1954-06-21

Hon. Lionel Chevrier (Minister of Transport):: 1 beg leave to table, Mr. Speaker, a copy, in English and in French, of the report of the Board of Transport Commissioners for Canada on the railway-highway problem in Canada, made pursuant to order in council P.C. 1953/52 of January 14, 1953. Copies of the report are being made available for distribution.



AGREEMENTS MADE WITH PROVINCES UNDER NATIONAL PHYSICAL FITNESS ACT

Hon. Paul Marlin (Minister of National Health and Welfare):: As I indicated on Saturday, Mr. Speaker, I am now tabling a copy of an agreement made under the National Physical Fitness Act between the government of Canada and the provinces, and also a copy of the annual report of the physical fitness division for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1954.



QUESTIONS


Mr. Diefenbaker:: 1.	What were the varieties and kinds of farm products for which export permits have been granted since the first of January, 1954?
2.	What was the quantity and sale price of each of such varieties and kinds of farm products for which such permits were granted for shipment, sale or consignment to (a) U.S.S.R.; (b) Hungary; (c) Roumania; (d) Bulgaria; (e) Poland?


Mr. Dickey:: 1.	Butter, canned pork, malt, hops, white sweet clover seeds, grass seeds and powdered whole milk, wheat, oats, barley.
2.	(a) 7,400,000 lbs. canned pork*. Barley 344,467 bushels; (b) 131,100 lbs. white blossom sweet clover seed; (c) 2,200 lbs. Canadian slender wheat grass seed; (d) no export permits were issued for farm products; (e) no export permits were issued for farm products.
Note:
Since in each instance there was only one exporter, in accordance with government policy the prices paid are not made public.
TRANS-CANADA AIR LINES PASSES Mr. Zapliiny:
1.	Were any flying passes issued by Trans-Canada Air Lines, during the 12 months ending March 31, 1954? If so, how many?
2.	How many of these passes were (a) permanent; (b) temporary?
3.	What are the names and addresses of all persons who received permanent passes, during the 12 month period ending March 31, 1954?


Mr. Dickey:: 1.	T.C.A. figures are compiled on a calendar year basis. The following is for the year 1953: Yes. 1,660 other than passes issued to T.C.A. employees.
2.	(a) Permanent - 13;	(b) Temporary -
1,647 (one trip only).
The foregoing temporary passes were issued in accordance with a policy agreed between the air transport board and scheduled carriers and authorized by the air transport board by which each carrier is granted a monthly quota of trip passes for promotional and public relations purposes. These quotas are related to the total business volume of each carrier.
3.	As per list hereunder:-
Cabinet ministers
The Right Hon. C. D. Howe, P.C.
The Hon. L. Chevrier, Q.C., M.P.
The Hon. Alcide Cote, Q.C.
Post Office Department Mr. W. J. Turnbull Col. E. J. Underwood Air transport board Mr. J. R. Baldwin Mr. J. P. R. Vachon Mr. A. D. McLean Department of Transport Mr. A. T. Cowley Major R. Dodds Mr. G. C. W. Browne Mr. A. Thomson Mr. E. M. Elsley


MILEAGE 87-1, FRANK, ALBERTA
Mr. Hansell:: 1.	Was there ever a railway crossing established at mileage 87 T Crowsnest subdivision, Canadian Pacific Railway at or near the village of Frank, Alberta?
2.	If so, was this crossing a public or private crossing?
3.	Was the crossing abandoned? If so, when and by what authority?

Questions


Mr. Langlois (Gaspe):: 1.	The board has no record of a crossing having been established at mileage 87-1 Crowsnest subdivision, Canadian Pacific Railway Company, at or near the village of Frank, Alberta.
2.	Answered by No. 1.
3.	Answered by No. 1.



OLD AGE SECURITY


Mr. Hansell:: 1.	How many liens have the government collected on estates of old age pensioners under the Old Age Pensions Act, since the Old Age Security Act came into force?
2.	What is the total amount collected?
3.	What amounts were collected from each province?


Paul Joseph James Martin: I should explain to the hon. member that it would take quite a long time to answer this question because we have to ask the provinces for the information. This is a matter over which they have control.


Mr. Hansell:: Perhaps I shall talk with the minister and we will have the question dropped later. It could stand for today.


Mr. Speaker:: Question stands.



HOUSES BUILT BY C.B.C.

Mr. Thalcher:: 1.	Has the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation built any homes in the past three years for the purpose of renting to any of their officials or employees?
2.	If so, how many?
3.	What was the cost and location of each?


Mr. McCann:: 1. No.
2 and 3. See answer to No. 1.



QUESTION PASSED AS ORDER FOR RETURN


Mr. Noseworlhy:: 1.	Has the Canadian National Railways paid any money to the R. F. Welch construction company, during the past five years? If so, what amount?
2.	What is the nature of the work done by that company for which such payments were made?
3.	How many people are usually employed by this company on Canadian National Railways work?
4.	Have any immigrants been brought to Canada during the past five years to work for this company? If so, how many?
5.	Is there any working agreement between the department of immigration or the Canadian National Railways and the R. F. Welch construction company for bringing immigrants to Canada?
6.	Does the R. F. Welch construction company maintain an agent in Italy for the purpose of securing immigrants for Canada?
7.	Dose this company maintain an office in Halifax for the purpose of securing employees from among the immigrants who come to Canada?

8.	Does this company maintain an agent or office at the union station, Toronto, adjacent to the government immigration office?
9.	Does the government exercise any supervision over the wages paid and working conditions provided by this company on Canadian National Railways contracts?
10.	What is the hourly rate of wages paid for Canadian National Railways contract work by this company?
11.	How do these wages compare with the wages agreed upon in the Canadian National Railways contract with the Maintenance of Way Workers Union?
12.	Does the R. F. Welch construction company enter into any contract with immigrants regarding employment?
13.	If so, what are the terms and conditions of these contracts?



MOTION FOR PAPERS


Mr. Dinsdale:: For a copy of the Laycock report on the subject of recreation and related services for Canada's armed forces.


Mr. Campney:: I am informed, Mr. Speaker, that there is no report known by this title in the files of the Department of National Defence. Dr. Laycock was associated with Professor Hendry in the studies which he made for departmental officials at the request of the defence research board, and assisted in the preparation of Professor Hendry's report. Any work done by Dr. Laycock was, therefore, included in Professor Hendry's report, the question of producing which has already been dealt with by the house. I suggest under such circumstances the hon. member might, therefore, withdraw his motion.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: In view of the fact that the defence estimates will be discussed later during the day, I am quite willing to take such action.


Mr. Speaker:: Motion dropped.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Alistair Stewart (Winnipeg North):: should like to direct a question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, but in his absence it might perhaps be regarded as notice. In view of the statement by Mr. John Foster Dulles last Tuesday that the great majority of the Guatemalan people have both the desire and the capability of cleaning their own house, can the minister inform us as to whether or not there has been any attempt at foreign interference in the dispute on behalf of either side?


Mr. Hoch Pinard (Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of Slate for External Affairs):: In the absence of the minister, Mr. Speaker, I shall follow the hon. member's suggestion and take the question as notice.


FINANCE
[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. M. Macdonnell (Greenwood):: May
I direct a question to the Minister of Finance of which I have given him notice referring to the April returns of receipts and expenditures of the federal government, showing a surplus of $29 million as against $79 million a year ago, a drop of some $23 million in the revenue and an increase of $24 million in expenditures, will the minister say whether it is possible to make any comment in the light of these early figures concerning his estimate of a surplus of $4 million for the full year?


Hon. Douglas Abbott (Minister of Finance):: I do not know that there is any special comment I can make. It is for the first month of the year. Defence expenditures were some $24 million higher this year than they were last year in the same month. They were rising last year, but they have levelled off now. The revenue, as my hon. friend has pointed out, is some $20 million odd lower, but there is no reason as yet to revise the estimates which I gave in my budget speech.


SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Can the Prime Minister say at what time the new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada will be notified of his appointment?


Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: There will be no one notified of
the appointment until the appointment has been made, and it is not intended that there be any appointment made today. There could not be one made today because there is no vacancy today.


Stanley Howard Knowles: There will be tomorrow.


INTERNATIONAL BANK
[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
James MacKerras Macdonnell: I have one further question to ask of the Minister of Finance. Would the minister comment
Inquiries of the Ministry on the news item in the Montreal Gazette of June 18 concerning the issue of $25 million of world bank securities in Canada? There are various comments made on this, and it seems to me it would be a matter of some interest if the minister would make his comments.


Douglas Charles Abbott: The only comment I believe I can make is this. This is the second issue of bonds which has been put out by the international bank for reconstruction and development in Canada. Speaking from memory, I think the first was some two years ago for $15 million, and this one is for $25 million. The institution is familiar to all members of the house. The bonds are first class securities- putting in a little plug for them-and they are eligible for investment by Canadian insurance companies. I have no other comment to make on this issue.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Mr. Speaker, may I ask a
supplementary question. Has this loan any connection with any of the loans made by the world bank to Canadian companies, or is that purely accidental?


Douglas Charles Abbott: I do not think so. So far as I am aware, the world bank has made no loans to Canadian companies, except the loan made some time ago to Brazilian Traction in Brazil. The Canadian money market is perfectly free. The Canadian government has no control over the issue of securities by the world bank, although under the articles of association the Canadian government is required to agree to the floating of an issue in Canada, as is the case with every other country which is a member of the bank under the Bretton Woods agreements.


JUDGES ACT
Hon. Stuart S. Garson (Minister of Justice) moved: the second reading of Bill No. 478, to amend the Judges Act.


Hon. George A. Drew (Leader of the Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to place one fact on the record. As will be recalled by members in the house, I asked on several occasions when we might expect this measure, and it was clearly indicated, by the nature of the question and from reports that appeared in the press, with the customary guiding phrase, that they were from a reliable government source, that this contemplated a general revision of judges1' salaries.

Judges Act
I wish to point out that, because of the understanding that this was the situation, this matter stood until the resolution was presented last week without any knowledge on my part, or on the part of any of the other members of the opposition, that a general revision was not contemplated.
I wish to say quite definitely that I was not aware until the resolution was on the order paper that the general revision which had been talked about in the press and had been discussed for some time was not contemplated in the amendments before us.
The amendment before us for second reading is for the specific appointment of two judges, which I believe, we will all agree, is an appropriate addition to the bench. And, so far as the amendments are concerned, it is our intention to support them.
So far as the other subject is concerned, we are coming to the end of the session without even consideration of something that has been very much in the minds of the public and of a number of members in the House of Commons.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, bill read the second time and the house went into committee thereon, Mr. Robinson (Simcoe East) in the chair.
On clause 1-Salaries of judges of Court of Appeal.
Mr. Fulton:: I wish to make one observation and express the hope-perhaps it is a forlorn hope, but I think it should be expressed again, in the light of past experience- that, in making appointments to fill vacancies indicated in the bill before us, the government will depart from the practice which has been followed generally in the past, and will broaden the basis of selection of lawyers to be appointed as judges.


Mr. Pickersgill:: Does the hon. member mean, when he refers to broadening the base, that judges in British Columbia should be chosen from outside the bar of British Columbia? I cannot see any other way the base can be broadened.


Edmund Davie Fulton: The Secretary of State is not usually so slow on the uptake. He knows perfectly well what I have in mind. I have in mind that no longer should it be felt that the past political affiliations of those who are being considered as candidates should be the main qualifying factors, and that consideration, I am suggesting, should be discarded as the basis of selection in this instance.
I am convinced that one of the reasons why there has been some difficulty-a difficulty expressed by the minister on previous occasions-in finding suitable candidates who

will accept appointments to the bench is that the minister confines the area within which he makes his selections too closely to those who are politically acceptable, instead of using as a basis for selection those who are qualified by experience, temperament and capacity for such appointments.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Chairman, I wish to make a brief comment. We are prepared to support this bill. Had it contained what we thought it was going to contain we would have opposed it. And in that connection may I say, by way of comment on the remarks made by the Leader of the Opposition, that I hope there will be no upward revision of judges' salaries until something has been done for our burnt-out pensioners on the war veterans allowance.


Some hon. Members:: Order.


[Stage Direction]
Clause agreed to.
Clause 2 agreed to.
Bill reported.
Mr. Speaker:: When shall the bill be read a third time?


Some hon. Members:: Now.


Stanley Howard Knowles: By leave.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: the third reading of the bill.
Motion agreed to and bill read the third time and passed.


Hon. Brooke Claxton (for the Minister of Finance) moved: that the house go into committee of supply.
Motion agreed to and the house went into committee, Mr. Robinson (Simcoe East) in the chair.


DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE
[Stage Direction]
239. To provide for the Canadian forces, the defence research hoard and other expenditures relating to defence, including contributions toward the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: to authorize expenditures in the current year out of the amount hereby provided, not exceeding $300,000,000, under the provisions of section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, and to provide that, notwithstanding subsection 3 of that section, where equipment or supplies acquired by the Canadian forces after March 31, 1950, are transferred, the estimated present value thereof shall, if the governor in council so directs, be credited to this vote instead of being paid into the special account mentioned in the said subsection 3, and when so credited may be expended for the purposes of the Canadian forces; and notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act to authorize total commitments for the foregoing purposes of $4,577,641,724 regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of

payment (of which it is estimated that $2,711,822,159 will come due for payment in future years), $1,865,819,565.
George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, I had addressed a few remarks to the committee before the adjournment some time ago. I wish to continue those remarks today and to start out by emphasizing the fact that under the estimates now being given consideration almost half the total expenditures by the government are provided.
It does not seem to me that during the time this subject was under discussion before there was any tendency on the part of the minister to take the House of Commons into his confidence as to the situation with which we are in fact confronted. There were generalities about the excellent morale of our men and women in uniform. There were sweeping statements about our ability to accept our responsibilities in defending this country against air attack. There were sweeping assertions as to our assumption of the responsibility at this time; but the fact is that at no point in his remarks did the minister say what he would have said, and that is: I regret to inform the committee that for reasons I shall now put forward the reserve forces, which are the backbone of the defence of Canada, are now confronted with serious problems; that we are not getting the men we need; that in many cases units are unable to go to camp with more than a fraction of the strength that has been authorized, and that in some cases units of great importance to the defence of Canada are actually going on parade with more officers than men.
Had the minister then explained to us what the reasons are for that situation, I am sure that hon. members of this committee would have been ready to join in any positive effort which could be made to meet that situation in the face of the gravity of the world picture now before us.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that you will permit me to read into the record a short summary of Soviet military power, prepared as appendix "A" to the report of the deputy supreme allied commander in Europe which was presented on May 24 last. I suggest that I be permitted to do this, because otherwise I would simply summarize paragraph by paragraph this short appendix. I believe it is in the most compact form possible, and therefore I propose that, with the consent of the committee, for the sake of brevity rather than otherwise, I be permitted to read this into the record. I do so rather than ask that it be printed because the facts are facts which should be in front of hon. members of the committee in dealing with this subject. I repeat, this is an appendix to a statement prepared by Field Marshal Montgomery and 83276-402
Supply-National Defence presented in the form of an address on May 24 and appearing as appendix "A" to that address:
1.	From 1947 to the present time, the numerical strength (175 divisions) of Soviet ground forces has remained fairly constant. Nonetheless, significant changes have been made in favour of increased mechanization with sturdy and efficient modern equipment. Sixty-five divisions of the present establishment are tank and mechanized divisions. Moreover, the rifle divisions have been provided motorized equipment; they also have organic tanks and additional artillery . . . Thus, the mobility and firepower of all Soviet divisions have been increased through the introduction of improved weapons and equipment.
2.	The U.S.S.R., Eastern Germany and the East European satellites today have over 6 million men under arms. Approximately 4-5 million of these are in the ground forces. A high state of preparedness is maintained by a rigorous training program.
3.	The number of satellite divisions has almost doubled since 1947, bringing their total to about 80 divisions.
4.	The U.S.S.R. has a ready-made spearhead for a rapid advance into western Europe. The spearhead is composed of 22 Soviet divisions in Eastern Germany, the bulk of these armoured divisions with nearly a complete complement of tanks and self-propelled guns. Behind this spearhead there are an additional 60 Soviet divisions located in the eastern European satellite countries and western U.S.S.R. (This does not take into account satellite divisions.)
5.	Their mobilization system is exercised periodically to insure its effectiveness, and by M 30 (30 days after mobilization day) the Soviet and satellite ground forces could number 400 divisions.
6.	The numerical strength of the Soviet air forces in recent years has been constant, having been stabilized at about 20,000 aircraft, but the rapid increase in the Soviet air potential is illustrated by the rate of changeover to jet aircraft. In 1951, about 20 per cent of their fighters were jet types. By early 1954, almost all of their fighters were jet types.
7.	A similar development has occurred with respect to their light bombers. In early 1951, jet light bombers had not been introduced into operational units. By 1954, well over two-thirds of their light-bomber forces were jets.
8.	In the medium-bomber category, the Soviets have, doubled, since 1951, the number of TU-4s (similar to the U.S. B-29) in operational units.
9.	Still newer types of jet fighters have recently appeared. Newer types of medium and heavy bombers, including jet models, also have been observed.
10.	The development of a comprehensive aviationtraining program has been one of the most significant contributions in the Soviet post-war program to improve the capability of the Soviet air power.
11.	The program for airfield construction is still in progress, with attention recently being directed to fields with very long runways. In the past three years the Soviets have about tripled the number of major airfields in eastern Europe which will accommodate jet fighters.
12.	In the past, the combat value of the satellite air forces has not been significant. In 1951, their aircraft were obsolete. By 1954, the numerical strength of the satellite air forces had been doubled with nearly half being jet fighters. Their facilities were improved and training had reached a fairly satisfactory standard.
13.	The growing complex of airfields throughout eastern Europe, the aircraft-control and warning systems and anti-aircraft artillery dispositions of
6360	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence the Soviet bloc are rapidly becoming capable of providing an effective air-defence belt along the western perimeter of the U.S.S.R.
14.	Since the end of world war II, the Soviet armed forces have improved their potential for the use of airborne troops and weapons.
15.	The principal naval threat is the Soviet
submarine capability.	The Soviet navy has
over 300 submarines in service, of which about half are large or medium ocean-going types. The current large-scale naval construction program lays emphasis on the continued production of large ocean-going submarines.
16.	Soviet submarine stockpiles, considered together with a considerable air and naval minelaying capability, constitute a growing threat, particularly against the LOC (lines of communication) of allied command Europe.
17.	Full credit must be given the Soviet bloc for having developed a strong capability in the special fields of atomic, chemical and biological warfare as well as in the field of guided missiles.
18.	The Soviet economy has maintained a level of military production sufficient to provide equipment and supplies for the Soviet and satellite forces and still pursue a program of stockpiles.
19.	To illustrate the magnitude of their total equipment stockpile, the Soviets have more than enough tanks, mortars and anti-tank guns for some 300 odd Soviet divisions. Their stockpile of field artillery and anti-aircraft artillery is several times that required to supply those divisions. Annual production of these items is continuing at a sizeable rate.
That is the carefully calculated statement by the man most competent to analyse Soviet military power at this time, Mr. Chairman. May I just for a moment again refer back to the last paragraph of that statement that the Soviet forces have more than enough tanks, mortars, and anti-aircraft guns for some 300-odd Soviet divisions, and then may I emphasize these words:
Their stockpile of field artillery and anti-aircraft artillery is several times that required to supply those divisions.
That is the cold, chilling reality with which we are confronted at this time, Mr. Chairman, when we discuss the estimates for the Department of National Defence.
As though that were not sufficient warning in itself, we then find that even within these past few days there have been further warnings of the rapid increase, not only in the enormous reserves of manpower, but in the supplies and quality of weapons for the Soviet forces. At Quantico, Virginia, only last Saturday, President Eisenhower was present at a meeting of senior staff officers and officials concerned with the general problem of defence, and at that meeting those who were gathered there were informed by the people best qualified to make a statement on the subject that Soviet production is not only expanding rapidly but that the lead in quality and technical novelty of weapons which have given the western allies their supremacy, in spite of a very great disparity in manpower, is rapidly closing in.


They warned, in the presence of President Eisenhower, that the Soviet forces both Russian and satellite are closing in very rapidly in the quantity, quality, and originality of design.
Those are the facts before us. Only yesterday in the celebration of air force day in Moscow, more than 600 planes of the largest and most modern jet type took part in a demonstration of Soviet air power. Those who listened to the radio description of that event heard that this was the largest demonstration of its kind that had ever taken place in the world in peacetime. They were told of the dropping of paratroops, and of all types of artillery of normal field standards, to give support to infantry and other lighter troops who were dropped by parachute.
Never in our history at any time, Mr. Chairman, have we been confronted so openly and with such accurate knowledge with the necessity for devoting whatever money we spend to the most effective defence possible, and with the necessity that our defence dollars produce defence and not just broad and sweeping statements about the general characteristics of our weapons, supplies, and organization.
Let us see what our position is. As of April 30 our active forces numbered 113,478. But, Mr. Chairman, that represents very largely the executive staff and various office employees necessary not only for the active forces, but also for the training, administration and supply of the reserve forces. It would be wholly wrong to think of those figures of active forces as fighting forces. We do not know exactly how many of those can be described as fighting forces.
It is fighting forces, after all, that General Montgomery is talking about when he speaks of six million men under arms. He is not talking about office staff or chauffeurs waiting outside the parliament buildings to take nonmilitary personnel to various non-military engagements. He is not talking about various details of that kind.
He is talking about six million men under arms. He is talking about 400 divisions in the field capable of going into battle within 30 days. He is talking about 300-odd Soviet divisions fully equipped, and not only with an adequate stockpile but with several times their requirements behind them for military purposes. These are the realities. When we examine it from that point of view, let us remember that with the enormous amount of money we are expending, and with all the satisfaction we may express in the training and morale of the young men and women in uniform, it is still a comparatively limited force compared with that reality.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the spokesman of our party, General Pearkes, has on more than one occasion emphasized our belief that there should be a reorganization of our forces in keeping with Canada's own particular military requirements, not only for the defence of our own vast territories, but to play our part in the over-all obligations to NATO which we have assumed. He has made it clear that he believes that the more we concentrate on air and airborne forces, the more we shall be capable of meeting our demands within our own boundaries and, in the unhappy event that the necessity should ever arise, of extending our effectiveness to distant points in other parts of the world.
On several occasions, Mr. Chairman, we have sought to obtain the report prepared by three senior officers of the armed forces in regard to the reserves. Let it be remembered that, while we talk of the active forces in Canada, the backbone of our defence is the reserve. We have never pretended at any time that we are a nation that seeks to maintain a standing army or a standing military force of air, land and naval units capable of meeting the demands of war. We have relied throughout the years on the strength of our reserve forces. That has been the backbone of our defence. It is the backbone of our defence today and it is the strength of the reserve that we should examine and about which we should have all the available information that can be given to us. We have asked several times for the production of that report. We have been told that this is a secret report; that it is a confidential report. But that, Mr. Chairman, is eyewash. That report is no more secret than was the report which was prepared twenty years ago and which formed the basis of the reorganization of the land forces of this country at that time. That report is no more secret than were the recommendations which were carried out twenty years ago and under which there was a conversion of half of our infantry units to artillery units, armoured units and other units of various types. That report was made public. That report was made public in detail. It was made public in detail for several reasons. It was made public because, as a result, it made it possible to obtain the support of the members of the house for the principles laid down and also to obtain the support of the general public, particularly the public in those communities where reserve units carry out their training. By making the general nature of that report public, support for the general plan of reorganization was gained in those communities which have a proud tradition of military training. Only one detail of that reorganization program was kept secret. That was the 83276-4024
Supply-National Defence part which referred to the specific units which should be converted or discontinued. I think the same principle could well apply to the present report.
There are obvious reasons why it is not desirable to present detailed recommendations with regard to the conversion or discontinuance of specific units until a general principle is settled and has gained support. If that procedure is followed, in the vexy nature of things the local pride in a particular type of service is bound to assert itself, often without due regard to the advantage there may be in the unit's becoming" part of a particular type of military service.
Mr. Chairman, I would certainly urge as well as agree to the idea that any recommendations with regard to specific units be withheld just as they were withheld twenty years ago when there took place at that time the sweeping reorganization which alone made it possible to mobilize on an effective basis in 1939. Let us, however, have the rest of the report. Any report can have the word "secret" or "confidential" put on it; but that does not mean that it is in fact secret or confidential. The members of the House of Commons have a right to know what assessment has been made of the strength of our reserve units, of their effectiveness at this time and of the possibility of suddenly mobilizing a force in the event that danger presents itself on a greater scale than that on which it is presented at this time.
I recognize that this matter presents one of the fundamental problems confronting every democratic legislative body. The balance between wide-open disclosure of all information and a measure of secrecy which) denies to the members of the elected legislative body adequate information for informed' discussion is one which today is engaging the attention of all those who are concerned about the effectiveness of our democratic system. Without in any way suggesting that it is our right, our duty or our prerogative to speak in critical terms of any other legislative body, I think it is appropriate that we should say that here in this chamber and in the parliament of Canada we certainly do not agree with certain propositions which have been put forward in Washington in recent days with regard to the full disclosure of all documents, no matter how secret those documents may be.
The proposition that any document made available in the utmost secrecy to a member of the executive or exchanged between governments should become available to any member of the elected body is, of course, one that would be intolerable to contemplate under our system. In fact, let it be said right

Supply-National Defence away that proper discussion between nations becomes more difficult when there is any uncertainty about the completely confidential character of those documents. But let it also be said right away that where there are truly secret documents-for instance, such documents as relate to secret military developments or to the assessment of new military power upon a highly confidential basis-they most certainly should not be disclosed. Having said that, however, we should not be placed in a position where, in the name of secrecy or confidential documents, we in this committee and in the House of Commons should be denied information that every member has the right to have.
This matter goes to the root of the whole effectiveness of the democratic system. The question before us is as fundamental as is democracy itself. The free election of men and women to sit in the House of Commons and be members of the parliament of Canada offers to the people of Canada no assurance that we shall, in fact, have either democracy or freedom unless those who meet here as representatives of the people have before them, for their knowledge, information and advice, the essential facts with regard to any matter brought before the House of Commons for consideration. We have not that information today. I hope the minister will not insult the intelligence of the members of this committee or the good sense of the people of Canada by suggesting that we have the essential information which makes it possible to discuss in a well-informed way those items that call for an expenditure of some $2 billion -during the current year.
We can obtain some of the facts in spite of the government's determined effort to hide them from us; and let no mistake be made about it, they are determined efforts, successfully carried out by the weight of their superior majority. For example, in the face of these cold and chilling facts that are presented in appendix "A" to the last statement of Field Marshal Montgomery, we are told about our ability to meet an air attack. We are also told that we rely on our reserve antiaircraft forces to meet that attack. Do hon. members of this committee know the strength of our reserve anti-aircraft forces? I happen to know the situation with regard to one of the best. They have less than one-tenth of the weapons they should have. They cannot even train effectively with that small number of weapons. They cannot train effectively because under the system they now have they often find they have more officers than men on parade. That would not be so if there were a sense of reality, of urgency and of duty in relation to the operation of these

reserve units. When I state that fact I do so simply because of personal contact. I have stated already with respect to a group of field artillery which is generally regarded as one of the best in Canada that in this year, when we are told that there are six million Soviet men under arms, that group, one of the best in Canada, will fire with 24 guns instead of 124. That group will go to camp in no single case with one of the regiments up to strength.
I am not talking about even full reserve field strength, as the minister implied in earlier remarks, nor am I talking about military strength for active service. I am talking about the reduced strength which has been established for training purposes. Not one of them will come up to that reduced strength, and some regiments will not even go as a single battery but only as troops of a battery because of their inability to man the guns, and that in this year 1954 when we are told that the military strength of the Soviet forces is mounting all the time.
There is another aspect of this problem which extends generally throughout the army. Because decisions have not been made with regard to the report to which I have referred, there are some units in a state of uncertainty today because they do not know what kind of units they are going to be. I know one of the best infantry units in the country that is scarcely able to train at all at this time because of the uncertainty as to what kind of unit it is going to be. These are merely examples which I put forward from personal contact. I do so with full responsibility as a member of this house. The members of the house should have before them a complete and detailed statement of the situation with respect to every reserve unit of the land, sea, and air forces right across Canada today. Without that, the estimates now before us and the general statements made are, in substantial measure, largely meaningless.
At this stage of the session, Mr. Chairman, it is still possible for the minister to say that in view of the situation that has developed it is his intention to present what has come to be known as the general's report. It is possible to place before this committee, this house and the parliament of Canada the essential information that has been found. Let us hope that, confronted with the threat of military might greater far than was ever presented by nazi Germany up to September, 1939, we will have reality and not blind generalities with regard to what we can do. I hope, in answer to demands of this kind, that we will not have statements by the minister that he is proud of the quality of

the training, of the effectiveness of the brigade in Germany, of the brigade in Korea, of our naval units on the seas of the world, of our airmen who fly the aircraft that we are getting in increasing numbers.
When I say I hope we will not hear that, it is not because we do not want to hear it. We have heard it already. We believe it and we believe it just as much as the government. We on this side of the house have just as much reason to be proud of the young Canadians in uniform as has any member on the other side of the house. Without reducing this to personalities may I simply, for the purpose of the record and for the knowledge of that younger generation who may not be aware of the facts, remind the house that the military spokesman of our party, General Pearkes, carries on his breast more decorations for valour than are worn by any other infantry officer in the units of the commonwealth today. I mention that not to glorify his military achievements, glorious though they are; but a man who wears the ribbon of the Victoria Cross, that highest of all decorations for valour, a decoration difficult to win and live, a man who wears the C.B., the D.S.O., the Military Cross and the many other decorations awarded to him for his service on the field of battle, a man who has risen from the rank of private in an infantry unit to divisional commander, is not a man who is going to place before this committee, this house, this parliament or the people of Canada any argument or any single statement that would reflect on the young men in whom he himself has such a deep and abiding pride.
Without extending it beyond that, Mr. Chairman, may I say that the same applies to a large percentage of the members of this house who have, in one service or another, done their best within their limited capacity to serve their country in time of war. I would not feel myself worthy of the remarks I am making if I did not concede and say with admiration that the Minister of National Defence himself is one of those who served gallantly on the field of battle, and from that service I would hope that he would be prompted to recognize the deep and grave concern of those of us who have seen the penalty of unpreparedness in the situation with which we are confronted in this country at this time.
As one whose contact with the reserve forces goes back for more years than I like to recall, I say without any reservation that on a comparative basis, in spite of the enthusiasm, the quality of training and the efforts of those in the reserve forces today, there has been no time in the last fifty years when the reserve forces of Canada were less
Supply-National Defence capable of immediately assuming the responsibilities they would be called upon to assume in the event of a sudden emergency. Surely that is not a situation we can contemplate with satisfaction. Surely that is a situation which should be fully examined, fully disclosed to us. Instead, we are simply told that under terms of secrecy and because the word "secret" or "confidential" appears on the document, we cannot have the findings which have been made.
This is becoming a habit, Mr. Chairman. It is not only in the case of the report to which I have referred that this same attitude applies. Only this morning an effort was made to obtain information respecting some inquiries that have been made, and that was denied on the ground that it was made in relation to other findings which have also been denied. That is one original way of denying information-deny the blanket and you deny everything under it. That is exactly what we have before us now. Then let us see some of the reports that there have been in regard to the various aspects of the military service. There was the Mainguy report on the navy; there was also the Gordon report on the national defence department within a limited field. There was the MacNab report; there was the Currie report; there was the Hendry report; and also there is the report which is known colloquially as the general's report and which perhaps is more accurately known as the Kennedy report from the name of the very distinguished general who acted as chairman of that committee.
During this past session, motion after motion has been presented to this house calling for the production of reports, including the Kennedy report, and they have been voted down by the solid voting strength of those supporting this government. So far as the supporters of the government are concerned, they are prepared to accept these blind assurances that all is well, in the face of the knowledge of many hon. members on the other side that all is not well and that we should have the information which is not available to us today. So far as the supporters of the government are concerned,
Theirs not to make reply.
Theirs not to reason why.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, that no one is under the impression that any statement in the Currie report has been challenged because of the fact that the government still is able to exercise such a sweeping majority for the suppression of all information in other cases. Not one word of that stands effectively challenged. The rails were stolen; the horses were on the payroll-

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Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


George Alexander Drew: The horses were on the payroll-


Some hon. Members:: No, no.


George Alexander Drew: -just as they were found, Mr. Chairman, to be on the payroll, by a man declared by the Minister of National Defence Jhimself to be the best qualified for that inquiry. The tawdry objections made by members opposite, in sounds that will not be recorded in Hansard, merely indicate the extent to which the Liberal mythology has already written off the Currie report.


Brooke Claxton: May I rise on a point of order?


George Alexander Drew: No, on a question of privilege, but not on a point of order. If it is a question of privilege, that is a different thing.


Brooke Claxton: The Leader of the Opposition is not chairman of this committee.


George Alexander Drew: No, nor are you.


Brooke Claxton: I should like to rise on a question of privilege to say that the question of the horses on the payroll was effectively dealt with in this house once and for all by the Prime Minister. Despite that fact the Conservative opposition has continued repeating this story about them. However, it was effectively dealt with once and for all in this house.


Mr. Rowe:: What point of order is that?


George Alexander Drew: That is exactly the kind of answer, Mr. Chairman, that should make every hon. member in this house concerned about every answer given by the minister, because that is not so. The statement he has just made is directly contrary to the facts. The statement he has made is contrary to the Currie report, which stands unchallenged. The statement made by the Prime Minister disposed of this thing in no way. The statement by the Prime Minister skirted around this question, and the fact that the Minister of National Defence would give this absolutely misleading answer is one reason why we should have before us now every word in the Kennedy report, and not rely upon his interpretation of it. If he is not capable of interpreting the Currie report correctly at this time, he is no more capable of interpreting the Kennedy report to us.
Let us remember, Mr. Chairman, that it was not only horses on the payroll. Let us remember the whole siding that was stolen. Let us remember the hobby horses that were made; let us remember also the fraudulent invoices and the disappearing cement and the general's fish pond and everything else found in that report which stands, unless the


minister is prepared to get up in this house and say he does not believe Mr. Currie.


Mr. McCann:: And include the Ontario highways.


George Alexander Drew: The sound effects from the C.B.C., Mr. Chairman, are not an appropriate background for the consideration and discussion of national defence.


James Joseph McCann: Just as important as yours.


George Alexander Drew: I recognize that in this house the minister is much more important because he has behind him a majority that will deny to this house any information he wants withheld, including information about the C.B.C. He is, therefore, very important in this house, particularly when he is backed up by this majority.


James Joseph McCann: You ought to get a few backers.


George Alexander Drew: That is the only thing that does give him importance. Certainly, we concede that as long as he is in a position to deny to this house, through the majority that supports this government, the information we should have, then he is very important indeed, and important mainly because of his capacity to deny us effective information.
Hon. members in this house who were not members before, Mr. Chairman, should read the Currie report and read also the statement of the Minister of National Defence that Mr. Currie or Colonel Currie or Brigadier Currie, as he may properly be called, was declared by the minister to be the best qualified man in Canada. Unless the minister says he does not believe him, then let every hon. member in this house accept that report; and because we did get so much information in that report, let the minister extend the information and tell us, not in the refined version but in its original form, the details of the Kennedy report.
In this whole subject a very successful device has been employed. Either the document has the word "confidential" on it, a very easy word to write, or it is not in the public interest to disclose the document. This is a very easy device with which to suppress effective information. The fact is that one thing that has so lengthened debates in this house-


An hon. Member:: George Drew.


George Alexander Drew: The distinguished hon. member opposite says "George Drew". I know the minister would prefer that the opposition remain silent and that we just meet here like the Soviet parliament, listen to what the

politburo tells us, and then go home; but we do not intend now or any other time to accept that interpretation.


James Joseph McCann: We will stay for the summer, if you want.


