1953-03-26

HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES


[Stage Direction]
BEING THE 95th SESSION FOR THE PERIOD 1867-1953

[Stage Direction]
queen's printer and controller of stationery OTTAWA, 1953
[Stage Direction]

Thursday, March 26, 1953


[Stage Direction]
Mr. A. W. Stuart (Charlotte) presented the fourth report of the standing committee on standing orders, and moved that the report be concurred in.
Motion agreed to.

Mr. Speaker:: Recently hon. members discussed the proper construction of standing order 60. The house will recall that on the 18th June, 1952, I made a ruling with respect to this standing order which was to the effect that on the second day, that is, when the order is called for the Speaker to leave the chair for the house to resolve itself into committee of the whole on a resolution dealing with money a full discussion of the resolution is not in order. However, in view of the ruling made by Mr. Speaker Glen in February, 1942, I ruled that a debate was permissible provided it was directed to the negative of the motion. When that ruling was made some hon. members expressed doubt whether it could be put into effect. It was not long before I came to the same conclusion and I think all members agree that my ruling of the 18th June last must be revised. Most members, if not all, who spoke recently on the point of order were of the opinion that there should be no debate at all or that a full debate should be allowed on the resolution.
Standing order 60 was adopted in the House of Commons in 1867 in almost the identical wording it has today. Debates took place from time to time over the years on the second day. In 1905 Mr. Sproule, who later became Speaker under the administration of the late Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden, objected to this procedure. He is reported at column 320 of Hansard of that year as follows:
On Friday next will not the Speaker have to leave the chair, in compliance with the motion just made, and allow the house to go into committee of the whole without a motion to that effect being made again, and will not this preclude any debate before the house is in committee?
However, his opinion did not prevail and debates continued to take place until 1912. Between 1912 and 1919 there were 140 resolutions and I can find only two instances where any debate took place. On October 15, 1919, pages 1013-14 of Hansard, Mr. Speaker Rhodes, who was Speaker under the administrations of the Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden and the Right Hon. Arthur Meighen, ruled that the motion was not debatable but that a vote could take place upon it. His ruling was generally respected until about the year 1930, after which the number of debates on this motion gradually increased.
It is to be noted that in February, 1942, the Right Hon. Mackenzie King objected to a debate at this stage and Mr. Speaker Glen gave the ruling to which I have referred. Subsequently, in 1946, Mr. King again contended that the motion was not debatable and quoted a communication from Dr. Arthur Beauchesne to that effect. See Hansard, page 761 of that year.
Along with standing order 60 it is necessary to consider standing order 38. It is to be noted that when Sir Robert Borden sponsored the resolution amending standing order 17 (a), which is now our standing order 38, in an amended form, he is quoted at column 7406 of Hansard of April 9, 1913, as saying:
What we have sought to do is to provide that ail substantial motions, which bring into question the propriety of passing any bill, measure, or vote, shall be debatable in the future as they have been in the past, but that purely formal motions, which, under the existing rules, would be used only for dilatory purposes, shall not in future continue to be debatable. That has been our object, and we propose to carry it into effect in a reasonable way.
From these words there seems to be no doubt that the intention of Sir Robert Borden while safeguarding the freedom of speech was to eliminate the occasions on which repetitious debate could arise. That I consider to be the spirit in which standing order 38 was adopted.
The resolution is not debatable on the first day by virtue of clause 1 (a) of standing order 38. On that day the house makes a decision that the resolution should be considered by a committee of the whole house at the next sitting. I must determine whether debate is permissible on the second day. It seems to me that a debate on the resolution at this stage cannot be permitted. The house has already decided that it should

Standing Order 60
go into committee at the next sitting to consider the resolution. It is surely, therefore, wrong for the house to consider at the said next sitting the resolution with the Speaker in the chair on the following grounds:
(1)	That once a question has been decided by the house it cannot be reopened in the same session. See Beauchesne's third edition, citation 332.
(2)	That when a resolution has been referred to a committee of the whole house that resolution cannot be debated in the house until the committee has reported.
What debate, if any, can be permitted on the second day, or is. a further motion of any kind required when the order under government orders is called "that the Speaker do now leave the chair for the house to resolve itself into committee of the whole on the following resolution . . . '. As stated above, since the house has already made a decision that that particular resolution is to be considered by the committee it is obviously irregular to have any further debate on that point. Therefore, the only possible subject matter for debate is as to whether the Speaker should leave the chair at that particular time, or later that day, or on some other day. However, even that subject matter is not debatable. Standing order 17 (2) provides that "whenever government business has precedence, government orders may be called in such sequence as the government may think fit", and of course it is the practice for the government to announce the
night before just what business will be called, the following day. In this way no one is taken by surprise.
From the above it would appear that the motion that the Speaker do now leave the chair for the house to resolve itself into committee of the whole on a money resolution moved on the second day under the provisions of standing order 60 is purely a procedural motion. It stands on the order of proceedings for the day, and were it other than a procedural motion it would, under standing order 38, be debatable. But procedural motions are not debatable. This was decided by Mr. Speaker Lemieux on June 18, 1923. See Hansard, page 4013 of that year. He said:
A bill is regularly on its way to the committee of the whole house and the motion has been made that X do now leave the chair. It is a purely formal motion.
It is doubtful if any motion at all is really necessary, but as Mr. Speaker Lemieux has ruled, and as Mr. Speaker Rhodes has also

