit to India, seems to have accepted the role of interpreter of the United States to that sister nation of the commonwealth. There is every reason why Canada, in the interests of world peace, should seek from her advantageous situation to assist the world in understanding the United States and her peaceful aims. Above all nations in the world we Canadians best know the United States. We know her generosity. We have had reason to admire her leadership in the world. When we look back and think how much the world suffered in earlier times for lack of United States leadership and how the whole course of history in the years leading up to 1939 might have been changed had the United States then been giving the leadership to the world she is giving today, we have a means of estimating the value of United States leadership to the world.
It is a fact that the United States is not popular in many quarters of the globe, even in quarters where United States aid has been most generously bestowed. In the days when Britain held the position of the world's most powerful nation there seemed to be a disposition to twist the lion's tail occasionally, and that now seems to be directed at the United States. It may be that mistakes are made at Washington. After all, this role

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that the United States has assumed is a new role for that nation. It is not to be expected that that role will be discharged without some evidences of immaturity at times. Certainly harm has been done by sabre-rattling speeches by some ministers at Washington or, if one may resort to more modem terms, we might talk about bomb-rattling speeches from that quarter. But admitting these factors the fact remains that hope for the peace of the world does now rest, to a degree without precedent in the world's history, on the leadership given by the United States.
We know that we can trust the United States. We know from long experience as her closest neighbour that we can put the utmost reliance upon the good faith of the United States. We have an opportunity to say that to the world today and to help the world to realize the peaceful aims of the United States.
May I say directly to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that I am sure the whole nation approved heartily the statement he made on behalf of the government immediately following the statement made by President Eisenhower in proposing control of the development of atomic energy, when the minister pledged Canada's unqualified approval of that statement.
The third aspect of the subject of our relations with the United States concerns relations between the United States and the United Kingdom. What hope is there for mankind, what hope is there for the peace of the world if the United States and the United Kingdom are not to work together side by side? What nation in all the world can provide, to use Mr. Churchill's expression, a more effective linchpin in that relationship than Canada? Well and truly did Sir Gladwyn Jebb, in his farewell speech at New York on his retirement as the representative of Great Britain on the security council of the United Nations, say on February 24, speaking of the United States and the British commonwealth:
If we can stay together and pursue joint policies of development and peace, then the future is secure. If we drift apart, then the future belongs to international communism.
Canada stands right in the middle between the United States and Great Britain, and we must supply the effective cement by which these two nations shall be bound together to walk their beneficent path in the interest of world peace. There need be no fear of the intentions of Great Britain and the United States. This week Mr. Churchill has given the strongest expression of support of the United States policy of massive retaliation in the event of aggression by those whose

intent is not peaceful. But he did say at the same time that the United States bases in Great Britain would not be used for retaliation in atomic warfare without the approval of the government of the United Kingdom.
I turn now to Europe. I say at once, although I do not think it needs to be said in this house, that whatever evidence there may be of changing tactics on the part of the masters in the Kremlin there can be no doubt in the mind of any one of us that the underlying and fundamental strategy of the Kremlin is unchanged. Surely we have learned long since, if we have learned anything, that we are not to trust what comes from the Kremlin. That man who, of all others in modern times, probably perpetrated the most mischief on the world, Karl Marx, said this a century ago about the Russians:
The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything *-as long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with are capable of nothing.
It will not be forgotten, Mr. Speaker, that we have from authentic communist sources something of the blueprint that they have been following ever since this blueprint was laid down for them by Lenin. In his collected works, volume 24, this statement appears:
We are living not merely in a state but in a system of states; and it is inconceivable that the Soviet republic should continue for a long period side by side with imperialist states. Ultimately, one or the other must conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes between the Soviet republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.
Again, this quotation is taken from Lenin's book, "The Infantile Sickness of Leftism in Communism".
It is necessary to use any ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, concealment of the truth.
We have had many proofs, Mr. Speaker, that that blueprint is followed scrupulously by those who believe in and practise communism in the world. Note, Mr. Speaker, what Lenin had to say about the series of clashes. I suppose what we have seen in the unfolding of that fundamental strategy has been this; that where it has suited that strategy to resort to the hot war, the hot war was resorted to; where it suits that strategy to resort to the cold war, then the cold war will be the method chosen. The fundamental attitude is hostile towards all bourgeois states. Therefore, while we must never reject out of hand anything that appears to be a gesture towards better understanding or more peaceful co-operation that may come from the Kremlin, let us learn from the past and ever be wary.
Notwithstanding the way in which China and the Far East have been occupying a leading place in the news in recent times, Germany, I submit, still remains the most important