George Alexander Drew: We intend to fulfil our function as an opposition, in spite of the difficulty of obtaining information. But we do make it clear to the people of Canada who send us here that one of the things that have lengthened this parliament is the fruitless effort that has been made by the opposition to obtain the kind of information that, as members of parliament and in consideration of the rights of the people, we should have in discussing these vitally important subjects before us.
At what point, Mr.,Chairman, is the information going to become available? We made the proposal last year that this gentleman, whom the Minister of National Defence described as the best qualified in Canada, should extend his report to every branch of the Department of National Defence. Do not let any member of the government, and above all the minister, say to this house that this reflects on any member of the armed forces. The highest tribute we can pay to the members of the armed forces is to insist that they have the training, the equipment and, above all, the reserves behind them that they are entitled to have as young men and women who have accepted the heavy obligations they have assumed in the uniform of Canada.
What we argued last year, what we have argued this year, and what we will still contend, is that even if the Minister of National Defence is not prepared to appoint Mr. Currie to conduct such an inquiry, then he should appoint some other individual or group of individuals, with the same freedom Mr. Currie had, to examine the organization of the Department of National Defence, and of general defence organizations throughout Canada.
After all, is there a single member in the House of Commons who believes for one moment that the very substantial savings which resulted from the Currie report would ever have been made if that inquiry had not been conducted in that way? There is no hon. member in this House of Commons, including those on the other side of the house, who thinks for a moment that this would have been done. And yet, let hon. members recall this, and particularly those who were not in the house when that report was discussed, that the inquiry conducted by Mr. Currie and those associated with him dealt only with one segment of one part of one
Supply-National Defence branch of the service. It dealt with less than a twentieth of the army organization, alone. Now, if that much was found which called for substantial savings, and very sweeping reorganization such as was recommended in the Currie report, then surely there can be no hon. member who would suggest that tremendous savings would not be made by a similarly objective inquiry carried into the whole organization.
Do not suggest that anyone in proposing this is seeking scapegoats, any more than those members of parliament who support a Companies Act which calls for regular audit would suggest that there is something inherently dishonest in business when they make it an absolute requirement that every year there shall be an independent audit of the books and of the organization of a company. That is done as an ordinary and sensible and businesslike recommendation. There is no suggestion that there is any natural tendency to impropriety in the handling of business of that kind. With the very best of intentions and of business purpose, any rapidly expanding organization is bound to break out at the seams. Any expanding organization calls for examination and review.
That is what we have asked for, and I repeat that request now. We are coming toward the end of the session; but such an inquiry could be conducted under an appointment made by the government while the House of Commons is not sitting. Such inquiry would produce information which, if it were placed before members of the house, would make it possible for us to deal with this problem next year in a way that has not been possible previously at any time.
We have here a long series of items. It is not our intention to continue repetitive inquiries in regard to those items in the unavailing thought that by such inquiry we might finally break through this veil of secrecy which has been thrown around the real details in the Department of National Defence. Nothing will be served by that procedure. Nothing will be served by constant requests for the examination of this item and that. We admit right now, and without hesitation, that by the method the government has followed, and by the use of the guillotine, which has been employed over and over again by the full weight of the government majority to stop inquiry, to close the door to the receiving of information, and to withhold reports, we are not in a position to discuss this subject as we should discuss it. We know that perfectly well. But I have just offered a few examples of things that are known to me. I have offered a few

Supply-National Defence examples that are known to hon. members on the other side of the house, in their own constituencies, in regard to actual conditions of the reserve force in their constituencies.
I would hope that we might have the refreshing experience of seeing one or two, or more, members on the other side of the house getting up and explaining that in spite of the high quality of the officers, the N.C.O.'s and men, and in spite of their earnestness, the reserve units in their constituencies in many cases are not able to meet the opportunities presented to them.


Mr. Ferguson:: They are too interested in the Senate and parliamentary jobs, and assistants, to do that.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, this talk about secrecy, this talk about confidential information is nothing but a farce. This talk about information which cannot be disclosed to the elected members of the people is nothing but an attempt to hide information which would simply whet the appetites of hon. members- and I hope hon. members on the other side of the house-for still more information.
Each one of those reports being withheld contains findings which explain where substantial savings could be made. Each one of them does. Let us have those reports. Let us have the Kennedy report. And, Mr. Chairman, unless the Minister of National Defence is prepared to say that Field Marshal Montgomery was exaggerating the gravity of the situation when he made his statement on May 24 last, appendix "A" to which I have put on the record, then let the Minister of National Defence now tell us that there will be an examination of the whole organization of the Department of National Defence, such as produced the savings about which he boasted following the Currie report. And then next year we would be able to come back here and really deal with these vitally important items, with knowledge of what lies behind them.
Let the public know today that the veil of secrecy thrown around the Department of National Defence by this government precludes the effectiveness of detailed questioning. Let us remember that we have a right to that information, because we are not dealing only with some two billions of dollars of the taxpayers' money: we are dealing with nothing less than national survival itself.


Mr. Mclvor:: Mr. Chairman, I agree with some of the things the Leader of the Opposition said, when he referred to the personalities of two of our distinguished members. But there is a lot I do not agree with in what he said. I do not agree with his


statement that guns, armament, fleets and material things are the only things necessary to win a war.


George Alexander Drew: And neither do I, Mr. Chairman.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Nobody else does.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: What was it that beat Hitler? It was not because he had a great fleet of submarines, the best in the world; it was not because he had more aeroplanes than all the allies put together, perhaps twice over; it was not because he had big guns and arms and armament, the best in the world. What beat Hitler? It was not his lack of preparation. We have heard from the Leader of the Opposition-


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Chairman, may I ask-


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


George Alexander Drew: No; the hon. member has asked a question, and I can answer it in a few words if he wants it answered. I will answer it very quickly, if he wants it answered.


The Deputy Chairman:: Order. The Leader of the Opposition knows that the hon. member for Fort William can be interrupted only with his own consent, and if he does not sit down he does not indicate that.


George Alexander Drew: That is quite true. I merely said if the hon. member is really asking a question I can answer it very quickly.


Mr. Croll:: You have all the answers.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: I will make myself pretty clear before I am through, I hope. I asked the question, and I am asking it of myself. What beat Hitler? One of the first things that beat Hitler was when he went out and murdered the Jews by the thousand for no other crime than that they were efficient and good businessmen, and that they believed in one God. "Thou shalt not kill." And he who breaks the Ten Commandments will be broken by them. Napoleon said, Talk not to me of Providence: Providence is on the side of heaviest battalions. But Providence was not on the side of heaviest battalions when he attacked Russia. When half a million of the flower of France were frozen to death in their saddles, Providence was on the side of the thin, clear, cool air of Russia. Providence was on the side of the snowflakes of Russia and not on the side of the well-equipped army of France.
The Leader of the Opposition said a good deal about information. If the Ministers of National Defence were not capable of keeping the information that should be kept they should not be there. What does Russia want to know? They want to get all the information that the Department of National Defence

has, and I do not think they should have it. I admit that we have only 15 million people in Canada, but when we have 113,000 in the armed forces, that is not too bad.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: That is Liberal defence; that is not defence of Canada.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: The hon. member can rise in his place in a moment or two. I am not through yet, but I shall soon be. What beat Hitler? Headquarters asked the Christian church in Canada all over for their co-operation, and after that co-operation what happened? You could see Hitler making his mistakes after Dunkirk. Why did they not wipe out the remnants of the British army in that area? They had enough aeroplanes, but they did not do it. What they did was to attack Russia, the second big mistake. The next mistake they made was when Japan was induced to make its attack on Pearl Harbor. You could see things coming along.
I can say, Mr. Chairman, that the Minister of National Defence has done a fine job in preparation. I have read the white paper. I have not gone on all the trips that we might have had, to see what the Department of National Defence is doing. We went to Petawawa, and to me it was a wonderful revelation to see what they were doing. We went out to the airfield in Ottawa and we saw what the aeroplanes were doing. The Minister of National Defence has done a splendid job. There comes a time in preparations when you cannot prepare any further and then the Man above comes in and He does His work.


Mr. Winch:: I desire to say a few words on this matter. I do not expect to be very long, but I do want to add my contribution in stating that I fail to understand the reason why at the present time the elected members of this House of Commons, and thereby the true representatives of the people, are not taken more into the confidence of the minister and of the government as to the defence situation in this dominion at the present time, and as to the value that is being received for the expenditures of over half of our national budget.
I can remember when Canada was at war, Mr. Chairman, and there was an enemy on the western coast. The members of the legislature of British Columbia were very disturbed about the situation because they were almost in the dark as to what it was. Therefore, the members of the legislature of British Columbia raised their voices and demanded that they be taken into the confidence of the military authorities as to what was going on in British Columbia and as to what our position was.
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Now, Mr. Chairman, there we were at war. There was a demand, if you like to put it that way, or more politely a request, that the members of the legislature be taken into the military confidence. What happened? Within the matter of seven days Mr. Hart, as the premier of British Columbia, and I as the leader of the opposition in British Columbia, and representatives on the floor of the legislature, were called together by the general in charge of the Pacific command, and he sits right here on the floor of the house, General Pearkes. He can tell you that what I am saying is correct. We were taken into the confidence of the general in charge of the command. We were told what was going on; we were given a demonstration of what could be done. I can remember we said: In the event of an air attack, a bombing attack on Victoria, how soon can you have a scramble of air fighters so as to meet those bombers? We were given an actual demonstration right then and there. We were not told what someone in a certain office told him; we were given a demonstration, and we knew right to the second just how soon a bombing raid could be met. I am not going to go into details, but I am going to say this on my responsibility in this house. As a member of the legislature of British Columbia in time of war we knew the situation, we knew the number of troops, we knew the number of ships and sailors and aircraft and fighters, and so on.
In view of that experience, I must admit that I cannot understand why at this time the members of this House of Commons cannot be taken into the confidence of the government to a far greater extent than they are at the present time. If there is some reason why it cannot be done in the open, then I say at least it should be done in camera. I have been amazed that we cannot get information from the minister or from the government on our own affairs here in the realm of defence in Canada, and yet just a few days ago we could meet-yes, in camera it was- and we could get information on what is going on in Europe under the NATO troops, information of vital importance, of vital interest. If the commander in chief of the NATO forces could see fit to take the members of parliament at least in part into his confidence, then why cannot our own minister of defence in Canada take his own members of parliament, the members of parliament of Canada, into a far greater confidence than has been done hitherto?
I do want to say a word in particular about the reserve army, because honestly I will admit I should like to know a lot more than I do at the present time about that army. I have a great deal of pride in that body of

Supply-National Defence men. I had the honour of being a member of the reserve forces in the city of Vancouver for a number of years, and I think that it certainly redounds to their credit that they do their eight hours of work in the factory, in the shop or in the office and then turn out two or three times a week at night and week ends and give up their annual holidays so as to go to the training camps. I was not very high; I was only one of those two-pip miracles. However, I was a training officer and in the two or three years I was in the reserve army I got to know the problems we run up against. I know of things that went on that we just could not understand, things which just about sent the training officers out of their heads. We had such things as changes in orders, changes in rules, changes in equipment, and we never knew exactly where we stood. There may have been reasons for them but I know that was the situation then and I would like to know whether these problems have been met, and I want to know whether we can obtain the information which is contained in the Kennedy report.
I do not think I need add any more, and certainly there is little need to be emotional about this. I would say, however, that the reserve army must be efficient and in view of the key information given to the elected representatives of British Columbia in time of war I cannot understand the hesitancy of the Minister of National Defence in making more information available to us at this time.
It is all very well for the minister to take up that attitude here in Ottawa, but in a matter of a week or two when we return to our constituencies we are the ones who are going to have to answer the questions about this and we cannot do it unless we are given that information by the executive. I sincerely hope that after due deliberation and perhaps a little more serious thought the minister will consider taking the people's elected representatives a little bit more into his confidence than he has done up to now.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: I think it seems obvious,
Mr. Chairman, that members of this committee find it difficult to discuss the subject of national defence in a vacuum of information. It also seems obvious that the reason for the extended discussion on this matter is due to a lack of specific knowledge of the affairs of the department. I know that I personally have tried on three occasions to scrutinize the items in the estimates so as to come to grips with some of the underlying difficulties. But I have found it almost impossible because we have been dependent upon the vague statements to which reference has already been made on numerous occasions


in this house. I have searched through the white paper and according to that white paper all is well in the department. I have examined the minister's statements and according to these statements everything is rosy in the defence garden.
Unfortunately that conclusion does not jibe with the reports I have received through personal contact with certain branches of the services, and also from the numerous letters which reach me particularly with regard to our reserve forces. This has been particularly true since the announcement of the completion of the Kennedy report. When queried for information, I find myself in the same position as other hon. members in this house, forced to say, "I am sorry but we have no information. We are merely members of parliament and apparently not to be taken into the confidence of the government in regard to these important matters."
Now, Mr. Chairman, I am rising to speak at this time because of a special interest in a subject with which I think it will be impossible to deal during the discussion on later items. I am especially concerned with the government's decision to deny these reports to members of parliament, because I am the victim of one of these refusals. I refer particularly to the Hendry report. I have been on the trail of this report for a long time and I have had to work on the basis of trial and error because there was no specific information available. In fact it was only indirectly that I learned such a report existed. During the pursuit there were times when I almost had it. Those most intimately connected with its preparation were of the opinion that there was no secrecy involved and that any revelations concerning it would not place our defence preparations in jeopardy.
At one time, when I thought I was going to receive this report, those whom I contacted said that as a precautionary measure they would have to consult the Department of National Defence. It was there that this cloak of secrecy descended upon what is a harmless and innocuous report in so far as military strategy, secret weapons and arms development are concerned.
If there is anything vital to the defence program of this country, civil defence as well as armed defence, it is the matter of comprehensive welfare planning. In this connection it is not only this matter of denying members of parliament access to reports which disturbs me. The shroud of secrecy around the department goes much further than that. During recent months, for example, I have been in touch with some of my

old air force buddies still active in the service. One particular incident would have been amusing if the implications behind it had not been so serious. We had not seen one another for a long time so we had lunch together in the parliamentary restaurant. This officer was ticked off for consorting with a member of the opposition. I think that is carrying the shroud of secrecy too far. It is this accumulation of frustration resulting from the denial of reports as well as other instances of police state tactics which bring me to my feet at the present time.
Then, there is the matter of our contacts with the reserve units. Some hon. members of this house maintain reserve contacts. I do not know whether my experience is exceptional, but I have found it very difficult to get into close contact with the work which is of the greatest interest to me and work for which my background, training and preparation in military matters best qualifies me to pursue. This seems to be particularly difficult if one happens to be a member of the House of Commons, which to my mind is the exact reverse of the principle which should prevail in a democratic society. My background happens to be that of an allweather night fighter pilot, but when I turn out for reserve training I am put on personnel work dealing with personnel problems which crop up fairly regularly under the present military scheme of things.
The only conclusion I can draw from this, Mr. Chairman, is that the government, in defence matters, is more afraid of the opposition than they are of any potential enemy. I have said this before and I repeat it now. I am quite sure that if there is any state interested in attacking this country, then they know far more about our military potential and preparation than do the members of the opposition in this House of Commons. That situation naturally arouses our suspicions. If we are sent here by our constituents to represent them in running the affairs of this country, then we must become suspicious when we are denied access to the details concerning a department which is one of the biggest spending departments of government, and which, in the present uneasy state of affairs existing in the world-and which state of affairs is likely to continue for some considerable time-has a great measure of responsibility for our security. I have come to the conclusion that an attitude of this kind can only suggest that the government is more afraid for the security and defence of the Liberal party than they are for the security and defence of the nation. That is not a particularly healthy attitude in view of the 83276-4031
Supply-National Defence emergency or the crisis, on the level of external affairs, that at this time confronts Canada and all the nations of the western world.
In the discussion this morning it has been pointed out that Canada's defence force is and always will be essentially a civilian force. That is something that has been so in more primitive, and earlier, experiences of military activity in this country. It certainly is much more true in the face of the kind of warfare confronting us in this twentieth century. The advent of the H-bomb and similar weapons of total destruction means that everyone, more or less, is in the front line. All we can hope to do in maintaining a defence force, a group of professionals, is to support a nucleus who, in the event of an emergency, would be able to bring into a state of rapid preparation and mobilization the much larger force that would be needed.
If we are going to maintain the interest of the public or if we are going to maintain the interest of the civilian soldier, the reservist, in defence matters, to me it seems logical to believe that we must take him into our confidence. It seems to me that the government must take the citizens into their confidence, must place all the facts before them, must present them repeatedly-and shock them if necessary-with the challenge of the urgency of the moment. That is why I have pursued this subject of welfare. I do not want to look at it in any narrow or restricted sense at all. But in a democracy where you have not the totalitarian or authoritarian machinery with which to do what should be done quickly in the face of a crisis, you have to depend upon high morale and esprit de corps among the citizenry generally. They must be inoculated with a deepseated conviction concerning their responsibilities in these matters. If we are going to be able to carry out our defence program successfully, it seems to me that such a happy state of affairs can arise only from the existence of a well-informed public.
From that standpoint alone I think it is unfortunate if not tragic-in view of the continuing emergency confronting us-that we as members in the first instance are denied access to those documents that have been referred to. Perhaps it is unfortunate that the Currie report, or what has sometimes been referred to as the bootleg copy of the Currie report, was revealed to the members of the House of Commons because, since the revelations that were made in that Currie report, the defence department has buried its head in the sand even deeper than before. I cannot imagine them denying access

Supply-National Defence to the members to such a harmless document as the Hendry report on welfare services had they not been, having regard to the implications of the Currie report, unduly disturbed for the security of the Liberal party.
If I needed to quote any example as to the proper attitude that should be taken in maintaining the necessary interest in defence matters in a democratic society, I think I need only refer to Sir Winston Churchill, the British Prime Minister. All during the twilight period before world war II he was the voice crying in the wilderness. Because he was not in tune or in step with the prevailing or predominating attitudes toward external affairs in the western world at that time, he was not very popular politically. He represented the "blood, sweat and tears" philosophy. Of course that philosophy, at any time, is not very sweet as far as the electorate is concerned. It does not help in the necessary process of obtaining votes. However, he was right. Because he was right, when the crisis eventually came he was called upon to assume responsibility. The story is well known to all the free peoples of the western world.
Like the hon. member for Vancouver East, I was greatly impressed with the frankness with which the problems of defence in relation to the present world situation were dealt with by General Gruenther. It was a straightforward and frank appraisal, as contrasted with the "gobbledygook", the circumvention that goes on in this chamber with regard to defence matters in relation to Canada which, in the matter of population, is a relatively small segment of the whole NATO defence program at the moment. I suppose it is inevitable that Canada remain ambivalent and vacillating with regard to these matters. I suppose that attitude is inevitable in view of our pre-war record, and in view of our postwar record for that matter because, after the war, we immediately indulged in wholesale rapid demobilization. Then along came Korea and we were forced to assume what has been referred to by the Minister of National Defence as "crash planning" in order to meet the immediate challenge of the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. But in this year 1954 I think the time has now long since passed when we should break away from crash planning and should begin to look into the future-the long haul and the long pull -with regard to defence matters.
I do not want to speak for too long on this matter. However, surveying briefly what has been accomplished in the field of defence
IMr. DinsdaleJ
at the expenditure of some $5 billion, may I say that the emphasis, as I review the situation, has been on supply and construction and it looks to me as though personnel problems have been minimized. I am just going to refer briefly to what has taken place in the air force and also to what has taken place in that closely related field of radar defences. Then finally I shall make some brief references to the situation so far as materiel supply is concerned.
The heart of our air force defence program has been the development of the all-weather fighter, the CF-100. That of course is logical in view of the challenge with which Canada would be confronted by any possible air attack. We have now arrived at the stage where a token force of CF-lOO's is operational. I would suggest that we cannot go very much further than the preparation of a token force so far as the all-weather fighter is concerned mainly because technological changes in aviation are taking place so quickly that a new type becomes obsolescent almost before it is ready for operational duty.
That is a difficulty that goes right back to world war II. From actual experience with a night fighter squadron, I remember that one of the biggest bugbears we had to face was the constant reconversion to new aircraft and the extensive retraining in the use of rapidly developing airborne radar equipment. We have arrived at the stage where we have a token all-weather fighter force. This does not solve the problems of reserve squadrons because it is very difficult for reserve squadrons to maintain the efficiency necessary to cope successfully and to keep themselves up to an operational level so far as the allweather jet fighters in service at the present time are concerned. I suggest that matter needs to be given serious consideration because if the reserves are the backbone of the defence of this country we are far from reaching the desirable state of preparedness that is mentioned so freely and glibly in the white paper report.
As to radar, I think the statement has been made in the house that we are now in a position to intercept nine out of ten enemy aircraft.


Brooke Claxton: No such statement was made.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: As I read the record that is the implication I got from the minister's statement. That statement has already been repudiated, and well it might be because no fighter-radar combination could possibly achieve that degree of success in coping with the difficulties involved in night operations, particularly bad weather operations. It is true that the two must be developed hand

in hand. All-weather fighters and the radar establishments are integral parts of the same system. Indeed, had it not been for the rapid development of radar or radio-location, as it was known in Britain, at the beginning of world war II it is doubtful whether the German luftwaffe could have been driven back during the crucial days of the battle of Britain. The secret of the operational use of radar was very carefully kept until the end of the war.
I remember that popular thinking during the war regarded members of night fighter units as individuals wearing mysterious dark goggles and eating great quantities of carrots in order to improve their vision at night. In my three years overseas I never saw any carrots. In fact, our staple vegetable diet was brussels sprouts which do not have any necessarily beneficial effects so far as night vision is concerned. It was due to the presence of a very efficient radar system that the battle of Britain was won which gave the allies an opportunity to prepare to meet the eventual onslaught of the nazi forces across Europe.
I mention that point merely to indicate the contrast today so far as this subject is concerned. We have very elaborate information on our radar establishments. In fact, Roundel, the official air force magazine, was even pinpointing these units for us a short time ago. Yet we are denied access to a report dealing with the broad subject of welfare for the troops as well as the problem of integration of military forces with the civilian population.
I am not going to elaborate on that theme any further. It seems to me that what we have achieved thus far is that we have spent large sums of money on material and equipment, and we have not yet come to grips with the real problem of any defence force in a democratic state, the problem of challenging the ordinary citizen so that he becomes keenly aware of his responsibilities in these matters, particularly in the face of the total war which threatens us at the present time.
It is almost one o'clock, Mr. Chairman, and before proceeding with one or two specific points on the subject of welfare I should like to call it one o'clock.
At one o'clock the committee took recess.
The committee resumed at 2.30 p.m.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: When the committee rose at one o'clock, Mr. Chairman, I was just coming to the concluding portion of my remarks concerning the general problem of
Supply-National Defence welfare services as they relate themselves to the armed forces. The theme I was endeavouring to develop was that in defence matters as well as in any other public affairs in this country, there must be the closest possible co-ordination and co-operation between the government and the people of Canada.
I have just one further observation concerning the major emphasis that has been felt in defence planning in this country. Since* the Korean incident we have been straining every resource and every fibre in building, up the materiel demands of our defence-effort; constructing permanent buildings, developing new types of aircraft and so on almost ad infinitum. But I do feel we have been neglecting the most vital part of the whole structure, that is the problem of personnel. It is a fine thing to have the best housed, best clothed, and best paid defence force in the western sphere of influence, but that does not necessarily mean that we have the most efficient defence force.
It occurs to me that the Roman legionnaires, at the time when the Roman empire was most vulnerable, could boast of all those things. They had the best equipment, the best materiel and all the other physical factors going towards the preparation of a defensive force. The one thing they lacked was good morale, the esprit de corps, and certainly there was very little integration and co-ordination between the civilian population and the military elite.
It seems to me, from the limited opportunities I have had of looking into our defence program, there is a lack of close integration. Elaborate training programs are carried on to meet the demands of technological warfare, but not much is done by way of endeavouring to integrate the military training programs with the needs of the civilian population. That is just one method whereby there could be closer relationship. It has been customary in any war effort to which Canada has made a contribution to make use of the civilian resources, buildings and so forth, to the maximum in order to effect complete mobilization. I sometimes compare the lavish sums of money that are spent in this process that has been described as "crash planning" in our defence build-up, with some of the financially restricted educational programs in civilian circles. The educational institution with which I was once connected, for example, carries on its whole year's work on a budget of $200,000, merely a drop in the bucket when compared; with the lavish expenditures we find taking;

Supply-National Defence place in our defence planning. Yet that institution has made many outstanding contributions to the public life of this country. The student body has included such people as the premier of Saskatchewan, the premier of Manitoba and no less a personage than the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre. I am referring, of course, to Brandon college. I am raising that point to indicate that while heavy expenditure is necessary to meet the defence challenge of the moment, and we are spending billions, as the record indicates; let us not be entirely preoccupied with the urgency of the moment, a tendency of all governments. Let us look into the future and consider the commitments of long-term planning.
I feel that this is where the subject of welfare planning comes into the picture, Mr. Chairman. As I have indicated, I am not referring to the provision of recreation programs only, or providing canteens, which is basic to any military welfare program. I am concerned with the broader problem of bringing together the special needs of the military community and the special needs of the civilian population. So long as we are dependent on a civilian military force, these two aspects of our defence program will have to work as one.
In a letter from the defence minister last January refusing me access to the Hendry report, this report is described as a special report prepared for the confidential information of those concerned. I cannot conceive of any group who should be more concerned about this matter than the members of this house. Our whole problem of raising the morale and esprit de corps of the people of Canada to meet the challenge of the moment is of vital concern to all the people of this [DOT]country.
There has been a lot of discussion in the press concerning incidents that crop up in military camps from time to time. There has been resulting criticism laid at the door of inadequate welfare and recreation facilities. I am not going to harp on, or labour, that particular point, because those incidents will occur in any large military force where you have a group of men who are uprooted from their regular community ties. Special social problems and personal behaviour problems are bound to occur under such circumstances. These have to deal with the narrower welfare approach. Routine recreation programs are necessary, as are canteens. Those things are basic and almost axiomatic; we have to provide those services in the regular civilian community. There has been a tendency in recent years to increase the contribution the public bodies make towards
[Mr. Dlnsdale.l

welfare programs of this kind in order to offset the impact of commercialized recreation, which I feel sometimes should be spelled '"wreckreation", rather than in the traditional manner of "recreation".
A comprehensive welfare program that is going to deal with the larger problem must tie in the voluntary groups. Indeed, in any crisis it is usually the voluntary groups who carry the main burden of responsibility and, in turn, it is these voluntary groups who, by means of their close contact with the civilian population, are able to arouse the necessary enthusiasm and interest among the citizenry generally in order to have them make a worth-while contribution to a welfare program. Again, it is through the voluntary groups that the contact with the home can be made and maintained. At the moment the Department of National Defence, so far as I can gather, is moving forward in all these categories. The routine recreational program is being strengthened, canteens are being provided, and an attempt is being made to work more closely with the voluntary groups. I do understand however that, so far as home contacts are concerned, we are still pretty well dependent upon the Department of Veterans Affairs to investigate the home situation and to make its report. Unfortunately the difficulty there arises from the fact that, having examined the situation and having given their report, they have no service to provide. As we know, the Department of Veterans Affairs is restricted in what it can do. So the net result is that they suffer from paralysis of analysis. All they can do is outline the problem. They have no resources for assisting in the solution.
There is another matter connected with this subject of welfare suggesting the tendency to segregate civilian from military needs. Right across the country there has been a tendency to carry on a program of segregation between the military camps and the civilian population. I was not in on the preliminary post-war discussions of mobilization for defence planning in Canada, but it seems to me that to segregate military formations, and to isolate them in self-contained army, air force or even navy encampments, is working against the real needs of a comprehensive and all-out defence program which would tie in our civilian population so that, if a crisis ever came, they would be aware of the problem and fully alerted to the responsibilities relating thereto.
Summing up, I would say there are immediate plans that have to be made to meet what has been called the demands of creeping mobilization, which has been the defence

program up to the present time. We have been adjusting ourselves slowly to the needs of this creeping mobilization. The situation has improved slowly. I am sure that had we had access to reports such as the Hendry report, we might have been able to make complimentary remarks concerning what has been going on, because no doubt the report contains a thorough examination of the situation. But we are working in the dark. We can give our viewpoint and express our conclusions only from a very restricted background of knowledge. That is the handicap under which we are working at the present time.
In addition to immediate plans, there is the need for long-term plans for total mobilization, if that desperate situation should ever develop in this country. It seems to me that, so far as welfare needs are concerned, here is where we are weakest. There is no group engaged in comprehensive over-all planning. The chaos which would result from a lack of co-ordination and integration, and because the situation has been obscure, owing to the attitude of the defence department in trying to assure us that all is well, would produce a very difficult situation, if a major crisis ever developed.
In connection with all these matters I maintain that the House of Commons should be taken into the confidence of the cabinet and its advisers. If anyone is vitally interested in these matters, then surely it should be the elected representatives of the people. Defence planning must take in the whole of the population.
I hope that some discussion along these lines will take place when we are dealing with civil defence. There needs to be co-ordination and complete integration if we are going to be in a position to meet the defence challenge of the moment.


Ernest George Hansell: Mr. Chairman, I should like to say only a word or two in the discussion of the first item of the estimates for the Department of National Defence, although I claim no expert knowledge in matters of national defence. I have never been a member of the armed forces. Apart from the occasional hunting trip I have never fired a gun, and I do not claim to be an expert on these matters. Nevertheless I think something should be said on one or two points.
I listened attentively this morning to the leader of the official opposition who, in many respects, seemed to be giving quite a speech. I did think however that in some respects it was a bit weak. Because I support the Leader of the Opposition in some of the
Supply-National Defence things he said, I would not want the minister or the government to gain the impression that I supported him 100 per cent. For instance, I saw no particular reason for bringing up the old story about the horses on the payroll.
I was here in the last parliament, of course-as I have been for a number of years. We all heard the story about the horses; and, frankly, I must confess I was pretty well satisfied with the Prime Minister's reply. I thought he replied conscientiously in the matter. Further, a committee of the house was set up and had every opportunity in the world to go into the subject. They had before them the man who was responsible for the Currie report. I had expected some fireworks in that committee, but there did not seem to be very much by way of an explosion at that time. I must confess that, after all the hullabaloo that went on about these things, I thought our Conservative friends fell down just a little bit in carrying out any vital investigation during the sittings of that committee.
For the Leader of the Opposition to bring in that matter this morning, after so long a time has passed by-for after all this was a matter that was brought up in a session previous to the last election-was rather small potatoes. I think it weakened his whole argument because I felt, well, now, surely he has something more important than that to bring up at this time. It is true, and I do agree with him, that since we have an expenditure of about $2 billion for defence, we have every right to know that it is efficiently spent; we have a right to know that we are getting a dollar's worth of efficiency and effectiveness for every dollar spent.
If there are any documents that might be regarded as secret, if those documents apply to such matters as defence strategy or some particular piece of equipment that it is not wise for the enemy to know about- and I doubt there is very much that they do not know about-if there is anything of that kind, I can quite understand how certain documents might be regarded as secret. But if those documents are involved with government policy, or the general conduct of the Department of National Defence, then I do not believe that any documents should be secret.
What I rose particularly to talk about was this. I wonder just how enthusiastic the people of Canada are in subscribing to the annual revenues of this country to the tune of $2 billion for defence. Are they enthusiastic in coming through with that much
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Supply-National Defence money for the carrying on of this department? I cannot answer that myself, but I do believe that you cannot go farther in defence expenditure or in anything else, as far as that goes, and have the support of the people, without carrying the people along with you, and letting them know what the score may be.
I am just wondering whether we have done a good job of really conditioning our people to what might be regarded as necessary in respect to our national defence budget. We use the term "national defence budget" but in reality it is a military budget. We use those terms because we do not like to have any connotation which might indicate that we are aggressive. But in reality it is a military budget, just as much a wartime budget as if we were in a war, although we are now living in peace and there are no particular shooting wars. Have our people been conditioned properly to understand even the potential powers of the enemy and the necessity of such vast expenditures for a small nation of 15 million people? I am inclined to think that instead of conditioning the people to withstand a formidable enemy, in many respects we have been conditioning the people to accept the enemy and accept them on their terms.
It seems to me that in the matter of public relations in this respect we have fallen down completely on the job. It seems to me that we have been playing cat and mouse with those who we know are our enemies, and more often than not we have been the mouse, and we have not gained many victories over the cat.
May I put it this way. Any gain geographically or in any other way that the Soviets have made has not been owing to any military successes. It has been owing to a type of propaganda, and yet they have gobbled up half the world without even firing a shot. I am not saying they have not aided and abetted other countries behind the iron curtain, but they themselves have been able to stay out of any military complications. They have done it by carrying on a real psychological warfare, both in the diplomatic field and in the field of propaganda throughout the world.
What are we doing psychologically to weaken them as they have been doing to weaken us? What are we doing psychologically to weaken the Soviets and those other powers behind the iron curtain? Well, they have certainly not overlooked the opportunity to weaken us within our borders. The object of their psychological warfare is their destruction of western democracy. This is all involved in a matter of defence. I should


like to know what we have actually been doing to weaken communistic dictatorships in the communist countries. We might boast that we have the atom bomb. So have they! We might boast that we have certain strategic bases and positions. So have they, to a very large extent; and, as far as I can understand it, they can match us man for man and gun for gun. But there is one place in which they cannot match us, and that is in the exposition of our way of life as compared with theirs.
I know what might be said. Well, we have to be careful because that would not be diplomatic protocol. All I would say to that is, how much do they care as to what is diplomatic protocol? They are out for the destruction of our way of life. I am going to suggest that the Department of National Defence take over the international shortwave service and really use it to engage in psychological war; for that is what they are doing continually. If it is not used for that purpose, to my mind it serves no purpose at all.


Mr. Hosking:: Mr. Chairman, it is not my intention to take up much time of the house in speaking on the estimates for national defence. However, there are one or two things about which I think I should express an opinion in view of the speeches which have been made here today. One matter I would like to suggest the minister should take under consideration is with regard to the pay for reserve forces who are employed by the dominion government. When I was on the city council of Guelph in 1948 we decided that the employees of the city who went to military camps for training as members of the reserve army should have their pay made up by the city so that they would not lose any money. I supported that because I thought it was the proper thing to do, and I would urge our government to give such a scheme their consideration today.
I would not suggest that they treat the taxpayers' money lightly and just go ahead and pay wages to these men to the same extent as they receive in their civilian job, although there are provincial governments, for instance the one in Ontario, which do. I do not think our government should take such a free attitude with the taxpayers' money that they are prepared to pay anything. Indeed, if my suggestion is accepted I would suggest that a further restriction be incorporated. I think it would be helpful to our reserve army if we made up that proportion of the recruit's pay so that he would not lose any money while attending camp, but in order to qualify for that allowance the recruit must turn in a report from his O.C.

verifying that he had attended a certain percentage of the regular drills. This percentage could be set at 75 or 80 per cent. If a recruit did that, then I think the government would be justified in making his pay up so that it would not be any hardship for his family if he attended a reserve army camp for training.
As most hon. members are no doubt aware, I represent the dominion artillery city, Guelph, and as the Leader of the Opposition pointed out early this morning, artillery is a very important arm of the services. Of course, everyone knows that the engineers are the backbone of the army, but since I represent an artillery city I would concede that they take second place. I was-


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: What about the S.R.D.?


Henry Alfred Hosking: I will come to that in a moment. I was touched by the magnificence of the address made this morning by the Leader of the Opposition. I envy his masterful style, and the cadence of expression he can get into his voice, but I want to tell him it has been my experience that the men in the army we used to refer to as "barrack room lawyers" were not very much admired. They used to say that the barracks were no good, that the officers were no good, the grub was no good, and in fact everything connected with the army was no good; and it has been my experience that they exercised very little influence for good on the morale of the troops.
If we are trying to get boys to join the reserve army it is hardly fitting for the Leader of the Opposition to stand up here and say that on reserve army parades there are more officers present than men. I do not believe that would inspire one single person in the Dominion of Canada to join a reserve army unit. That type of propaganda has never been made in my hearing by his supporter, the hon. member for Simcoe North. I have listened to him on several occasions both inside and outside the house, and he has always claimed that the army training he received was something of which he was proud. He makes the kind of speeches that will inspire our boys to join the reserve army.
If the Leader of the Opposition is really interested in getting men to join our reserve forces, that is the sort of attitude he should take, and he should not suggest that we have an army of thieves, a reserve army comprised of people who will not take part in their parades, and that more officers are present than men. He should leave out all these arguments, of the type which are used by the barrack room lawyers to make out a very bad case for conditions in the army.
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It would be far better if the Leader of the Opposition listened to the hon. member for Cape Breton South when that hon. member told us about his experiences and the good times that were had in the army. Everyone who has been in the army knows it is not all hard work. There is plenty of hard work but there are good times in the army too. There is good fellowship, great experiences, and good training. Those are the things that will attract recruits, not the sort of dissertation indulged in by barrack room lawyers, who always annoyed those charged with the responsibility of doing a job when we were overseas. I do not think any reasonable person either in the army or in civilian life would expect a training unit to have a full complement of guns on exercise. When the Leader of the Opposition mentions this fact he gives the impression there is not sufficient equipment for the troops who attend army reserve training camps to enable them to obtain a good training.


Mr. Harkness:: Neither there is.


