1954-05-28

VETERANS AFFAIRS

[Stage Direction]
First report of special committee on veterans affairs.-Mr. Tucker.

Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to table three copies in English and in French of the international tin agreement resulting from the United Nations tin conference convened in Geneva on November 16, 1953. This agreement is open for signature from March 1 to June 30, 1954, and it has been decided to authorize the High Commissioner in London to sign the agreement on behalf of Canada. But before ratification of the agreement is deposited opportunity will be given to the House of Commons to discuss it on the estimates of the Department of Trade and Commerce.



PORTUGAL


Right Hon. C. D. Howe (Minister of Trade and Commerce):: Mr. Speaker, on Wednesday of this week my colleague, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), announced the signing in Madrid of a new trade treaty between Canada and Spain.
I now wish to inform the house that a similar trade treaty was signed today in Lisbon between Canada and Portugal. This agreement was signed on behalf of Canada by the Hon. Mr. Winters, Minister of Public Works, who is at present in Portugal, and by Hon. William F. A. Turgeon, Q.C., Canadian minister to Portugal. The agreement was signed on behalf of Portugal by Mr. Paulo Cunha, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and by Mr. Correa de Barros, director general of economic affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Mr. W. F. Bull, deputy minister of trade and commerce, and other Canadian officials have recently returned from Portugal following discussions with Portuguese officials.
This is the first direct trade agreement between Canada and Portugal. It provides
for the continued exchange of most-favourednation treatment with respect to customs duties and related matters. Both countries undertake not to impose discriminatory import or exchange restrictions, except for balance of payments reasons. When such restrictions are imposed they must not discriminate between countries having convertible currencies.
As part of the agreement, the Portuguese government has agreed to make available import licences and dollar exchange for minimum annual imports from dollar countries of 3,000 tons of dry salted codfish. This quantity is divided between 1,000 tons of small codfish and 2,000 tons of the larger sizes. This arrangement will place Canadian sales of dry salted codfish in the Portuguese market on a more stabilized and permanent basis and will provide an opportunity for increasing sales.
For the first time Canada will accord mostfavoured-nation treatment to certain Portuguese colonies. As a result, coffee, which is one of the chief colonial products of Portugal, will now enter Canada at the most-favourednation rate rather than at the general rate as has been the case up to now. Canada has also made the following tariff concessions to Portugal: The rate on almonds is reduced from 1 cent per pound to free; the rate on corks, over | inch in diameter, is reduced from 41 cents to 2 cents per pound, while the duty on smaller sized corks is reduced from 8 cents to 2 cents per pound.
I wish to draw the attention of hon. members to the important advantages which accrue to the Newfoundland codfish industry as the combined result of the two new trade agreements with Spain and Portugal, which open up an assured annual market for 100,000 quintals of dry salted codfish, a substantial portion of which can be shipped in small sizes.


Mr. Macdonnell:: May I ask the Minister of Trade and Commerce a question arising out of the explanation he gave of the Portuguese treaty? What countries would be especially in mind in the reference to no discrimination against countries with convertible currencies?


Clarence Decatur Howe: The meaning of that statement is that if dollars are convertible, the Portuguese government is bound

Inquiries of the Ministry not to discriminate between dollar countries. It sterling is convertible, they are bound not to discriminate between sterling countries. In other words, any currency that is convertible must receive equal treatment with other currencies that are convertible.



INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS


Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre) moved: for leave to introduce Bill No. 466, to amend the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act (laying of information).


Some hon. Members:: Explain.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, the purpose of this bill is to clear up an uncertainty that has arisen in connection with the laying of an information, or the bringing of a prosecution, under the Industrial Relations and Disputes Investigation Act.
As section 45 now stands, it is clear that a prosecution for an offence under the act may be brought against a trade union or against an employers' organization. However, in view of a recent court decision, it is now uncertain as to whether an information or complaint can be laid by an aggrieved trade union, or for that matter by an employers' organization. "Against" is all right; "by" is in doubt. The purpose of this bill is to amend section 45 of the act so as to clear up this uncertainty.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. W. Dufresne (Quebec West):: Mr. Speaker, I had written out a question for the Minister of National Defence. I had written it in French, but I shall translate it inte English for the benefit of the associate minister. In a press conference given in Quebec city on Thursday, May 27, was Commodore K. F. Adams, on this occasion, expressing the policy of the government? If not, will disciplinary action be taken against this officer for making statements so absurd and ridiculous?


Hon. R. O. Campney (Associate Minister of National Defence):: The hon. member did not refer to the nature of the statements alleged to have been made by the naval officer to whom he refers. I have not seen the report 
of the press conference to which he refers, and in any event I would not wish to comment on it without checking as to the accuracy of the report.



CUSTOMS TARIFF


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Stanley Howard Knowles: May I direct a question to the Minister of National Revenue?
In view of the exchequer court's rejection of the appeal against the tariff board's ruling to the effect that mixed fruit is not peaches, will provision now be made for rebate of the excess duties paid on the importation of canned mixed fruit during the period that the higher rate of duty has been charged?
Hon. J. J. McCann (Minister of National
Revenue): Mr. Speaker, I thank the hon. gentleman for having given me notice of his question. We have not yet received a report from our legal advisers, and until such time as we do I am not prepared to answer the hon. gentleman's question. However, notice will be taken of it.

The house in committee of supply, Mr. Applewhaite in the chair.


DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
The Deputy Chairman:: We are dealing with item No. 84. For the information of hon. members the item will be found on page 13 of the estimates, and the details on page 157.
Department and missions abroad-
84. Departmental administration, $3,333,583.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, this item of my estimates gives me an opportunity, of which I am glad to avail myself, to make a report to the committee about my recent trip to Europe, during which I attended the meeting of the North Atlantic council, the early sessions, which were held in London, of the subcommittee of the disarmament committee of the United Nations, which is concerned with disarmament in general and more particularly with the limitation or abolition of weapons of mass destruction; and finally, the Geneva conference on Far Eastern affairs.
So far as the North Atlantic council meeting is concerned there is little that I can add to the communique which was issued at the time. It was a short, regular meeting of the council, with ministerial representation,

at which views were exchanged on the international situation generally, and on the western European and the Atlantic situation in particular, and during which we also discussed ways and means of making the council a more effective body for consultation on foreign affairs.
In so far as the disarmament subcommittee is concerned, as hon. members know, it consists of the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, France, the U.S.S.R. and Canada. It was set up by the full committee to go into the question of disarmament, as I have said, in general, and atomic disarmament in particular, in restricted and private meetings, in the hope that by meetings of this kind progress might at least be more likely in a field of such transcendent importance as this is.
The subcommittee will eventually report back to the full committee, and I am not in a position now, as I indicated to the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre the other day, to report on the discussions that have taken place because of the nature of those discussions and because of the fact that they are still going on. I can say that, because of the restricted and private character of the meetings, we got to grips with this problem very quickly, and that grip has not been loosened.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I can of course-and the committee would expect me to-report in greater detail on the Geneva conference on Far Eastern affairs. That conference, however, is also still proceeding, and because of that fact there is a limit to what I can appropriately say at this time, and certainly no final report is yet possible.
I have returned from Geneva myself, but the Canadian delegation remains, and is taking an active part in the work. It is a small delegation, but as I am no longer a part of it, I think possibly I can say with propriety that, in my view, it is a well-informed and efficient delegation. If the situation seems to require it, of course I can return to Geneva without delay.
The conference now has been going on for some weeks, and I think it is generally agreed that while it would be a great mistake to break it off as long as there is any, even remote, possibility of success, it should not be allowed to go on indefinitely if it becomes demonstrably clear that it is being used only for propaganda purposes.
The conference probably should not be referred to as such because in reality there are two conferences going on at the same time in Geneva. As hon. members know, the first one deals with Korea. The origin of that
Supply-External Affairs conference is to be found in the United Nations armistice of July, 1953, concluded in Korea. It will be remembered that in the terms of that armistice there was a provision that a political conference should follow within three months. That was not possible but the conference is now taking place and though it is not a United Nations conference in any formal sense, I think it can be regarded as fulfilling the provision of the armistice agreement which called for such a conference.
The immediate origin of the conference is to be found in the meeting of the foreign ministers at Berlin in February of this year when it was agreed by those foreign ministers to invite the United Nations governments which had forces in Korea, the republic of Korea, the communist government of Peking, and the communist government of North Korea, to take part in a conference to meet at Geneva.
The membership of this conference is in a sense two-sided. Indeed, it might be considered as three-sided. There is the United Nations side, which consists of 15 delegations, including the Canadian, there is the republic of Korea side, which is distinct to some extent from the others because they are not yet a member of the United Nations; and then there is the communist side consisting of the three communist delegations.
We anticipated before we went to Geneva a good deal of difficulty in getting this conference going because of its unique character and composition. There might indeed have been great difficulties over organization and procedure and all that sort of thing which can cause so much delay if anyone wishes to use procedure in order to cause delay. The communists very often in the past have been adept at that kind of thing.
But our fears were not realized and by conciliatory attitudes on both sides all these organizational and procedural difficulties were removed without delay and the conference got down to work at once.
In so far as it went, that was an encouraging sign, but the encouragement which we got from our agreement over procedure has not yet extended to any noticeable progress in the substance of the questions with which we were dealing.
The objective of the conference, of course, was a simple one. It was to convert the armistice which had been signed in Korea into a peace settlement which would last, and on our side, at least, to achieve that settlement by agreement in accordance with United Nations resolutions and decisions on the subject which were meant to facilitate a free, united and democratic Korea.
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We must not, of course, forget that we were not in a position at Geneva or indeed elsewhere to impose that kind of settlement on a defeated enemy. And we must not forget either that we have no obligation to impose that kind of settlement on Korea by force. Therefore, it could only be done by agreement, and agreement, of course, has not been easy to obtain.
In seeking such an agreement to attain the objectives laid down by the United Nations, the United Nations and the republic of Korea delegations have worked closely together in friendly co-operation. They have not always, of course, seen eye to eye on means, but have been in agreement in regard to ends.
Such differences are, I suppose, inevitable in discussion between representatives of free governments, but I know the house will agree when I say, Mr. Chairman, that we should try to keep them to a minimum in the face of the common menace which confronts us all.
The communist delegations at the Korean conference spoke as one. They spoke in the same vein and indeed often in the same words in their accusations and attacks largely directed against the United States. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that 90 per cent of the content of their speeches consisted of propaganda and polemics. We got the same distortions of recent developments in Korea to which we have been accustomed at the United Nations, and we got the same falsification of fact and of history. It was interesting to note that the dialectics and diatribes of the new communist delegations were just about the same as that of the old hands.
The delegates on the United Nations side, though anxious to get on with the business of negotiating a Korean settlement, have not allowed these unfounded accusations to go unanswered. To reply to the slanderous attacks and abusive propaganda which form such a depressing proportion of the communist speeches at meetings of this kind is a timeconsuming and unpleasant task, but when the eyes of the world are focused on a conference it is a task which I think we cannot afford to forgo lest it should be supposed in any part of the world, especially in this case in the Asian part of the world, that silence may indicate some kind of consent.
Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in my own intervention in the general debate on the Korean question at Geneva I attempted on May 4 to follow the course which had already been laid down by others in dealing with some of these communist charges, and particularly I ventured to point out that, contrary to the assertions of Mr. Molotov, who took it


upon himself to speak for Asia, we in the west did understand, and fully accepted, the significance of what has been taking place in Asia over recent years, and that we were indeed sympathetic in the march of the peoples of Asia toward national freedom and greater human welfare.
I added, however, that the right to be free did not include the obligation to be communist, nor did "Asia for the Asians", which is a phrase Molotov and others had used, mean Asia for the cominform.
I also pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that our own national experience in Canada refuted completely the wild charges which were levelled by communist delegations to the effect that the people of the United States were either aggressive or imperialist in their outlook.
Now, Mr. Chairman, I should explain in a few words what the communist peace plan for Korea was as put forward at the Geneva conference. In principle it involved the repudiation of United Nations plans on which we had previously agreed, and if it had been carried into effect it would also have necessitated the exclusion of the United Nations as a belligerent from the substance and the supervision of the peace settlement. It would have required us on our side to accept the fact of United States and republic of Korea aggression, and of the charge that the United Nations in this matter had merely acted as the victim and the tool of United States imperialism.
Obviously any proposal based on these premises was not acceptable to the United Nations delegations. There were also other details which made this plan unacceptable.
The two governments of the republic of Korea and North Korea were to be considered on the same political, legal and moral level, and acceptance of this was to be recognized in an all-Korean commission with equal representation of the north and south, though the south in population is probably five or six times greater than the north. This all-Korean commission was to work out plans for all-Korean elections, free from outside supervision except-and this has been an additional proposal of the communists since I left Geneva-by what they call a neutral commission.
We are not quite clear about this neutral commission but it is certainly to be divorced from the United Nations. Its function is to assist the all-Korean commission, and its composition would presumably exclude all

United Nations members who have participated in Korean military operations. It could, however, include such neutrals-and I use that word in a Pickwickian sense-as Poland or Czechoslovakia. Then also under this plan all foreign forces were to be withdrawn within six months. The powers directly interested in Korea-and it was made clear that they would include communist China and the U.S.S.R.-were to assist in Korean development as a democratic state. The United Nations, however, was to keep out.
Even cursory examination of a plan of this kind makes its unacceptability quite obvious. It looked to us like a snare and a delusion. Indeed we wondered whether it was really meant to be accepted, at least in that form. It is certainly unrealistic to the point of absurdity to think that two sides which fear and hate each other as much as do North Korea and South Korea, after fighting each other viciously if indecisively for years, should sit down amicably and work together through an all-Korean commission, on a fifty-fifty basis, with each side having a veto over the decisions of the commission and in that way produce a new Korea by free elections. Of course we pointed out the weakness and indeed the impracticability of this plan, but the questions which we addressed to the other side were unanswered.
Indeed it is clear that this is a scheme designed to provide for the establishment of an interim government, along the pattern of the communist proposals in Germany, in which the communist representatives would hold the power of veto. In other words, the commission would operate as the communist members wished it to operate or not at all. We all know, of course, that this is the familiar first step in the establishment of communist dictatorship through the perversion of democratic procedures.
We might have accepted the impossibility of this scheme without any further argument and, pinning the responsibility squarely where it belongs, namely on the communists who were putting forward this scheme, called the conference off on that issue. But most of the United Nations delegations-indeed, I think all of them-felt that they should put forward their own proposals and their own views as to what would constitute a good Korean settlement. For that purpose, Mr. Chairman, I should like to put on the record the Canadian views of what should be done to reach that desirable objective, or in other words the basic principles which we think should underlie any agreement for a free, democratic and united Korea. If I may just enumerate them briefly, those principles are as follows.
Supply-External Affairs
First, a unified Korea should preserve the state structure for Korea which has been endorsed by the United Nations, with such constitutional changes as might be necessary to establish an all-Korean government.
Second, the people of Korea should be given an opportunity to express their views as to their future government and for that purpose there should be held, with a minimum of delay, free and fair elections for a national assembly and possibly also for a president.
Third, the conditions for such elections should include equitable representation by population over the whole of Korea.
Fourth, to ensure that such elections should be fair and free, they should be supervised by an international agency agreed on, if possible, by the Geneva conference but acceptable to the United Nations. In order to ensure maximum objectivity-and that is going quite a long way to meet the views of the other side-we felt that this supervisory agency might consist of nations which do not belong to the communist bloc and which did not participate in military operations in Korea.
Fifth, arrangements should be made for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea by stages, that withdrawal to be completed in a short period, to be fixed by the conference, after the post-election all-Korean government had begun effectively to function; in other words, withdrawal might begin at once by both sides and be completed within a short time after the Korean government had begun to function.
Sixth, a reaffirmation of international responsibility under the United Nations to participate in the relief and rehabilitation of Korea through economic and material assistance. Finally, an international guarantee under the auspices of the United Nations of the territorial integrity of unified, free and democratic Korea.
It was hoped that some kind of proposal based on principles of that nature might be put forward as coming from all sixteen powers. That procedure has not yet been possible, Mr. Chairman, but we are very close in our views. Indeed, as a result of negotiations between the delegations on our side, all sixteen powers are very close together now on what constitutes the principles for a good Korean settlement.
Meanwhile, the government delegation of the republic of Korea has put forward its own proposals for a settlement. We think that these are acceptable as a basis of negotiation but we have doubts about one or two of the points included in their proposals, more particularly that which would give to South

Supply-External Affairs Korea a veto on the election in that part and their insistence that all Chinese troops be out of Korea before the six-months period would end. We feel now-and this is the attitude we are taking at Geneva where the matter is being debated this afternoon- that these proposals on the communist side and the proposals on our side should go to a small negotiating committee. If that suggestion is followed, we shall soon be able to find out whether progress is possible.
It would be unwise to be too optimistic on that score. We therefore ask ourselves what should be done if, at this Korean conference at Geneva, we cannot succeed in bringing about the unification of that unhappy land.
I think it would be wise, under these circumstances, to suspend, not to terminate, the conference and to agree to look at the problem again some months ahead when conditions might be a little bit different. I think it would also be wise if this conference, in some form, could confirm armistice arrangements which would remain in effect until a peace settlement becomes possible.
I admit, Mr. Chairman, that we are still far short of the achievement of a peaceful solution of the Korean question. It is an intensely difficult problem and we shall need a large fund of patience if an acceptable solution is to be attained; but there is still hope that such a solution will eventually be attained. Meanwhile I feel-and it is no unimportant result if I am correct in this feeling -that after the Geneva discussions the renewal of hostilities in Korea is much less likely than it might have been before that conference opened.
I should now say something about the Indo-Chinese side of the conference, Mr. Chairman. The situation in respect of this particular conference is, as Sir Winston Churchill said the other day, "in constant flux," and of course it is impossible therefore to make any final report on what has happened or speculate with any degree of assurance on what is likely to happen. The invitation to the Indo-Chinese conference came, as hon. members know, from the Berlin meeting in February. At that meeting of the foreign ministers it was decided that the membership of the Indo-Chinese conference should consist of the four inviting powers, the Chinese People's Republic and other interested states. Therefore at Geneva the inviting powers were confronted at once with the problem of deciding, and only they could make the decision, who were the other interested states.
There were various alternatives that were canvassed. The first was that the conference


would consist of the four, the Chinese communist government and the belligerents, the belligerents including the three associated states of Indo-China and the Viet Minh. Another proposal was that the conference should be widened somewhat to include also the neighbouring states and others directly and immediately concerned or who have commitments in that area.
Finally, it was suggested in some quarters that the conference might be extended even wider to include additional communist states, neutrals and others. After a good deal of discussion among the inviting powers it was decided that the limited conference of the four, the Chinese communists and the belligerent states gave the best prospect of progress and success and that was the decision which was eventually adopted.
As far as Canada's position is concerned, we felt we had no complaint in the circumstances about non-membership in this conference. We have of course in Canada a very definite interest in this problem but no special or separate responsibility for IndoChina or for southeast Asia. We have no regional or special commitments in that part of the world and no question of accepting such has arisen at Geneva. So the policy of our delegation in respect of this very limited conference, which I would point out again excluded even the neighbouring states, was to avoid on the one hand involvement in any specific commitments for which the delegation did not have a mandate and, on the other hand, to avoid any appearance or attitude of indifference to developments, the consequences of which, if they deteriorated into conflict, would certainly concern us and might involve us.
With these considerations in mind, we kept ourselves fully informed of the formal conference talks on Indo-China and participated in many useful informal discussions with delegations who were more directly concerned than we were with the problem of IndoChina and of security in southeast Asia. Our co-operation and our consultation in these discussions was especially close with the delegations of the commonwealth and of the United States. Here, if I may, Mr. Chairman, I should like to pay a very sincere tribute to the work that the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom is doing at this conference. His contacts with what we may call the other side gave him, in a sense, a mediating position on occasions on those matters where mediation was possible, and he is playing that invaluable role, if I may say so, with wisdom, patience and skill.
The problem of Indo-China as we see it is twofold. There is first the short-range problem, and that might in its turn be divided

into two parts. The first part is how to bring the Indo-Chinese war to an end on terms which France, which has borne the heat and the burden of the day there at great sacrifice for many years now, and the associated states of Indo-China could accept. The second point, so far as the short-range problem is concerned, is to work out international arrangements with a maximum of free Asian participation to guarantee any settlement that might be reached.
But there is also the long-range problem of how to build up a collective security system for southeast Asia, again with a maximum of free Asian participation, so that new aggression may be prevented and the peace maintained. The short-range problem was of course made more difficult by the character and developments of the war and that in turn tended to complicate, colour and at times almost give an atmosphere of crisis to the second and longer range objective. Crisis diplomacy, Mr. Chairman, is at times in these days unavoidable, but it is not always the most effective agency for the solution of long-range problems. In the search for a solution to these problems one viewpoint emphasized that we should concentrate first on the immediate problem of the war, then work out arrangements to guarantee the armistice settlement and only afterwards deal with the bigger problem of collective security and the future. It was felt by those who held this view that the exigencies of the military situation, and they certainly existed, should not push those concerned into premature or ill-considered discussion of political or defence arrangements which would not have the solid foundation of general and wide support which was essential, and which would have given the communists an excuse to say that the Geneva conference had been sabotaged.
It was felt by this school of opinion that before attempting to organize security you must be sure that you know what you are going to organize, also that all the free countries of southeast Asia should at least be invited to participate in the consideration of the problem, and finally that there should be reasonable assurance of agreement and unity at home in regard to the acceptance of the commitments which might be necessary.
That was one view, one approach to this problem. The other approach, the other viewpoint, argued that recent events had shown the necessity of not only making a just peace in Indo-China but of taking steps, even while the conference was going on, to show by readiness to consider arrangements for collective action that the pattern of communist aggression in Asia could not be repeated without meeting strong and collective resistance;
Supply-External Affairs that convincing evidence should be given now that any state which wanted to be free would be assisted in staying free.
It was felt by those who held this viewpoint-and there were of course shades of viewpoint between these two-that the adoption of this position and this attitude would not only make early peace in Indo-China more likely, by underlining the risks the communists would be taking if they prolonged the war, but would also act as an effective deterrent against communist aggression in the future. The United States, of course, has been reported as leaning to the latter view, and the United Kingdom to the former. Therefore alarming and often exaggerated conclusions have been drawn of Anglo-American divisions and differences. That was not unnatural in the circumstances, the circumstances being that there were at least 1,500 journalists in Geneva looking for news. Included in those 1,500 there was a small group of Canadian journalists and I should like to pay my tribute to the full, and I thought objective and careful, reports that were sent back home by that small group.
While differences, differences in emphasis and differences in approach, are I think unavoidable in a coalition of free states, especially in circumstances of this kind, it is of importance cf course that they should be resolved. It is of vital importance, and I know that this is appreciated on all sides and indeed in all countries except the communist countries, that these differences should not become differences of policy and principle between our two closest friends, the United Kingdom and the United States. It would be the greatest possible tragedy if Asia were allowed to split the West. I am confident that this will not occur.
So far as the immediate problem of IndoChina is concerned, the short-range problem that I mentioned, the delegation of France put forward proposals to solve it and so did the communist delegations. The French proposal put forward by Mr. Bidault, who is playing a very difficult part in Geneva with great skill, enumerated certain points of settlement, and his point? were supported by the United States, the United Kingdom and the associated states of Indo-China.
First, there should be an armistice to bring the fighting to an end, and then a political settlement based on the independence of the three states, which would be internationally supervised and guaranteed. Secondly, there should be separate consideration for the three states of Laos, Cambodia and Viet Nam. In so far as Laos and Cambodia were concerned, the Viet Minh should evacuate those countries at once. So far as Viet Nam
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The communist plan included proposals for an armistice in Indo-China and a political settlement to be negotiated simultaneously over the whole of Indo-China and all three states would be treated on the same basis. It also included recognition of what they called the liberating regimes, not only of the Viet Minh but also of Laos and Cambodia. We had not heard anything about those latter two regimes before we went to Geneva. It provided for the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Indo-China, and for elections in all three countries without any effective international supervision.
It seemed on the face of it, though they are still negotiating these proposals and it is unwise to give final conclusions in regard to them, that this communist plan was designed to bring communist regimes to power. At times it seemed also that the communists were indulging in delaying and obstructive tactics, encouraged no doubt by the military situation in Indo-China. However, Mr. Chairman, negotiations have been continuing during the last ten days since I left Geneva. They have been concerned with these two main considerations: first, the possibility of a negotiated cease-fire and, secondly, a political settlement. These negotiations seem now to be at a critical stage. We are being kept carefully and closely informed of them by our delegation at Geneva.
I believe it is too early to predict whether a negotiated settlement can or cannot be reached on honourable terms which would bring an effective end to the hostilities, provide a basis for a workable political settlement, recognizing the interests of the indigenous peoples of the countries concerned, and which would be a wise move in the direction of creating positions of stability in the southeast Asia area. So long as negotiations are still going on, however, I think it would be unwise and indeed unnecessary for me to speculate on the result of the failure to end the war. Nevertheless whether success or failure results, the problem of general security in southeast Asia remains.
As I see it, the solution to that problem depends largely on whether the countries most immediately involved can agree on the objectives and principles that should underlie


any collective arrangement to maintain and strengthen security in that area. I hope I may be pardoned, Mr. Chairman, if I put forward, on the basis of my own association with this problem in recent weeks, some considerations which in my view affect the search for security in southeast Asia.
In the first place, I think we must accept the fact that the international communist conspiracy is working for, and has made progress in, securing control of southeast Asia. We should certainly be aware of the danger to international peace and security in this development, a danger which cannot be exorcised by comforting interpretations of Asian communism as merely agrarian reform or as nationalism painted red.
It is true, I think, that the urge for national freedom and for social and economic reform, and not devotion to communism as such, is the mainspring of the greatest revolution of our time, the emergence of the masses of Asia from colonial control, feudal restrictions and western pressures. But communist imperialism, directed from Moscow or from Peking or both, has been too successful in exploiting, and in some cases in capturing these forces, even though communism as the agent of aggressive and reactionary imperialism cannot bring either freedom or progress to those it envelops. We know that, Mr. Chairman, but there are millions of destitute and despairing people in Asia who do not as yet.
In the second place we should, I think accept the fact that if this danger exists, and I think it does, there can be no objection to, indeed there should be approval of, regional collective security arrangements organized to meet those dangers in the right way, by those immediately concerned, under article 51 of the United Nations charter. We cannot support the principle of collective security in one part of the world and reject it in another. I think it is right and important that the United States of America should be reassured by its friends on this question of principle. Nevertheless, we should also recognize that in practice the type of collective security arrangements suitable for the Atlantic area might not be practical or desirable in southeast Asia.
An understanding of these needs and these differences will assist, indeed I think will be essential, in finding the right regional solution to the problem of security in that part of the world, once it is agreed that such a solution is necessary to supplement and make more binding the general application of the United Nations charter. Any such regional solution, I think, might well embody the following principles:
First, arrangements reached must be consistent with the provisions of the United

