1953-02-16

Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, as a matter of privilege, I am sure you yourself and all hon. members of the house, no matter where they sit, are delighted to welcome back to the house the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell). We all hope that his recovery makes him as well as he looks at this time and that he will long continue to be as well as he looks.



CONGRATULATIONS TO HON. MEMBER FOR FORT WILLIAM ON BIRTHDAY

Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Mr. Speaker, it has been called to my attention that I omitted to mention that our venerable valentine, the dean in age of the House of Commons, celebrated his birthday on Saturday, St. Valentine's day. I am sure we all desire to express to the hon. member for Fort William (Mr. Mclvor) our wish that he may be the recipient of many more happy returns of St. Valentine's day and his birthday.



REPORT ON ORGANIZATION OF COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN RELIEF

Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Mr. Speaker, it might be of interest to hon. members of the house to inform them-they have no doubt learned of it through the newspapers-that the organization meeting of the Canadian national European flood relief committee was held at Government House on Friday afternoon under the chairmanship of His Excellency the Governor General. As hon. members know, that committee comprises the Prime Minister, the Leader of the Opposition, four other members of this house and the two lady members of the other house of parliament. Every one of the ten provincial premiers has welcomed the opportunity of serving on the committee, and the campaign has their warm support. It is being started today in all ten Canadian provinces but the national committee does not intend to organize the campaigns locally. It is counting upon the
welfare or service cluns in the various localities to set up their local organizations. But in handling a matter of that character, it is very important that there be co-ordination and that only the supplies that are really needed are sent forward and that they are sent to the places where they are most urgently needed. The Red Cross has its officials in Europe now, and the offices of the high commissioner in London and the embassies at The Hague and at Brussels are in close touch with the government relief agencies of these three countries, as well as in close touch with the officials of the Canadian Red Cross. Miss Margaret Wilson, executive secretary, is at present in London and Colonel Walter Reynolds, national director of disaster services, is still at The Hague. These officials are keeping in very close touch with what the local relief organizations are doing.
The high commissioner's office and the two embassies are making cable facilities available to these representatives of the Red Cross so that they can make daily reports to the central organization here in Canada to be sure that the right kind of supplies will be provided, to the extent to which that can be done from Canada, and that they will be provided in the places where they are most urgently required. It would seem that the immediate urgent requirements for food or medical supplies or even for large amounts of clothing have been met, and that the big problem will be the permanent or semipermanent rehabilitation of the very large numbers who have suffered so severely from this flood disaster.
I think that through the activities of the Red Cross, and the assistance they are thus getting overseas, we will be kept well informed as to what will comply with that resolution adopted unanimously by the House of Commons the other day to give concrete examples of our sympathy in the most helpful way possible.



EDUCATION


Mr. George A. Drew (Leader of ihe Opposiiion):: Perhaps this would be the appropriate place in the proceedings to raise a matter that came to my attention through a
1950	HOUSE OF
University Scholarships report in the Ottawa Citizen of Saturday, February 14. In that issue of the Citizen there is a report of a visit the previous day by representatives of the national executive of the National Federation of University Students. The Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) is reported as informing them, and I quote:
The Prime Minister said he had been attempting since last fall to set up a Canadian committee to administer such scholarships, but had failed in the attempt.
The reference is to a request that was made that the government implement certain recommendations of the Massey report in regard to scholarships. The reply given to the student representatives indicates that the government has reached some decision. Since this is a subject in regard to which hon. members in every part of the house are interested and upon which they have been receiving representations, I would ask the Prime Minister whether he could tell the house what the decision is that the government has reached, and also indicate the nature of the difficulties to which he has referred.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I am afraid that that report in the Citizen is rather more than second hand; it must be third or fourth hand, because it is not an accurate report of what transpired. I assured these young people that I had always had a great interest in university work, and that though for something over eleven years now my active connection with universities had not been as intimate as it was before, I was still very much interested. I said that personally I felt we had had an illustration, in the success of the veterans who got university training after the last war, that anything that was expended in that way was a national investment and brought returns even to the Canadian treasury.
I informed them that I had been concerned about this part of the Massey report, and I have been endeavouring to make such inquiries as would have enabled me to make a recommendation to my colleagues about the set-up of a Canadian council. Unfortunately, those I had approached for that purpose had found that they could not at the present time fall in with our plans, and I have not yet been able to co-ordinate in my own mind the kind of thing I could recommend to my colleagues. I felt that that was something that would necessarily have to precede the establishment of a system of scholarships, because I thought a system of scholarships would have to be administered by the kind of organization that would be quite divorced from any suggestion of political patronage.
TMr. Drew.]

I told them that I realized that their generation of students was advancing, and that they were very anxious to have it done at the earliest possible moment. I had found, however, it had not been possible for me to co-ordinate anything that I could put before my colleagues for implementation during this session of parliament.


George Alexander Drew: In view of the statement which the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) has made, might I suggest that there are meetings of representatives of the universities before which a suggestion of this kind could be placed and doubtless recommendations made that would be acceptable to those universities, without any of the difficulties to which the Prime Minister has referred.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I had some experience
last year, Mr. Speaker, with the recommendations made by the university council about the grants to universities. A solution was found for last year, but we were informed that it was only for one year that that solution was being accepted. It has not been possible as yet to find a solution acceptable for this year. These are matters in which the hon. gentleman and I, and every other hon. member in the house, are deeply concerned. But we are also deeply concerned with avoiding the doing of anything to countenance this suggestion that we are trying to inject ourselves into the domain of education. No one wants to do that. Everyone wants to leave that responsibility of the provincial administration as the fathers of confederation intended it should be.
It is not easy to do anything at all that does have a bearing upon the educational problem without there being misgivings in many quarters. I hope that will not always be so, and I hope that as it was possible to find a solution last year it will be possible to find a solution this year and that those solutions, one after the other, may establish a precedent that will allow these desirable things to be done without there being additional misgivings about interference by the central government with matters of provincial jurisdiction and responsibility.


George Alexander Drew: I do not wish to extend this matter beyond this point, but I want to make the observation that the granting of scholarships is, of course, different from the granting of financial assistance direct to the universities. There are scholarships now being awarded in certain connections by agencies of the dominion government. I understood the recommendation was that these should be extended, and that does not bring the government in direct contact with the administration of any university.


Mr. R. R. Knight (Saskatoon):: Might 1 ask a supplementary question?


Some hon. Members:: Order, order.


Robert Ross (Roy) Knight: I too have my rights in asking questions. In view of the question asked by myself as reported at page 1729 of Hansard and the answer given at that time by the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier), that the government is continuing to study the recommendation on scholarships, I would ask the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) whether consideration has been given by the government to this matter as a whole as well as the consideration which he himself says he has given to it.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Mr. Speaker I have not found it possible to bring to my colleagues for decision a recommendation on the subject.



QUESTIONS


AMMUNITION


Mr. Churchill:: 1.	What Is the total number of rounds of ammunition expended by the 25th brigade while In Korea to 30th November, 1952, under the headings (a) high explosive shells: (b) mortar shells: (c) small arms?
2.	What have been the casualties of each unit that has served or is now serving with the 25th brigade in Korea to 30th November, 1952, expressed in the categories (a) killed; (b) wounded; (c) missing; (d) injured in action; (e) captured?


Mr. Claxion:: Mr. Speaker, for reasons which I have given to the hon. member who asked the question, I would ask if he would consent to drop it.


Mr. Speaker:: Dropped.



CENSORSHIP OF PRESS DISPATCHES

Mr. Churchill:: 1.	Are press dispatches from Korea subject to censorship? If so, by whom?
2.	Do security regulations permit press dispatches to name the units being sent to or brought from Korea prior to sailing or arrival dates?
3.	Do security regulations permit press dispatches to designate the months in which rotation of units in Korea will take place?


Mr. Campney:: 1.	Yes. All press dispatches from Korea are passed through the joint press censorship group of the United Nations and Far Eastern commands.
2	and 3. Generally no release is approved until after a move has taken place in order to avoid publication of information which might aid the enemy. However, if a projected move is to take place some time in the future and exact dates are not mentioned, the censorship group may permit such reference
Questions
if operational headquarters in Korea are of the opinion that there is no risk to security involved.



HEALTH INSURANCE


Mr. Knowles:: 1.	Did the Minister of Fisheries make a speech at Nelson, British Columbia, on Thursday, January 15, 1953, as reported in the Nelson Daily News of January 17, 1953?
2.	If so, did the Minister of Fisheries indicate at that time that an announcement respecting national health insurance would be made at this session of parliament, as reported in the said newspaper?
3.	When will the said announcement respecting national health insurance be made?


Mr. Bradley:: 1.	Yes.
2.	No.
3.	Whenever an announcement regarding government policy is made it is always made by the government at a time chosen by the government.



*R.C.A.F  FIRST CF-100 SQUADRON

Mr. Fulton:: 1.	When is it expected that the first Royal Canadian Air Force squadron will be fully equipped with CF-100 aircraft?
2.	How many CF-lOO's will this squadron have?
3.	Where will it be stationed?
4.	How far behind original schedule will the final deliveries to this squadron be?



CF-100 AIRCRAFT-RE-ENGINEERING

Mr. Fulton:: 1.	Were any major defect or defects, omissions or oversights discovered in the course of production of the CF-100 which necessitated major re-engineering?
2.	If so, what was their nature and what changes were made necessary?
3.	What was the additional cost occasioned by such re-engineering?
4.	By what length of time were final production and delivery schedules delayed as a result?
5.	Who was responsible in the defence production department or defence department for the ordering of equipment later decided to be unsuitable or defective?



CF-100 AIRCRAFT  DESIGN AND PRODUCTION

Mr. Fulton:: 1.	How many marks of the CF-100 have been designed? What are their numbers?
2.	Have any been rejected as unsatisfactory? If so, which ones?
3.	How many of each have been produced?
4.	Which one is intended to be the production model for general use by the Royal Canadian Air Force?
5.	When will this one be in quantity production?
6.	In what respects will the latest mark be superior to the mark now in production?
For answer to this question, see pages 2051-52.

Questions



ORENDA ENGINE


Mr. Fullon:: 1.	How many marks or models of the Orenda engine have been designed? What are their numbers or other differentiating designations?
2.	Have any been rejected as unsatisfactory? If so, which ones?
3.	How many of each have been produced?
4.	Which one is intended to be the production model for general use by the Royal Canadian Air Force?
5.	When will this one be in quantity production?
6.	In what respect will the latest mark or model be superior to the model now in production?
V. What is the static thrust figure for the model of the Orenda engine in current production?



R.C.A.F.-NEW FIGHTER PLANE

Mr. Fullon:: 1.	Have plans been made or are plans being considered for the design and production in Canada of a new type of fighter plane for the Royal Canadian Air Force as an eventual replacement for the CF-100?
2.	H so, who is to design and produce this new aircraft?
3.	What is estimated to be the cost of design and production?
4.	If no firm estimate can be given, what is the maximum amount which the government considers it may be necessary to make provision for before the program is complete?


Mr. Howe:: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) has on the order paper four questions which actually consist of 22 separate queries and which refer to the A.V. Roe program. This program has also been recently referred to in the house by the hon. member for York West (Mr. Adamson) and the hon. member for York South (Mr. Noseworthy). I believe that I can make one statement which will answer these and any similar questions, and at the same time clarify the situation which exists at A.V. Roe.
After A.V. Roe established in Canada on December 1, 1945, the company was given the primary task of developing a long-range, all-weather interceptor and turbo-jet engine for the R.C.A.F. They were also asked to develop a jet transport plane, overhaul and modify world war II Lancasters, and in addition were given a number of lesser projects.
Gas Turbine Development
In November, 1945, Turbo Research Limited, a crown company, was authorized to proceed with the design and construction of the TR-3 Chinook. Detail design of this power plant was under way when the assets of Turbo Research Limited were transferred to A.V. Roe Canada Limited in 1946. The Chinook was originally intended as the power plant for a R.C.A.F. fighter. Changed requirements produced the specification for the Orenda.

The Chinook, a 2,900 pound thrust machine, was completed to provide experience in design, development and manufacturing problems. The Orenda specification called for an engine of 6,500 pound thrust, equal to that of the largest engines then in design in the United States and the United Kingdom.
The Orenda first ran in February, 1949, thirty months from commencement of design. The gas turbine staff was then about 800, and expenditures on the Orenda project to the end of March, 1949, amounted to $3,917,900. With the running of the first engine, the development phase commenced. This has extended over four years, and five distinguishable versions of the engine have now passed the development phase. These are:
Series 1-Original design.
Series 2-Modification to permit three point suspension system, to increase strength, reduce weight, and make fuselage installations easier.
Series 8-Modified compressor to improve acceleration characteristics.
Series 9-Version for CF-100 Mark 4.
Series 10-Version for F-86.
All of these engines are in the 6,0006,500 pound thrust category. In addition, the series 11 engine (7,500 pound thrust) has run in lash-up form, and the basic scheming on the series 12 engine, with a further increase in thrust is complete.
The $30,274,199 spent on the Orenda over the last four years is described as a development expense. In fact, however, all engineering expenses, some of which would have been charged to production, have been carried on this contract. The expenditures have supported an engineering department large enough to carry out the production activities, produce the variants of the basic engine described above, and work on certain more advanced developments. Finally, engineering expenses include the operation of the experimental or model shop, and also the Nobel facility, a laboratory which carries out research and development of turbines, compressors, and combustion systems.
The Orenda engine series 11 will be superior to the present production versions of engines designed for similar purposes in other countries. We are satisfied that the Orenda series 12 engine will meet our requirements for some years, and be competitive with foreign engines.
Gas Turbine Production
The prototype Orenda first ran in February, 1949. At December 31, 1952, expenditures on tooling were $15,029,350. This figure covers preproduction and production tooling for all series of the engine.

Total expenditures on production have now reached $38,785,500, with $17,839,300 representing the value of engines delivered, $20,946,300 the value of engines in final assembly, parts completed and in process, progress payments to suppliers, materials inventory and mill supplies. For this expenditure, 96 engines were delivered at December 31, 1952.
The first twelve Orendas were produced in the development shop, on limited tooling, to supply urgently needed engines for early aircraft. In addition, the two changes of engine production location, first from the experimental shop to the pilot line in the aircraft plant and then to the new engine plant, have had an adverse effect on costs.
The construction of the engine plant was authorized in October, 1950. An eight-month delay in completion of the plant proper resulted from the shortage of steel at that time. In March, 1952, only 10 per cent of the machine tools were installed. The plant can scarcely be considered to have begun operations before June, 1952, when 60 per cent of the machine tools were installed, while the assembly shops were not moved until July, 1952, and heat treating facilities until November of last year. Under these circumstances, and considering the problems of setting up subcontractors' facilities, the performance has been good.
The Orenda series 2 was the first production engine. This passed its type test in February, 1952, and is now out of production. The series 8 and series 10 passed their type tests in January of this year and these are the engines presently in production. The series 9 is to be introduced during the summer of 1953.
Airframe Development
In October, 1946, a contract was executed with A. V. Roe for the design and construction of two prototypes of the CF-100, plus one static test airframe. In January, 1950, the first prototype flew. This was a Mark 1 aeroplane, fitted with Rolls-Royce Avons. Cumulative expenditures to March 31, 1950, were $5,131,754.68.
To the present, cumulative expenditures on development of the airframe have amounted to $11,784,400, an increase of $6,652,646 since March, 1950. Variants of the aeroplane obtained for this expenditure are:
(1)	CF-100 Mark 2-powered by Orenda series 1; no armament.
(2)	CF-100 Mark 3-powered by the Orenda series 2 and series 8, and armed with eight 50 calibre machine guns and APG 33 radar.
Questions
(3)	CF-100 Mark 4-powered by the Orenda series 9 and armed with 50 calibre machine guns, air to air rockets, and APG 40 radar.
The development of the Mark 4 control system for firing the armament is not yet completed.
I have already mentioned two of the differences between these four marks of the CF-100. One is the different series of engines and the other is the different weapon systems. Externally, all Marks are similar. The structure has undergone considerable development, beginning with the first static test in March, 1950. It is expected that the final proving of the structure to Mark 4 loads will be complete in March, 1953. This long time results from the growth of all-up weight (about 50 per cent), as well as from deficiencies in the original design. In addition, systems have been altered: for example, the control system has been changed to obtain improved flying qualities; hydraulic and electrical systems were altered as a result of increased demands and a desire to clean up the original design.
I have mentioned the deficiency in the original design, a subject that has been given a great deal of publicity. The facts were that in November, 1951, during R.C.A.F. proving flights, a failure developed in the ring connecting the fuselage to the front spar. This necessitated a redesign of this structure which has now been successfully accomplished. Vigorous rectification commenced with the reorganization of the engineering department, and progress since then has been good. No time has been lost on the delivery schedule of the Mark 4 (rocket firing) aircraft, as the delivery date of this aircraft is determined by the weapons system, which is being produced in the United States. The delay in the Mark 3 program amounted to 4 - 6 months. It is not possible to separate out the costs of this element of the CF-100 development program. The only other two seat fighters in the same class as the CF-100 have also suffered structural deficiencies which have caused serious delays.
Summarizing the CF-100 development, this aircraft appears to be superior to its only immediate competitor, although it is inevitable that in time it will be made obsolete by the introduction of improved jet bombers.
Airframe Production
In May, 1949, seven months before the flight of the first development prototype, a contract was issued for ten preproduction fighter aircraft. In June, 1951, the first of these aircraft flew, the last in October, 1952.

Questions
The first five of the aircraft were Mark 2, the next four were Mark 3, and the tenth was the Mark 4 weapons system prototype.
The first production order for the CF-100 was given in October, 1950. The first production aeroplane was delivered in November, 1952, 25 months from the placing of the contract. This length of time resulted primarily from the difficulties encountered with the structure of the aeroplane, to which I have already made reference. The Mark 3 aeroplane is now in production and 70 fighters of this mark, fitted with 50 calibre guns, will be produced. Volume production of the CF-100 Mark 4 will begin late this summer.
Tooling expenditures to the present have amounted to $15,882,450. Total production cost of the 16 aircraft delivered up to December 31, 1952, against the preproduction and production program, is divided as follows:
(1)	Aircraft manufactured, $27,248,300.
(2)	Mill supply inventory, raw material inventory, work in process, $25,788,800.
(3)	Payments to subcontractors and supplies, $4,183,500.
(4)	Ground handling equipment, maintenance tools, publications, etc., $2,582,400.
At the present time, there are approximately 14,000 persons employed at A.V. Roe, and it is not expected that this number will increase significantly during the course of the present program. Last summer there was some concern that there were more people on the A.V. Roe payroll than production warranted. I think probably that, to some extent, this was true. I am satisfied that this condition no longer exists. The under-utilization of the Avro labour force was the result of a number of factors:
(a)	Hiring was done in advance of the work to be performed because many of the new employees required training on the job to fit them for full production work. At the same time, production in some cases did not get underway according to schedule, and, correctly anticipating a tight labour market, Avro was hesitant about letting these workers go.
(b)	The very magnitude of the build-up in employment, required to meet production schedules, made it almost inevitable that some labour inefficiency would result. In 1952, for example, Avro hired some 9,000 new employees during a period when total employment showed a net increase of just over 6,000 workers. Now that intake can be slowed down substantially, greater emphasis can be placed on improved selection of workers, with a resulting increase in labour efficiency.

(c)	The physical problem involved in bringing a large amount of new plant into operation, and in transferring and rearranging machines and workers, caused some reduction in the efficiency of the labour force.
(d)	The difficulties encountered in getting the CF-100 centre section redesigned and cleared for production resulted in less than optimum utilization of the labour force. This is no longer a problem.
In considering the A. V. Roe program, comparisons are often made with the F-86 program at Canadair. In making such comparisons, however, there are several factors that must be kept in mind.
1.	The CF-100 is one of the biggest and heaviest fighter aircraft being produced today. It weighs approximately 17 tons. That is heavier than the 21 passenger DC-3 transport, and about two and a half times as heavy as a standard fighter such as the Sabre. If comparisons are to be made, this additional weight and the increased complexity must be kept in mind.
2.	A. V. Roe has designed, developed, and is now producing both the airframe and engine. It is true that development costs have been heavy, but it must be remembered that in manufacturing a plane developed in another country, as we are doing at Canadair, we are faced with heavy licence fees that are in reality a payment which we are making to support the development staff of an aircraft company in another country.
3.	We were able to give Canadair a sufficiently large order to permit them to set up an economic production line, which they have done with great efficiency and which will enable Canada to fill its NATO commitments in the time allotted. On the other hand, the CF-100 will be the basis of our home defence and we are most concerned that it does not become obsolescent too rapidly. Consequently, it has been our policy not to load the air force with the earlier marks of the CF-100, and to place a minimum order for the Mark 3 in order to await the Mark 4. We will place a heavier order for this aeroplane, thus permitting more efficient production at A. V. Roe.
There has been some recent speculation concerning fighters of advanced designs. This is a subject on which I can say very little without compromising military security. I can assure hon. members, however, that we are constantly studying new concepts and new designs. In doing so, we are anxious to examine designs which are available to us from other countries. However, we have what I consider a good design and development organization at A. V. Roe and, naturally, we will not overlook their talents.