Henry Alfred Hosking: That is not the case. Here again I must refer to my artillery friends, for the officer commanding that unit told me they had the very best of equipment, food, and conditions in camp. They did not come back and report to me that the food and conditions were bad and they were short of guns. In fact, they told me the absolute reverse of that, and the people who criticize and who are always complaining do very much to break down the morale of our troops. I do not like to hear it and I do not think it is a good thing for our country.
We have difficulties enough in inspiring in our people a belief that our country is worth fighting for and that it is necessary for a certain number of citizens to assume the responsibility of defending it. Those are the principles on which our democratic people join the army. The socialists, who want to see everyone's service paid for, will never inspire anyone to join the army, and under their system it is impossible to get good troops. The only way to get troops in a socialist country is to conscript them, and the same is true of a dictatorship. This is also true whether in time of peace or in war.
However, in a democracy there is every good reason to fight for one's country; that is the reason why people join our reserve army and fighting forces. It is certainly not for any of the other reasons which have been mentioned.
There is one other point I would like to mention. If it is agreed we are going to have a large standing army for years, in this country, I think the Department of National Defence should give serious consideration to
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Supply-National Defence taking over some of the construction work which is done for the dominion. I am quite convinced that there is no better proving ground for tank operators, tradesmen and men of the ancillary services of the army than in construction work. If the personnel of our army were to build a trans-Canada highway from one side of this continent to the other, we would have the best trained troops that it would be possible to have. By doing this work, there would be an opportunity to teach discipline, there would be opportunities for various members of the army to show their ability, and there would be an opportunity to train the troops to do things. The United States army does that. The United States army engineers do a great deal of the civil engineering work for that country south of us. We are going to have construction work here for years and years to come. With the deepening of the St. Lawrence seaway, there will be ports and docks to build. In a great deal of the construction of that seaway itself there will be work that could be done by army personnel. Where could we get a better place in which to train troops including our electricians, our mechanics, our signallers, and all the special units. There would be a wonderful opportunity to make use of the available army manpower that we apparently must have in this country for many years to come. I would ask the Minister of National Defence if he would not give serious consideration to this suggestion in order to see that the troops we must have in this country would get some practical and useful work which would make them better fighting troops if and when they are required to do the job for which they were signed up.


Mr. Churchill:: Mr. Chairman, I am taking part again in this debate owing to the completely unsatisfactory statement which the minister made on May 21. As reported at page 4992 of Hansard, in reference to the fact that I had mentioned armour, he said this:
This matter has already been dealt with in the house on April 15, 1953, on December 1, 1953; and on several other occasions we have gone over the same ground.
The implication conveyed by this sentence is that the subject of armour has been completely dealt with in the debates here in the house. The implication is that the minister has covered the ground fully and carefully with regard to armour. The actual fact is that no such thing has been done.
If you look at the first reference which he gave, Mr. Chairman, that of April 15, 1953, you will discover that we were then discussing the suggestion which had been put forward by the opposition for the employment of an
IMr. Hosking.]

armoured brigade in Europe instead of an infantry brigade, and that the minister simply dismissed the idea out of hand. His second reference is to December 1,	1953. His
reference is correct in this regard, namely that the matter was fully covered; but it was fully covered only by me. I made a speech on December 1. The minister did not do so. I dealt with the necessity for armour in the Canadian army and lamented the fact that the armoured corps was being sadly neglected. I appealed to the minister to put his mind to the problem of employing the armoured personnel carrier in order to save the lives of Canadian infantry soldiers. That was the speech of December 1. The minister had no part whatsoever in the discussion that day. He had spoken in the debate on the speech from the throne on November 26 and in the course of his remarks he did not once mention armour.
When I spoke on this matter last month, again I dwelt on the subject of the neglect of the armoured corps and I was ably supported by the hon member for Calgary North and others. I suggested to the minister that, if it was not possible to adopt our earlier suggestion of maintaining an armoured brigade in Europe and an armoured brigade at home, rotating the two, in order at least to get the army back into proper balance we should maintain an armoured brigade at home, and that that would require activating another armoured regiment, brigading it with the Royal Canadian Dragoons and the Lord Strathcona's Horse, setting up brigade headquarters and carrying out here in Canada armoured brigade training. The minister completely ignored this suggestion. He paid no attention whatsoever to it. The statement on May 21 refers to the impossibility of rotating the armoured regiments. Let me just read his statement so that you will see what it is:
I should like to point out that it is impossible to work our present armed forces, with their commitments in Korea and in Germany and the requirement of having a mobile striking force of airborne troops, and still have two armoured regiments rotating abroad. You just cannot figure out mathematically a way of using the same manpower to do that complicated operation. Once you train a man for armour, you do not want to use him in the infantry and vice versa.
Mr. Chairman, this is one of the typical statements of the Minister of National Defence. He has acquired a national reputation for statements of this nature which are allembracing, comprehensive and completely meaningless. He has completely evaded the issue. At no time have I suggested that an armoured regiment be maintained overseas and be rotated with the other armoured

regiments at home. I talked in terms of an armoured brigade. At no time have I suggested that you should train a man as an armoured corps man and then use him in the infantry or should train a man in the infantry and then use him in a tank. Only the minister could come forward with a suggestion of that nature. It has no meaning. It is confusing. It may confuse the general public. It may confuse those who have no knowledge of the army. However, it certainly has not confused anyone here on the opposition side. It beclouds the issue unnecessarily. What a suggestion to make! The minister has told us that we cannot do this because it involves training a man for armoured vehicle purposes and then sending him overseas and using him as an infantryman or of training a man as an infantryman and employing him in a tank. That is utter nonsense.
In completing his statement with regard to my request for greater use of armour, the minister said this:
Also, of course, an armoured brigade would cost about $100 million more than a corresponding infantry brigade.
That is the end of the quotation. There is no break-down made with regard to the number oi vehicles required or the number of men, nor is there given any estimate of the cost by regiment or anything of that nature. It is just one of those general statements. The minister says it will cost $100 million more for an armoured brigade than it would for an infantry brigade. Earlier the minister had said that the cost of the present infantry brigade in Europe, to maintain it there, was approximately $60 million a year. The implication then is that an armoured brigade similarly placed would cost $160 million. I suggest to the minister that he produce his figures to indicate how he arrives at this grand total. For one thing, based on the figures found in the handbook for war establishments published by the Department of National Defence, an armoured brigade would require 500 fewer men than an infantry brigade, and if you work out the cost of 500 men on an annual basis with their pay and allowances-the figure given to me last year was something in the neighbourhood of $7 per man per day, but it must be higher now-you would effect a saving on pay and allowances, even accepting that figure, of $1,500,000 a year as between an infantry brigade and an armoured brigade. That is without taking into account such matters as married quarters and schooling for children, because obviously there would be fewer married quarters required and fewer children to be educated if you had 500 fewer men overseas.
Supply-National Defence
Let us consider the question of equipment. An armoured brigade requires 232 tanks. Some of these tanks are used for different purposes, some are small and some are large; but for our discussion here I think it would be fair enough to consider that they might all be Centurion tanks, the gun tank that was the normal equipment of our armoured regiments. The cost of the Centurion tank is roughly $100,000. Two hundred and thirty-two, the equipment for a brigade, would give you a cost of $23 million. It is not a recurring annual cost. Tanks do not disintegrate and become unusable in just one year. They last for a very long time. The reserve army regiments of the armoured corps are using for training purposes tanks which must be at least ten years old. The minister may remember that in the year 1940 at Camp Borden the first Canadian armoured brigade used for training purposes tanks which had been manufactured by the United States in 1918. They served a useful purpose. They were still serviceable to a certain extent over twenty years later.
Therefore the expenditure of $23 million to equip a brigade fully with tanks is not an annual recurring expenditure. How then does the minister get the $100 million more for an armoured brigade than for an infantry brigade? Even though we make a generous allowance for other things, spare parts and so on, and take a figure of say $30 million, there is a discrepancy of $70 million for which the minister has to account. I hope he will give us an accounting rather than brush aside an armoured brigade on the implication that it is prohibitive in cost. It is not prohibitive in cost, and in any case it would not mean at this time an additional $30 million added to the national defence budget, because surely we have come close to the end of some of the stockpiling that is going on of soft goods and things of that nature and can divert to actual fighting vehicles some of the money which has been set aside for other matters.
The minister in his statement has, I think, confused the issue completely. I have maintained that the Canadian army is out of balance. Other nations are still maintaining their armoured formations-the United States, the United Kingdom. Canada has fallen behind. We have produced an infantry army with the supporting arms, artillery and engineers, and it is a good army for infantry work. But that is the type of army we had from 1914 to 1918. It is not a modem mobile force, and it is a modern mobile force that is the requirement at the present time.
But the minister refuses to consider this problem. He is content to let the armoured corps remain at the strength of just two

Supply-National Defence regiments, content to raise and equip infantry formations, and is not taking the precaution to see that those infantry formations are protected against loss of life. The experience of the last war showed very clearly that infantry can be protected against unnecessary loss of life, particularly in an advance. In the course of my remarks in the house during the last three years I have repeatedly referred to Canada's great discovery and invention, the armoured personnel carrier, which has been neglected by the Canadian army since the war. I cannot understand why that should be so. But I find that in the United Kingdom they are providing armoured personnel carriers for the protection of their infantry. In the United States they are doing the same thing. It is astonishing to turn to the issue of Life of June 7 of this year and find pictures and an article with regard to an armoured personnel carrier that has been devised and is in use in the United States army, and for which they are appropriating the sum of $50 million.
It is a very wise investment indeed, and I should like to read a sentence or two from the article to indicate what is involved. Appropriately enough, they are calling these vehicles "lifesavers", which is what they are. Here is the description:
The M-59 "lifesaver", a boxlike vehicle with tread to carry it over bad terrain and armour to ward off machine gun bullets is the United States army's latest and most promising attempt to adapt infantry to mechanized and atomic war. Carrying a squad of nine riflemen, it can keep up with tanks and take infantry across open ground which would be suicidal in foot attack. It also enables friendly artillery, firing ahead of infantry, to keep shelling until the last moments since shell fragments also bounce off the M-59. In atomic warfare, where mobility under fire is the key to ground tactics, the M-59 lifesaver would be invaluable. It has been called a "mechanized atomic foxhole", its armour providing protection against radiation and heat flash and its 30-m.p.h. speed permitting quick dispersion.
I think it is a rather sad reflection on the Department of National Defence that Canada, the country which produced the armoured personnel carrier, should now be last in the field, and that we have to turn to the United States and the United Kingdom to discover what is being done along this line. But that is necessary for infantry tactics on the battlefield if our purpose is to save the lives of infantrymen. I submit that the lives of infantrymen have been sacrificed needlessly in two or three wars in which Canada has been engaged, and that fact is known to all. But Canada discovered a means of saving the lives of infantrymen in the last war and should adopt that means now for the protection of our men.

Again I say that the minister has neglected to deal adequately with this particular matter. I went to some length, when I spoke on this subject last May, to point out that we were failing to train the high command properly if we did not provide armoured formations within a brigade so that they could become accustomed to using armour, artillery and infantry in conjunction; and until we do provide armoured formations in adequate number we will not train the high command properly. From that we will suffer serious results because it is essential that those who are placed in command of armies know how to use properly all arms of the services. Unless we provide an armoured brigade, train it on a brigade level and provide it for the training of divisional and corps commanders, there will be little effective training of those who will attain high command in our Canadian army.
You see what we have done, Mr. Chairman. Earlier this afternoon the hon. member for Macleod was asking if we were getting a dollar's worth for a dollar expended in national defence. I have intimated people would be satisfied if that were the case. I think we cannot get a dollar's worth for a dollar expended because we are out of balance so far as the Canadian army is concerned. We are producing an army in the 1914-18 pattern, and conditions of warfare have changed and are changing very quickly since the development of atomic weapons. Those people who are in command in Europe over our NATO forces are asking for mobility and more mobility. In a newspaper not long ago one of our own distinguished generals commented upon and stressed the necessity for mobility of troops in the field. What are we doing about it? You are not very mobile on your flat feet. You have to have tracked armoured vehicles, tanks and armoured personnel carriers, if you are going to make your infantry forces mobile and if you are going to protect them. We are not, therefore, keeping up with the times and the responsibility rests with the Minister of National Defence.
I think it is a pretence to suggest that our brigade in Europe, fine as it may be as an infantry brigade-I think it is one of the finest because it has so many veterans of the second world war and Korea in its ranks- is an effective fighting machine against the type of attack which may be launched against that brigade by the Russians. You have only to recall how the Germans swept through Europe in 1940, with a very small mobile armoured force, to realize the truth of my remarks. The Germans were opposed at that time by infantry forces similar to our infantry forces.

Infantry forces of that nature are ineffective against powerful armoured formations. You have to have tanks and a preponderance of artillery if you are going to resist armour. We have committed our infantry brigade over in Europe to a very great hazard. I am surprised the Minister of National Defence does not recognize that and does not take effective steps to put the brigade in better condition to resist attack.
I shall conclude these remarks, Mr. Chairman, with a reference to the white paper. The white paper lists three objectives of our defence policy, namely defence against direct attack on Canada; implementation of undertakings for collective security, and the buildup of our organization for total war. In my opinion, the minister has fallen far short of achieving any of these objectives. The second one, in my opinion, should be rewritten and instead of saying, "implementation of undertakings for collective security," which is an odd and general phrase that might mean anything, I think we should say, the provision of fully equipped and highly trained forces and formations of armour, artillery and infantry suitable for modern mobile warfare in order to implement any undertakings by Canada for collective security.


Mr. Herridge:: I do not intend to detain the committee very long.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Some hon. members say, "hear, hear", that is a good way to extend debate. First of all, I want to make a reference to the remarks made by the hon. member for Wellington South. He made some rather caustic comments about the principles of socialism, and then went on to say there was a good deal of happiness found in the army. That statement is quite correct, and I agree with it. Why is there a great deal of happiness found in the army? It is because of the sense of security provided by an assured income, permanent employment, good housing, clothing always provided and three good meals a day for certain. I must admit that so far as Canada is concerned, these things are provided in good quantity and quality. All the socialist wants to do is to provide the same sense of security to the whole population in Canada which many do not enjoy now.


Mr. Studer:: The same is true of being in jail.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Mr. Chairman, is the hon. member for Swift Current-Maple Creek suggesting that being in the army is like being in jail? I am amazed. How is that condition
Supply-National Defence obtained? It is the result of government organization and government action. From time to time we in this group are asking the same things for those people who do not enjoy similar security.
Strangely enough, I disagree with the hon. member's comments in one respect, but I support them wholeheartedly in another. The hon. member suggested we could use some of the members of the permanent forces for construction purposes, the building of roads and bridges. Speakers at a recent conference in Canada concerning our renewable natural resources suggested these men could be used for fire-fighting purposes. Here we are in Canada lagging in the building of the trans-Canada highway, lagging in the building of roads and bridges everywhere, and we have this great force of excellent men available who, no doubt under present conditions, will find themselves in the army for a number of years. I believe the hon. member's suggestion is an excellent one, and I support it.
These men would gain experience from useful employment that would be of great advantage to this country. I have had letters from men in the forces who tell me they get tired of digging a hole and filling it in again, of building a bridge and pulling it down, and of doing all those things that are necessary to train engineers, and pioneers over and over again. I feel the hon. member made a very good suggestion. We could perhaps rotate a proportion of our _armed forces and use them in construction of trans-Canada and other highways that are so necessary at the present time. At the same time they would be gaining experience that they have to gain in other less useful ways.
I was very pleased with the minister's reply to my brief comments in the debate when the estimates were before the committee on a previous occasion. He told the house there were no members of the defence forces who served in the second world war, and who committed offences, that were still in jail. I was very glad to hear that indeed. I wish to make another brief appeal with respect to officers and other ranks who were dismissed from the forces and who lost permanent pension rights and other rights as a result of military offences which, in some cases, would not be serious offences in civil life. In my opinion these men should receive at least equal consideration to those in the R.C.M.P. I will quote from a Canadian Press

Supply-National Defence dispatch in this respect. The dispatch is headed "Misconduct Mounties given Pension Break". It reads:
Seven members of the RCMP discharged since 1949 for inefficiency or misconduct will have their pensions restored in part under legislation introduced in Commons.
The bill changes an RCMP pension plan, in effect since 1949, to allow a partial pension to be paid to members of the force discharged for inefficiency or misconduct.
Justice Minister Garson informed the house that the measure will be made retroactive to cover seven members discharged for those reasons in the last five years.
He said the change is being made to put insurance plans in line with the former pension plan under which those discharged for inefficiency or misconduct were eligible for half-pension until the age of sixty-five and a two-thirds pension after that.
I feel that if the Minister of Justice can give former R.C.M.P. personnel a break in that respect our defence minister should give those men who are suffering from their misdemeanours under military law a break. Therefore I appeal for a reconsideration of their cases.
I want to mention another little matter that rather intrigued me. I am speaking as a sort of backwoodsman without any knowledge of the details of present military life. I was interested in a press dispatch in the Ottawa Citizen of June 16, 1954, headed "Not Permitted to take Salute". Then, it goes on to say:
The dispute centres around a plan that the mayor would take the salute of the Cameron Highlanders regiment in a ceremony at city hall square on July 1.
I want it to be understood that I am not taking the mayor's part or anything of that sort, but in my opinion there is a principle involved here.
The army has advised that the mayor cannot take the salute-that this honour is reserved to the Queen, her official representatives, the Minister of National Defence and senior army officials.
I did not know this privilege was so limited, because I have seen mayors take the salute before. Senator McGeer while mayor of Vancouver took the salute on one occasion in the city of Nelson from the armed forces present. My question is this: Upon what regulation is this ruling based? When the minister is replying I would like him to answer this question: Does this ruling preclude the Prime Minister of Canada or the premier of a province from taking the salute from a regiment? I cannot understand in a democratic country why the Prime Minister or a premier of a province would be denied taking the salute from a regiment of our armed forces, because of regulations. I get the very strong suspicion that this is a musty old tradition that has come down from the Victorian period, and
[Mr. Herridge.j

that some obscure and unknown official of the armed forces has dug it up from the dusty files to thwart the wishes of the present mayor of Ottawa.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Some people would like to give her a 21-gun salute.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: As a matter of fact, I may not leave Ottawa until midnight July 1, because I want to see the ceremony.
I come now to my last point. We in Canada look upon our defence forces as a citizens army, whether these citizens are in the permanent force or the reserve army. At this point I wish to pay tribute to the members of the reserve army who give their evenings and summer holidays over to training in the reserve force. I think they should receive every encouragement. I know the two or three units in my district struggle along under considerable difficulty and, particularly in Nelson, with very little accommodation and equipment. But these few men at least carry on a very useful work, and I should be very pleased to hear what is going to be done in the future to improve the position of the reserve army, and support their efforts.
Canadian citizens who fought in the first and second world wars did so for the defence of this country, because they had a general understanding of and respect for democratic principles and democratic ideals-and that means a great deal in any army. They had faith and belief in certain principles, which gave weight to their blows against the enemy. And, because of that strength, engendered by such principles, a totalitarian dictatorship was defeated.
I wish to see our army maintained as a citizen army and I would hope it will continue to be composed of people who believe in democratic principles and in democratic ideals, and who are willing to defend this country because they believe in those ideals. I believe the hon. member for Macleod made reference to the same subject, that our army should be composed of persons of that kind.
However, I have been a little bit disturbed by reports I have received, and to which I am rather inclined to give some attention.
I would ask the minister three questions which I trust he will answer when he replies in this debate. Fi-rst, are German immigrants being brought into Canada who served in the armed forces of the Third Reich, who are not citizens of Canada, but who are being enlisted in the armed forces of this country? If so, in what numbers?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: They are being enlisted now. And it is a good thing they are; they are good fighters.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: The hon. member can make his speech later.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: I am informing you.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I wish to say this, that if I depended upon the hon. member for Simeoe North for my information, I would be misinformed very often.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: You would be more accurate than you are now; you would not make as many mistakes.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: My second question is this: If so, were any of these men who have been enlisted in the armed forces of Canada awarded the iron cross or other decorations, personally, by Hitler, because of aggressive action against the British or Canadian troops?
My third question is this: Have any of these men asked permission of their commanding officers to wear these decorations on Canadian uniforms? That is all I have to say at the moment. I believe the hon. member for Simeoe North is ready to speak.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Yes, I am. I am not sure whether the Minister of National Defence got this preferred position near the closing hours of the session so that it would be run through in as few hours as possible. But in my opinion this is one department that should have had a full-scale discussion. It is one department of government that is spending many more millions of dollars than any other department.
One of the motives which prompted me to stand as a candidate for parliament was that I enlisted in the first war, and at the time I enlisted I had great faith in the government. I thought: Well, we have a good minister of national defence in Sam Hughes. He has all the information available from that great British war machine. But it was not very long before I realized the truth of the situation.
The British government had been forced into war by the kaiser, and there was never any group of people more unprepared to meet that war than the people of the British Empire. That war was not necessary; it was absolutely unnecessary. But we always sat back and said: Well, we will not believe the facts we see; we will not believe the kaiser has built an army so large that the only thing he can do is to start a war.
No, we were not prepared. Men were sent overseas with insufficient ammunition in their pouches to defend themselves. I served one whole winter, personally, in the trenches as second in command of a company. There was only our company commander, with myself, in those trenches during the entire
Supply-National Defence winter on our piece of front line. In March seven or eight officers came to reinforce the company.
Many situations are similar today. At the time of the last war I talked to the manager of the Hotchkiss company of France. This man was an Englishman. When France was taken by the Germans he paid a visit to Canada, and during that visit came to my home. I said to him, "Well, the French capitulated." Bear in mind that this chap was an Englishman. He said to me, "I do not blame them, at all."
Let us be frank about it. At that time the great braintrusters in England said to the French, "You build the Maginot line and you can hold the Germans there. We will be prepared to stop any German rush on the beaches."
What was the result of the preparations for defence? Well, the Germans came down through Holland and Belgium. They circled around the Maginot line and came in behind it on the beaches. This man was one who had aided Lloyd George tremendously in the first war in the production of munitions. He was not just some man who was shooting off his mouth concerning something he knew nothing about. This man just escaped from France with his life when the Germans came in. He told me there were only about 27 anti-aircraft guns in the whole of the British Isles when war broke out-or maybe it was 28.
Knowing these things to be true, and knowing from personal experience that we have never been prepared, I have always felt that as members of parliament, irrespective of politics, we should come to Ottawa and offer our little bit, for what it may be worth, as the representatives of the people in the constituencies of Canada. We should do this irrespective of politics, so that, with an open mind, the minister would be able to accept advice, even from opposition members, if it was worth while. Members of the Liberal party should realize what they owe to their constituents, not just during a war but before it starts, to make sure of one thing-that Canada is prepared, so far as she can go.
Do not bother so much about what the other fellow is doing. The Americans may be adequately prepared; the people of England may be, or they may not be. We have an obligation here in Canada, as a group of people sent to Ottawa, to look after the rights of the people and to prepare ourselves. We can aid very little when the minister hides behind the iron curtain as far as information regarding our armed forces is concerned. We as
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Supply-National Defence members of parliament duly elected from every section of this country are big enough and ugly enough to take the cold facts whether we are adequately prepared according to conditions in the world today. We are either prepared or we are not prepared. We can take it on the end of the nose if we need greater taxation, greater expansion, greater sacrifices now before the war starts rather than months after it starts.
Down in Barrie we have an armoury that was built in 1910. It is not big enough for sea cadets or the flying corps cadets to train one-tenth as properly as they should train, to say nothing of men in the militia. We find this government building-what they call armouries in certain communities. In my opinion they are glorified bar rooms for leading citizens to consume liquor in for hours at a stretch.


John Whitney Pickersgill: Has the hon. gentleman any personal experience?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Yes, I have, and enjoyed it. I am not a hypocrite like some people I know but it was not built intentionally for my enjoyment or for the enjoyment of anybody else. It was built to train troops, or else take the name "armoury" away from it. Why do we not get down to facts? Why try to satisfy a handful of people in the militia in a small community by putting up a luxury building with beautiful furnishings, lovely drapes and a bar, and have the members of that particular section of the militia go out and solicit people to come in and have a drink of liquor in those places? They are now competing against the veterans' beer parlours. These are the facts. They are known to everybody. I have no objection to drinking liquor, not at all. I have drunk it on every occasion all my life, and I will continue to do so, if that is any answer to you.


Mr. Gauthier (Portneuf):: Be careful.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: That has nothing to do with the question of preparedness. We are not prepared in this country. If the minister is properly prepared for conditions which might arise he should be the proudest man in the Dominion of Canada, and he should come out and say, This is what we have; we defy any enemy. This is what we have in this country. We have adequate places in which to train people; we have adequate camps. We have no trouble with recruiting; we are proud of our army and the people of Canada are proud of the army. Young men are falling over themselves to belong to a group of Canadians of whom they should be justly


proud. Young men wearing the Queen's uniform have every right to stick their chests out and hold their heads high, and say: We are members of the armed forces.
We should have no difficulty with recruiting; but as long as the minister is going to permit senior officers to take an emblem off the caps of a certain branch of the forces- the hon. member from Newfoundland throws his head back, guffaws and laughs. That is symbolic of his party, Mr. Chairman. That is exactly what the minister has permitted in the air force. When the minister laughs about the removal of the crown from the caps, I say it is not helpful to this country. The crown is a symbol, and thank God most of the men and women of the country are very proud of it. But there are some who throw their heads back and grin when the crown is mentioned.


John Whitney Pickersgill: What about the time when your friends took it off the motor licence plate?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Two wrongs never made a right. You are now talking about a piece of tin plate on the back of a motor car. That has no comparison with Her Majesty's forces in the Royal Canadian Air Force of Canada.


Pierre Gauthier: A very poor answer.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Don't bring the crown on the cap badges down to the level of a licence on an automobile. That is about the size of your mentality. I ask the minister whether he has had sufficient time to obliterate the slur which was cast on Her Majesty the Queen of this empire by the abolition of that crown without her consent? This matter was brought up on a previous occasion and the minister said he would make a statement. I was interrupted by the Speaker of the house when I mentioned it' before and I was not permitted on that occasion to speak regarding the removal of that cap badge. Is it permanently removed? Was permission granted? If so, was permission granted by Her Majesty the Queen? What good reason can the minister give for taking off the crown? He should give a reason for taking "Rule, Britannia", the theme of the navy, out of the navy. It is just one thing after another, tearing down the traditions of the British Empire and everything that we have to fight for. The regiments of this country have become famous because they are affiliated with the famous British regiments who defended this empire before a Canadian soldier ever stood up in the Dominion of Canada. Go out to the Toronto exhibition,

at Fort York, and take a look at the little cemetery there, forty feet by forty feet, and read the names of the men in the regiments who defended muddy York in 1812. Every single one is a British regiment.
We have men who joined regiments and fought in the South African war, the first big war, and in the second war, who were proud to wear the kilt, who were proud to wear the riflemen's uniform when there was tradition behind them. You take tradition out of the army and you have no army. You have a machine which cannot stand up against enthusiasm and esprit de corps. I say this to the minister. It is not too late to give back to these men the crown, the symbol of the Queen of this empire. Put it back on the cap badges. If it was too heavy for some of the fragile young women to wear in the service, what are we running, a military establishment, a flying corps or what?
I hold in my hand a big file of protests. There are letters and telegrams from all over Canada protesting the action of a senior officer of the R.C.A.F. in taking the crown off the cap badges of our air force. We are the only air force in the commonwealth that took the crown off. I think it is despicable, but it is in keeping with many actions of the minister in obliterating the things that we hold dear, the tradition of the great British Isles and the regiments that we have been affiliated with and which built up the great Canadian armies of the past, that have fought for these things and that have stood for this type of character that we have in Canada. Do not keep on taking these traditions away from them. Give them back if you possibly can.


Brooke Claxton: If there is no further general debate I should like to pay hon. members opposite the courtesy of a reply. With regard to what the hon. member for Simcoe North said, I have nothing to add to what was said in the house with regard to the badge on some of the caps of the R.C.A.F. This matter was explained at that time. I have nothing to add to it. If it becomes desirable in the view of the services and of the department to make a change, then the change will be made and announced in due course.
It is of course ridiculous to say that any slur was cast on the Queen. I would like to add this. I have not interfered in any way with the traditions of the armed forces, and have done everything possible during the time that I have had to do with them to build up in them a feeling of affection for
Supply-National Defence and pride in their own country. It may be recalled that the ships of the Royal Canadian Navy carried maple leaves on their funnels during the war. Soon after I came into office I found that when the ships were being repainted the maple leaf was being painted out. As soon as I found that out I told them to paint the maple leaf back on and keep it on, and that has since happened.
I found officers and men in certain components of the armed forces no longer wearing the name of the country on their shoulders. When I found this out I directed that all officers and men of the services were always to wear "Canada" or "Canadian" either on their shoulders or shoulder badges if the name was not clearly written on some other insignia they were wearing. I can add that they are just as proud of their country as I hope all hon. members are. They have shown their devotion to their Queen and country by their service at home and abroad. They also showed that in the part they took and took magnificently in the reception of the Queen, then Princess, during the royal tour of Canada, and in the splendid ceremonies of the coronation abroad and at home they were second to none in their loyalty to the Queen and in their pride in their country.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: No one mentioned loyalty to the Queen. I was talking about cap badges.


Brooke Claxton: Now, Mr. Chairman, the Leader of the Opposition referred to a matter that I will certainly not deal with at this time beyond saying that the answer to the question he raised can be found at page 893 of Hansard for January 12, 1953, where it will be found that the position is precisely as it is stated to be.
Other hon. members requested information and I repeat what I have said before on many occasions, namely that I do not think any parliament in the British commonwealth has ever had so much information about defence in all its aspects as this parliament has had over the past several years. This charge today was pinned on a refusal to table two reports, one of which was referred to as the Hendry report and the other a report on the reserve army. It was suggested that there was nothing secret in these reports. Whether or not there is anything secret in these reports can really only be ascertained by those who have seen them. But the point here is not whether there is anything secret in the reports but whether the reports were designed for the information of the officers of the armed services, the officials of the department, or members of the government
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Supply-National Defence in order that they might decide, on the basis of that information and advice, what action they should take.
It is a fundamental rule of our parliamentary democracy, as practised at Westminster and here right down through the years, that members of the government are entitled to have frank and full information from those reporting to them, and they are entitled to ask whom they want for advice. They are entitled to treat that advice as confidential for two reasons. There is no reason why they should disclose the basis of their action. The second reason is that the people who give them that advice are entitled to have its source treated as confidential because they are not here to speak for themselves. On the basis of that advice the government makes its decision, announces it to parliament, and is responsible to parliament for that action, the policy adopted, and answers for any of the civil servants or officers involved. That is our system and in order to enable it to work it seems to me it is essential that members of the government, like members of the armed forces and officials in government departments, should be able to get advice, information, and assistance on a confidential basis. The thing is just as simple as that.
Now, sir, there are a few other points some of which I think might more properly be dealt with as we come to the details of the estimates, but I would like to refer here to the remarks made by the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre with regard to armour. As he pointed out, this is a favourite subject of his. He has brought it forward on at least three occasions and he does not appear to be satisfied with the answers I have given. I do not need to tell him that I do not pretend to be an expert . in armour. In the first world war, in which I took a small part for a short time, I saw some tanks in the distance and they were mostly bogged down and stayed bogged down. That was my only personal experience of that operation. But in this we must take the advice of responsible officers of the department who have the advantage of conferring with the officers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and we must work out with our allies in that organization the type of balanced force which will enable our country to make its particular contribution in the most economical and effective way it can and at the place where it is most needed. The hon. member disclaimed knowledge of there being rotation of armoured regiments in Europe and he said that we required an armoured brigade group. But that makes it just about three times as impossible. An


armoured brigade group is a difficult thing far us to maintain abroad in peacetime. It is difficult because you have to have tanks in Germany; you have to service them in England; and then you require very nearly the equivalent number of tanks in Canada where almost inevitably they will never be used in war but must be available for training purposes. It is also difficult because of the very much larger number of men who would be involved, and of course there would be an impossible mathematical problem involved in rotation. I will just say a word about each of these.
With regard to the number of men, we are talking here not of a brigade, as I understand they were organized during the second world war, but of a brigade group, that is, something which might operate in a fairly independent way and which would have to have all the supporting services that an infantry brigade group has at the present time. Then it would have to have special services appropriate to the maintenance of tanks, as well as regiments of tanks. The number of men, I am told, who would be involved in such a formation in Europe would be 6,899, and the number of men involved in an infantry brigade group is 5,933. Now, the expenses to which the hon. member referred were not the cost of maintaining either an infantry brigade group or an armoured brigade group in Europe for a year. That was the one-time cost of equipping it and the cost of maintaining it for a year.
In the case of an independent armoured brigade group the one-time cost was $120,800,000 and the cost of an infantry brigade was $45,525,000, whereas the estimated annual recurring cost of an armoured brigade was $39,600,000 and an infantry brigade $29,762,000, so that the differential is rather less than the $100,000,000 to which I referred. Now let me state the reason why it is mathematically impossible for us to do what is suggested with an army of about the size of the present one. At the present time, we have to have three infantry battalions in Korea. They are rotated as units each year. We have to have three infantry battalions as part of the mobile striking force, and that operation has to be carried on continuously. Then we have three infantry battalions overseas in Germany as part of the first infantry brigade there. So that in those formations, in the first Canadian infantry brigade in Korea we have three battalions, three in the mobile striking force and three overseas in Germany. That is nine battalions of infantry to carry out rotation annually for units to Korea and once every two years for units to Germany, and to do

this on a basis which ensures that in between service abroad the unit will have at least eighteen months in Canada, requires that we have six more infantry battalions, or a total of fifteen infantry battalions. Also that number of battalions will enable us, at the end of the Korean war, to constitute an infantry division at full strength with some reinforcements in addition to the mobile striking force. However, if we put into Europe an armoured brigade group of three regiments, then we cannot interchange those regiments with infantry regiments. I would say you would have to have at least five armoured regiments in Canada to do the job. That would mean seven or eight armoured regiments and three airborne infantry battalions in the mobile striking force which would not be interchangeable with the regiments in Germany. Then you would have to have four and a half or five infantry battalions to rotate with the infantry battalions in Korea. In other words, you would require a larger number of major formations; you would not have the same interchangeability and you would have this greatly increased expenditure.
There is another reason and that is, of course, that in the event of a war I think everyone would contemplate that we would be expected to have at least the equivalent of a division in Europe in D-plus the time of transportation. In order to supply the tanks of the infantry division in D-plus the time of transportation we must have the tanks already in Europe. We are building up mobilization stores of heavy equipment for that purpose there. This will bring home to hon. members just how complex is this business of building up forces in peacetime, with the enormous quantities of expensive and heavy equipment required, on another continent 3,000 miles away. No other country I know of feels it necessary to build up mobilization stores to meet the challenge of an emergency in a country abroad.
The hon. member for Kootenay West referred to Germans enlisting in the armed forces of Canada. We have taken into the armed forces a very small number of German immigrants. Each case is considered on its own merits. It is only done on the specific personal permission of the chief of staff of the service concerned. There is just as much screening as possible. I know of none of them having an iron cross for any reason.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Will the minister look into the matter?


Brooke Claxton: Yes. If such a man were foolish enough to ask an officer if he might wear the iron cross, I think the officer would
Supply-National Defence speedily tell him "No", in extremely emphatic terms. It is almost unthinkable that anyone should have the silliness to ask the question.
I think I have covered most of the points raised by hon. members. If there are any that I have not covered, I shall be only too happy to be reminded now or else I can deal with them when the details are before us for consideration.
There was one series of observations made, I think, by the hon. member for Wetaskiwin when the defence estimates were before us on May 20 and 21. He said he had been told that the troops in Korea had been furnished with quonset huts shortly in advance of and probably on account of the Prime Minister's visit and that the broadcasting station had been out of order and was only put into order before the Prime Minister's visit. May I say that the quonset huts referred to were ordered for the whole commonwealth division about eight months before the Prime Minister's visit and the last huts were delivered some months before his visit. There is nothing in that. The radio station was brought into operation about Christmas, 1953. I am informed that it has been out of operation for less than an hour and this was for technical reasons but that otherwise it has been in operation and that there is nothing the matter with it.
I also want to assure the hon. member for Kootenay West that there is nothing in the rather amusing story he told about coffee on the minister's pants. There is also nothing in the account he appears to have got that a general notice or order was posted with regard to the carriage of coffee. Some person thought it was desirable to cut down this kind of transportation around the building- and I believe it is desirable-and he posted this up for his own staff.
I hope there is nothing in the remarks of the hon. member for Brandon to the effect that some officer was ticked off for talking to a member of the opposition. I have never heard of such a thing. I cannot imagine any officer acting this way. I do not know of any more delightful thing than to talk to members of the opposition. I hope the officers of the armed forces talk to them still more, so that thereby they would be able to make most interesting and valuable contributions to our debates and would feel that our officers were good at their jobs.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: I should like to ask the minister this question. Is it necessary to obtain Her Majesty's consent to the wearing of the crown by any regiment, before the crown can at any time be put on any part of the uniform?