of all areas of diplomatic conflict in the world. Here 1954 will be a decisive year. It will be a year for that reason of vast importance to Canada. Happily we see in NATO growing strength; we see substantial accomplishments, but we must not rest on those accomplishments. German rearmament was decided upon a year and a half ago. For this problem the solution offered was of a European army, with German units integrated into it. The feeling of the United States government is that the ratification of EDC on the part of all the nations concerned is imperative. The predominant feeling in Great Britain, and certainly the policy of the government of the United Kingdom, is to bring about that ratification of EDC and the setting up of a European army as soon as possible. In Germany lies the biggest untouched reservoir of manpower available to the free world.
The feeling in France is an understandable feeling. The spirit of nationalism is still strong in the French army. The memory of three invasions within the lifetime of some Frenchmen will never be effaced, and there is very great distrust there of the idea of a European army. Bear in mind, sir, it is not an allied army that is proposed. It is something quite different from any army that has ever existed before. The weakness of the French state today is attributable in part to the gigantic losses of France in both world wars, and to the way in which she is being bled of manhood and treasure in Indo-China as well as to the presence of a large number of communists in France today.
The most signal event in the history of Europe in 1953 was unquestionably the resounding victory won at the polls by Chancellor Adenauer, and with it the complete endorsement by the people of the western German republic of the whole idea of a European army and the German rearmament associated with it. We have the opportunity of judging how important to the western nations is the fulfilment of the dream of ratification of EDC and the establishment of the European army, when we see the stratagems and machinations that the Russians are resorting to in an attempt to prevent ratification of EDC at all costs. In recent months their tactics have all been directed towards restraining France from proceeding with the task of ratification. Now again, one can understand the feelings of the French in this regard. But, Mr. Speaker, the central issue in international affairs in 1954, so far as Europe is concerned, will be the question of ratification and the establishment of the European army. The Russians know it. Their whole tactics in recent times show how well they realize that if this important step is taken then their 83276-213
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hopes of expanding the area of aggression and the march of the iron curtain westward are stopped in Europe.
If there are alternate plans, Mr. Speaker, as the Secretary of State for External Affairs seemed to permit himself to hint today when he said that EDC ought to be ratified or something like it, then he ought to take the house into his confidence in this matter. Here, we are dealing with something that is of primary importance to the peace of the world.
Today the Prime Minister told us almost nothing about NATO. Sir Gladwyn Jebb, in a speech from which I quoted earlier, said this:
NATO is the shield and buckler of the west and without it we should lose all our freedom . . .
If war should come it is in such organization as the NATO that our trust must primarily be placed.
That came from a man who has in recent years represented the United Kingdom on the security council of the United Nations. He was saying in the plainest terms that if war should come our hope of preservation must lie with NATO.
There was one statement that came from the Prime Minister's tour on which he made little or no comment today. This is a dispatch from Paris dated February 9:
Although the discussion was held in the strictest privacy,-
That is a discussion between the Prime Minister and General Gruenther at SHAPE headquarters.
-it was reliably reported that Canada's Prime Minister gave General Gruenther his solemn assurance that Canada would increase its contribution if the international situation should become any worse.
This afternoon the Prime Minister touched on this subject very briefly. He did not say that he was relating it especially to the report that emanated from Paris to which I have just now made reference. I do hope before this debate has run its course, either the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs will make a clear statement on this point for the information of the house.
I turn now, sir, to Asia. Since the ceasefire our thoughts have been turning, it seems to me, more from Korea to China. Let us recall that all that has been accomplished in Korea is a cease-fire with a retirement of the forces to the rear of a widened no-man's-land and then an agreement, not then immediately entered into but since, for a conference on Asian affairs to be held at Geneva. In the meantime, sixteen nations including Canada have signed a pledge that if aggression should be renewed in Korea,