During the period of "cold war" such as we are experiencing at the present time, it is a matter of serious concern to the R.C.A.F. to keep its equipment modern without retiring serviceable but obsolete aircraft. In war, this problem does not generally exist as the aircraft are consumed in service before they become obsolete. In peacetime, however, it is very difficult to keep the force modern without making frequent changes in the production line and producing relatively small numbers of different marks of aircraft. When the R.C.A.F. is up to strength in aircraft, it is our intention to then provide new aircraft at the attrition rate of those that are in the service. This will mean a small yearly volume of production, but obviously they must be of the latest possible types.
In conclusion, I am satisfied that our program at A. V. Roe is now in good shape. As a country inexperienced in aircraft design and development, it was natural that we should experience difficulties and delays which are, in fact, characteristic of the aeroplane business. It might have been expected that, in our case, delays would have been more protracted than those experienced in countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, where they have not only a well established aircraft industry, but also the supporting industry which is so essential. Considering the Orenda program, A. V. Roe's record in getting into production compares well with that of other companies. This is a particularly outstanding achievement when one considers that, not only did we have to build the new plant at A. V. Roe, but also had to bring into being more than a dozen new industries that are producing in Canada, for the first time, technical components which will not only serve our aircraft industry but also our general economy. A. V. Roe's record on the CF-100, which is our first all-Canadian fighter, has been a credit to the company.


Mr. Fulton:: Mr. Speaker, since it is unlikely that we will reach the orders of the day today, may I ask the minister two questions based upon the statement he has just given with respect to certain other questions I had asked. The first point is, that while the minister has given an answer to four questions, there were two other questions dealing with the same subject, but asking for additional information, and these were passed as orders for returns on January 28. I would express the hope that the minister will not regard this as a reply to those questions.
Questions
My second point is that the minister said that 70 Mark 3 CF-lOO's would be produced, but I did not hear any production target date for those 70. Can the minister say when those 70 will be produced?


Clarence Decatur Howe: The important date is the date upon which we will have the remaining information on the Mark 4. It is the intention to schedule the 70 Mark 3 aircraft so that there will be no interruption in manufacturing before going into Mark 4 aircraft. I cannot say what that date will be. There has been some delay. One American firm is designing the firing apparatus for all the rocket-firing aircraft. At the present time we are waiting for final approval of the mechanism before we can set a date for the production of the Mark 4. The result is that there is no hurry about finishing the Mark 3, because we do not want to have to shut the plant down until we get a chance to undertake the Mark 4.


Mr. Macdonnell (Greenwood):: I did not
understand the minister's apology that-


Clarence Decatur Howe: The minister never apologizes.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I may have misunderstood, then. I thought he had made an apology. Can the minister give any indication as to the time for those 70 fighters of the Mark 3 type, or are they just going to mark time?


Clarence Decatur Howe: I just answered that question.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: No, the
minister did not give any suggested time.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I am sure if my hon. friend will read Hansard he will find that I answered it fully.


Mr. Harkness:: May I ask a further question? Did the figure the minister gave include any of the capital assistance which has been accorded this company and, if so, what is the amount of that capital assistance?


Clarence Decatur Howe: If my hon. friend will put that question on the order paper I will endeavour to get the information.


Mr. Speaker:: Questions numbers 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 answered.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Not 15. The minister referred to number 14 only.


Mr. Speaker:: Questions 11, 12, 13 and 14 answered by the minister's statement. Question number 15?


Clarence Decatur Howe: I think that is answered, also.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Then number 11 should not be counted. Perhaps the minister counted

Questions
numbers 12, 13, 14 and 15, but not question 11. Surely it should be either questions 12, 13, 14 and 15 or questions 11, 12, 13 and 14.


Clarence Decatur Howe: In the first place, I gave all the information there is about the production of the Mark 4. I cannot answer the question as to whether the Royal Canadian Air Force will be equipped with CF-100 aircraft. That depends upon whether they are satisfied to adopt the Mark 3, or whether they wish to wait for the Mark 4.


Some hon. Members:: Answered.


Edmund Davie Fulton: No, it should stand.


Some hon. Members:: Answered.


Mr. Speaker:: Question number 11?


Some hon. Members:: Stand.


Some hon. Members:: Answered.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I should like to know whether question 11 has or has not been answered.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Mr. Speaker, I answered that question. I gave all the information that there is available.


Mr. Speaker:: Questions 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15 answered by the minister.


Edmund Davie Fulton: On a question of privilege, may I point out that question number 11 deals with plans respecting the R.C.A.F. If the minister will look at parts 2, 3 and 4 he will see that they do not deal with problems of production of aircraft, but rather with the organizational plan. This was not answered.


Clarence Decatur Howe: Oh, let it stand.


Mr. Speaker:: Question number 11 stands; questions 12, 13, 14 and 15 answered by the minister's statement.



PRINTING BUREAU-FIVE-DAY WEEK

Mr. Knowles:: 1.	Has consideration been given at any time since January 1, 1952, to the establishing of a five-day forty-hour week in the government printing bureau?
2.	If so, on what dates was such consideration given?
3.	What is the result of such consideration?
4.	When will the five-day forty-hour week be established at. the government printing bureau?


Mr. Lesage:: 1.	Yes.
2.	September 16, 1952, when the Minister of Finance met with representatives of the printing trades council and on several occa-

sions thereafter before the issue of the letter of November 25, 1952 from the Minister of Finance to the national joint council of the public service concerning the five-day week.
3.	The minister advised the representatives of the printing trades council that continuing consideration was being given by the government to the application of the five-day week in various cities in Canada but that there was not evidence at that time which would justify a decision1 that the five-day week should be applied in Ottawa. The letter from the Minister of Finance to the national joint council of the public service of November 25, 1952 on the government's policy in regard to the five-day week generally was tabled in the House of Commons on November 25, 1952.
4.	It is not the practice to announce government policy in giving answers to questions in the House of Commons.



CANADIAN FORCES, KOREA-SUB-MACHINE GUNS

Mr. Harkness:: 1.	What type of sub-machine gun was issued to Canadian troops for use in Korea?
2.	Was this type of sub-machine gun found satisfactory in action; if not, what were the deficiencies?
3.	Has a different type of sub-machine gun been issued?


Mr. Campney:: 1.	Carbine machine Sten 9 mm. Mk 2.
2.	While not entirely satisfactory, it is regarded as being as satisfactory as other available types. It has certain disadvantages, particularly in the magazine.
3.	Not for operational use, but a more recent type has been issued for user trials.



FISHERIES-CANNING OF LIVE LOBSTERS

Mr. Robichaud:: 1.	Has the Department of Fisheries any information concerning a new process of canning live lobster and marketing the same, as advertised recently by a firm in Boston, Massachusetts?
2.	If so, what means are being taken by the Department of Fisheries to acquaint the lobster industry of the maritime provinces with this new method?


Mr. MacNaughl:: 1.	The Department of Fisheries understand a process has been invented in the United States whereby live lobsters are packed in sealed containers and remain alive for a limited period of time. Its further information is that patent rights on the process are pending and, consequently, it is impossible to obtain further information regarding the process.
2.	Answered by No. 1.



HOUSING UNITS, SAINT JOHN, N.B.   ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Riley:: 1.	Are the housing units which have been built in the city of Saint John, New Brunswick, by Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation, administered by a housing authority?
2.	If so, how many members are there on this housing authority?
3.	What are their names?
4.	Have any recent changes been made in the personnel of this housing authority?
5.	If so, when, and by whom were these changes made?
6.	If such changes were made, for what reason were they made?
7.	Did the Minister of Resources and Development, or any of the officials of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation approve any such changes?
8.	Have any complaints ever been received by Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation regarding any of the members of this housing authority?


Mr. Winters:: 1.	Yes.
2.	Five.
3.	E. F. Charlton, Eli Boyaner, Geo. A. Hayter, Alfred E. Stevenson, Mrs. Melville Lynch.
4.	Yes.
5.	Effective January 15,	1953, made
by lieutenant governor in council.
6.	Reasons unknown to us.
7.	No.
8.	No.



CURRIE REPORT

Mr. Wright:: 1.	What was the cost to the government of the Currie report in (a) fees; (b) travelling costs; (c) any other costs?
2.	What was the number of personnel employed
in the investigation and the number of days each was employed?


Mr. Campney:: 1.	Billings to November 30, 1952, total the following amounts:
(a)	fees	$ 47,528.00(b)	travelling	costs	
6,353.80(c)	other coststelephones and	telegraphs ..	428.10postage	
2.37stationery	
255.15
Total cost $ 54,567.42
2.	The Department of National Defence has not a complete record of the number of personnel employed by G. S. Currie, Esq., on the investigation.
The following information with regard to time spent by different categories of personnel is available from the billings received to November 30, 1952:
Questions
Senior partners, 51 days; Junior partners, 284 days; Seniors, 292 days; Intermediates, 151J days; Juniors and secretarial staff, 174J days.



PROFILING MACHINES

Mr. Diefenbaker:: 1.	How many profiling machines have the Cross Machinery Company, Toronto, purchased from the government, since the first day of September, 1945?
2.	What were the types, giving the manufacturers' name thereof, and the prices paid for each of them?
3.	How many profiling machines have been sold by the said company to the government, since the first day of January, 1947 to date, and what price for each of them, giving description and manufacturer's name?
He said: Mr. Speaker, in the reproduction of this question there is reference to the Cross Machinery Company. It should be the Gross Machinery Company.


Mr. Speaker:: Question number 38 stands,
to be corrected in accordance with the statement of the hon. member for Lake Centre.



ST. BONAVENTURE D'HAMILTON-PUBLIC WHARF

Mr. Robichaud:: 1.	Was any new construction work and/or repairs effected on the public wharf at St. Bonaventure d'Hamilton, in the county of Bonaventure, Quebec, during the following periods; (a) from the 1st day of August, 1951 to the month of June, 1952 inclusive; (b) from the 1st day of September, 1952, up to and including the month of October, 1952?
2.	If so, was this work done under contract or by day labour?
3.	If by contract, were tenders invited and what tenders were received?


Mr. Fournier (Hull):: 1.	(a) Yes, repairs.
(b) Yes, repairs.
2.	Under contract.
3.	(a) Yes, tenders were received from: Bert Dimock, $13,200; J. Antonio Dufour, $15,852.62; T. E. Rousseau, $23,052.50.
(b) Yes, tenders were received from: J. A. Dufour, $14,989.60; Bert Dimock, $15,351; Geo. K. Steele, $15,895.



THE PRIME MINISTER


Edmund Davie Fulton: In connection with the Prime Minister's trip to western Canada in August and September of 1952;
1.	How many were in the official party, including any precursors who went ahead to make straight the way?
2.	What were their names and in what capacity did each one travel?
3.	What were the total expenses of the official party charged to or ultimately payable by the treasury?

Orders for Returns
4.	Did this include any amount to cover expenses of the clerk of the privy council? If so, how much?
5.	Did it include any sum for railway accommodation?
6.	What was the purpose of the trip?
7.	What was its duration?
8.	What points were visited?


Mr. St. Laurent:: 1.	Three.
2.	Right Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent, in his capacity as Prime Minister, Mr. W. M. Martin, in his capacity as Secretary, prime minister's office, Mr. J. W. Pickersgill for part of the journey, in his capacity as secretary to the cabinet.
3.	$506.21.
4.	Yes, $30.35.
5.	No.
6.	See Hansard for December 17, 1952, page 822, part 8 of answer to question by hon. member for Wentworth.
7.	Left Ottawa August 28, 1952. Returned to Ottawa September 13, 1952.
8.	Trail, Penticton, Kelowna, Vernon, Vancouver, New Westminster, Victoria, Esqui-malt, Duncan, Chemainus, Ladysmith, Nanaimo, Parksville, Qualicum, Courtenay, Comox, Powell River, Prince Rupert, Smithers, Prince George, Edmonton, Portage la Prairie, Winnipeg.
There was also a visit to Orillia, Midland and Huronia on the way west, and a visit to Hamilton on the return journey where the Prime Minister addressed the diamond jubilee anniversary dinner of the Association of Canadian Clubs.



QUESTIONS PASSED AS ORDERS FOR RETURNS


Mr. Robichaud:: 1.	What Is the total amount which has been expended to date on, or in any way concerning, the Chatham, New Brunswick, jet operational and training base of the Royal Canadian Air Force?
2.	What have been the annual amounts expended on, or in any way concerning the said training base, in each and every year, from and including the year of its inception, to and including the year 1951?
3.	What is the amount expended on, or in any way concerning, the said training base, to date in the year 1952?
4.	Were any contracts awarded to any individuals and/or firms, in connection or in any way concerning the said training base, during the year 1952?
5.	If so (a) what were these contracts for; (b) to whom were they awarded; (c) what was the amount of each contract?
6.	Were tenders called for any or all of these contracts?
7.	If so, what individuals or firms submitted tenders, and what was the amount of each tender submitted?



IPPERWASH CAMP


Mr. Knowles:: 1.	Has the government, at any time since January 1, 1950, purchased any property adjacent to Ipperwash camp, in western Ontario?
2.	If so, from whom was the property purchased, what amount was paid for it, and what was the date of the transaction?
3.	What is the estimated value of the property at the present time?
4.	Did any person or firm act in this sale? If so, what are the names of any such persons or firms?
5.	To what use is such property being put?



FLOOD CONTROL PROGRAMS-ASSISTANCE TO MUNICIPALITIES

Mr. Jones:: 1.	Did the dominion government make a financial contribution to the city of London, Ontario, to assist in their flood control program, some time ago?
2.	If so, to what extent?
3.	Has federal government financial assistance been given to any other municipality in Canada for a flood control program?
4.	If so, to what municipality and to what extent?



RESERVE ARMY


Mr. Lennard:: 1.	How many pairs of half-hose were supplied to the reserve army in Canada, from the period January 1, 1952 to December 31, 1952?
2.	What quantities were supplied to each district command?



INTERNATIONAL SERVICE, C.B.C.

James MacKerras Macdonnell: What were the total expenditures of the international service of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation in each of the calendar years 1951 and 1952, indicating the amount paid by; (a) Department of External Affairs; (b) Canadian Broadcasting Corporation; (c) any other department or departments of government?



ALEXANDER CONSTRUCTION LIMITED

Mr. Diefenbaker:: 1. What contracts have been awarded to the Alexander Construction Company of Edmonton, Alberta, since the first day of January, 1946?
2. How many of these contracts provide for payment by (a) fixed fee; (b) cost plus?



DISABLED PERSONS

Mr. Hansell:: How many of the 325,000 disabled persons in Canada are in the following classifications:	(a)
over 70 years of age; (b) over 65 years of age; (c) blind, not included in (a) and (b);	(d) war
veterans not included In (a) (b) or (c); (e) others not included in the foregoing?
7 DELAWARE AVENUE, OTTAWA Mr. Fulton:
1.	Is the house known as No. 7 Delaware avenue Ottawa, owned by the crown in right of Canada?
2.	If so, from whom was it purchased, when, and for what price?

3.	What was the house last used for before it was purchased? Was it at one time used as an embassy or legation? If so, of what country?
4.	What is it used for now?
5.	How many rooms has this house?
6.	Since its purchase, what is the average number of persons who have been occupying it on a permanent or residential basis, i.e., exclusive of casual or temporary visitors for purposes of classes, etc.?
7.	What is the annual cost of heat and general maintenance for this house?
8.	What is the amount paid for salaries or wages for permanent staff, caretakers, etc?
9.	How many times a week, on the average, is this house used for classes, lectures, etc., or otherwise for the purpose referred to in part 4 hereof?
10.	What is the average number of those attending for such purpose?



STATEMENT BY MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE

Right Hon. J. G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture):: Mr. Speaker, before proceeding with the next order of business, in view of the number of questions that have been asked on the matter previously I should like to read to the house a statement I intend to give to the press with regard to butter. It is as follows:
Commenting on the butter situation the Minister of Agriculture stated today that the government still owned more than 29,000,000 pounds of butter and that this supply was regarded as being sufficient to meet all needs until the new production season opens up. He also stated that the government butter would be sold at a basic price of 62 cents per pound for solids in Quebec and Ontario.
And at comparable prices elsewhere.
The only condition attached to sales would be that the buyer would make immediate delivery to retailers and that the mark-up for cutting, wrapping and distributing would be fair and reasonable. The minister pointed out that due to the wide variety of conditions governing retail trade it was very difficult to name a mark-up that would govern all situations. He did say that in many of the larger centres a price of 62 cents for solids in the past had enabled a large section of the retail trade to sell at retail prices of 65 cents and 66 cents, but he recognized that these prices could not be made to govern cases where special services were required. Nevertheless it is expected that there will be full co-operation from the trade and that fair prices will prevail.
The minister also observed that butter production at the present time is somewhat higher than it was last year at the same date. In addition, the point of low production for the year has already been passed and fresh supplies will increase from week to week. For this reason and because of the availability of government stocks of stored butter consumers can be assured of ample supplies at 62 cents wholesale for solids for the remainder of this year.



MOTIONS FOR PAPERS


Mr. Charlton:: For a copy of all memoranda, directives, orders in council, regulations and other documents, issued
Motions for Papers
by any department of the government, since January 1, 1952, relative to preventive measures against the possible entry into Canada of infectious animal diseases.



CUBAN REFINED SUGAR


Mr. Diefenbaker:: For a copy of all telegrams, letters and other communications received by the Minister or the Department of Trade and Commerce, since October 1, 1952, and to date, asking for action to stop the import of Cuban refined sugar.




John George Diefenbaker: For a copy of all letters, telegrams or other communications received by the Minister or the Department of Trade and Commerce, or memoranda of telephone conversations, wherein the minister was advised by "the rest of the industry" other than the Canada and Dominion Sugar Company, that they or any of them would have nothing to do with the alleged complaint to bring about legislation to stop the import of Cuban refined sugar, and replies to any such communications, since October 1, 1952.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I have no objection to the
motion being agreed to, but it will of course be understood that it will be subject to the usual rule with regard to communications marked "private", "confidential", or "personal", or all three, and that such papers will not be tabled. I may say that it is not my practice to make memoranda of telephone conversations for that particular type of conversation.


John George Diefenbaker: That will be the usual qualification, but if those letters are marked "personal" or "private" they should not have been referred to or summarized in the house.


Mr. Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the house to adopt the motion, subject to the statement made by the minister?


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


Mr. T. H. Goode (Burnaby-Richmond):: Mr. Speaker, I desire to ask permission to move, seconded by the hon. member for Fraser Valley (Mr. Cruickshank), the adjournment of the house under standing order 31 for the purpose of discussing a matter of urgent public importance, namely, the adverse effects on employment in and the economy of the province of British Columbia caused by the successful application of the Trans Mountain Oil Pipe Line Company to the board of transport commissioners to export to the United States for refining, by one or more direct pipe lines, huge quantities of crude oil from the Alberta oil fields.
1960	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member has made a motion under standing order 31 for the adjournment of the house to discuss a definite matter of urgent public importance. This motion must be made after the ordinary daily routine of business has been concluded and before notices of motions or orders of the day have been entered upon. The motion would appear to have been made at the proper time. The hon. member has handed me a copy of the motion which he proposes to move.
The matter which he proposes to discuss is one relating to the adverse effects on employment in and the economy of the province of British Columbia caused by the successful application of the Trans Mountain Oil Pipe Line Company. I must decide whether the motion is in order and whether it is a matter of urgency in accordance with the rules of the house. The matter must be one of national importance. No doubt this is an important matter to the province of British Columbia, but whether I can conclude from that that it is one of national importance is something about which I have considerable doubt.
It must also be within the administrative responsibility of the government. I doubt if that is so. Apart from that, it must be a matter of such urgency that the business of the house arranged for today should be interrupted and set aside so that it can be discussed.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Anything affecting British
Columbia meets that qualification.


Mr. Speaker:: It appears to me that there will be opportunities in the near future to discuss this matter and therefore I cannot permit the business which has been arranged for for today to be set aside. Accordingly, I cannot accept the motion.



WATER POWER


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Howard C. Green (Vancouver-Quadra):: I should like to ask the Minister of Resources and Development whether a permit has been granted to Frobisher Limited to survey the water power potential in the Yukon and, if so, would the minister make a statement thereon?


Hon. Robert H. Winters (Minister of Resources and Development):: I thank the hon. member for having given me notice of his question. On December 29, 1952, a survey permit was granted to Quebec Metallurgical Industries, Limited, which is a subsidiary of


Frobisher Limited. The survey permit authorizes Quebec Metallurgical Industries to conduct surveys of the water power potential in the southern part of the Yukon and, more especially, the drainage basins of the Alsek river, the Yukon river and the Donjek river and their tributaries.
There is nothing exclusive about this permit, which was granted under the dominion water power regulations. There are large-scale water resources in this general area and it is believed that information already on hand, together with that which should be forthcoming from these surveys, will indicate that this potential can result in water power developments in the Yukon Territory which will stimulate the development of the mineral resources and the general growth of this potentially rich area.


Mr. Adamson:: With respect to the question just asked the minister concerning the Frobisher company, may I ask whether any of the intentions of this company in any way means the diversion of the headwaters of the Yukon into United States territory?


Robert Henry Winters: If there are any such intentions, they have not been communicated to me.


Agar Rodney Adamson: The policy of the government is still against the diversion of the headwaters of the river?


Robert Henry Winters: The policy of the government remains the same as I expressed in the house earlier in reply to a question by the hon. member on December 17, 1952.