ruled that the motion should be made, and that, though the motion is not debatable, the members have a right to vote thereon, I will follow their rulings.
Accordingly in future once the house has decided that the Speaker will leave the chair at the next sitting of the house to resolve itself into committee of the whole to consider a resolution I will put the motion when the order is called, but the motion will not be debatable although members will have the right to vote thereon.


Mr. George A. Drew (Leader of the Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, with respect, I cannot accept the ruling; but in view of the fact that it is obvious there must be a review of the rules, as has been indicated on different occasions during this session, I prefer not to divide the house but to leave the matter in the record in that way.



QUESTIONS


Mr. Robichaud:: 1.	How many new post office buildings have been constructed1 in the provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, since 1945?
2.	In what localities were these buildings constructed and at what price?


Mr. Fournier (Hull):: 1 and 2. New Brunswick: 1950-52, Fredericton, public building, $802,882.23; 1950-52, St. Stephen, public building, $192,807.61.
Nova Scotia: 1945-46, Canso, public building, $48,994.41; 1947-50, Halifax (north end) public building, $79,193.21; 1950-51, Dominion, public building, $31,072; 1950-51, Kingston, public building, $60,538.14.
Prince Edward Island: 1950-53, Summer-side, public building, $377,628.60.



CHICOUTIMI, LAPOINTE AND LAC-SAINT-JEAN COUNTIES, QUE.  HEALTH AND WELFARE PAYMENTS

Mr. Gagnon:: Since January 1, 1949, what amounts have been spent each year by the Department of National Health and Welfare in the counties of (a) Chicoutimi; (b) Lapointe; (c) Lac-Saint-Jean, (i) for the payment of medical fees and other professional services, and to whom; (ii) under the following headings:	immigration medical services, special
technical services, general health grants, hospital construction grants, general public health grants, tuberculosis control grants, mental health grants, professional training grants and cancer control grants?


Mr. McCusker:: (a) (i) and (ii)
Questions
Quarantine, Immigration Medical, and Sick Mariners	1949	1950	1951Dr. R. Rousseau	$ cts. 182 00 1,448 00	$ cts. 194 00 1,350 00	$ cts. 247 00 1,480 00Dr. Leo Tanguay	Dr. J. Luc Morin	Dr. Georges T. Gauthier	40 00 2,401 00 360 00 270 00	15 00 2,223 00 804 75 225 00 3 00 140 00 302 00 3 00Dr. Eugene Tremblay	1,533 00 798 00 205 00	Dr. Gilles Tremblay	Dr. Gaston Comtois	Dr. Roland Saucier	Dr. Gerard Boudreault	Dr. George W. Tremblay	404 50 5 00	546 50	Dr. P. Riverin	Dr. J. A. Desbiens	Dr. Gerard Guillemette	Dr. Emile Beaulieu	2,306 00	2,184 00	2,140 00
6,881 50	7,345 50	7,582 75
S cts.
1,428 00 220 00 10 00 2,042 00 145 00 205 00 18 00 180 00 78 00
9 00 41 00 2,115 00
6,491 00
General Health Grants:-
Hospital construction grant:-
Hotel-Dieu St. Vallier de Chicoutimi, total amount approved $362,744.53.
Venereal Disease control grant:-
Diagnostic and treatment services to the venereal disease clinic at the Hotel-Dieu St. Vallier de Chicoutimi.
As these services form part of the overall provincial V. D. control programme, information as to the amount of federal assistance spent in respect of this particular hospital is not readily available.
Mental health grant:-
Support of psychiatric services at the Hotel-Dieu St. Vallier de Chicoutimi Hospital., Public health research grant:-
Support of a study on chemical dosage of pregnanediol during miscarriage proceedings being carried out in the laboratories of the Hotel-Dieu St. Vallier de Chicoutimi..
All other headings.
(b) (i) and (ii) All headings__
(c) (i) and (ii)
General health grants:-
Hospital construction grant:-
Hotel Dieu d'Alma, total amount approved $183,873.22.,
All other headings.
Expenditures
$ cts.
1949	-	-1950	-	-1951	-	_1952	- 163,801 671949	[DOT]1950	[DOT]1951	*1952	*
1,984 00 9,554 00
1949	-	-1950	-	-1951	-	-1952	-	2,684	001949	-	-1950	-	-1951	-	-1952	-	-1949	-	-1950	-	-1951	-	-1952	-	-1949	-	-1950	-	-1951	-	-1952	- 79,436 661949	-	-1950	-	-1951	-	-1952	-	-
68108-209J
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Inquiries of the Ministry