Nations charter. If they could be associated in some form with the United Nations, so much the better.
Secondly, they must be divorced from anything that could be called colonialism and not designed to maintain regimes, colonial or national, that have little or no popular support.
Thirdly, it should be recognized that the problem cannot be dealt with effectively in military terms alone, and that no mere military agreement is likely to be satisfactory or enduring. Indeed military aggression of the conventional sort is not likely to be the main danger so much as communist imperialism exploiting those forces within the state-and not always unworthy forces-in order to bring about subversion, civil war and the forcible installation of communist regimes.
It should also be recognized that, as President Eisenhower said on May 12, no country can be saved from communism unless it wants to be saved.
Then, fourth, as I see it, any solution must not be, or susceptible to the interpretation as being, a purely "western" one, or one from which free Asian countries feel that they have been excluded. Surely we must recognize that, whether we agree with all their policies or not, little of a substantial or permanent character is likely to be achieved in establishing peace and security in southeast Asia, or any other part of Asia, without the advice, co-operation and assistance of the free Asian countries. I think it is most important-and I am sure the house agrees with me-that those countries should feel that, even if they are not members of it, any collective security arrangements in southeast Asia that may be worked out should be in their interest, and have taken into consideration their interests. If not enough Asian states feel that way, the foundation of any southeast Asian security organization will not be very firm.
In this connection, the commonwealth association can play and has played a valuable role. And that is one reason why, in my opinion, it was helpful and wise to keep the Asian members of the commonwealth informed, as they were kept informed, closely and continuously, of Geneva developments. It is also one reason why I regret that India, or some similar Asian state or states, was not a member of the Geneva conference.
The working out of an arrangement which would be based on the considerations I have ventured to mention will not be easy, and I think that it will take time. But there is a dilemma here, in that time may be against those who desire to build up a security
Supply-External Affairs system to deter aggression in southeast Asia. After all, there is a war going on there. It is not easy, in diplomacy, to reconcile considerations of defence urgency with the necessity for careful political preparation and of securing general and wholehearted agreement. There can be danger both from overtimidity and from overzealousness. There can also be trouble between friends if there is doubt about timing, about exactly what is being planned, about what we are trying to secure, and about what we are trying to prevent.
We should certainly be clear on that last point-what we are trying to prevent. Is the united action which it is desired to bring about to be against communism as such, regardless of the means, military or otherwise, which it adopts to secure its ends in any particular Asian country; or is the commitment for collective action against military aggression only? If it is to be the first, then we should realize that arrangements to achieve this end will be interpreted as a declaration of implacable and fixed hostility, with all action short of general war, and even at the risk of such war, against Asian communism.
The other concept is that which is embodied in NATO. Here the commitment for action, in contradistinction to consultation, is clear and explicit. And it comes into operation as soon as a military aggression has been committed by one state against another-but not sooner.
I do not think it will do any service to the unity of those who are working together for peace if there is not a very clear understanding on this point, and if any negotiations are not based on that understanding.
Now, if I may close by referring a little more specifically to the policy of the Canadian government in respect to the questions we have been discussing at Geneva, and which are still under discussion there.
We will continue-and I am sure there will be general agreement on this-we will continue to assist in bringing about a Korean peace settlement, consistent with United Nations principles and decisions; but we will not repudiate or betray those principles or decisions.
If the Geneva conference should not at this time achieve such a settlement, we will favour a re-examination of the problem at a future date, whether at the United Nations general assembly or by a resumption of the present conference called for that purpose.
We will oppose any move by anyone to resume hostilities in Korea.
So far as Indo-China and southeast Asia are concerned, we recognize that Canada has
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Supply-External Affairs a very real interest in what is happening there, and what is likely to happen there. As a country with hundreds of miles of exposed coast on the Pacific, Canada is naturally concerned with problems affecting security in the Pacific and in Asia. Moreover, we know from the experience of two world wars that peace is indivisible and that a threat to peace anywhere can soon cover the whole world.
Our inevitable concern for developments in southeast Asia is increased by our close relationship to the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and the three Asian members of the commonwealth. The growing anxiety of these latter three over hostilities going on so near to their homelands can be readily appreciated, since their security would be very seriously threatened if an aggressive communist nation took control, either by internal subversion or by direct military intervention, of one after another of the countries in the area.
Added evidence of our concern for the security and well-being of the nations of south and southeast Asia is to be found in our active participation in the Colombo plan, whereby we have sought to associate ourselves with the area's economic development.
In so far as accepting special political and defence commitments is concerned, there is of course a limit to what a country of Canada's population and resources can do. We have limited strength, in both men and materials; and our commitments, Mr. Chairman, are already heavy. Existing undertakings, such as those under NATO, are such as to circumscribe what Canada can and cannot undertake, militarily and otherwise, not only in southeast Asia but elsewhere.
And therefore, while it is true that if peace is threatened by communist aggression anywhere, it is threatened everywhere, it is also true that Canada cannot be expected to accept special or regional defence commitments in every part of the world where collective arrangements may be advisable. We have of course, through membership in the United Nations, accepted the provisions of the charter. Canada has, therefore, already definite, if general, obligations in the maintenance and restoration of peace and security in all areas where these are in danger. In this connection, it should be realized that the situation in Indo-China, with all its consequences to the peace and security of southeast Asia, has not yet been brought to the United Nations, and is not before the United Nations at the present time. If or when that position should change, Canada's policy, like those of other member states, will of course depend upon the nature, the purposes


and the scope of any action which might be recommended by the United Nations. Any action involving an extension of Canada's present commitments would be placed before parliament.
The responsibility for seeking recourse to the United Nations would rest with the states and governments in the areas which are most directly concerned, and any such approach would, I assume, depend upon the outcome of the direct discussions which are now going on in Geneva, and also on a clear assessment of the possibilities and limitations of effective United Nations action. It is clear-at least it seems clear to me-that the United Nations Organization possesses a fund of experience and provides available procedures for peaceful settlement which, in other circumstances, have helped in the past to put seemingly intractable problems on the road to solution, or to halt deterioration in situations threatening the peace, and I would hope that the United Nations might prove useful in this situation, too. But, Mr. Chairman, whether at the United Nations or at Geneva, or wherever the road may lead, the search for peace and security goes on.


Mr. Diefenbaker:: Mr. Chairman, as I
listened to the unveiling of the speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs I was rather disappointed in that stand as revealed by him in the early portion of his speech. Without having before me the actual words he used in the two or three concluding paragraphs of his speech, I believe the minister has gone farther in the commitment of Canada to its world responsibilities than this government has ever gone before. His concluding statement to the effect that Canada today has a responsibility in NATO, which is direct, and that Canada internationally, under the United Nations, assumes responsibility for assuring that communism should not advance anywhere in the world, regardless of any words that might dilute the statement that he made means, if literally taken, a commitment far and beyond those ever before taken by this government.
When speaking of the situation in Asia, the minister said that which many of us in other parts of the house have said on other occasions, namely, that military defences of themselves will not maintain bulwarks against communism unless the nations affected desire to be protected or to stand against communism. He referred to the Colombo plan with satisfaction in the degree to which Canada is contributing to raising the standards of people in undeveloped areas in Asia and in other parts of the world.
Through the years I have taken the stand that Canada must extend the amount of that

assistance; tor people who suffer from the curse of hunger cannot have their stomachs filled by promises of democracy.
The views he expressed at Geneva on May 4 regarding Korea in general represent, I think, the point of view of the Canadian people. What people want everywhere in the world is a cessation of war and the achievement of a degree of peace, which has not been present in recent years.
While the minister weighed the views of two schools of thought in Geneva on the proper course to take to oppose successfully the communist march, as revealed here in the course of his speech, he did not place Canada's position before the conference as I think he should have done. The point of view he has expressed today on southeast Asia is one that he could have expressed there regardless of whether Canada was in fact a member of that conference.
All the peoples of the world, apart from those who are dominated in communist countries, desire peace. Peace can be achieved either by negotiation or through collective action. The minister states that it is the intention of the free nations associated at Geneva to continue negotiation until such time as it will have been established that there is a possibility that negotiation may lead to settlement; but if it is demonstrably established that what is taking place is mere propaganda, that will be the time to terminate the gathering. I agree to the utmost that Canada has a responsibility to bring about the closest relationship between Great Britain and the United States of America. Any divisions that have taken place can be regarded only as difficulties and divergences of views such as happen at any time between nations, however closely allied or united in common objectives they may be.
The real trouble at Geneva was well set out in an editorial in the Ottawa Journal of May 15, which reads as follows:
The true reason for Geneva's failure becomes starkly clear. It is that the western powers, unable to make peace, are unwilling to make war-unwilling to make even the limited war that might lead to something worse.
The communists know this. They learned it when Mr. Dulles arrived at Geneva brandishing a sword only to return it to its scabbard. They learned it when they saw Britain and France turn away from Mr. Dulles. They learned it completely when the congress of Mr. Dulles' own country showed that Mr. Dulles was in fact offering something he had no power to deliver.
The communists, thus enlightened, and with time on their side had but to wait.
This is the west's tragedy.
Everywhere in the allied camp there was disunity, doubt, confusion.
Yet now, with the test come in Indo-China, with the whole western case in the balance in Asia, it is the west that falters, not the communists.
Supply-External Affairs
One can understand why it is they falter, for the free nations with the grim experience of two world wars realize something of the awfulness of the possibility which faces the world. It is so easy for us here to say what nations should do; it is difficult to secure that unity in the action they may take with the inherent risk of war should too drastic a course be entered upon.
The tribute the minister paid to Mr. Eden is one that I believe will be accepted everywhere among the peoples of the free nations. With dignity, with a capacity for negotiation based on experience, with a realization that only in give and take is there hope for the achievement of peace, he represented and epitomized something of what British statesmanship can achieve.
I was struck with the fact that while the minister generally dealt with the necessity for unity in southeast Asia among freedom-loving nations, he did not definitely state the views of this government regarding a pact in southeast Asia to protect, preserve and maintain freedom in southeast Asia.
He spoke of the need for collective action there; and of bringing the free nations in southeast Asia into an Asiatic pact. I think Mr. Eden, by his conciliatory course at the Geneva conference, has gone a long way to show the people of India that straightforward negotiations for peace are being met by the communists who place roadblocks in the road that leads to peace and settlement- roadblocks of evasion and postponement of final conclusions.
But there is hope. The attitude of Pakistan and of Ceylon indicate that those nations are beginning to realize this, that only in collective security is there survival. They are beginning to realize, too, that communism is something more than a philosophy. They recognize its aggressiveness and danger to their freedom and survival.
They are looking for a declaration by the free nations of the need for the establishment and the setting up in Asia of an organization similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization has operated in Europe, why then will not a similarly conceived organization for peace operate in Asia? It will not operate, unless it includes Asian members. I think that is a salient feature which must be realized.
Out of the travail of Geneva may well be achieved a realization by India, Burma and other Asian countries of what communism means, so there is hope for the establishment of an organization similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which has
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Supply-External Affairs achieved so much for freedom's survival in Europe. Canada being a Pacific power, what attitude will the Canadian government take with reference to becoming a member of such an organization in the Pacific? For several years the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra has been advocating the formation of a Pacific pact. On occasion he has faced ridicule and sometimes indifference. The events of the last few months bear witness to the degree to which that hon. gentleman saw something of the needs in Asia in his advocacy of an organization similar to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
The other day I referred to some conclusions I had formed in consequence of the visit I made to Europe a few weeks ago. In every part of Europe every opportunity and every courtesy was extended to me by members of the Canadian diplomatic corps, and every opportunity was given me to see the things I desired to see. I came back with a renewed confidence in the forcefulness and effectiveness of NATO and with the hope, almost one of assurance, that in the immediate future peace will be maintained through the instrumentality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
What I said has been borne out since by a statement within the last few lays by Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, when he said that allied forces are capable of stopping any Soviet surprise attack on western Europe.
Only an all-out Soviet offensive preceded by a big build-up could overwhelm present allied armies, he said, and such a build-up would give time for the west to prepare itself.
That is his considered opinion as to the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and I think the minister could follow no wiser course to bring Britain and the United States together even closer than in the past, than making the announcement that, in the event of the Geneva conference proving unsuccessful in settling the Indo-China problem, Canada would join with other freedom-loving nations in a pact in Asia designed to assure peace to the same degree as peace has been assured in Europe through the instrumentality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Indo-China, and what is happening there, may be a turning point in our history. What is happening in Geneva may bring the commonwealth closer to the United States than ever before. The commonwealth has a tremendous contribution to make in the world in the preservation of peace in Asia,


with its Asiatic membership joining with the western members of the family.
The future of southeast Asia is at stake. The unity of the western powers must be maintained. Communist strategy seems to be designed to divide and conquer. This debate will show that as far as Canada is concerned we will not be divided. I hope there will come in our country a fuller realization of the responsibilities of Canada in the world of today, and a determination to continue the course of peace we took in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The minister has shown that Canada has responsibilities for peace in all parts of the world, not only in the United Nations; we have to accept them in any Pacific pact that may be achieved, so that the other parts of our commonwealth-Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon-will know that Canada and the commonwealth will stand with the United States and thereby assure the maintenance of a solid wall against the advance of communism everywhere in the world.


Mr. Coldwell:: Mr. Chairman, we listened this afternoon to an extremely interesting speech. I was particularly interested in the four points the minister made at the conclusion of his speech, when he said that Canada would continue at Geneva to endeavour to bring about a settlement in Korea through United Nations efforts; that, if unsuccessful, we would hope that a further examination of the situation could be made at a future date with the hope that something useful might come out of it and particularly that peace might be attained; and that we would oppose the reopening of hostilities in Korea. Then again, with regard to IndoChina, the minister made it clear-and I am glad he did so-that we share the anxieties that are felt by our commonwealth associates, particularly those in southeast Asia. Then he went on to say that Canada had already extended her defence commitments as far as he thought we were able to extend them.
I could not agree with the hon. member for Prince Albert when he said that this was a new statement involving further commitments because, as I understood the minister, he said that we had, under the United Nations charter, obligations which we were prepared at all times to fulfil. He also said that we had accepted obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which we were obliged to fulfil but that beyond that Canada should not go. I do not say that he used those words, but I think that was the inference.

This afternoon I am not going to say anything about NATO, although the minister made a short reference to it. Later on in the discussion of the estimates opportunities may arise when hon. members who wish to discuss NATO and to make inquiries concerning that organization will have the opportunity of doing so. I was pleased indeed to hear the minister say that the subcommittee of the disarmament conference, although meeting in secret, had made some progress in adopting an agenda and that the speed which had been attained in preparing for the further discussions was still being maintained.
The minister paid a tribute to the personnel of the Canadian delegation left at Geneva. From my experience at various international conferences with some of the personnel of our delegation, I am perfectly sure that Canada will be well represented even in the absence of the minister; though, of course, should events require his presence I have no doubt that he would proceed there immediately.
I do not want to go into all the points made by the minister but I want to say this. If we are to attain understanding and peace and if we are to attain the co-operation of the Asian people-which we all know is so essential, as the hon. member for Prince Albert indicated in his remarks also-I think what we have to do is to demonstrate our understanding of and sympathy for the aims and aspirations of those Asians who are seeking for independence and for freedom.
The minister said that the situation with regard to Indo-China at the conference was always in a state of flux. I think that statement is true. When we hear it said that this is a struggle between the western democracies and the communists for the control of Asia, I think we must bear in mind that the position in which we find ourselves is largely of our own making. Had we shown sufficient sympathy for the aspirations of the Asian peoples, certainly from the close of the late war, I do not think that the communists would have been able to seize the leadership of liberation movements in the Asian countries. If certain Asians are now becoming a part of a communist conspiracy or are coming under the aegis of communist imperialism, it is largely our neglect of opportunities that were presented to us in years past that has brought this condition about.
This afternoon I want to say something about the background of the present conflict in Indo-China because I think it has a bearing on the policy that Canada must pursue, particularly if things take a turn for the worse. To begin with, we should keep in
Supply-External Affairs mind, of course, that this conflict in IndoChina is not of recent origin. Determined efforts of the Indo-Chinese people to obtain their freedom began many years ago. When Japan entered the war in 1941 the allied troops were actually assisted by the nationalists and other groups-under whose leadership?-under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh. At that time the movement was known as Viet Minh. A proclamation was issued by this independence group. They were not communists but were a group, as Nehru said the other day in his statement 

and which I may refer to in a moment- consisting of all sorts and conditions of Indo-Chinese people, including people who were by no means communists, but some of whom were socialists, some of whom were Liberals and indeed some of whom were Catholic in religion. I heard that interesting fact stated also the other day in a talk given by Mr. Andre Laurendeau, editor of Le Devoir, in a Sunday evening commentary not long ago when he recorded a conversation he had had with a young Indo-Chinese lady who was a member of the Roman Catholic church and she refused to speak French because she said until the French were out of Indo-China they were not going to use the language of France. A proclamation was issued by this group-and I quote part of it- supporting "the defence of democratic principles by the United States, U.S.S.R., Britain, and China"-as they called the war at that time-and at the same time our Indo-Chinese allies asked the great powers to make a declaration that when victory came over the Japanese forces, the Indo-Chinese people would be granted complete autonomy.
When the war ended a provisional government of fifteen members was set up, five of whom were communists but which included nationalists, some Catholics and others, to govern the country. That group elected Ho Chi Minh as president of "the democratic republic of Viet Nam" This republic was recognized in September, 1945, by the government of China which of course was at that time the government headed by Chiang Kai-shek.
In March, 1946,-to give a brief outline of these events-France signed an agreement with Ho Chi Minh recognizing the democratic republic of Viet Nam "as a free state with its own government, parliament, army and finance, and forming part of the IndoChinese Federation of the French Union". Unfortunately that recognition did not last. In 1947 grave differences arose between the new republic and the French republic which resulted in various acts of violence. In 1948, a year later, France signed a new agreement
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Supply-External Affairs with Bao Dai, Emperor of Annam, and appointed him chief of Viet Nam within the French union. Similar agreements were made by France with the kingdoms of Laos and Cambodia, the two other states of Indo-China. This gave communist leadership the opportunity to further the communist conspiracy, to use the minister's own words. Then of course war began in earnest. The French used United States equipment which had been given to them to prosecute the war, and Ho Chi Minh and his associates, in what they termed their struggle against colonialism, received supplies from the new government of China, a government which simply continued the recognition of this new republic which had been accorded by the former government of Chiang Kai-shek.
I think it is with this background that our appraisal of the situation in Indo-China at the present time must be made. The struggle, as we all know, gradually assumed the more ominous aspects that have culminated in the events of the past few months, events with which we are more or less familiar from the public press. The French government has poured armies, effort and money into the war. French public opinion has been disturbed and divided and is still disturbed and divided. Daniel Mayer, as spokesman of the French socialist party, the largest party in the French chamber of deputies, referred to the background of the struggle on March 5 when speaking in the chamber of deputies, and stated that the agreements between France and Indo-China were not "mere governmental agreements but agreements which bind both peoples." He went on to say that they tie French policy with regard to all Vietnamese governments whatever their character. He referred to a statement by his late leader, Leon Blum, in 1950 when he referred to the agreement in these words:
They are in reality concluded between the French and the Vietnamese people and proclaim and sanction, unconditionally and absolutely, the independence of Viet Nam within the French union.
M. Mayer then went on to state the problem as he saw it. In the French chamber of deputies he said:
The problem which faces us today is not so much that of giving more power to the present Vietnamese government. It is rather that of determining whom that government really represents. A Syngman Rhee and a Chiang Kai-shek are sufficient handicaps to the reasonable policy which the west should adopt in Asia. Britain, a nation of traders and sailors, had the wisdom to give India her independence-one of the finest actions promoted by the Attlee government. If only we had followed its example then, we should not need to debate the war in Indo-China here today-there would have been peace long ago. On the 17th of January, 1949, when we socialists were in the government, the general secretary of our party wrote to the president of the council reminding him that
fMr. Coldwell.l

the socialists had warned every successive government against a policy of force and against negotiating peace through men like Bao Dai and General Xuan-already then these policies had suffered shipwreck.
He went on to say:
Today a lead has come from the most remarkable statesman of the young Indian nation, who has set an example of greatness and given us an opportunity to respond in the same spirit. France must seize every opportunity which offers itself for peace. Only thus will she remain loyal to her world mission and respond to the voices which are calling from the very depths of the French people.	!
I might add once more that this was said in the French chamber of deputies as recently as March 5 of this year. Since these words were spoken the Berlin conference has of course been held and at the present time, as outlined by the minister this afternoon, the representatives of the nations directly involved, together with the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet union, are meeting in Geneva. As the minister said, what the outcome will be is still very doubtful. But in my opinion the climate of this conference has been bad from the beginning.
As Mr. Nehru pointed out in his speech of April 24, great concern has been felt because of statements which have been made since the Geneva conference was called, of the possibility of attacks on the Asian mainland and massive retaliation and the use of atomic weapons, by leading members of the United States congress and some of the military personnel of our great neighbour. Proposals for a collective pact for united action in southeast Asia, without the proviso that the hon. member for Prince Albert made this afternoon, without the adherence of the Asian nations, have caused general alarm in Asia and, I may say, in other parts of the world.
It is certain, as Mr. Nehru stated, that the implications of these statements promote fear that the newly-won independence of the Asian countries may be jeopardized. If I may quote Mr. Nehru, he said:
The maintenance of independence and sovereignty of the Asian countries as well as the end of colonial and foreign rule is essential to the prosperity of Asian peoples as well as for the peace of the world.
That is the considered opinion of the leader of the great Indian associate in our commonwealth of nations. I say that we in the commonwealth of nations have every reason to consider carefully the opinions of our largest and most populated sister nation in the commonwealth. Proposals for a southeast Asian pact should not be considered without first obtaining the co-operation and agreement of India, Burma, Pakistan and Ceylon. For the western powers to enter