MEETING WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF REFINERS

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. E. B. Huffman (Kent, Oni.):: I should like to ask the Minister of Trade and Commerce if the meeting of the representatives of the sugar refiners of Canada and the minister was held on Friday, February 13, as scheduled and, if so, has the minister a report for the house?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Mr. Speaker, I did meet representatives of the sugar industry on Friday. I reported to them my findings arising out of discussions with individual exporters in Cuba and also with the sugar institute of Cuba, and I made suggestions that I thought would improve the situation. It was decided that a representative of the refiners would go to Cuba immediately and follow up my report

with the industry there in the hope that all we expected to accomplish would definitely be accomplished.



INCOME TAX


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Stanley Knowles (Winnipeg North Centre):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Finance. Is the minister remembering the promise he made on January 12 to give consideration this year to the removal of the 4 per cent floor under medical expenses in relation to income tax?


Hon. Douglas Abbott (Minister of Finance):: The minister never forgets a promise, Mr. Speaker.



LIVESTOCK


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. William Bryce (Selkirk):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Agriculture. Has he any further information to give the house regarding the lifting on the 1st of March of the embargo on livestock entering the United States?


James Garfield Gardiner: There is no further information other than what has already been given to the house. Our understanding still is that it is the intention of the United States government to admit livestock on the 1st of March.


William Scottie Bryce: Will the minister tell the house why he advises producers to hold back their livestock?


James Garfield Gardiner: We have always advised them to do that ever since foot-and-mouth disease afflicted the country and the embargo was imposed by the United States, the main reason of course being that the number of cattle which would naturally come on the Canadian market in a year could not possibly be consumed in this country. The great majority of farmers have held back their cattle. I do not think it would be fair to those who have done so for others to rush them on the market now in the last two weeks and put the government or anyone else in the position where they would have to market these cattle in the first two or three weeks after the United States border is opened in competition with cattle held back by farmers. In other words, we simply suggest that now in the last two weeks farmers carry out the same program that has been
Inquiries of the Ministry carried out by the great majority of farmers right through the whole period of the foot-and-mouth disease difficulty.


William Scottie Bryce: With the present prices on United States markets, is it not likely that cattle will be coming to this country instead of going there?


James Garfield Gardiner: I would not say there will be, but at the same time I can say very definitely that if the government were to take delivery of cattle within the next two weeks and thereby pay a subsidy on the cattle we would not be permitted to market those cattle in the United States. They would have to be slaughtered in this country, and that would put them in direct competition with the cattle that are delivered to the market in the weeks immediately following the opening of the United States market. We do not think it would be fair to farmers who have held back their cattle for the government to take delivery of the cattle of a few farmers who put their cattle on the market at this time.



IRRIGATION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
John George Diefenbaker: should like to direct a question to the Prime Minister. Have officers of the South Saskatchewan river dam and irrigation project communicated with the Prime Minister or the government suggesting that they might send a delegation to meet the government and the cabinet? If they do send a delegation, will they be received by the Prime Minister and the cabinet?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Did I understand the hon. gentleman's question to refer to engineers of the South Saskatchewan association-


John George Diefenbaker: No, these are representatives of the association and the rural and urban municipalities of Saskatchewan.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I have received a telegram from a gentleman who signs as representing the South Saskatchewan association. I have also received a letter from the premier o! Saskatchewan stating that his governmew is preparing a brief indicating their disagreement with some of the recommendations ol the commission and the reasons for tha' disagreement. I am not sure whether the answer has gone to the official of the South Saskatchewan association-if it has not gone it is going-and I felt that it might be more advantageous if we had the brief from the government before we met the delegatior

External Affairs
from the province. I have given the premier of Saskatchewan the assurance that any representations made will receive very careful consideration. I sent him at the same time, as expressing the present viewpoint of the Minister of Agriculture and myself, a copy of Hansard containing the minister's speech and my intervention when the hon. member for Lake Centre was himself speaking.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. H. Rooney (St. Paul's):: I should like to address a question to the Minister of National Defence, and I apologize for not advising him of it. It arises out of something I saw in a newspaper I was reading yesterday. Can he tell me whether or not we are at war? The decision of a judge of a court in the United States, as contained in yesterday's paper, was that we are not at war and that as a result thereof the personal life insurance policies of two men who were killed in Korea were affected. I feel that this might have a serious effect on some of our troops overseas and I believe the matter should be investigated.


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


James Hendrick Rooney: That is the reason I asked the question.


Brooke Claxton: The question of whether or not we are at war should properly be directed to the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs, but I am sure they will agree with the answer I am going to give, namely, that we have never declared or proclaimed a state of war. We are fighting in Korea and the fighting there certainly is tough. I will be glad to look into the remaining part of the hon. member's question concerning the effect on the insurance of soldiers.



EXTERNAL AFFAIRS


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed, from Friday, February 13, consideration of the motion of Mr. Pearson:
That items Nos. 85 to 104 inclusive of the main estimates, 1953-54, be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external aifairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.
Mr. J. A. Byrne (Kootenay East):: Mr. Speaker, just before I adjourned the debate

on Friday evening I was drawing to the attention of the house the desirability of unanimity in the face of a common enemy so far as Canadian foreign affairs are concerned. I pointed out that because of statements, however veiled, that had been made in the house by the leader of the Social Credit party (Mr. Low) and statements that had been made throughout the country by another member of that party, the hon. member for Macleod (Mr. Hansell), this no longer is a fact. It may be a fact in the house, yet it is unfair to the Canadian people that they be given the impression that the House of Commons is not in any way divided on the question of participation in the United Nations and in world affairs.
I drew the attention of the house to a statement by the member for Peace River (Mr. Low), in which he said, and I quote from page 1881 of Hansard for February 12, 1953:
But, Mr. Speaker, when the full history of these times is written, when all of the facts have been brought to light, there will be many people who will say that the past two presidents of the United States have been the great betrayers of humanity.
At that time I was asked by the hon. member to read on. I did, Mr. Speaker, and to my great astonishment I found the following on the same page of Hansard:
To be charitable, as I ought to be, I will say that some of those decisions made at Yalta and Potsdam, some of the secret understandings and agreements that were had with Stalin, may have been made in good faith.
I may say that at both of these conferences the Right Hon. Winston Churchill was present, and in addition at the Potsdam conference there were well known figures in the political life of Britain and the United States. At the Potsdam conference the following were present: Harry S. Truman, J. Stalin, Winston Churchill and the secretaries of the three governments, Mr. James Byrnes, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Anthony Eden. Are these the gentlemen who we are to believe have been treacherous in their decisions? When the history is written, Mr. Speaker, regardless of whether it is written by fascist sympathizers or true historians, as one Canadian citizen I shall refuse to believe that there was any treachery by western representatives during the time these agreements were made. Mistakes may have been made, but to say that they were treacherous mistakes is certainly not a becoming statement.
The hon. member for Provencher (Mr Jutras) read into the record an article which the hon. member for Macleod agreed that he had written. In this article, which is supposed

to be an honest appraisal of the United Nations, the hon. member said:
-truth is still our weapon, but let us have the whole truth. The fact of the matter is that this United Nations is largely a socialist-communist organization.
The hon. member for Camrose (Mr. Beyer-stein), a member of the Social Credit party, was a parliamentary observer at the United Nations, and it would be interesting to hear from him whether, during his visit there, he found that he was associating largely with communist-socialists. I believe that quite the contrary was true. We have a continuous opposition from the Soviet bloc which represents five votes. If that bloc were given the same rights in privileges as the United States, with the large number of states compared with the socialist states, I am sure it would have only one vote and that would leave the communist world with but one vote in the United Nations.
I regret, Mr. Speaker, that because of the rules of the house it is impossible for me to move that this house register in the affirmative its decision to carry on its allegiance to the United Nations as a world organization. I believe that in the interest of the Canadian public generally that should be done before this session is prorogued.
On Friday I mentioned that there was one particular matter coming before the United Nations which I believed is of great importance. It was referred to by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) in his address which opened this debate. I believe we all appreciate the fact that the minister, now that he is president of the general assembly, cannot speak out in the same terms and with the same force as he did on earlier occasions. However, during his address he stated, and I quote from page 1849 of Hansard for February 11, 1953:
It is probable, however, that there will be further far-reaching discussions at later sessions of the general assembly on the reconciliation of domestic jurisdiction as laid down in the charter with the claim that the United Nations is competent to consider and to intervene in any question which anyone may wish to put on the agenda. There is probably no more important long-range problem facing the United Nations general assembly than this.
In his address during this debate the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) suggested that a committee should be set up to discuss the charter of the United Nations and to make recommendations. Should such a committee be set up, I feel that this is one very important question with which it should deal. The committee which will discuss chese estimates should also consider this
External Affairs
very important question. Reference is made to this matter in article 1, subsection 7, of the charter, and I quote:
Nothing contained in the present charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the members to submit such matters to settlement under the present charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under chapter VII.
In an earlier address 'the hon. member for Assiniboia (Mr. Argue) criticized the Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin) for the position the Canadian delegation took on the question of apartheid in South Africa. I believe that this question is perhaps a basic one with respect to United Nations authority. We should consider the United Nations as united nations rather than a united states. If we are to deal with minority groups in any and every state, then the United Nations would be almost ineffective in that it would be cluttered up with every conceivable jurisdictional question, questions of domestic jurisdiction, which many nations themselves cannot solve. If these questions were brought before the world forum, it would simply confuse the issues instead of settling them. However abhorrent the South African government's decision is to us as individuals, there is perhaps much to be said and much consideration should be given to the various problems of that country.
It may be noted that the Russian delegation were all in favour of this type of intervention. But as to a nation which is reported to have 20 million political prisoners within its boundaries, what can be said of its right to vote condemning a smaller country for its particular political problems respecting minorities?
I also draw to your attention another matter, Mr. Speaker. Even at the time this matter was being voted upon, I read in one of the United States papers an article stating that a white man had been arrested for sitting at the same cafe counter with a negro in one of the southern states. There are laws with respect to racial discrimination in almost every country of the world. Who is to say what country is Simon pure? Which one can cast the first stone? I am sure that many of the countries that spoke out most loudly on the question of race persecution are those which have the least right to cast that first stone.
Mr. Speaker, I know that this debate has been somewhat prolonged. As I pointed out earlier, perhaps it should not have gone into the question of disunity respecting foreign affairs; but I feel that the general public should know what is the position of all parties
1964

External Affairs
in this house with respect to our continued all-out support for the United Nations.


Ernest George Hansell: Mr. Speaker,
I had not intended to take part in this debate at all because I thought that my leader did an excellent job in propounding to the house the position which Social Crediters take at the present time with respect to foreign policy. But during the debate several attacks have been made upon this group, upon the leader of the Social Credit party and upon myself; and these call for a continuation of the debate. Very often that is what happens in debates.
Since the motion was to refer the estimates to the standing committee on external affairs,
1 had expected that a pronouncement by each of the leaders might have been sufficient so that the estimates could have gone to the committee and the minister could have been free to go to the United Nations as I understand he desires to do at the earliest possible moment.
At the outset of my speech, however, I wish to say that I too have visited the United Nations-as have many others in this parliament. It was my privilege to go with the delegation, as one of the parliamentary advisers, last year when we met in Paris, France. I must say that I enjoyed my work greatly. I did not have a great deal to say, but as a result of my observations, I would say I was pleased with the way the Canadian delegation took up their task and worked. I was particularly impressed by and pleased with the staff of brilliant young men the minister had at Paris at the time. I have no criticism whatsoever to make of the staff in the Department of External Affairs. I believe they are doing an excellent job in attempting to achieve the policy which is laid down by the government itself. I would say the same thing for the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson). While at times we may rise and exercise our democratic right of criticism, we want the minister to know that, as far as we are concerned, and as far as our relationship with him goes, we are behind him in his desire to accomplish that which he set out to do. We do not always agree with government policy in respect of foreign affairs.
I might also say this, if it is not premature to do so. Should the minister reach higher levels of responsibility in the United Nations, we want him to know that this group will be behind him in the exercise of those responsibilities. Whether or not he will eventually be in a position of determining policy, I do not know; but as to any responsibility that might come to him in giving guidance to

such a vast organization, we want him to know that we will stand with him in his work. However, once again I might say that that fact does not preclude at all the opportunity that is presented in this parliament of speaking freely and of exercising our democratic right in placing our views before the country. In fact, I quite believe that the minister himself and the government would welcome criticisms and observations.
Having said that, I want to deal for a moment with the speech that was made the other night by the hon. member for Pro-vencher (Mr. Jutras). I do so because, in his speech, mention was made of an article which I wrote some time ago. That was the second time that this article had been mentioned in the house. The hon. member for Kootenay East (Mr. Byrne) rose this afternoon and referred to the same article. That is the third time that article has been referred to in this house. I will say now that I am not retracting anything that I have said or that I have written unless it is proved that my observations are absolutely incorrect.
I will say this, Mr. Speaker. In the quotation made from this article, one part was omitted. In fact, quite a bit of it was omitted, but I have reference to one particular part. I am not blaming the hon. member for Provencher because, on looking up the local paper that reprinted the article, I find that this particular part was not there. Therefore I would not expect him to quote this part; but in the original printed article which was put out in pamphlet form this was printed as a prominent footnote to the article and with a prominent bold face title which reads: "Please do not misunderstand", and the following notation is made. I am reading this for the purpose of the record:
We are not opposed to the United Nations as an instrument for the furtherance of international cooperation. We believe that such an organization, recognizing the sovereignty of its member nations, working together, can do much to foster and bring about peace and good will among men. We do feel, however, that there is definite evidence of intrigue in high places which is undermining the sovereignty of the freedom loving nations of the world, and which will ultimately enslave the people through world government over which they will have no control.
Might I say once again to the hon. member for Provencher that I am retracting nothing until such time as I am proven to be wrong by the actual facts of the circumstances, and certainly my friend's argument will not prove me to be wrong. Several times he quotes and remarks, as he is quoting, "I do not understand" or "I do not exactly know", as though he were unable to comprehend something that I was writing about. If that is so, then why does he attempt to disprove my thesis, if

he does not understand or does not exactly know? Furthermore, I cannot help it if the hon. member for Provencher does not possess the necessary powers of comprehension. At page 1939 of Hansard the hon. member quoted from my article. I might say that when the hon. member quoted the article he did not quote the title of it. He quoted the subtitle, which was my honest appraisal of the United Nations. The actual title of my article was "Intrigue in high places", and the article must be read in the light of what I am attempting to show, that behind the scenes there has been intrigue in high places.
I wish the United Nations every success, but if there is in high places intrigue that will depreciate and render the work of the United Nations useless, those forces should consequently be exposed.
My hon. friend says on page 1939 of Hansard'.
The most important nation in the United Nations and the one that is carrying the biggest load of all is the United States of America, and it is not socialist.
There seems to be an idea in the minds of many people that in order for a person to be a socialist he must belong to the C.C.F. or to the socialist party of Great Britain. When I talk of socialism or socialists I do not care where they belong. I do not care whether they belong to the C.C.F. or even to my own organization.


An hon. Member:: Or the Liberal party.


Ernest George Hansell: Or the Liberal party, or the Conservative party. It is not a matter of whether a man has a membership in a socialist organization.


Stanley Howard Knowles: It is a matter of being intelligent.


Mr. Blackmore:: Halfway intelligent.


Ernest George Hansell: I will say this. Without using the term "intelligent", I will say that it is a mental attitude towards certain things, and we can have a socialist mentality and sometimes not know it. That is the truth, and when my friends talk of nations being socialist we believe, of course, that the United States of America has a free enterprise government. But I am going to tell you that a good deal of what Mr. Truman did was to put in certain socialist legislation. I would say to some of the Liberal party here: there are Liberals here who have a socialist mentality, and particularly when it comes to matters of the wider scope of international relations.


Mr. Decore:: What about the big shots of Alberta?
68108-125J
External Affairs


Ernest George Hansell: Let me go a step further. On the same page of Hansard the hon. member quotes from the charter of the United Nations as follows:
-to reaffirm faith in fundamental rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.
That is very good; we can agree with that. Further down he continues:
To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.
Well, that is all right; we believe that.


Mr. Low:: A lot of other people do not.


Ernest George Hansell: I have quoted from the United Nations charter. These things are all well and they are all good, and we do trust that the United Nations will safeguard these things and live up to them. We are with them when they do so. But the fact of the matter is, history records that the nations of the world have not lived up to them, and the very administrations that my leader referred to the other night, the Roosevelt and Truman administrations, sold those very principles down the river. Let us make no mistake about that.


Mr. Sluder:: Which river?


John Horne Blackmore: Any river you want to name.


Ernest George Hansell: That remark coming from over there is a measure of my hon. friend's intelligence. I am telling you that when we are dealing with matters like these we are not dealing with petty party differences; we are dealing with the destiny of the human race, and my hon. friend pops up and says, "What river?"
The hon. member for Provencher could not help but read a certain part of my article, and then he said:
It is obvious that the writer has indulged in a little indirect antisemitism.
The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) did the same thing a week or two ago. Well, I did not answer him; I can let things go by. But when one is annoyed time and again one must make a reply. It is reaching the point where a person cannot use a quotation, and mention the name of the one he is quoting, without someone levelling against him a charge of antisemitism. It is a device to try to silence one.
Well, some of us are not going to be silenced. I have great respect for those who are not of my race or religion, and would be one of the first to defend them if they were ever in trouble. But what was the hon. member really doing? I will tell
19SS

External Affairs
you what he was doing, because I have analysed one or two of his statements. Now I am going to analyse him. Yes, I am going to practise a little psychiatry and proceed to psychoanalyse him.
The hon. member is getting a bit jittery, because I was out in his constituency. He says that I left a pamphlet there. I did not leave it there; I do not know how it got there. But I am not worrying about the matter. I hope it was there, and I hope it goes farther, although it is out of print now.
I was invited to his constituency and addressed an enthusiastic meeting. That is what is bothering the hon. member and why he levels these charges of antisemitism against us. We see the pattern running true to form. It happened in British Columbia, when they got jittery out there, when they had nothing to propose and saw their popularity waning. This was just a sample of the old smear technique. The same thing happened in British Columbia. Well, they got their answer out there. Now my hon. friend from the province of Manitoba starts the same thing. He had better be careful or Manitoba will get its answer, too.
Not only was I in that community, on invitation-and I do not go anywhere unless I am invited. The hon. member need not get jittery again-but I have been invited to go back again.


Mr. Jutras:: Would the hon. member permit one brief word? I just wish to assure him that he is most welcome at any time in my constituency. I have no objection whatsoever to his holding a meeting at any time.


Ernest George Hansell: Well now, that was a nice thing to say, and I appreciate it very much. Nevertheless, it is the same old pattern, the same thing we have met before. We are not dunces at this sort of thing.
A large portion of my pamphlet was not quoted, and for that reason I shall read from it the conclusion I reached. The hon. member did not quote this part of it, and perhaps for very good reasons. The subtitle of the paragraph is "Prediction". This is my conviction. I wrote this without consultation with anyone:
If the United Nations world organization fails and the third world war breaks, it will not cause men to admit their failure. In the re-examination of the process, as the Christian Science Monitor suggests, men will not come to their senses and publicly confess they have been on the wrong track all the time. No! No! They will say the very opposite. They will say we did not go far enough; that the United Nations was weak in that it was not given enough power. This will be meat for the proponents of world government. They will seize the opportunity of a third world

war to bring in a world government, with supreme power. The stage will then be set for the coming of the world dictator.
And then this other paragraph:
And what has all this to do with Social Credit? The Social Credit Association of Canada is organizing Canada for the purpose of eventually forming a government at Ottawa. In this process we will tell the truth. We believe we are among the few who know the truth. When once the people are informed, they will rally to the truth which is the only thing that will make men free.
He did not quote that part of my article.
Then, I should like to deal with what was said by the hon. member for Kootenay East (Mr. Byrne). When I listened to him on Friday evening, when he commenced the speech he finished today, I must say that he sounded more like a kindergarten boy attempting to instruct his teacher, when he proceeded to level his criticism against my leader. The hon. member picked out one sentence; then he went a little farther today. May I place on record what the leader of the Social Credit party did say on that occasion. Let me add that the hon. member was trying to say the leader of this party had branded President Roosevelt and President Truman as traitors. Let us see what he did say. I will read the entire quotation as it appears in the speech of the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) as reported at page 1881 of Hansard:
Consequently, in so far as Mr. Truman did meet international challenges during the years he occupied the presidential office, I join with the minister in paying tribute. But, Mr. Speaker, when the full history of these times is written, when all of the facts have been brought to light, there will be many people who will say that the past two presidents of the United States have been the great betrayers of humanity. To be charitable, as I ought to be, I will say that some of those decisions made at Yalta and Potsdam, some of the secret understandings and agreements that were had with Stalin, may have been made in good faith; but the very best anyone can say is that they indicated a most serious lack of foresight and judgment on the part of those two presidents. It may have been that they listened too much to unsound advice from men like Alger Hiss, but they will not on that account be able to escape the judgment of history.
I should like to make it clear that in using those words the other day in the house the hon. member for Peace River did not, himself, condemn President Truman and President Roosevelt. He said distinctly that when the full history is written many people will say that the past two presidents have been the great betrayers of humanity. My leader does not make statements that he cannot prove.
I wonder now if I may quote what was said by Congressman B. Carroll Reese of Tennessee when speaking in the House of

Representatives on March 19,	1951, as
recorded at pages A-1564 to A-1568 of the Congressional Record. He said:
We could have easily gotten to Berlin first. But our troops were first halted at the Elbe. They were then withdrawn from that river in a wide circle- far enough westward to make Stalin a present of the great Zeiss optical and precision instrument works at Jena, the most important VI and V2 rocket laboratory and production plant in Nord-hausen, and the vital underground jet plant in Kahla. Everywhere we surrendered to the soviets intact, thousands of German planes, including great masses of jet fighters ready for assembly, as well as research centres, rocket developments, scientific personnel, and other military treasures.
When it was all over, a large part of the formidable Russian militarism of today was clearly marked "made in America" or "donated by America from Germany". But where Roosevelt left off, President Truman resumed.
At Potsdam, Truman, maintaining intact Roosevelt's iron curtain of secret diplomacy, played fast and loose with American honour and security. He agreed to an enlargement of the boundaries of a Poland already delivered by Roosevelt and Churchill to Russian control through addition of areas that had, for centuries, been occupied by Germans or people of German origin. Some 14 million persons were brutally expelled from their homes with the confiscation of virtually all their property. Only 10 million finally reached the American, French and British zones of Germany. Four million mysteriously disappeared, though the finger points toward Russian atrocities. Thus Truman approved one of the great mass deportations in history, which for sheer cruelty is a dark page in the annals of history.
At Potsdam, Truman also sanctioned Russian acquisition of Eastern Germany, the food-bin of that nation before the war. It then became impossible for the remaining German economy in British, French, and American hands to feed its people. Germany, like Japan, also went on our bounty rolls.
Like Roosevelt, Truman did not neglect to build up Russian military strength when his opportunity came at Potsdam. He provided her with more factories, machines and military equipment, though at the time he attended Potsdam, Truman knew that through lend-lease we had already dangerously expanded Russia's military might and that, in addition, we had given the soviets some 15,000 planes-many of them of our latest type-and 7,000 tanks.
That is from a speech by Representative B. Carroll Reese.