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they will stand together in resisting that aggression. They have put the following in their statement:
The consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.
Finally, we are of the opinion that the armistice must not result in jeopardizing the restoration or the safeguarding of peace in any other part of Asia.
It is a very strong pledge that the sixteen nations, including Canada, have taken in that regard.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs intimated today in this regard that Canada would probably be playing a rather minor part in the conference at Geneva. Be that as it may, sir, I hope-


Lester Bowles Pearson: I do not want to interrupt the hon. gentleman, but I said a relatively minor part in the Indo-Chinese part of the conference.


Donald Methuen Fleming: That is what I was coming to, but I am glad to have that clarification from the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Whatever part Canada does play I hope that there will be nothing done to weaken the application of the principle that in negotiations with these communists we must negotiate from strength; we must be canny; we must not be throwing away a single card now that we may have an opportunity to play later, and we must go into that conference determined to preserve the integrity of the principle that aggression must be shown before all the world not to pay. That is a lesson that has to be taught to those who are practising aggression and hot warfare in Indo-China today.
Now, sir, what of China-China that we used to think of years ago as a great peaceful nation, as peace-loving a nation as any in all the world? What a travesty of history that that nation of peace-loving people has now been turned into a red-handed aggressor, an aggressor which inspired and spurred on the aggression of the North Koreans in 1950, aided and abetted it and then finally itself marched into North Korea. It is a nation under a communist regime which has been branded by the United Nations before all the world as an aggressor, an indictment by mankind; a nation under a communist government that has today virtually annexed North Korea, that has virtually annexed Tibet, which, if it has its way will undoubtedly seek to work the same result in IndoChina ; a nation which has been singled out by the United Nations for the passage of a resolution denying strategic materials to it, as a nation in whose hands any materials that can be used in warfare are not to be

trusted. And it is the communist government of this nation that some would now have us recognize as the government of China.
Well, sir, let us turn back to the rule, which they say runs something like this: that where a government, regardless of how it came into being, does exercise control over a specified territory and conditions are sufficiently settled that it cannot be said that its authority within that territory is seriously challenged, then it is entitled to recognition. Sir, that, as I read the rules of public international law, is not an altogether correct statement of the rule. I suppose the leading authority on public international law is Professor Oppenheim of Cambridge. I have in my hand volume I, sixth edition, of his work on international law, where the rule is put at pages 126 and 127 in this way:
When, however, the new head or government, be it a monarch succeeding another monarch, a president of a republic succeeding another president, a monarch succeeding a president of a republic, or a president of a republic a monarch, comes into power not in a constitutional manner but after a coup d'dtat, a revolution (which need not involve bloodshed), or any other event involving a break in legal continuity, the determination by other states of the attitude to be adopted toward the new head or government is often difficult. They are called upon to arrive at a decision on the question whether the new authority can be properly regarded as representing the state in question. In arriving at that decision, they exercise a discretion which, though necessarily wide, is not an arbitrary act.
I suggest that where discretion exists in this matter, under that statement of the rule of public international law, Canada ought to exercise her discretion not to give recognition to the so-called people's government of Peking.
There follows a review of the trends in relation to the recognition of new governments. There is not time at my disposal to review these. They follow in the succeeding pages, but it is a fair summary to say that there have been conflicting trends as to whether, in deciding to give or withhold recognition of any new government, a nation is entitled to ask itself if that government is capable of fulfilling the normal requirements of civilized international behaviour between states.
Does any opposition exist in China, any effective opposition to the present people's government? Well, if it does not, Mr. Speaker, we well know why. It is because that opposition has been exterminated in the most ruthless manner by the present government.
How did this regime come to be in control of the reins of power in China? It came not as a result of some innocent movement for agrarian reform as the communists sought to pretend-Canadian communists as well as others-in recent years. It came into power,