NATIONAL FILM BOARD REVENUE

Mr. Caiherwood:: 1.	What was the total revenue of the national film board, during the year ending December 31, 1952?
2.	Of this amount, does any of the revenue come
from the showing of national film board films in the United States?
3.	If any, what amount comes from this source?


Mr. Winters:: 1.	Revenue from Aims, $202,525.
2.	Yes.
3.	$78,517.
st. John's, nfld., public building


Mr. Higgins:: What is the present position with respect to the erection of the federal public building in St. John's, Newfoundland?


Alphonse Fournier: Preliminary studies have been made preparatory to discussion with the town planning commission of St. John's, Newfoundland, as to location of proposed public building.



QUESTION PASSED AS ORDER FOR RETURN


Mr. Higgins:: 1.	How many motor cars were manufactured in Canada in 1952?
2.	What was the value of same?
3.	How many motor cars were imported into Canada in 1952?
4.	From what countries were they imported and what was the value of the cars imported from each such country?
5.	How much was collected in customs duties on the cars so imported?
6.	How much in taxes was collected on the cars manufactured in Canada in 1952?
7.	How many motor cars were exported from Canada in (a) 1951; (b) 1952?



FISHERIES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. Watson MacNaught (Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Fisheries):: Mr. Speaker, yesterday the senior member for Queens (Mr. McLure) asked whether the lobster fishermen in Prince Edward Island had requested that the carapace measurement of lobsters for canning purposes be increased to 2\ inches. The direct answer to this question is that they did not, but further explanation is essential.
At the beginning of the 1952 season it was decided and agreed that for canning lobsters a change should be made from the existing over-all length measurement of 7 inches to
[Mr. McCusker.l

the more accurate carapace measure. Our scientists recommended 2| inches as being the closest figure to 7 inches since it would give an average length of 6-9 inches and a range of 6-5 to 7-5. During the year we had constant complaints that the catches included lobsters much too small from fishermen in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia, who, it must be remembered, also fish lobster districts 7B and 8. Our scientists re-investigated in the light of one year's experience and recommended the increase to 2J inches on the basis of conservation. This new measure will give a size range of 6-8 to 7-9 inches and an average size of 7[DOT] 3 inches.
In October, 1952, the proposed change was explained and discussed with fishermen and processors at well advertised and well attended meetings at Moncton, Antigonish, Summerside and Shelburne. Considering as a whole the reactions at the first three meetings where fishermen and producers handling canning lobsters were heavily represented, the obvious conclusion was that the great majority of lobster fishermen and processors favoured the suggested increase.


Mr. Browne (St. John's West):: I should like to ask a supplementary question, Mr. Speaker. Can the parliamentary assistant tell us the meaning of the word "carapace"?


John Watson MacNaught: Mr. Speaker, I cannot believe that there is much urgency in the hon. member's question, but in reply to it I may say that carapace is the upper shell of a crustacean.



DROP IN COD PRICES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. A. M. Robichaud (Gloucester):: Mr. Speaker, I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Fisheries. Is the Department of Fisheries aware of the serious situation now facing the cod fishermen and the packers of fillets in the maritime provinces as a result of a substantial drop in prices on the United States markets with a large quantity of last year's pack still held over-


Some hon. Members:: Order paper.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. If the hon. member has a question which he can ask briefly, I will allow him to do so.


Albany M. Robichaud: -or hanging on the
market-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I am afraid I cannot allow that question.


Albany M. Robichaud: Mr. Speaker, I will attempt to make it shorter.


Mr. Cruickshank:: Send it over television.


An hon. Member:: Write him a letter.


Mr. Casselman:: Don't put on the steam roller.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


Albany M. Robichaud: Is the Department of
Fisheries aware of the serious situation of the cod fishermen and the packers of fillets in the maritime provinces?


Mr. Speaker:: I doubt whether that is the type of question that should be asked on orders of the day. I cannot allow the question.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
FEBVREj QUE.-PROTEST AGAINST

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Leon Balcer (Three Rivers):: Mr. Speaker, is the Minister of National Defence in a position to answer the question I asked yesterday?