John Horne Blackmore: That is what won China for the communists.


Ernest George Hansell: I want to ask the hon. member for Kootenay East, or any other hon. member who wants to be critical of what my leader said in the house on February 12: Do you endorse the secret agreements which Roosevelt and Truman made with Stalin at Yalta and Potsdam? That is the question. Do you approve of that? Do you back them in callously turning over Poland, East Germany, Korea and the northern Japanese islands to Russia? Do you approve of the way in which those presidents deliberately contravened the United Nations charter,
External Affairs
which stated that the right of self-determination was an inalienable right of all peoples and must be adhered to strictly as part of the new order that was to be ushered in by the United Nations? Think of the millions of people who were given to Stalin by these presidents without their consent and think of the human suffering that has resulted.


John Horne Blackmore: The loss of life too.


Ernest George Hansell: When you think of these things, if you are at all fair, I say to the hon. member for Kootenay East and to any other hon. members who pursue the same argument that they must admit that the words of my leader, uttered in this house on February 12, were very restrained and moderate in the light of the circumstances. What he said was like a mild and perfumed lovetap in comparison with what millions of betrayed people are thinking and saying. What is more, during the election campaign in the United States, hundreds of speakers over the air and on the hustings said things that make my leader's words look weak, pale and anaemic. Let me read from the platform of the Republican party concerning these agreements. That is what it said:
The government of the United States, under Republican leadership, will repudiate all commitments contained in secret understandings such as those at Yalta which aid communist enslavement. It will make clear, on the highest authority of the President and the Congress, that United States policy, as one of its peaceful purposes, looks happily forward to the genuine independence of those captive peoples.
The hon. member for Kootenay East tried to bolster up his case by pointing out that Churchill was at Yalta and Potsdam. I suppose he wanted to convey that if anyone was condemning Presidents Roosevelt and Truman he would also have to condemn Churchill. I should like to point out that Mr. Churchill was very alarmed at President Roosevelt's silly infatuation for Stalin and his reckless serving of the interests of world communism. On October 21,	1942, Mr. Churchill wrote to the British foreign secretary, Anthony Eden, as follows:
It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarism overlaid the culture and independence of the ancient states of Europe.
From all one can gather from the bits and pieces that have dropped from the lips and pen of Churchill, that gentleman did what he could to oppose Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman in their recklessness. I would point out also to hon. members that Churchill felt that an invasion of the Balkans was to be preferred to head-on attempting to invade Germany by way of the northern counties of France. Roosevelt opposed this request, it appears, for no other reason than to please

External Affairs
Stalin. In fact, Churchill evidently put up with a great deal of indignity and had to agree to many strategically unsound policies to prevent the clique of betrayers around Roosevelt from prompting the president to injure, even more than he had done, Britain's position in the world.
If any of you will take the trouble to read the book "As He Saw It" by General Elliott Roosevelt, the son of the late president, he will find some very frank statements concerning some of these things. It is apparent that General Elliott Roosevelt was determined to tell the truth so that posterity would have it. He was with his father at Casablanca1, evidently as a military adviser. On page 116 he indicates his father's anti-British attitude in a quotation from what his father said, as follows:
I will work with all my might and main to see to it that the United States is not wheedled into the position of accepting any plan that will aid or abet the British empire in its imperial ambitions.
I remind you that those words were said by Mr. Roosevelt just before he issued his unconditional surrender proclamation on Saturday, January 23, 1943. The next day Mr. Roosevelt again said to his son:
The British must never get the idea that we're in this war just to help them hang on to the archaic medieval empire ideas.
There are many people who interpreted this attitude toward Britain, along with the great delight that Mr. Roosevelt had in making Churchill squirm, as the reason for the president siding with Stalin on the choice of a strategically insignificant area for the Mediterranean front rather than the corridor up through which Mr. Churchill felt it would be comparatively easy to drive into the very heart of nazi territory. Mr. Roosevelt was condemned by those words of his son far more strongly than by anything ever said by my leader.
What was the position of Churchill at Yalta and Teheran? Just because the hon. member for Kootenay East (Mr. Byrne) says Mr. Churchill was there and Mr. Eden was there, that does not mean they could not be wrong. Mr. Churchill can be wrong. There is no living individual who is infallible. The hon. member brings in the name of Churchill as if everybody is going to step up and say "hurrah, hurrah". Mr. Churchill can be wrong. Let us also remember that men can be made and men can be broken. Personally I think Mr. Roosevelt was a much overrated man; congenial of course, but the press and the whole propaganda machine of the United States were behind him as they were behind Truman.
What is more, that same propaganda machine can make men and break them. I am not saying whether Mr. Churchill was right or wrong, but I wonder if the hon. member for Kootenay East has ever studied the position of these three big men of the earth as they sat around the table at Teheran and Yalta. Let us look at them. There was Mr. Roosevelt, the president of the United States of America. He was the man who held the purse. There was Mr. Stalin, the man of steel, with a mind as sharp as a two-edged sword and a heart bent on world conquest. There was Mr. Churchill, with one of the greatest burdens of responsibility upon his shoulders, nothing more nor less than the destiny of one of the greatest of peoples of all times, a nation crowded on a small island whose resources were then well spent.
In this connection I do not think I can do much better than quote the remarks of the well-known columnist, George Sokolsky, which appeared in the New York Sun on March 8, 1945. I gather from the article that he covered the meeting at Teheran. What did he say about Churchill? These are his words:
One of these men (the big three) is a British aristocrat, Conservative, imperialistic, proud, the most heroic political figure of the war. But he heads an empire that has long been used to the limit. Its principal resource now is the treasury and industry of the United States. His mind is robust, but his purse is bare. At a bargain he sits with empty hands and high hopes.
That is Mr. Churchill at these conferences. One of my colleagues has passed me a note indicating that I have two minutes left. I can finish in that time because I do not think I need to say anything further. If it is thought that we differ at times with government policy respecting foreign affairs, we want it to be understood that we do so not because we sit on the opposition side of the house and not because we oppose any individual with whom we may disagree, but because we have a conscience and a conviction concerning the destinies of the nations of the world.


Mr. P. E. Wright (Melfort):: Mr. Speaker, it is not my intention to follow the argument of the hon. member who has just taken his seat.


John Horne Blackmore: You could not do it if you tried.


Percy Ellis Wright: I want to comment, however, on one statement he made. He said that Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Truman had the propaganda machine of the United States behind them, that they had the press behind them, and that is why they were such great national figures. If the rest of his speech is as correct as that statement I would hate to put much credence in it, because everyone who has followed conditions in the United States
TMr. Hansell.]

knows that 85 per cent of the press of that country were opposed to both Mr. Truman and Mr. Roosevelt.
In taking part in this debate I wish to congratulate the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) on the distinction conferred on him by the general assembly of the United Nations in electing him as president.
I believe it was a timely recognition of good service rendered, and it brought honour both to himself and to Canada. I enjoyed his speech on Wednesday; and if I have any criticism to offer it is that he has become so steeped in diplomacy in his work at the United Nations that he forgets that when he is at home he could afford to be-and I believe should be-a little more explicit and definite in his statements to parliament on Canada's position with respect to the serious international situation in which we find ourselves at the present time.
In my opinion it is poor policy for Canada not to make her position clear before commitments are made which may involve us at some later date in a serious world situation. I do not think that position is fair to our friends, and I believe in the long run it will only benefit our enemies. When the hon. member for St. John's West (Mr. Browne) was speaking the other night, he stated that we in this group criticized Mr. Dulles for some of his forthright statements in Europe yet at the same time we criticized the Secretary of State for External Affairs for not being more forthright with members of the house. I believe there is a difference. I believe there is a position between those two extremes that we in this country could follow. I know it is a difficult position. The Secretary of State for External Affairs explained that to us when he spoke to the house, but I am convinced that it is better to speak before than after the event has happened.
I have listened carefully to the speeches of the members of the official opposition during this debate. Formerly they took their lead from the Conservative government of Mr. Churchill in Great Britain-


Edmund Davie Fulton: Oh, no.


Percy Ellis Wright: -but now they are following the Republican government of Mr. Eisenhower in the United States. I do not think I have ever seen a group in Canada that seemed as anxious as my hon. friends to occupy the position of a satellite to some other nation. They seem content to be the tail of any big dog. Pretty soon they will be recommending the Stars and Stripes as our national flag instead of the Union Jack.
External Affairs


Edmund Davie Fulton: I did not know that my hon. friend had such a vivid imagination.


Percy Ellis Wright: I wonder what Sir Robert Borden would think if he had been here and heard the speeches made by my hon. friends in the last two days of this debate.


Edmund Davie Fulton: I do not know what he would think if he heard your speech.


Percy Ellis Wright: I do not imagine my hon. friends would have made such statements under his leadersip. I remember an election that was fought away back in 1911. I was not very big at the time but it seems to me that I recall hearing something about "no truck or trade with the Yankees". At Versailles Sir Robert Borden stood up for an independent Canada, a Canada that would express its own opinions and take a clear position in world affairs. I think we should follow the same policy. I believe Sir Robert Borden was right.
I do not intend to deal with the political aspects of the world situation today. I think the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Maclnnis) and the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) did that quite well. However, I want to deal with two other aspects of the situation. I am going to confine myself to the necessity for economic aid in Europe as well as military development, and assistance to underdeveloped areas in Asia, the Near East and Africa. I do not intend to deal very fully with the matter of economic aid. I think that can be done later on the estimates of the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe). But there are three or four things which it is my opinion we must do if we are to build the economies of Europe to the point where they can carry the military establishments that they are being asked to carry under NATO.
First, I think we are going to have to purchase more goods from Europe. We are going to have to remove some of the barriers that are in the way of the purchase of these goods in Canada and the United States. Then I think we are going to have to take sterling in exchange for some of the goods we wish to sell to Europe. I believe we shall have to invest that sterling in projects in the sterling area or make loans to the governments of the commonwealth to enable them to develop some of their great natural resources. I believe that if we carried out those two or three things, encouraged private investment and had some public investment or made it easier for the old countries to trade with us, we would overcome that situation.

External Affairs
I want particularly to deal with the latter of the two subjects I mentioned, that is the assistance to underdeveloped areas. When Chief Justice William Douglas of the United States supreme court returned from Asia a year or two ago he said the United States had been so busy fighting against communism that it had not tried to fight against the conditions that breed communism. If that is so in the United States, I think some of the figures I have here will point up the fact that it is even more so in Canada. In his speech the other day at page 1851 of Hansard, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) said this, when speaking of the recent commonwealth conference:
The effectiveness of this commonwealth conference cannot, of course, be judged finally until more is known of the measures adopted by individual governments following it, and until further discussions have taken place between its members and other governments, particularly the government of the United States, and with various international organizations, particularly the organization for European economic co-operation. The commonwealth countries have, however, taken a useful initiative. In following it up there will have to be co-operation on the broadest possible basis to ease the necessary but not easy adjustments which may have to be made, especially by some of the members of the commonwealth. In this process the Canadian government will naturally wish to play a full and, I hope, constructive part.
I want to give some figures as to the constructive part the Canadian government has been playing with regard to grants to these areas of the world which need some assistance at this time. I am speaking only of grants, and I shall deal with loans later. During the last four fiscal years, 1949 to 1952, Canada has given in non-military foreign grants a total of $51,765,900, while during the equivalent fiscal years the United States has given $15,817 million in non-military grants. This aid has been given since approximately the beginning of the ECA program in the United States, which started in April, 1948. The Canadian figures, by years, are as follows- I shall not give the odd figures but just the even thousands: In 1949, $5,811,000; 1950, $6,959,000; 1951, $12,313,000; 1952, $26,683,000. In the equivalent years the United States grants have been, 1949, $5,423 million; 1950, $4,620 million; 1951, $3,225 million; 1952, $2,549 million.
Let us take it on a per capita basis; since the United States is a large country and has a much greater population than we have, I think that is the only fair way. On a per capita basis Canada's actual grants during this period were $3.69 while the United States gave, on a per capita basis, $102 or almost 30 times as much as each Canadian. I believe those are rather startling figures. I do not think we in this country have anything

of which to be proud in the grants of economic aid which we have made available to other parts of the world. This economic aid has been given through various organizations such as the Colombo plan, the United Nations technical assistance program, and so on. Canada's total grants for four years should have been $1,237,215,000, if we had been giving on the basis of our productive capacity, rather than the meagre $51,765,900 which we did give.
During those years we in Canada were receiving considerable benefits from those grants given by the United States for assistance to Europe and other parts of the world. Many of our agricultural products and manufactured articles were being sold to Europe and paid for out of grants which the United States was making during this period. Canada benefited under ECA through United States offshore purchases from April, 1947 to March 1952 to the extent of $1,136,700,000. During this time we were giving aid to those countries totalling about $51,765,000 and we were benefiting by over $1,136,000,000 in purchases made out of United States funds. During that period we contributed not one cent to direct European aid. Our position is not very strong, therefore, when the minister suggests that the United States must come in with the commonwealth in providing greater sums of money for economic aid to the various parts of the world.
I have a table here showing contributions Canada has made over the past four years. It shows that under I.R.O. we contributed $5,411,000 in 1949; 1950, $5,826,000;	1951,
$2,107,000. For Near East relief we contributed in 1949, $73,800; in 1950, $57,400; in
1951,	$1,500,000. For post-UNRRA relief we contributed in 1949 about $325,000; under the United Nations expanded program for technical assistance, about $850,000; contribution to United Nations relief and rehabilitation program in Korea, $7,250,000; Colombo plan, $25 million; commonwealth consultative committee on south and southeast Asia, $265,000 in 1952; to provide for purchase and transportation to Yugoslavia of relief supplies in
1952,	$43,800; to provide for gifts of wheat or flour as a contribution to famine relief in Greece, some $825,000.
Those are figures for our direct contributions in the way of grants in aid to these countries during the last four years. In view of the amount we are spending and have been spending in Canada on military preparedness, and the budgetary surpluses we have had in those years in this country, I think the amount we have contributed is a miserable figure to try to build up better conditions in the world and to combat communism.


IB, 1953
[Stage Direction]
What did we have by way of budgetary surpluses in those years? In 1949 we had a surplus of $595,500,000; in 1950 we had $131,500,000; in 1951 we had $211,300,000; in 1952 we had $249 million, or a total surplus of $1,187,350,000. During a similar period we could contribute in grants only some $51,765,000 to combat communism in other parts of the world.
Let us now see what we did in some other respects, because we did a great deal more than that. In credits, in military relief, including those grants I have mentioned, and NATO mutual aid, we contributed between 1945 and 1952 some $2,410 million. That is a large sum of money. Let us see what the United States did. During a similar period the United States contributed $35,623 million; and in those contributions I have mentioned that we made during that time, the largest single item was the loan we made to Great Britain just after the war amounting to some $1,250 million. In loans and military aid we were somewhere near in proportion to the amounts given by the United States-[DOT] that is, on a per capita basis-but when it comes to straight grants in aid, we just do not compare with them at all. In other words, the United States have contributed about 30 times as much per capita as have we in Canada.
Let us see what our national defence expenditures were in those years. According to the public accounts, in 1949 we spent $264,820,000; in 1950, $380,948,000; in 1951 $780,204,000; and in 1952, $1,415,473,000. Last year our estimates of expenditure were $2,001 million. This year it is estimated that we will spend approximately the same amount, or another $2 billion. In other words, in the four-year period when we gave $51,765,000 in grants in aid, we spent in military preparedness $2,841 million. I do not think that is a fair proportion or division of the amount of money we in Canada have to spend if we are honest in saying-as the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) and the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) have said on various occasions-that we shall not be able to accomplish the things we want to accomplish unless we can build up the economies of these backward countries, unless we can assist Europe to establish a sound economy, unless we are prepared to see that these countries have a strong economic background on which to base their military establishments and unless we are prepared to see that in Asia and these other countries some technical assistance is given there, because military preparedness is not enough.
With regard to that matter I should like to quote what the minister said on technical 68108-126
External Affairs
assistance under the Colombo plan. As reported at page 1851 of Hansard he stated:
Another commonwealth initiative on which I can only touch at this time, but which I am sure will be given consideration later, is the Colombo plan, which likewise was framed in full awareness of the interests of other countries and other organizations, particularly the United Nations. That plan is now nearing the end of its second year and it continues to be one of the most important and constructive elements in our foreign economic policy.
When I looked over a release of the United Kingdom information office of December 11, 1952 in connection with the Colombo plan, I was rather surprised to find that there was a branch set up to give technical assistance to those nations of the commonwealth. In this pamphlet we find this statement:
The original members of the council were the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan and Ceylon. They were joined as full members in 1951 by Viet Nam and Cambodia, and early in 1952 by Burma and Nepal.
This council is set up for the purpose of giving technical assistance and of organizing in those various countries places of training for personnel who will go out and assist the inhabitants of those countries in building a better economy. It is stated here:
Co-operation is the key-note of the scheme . . . India has agreed to provide assistance to the value of Rs. 10 million (£750,000) . . .
Pakistan, Ceylon, Indonesia and other countries are putting in similar amounts in order to assist.
Pakistan has offered a contribution of Rs. H million to cover scholarships, fellowships and the provision of experts and training facilities: it has offered Ceylon four scholarships in sugar agronomy and training facilities relating to a projected vegetable oil mill. Ceylon is to contribute Rs. 1,776,000 for each year of the scheme and is providing training facilities in rural development work and the working of co-operatives.
Here is what I was surprised at, when I came to what had been done by the various countries:
As on 31st August, 1952, the services of 80 experts and training facilities for 658 persons had been offered and accepted under the scheme. The allocation of experts was as follows: India-15; Pakistan-36; and Ceylon-29.
Then listen to this:
The supplying countries were the United Kingdom-39; Canada-4; Australia-21; New Zealand- 13; and India-3.
When it comes to supplying facilities for training in the field, this is the situation:
The facilities were provided by the United Kingdom-207; Canada-95; Australia-218; New Zealand -107; India-30 and Pakistan-1.
I do not think we have anything to be proud of in that record; but I want to be fair. I want to point out that Canada, in providing these experts, decided that she would use the
[Stage Direction]
External Affairs
technical assistance program of the United Nations in providing the facilities. In Canada and the United Nations, 1951-52, at page 48, we find this statement:
In an effort to co-ordinate its own participation in the expanded program, Canada sought to obtain the agreement of all the participating organizations to channel their activities in recruiting experts or in placing trainees in Canada through the technical co-operation service which had been set up in the Department of Trade and Commerce. By June 1952 a total of 54 trainees had been sent to Canada by the technical assistance administration for training in fields which included public administration, agriculture, hydroelectric power development and social welfare. These students have come from such countries as India, Pakistan, Cuba, Finland, Brazil, Uruguay, Burma, Venezuela and the British West Indies. By that date 24 experts had been recruited from Canada by the technical assistance administration and the specialized agencies.
If we total up the experts we have placed at the disposal of both these schemes, and if we add the trainees that we have accepted in Canada, some 58 trainees from all of Asia and these other underdeveloped countries, up to June, 1952, it does not seem to me that you get a reasonable contribution on the part of this government to building better technical understanding and better relations with the countries in the Far East and the Near East. It seems to me that, with the facilities we have here in Canada, we should be able to do much more than we have been doing to date in the training of personnel in this country and in the bringing of individuals from these backward countries for training in Canada.
I am convinced that if we are to meet the threat of communism in the world today, the only sensible way to do it is to bring some of the young people from these countries over to Canada, to the United States, to Great Britain and to the other democratic countries and show them what we have here, show them that we have a system that works, that we have a system that provides plenty. If we fail to do it, then make no mistake; Russia is not going to fail to do it. She is not going to fail to take them to her country and give them every opportunity, and try to show them that they have a better system than we have.
In my estimation that is the only way we are going to get value for the amount of money we are spending on military preparedness today. To get value we have to build up the economies of these countries so they can assist themselves. So far I do not think that we in Canada are doing anything like what we can and should do in that regard.
Mr. W. G. Dinsdale (Brandon):: Mr. Speaker, an ordinary backbencher hesitates to participate in a debate dealing with external affairs.
TMr. Wright.]
We are aware of the fact that this particular area of interest involves a very complex field indeed.
As I have sat in this house and listened to debates on various topics I have been encouraged as a backbencher to feel that I might be able to make some small contribution to this discussion, because I find that ability or expert knowledge is not necessarily equated with the length of speeches on any particular topic. As a matter of fact, in a little aside that went on just before I rose to my feet, someone near me expressed the thought that he was not taking part in this debate because he had only one idea on the subject and he did not think that was adequate resources. The rejoinder was that very often this particular person had spoken on a subject with more limited resources than even one idea.
I rise to deal with this topic because actually it is the most important problem that faces hon. members. If we do not solve the difficulties of external affairs, obviously of course we will solve nothing. We are blessed today in Canada, as well as the people in other parts of the western world, with the most incredible material progress that mankind has seen. During the past 200 years the west has passed through a state of progress, so far as material and technical civilization are concerned, that is almost beyond the capacity of the mind to grasp.
In 1750, if we go back that far, if we were to look at the conditions of the peasant in either Europe or Asia, we would find that actually there was very little to distinguish between the two. Today there is absolutely no comparison at all. What is most disconcerting is that we have emerged into the post-war atomic era and we find that the speed of technological change has increased rather than diminished. It has brought western nations to a fundamental crisis which I suppose could be called a moral crisis rather than anything else, in that our moral development and social intelligence have failed to keep pace with our material development.
So far as the sphere of political activity is concerned, we have noted, in the internal situation as well as the external, the tendency toward increased concentration on political power. In the field of external relations we find today, if we were to try to sum up the problem in the simplest terms, two great world powers facing one another and not on very amiable terms. We have the U.S.S.R. and its satellites on one hand, the eastern group; and in the other, the western group, we have