Supply-National Defence


Brooke Claxton: That has been the case for some years past, but I understand it was not always the case.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: I have a supplementary question. When the crown is once up, is it necessary to ask Her Majesty's permission to take the crown down?


Brooke Claxton: Certainly not.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: I should like to ask the minister one question-


Brooke Claxton: I should perhaps make the situation clear to the hon. member because I know he is keenly interested in it. The reason why permission is asked of Her Majesty for the use of the crown is so that the sovereign and those personally advising her may have complete control over the conditions in which the crown is used.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: That is what I would think.


Brooke Claxton: For instance, over the size and the shape of the crown. For example, since the present Queen became queen there has been a direction that the crown used should be a different type of crown from the one used previously. That will be gradually replaced. But there is no suggestion, no order and no regulation to the effect that when you do not use the crown, you must ask her consent.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: But when you use the crown and you have had that permission granted, the minister says her consent is not necessary-


Brooke Claxton: That is right.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: -and that the crown can be taken down by the wish of any senior officer in the armed forces.


Brooke Claxton: The crown is not taken down. There was no crown taken down here. What was done was that a new badge was adopted without a crown for a certain limited use.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: I call that "taking down".


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: The minister did not answer my question with relation to the regulation with respect to saluting. Do the regulations preclude the prime minister of Canada taking the salute from any regiment?


Brooke Claxton: No. The regulations were revised quite substantially some years ago. They are the same in all commonwealth countries. They generally provide for a long list of persons being given military honours. There is a general catch-all for them, but mayors of municipalities are not included. I should make it plain that the mayor of Ottawa never complained to me or raised with me or anyone in the department the question of receiving the salute. What has obscured

the situation, I think, is that the arrangements for the ceremony to take place on July 1 provided that a unit of the Canadian reserve army would be present, that His Excellency the Governor General would be present, and that the unit would naturally give military honours to His Excellency the Governor General. It is completely unthinkable under military practice and tradition that either before or after the Governor General receives military honours the same unit on the same parade should give military honours to anyone else.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: But the regulations would not prevent the Prime Minister receiving the salute?


Brooke Claxton: Oh, no, but not on that same occasion. On the other hand, military honours are, generally speaking, given to people who have to do with military things, and of course to members of the royal family because they are members of the royal family. As a matter of courtesy the practice has grown up in recent years of prime ministers and similar people receiving military honours. That is a rather recent development that has come about in the last fifty or sixty years.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: Who drafts the regulations?


Brooke Claxton: They are passed by the governor in council.


Herbert Wilfred Herridge: For each country?


The Chairman:: Order. In order to make for an orderly discussion, is it now the desire of the committee that I call the headings in the blue book?


Gordon Minto Churchill: May I take a minute to comment on the minister's statement and to say that I recognize the hopelessness of attempting to debate the question of an armoured corps with the minister. Our minds are certainly not at one with regard to the matter. I am not the least bit impressed with his advisers, and I regret that in the figures he has now placed on Hansard he has used the basis of an independent armoured brigade group which was not the subject I was talking about. I was talking about an armoured brigade, and naturally his figures are different from mine. Consequently he makes the picture appear much blacker, much more prohibitive in cost because he is talking about a different thing.
But, as I say, I recognize the hopelessness of continuing a discussion along these lines. I further regret that the minister has not dealt with the question of the maintenance build-up of the armoured corps in Canada and with the introduction of the armoured personnel carrier to save the lives of our infantry overseas.


Brooke Claxton: I beg the hon. member's pardon. With respect to the armoured personnel carrier, I should tell him that we are by no means satisfied with the carriers so far developed in any country. With support from the British and United States armies, we are initiating a development program to see if we cannot develop a more satisfactory infantry carrier than has yet been devised, and that work is under way. I think the account in Life of what they have in the United States is rather glowing.
With regard to the other point, if the hon. member would not like us to have an armoured brigade group abroad then I assume he would be prepared to have Canada take the consequences and have the supporting services for our armour that he would propose to have abroad supplied for us by the British or American forces. I am sure they would not do it.


Gordon Minto Churchill: With respect to the minister saying that I would not wish to have an armoured brigade group overseas, may I say that I have not said anything of that nature whatsoever. But when for the purpose of argument I discuss an armoured brigade and give figures with respect to an armoured brigade I think the minister, if he is refuting my charges with regard to the number of men and the cost, should use a somewhat comparable formation and not an armoured brigade group.


Brooke Claxton: That formation would be totally unacceptable to the Canadian government, the Canadian parliament and the Canadian people because it would not be a selfsupporting independent Canadian unit.


Mr. Blackmore:: I should like to ask of the minister a question which I do not think comes properly under any particular item. I wish to raise the question of Canadian morale, and I should like the minister to follow my reasoning closely in order to see if it seems sound. If I have got the right idea concerning our preparations for war, we are arming with the ultimate purpose of meeting and beating communism. Is that correct? We are looking to an ultimate showdown with the communist conspiracy which rules Russia.


Brooke Claxton: That is not our object. Our object is to try to avoid another war by showing the communists that they cannot win, and to maintain the strength of our economies during that period. That means a lot more than military preparedness. We look forward to the time when the communists may be persuaded by peaceful means to change their attitude so that we can live in the world together without the necessity of
Supply-National Defence having these armed camps on each side by which the communists are deterred from war through their fear that they will not win and through which we hope to achieve our desire for peace.


John Horne Blackmore: I agree utterly with the minister's general ideal, but while we have been looking forward to this idyllic situation he dreams of, we have lost something like 700 million people to communism. It seems to me the conclusion must be obvious that the Russians have no such idea as that of settling down to live with us on this planet. They have made declarations time and again that capitalism and communism cannot live together. Surely we are not stupid enough to be impossible of teaching in these matters!
If that is the case, then let me ask one other question. I think the minister would agree that, in our hope, which is perfectly righteous and with which I completely agree, that ultimately we can bring Russia to reason, we should be preparing, in case of need, to do everything in our power to defeat Russia. That is correct, is it not? The minister is aiming at that purpose. If we have to fight, he intends that we shall be able to meet the foe and defeat him. I think the minister has no reservations to make on that statement.
If this is the case, everything that takes place in Canada which tends to weaken the Canadian morale to fight communism, is working diametrically against the purpose of the minister. Would that be correct? I assume the minister's omission to reply is tantamount to acquiescence in what I say. Has the minister given thought and study, as part of the over-all problem of making ready this nation to meet and defeat the communist conspiracy, to what is going on in Canada tending to weaken the Canadian morale to fight against communism? Has he taken any measures?
To clarify, may I illustrate? In dealing with the C.B.C. the other day I referred to Bill Boss. Bill Boss has been writing articles which have appeared in so many of the newspapers of Canada that I am tempted to suppose they have appeared in all of them. Almost every one of these articles has tended to make people believe that communism was not so bad after all, and that possibly it just was not worth while taking serious measures to get ready to fight communism. Has the minister given any attention to articles like those written by Bill Boss?


Brooke Claxton: Certainly in my quality as a member of the government, a citizen of Canada and a member of parliament I give consideration to all such things. As Minister of National Defence, however, that does not
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Supply-National Defence come properly within the scope of my department and should not be discussed on these estimates. I would suggest to the members of the committee that, in accordance with the understanding we have had and now that the hon. member has, I think, made his point, we should go ahead with consideration of the main headings of the estimates.


John Horne Blackmore: That would be fine, but there are two or three other matters that have to be taken up, too. I suggested something the other night upon which I still have not had an opportunity of elaborating, and upon which I intend to elaborate to the bitter end. It is that the C.B.C. is indoctrinating people in Canada with communism, and because of that-


William Alfred Robinson: Order. May I point out to the hon. member that we are now discussing the estimates of the Minister of National Defence, and he has nothing whatever to do with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. If the hon. member wishes to continue, I would ask him to direct his remarks specifically to the Department of National Defence.


John Horne Blackmore: What I am having to say, Mr. Chairman, is specifically connected with defence in Canada, whether or not it has to do with the Department of National Defence. No one with any sense of reality will question that it has to do with the defence of Canada; that must be quite obvious.
I do not propose to follow this matter to any great extent today, but I do suggest that unless the minister, somehow or other, is, by the cabinet, given some means whereby he can co-ordinate the efforts of all the departments of government in the general direction of total preparation for total war against the communist conspiracy, then his efforts are being defeated. Now, that must be serious. If we are spending $2 billion per year of the taxpayers' money that we can ill afford, if we are spending that to prepare to defeat the enemy, and then we are allowing our efforts to be neutralized through the back door and through the basement windows, and a half dozen other means, where is the consistency in our procedure?
I would say with all deference, Mr. Chairman, that certainly we must look upon this whole matter of preparedness as a whole matter. We have the Department of Defence Production, and certainly that enters directly into the general over-all preparedness of Canada; certainly our finance department is working in that direction and many other departments must be co-operating. I just wanted to know whether the minister was looking into this communist propaganda matter at all.


May I suggest to him, in all seriousness, that there has been no more steady supporter of the Minister of National Defence than I. He knows that. Certainly, no member of the opposition has stood more earnestly behind him than I have. I say to him that I believe he means business, that he really intends to defeat the enemy if he has to. May I, as one of the most sympathetic of all opposition members, tell the minister he had better look to all these matters, such as that of indoctrinating the Canadian people with communism, and he should see that something adequate is done to offset the stream of communist propaganda that is pouring into this nation from four or five different sources. Otherwise, we are just wasting our time in preparing an army.
All we have to do is take one simple illustration. We had this year a proposal-though it was not, I grant, seriously brought down by the dominion government-implying quite definitely that we should recognize red China. It was fairly well understood. Now anyone knows that recognition of red China would be taken as a definite step forward by Russia. Russia knows that, whether or not we do. Every one of such little steps plays an important part in the over-all picture. I believe I have made quite clear what my meaning is. I hope I do not have to raise this matter again, but if I have to do so, I certainly will.


William Alfred Robinson: Shall I now proceed with the headings?


Mr. Shaw:: I do not want to delay consideration of this matter, but I should like to remind the minister that when the estimates were before the committee on a previous occasion a few weeks ago, I brought up the matter of protection against fire at the Royal Canadian Air Force stations and other military establishments across Canada. We had two fires, and we will probably have more. These things do happen. I am vitally concerned about the nature of the fire protection, particularly the program respecting fire watching that is established at the stations.


Brooke Claxton: The hon. member did ask me about this when we were discussing the estimates on May 20 and May 21 and I prepared an answer for him which I omitted to give just a few minutes ago.


Frederick Davis Shaw: If the minister would care to answer a little later, I am quite prepared to wait.


Brooke Claxton: Perhaps I could answer when we come to the air force item.


Frederick Davis Shaw: Yes.


William Alfred Robinson: Shall we take departmental administration, as the item is found on page 287 setting out the details?
Departmental administration.


Mr. Pearkes:: It is not our proposal to carry out a long series of unrelated questions on these various items under the different headings which you will call. You will recall that the Leader of the Opposition pointed out this morning that in the past we had not achieved much success in getting information by that procedure, nor had we earlier in this session, for the same reason, asked that a committee be set up under defence expenditures. There will be some questions which we will feel are pertinent, and about which we must ask for further information.
Under this first heading of departmental administration I note there is an increase of $550,000 for civilian personnel. When we recall that this is at the end of a three-year program during which there has been a build-up of defence services going on, one might at least have expected a levelling off of expenditures in other than what might be termed the actual fighting services. I am surprised to see that there is this increase in expenditure for civilian personnel. Nor can it be passed off by the suggestion that it is due entirely to the introduction of the five-day week. I noticed that there was an increase from 277 to 362 civilian clerks, and it is quite obvious that increase far exceeds the number which would be necessary to compensate for the introduction of the five-day week.
I noticed that the second item following the item covering the salary of the deputy minister covers a special adviser to the Department of National Defence. I imagine that is the special adviser on civilian personnel. Quite obviously he is imbued with the idea of increasing the number of civilian personnel which are included in the department. Then we have been told several times that the peak has been reached in so far as defence construction is concerned.
I am surprised to find that there is for the first time a real estate appraiser being appointed for the Department of National Defence. Could the minister enlighten us as to why it is so necessary to increase the strength of civilian personnel there? Then, again, I notice an increase in accountants from 14 to 31. I am referring to civilian accountants. We do recall that there was some criticism a few months ago of the accounting system in the army, when it was disclosed that there were no less than eight different accounting systems. One can understand that there must necessarily be some
Supply-National Defence difference in the system in the various services, and even in the arms of those services. But is this an attempt to straighten out the accounting system by doubling the number of accountants this year?


Brooke Claxton: Answering the first question put by the hon. member, the adviser on civilian personnel ceased to be associated with the department on March 31, 1954. In any event he had nothing to do with the establishment specifically, and certainly was in no sense an empire builder.


George Randolph Pearkes: Then why do you need the item for $13,500, if he is going to cease his duties?


Brooke Claxton: He came in after the book was published last year and went out after it was published this year.


George Randolph Pearkes: So you do not need the money?


Brooke Claxton: That is correct. But as the hon. member knows, these details, after all, make up a total approximating two billions of dollars, and they are put here for the convenience of hon. members.
Then, with regard to the increase in staff: the number of civilian staff proposed to be increased amounts to 49, of which 10 are for the staff of the associate minister, formerly paid by the Department of Justice; 2 are for the deputy minister's branch. These are for new positions in the United Kingdom on account of our increasing activities there; 34 are in the directorate of civilian personnel, and 3 in the chief auditor's branch. The total is 49, representing an increase of $136,210. Then $200,000 is provided for the increase in civil service salary rates.


George Randolph Pearkes: What about the real estate appraiser? Can we dispense with him, too?


Brooke Claxton: No.


George Randolph Pearkes: I notice that the salary is $7,200.


Brooke Claxton: This is a reclassification. The same man is doing the same work under a reclassification.


George Randolph Pearkes: Has there been any revision in the accounting system which would justify doubling the number of accountants?


Brooke Claxton: Yes, the number of accountants on the chief auditor's staff is being increased. That has been sought for some three years, and it is in order to have a more effective check.


Mr. Noseworthy:: Mr. Chairman, as I have when other estimates were introduced, I want to protest on this occasion about the
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Supply-National Defence way in which these estimates are presented to us. I have never been able to find out whether it is the responsibility of this department or that of the Department of National Revenue for the way in which these estimates are presented to us.
Let me give an illustration. We have here for the Department of National Defence 36 pages of details. Something more than 30 pages of these are concerned with details pertaining to civil employees. We are told exactly how many charwomen are employed in the three services, and what pay they receive. We are told how many office boys are employed, and the pay they receive. We are told how many messengers are employed and how many typists, and whether they are of grade 1, grade 2 or grade 3, and their pay.
For the army, for instance, we have 8 pages devoted to an itemized statement of civilian employees, and we are told that the total civil salaries and wages enumerated on those 8 pages amount to $40 million. Then the next item which deals with pay and allowances of the army amounts to $128 million, and it is dismissed with only three words. In other words, for an expenditure of $128 million there are only three words of explanation, but there are 8 pages of details for expenditures of $40 million.
I find that all the major items are detailed in the same way. For instance, the amount for clothing and personal equipment comes to over $12 million.
So far as the air force is concerned, 5 pages are devoted to enumerating expenditures on civil salaries amounting to $31 million, but there are only three words for an expenditure on pay and allowances amounting to $120 million. There are about five words for an expenditure of $107 million for the construction of buildings and works, and only three words for an expenditure of $305 million for aircraft and engines.
And so on, all down the line. One expenditure of $30 million is given only one word-"ships". I do not know how these estimates originated, or what purpose is served in giving us all this detail about civilian employees, right down to the last charwoman, and then disposing of the spending of hundreds of millions of dollars for construction, shipbuilding, aircraft, pay and allowances without any detail whatsoever, with the exception of two or three words.
I suggest someone could give some consideration to giving us estimates in a form in which they would be more useful and beneficial to members of the House of Commons than they are in their present form.


Then, I have one other matter I wish to bring to the minister's attention-and there will be others when we reach other items. I refer to the regulations formulated by somebody in the defence department with reference to the deduction of income tax from the pay of men and women in the forces. The administration of the income tax legislation rests with the Department of National Revenue, but that department says the regulations were drawn up by and presented to it by the Department of National Defence.
The regulations were designed for the convenience of collecting income tax from members of the forces. If a man remains in the forces, and as long as he remains in the forces, the regulations seem to work very satisfactorily. My complaint is that if a man is discharged from the forces at any time during the year he is given no statement of what his income was for that part of the year, nor of the taxes he paid for that part of the year. It is a closed book. He goes back into civilian life for a part of the year. He may get married in the latter part of the year. Were he a civilian he would be entitled to marriage status, but he is not permitted to take his whole year's income. That half or the part of his year's income that was earned in the services is a closed book. He starts over as though he were a different individual altogether. It seems to me as though it would be feasible for anyone who is discharged at any time during the year to be given, as is a private civilian, a statement of his earnings for that part of the year that he was in the forces, and a statement of his deductions so that he may incorporate them when he comes to make up his income tax for the year. And if he has paid more taxes than he should have paid, he would then be able to get a refund on the same basis as the civilian taxpayer. As it is, he cannot. I have given some study to this and I find that the only ones who profit by ihis practice are the higher paid officers. They may stand to profit by closing up that part of the year in which they were in the services, and starting over again as civilians. The ones who lose in every instance are the privates and the non-commissioned officers and those in the lower ranks. They are the only ones who stand to lose by this regulation. I suggest to the minister that consideration be given to finding ways and means whereby any man being discharged from the forces during the half of the year be given the statement of his income and the taxes paid for that part of the year so that if he desires to do so he can incorporate it and make a return for his entire year's earnings.


Ralph Osborne Campney: With respect to the first point raised by the hon. member, I understand that the Department of National Defence, until some years ago, did not give all the details of the civil administration staff as they do at the present time. They now do because it was desired to have this department use the same form of set-up in the estimates as do the other departments.
With regard to the second point in respect of the income tax statements and deductions, I understand that this department worked out the existing income tax regulations in conjunction with the Department of National Revenue, but I shall certainly be glad to look into the observation the hon. member has made. I am not aware that it is so. I am not aware that people who leave the services are not in a position to deal with their income statements and their income tax as in other cases of severance.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Included in the details we are looking at on page 287 is an item listed as "Director of bureau of current affairs." I presume it is that bureau that is responsible for the production of the very interesting series of booklets entitled "Current Affairs for the Canadian Forces." I chose my words advisedly when I referred to this series of booklets as very interesting. I should like to go further and offer my congratulations not only to those who are at the head of this bureau, but to the various writers who have been enlisted to write the different booklets that have been produced. Obviously, I am leading up to a criticism, but for the most part they are well done. Particularly is that the case when the booklet deals with some other country or something entirely apart from Canada. On the whole, I would say a very useful bit of educational work is being done through this series of booklets. In fact, I find them useful to file away. They contain in very brief form very worth while and helpful information. I felt, however, that this one which I hold in my hand, which is volume 6, No. 3, February 1, 1954, did not quite measure up to the standards of other booklets in terms of objectivity. It is entitled "The Canadian Budget." I do not know who wrote it, but it is well set up, in the sense that it is broken down into four general aspects of the problem. The first chapter of the booklet is entitled "What is the budget and why is it important?" The second chapter is entitled "What do you get for your taxes?" The third chapter is entitled "How do you pay for federal services?" The fourth and final chapter is entitled "The budget before parliament."
The first three chapters measure up to the standards of objectivity pretty well,
Supply-National Defence except that I notice interesting comments as to the fairness of the present tax set-up in Canada, with which all hon. members in the House of Commons, and with which all Canadian citizens might not fully agree. However, I was prepared to forgive what I felt to be that lack of fairness, but as I got to chapter 4, which was entitled "The budget before parliament", I thought that this would be a chapter in which it would surely be admitted that the parliament of Canada is not a one-party affair. I thought it might at least be admitted that there were other people in parliament besides those on the government side. Not so, for I found that the story of the budget before parliament, as set out in this booklet, was merely the story of what the Minister of Finance had to say. The reference in this case was to the budget speech of 1953. That was the budget speech about which it was easier to write an interesting story-that was the one just before the election-than would have been the case this year. In any case, the brief summary of the minister's speech is a fair summary. It gives plenty of credit to the minister for the proposals that he made. It points out that he moved that Mr. Speaker leave the chair for the house to go into committee of ways and means to consider his resolutions. At the end it says, and
I	now quote:
Thence, concluding his remarks, he summarized the tax changes and moved a series of resolutions to amend the various tax acts.
The general debate which followed this budget speech took place upon the minister's motion to go into committee.
If my memory serves me correctly, there was an amendment moved by the hon. member for Greenwood, to which there was a subamendment moved by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar. If I recall correctly, there were about a hundred or more speeches made in 1953. Believe it or not, I did not make one that year. I had to be away for part of the time; therefore I have no personal interest in this matter. But it does seem to me, Mr. Chairman, that this booklet did not measure up to the others in terms of giving an objective picture of the subject matter on which it was written. Surely it would not hurt our forces to let them know that this is a democracy and that there are opposition parties in this house as well as the party on the government side.
I recall the excellent booklets of a similar nature that were put out during world war
II	by the wartime information board. As a matter of fact, I still find occasion to quote from some of them. They were very well done, in terms of giving all sides of the subject. I simply make the plea that this
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bureau, when it writes about Canadian affairs administrative item on which we have just and about things in which there are admit- concluded a discussion. I hope that when tedly political involvements, use the same these items come up next year we will see the amount of objectivity that it uses when it same sort of reductions in these other admini-writes about the affairs of countries outside strative branches that we have seen this year of Canada.	in the inspection services.


Ralph Osborne Campney: I thank the hon. member for his general words of approval and approbation. These booklets are proving to be extremely useful. I think the effect of them has been extremely good, and I am glad to realize that the hon. member has the same feeling. On the occasion which his critical eye detected it may have been that the hundred speeches to which the hon. member referred submerged the author's sense of objectivity and led to some minor lapse. Seriously speaking, I do appreciate what the hon. member has said and I can assure him that every attempt will continue to be made to make these articles both factual and entirely objective.
Inspection services.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, this is one of the subheadings which looks extremely encouraging. The total expenditure is down by about $1,100,000 and the number of employees by about 250. It appears as though some real effort has been made in the inspection services to institute some form of economy, and it is one of the few special items in the entire defence department in which this appears to have been done. I hope that this indeed is the case and that the reduction is a real reduction and has not been accomplished merely by transferring all these people to other departments and thereby building up the expenses under another heading. I wonder if the minister would just comment on that because not only have the number of employees been reduced but all the major items, including professional and special services, travelling and removal expenses-in the latter case a reduction of $500,000-appear to have been cut down. Could the minister tell us whether this has been a real saving?


Brooke Claxton: Yes, I can give the hon. member that assurance. The inspection services, which are now at their post-war peak load, handle contracts amounting to $1,092 million, and with a greater continuity of work and better training it has been possible for about the same number of men to do the job.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am very glad to hear that, Mr. Chairman, and I would think that what has been accomplished in this particular branch might very well be accomplished in a lot of other administrative branches of national defence, and of the three services as well which are covered by the general

Royal Canadian Navy-Active force and general.


George Randolph Pearkes: Mr. Chairman, during the debate on this topic in May I made some observations in connection with destroyer-escort vessels and the delay there had been in the production of the first of that type of vessel. I also dealt with the very considerable increase in the estimated cost. Speaking during 1951 the minister intimated that the cost of the vessels would be in the neighbourhood of $8 million. I understand that the cost of that vessel has now increased very materially and they have now become extremely expensive. On May 21 the minister indicated that plans were under way for the construction of a ship which would be very much less expensive, easier to build, and which would carry out the same sort of task as that for which the destroyer-escort vessels were to be built. I would like to know what percentage of the $93 million devoted to ships will be included for the completion of the 14 destroyer-escort vessels.
I wish to raise the point again as to whether it is really necessary to go ahead with the completion of these very expensive vessels. I know there is value at certain times in the desire of the armed services to try and get a superlative weapon, and here no doubt we are getting, or are laying plans to get the very best escort vessel in the world. But it is also the most expensive vessel of any of the navies of the world, and I wonder whether we should go on with this particular type if we can get a cheaper vessel which will do the same work.
As I explained on May 20, we are going to need many, many more escort vessels than was first appreciated owing to the increased range and manoeuvrability of the modem torpedo. Again, on May 20 I called to the attention of the minister the fact that the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom is now concentrating its efforts on helicopters for anti-submarine operation, and that these helicopters are being equipped with dipping asdic which will enable them to report on the presence of submarines. There was a short article recently dispatched from Portsmouth, England, in which it was stated that in the exercise which will be carried out this summer by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, naval squadrons in the Mediterranean will operate with helicopters fitted

with these dipping asdics for the location of submerged hostile submarines. Of course, the great advantage of the helicopter is that it is not vulnerable to the submarine, whereas the escort vessel, no matter how expensive, is still vulnerable to submarine.
The same article goes on to tell about a new device for locating submarines which will be attached to Fairey Gannets. I think this device is called a sonobuoy and the Fairey Gannets are to replace the Avenger in the Royal Navy. My questions are these. How much of the money allocated for the construction of ships is still earmarked for the completion of the 14 destroyer-escort vessels? Can the minister give us any information regarding these newer and cheaper escort vessels, plans for which he said on May 21 were being considered?


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman, the hon. member on several occasions has referred to our shipbuilding and conversion program and perhaps I should say a few words about it now. This program upon which we embarked in 1951 involved the construction of 35 major vessels of five different types, ranging from destroyer-escorts to gate vessels, and 41 auxiliary craft of eight different types. The conversion and rearmament program covered 40 major vessels of six different types, ranging from "Tribal" class destroyers to "Bangors". In a good many instances this conversion was a fairly thorough job. For example, the work on H.M.C.S. Algonquin, which was completed in March 1953, took about one and a quarter million shipfitting man-hours.
It is a major operation to convert these "Tribal" class destroyers into modern escort vessels. This is a sizeable program and must be viewed in relation to Canada's shipbuilding and refitting abilities at that time. Moreover the program had to be fitted into the operation of three ships in the Korean war in which eight destroyers engaged, and that involved a good deal of work and refitting and also a good deal of deployment of especially experienced personnel.
With regard to the new anti-submarine escort vessels, I should draw the attention of the committee again to the fact that our major role at sea in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is anti-submarine work. That is recognized by us all. In fact, that function and coastal defence are our only roles. Our fleet is being built up, renovated, trained and manned for this purpose. Included in the submarine threat to which the Leader of the Opposition and others have referred is, of course, the fact that the Russians have a number of high-speed, long-range submarines. The threat is much greater today than 83276-4044
Supply-National Defence it was at any time in the first or second world wars; that is, the power of the enemy to employ high-speed submarines at long range, for long periods of time, is greater than it ever was in either war.
The number of long-range high-speed submarines the Soviet union has cannot be disclosed. It is still, I am glad to say, relatively small. Our anti-submarine escort vessel is designed as a ship-and it is one of the few ships designed for that purpose-to be able to hunt those high-speed submarines. On that account it must have the very expensive characteristics of great speed, lack of vibration, low noise level, non-magnetic features and the like as well as a very full set of electronic and electrical equipment. It is an extremely complicated and advanced ship. We designed it after co-operation and consultation with the British navy and with expert assistance from civilian firms.
Delays were caused by a number of factors, including the extremely complicated nature of the ship. In the second place, I think was the fact that we rather underestimated the amount of electronic and electrical work of a new character and the great demand that would be made on engineers in those professions, both in the navy and in civilian firms. Then too we had complicated problems of engineering, engine design and the like. However, it was announced that the first of these ships would be launched in 1951, and it was launched in 1951. The first of them to be completed should be completed next year, rather more than a year behind schedule. That is the target, but really the targets were the best guess we could make, in the light of lack of any experience in building a ship of this kind.
The hon. member has referred to the expense of the ship. It has cost a great deal more than was estimated. That fact is partly owing to the increased costs and partly owing to the fact that this equipment is so special and so new and that it takes a great deal of time to fit it into the ship. He spoke about the possibility of dropping the thing now. These are really our front line antisubmarine vessels. It would be an appalling waste to stop them now. We do not propose to build any more of them. These add greatly to our ability to discharge our role under SACLANT in convoying across the south Atlantic. They are counted in with our forces at least at a later stage and we propose to go through with the project. We do not know yet whether they will prove to be as successful as we expect but, from indications, we are very hopeful.
With regard to the construction of another anti-submarine ship of lesser cost, we are

Supply-National Defence proceeding with designs and specifications for such a ship and they ought to be completed next year. We have no intention of entering upon the construction of any such ships until the designs are thoroughly completed, the specifications are drawn up and everything possible done to ready the work. However, it is not yet decided whether or not to proceed with the construction of ships of this new class.
The hon. member referred to helicopters. We have a number of helicopters in the navy. We are forming a group of anti-submarine helicopters this summer-we hope to get delivery of the new helicopters probably in July-and it will form the first anti-submarine helicopter group.
As to sonobuoys, we have been working closely with the British and Americans on this matter. Our new anti-submarine aircraft, the S-2F, like the "Avenger", is designed to use the sonobuoy. I can tell the hon. member that just last week there was a conference here in Ottawa of the representatives of the Royal Navy, the United States navy and the Canadian navy, under our auspices, working on standardization in this field.


George Randolph Pearkes: I am not critical of the policy or of the advice that the minister received in 1951. I admit quite frankly that these destroyer-escort vessels seemed to be the answer to the submarine menace in 1951. But since then we have advanced considerably. Not only have we advanced but, as I said before, the range and the manoeuvrability of the torpedoes are matters in which tremendous strides have also been made. While it was a sound policy to start on the building of these destroyer-escort vessels in those days, I now question the advisability of continuing with the construction of this particular type of vessel. We shall have the pilot model commissioned in the near future, but the other vessels are far from being completed. While it may be an appalling waste, as the minister said a few moments ago, to stop construction of this particular type of vessel, if the policy under which these vessels were constructed is now proved to be out of date, I suggest it is going to be an even greater and more appalling waste if we continue to develop all these fourteen vessels only to find, before they are launched -and certainly before they are commissioned-that, because of the advance in the trend in anti-submarine methods, they are obsolete. I know that these trends and changes take place. All too frequently the design of an aircraft, a ship or a gun proves to be out of date before that particular weapon is produced. I do not think anybody as to blame for that. But if it becomes clear
IMr. Claxton.]

that a type of vessel, aircraft or gun is not going to be able to play the role that it was intended it should play when it was first designed several years ago I think it is highly questionable whether it is advisable to continue with the construction of vessels of that type or other things which are not nearing completion at the present time.


Brooke Claxton: I can assure the hon. member that his premise has no foundation whatever. These vessels are not out of date. They are not obsolete. They are not obsolescent except in the sense that every article of military equipment in the long run becomes obsolete. These are the last word. They are being equipped with the most modern and advanced electronic submarine detection devices. They are equipped with the most modern anti-submarine weapons and guns for anti-aircraft work as well as anti-submarine work. It is still fundamental in our concept of anti-submarine warfare that it should be fought by surface vessels and aircraft working together in teams. This is the leading element in this important part of the team. I should also add that both the British and the Americans are proceeding on the same assumption, that we need surface vessels for this operation and that it is a team operation.
They are also proceeding with the construction of ships along these lines. I do not think they are quite as far advanced and I do not think their ships will have quite the performance that ours have. That is our hope, but from the reports I have received we will have the leading vessel of this type at the time necessary to do the job.


Mr. Nicholson:: My question involves the navy, army and air force, but perhaps the minister might answer it at this point. Some of my medical friends advise me that with a medical service provided for each of the three services during the war we had a good deal of overlapping. It was difficult to get one set-up at that time but it was their hope that in peacetime it might be possible to have one central organization to provide medical services for all the armed services. However, I note from the telephone directory that we have a medical director general for the navy, a director general of medical services for the army and a director of medical services for the air force. Would the minister indicate what progress is being made with a view to bringing these services together?
In a place like Halifax, for example, an excellent naval hospital was built during the war. It hardly seems necessary that similar

hospitals should be available for the army and the air force. With such a shortage of medical doctors in the country I would think we could have a better medical service with fewer personnel if these services were combined. My understanding is that that was achieved some time ago in connection with the dental services. Could the minister indicate the number of medical officers we now have for the navy, army and air force and also what progress is being made with respect to combining the services?


Brooke Claxton: I have not the figures of the medical personnel gathered together for the three services, but I can give that to the hon. member later. As to the elimination of duplication, that has been our aim since the reorganization began in 1946 and 1947. At times we have considered amalgamating the three medical services but on further reconsideration it did not seem that any great economy would be effected, and that a great deal would be lost in the way of tradition, pride of service and the like. However, we have eliminated all duplication that has been found. For example, the naval hospital at H.M.C.S. Stadacona in Halifax looks after army and air force personnel. Similarly, the air force hospital at Rockcliffe looks after navy and army personnel. The army hospital at Winnipeg looks after personnel of all three services. In this triservice operation as between the services there is no paper work, payments backwards and forwards, forms and so on.
All three services have common medical practices. They have a single medical stores which is run by the army and a single dental service which is operated by the army. To further effect co-ordination we have recently set up a civilian committee called the armed forces medical council with Dr. J. A. Mac-Farlane, dean of the faculty of medicine of the University of Toronto, as chairman. He devotes a great deal of his time to this matter. The other members are Dr. G. E. Hall, president of Western Ontario University, Dr. Mathieu Samson of Quebec and Laval University and Dr. W. C. Mackenzie of Edmonton. They are a very outstanding group. They have made a report on this and other subjects and are now carrying it through with the full co-operation of the armed forces. Acting as full-time secretary of this council is Brigadier Crawford, who is deputy director general of medical services of the army.
One of the main objectives of this activity is to eliminate duplication. We now think we are getting to the place where we will have enough doctors for the three services. We are still short, but with the' recruits from
Supply-National Defence abroad, whom we are continuing to get from the British Isles, and others brought in through university plans we should be able in time to overtake this deficiency, although it is still considerable.


Mr. Bell:: I should like to refer to the matter of seaward defences. We learn from the white paper that installations have been made at Halifax and also that plans are going ahead at St. John's, Newfoundland and Esquimalt. I believe that Sydney also comes under present plans. I am interested in the position of Saint John, New Brunswick, so far as seaward defence plans are concerned. We in Saint John have always felt that we were in a fairly strategic position. We have a drydock there, and it is the largest manufacturing city in the maritimes. It has also been understood that if any sort of concerted attack were to be made on the maritimes it would be natural that the enemy forces would come to Saint John. Perhaps they would cut off Nova Scotia at the neck of land between the two provinces. I am interested in hearing from the minister whether the plans of the first and second wars have been changed in the light of present warfare, or are we still to be included in these necessary defences on the Atlantic coast?


Brooke Claxton: Seaward defences are being constructed at the places we consider to be the most vulnerable. I should point out that even if you have seaward defences fully constructed it takes some hours to put in the installation. The nets, booms and buoys deteriorate rapidly if left in sea water. The state of readiness in any event is relative. We are getting equipment. At Saint John equipment will be made available out of funds that are provided in these estimates, but it is not our present intention to make a permanent installation there for the reason I have stated. In addition, we have finished the program of construction of gate vessels.


Thomas Miller Bell: May I ask the minister if he does not think that Saint" John is just as important as Sydney or St. John's, Newfoundland?


Brooke Claxton: It is not nearly as exposed.


Thomas Miller Bell: Will the minister comment on my remark that Saint John is in a vulnerable position due to the fact that an enemy could cut off Nova Scotia at the neck. That has always been our impression. There were submarines in the bay of Fundy in the last war, and I never heard of any actually creating any danger to Halifax harbour.


Brooke Claxton: Sydney is designed for seaward defence now because that is where we have our whole reserve fleet in storage.

Supply-National Defence There are now something like twenty odd vessels. I am informed there will be a total of twenty-nine. It also will be our secondary base on the Atlantic for naval operations; so that it requires special treatment and will be regarded as particularly liable to attack; both for those reasons and on account of its location. Saint John does not fall within that category and the question of vulnerability is a relative one. We have to do the most vulnerable things first.


Thomas Miller Bell: May I ask the minister if he does not think Saint John will be of increasing importance because it will be a seaport for the new army camp?


Brooke Claxton: Yes, I quite agree.


Thomas Miller Bell: May I ask that serious consideration be given this matter of Saint John because we feel we are being overlooked in this respect?