such a pact with Australia and New Zealand would in our opinion be fatal to the democratic cause in Asia, and fatal to the peace of the world. I think our United States friends should be told that very plainly by Canada.
Canada should oppose and refuse to associate itself with any southeast Asian alliance which does not include at least the Asian countries I have mentioned. I think, indeed, that was implicit in the statement of the minister this afternoon. This is apparently the view that is strongly held in the United Kingdom. On April 12 and 13 Mr. Dulles and Mr. Eden met to discuss the Indo-Chinese situation. They issued a joint statement which read in part as follows:
We are ready to take part, with the other countries principally concerned, that is France, Australia, New Zealand, Siam and the Philippines, in an examination of the possibility of establishing a collective defence, within the framework of the United Nations charter, to assure the peace, security and freedom of southeast Asia and the western Pacific.
You will notice that some Asian nations were included and some were not mentioned. On April 13 Mr. Eden placed this statement before the House of Commons. Mr. Attlee, the leader of the opposition, urged that it be recognized that "in building up the strength of the free nations of Asia against aggression, it is vital that there should be a union of Asian countries as well as those of European descent, whether in Australia, here, or in America." Mr. Attlee went on to declare:
The essential thing is that it should be a freeing of the peoples of Asia which should not in any way be misrepresented-as it may be misrepresented-as a defence of obsolete colonialism.
Therein lies the danger, that a southeast Asian pact without these new free nations would be regarded by these peoples as an attempt to inflict upon them once again an obsolete colonialism. Thus there was a debate in the British parliament and the matter was discussed by the British press and the public throughout the next few weeks. The situation was discussed, and with what result? I read quite a number of British papers, and as far as I have been able to ascertain the result was that public opinion was strongly against any declaration involving united action in southeast Asia without participation by India and the adjacent countries. I believe Mr. Churchill was impressed with public opinion, so that on April 27 he rose in the house, and in reply to a question said:
The government are not prepared to give any undertakings about United Kingdom military action in Indo-China in advance of the results of Geneva.
It is a fact, too, that Mr. Eden at Geneva has exercised, as the hon. gentleman said
Supply-External Affairs this afternoon, patience, perseverance and restraint in an endeavour to bring about a cease-fire and peace by negotiation.
While this conference has been in progress France has suffered severe setbacks in IndoChina, and now finds herself in a position where she cannot win. Irrespective of what may happen in that area, her bargaining position has been effectually weakened. In the "Foreign Policy Bulletin" of May 15, 1954, Mr. William B. Dunn, a member of the United States foreign service who served from 1949 to 1953 in the troubled area, and who is regarded as a specialist on southeast Asia, points out that the Vietnamese are determined to win complete independence. He is not a communist and he has not been attacked by Senator McCarthy or any others. He was regarded, and is still regarded by the state department, as an authority on southeast Asian problems. He says this:
It means independence from France, and no other political problem seems to them to be of much importance. Virtually all Vietnamese overflow with bitter recollections of firsthand experiences under the old colonial regime. They find it impossible to believe that France is capable of any generous act. Consequently, they are not prepared to believe their country to be independent as long as there is any special political association with France or while the military forces of the French union remain in Viet Nam. The French sponsored government of Bao Dai to them is a mere continuation of the old colonial system under a new label.
We may not think that is a fair statement so far as France is concerned, but he gives it as his opinion, and I want to place it on the record because it is the opinion of a man who is regarded as an authority on the problems of southeast Asia. I may say this also seems to be the opinion of many citizens of the United States. We are told that congress has been deluged with letters protesting against United States intervention in this struggle. Many citizens of the United States remember that until very recently United States policy has been traditionally an anticolonial policy. Indeed, many of us who had the opportunity, before and during the war, of addressing United States audiences can remember vividly the invariable question relating to the struggle of India for independence, and what I considered from time to time the very unfair references to Canada as a part of the British Empire allegedly supporting colonial oppression in India.
We believe that if France declared dissociation from colonialism in Indo-China it would be more effective in weakening the anti-colonial propaganda of Moscow and Peking, which is false propaganda but which has proven so valuable to Ho Chi Minh, than the dropping of an atomic or hydrogen bomb
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Supply-External Affairs on Indo-China or any other part of Asia. Indeed, such proposals by prominent United States leaders for direct intervention have received severe criticism in the United Kingdom press. The London Economist, which many of us read from time to time, certainly cannot be regarded as an anti-United States paper. I would say that from time to time the Economist has warmly defended United States economic and external policies. In its issue of May 8, three weeks ago, the paper had this to say:
Even the majority leader of the Senate himself. Senator Knowland. is allowed to parade his irresponsibility daily, urging war with China and, when others hesitate to involve themselves in it, writing them off as unworthy allies. Is it surprising, with such goings on filling the press, that there should be a lack of confidence in the coherence, and even in the pacific intentions, of American diplomacy?
Then it sharply criticized the tactics of Mr. Dulles, and the Economist said this of his activities:
Bluff plays a proper part in diplomacy, if it is not tried too often and is never called. Unfortunately, too many of Mr. Dulles's bluffs have not worked. The "liberation" bluff, the "agonizing reappraisal" bluff, the "instant and massive retaliation" bluff-all these have been discovered to mean much less than they appeared to. The result has been to frighten America's allies much more than to impress the communists.
I fear, unfortunately, those words are true.
I should like to say again that I am not criticizing the people of the United States, as a people, because I have every confidence that in the main the people of the United States share the desire for peace and a settlement that most of the rest of us have in mind.
Then, too, ill feeling has been engendered by the suggestion that if it were not for British timidity the United States would have approved the French request for air help before Dien Bien Phu fell. British opinion is doubtful if congress would have approved such action, and even if congress did it is doubtful if United States public opinion would have supported the action. I am going to quote again from the comment in the Economist:
In any case, one would have thought the merits of intervening at this precise moment of time and in a way that was much more likely to provoke Chinese counter-intervention than to save Dien Bien Phu were, to say the least, open to question.
I have devoted considerable attention to British opinion because they see, as we should do and I believe from the Prime Minister's statements earlier this session we see too, that such intervention as proposed in some United States circles would lead to an all-out Asian war and possibly to a world war. In any event, and I think this is something we


always have to bear in mind in the commonwealth, in my opinion it would destroy once and for all that valuable association of India with Britain and the other countries in the commonwealth. I think we could say goodbye to India if that happened.
Articles by Hanson W. Baldwin, the well-known writer on international affairs, in the New York Times point out the dangers inherent in intervention. In various articles in the New York Times and particularly one which appeared last Sunday, May 23, he warns that the use of atomic weapons would be useless against the guerrilla forces of Ho Chi Minh, and would have the effect of consolidating much of southeast Asia psychologically, at least, against the United States. In summing up his views Mr. Baldwin wrote:
The limited advantages and considerable disadvantages-and the risks-of any course we may take in Indo-China were therefore enough to give Washington pause.
If I interpret the remarks of the minister of external affairs this afternoon correctly, and the remarks of the Prime Minister on an earlier occasion, we did not need to pause because we had not taken steps in that direction. I know that gives some satisfaction to many in this house and in the country.
Under these circumstances and with this background, it is obvious that the organization of collective security in southeast Asia presents an entirely different problem from the kind of regional collective security brought about by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I do not want to go into that, because the minister went into it. But I think that is perfectly correct; the two ideas are not analogous. They are quite different, and we should bear that in mind.
Walter Lippmann, whose articles many of us read in the Montreal Gazette every other day, elaborated this view in that newspaper on May 14 of this year. He suggested an alternative policy to strengthen the existing governments of Burma, Thailand and Indonesia, but with this very important proviso: Only if western co-operation is invited, not if it is forced upon them.
In other words, we believe that the initiative must come from Asia if we are going to have a security pact, a regional pact, within the United Nations, and particularly from India. That is essential if any united defence policy is to be approved by Canada, and as I hope by other western countries. And as I have already indicated, we think that any such pact should be a regional pact within the orbit of the United Nations charter and requested by Asian countries.
A few days ago I read a very interesting statement issued by the non-communist

socialists of Viet Nam. Let us bear in mind that these non-communist or indeed anticommunist Asian socialist parties in Burma, Indonesia and other countries are exercising a tremendous influence on the conduct of affairs. They sent a statement to the foreign ministers of the principal powers represented at the Geneva conference, and outlined some simple objectives which, they said, must be pursued if peace was to be attained. These objectives were four in number. The first was the suspension of hostilities. Second was the establishment of real independence for Viet Nam. Third was general elections under the control of neutral countries such as-and they gave as examples-India, the Philippines and Siam. Fourth was the conclusion of a treaty giving France cultural, economic, diplomatic and technical facilities similar to those which were provided in the treaty between Great Britain and India.
It seems to me that these are very moderate terms and, if accepted, might form the basis for a lasting peace. They may be idealistic; they may be unacceptable to the other side, even if they were acceptable to our side. But at least it seems to me they form a basis. And in the granting of elections I think they confirm very largely the views most of us hold with regard to the future government of Korea-that if free elections are to be held in Korea they should be supervised by those who are not involved in the war, supervised by those who are not associated with the communist group. And I would add one further proviso: They should be Asian nations associated with the United Nations, but not having participated in the late war.
There are a number of other matters I would have liked to discuss this afternoon. I had wanted to deal more particularly with the background, and with the situation as we see it in Indo-China. I am certain that if France had followed the example of Great Britain in India or, as did the Dutch a little later under pressure, in Indonesia, the situation in southeast Asia would be far different from what it is today.
But the .situation is there. And not by threats of massive retaliation, not by threats of military intervention shall we be able to end the troubles in that region. I still believe that the more we can do to assist these Asian peoples in arriving at independence and freedom, and then of building up their economies so that they may improve their standard of living, the more we shall have done to meet the threat of communism. We can do more in that than in any other way.
The tragedy of it is that, so long as there is turmoil and strife in these countries, there is little or no production, little or no building up
Supply-External Affairs of those countries. And behind them, to the rear of them, China stands uninvaded; and within its borders, so far as we know, it is at peace, building up its economy and giving a demonstration of what these communists will tell the Asian countries communists can do.
I think that is the tragedy of our time, and I hope that the conference at Geneva will be successful. I agree with my hon. friend; Mr. Eden's part in that conference has been a very worthy one. One of the reasons he has been able to act as negotiator is, I would draw to the attention of the house, that unlike Mr. Dulles, who walked out because the United States does not recognize the fact of a new government in China, Mr. Eden could remain and talk because his government had recognized that fact. That, I think, is an argument for those who would recognize the fact of a new government in China. While we may not agree with his political views, Mr. Eden has been enabled to fulfil a function that no one else could fulfil, at least in the same way.


Mr. Low:: Mr. Chairman, before I enter upon a discussion of external affairs generally I should like to explain to the house why it was impossible for me to be here at the beginning of Mr. Pearson's address. I am sorry I had to be away for well over a half hour attending a funeral. I should have liked very much to have been in my seat to hear all he said. However, he was courteous enough to send me a copy of the notes from which he was going to speak. Since coming to the house I have had a chance to look at them, and also to follow what he had to say.
However, before dealing with the minister's statement I should like to say something about the work of the external affairs committee. Nothing has been said this afternoon to this effect, but the occasion for the launching of this debate was a report from that committee. I should like to say a word or two about two or three features of our work, as a background to what I shall discuss later in connection with our external relations.
I have been a member of that committee since it was set up in 1945. During all those years I think it has proved to be a good committee. It has justified itself by the thorough study of the estimates it has made each year and by the painstaking and careful investigation of matters that have arisen. I believe there is very little relative to our external relations that has been overlooked. I believe that the good experience in the external affairs committee might serve as a pattern for some of the other departments of government. I would not suggest all of them should
5200	HOUSE OF
Supply-External Affairs follow the pattern, but certainly I should think it might be wise to try the experiment of referring the departmental estimates of three or four departments to select standing or special committees for studying. Because it seems to me that when the estimates are studied by a committee, where witnesses can be examined, conclusions drawn and recommendations made to the government in a report, a very thorough job can be done- more thorough than in the way in which we deal with estimates normally.
Of course I am not so optimistic as to think that a report sent back to the government from a committee will attain anything very startling, because the inclination on the part of the heavily weighted government committees is to avoid any recommendations or suggestions that might be slightly critical of government policy. For that reason I do not think that the reports would be of tremendous value, but certainly the study itself of the estimates would be.
In the course of our studies this year, most able and interesting witnesses came before us. We appreciated them all; and if we mention some of them particularly, it is only because their work in the field of duty is more interesting to us than were the others. We called before us Mr. Nik Cavell, who is the head of the international economic and technical co-operation division of the Department of Trade and Commerce and administrator of the Canadian participation in the Colombo plan. Mr. Cavell's evidence was not only intensely interesting, but it was most valuable to the whole committee. Through him we learned about the many valuable projects that are being carried on under the Colombo plan and the technical assistance branches in Ceylon, India and Pakistan. We learned that Canada is participating in some very worth-while projects. From the evidence which we were able to get, I would judge that up until recently, at any rate, the countries contributing to the Colombo plan were putting up just about as much money as could efficiently and readily be used by India, Pakistan and Ceylon. However, I think that we are emerging from that position now, and as more engineers and technicians are available, and as experience accumulates, and, further, as these countries that have been looked upon as underdeveloped in the past are able to build up their own productive capacities, more money for capital certainly could be used. Then, under the plans that I have mentioned, I think it is important for us now to consider increasing the amount of capital in both technical assistance and the Colombo plan. The sum of $25 million is what we have been giving each year under the Colombo plan.


That will not go very far in the development of the worth-while Colombo projects in which Canada is participating at the present time.
I mention this work in particular because I thought that what the minister said this afternoon is perfectly correct. I think he affirmed his belief that the problems in Asia cannot be solved by military action alone. That is true; I believe that. The Colombo plan and the technical assistance work are two means by which we can help and supplement whatever else might have to be done. I think that these two ideas were well conceived. In my judgment, the best help we can possibly extend to any underdeveloped people or to any underdeveloped country is the kind of help that will enable them to help themselves. Those countries need power development schemes; great pumping stations for lifting waters out of the rivers and into irrigation canals so that it can be put on the land in various parts of their countries. They need improved and more efficient transportation systems that will make it possible for much more efficient productive enterprises and commerce to be carried on. They need improved fishing techniques and equipment to make available the protein foods from the sea, and with these things more cold storage plants that can properly take care of the fish when they are caught. All of these things, and perhaps many more, are the type of things that need to be developed in those countries. To a very large degree they are being done and done very commendably under the Colombo plan.
Mr. Cavell's evidence indicated that already projects which had been under development for some years in India and Pakistan especially are showing their results in increased production of foodstuffs. Last year, for example, for the first time in many years, we were told that India found it possible to provide the necessary food for her people without having to buy abroad. Of course we realize that the past season was a good crop season, but the various community projects under India's five-year plan, assisted by Colombo and the technical assistance program, have done much to increase production of food in that country.
It is reasonable to expect that within a matter of 30 years or 40 years it will be possible, with help from the western countries, to bring up the productive capacity of these three commonwealth countries to the point where those areas will be able to feed their great population on a reasonable level of good nutrition.
Indeed, Mr. Cavell, in his evidence, suggested that we would have to consider the Colombo and technical assistance plans as

long-range plans. He emphasized that we cannot expect to accomplish too much overnight, and that those countries that are contributing to the scheme might very well consider that they will have to go on making capital and technical contributions over quite a considerable period of time if we are to achieve the kind of thing that we want to achieve through the operations of the scheme themselves. Even so, if we have to go on for 30 or 40 years, I think that they are very well worth while; and besides the material benefits that will accrue from them to the underdeveloped and underprivileged people of the countries I have named, eventually, there will be also tremendous psychological benefits that will be favourable to the western world. We must remember, Mr. Chairman, that Ceylon, India and Pakistan are members of our great commonwealth family, and as such they deserve our sympathetic understanding, support and help in their great struggle to improve the lot of their myriads of people.
The kind of assistance we are giving to them is the best kind. I am convinced of that. In my judgment it would never do for us to feel that by sending quantities of consumable goods year after year we could help them in a permanent way. Of course, I think we should send gifts of consumable goods, as we can out of our abundant production right here in Canada, and some other countries of the western world, gifts of food materials and other consumable goods that we can spare, to help to show these people that when we call ourselves a Christian nation that is what we really are. I believe that many of the people of the world would be impressed by such gifts, impressed with the fact that we are what we claim to be, and that out of the abundance of our blessings we are prepared to share them with less fortunate people.
I think right here that a word of commendation to Mr. Cavell and his associates for the excellent work they are doing would not be out of place. We are fortunate in being able to have a man like Mr. Cavell to head up this work for Canada.
Another outstanding feature, at least to me, of the committee's experience this year was General McNaughton's appearance before it. As hon. members know, General McNaughton is the chairman of the international joint commission. His report, and the answers he gave to the many questions that we asked, were not only interesting, but also reassuring and educational. General McNaughton is doing an outstanding job for Canada on this very important commission. His strength and his vision and his determination are the very qualities that make him 83276-329
Supply-External Affairs the right man in the right place at the right time. Many studies are being made by the international joint commission involving matters of tremendous importance to Canada and to her future welfare. Of particular interest to me are the studies relating to the boundary waters from the St. Lawrence in eastern Canada to the Columbia river reference in western Canada. The fair division of all waters under study is vital to Canada. Back in 1909 Canada and the United States signed a treaty governing boundary or international waters. Since then Canada has meticulously-and I emphasize that-observed the provisions, every single one of them, of that treaty. However, subsequent acts of the congress of the United States have had the effect of rendering the treaty of 1909 somewhat unstable from the point of view of interpretation by United States interests, and therefore the work of the Canadian section of the international joint commission has been very complicated and exceedingly difficult at times.
It was reassuring to members of the committee to hear General McNaughton say that the Canadian section of the commission is determined to stand by the treaty of 1909 and secure Canada's fair share of the boundary waters as well as a fair share of the power developed from them. May I emphasize that Canada does not want any more than her fair share. But I am certain I am speaking for every one here when I say that we want our fair share. It seems to me that we should lose no appropriate occasion to let General McNaughton and his Canadian colleagues know that the Canadian people stand unitedly behind them in their efforts.
Moreover, our people should be brought to a calm awareness-I do not think it is necessary to arouse them to any emotional hysteria -of the facts of the situation. There are greedy interests in the United States who will spare no efforts to grab the lion's share of the water and power from the international authority. I am not speaking of the United States generally, or the United States government. But there are greedy interests in the United States who would grab the lion's share if they could get it. These interests will attempt to put heavy pressure upon the international joint commission which is charged with making decisions vis-a-vis the international waters, and references thereto.
It is for that reason, among others, that I say we are very fortunate to have as leader of the Canadian section a man of the character and stature of General McNaughton who, with his colleagues, should be made to feel the interested support of all Canada in his very difficult task.
5202	HOUSE OF
Supply-External Afairs
Now, Mr. Chairman, I would like to turn for a few moments to the world situation. I suppose in a general fashion the best way to describe it at the moment is to say it is a mess, and I suppose one could be pardoned for asking what has happened to statesmanship in the world, and for inquiring the whereabouts of our statesmen. In view of the manner in which the situation has steadily deteriorated a person could be excused for thinking they had at last chucked up the job and gone off on a fishing trip leaving the office boys to decide policy. The stenographers, I am certain, would sometimes do a better job.
We all hope, and there has been at least some reason to hope, that the Geneva conference would get down to business without delay and work out some kind of peace treaty for Korea and at least an armistice in Indochina. We were hopeful of that and I certainly have not lost my hope yet by any means. We had hoped that France would be able to hold the communist-led Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu, at least until the conference called a cease-fire, for that would have strengthened France's position tremendously. I was hopeful that France would have the good sense to give the people of the provinces in Indo-China some satisfactory guarantee of early independence on a political basis of which we could all be proud.
I was hopeful too that the western nations would go to the conference united on a firm policy with respect to Indo-China as well as the whole of southeast Asia. But France demonstrated, unfortunately, and I say this sadly and not with any desire to be critical, how left-wing sympathies can demoralize the people and render a country almost impotent.
We have all had to pay tribute to the gallantry of the French forces who put up such a marvellous defence at Dien Bien Phu. But their gallant stand and heroism were useless while impotence and indecision governed everything back in France where direction and wherewithal had to come from. The world was disgusted and saddened at the callous refusal of left-wing members of the French parliament to stand with their countrymen in a moment of silence out of respect to the men of their own flesh and blood who had died in the defence of Dien Bien Phu. France is not the only country that has been rendered almost or completely impotent by communist paralysis. To a greater or lesser degree every country in the world has been affected by it. But thank God some countries have roused themselves to the danger and are doing their best to clean up their own houses and put them in order.


Unfortunately, Britain seems at this time not to be able to give the kind of leadership that is expected and required of her in a world of confusion. There is only one good reason for it that I can see, and that is the effects of the paralysis of which I have already spoken which, if not checked, get so strong as to turn statesmen from statesmanship to expediency.
As a consequence, everybody has been waiting around expecting everybody else to decide what to do in Indo-China and while they have been blundering along the communists have been progressing successfully from one objective to another until today Hanoi, and the rich rice plains of that country, are in danger of capture by the Viet Minh.
I realize some of the difficulties in the way of achieving unity amongst the western nations and of deciding on a firm policy. I know that democratic countries cannot do more than their people are prepared to allow them to do. But I am certain in my own mind that if every means available were used to inform the Canadian, United States and British people to make them aware of the dangers and the possible solutions to the problems involved at Geneva, they would be prepared-and I am speaking of all the people generally now-to do whatever is necessary to preserve their freedom and establish their security.
Let it not be forgotten for one moment that the freedom, future security, happiness and well-being of every individual in these countries is involved in what happens at Geneva. The stakes are high, and that part of the game has to be played mighty carefully. However, in our part of the world I fear that the people generally have not been made aware of the dangers and the possible solutions to the problems. Consequently they are confused and hesitant about what should be done and what they are prepared to sacrifice to bring our cause to triumph. Our people have somehow got to be made to understand, and when I say our people I mean not only the people of Canada but of all the free nations of the world, that there is a great cause and that that cause is worth struggling for.
On October 31, 1942, not very long after Britain's darkest hour of the late war, Prime Minister Churchill spoke to a group of about 3,000 mine owners and mine workers delegates at some point in England. In the course of his speech the Prime Minister is reported to have said these words:
I sometimes have a feeling of interference. I want to stress that. I have a feeling sometimes that some guiding hand has interfered. I have a feeling that we have a guardian because we've a

great cause, and we shall have that guardian so long as we serve that cause faithfully. And what a cause it is!
That ends the quotation from Mr. Churchill but I should just like to say one word on what Mr. Churchill said. The Prime Minister of Britain expressed a deep faith and that faith was vindicated to the full by event after event during world war II. The people of Britain were made aware of their danger. They were made aware of the great cause for which they were struggling, of the overarching Divine Providence and protection for their cause, and the righteousness of their cause. They did not hesitate to decide what they were willing to do.
At the appropriate moment, given statesmanship and leadership, the people of the free countries in the world, I am satisfied, would not hesitate to decide the part they would play and what sacrifices they would be prepared to make if they were made aware of the dangers to their freedom and liberty, and if they could be assured that our cause was just and right.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I am sorry to have to interrupt the hon. member but it is five o'clock and the house must now proceed with private and public bills.
At five o'clock the Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaite) resumed the chair.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaite):: There are several divorce bills to be considered in committee of the whole. Is it agreed that they all be taken in one motion?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaite):: Is it agreed that I do now leave the chair for the house to resolve itself into committee of the whole on divorce bills Nos. 380 to 388 inclusive, 395 to 417 inclusive and 423 to 440 inclusive?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
The house went into committee, Mr. Applewhaite in the chair.