the United States of America and her associates. I use the term "satellite" and "associates" to distinguish the relationship that exists between the Soviet and those within her sphere of influence, and the United States of America and the countries which come within her orbit of influence.
Actually, either of those world powers- and they are just that, world powers-could exercise world control without any difficulty at all, were it not for the existence of the other. We have the means of communication and transportation, as a result of developments on the scientific and material levels, that would make it possible for either of those powers to achieve in concrete political terms what has been the overwhelming desire of world powers from the beginning of the history of mankind. Therefore when the hon. member for Melfort (Mr. Wright) makes reference to the positive attitude of this group toward the United States of America, I do not think he can infer that we have necessarily allowed ourselves to be completely dominated, to come completely under the control of that particular sphere of influence. I think actually the situation is the result of political reality. Whether we like it or not, the United States of America is leading the western nations in the struggle for world domination between communism and the western democracies.
What is most difficult in this problem is the fact that today, in dealing with political matters, we are faced with the threat of atomic warfare. In listening to Mr. Truman give his last statement to Congress before he retired from the presidency of the United States, I was interested in a particular point. He said something like this, and he addressed his remarks directly to Stalin. I do not know whether that gentleman was listening, but Mr. Truman intended the remarks for Stalin's ears. He said:
You claim belief in Lenin's prophecy that one stage in the development of communist society would be war between your world and ours. But Lenin was a pre-atomic man who viewed society and history with pre-atomic eyes. Something profound has happened since he wrote. War has changed its shape and dimensions. It cannot be a stage in the development of anything save ruin.
I am sure hon. members in this chamber will agree with these words of the former president of the United States that today war can mean only inevitable ruin for civilization. We have within our grasp the power to incinerate fifty million people within a space of five minutes, if it ever happens that the hot war should break out in full intensity.
It is because of this that I feel the present debate is of the utmost importance and, as a backbencher, I am going to make 68108-126J
External Affairs
some small contribution to the discussion. The interest aroused from this debate, as the various points are discussed in the chamber and in the press, will create in the minds of the public an awareness of the gravity of the situation.
It seems to me that in Canada we have been more preoccupied with our own material development and prosperity than in acknowledging our obligations, as we are confronted with this extremely grave external situation. I suppose politicians-not necessarily those on the opposition side-have been more at fault than others for having stirred up a false sense of well-being and security, and for having harped constantly on the theme of Canadian prosperity. Our prosperity is meaningless if we do not do something to solve the very difficult problem that, as an autonomous nation within the framework of the British commonwealth, we are forced to face.
My thinking on the matter has been shaped largely outside this chamber. I have not had the opportunity to sit through many debates on external affairs during my membership in the house. Many of the ideas I shall bring forth were formulated in the weird and wonderful period immediately following world war II. Those of us who served in that war were deeply interested in what was then popularly described as the winning of the peace. It was said that a military victory was useless unless we were equally successful in winning the peace. Everyone was heartened as we saw the United Nations take shape to deal with problems affecting international relations.
Unfortunately, as has been indicated by several speakers in this debate, the United Nations got bogged down in fuzzy idealism. After the second world war we believed, as we did after world war I, that the world had been made safe for democracy. The original claim of the United Nations, unfortunately, has not been realized in actuality. I do not believe there was anything sinister in connection with what happened when the United Nations was formed. Actually, as I have already pointed out, the same attitude prevailed at the time of the formation of the league of nations after world war I. I do not think there was any world conspiracy that dominated that organization. Rather it was apathy, lack of interest, lack of understanding and comprehension on the part of those who were responsible for guiding the affairs of the world.
For example I believe it was President Harding who refused even to acknowledge communications from the league of nations, and it was such apathy, lack of interest and

External Affairs
isolationism that sabotaged that organization. I do not think there is anything sinister in what occurred in respect of the league of nations. It was a matter of indifference; and perhaps during the twentieth century ideas emerged preventing the real issues from being faced by those who were most responsible for carrying out the early negotiations of that international body.
Today, as the result of failure by the United Nations to grapple successfully with the problem of winning the peace, we find ourselves in a cold war period. In this changed situation the borderline between peace and war has become somewhat blurred. When the house commenced its deliberations this afternoon, for example, an effort was made, through a question asked in the house, to ascertain whether or not we are now actually engaged in war.
While we were indulging in wishful thinking the Russians, true to form-and had we had any knowledge of history we would have expected it-seized	the initiative and
succeeded in building up a buffer of "friendly" satellites. This was done with very little effort on the part of Russia. At that time the west had neither the power nor the will to resist. Actually, if we had had an understanding of the communist world movement we should have been aware that this condition of affairs would have developed; because communism, as an ideology, must be recognized as a world religion. One of the strong motivating factors in the communist idea is the religious faith it arouses in its devotees. It appears to have great strength in areas where there is a religious vacuum; and we know there are many religious vacuums around the world today.
In addition to the religious aspect of communism it is utterly and absolutely opposed to what is sometimes described as western capitalism. It has as its fundamental objective the extermination in any way possible of the capitalist form of society. Communism has its imperialistic aspect. For example, it is significant that the only countries that have been brought within the scope of soviet influence by internal disorder have been China and Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is now afflicted with an interesting disease called Titoism, and it is hoped that China, that vast and mysterious country of the east, will become afflicted with the same political illness. It seems inconceivable that China will allow herself to remain indefinitely the puppet of the political manipulators in Moscow. An understanding of the true nature of Russian communism, as well as its religious and imperialistic aspects, should have put us on the alert, so far as the post-war activities of that nation are concerned. Instead of
that, both at Yalta and at Potsdam, as has been indicated in this debate, we took the attitude of compromise and conciliation, an attitude similar to that taken toward the nazis before world war II. At that time the slogan was: Let's not be nasty to the nazis. This time it was: Let's not be nasty to the soviets. We indulged in wholesale disarmament while Russia, very easily and without much effort on her part, was gobbling up the countries within her immediate sphere of influence. And it is only recently, since the reorganization of the cominform in 1947, that we have begun to stiffen our attitude toward communist imperialism.
Today we have the soviets at bay in the west since the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is rather an encouraging sign that since NATO was established there has been every evidence cf increasing solidarity in western European countries. It is almost possible to conclude that the situation, so far as Europe is concerned, has been stabilized because at long last the western powers have awakened to the reality of Russian intent and they are offering firm resistance to any further encroachment by that world power.
Today Russia has been stopped temporarily in the west. I think the reason she has been stopped is because she realizes that she can make further gains in Europe only at the risk of open conflict. Surely responsible leaders in Russia are no more happy about the prospect of atomic warfare than are we in the west. She came very close to absorbing France and Italy within her sphere of influence. I repeat that we owe much of the relative stability in western Europe today to the wisdom of those who were responsible for promoting the NATO plan.
The question is, can it last? The communist plan is a fluid and mobile one. It was General Eisenhower, when in charge of the European army, who said that Europe cannot be defended unless she unites. Now that General Eisenhower has become president of the United States I imagine he still holds that viewpoint in connection with international affairs and is still of the opinion that we cannot defend Europe against further Russian encroachment unless Europe does unite. I think that could account for the recent statements by the secretary of state, Mr. Dulles, in Europe, when he emphasized the necessity of European union in order to preserve the situation as it stands at the moment.
So much for Europe. I have listened to this discussion with a great deal of interest, and have realized that Europe and NATO have been considerably in the background.

Our attention has been focused upon east Asian matters precipitated by the recent announcement concerning Formosa. I do not think we can call what is taking place in east Asia a cold war. The term "cold war" as I have indicated suggests a blurred understanding of what is actually peace and what is war. The minister of external affairs has referred to Korea as a police action. As I read the reports from that area and try to keep in touch with the situation it seems to me to be a pretty hot police action, almost hot enough to be called a hot war.
Unfortunately the situation in Asia is not turning out as well as it has in western Europe. The situation in Asia as represented by the stalemate in Korea is weighing heavily against the democracies. It is a very delicate situation indeed, because there we have not the background of democratic traditions and type of thinking that we found in the west which made it possible for the western powers to come together once they were made aware of the imperialistic drive of communism.
In Asia it is more than a case of communism versus democracy. In the eastern part of the world we have been witnessing during recent years, ever since the west became interested in the Orient as a matter of fact, the beginning of an industrial revolution with its consequent effects upon nationalism and racialism. What is taking place in Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaya and throughout the east, and also to a certain extent in China, is the result primarily of influences that have come in from the west.
The missionaries who have gone there have preached the fundamental ideas of Christianity, the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man. Those ideas have had a tremendous impact upon the Asian people. Not only have we sent religious missionaries; we have sent political prophets who have expounded the principles of freedom and liberty to people who have no background of democratic thought or experience. Then our commercial salesmen followed in the wake of the missionaries and introduced the peoples of the east, who I suppose were at a stage of economic development which could be compared to that existing in Europe some four or five hundred years ago, to the material benefits of our western way of life.
It seems to me that the real difficulty in the east arises from nationalistic sentiments. I think it is obvious to those who are familiar with the situation that the events that have been taking place in China over some decades, but more recently since world war II, are interpreted by the people of east Asia as a triumph of Asiatic nationalism
External Affairs
over what they call western colonial oppression, and it is very easy for Russia to sell that notion to the Chinese people. The people of the east are very suspicious of the motives of the western nations as they endeavour to stabilize an extremely difficult situation in that part of the world. I suppose they have cause to be suspicious, because it is not so many years ago that the western powers were carrying on what might be termed colonial oppression.
The crux of the matter, as I see it, in east Asia is what is going to happen to the 800 million people who are still outside the orbit of soviet influence. They are being weighed in the balance at the moment. We do not know whether they are going to move in the direction of the western democracies or be inveigled by the false promises of liberty and economic benefits which Russia and communism can hold out before the eyes of these people. We have found that communism is capable of being all things to all people until it actually takes over and is in political control of the situation. That seems to be the crux of the matter. What happens in regard to the east as negotiations are carried on at the United Nations is going to determine very largely the direction in which the people will turn.
So far as China is concerned, it used to be thought that the social and political revolution that has occurred in that country was merely a continuation of the agrarian reform movement that has been going on for a long time in that country. But today, as we see the participation of the Chinese communists in Korea, we cannot fail to recognize that behind that effort is the subtle manipulation of the Soviets. We are faced with a situation very similar to that which confronted us shortly after world war II. The pressure that was formerly exerted on the satellite countries of Europe is now being exerted in Korea; and as I have indicated, the situation has been exploited very favourably by the Soviets thus far on their own behalf.
If it is true in the east, as it was in the west, that the Soviets only understand a firm voice, I do not think we need become too disturbed and this is an opinion that has already been expressed by the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) about the recent United States action with respect to Formosa, because to me it merely seems to indicate that the pressure that was applied in the west is now going to be applied in the east. We must remember, of course, that there is greater danger of open conflict in the Asiatic situation because of the nationalism and

External Affairs
racialism and the social and political upheaval I have briefly outlined. However, inasmuch as Russia responded to increased pressure in the west, why should she not react in the same manner to increased pressure in the Asian sphere of influence? A firm voice in the west brought results. If Russia shows the same reluctance to face an outbreak of hostilities that she did in the west, surely she will be reasonable enougn to withdraw from a situation that could be made untenable once the western powers indicate their real intent there.
We must always remember, of course-and this is a difficulty no one can resolve-that no one can decide what Russia is going to do. Actually the answer is in her hands, and it might be that with madmen in authority she will precipitate the world into the ruinous war, a war that everyone fervently hopes will never occur, because it is a foregone conclusion in this atomic age that war can only result in ruin for all the peoples of the world.
It has been suggested by this group that a positive contribution toward the stabilization of the situation in Asia might be made by the creation of a pact or organization similar to that which was established in western Europe. The minister has been reluctant to meet the situation head on with a pointblank statement. We have been faced with embarrassing unilateral action on the part of the United States. Much of the discussion that has gone on in the house has been of a speculative variety concerning the true intent of that country, whether they are going to push the struggle in the east right to the limit, which means open warfare, or whether their action merely reflects a stiffening resistance. Apparently we do not know, mainly because we were not consulted.
It seems to me that the success achieved by NATO in stabilizing the European situation might also be realized in the east if we were able to get together in some form of Pacific pact or organization. In order to avoid the possibility of armed conflict, certainly everything in our power must be done. If a Pacific pact can help, it seems to me it would be a logical step in proceeding toward some form of political machinery for resolving by negotiation and agreement the difficulty that exists between the two world powers, these two gigantic spheres of influence, the U.S.S.R. on the one side and the United States on the other. As to the question of who shall join such a Pacific pact, that would resolve itself as the organization took shape, just as it has in the case of

NATO which now extends its sphere of influence far beyond the immediate geographic area of the Atlantic.
In the immediate post-war period after world war II we talked about winning the peace, we talked about one world or none. The slogan "one world or none" is just as applicable now as it was in those days. The United Nations must succeed. It is the ultimate hope for carrying on international negotiations by peaceful means. At the moment it is blocked because of the difficulty that has arisen between the eastern and western spheres of influence. We must work toward the establishment of some form of political machinery whereby international affairs can be settled by discussion and agreement and not by participation in a devastating war.
I say again that here is the heart of the matter. It is essentially a moral problem. Because of the rapid rate of scientific and materialistic progress we have been precipitated violently into a world in which we have neither the social intelligence nor the moral integrity to handle the problems that have developed. That gap must be bridged if humanity is to survive.


Mr. H. A. MacKenzie (Lamblon-Kent):: Mr. Speaker, I had not intended to take part in this debate on external affairs until I saw in the press this morning that the debate was to be concluded today. Therefore I thought I should like to make a few observations at this time. It seems to me that this is a great day for the backbenchers, because they are taking part in the debate at the present time.
First of all I want to extend my congratulations to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) on being chosen president of the seventh session of the general assembly of the United Nations. It is a great tribute to him in his own right and a gesture of good will to Canada as well. I am sure that he will preside at the meetings of the assembly with firmness and efficiency that will bring credit, as has always been the case at external affairs meetings, not only to himself but to the great dominion which he so ably represents.
I am not going to take much time to debate the different problems that confront us in respect to external affairs. I am not going to talk about the great problems confronting NATO, or the problems of the Near East and Middle East, great as they are, because they have already been discussed by members of the house who are much better qualified to do so than I am. I do not profess to be an expert or even an authority on external

affairs, because it does seem to me that is a line of study that is available to very few people.
I do want to make some reference to the situation in the Far East and the recent change in policy made by President Eisenhower, which has caused a great deal of consternation throughout the world because of the fear that the government of the United States may take further action in this regard which, without bringing to an end the war in Korea, could easily develop into a third global war.
In referring to that, I should like to quote briefly from an editorial that appeared a few ' days ago in the Citizen which I felt summarized the matter very well. It reads:
Reassuring statements in Washington have as yet only partially allayed British and west European alarm at President Eisenhower's decision to end the "neutralization" of Formosa. The disturbing fact is that unilateral action by the United States in the Far East cannot be kept separate from United Nations action in Korea. For Canada, with its American, commonwealth, and U.N. links, the situation is particularly difficult. But now is the time to take a stand, and in parliament on Wednesday the external affairs minister, Mr. Pearson, made plain that Canadian exertions in Korea are for no other cause than that of the United Nations.
The complicating factor is United States foreign policy, which has been developed at the same time as the Americans have given the U.N. leadership in Korea. Regarding the Chinese communist victory as defeat for that policy, some Americans have continued to hope that the restoration of Chiang Kai-shek's regime, now on Formosa, might be engineered or assisted. So the Truman administration simultaneously rallied the U.N. to defend South Korea and sent a fleet to protect Formosa, lest the mainland Chinese should think the situation ripe for an attempt to conclude the civil war by an attack on Chiang Kai-shek.
The United States alone preserved and built up Chiang's forces, while not preventing them from making minor raids on the mainland. It has now released them for any larger enterprises that may be considered feasible, and has promised increased aid. The theory is that China may be forced to come to terms in Korea. But this policy plays into the hands of those in the west who want the western nations to try to reverse the Chinese revolution, and indeed to achieve the effective restoration of their former power throughout most of Asia. It would be likely to consolidate communist Asia, Russian and Chinese, since antiwestern feeling has contributed powerfully to communist success. It would alienate non-communist Asia, where suspicion of the west is still strong. The spread of fighting might result in a major war.
Mr. Pearson has very likely foreseen all these dangers. He has reiterated the Canadian government's view that the concern of the United Nations is not to intervene in Chinese affairs, not to spread the hostilities, but only to protect South Korea. This position is likely to commend itself to parliament.
I was in New York early in December, and while not there as an official delegate of Canada I spent several days at the United
External Affairs
Nations assembly and attended political committee meetings from time to time. When the Indian plan was presented as a means of ending the Korean conflict I hoped that this would be accepted by the Russian delegates and their satellite nations, who were the spokesmen for the Chinese and North Koreans on that occasion. Since this was an Asian plan and was promoted by a free state, it could not in any sense of the word be considered as an imperialist plot. I felt that it would surely be accepted. But after listening to the spokesman for the Russian delegation, Mr. Vishinsky, in his tirade against this plan, I knew that it would not be accepted.
The plan represented a compromise safeguarding the principle of non-forcible repatriation of war prisoners, while conceding to the Chinese the right to have representatives from two communistic countries on the screening committee. The rejection has made a negotiated peace much more difficult than ever to achieve, and has increased the danger of the Korean conflict spreading. Undoubtedly this change in policy by the United States was designed to relieve the pressure on the Korean front which could, in turn, convince the North Korean and Chinese communists that the stalemate in Korea could not continue much longer, and that peace would be much more desirable. This action on the part of President Eisenhower would seem to eliminate all the provisions of the Cairo agreement that was signed in 1943 by Churchill, Roosevelt and Chiang Kai-shek, the leader of the nationalist government.
Under the terms of that agreement, Formosa was to be returned to the Chinese republic after the cessation of hostilities. The situation is most difficult because the United States still recognizes the nationalist government that operates from Formosa as the government of China, yet Great Britain, whose government is still headed by the same man who signed the Cairo agreement, recognizes the new communist regime. The United States policy can only be interpreted as one that allows the nationalist government to carry on its operations against the mainland, and also assists it with arms, war munitions and material. At the same time the seventh fleet could be used to protect Formosa from any attack from the mainland of China. This could lead to a global or third world war which, if at all possible, we want to avoid.
On former occasions I have spoken in this house regarding the situation in China. I do not think it would serve any useful purpose to thresh old straw. I do not believe it would accomplish much to go over the merits or