Brooke Claxton: Yes.


George Randolph Pearkes: Earlier this year the Department of Public Works called for tenders for the construction of a new naval dock in Esquimalt harbour. The newspapers at the time said that this was connected with the seaward defence of Esquimalt harbour. At Easter the tenders were all returned to the various engineering firms that had submitted tenders. Is it the intention of the department to go ahead with the construction of this new wharf? If so, what was the reason for suddenly cancelling the tenders and returning them to the firms concerned?


Ralph Osborne Campney: The jetty at Esquimalt to which the hon. member refers was undertaken as part of our seaward defence, and was designed and to be constructed by the Department of Public Works as our agent. The designs were completed and tenders called, but further studies of the harbour and the nature of the bottom of the harbour led to some doubt as to whether the present design would be suitable. Some further investigations were made and it was decided to redesign, in part at least, this jetty. The jetty will be built as proposed, but it will be delayed for some time until these designs have been drawn to the satisfaction of the Department of Public Works and ourselves.


George Randolph Pearkes: I want to ask a question under this heading in connection with the supply of naval fuel. I put a question on the order paper the other day, and was surprised upon seeing the answer to find that bunker fuel and diesel oil fuel was being supplied from foreign crude oil, and then it was being delivered direct to Esquimalt by tankers coming from California. While I imagine that the source


from which this oil is obtained may be a question to be answered by the Minister of Defence Production, I should like to know what is to' be the future of H.M.C.S. Dundurn, which is a Canadian naval tanker on the Pacific coast. Are we going to allow that tanker to remain idle in Esquimalt harbour or what is its future?
If we are having oil delivered from foreign sources instead of from Canadian sources in Vancouver where the Dundurn would be able to move the fuel from Vancouver to Esquimalt, I wonder what is the future for that vessel. I intend to ask the Minister of Defence Production about the source of supply. It seems an extraordinary thing that we should build a pipe line from Alberta to Vancouver, and then have the government turn around and buy this oil direct from California.


Ralph Osborne Campney: As regards the source of the fuel oil for naval vessels in Esquimalt, I understand we did not specify the source, but merely gave the specifications and the Department of Defence Production made the purchase.
With regard to the Dundurn, I understand that she is used in the harbour for fuelling the larger ships instead of sending them to the jetty. She is not generally used to transport oil from Vancouver or other sources. I understand if oil is purchased from Vancouver, it is delivered by the tanker of the company which sells the oil.


George Randolph Pearkes: Is the future of the Dundurn assured then?


Ralph Osborne Campney: Yes, she will continue as at present.


Douglas Scott Harkness: It seems to me extremely regrettable, after this pipe line was built from Alberta to the Pacific coast with defence as one objective, that the government buys oil from foreign sources. The pipe line was built to obviate the long and hazardous route which this oil would follow from the Middle East. Just after the pipe line had been in operation a short time the Department of National Defence starts buying oil from foreign sources, thus increasing the difficulty this pipe line has been meeting in any event due to a tanker war. This war has made it possible to deliver Middle Eastern oil at a cost slightly below that delivered from Alberta. The situation is not going to continue very long, I understand, but I say it is regrettable and it is not in the interests of Canada generally, including defence policy, to use these other sources which would not

be available in time of war. We should patronize our home industry and particularly this pipe line.


Edward Turney Applewhaite: Shall we pass on to the next heading?


Douglas Scott Harkness: No. Under this particular heading I note that the total number of employees has increased. The cost of these employees has increased some $4-5 million. I would have thought that the same thing could have been done in this branch of the department as was done in the inspection branch. The number of these civilian employees might have been reduced or at any rate might have been held to the same level instead of being increased by a little more than 12 per cent over last year. I am not going to go into the numerous cases in which those increases have taken place, but I should like to call attention to one or two instances that I believe are completely unjustified.
According to the details on page 294 the total number of clerks of various classes is going to be increased and this year will be 1,651 compared with 1,335 for last year or an increase of 316 clerks. Now, surely all that indicates is a great multiplication of the paper work. This is the very thing we have been complaining about for so long and the minister agreed that it should be cut down. Here we find one of the surest means of increasing it, a very large increase in the number of clerks. It is extremely difficult for me to see how an increase of that sort is jusified.
Then the only other item I will mention is mess men. The number is increased from 44 to 130. I presume these are the men who wait on the troops at dinner and things of that sort. It is difficult also to understand why there should be an increase from 44 to 130, three times as many mess boys in one year. From those two examples, and the general 12 per cent increase in personnel, it does not appear that any effort has been made to economize so far as civilian personnel are concerned. The total increase in personnel in the navy is not going to be very great and it does not seem to me to justify anything like this large increase in the number of civilian and administrative personnel.


Ralph Osborne Campney: As is obvious, I suggest, from information given the house thus far, the navy is increasing the number of ships and the number of servicing stations necessary to service those ships. This increase of personnel, amounting, roughly, to a thousand-
Supply-National Defence


Douglas Scott Harkness: Is the associate minister referring to civilian personnel?


Ralph Osborne Campney: Naval personnel.


Douglas Scott Harkness: But I am not talking about naval personnel; I am talking about civilians. The increase is over 1,200.


Ralph Osborne Campney: I was going to give information as to the civilians.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Under the naval branch?


Ralph Osborne Campney: Yes. The increase in civilian personnel which will be required during the present year is made up of approximately 200 people who are now manning the principal stores depot at Montreal, which was recently put into operation for all naval supplies; over 100 who will be required in the maintenance of ships in inactive reserve at Sydney-security, fire and various servicing activities; something over 100 in Ottawa, at headquarters, to meet the needs of the increasing expansion and about 300 each on the east coast and a similar number on the west coast in the dockyards, stores departments, armament depots, and in the magazines which either have been or are being constructed and put into operation to serve the fleet, as it increases in number.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The minister has not met my criticism, I am sorry to say. I do not want to take up more time, but I would refer to it in this way: A department store, for example, may have 500 employees and is doing $5 million worth of business. If the number of customers increases, and the value of the business also increases, we will say to $7 million or something like that, they do not have to have a very great increase in the number of clerks in the store. In other words once you have your basic set-up in an organization you can handle quite a bit more business without any great increase in staff.
In other words, my general criticism is that the number of personnel is increasing every year. If this happened in only one year it would be a different matter; but it is going up, up, up, up every year. Here we have another increase from last year, when it had already built up to 10,000 people.
Furthermore, what the minister has said does not explain this increase. For instance, a quarter of the total increase is made up of about 300 clerks. What he said does not meet my general criticism and does not explain why there should be this great increase in the number of clerks, people who handle paper.
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Ralph Osborne Campney: Well, I mentioned a moment ago that the navy is increasing quite rapidly. Naturally once a ship is in commission we must take care of its contracts and all its day to day activities. There is office work in connection with that, and also more work in the servicing departments-armament depots, ammunition stores, etc. Naturally the staff will increase slightly each year until we reach a fixed position in the navy. 1 suggest that is obvious. First of all we must have a substantial nucleus to serve the navy generally, and then we have all these specific services to meet the needs of ships individually and collectively as they become more numerous on our east and west coasts.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The fact that the number is increasing like this-and there can be no doubt about it-indicates that there is not proper control being exercised and no real effort being made to hold down these administrative expenses. I am very concerned about this matter, and have been for some time. We have been told what was accomplished in the inspection branch, in spite of the fact that the work of that branch, as the minister said, is now at its peak. In spite of that, the number of people employed has been greatly reduced. I am only too glad to give credit to the department for having accomplished this. I have already complimented them upon it, and I will do it again. But having been able to accomplish this in the inspection branch when things were at a peak, I cannot see any reason at all for this very large increase in civilian employees generally of the navy. And I refer particularly to this terrific increase in the number of clerks.


Ralph Osborne Campney: I might say that it has always been the practice of the navy to operate all their shore establishments with civilians. In connection with the big naval stores depot at La Salle, brought into service not many months ago, I might mention there are 400 civilians employed there, and probably only six or eight naval personnel. It is the practice of the navy to operate their shore establishments to a great extent with civilians. As the requirements become greater and as the fleet grows this will be reflected in the increased number of civilian employees.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Why is it necessary to have 300 more clerks? This general talk about building up the navy does not answer my question at all; it does not get to the nub of the matter. Why is it necessary to have an increase of 316 clerks? That is about 25 per cent in one year.


Ralph Osborne Campney: Depots consist mostly of clerks for servicing and accounting.


Douglas Scott Harkness: But the depots have been there right along.


Ralph Osborne Campney: No, some of them have been enlarged and some have just been built. At least one armament depot has just come into use. I am trying to say to my hon. friend that these servicing establishments on both coasts, and in various parts of the country- at least some of them-are just coming into commission now. Some have had to be enlarged.


Mr. MacLean:: Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of questions, and they apply equally to all three services. Perhaps the minister in replying could answer with that in mind, and save duplication. My first question relates to automatic punch card machines which are used for personnel records. Are they owned by the department, or are they rented? If they are rented, are they all rented from the same source? If so, what is the rental?


Brooke Claxton: Subject to some exceptions, I believe generally they are rented, and obtained from three sources: International Business Machines, National Cash Register and Burroughs.


John Angus MacLean: Then in connection with travelling and removal expenses in the case of postings overseas to Europe: I have had complaints from servicemen going to Europe that there is a wide discrepancy in the standard of accommodation supplied to various personnel of equal rank in equal circumstances. What standards are required of the shipping companies, or whoever supplies this accommodation, when troops are being posted either to or from Europe?


Brooke Claxton: The question of transportation is almost entirely army and air force, which we have not reached yet. We shall get it for you and answer it later. The entitlement for all three services is on a uniform basis. While standards are laid down uniformly, inevitably the type of accommodation, and sometimes transportation, depends on availability. If we were to wait until the wives and children all got the same they might be disappointed in not getting there. Therefore it is sometimes better to take poorer accommodation in order to get them together just as soon as possible. It is largely a question of availability.


John Angus MacLean: I presume some minimum standards are required.


Brooke Claxton: Yes.


John Angus MacLean: At the bottom of page 298 there is an item "Major procurement of equipment". Ships, aircraft, engines and so

on are mentioned. Aircraft and engines are up from roughly $1,500,000 to $23,500,000 in round figures. Can the minister put something on the record with regard to the replacement program of naval aircraft?


Brooke Claxton: This is a very fair proportion of the total cost of getting new suit of aircraft for the Magnificent's successor, H.M.C.S. Bonaventure. We are replacing the Avengers with the S-2F aircraft and we are replacing Sea Furies by jet Banshees. Most of these have been purchased. We are also buying a considerable number of helicopters. That accounts for the cost.


John Angus MacLean: In the case of removal and travelling expenses for civilians, I notice the item is down considerably from $750,000 to $498,000. My question is not with regard to the amount. I take it that civilians are generally speaking locally employed. What are the circumstances under which it is necessary to post civilians who are employed in the service from one area to another, and therefore require removal expenses?


Brooke Claxton: Transportation allowances are provided for civilians employed in outlying districts, and also some provision is made for transportation of children of service personnel to schools. But generally speaking what the hon. member says is correct. There are no large movements of civilian personnel from place to place, but there is a considerable removal of supervisory personnel. Some of the naval magazines and depots are not close to major centres. One thinks of some of the wireless stations, Renous, depots in New Brunswick, and there are three ammunition dumps or depots in British Columbia. This also includes a considerable amount for reallocation of personnel consequent on the establishment of the new naval depot at La Salle, near Montreal.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The general picture presented here is somewhat interesting. The total amount to be expended this year is just $5 million more than the amount that was expended last year, and, as I pointed out before, this is the same amount as the increase in the cost of civilian personnel this year amounts to Apart from this increase in the cost of civilian personnel there will be no increase by and large as far as the cost of the navy is concerned. We find an item of $23,500,000 this year; whereas last year it was only $14 million for aircraft and engines which my colleague has just been talking about; which means that some $22 million at least has been pared off the other items. I notice it has come chiefly off the other items which are important as far as a fighting navy is concerned; that is, the 83276-405
Supply-National Defence things that they fight with. For example, signal and wireless equipment are down nearly $7 million. Armament equipment, guns and so forth are down $4 million. The ships are down $1 million. Then we find that ammunition and bombs are down nearly $8,500,000. Therefore, some of the other items which are not fighting items, you might say, are up. It would appear that the items for the navy this year, that is, items of fighting equipment such as bombs, ammunition, guns and so forth are all down really very materially. Can the minister explain why that is? It is all right to build up all these big civilian staffs, and so on, but when it actually comes to the navy doing the work for which we maintain it, the important things for them to have are ships, guns, planes, ammunition and so forth, to run them. As I say, it appears from this that these are the very things by and large in which there has been quite a large reduction. Non-essential items have gone up.


Brooke Claxton: It is explained to me that in the case of those items of fighting equipment that the hon. member mentions, the changes are owing to different changes in the time of placing and getting delivery of contracts. We have got ammunition; we need lots of it. We have got electronics; we need lots of that. I am only mentioning these as illustrations. The hon. member did not mention clothing and personnel equipment which is down from $7 million to $2,500,000. That is because we were able to get quite a considerable proportion of these so-called "soft" things, and they are on hand. There is no particular significance in this except I should tell the hon. member that the navy and the other two services work out, through their chiefs of staffs, with the deputy minister and others the proportion of the defence dollar that is allotted to them, and then they have to divide that year's money so as best to carry out the program and keep that phase together. Therefore next year it may be that some of this no doubt will be up again.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Just one comment-


Edward Turney Applewhaite: It being six o'clock I do now leave the chair.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at seven o'clock. The Chairman: When the committee rose at six o'clock we were discussing the item
6400	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence under the Royal Canadian Navy-active force and general. Is this discussion concluded?
Douglas Scott Harkness: No, Mr. Chairman, I had just risen in order to make a brief comment on what the minister said in reply to the very brief observation I had made that the total cost for the navy is up by some $5 million and that that is accounted for almost entirely by the increase in civilian personnel. I asked why it was that there had been considerable reductions in the fighting equipment for the navy.
Without going into the minister's reply I would like to comment that I think this is a good example of the fact that the expenditure of more money does not necessarily mean we are getting more defence. In spite of the fact that we are spending more money under this particular heading the actual amount being spent for ships, guns, and other things which make the navy an effective fighting force is being reduced, and unfortunately I believe that has been the situation for quite a number of years in most of the branches of the department. One of the chief arguments we have advanced here over the last four or five years was that that was what was actually happening, and that the very large sums of money which have been spent have not produced for us the fighting force to which we are entitled for the large amount of money expended.


Mr. Gillis:: I would like to get some idea from the minister as to what kind of machinery exists between the defence purchasing department and the Department of National Defence. Defence purchasing in Canada means quite a lot of employment in Canada, and I would like to give a case in point. There is a large naval base at Sydney, Nova Scotia, and in that area about one mile from the base there is a large wire and nail mill. At the present time there is a bad unemployment problem there. Last November I found that large shipments of nails brought from Hamilton, Ontario, were being used at that naval base at a time when nails were being manufactured in that area and when half the men in that factory were unemployed. I was just wondering where the economy is obtained by purchasing nails for the Department of National Defence in Hamilton, Ontario, and shipping them 1,400 miles for use in a spot where there is a nail mill in operation working half time.
I would like the Minister of National Defence or the associate minister to give me an explanation about this because it is pretty poor planning. It may be bad salesmanship on the part of the company which manufactures these nails, but if it is I would like to know. I know for a fact that many
[The Chairman.]

kegs of these nails come from Hamilton because I not only looked at them myself but I took one of the covers with me in order to make sure I would have the evidence if I was questioned. If this is the kind of way in which materials are purchased, without regard to employment conditions in the area, and regardless of the fact that you can obtain the materials cheaper and at the same time assist that area in the matter of employment, then I think there is poor planning somewhere between the Department of National Defence and the defence purchasing department.


Ralph Osborne Campney: I wonder if the hon. member could tell me whether the nails he mentioned were obtained from a contractor or were being used by the navy.


Clarence Gillis: I do not know for certain. The base is a naval base and it is under the Department of National Defence. I do not know whether a contractor purchased these nails but in any case that contract would be let by the Department of National Defence and I think there should be some understanding when letting these contracts that the materials that are available in the area in which the work is being carried on should be given first priority, other things being equal. I thought it looked pretty bad to see a nail mill working half time while a project which was under national defence was using nails they had dragged 1,400 miles across the country which would bear the additional burden of freight. I think it adds up to poor salesmanship somewhere.


Ralph Osborne Campney: It is my understanding that as regards the procurement of goods for the Department of National Defence by the Department of Defence Production we prepare a specification for the required goods and we make what is called a contract demand on the Department of Defence Production. That department is then charged with the responsibility of procuring these materials, having regard to the specification, price, delivery terms, and so on. Procurement of the goods having been completed, we then inspect them, accept them and pay for them. Under those circumstances I presume there are a number of considerations which actuate my colleague, the Minister of Defence Production, in securing the goods for which we have made a contract demand. The only variation there might be with regard to this particular case, and of course I am not aware of all the facts, is that we might have sent nails to our own naval base from some of our stores at some point or other for use by the navy. That might have happened, but generally speaking

I think the procedure is as I have outlined it, subject to anything my colleague might say on the matter.


Clarence Gillis: When the estimates tor the Department of Defence Production come up I hope I will be able to get a run-down answer to this question.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Mr. Chairman, it is very difficult for a layman to venture into the field of questioning military expenditures, but I think even a layman is entitled to ask a question about civilian expenditure. I am coming back to the matter the hon. member for Calgary North has already ventilated and to be found in the details at page 298. I note there is between $4 million and $5 million apparently additional on the civilian part of the staff. That seems to me a lot of money. We think it is a lot of money in Greenwood. I would like to ask the minister what steps are taken to satisfy the department that those men are needed.
I heard of one industrialist who approached his staff with a very crude and simple test. He divided his staff into those that produced and those that did not produce. The only producers in his mind were the people who produced the things that you could handle. He regarded all his office staff as non-producers and he was accordingly critical of them. In the same way it seems to me that as laymen we are entitled to be extremely inquisitive and curious about the civilian staff. This businessman I speak of is reported to have been made the head of a certain company and to have begun by firing all the clerical staff and then taking them back one by one as they were proved to be needed. That is a crude illustration of what I have in mind. In any event it is a crude illustration of the feeling one has in surveying a military establishment, with all the civilians that are in it.
Even those of us whose experience of war is not as recent as it might be can remember the scornful way in which we used to talk of the paper war and speak of all the people who never got outside of the office and who were on lines of communication. Now in peacetime I suppose you not only have those people but you have out-and-out civilians.
I want to ask the minister this question. I have raised it before. It is not new. In some departments recourse has been had to people whose business is organizing efficiency. I should like to ask the minister whether any recourse has been had to efficiency experts in this instance? They have been used in certain departments. At one time when I raised this question I was told that 83276-405J
Supply-National Defence such assistance was not used in large organizations in civilian life but only in small ones. That statement is manifestly wrong. Actually they are used more in larger undertakings than in smaller ones. I should like to ask the minister whether, if that is something that has not been done, it will be done. It seems to me that the onus is absolutely on the department, when they come along with between $4 million and $5 million for additional civilian assistance, to explain why. If any other department came in here with $4 million additional for clerical assistance, I think we would be absolutely outraged. I realize that the military establishment is huge. It may be that if we knew all about it we would be satisfied. But that item of nearly $5 million raises a big question in my mind.


Ralph Osborne Campney: Mr. Chairman, I would repeat first just briefly what I observed when this matter was raised by the hon. member for Calgary North. First, the naval establishment ashore is primarily and almost entirely civilian. As the navy grows and the shore establishment grows, naturally the civilian component of the shore establishment increases. I am informed that when a branch which has been established or which has increased its facilities wishes to have new personnel to meet that need, that branch makes an application to the naval complement committee at headquarters who as specialists review the applications carefully. If it is approved by the naval complement committee-and only to that extent because the committee has powers and facilities to investigate and if necessary to reduce the numbers required-the requirement then goes to the civil service commission. The commission also has its own methods of investigation and of satisfying itself as to the need. When the application has survived those two reviews-if it has; I refer to the need of the branch as set forth in the requirement-it goes to treasury board. From my experience serving on treasury board that body is not in any sense a rubber stamp. It also has its own methods of investigation both here and at other places. It is only when treasury board has approved the setting up of an additional civilian position or a number of positions to meet an established need in a certain place that those positions are filled.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I am still left with this basic question. The minister has mentioned this naval committee. As I understand it, these additional requirements are first of all endorsed and approved by what the minister
6402	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence called a naval committee. What would be the personnel of that committee? Is it composed of naval officers?


Ralph Osborne Campney: It is a joint committee composed of navy officers and civilians in the department.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: No one has more respect than I have for naval officers but I do not imagine that naval officers have spent much of their time in being trained for office management. At any rate I would hope that they have not. I would hope that sea duties are what they have been trained in. It is therefore all very well for the minister to say that this matter goes to two or three bodies, each of which scrutinizes it, including the civil service commission and the treasury board. I know the treasury board is always held up as being a most formidable body, and I have no doubt that it is. Nevertheless, if the thing gets a bad start-if you have the original recommendation made without the thorough scrutiny which I am asking for, if indeed it is not being made now-if you get it started without a proper scrutiny, it seems to me that from then on everyone else is beaten. They are not going to send down and make an entirely new investigation of the duties. Surely the civil service commission is not going to do it all over again and treasury board is not going to do it all over again. I am not quite sure whether the minister is differing with me or whether he is going to say that they do that, but I still feel uneasy and that somehow or other this matter is not getting the scrutiny that it should get.


Ralph Osborne Campney: I might just point out to the hon. member that it has just been brought to my attention that very recently, as a result of a survey by the naval complement committee, over 80 applications were turned down. I think this committee is a thoroughgoing and rigorous committee. Any application must pass that committee before it even goes to the civil service commission, much less the treasury board. I am informed that the naval complement committee is extremely strict and looks into the situation most thoroughly.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I have one final question, or at least I hope it is final. The minister said that the increased staff on shore had to take care of increased personnel and increased units afloat, if I understood him correctly. Can he indicate what, in the last year, has been the increase of the service personnel as distinct from the administrative? When I say "service" I mean really "service".


Ralph Osborne Campney: As between March 31, 1953, to March 31, 1954, in the naval strength there was an increase of practically 1,500.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: What percentage is that? I do not want the total. What would that be in percentage?


Ralph Osborne Campney: From 15,546 on March 31, 1953, to 16,955 on March 31, 1954.


George Randolph Pearkes: What is the civilian increase?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The civilian increase was nearly 1,200.


Ralph Osborne Campney: That is naval personnel.


William Alfred Robinson: Shall I pass on to Royal Canadian Naval Reserve?


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Just a minute. This is very interesting. My understanding is there has been an increase of about 1,200 in the civilian personnel and 1,500 in the service personnel. Am I correct? There again there may be things which I do not understand which will make it clear, but it is very unconvincing to me that to look after the needs of additional service personnel you need almost man for man to look after the administrative duties. I would have thought that the various branches would have been set up and that one man ashore could somehow or other do a little more than look after a man and a quarter afloat.


Ralph Osborne Campney: I mentioned several reasons this afternoon why the total number of civilian personnel has increased. For example, we have opened a very large and extensive stores depot at La Salle which has necessitated 200 more personnel. We have extended our facilities at Sydney where the inactive reserve of the fleet is being stored. This has led to the necessity of security and fire protection personnel, dehumidifying plants and various other services which account for about 100 personnel. We have had to create about 300 new positions on each coast due to the establishment of new armament depots, stores depots, new and larger magazines, and various other installations to serve the growing fleet on each of these coasts. These developments have made necessary an increase of something over 100 personnel at headquarters. These increases make up approximately the figure the hon. member mentioned.


George Randolph Pearkes: What is the total number of civilians employed with the navy?


Ralph Osborne Campney: As of April 30, 1954, the total number of civilians employed by the navy was 11,559.


Douglas Scott Harkness: That does not include dockyard workers.


Ralph Osborne Campney: I understand it does.


William Alfred Robinson: Shall we pass on now to the Royal Canadian Naval Reserve?


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I want to leave this
request with the minister, and I am not asking him to accept or reject it now. I ask that some outside scrutiny be introduced within the next year to make a report on the tens of thousands of civilians working for the armed services.
Royal Canadian Naval Reserve.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I note that the number of people on the permanent staff has approximately doubled, from 94 to 184, but the pay and allowances for the coming year will be just under $2J million whereas last year they were $3 million. In other words, apparently it is anticipated that the number of people in the reserve will be fewer than last year because the pay and allowances are considerably less, but the regular staff has increased. Would the minister explain that inconsistency?


Ralph Osborne Campney: I understand that the difference arises from the fact that while it was estimated last year that the pay and allowances would be $3 million, we actually spent $1,719,000. In making the estimate for this year, and allowing for the expectation of some increase, the figure was reduced to $2,499,000.


Douglas Scott Harkness: 
Ralph Osborne Campney: All I can say is that we overestimated last year, and the estimate this year has been made as realistic, in the light of all the facts, as we can made it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Is it correct, as would seem to be the case from the minister's answers, that the number of people in the naval reserve fell very considerably last year? It must have because the amount of pay and allowances used was only half what was estimated would be needed.


Ralph Osborne Campney: It did not fall; it did not grow as rapidly as we had hoped.


William Alfred Robinson: Royal Canadian Sea
Cadets? If there are no questions we will pass on to Canadian army, active force and general.
Supply-National Defence
Canadian Army-Active force and general.


Gordon Minto Churchill: I have several questions to ask but I will start with an easy one so that we will get into the army picture. My first question concerns the size of our force in Korea compared with the size of our force in northwest Europe. In view of the minister's statement this afternoon with respect to brigade groups, could we have the picture clearly as to those two forces? I understand that in Korea we have an infantry brigade incorporated within the commonwealth division. In Europe we have an infantry brigade group able to operate independently. In the words of the minister, I think he said at one time it was almost a small division. My question is what is the difference in the number of personnel as between these two formations?
My second question is this. Has the infantry brigade incorporated within the commonwealth division in Korea been able to function to the satisfaction of that division and the Department of National Defence? Then I come to my third question, and I do not want to labour this point. If the infantry brigade incorporated within the commonwealth division has been found a satisfactory answer to some of our commitments abroad, could not an armoured brigade incorporated within a British armoured division perhaps be the answer to this problem of the armoured corps?


Brooke Claxton: In answer to the hon. member's questions, I can say that the British have two armoured divisions in Germany and they have none in Korea. In Korea we have operated exceedingly happily with the commonwealth division. It has worked out very well. They were all infantry with a component of armour. But in Europe the British formations are organized as divisions, and it would be very difficult indeed to integrate an armoured brigade group into one of their divisions. I am advised it could not be done, that it would have to be an extra unit and it would have to have the extra supporting services that I referred to before.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Are the figures available with regard to the difference in size of these forces?


Brooke Claxton: They are very much the same.


Gordon Minto Churchill: My other question has to do with the rifle. Some time earlier in the house I asked a number of questions concerning the adoption by Canada of the Belgian rifle, which has been adopted as the standard infantry weapon for the United Kingdom. The minister's reply to this question indicated that tests were being conducted in Canada of

Supply-National Defence the FN rifle, and that if they were satisfactory an announcement would be made in due course. Is the minister prepared to give us a full statement now with regard to this question of the rifle?


Brooke Claxton: Yes, to bring the house up to date I may say that the Belgian FN rifle has been adopted by the British army, and they are obtaining some quantities for further trial and testing. We have not yet decided to adopt the rifle. We are subjecting it to further tests. We have placed an order for a number that are being delivered to us. Simultaneously the United States have had some FN rifles which they have subjected to Arctic trials, and trials under northern conditions. As a consequence of this, I think some modifications will have to be made.
In the meanwhile our role in the picture is that we are, through Canadian Arsenals Limited, arriving at engineering designs and production designs and specifications for the production of the rifle according to the standards that have been agreed upon by the British, Canadian and United States teams. This work is being pushed by the Department of Defence Production through Canadian Arsenals Limited. If it were decided to go ahead with the production of the rifle, there will be no delay in connection with the work. In that connection work is being pressed forward in the production of drawings, designs and engineering specifications. We are getting rifles from Belgium for that purpose. My colleague the Minister of Defence Production has had officers in Belgium working with Canadian army officers and with Fabrique Nationale, the original producer of this rifle. The work is progressing satisfactorily.
How soon it will be possible to announce the final results, I do not know because it will depend on the tests. We have been very anxious in this not to get too far ahead of any country in the decision to adopt the rifle. We have been very anxious indeed that Great Britain, the United States, France, Belgium and ourselves should adopt the rifle as standard, and we have done everything possible to that end. The discussions started really in 1946 in what is called the A.B.C. committee, composed of United States, Britain and Canada and in April 1951 these considerations seemed to be getting nowhere, when the British announced their intention to go ahead with their own rifle, the EM. I made an appeal, which I think has been reported to this house, to the then minister of defence in Britain and the secretary of defence in the United States, that we should meet once more
IMr. Churchill.]
at the ministerial level with very high ranking officers and have another look at the matter.
I am glad to say the meeting took place in Washington on the first and second of August, 1951. Since then we have been working progressively towards a solution of that very desirable objective, the adoption of a common rifle. In the meantime, however, we have agreed on a common round; that was announced by me at the meeting we had in Paris of the North Atlantic council in December. This work is also proceeding. The experts met in Quebec and Ottawa, and arrived at the final specifications for the round. Those were agreed to and the round has now been agreed upon. While it has been a long struggle, I am happy to say we are making considerable progress. I believe we will arrive, not only at a uniform round but also a uniform rifle.


Gordon Minto Churchill: There are some circumstances in regard to the question of the rifle which I think need clarification. There was a debate in the British House of Commons some time ago in connection with the decision there to adopt the Belgian FN rifle, whereas earlier the British government of that period until 1951 had decided the British EM2 rifle was the most satisfactory weapon. The adoption of a rifle is an important matter. The Lee Enfield rifle, which has been the standard rifle for over 50 years now, is an indication of the length of life that may be expected of a rifle used in the army. When the time comes to adopt a new type of rifle, the greatest care is necessary to ensure that it is the most satisfactory.
After the conclusion of the second world war the British, as I understand from reading accounts, asked for a new rifle which would be automatic or semi-automatic and which would be, if possible, shorter and lighter than the Lee Enfield. From that point inquiries have been made and studies made in order to arrive at the type of rifle that would be most suitable for modern requirements. Modern requirements seem to point to the use of a rifle which is automatic, shorter and lighter. The result at the moment is that the Belgian FN rifle does not meet all these requirements. In some respects it does not seem to be the equal of the British EM2 rifle.
My concern about this was aroused by reading certain accounts as to Canada's position in the matter. I believe Canada's position is quite clear with regard to the standardization of the round, now standardized at -30. I think there could be no dispute

about that at all, and that is a major advancement. The NATO countries have agreed to use the same type of ammunition. Our record does not seem to me to be quite so clear with regard to the rifle. We appear to have adopted a negative attitude in so far as that was concerned.
I notice reports from the British House of Commons regarding the Canadian stand on the rifle, and accounts in the press, which seemed to indicate that if our representatives had taken a definite stand the British EM2 rifle would have been selected. For example in the House of Commons at Westminster on February 1, 1954, during the debate on the adoption of the rifle, Canada came into the picture on several occasions. The discussion is found at page 55 of the British Hansard for that date. The subject was mentioned by the prime minister and then Mr. Shinwell had this to say:
The position of the United States was as the right hon. gentleman has stated, the position of France was that she had no opinion at all, and the position of Canada was as stated by the then, and, I think, present minister of defence, Mr. Brooke Claxton, that he was quite unconcerned about the size of the round or the type of rifle as long as Canada had the opportunity of producing whatever rifle or whatever round was decided upon.
And then at page 93 Mr. Shinwell, in answer to some further point in the debate, has this to say:
Where does standardization come in? The French have not expressed their willingness to accept it. What about Canada? The prime minister talked about Canada and X said in an interjection that X had had discussions with Brooke Claxton, the minister of defence. He said to me, "I am not going to take sides. What we are concerned about is who is going to produce the rifle and the round."
Then at page 97 Mr. Head, speaking for the government, said this:
The point is that Canada has stated that for her government to manufacture a rifle which has been turned down by the United States would be a course which they could not accept.
That seems to indicate that the Canadian position has been that of a person on the sidelines, and in a measure unconcerned with regard to the type of rifle which might be placed in the hands of Canadian troops. It would indicate that rightly, and naturally, Canada was interested in the standardization process, and still more interested in the matter of production-and not without reason, because the British look to the American continent for the production of rifles.
Nevertheless I think Canada's position is a bit weak in this, when we seem not to have put forward our own view with regard to the type of rifle that would be most useful and suitable for our infantry. And that is the point that bothers me. Why could we not
Supply-National Defence determine and make our choice among the various types of rifles that are available- the Belgian FN, the British EM2, the modifications of the Garand that are being carried on in the United States, and perhaps others. Canadians are as familiar as any soldiers in the world with the type of rifle that would be most suitable for modern warfare. I discussed with a brigade commander who had a long and honourable career in the second world war in northwestern Europe and he told me that at one stage during the course of the conflict he was attempting to get his entire infantry component of the brigade equipped with a carbine, or a Sten gun, or a Thompson submachine gun, rather than the Lee Enfield rifle. The reason was that, in the type of attack they were carrying on, with so much night action, the shorter weapon, and the automatic weapon, was what was desirable. He failed to achieve his object. I asked him what would be his suggestion at the present time, and he said, "By all means something that is short and light and automatic".
Now, it is the opinion of fighting troops that that is essential in this matter. Too frequently, in such experiences as I have had, decisions are made by people who have not actually used weapons in the field. What I wonder is whether we have made a complete study of the rifle we have adopted now, which might well be the weapon in the hands of our forces for the next fifty years; because we cannot change from year to year the production of a standard weapon such as a rifle. You have to produce them in great numbers.
I tried to find out earlier if we had made comparative tests between the Belgian rifle and the British rifle, both adapted to use the common .30 round. However I did not get a complete answer to that question. Apparently we had observers at various try-outs of rifles. But some of those try-outs -and this is where the difficulty comes in- some of those trials which took place in the United States and Britain were between the British rifle using the .280 and the Belgian rifle using the .30. Now that they both use the same round, comparative tests should be conducted to determine which of the two is more satisfactory.
Or perhaps some other rifle would be much more satisfactory. I have been saying that Canada has played a strange part in this matter of the standardization of the rifle. She has taken a rather negative attitude, and that negative attitude may have been the decisive factor.
6408	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence I have a newspaper report here which appeared in the Winnipeg Tribune of February 25. It is a dispatch from London to the Canadian Press referring to the estimates submitted in the British House of Commons, and is in these words:
Because the FN was the type of rifle favoured by the Canadians and is also being ordered for trials by Americans, it was decided that its adoption was the wisest course in view of the greatly increased prospects of North American production. Neither Canada nor the United States would favour the adoption of the British EM2.
So Canada has weighed the balance in this matter. And the British, whether they have preferred their own EM2 rifle because of its design and weight and other important factors, would have preferred their own rifle if it could be produced in this country. Yet we are obliged, so far as I can find out from these records, to favour the Belgian rifle because the United States rejected the British EM2 and Canada played no active part in the deliberations. I think it would have been better for Canada to have played a much more active part in this than simply to have stood on the sidelines-not interested in the rifle, but interested only in the production thereof.
I do not think that is good enough. I believe Canadian military people have sufficient experience to determine the best rifle for Canadian use, without having to adopt something that is produced by some other country. And Canada might very well have come up with some other idea. The standardization of the rifle is important; but more important is the standardization of the round, which has been achieved. And it might well be that, for Canadian purposes, something different is desirable. Are we facing up to the realities of this, or are we simply going to wait and see what the United States does?
Now, let me point out that according to a report published in the Gazette of May 10, 1954 bearing a New York dateline and written by Hanson W. Baldwin of the New York Times service, it states, under the heading "Standard Rifle Far Off":
Belgium's rifle is lighter than the M-l-
An American model.
-and fires in bursts at a rate of about 700 rounds a minute. But the FN, in later tests, did not meet trials in severe cold in Canada as well as the M-l and T-44; there were more malfunctions and some breakages.
Well, that seems to cast some doubt on this rifle, which for some reason or other has had to be adopted by Britain, and has been rejected by the United States.


Brooke Claxton: What does the hon. member mean "rejected by the United States"?