[Stage Direction]
Bill No. 380, for the relief of Rita Boucher Dufort.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 381, for the relief of Lucy Halga Saunders Gibson.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 382, for the relief of Antonie Lutz Jedrzejewski.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 383, for the relief of Jessie Clarke Thompson.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 384, for the relief of Dorothy Coughtry Paquette.-Mr. Hunter.
83276-329J
Private Bills-Divorce
Bill No. 385, for the relief of Isabel Ruth Smith Newey.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 386, for the relief of Eugene Clifford Carbonneau.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 387, for the relief of Jean Antoine Francois Armand.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 388, for the relief of Maria Clara Anita Cauchon Quirion.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 395, for the relief of Elsie Elizabeth Belford Grant.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 396, for the relief of Jean Monette. -Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 397, for the relief of Pearl Mary Brown Pratt.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 398, for the relief of Annie Holman James.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 399, for the relief of Marie Paule Lemay Mondello.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 400, for the relief of Marilyn Lesley Simpson Lavallee.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 401, for the relief of Edith Lorraine McBurney Robinson.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 402, for the relief of Aline Gosselin du Berger.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 403, for the relief of Eileen Lucy Tollett Power-Williams.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 404, for the relief of William Pappas.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 405, for the relief of Claire Labelle Cousineau.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 406, for the relief of Denise Marie Helene Laporte Woodhouse.'-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 407, for the relief of Lois Helena Kearns Higham.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 408, for the relief of Dorothy Rita Wade Moulden.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	409,	for	the	relief	of	Albert
Thornton.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	410,	for	the	relief	of	Koidula
Laigma Hagel.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	411,	for	the	relief	of	Yvette
Lafontaine Tatos.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 412, for the relief of Freda Becker Blumenthal.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	413,	for	the	relief	of	Monica
Elizabeth Benoit Mullin.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 414, for the relief of Felix Andre Landry.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 415, for the relief of Marie-Claire Parisien Barbeau.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 416, for the relief of Marie Muriel Gladys Lena Soubre Dubour.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 417, for the relief of Joan Millicent Kemp Tessier.'-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 423, for the relief of Mary Joy Thomson Asselin.-Mr. Hunter.
[Stage Direction]
Private Bills-Divorce
Bill No. 424, for the relief of Ronald Arthur Leslie.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 425, for the relief of Lucienne Saint-Laurent Calve.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	426,	for	the	relief	of	Roberta
Barbara Shvemar Feigelman.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 427, for the relief of Pearl Marie Neil Lane.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 428, for the relief of Marjorie May Price Amory.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 429, for the relief of Marie Jeannette Laure Lafreniere Lucas.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	430,	for	the	relief	of	Frances
Goldberg Glegg.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 431, for the relief of Thelma Nellie McKeage Patrick.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 432, for the relief of Madeleine Roy Julien.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 433, for the relief of Louis Tothe. -Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 434, for the relief of Joseph Delphis Guillaume Delorme.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	435,	for	the	relief	of	Nicolas
Joseph Ladislas Barath.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	436,	for	the	relief	of	Ferencz
Gyula Babinszki.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill	No.	437,	for	the	relief	of	Beatrice
Alexandra Duff Sheppard.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 438, for the relief of Remi Char-bonneau.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 439, for the relief of Kathleen Florence Pippy Hayward.-Mr. Hunter.
Bill No. 440, for the relief of Fred Skiffing-ton.-Mr. Hunter.
Edward Turney Applewhaite: We will consider clause 1 of these bills.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Chairman, I am not going to ask you to go through the task of calling all the bills one by one but there are two or three of these cases on which I should like to make a brief comment. I am in your hands as to how you would like to handle them.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: If the committee were in agreement that the bills be committed all at one time, perhaps the remarks the hon. member wishes to make on one or two of them might be made when the appropriate section is called. Is that procedure agreeable to the committee?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
On clause 1-Marriage dissolved.


Mr. Regier:: Mr. Chairman, this divorce case is a case that is based on evidence. I do not choose to oppose the case in any way, shape or form. However, I should like to say something on this matter of evidence. All these cases, as was this one, are based on sworn evidence-evidence taken under oath -by individuals. These people come to the committee of the other house, and if necessary, they come to a committee of this house and take an oath that they will tell the truth and nothing but the truth. Many of us are not trained in legal matters and we have a great deal of difficulty in sorting out the evidence. I feel that our people back home sent me here to legislate. I feel that they sent me here for the purpose of making laws, not to determine between different types of evidence and to decide which evidence is acceptable and which is not. I feel that I am wholly unqualified to perform that function.
The question that enters my mind is this. What happens if in this evidence perjury is apparent or is possibly even admitted? As the committee will recall, I drew the attention of the house to one of these cases on April 2 last. The case was referred back to the committee, presumably for them once again to peruse the evidence and to reconsider their decision. However, when this committee met the counsel for the petitioner appeared and asked permission to withdraw the case. He was asked for a reason and he said that his client had found that those who had given evidence on his behalf were wholly untrustworthy. To me that statement seemed to be an admission of the suspicion to which I gave vent on April 2. There was at least cause to suspect perjury there. In fact, in this particular case the man had given evidence under oath that he was an agent for a certain life insurance company. But we have an affidavit from that life insurance company to say that they had never heard of that man, so he could not possibly have been registered as one of their salesmen. There were other evidences of perjury.
What I should like to know is this. Since these cases are based on sworn evidence, if there is an admission or a suspicion of false evidence having been given, who is responsible for instituting action for perjury? Is it the committee of this house? Is it the committee of the other house? Is it the chairman of our committee or of the other committee or is it our Minister of Justice? Or is it up to the attorney general of the provincial government? If it happens in this house, is
[The Acting Speaker.]

Private Bills-Divorce
it the attorney general of the province of Ontario? We have a great many committees in this house which from year to year hear evidence taken under oath. Is it a satisfactory situation when the attorney general of a provincial government has to peruse all cases of possible perjury in committees of this house or of the other house? I should like the Minister of Justice to give me an answer as to who really is responsible.


Mr. Garson:: Mr. Chairman, there is not any question at all that the constitutional responsibility for the administration of justice comes squarely under the provincial authorities under the terms of the British North America Act.


Erhart Regier: Which provincial authority?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: In connection with a case of this sort, the provincial authority of the province in which the offence occurs.


Mr. Nicholson:: That would be Ontario or
Quebec in this case?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: If perjury were committed before a Senate committee, that is in the city of Ottawa in Ontario.
There is, however, good sense in the remarks which the hon. member for Burnaby-Coquitlam made to the effect that crown prosecutors and attorneys general of the provinces can hardly be expected in the normal course of their duties to examine the evidence which is given before Senate committees and to see whether any perjury is committed. If, therefore, it is suspected that the evidence which is given before the divorce committee of the other place indicates that perjury has been committed, and if all of the circumstances seem to warrant it I should think that the proper procedure for the responsible official of the other place would be to send the file to the crown attorney of the city of Ottawa for attention, if the offence took place here, in the same way that he would give attention to any crime or alleged crimes that were brought to his attention in the course of his duties. In that way the proper federal authorities would be acting in a manner for which they had the proper machinery and the provincial authorities in the same connection would be acting similarly. I am sure my hon. friend must realize that when we do not have the responsibility for the administration of justice we do not build up a staff of crown prosecutors and so forth to act under federal auspices,-


John George Diefenbaker: You have lots of lawyers though.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: -except in relation to customs and excise offences and so on. Even then we retain outside counsel in most cases because
the volume is not sufficiently large in any one place to warrant our having salaried crown attorneys. Therefore I would think that if the circumstances of the case to which my hon. friend refers appears sufficiently heinous the file might be sent to the crown attorney.


John George Diefenbaker: Would the minister allow one question? Is there no one who takes the position of the Queen's proctor in connection with divorce actions?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: My hon. friend means divorce proceedings before the Senate committee?


John George Diefenbaker: Yes, before the Senate committee.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I must confess I cannot answer that question offhand. I should think that probably the committee as a whole would take that position. I think that my hon. friend from Prince Albert, upon reflection, would agree that was the case. If there were any irregularity or impropriety connected with the proceedings before the committee I am sure that every member of it would feel some responsibility to see that proper action was taken in respect of it.


Erhart Regier: Before I cast a vote for this first section which is based on sworn evidence, would the minister give the house his assurance that the case to which I referred on April 2 will be carefully investigated by his department and, if necessary, the particulars called to the attention of the attorney general of the province of Ontario? I feel this is a rather important matter because we do not want our citizens to get the idea that sworn evidence before a committee of this house or of the other place is just a mockery. In my opinion it is important that Canadian citizens realize their responsibility when they are asked to appear and to take an oath.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I must say in all candour that I am not at all seized with the circumstances of the case to which my hon. friend refers, but I will be glad to discuss the matter with the chairman of the Senate divorce committee and move on from there in accordance with what seems to be the proper thing to do in the light of our discussion.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Before this discussion continues I think it is up to me to make this point. I am not suggesting a ruling that the evidence upon which these cases are based is not open for discussion at this time. Of course it is, but I am going to tell the commitee now that a debate as to what should be done with respect to instituting a perjury action in a case of this sort, and where the responsibility for that lies, is not, I think, within the ambit of the committee's duties at this time.

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Mr. Gillis:: I want to get a little information. I do not think I agree with your ruling, Mr. Chairman. The case that the hon. member for Burnaby-Coquitlam has brought up is one that has already been before the house. It was sent back from the house because of the evidence. I am not going to argue it one way or the other, but I should like to get one thing clear in my mind. Incidentally, this is a good example of why we should not be handling these matters here. The Minister of Justice stated a minute ago that he thought the expenses involved in a prosecution for perjury should fall upon the province of Ontario. But this was not an Ontario divorce. This was a Quebec divorce and the crime was committed in Quebec.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I am afraid I must point out that if I have followed the discussion correctly the evidence to which hon. members are now referring is evidence taken in a case concerning which there is not even a bill before the committee at the moment. I admit that the method of acquiring the evidence upon which these cases are based and the validity of such evidence are certainly open to discussion in the committee at this time, but whether or not somebody should institute a prosecution for perjury with respect to a divorce bill which has not reached this house-


Clarence Gillis: It has gone from the house; it was sent back.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: -which is not before the committee at this time is, I am afraid, not a proper subject for discussion on clause 1 of these bills.


Clarence Gillis: I was not-


Edward Turney Applewhaite: I think the Leader of the Opposition wanted to say something.


Clarence Gillis: I was not debating the evidence or questioning it at all. However, the Minister of Justice did state that he was going to examine the question-and we should know-of where the responsibility rests for prosecution. He indicated that in this case it would fall on Ontario. That is not fair to Ontario. If he is going to look into this particular case, which was passed by the Senate, came to this house, was sent back and thrown out, then I suggest that he should also examine that aspect of the matter. It is not fair to put Ontario to the expense of a prosecution for something that comes from Quebec.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order.


Clarence Gillis: I am through.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order.


Clarence Gillis: I am finished.
[The Deputy Chairman.]


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I want to make it quite clear that in so far as the question of instituting a prosecution for perjury based on a case not before us at the present time is concerned, the question of where the responsibility for that lies is not a subject for discussion on clause 1 of these bills.


Mr. Drew:: Mr. Chairman, I propose to bring this debate in order because I believe the Minister of Justice has raised an extremely important point. I propose to vote against the measure and to explain why I am going to vote against it. I will refer to what the Minister of Justice has just said. I must confess that I had not realized previously that the Minister of Justice accepted no responsibility in his department for considering the nature of the evidence and taking appropriate action if it should be disclosed that the evidence did not support divorce. There are many of us who for different reasons have very strong objections to the laxity in divorce proceedings in any event. There are some of us who belong to communions in which there is a definite prohibition against that proceeding.
But apart from that consideration entirely we are confronted now with the statement that the Department of Justice stands aside in respect of the evidence upon which a divorce is being granted through the special legislative action of the parliament of Canada. For some time a great deal of concern has been felt in the house about the fact that we should find ourselves in the position of having to accept a whole series of divorce bills with no real opportunity to test the evidence or to challenge it. We had one case recently where the evidence manifestly was, to put it very mildly, most unlikely, in fact, so unlikely that I understand those who had taken the responsibility for presenting the application deemed it wise to proceed no further.
The fact remains, however, that if there was perjury that perjury is in no way cured simply because the proceedings have not been pressed and the application has either been withdrawn or allowed to stand. I would have thought that the Department of Justice would have inquired into that curious case where the horn played such an important part. I have forgotten just how the horn was sounded or the particular part it had in the proceedings, but the whole thing sounded fishy. In fact, apparently it was regarded as sufficiently fishy by those who had presented the application that they decided not to proceed. If there was perjury, then perjury should be no less perjury in a case of this kind. If we are going to be called upon to deal-


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. The Leader of the Opposition is carrying on the same discussion that I felt called upon to interrupt when another hon. member was speaking, namely the discussion of the evidence that might have been or would have been the justification for a bill being submitted to this committee. At this time that bill is not before this committee. I must say it is my ruling that discussion of a perjury action or what action is to be taken as a result of certain evidence given in this building has not any connection with any of the bills now before the committee, and is not a subject for discussion at a time when we are in committee on certain specific divorce bills.


George Alexander Drew: I am not finished yet, Mr. Chairman. I have presented the illustration, and I simply say now that proposition that has been stated in relation to this particular case, that it is not the responsibility of the Department of Justice because these parliament buildings happen to be in the province of Ontario, that the responsibility rests upon the attorney general of Ontario to examine the evidence that is given here and consider whether or not a question of perjury might arise, is one that places before this house a situation that makes it very difficult for us to proceed in this very extraordinary way we have been proceeding. For that reason, and to give conformity to the procedure I have put forward, I propose to vote against this measure.


Mr. Mclvor:: I should like to ask a question, Mr. Chairman. Where was the perjury committed?


Stanley Howard Knowles: We have before the committee, by a procedure which you have suggested, Mr. Chairman, clause 1 of fifty different divorce bills. I have indicated that there were three or four of them upon which I wish to make a brief comment, and I indicated that it was satisfactory to me if you found some other method rather than calling them one at a time. I now wonder whether we should not have followed the other practice, but at any rate may I indicate, so that you will see how thoroughly in order I am, that my remarks are directed to Bills Nos. 382, 399, 401 and 407.
I do not wish to suggest that I might not have remarks of a similar character to make with respect to the other bills included in this group of fifty, but I am speaking directly to those four bills, the number of which I have given but I have given them without indicating the names of the persons involved. In looking through the evidence concerning these four bills, I find that in every case the evidence was given by one or the other or
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both of two detectives. Again, I shall not advertise them by giving their names. But I point out that the committee on miscellaneous private bills, when it considered a batch of these bills the other day, not only rejected the bill to which reference has been made and which Your Honour has suggested should not be further discussed, but rejected another bill.
We will call this other bill a bill dealing with people by the name of Mr. and Mrs. A. This bill was rejected by the committee unanimously. Nobody would defend it at all. The committee was not satisfied with the evidence contained in this other case- that of Mr. and Mrs. A. Their name does not begin with A; I just picked that out of the air.
I draw the committee's attention to the fact that the two detectives who were witnesses in this case which was turned down unanimously by the committee turn up in these four cases, covered by Bills Nos. 382, 399, 401 and 407. I ask the members of this committee:	What confidence can you have
in the validity of bills based upon evidence from these detectives, and they are names that have been turning up in these cases through most of the years I have been in parliament. Time and time again it has been evident, on the basis of just reading the transcript, that it is evidence that cannot be trusted. On the basis of that, what confidence can we have in the validity of the cases being brought before us? I do not know. It may be that some of these cases covered by the bills to which I have referred are legitimate cases so far as the laws of the land stand at the present time. But when, as I say, one case is turned down unanimously because the members of the committee are not satisfied with the evidence that has been given, what confidence can we have when the same people bring in so-called evidence in other cases?
Hon. members know the kind of evidence they give, such as putting a matchstick at the door or putting scotch tape on the door; that sort of thing. I need not go into it. I believe that in the case that was rejected it was revealed that evidence was given concerning a certain woman who was supposed to have been in Montreal, but our committee was convinced she was not in Montreal at that time at all. Some of us have never had any confidence in this way of dealing with the matter, but what has happened recently surely must shatter the confidence of any who still had confidence in this way of dealing with the business.
My points are two. One is the matter we are not supposed to discuss, the bill that has

Private Bills-Divorce been dropped because counsel appeared and said it should be withdrawn. The other is that we can hardly have confidence in those who passed that bill. Here is another one which went before the committee and the members of the committee said, despite the fact the Senate passed this, we have no confidence in it. They unanimously threw it out. Yet, we have these four bills before us today. I have not taken the time to read them all, and I do not know what is in all the others.


John George Diefenbaker: Was the evidence direct evidence or circumstantial?


Stanley Howard Knowles: Some of both, if I may answer my hon friend. A great deal of it, indeed most of it, is circumstantial.
There is no secret about what we are advocating, and we are not picking on these particular cases. I mentioned them so I could stay in order. Surely, the members of the house must be coming around to the position we have taken for a long time that parliament is not the place to deal with these cases. We ought to find some other way. I hope that will be done.
I have mentioned four of the fifty bills, Mr. Chairman, and I have done so because of these same detectives who turn up over and over again. When I see their names in the evidence and recall some of the other cases in which they had been mixed up, I certainly do not feel that it is parliament's business to be dealing with matters of that kind.
There is another one in the group that presents a strange story, and that is Bill No. 397. Again, I shall refrain from giving names. As I understand it, the man in this case some time ago applied to parliament for a divorce from his wife on the ground that she was incurably insane. Hon. members will recall that application and the considerable interest in it, because it raised the whole question of the grounds for divorce. Then, we did not hear anything about it for quite a while. In fact, most members probably wonder what happened to the case. It appears the lady came before the senators during the hearing, and they decided she was not incurably insane. I suppose senators are capable of judging sanity or insanity. Anyway, the initial case was withdrawn. But now we have a case between the same two parties before us again. This woman, who was earlier alleged by her husband to be incurably insane-


John George Diefenbaker: How many years ago was that?


Stanley Howard Knowles: It was about 1939 when she first went to the hospital. Now she has come back to this parliament and applied


for a divorce against her husband on the grounds that he has committed adultery. And who was the chief witness to the fact that he had committed adultery? It was the husband, himself.
I do not propose to judge that case-this is Bill 397, clause 1; I could not be more in order, could I?-I do not propose to judge as to what is right or wrong in that case. I am not competent to do so, and I doubt if any member in the House of Commons feels that he is competent-certainly not on the basis of such evidence as we have here. I do not suppose many members have read the case.
I would like to know what has gone on in the interval between the time when the first application was made, on the grounds of insanity, and this application on the grounds of adultery on the part of the other person.
Well, the divorce has been approved by the Senate, and here it is, buried in this bunch which has come along today. I do not know whether the committee on miscellaneous private bills considered this one or not, but there it is. It is one of the fifty and, as the hon. member for Burnaby-Coquitlam has said, his constituents did not think, when they elected him on August 10, that they were electing a person to judge on issues like this, which are judicial in character and should be dealt with by a proper court.
None of us feels that he is competent to deal with a matter of this kind. I certainly hope that the members of this House of Commons and the members of the government will consider very seriously the spot in which we are being placed with regard to this whole business, which is not the business of parliament, I suggest. If anything at all, it is the business of a court. Surely we must, as we recognize the necessity of getting rid of this business, give it in some way to an appropriate court that can deal with it properly.


Mr. Ellis:: Mr. Chairman, we are called upon to vote on these bills. As a member of the committee I should like to say that when they come in large groups, as they do, I think in the past members may have voted for those bills on the strength of the fact that the Senate committee had passed them and had granted the applications for divorces. However at our last meeting of the committee there were only two cases before it. As has already been pointed out, the first of these was withdrawn-and under very curious circumstances which, as had been suggested, should lead to very close examination of the case because of a possibility of perjury.
The second case passed the Senate committee, but was thrown out unanimously by

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the committee of this house. In other words, at one meeting of the House of Commons committee both cases passed by the Senate committee were rejected.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Would the hon. member please come to the bill before the committee.


Alfred Claude Ellis: Mr. Chairman, we are called upon to vote for a series of divorce bills, and there has been no opportunity for a close examination of the evidence. We are asked to vote on these bills on the strength of the evidence presented to the Senate committee. I suggest that under the circumstances, in view of the fact that at the last meeting of the committee on miscellaneous private bills two bills passed by the Senate were thrown out-and very wisely so-the circumstances have altered somewhat, and that before we should be called upon to vote on these bills we should be prepared to give a great deal more consideration than has been given in the past.
In other words, if the Senate passed two bills, as they did, which were thrown out by the House of Commons committee, then I suggest this house ought to give a great deal closer consideration to divorce bills when they come before us in the future. For that reason I say we ought to consider the whole question of the handling of these divorce cases in the House of Commons before we are asked to vote en bloc on a great many of these bills.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, I think that inadvertently an extremely important issue has been raised on this occasion. I believe it will be agreed that the sanction behind our ordinary judicial procedure is, in large measure, the knowledge on the part of those who give sworn evidence that if there is perjury they may and should be charged in respect of that perjury. While we would like to think that the consciences of people would prevent their making false oaths, the very fact that we include the perjury provisions in the Criminal Code indicates the extent to which this is regarded as a sanction behind our judicial procedure.
In the present instance I am not discussing the procedure, because that is a big consideration. I wish it quite clearly understood that in this respect I am not identifying myself with the particular argument that has been put forward by members of the party which first raised the question today. That is a very big subject, to be discussed on some other occasion.
However the situation in which we now find ourselves, in relation to these bills which are placed before us in bulk, and the first 83276-330
items of which we are now discussing, is that we are told that unless the attorney general of the province of Ontario sees fit to examine every one of these cases, then there is no sanction such as ordinarily applies in such a case.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: No, no. On a point of privilege, Mr. Chairman; I am sure I did not leave any such impression. What happens in the ordinary case, where A is suing B for damages following an accident, is that if perjury is committed by any witness in such a case the person chiefly concerned-very often the judge who tries the case-brings to the attention of the crown prosecutor the fact that such perjury has been committed in order that the crown prosecutor may look into the matter to see if he thinks a charge of perjury should be laid.
When the hon. member asked me this afternoon what procedure would be adopted where perjury had been committed in proceedings before the Senate committee, I thought I had given to hon. members a very clear indication that an analogous step would be taken by, possibly, the chairman of the Senate divorce committee, to bring that matter to the attention of the crown prosecutor in the same manner as a judge would do it in the case to which I referred a moment ago.
I said in that connection that the constitutional responsibility for the administration of justice was that of the province, and that to this end in every province of Canada the government has fairly elaborate machinery, consisting of the attorney general's department and a number of crown prosecutors scattered throughout the province for the purpose of carrying out that constitutional responsibility.
I did not say that the attorney general or crown prosecutor of the province would have to give the matter his personal attention and examine the evidence that was brought before the Senate committee for suspected perjury; because he could not discharge that responsibility even in connection with the ordinary lawsuits that are tried in the law courts. Cases of perjury there are brought to the attention of the crown prosecutor or the attorney general's department, and are investigated in a routine manner using machinery which is set up for that purpose. If there is an indication that there is evidence to support a charge of perjury, that charge is laid and then continues in the ordinary way.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Will the minister permit a question?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Yes.

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James MacKerras Macdonnell: Has there ever been a charge of perjury laid in connection with those divorce cases?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I am sure I have not the faintest idea whether there ever has been or not. The question that was addressed to me and which I have endeavoured to answer was what steps could be taken, in the event that perjury had been suspected; what procedure should be followed?