External Affairs
demerits of the former regime in China, because I believe they have been well established in the world at large. I do believe there are a few basic facts that should be pointed out. In reading Hansard of Friday night, I believe it was, I noticed that the member for St. John's West (Mr. Browne), in speaking of the nationalist government of China, said they had the same ideas we have. This afternoon I was amazed to hear some members state that the late Franklin Roosevelt was a much overrated man. Personally I was a great admirer of the late Franklin D. Roosevelt. I recall the occasion upon which he visited this parliament, and one of the things that was a revelation to me was that a man who had such a physical handicap would carry on in the service of his country and make such contributions to his fellow men during his lifetime.
As I said, I was a great admirer of the late Franklin D. Roosevelt. One of the things that impressed me was the statement he issued regarding the four freedoms of our democracy, freedoms of which he was the champion and the director. The first of these was the freedom of speech and assembly. The second was the freedom of worship. I was in China for almost two and a half years, and I would say that freedom of worship was in evidence all over China. In Shanghai there were many, many churches. I remember that in the old French concession, in what we called the Zeg Wai district, the Catholic church had a very large organization. They had schools for boys and for girls; they had a nursery started. We went there many times because we, as a relief and rehabilitation organization, on many occasions had given them relief supplies in the nature of clothing and flour.
I visited the cathedral there. Next to Notre Dame cathedral in Montreal and one in New York, I think it was the greatest cathedral I was ever in. There was freedom of worship in all of the different communities throughout the city. They worshipped there as they cared to. In the community centre, which was part of the old American zone, the community church was there, and I used to attend the community church service. When there one Sunday-and I am sure my friend the hon. member for Macleod (Mr. Hansell) would be interested in this-I heard the late ambassador to China, Leighton Stuart, make an extremely fine address. I think that was in July, 1947. Today the local temples are, I believe, still open for worship as they were on former occasions; but the missions and the churches that have been conducted by
[Mr. MacKenzie.l
the people of foreign districts or of foreign lands do not enjoy the freedom of worship they had when I was there.
Of course this question about the nationalist government and its merits or demerits is something that was a political question in the United States. As a matter of fact, during the last presidential election the matter was discussed at some length and people took both sides, and did so rather heatedly. There were honest opinions expressed, I have no doubt, on both sides, and that was their right. But when we think about these names that have been prominent in China for so many years:	T.
V. Soong; Dr. T. F. Tsiang; Dr. H. H. Kung; K. C. Wu and General Claire Chennault, many of them recall old acquaintances that I had when I was in that Far East country. Mr. Wu was at that time mayor of the city of Shanghai. He did a good job. He is now the governor of Formosa. It is unfortunate that he was not there in the first place, because he probably could have avoided that most disastrous massacre of the people which was conducted by the former governor.
As to Major General Chennault, I met him on several occasions, and had the privilege and pleasure of meeting him one night and entertaining him in one of the hotel rooms. He was at that time the president of the civil air transport, CAT. He was doing quite a large commercial business there. They eventually amalgamated with another commercial air line, and they had almost a monopoly on the commercial air lines in China.
When the generalissimo took over the Chinese republic, the first president of the executive council and practically the premier was T. V. Soong. In 1928 he took over, and he held that position until 1933 when H. H. Kung replaced him. Both these men, by the way, were brothers-in-law of the president. He was kept in power until 1944, when Soong was again re-established as president and premier of the Chinese republic.
When I arrived in China in 1945 T. V. Soong was the president of the executive union and also the premier. We distributed a great'many relief supplies to the Chinese people. T. V. Soong at that time was the man actually in charge. He tried, to some extent, to control the provisions that were sent over under the United Nations relief and rehabilitation program. I well remember that in 1946, when 550,000 bales of cotton were distributed in China in order to rehabilitate the industry and also to provide relief clothing, 75 per cent of that cotton was distributed among Chinese-owned mills

which were actually T. V. Soong and company's mills; because they took over the former Japanese mills in Shanghai and operated them under the name of C.T.I.I. or China Textile Industries Incorporated. They made much of that cotton into uniforms for the armed services. Of course that was completely contrary to the terms of the contract that was made for the distribution of those supplies.
The director of the CNRRA organization which, after all, was under the control of T. V. Soong, was Dr. T. F. Tsiang. I have not my records here so that I can be exact, but during that period a protest was sent to Washington in order to stop the supplies coming into China until there was some clarification of where they were to go. These were held back for some time, but later they were released.
Most people now admit that any amount of aid sent to the Chinese nationalist forces when they were in power could not have saved them. Mr. Acheson said in a press release that from 1945 to 1951, I think it was, some $2 billion or more of aid was authorized to go to the Chinese republic. Those supplies positively, in many cases, were sold. Whole regiments that were equipped with United States equipment went over to the communists of that time, so that the supplies the United States shipped over at that time played as large if not a larger part in the overthrow of the nationalist government than did the supplies they received from Russia, though Russia unquestionably gave them supplies.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.
Hugh Alexander MacKenzie: Mr. Speaker, when the house rose at six o'clock I was discussing some of the reasons why, in my opinion, we had lost China as an ally. As a matter of fact, during the first year of the Korean war much of the equipment captured by the allies from the North Koreans was of United States manufacture. It is generally agreed by those who look at this in a realistic way that the war in China could never have been won unless the United States had taken an active part in it and had complete control of all the supplies and equipment they sent in there from time to time.
The question is asked, is the situation much better today? Toward the latter part of 1949 Madame Chiang came to the United
External Affairs
States. On January 8, 1950 she gave a farewell broadcast from New York, and I was fortunate enough to hear it. That night she was very critical of the position Great Britain had taken. She definitely intimated that the recognition of the communist government was of a mercenary nature; that that was what led Great Britain to recognize the new regime in China. She mentioned the fact that Great Britain had possession of Hong Kong and other places that meant so much to her. But she forgot to mention that many of the Asiatic countries had also recognized the new regime. She forgot to mention that many European countries such as Holland, Denmark, Switzerland and Sweden could hardly be regarded as communist countries, and they had recognized the new regime in China.
In 1950 I went to Lake Success; and when I went to the security council and saw the delegates there in their permanent seats I was. actually surprised to find as China's permanent delegate my old friend Dr. T. F. Tsiang whom I knew so well in China and with whom I had quite a few differences in regard to the distribution of materials among the war-devastated and war-ravaged areas of China. According to our contract these supplies were to have been distributed without discrimination as to race, creed or political differences, but of course that is something they just did not do.
If China had been recognized at that time the question is often asked would the situation be any better, would the conditions be any better than they are now. That is a question no one can answer. It is futile even to prophesy as to what would have happened. But I will say this. I do not see how it could have been any worse, at any rate. By recognizing the government of China you would not be approving or disapproving the type of government they had. You would be only acknowledging a fact that already existed. You would be acknowledging that they had restored some order and that they had control of the situation, and that is all that would have been implied in recognition of the government.
I remember sitting in the delegates lounge during 1950 and talking to some of the United States delegates. They said: "Of course we would not recognize a gangster mob. That is something we will not do. How do you expect us to recognize a revolutionary gangster mob?" I remember exactly what they said. They said: "Why these people are in the A1 Capone and Frank Costello class." I said: "I quite appreciate that, but don't forget that in 1917 the Russians had probably one of the cruelest revolutions of all time, in which they liquidated their rulers and took

External Affairs
their property. It was one of the wickedest in all history; still you have recognized them for the last 17 years; you are in full diplomatic relations with them." The fact is, if you go back into history you will find that Chiang himself came into power in the same way. That was hardly a good enough reason for not recognizing China.
What is the situation today? When I was in New York in December I made some inquiries about my old friends whom I knew in China. They probably would not recognize me. As a matter of fact I never met Dr. Kung, but I did meet T. V. Soong. He was a very charming personality. I made inquiries about where they were and what they were doing. I was told that they were settled down in New York. They are pretty well established there. As a matter of fact they are very wealthy. They told me too that Madame Chiang was still there, although I have no proof for that statement. The two brothers-in-law of Chiang, T. V. Soong and Dr. Kung, have become very wealthy, because for a long time they were not only premier and minister of finance of the country, which is a great combination, but they did have a tremendous amount of money. They are conducting and directing one of the most powerful lobbies that has ever taken place in the United States not only in Washington but at the United Nations as well.
I hold in my hand a magazine that is published in New York called the Reporter.
magazine can be obtained in the reading room. In the issues of April 15, 1952 and April 29, 1952 you will find described the most powerful lobby that has taken place in many, many years. They know that the old regime cannot possibly be reinstated in the Chinese homeland unless there is all-out revolution, unless there is a war. That is the only hope they have of being reinstated in their former status. I noticed that in the political committee, when the final vote came on the Indian proposal for peace in Korea, the Chinese delegate abstained from voting.
There are very few of us who fully appreciate that communism in some of these underprivileged and backward countries has a much greater appeal than it has to the people of Canada. I venture to say there is no one in this chamber this evening who knows very much about the pangs of hunger, who knows the devastating effects that hunger and want and privation have on a people. But those people know. And of course communism has a great appeal to them because it promises them a better way of life. It promises to free them from their economic chains. It promises to give them a better
[Mr. MacKenzie.l
standard of living. Naturally, with nothing to lose, they take a chance on it. They do not appreciate that the first objective of communist doctrine is for the state to get complete control of the individual. The second objective is to obtain complete domination over all the people.
In the final analysis the object of communism is world power, bringing with it concentration camps and slave labour. That is something these underprivileged people have not yet realized. Has that stage yet arrived in China? I do not think so, and I believe that with the help of the United Nations that old land may possibly be reinstated.
So in conclusion I ask this question. Do the peoples of the free world want to win China from Russian domination? The answer obviously is yes, that it must be done. Surely we can find some champion of our way of life, our Christian democracy, among the Chinese people, without trying to reinstate the old regime which, in my opinion, will never bring about that condition. Because, eventually, China will break from Russia.


Mr. H. R. Argue (Assiniboia):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to take part in the debate tonight to support what has been said by hon. members of this group who have already spoken. We are interested chiefly in the situation in Korea, in doing everything possible to prevent an extension of the war and in doing everything possible toward bringing it to a speedy end.
I believe the hon. member for Cariboo (Mr. Murray) made an excellent contribution to the debate when, among other things, he pointed out what Canada could do by way of economic assistance to Asian countries in order to promote good will and democratic principles in those areas.
I was not able to be in the house on the days the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) made his survey of international affairs. However, I read his speeches on both days and, in the main, I believe I can agree with what he said. I felt, however, when reading his speeches, that he should have taken a firmer stand in regard to the Eisenhower instruction to remove the seventh fleet shield from the Chinese mainland.
I gained the impression from reading the minister's speech that he was sitting on the fence, but leaning toward the position taken later by the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Maclnnis) and the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles). We in this group certainly view with alarm the recent order by President Eisenhower in regard to the seventh fleet. Not only do we feel that it was a mistake

but, in common with other members in the house, we have seen statements by other prominent Americans suggesting such things as a naval blockade of the Chinese mainland, air and naval support for Chiang Kai-shek, and the use of new weapons. We are fearful lest this first action by President Eisenhower be followed by actions of the kind I have just mentioned that might, in fact, extend the war to the point where we would be definitely involved in a war on the Asian continent.
We are certainly opposed to any such further steps as might lead to that terrible result. We feel President Eisenhower's order was a mistake, not only because we do not agree with it but because, as we understand it, it was arrived at after very little consultation with the other members of the United Nations involved in the current police action.
I do not think the United States can support United Nations action in Korea and say, on the one hand, that it is the action of the United Nations, and on the other hand feel free in some other way to take unilateral action connected with the Korean conflict. Either the action in Korea is a United Nations action or it is not; and so long as it is a United Nations action we feel that any decision should be taken only after consultation among the nations involved and after general agreement has been achieved.
In the United Kingdom, for example, both the Labour party and the Conservative government are opposed to the recent United States action. I see in a Canadian Press dispatch from London appearing in the Regina Leader-Post of February 3, the following:
Foreign Secretary Eden said Tuesday Britain feels the United States decision on Formosa will have "unfortunate political repercussions without compensating military advantages".
I have seen press reports of the debate that took place at Westminster. Certainly the Labour party is opposed to the Eisenhower directive and feels that it is fraught with the greatest danger. It has been suggested by prominent people in the United States that there should be a blockade of the Chinese mainland. When the blockade was being discussed in the United Kingdom parliament Mr. Herbert Morrison asked a number of questions of Mr. Eden. He asked what the United Kingdom government would do if Chiang Kai-shek, in a blockade he might undertake, interfered with British ships. And he asked this question:
Supposing forces of Chiang Kai-shek conducted a blockade against the Chinese mainland and interfered with British merchant shipping peacefully
External Affairs
going about its business? I would like to ask the foreign secretary to inform us what Her Majesty's government would do. What does the Royal Navy do?
And again:
Replying to that part of the speech, Eden later said "Her Majesty's ships on their lawful occasion would always be protected-that is the duty of any government of this country."
We sincerely hope that such protection by the United Kingdom of British merchant ships will not be necessary, but the discussion in the British House of Commons demonstrates how serious is the United States action and the great danger that is involved.
I think it is important for us in the western world to cultivate the friendship of noncommunist Asian countries such as India and Pakistan. I think it is particularly important that we co-operate with India, and any action by the western world that is opposed by India should be taken only after the most serious consideration. Here we have United States unilateral action which is opposed by the government of India. The Montreal Gazette of February 12 contained a dispatch from New Delhi, as follows:
The Indian government views with "grave concern" the recent developments in the Far East following the United States government's withdrawal of the seventh fleet, President Rajendra Prasad said today in an address to a joint session of parliament.
And the concluding sentence in the dispatch reads:
The address made it clear that Prime Minister Nehru's government totally disapproved of Washington's decision.
I think we are all anxious to have the war in Korea settled. I think we are all anxious that it should not be extended, and I think we should give more regard to the views of the governments of India and the other Asian nations in the free world.
I listened to the speech just delivered by the hon. member for Lambton-Kent (Mr. MacKenzie). Because of his experience he is better qualified than I to comment on the Chiang Kai-shek regime, either as it existed on the Chinese mainland or as it presently exists on Formosa. I noticed that he referred to the China lobby in Washington and the people associated with it as the same old crowd. He went on to say that Chiang Kai-shek and the same old crowd could not be reinstated as the government of China without an all-out global war. That is certainly my view. I feel that anything done to reinstate Chiang Kai-shek in China is not only impractical and probably impossible, but would mean the loss of support and good will among other Asian countries.
I have referred to statements by United States leaders. I should like to quote from a

External Affairs
special dispatch to the New York Times, dated Washington, February 8, from Clayton Knowles as follows:
Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, Republican leader of the Senate, added fuel today to the major foreign policy debate, now shaping up in Congress, by declaring that the United States already was "at full war" with communist China.
For this reason, he asserted, neither the bombing of Manchurian supply bases north of Korea nor a blockade of the China mainland could be expected to extend the war.
He said he thought a blockade was "desirable" if it could be worked out "without too great international complications with our allies."
There it is. Senator Taft, the Republican leader in the United States Senate, is advocating a blockade of the Chinese mainland and saying that the United States is already at full war with communist China. There is another dispatch in the New York Times of February 8 as follows:
Senator William F. Knowland of California, chairman of the Senate Republican policy committee, said today the United States, alone if necessary, should blockade communist China to increase allied pressure for Korean peace.
And again:
"We should have the co-operation of the British and French in a blockade," Senator Knowland said.
And again:
But if such co-operation is not forthcoming I think we could carry on a unilateral blockade.
I listened to a radio news report last night which said that Senator Knowland had just been on a television broadcast and had reiterated his demand for a blockade of the China coast. We in the C.C.F. are opposed to such blockade because we are afraid it would lead to an extension of the war; we feel that it is impracticable unless shipping could be prevented from reaching the Russian port of Vladivostok because unless that were done commodities would still arrive on the Chinese mainland. Moreover, any such unilateral action by the United States would be disastrous to United Nations action in Korea and would involve us in a global war.
The statement of the minister of external affairs in regard to this matter was certainly very mild, and perhaps because of that we find the following report in the Ottawa Citizen of February 11, in a Reuters news agency item headed "Rely on Canada for Realism" and reading:
The Washington Post says today the United States can usually rely on Canada for realism in foreign affairs as well as plain speaking when the occasion demands it.
It is significant that President Eisenhower's state of the union message, particularly the passage on Formosa, aroused in Canada little of the uneasiness reported from parts of Europe, it adds in a leading article.

I think it would have been much better if the minister of external affairs had taken a stronger stand which could not be interpreted in Washington as indicating that Canada, which is said to usually take a realistic stand, is not greatly alarmed at the action taken. I have noticed other references by the minister of external affairs in connection with the St. Lawrence seaway, and I have heard him speak in regard to United States trade barriers. I congratulate the minister upon the statement he made in reference to the St. Lawrence seaway. Certainly he was telling the United States in firm language that Canada wanted the St. Lawrence seaway and did not want any further stalling on that project. For example, he said:
There is one matter, however, in which our American friends have not been able to co-operate with us at the pace we feel the requirements of the situation demand.
And again:
We hope that it will be soon, and we are disappointed that that decision has not already been reached.
And again:
It has been made clear, however, that the discussion of any new proposal for sharing this task must not delay any longer the whole project.
Other members of the government, such as the Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott), have made strong statements from time to time in regard to the desirability of the United States reducing trade barriers. The government are prepared to talk up to the United States when it comes to the St. Lawrence seaway development and international trade, and for that I compliment them. In his speech the other day the Secretary of State for External Affairs spoke with the voice of a lion when dealing with the subject of the St. Lawrence seaway, but when he came to refer to the action that had been taken in connection with Formosa I am afraid that he spoke with the voice of a lamb.
We would like to see him take just as firm a stand with regard to the Formosa action as he has taken with respect to the St. Lawrence seaway. I feel that it is not so easy for the nations in Europe to talk to the United States in the same kind of firm language that Canada could use because these countries have depended, and depend today, on economic assistance from the United States. They are still suffering from the ravages of the recent war, and therefore they need United States economic help.
We in Canada are living in a wealthy country. We do not need to seek economic assistance from the United States. It is true that we are dependent on American good will to a large extent so far as economic and

trade matters are concerned, but the same thing can be said about the United States in relation to Canada. The United States is dependent on Canada for a great many natural products for its own prosperity and well-being. Because Canada is less dependent in its relationship to the United States from an economic standpoint, I think Canada is in the best position of any nation in the world to make her views clear to that country. We are of course a member of the commonwealth; since other members of the commonwealth disagree with the United States policy, and since we are a North American nation, I think we are in a particularly good position to help present their viewpoint to the government of the United States.
I understand that the Secretary of State for External Affairs was in Washington over the week end. I have no doubt that he will be reporting to parliament on his discussions, perhaps this evening. He shakes his head to the contrary. I hope that in his discussions in the United States he has made the Canadian position perfectly clear, and I hope that it is a firmer position but along the lines referred to in the statement he made to the house. If his reception in Washington has not been entirely satisfactory, then I think he should consider one further step. The Prime Minister of Great Britain made a trip to Washington earlier this year to present his views to the President of the United States and exchange views with him. According to an article in the Christian Science Monitor, Mr. Anthony Eden will make a trip to Washington soon, as will Premier Mayer of France.
In order to underline the Canadian position, which I understand is that nothing should be done that might extend the conflict in Korea to other areas, and in order to make that position abundantly clear to the United States, the Secretary of State for External Affairs might recommend to the Prime Minister that he go to Washington to interview President Eisenhower, perhaps Senator Taft, certainly Mr. Dulles, and other congressional spokesmen in the hope that further unilateral action by the United States which may extend the conflict will not be embarked upon. I believe that such a trip by the Prime Minister would constitute a mission of peace. If the Secretary of State for External Affairs was not completely satisfied with the conversations he had-I hope he was-then the Prime Minister might consider such a visit because unless such action is taken now, some time later it may be too late.
I believe the hon. member for Melfort (Mr. Wright) emphasized very well this afternoon the need for economic assistance to underdeveloped countries. I believe that if we are
External Affairs
going to win friends for democracy, if we are going to win friends for the west, we should increase our economic and technical assistance to backward nations. I was really amazed at the figures the hon. member placed on the record, which if I remember correctly, indicated that since 1949 Canada's per capita contribution by way of economic aid and technical assistance has only been some $3.69 per capita, whereas the United States per capita contribution for the same purpose within the same period has been over $100. Canadians are a generous people. I believe they are willing to send surplus agricultural commodities and additional quantities of other goods from Canada. I believe they are willing that parliament should vote additional moneys for technical assistance in order to help those underdeveloped countries that are in a much less fortunate position than Canada. By so doing we would not only strengthen democratic institutions but we would be following good, sound, Christian principles.
From time to time I have read, as other members no doubt have, of the poverty, privation, distress, malnutrition, yes, starvation, rampant in Korea today. I believe we have a special obligation to assist the people of Korea. If they are short of food; if for example their children need larger quantities of milk, as I am sure they must, then certainly Canada is well able to provide the people of Korea with large quantities of foods that are now in surplus supply in this country. We have such a surplus of meat products and such a surplus of grain that farmers do not know how long the market can carry these commodities even at present prices, many of which are depressed. We have a surplus of 100 million pounds of meat that the government is holding. I think that provides us with a real opportunity to make available meat and grain to help prevent starvation and malnutrition in Korea. And the same applies to powdered milk.
As I have already said, we hope that no further steps will be taken that will lead to an extension of the war in Korea and that in the end might lead to an all-out war. I am particularly fearful that a unilateral blockade of China by the United States would be a step leading to all-out war. I would object to Canada's involvement in such a war, and the taking of Canadian youths from their normal peacetime occupations to be thrown into a conflagration on the continent of Asia.