Mr. Speaker, because of aid from Russia. It was never a genuine movement on the part of the people, and on the hands of these aggressors today are stains of blood, including the blood of Canadians. It is to this regime that the C.C.F. party in this house asks the Canadian government to give recognition. I say to you, Mr. Speaker, it is a dreadful, a shocking proposition.
Sir, this is not the first time that the C.C.F. have advocated recognition of this present regime in China. As long ago as June, long before the cease-fire, while Canadians were withstanding the surge of battle, attacks by Chinese troops thrown in under the orders of this so-called people's government at Peking, the leader of the C.C.F. party, speaking at the meeting which nominated the present member for York South (Mr. Noseworthy) in Toronto on June 9 of last year, advocated the recognition of this so-called people's government at Peking. Mao Tse-tung wants recognition; the U.S.S.R. wants recognition of the so-called people's regime at Peking, and they are using every stratagem and every device to bring about that object. Mr. Speaker, in that regard we would do well to recall these words from Lenin's book to which I referred earlier:
It is necessary to use any ruse, cunning, unlawful method, evasion, concealment of the truth-
-for the purpose of achieving the ends of communism.
Sir, we welcome the statement of the Prime Minister today that it is no part of the intention of the government to give recognition to this regime at Peking. Undoubtedly the statement attributed to the Prime Minister in the press during his tour has done incalculable harm. It has received wide currency, and I think the Prime Minister will be the first to say, and I am sure the Secretary of State for External Affairs will be the first to agree, that commendable restraint in this respect has been shown in this house pending the return of the Prime Minister. I think they will agree that there has been on the part of the opposition commendable willingness to defer discussion of the matter until the return of the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), when he could be present to take part in the discussion. But, sir, I hope that every effort will be made to see that the statement made by the Prime Minister today, in his effort to overtake the statement that was attributed to him in the press, will receive just as wide currency as that other statement which has done so much harm.
How shall we prove that aggression does not pay, if we allow this regime at Peking to shoot and bludgeon its way into polite 83276-2131
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international company? The cause of resisting aggression in Indo-China would be lost, at once. What is to be, then, the fate of Formosa?
And they quote recognition of the government in Spain. Well, I do not think anyone in this House of Commons has a lower opinion of the government in Spain than the member who is now speaking. But what happened in Spain, I suggest, is no precedent for a recognition of the regime in Peking. Franco never directed his army in any aggressive manner against us. He never was branded an aggressor in any indictment on the part of the United Nations. And the Canadian government waited just about fifteen years before deciding to exchange diplomatic representatives with General Franco's regime.
So I suggest that, in the light of that fact, we can afford to take our time in considering any question of the recognition of the regime at Peking. So far as recognition of that regime by Great Britain in 1949 is concerned, let us remember that that was before Korea. Had the Korean aggression occurred before Great Britain gave recognition to the Peking regime, I think it is very doubtful if they would ever have considered giving that recognition.
In any event there is not very much, in the way in which Great Britain has been treated since that time by the Peking government, that would encourage anyone else to recommend that course. They have had little except insults from the Peking regime since that time.
Let us not forget, also, that the Japanese government, the new government in Japan to which we are trying to give every encouragement, on June 19, 1952, decided to give recognition to nationalist China as the government of China.
And then, sir, so far as our recognition of the government of the U.S.S.R. is concerned, let us bear this in mind, that we took our time about that, too. The revolution in Russia occurred in November of 1917. It was not until March 24, 1924, thirty years ago yesterday, that the Canadian government informed the then newly-arrived soviet official agent in Montreal that it was prepared to recognize the U.S.S.R. The function of that officer was, to some extent, that of consul, but more largely related to trade. Nothing came of that suggestion.
It was not until March, 1942, that the governments of Canada and the U.S.S.R. agreed to exchange diplomatic representatives. It was on October 21, 1942, that Mr. Gusev presented his credentials as minister