Gordon Minto Churchill: I am quoting from what I read in the British Hansard and from those reports. The minister has corrected me. The United States is still continuing tests with regard to the Belgian rifle. In so far as these reports are concerned, the United States has been reluctant to accept it. The Winnipeg Free Press of February 25 commented in an editorial on the Belgian rifle and had this to say dealing with remarks made in the United Kingdom. I quote:
Judging by Sir Winston's words, the attitude of the Canadian government was decisive. He might have been tempted to take a chance if Canada had favoured the British rifle. But without either Canada or the United States he was adamant.
That, Mr. Chairman, is the situation. I think it is a confused one with regard to the question of the type of rifle that might be adopted for the Canadian army in the future. We are in between the two larger powers, the United Kingdom and the United States, and we seem to have sided in a negative way with the United States which, according to the gentlemen in the United Kingdom, has affected their decision with regard to the type of rifle that has been selected.
I would have felt happier about it if Canadian tests had been conducted with both these rifles or others, and if a full disclosure of all these operations with regard to the rifle had been made to us earlier and if a full understanding of this problem had been presented. At the moment it seems to me to be a bit confused, and the attitude of Canada does not seem to me to be as creditable as it might have been had we taken a more positive stand with regard to this particular matter.


Brooke Claxton: If the hon. member is confused I am not surprised because he has indicated that confusion throughout his whole speech. He has referred to a matter which has been the subject of discussion and a released statement, which is well known. Yet he attempts at this time to confuse this committee and to confuse this most important issue.
The point that Canada made throughout was that it was vitally important, in the interests of our common defence in NATO and as between Britain, United States and Canada particularly, that we should agree on a round and on a rifle. If anyone takes issue with the part that Canada played in aiming at that objective, then I take issue with him and so does every Canadian and so does every American, and so does everyone who lives in the British commonwealth and in the NATO countries. That was a desirable aim, and we aimed at that right

through. We found that the British were not going to adopt an American or other rifle. They felt in April, 1951 for reasons of their own that they should adopt the EM rifle and they so announced. Then I felt that in the interests of combined action and union between the three countries, but particularly in the interests of Canada, which is a surplus producer of arms, we should try again to see if we could not arrive at an agreement. Is that sitting back on the fence or of taking a backward position?
I sent a telegram-and I have the permission of the British war office and also of the secretary of defence to produce it-that in the interests of our unity we must agree on a round and on a rifle. If we could not agree on that, then what sense was there in NATO at all? This was fundamental. If we could not agree on a common hand weapon, then our whole alliance would be subject to very grave criticism. Anyway, in consequence of the Canadian intervention, we had this meeting at Washington. They suggested that it should be held at Ottawa. I suggested that it should be held at Washington. The United States was represented by the Hon. Frank Pace, former secretary of the army, and by General Joe Collins, the chief of the general staff. Britain was represented by the minister of defence, the Hon. Mr. Shinwell, accompanied by lieutenant-general, as he then was, now General Whiteley. France was represented by His Excellency Jules Moch, accompanied by a high ranking French officer. I was accompanied by Lieutenant General Simonds. We met during two days. We heard the experts describe their rifles. We received the reports again. It became perfectly evident that there had not been as full an interchange of information at various levels as there should have been. In consequence of those two-day discussions it was decided that we should have a fresh look.
In answer' to the hon. member, may I say that this meeting took place on the initiative of Canada. At the end of the meeting the secretary of the army of the United States said that he was grateful to the Canadian minister and to the Canadian team for the part they played in initiating this discussion and bringing them together. Then at our suggestion the discussion was transferred to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's standing group. They agreed to a team of four on which we were represented by Major General Graham. That team brought in a report. Further studies were continued, and the result was an agreement on the round was announced at Paris, in December.
Supply-National Defence
When I was asked whether I would announce this agreement, it was done because the initiative was taken by Canada and followed up by Canadian generals and Canadian technicians in bringing the various groups together. The fact that I was asked to announce that agreement, and also to propose to the North Atlantic council that we should agree on this round as the standard round, has indicated that Canada was taking no backward part.
Then we came on to the rifle. If the British have adopted the FN rifle it is because the British chose to adopt the FN rifle. We do not influence the British. They make their own decisions. When that decision was announced and discussed in the house in the debate to which my hon. friend referred, some statements were made that seemed to me to have just about as little understanding of the real issues involved as those made in the speech we have just listened to from the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre. I did not say, as quoted, that we were not concerned about what rifle or what round. How could I say that? Who in Heaven's name would ever say that? What I said was that what we were concerned with was that we should get agreement between the British, the Americans, the other countries and ourselves, and I said we would help to get that agreement. I said also that we were more interested in this than probably any other country of our size, because other countries would look to us as sources of supply, not only in the event of an emergency but in the event of the continuation of a cold war. They would expect us to supply them with rifles of one type or another, and it was of tremendous importance, in their interests, in the interests of the French, the British and everyone else, that whatever rifle was adopted would be one which would be adopted for common use and also if possible for common production in the United States, in Canada and in other countries.
We have been and we are still working towards that end. The record is totally against the view advanced by the hon. member. We have been constantly pressing to achieve an agreement on the rifle and I still hope that that agreement will be achieved. If there was anything wrong with the FN why did the British adopt it? If there is anything that requires to be corrected in this rifle on account of these Arctic trials then these corrections are and can be made and I hope they are being made successfully. If, on the other hand, it turns out that the FN is not the ideal rifle then it is still the best rifle that has yet been produced and it can be further developed. We are in the position

Supply-National Defence where we have not decided to take the FN because we want to see the results of the trials and we want to have user trials. We then want to go into production on whatever rifle we decide to produce.
All things considered I think it would be very desirable that we go into production on the FN rifle even if the United States does not choose that rifle, because it is a very good rifle and it is very desirable that the British should have an alternative source of supply outside of the United Kingdom. As everyone knows we supplied them with many hundreds of thousands of small arms during the war and with many billions of rounds of small arms ammunition. It is of vital importance that as far as possible we should work together. We have succeeded, in company with our allies and partners, in getting an agreement on a round. That is a great achievement and we now hope to succeed in getting an agreement on the rifle.


Gordon Minto Churchill: The minister thinks I am confused about this matter but I am not the least bit confused. I know what I am talking about in regard to the rifle and the round, and the confusion has arisen from the lack of information as supplied by the Department of National Defence. The minister confused the issue a little more just recently by discussing at great length the standardization of the round, for which I gave him full credit in my introductory remarks. The standardization of the round was made following that conference in 1951, and at that conference the British rifle, which was under consideration, was using -280 ammunition and the Belgian rifle was using -30. Canada came down in favour of the -30 ammunition and the NATO countries followed suit. We have standardized on the round and to that there is no objection.
But now the issue has advanced one stage further and it was with that further development that I was dealing. The issue has gone from that to the type of rifle to be adopted for the Canadian army. You can have a standardized round and a dozen different makes of rifles and machine guns all using that type of ammunition, and if you have the same ammunition for the NATO forces it might be better to have the same rifle. Nevertheless, if you have different makes and model of rifle each using the same type of ammunition you are on very sound ground indeed, and there is no confusion in my mind in that regard. There is no dispute on that point. We have standardized on the round.
But when it comes to the choice of rifle the evidence from the British Hansard


indicates that Canada's attitude was decisive with regard to the British having to adopt the Belgian FN rifle and


Brooke Claxton: That simply is not true
either in regard to the British Hansard or in regard to the Canadian attitude. It has been shown to be completely untrue in the British Hansard, and all we have there are unproven statements.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Well, I deserve thanks from the minister for giving him the opportunity to correct the British Hansard which has put him in a very bad light.


Brooke Claxton: I am correcting the hon.
member's interpretation of British Hansard.


Gordon Minto Churchill: It is not my interpretation. I have read the words of Mr. Shinwell and Mr. Head, and I shall not read them again^ as some hon. members here are suggesting. The words are there and I am not interpreting them. I am simply stating what I saw there and the press reports interpret them in much the same fashion. But let me give the words of the minister himself in order to see whether the issue has not been confused by the Department of National Defence. On March 3, 1954, I received an answer to a question which I placed on the order paper. Here was my question:
1.	Did the Minister of National Defence or any representative of his department recommend the adoption of or indicate a preference for the Belgian FN rifle at any conference of NATO countries on the subject of the standardization of weapons?
2.	If so, when and at what conference?
Here is the answer, Mr. Chairman.
1 and 2. Discussion at NATO meetings took place on the round but not on the rifle and the answer to this question is consequently "No".
I was trying to get information when I put that question on the order paper and that was the answer I received. In other words, we decided on the round but we made no commitments on the rifle. Now the minister is asserting that the situation is the opposite.


Brooke Claxton: The answer is precisely as declared there. There is no commitment on the rifle.


Gordon Minto Churchill: But the minister said the rifle was discussed at this conference and apparently it was just the round. Who is providing the confusion? That is the situation, Mr. Chairman, and I think our position could be made clear if Canada took a somewhat more positive stand with regard to this very important-


Brooke Claxton: May I ask the hon. gentleman a question? When the British have refused to adopt their own EM2 rifle would he ask

us to adopt that rifle when neither the British, the United States, the Belgians, the French, nor ourselves have adopted any one of the United States types? Would he not agree that the right course was for us to wait and see the result of the user trials?


Gordon Minto Churchill: Obviously, Mr. Chairman, the right course is to depend on the user trials which, I would hope, would be conducted by Canadians on all of these rifles firing the standard round. I hope we are not depending on other countries to make user trials and that these trials will be conducted under such conditions that we will be absolutely certain the proper rifle has been selected. We have a record in Canada of adopting a rifle which proved to be ineffective under battle conditions, and battle conditions involve mud and difficult weather conditions under which some rifles will not operate. Is there not a chance that unless we ourselves determine that this Belgian rifle is the most effective that we might make the mistake of adopting a rifle which would not stand up under difficult conditions? And what about the statement I read from that New York report to the effect that this rifle has not stood up under some of the Arctic trials? Are we trying out other rifles under the same conditions; is every country giving them the same test, and is Canada undertaking these tests?


Brooke Claxton: I can assure the hon. member that we will make our decision on the basis of tests and trials by Canadians as well as by others working in this partnership.


Douglas Scott Harkness: During this debate and in speaking in previous debates the minister has always expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the condition of the Canadian army. I refer particularly to the organization, the adequacy of equipment and so forth. I think we are all agreed on the high calibre, on the whole, of the officers and men in the Canadian army, and that all wish to pay tribute to them whenever the opportunity presents itself. However, in view of these numerous statements by the minister which are echoed by the people on his side of the house -the ones who have spoken in this debate today-I should like to devote some time to an exercise which was held last year, called Buffalo IV and which was heralded widely in the press as the largest peacetime exercise in the history of the Canadian army.
These exercises or schemes are put on, of course, to give training to the troops and also as a test of their efficiency from various points of view as for example, their efficiency as subunits, as units, as formations, the efficiency of the various officers in exercising
Supply-National Defence command, tests of weapons and so on. As I say, this exercise which was heralded as the largest army exercise in peacetime as far as Canada was concerned was held last year in August.
There was a great deal of laudatory comment put out by the P.R.O.'s and so on. However, there attended at this exercise a reporter for the Calgary Herald by the name of Jim Senter who wrote four articles which were published in the Herald-I do not know what other papers they may have been in-giving his impressions of the exercise. I may say that I think he is particularly well qualified to give his impressions of this exercise. He went overseas. He happened to be in the same unit that I was in. He became an N.C.O., subsequently was put up for a commission and later served as a commissioned officer in the artillery. The particular article that I will start with, quote from fairly briefly and comment on is headed "Manoeuvres Reveal Weaknesses in Army; Many Improvements Considered Urgent to make Army Effective Defence Force". The article then goes on to say:
Exercise Buffalo IV, the biggest peacetime workout of the Canadian army, has passed into history and, with its passing, five basic weaknesses of the army stand revealed.
These weaknesses are to be found in the armoured corps,-
My friend the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre has spoken about this matter at some length today and previously.
-the artillery,-
About which the Leader of the Opposition had something to say.
-the signal corps, the supply services, such as the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, and the reserve army.
Basically, these are shortages of men and equipment but there is more to it than that.
There is the lack of proper training, units employed out of context, improper thinking, units that don't exist that should exist and units that have failed to be expanded in proportion to the increasing needs of the Canadian army.
The article then goes on and elaborates on those various points. I am not going to take up the time of the committee to go into all those matters. The point I want to make is that the rosy picture painted by the minister, particularly as to the situation in the Canadian army, is just not borne out by the exercises which have been held and by the facts, as far as competent observers who had the opportunity to look at them have reported. The organization of the army generally, as has been stressed by my friend, the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre, is wrong, in my opinion. Certainly the equipment is not adequate and in many cases it is

Supply-National Defence much out of date. This article goes on- it is talking about the armour to begin with-to say this:
The Strathconas-
The Strathconas are the armoured regiment in the west and are an exceptionally fine regiment. I have the honour of belonging to their mess as an honorary member and I have had the opportunity to observe them at their exercises at Sarcee and they are extremely fortunate to have a training ground right at their back door. I think they are in a high state of efficiency. The article continues:
-who supplied the armour for Buffalo IV, could provide only half their full strength for the exercise. One of their squadrons is now in Korea and the second is just now coming oil leave, having only recently returned from Korea.
This left two squadrons for the exercise and, of these two, one-"C" squadron, the first Canadian armoured unit to go to Korea-had to act in what is a new role for the Canadian army: heavy gun tanks . . .
The role of the heavy gun tanks is strictly defensive. It calls for a 65-ton tank mounting a gun ranging in size from 120 to 185 millimeters. Present thinking seems to favour the high velocity 120-mm.
Such a tank mounting such a gun certainly does not exist in Canada, and it is doubtful if a good version of such a weapon is to be found anywhere in the western world. "C" squadron had to use the obsolescent Sherman tank mounting a 76-mm. gun to simulate the role.
In their heavy gun tank role, the tanks were responsible for the divisional anti-tank defence-
I should like to stress that statement, that they were responsible for the divisional antitank defence. To continue:
-and provide depth and greater hitting power to the anti-tank screen provided by the infantry antitank platoons and the field artillery.
They are sited so that the enemy tanks in the offensive-
And so on. We do not need to go into that. To continue:
Though this role is new to the armour, it is not new to the Canadian army. In the second great war it was performed by anti-tank regiments using towed and self-propelled guns under the command of the artillery.
Aside from the fact that equipment for the heavy gun tank role does not exist . . . the biggest lesson learned here was that normal tank squadron and troop administration methods aren't enough.
I should like to follow up a bit this matter of anti-tank defence. It happens to have been the particular arm of the artillery in which I served for most of the war. Hence I have a certain amount of knowledge of it. About two or three years ago apparently a decision was taken-though it was extremely difficult to get the minister to admit it-that the anti-tank role would be taken on in future by the armoured corps and there would cease to be artillery antitank units. However nothing firm really has
[Mr. Harkness.l
happened about the matter since so that for the past two years or more the anti-tank regiments in the artillery-and those are the reserve anti-tank regiments, of course, because there are no permanent force ones- have been sitting there. They had their anti-tank weapons taken away from them. Some were given 25-pounder guns, some were given other guns. They are just sort of marking time not knowing what they would do.
In the meantime, nothing was done in the matter of building up anti-tank forces amongst the armour. The total result is, as is indicated here, that even the permanent force armoured regiment have had no training in anti-tank war. In spite of the fact that anti-tank defence was demonstrated during the last war as being one of the most important elements in the modern army, we have absolutely no anti-tank elements in our army at the present time. It was the lack of sufficient anti-tank weapons which enabled the German break-through of armour to take place in the overrunning of France in the early part of the war. It was the existence of a screen of German anti-tank guns which prevented our own armour from breaking through the German defence when we attempted it to begin with outside of Caen.
First the British army and then the Canadian army were foiled to a large extent by a screen of anti-tank guns. In spite of all the lessons of the necessity of anti-tank guns, particularly self-propelled anti-tank guns, the Canadian army has absolutely none now. The two regular force armoured regiments have had no training in the role, and as is indicated here this test showed that their troop organization and so forth was not of a kind that would enable them to carry out that role successfully. I will read further. He elaborates on that.


Brooke Claxton: Who is "he"?


Douglas Scott Harkness: I indicated that. This
gentleman is Jim Senter who is either with the brigade in Europe or has just returned from there.


Brooke Claxton: A newspaper reporter, a
reporter for the Calgary Herald'!


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes. As he says here, this does establish that normal tank squadron and troop administration methods are not enough to enable them to carry out this difficult role. He continues:
Normally, a troop commander has his tanks close together and he can handle them and fire them from the turret of his command vehicle. In the heavy gun role, the tanks are widely deployed, dug

in and lying doggo. For better efficiency in fighting his tanks and in the administration and supply of the needs of his men, guns and vehicles, it is better that the troop and squadron commanders operate from a separate small headquarters of their own, leaving their command vehicles to be fought by a non-commissioned officer. These were lessons learned by the anti-tank regiments during the last war, and, for some reason, not passed on to the armour for the proper handling of their new role. Why has the armoured corps not been expanded to proportionate size with the rest of the army and why are the heavy gun tanks not available?
Those are two unanswered questions and two questions which of course I think the minister should answer. I should like to say a little more about the present anti-tank role which the armoured forces have taken on. As the result of some five years' experience during the last war I found it was a very difficult matter to train officers and men to deploy and handle anti-tank guns properly. Even after the long period of training we had in England a considerable number of guns were always badly placed. As a result some of course were lost and others would not have been effective if a tank attack had been made through their positions. It is a branch of army work which people just cannot walk out and do. It takes a lot of training and, as is indicated in this article, you need an administrative set-up within the troop and within the regiment so that the troop commander can control the placing of his guns and the squadron commander can control the deployment and fighting of his troops.
The way the armour is organized at the present time they just cannot do it. The squadrons which are with the troops in Korea and Europe at the present time have apparently been given this role and they are not able to carry it out because they are not organized properly for the purpose and they have not been trained for it. I repeat that we are really left without any anti-tank defence. In other words, from that point of view we have not a modern army at all or anything like it.
So much for that subject. There has been a good deal of talk about whether there is or is not sufficient equipment. Certainly there is no anti-tank equipment. That is one thing we are definitely short of. Here is another article about the same exercise which is headed, "Reserve Army Gunners Find Weapon Shortage". I wish to deal with this now because it also concerns the regular forces. That happens to be the heading of the article but it deals with the regular force gunners as well as those of the reserve force. The dispatch is from Wainwright and reads as follows:
Perhaps the most shocking disclosure to come out of the Canadian army's recently completed
Supply-National Defence exercise Buffalo IV held at Wainwright military camp, is the ragtailed state of the divisional artillery . . . Two regiments of artillery were deployed for the manoeuvre and, for lack of better names, were known as-
We do not need to go into that. The two regiments were made up of detachments from four of the reserve force units. This was their summer camp. I continue:
In all, reservists contributed by these four regiments totalled twenty-eight officers and seventy-two other ranks-
The total war strength of course of these four regiments would have been approximately 3,200 men all told. However they were only able to muster for this exercise 28 officers and 72 other ranks, and this constituted summer training. I continue:
Added to the reservists was a parachute battery from Canada's airborne brigade, "Z" battery. R.C.H.A.-
That was formerly an anti-tank battery but it is now converted to a parachute battery.
-which, normally, uses 4*2 in. mortars, and regular army gunners from the 119th and 129th light antiaircraft batteries, Victoria. The anti-aircraft gunners were given a two to three week conversion course from ack-ack to field artillery before proceeding to Wainwright for the exercise.
In other words, in order to hold this exercise in the western command and to put out in token form two field regiments to represent the divisional artillery-of course they would not because there would be three field regiments which would be backed up by a medium regiment-they had to bring in this regular force parachute battery and detachments from two ack-ack batteries on the Pacific coast.
This afternoon the hon. member for Wellington South said that there was plenty of equipment, that these people in the artillery units were all right and so forth. This article gives some idea of the number of people they can get out for summer camp. I will go on to something about equipment. He continues:
Cutting echelon groups to a minimum and eliminating wagon lines, cooks and tradesmen wherever possible, this left more than enough gunners and specialists to man, control and fire the some twenty-three 25-pounder field guns provided.
Why there were 23 provided I do not know. Twenty-four is the number for one regiment, not two regiments. I presume the reason there were 23 was that was all they could dig up in the western command to take out on the exercise. He continues:
It comes as something of a shock when it is realized that, of these twenty-three guns, only eight could be fired in a live shoot.
6412	HOUSE OF
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Mark you, there are 23 guns on the exercise representing the divisional artillery, one gun short of the number there should have been for one field regiment, and of these 23 guns only eight could be fired. The others were there really as dummies on which people could do gun drill. Only eight could be fired in a live shoot. He continues:
The remaining fifteen had to stand idle in their gun positions. For the most part, these guns had not been calibrated. "They want reserve army men to come to camp and they can't even give us enough guns when we get here", said one reserve officer with considerable bitterness. I know a lot of reserve army gunners who won't be here next year."
As we have continually pointed out in the house time after time, there is one of the reasons why more people do not go to summer camp and do not turn out for the reserve forces. It is all right for the minister and the member for Wellington South to say that there is all kinds of equipment for these reserve force units, but when you discover what actually happened in this biggest exercise ever held in peacetime by the Canadian army you find that they only had eight guns that would fire for the entire divisional artillery. Naturally men are going to be disgusted. That kills their morale and they say "the heck with it, we will not come back." That is the kind of thing that kills morale and points up the terrible situation that exists. We ask that it be corrected. The article continues:
In some cases, three guns had to simulate a battery. During live firing, which occurred on only one day of the whole exercise, and that toward the end, gun crews had to line up and wait their turns at the guns.
Now, that was a fine exercise, was it not? Here is the biggest exercise ever held in Canada in peacetime and these gun detachments had to be brought from wherever their guns were and lined up one behind the other to take a turn at firing a few rounds of ammunition. That is extremely realistic training. It is certainly the type of training that is going to encourage people to join or stay in our reserve forces.
There was bad feeling over this among members of the reserve army as they felt they should have been given preference over the regular gunners in the firing practice. As it was, the reservists claim, it was the other way around.
In other words, instead of giving the reserves, who were out there for summer training practice, an opportunity to fire live ammunition, it was given chiefly to the regular army gunners. Perhaps that was the only practice they had, too; I do not know. It was felt the regular army had priority. I
[Mr. Harkness.l

shall not go on with the rest of this article, but I should like to read one or two more sentences:
What makes all this so depressing is the thought that the gunner representation on "Buffalo IV" represented the artillery resources of western command, the largest and probably the most important command in Canada.
I cannot resist reading the final paragraph:
In spite of everything, however, the gunners were reasonably well on their toes. And, as this reporter wandered about through the exercise area, the gunners were the only people who met him with levelled rifles and demanded to see his credentials.
In other words, the gunners are always on the job in spite of the difficulties imposed by this government or any other.


An hon. Member:: Did they have rifles or broomsticks?


Douglas Scott Harkness: They had rifles, but probably they would not fire.
The Calgary Herald commented on this editorial-


Brooke Claxton: I think "editorial" is the right word.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I am glad the minister says it is right.


Brooke Claxton: I said that I think "editorial" is the right word for this so-called report. I was referring to this so-called report of what happened and the hon. member said this "editorial" and I agree with you that it seems to be editorializing.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The reporter was giving his impression, and if the minister had been listening when I started he would have heard what this reporter's qualifications were.


Brooke Claxton: I asked, and the hon. member told me.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I outlined the whole thing at some length before that, and just told the minister his name. The editorial is from the Calgary Herald and it speaks of this exercise in these words:
It was designed to test a division in a defensive role . . .
The first, and biggest, thing wrong with the whole operation was that there was no division to test, defensively or otherwise . . .
Operation Buffalo IV was supposed to be a western command exercise. Scraping the bottom of the barrel in both the regular and reserve army, western command fielded about one half a division. To make the exercise possible, other commands had had to be called in to help. The signals system alone required 900 men. The combined resources produced about 300. Food had to delivered by trucks in the field because there were neither sufficient men nor vehicles to provide a proper field ration and feeding system . . .

It is a waste of words to say again that this is a shocking condition to find in Canada's army in these times. It is past the shocking stage. It is enough to make anybody's hair stand straight on end, whether it is regarded from the standpoint of national safety or from the mundane angle of $2 billion a year being spent on a travesty of defence like this.
As I say, that shows the picture presented by a competent reporter with a military background, and without any axe to grind, except he is still a member of the reserve forces and so far as I know desires to improve the reserve and regular forces of this country. As the editorial says, it is indeed a shocking picture.
While I am on my feet, I should like to just indicate some of the things this same reporter found in the Canadian brigade in Germany, from where he has just returned and upon which he wrote another series of articles. I have one here which appeared in the Calgary Herald of Friday, June 4, and it is headed "Equipment Shortages Plague Canadian Troops in Germany". The heading, of course, was put on by the newspaper but the dateline is Soest, Germany. We have been told by the minister that we have all kinds of equipment, and so forth; no difficulties along this line; everything is rosy and everything is of the best. I am not going to read all this article, but I am going to read about a few of the shortages this reporter found and for which there seems to be absolutely no excuse. Here is a quotation from one of the men who said:
We can send 80 jet fighters to the Netherlands, but we do not even have shoe laces or stoppers for our own water bottles.
Then, the article goes on:
The shortages are to be found in transport, weapons and clothing, and much of the equipment at present possessed by the brigade is old, worn out and obsolescent.
And the thing which makes the Canadian soldier so angry is that this is supposed to be a show brigade. They are the only true NATO troops in the area, but they still have the worst equipment.
To be found close by are both the British and the Belgians. Both are occupation formations, operate under reparations and have the power of requisition. The Canadians, however, are NATO troops and, as such, pay their own way out of Canadian funds.
Yet, the British equipment is something out of this world-a dream to behold-and the Belgian units all have brand new transports and the finest weapons. But Canada's stuff is old and worn out and any large scale move means a widespread dotting of broken down Canadian tanks and trucks.
Just to look at the question of military transport, an item of vital importance to any military formation:
Military transport for the Canadian brigade totals approximately 1,800 vehicles of every kind for all units. In addition to these, extensive use is made of the German Volkswagen as "runabouts" within the brigade area.
Supply-National Defence
"It would take 200 three-ton trucks to carry all the spare parts used by military vehicles since the brigade came overseas last fall" said one officer who was in a position to know . . .
Everywhere within the Canadian brigade area in Germany today, transport is critically short in supply. "It's not that there is anything wrong with our maintenance, it's just that the breakdowns occur more rapidly than the repair services can fix them", another officer added.
"The vehicles are just old and worn out. They were not new when they came over here and they have travelled all over Europe, from Normandy at D-day to Berlin. We put in a new engine today and the vehicle is running fine. Tomorrow the rear end drops out."
And, as they look at their broken down vehicles, spread over the autobahns and by-roads of Europe, the Canadian soldier sums it up nicely. "It's embarrassing", they say.
The article says that weapons are another item of great concern, and talks about rifles. It reads as follows:
The rifles, for example, are worn and pitted, and, in many cases, have been re-blued over the rust. Bren guns, too, are badly worn and, in the case of one unit, out of approximately 80 Bren guns provided for in establishment, only ten could fire when first taken over by the unit.
Then the article goes on to deal with various other items of equipment. I am not going to take any more of the time of the committee to read this. There is a report by a responsible and competent observer, concerning what he saw in the early part of this month when visiting our brigade in Germany. The truth of the matter is that I believe we have had a situation with regard to this brigade in Germany misrepresented to us. I cannot say anything else. Quite evidently, the brigade has old equipment. It has rifles which, in many cases, probably if safe to fire at least are not going to be accurate because they are pitted and rusted.


Mr. Dickey:: Would the hon. member permit a question?


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes.


John Horace Dickey: Did the hon. member hear the commander of the NATO forces, General Gruenther, speak the other day about the Canadian brigade; and does he believe that a competent and brilliant staff officer of his type would have said what he said about the Canadian brigade if what the hon. member says about it were true?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Oh, you think generals know everything about it.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman-


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: All the experience he has-


William Alfred Robinson: The hon. member for Calgary North.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Yes, I heard the report, and I think the report was absolutely correct. As
6414	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence I said at the beginning, I think there is nothing wrong with the commanders, the officers or the men; I think they are absolutely splendid.


Brooke Claxton: Everything is right except the shoe laces.


Douglas Scott Harkness: But according to this report -and I have confidence in it-the equipment those people have been supplied with is not up to scratch.


John Horace Dickey: Have you no confidence in General Gruenther's report?


Douglas Scott Harkness: General Gruenther said
nothing about equipment. He never mentioned equipment. He said the brigade was a fine brigade.


John Horace Dickey: He spoke of the brigade as an operational brigade, and that includes equipment.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I have no doubt they are fine men. But it is made clear from this report; and I challenge the minister to deny the accuracy of this report-


Brooke Claxton: I do accept the challenge, and I deny it.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: All they do is challenge.


An hon. Member:: Why don't you prove it?


Douglas Scott Harkness: The minister challenges it. Are not those vehicles the same vehicles that we went to France with, in the invasion of the continent, during the last war, or that we went into Italy with, the year before that, in 1943?


John Horace Dickey: No.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Are they not the same vehicles? I challenge the minister.


Brooke Claxton: No.


Douglas Scott Harkness: What vehicles are they, then? I am asking the minister:	What
vehicles are they, then?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: It is not in the public interest to tell!


Douglas Scott Harkness: Let the minister tell us what vehicles they are.


John Horace Dickey: Sit down, and let him have a chance.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Now, look, Mr. Chairman, the minister dare not say that they are not the same vehicles. He dare not say it, because they are the same vehicles. He started out to say it. I asked what vehicles they were, and he is not able to tell me. They may be vehicles which were used in England during the war; but they are either vehicles we used in England during the last


war, or the vehicles we left in France and Italy, one or the other. And if the minister wishes to say something, I will sit down.


Brooke Claxton: Yes. I am afraid I cannot dig up the vehicle number of every motor vehicle in the armed forces. We have 31,000 of them. I will tell my hon. friend that the vehicles that went abroad with the 27th brigade to Europe were either new or as good as new-completely rebuilt motor vehicles. They were as good as could be found anywhere for any purpose at that time, and they went abroad in perfect condition.


Douglas Scott Harkness: When?


Brooke Claxton: They may have had some use, but they were well maintained. We have some motor vehicles of new types we have been producing, and we have proposed to issue them as the old ones wear out. Of course that is natural enough. Why should it not be?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Good old rebuilts! The old rebuilts with the Canadian army!


Brooke Claxton: Would you like us to throw away every motor vehicle?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Would you buy a secondhand car? You know you would not.


Brooke Claxton: We have to rebuild and rebuild. And we rebuild them just as well as they can be rebuilt. And if they were not rebuilt my hon. friend opposite would be the first to complain about our throwing away two-year-old models.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, I think it is quite apparent that these vehicles are vehicles which were produced during the war, and which were used during the war. There may be a few of them that were not used at all, as the minister says, but they were vehicles produced during the war, and they were vehicles for the most part used during the war. Whether they were used in Canada or in England or in Italy or in France does not matter. The fact is that now they are worn out. They have had all that wear, and they have been repaired and repaired and repaired. And I am glad they have been repaired. But apparently they have reached the stage where it is not economical to repair them any more.
It is all very well for the minister to say, "We will keep on repairing them, to save money". But if you have ever had a fleet of trucks, and in that fleet you have a truck with a great number of miles on it, you know it is not economical to repair it any more. You are just throwing money away. You are far better off to get rid of it and get a new one. And I think, from what I can

make out, that that is the situation with regard to these vehicles with the brigade in Europe at the present time.


John Horace Dickey: Never mind the expense!


Douglas Scott Harkness: We could save money, but not by attempting to repair worn-out trucks.


John Horace Dickey: What about worn-out arguments?


Mr. Fleming:: Or this worn-out government.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Your argument is as worn-out as the trucks, and has as many holes in it.


John Horace Dickey: Don't go away mad.


Douglas Scott Harkness: So far as the other shortages are concerned, I have not the slightest doubt that they existed. The minister does not seem to know at the present time whether they existed or not. I would think it would be up to him to see if that is the situation; and I will be interested to see if it is correct. He should try to find that out, instead of getting up as he did a while ago and making the blunt assertion that none of this is correct. Here is an observer, a competent man with considerable background. There is absolutely no doubt that he is not the type who would send in an utterly false report about these things he saw. He is giving a news report on it. And if the minister followed the reasonable procedure he would find out to what extent this is old and worn-out equipment, and to what extent proper equipment is supplied to these troops.


Brooke Claxton: I do not know how far I need to go in following Mr. Senter in his trip around the world. But it does indicate how difficult it is to answer the reports of a reporter as quoted by a member. There used to be a pretty good rule that you could not read newspaper reports in the house, because they are not evidence.
Now, with regard to what he said about this exercise-I was not there and I have never seen the report to which reference is made, and to which the hon. member referred. It must have escaped me. But I can tell him I am informed that this exercise was not the biggest exercise ever held in peacetime.


Douglas Scott Harkness: That is how it was advertised in all the papers.


Brooke Claxton: I am not responsible for the papers.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Your P.R.O.'s are, though.


Brooke Claxton: Not at all. He says that there was no divisional artillery. This was a brigade exercise, with only three battalions who were to go to Korea. They are in Korea, and so
Supply-National Defence far as I know they are doing excellently. They were the three battalions of the R.C.R.'s, the P.P.C.L.I.'s-no, the Black Watch and the Second Queens-


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Who else, tell me?


Brooke Claxton: And the Fourth Guards. These are very good battalions. They had a brigade exercise, but for the purpose of holding the exercise within the framework of a division they asked some reserve units to come in to form up the framework of a division. Any hon. member who served in any armed force in any war knows that you have exercises at the divisional level with sometimes no more than 150 officers present. That sometimes is done.
Then, the kind of remarks the hon. member has made about equipment-I just do not understand them, because we have no end of 25-pounder guns. We have given away probably a thousand. We have a surplus still, and they are available at command headquarters, as is all other equipment, for use by the reserves, as they can be used to advantage by them. It is not distributed to units beyond their capacity to use, store and maintain it, and that makes sense too, and that is because the reserve forces want it that way.
With regard to this business of equipment of the brigade overseas, I think the senior member for Halifax made a very good intervention, but the hon. member for Calgary North said that I should have made an inquiry and got a report. But I got a report of all this as soon as I saw the Senter piece. But I should like to refer to this against the background of the previous Senter piece:
Canadians draw Soviet interest as commonwealth exercises open.
That is the first part of it.
Canadians beat "desert rats", dominion's brigade in Germany excels in week-long commonwealth army exercises.
That was the second article:
Calgary units star in "War".
Canadian infantry put on good show against crack British in German scheme.
That was the third article. It was in this latter one that he dealt with equipment. Perhaps I will agree with the hon. member when he says that this was a good job and a very authentic and reliable reporter with regard to the first three articles, but when he comes to the fourth I must only assume that he has picked out bits and pieces of the kind of talk that you get around if you look for that kind of talk. This again is significant. I have the word of the chief of the general staff that any shortages that developed would be of a temporary nature only, and

Supply-National Defence would represent only the time necessary to call on reserves on the continent or in the United Kingdom.
Then a very big thing was made of the shortages of shoe laces. Well, now, shoe laces are not a very important element in fighting, but still it is a very important element in veracity, and I took this one up, too, and I had a signal sent across to the other side asking: "How many shoe laces have you got?" That is the kind of thing we are led into by this kind of talk, and I think it is a waste of public money. However, I found out that I have here from Brigadier Anderson in West Germany, a very fine officer commanding the brigade, information that we have a total of 5,206 pairs of shoe laces in the brigade, and I assure the hon. gentleman that there is no shortage.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The point is, when did they get them, after this article was written?


Brooke Claxton: They could not get them after.
The hon. member made some remarks about anti-tank activities. Our troops are trained in anti-tank activities, whether they are armour, artillery or infantry, and that is about the biggest single item, the biggest single aspect of the field training that they have to do. How he can say they are not trained in anti-tank activities, I do not know, because he must have known. I have been at exercises at Wainwright and Petawawa and he must have been; I have seen them in Germany and seen them constantly in films that have been taken-there is a major field of continuous anti-tank activities. We try to have the latest types of training work, the latest type of dropping is practised, and they use the best kind of equipment.


Douglas Scott Harkness: On the basis of some five or six years experience of this, I can assure the minister that his remarks that everybody is trained in anti-tank activities and so forth merely indicate his complete lack of comprehension in regard to the role of these antitank guns and the methods of handling them, deploying them and everything else. When he says the infantry, the armour and everybody else are trained in the matter of antitank defence, he is talking about the medium anti-tank defence of a particular area where the platoon is or the company or anything else along that line. The very fact that he made that statement shows that he knows absolutely nothing of what I was talking about, just absolutely nothing.


John Horace Dickey: Do you know?