Edmund Davie Fulton: I was not
absolutely certain, Mr. Speaker, that I wanted to take part in this debate, although I have not been totally unprepared, until I heard

External Affairs
speeches such as that delivered by the hon. member for Melfort (Mr. Wright) earlier today and the speech just delivered by the hon. member for Assiniboia (Mr. Argue). If I had any doubts as to whether or not I should take part in this debate, those speeches resolved my doubts.
The doubts I had are those which any amateur must feel when he ventures, for not quite the first time but almost the first time, into a professional league. I have been watching the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) during the course of some of the speeches delivered in the last part of the debate, and I observed that the minister appears to feel somewhat uncomfortable. I could not help observing that. Probably the minister and I feel equally uncomfortable, but for completely opposite reasons.
I imagine the minister feels uncomfortable because he regrets that he was not more outspoken. He probably regrets that he minced so daintily around the field of foreign affairs, and refrained from enunciating more clearly just what is Canada's policy. I feel uncomfortable because I realize that if I were to make a definite statement, then I probably would be attacked as vigorously and from as many different quarters as the minister is now being attacked because he refrained from making a definite statement.
There are, Mr. Speaker, certain things which should be said. I go back in my mind to what the hon. member for Melfort said at the beginning of what was otherwise a fairly good speech. I think it is a shame if we are going to have to interrupt what appears to have been a modus vivendi established between ourselves and the members of the C.C.F. party by taking somewhat sharp issue with them in this field of foreign affairs. I feel that my friends of the C.C.F. party will have the same respect for my views if I feel compelled to express them as I have for theirs, and realize that it is an honest difference of opinion that moves us to say what we have to say in the course of this debate.


Mr. Maclnnis:: We did not call you yapping dogs as yet, did we?


Edmund Davie Fulton: I have not heard that expression used in the house.


Donald MacInnis: Look up the speech of the hon. member for York West (Mr. Adamson).


Edmund Davie Fulton: I was not in the house when the expression was used that appears to have somewhat disturbed my friends in the C.C.F. party. If it was used, I can only ask them to put it down to the heat of debate.


Donald MacInnis: We seem to have disturbed you.


Edmund Davie Fulton: My hon. friend the member for Vancouver East (Mr. Maclnnis) may be disturbed, but I am equally disturbed by some of the things he has said in the course of this and preceding debates. I do not want to be bitter or to suggest that there has been disloyalty or anything of that kind. I want to discuss this thing on the basis of reality and common sense.
The hon. member for Melfort referred this afternoon to statements which have been made by members of this party in the course of this debate, and said that if Sir Robert Borden had been alive today he would have been disturbed to see the Conservative party apparently following-what he suggested, but what is not a fact-with slavish adulation the policy of President Eisenhower, the new president of the United States. Let me suggest to my hon. friends of the C.C.F. party that what we are doing is not following this, that or the other lead from any foreign government, but we are trying to adopt a sane and sensible foreign policy which, if I may suggest to my hon. friends, will not be subject to the same vacillations as theirs.
We are not disturbed if we find that the governments of other countries, changing as they may do from time to time, adopt foreign policies which from time to time differ from that which we think should be the foreign policy of this country. If my hon. friend complains because for the time being there appears to be some difference between ourselves and some expressions used by the government of the United Kingdom in the approach to this problem of foreign policy with respect to the Asiatic sphere-well, I leave him to be concerned about that. I shall ask him, however, if in analysing the situation and accusing us of a shift in policy he would be kind enough to explain to us the complete shift in foreign policy which his own party has made with respect particularly to this Formosan situation.
I recall so vividly, Mr. Speaker, that in 1950, when President Truman announced his policy of controlling Formosa, there were no more bitter critics of that policy than my hon. friends of the C.C.F. party. Today, when President Eisenhower announced his decision to lift the ban, to take off the quarantine on Formosa, there are no more bitter critics of President Eisenhower's policy than my hon. friends of the C.C.F. party.


Donald MacInnis: He only half lifted it.


Edmund Davie Fulton: The hon. member for Vancouver East objects because he says the quarantine has been only half removed. Imagine how much bitterer his criticism would have been if it had been totally removed.


Donald MacInnis: Not at all.


Edmund Davie Fulton: What does my hon. friend want?


Donald MacInnis: I do not want to get involved in a Chinese civil war.


Edmund Davie Fulton: You say you do not want to get involved in a Chinese civil war, and none of us does. What we are discussing here is a shift or what is alleged to be a shift in foreign policy. I am pointing out that when President Truman quarantined Formosa there were no more bitter critics of that policy than my hon. friends of the C.C.F. party. Now President Eisenhower has half lifted that quarantine-I use their own words-and they suggest President Eisenhower is deliberately involving us in the Chinese civil war. When President Truman applied the quarantine their great fear was that this might somehow or other involve us in a Chinese civil war, so I do not know what my hon. friends of the C.C.F. party want. They criticize us for what they allege to be the subservient following of the foreign policy of some other government when we try to pursue a consistent course and suggest that what is being done today by President Eisenhower is not such a great change after all, and that we should not allow ourselves, as they appear to be allowing themselves, to be influenced by a personal dislike of the present regime in the United States. They seem to be influenced by that personal dislike into criticizing a quite logical development in foreign policy.


Donald MacInnis: You should not attribute motives.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Churchill takes the same position.


Edmund Davie Fulton: If I have attributed motives, then I apologize for doing so. Let me content myself with saying that we should not criticize the present policy of the United States government simply because it happens to be the policy of President Eisenhower and not that of President Truman.
A little earlier I said that the Secretary of State for External Affairs seems to be somewhat uncomfortable as a result of the criticism or speeches which have been made by members of the C.C.F. party who have spoken latterly in this debate.


Mr. Pearson:: I am perfectly comfortable.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Then the minister should develop more of a poker face.


Mr. Bradley:: Or the hon. member should get a pair of glasses.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I am just exhausted.


Edmund Davie Fulton: I notice, Mr. Speaker, that the minister skated carefully around this subject of Formosa as dealt with by President
External Affairs
Eisenhower in his recent state of the union message to Congress, but he contrived to leave the impression that the Canadian government was not too happy about that policy. I am therefore afraid that we must associate him to some extent with the spokesmen for the C.C.F. party who have also criticized President Eisenhower's policy.


Stanley Howard Knowles: The minister has to be right once in a while.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Yes; he has to be right once in a while. But I suggest that he has not been right yet. When this subject was discussed in the house in 1950 and the quarantine of Formosa was applied by President Truman, I recall that the minister expressed himself carefully but in terms which certainly implied that he was not happy about that policy. As reported at page 96 of Hansard of August 31, 1950 starting at page 95, he stated as follows:
We have, however, been disturbed, as I have no doubt others have been disturbed, by reports of preventive military measures taken by the nationalist government of China against communist concentrations along the mainland coast, as well as by statements reported to have been made by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek concerning United States-Chinese "military co-operation". We have also been disturbed by statements that seem in our minds to confuse the defence of Korea, which has been assumed by the United Nations, with the defence of Formosa, which has not;-


Lester Bowles Pearson: I said that the other night.


Edmund Davie Fulton: To continue:
-statements that have even implied-somewhat mistakenly I think-that those who wish to draw at this time a distinction between the two operations are defeatists and appeasers. So far as this government is concerned, we are concerned solely with carrying out our United Nations obligations in Korea or elsewhere. These obligations do not, as I understand them at the present time, include anything that can be interpreted as the restoration of the nationalist Chinese government to the mainland of China, or an intervention in Formosa.
With that statement we perhaps could not find too much to disagree. But it is significant, Mr. Speaker, that that statement was made after President Truman had announced his policy of quarantining Formosa. Then President Eisenhower announced his policy of dequarantining Formosa, and we find the Secretary of State for External Affairs making almost the same statement as he made on the previous occasions. He finds fault with both policies. Neither of them suits him. But he does not tell us exactly what it is that he would have this government do, or rather what policy it is that he would have this country follow with respect to that matter.
When you read the debates, Mr. Speaker, it is quite clear that at that time, in 1950, the minister's statement was taken as being quite

External Affairs
substantially critical of the policy adopted at the moment by the President of the United States; I refer to the policy of quarantining Formosa. In support of that contention I cite statements of members of the C.C.F. as well as statements of members of his own party. For instance, starting at page 173 of Hansard for the same session, the hon. member for Winnipeg North (Mr. Stewart) delivered himself of a speech, in which he strongly criticized the Chiang Kai-shek government and suggested that the Secretary of State for External Affairs was quite right in criticizing the policy then followed by the President of the United States. At page 229 of Hansard the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Maclnnis) had much the same thing to say. At page 125 the leader of the C.C.F. party aligned himself fully with what the Secretary of State for External Affairs had said. These were his words:
May I say before 1 take my seat how pleased I was yesterday when the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in discussing the Korean situation. made it abundantly clear that Canada was participating in the United Nations action in Korea, and that we were in no way involved in the Formosan situation. I said some time ago, and I now repeat, that the only thing to do-and it should have been done long ago-is to say to Chiang Kai-shek, "Get out of Formosa and stay out of Formosa", so as ultimately to give the Formosan people an opportunity to choose their own form of government-because they were once a free and independent people, and not so many decades ago at that.
He then went on to say:
I cannot go into that phase of the matter further except to say that the minister has the support at least of this group in the house in the attitude he has expressed from time to time in connection with Formosa, and the difficulties that have arisen in connection with it.
Some of the difficulties which the leader of the C.C.F. party was discussing were difficulties created by the announcement of President Truman with respect to Formosa; and it is difficulties with respect to the same situation which now cause the hon. gentleman to denounce the policy being followed by the United States in dequarantining Formosa. Yet the basis of their other criticism was that the quarantine of Formosa would involve us somehow in the Chinese civil war.
That was a position which, by inference if not by direct statement, was taken by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I point out to you, Mr. Speaker, that at no time during the course of the debate in 1950 did he dissociate himself from the interpretation placed upon his position by the C.C.F. party. I therefore must assume that the hon. gentleman's position in 1950 was the same as the position expressed by the C.C.F. party at that time. Hence we find

that today, in 1953, when Formosa is de-quarantined, the Secretary of State for External Affairs expresses himself as being concerned

although not dotting the "i's" or crossing the "t's" as to the extent of his concern-over the possible implications of the President's policy.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask the hon. gentleman a question?


Edmund Davie Fulton: Yes.


Lester Bowles Pearson: What did he mean by "dequarantine"?


Edmund Davie Fulton: I should think that was reasonably obvious, Mr. Speaker. When you apply a quarantine, you post a notice and say that no one will be allowed to come into this house. When you dequarantine, you take down the notice and say that this house is no longer subject to quarantine.


Lester Bowles Pearson: The notice has not been taken down.


Edmund Davie Fulton: The minister says the notice has not been taken down. I do not know what interpretation he places upon the President's message to the Congress of the United States. Perhaps he will be good enough to explain to us when he closes the debate-as I presume he will-just what interpretation he places on it.
At any rate, whatever interpretation he places on it, the fact is that the message has given him cause for some concern; and I should be greatly interested to know whether or not the cause for concern which it gives him is the same cause for concern, and the same inconsistent cause for concern, as it gives to my hon. friends of the C.C.F. party, namely that somehow or other, by some strange transmutation of all the processes of international relations, the very opposite of the act which was alleged in 1950 would involve us in the Chinese civil war, in 1953 is going to have the same result.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs has involved himself in other difficulties in connection with this matter. They are difficulties perhaps of a minor nature; nevertheless they are significant when highlighted against the background of the whole government policy.
These difficulties that are referred to at the moment are in connection with the interpretation we place upon the seriousness of this whole war in Korea. I do not want to be overly captious, although the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) accused me of that fault at an earlier stage of this debate, particularly in respect to my criticisms of the government. Of course, Mr. Speaker, I do not want to adopt a tone

which is offensive, because we have been told that if our tone is not exactly suited to the sensitive ears of the government, then they may not care to sit here and listen to us. Therefore if my tone is offensive I hope the Secretary of State for External Affairs and others of his colleagues in the cabinet will let me know, and I shall attempt to modulate the tone to their delicate sensibilities.
What I have in mind is that the other night the Secretary of State for External Affairs objected to a criticism which I advanced against the use of the words "police action" to describe the present war in Korea. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, placing a reliance upon a magazine which, as he himself pointed out, is better known for its humorous qualities than for its biblical authority in the field of international affairs, proceeded to quote from the New Yorker. If the Secretary of State for External Affairs had quoted from the New York Times, which we have always been given to understand is the authorized version of the bible in so far as the formulation of government policy on foreign affairs is concerned, I would have been more impressed, but he chose to quote from the New Yorker in justification of his description of the action in Korea as a police action.
I was interested this afternoon when the hon. member for St. Paul's (Mr. Rooney) addressed a question to the government as to whether or not we are at war. The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton), giving a very cautious answer, said in the course of his reply that the question might better have been directed either to the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for External Affairs. When he said that I could'not help but think that he should have said the question should have been directed both to the Prime Minister and to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, because undoubtedly he would have obtained a different answer from each of the hon. gentlemen.
Although the fact is that the Secretary of State for External Affairs saw fit to disagree with me and criticize me for having taken exception to the description of the war in Korea as a police action, the Prime Minister leaves no doubt that in his opinion that in which we are engaged in Korea is a war. The Secretary of State for External Affairs prefers to describe it in 1953 as a police action; but I point out to you, Mr. Speaker, that when he spoke in this house not very long ago the Prime Minister said, as reported at page 1524 of Hansard:
We do agree that if war were not being waged in Korea, a war which might have serious consequences for the free world at large, young Cana-
External Affairs
dians would not be voluntarily offering up their services and risking their lives for something of the character of an ordinary police action.
I wonder which the Secretary of State for External Affairs is going to take as his authority, the Prime Minister or the New Yorker magazine. On humorous subjects I would be willing to agree with him that the New Yorker might speak with a voice of greater authority, but I should think that in this house a colleague in the cabinet would prefer to accept the authoritative pronouncement of the Prime Minister. But of course if the Secretary of State for External Affairs is implying that the statements of the Prime Minister are humorous in their nature, even dealing with a serious subject of this sort, well, who am I to quarrel with him? I do hope the hon. gentleman will reconcile not only the very marked difference of interpretation between himself and the Prime Minister in these two speeches, but will also reconcile for us the difference in his attitude in 1953 from what he said when he dealt with this subject in 1950.
I might point out to the hon. gentleman and to the hon. gentleman who is sitting with him at the moment, and who I presume is equally interested in this debate, that in 1950 when he dealt with this subject the Secretary of State for External Affairs on no fewer than four occasions referred to what was going on in Korea as a war, and on two occasions as a military challenge and on another occasion as the conflict in Korea. I do not recall that at any time on that occasion he described it as a police action. Here is what he said as reported on page 91 of Hansard of August 31, 1950. After having described the developments which led up to the outbreak of war in Korea he said:
This is the perspective in which we must view the war in Korea today, though I do not for a moment suggest that these considerations should lessen our anxiety over those events or block our response to them. In Korea, together with the other countries of the free world, we are now faced with a plain and unmistakable military challenge; and we, in common with all the free world, must answer that challenge.
Then further down on the same page he said:
It was possible in Korea, as it has been possible elsewhere, for the war to be fought by satellites, by Asian troops alone. Therefore, when the United Nations intervened, the war could be misrepresented, as it has been misrepresented, as one of Asian popular forces against those of western imperialist capitalism.
On page 94 the Secretary of State for External Affairs had this to say in referring

External Affairs
to the Canadian brigade which was being sent to Korea to take part in a war, not a police action:
This special force is unique in one way among the offers of military forces which have been made to the United Nations as the result of the war in Korea-
Well now, Mr. Speaker, viewed in the light of the last situation with which we are confronted it is perhaps a fairly small matter as to whether we describe it as a war or a police action; except that I suggest to you, Mr. Speaker, that the consequences of this situation which has resulted in a war in Korea are too grave for us to take casually and in the mincing attitude the Secretary of State for External Affairs has adopted toward them.
After all, the President of the United States has said certain things with regard to United States policy with respect to the communist threat confronting the world today. I think it is truthful to say he indicated that he intends, in so far as his government is concerned, to adopt a certain policy with respect to that question, a policy which reverses the position in which his government has found itself in the past, as he says, of always having to come from behind and deal with a situation provoked by the communists, instead of trying to take the initiative, always within the limit of peaceful means, and within the limits of peaceful means trying instead to keep the communists guessing.
It seems to me, when our troops are engaged in war in Korea, I say as the Prime Minister said a few days ago:
We do agree that if war were not being waged in Korea, a war which might have serious consequences for the free world at large, young Canadians would not be voluntarily offering up their services and risking their lives for something of the character of an ordinary police action.
I say when we are faced with that situation it is high time for us to stop fiddling around and saying, on the one hand, that what President Truman did in 1950 might have involved us in civil war in China, and then saying that fatal action has been taken by the President of the United States in 1953 that might well involve us in civil war in China.
It is time we stopped fiddling about and wearying-well, I will not say wearying of the foreign policies of other countries, because obviously we have to be concerned with their foreign policies-but it is time we stopped trying to criticize the foreign policies of other countries in order to make political advantage for ourselves here at home. It is time we adopted a policy consistent with our traditional position as a member of the commonwealth.
Goodness knows, from time to time we may find ourselves having differences of opinion with other nations in the commonwealth, but let us not be dismayed when that happens. That simply means that we just have to sit down around a table, as this government has done all too seldom, and iron out those differences. We just have to try to find a common denominator in commonwealth foreign policy, and reconcile that foreign policy with the foreign policy of the United States, always recognizing honest differences but not carping at them simply because they happen to have changed their president.
Let us go forward so that, within the framework of the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization we may have a foreign policy which will prevent our always being on the defence in the cold war. I say again, within the limits of peaceful means at our disposal let us make certain that, for a change, the communists are kept guessing in this cold war instead of, in the company of our allies and our friends, always having to come from behind, with no preconceived idea of what we must do to prevent a further extension of communist success in this sphere.
I have said it is not easy for the inexpert to venture in where the experts themselves are somewhat at a loss. But I said at the outset that I hope my hon. friends, particularly those in the C.C.F., would not take it amiss if I appear to differ somewhat sharply from their views.


Stanley Howard Knowles: We do not object to that; but we do wish you would state your own views.


Edmund Davie Fulton: I have stated them. I have just said that I believe Canada, in concert with other nations of the commonwealth and, in so far as it is possible, with the United States of America, should adopt a foreign policy which would carry not the hot war but the cold war to the communists, and keep them guessing for a change. Let us do that, instead of always having the reverse situation, in which the communists have been carrying the cold war to us and keeping us guessing.
If that statement is not sufficiently definite for my hon. friend from Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) I hope he will elaborate upon his views so I may have the benefit of knowing just where he stands, and of understanding that the views expressed in this debate by his party are not formulated solely and simply because there has been a change in the presidency of that great nation to the south of us, the United States of America.


Mr. G. A. Cruickshank (Fraser Valley):: Mr. Speaker, I believe the remarks I shall make

in this foreign affairs debate will be unique in that they will be the briefest. My only reason for rising is to make it perfectly clear that there are two things in respect of which the people in the Fraser valley stand united. First, we hate war; second, we believe the United Nations is the best hope we have to prevent war.
I am sorry my hon. friends of the Social Credit party apparently do not agree with me in either case. We have had a small influx of their numbers into our province, and I want to impress upon them that, possibly because from personal experience we have a deep appreciation of war and because we hate war, we want to prevent it; and we think the best way of preventing it is through the United Nations.
We in the Fraser valley have not forgotten Great Britain and her allies who are facing a most difficult time. We have not forgotten men like the late President Roosevelt who, under lend-lease, saw to it that we got the destroyers when we needed them most. We have not forgotten that. And as Canadians in the Fraser valley we always regarded President Roosevelt as the greatest friend Canada ever had.
Nor have we forgotten President Truman, and the manner in which he co-operated with us. Let us not forget that long before his country was at war, President Roosevelt was standing behind us and behind Great Britain. The policy of the Social Credit party is that set out at page 1881 of Hansard, where their leader said:
-the past two presidents-
And we do not forget that this would include Mr. Winston Churchill, too.
-of the United States have been the great betrayers of humanity.
We cannot understand a party, through its leader, enunciating a policy like that, which attacks men like Roosevelt and Truman after all they have done, and describes them as the great betrayers of humanity.
As I have said, we in the Fraser valley, and I believe the people throughout British Columbia, believe that our great hope to prevent future wars lies in the United Nations. But the second lieutenant of the Social Credit party-or perhaps he is the corporal-said, at page 1938 of Hansard:
The fact of the matter is that this United Nations is largely a socialist-communist organization.
Well, I think that is an insult to the people of Canada and the people of the whole free world. It is an insult when any man tells me that our Secretary of State for External
External Affairs
Affairs (Mr. Pearson) is a socialist or a communist, or that the representatives from Great Britain are socialists or communists. There have been suggested changes in the rules of the house. I would hope they might be modified so that I would be permitted to answer in language that should be used.
I said I would be brief, and I shall be. In the Fraser valley we do not want war, and we believe that the best way to prevent it is by supporting, not attacking, the United Nations.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker,-


Mr. Speaker:: When the minister speaks he will close the debate.