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to Canada, and on March 10, 1943, that Mr. Dana Wilgress presented his credentials as Canadian minister at Moscow. It was in 1944 that the status of the two missions was raised to that of embassies.
But, sir, what are the consequences of recognition? Let us not forget how very important and far-reaching these are. Here is the way Oppenheim describes them at pages 132 and 133:
Among the more important consequences which flow from the recognition of a new government or state are these: (1) it thereby acquires the capacity to enter into diplomatic relations with other states and to make treaties with them; (2) within limitations which are far from being clear, former treaties (if any) concluded between the two states, assuming it to be an old state and not a newly-born one, are automatically revived and come into force; (3) it thereby acquires the right, which, at any rate according to English law, it did not previously possess, of suing in the courts of law of the recognizing state; (4) it thereby acquires for itself and its property immunity from the jurisdiction of the courts of law of the state recognizing it and the ancillary rights which are discussed later-an immunity which, according to English law at any rate, it does not enjoy before recognition. (5) It also becomes entitled to demand and receive possession of property situate within the jurisdiction of a recognizing state, which formerly belonged to the preceding government at the time of its suppression. (6) Recognition being retroactive and dating back to the moment at which the newly recognized government established itself in power, its effect is to preclude the courts of law of the recognizing state from questioning the legality or validity of the acts both legislative and executive, past and future, of that government; it therefore validates, so far as concerns those courts of law, certain transfers of property and other transactions which before recognition they would have treated as invalid.
And, sir, in our time, added to these would be, of course, inevitably as the next step, admission to the United Nations. And if this communist regime at Peking is admitted to supersede the nationalist government of China there, it means that they step automatically into a permanent seat on the security council, and acquire the veto. And as the Russians have used the United Nations as a sounding board for propaganda, it just means double the voices of propaganda in that council.
I submit, too, that the Peking regime is not eligible to be admitted to the United Nations. Chapter II, article 4, of the United Nations charter makes this stipulation:
Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which accept the obligations contained in the present charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
Can it be said that this people's regime at Peking represents a peace-loving state, when they have been denounced as aggressors? No; I submit to you that they are not eligible. And yet, if they were recognized,

this inevitably would be the next step. For, if you recognize this people's government, what answer have you to them when they apply to supplant the nationalist government as the representative of China at the United Nations? It would be a triumph of aggression, a triumph of the aggressor who holds a pistol at the head of the United Nations.
And, sir, whatever may come out of the Geneva conference, let us have the assurance that Geneva will never be permitted to become another Munich.
I leave this subject of recognition of the Peking regime with this one remark: I accept what the Prime Minister said this afternoon; we are not making a judgment for all time. But we look at the existing situation and we are, I hope, making a clear and firm judgment on that situation as it exists today.
Finally, a word about trade. Trade can be an aid to peace. There is no reason why we should not, like Great Britain, trade with Russia on one condition, and that is that no strategic material be allowed to come into the hands of the Russians. We have noted what has been said at Westminster of late about the keen desire of the British government to extend trade with Russia, in the hope that that will help to bring about more peaceful relations. The statement was made by the Hon. Derick Heathcoat-Amory, deputy trade minister, in Great Britain only two days ago that the British market is "wide open to Russian grain, timber, metals and manganese ore." The newspaper article goes on to say:
Speaking in debate on east-west trade, he said it would be "very helpful if larger quantities of grain could be made available."
Well, while I am sure we will have no wish to put any obstacles in the way of trade between Great Britain and Russia, which may make a contribution to peace, I hope we will not be slow or tardy in making a just claim, on behalf of Canadian grain producers, to the British market for our grain.
Finally, whatever may be said about trade in the world today, there must be no weakening in the proscription of trade with this aggressor government of China in the matter of strategic materials, or anything that could be of assistance to an aggressor nation. We must watch vigilantly any attempt to whittle down the category of strategic materials.
These are grave days in which we live. The time may come when we may look back on these days as those in which important decisions were taken which contributed much to better relations, and the building of sounder foundations for peace in the world. But, Mr. Speaker, in all that we do, let us be realists; let us keep our powder dry when dealing with those who, unhappily, respect only force.