Brooke Claxton: I do not know what the hon. member is talking about.
[Mr. Claxton.l


Douglas Scott Harkness: The minister's remarks
prove that he does not know, or he would not have made the remarks he did.


Brooke Claxton: He talks about heavy antitank guns. We have anti-tank guns as a part of the tank equipment in the Centurions, and they occupy today an anti-tank role. That is their role. If he is talking about something heavier than that-


Douglas Scott Harkness: No, I am not talking about that. They are not organized to carry out the role. That is what I was saying, they cannot do it.


Brooke Claxton: They are doing it steadily.


Douglas Scott Harkness: They cannot do it
effectively.


Brooke Claxton: They are doing it steadily.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, he says they are doing it steadily. It is indicated in this article that an organized tank troop, tank squadrons cannot carry out that role effectively; it just cannot be done.


Gordon Minto Churchill: I have a subject here in which the minister is thoroughly informed, but he should give some information to the committee on this. This is the last topic I propose raising, and I shall be as brief as possible. A major decision was made in regard to the units within the Canadian army some time last year, and the Regiment of Canadian Guards was organized in October. On November 26, when the minister spoke in the House of Commons and gave a review of the situation in so far as national defence is concerned, he did not mention this major decision, nor did he mention it on May 20 when he spoke in this particular debate, and I wondered at his reticence in regard to this matter.
Why should we not be informed when a new departure is entered upon, a new active regiment is formed? I put some questions on the order paper to elicit information. The minister will recall that subsequently I asked him about the order of seniority of the regiments. There are not very many of them but at the moment he could not recall what it was, and yet a major decision to create the Regiment of Canadian Guards was made some time last year and this new regiment was named first in the seniority list. That is a complete departure in recent times from the army tradition, and some explanation should be forthcoming.
Well, the only way we have of getting information here is by questions on the order paper or by asking the minister. I did what I could. I asked him to name the infantry regiments in the Canadian army, when they

were formed and to give their battle honours. Of course the committee will recall the astonishing information which came as a result of these questions. The answer as to the infantry regiments is as follows, and I think their names should be recorded.


Brooke Claxton: What is the date of that?


Gordon Minto Churchill: March 10, 1954. My question was:
What are the infantry regiments of the Canadian active army?
The answer was:-
The following are the infantry regiments of the Canadian army, active force:	(a) The Regiment
of Canadian Guards; (b) The Royal Canadian Regiment; (c) Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry; (d) Royal 22e Regiment; (e) The Queen's Own Rifles of Canada; (f) The Black Watch (Royal Highland Regiment) of Canada.
Then I asked for the dates when these regiments were originally formed. The answer was:
Their dates of original formation are: (a) October 16, 1953;
That is the Regiment of Canadian Guards. The Royal Canadian Regiment, December 21, 1883; Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, August 10, 1914; Royal 22e, October 22, 1914; Queen's Own, April 26, 1860; the Black Watch, January 1, 1862. My third question was:
What are the battle honours of each regiment?
The answer to that I will not read in full but part of the answer reads:
(a) The Regiment of Canadian Guards: none.
So here we are faced with this situation. The first regiment in seniority of the infantry regiments in the Canadian army is the Regiment of Canadian Guards, organized in October, 1953, carrying no battle honours. If you look at these other famous regiments you will see that their battle honours run from 20 to 27 and that is not counting the battle honours which will be accorded them after the second world war and for Korea. The older regiments have a great tradition behind them. I shall not dwell on the statement on the value and importance of tradition made this afternoon by the hon. member for Simcoe North in very fine terms. It is important, as he pointed out. Here we have a new regiment the first of the line and the senior regiment of the Canadian army with no tradition behind it.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Shame.


Gordon Minto Churchill: I wonder why the minister in organizing this new regiment did not bring behind it some of the other regiments which have an honourable history in the Canadian
Supply-National Defence army. He could have incorporated the foot-guards, the horseguards, or the Canadian Grenadier Guards. These names are not unfamiliar within the army. Why were they not made a part of this regiment and their battle honours carried over so that men serving in this new regiment would have something behind them which would serve as an inspiration?
I shall not read a newspaper report, Mr. Chairman, but I would like to refer to an advertisement which has been put in the newspapers and which is the responsibility of the Department of National Defence. It reads:
Applications now being accepted for the new
Regiment of Canadian Guards.
And then listen to the sentences which follow:	"Second to none on the -parade
ground." That seems to be the first matter of importance.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Never fought and were never defeated.


Gordon Minto Churchill: I wonder if this is a great inducement-


Some hon. Members:: Quack! Quack!


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Listen to the crows.


Gordon Minto Churchill: Then it goes on to say:
Incorporating the colour and smartness of military tradition at its finest, the Canadian guards ranks first among the army's regular infantry regiments.
Further on it says:
Right now there is a requirement for young men who would like to share in the colourful dress and ceremonial activities of the new Canadian guards.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Chocolate soldiers.


Gordon Minto Churchill: I was a bit shocked in 1946, Mr. Chairman, when I returned from overseas to see advertisements appearing in our newspapers and carried on buses urging young men to join the forces and offering them security. I think that was a remarkable statement to be put out, to urge young men of 18 and 19 to enter the services in search of security. Fortunately those advertisements disappeared and were replaced by others which made a different appeal to the young and active members of the population. This advertisement for the Canadian guards is reverting to that type of thing which appeared in 1946, and which places the emphasis in the wrong direction.
I do not know whether the men who are in the Regiment of Canadian Guards have been drafted or in what manner it has been formed but I hope the minister will give us a complete statement. My sympathy goes to those men who will be attempting to do their duty as they see it and who have back of
6418	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence them no tradition. It could have been arranged that they had something back of them in the way of tradition. But instead of that the emphasis is put on the parade ground and on ceremonial drill. In this century during which we have had war for most of the time we have no time for that type of emphasis. There is a place for ceremonial drill, for fine trappings and for good appearance for men in the armed services, but surely the emphasis should be on other matters. The emphasis must be on fighting quality and the men who enter the armed services must be prepared to risk their lives, and they will risk their lives if back of them they have a tradition within their regiment to look up to and which will comfort them in time of peril. Let me just quote from Field Marshal Sir William Slim, former chief of the imperial staff:
One vital element In army life is pride of regiment which is still the foundation of the British soldier's stubborn valour.
Pride in regiment is an important thing.
I am not unaware that regiments formed in time of war and placed on active service can very quickly acquire esprit de corps and build up a tradition such as was done by the Royal 22nd and the Princess Patricia's in the first world war. I have known regiments in both world wars, hastily formed and put into action which soon developed a fine esprit de corps and a magnificent tradition. But it is only on the battlefield that that can be developed and it seems to me to be rather a mistake to organize now, out of the blue, a regiment such as this and giving it the rather famous name of the Canadian guards with the implication that it is-and I believe it is to be-affiliated with the guards of Great Britain. That famous name is being used and yet behind this regiment there is nothing in the way of tradition. It will be difficult for the officers and men serving in the Canadian guards when they come in contact with some other regiment just to rest on their laurels as being a great parade ground regiment or a regiment expert on ceremonial duties. They have no tradition behind them of service on the battlefield and I think they are being placed in an awkward position. My sympathies go out to the officers and men who are at present serving in that regiment.
There is still time for the minister to do something about it. He can make the necessary arrangements to incorporate in that regiment some of these others regiments in Canadian history which have an honourable record. I do not know why the minister should not explain to the house at an early date when decisions such as this are taken so as to avoid misrepresentation, if you like, 

and misunderstanding, and to avoid criticism. We would gladly have heard him on November 26 with regard to this major decision, but not a word was said and we were dependent on the press and advertisements in the newspapers for information of this nature.
I hope the minister will tell us the purpose behind this and what he proposes to do to give this regiment something more than is implied in the advertisement to which I referred. It cannot compete properly with these other famous regiments, with their great tradition behind them, on such a slim basis as that. It has been named the senior regiment in the Canadian infantry and these other regiments with a much longer service have been overlooked. I hope that it is not intended to be just an imitation of the guards of England who are held in the highest respect among fighting men throughout the world. I hope it is not that. We do not want in this country an imitation of something elsewhere. We have our own products.
But as I say, the word "Guards" has been used in the Canadian army for many long years by those other regiments that I have mentioned and we could quite properly use it if we incorporate them in this formation in some way. But at the moment the impression abroad is that this is some new regiment designed to be second to none on the parade ground, designed to be first in executing ceremonial drill, with no fighting tradition behind it and not being prepared for battle. I think that the wrong type of suggestion is being made to our young men to join that regiment. I would not have taken this time on this subject, Mr. Chairman, had the Minister of National Defence earlier in the year taken the house into his confidence in this matter and given us the information which we deserve to have.


Brooke Claxton: I think I should answer the hon. member, Mr. Chairman. He says he did not get any information. A release was issued in my name announcing this decision. I should say it would be in October, 1953. The regiment came into existence. They started work. Then the hon. member asked a question which was answered on March 10, 1954 giving him the information. But then all this kind of thing that he has just said was raised by another hon. member on May 21, 1954, as reported at page 4974 of Hansard. It is all there. Why he should be so greatly concerned about the matter, I do not know.
I can tell him that the regiment of guards is going great guns. It is derived from some famous units of the Canadian army. The first regiment of the guards is derived from

the third battalion of the R.C.R.'s. The second regiment is derived from the third battalion of the P.P.C.L.I. The third regiment is derived from the first infantry battalion which is in turn derived from five famous units of the reserve forces. The fourth guards battalion is derived from the second Canadian infantry battalion and is now on service in Korea.
As far as I know the question has been raised-and I think I am right-only by the hon. member for Peel, I think it was, and this hon. member who has raised the question tonight. I have not had a single word of complaint from either the old battalions or the new. They are getting along well. They are working well. They are doing their job. They are good Canadians. They are going to be good soldiers. They have a fine background of tradition through their origin. By what other name you could call them to suit the Canadian scene at that particular moment, I do not know.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Mr. Chairman, when you take an unknown regiment and put it'at the top of the list of Canadian regiments and put last the famous Queen's Own regiment of the city of Toronto and the little black devils of Winnipeg, I think some comment should be made. The minister said today he was talking about many well known Canadian regiments. Let me remind the minister that those regiments were Canadian in Canada before he was ever thought of as a Canadian.


An hon. Member:: Louder.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: The Liberal crows from Toronto are not men enough to get up on their feet and defend the great and famous Queen's Own Rifles of Toronto. My greatgrandfather fought in that regiment for twenty years, or rather served in that regiment for twenty years. I had the great honour and privilege of serving with the black devils of Winnipeg.


An hon. Member:: Bragging.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: That is not bragging. Let us have the facts truthfully about it and they will learn something if they try it. I resent the fact-not only with respect to my regiment but with respect to the Queen's Own in which my great-grandfather served-that we bring up a new regiment or a new name, try to put tradition behind that regiment and call it the first regiment of Canada.


Brooke Claxton: The hon. member is helping a lot.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: They threw the torch for you to carry, you Canadians. The men who died in Flanders fields threw the torch to
Supply-National Defence you. When we have a Minister of National Defence who throws that torch in the gutter-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Do not "oh, oh" me. You will not stop me from telling the truth.


An hon. Member:: This is all nonsense.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Oh, do not be so ridiculous.


William Alfred Robinson: Order.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: They handed on the torch for it to be carried by the veterans in the first war and the veterans in the second war. Let me say this to you men in the house tonight who served as soldiers in the first and the second war. You are letting the torch down as long as you let a man like the one we have today, as the head of our Department of National Defence, lower the name of the men who died and the regiments for which they fought, and put them down at the very bottom of the list as far as the standing of Canadian regiments goes. It is something that is on their conscience, as it should be. You men belong to a different party from that to which I belong, and sit on the opposite side of the house. I am not talking for a political purpose. I am talking about a disgrace that has been brought on the name of famous regiments in this country who protected this country so that we tonight can sit in parliament.


An hon. Member:: Woof!


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: It is time you learned something about the traditions of Canada rather than talk about things you do not appreciate. You know nothing about Canada's traditions or how the soldiers died and bled on the battlefield.


John Horace Dickey: I know more about it than you do.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Then why do you not voice your truthful opinion instead of being a rubber stamp for the government?


John Horace Dickey: Why do you not?


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: You never heard a shot fired in your life. You never fought and never were wounded. That is your record. Yet you have had more to say than any man in the Liberal party. We expected more than that from you. I am fighting for these men who gave their lives in defence of this country and so made it possible for you to sit in parliament and drag their famous names down to the lowest standing among the Canadian regiments. We have a Minister of National Defence who forms a guards regiment out of a hodgepodge of other regiments which nobody knows very well and he puts down at the bottom of the list the

Supply-National Defence famous rifle regiments of Canada, the Queen's Own of Toronto and the little black devils of Winnipeg, famous regiments of this country who fought a hundred years ago in defence of this country, from famous regiments of the old country, the Black Watch-


An hon. Member:: Oh, oh.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: You do not like it, you men of the Liberal party. Shame on you. You have not the gumption to stand up and even defend the dead soldiers. You sit here and you let the Minister of National Defence take all their traditions from you. You are afraid to stand up and be men, every one of you.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: There comes a time in every man's life when he has got enough and says, "So far I will go and no further". But here we find a man who takes the "Rule, Britannia" out of the navy, the crown off the royal flying corps badges and forms a new regiment, calls it the guards and tries to justify his stand by saying, "We have put in one common cauldron some Canadian regiments". But he has by-passed regiments that are now in the permanent forces of Canada and has put the famous rifle regiments at the bottom of the list of Canadian regiments. The Minister of National Defence, supported by you Liberals, you Canadians, has done it.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: All right. It will never be said that Julian Ferguson would ever be so subservient to any party that he would sink into that kind of mire, thank God.


Mr. Kirk (Aniigonish-Guysborough):: I
object strongly to the attack by the hon. member for Simcoe North on the senior member for Halifax whose father is now lying in Flanders fields and has lain there since world war I.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: The father handed on a torch which he should now be carrying. I am not standing on my father's glory. I am standing on the glory of the men who died, including his father for whom I have every regard.


William Alfred Robinson: Order.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: Not only his father. Don't you try to defend him, Mister.


William Alfred Robinson: Shall we pass on to the reserve force?


George Randolph Pearkes: Before we deal with the question of the reserve force I should like to say that the units of the reserve forces have contributed to the various units of the active forces. There has been a good deal of


difficulty in raising the units for the new active forces, and in order not to emphasize too much the decision which had to be made as to the order of seniority of the various units of the forces I think a fair effort was made by the personnel of the defence department to try to give credit to the many units which have a long record in the Canadian army. Rather than single out two or three units in order to perpetuate them in the active force, the decision was made to create this new regiment of guards. I do not quite know how a different decision could have been reached had the desire been to give credit to the great many units of the reserve army. I am not going to say any more about that matter. Coming to the question of the reserve army-


James MacKerras Macdonnell: May I interrupt the hon. member for a moment? I have one question respecting the active army. May I ask it now, or will it be understood that I can ask it later?


George Randolph Pearkes: All right.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: What forces of the Canadian army are stationed in the Yukon? What is their role, what is their equipment and what is the estimated cost of maintaining them for a year?


Brooke Claxton: There are two sets of activities centred in the Yukon. The first is the part played mostly by the Royal Canadian Engineers in the maintenance and Qperation of the northwest highway system. The second is the operation of the Northwest Territories and Yukon telegraph system. The first has been carried on since the highway was handed over to the Royal Canadian Engineers in 1946, I believe. While we do not keep the accounts segregated that way any longer, my recollection is that the cost of maintenance and operation of the highway system is about $6 million a year. That would cover about 1,200 miles and it covers a good deal of replacement of capital installations such as bridges, culverts and the like on a more permanent basis. We are doing a steady program of replacement.
The Northwest Territories and Yukon telegraph system supplies all the telecommunication services, civilian and military, in the Northwest Territories and the Yukon. Speaking again from memory, I believe there are twenty-one stations in the Yukon and the Northwest Territories. They carry all the military traffic, all the government service and most of the commercial. My recollection would be that the amount of revenue they take from handling commercial traffic varies but averages approximately $500,000 a year.

They handle a good many hundred thousand messages for the armed forces, weather stations and other government services, so that these are two very considerable operations, one by the engineers and the other by the signals.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Would I be correct in summarizing what the minister has said in this way, that the units there are purely technical, engineers and signals, and that their duties are to maintain roads and communications? That tells the whole story of the troops located there, does it?


Brooke Claxton: Yes, if the hon. member is talking about the army only. There are of course some elements of Canadian Rangers and some reserve force elements, but I am talking about the active force army.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I think the figure the minister gave for the road was for the upkeep on the road. Is that intended to cover also the cost of these units or can he segregate the cost of these units? That is the figure I seek, not the maintenance of the road but the expense of the units themselves.


Brooke Claxton: Pay and allowances for the Northwest Territories and Yukon road system for 1953-54 amounted to $572,000, and for 1954-55 they are $581,000. A total of seven officers and 178 men are engaged in this operation. With respect to the northwest telegraph system the cash estimate was less than I said because it does not include some capital expenditures. This is just pay and allowances. For 1953-54 the pay and allowances were $1,215,000, and for 1954-55, $1,550,000. There is a total of 60 officers, 400 men and 322 civilians.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Would the minister give us the rank of the commanding officer?


Brooke Claxton: Brigadier.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: What is the relationship of this to the Department of Public Works? There was a report that the Department of Public Works had taken over the highway and there seemed to be some misunderstanding about it.


Brooke Claxton: The Department of National Defence and the Department of Public Works are considering whether or not it would be a good thing for the Department of Public Works to take over this operation. We have had it in defence for the last eight years. It has now become stabilized, and more and more it is becoming essentially a civilian operation. We feel that it might be more economical and practical for it to be taken over by the Department of Public Works. Discussions are going on towards that end. No details have been arrived at, but I think
Supply-National Defence it is moving along in the direction of the Department of Public Works taking it over.


Mr. Montgomery:: A few minutes ago I understood the minister to say that the third battalion of the guards regiment was formed by five reserve units. Would he give us the names of those reserve units?


Brooke Claxton: It was formed from the 1st Canadian infantry battalion, which formed part of the 27th infantry brigade in Germany, and it in turn was formed out of five companies formed from five reserve units. I do not recall them. I can get them for the hon. member very easily.


Gage Workman Montgomery: If the minister will do that, it will be all right.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: During a parliamentary visit to the service college at Kingston I noticed that some research was taking place there. I am interested in knowing if that research is paid for out of the general appropriations for defence research, as indicated on page 36 of the white paper, and which involves the sum of $50,400,000. I should like to know also if the research is pure research or is connected with some specific problem?


Brooke Claxton: The Royal Military College is, I think it is fair to say as a generalization, on the same footing as a university. The personnel of the staff is comparable with that in most universities. In order to have a good staff you must have research done, and they must have facilities for doing research. A lot of the staff are highly qualified scientists and they would not stay at the university unless they did research. It is, therefore, very much in the interests of the college that they should do research. Part of this research is done on college time and paid for out of the vote. In addition, some of them, in the same way as the average professor at other universities, may receive grants from the defence research board, for work during the summer months.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: I take from the minister's remarks that grants to the service college in this respect would be on the same basis and in the same proportions as grants to the members of the staff of any university doing work for defence research?


Brooke Claxton: The same considerations
would apply.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I think there is a matter I should like to mention upon which the minister and I can agree more readily than the other matters I have mentioned. I refer to some complaints I have in regard to mail. I understand that so far as mail to Korea is concerned, there have been no complaints. Practically everyone has been well satisfied
6422	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence with it in recent months. There was some delay, but in recent months I believe the situation has been improved.
There have been, however, some complaints in connection with mail to Europe. I understand that the Canadian army postal corps looks after the mail for both the army and the air force in Europe. I understand they do an extremely good job of it and there is no complaint from that point of view. I understand, however, that the mail sometimes comes later than some people feel is necessary because of the fact that all the mail going to Europe has to go via T.C.A. even though there are R.C.A.F. planes going over. Although it would provide better service the mail cannot go via R.C.A.F. because it would mean competition with T.C.A. When the minister replies, I should like him to comment on that. I ask him if that is indeed the case, and if it is the case, I would ask him if he could not get that corrected so the service would be improved.
Another complaint I have received concerns the price of mail. The complaint in this regard is that Canadian rates are much higher than those of the British or United States servicemen alongside of whom the Canadians are serving. The British get ordinary letters for twopence-halfpenny and send air mail letters for sixpence for the first half ounce. The United States servicemen get their mail at the regular civilian rate of 6 cents. The Canadian rates are 5 cents for ordinary letters, which is twice the British rate, and 15 cents for a half ounce air mail. This rate is equivalent to one shilling threepence or three times the British rate. This is not a very important matter, I realize, but it is these little things, I have found in my personal experience, that cause a lot of trouble. These things such as the type of food, the way it is being prepared or served, some of these complaints over mail, are the things that cause a lot of trouble completely out of proportion to their own intrinsic importance. If one looks after a lot of the little things, very frequently you will have a unit in which there is no trouble and where the spirit and morale is very much better than it would be if you let a few of these little things go along with a lot of people labouring under a sense of injustice.
In addition to that, there is another complaint. I am informed that so far as the mail in Canada is concerned people on a station have to get their mail through the station post office. They cannot have a box there or anything along that line. The mail is put in a rack and they have to go and pick it up. They are not allowed to have the mail delivered to the general delivery in the place
[Mr. Harkness.l

where they happen to be or to have a box there. This is another matter that is not very important, but as I say it is the small complaints that cause difficulty. They are matters which I believe the minister should investigate. I have received representations on the actual conditions that exist, and he may perhaps get them corrected.


Brooke Claxton: I agree with the hon. member about the importance of mail. This is something we have been trying to look after very carefully. I must say that I have had very few complaints, generally speaking. The mail seems to have been very well delivered. I have had no complaints at all about delivery to Europe.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I said my reports on the Canadian postal corps were excellent. Everybody agreed they did a good job.


Brooke Claxton: I shall be glad to look into it. If the R.C.A.F. do not carry mail to Europe it may be because their airlift is fully occupied by their own loads. We have hired a good deal of T.C.A. airlift service to Europe to service the R.C.A.F. abroad. There may be something also in connection with licences to carry mail or something of that kind.
Now, with regard to rates, I am very surprised at the complaint. I have never heard the suggestion before that rates were other than reasonable. Ordinary letter rate is 4 cents to the orient.


Douglas Scott Harkness: I was talking about Europe.


Brooke Claxton: The air mail rate to the Orient is 7 cents for the first ounce. The air mail rate to Europe is 15 cents each half ounce.


Douglas Scott Harkness: That is what I said.


Brooke Claxton: The forces letter rate is 5 cents, which would seem to be a very reasonable rate, in view of the distance to Europe.


Douglas Scott Harkness: The point is, as I understand it, that the people in Europe have to pay the regular rate. They do not get a forces letter rate, as the British do.


Brooke Claxton: They get a forces letter form for 5 cents, and it carries a lot. This rate is much less than the United States, as I understand it.
Reserve force (including Canadian Officers Training Corps).


George Randolph Pearkes: I was going to speak on the reserve forces.


Brooke Claxton: If we have reached that point I believe I should make a statement. In my opening speech on May 20, and again in reply on May 21, I said that I would make a statement on the reserve forces at this time when

we came to this item. It would seem to be the most appropriate time to do so.
The reserve army, or the non-permanent active militia, as it was called, played the major role in the build-up of the Canadian army during the great war 1914-18 and the second world war, and contributed greatly to the fine record of Canada in both these wars.
Since the end of the second world war, and particularly during the last five years, there have been a number of developments which must be taken into account in considering the organization of the reserve army so as to be best prepared at any given time to meet an emergency if and when it should occur.
These developments include the war in Korea; commitment of an infantry brigade to the NATO forces in western Europe; rotation requirements; increasing emphasis on continental defence; a tenfold increase in the size of the regular army since 1939 and an even more considerable increase in its fighting effectiveness.
It has come to be generally accepted that if there were a third world war it would fall into two or more fairly well-defined stages, and the requirements of the Canadian army in the first stage could only be met by fulltime or regular forces.
The role of the reserve force of the army today is, therefore, to provide a partially trained and equipped force as the nucleus of units to be mobilized and brought up to strength in the case of an emergency. The effectiveness of the reserve force depends upon a strong hard corps of volunteers, and it also depends on the active support of Canadian people throughout the country.
In May of last year the chief of the general staff, on the recommendation of the conference of defence associations and with the concurrence of the Minister of National Defence, established a committee of distinguished soldiers for the purpose of examining, reporting and recommending on the organization, training and administration of the Canadian army reserve force with a view to improving its effectiveness.
This committee was headed by Major General Howard Kennedy, C.B.E., M.C., and had, as additional members, Major General E. J. Renaud, C.B., C.B.E., C.D., and Major General H. F. G. Letson, C.B., C.B.E., M.C., E.D. The wide experience in civil and military affairs of the members of this committee and in particular the close association of Major Generals Kennedy and Letson with the reserve force over a period of many years, made them particularly suited to study and advise on problems of the reserve force.
Supply-National Defence Before beginning their survey, this committee was thoroughly briefed concerning peace and wartime plans for the Canadian forces. In the course of its examination and study the committee visited reserve force units from coast to coast, both at their local headquarters and during annual camp. Discussions were held with senior reserve force officers of all corps. The recommendations of the committee, therefore, were based on long experience and on close and comprehensive study on the ground of conditions and problems.
The report of the committee was submitted to the chief of the general staff in January last. It has been examined by army headquarters and discussed in detail with the conference of defence associations, as well as the general officers commanding the five army commands.
It should be observed that no particular reference is made to the various types of training-at summer or other camps, corps schools, week-end training at areas near unit headquarters, et cetera-because great latitude is already allowed each command, area and unit, so as to enable each unit best to meet local conditions.
As a result of the report and the detailed study and consideration which followed, it has now been decided to take the following steps:
1.	There will be an extensive reorganization of militia units to relate them more closely to possible wartime requirements, effective peacetime training and local support. This reorganization includes:
(a) Present brigade and other formation headquarters will be replaced by a new type to be known as militia group headquarters:
(b)	as the anti-tank defence role has been transferred from the artillery to the armoured corps, a number of artillery units will be converted:
(c)	excess anti-aircraft will be converted to other types of artillery or amalgamated with units of other corps;
(d)	as coast defence has become the primary responsibility of the navy and air force, the coast defence units will become harbour defence batteries:
(e)	as the type of training in field park squadrons is not suited to the reserve force, field park squadrons of the reserve force will be converted to or included in field squadrons:
(f)	two of the signal regiments are to be amalgamated to form one signal regiment;
(g)	the Royal Canadian Army Service Corps, the Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps, and the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps will be reorganized to reflect as closely as possible the potential support in their localities;
(h)	there will be a number of changes in infantry formations.
2.	The Canadian army (reserve force) is to be renamed the Canadian army (militia).
3.	The Canadian army (active) will be known as the Canadian army (regular).
4.	There will be an adviser to the chief of the general staff in militia matters. The officer to be

Supply-National Defence selected will be a senior officer with extensive service in the reserve. The first officer appointed is Major-General H. F. G. Letson, C.B., C.B.E., M.C.,
E.D.	.	.	.
5.	A new directorate combining militia and cadets will be set up at army headquarters.
6.	Accommodation and training facilities for the militia are being reviewed and new construction and additional facilities will be progressively provided as funds permit.
7.	Steps are being taken to explain, emphasize and enforce the obligations which a man undertakes on joining a unit of the militia.
8.	Minimum attendance, equivalent to 15 days' training, will be necessary before a member of the militia is entitled to receive pay.
9.	The foregoing provision must be taken with a new bonus to be paid to each individual attending annual camp, provided he has attended not less than 75 per cent of local unit training in the six months preceding summer camp.
10.	Training standards will be amended to enable a militia soldier to obtain his qualification in stages and to receive credit for any stage reached.
11.	Field summer uniforms are to be issued for wear at camp and local headquarters training in warm weather.
12.	Qualification badges in various military trades and specialties will be worn on uniforms as well as chevrons to denote length of service in the militia.
13.	Full-time assistance is to be provided on an increased scale to aid militia units in their administration.
14.	Unit allowances are to be simplified and consolidated to reduce the work involved in bookkeeping.
15.	Grants for bands will be increased and provision of suitable instruments will be accelerated under a replacement program.
16. An allowance will be made for a dress uniform for bands.
17.	In order to provide assistance in arranging local publicity for militia units, each HQ and major unit will be able to have an additional militia officer specifically for public relations duties.
18.	There will be a substantial increase in grants to army cadet units and additional clothing will be provided for them.
19.	Officers, serving in various honorary appointments, many of whom have done much to promote interest in the service, will be eligible for 'he Canadian forces decoration.
20.	Income tax will now be deducted at source for all members of the militia unless a member claims that his total net taxable income is below the minimum taxable and requests that no deductions be made.
The action outlined here has been considered with the committee and is in accordance with its views.
In dealing with this matter, I should like to emphasize that the steps being taken with respect to the army reserve force are in effect the views of the reserve force itself, as ascertained and weighed by the committee under Major General Kennedy.
I should add that while the committee under Major General Kennedy made recommendations with regard to specific units, of necessity the list of specific units that were to be affected was not put before the conference and therefore was not specifically

approved by it, though the conference did approve, in principle, the general steps I have outlined.
Not only is this the case but the changes recommended have all been discussed with the conference of defence associations, representing the twelve different corps associations. This body, which represents every single unit in the reserve forces, has unanimously approved the committee's recommendat.'ins to which I have referred, thus indicating that these recommendations have the active support of all its member corps.
The changes proposed are planned to tap the resources of interested and available personnel so as to provide the best basis for the build-up of forces that may be required in the second or later stages of another world war. The over-all number of units will be substantially reduced. It is expected that at the outset these changes may result in some reductions in the total number of officers and men on strength. But it is expected that they will result in more effective use of personnel.
It is hoped to work all these changes out so that there will be as few as possible actual disbandments and no loss of existing support or local interest. Further consideration is being expedited in the hope that all necessary changes will be satisfactorily completed at an early date. The reserve force associations have promised their strong support in carrying all this into effect.
In conclusion, I should like to appeal to the House of Commons sitting in committee and to the public generally to support the steps to which I have referred. The3r are designed to meet anticipated changes in the needs and requirements of the service and to produce increased efficiency and effectiveness of the reserve force of the army, henceforth to be known as the Canadian Army (militia). The support of the reserve force associations will, I am sure, ensure success in carrying out the new policies and changes which I have announced but the degree of that success will rest primarily on the popular support accorded it throughout the country. If this support is not continuously given many of these improvements and changes will be largely vitiated. The role, importance, and potentialities of the reserve force must be understood and acted upon.
The militia units will in no small degree be community units. Community organizations can do much toward educating our youth in the value of our free institutions. They can point out that it is the duty of each individual Canadian to do what he can

to safeguard these institutions by service in the regular or reserve forces. Employers and trade unions can assist by encouraging young men and women to join the militia and by making it possible for them to acquire the necessary training and particularly practical training at summer camps.
The citizen who plays his part in Canada's militia is serving the interests of his country at the expense of his own free time. He must be made to feel that the public appreciates the effort he is making in peacetime just as much as the appreciation shown to those who participate in active service. All our citizens can thus contribute to creating the realization in our youth that service in the militia is an honourable duty which all should discharge in order that as many Canadians as possible may be made ready to defend their country.


George Randolph Pearkes: Mr. Chairman, of course you will realize it would be extremely difficult to comment adequately upon this important document which we have received only just this minute. In fact very few hon. members have even received a copy, and have to depend upon what they heard the minister say. I cannot help expressing regret that earlier publicity has not been given to the findings of this committee. As long ago as January of this year I asked the minister whether he intended to table the Kennedy report. He said he was not prepared to do that as it was a report prepared at the request of the chief on the general staff but that he would-and these were his words-report to the house very shortly. Well, a good many months have gone by since then, and there has been much uncertainty amongst the units of the Canadian Army (militia), as it is now to be called, because of this long delay.
We are told that the recommendations of the report, which the minister is prepared to accept, have been concurred in by the various defence associations. Of course no reference was made to the recommendations of the report which the minister is not prepared to accept, and that must unfortunately remain a closed book because we are not privileged to see the report. I hope they are not extensive because, as the minister has said, the success of the reserve army, of the militia unit, depends entirely upon the public support that they receive. We all believe that a reserve force is necessary.
General Gruenther has emphasized the importance of the reserves. Well, we cannot have an adequate and an efficient reserve force unless not only members of parliament but the whole public get behind those units.
83276-406J
oupply-National Defence I feel sure that members of the house from every party and group will give support to the units of the reserve force.
If there is any comment at the present moment as to the recommendations of this report, I think it is likely to be upon the fact that we really do not know what the Kennedy report says and what their main recommendations or what the other recommendations are that the minister is not prepared to accept.
In those items which were mentioned I note with particular satisfaction that there is to be an adviser to the chief of the general staff on militia matters. The emphasis on our forces has veered in recent years from the reserve forces to the active forces. Remember that in the days before world war II there was a very small active force and the energies of the Department of National Defence and the staffs across the country were mainly directed to increasing the efficiency of the reserve units. After the second world war that emphasis was changed., and there has to a certain extent been a neglect of the reserve units. By appointing a particular adviser to the chief of the general staff and a man of the experience, both with the reserve and in special duties, of Major General Letson, we may rest assured that the requirements of the reserve forces in the future will be vigorously presented to the chief of the general staff.
As lar as I can gather from recommendation No. 9, it would seem that there will be a bonus paid now to men who have completed a certain percentage of their training in camp. That is dependent upon their having carried out a certain number of days' training prior to moving into camp. I think that the change of name and change of status of the brigade commands is a step in the right direction, because quite obviously those brigade commands could not assume the ordinary duties of a brigade headquarters on, mobilization. They were not called upon to do so during the mobilization of 1939. Specially selected officers from the country as a' whole were chosen for brigade commands and brigade staffs.
I know of no one single recommendation which will meet with greater approval' amongst the personnel of the reserve forces than will the last one with reference to income tax. Members on this side of the house have repeatedly asked that some relief should be given to the officers and men who have contributed so much of their time. I am pleased that when an actual canvass was made by these three retired generals they sensed the wish of the reserve unit and they
6426	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence have been able to have the government accept a recommendation which will relieve the officers and men from income tax payments in part on their reserve army pay.
I do not intend to comment further on this report at the present time. I am pleased that it has been referred to the defence associations. In fact, it is quite obvious that the defence associations a year ago really initiated the idea that such an investigation should be carried out. The fact that the various corps associations approved the recommendations of the investigating committee, which have been accepted by the government, indicate that they are prepared to accept those recommendations and to stand behind the plans of the department to try and make the reserve forces more efficient.
I think it is of the utmost importance that the names of the units which are to change their corps or be disbanded or in any way affected be published at the earliest possible moment. I had hoped the minister would have been able to attach as an appendix to this report a list of those changes. There is merely the announcement that there are going to be many changes and that will continue the uncertainty. Until the changes are published it will be very hard for the commanding officers of the various units to proceed with the training programs.
The one point which strikes me as perhaps not being as sound as I would like to have seen it is the fact that a reduction is being made in the number of anti-aircraft artillery. I should have thought that the reserve army would have been called upon to play a major role in the defence of this country and provide anti-aircraft defence for the localities in which they are stationed. We have heard a good deal about the need for increased emphasis being placed upon civil defence, and the dangers to which this country might be subjected in the event of a third world war. It would seem to me that anti-aircraft artillery units should work in close co-operation with the civil defence organizations of the land, and therefore I am surprised to hear the minister state-and I think I heard correctly-that there was to be a considerable reduction in the number of anti-aircraft units in the reserve army.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Mr. Chairman, since the minister has just made this statement tonight I have had no opportunity of studying it and I propose to make only one or two brief comments on it, particularly in view of the fact that the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich, despite the extremely short notice, has covered the report very well. Following the remarks of the Leader of the Opposition
IMr. Pearkes.l

this morning, however, the minister stated in connection with the Kennedy report that there was no reason why the officials of the government should disclose the reasons for any action the government might take. I presume he had in mind the fact that he was going to give us this report tonight and his remarks struck me as rather peculiar because I have always understood that one of the duties of the opposition was to ask questions in regard to the reasons why the government took any particular action, and that one of their functions was to secure and probe into these reasons. I think the statement the minister made to the effect that there was no reason why the government should disclose reasons for any action they may take is directly contrary to our ordinary democratic procedures and the way in which we carry on government in this country.
I am extremely glad we have had this report. From what I could gather as the minister read his statement there are going to be quite a lot of changes which will help improve the reserve forces, which is an aim for which I think we are all striving. However, I am sorry we have not got the Kennedy report itself so that as a result we could form our own conclusions on the evidence presented by units all across Canada and gathered by the three generals who conducted the investigation. In other words, I think we in this house are entitled to have the reasons why the decision which has just been announced was arrived at and to know the basis on which it was arrived at. However, I am glad we at least have the statement made by the minister. One thing I noted in particular was that a definite decision has been taken to transfer the antitank corps at divisional level to the armoured corps, and that a number of anti-tank units will be transferred from artillery to the armoured corps. I am sure the artillery will very much regret losing those units but it will be to gain the advantage of armour and certainly I think it is a proper move to make. I think the self-propelled anti-tank guns in use today can be of better use in the armoured corps than in the artillery, and I think a move in this direction should have been made long before this. As I pointed out earlier, for the past two or three years we have not had any anti-tank units or components in our army at all, and I am extremely glad that we are now going to have these units as part of the armoured corps.