John George Diefenbaker: It would be contempt of parliament, would it not, and as such punishable by parliament?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I would not like to say offhand that my hon. friend was wrong in that suggestion, but I am perfectly certain that it would be perjury because-


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I think I must interrupt the Minister of Justice at this point because the committee will agree with me that, interesting as this discussion may be, it has nothing to do with clause 1 of the bill which we are considering. 1 propose to read to the committee clause 1 of the first of the 50 bills which are being considered. The clause reads:
The said marriage between Rita Boucher and Roland Dufort, her husband, is hereby dissolved, and shall be henceforth null and void to all intents and purposes whatsoever.
In so far as any member wishes to argue whether or not that clause 1 is based on correct or incorrect evidence I cannot rule him out of order; but assuming that perjury has been committed in connection with clause 1 of any of these 50 bills under discussion in this committee, as to whether or not clause 1 shall or shall not be adopted, the discussion as to where the responsibility for laying a charge of perjury lies is absolutely out of order. Will the members please confine themselves to a discussion of clause 1 of the bills before them?


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: Now that the question of perjury has been drawn into the discussion-


Edward Turney Applewhaite: I hoped I had ruled the question of perjury out of the discussion.


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: It is significant that with respect to the 50 bills before us it is the hon. member for Parkdale who is the sponsor, and he is not in his place. There are 75 members here from the province of Quebec where these bills originate. As I say, there are 75 members from the province of Quebec, and yet it has not been possible to get one member from that province to sponsor these 50 bills. They have to go to Ontario, to the city of Toronto, to get the hon. member for Parkdale, who is absent, to be the

sponsor. We should not be asked to accept clause 1 without having the assurance that no perjury has been committed in connection with the evidence having to do with Bill No. 380.
While I am on my feet I should like to ask the minister whether he has acted on the suggestion of hon. members and has read the evidence in connection with Bill No. 327. If he has not, will he give an undertaking that he will read the evidence over the week end and indicate whether he thinks it is fair that the province of Ontario should have to take on the responsibility of following up and incurring public expense in connection with prosecuting for perjury that really is-


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I might point out to the hon. member that it will not be possible for me to permit the minister to answer that question because Bill No. 327 is not before this committee. We start with Bill No. 380. Is the committee ready for the question?


James MacKerras Macdonnell: You will be very surprised to hear me raise a point of order, Mr. Chairman, but I want to ask you whether you think that this question is irrelevant, because it is very important to me so as to help me to know how I am to vote. I have always been very troubled with this procedure. I remember when I was first in this house Mr. Ilsley trying to defend it with very great uneasiness, showing how much he disliked it, but saying there did not seem to be any alternative, as did the Prime Minister once when the house became particularly restive and asked to change the procedure. But up to the present moment I had assumed that while this is a procedure that is very distasteful, it was at least carried out in an efficient manner. What has happened this afternoon makes me feel that perhaps by inadvertence the usual sanctions, to use the words of my leader, which are applicable in ordinary judicial proceedings or in any kind of a proceeding where oaths are involved, appear at least to be utterly absent here. I suggest to you a determination of this question is very important to the vote of some of us, and therefore I hope you will not rule it out of order.


George Alexander Drew: I do want to refer to certain statements made in regard to this by the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice pointed out that under the British North America Act the administration of justice is under the provinces. We are not dealing now with the administration of justice in the ordinary sense. We are dealing now with a parliamentary procedure. The hon. member

for Prince Albert has pointed out that probably there may be two points raised by this. There may well be the question of contempt of parliament; but in any event, as the minister said, if the evidence is false it could be perjury. The minister suggested that he did not make the statement that this would be the responsibility of the attorney general of Ontario. I would point out to him he said earlier that since this evidence is given-


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Order. I would hope it will not be necessary for me to point out to the Leader of the Opposition or to the Minister of Justice that if they consider I was in error in ruling that these matters in connection with perjury are out of order they have the right to appeal to the house. I have made the ruling, and I regret I must repeat it, that the question of perjury proceedings and where the jurisdictional responsibility lies and so forth, even in connection with perjury which may have taken place on these bills, or on bills which are not before the committee, is not in order at the present time. We are not even considering the general principle of the bill. We are in committee of the whole on clause 1 of a group of bills which have come to this committee from the miscellaneous private bills committee of this house. They appear in the name of the chairman of that commitee, because it is his duty to sponsor them.


An hon. Member:: He is not here.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: I must insist that we confine our discussion to the merits or demerits of clause 1 of these individual bills, and that matters of procedure, jurisdiction and so forth, important as they may be, are not in order in the committee stage on clause 1 of these bills.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: You are right.


Stanley Howard Knowles: I wonder whether I may ask a question of the Minister of Justice with regard to clause 1 of the four bills, the numbers of which I gave him before? I have tried my best, as you will confirm, Mr. Chairman, to be in order. I refer to Bills Nos. 382, 399, 401 and 407. In view of the statement that I made a few moments ago that persons who gave evidence in connection with these four cases were persons who gave evidence in connection with a case that has been thrown out, would he consider that it might be a good idea for him to look at evidence given by those persons?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Well, Mr. Chairman, I apprehend that the function of the Senate committee and of the House of Commons committee which have been set up for this purpose was to deal with this very question 83276-330J
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to which my hon. friend refers, and since they have been set up for that purpose I think the proper course for all hon. members is to leave that responsibility, at least in the first instance, with them.


Mr. Campbell:: Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say a word about this. I would point out to the Minister of Justice that there is something in the neighbourhood of 400 of these bills. How can any committee of this house give the proper study to these bills and decide whether they should go through?


Mr. Fairey:: Mr. Chairman, may I say a word about this matter. It seems to me we are getting far afield on this question. As a member of the miscellaneous private bills committee, and like several other hon. members who have spoken, I would like to remind the house that we are discussing these particular bills which have been before our committee and which have been recommended to this house for approval. It has been said we had no opportunity to study the evidence. That is not true. Every member received copies of the evidence in each of these cases, and if any particular hon. member did not read that evidence then it is his own fault. The fact is that every one of these bills came before us en bloc and they received unanimous consent of the miscellaneous private bills committee.


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: Would the hon. member
permit a question?


Francis Thrower Fairey: Yes.


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: Has the hon. member read all the evidence?


Francis Thrower Fairey: Yes, that is exactly why I stand on my feet. I found out, as did every other hon. member, that I did not like the procedure, and I did not like the evidence I have had to read. I suspect there may be collusion in it. But the fact is that I have read the evidence and every member of the committee is supposed to have read the evidence, otherwise they should not have passed them unanimously in the miscellaneous private bills committee. That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman. These bills are commended by a committee of this house. I am a member of that committee, I have voted for them in committee, and I shall vote for them now.


Erhart Regier: Mr. Chairman, I do not think we are so very far afield at all. We are asked to dissolve some 50 or so marriages. That is set out in clause 1 as I understand the clause, and the reason for the dissolution is the sworn evidence. I am not going back to the integrity of this sworn evidence again on

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which we are asked to dissolve these marriages, but if I heard the hon. member for Victoria, B.C., correctly I understood him to make the statement, "I believe there is collusion in them." That is a most amazing statement for him to make, along with the admission that he voted for them.


Francis Thrower Fairey: Mr. Chairman, I said "I
suspected from the nature of the evidence there might be collusion."


Erhart Regier: In that case that puts a slightly different light on it. However, coming back to the integrity of this evidence, I notice that of the very few cases which have been contested-I think about half a dozen cases in all this Winter have been contested- three cases have not made the grade, and it makes me begin to wonder, if these men and women with whom we are at present concerned had the wherewithal and contested these cases, how many would manage to make the grade through this house and through our committee.
I asked one of these attorneys concerned how much it would cost me to get the type of divorce with which we are now dealing. "Well," he said, "I will tell you. If it is an open and shut case, and if we have no arguments anywhere down the line, my minimum fee would be $1,250." I was horrified, and he turned to me and he said: ''Well, we have to pay the government so much"-I forget the exact figure, but it was about $300-odd- "and then there is this fee and that fee." I said:	"That is your minimum, $1,250?"
And he said "yes" and he added, "That is $250 less than what most of my fellow lawyers are charging."
Now, imagine a husband or a wife in any one of these cases being served with a notice of divorce and facing a fee like that in order to contest it. In all likelihood the marriage has broken up in any case, and who wants to spend $1,000 to defend a broken home. These circumstances throw a great shadow of suspicion on all this evidence on the basis of which we are supposed to dissolve these marriages.
I have heard a rumour, in fact it is more than a rumour for I read an item in this regard in a newspaper some time ago, to the effect that there is a possibility of the other place being given sole authority to deal with these matters. I hope the government will never seriously accept such a suggestion because what has been revealed this winter should be enough to convince the government that that is not a solution. I cannot support these measures because I have lost all
[Mr. Regier.I
faith in the type of evidence which is being given to committees of this house or of the other place.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, I hope there will be a vote on this before six o'clock. I take the statement of the hon. member for Victoria, B.C., on his responsibility as a member of this house. He states that he suspects collusion. I therefore propose to vote against this, and I call for a recorded vote.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Is the house ready for the question?


Mr. Harris:: Mr. Chairman, I must say that I have had some information this afternoon that I did not expect to obtain. I happen to be perhaps the only member of the house Who has appeared before the Senate committee on divorce when Ontario was in a position in which some of the other provinces appear to be at the present time. I must say that my hon. friend's remarks on the charges being made lead me to think things have improved in that particular field.


Stanley Howard Knowles: There has been a lot of inflation since then.


Walter Edward Harris: Yes, I suppose so, and a lot of good things have happened, at least under the Liberal government. But it does seem to me, if I may raise a point of order, Mr. Chairman, that the Leader of the Opposition and others who have spoken on the matter that you ruled out of order are perhaps suggesting something which might be considered by the house with respect to any responsibility we might have in the matter, such as suggested by the hon. member for Prince Albert, namely in the role of a Queen's proctor. It is at least a thought to bear in mind for future occasions and I think it could perhaps be debated if one felt so inclined on the estimates of the Minister of Justice.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Well done.


Walter Edward Harris: Nevertheless, Mr. Chairman, may I call it six o'clock?


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Shall I report progress and ask leave to sit again?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
Clause stands.
Progress reported.


The Acting Speaker (Mr. Applewhaite):: The
time allotted for private and public bills having expired, the house will resume consideration at eight o'clock of the business which was interrupted at five o'clock.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.
[Stage Direction]
The house again in committee of supply, Mr. Applewhaite in the chair.
DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS 84. Departmental administration, $3,333,583.
Solon Earl Low: Mr. Chairman, at five o'clock when we started discussing domestic affairs, particularly the type that often lead to action in the other place, I was saying something about causes and I believe I had asked what our cause is at the present time.
In his speech this afternoon I believe the minister outlined the cause fairly well. I had drafted my own speech before I had a chance to hear it, but I can say that we are much in agreement. However, I am going to say what I think our cause is.
Certainly the immediate part of it must be to put an end to communist subversion and aggression, because these things are evil things; unless they are stopped, there can be no peace or freedom left in the world. It is true that the communists in southeastern Asia, as in some other parts of the world, have succeeded in identifying communism with nationalism. They have succeeded in identifying communism, in the minds of inexperienced and unthinking people, even with humanitarianism. But that is in the same class with loving and making a lie. It is only an ostensible coat of goodlooking paint applied to a destroyer of human beings and their souls.
Communist subversion and aggression have got to be stopped some time. That is why I feel that Mr. Dulles was right at least in proposing a southeastern Asia defence pact. He has been criticized for the way in which he did that, but I will say this: Perhaps he has made mistakes in some of his methods but at least his general proposal, in my judgment, was sound. In my judgment, also, a declaration now that the free world has called a halt to communist aggression and subversion should be made, and it should be embodied in a southeast Asia defence pact. If such a declaration were made by a united western world, joined by the free Asian countries, I am sure that it would strengthen French hands at Geneva, that it would stop the aggressors just as NATO has deterred aggression in western Europe and that it would give hope and encouragement to millions of people who live constantly in fear of this marching giant, communist aggression.
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We sincerely hope that France will give the Indo-Chinese people satisfactory assurances of early independence and also assurances of sympathetic help to build up their economies and to protect themselves after they have won their independence. If that were done concurrently with the announcement of a southeastern Asia defence pact, it would be of inestimable value to the whole free world, in my opinion.
Some will criticize what I am now saying by declaring that it would involve the risk of having to send men into southeastern Asia. But I want to make it abundantly clear that I believe that unless Canada, the United States, Britain, France and other free countries, including India, Ceylon and Pakistan, are willing to send men into southeastern Asia and also adequate material with which to back them up, in my judgment there is grave danger that the whole of southeastern Asia will fall before communist aggression. I am further convinced that if a southeastern Asia defence pact is announced at an early date, and men and materials are made ready to halt communist aggression and further subversion on their part, there will be little or no need for any substantial loss of life or property in anything that might occur. In fact, I am satisfied that it would be an effective deterrent to all-out aggression.
What is going on in southeastern Asia today was encouraged, in my judgment, by what happened in Korea. Through United Nations failure to take decisive action in Korea, the communist aggressors have been invited to continue their encroachments and their subversions, step by step, from country to country. They knew that United Nations policy in Korea was one of limited war. They knew that the United Nations were determined that action should be confined strictly to the country in which the aggression had taken place. They learned very quickly that the United Nations Organization was too timid to strike at their accumulation of supplies and troops if those accumulations were kept just across or beyond the borders of the country where the aggression took place. As a consequence, month by month they have grown bolder and more determined to continue their aggression. I therefore say that what happened in Korea was an invitation to the communists to do whatever they pleased in any country that could be supplied from China and Russia. As a consequence, communist aggressors are advancing from post to post, using unlimited help from China and Russia. I suppose that most of us are asking ourselves this question: Where is it all going to end? Are the free nations going to let it go on, and lose to the

Supply-External Affairs aggressor post after post and, with those posts, prestige and morale? What is next on the communist timetable? Is it Burma, Malaya, all of Asia? Then, fortified and strengthened with the sources of great strategic materials and unlimited men, will they then go after Europe in an all-out fashion?
It must be remembered that the communist countries are getting stronger through their aggression. That means that the remaining free world, taking it as a whole, must be getting weaker. I am convinced that Russia and China will not chance a full-scale war as long as they are growing stronger and we are growing steadily weaker. Why should they do so? I think we have come to the point where we should either get out of the countries of southeastern Asia and let the cwnmunists have them or we should put in enough strength to prevent further advances, while at the same time providing for the peoples there satisfactory assurances that their desires with respect to independence and security will be satisfied to the very best of our ability to satisfy them. I do not think it will be necessary to have an all-out war. But I think that the people of the western world and our Asian commonwealth brethren must come to realize that there is a great and pressing cause for which they must be prepared to fight if necessary, and to make secure by whatever sacrifies are necessary.
I should like to close on this note, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend the minister for his speech this afternoon. Judging by that part of it which I heard, I thought it was a good speech. I want to commend the minister for his timely and able defence at Geneva of the United States. We do not always see eye to eye with our neighbours to the south. We have had our differences. However, we have common cause with the United States. We know that, although she sometimes makes mistakes-and we must realize that we also make them-her aims and objectives are righteous. We must do everything we can to achieve unity with her and with the other nations of the western world who prize peace, security and the freedom of the peoples of all the world.
When it comes time, Mr. Chairman, I have some questions which I believe should be answered. After having given other hon. members the opportunity to make whatever contribution they wish to this debate, I should then like to have the chance to ask the minister some questions about things that have happened at Geneva.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: I have a question to ask the
minister which he may answer when he speaks. But before I ask the question I should like to say that I am proud of the minister and the way he has conducted himself, both socially and as a statesman, while away from home. As a statesman he has been a credit to Canada. I have tried to read everything I could get hold of about his actions, and everything I have read has indicated to me that he has been a first-rate representative of Canada. As the hon. member who has just sat down said, I was mighty proud that the minister was able to stand up for the United States. They may not always be right and they are not all saints but they are our neighbours. I am glad to see the minister stand up and support them when they are right.
The minister has a terrific responsibility and it is your duty and mine to help him in the best way we can. I appreciate the fact that speakers on the opposition side all appear to be fighting for the same thing. I think that is a fine thing. I was proud to hear the minister say that aggression cannot be allowed, and I think there was a little hint of the golden rule in his closing remarks. If you get too far away from that you get into difficulties. It is an oft-quoted phrase that when truth is on the scaffold and wrong upon the throne God behind the scenes keeps watch above his own. The truth upon the scaffold will win. I know how the minister thinks and his thoughts are expressed in his actions. When we have such a man representing us at the United Nations or anywhere else we can feel secure.
There is one man over yonder for whom I have great admiration, Syngman Rhee, and I want to ask a question. Hon. members may not agree with me but I think Syngman Rhee has been one of the outstanding men in the fight against communism. However, there are a lot of things I do not know about him and that is why I want to ask my question. I wonder whether the minister knows of any co-operation between him and Chiang Kai-shek and whether there is any possibility of attack on China from that quarter.


Mr. Stewart (Winnipeg North):: Mr. Chairman, I would be very interested in hearing the minister's candid answer to that last question. If he answered it as candidly as perhaps he might I wonder whether the hon. member who has just taken his seat would still be imbued with as much pride in the minister as he had when he started. This might be one of those diplomatic times when perhaps an answer should not be given. I thought that the most important part of the minister's speech this afternoon was that in

which he outlined four points of possible settlement of the future of east Asia. As he uttered the words I found myself tentatively in some agreement with him, but I should like to reserve my decision until I read the actual text. However, I would like to know whether what the minister said is an expression of policy on the part of the government or merely his own personal view at the moment.
But there was another sentence he uttered to which I found myself in strong opposition. I hope that I can quote it fairly and not too much out of context. The minister said that we have got to be clear on what we are trying to prevent. I think we have been abundantly clear through the years on what we have been trying to prevent, and because we have been trying to prevent something we have been pursuing a negative policy which in Asia is landing us in disaster. What we ought to be clear about is what we are trying to do, and what we are trying to do should be something vastly more constructive, vastly more positive, vastly more dynamic than what we are trying to prevent.
After all, what do the people of Asia want? They want freedom from the west. They want to be free nationally. They want to be their own masters so that they can create the social reforms which are so obviously needed in Asia, and if we are clear on what we are trying to do we should be supporting them and helping them in these aims and objectives. But all that we have been clear about is what we are trying to prevent. What we have been trying to prevent is communist expansion, and because we are trying to prevent it we have fought the communists on communism's own ground to our own detriment instead of fighting them on our ground, which is something positive and dynamic. If we can persuade the people of Asia that there is something worth while in our ethos and we support them by practical action then we are going to win Asia and the communists never can.
The minister also said that communist imperialism has been too successful in Asia. Of course it has been successful, and because of our own negative policies. He said too that we have got to accept the fact that the communists are working for control of southeast Asia and to some extent maintaining and achieving it, but if that is so I know of no greater indictment of western diplomacy. The western world has failed abysmally over the last few years to appreciate what was happening in Asia, and there is not one nation which is exempt from blame.
What we have refused to realize is that changes were taking place. Changes were
Supply-External Affairs taking place in front of our eyes but we blinded ourselves to them. After every war the status quo must change. In some places it may be destroyed thoroughly, in some others distorted, but there is going to be change and it is the better part of wisdom to face that fact. I have said in the past in the house that the power of ideas is an infinitely greater power than the power of bullets. The truth of that is seen most graphically today in Asia because there are ideas at work there. They are ideas which came from the west. They are ideas which are fermenting in the minds and brains of people and the greatest idea of all is the ideal of freedom.
Certainly the most important thing that was said during the war from the point of view of affecting the status quo was said by President Roosevelt. He gave rebirth to an idea, an idea as old as man himself, the idea that men should be free. He gave rebirth to that idea in the four freedoms. The people of the world heard him, the people of the world believed him and the world has changed but we are afraid of the change which has taken place. Colonial peoples are going to be free. We may think we can stop them, we may think we can slow them down, but they will be free and there is the end to it. The sooner we realize they are going to be free and support their aspirations the sooner shall we make friends of them.
The question is of course how far are we prepared to go in co-operation with these people to achieve the freedom which they desire and which we ourselves possess. There are those who fear revolution, but we ourselves, we in this parliament, are creatures of revolution. Whether our forefathers came from the United Kingdom, France or any other nation, we are still creatures of revolution. Perhaps there are some who prefer to forget it. Perhaps there are some who have forgotten it. But still it is a fact that our freedom today stems from the overthrow of a tyrannical monarchy and .governments which rejected democratic concepts. We are free because our ancestors fought and slew those who would have denied them freedom.
The same is true of the United States. The people of that country are also the children of revolution. Today they have as their founding father George Washington. He is the founding father of the United States because he led a successful revolution. Had he failed he would have been hanged by the neck as a traitor. Obviously, success is the difference between immortality and infamy. Now, men in other parts of the world are imbued with the same hope and wish for