Mr. Colin Cameron (Nanaimo):: Mr. Speaker, in the few moments at my disposal before ten o'clock I would like to deal with some of the things we have heard about from the hon. member for Eglinton Mr. (Fleming). Naturally enough I do not share the horror with which he apparently views, not only the statement of the leader of the C.C.F. but also the statement which the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. St. Laurent) made in this house this afternoon.
I was particularly interested in the hon. member's denunciation of the communist regime in China for its attempt to fight its way into what he termed "polite international company". It sometimes seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that we use words in a very strange manner. I am not quite sure what the hon. member's definition of "polite international company" is. Possibly it includes Francisco Franco of Spain, with whom the hon. member for Eglinton seems to have affinity; perhaps it includes all the little squalid dictatorships of Central America; perhaps it includes Dr. Salazar of Portugal; and I presume he must also include in that polite international society that member state of the United Nations which is the object of his fear and enmity, the Soviet union and all its satellites in Europe.
I wonder whether he considers as one of the members of that polite international society the successor of a regime which shot its way into power, and whether the hon. member for Eglinton would not suggest that even at this late date we should perhaps withdraw recognition from the administration in Washington.
I think, Mr. Speaker, we have to be a little realistic about this thing. We have to recognize the facts of life, however unpalatable they may be, and I would suggest that the logical consequence of our hon. friend's thesis is that as there is no possibility of being able to sit down in peace and amity with the present rulers of China then, of course, the only alternative is to blast them out of existence. On that score, Mr. Speaker, I would suggest that the hon. member and all those who feel as he feels have been grossly negligent in their duty for several years past, because we were perhaps in a rather better position to blast them out of existence a few years ago and we neglected our opportunity.
I wondered, Mr. Speaker, particularly when I listened this afternoon to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), if other people had the same reaction that I had when we were made to realize the real extent of the change in world relationships which has taken place during my lifetime.
External Affairs
I can recall before the days of 1914 when there were in the world a number of states, some of quite modest power, which nevertheless were able to pursue a fairly independent foreign policy within fairly wide limits because of their ability to either add or detract from the strength of some existing power bloc. It was on their ability to upset or to maintain this delicate balance of power that these states, most of them located in Europe, were able at that time to pursue a relatively independent foreign policy. In those days a discussion such as we are having this evening taking place in the parliament of one of those nations would, I imagine, have been devoted very largely to the actual discussion of that nation's foreign policy, what course it was going to pursue, and what independent stand it was going to take.
All that world went down the drain when the Germans marched into Belgium in August, 1914, and today we have an entirely different situation, so different that if we are to have a realistic discussion of Canada's foreign policy we are obliged in actual fact to discuss not so much our own foreign policy but the foreign policies of the two colossal power blocs in the world. I believe the Secretary of State for External Affairs illustrated that very well this afternoon, because you will recall, sir, that a very large part of his address was devoted to a discussion and interpretation and, shall I say, a dissection of the foreign policy of our great neighbour to the south.
I believe one might well say that in that situation the foreign policy of a nation such as Canada must concern itself not only with the overt foreign policy of our great ally, or the overt foreign policy of our great hostile antagonist, but must also, as far as we are able, devote itself to a dissection and analysis of the internal affairs within these countries which develop that foregin policy.
I believe one might say, Mr. Speaker, that the two recent addresses the Secretary of State for External Affairs made in the United States and to which he referred this afternoon were welcomed with a sigh of relief from every intelligent Canadian. Some of us may have felt that they came rather late on the scene. Some of us may have perhaps felt that they might have been underlined more decisively, but nevertheless I believe the general reaction was one of relief among intelligent Canadians that at last the government of Canada was preparing to do the only thing that is open to it in the present state of world affairs, and that is to attempt to

External Affairs
influence the internal policies of the United States and its consequent external policy.
I see, Mr. Speaker, that it is ten o'clock and with your permission I will beg leave to adjourn the debate.
On motion of Mr. Cameron (Nanaimo) the debate was adjourned.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Walter Edward Harris: After we have disposed of this debate tomorrow we shall take the Criminal Code.


[Stage Direction]
At ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
[Stage Direction]
Friday, March 26, 1954