William Alfred Robinson: Does that conclude the discussion on reserve army?


Some hon. Members:: Ten o'clock.


Gage Workman Montgomery: Mr. Chairman, I wanted to say a few words on the reserve army. I refrained this morning from saying anything about the reserve army although I am interested in it. We have a battalion in my area which gained fame during the last war and during the previous one, and I might say to the minister that there has been a great deal of dissatisfaction during the last few months and a lot of rumours due no doubt to the fact that this Kennedy committee has been going around and the officers and men do not know what is going to happen to them. As my colleague said a few minutes ago, I think it is important that the list of these battalions or regiments that are going to be maintained be posted soon. A great many of these units right now do not know what is going to happen. The officers are having a difficult time to get men out. The men are wondering whether the unit is going to be disbanded.
You would be surprised to know, Mr. Chairman, how much information about this report is around the country. How much of it is authentic is what we do not know. I think it is most unfortunate that the government do not see fit to inform members of parliament of the true facts about a report like this. We are the people who are approached when we go back to our constituencies. When we go to our homes these people want to know what is going on in Ottawa. They almost think we are not around in the house and that we do not even ask the department what is going on. When we tell them that the department will not disclose these facts, they are amazed. I want to bring out that point.
I think we are entitled to this information and that we should receive it at an early date. If you expect us and the public to give you the support which you need to have a successful reserve military force, you must pass out the information. That is the first lesson that we all learned in the army. You cannot carry out any successful exercise unless everybody is in the picture. You just cannot take out a few staff officers and a lot of brass and carry out a successful exercise. Anybody who is in the army will agree with me on that point. Everybody must be in the picture.
I believe we should have good reserve forces. I believe that they really will be the first line of defence in case of trouble. The active forces you have are all tied up and they will continue to be tied up, and they will be the last troops to get to the vital places where defence is necessary. Defence is therefore going to fall back on what you are now going to call the reserve or the
Supply-National Defence militia group. You therefore need the support of the public, and you will not get that support unless you put the public in the picture. If you do not put the members of parliament in the picture, you will not get the public in the picture. I therefore think it is important that we be told all the facts and that we be told them at an early date so that we can talk intelligently, so that we can help you, so that you can help the public, and so that we can get together and in cooperation have a good reserve unit.
I know that for a number of years before the last war it was not easy to get a reserve unit up to strength or up to standard. I was one of those who had the experience of spending not only a little bit of money and time but quite a bit of it. I may say that I never regretted it because we had a battalion which, when the war broke out, was one of the best in our brigade. It was selected, thank goodness, because of the fact that it had won the brigade prize for a number of years. That was not done by sitting back and not putting the public in the picture. You cannot expect to have a good reserve unit unless you have the businessmen, the ordinary farmers in the community and all the people behind that unit. In order to do that, you must give some support to the officers and to the members of parliament, the members of the legislature and the businessmen in that community.
I may sound a little bit drastic in this matter but really and truly I have sat back since the war and noticed the reserve unit going down and down. It has been going down because it has not been getting the support of the public; and it has not been getting the support of the public because nobody has ever come down to our area and invited to a meeting the ordinary citizens and the ordinary farmers from which we have to draw our recruits, the people in that community. Nobody has ever asked them to a meeting to explain what the reserve army is for or what role the reserve army is expected to carry out in case of an emergency. Unless you are prepared to do that, you will not get a good reserve unit. I plead with the minister.
Under this reorganization I hope that unit in my area will be one of the units that will be retained. I do not know whether it will be retained or not. It could be possible that it will not be retained. I suppose that better units will be selected. Maybe that matter has all been decided. But if it is retained you could have a good unit, if you give us some support. If you put us into the picture you will get my support and you will get the support of many other reserve officers

Supply-*National Defence who are there. At the moment they will not do one thing because they do not know -and this is a fact-what role the reserve army should be playing. I claim that is the fault of the army. It is not the civilians' fault. I can be backed up in that statement by many other officers with good service in the last war and in the first war and who did good service in the reserve units between the wars.
I impress this point upon the minister. You have got to pass on all the information that you possibly can. If you do that you will get the support of the people who will make a good service unit. Pay is not going to bring them in. Pleasure is not going to bring them in. Security is not going to bring them in, except the type of security that you have got to impress upon those young men. You must impress upon them that they need this training to protect their wives and families in case of emergency. That is the type of training that will bring them in. You have got to give them enthusiasm, not for the few dollars they will earn but because they really believe in a cause, because they believe there may be another war, and that if there were another war their service would be needed. I believe it is needed. I believe that is the type of training these young men need.
Royal Canadian Air Force-regular and general.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: Mr. Chairman-
Mr. Hansel!: Mr. Chairman, will you call it ten o'clock?


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: Are we carrying on, Mr. Chairman?


William Alfred Robinson: Shall the hon. member have leave to continue?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Harold Edward Winch: Ten o'clock.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Ten o'clock.


William Alfred Robinson: Has the hon. member unanimous consent to proceed?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: Unfortunately I did not make myself too clear at the time. Perhaps I can have this evening an enlargement upon that reply.
I asked the minister this question: In the case of veterans of world war II re-enlisting in the Canadian armed forces is any reference made to world war II records for screening purposes? In reply to that question I received the answer "Yes". I should like to go a little bit further and to ask the minister whether, in the case of these veterans of world war II re-enlisting- whether it be in the air force or in the army -any reference is made to the records of the Department of Veterans Affairs. If that is so it would avoid a situation that crops up periodically in our defence forces where an undesirable recruit seems to slip through the screening net, with considerable embarrassment to the department as well as to himself. I would appreciate it if the minister could reply to the extended question I have presented to him this evening.
I have also been interested in the washout rate among aircrew in particular. It has been suggested from time to time that because of the difficulty of obtaining a desirable type of recruit for aircrew training the wash-out rate is unnecessarily high among our R.C.A.F. recruits. Is it possible to give any information on this score and any statistics which will present a comparison of our wash-out rate with that of trainees from the other NATO countries participating in our air training scheme?
Recently the Department of National Defence has extended its excellent program for training university students in the various branches of the services. I note that on page 27 of the white paper, I believe it is, the total figure is given of the number of students taking part under the R.O.T.P. scheme. The figure for the R.C.A.F. is 1,984. I believe this scheme was further extended recently making it possible for university students to have a short experience in the armed forces during the summer recess with the hope of encouraging such students to participate in the more extensive R.O.T.P. scheme. Does the figure of 1,984 for the air force include this special group or does the total figure of officer cadets for all the armed forces that is given in the white paper, 6,955, include this particular group?
I also note that the expenditure for film displays and other material of that kind is up from $935,000 to $1,509,000 for the current year. This would suggest that the Department of National Defence is contemplating a more vigorous recruiting program than hitherto. It also suggests that perhaps the recruiting program has not been going

as well as anticipated with the result that the department considers there is a necessity of giving further publicity to this important aspect of our whole defence program.


Brooke Claxton: In answer to the hon. member's interesting questions, he asked first whether, in the case of veterans of world war II desiring to enlist, any reference is made to their records in world war II. I am informed that when they apply to join one of the forms they sign is a form dealing with their previous war experience. That form is referred for further inquiry to the Department of Veterans Affairs which keeps the records of veterans of the first and second world wars. My understanding is that the answer is yes, but I do not want to suggest for a moment that this is done sufficiently rapidly to screen out people who may have had bad records. An effort is made, but this is a very large-scale operation. We are dealing with another government department, and I am not sure whether or not that is done in time to turn down a man on the score that he has had a bad record if he does not disclose it himself. However, a check is made.
The hon. member also asked about the wash-out rate for aircrew. This rate is not given in any country. We have checked this, and I think hon. members will appreciate the reasons for not doing so. I am not in a position to give any comparison between the wash-out rate for R.C.A.F. and other trainees. This is a matter which is receiving continuous consideration by everyone concerned in our air force and the other air forces, and we are working together very closely on it. I must say personally that I am reaching the point where, having had some experience and having discussed the matter extensively with experts in this field in other countries, I am beginning to doubt whether increasing the level of selection produces a corresponding decrease in the rate of losses in training. You get to a point where, whatever the rate of refusal on selection is, statistically the rate of losses in training appears to be just about the same, so that you could select out too high a proportion without getting corresponding returns. However, that is an idea of mine. Other people are testing the matter scientifically.
The hon. member also asked whether in the figures given in the white paper for R.O.T.P. personnel we include any of this new group he mentioned. I was not able to hear precisely what he said. If they are officer candidates from the universities or the service colleges then they are included. If, however, they were previously officers and are taking
Supply-National Defence refresher courses they are not included in that figure. The figure in the white paper is for officer candidates only.
The hon. member inquired about the expenditure in an item on page 317, I believe. I understand he was referring to the item for films, displays, broadcasting, advertising and other informational materials, $936,000 for this year and $936,700 for last year. It is very much the same figure. We feel it is desirable to maintain advertising at about the same level, but I can assure the hon. member and the house that this matter is being reviewed within the next two or three weeks to see if we cannot effect some further reduction in recruiting expenses. We have some experience in this regard. We did make a substantial reduction in March, April, May and June of 1950 and the rate of recruiting slipped very materially. We were about reaching our then targets or coming within sight of them. Then we had the Korean affair and it was necessary to build up the program again. Personally I am rather opposed to making too sharp a drop until we see whether or not we are maintaining our present levels in the services and increasing them slightly towards the targets.
Of course, hon. members should appreciate that as we attain our target, not that we will ever have any fixed target because we will be changing from year to year, but as we reach about the targets we will see that wasting will exactly equal intake and intake will equal wastage. We shall have an exact equilibrium. People will talk then about our high rates of wastage. Our aim will be to maintain our intake at precisely the level necessary to meet wastage. As long as we do that, we will be meeting the target.
Naturally, we will always be striving to keep down wastage in order to keep the men of experience. Actually our wastage rates for the three services are I believe very favourable. Let me put it this way, our rates of re-engagement for the three services are very favourable. I have got the rates for other countries and for ours, and they are improving in our country or holding their own, while relative to the others with which we are familiar, they are very much better. This is a good position, but I should like to see it still better.


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: I should like to ask one further question concerning the use of D.V.A. files. Can the minister indicate whether it has been the practice to refer to D.V.A. files since the beginning of recruiting in connection with the Korean campaign or recruiting since Korea or is it a new practice that has been added in recent times?
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Brooke Claxton: This is relatively recent.


Harold Edward Winch: I have just one short question. I am not going to raise the matter which I understand is being discussed between the Department of Transport and the minister of defence, the matter of the skyways for the various planes, but I should like to draw the attention of the minister to the hundreds of millions of dollars Canada has invested in aeroplanes. Surely we do not want to see them damaged if it is at all possible to escape damage. We all know that accidents will happen, but why invite accidents?
The question I should like to ask the minister is: Is it not possible to issue and enforce orders that R.C.A.F. planes shall not deliberately buzz the major cities of the Dominion of Canada? I was home over the Easter week end for a few days, and not one but a number of aeroplanes zoomed and buzzed the major city of Vancouver. It was really frightening. The roar of the planes was such that you would have thought a plane was in trouble and coming down. All the windows rattled. People by the thousands dashed out of their homes to see what was happening. 1 did myself. Here were a number of planes, five or seven, zooming back and forth over the city of Vancouver. If there had been a slight defect in the plane, the pilot and crew were absolutely doomed, as was the property and lives of the people of Vancouver. Why is it allowed to continue? Can it not be stopped?


Brooke Claxton: Both the Royal Canadian
naval air arm and the Royal Canadian Air Force have to fly by the rules regarding civil aviation. They are just as much subject to those rules as commercial aircraft, and that applies to low flying or flying on certain levels, flying by instruments and everything else. They are completely subject to the same rules. I can assure you that in the case of the two service air forces, these rules are strictly enforced. Whenever any infraction is found, severe disciplinary action is taken. When this happens a man may be dismissed from the service, and then very frequently I have representations made that he should be restored.
I know of the incident in Vancouver to which the hon. member referred. It was drawn to my attention before. This was an occasion when the naval air arm had been out doing some exercises at Patricia bay. On the way back from Patricia bay to the east they, as a way of celebrating the Queen's birthday, did a flypast over Vancouver. They understood that this had been advertised and cleared with the local people, the newspapers and so on. Apparently it was not, and it was a surprise. This was planned and organized
[Mr. Dinsdale.l

as a patriotic demonstration, as is done on numerous occasions. We had a magnificent flypast over Ottawa on the occasion of the coronation when 140 aircraft went by. Some of them were below ordinary flying height, but very little danger is involved in that. However, it is disturbing and I am assured there was a misunderstanding about it, otherwise it would not have occurred.
With regard to other matters, we simply are not in a position to say to the R.C.A.F. that they must not fly in or out of the airfields that have been built for the R.C.A.F. at vast expense to the Canadian people, whether they be at Moose Jaw, Saskatoon or any of the other places. Each of these airfields probably represents an investment of $30 million. They have to be located near a city and they are operated as safely as possible. At some of these airfields the trainees rise and descend at the rate of more than one a minute, so that the air may at times be infested with Harvards. If the weather is clear, there is no reason why that should represent a hazard.
In the case of the Moose Jaw business I have nothing to add to the statement made by the Minister of Trade and Commerce who made the statement for the government in that connection. We are looking into it and we are hoping to arrive at some very sensible and reasonable provision which will make it less likely than the almost mathematical impossibility that a collision should occur. It is almost impossible to conceive that a collision should have occurred between those two aircraft in broad daylight; yet it did; that is being investigated.


Frederick Davis Shaw: Earlier in the day the minister indicated his intention of placing on the record a statement regarding fire-fighting equipment and facilities.


Brooke Claxton: Yes, I did. The hon. member asked me about fire in R.C.A.F. hangars, and I promised to give him and other hon. members at various times, information about it. I thought it would be best if I dealt with all the questions at once. At the present time we have 137 hangars for storage or maintenance work. Of this total only 26 were constructed after the second world war. The new hangars are all of fire-resistant construction. The 161 older hangars cost a total of approximately $14 million when they were constructed. They were, of course, rushed up and were of temporary wooden construction. They have lasted much longer than planned, and many of them are still capable of being used, particularly in view of the fact to replace them all with modern fire-resistant types would cost approximately $177 million today. You get into a position

where the interest on the cost of replacement would be far bigger than the average amount of fire loss on this account, which has been about $700,000 a year.
Consequently, we have a replacement program with which we are proceeding, but on the basis of economy we would not be justified in tearing down these old hangars and replacing them even if we had the productive machinery and resources to do it at once.


Frederick Davis Shaw: I should like to stress, of course, that I did not at any time suggest they should tear down the old hangars and replace them. Would the minister indicate the system of fire watching that is maintained? If he recalls, when I was speaking previously, I quoted an editorial from one of the Calgary daily papers in which it was indicated that to the best of their knowledge an adequate system of fire watching was not maintained. I believe they pointed out that with the amount of investment in government hangars they would be warranted in having one person on duty at all times. We realize fully that when a fire starts in a hangar, at least if it makes any headway at all, it is just about impossible to stop it. But it does seem to me that if someone is on the spot at all times that a fire might very easily be detected in its very early stages, and there would probably be some opportunity of stopping it. Just what is the policy with respect to that?


Brooke Claxton: At each air station they have a service fire-fighter squad which is highly trained and fully equipped. In this case it was on the scene of the fire within a minute of discovery. In addition, there are fire prevention services and patrols. They are arranged in accordance with the regulations laid down by headquarters of the three services and with the work of the fire marshals. If we had men constantly on duty at each of say six hangars it would mean 24 men a day, and would amount to a good deal of money.


John Angus MacLean: Mr. Chairman, I have had some complaints from officers who served in the air force during the second world war and then went into civilian life, some of them working for various government departments. They were then called back into the service at the time of the Korean crisis. They were given leave of absence by the departments for only four years. Now they are in the position of either leaving the air force and forfeiting their gratuities-that is, if the air force would let them go; and the air force is under no obligation to do so-or, having overstayed their four years' leave of absence from the department of government, they have lost their jobs in civil employment.
Supply-National Defence What liaison is there between the Department of National Defence and other departments of government?


Brooke Claxton: This is the first time the question has been brought to my attention. I will look into it.


John Angus MacLean: Thank you very much. As a matter of fact I have taken it up with the department concerned. Now, I have a question regarding civil employees. I notice there is a very large increase in some classifications of employees. For example typists, cleaners and helpers. I suppose these are civilians who are employed to replace service personnel?


Brooke Claxton: Yes.


John Angus MacLean: In the case of cleaners and helpers, for instance, the number has increased from 39 to 482, as set out at page 315. Then, there are other large increases in some other trades, although those increases are not as great as the one I have indicated.


Brooke Claxton: This is largely a reclassification by the civil service commission of a number of messmen positions to those of cleaners and helpers.


John Angus MacLean: And I notice the same thing in connection with the corps of commissionaires. Is this just a reclassification?


Brooke Claxton: We are trying so far as possible to replace service personnel by members of the corps of commissionaires.


John Angus MacLean: I believe it is the intention of the air force to move the wing in North Luffenham to the continent, if that has not already been done. Is it the intention to retain North Luffenham as a Canadian air force station, or will that be returned to the R.A.F.?


Brooke Claxton: It will be returned. We do not propose to make the move until the station at Marville in France is built and ready for habitation. Then the move will be made. It was first planned that this move would have taken place in December, but that would not have been a very good time to make a move. As it happens the station is not likely to be ready. Married quarters will not be quite ready and the move will not be made until March or April.


John Angus MacLean: Then a further question. I notice that in the reserve air force there are a group of civilian employees for whom there was no item last year. What is the explanation of that? Is it considered now that it is beneficial to employ civilians in reserve squadrons? I am referring to what appears at page 318.
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Brooke Claxton: These have been carried here as part of the active force increment with the reserve squadron.


John Angus MacLean: Would the minister be kind enough to make a very brief statement as to what progress is being made in two regards, first as to the equipping of squadrons stationed in Canada with CF-lOO's and the other as to the equipping of squadrons overseas with Orenda-powered Sabres.


Brooke Claxton: With regard first to the equipping of squadrons with CF-lOO's, I may say that is continuing. As I said before, I expect all the regular squadrons to be equipped with CF-lOO's will be organized and in existence, and at least partly equipped with CF-lOO's, by the end of this year.
The delivery of Orendas for the F-86 is going on apace. Aircraft are being flown across. They are being put on stations. We will be making aircraft available with the J-47 engine when they are released and available for mutual aid.
I think hon. members would be interested in a fact that I believe I can give safely now. I refer to the figures of aircraft we have disposed of to other countries. We transferred to Great Britain 370 Sabres with, of course, American engines and other government-found property representing about 30 per cent of the cost. We sold to the United States 60 Sabres for use in Korea, and 60 for transfer by them to Great Britain. We have now allocated to Greece and Turkey 82 each. If my mental arithmetic is right that represents a total of 594 Sabres that we have made available to other countries, in addition to those necessary to equip ourselves.
We have already produced, of this leading aircraft of this type, over 1,100. And when you speak about the Russians having 20,000 front-line aircraft, of which 50 per cent are jets, it must be kept in mind that we have produced 1,100 of this type alone.


Donald Methuen Fleming: There is one matter, Mr. Chairman, I wish to mention. It has been the subject of correspondence between the two ministers and myself and relates to the construction by the Department of National Defence at the R.C.A.F. station on Avenue road in Toronto of a large three-storey building, which looks like a factory.
This property was sold by the city of Toronto to the crown in 1940 at the urgent request of the government. It is the old Eglinton Hunt Club property. The city conveyed the property at the request of the Department of National Defence to the crown in 1940, in view of a very urgent plea from the department to make the property available for use in connection with the activities of the Department of National Defence. It


has been developed as an R.C.A.F. station; not, of course, an operational station, but known as No. 1 A.T.S.
Last year, without any intimation to the property owners in the neighbourhood, the Department of National Defence erected on what had been the parade ground on Avenue road this building to which I have referred. It is not yet completed. It is a high, three-storey, red brick building, which has all the appearance of a factory. This building is erected in a residential area. All the property in the area is zoned, and the zoning restrictions are quite severe, in the general interest.
But when the Department of National Defence apparently decided that it needed more accommodation it gave no thought whatever to the effect the erection of this ungainly building was going to have upon property in the neighbourhood.
I may say to the committee, Mr. Chairman, that the effect of the erection of that building on that site in a residential area has been to depreciate the value of other residential property in the immediate neighbourhood quite substantially. You can just picture, Mr. Chairman, how you would feel if, living in a residential area, there was built right across from you a tall three-storey building, that has the appearance of a factory. That is how these people whose property has been damaged by the erection of that building feel over what has been done there.
The department can quibble and say: we are not bound by residential restrictions. They can go further and say that when they obtained the property at a very low price, indeed much below the actual value of the property in 1940, from the city of Toronto, it was made possible for them just to go ahead and use the existing buildings for the purpose of an R.C.A.F. station. That is a very different matter, Mr. Chairman, from coming along now and erecting an entirely new building on these premises, one, as I have indicated, which has lowered the value of properties in the neighbourhood very severely.
I brought this matter to the attention of the Minister of National Defence last year when the construction was commenced, and the minister's letter indicated that he would look into it. Then some time later I received a letter from the Associate Minister of National Defence saying in effect that these restrictions did not apply to this property. That is not the spirit of the agreement by which the property was conveyed to the crown in 1940. It happened that at that time I was chairman of the property committee of the city when the crown's representatives came before that committee and asked the city to convey that property. There was

no suggestion then about erecting new buildings on the property. There was a temporary building put up there tor the accommodation of personnel during the war. People did not object to that because it was a temporary building. There is nothing temporary about the building that has been erected now. It is a permanent three-storey brick dwelling, higher than any building in the neighbourhood and damaging all those affected.
Then the associate minister wound up his letter of December 17, 1953, by saying:
While the Royal Canadian Air Force does not wish to interfere with the activities of the community which it serves, it is felt that as reasonable people the citizens of Toronto should be prepared to accept any disadvantages there might be to having this situation in operation as such disadvantages are more than offset by the advantages accruing to the municipality through R.C.A.F. activities.
Mr. Chairman, that is no answer to the complaint of persons whose properties are damaged. The city of Toronto will be second to no municipality or community in this country in the support and loyal assistance that it gives to any activities of the armed forces in this country. It will be second to none in doing its part but, Mr. Chairman, it is a very different matter that citizens of a whole municipality, in this case a million people or more, are prepared to do their part from saying that people in the neighbourhood must submit above all others in the city to the damaging of their properties, and the subtraction of substantial amounts of money from their investments. Some of those people in the neighbourhood affected have invested their life savings in their homes.
I wish to raise again the complaint that I made last year which produced no effect as far as the department is concerned, and to say that I think the department has been very thoughtless, very unfair, in the way it has gone ahead with a project which has brought this damage upon the value of homes in the neighbourhood.


Brooke Claxton: I appreciate the point made by the hon. member. We have been criticized for having too good a building in Washington and not a good enough one in Toronto. I venture to say that if you look at the unit cost of the two buildings, you will find that they are within five cents or ten cents a cubic foot of each other. However, the one in Toronto is unquestionably on too small a lot. I think that really is the point about the building. That is all the area that there was to put it on, so it was put rather flush with the street and interferes with the street line. I certainly would like to have seen it put on a larger lot.
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Donald Methuen Fleming: That is not part of the point at all. The point is that this building was erected in a residential area. You do not take three-storey buildings with a factory appearance and erect them in a residential area. I have made a complaint, and I could put it very strongly. I think the department has been very thoughtless and very unfair to these people concerned in going ahead and putting up a building of that kind in the heart of a residential area of the city and in that way inevitably causing damage to the value of their properties. There is no member in this house who would feel otherwise than these people do if the Department of National Defence just went ahead in a residential area right across the road from them and put up a big three-storey brick building that just looks like a factory or warehouse.


Brooke Claxton: It is an office building.


Donald Methuen Fleming: From its appearance it might be a warehouse or a factory. I may tell the minister that this thoughtless action has damaged the value of homes and has subtracted a good many thousands of dollars from the investment that these people in that neighbourhood have in their homes. I raised the objection at the time when I thought it might still have been considered before the building was fully erected. Nothing was done. The plans were carried through and the building is now virtually completed. I think it is most unfair that the crown in a situation of this kind should take advantage of its own immunity from the effect of municipal bylaws in the case of property that it owns in a residential area. This property should never have been developed in this way, and the crown should never have erected this building on the property.


Douglas Scott Harkness: There is one matter I should like to ask the minister a question about. It concerns the notification of next-of-kin when there has been an air crash, and then the subsequent putting out of the information generally. I realize the fact that the next-of-kin must be notified before the information as to who has been killed in an air crash is released, but there is quite a bit of delay before the name is released generally or the names of people who have been killed in one of those crashes. During that intervening time a great deal of mental anguish is caused to parents, wives and so forth, of men who are serving in the same area. For example, a flash comes over the radio that there has been an aeroplane crash in New Brunswick at a certain station, and everybody who has a son or a husband serving there immediately wonders whether it

Supply-National Defence is his son, her husband and so forth. Until the general news is put out as to the name of that person these people of course go through great agonies of mind. As I say,
I appreciate the next-of-kin must be notified first, but I wonder whether it would not be possible to expedite this matter and get the genera] information out so that everybody knows it, and all the relatives know what their situation is more rapidly than has been the case heretofore. It would be a great help to morale and so forth if that could be done.


Brooke Claxton: That is appreciated, Mr. Chairman. As soon as an accident does occur every effort is made through every suitable means to notify the next-of-kin. The best possible means are chosen. If there is an air force padre in the neighbourhood he is at once put on the job by long distance telephone and signal. If not, some other minister, clergyman or priest who has had service connections or an officer commanding, or other suitable person, but we do try to give the first communication to the next-of-kin by word of mouth in person. I find, through a great deal of experience in this, that it is very desirable. Only last week we had a case where it was not possible to do that, where the next-of-kin learned through other sources in advance, and it created very unfortunate and unnecessary shock. As the hon. member said, the next-of-kin must be notified first. We try to do that with the utmost speed, but we have in mind the considerations the hon. member has brought to our attention.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Perhaps the minister did not get my point. I was concerned with the relatives of the people who have not been killed.


Brooke Claxton: Yes, who might have been flying.


Douglas Scott Harkness: Who are extremely worried that it is their relative who is concerned in this crash. My whole point was to try to get out the general information more rapidly than is being done.


Brooke Claxton: I appreciate that.


William Alfred Robinson: We shall now turn to Royal Canadian Air Force (reserve).
Royal Canadian Air Force (reserve).


Walter Gilbert Dinsdale: Mr. Chairman, the problem of the reserve in relation to the army has been mentioned earlier this evening and many of these factors relate themselves to the air force because, as has been pointed out, the reserve is the backbone of our defence
fMr. Harkness.]
program. One of the encouraging developments in our air force defence has been the establishment of at least an operational wing of CF-100 fighters. When I say an operational wing that is merely a guess because there is no specific information in the white paper as to the exact number of squadrons which are available for operational work today. But on page 7 of the white paper in the last sentence of paragraph 14 we have reference to the fact that auxiliary squadrons will in due course be converted to CF-100 fighters. I am wondering just what time element is involved in the phrase "in due course".
There have been one or two incidents in Canada during the past two years which have suggested there is a great deal of dissatisfaction among the members of the reserve serving in auxiliary squadrons concerning the type of operational equipment available to them. Their complement consists of Mustangs and Vampires both of which are obsolete and were obsolescent during world war II. It is therefore imperative, if the reserve squadrons are the backbone of our Canadian air defence, that this re-equipping process be brought forward as quickly as possibly. I trust it will be possible for the Minister of National Defence to give us some further details in this regard. I am sure it would mean much to the morale of those who are trying to do a job with equipment that is obviously far from being adequate.
On page 318 of the estimates relative to expenses for the reserve forces I note, and I believe I am right in these figures, that the expenditure last year was $5,750,400, and this year the estimated expenditure is $3,537,000, a decrease of some $2 million covering the activities of the reserve squadrons. I am wondering what this decrease represents. Does it mean that the reserve squadrons are not operating at full strength? I note also that pay and allowances are down and I would like to know how that saving indicated in the blue book is made up by the department.
I notice also that the item for expenditure on the air cadet corps is down slightly from $447,200 to $412,000. The air cadet movement is one of the best sources for potential recruits to the regular Canadian air force. Finally, on this matter of the reserve forces, there is a reference made under this section to a certain contribution made to various military groups and I wonder if the air force association is included in these grants. I have scanned the estimates and I have not been able to locate any reference to grants in aid of activities of this kind. I trust they are being given some support because the air force association, which is made up of

thousands of R.C.A.F. veterans of world war II, is a reservoir for auxiliary service personnel. It is out of the air force association that the participants in the mobilization assignment training program are largely recruited, and these air force associations right across the country are taking advantage of every available opportunity to promote the welfare of members of the R.C.A.F.
In my final word on reserve matters I would like to refer to a communication I received from the minister after our discussion on last year's estimates. Because we adjourned earlier last year than this year it was not possible for the minister to reply verbally to a question I had asked concerning the disposition of reserve units across the country. The minister in his reply dated May 15, 1953 indicated that it is contemplated that several reserve radar units would be established. During the past two years I have urged that an opportunity be given to our air force association wing in the city of Brandon to make a more positive contribution to the defence of Canada. We have one of the best wings in the country but up to the present time its contribution has been restricted largely to maintaining interest locally in air force matters because there has been no possibility of establishing a more or less active reserve unit in the city of Brandon. It occurs to me that one of these radar units, particularly a light warning set, would perhaps meet the need of an air force association such as we have in the city of Brandon. It would not involve too many personnel and would also provide basic training in a most important aspect of air force defence, that is in connection with our radar units. In his general statement the minister made reference to the fact that in the next decade we will be approaching the push button stage of aerial warfare and that, of course, means that radar will be the chief means whereby this will be accomplished. I would appreciate the minister making some comment on the questions I have raised. I would appreciate it if the minister would make some comment on those questions I have asked.


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman, I will answer the hon. member very rapidly. With regard to R.C.A.F. associations grant, if he will look at page 322 of the estimates, he will see provision for grants of $15,000. The reason for the reduction that there is in the air cadet appropriation is that this is more realistically related to what is intended for this year.
With regard to auxiliary squadrons, we expect to begin the equipment of existing
Supply-National Defence squadrons with CF-lOO's in 1955. But preliminary to that we plan this summer to start trying this out with a single squadron on an experimental basis. The problems involved in this operation are extremely complicated. In order to have the squadrons work with CF-lOO's, it will probably be necessary to have about half the strength regular force.
With regard to Mustangs, Mitchells and Vampires, may I say that Mustangs are very good aircraft for catching the kind of bombers that might come over at this particular period. Mitchells are going to continue to be used for the operation of cleaning up any landings that might take place. They are very good aircraft for the purpose. With regard to Brandon having an air station or reserve flight or something of the kind, I think the air force's answer to that would be that it has been found generally desirable to locate these air control and warning units, large or small, at places where active flying is carried on so that they can train on active flying by the R.C.A.F. and where there is not too far away a radar station which they would be mobilized to assist. Those two conditions do not exist at Brandon yet. However, we have to take it into consideration.
Contributions towards the military costs of NATO.


Ernest George Hansell: Mr. Chairman, I do not rise to speak on this item of NATO but to say that I think we have had a fairly full day. Here is NATO with an appropriation of $12 million. I think it is about time we called it a day and called it ten o'clock.


Mr. Harris:: Before we do so, Mr. Chairman, may I say that I appreciate the fact that we have had a full day, but it seems to me that hon. members are in excellent shape to contribute to the debate at this time rather than at another time.


Douglas Scott Harkness: We are very co-operative tonight.


Walter Edward Harris: You certainly are. I think the hon. member for Macleod could probably get the ear of the committee at this moment with a great deal of attention and that what he was about to say on NATO would be the local logical conclusion to many of the things that have been said here. I wonder whether he would reconsider so that we might finish this department tonight?


Ernest George Hansell: Mr. Chairman, I do not like to be unpopular; I like to be co-operative. It is not a matter of wanting to say anything. I am so tuckered out that I cannot listen.


Some hon. Members:: Carried.
Mutual aid.


Mr. Michener:: Before this item is concluded I should like to ask about a project

Supply-National Defence which the department seemed to have under way a short time ago, that of making the Long Branch rifle ranges available, by finding other property, so that they might be used for a housing project or other uses of that kind. Can the minister say how that matter stands?


Brooke Claxton: Yes. About five years ago I was brought into the picture with regard to Long Branch. We decided then, as a matter of policy, to co-operate with the provincial government, Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation and the local community in working out a complete plan under which we would give up Long Branch in exchange for an equally good and convenient bit of land on which to have a range. Owing to one reason or another that kind of arrangement was not carried out. I have since announced repeatedly that we are willing to go through with it so that the department of defence would have equivalent ground for the job somewhere else. We even went so far at one stage as to take expropriation proceedings to secure ground north of Toronto. I thought this was being done without objection from the local community. There were very few farmers concerned. However, in the end they objected strenuously and we dropped the matter. Now we are exploring the possibility of seeing whether, with the improved transportation facilities in Toronto and area, it may not be possible to use Borden. That suggestion is being explored.


[Stage Direction]
Items agreed to.
William Alfred Robinson: Shall I rise, report progress and request leave to sit again?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Brooke Claxton: If you have not left the chair, Mr. Chairman, may I express to hon. members appreciation for their co-operation.
Progress reported.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Walter Edward Harris: On Saturday evening I set out the agenda for this week. Subject to any unexpected changes we shall follow the order of departments as I set them out. That would mean that tomorrow we would begin with defence production, then take national health and welfare and follow with those that were indicated for tomorrow in the statement I made on Saturday evening.


Ernest George Hansell: Might I ask the house leader this question? Since we were co-operative in allowing this big item with regard to NATO to pass and in view of the fact that there are many items here that could conceivably come
under defence production, I am just wondering if he would like to co-operate with us a little bit and might suggest that we might be able to discuss this item on defence production.


Walter Edward Harris: I am not sure that I understand what my hon. friend is referring to. But certainly, at any rate, he has banked a little bit of good will on my part tonight.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Banks have been known to go broke, though.
It being twenty minutes after eleven the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
[The following items were passed in committee of supply]:



DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

[Stage Direction]
Defence services-
239.	To provide for the Canadian forces, the defence research board and other expenditures relating to defence, including contributions toward the military costs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; to authorize expenditures in the current year out of the amount hereby provided, not exceeding $300,000,000, under the provisions of section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1930, and to provide that, notwithstanding subsection 3 of that section, where equipment or supplies acquired by the Canadian forces after March 31, 1950, are transferred, the estimated present value thereof shall, if the governor in council so directs, be credited to this vote instead of being paid into the special account mentioned in the said subsection 3, and when so credited may be expended for the purposes of the Canadian forces; and notwithstanding section 30 of the Financial Administration Act to .authorize total commitments for the foregoing purposes of $4,577,641,724 regardless of the year in which such commitments will come in course of payment (of when it is estimated that $2,711,822,159 will come due for payment in future years), $1,865,819,565.
General services-
240.	Grants to military associations, institutes and others, as detailed in the estimates, $237,725.
241.	War museum, $24,690.
Pensions and other benefits-
242.	Civil pensions, as detailed in the estimates, $2,977.
243.	To authorize in respect of members of the Royal Canadian Air Force on leave without pay and serving as instructors with civilian training organizations operating under the British commonwealth air training plan who were killed, payments to their dependents of amounts equal to the amounts such dependents would have received under the Pension Act, as amended, had such service as instructors been military service in the armed forces of Canada, less the value of any benefits received by such dependents under insurance contracts which were effected on the lives of such members of the Royal Canadian Air Force by or at the expense of the civilian organizations, $4,356.
Defence Services Pension Act-
244.	Government's contribution to the permanent services pension account, $36,734,187.
[Stage Direction]
Tuesday, June 22, 1954