Supply-External Affairs freedom that we have. Are we going to deny them, dare we deny them it? That is another of the questions which we have got to answer.
It could be argued, of course, that the colonial peoples are not yet ready for selfgovernment. It may be true, yet I doubt if our ancestors were ready for self-government and freedom when they obtained them. After all we do learn to govern ourselves by governing. We learn to do by doing. If we want to learn to swim, we do not learn by placing ourselves over a kitchen chair and wildly flailing our arms and legs in the air. We learn by going into the water. If we want to learn how to govern, we learn by governing, and no other way.
There is no argument in morality why people should not have the right to do that. Yet, there are those even in this country who for their own purposes, probably quite honestly, do not want to see these colonial peoples given their freedom. They do not want that because they see Asia as a fighting ground between communists and anti-communists, and nothing else. That sort of oversimplification does our cause no good, because although we might believe it the people of Asia do not; the people of Asia know much better.
In this morning's Montreal Gazette there was an editorial entitled, "Britain makes a Hard Decision". It is a really extraordinary statement, and I am going to quote two sentences from it. The first is:
The prospect of entering into a military pact which would primarily help the French cause in tndo-China and thus make possible a full scale-war with China, is not a pleasant one for Britons to face.
How kind of the Gazette editor to realize this. How magnanimous of him to realize that war with China would not be a pleasant thing for Britons to face. Why would it not be pleasant? Because the British people know full well if there is a war with China the chances are there will be a war with Russia. The British suspect also that perhaps in certain quarters they are considered to be expendable; that they will provide the advance airfields for other people to use. If there is going to be a war on that scale, then the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe is going to be destroyed. The people in Europe are not prepared yet for that sort of nonsense, no matter what the editor of the Gazette may desire.
There are other aspects to the matter. There is the political one which I am sure will appeal to all of us in this house, because I am quite certain any British gov-


ernment that decides to support the French cause and take the risk of war with China is going to find itself out of power within a matter of hours. The British people are opposed to such a policy, as I suspect most other people in Europe are. After all, what is this French cause? Rightly or wrongly, in the minds of Asians it is the cause of colonialism. In our minds, the issue might not be so clearly cut, but in Asia that is what it means. There are those who talk, as I think the leader of the Social Credit party hinted, of localized wars, regional wars. They are taking a most fantastic risk. It is possible that war can be localized, but the chances of a conflagration are far too great to assume that risk.
There is another aspect to the British situation. If they were to get into this war in Indo-China, if they were to enter into a war with China, obviously it would mean the end of the commonwealth of nations as we know it now. Of this much I am certain. Great as is his gift of irony, I cannot see Sir Winston Churchill presiding over this final irony. It is for that reason I feel the British government will not accept the invitation of the editor of the Gazette. But there is another sentence in this editorial that is a really brutal distortion of history. It says:
It Is the same kind of decision that had to be made in 1939.
I say that is a brutal distortion of history. Fortunately, we have not yet arrived at 1984, but we can see with great clarity what could happen in 1984 if men like this were running the country. After all, what was the situation in 1939? We had seen Austria engulfed, but Austria did not lose her identity because the people of Austria rose up against their own government. The Austrian people were taken over and others were content to forget it because they felt there was some sort of kinship between Austrians and Germans. After all, did they not speak the same language? Then, there was the Sudeten. The people there did not rise against their oppressors in Prague. The Sudeten people were "rescued" by an aggressive enemy power that came in and within six months went further to take Prague and all Czechoslovakia. Only a few months later, in September, 1939, the Polish people did not rise against their own government, but the German armies marched in in the most aggressive sense of the word. Where then, is there a comparison between 1939 and 1954? It is only in the superheated brain of the man who wrote these words.
I say that is an editorial which is deliberately mischievous. I only hope it is not read by people outside Canada who might believe

for a moment that this is going to be Canadian policy. I am convinced that the people of Canada are not ready to go to war to rescue a colonial power from the follies' it has committed; I think the people of Canada are right. Yet, there is not one of us who has not got a feeling of friendship and kinship, and today anxiety for France. We are close to that country. We wish to be close to what is after all the cultural leader of Europe. We have for France the greatest of admiration and friendship, but we are doing France no service and we are doing our own people a disservice if we refrain from saying these things which are honestly upon our minds. For once it appears that the logic of the French has misled them.
We know, and we do admire, the gallantry of those who fought at Dien Bien Phu. Yet need Dien Bien Phu have occurred at all had there been greater wisdom in French policy? And another question is on my mind. Is French concern in Indo-China completely divorced from concern for other areas much nearer continental France? Is that not one of the nubs of this whole situation? If France gets out of Indo-China, what then happens to Tunisia and Morocco? That is a situation which France must face, and face up to very shortly because the people in those areas also want their independence. They also want their freedom. They also want the right to say "we are going to govern ourselves," and France still refuses.
It is conceivable that there are people in this country, and even in the government, who see an advantage in France hanging on to these territories. After all, so long as France has Morocco and Tunisia-well, we will have air bases to use in the event of war. But if the people of these territories have decided that they are going to be free, we shall have no air bases; and, even although we subjugate them, we shall not be free to use those bases.
If we think only in terms of bases in north Africa, surely the obvious thing to do is to make friends of these people. The way for France to make friends with them is to say to them, "In a certain number of years we will give you your freedom and your independence, and during those years we would like to help you. We would like to train your civil service. We would like to train an administration so that it can take over." And then France can leave, with credit and glory; and France can leave friends behind her.
As it is, if France's policy is the same policy she pursued in Indo-China she will leave enemies behind her-and not only for France, but also for the western world. And the Arab bloc will have gained fresh allies.
Supply-External Affairs But there are other aspects of the situation I would like to deal with. This afternoon my leader gave briefly some of the history of Indo-China. I want to bring the matter up to date, and particularly do I wish to refer to an idea given out this afternoon by the hon. member for Prince Albert. There is in many areas a desire to have a pact to restrain Mr. Dulles-I beg your pardon, I mean communist aggression in Asia. And apparently the hon. member for Prince Albert would like to see some sort of Asian counterpart of NATO-a southeast Asian treaty organization. He told us, of course, that it would not operate without Asian nations in it.
Obviously. But what Asian nations did he have in mind? That is a fair question to put to the hon. member. After all, it is quite possible that the Asian nations he has in mind might refer to Formosa-or it could be the Philippines, or it could be South Korea or all of them. These are Asian nations. But I do not think these are the Asian nations the hon. member for Prince Albert had in mind. Perhaps he had in mind India, and other countries of the Colombo group; at least I hope so.
But I submit this to him, that if we are going to wait for the Colombo nations to come into such a pact, we are going to wait long, long years, beyond the span of life of any member in this House of Commons. India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia, Burma-none of these will have anything to do with such a pact, and for a very good reason. The leader of the Social Credit party said we had to persuade these people to act with us in our great and pressing cause. They are not remotely interested in our great and pressing cause. For all that the people in Asia can see are great and powerful and wealthy nations-wealthy beyond avarice, nations which have something to defend, something to hang on to, something to protect.
But what does Asia have to defend? What do the Asians have to protect? They have a mortality rate whereby the expectancy of life is 27. They have poverty, illiteracy and disease. Is Asia going to fight for these things? No, Asia will fight only for a new social order; and that is the first and the most important thing in the world to Asians today. So why should they see our desire to protect our world as a great and pressing cause? The whole idea is absurd! Asia is going to improve the conditions of its own people before it considers protecting what we have, and what we have been so loath to give up in the past-no matter how noble our protestations have been.
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Certainly, we have to fight against communism. But we are fighting for our goods and chattels. They too are fighting for something-for the right to live. And until they have achieved that right to live on the same basis that we have it they are not going to be interested in our power pacts in southeast Asia, or anywhere else. Asia will join us only when their circumstances are infinitely better than they are today; Asia will join us when they feel that they can trust us.
But the hon. member for Prince Albert also said that if the Geneva conference is unsuccessful Canada should join a pact in Asia to ensure peace. Well, what sort of a pact would this be? With whom would it be? I am quite sure that New Zealand and Australia would be more than chary about joining such a pact. As I said earlier, if the United States wants the Philippines and South Korea, it is welcome to them; but as an alliance it is not one which will strike terror to anybody's heart.
What would be the purpose of a treaty such as that? I think we should examine it as fairly and objectively as we can. Would its intention be to issue a stern warning? And if the situation got worse would its intention be to issue a graver warning? Well, we have had warnings issued ad nauseam almost every day recently. But would such a treaty have as its purpose direct intervention, the use of force, against Asian nations? I hope not, because then that would mean the scuttling of the United Nations.
But, if it does, what sort of intervention is needed in Indo-China today? General Leelerc of the French army has given his figure as 500,000 men. Is North America prepared to put anything like that number of men into Indo-China to try to win it back from the communists? Certainly not. And yet to recover Indo-China intervention on the most massive scale is the only thing which could be undertaken and immediately there would be retaliation which would mean intervention on a massive scale from the other side.
I agree that we and our allies should be constantly examining what is happening in Asia. But, as I said earlier, any Asian treaty is worse than hopeless without the Colombo nations in it. And while I cannot say that this is a matter of party policy, I state as strongly as I can that I would oppose such a treaty without these Asian nations in it.
I wish to ask the hon. member for Prince Albert a question, or if the leader of the Conservative party speaks tonight I would ask him if the Conservative party is prepared to enter into such an Asian pact against the express objections of the Colombo nations. And I would appreciate an answer to that question.


By all means let there be consultation; by all means let there be discussion. We know that there may be an answer to be found; but I doubt if we can go much farther than that. And now, let me say this. The western world today is frustrated, and the western world is nervous. It is frustrated because there is no clear leadership, because by the dominant partner in the western alliance there are day to day changes in policy, and statements of leaders, and statements of pseudo-leaders, and statements of would-be leaders which leave us completely confused, and not knowing what the situation really is. There is nervousness in the west because of this conflict in policy, and because we do not know what is going on.
The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar read an editorial from the Economist which suggested that America's allies had more to fear as a result of American statements than had America's enemies. And that reminded me of what the Duke of Wellington said when he had a shipload of new recruits given to him during the Spanish war. He said, "Well, I don't know what effect they will have on the enemy but, by God, they terrify me". And there are times when I am in the same position with regard to American policies.
I have no idea what influence American statements will have on any potential enemy but I certainly feel nervous and confused. But of this I am completely certain, if the United States is determined to take military action in Indo-China to bolster up colonialism, then it goes it alone. The people of Canada will not accept such a policy.
The United States has told us about "massive retaliation" which ended in a monsoon in Indo-China. It has told us about its agonizing reappraisal, and perhaps, Mr. Chairman, that reappraisal has taken place. If it has, it may be a most significant one. That reappraisal has given United States two alternatives. She has to decide who are her allies. Are her allies in the world to be Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee, Bao Dai, or are her allies to be Canada, the United Kingdom and the rest of the free countries of the west? That surely should not be an agonizing reappraisal; but the Americans have to make up their minds which way they are going. I do not suggest for a moment that there is here a hopeless split; there is here no parting of the ways. I can only hope and I think that wise counsel will prevail over the interventionists; that cool minds will be listened to in preference to hot heads.
It is so difficult to see the situation clearly just now. There seems to be a lull, a quietness; but is it the lull before the storm, or is it the deathly sort of quietness which one

gets within the very heart and centre of the storm, or have we ridden it out and are we now sailing into smoother waters? I do not know. The next few weeks are going to tell and I can only hope that the common-sense of the American people will show them the peril of certain ways which conceivably they might travel.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, with a great deal that has been said in the committee today I think there will be general agreement. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has placed before us the broad problems confronting the conference at Geneva in a manner which I think will be regarded as a fair appraisal of the situation as it exists today.
I was very happy to hear the tribute he paid to Mr. Anthony Eden and the remark that he made that his patience and judgment did play such an important role in keeping alive the hopes of those who are still meeting at Geneva. It seemed to me that in summing up the situation the Secretary of State for External Affairs did lay down a proposition that unquestionably carries this government farther into acceptance of responsibility than it has yet gone at any time before. The exact words he used were: "We cannot accept the principle of collective security in one part of the world and reject it in another." If one will examine these words and their implication he will see that it is a statement of immense importance to hon. members, to the parliament of Canada and to the people of Canada generally.
Shortly after he had made that statement he made a statement that I think will find general acceptance, as well as some of the comments he made about the situation in Geneva. He said that no nation can be saved from communism unless it wants to be. That I think is a statement that cannot be challenged. However, I think we can go a great deal farther than that, because I do not know any nation yet that has wanted communism. That is something we should remember. Less than 2 per cent of the people of Russia were communists at the time of the Russian revolution. I doubt whether there has been a single country in the world where communism has taken power that 10 per cent of the people have been communists. There has been no single case where communism has come to power as an expression of the will of the people. There is no communist government in the world which can be regarded as the government the people of that country want.
While not in any way challenging the statement that no nation can be saved from communism unless it wants to be, I should like
Supply-External Affairs to emphasize the fact that many nations which have not wanted to be communist have become communist by force, by a threat of force and by treachery. The latter weapon is the weapon most employed by communists the world over. Undoubtedly the problem of those who are seeking to stem the tide of communism is very much greater in those countries where an understanding of the danger of communism is not already in their minds. We can see the difference in some of the countries of Asia and what happened in Malaya. It was not alone the stern discipline which was exercised by that very gallant soldier, General Templer, which dealt so effectively with communism in Malaya. There also was the fact that the people of Malaya did not want communism, had some idea of the danger and were ready to be rallied by those who sought to lead them against that evil force.
I must say, however, there is one other thought we should perhaps keep in mind. We have heard a great deal about the fact that under no circumstances must we do anything to preserve colonialism. Undoubtedly the world is moving forward. Undoubtedly great strides have been taken away from the kind of dependence that we describe as colonialism. I think, however, it would be wise for those who talk so loosely in those terms to ask themselves one question. Are they prepared to insist upon an immediate end, without any period of transition, of the colonialism under western powers, and by doing so create a vacuum into which the Soviet empire will immediately move?


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: It did not happen in India.


George Alexander Drew: I just heard the interjection "They have in India".


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: It did not happen in India.


George Alexander Drew: Well, then, I hear it better now: "It did not happen in India." Of course it did not happen in India because the situation was in no way parallel. What happened in India was a long process of the history of this commonwealth, and there is no single incident which offers more hope to those today than the transition by which step by step India advanced to full nationhood by the voluntary action of the government of Great Britain.


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: It took a Labour government to bring it about.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, we are talking about those nations which as yet have not had the opportunity to establish a form of government under which any organized resistance of their own could become a reality. Those of us who believe in the steady

Supply-External Affairs movement toward freedom of nations should also bear in mind that under any impractical abandonment of such measure of organized direction as now exists, without something else being put in its place, we may well open the door to the vilest form of slavery this world has known.


An hon. Member:: You said that before.


George Alexander Drew: Yes, I have said that before, and may I say to my hon. friend of the C.C.F. party who just interjected, that I shall say it again on many occasions, because of all the vile forms of slavery this world has known I do not think there is anything to compare with the Godless communism which has been imposed by force upon nearly 800 million people in this world in comparatively recent years.
As I conceive it, and as I conceive the hope of those who have been discussing the problems of Asia, it is a hope that through the assistance of the democratic powers, and through the combined strength of those democratic powers, an opportunity may be offered to the countries of Asia, as to the countries of the rest of the world, to enjoy at some time, and as soon as may be possible in Divine Wisdom, that kind of freedom which has been our privilege in Canada and in every country that enjoys the same parliamentary system.
Why should any of us be reluctant to talk of collective action to preserve freedom? Was that not the whole concept of the charter of the United Nations signed at San Francisco in the spring of 1945? Every nation that signed that charter pledged itself to a common effort to assure to every nation in the world, strong or weak, the right to determine its own form of government and its own course by its own free choice. As we speak of the necessity for recognizing the right of freedom in Asia and in other parts of the world, the right which all of us certainly accept, let us never at any time talk of that right of freedom without remembering those nations now behind the iron curtain which also have the right of freedom at some time and under some plan which may become possible by the very terms of the charter of the United Nations which we all signed.
Do not let anyone suggest that Poland, the Ukraine, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, or any other country, including China, now under a communist government received that form of government except by the power, or threat of power, exercised by Moscow.
No one is suggesting that any sudden change in this tragic scene of slavery can


take place, but never at any time should we forget that if our signatures and the signatures of all the free nations to the charter of the United Nations means anything at all, it means that we accepted the proposition that every nation had the right to choose its own course.
While some of these other nations are being discussed, and while Russia, China, and the other satellites are making their proposals, I think that the free nations should be making the proposal that under the supervision of the United Nations a vote be taken in those countries now under Russian dominance to see what kind of government they want. Before this satellite government in China tells us what should be done in any part of the world, before we accept advice from Russia at any time, surely it is our right and our duty to go back to that charter, signed in the spring of 1945, and point out the obligation that exists under that charter for such an opportunity to express their own opinion by the nations which now have communist governments enforced upon them.
This is not an original idea. This is not a new concept. This thought was carried forward from the days after the. first world war. After that struggle votes were taken under the auspices of the league of nations and the result of those votes was interpreted in the subsequent recognition of the wish of the people as expressed by the ballot.
I leave that subject there, but while we talk so much about assuring freedom in many distant lands, and no one disagrees with the reminder of the need for that freedom, let us also keep in mind those ancient lands with centuries upon centuries of culture and civilization behind them which want freedom from communism as much as any people in the world. I would hope that the day will not be long distant when those proposals will be put before gatherings attended by Russia, by the satellite nations, and by those other nations which are so generous with their advice to us.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs, in speaking of those different world-wide associations which have emerged under the United Nations or in association with it, spoke of the commonwealth association. He said that it has played and can play a very valuable role. He expressed regret that India and other Asian members of the commonwealth had not been included in the conference. I think all of us will share that regret, and I think all of us would welcome the day with enthusiasm, and with great hope, when India and Pakistan, Ceylon and

other territories in Asia associated with us in this great partnership, join in these deliberations.
However, they are members of the United Nations, and in that organization the opportunity presents itself to exchange opinions with them and to bring them closer and closer in harmony with our own thoughts on world affairs.
I wish to direct the remainder of my remarks to that commonwealth association. Much has been said about the United Nations and about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We know the steps that are being taken to bring to reality the European defence community. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has spoken of the possibility of a new organization in Asia with powers and scope similar to those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Each one of these efforts is in itself a forward step in those collective efforts which have done so much to bring closer together, in common action, the nations which desire peace and which, while desiring peace, also desire freedom for themselves and others.
As I listened to some of the comments about statements made in the United States, I could not help noticing how critical some people in this chamber are ready to be about statements made in the United States, and yet how little I have heard by way of criticism from the same source about things that are being said by Russia and by China at this time. Does any hon. member in this chamber suggest for one moment that the position of the United States and that of Russia are comparable in this world picture with which we are confronted today? There is not one thoughtful member of this committee who would even for a moment tolerate such a suggestion. We know the people of the United States too well-there are too many blood ties as well as an understanding of the broadest kind-for us to believe at any time that, with whatever power they might possess, the United States have any hope but that of peace.
It would be well for us to remember that if the United States ceases to be the central core of our great organization for defence, the main hope of achieving continuing peace in the world today will have disappeared. I do not believe for one moment we shall reach any such time. However, I do not think that anyone contributes to the advancement of the hope of peace by suggesting that anyone in the United States-whether we approve of their particular words or not- has any aspiration other than for the same kind of peace that we want here in Canada.
Supply-External Affairs
Some of those who are so free in their criticism of statements made in the United States might well subject their own statements to examination before they suggest that we should be too ready to have our position at any time tested by their words. Not one of these nations is perfect. No single nation in this western fellowship is without its faults, but at least we can say this: The people of the United States, to our knowledge, are just as anxious as we are to have peace. If at any time there is any discussion of the strength of their weapons and of how, in any dreadful circumstances, those weapons might be employed, it is only because we have come to learn that in this world we may be a long time waiting for a second chance if we are unprepared to defend ourselves against the declared aggressive plans of Russia and the satellite governments associated with Moscow.
We have spoken of these wider associations. Each one of them offers its hope. Mr. Chairman, I believe there is no single association in the world that offers us greater hope for the years ahead than does the commonwealth of nations, expressing a common loyalty to a similar parliamentary system and the rule of law. This is no mere sentimental expression of an ancient fellowship. Either this commonwealth is a reality or it is not. Either we believe in this commonwealth or we have abandoned our faith in an organization that has done more for the advancement of society in this world than has any other group of people in the long history of the human race.
We are inclined to boast about the thin and intangible ties that hold this commonwealth together. I suggest that we should not let those ties become too thin and too intangible. We are also inclined to speak about the fact that this relationship is undefinable. I think it would be well that we define it, not in rigid terms but in terms that we can understand. Whatever other definition there may be, I think we at least can say that this commonwealth represents the greatest experiment in international friendship that has yet been worked out by the genius of man. We have been advised that it is well to keep friendships in repair. I think it is wise to keep this particular form of international friendship in good repair at all times.
I thought that a former prime minister of New Zealand answered the questions that sometimes seem to creep into some people's minds, as well as it could be done. There are those who seem to feel that a definite acceptance of a real association within the commonwealth in some way suggests a

Supply-External Affairs limitation of our field of sovereign independence as a nation. To that suggestion Peter Fraser, while he was prime minister of New Zealand, used these memorable words:
Membership of the commonwealth is not independence with something taken away: it is independence with something added.
I do not believe the thought could be better expressed. As a completely sovereign nation, in no way subordinate in any manner to any other nation, nevertheless within this fellowship, by the very association we establish, we add something to the strength of our own freedom by this fellowship of people who respect the same institutions, the same traditions and the same concept of the right of the individual under well-stated and well-defined laws.
There are of course those who seem to think that in these wider associations, such as the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other organizations of that kind, we have in effect thrown off something of this older fellowship We speak of it as though it was some mysterious entity that has no more substance than a Cheshire cat with nothing but the smile remaining. Let us examine it and see what it really means. Certainly no one who was in the great hall of Westminster almost a year ago now, at the time that more than a thousand representatives of fifty-five nations and other political bodies within the commonwealth met there in the presence of their Queen, will ever forget that memorable scene when in that ancient hall that enormous group of nations expressed their loyalty to the Queen and at the same time heard from that Queen her declaration of service to her people.
Fifty-five nations with one concept of freedom, fifty-five nations expressing common ideals, and then only a few days later in the coronation service the heads of those states walked into the abbey and saw the young Queen dedicate herself in that solemn service to the great cause of which we are all a part. Was that only pageantry? Was that merely something that attracted a great crowd to London a year ago or was that something real and lasting, something of great meaning to us and to the rest of mankind? I prefer to believe that this was the beginning of a new hope which may be fulfilled if we recognize all the opportunities presented by what was symbolized on that occasion. I say "hope" advisedly because we should not yet assume that we have achieved the things for which so many of us have been hoping and dreaming for so many years.
We are inclined to speak of the second Elizabethan era as though the mere fact that her name is Elizabeth would of necessity


give to our Queen the same role in revivifying and revitalizing this great fellowship as fell to the lot of an earlier Elizabeth. I think it would be well for us to remember that when the first Elizabeth came to the throne it was in a time of poverty, of diminishing resources and of an economic blockade which threatened even starvation itself in the British Isles. It was not the mere arrival on the throne of a young queen that changed all that. It was the spirit of a people dedicated to a great cause.
The reason that from its early plight Britain assumed a new role and laid the foundations for this commonwealth within the reign of that first Elizabeth was that men and women of vision, boldness and daring were prepared to make decisions which resulted in the wider concept of freedom that has come down to us at this time. We will only know the full freedom of a second Elizabethan era if we are prepared to make bold decisions today and, with the same vision, the same broad prospects for the future, are prepared to go forward together with the possibilities of our own prosperity clearly before our eyes and at the same time the knowledge of what that can mean to all the rest of the world.
This is no simple task that we are called upon to undertake if in fact we do undertake it in the way we should. What a challenge it is to the spirit of every one of us. Just let us visualize the broad picture of what this means. We have heard of the millions in Asia. We have spoken of the hundreds of millions brought under communist domination. I think it is well for us to remember that in this commonwealth today, in this commonwealth represented by those who were in London a year ago, there are at this time 620 million people. That in itself gives some idea of the immense and almost limitless possibilities that are before us if we keep this partnership as a real adventure in friendship between nations with common traditions and common understanding of their past.
Let us look at the numbers embraced in that figure. India has 367 million people, Pakistan 80 million, the United Kingdom 51 million, Canada 15 million, the Union of South Africa 13,153,000, Australia 8,829,000, Ceylon 7,941,000, New Zealand 2,047,000, and in the other territories within this great fellowship there are 75 million people.
I do not think anyone will challenge the statement made earlier that in this great task before us nothing can be more important in the hope of stability in Asia than that we should gain the confidence and support of the government and people of India. When the Prime Minister left on his tour some time ago I expressed the warm support of

the members of this party, as did members of the other parties on this side of the house, for the purpose and concept of that trip. I believe that the Prime Minister performed a great service in India in expressing the friendship of Canada to that great nation associated with us in its new status, and I also believe that he accepted, in a manner that may have very far-reaching consequences, the opportunity to indicate our confidence in the people of the United States. Expressions such as he has placed before the government and people of India at that time can greatly help in broadening the basis of this wide understanding that we have.
Throughout the years, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa have all emerged as fully sovereign states. This evolution has at no time demanded the force of arms to attain the status we now hold. In the same steady process of evolution, India, Pakistan and Ceylon have now emerged with similar sovereign status, under the guidance of Westminster, with the blessing of Westminster and with assistance in drafting their constitutions and other details of that kind from those who have for so long been in the civil service at a time when the status of those nations was entirely different.
If there has seemed to be caution and delay on the part of the government of Great Britain about the steps it has been taking, we certainly must remember that never at any time is there absent from their mind the thought that has been expressed here today, that as we merge into the future it is of vital importance if it is within the realm of wisdom and human judgment to bring along that same body of Asiatic nations that have carried into Asia our parliamentary system and our concept of individual freedom. Every great human venture, Mr. Chairman, demands a conviction on the part of those who seek to make it a reality. It is not only in the spiritual field, but in the temporal field as well that there is at all times a deep longing in every human to be able to say with conviction, I believe.
In the temporal field in this great experiment in human advancement it is important that we be able to say with deep conviction: I believe in the advantages of this association; I believe in the future of the commonwealth for our own benefit and for the benefit of free people everywhere. This is not something in which we alone have a deep concern. Let us be quite certain that if by neglect this commonwealth of ours should fall asunder, then we would be talking in terms of meaningless hope if we declared our expectations that other nations could retain throughout the years ahead any effective
Supply-External Affairs association of some other kind. If these nations with their common concept of freedom, if these nations with their common traditions are unable to work together, then what hope can there be for an effective association of nations with no such common background behind them?
I would hope that as this loosely associated partnership of nations moves forward into the future-speaking not of five years ahead but of 50, 100 and 200 years ahead-we will also bear in mind that if our course is wise and if we do demonstrate the great advantage of this system, then we have every reason to expect there may be new additions to this fellowship. It is not long ago since Burma became a separate republic outside of the commonwealth. Still I say that in the years not too far distant, by the example we may set, Burma might seek re-entry into that commonwealth. Is it utterly beyond possibility that the example of effective co-operation of so many races, creeds, tongues and nationalities, might offer such an example that nations not at any time in the past associated with this fellowship might seek association in this historic partnership?
I would hope that it is not impossible that at some time in the future, because of the example given through this great association, southern Ireland or Eire, call it what you will, might re-enter this partnership with which it was once associated. Most certainly on our part, as I am sure on the part of every other section of the commonwealth, that reentry would be welcomed with great warmth and enthusiasm. Then let us think of this great partnership in practical terms. We speak of stability in Asia. Where could we have greater hope of stability in Asia than in a powerful India, associated with us, associated with Pakistan, with Ceylon, with Australia, New Zealand and the other nations in that part of the world.
There are many of us here who have reason to know the great fighting qualities of Indian soldiers. There are men in this house tonight who have seen Indian troops in action, and who will never forget those magnificent men and the bravery they displayed. I am not mentioning that in warlike terms by any manner of means. Unfortunately, in this world in which we live we are called upon to think in terms of strength which will provide the opportunity for peace and freedom. As India gains increasing national strength, as India gains increasing prosperity with our help and with the help of other nations in the western world, we may hope that Indian strength will be the great bulwark of democracy in Asia; that Pakistan and Ceylon, side by side, will stand for that kind of