Lester Bowles Pearson: This has been a most interesting debate. A good many points have arisen during it, with some of which at least I am sure the house will expect me to deal. Before doing so, however, I should like sincerely to thank hon. members who were good enough to congratulate me during the course of the debate upon my election to the presidency of the United Nations general assembly. I shall be going back there in a day or two; and during the course of the resumed session I know that I shall listen once again to a great many very long speeches, with all of which I shall certainly not agree. While I am in the chair I shall have the opportunity to speculate, speculation which would certainly be out of place in this house, as to which is the more important, freedom of speech or freedom from speeches.
I should like to follow the hon. member for Kamloops (Mr. Fulton) in what I must confess I considered to be his somewhat tortuous reasoning as to the difference between police action and war, and also in his attempt, which so far as I was concerned was not successful-possibly because I was not very bright-to decide when a quarantine is put on and when it is taken off. I suggest to him that if he studies the terms of President Truman's quarantine in 1950 and the terms of President Eisenhower's statement the other day he will realize that only half the quarantine has been lifted. When a quarantine is lifted so that people can leave the quarantined house but nobody can enter, that is not dequarantining as I understand it.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Would the minister say-


An hon. Member:: Sit down.


An hon. Member:: You made your speech.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Would the minister say whether he agrees with the President's policy, or does he think that President Eisenhower should have gone further?

External Affairs


Lester Bowles Pearson: I will deal with that in a minute if the hon. gentleman will be just half as patient with me as I tried to be with him. One subj ect came up in the debate which I think was unfortunate, and this was dealt with by other speakers. I refer to the statement made by the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) and to certain observations made this afternoon by the hon. member for Macleod (Mr. Hansell). So far as the reputation of and the verdict on President Roosevelt and President Truman are concerned, I think we can leave that to history. When all the facts are known and the judgment is written I feel quite certain that the verdict will not be that which has been suggested in this house-that he should be considered as being a betrayer of humanity. President Roosevelt was one of the great defenders of humanity. I also like to think that when history is written it will find a more adequate source of material than the memoirs of Mr. Elliott Roosevelt.
I am sure that Mr. Winston Churchill will be most interested in the observations of the hon. member for Macleod this afternoon that at the conferences which were attended by him and President Roosevelt, the latter spent most of his time making Mr. Churchill squirm. Mr. Churchill does not squirm easily.
In the article to which so much attention has been directed in this debate and which was written by the hon. member for Macleod -I think he has authenticated the article- he indicated that he was turning the searchlight on truth on certain things. Therefore he must naturally expect to be judged pretty critically when he himself states that he is turning that searchlight on the United Nations. He also said during the course of his statement that if there were demonstrated inaccuracies in that article he would withdraw them, but not until they were demonstrated to be inaccurate. That is a fair observation on his part.
I shall just point out to him without any further explanation one inaccuracy which has been pointed out in the last few minutes. In that article he described the United Nations as being largely a socialist-communist organization. I am taking just a few of his statements at random. He also said that Mr. Alger Hiss was the executive secretary of the Bretton Woods conference. Third, he said in that article that Mr. Hiss's advisers-Mr. Hiss was a middle-ranking civil servant at that time-were Henry Morgenthau, Jr., the secretary of the treasury; Mr. James P. Warburg, Mr. Eugene Meyer, and a man with a Scotch name, Mr. John J. McCloy, who he said sat under the teaching of the marxist Felix Frankfurter of Harvard Law School,

Felix Frankfurter being a very distinguished justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. I would hope that at an appropriate opportunity the hon. member for Macleod will admit that some of those statements are demonstrably inaccurate.
My own contribution to this debate up to the present has been governed, as I meant it to be governed, by the fact that I speak with the responsibility of a member of the government charged with external affairs. When I am criticized, as I was criticized this evening by the hon. member for Kamloops, for my casual and mincing attitude toward this matter, I realize that I do not speak with his freedom from official responsibility. It has also been suggested by the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon)-I am sorry he is not in the house tonight-that my earlier statement might be described as tiptoeing among the tulips.
There were at least two members of my hon. friend's group-the leaders of what I have called the dynamic wing of that group, the hon. member for York West (Mr. Adamson) and the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green)-who were certainly doing no tiptoeing in their statements. I hope I am not doing them an injustice when I suggest that they seemed to have adopted as a principle for the conduct of diplomacy and international affairs what I might call tulip trampling or gatecrashing. If they had had the same limitation of responsibility that I had when I spoke here they might possibly agree that in the delicate situation, such as that in which we find ourselves today in the Far East and Korea and in connection with international relations generally, the behaviour of the Secretary of State for External Affairs should be to tiptoe carefully and not trample the tulips.
The hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker) in a most interesting contribution to the debate criticized my statement as being too optimistic, or very optimistic, as he described it. I think in that earlier contribution my optimism was indeed most limited, as it was meant to be. The hon. member for Lake Centre contrasted what he called my great optimism with the view of a much greater authority on foreign affairs than I, or any of us possibly-Mr. Winston Churchill. But it was only a few weeks ago that Mr. Winston Churchill when landing in New York stated to the press that in his view the danger of war had receded. If Mr. Churchill saw fit to take a more sombre view of international developments the other day in the House of Commons in London, this


IS, 1953
[Stage Direction]
merely shows the difficulty of making up one's mind during the ebb and flow of international events.
As a matter of fact we have no cause at this time for either optimism or despair. This afternoon the hon. member for Brandon (Mr. Dinsdale) made what I thought was a very interesting and thoughtful contribution to this debate. In referring to the situation in western Europe he said that because of the growing strength of NATO the situation in western Europe had been stabilized and the Soviet union was at bay. I certainly would not go as far as that, and possibly he did not mean to go as far as his words might indicate.
I suggest that we should avoid both excessive optimism and excessive pessimism. We should not get too cheerful when things seem to go well or too panicky when they seem to go badly.
In the course of our discussion the question of our policy toward the United Nations was brought up by more than one speaker, and the very interesting proposal was made by more than one member of the official opposition that it would be a good thing if the standing committee on external affairs set up a group or a subcommittee to discuss, no doubt with the department and its officials, the revision of the United Nations chartef which in any event has to be discussed at the United Nations general assembly before the tenth session. I think that is a good idea, and I hope that possibly the standing committee on external affairs will follow it up when it meets.
The hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker) thought that in order to relieve the general assembly of the growing pressure of business, which is resulting now in two sessions every year, there should be set up at the United Nations an agenda committee which would screen the subjects for discussion at each general assembly and thereby reduce the number of subjects and I hope the time devoted to them. If he were here I would have pointed out to him that this has been tried more than once at the United Nations general assembly. Proposals have been made for the establishment of such a committee, but they have never met with enough approval to be given a trial. As a matter of fact there are obvious difficulties in a proposal of that kind because in the screening process some subjects might be left out which might be of very great importance to some countries, though not so much to others, and it would be extremely difficult to take away from any national delegation the right to put any subject on the agenda.
External Affairs
Then in our discussion more than one speaker referred to the problems about the United Nations secretariat. In fact the hon. member for Winnipeg North (Mr. Stewart) devoted most of his speech to that subject. There is an impression being created in some quarters that the United Nations is honeycombed with subversive agents and that the security of the host country is being prejudiced by the secretariat. My own view is that that impression has no basis in reality at all, and I think it is deplorable that it should be spreading so widely over the continent.
The hon. member for Lake Centre also touched on this subject. He underlined the difficulties in dealing with security not only in the United Nations but also at home when he said-and the same comment was made by the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) 

that while we must maintain our freedoms unimpaired, which I think was the expression he used, we must at the same time not allow diplomatic immunity to be used to attack the security of the state. The difficulty of course is to reconcile these two things. We cannot allow freedom to be used to destroy security, but we would surely be making a great mistake if we took unnecessary measures in the name of security which would destroy our freedom. What we have to do in these matters, I suppose, both internationally at the United Nations and domestically at home, is to make a reasonable and wise reconciliation between these two matters.
So far as attacks on the United Nations secretariat are concerned, we must not forget that they are often made by people who are really attacking the United Nations itself. When attacks are made on United States citizens in the United Nations, you will often find behind them attacks on the fact that the United States is in the United Nations at all. It is an important problem. It is on the agenda of the resumed session, when it will be discussed; and I think it would probably not be quite appropriate for me to say anything more about it at this time.
It is in this spirit, however, of attempting to reconcile freedom and security that in the Department of External Affairs we attempt to deal with passport difficulties, a question which was also raised by the hon. member for Peel. In our passport policies-and we have discussed these at great length before the standing committee on external affairs, as I have no doubt we will discuss them again this year-I confess we have followed the British rather than the United States practice. We interfere only on very rare occasions with the right of a Canadian citizen
[Stage Direction]
External Affairs
to possess a passport, which is after all merely a certificate of his Canadian citizenship. We have the power, of course, to refuse a passport or to withdraw a passport, and when the danger to the state is immediate and clear we should of course take that action; and it has been taken within recent years. But I suggest that we should interfere just as little as possible with the right of a Canadian to have this certificate of identity.
The hon. member for Peel brought up four or five other questions which he hoped I could deal with in my reply. I think possibly they should be referred to the standing committee, where all information concerning them can be given. He mentioned, for instance, the case of a Canadian citizen of Polish extraction-indeed a Polish national as well because he had dual nationality-who had received what seemed to the Auditor General exorbitant sums for relief in Warsaw in circumstances which appeared to be a little ambiguous. I think that case can be satisfactorily explained to the committee in all its details. I would only say here that this Polish-Canadian citizen served during the war in the Canadian navy, where he had a good record. He went back to Poland after the war in the hope that he could bring his wife and family to Canada. There he was arrested by the Polish authorities. After he was released from jail he was destitute. The Canadian diplomatic mission in Warsaw felt it was its duty to help this man until his case was cleared up. Relief was extended. It might seem to be a large amount, but the amount in dollars was converted at the official diplomatic rate to zlotys which, in terms of real value, would cut it in half. As I say, we can go into this particular question in the standing committee in enough detail, I think, to satisfy hon. members of the committee.
The hon. member for Peel also hoped that I could say something about the C.B.C. international service. He suggested that we call the director of that service before the committee. I think that is a good suggestion. I am quite sure it can be acted on and that we can go into the whole question, as indeed we have done before, of the relationship between the Department of External Affairs and the C.B.C. international service. The hon. member did go a little further than I thought was practical when he expressed the hope that we might listen to recordings of the broadcasts we are making to these countries. He may be more cultivated linguistically than I am, but I think recordings in Ukrainian, Polish, Czechoslovakian and other languages would not be very meaningful, at least so far as I am concerned.
The hon. member for Lake Centre made a very interesting suggestion in connection with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He thought we should take the lead in the extension of the pact from 20 to 50 years. It is now a 20-year pact which can be renewed after the 20-year period indefinitely from year to year. The European defence community treaty is a 50-year pact. It was felt that if we could make the two agreements synchronize that would help to remove some of the uneasiness, particularly in France, over this matter.
As a matter of fact that question is already under discussion. There is a difficulty at this time in extending the North Atlantic treaty to 50 years because it would mean a formal amendment of the pact, which would have to go back to the 14 legislatures. There may be a better way than that of accomplishing the same purpose, but the question is under consideration at the present time.
Now, Mr. Speaker, though all these matters arose during the course of the debate, and many others, the question of most interest to hon. members quite naturally was that of Korea, Formosa and the Far East generally -the question of our Far Eastern policy at the present time.
The hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker), in discussing my observations on this question, criticized them as being without substance. He described part of my remarks on President Eisenhower's statement about Formosa as a masterpiece of circumlocution. Well, I listened to his statement very carefully-I am sorry he is not in his seat tonight-and I read his statement in Hansard very carefully. In a friendly vein I should like to return the compliment and suggest that his own statement was a masterpiece of concealment.
The hon. member said that the opposition, in discussing foreign affairs, should put forward alternative suggestions. I certainly agree with that. Then he added-without which a discussion on foreign affairs would be as shadowy as it would be meaningless. I have gone through his speech, as I have stated, and I have gone through several speeches by hon. members on the other side to see if I could get some of these alternative suggestions. I have not been very successful in finding them. It is not easy, therefore, for me to take the constructive advice that I should like to secure from the statements made by members of the opposition on this occasion, except in one or two speeches with which I shall deal later.
The hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) made the same criticism and he, but more
[Stage Direction]
particularly the hon. member for Lake Centre, in a very eloquent and rhetorical bit, said that this house and this country had the right to know where we stood on Far Eastern matters. He went on to prove his point by stating that the people of the United States knew where their government stood, as did the people of the United Kingdom through Mr. Eden's statement, and that we in Canada should also know.
I have taken the trouble to read Mr. Eden's statements, the one he made on February 3 and the one he made in the House of Commons on February 9. Dealing with the Formosa decision on February 3, he said that Her Majesty's government in the United Kingdom were informed in advance of the decision of the United States government and at once made known their concern at this decision which they feared would have unfortunate political repercussions without compensating military advantages. In his statement a few days later in the House of Commons, Mr. Eden spoke at some length on this Formosa decision. He explained some of the United States preoccupations, difficulties and worries. He deprecated the exaggeration of the implications of this action. He reiterated the British policy on the blockade, and he mentioned the cease-fire proposals; but comparing his statement with the statement of government policy made in this house I would suggest, Mr. Speaker, that we were as definite and I think went just about as far as Mr. Eden did.
I propose to put on the record again one or two of the things I have said, representing the government, in my last two statements on this subject.
So far as the United States is concerned, I have just come back from Washington. Of course I read the United States papers, the New York Times and even the New Yorker. I am afraid there are a good many people in the United States who do not feel that they know exactly where their government stands on these Far Eastern matters and who might, with charity, consider that the Canadian people are just about as well informed in respect of the policy of their government on this particular question.
On February 5, when I spoke in the house on the Formosan statement I said, as recorded at page 1639 of Hansard-and I refer this to the hon. member for Kamloops because it repeats almost verbatim what I said almost two years ago on the subject-
-while we remain resolved to carry out our United Nations obligations in Korea, we do not think that the defence of Formosa, which has not been assumed by the United Nations, should be confused with the defence of Korea, which has.
I think that is clear.
External Affairs
Edmund Davie Fulton: You said the same thing on both occasions.


Lester Bowles Pearson: On the same occasion and on the same page I said:
We are not of course committed by, though naturally we are concerned with, the action taken in Washington in connection with this matter.
We are not committed by it, though naturally we are concerned with it. The words Mr. Eden used in London were "at once made known our concern." I recall that when I used the word "concern" in a diplomatic note not many months ago in connection with a Far Eastern question, that was considered by hon. gentlemen opposite to be a very vigorous protest indeed. It was not a very vigorous protest then, and it is not a protest at all on this occasion, but it is a good word to use in a situation such as this. We are concerned with this matter, and we have made our concern known to the United States.
It has been suggested by hon. members opposite that in my Wednesday statement I was much less definite and more tiptoeing than in my previous one. On that occasion, to make our position as clear as I think it should be at this time, I said, as recorded on page 1852 of Hansard for February 11, 1953:
The guiding principle of Canadian policy in Korea is to continue to do everything possible to limit the present hostilities to the Korean peninsula, and to take advantage of any opportunity for an early settlement of these hostilities by peaceful negotiation.
Farther down on the same page I said:
We consider also that the purpose of the United Nations in Korea remains the defeat of aggression there, and does not include intervention in the civil war in China.
On the next page, I said:
We do not believe, accordingly, that the western powers should press for military or economic measures, at the United Nations or elsewhere, which would certainly not be supported and indeed might be actively opposed by important non-communist Asian states, and which without such support would be less effective in ending the Korean war than in extending it.
Then I added:
This principle has guided our policy in this matter in the past, and it will continue to guide us in considering any such proposals which may be made in the future.
It seemed to me, Mr. Speaker, that those were fairly definite statements. We expressed our concern with these Formosan declarations; we expressed our anxiety lest anything should be done which would extend the war from Korea to the mainland; and we underlined the contrast between action taken through the United Nations and action taken in other ways. So far as consultation is concerned, immediately this declaration was

External Affairs
decided upon by the United States government as a unilateral action-though I confess we had some advance information that some such action was in contemplation-we were informed by that government at once, as other governments were. We took steps at once through our ambassador in Washington to make immediate inquiries as to what it involved, what the implications were, if any, and to discuss the matter with the state department. Immediately after those discussions in Washington the ambassador came to Ottawa and we got a firsthand report from him. I think the consultation on this occasion was not anything that we could complain about, though if it had been possible to announce the step to us a little earlier we would have had more time to intervene, if we had felt that intervention was desirable; something that we did not feel on this occasion.
I only say that we-I mean the government-regret, as I think do most members of the house, that the United States government found it necessary to take this action. We are not condemning them for it, but we regret that they felt it necessary to take this action, the military advantages of which might be neutralized by the political disadvantages.
At the same time I think it is only right to state that the situation in 1953 with respect to the neutralization of Formosa, and the situation generally in that area is very different from that in 1950 when the original action was taken. At that time the Chinese communists had not directly intervened in the Korean struggle. Since then many an effort has been made through the United Nations to settle this conflict, and all of them have been rejected by the communists in China or in North Korea.
I had the privilege of spending the week end in Washington, and yesterday I had an interesting, friendly and frank discussion with the Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, at our embassy there. I told him in an informal but frank way-and we are on those terms in Washington with the new Secretary of State, as we were with the old secretary of state- our views and our preoccupations. I told him quite clearly-something which his officials of course already knew-how we felt about Far Eastern affairs generally, and I think we have also made that clear in the house. I also learned from him about the background of this action, and of the preoccupations and worries which prompted the United States to take it. I think we should do our best to understand the United States position on this matter and to appreciate their anxiety over the stalemate which has

developed. I also think they should appreciate, as I think they do, our anxiety over the possibility of this war extending and our desire to prevent that eventuality.
The exchange of views that we had yesterday, I think, without exaggerating their importance, may have been considered helpful in that respect. It was made quite clear to me yesterday by the Secretary of State that some of the far-reaching fears that had been read into this action and other actions are not justified; that they are naturally exceedingly anxious to take advantage of any situation which will give them and the United Nations-because they are acting as a member of the United Nations in this general Korean situation-the initiative, and also to do anything they can to keep the enemies of the United Nations off balance. I feel reasonably assured that there is no intention on the part of the administration in Washington to do anything that is rash, provocative or adventurous, and that on their part they have no desire to extend the war to the continent of Asia.
I also feel that, like their predecessors in Washington, they appreciate the necessity and the desirability of consultation before decisions are taken in Washington which affect the other members of the United Nations who, whether or not they are committed formally by those decisions, cannot escape the consequences of them. Mr. Dulles, the Secretary of State, made a broadcast the other night, to which I am sure a good many hon. members listened, in which he said:
It is important for us all to remember that we-
And he was talking about the American people.
-do carry a tremendous responsibility. Any false step could mean disaster not only for us but for our friends. Possibly our friends would suffer even more than we ourselves. Therefore, we must be sober and restrained in our national conduct.
Then in concluding his broadcast he went on to say this:
That does not mean being timid, and afraid to take the initiative, to speak frankly or to make hard decisions. Indecision, weakness and vacillation are the qualities which most often lead to war. It does mean that in order to win and hold the confidence of those whom we need as friends and allies, we must at all times play the part of a nation which is fully aware of the grave responsibility which it carries.
I am sure that when the Secretary of State uttered those words he was sincere in his own determination to do his best to carry them out. I am reinforced in that feeling by my visit to Washington.
The other day, in his speech in this debate, the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Maclnnis) said we should let the United

External Affairs
States know that they cannot count on support from us in every political adventure into which their political exigencies at home may lead them. May I say, Mr. Speaker, that I think they know that. But I also think it would be wrong at this time to assume, on the basis of the decision taken with respect to Formosa, that they are going to engage in such adventures. I do not think it would be wise, in our relations with this new administration, to start on a note of suspicion or controversy, if we can avoid it, any more than I think it would be wise to start by giving them the feeling that they can count on us on all occasions, no matter what they may be impelled to do. In this connection 1 think we would be well advised to distinguish-if we can, and it is not always as easy as it should be-between official statements on behalf of the administration and newspaper reports of statements by military leaders who seem to do a good deal of talking in one way or another-


Edmund Davie Fulton: In both countries.


Lester Bowles Pearson: -and by civilians who have not the responsibility for their statements that members of the administration have and who recently have been making some statements which I confess are rather alarming. Mr. Dulles himself, in the broadcast to which I referred, had this to say on that point:
The talks which we had with the political leaders of the countries we visited-
He was talking about his visit to Europe.
-went far, I think, to dispel these fears in so far as official quarters are concerned.
He was talking about some fears that had been aroused by what had been going on. He went on to say:
However, the public and the opposition parties seize upon incidents and upon statements made here-
That is in the United States.
-which seem to them to be reckless. Unscrupulous persons use such incidents and statements as reasons why the European nations should not trust us.
I therefore hope that we shall be careful to differentiate between unofficial statements which often get on the front page and more important official statements which are not always on the front page.
On motion of Mr. Pearson the debate was adjourned.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Mr. Fournier (Hull):: Mr. Speaker, tomorrow we shall conclude this debate. Then we shall revert to notices of motion and take up the motion of the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe) to set up a special committee to examine into the operations of the government in the field of atomic energy; then the resolution of the Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott) with respect to the Farm Improvement Loans Act, 1944; Bill No. 48, respecting food, drugs, cosmetics and therapeutic devices; Bill No. 44, to protect the coastal fisheries; Bill No. 46, to amend the Merchant Seamen Compensation Act; then the resolution respecting confirmation of the international convention for the high seas fisheries of the north Pacific ocean, signed by Canada, the United States and Japan.


[Stage Direction]
It being two minutes after ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
[Stage Direction]

~~
[Stage Direction]
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		[DOT]
		
		
		
		
		
		
[Stage Direction]
.
[Stage Direction]


: i
[Stage Direction]
Tuesday, February 17, 1953