Supply-External Affairs freedom, and that all those differences which today have emerged will be forgotten as other differences have been forgotten in the past.
Mr. Chairman, I have mentioned these things because I believe that this is a time for a great affirmation of faith in the future of the commonwealth on the part of those of us here in this house and in Canada, and throughout the commonwealth generally- a great affirmation of faith in a basic organization which itself can give strength to the efforts of the United States, to the United Nations, and to all those other organizations with which we are associated.
We all remember the ancient injunction: For if the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who then shall prepare himself to the battle? Let us leave no uncertainty about our convictions in this respect. And let us plan with the broad vision of our own advancing prosperity, with all the human and material resources we possess within this commonwealth; and at the same time let us think of what that will mean to other nations as well. But, above all, let any plans of that kind be great and embracing plans. Small, limited plans have nothing in them to stir the heart and soul of red-blooded men and women. Let us place before our people, with greater opportunities than were ever known in those earlier days, confident statements of our own faith and hope, such as stirred the spirit of the people in that first Elizabethan age.
And as I close these remarks, may I recall the words spoken by our Queen when she herself defined so simply the change that has taken place in this great fellowship, this loosely defined fellowship of sovereign nations of which we form a part. These were her words:
The commonwealth bears no resemblance to the empire of the past. It is an entirely new conception-built on the highest qualities of the spirit of man: friendship, loyalty, and the desire of freedom and peace. To that new conception of an equal partnership of nations and races I shall give myself heart and soul every day of my life.
As we think of all that young Queen has done to fulfil that pledge within recent months, is it too much to suggest that each one of us will pledge himself to build on the highest qualities of the spirit of man: friendship, loyalty and the desire of freedom and peace; and that we, too, shall give ourselves, heart and soul, to that high ideal every day of our lives.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Shall the item
carry? Does the Secretary of State for External Affairs wish to speak at this time?
LMr. Drew.l


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, before this item carries it probably would be expected of me that I should deal with one or two of the points that have been raised in the general discussion following the statement I made this afternoon.
I should like first of all to refer to an observation made by the hon. member for Prince Albert, and repeated a few moments ago by the Leader of the Opposition, that in my statement this afternoon-and I quote from the words of the hon. member for Prince Albert-I went further in the commitment of Canada in its world responsibilities than this government had ever gone before.
At the time I heard those words I was somewhat at a loss to find that interpretation in anything I had said. But the Leader of the Opposition made the matter clearer for me when he related the statement of my hon. friend to the sentence I had used earlier as follows:	"We cannot accept"-and I did
use these words-"the principle of collective security in one part of the world, and reject it in another".
Well, Mr. Chairman, I would not like it to be thought that in using those words I have added any commitment of any kind to anything that this government has previously undertaken. And I do not, myself, see how any such commitment can be read into those words or, indeed, into any other words I used this afternoon. I am talking about specific commitments on the part of this government for action.
What I had in mind in that sentence, of course, was the point that we cannot accept the principle of collective security in relation to the Atlantic area, and then deny its validity in respect of some other part of the world. But, as I see it, that of course is not remotely the same thing as saying that, having accepted specific commitments in NATO, we should accept similar commitments ourselves in respect of other parts of the world.
I think that if this principle works well for us in the Atlantic area, then if it is carried out in the right way on the initiative of the Asian people themselves, and those most directly concerned with the area, it might work well in that other part of the world. But of course that is a very different thing from saying that we as a government, having accepted commitments in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, should accept similar commitments in a southeast Asian treaty organization. And I would not like those words of mine to be interpreted in any other sense.

Indeed, Mr. Chairman, in the latter part of my observations I did give utterance to some cautionary observations in regard to the extension of Canada's commitments, her specific commitments, apart from our general commitments in the United Nations, which we recognize as extending to all the world. But I did express cautionary observations with regard to the extension of additional specific commitments to other areas. As 1 understood him, the hon. member for Prince Albert, however, made an interesting and, indeed, an important statement in regard to his view as to the desirability of the government's accepting additional commitments. He made this statement this afternoon:
-on behalf of the people of Canada he-
That is, the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
-should give notice that, in the event of the Geneva conference proving unsuccessful in settling the Indo-China problem Canada would join with other freedom-loving nations in a pact in Asia designed to assure peace to the same degree as peace has been assured in Europe through the instrumentality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
And later on he came back to that point when he said:
The minister has shown that Canada has responsibilities for peace in all parts of the world, not only in the United Nations; we have to accept them in any Pacific pact that may be achieved, so that the other parts of our commonwealth- Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon -will know that Canada and the commonwealth will stand with the United States and thereby assure the maintenance of a solid wall against the advance of communism everywhere in the world.
Well, all I would say in regard to that, Mr. Chairman-and I was asked by the hon. member to state my view in regard to it-is that this government is not ready to take any such far-reaching additional specific commitment in respect of collective security at this time. But we remain ready to carry out our obligations of collective security under the United Nations charter in any part of the world at any time, along with the other members of the United Nations, and we accept and confirm the specific obligations that we already have under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As I said earlier this afternoon, Mr. Chairman, we would have to be, in our opinion, very careful, in view of our resources and our other commitments, in the extension of specific commitments beyond those which we have already undertaken. On that very point, Mr. Chairman, the advice which was given to the government in this house on May 20
Supply-External Affairs by the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich is very much to the point, when he said- and I quote from Hansard at page 4916:
In closing, I repeat that we on this side of the house appreciate the difficulties confronting the minister-
That is the Minister of National Defence. I continue:
-and his department in these very uncertain times. We urge caution in accepting new commitments; we stress the importance of continued emphasis on the defence of the home front, the North American continent; we urge care in all expenditures.
Mr. Chairman, that, in so far as commitments are concerned, expresses the viewpoint to which I tried to give expression this afternoon. We urge caution in respect of the undertaking of new special commitments in any other area of the world than that of the north Atlantic area, to which we are already committed.
That, Mr. Chairman, as I have already said, is not the same as saying that we cannot accept the principle of collective security in one part of the world and reject it in another. I would be glad to stand by that statement, because if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is working well in the defence of the Atlantic area against aggression, and if it has worked well as a deterrent against aggression, a southeast Asia security organization, which would include, as pointed out by more than one speaker, the Asian countries themselves and those other countries who have special commitments and special responsibilities for Asian territories, might well contribute, not only to the security but to the progress and indeed to the freedom of that part of the world.
I do not think that there were any other specific questions that were addressed to me this afternoon except possibly by the hon. member for Fort William. If he were in his seat I would like to thank him for the kind words he said about me, and I hope that my reply to his question will not interfere with our friendship because I do not think it is going to be the kind of answer that he might welcome. He asked me whether Mr. Syngman Rhee and Mr. Chiang Kai-shek were in close co-operation, and whether there was any chance of an attack on China from that co-operative source. Well, all I can say to the hon. member is that I know very little about the co-operation between Mr. Syngman Rhee and General Chiang Kai-shek, but I do understand there does exist such co-operation. I express my own view in saying that I hope that the co-operation will not result in an attack by those two governments on the mainland of China. I say that, not because I have any high regard for

Supply-External Affairs the government on the mainland of China but because I think that that would be a rash and ill-advised action, even for the sake of overthrowing that government, if that were itself a desirable objective.
The hon. member for Winnipeg North did bring up a lot of interesting points and interesting questions in his speech. He was inclined to be critical about something I said this afternoon, in that I was negative and not positive enough; that while I emphasized that we must be clear, Mr. Chairman, on what we are trying to prevent, I said very little about what we are trying to do. If he will recall the context of those remarks when I talked about the desirability of clarity in respect of what we were trying to prevent, he will see I was thinking about the defence security, military security organizations, and not about the prevention of communism as a doctrine, as a social and economic doctrine. On more than one occasion in this house, and I did mention it in passing this afternoon, I have emphasized that it is far more important for the prevention of communism itself-I am not now referring merely to military aggression-to have a positive policy than merely a negative one. If he took anything from my remarks this afternoon indicating I had departed from that view I assure him that he was mistaken.
That, Mr. Chairman, is all I have to say at this time. No doubt other matters will come up in the consideration of other items of the estimates, and I shall be glad to do my best to deal with those questions as they arise.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
87. Representation abroad-construction, acquisition or improvement of buildings, works, land, new equipment and furnishings, and to the extent that blocked funds are available for these expenditures to provide for payment from these foreign currencies owned by Canada and provided only for governmental or other limited purposes, $1,945,480.
Mr. Green:: This item deals with construction, acquisition and improvement of buildings, works, lands and so on, abroad. There is a recommendation of the standing committee on external affairs which reads as follows:
Your committee approves of the exploratory negotiations being carried on between the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Public Works concerning the liaison to be established between these departments as to the purchase of properties, the erection and maintenance of buildings occupied by the department.
That was discussed in the committee at the time the minister was abroad. It would be helpful if we could have his comments on the recommendation. As he knows, the present situation is that his own department, which is in no sense a building department,

is carrying on most of this work; whereas in our governmental structure we have a Department of Public Works, which is now supposed to be much more efficient than it was before and thoroughly capable of handling all public construction. It does seem to me that this is one case where it could be called in.
We have had examples of tremendous sums of money being used for construction of buildings abroad. We have the situation in Rome where about $186,000 has been spent on a site in one of the most expensive portions of the city, and there are potential plans of the minister's department for the erection of an embassy to house one ambassador and his family costing $325,000, and equipment, furniture and so on for that same embassy to cost $75,000, making a total of about $600,000 for this one embassy.
I believe if the Department of Public Works were called in to do work of this kind the result might be a big saving for the taxpayers of Canada. The embassy in Rome is only one of several which are costing this country a great deal, and just in the last few days we have had a proposal made by one of the minister's representatives abroad, the consul general in New York, that private Canadians subscribe $100,000 apiece to build a Canada House in New York for a total cost of about $10 million, and that the hope is that the government will take that over and there is an assurance that it will not lose money.
There we have a plan which would mean that the Canadian government would be going into the office building business in a foreign country to the extent of $10 million and be subject to all the changes and economic conditions in that area. In the committee of external affairs the acting deputy minister, I think it was, intimated that they knew nothing about such a plan and in any event the government was not committed to it.
But we have suggestions being made and these construction projects always seem to be costing millions of dollars. We have another big building going up in Washington to house the Department of National Defence and defence construction and to accommodate 150 people. That office building is to cost $2 million when it is erected in a swank part of that city.
I would like to have the minister's comments on the policy of his department, particularly with regard to turning these construction jobs over to the Department of Public Works.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, in reply to what the hon. gentleman has just said I would like to assure him and the house that

1 welcome the discussions which are going on between the Department of External Affairs and Department of Public Works in regard to this matter, and I hope that as a result of these discussions the Department of Public Works will be able to take from our shoulders a greater share of the responsibility for the construction and maintenance of building projects.
That will depend, of course, on a good many considerations and whether it is desirable to do so in all cases. It may well be desirable and I hope it will be considered by the Department of Public Works to be desirable to do that in cities such as London, Paris, Rome, New York and Washington. It may not be equally desirable or feasible in some of the more remote capitals. Indeed I doubt whether the Department of Public Works would like to take on the responsibility for furnishing and maintaining some of our buildings in some of the Asian countries which are pretty far removed from Ottawa and where they have no knowledge of conditions on the spot.
I would assure the hon. member that we are pursuing these discussions and I would like to express my own hope that the Department of Public Works will be able to take a greater share of responsibility in this matter.
My hon. friend mentioned the building in Rome, but I would point out to him, and I have no doubt it has been pointed out in committee, that the amount of money invested in the property in Rome, which amounted to nearly $200,000 at one time, was earmarked for the construction not only of an embassy residence but also for the building of Canadian offices in Rome. That money was invested in the property a few years ago at a time when it was in our possession in the form of blocked lira and it seemed to us then, and still seems to us, to have been good business that, instead of keeping the money In the bank-we could not convert it into dollars-we should put it in land which is a better hedge against inflation than banks. I think our judgment has been vindicated in that respect because we have had a valuation of that property made recently and we have been assured that its value is now more than twice what it was when we bought it a few years ago.


Howard Charles Green: Then why not sell it?


Lester Bowles Pearson: We may sell it, but it is good property on which to build and I am not sure whether it would be more economic to sell it and build at some other spot. However, I can assure my hon. friend that in whatever decision we may make in this regard we will have considerations of efficiency and economy in mind.
Supply-External Affairs
The hon. member also mentioned the situation in New York which is not, I think, exactly as he described it, because the government is not getting into the real estate business in New York in the manner in which I think he indicated. This was on the initiative of the consul general in New York and I think it was a very imaginative and useful suggestion for a co-operative building project in New York for what has been already termed a Canada House in which the government would rent space, as well as other Canadian businesses. In short, one building would cover all the Canadian offices and certain Canadian banks and agencies. That I think would be conducive to efficiency, not only as regards government offices but in relation to Canadian agencies as well. But the government itself is not responsible for that building. It is a co-operative venture in which the government may rent space. But on the hon. member's first point, I echo his hope that the Department of Public Works will be able to play a bigger part in the construction and maintenance program.


Howard Charles Green: First of all, Mr. Chairman, with regard to the proposed embassy in Rome, I think the situation is that the government bought this property for nearly $200,000 planning apparently to build an embassy and a chancellery, and then found that it was against the law to build a chancellery on that property. Therefore, it certainly did not show very good business judgment, and as far as the funds being in blocked lira is concerned, these funds could be used to enable Canadian students to study in Italy, and indeed I think some of them have been spent for that purpose. But it is not a very good excuse for lavish expenditure of government funds to say that because the money happens to be there in another currency it should therefore be used extravagantly to build such places.
As regards the building in New York, the minister said the government is co-operating, but apparently the government is involved in this plan, and I would like to know whether this co-operation consists merely of renting accommodation in buildings to be built by individuals, or whether the government is going to take over that building at $10 million, or whatever it will cost, in which event Canada will become a landlord of office accommodation in a city in a foreign country. If it is a nice thing to have a Canada House in New York I suppose it can be said that the same thing should be built in Chicago, or Seattle-


Mr. Abbott:: They have one in London now.


Howard Charles Green: Yes, but I believe the Canada House in London was not erected for the

Supply-External Affairs purpose of renting out accommodation to business people. I would like to know to what extent the department is co-operating in this program.


Mr. St. Laurent:: Mr. Chairman, I think the Hon. Mr. Lawson spoke to me rather than to any other member of the government about this matter and I told him I could give him no commitment whatsoever, but that if there was a building well located, in which accommodation was available at an economic figure, I had no doubt that on such premises the government would be prepared to give consideration to making leases. But I told him I could make no commitment, and I was not going to ask my colleagues to make any commitments whatsoever. I was very guarded in all my conversations and in the two or three letters I exchanged with Mr. Lawson, because I do not feel that any prime minister, or any government, should make that kind of commitments at this time. I told him that if he had friends who thought that was a good thing to do then that would be all right, but I asked him not to say that they had offered options to the government in any statement he made, but merely to say they would be prepared to offer options to the government. I asked him to be particularly careful not to hold out any inducement whatsoever that this was a government-sponsored scheme. Personally, I thought that if he and like-minded Canadians felt that it was something they could undertake, that was all right.
As it was described to me it was something about which they did not expect to make any profit themselves but they did expect that profits would be realized and that those profits would be used to retire the senior securities. There was no suggestion that there would be any thought that the government would want to exercise an option until, as he said in the notes he showed me of the speech he intended to make, it could be turned over practically without cost. Here the scheme was for amortization over a period of several decades during which time it was suggested that the senior securities could be retired.
I was extremely careful, because I did not think that any government could make any commitment to a scheme of that kind in these days. If it turns out all right and there comes a time when most of the senior securities have been retired and those who have the junior securities have given a long-term option that is still in existence to take it over at what would have to be much less than its original cost, it might then be considered. But I do not think that a government in


office can attempt to bind future generations as to what those future generations will do when it becomes their turn to have the responsibility of making decisions.


Howard Charles Green: As I understand it, it is a fundamental part of the plan that the government would take over this building. As I read it in the press, the plan is that while it will be put up in the meantime by individuals, eventually it is to be turned over to the government. The statement made I think indicated that the building would pay and that therefore the government would not lose any money. That is an entirely different thing from the government renting accommodation in a building of that type, a procedure with which nobody could quarrel. What I should like to know is whether the government is planning to enter into a scheme of this kind, either by way of accepting an option or in any other way which will lead eventually to the country paying for the building and becoming a landlord in New York.


Mr. SI. Laurent:: I told Mr. Lawson that I would not even put it before my colleagues. I told him that I could not give any undertaking or any commitment whatsoever and that I would not put it before my colleagues to make any commitment even as to what space they would take; that the promoters would have to take the risk of having desirable space and then offering it when it was available, and that if it was desirable and was competitive with respect to rent I felt that the government at that time, whoever might be in office, would be glad to consider entering into leases.


John George Diefenbaker: What was the scheme? Can the Prime Minister say what the scheme was? What did Mr. Lawson offer to the Prime Minister?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Mr. Lawson told me that there were individuals who were prepared to take the risk of putting up a building. First of all he suggested that the government might be one of those who would promote a building there. I told him that I would not even recommend that to my colleagues. I said: If you have friends who think that a building would be a good thing and would not involve them in any loss, they will have to do it on their own without there being any kind of a commitment by the Canadian government.
I know that we have rented space in many different parts and that it would be more convenient to be housed under one roof. But I could not give him any undertaking that there would be leases but could only say that there might be leases if at the time

the premises were available, space was available at prices that seemed to be attractive to whoever happened to be in office at that time. I even told him that I would not even discuss the matter with my colleagues because we did not want in any way to become involved in the project. We cannot prevent them from saying, if they choose, that they are prepared to have a long-term outstanding option in favour of the government to purchase. But I was shown the notes of what he intended to say, and I asked him to make a change where he intended to say that options had been offered to the government. I said: No, you have not offered anything to the government. I am not the government and there has been no proposal submitted to the government. You can say, if you like, that your friends are prepared to offer an option to the government but I would ask you not to say that you have offered one because, in talking to me, you are not talking to the government.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Does the item carry?


John George Diefenbaker: Mr. Chairman, there was not an offer made by Mr. Lawson but what were the negotiations that he placed before the Prime Minister? What was the ultimate price to be? What basis of negotiation was placed before the Prime Minister, whether he was the government or not? Mr. Lawson wrote certain letters, apparently, and in them must have embodied something of his plan.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I will show my hon. friend the letters and my answers. There were no negotiations. I did not want to go into any details at all. I did not want to go into the figures or to have any responsibility whatsoever for the project. I shall be glad to let my hon. friend see the file.


John George Diefenbaker: I would ask the minister what plans, if any, he or the department has for the opening up of other embassies. Is there any such plan in mind in any country other than those in which embassies have now been established or in which there are ministries?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, Mr. Chairman. As indicated to the committee on external affairs, plans and appropriations are being voted, I hope, for the opening up of new missions this year. I am not in a position to mention some of the countries because we are in the middle of negotiations with them now. I should be glad to tell my hon. friend in confidence but until we get those negotiations cleared I am not in a position to make public all of the countries in which we are going to open this year. We are converting a trade office in the Dominican republic into a branch
Supply-External Affairs office, if you like to call it that, of the embassy in Cuba; and in Haiti there will be a branch office of the embassy in Mexico. That is all I am in a position to announce at this time but there will be two or three more later in the year.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Just on a question of privilege, Mr. Chairman, may I ask this question. I wonder whether we could not get along for the rest of the evening without the services of the page boys?


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Shall the item carry?


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
90. Canadian representation at international conferences, $175,000.
Solon Earl Low: I want to refer to an article which appeared on the front page of the Ensign, a newspaper which enjoys quite a wide circulation in some parts of Canada. This article purports to be a dispatch from Geneva under the hand of a writer by the name of Bertrand. I have sent a copy of the article to the minister, and along with it I have sent a copy of some questions which I think it would be wise to have answered at this time in the committee.
I think perhaps we might ask the minister if he would be prepared to comment on the article using the ten questions I have sent him as a basis for his reply. I do not mean to say that he should be confined to these questions if he wishes to go beyond them or that he should answer them exactly as they are written or in that order. Since I formulated these questions for the purpose of bringing out the truth and no other purpose, I have decided that perhaps No. 5 might not be a proper question, and I will be perfectly satisfied if the minister chooses to disregard that one or to comment on it in some other fashion than answering it directly. If the minister will comment on the article with these questions in mind and put on the record the truth of the situation, I am quite sure that he can set at rest a good many minds that may be somewhat disturbed on reading the article for the first time.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have the article before me. My hon. friend was good enough to tell me that he was going to raise this matter. Indeed, he was good enough to send me a copy of the article and a copy of his ten questions which I now reduce to nine. The article is from the issue of the Ensign of May 29. It is headed, "Ronning appointment viewed with interest." I have read the article. I read it before the hon. member was good enough to send it to me. I can assure him that the facts are not as stated in

Supply-External Affairs the article and that the deductions from those facts are both unfair and unwarranted. The first question the hon. member asked me is as follows:
Why was Chester Ronning selected as temporary leader to replace the hon. minister of external affairs when he was to be absent from the conference?
The reason is a very obvious one. Mr. Ronning was the senior member of the delegation and would automatically take my place when I left as acting leader. He was the senior member of the delegation because he is a senior official in our department with great knowledge and experience of Far Eastern affairs, and this was a conference dealing with Far Eastern affairs. The second question read:
Is it true that "one of Mr. Ronning's first acts was to seek out Chou En-lai, leader of the red Chinese delegation at Geneva?"
The answer to that question is no, it is not true. Therefore I do not need to deal with questions 3 and 4. The sixth question reads as follows:
Is there any truth to the Canadian Press report from London that "it is possible that there is some connection between the release of the last two Canadian missionaries and the conversations which took place between the Canadian delegation and the red Chinese delegation in Geneva"?
The answer to that question is that an informal discussion did take place in Geneva between a member of our delegation, Mr. Ronning, and a secretary of the Chinese delegation after we had first taken up the matter with the United Kingdom charge d'affaires at Peking in the hope that by bringing to the attention of this particular Chinese communist official the plight of these Canadian missionaries who were still detained something might be done to bring about their release. It will be recalled that before I went to Geneva I was asked by more than one member of the house, including the Leader of the Opposition, if I would take advantage of any opportunity that might present itself to bring to the attention of the Chinese communist government that there were Canadians under detention and do what I could to secure their release.
It was in view of that advice, which was good advice, and I hope I would have undertaken it in any event, that we got in touch with a member of the Chinese communist delegation after ascertaining first through the representative of a state which had recognized the government of which this particular person was an official and not a delegate that this particular official would talk to our representative. It may be that the result of


those talks is one of the reasons why certain releases of Canadian missionaries in China have taken place in the last few days.


Mr. Maclnnis:: May I ask the minister a question on that point? Does the article, which I have not seen, conclude that it was wrong for the-


Lester Bowles Pearson: I will come to that point because one of the subsequent questions deals with it. The seventh question reads as follows:
Did the minister of external affairs speak to Mr. Trevelyan of the British foreign office last month about this matter?
Mr. Trevelyan is the United Kingdom charge d'affaires in Peking, and no doubt the reason that question has been asked is that a Canadian Press dispatch which was quoted in the Ensign article is said to suggest that Canadian recognition of red China was under discussion and that for that reason I may have spoken to Mr. Trevelyan and tried to link the two things. I can assure my hon. friend I did speak to Mr. Trevelyan, the United Kingdom charge d'affaires. I was very happy indeed to meet and discuss conditions in China with him and to thank him for all that he has done as United Kingdom charge d'affaires to protect the interests of Canadians in China during these difficult months because it was through him and only through him at that time that we had access to the Chinese authorities after we withdrew our own representatives.
But it is quite untrue to suggest that I was using Mr. Trevelyan as a liaison officer or in any such capacity to bring up the possibility of even discussing the recognition of red China. I talked to him solely about what he had done for Canadians and expressed the hope that possibly at Geneva we might be able to get in touch through him with some Chinese official in the hope that we might secure the release of the remaining six Canadians who are under detention in China. I should like to think that possibly we have had some success in that matter. The eighth question is as follows:
Is it true that the two Canadian missionaries, Reverend Beauregard and Reverend Venadam, had already been freed by orders issued many weeks ago, and arrived at Hong Kong in the middle of May?
I am not sure of that. It may well have been, and I am not suggesting that because we did have these talks with a Chinese official through one of our officials that that could have in any way been responsible for the release of Canadian missionaries who arrived in Hong Kong before the conference opened. The ninth question also deals with

two missionaries whose fate I am not sure of at the moment. The tenth question is as follows:
Is there any truth whatsoever to this part of the Ensign article?
The answer, Mr. Chairman, is no.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
General-
95.	To provide for the Canadian government's contribution to the United Nations expanded program for technical assistance to underdeveloped countries in an amount of $872,354 U.S., notwithstanding that payment may exceed or fall short of the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January, 1954, which is, $850,000.
Stanley Howard Knowles: Item 95 is one of two or three items of the main estimates, together with an item or two in the supplementary estimates, that come under the general heading of economic aid. If I may say so, I feel that some of the most thrilling hours of the time we spent in the committee on external affairs were when we had Mr. Nik Cavell before us telling us the story of what is being done under the Colombo plan in the countries in southeast Asia which are participants in that plan. It does seem to me that it would be well worth while for members generally to read the evidence of the committee reporting Mr. Cavell's statement to us. As hon. members are aware, the committee not only recommended to the house the items in the estimates covering technical assistance under the Colombo plan and economic aid generally but also included in its report a paragraph on this general subject which reads as follows:
Your committee was impressed with the valuable work being done under the Colombo plan and is of the view that this aid is of considerable importance to help the growth of democracy and it also approves of the increase in the Canadian contribution to the United Nations program for technical assistance to underdeveloped countries.
It is obvious from the vein in which I have been speaking and it is well known from what all of us in this group have said on many occasions that we support wholeheartedly these programs of economic aid to underdeveloped countries. We support them because we think it is the right thing to do for the people of these countries. We also support these programs because we believe that it is a way of giving real and tangible aid to those who are trying to build democracy in other parts of the world. This is indeed a part of what my colleague the hon. member for Winnipeg North was speaking about earlier this evening when he urged that we be concerned as to what we are striving for in this world as well as what we are striving against.
Supply-External Affairs
Now, Mr. Chairman, because we are in full support of these amounts for economic aid I will not take the time of the committee to spell out that support. There is just this I should like to say. It seems to me that the impression has been created over the past year or two-and if I may say so with respect I think the Secretary of State for External Affairs has helped to create that impression -that we are doing all we can. The impression has been created that even if we were to vote more money the arrangements have not been set up to make use of that money; even if we were prepared to give more these other countries could not use it and are not ready to absorb such help as we might be prepared to give. If I have gathered the wrong impression I would be delighted to have it corrected. I think it is fair to say that impression has been created.
As a matter of fact it had been created to such an extent that some of the questions put to Mr. Cavell in the committee were based on that premise. The questions of some members of the committee started from the idea that we were doing all we could within the capacity of those countries to accept and make use of our aid. I noticed, however, that in response to some of the questions we put to Mr. Cavell he made it clear that the requests those countries make to us are made in the light of their knowledge of the amount of money we are prepared to put into these various plans. He told us also that the amount of help that could be used by way of capital aid in these countries was almost unlimited. I am sure that we in the committee all agreed with the basic principle he laid down, that was the principle that we must help them get on their own feet. We must provide training and capital assistance rather than relief and rather than relying on the notion that we, by ourselves, could rehabilitate that whole area.
Perhaps the reason I have risen to say these few words, Mr. Chairman, is in the hope that the Secretary of State for External Affairs may see fit to dispel that impression which I think has been created. If the fact is that the government feels we cannot yet appropriate more money, let it be said squarely that that is the case. But believing as I do that one of the things that can contribute most to the saving of the world from communism is the effort to build it up in terms of strong and indigenous democracy, I think that every dollar we can spend in this way is very well spent. The money that we spend on economic aid is a drop in the bucket compared to what we are called upon to spend for military preparations. I know the arguments that are thrown back when we make

Supply-External Affairs these comparisons, but it does seem to me that for the good of these people, for the peace of the world and for our own good we could do a lot more yet in the way of technical assistance and economic aid generally.
The minister knows he has our wholehearted support in everything that is being done along this line. I hope he will agree with me that there is room yet for a great deal more that we could do, and that he will join with us in an appeal to our people generally to give support to all possible aid of this kind. Before I conclude, I may say that I was interested in the response the Secretary of State made to a question of mine which was on the order paper a few days ago. I asked for certain correspondence regarding Canadian aid to Korean relief. I thought there might be a dozen letters or a few more than that that would meet the terms of my motion. The minister said there were so many it would be a heavy task to copy them all. I thought that was quite significant, if there were that many groups and organizations in this country writing to the government urging that something be done by way of aid to Korean relief with Canadian wheat and other products. This suggests to me that the will of the Canadian people is clearly on the right side. They believe that along with whatever else we are doing we can make a real contribution to the peace of the world and to the benefit of mankind by doing all we can in this field of economic aid.


Alexander Malcolm Nicholson: Before the item carries, I have one suggestion to make. I have just been reading the New York Times for Monday, May 24. There are two interesting pages telling about the sharing of technical knowledge in transforming the older sectors of the world. We have the figures showing what the United States expenditures are as compared with the United Nations expenditures. I would suggest that the minister use his good offices to try to get the United States to channel more of their expenditures through the United Nations. The comparable figures are as follows:
Contributions in Millions
Area	U.N.	United States
Asian Pacific 			120
Middle East 			 8	77
		 1	6
Latin America 			45
Europe 			 3	20
In view of the fact that the United Nations is a new organization, I believe it is important that its good name should be protected throughout the various parts of the world. I am sure that the minister, in the light of 
the post he has held, could use his influence to try to get our neighbour to the south to increase their contributions to the United Nations so the United Nations specialized agencies might do more effective work.


John George Diefenbaker: I wonder whether the minister would give his considered opinion concerning assistance in the nature of surplus wheat and the like being granted to the Colombo plan. We hear it said so frequently, and I am in general agreement with it, that assistance of this kind is a bulwark against communism and that the main weapon of communism in Asia today is hunger. We have also read on one occasion where Mr. Hoffman said that if $400 million or $500 million in economic assistance had been given to China during the years 1944, 1945 and 1946, China might well not have fallen victim to aggressive communism. I should like the minister to clarify that situation.
One hears it argued that assistance of this kind by way of grants of surplus wheat and the like to make up the $25 million or a portion of it would not be acceptable to the eastern nations. Will the minister elucidate this, because I think it is the cause of a great deal of misunderstanding, and clarification would go a long way to meeting the requests of people in general.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, in the first place I would like to echo what has already been said by the last three members who have spoken about the value of economic and material assistance, and encouragement as well as support for the Asian countries in the struggle they are making for a better life, and in the struggle against communism about which we talk so much. And that is the positive side of this effort to which reference was made earlier in the discussion.
In replying to what my hon. friend from Prince Albert has said, I think we ought to view with some hesitation the giving of wheat and consumer products of that kind to these countries, except in cases of need, starvation and famine. It might be of far greater importance to them, and certainly it would cause less interference in the normal conduct of international trade, if when we were giving assistance of that kind we were to give it to them in the form of financial assistance, and let them spend it where they desire.
But in so far as the sending of wheat is concerned-and that is the commodity which was mentioned by the hon. member-the Colombo plan is a co-operative device for capital and technical assistance. It was understood when the plan was drawn up, and it

is still understood, that only in exceptional circumstances will other forms of assistance be given under that plan.
It is true that we have made grants of wheat under the Colombo plan in India and, I think, possibly in one or two other countries-at the moment I am not quite sure which ones-but those were special circumstances. The wheat was requested by the governments concerned, and it was given under conditions which required the setting up of counterpart funds, so that the money which would be realized from the sale of the wheat-because it was sold to the countries in question-would be used for the purchase of materials and commodities which, in their turn, could be used in the capital assistance program.
So, in principle and in general, I think it would be well to confine our assistance under the Colombo plan to capital and technical assistance. That, indeed, is what the countries on the receiving end have asked.
Then, so far as the remarks of the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre are concerned, of course we can always do more in any good cause. And that applies to the Colombo plan as it does to United Nations technical assistance and other forms of contributions to what I might call the international community chest.
But the Colombo plan is a continuing plan. At the present time it is a five-year plan to which we have pledged ourselves a contribution of $125 million, and some few millions for technical assistance. And I think that having regard to all the circumstances that was a reasonable amount for Canada to contribute for those five years. And I still think that if we had pledged five years ago a greater amount we would have had some difficulty in expending it efficiently, economically and productively. But the Colombo plan is a continuing program, as I say, and I hope that Canada will continue to play a very important part in the years ahead in carrying out that project.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Is there any problem as to the method of rendering technical assistance? It has been suggested to me that sometimes the sending in of people from the outside does not work entirely smoothly. Would the minister say a word as to whether the trend now is to educate the people of the beneficiary country, or whether we send in technical people, or both.


Lester Bowles Pearson: The answer is both. As my hon. friend has pointed out, the sending of technicians from western countries to Asian countries has not in all cases worked out
Supply-External Affairs successfully. Not only do the technicians have to be good ones, but they have to know how to get along with the people in the countries concerned. And occasionally in the early stages of these co-operative international assistance programs people were sent, not only from this country but from other countries, who might have been good technicians but perhaps were not always best qualified to co-operate with those at the other end.
But those difficulties were bound to occur, and most of them have been surmounted. The greater difficulty in that regard is the finding of technicians in countries like Canada and the United States-qualified technicians and scientists-who are available for assistance in those countries. Because they are the people who are most in demand in North America. Another important part of the technical assistance program has been to bring students from those countries to Canada and the United States to teach them the skills and techniques so that they can go back and do this work for themselves. One of the great difficulties in carrying out these co-operative programs is the absence of qualified nationals on the spot. And it will take some time to overcome that difficulty.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: From the huge sums that we know the United States is contributing in various ways, can the minister tell us roughly how much of those contributions go into similar work, and to what extent the problem in a country like India-where it must be huge -is being grappled with. Or is it just a small beginning in a problem which continues to be overwhelming?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I am not quite sure if I understood my hon. friend's question.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: My question is as to what relative amounts are being used by the United States for similar purposes under the Colombo plan.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have not the figures available. But perhaps my hon. friend from Ottawa West, who has been directly connected with some of these programs, might be able to give information as to the relative amounts expended under the Colombo plan in a country like India. It will probably be found that the United States has spent more in the last four or five years in countries like India or Pakistan. But I believe it has already been indicated that the great proportion of the money spent by the United States was under their Point Four program, and not under schemes of United Nations technical assistance or co-operative schemes. I would guess that the amount of United States money spent

Supply-External Affairs in India would be in excess of that which came from the Colombo plan. Indeed I am informed it is very much in excess.


John George Diefenbaker: The minister has mentioned the difficulties in connection with sending agricultural products as part of the contribution under the Colombo plan. Is it his considered opinion that the suggestions made by various farm organizations that assistance in this form-not by way of gifts, but actually by way of contributions under our allotment, or under the amount we intend to spend-would not be practicable? Would it be acceptable to India and other Asiatic countries?


Mr. Mcllraiih:: Mr. Chairman, I hesitate to say much at this late hour on the subject. But I must say at once that I did appreciate the stand taken by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre in supporting the Colombo plan and its work, and the similar activities under other auspices.
It seems to me there is danger of two misconceptions in the minds of Canadians on this subject. One is the view that the mere addition of money would improve the situation. It is not as simple as that. What is required is, first of all, an appreciation of the problems, a sympathetic understanding of them and then help in such projects as require it.
When one considers the three Asiatic countries in the commonwealth who are in the Colombo plan it is rather extraordinary just how similar their problems are to some of the problems this country has come through in its history. It is not simply a matter of providing more money to each country and doing what is required; it is rather a problem of working out with them what particular phase of development work is required and then helping them to go forward with the development they are undertaking. It is a question of helping them with those projects that are designed to develop their own economy, and making a positive contribution to their own capacity to produce more for their people.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Can the hon. member
give us an illustration?


George James McIlraith: Yes. A good illustration is that in some parts of those countries the problem arises, curiously enough, from the same rivers causing flood damage and then drought occurring in the immediate area. That seems rather strange in North America, but that is the way it is. What is required there is assistance to them in constructing the dams to control the flooding and then

taking electric power off, if that is feasible, and at the same time developing the irrigation works so that the land will be made productive. Incidentally, I hope some of our western friends will not misunderstand me if I say that it is just possible that some of our people could learn a little about irrigation from the East.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Are you speaking to the
members of the cabinet?


George James McIlraith: That is the type of problem that arises. It is a matter of assisting those projects.


John George Diefenbaker: You should whisper that to the Prime Minister and teach him something about irrigation. That would be a good place to start. .


George James McIlraith: I am speaking of those projects about which the hon. member for Greenwood inquired. When the authorities there feel that they are able to undertake projects it is a matter of assisting them in the development of those projects.
There is a very good project going on in West Pakistan. The problem there in irrigation is that you must not put too much water in the soil, because if you raise the water table, curiously enough, you destroy the productivity of the land, because there is salt in the sub-soil and you bring the salt to the surface and nothing will grow. Therefore the irrigation must be done as a surface proposition rather than by raising the water table. Not only that, but when you construct the irrigation canals they must be lined; otherwise the water simply disappears in the canal and the whole flow of the river would disappear very quickly. Not only would it disappear and the water be lost but you would destroy the land by raising the salt when you raise the water table.
What we have done there is to create a cement plant in that area to provide cement for the construction of the dams for the control of the flooding and creation of electric power, to line the beds of the irrigation canals, and for the construction of houses in the land settlement scheme on the land that is made productive by reason of the irrigation.
Hon. members will see that for that particular project what was required was the cement facility. A different form of help is required in the different countries and for the different projects brought forward. I merely mentioned this one project by way of illustration because I thought it was a good one. A much smaller thing in Ceylon is the experimental work being done in the fishing

industry. By the way, anyone interested in technical assistance in that country might be pleased to know that we had an outstanding Canadian on that work. The west coast members can be very proud of him indeed. Incidentally, in Ceylon some very good work was being done for agriculture under the FAO organization. I had occasion to meet the representatives of that organization who were working in Ceylon.
In India there are of course many other projects. Perhaps it is not useful for me to illustrate them further. In picking out these individual projects I want to make it clear that I merely picked them out by way of illustration and not in an attempt to assess the importance of one over another.
There is another problem running all through this. We must remember that these countries have their new-found independence that has created some problems for them. For instance, Pakistan was created seven years ago this summer. You must remember that there was no civil service there. When you start a government afresh with no civil service, no government machinery or anything, there are very great difficulties in internal organization of the governmental machinery that tend to make it difficult for such countries to develop projects for assistance. Then you must remember that there are other difficulties such as the appalling shortage of engineers and mechanics. It varies from country to country, but it is being corrected.
It is just a week or two since the representative who is responsible for the Colombo plan administration in Ceylon was here. These men are here from time to time. The Colombo plan is now an effectively working piece of machinery to provide economic aid and technical assistance. I for one am particularly pleased that this year the Colombo plan meeting will be held in Canada. That is most fortunate. Most of the time it has been held in the countries that are receiving assistance.
I hope that as the years go on and as the Colombo plan proves itself and the technical assistance machinery generally improves there will be such increases in aid given by Canada as are required.
I must also say there is another facet of this whole subject. These so-called underdeveloped countries have something real to contribute to us under this Colombo plan. I will not go into that feature of the subject tonight, but from their great culture and background there is much for us to learn.
83276-331J
Supply-External Affairs


John George Diefenbaker: What we have just listened to was a very interesting recital, and one that I am sure the hon. member can speak about with an authority that few in the committee possess. I was most interested in his development of the technological side of the question but, Mr. Chairman, it did not answer the simple question that I asked. It covered a wide sphere of discussion which was most interesting and most revealing, but it did not answer the question I posed to the minister. A number of western farm organizations, and I think some eastern ones, have been impressing upon the government the fact that in the expenditure of this $25 million on the Colombo relief scheme the contribution should be made in the form of agricultural products, which could then be sold by the recipient countries and purchases of technological requirements made. What has the minister to say as to the practicality of the resolutions that these farm organizations have advanced as to means whereby part of our surpluses would not be given away as a gift, but would in fact provide a saleable opportunity in those countries of Asia and at the same time provide for the disposal of surpluses?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Chairman, the answer to that question is that the Colombo plan provides for capital and technical assistance and not for consumer assistance, and the articles of the Colombo plan would have to be changed to take care of the question raised by my hon. friend. It is true, as I have said before, that wheat has been transferred to India under the Colombo plan. But that was to meet an emergency and at the request of the Indian government. Normally the receiving governments would not welcome assistance of that kind under the Colombo plan, even if the agreement signed to bring that plan into effect contained such a provision.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Edward Turney Applewhaite: It seems to me we have been discussing item 101 as much as item 95. Shall item 101 carry?


Some hon. Members:: Carried.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
96.	Contribution to the United Nations children's fund, $500,000.
James MacKerras Macdonnell: Mr. Chairman, on this item 96 I would like to have the minister's comments in regard to the children's fund.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I can only say that this is, I think, one of the most useful and successful of the United Nations humanitarian projects.

Supply-External Affairs It is a very effective one and it operates in a great many countries. We have continued to support it from its establishment.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization-
97.	To provide, subject to the approval of the governor general in council and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Civil Service Act, for special administrative expenses, including payment of remuneration in connection with the assignment by the Canadian government of Canadians to the international staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (part recoverable from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), $51,000.
Erhart Regier: I noticed the other day that this house established an annuity for, I believe, a leading agriculturist. Would it not be possible and more businesslike if we had a certain lump sum at one time and only at one time for each individual which would purchase an annuity? As I see it this appears to come up each year in the estimates. Is that correct?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, that is correct, Mr. Chairman, and that indeed may be a better method of dealing with the matter. This particular annuity was voted in 1949 to one of our representatives abroad who served for 20 or 30 years and in that way the matter has been handled each year. Certainly I think it will be much better in future if we could handle it in a lump sum manner as the hon. member has suggested.


Erhart Regier: The reason I raised this, Mr. Chairman, is that we are all looking for methods of speeding up the business of the house and I think that would be one way of doing so. There are lots of similar annuities in the different departments of government and I think they might well be handled in the fashion I have suggested.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
The Depuiy Chairman: As that completes the estimates for the Department of External Affairs, shall I report the resolutions and ask leave to sit again?
Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
Progress reported.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

['Mr. Speaker, I move the adjournment of the house. On Monday business taken up will be first, supply motion; second, ways and means budget resolutions; third, the Bank of Canada Act; fourth, the savings banks in Quebec; fifth, superannuation in crown corporations; sixth, the Royal\n\nCanadian Mounted Police Act; seventh, the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act; and eighth, allowances for disabled persons.\nMotion agreed to and the house adjourned at 10.57 p.m.\n[The following items were passed in committee of supply]:']
Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker, I move the adjournment of the house. On Monday business taken up will be first, supply motion; second, ways and means budget resolutions; third, the Bank of Canada Act; fourth, the savings banks in Quebec; fifth, superannuation in crown corporations; sixth, the Royal

Canadian Mounted Police Act; seventh, the Opium and Narcotic Drug Act; and eighth, allowances for disabled persons.
Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at 10.57 p.m.
[The following items were passed in committee of supply]:



[Stage Direction]
A-Department and missions abroad-
84.	Departmental administration, $3,333,583.
85.	Passport office administration, $256,649.
86.	Representation abroad-operational-including payment of salaries of high commissioners, ambassadors, ministers plenipotentiary, consuls, secretaries and staff appointed as directed by the governor general in council, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Civil Service Act or any of its amendments, $6,301,835.
87.	Representation abroad-construction, acquisition or improvement of buildings, works, land, new equipment and furnishings, and to the extent that blocked funds are available for these expenditures to provide for payment from these foreign currencies owned by Canada and provided only for governmental or other limited purposes, $1,945,480.
88.	To provide for official hospitality, $20,000.
89.	To provide for relief of distressed Canadian citizens abroad and their dependents and for the reimbursement of the United Kingdom for relief expenditures incurred by its diplomatic and consular posts on Canadian account (part recoverable), $15,000.
90.	Canadian representation at international conferences, $175,000.
91.	Grant to the United Nations Association in Canada, $11,000.
92.	Grant to the international committee of the Red Cross, $15,000.
93.	To authorize and provide for the payment from foreign currencies owned by Canada and available only for governmental or other limited purposes, in France, The Netherlands and Italy, of fellowships and scholarships and travelling expenses to enable Canadians to study in those countries, and for payment to the Royal Society of Canada of amounts not to exceed $10,000 in all to meet travelling and other administrative costs incurred by the society for those it may designate to act on its behalf in selecting persons to receive fellowships and scholarships, $125,000.
B-General-
94.	To provide for the Canadian government's assessment for membership in international and commonwealth organizations as detailed in the estimates, including authority to pay the amounts specified in the currencies of the countries indicated, notwithstanding that the payments may exceed or fall short of the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January, 1954, which is, $2,893,012.
95.	To provide for the Canadian government's contribution to the United Nations expanded program for technical assistance to under-developed countries in an amount of $872,354 U.S., notwithstanding that payment may exceed or fall short of the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January, 1954, which is. $850,000.

96.	Contribution to the United Nations children's fund. $500,000.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization-
97.	To provide, subject to the approval of the governor general in council and notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Civil Service Act, for special administrative expenses, including payment of remuneration, in connection with the assignment by the Canadian government of Canadians to the international staff of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (part recoverable from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization), $51,000.
International civil aviation organization-
98.	To provide the international civil aviation organization with office accommodation at less than commercial rates, $200,218.
International joint commission-
99.	Salaries and expenses of the commission, $95,500.
100.	To provide for Canada's share of the expenses of studies, surveys and investigations of the international joint commission, $104,575.
Terminable services-
101.	Colombo plan, $25,400,000.
102.	To provide for the Canadian government's assessment for membership in the intergovernmental committee for European migration in an
Supply-External Affairs
amount of $172,349 U.S., notwithstanding that payment may exceed or fall short of the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of January, 1954, which is, $167,933.
103.	To provide for a gift of Canadian fish for relief purposes in Korea, $300,000.
B-General-
648.	To provide a further amount of $627,646 U.S. for the Canadian government's contribution to the United Nations expanded program for technical assistance to under-developed countries, notwithstanding that payment may exceed or fall short of the equivalent in Canadian dollars, estimated as of April, 1954, which is, $615,878.
Terminable services-
649.	To provide for the expenses incurred by Canada as host at the Ottawa conference of the consultative committee for co-operative economic development in south and south-east Asia (the Colombo plan), $121,000.
650. To provide for a grant by the Canadian government to the intergovernmental committee for European migration for the resettlement of refugees of European origin now in China, $50,000.
651. To provide for a grant by the Canadian government to the United Nations high commissioner for refugees for subsistence relief for refugees of European origin in China, $50,000.
[Stage Direction]
Monday, May 31, 1954