Hon. Brooke Claxion (Minister of National Defence):: No, Mr. Speaker. I have not had the information yet.



EMERGENCY POWERS ACT


Hon. Stuart S. Garson (for the Prime Minister) moved: the second reading of Bill No. 279, to amend the Emergency Powers Act.


Mr. Macdonnell (Greenwood):: Is the minister going to speak?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker, my position in interrupting my friend the hon. member for Greenwood is that if I do not say something in moving the second reading of this bill, I shall not have an opportunity of making a reply; and if I have no opportunity of making a reply, I shall not have an opportunity of answering certain misstatements of fact and of law which now deface the record of this debate. Hence I wish to deal fairly briefly in my present remarks with the-


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, I regret that, with the noise in the chamber, I could not hear what the minister said. If it would not be asking too much, might I ask him to start over again because I assure him that we on this side of the house could not hear what he said.


Mr. Speaker:: May I ask hon. members not to carry on conversations in the house. If any hon. members desire to leave the house
Emergency Powers Act
now that we have reached the orders of the day, may I ask them to do so as quietly as possible. That request applies not only to today but to every day. When hon. members who have other duties to perform are leaving the chamber, I would request them to leave as quietly as possible.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker, in response to the suggestion of my friend the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew), may I say that I had opened my remarks by saying that I regretted having to interrupt my friend the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Macdonnell), but that my position is that if I do not speak in moving the second reading of the bill I shall not later have an opportunity of making a reply, and for that reason would be deprived of the chance of correcting what I must regard as certain serious misstatements of fact and law which deface the record in this debate.


George Alexander Drew: Is that word "debase"?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Deface.


Alphonse Fournier: Change the face of.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: The issue in this matter has been discussed perhaps at great length, but somewhat desultorily in committee and my only purpose in my present remarks is to bring together in as brief a compass as I can the basis upon which we of the government are asking that the Emergency Powers Act should be extended for another period of one year.
As we have made clear, in 1951, when the act was first passed, and on a number of occasions since, we have been seeking in the Emergency Powers Act not an extension or an increase in the powers of the governor in council, but on the contrary a diminution, an important diminution, in these powers. Once it is a fact that the nation is in the emergency of apprehended war, and the wide amplitude of powers under the War Measures Act become available to the governor in council under the War Measures Act, then the passage of the measure which we are now considering, the extension of the Emergency Powers Act, does not increase, it substantially diminishes the powers of the governor in council and subjects the orders in council passed in the exercise of those powers to the prompt tabling in parliament, and to a scrutiny by parliament, and to annulment proceedings that may be taken in a summary manner in respect of anything that is done pursuant to the Emergency Powers Act.
I concede at once that the validity of our argument depends in large measure upon one fact, and that is whether there was an emergency of apprehended war in 1951 when the
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Emergency Powers Act Emergency Powers Act was first passed, and whether that emergency still continues today.
We of the government took the position in. 1951, and. were supported on that occasion by every opposition party, by I think every member of the house who took part in the debates, with the single honourable exception, I must confess, of the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming), who throughout this matter has been in disagreement not only with the government and with the C.C.F. and the Social Credit parties, but with all the other members of his own party as well.


Mr. Fleming:: Why spoil a perfectly good statement by an addition at the end that is not right?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Well, I will quote in a few minutes to show that it is quite right, but I want to make it clear that he has preserved a consistent position from beginning to end in this matter, and his main embarrassment has arisen from the fact that he is a member of the Conservative party, and the position which he has taken consistently for the most part has been diametrically apposite to that taken by his party.
Was there an emergency in 1951? The Prime Minister, in seeking the passage of the Emergency Powers Act at that time, clearly indicated that there was, and the Leader of the Opposition agreed with him at that time. He said, quoting the Prime Minister, as recorded at page 500 of Hansard of February 20, 1951:
He-
That is the Prime Minister.
-has indicated that the emergency is the increased menace in the Far East which demonstrates the full extent of the threat of communist imperialism. He has quoted from some words I used in the debate on the speech from the throne. I agree that those words were intended to convey my own belief that there is an emergency of the nature which he described.
And indeed, sir, the support which was accorded the Emergency Powers Act in 1951 by every opposition party would make no sense, unless it was based upon a recognition by them of the existence of an emergency which alone would make an Emergency Powers Act justifiable.
Does that emergency still continue? That is again a straight question of fact. We say that it continues. We say that at a time when thousands of our citizens are fighting in Korea and many of them losing their lives, at a time when we have a brigade group on the Elbe, and six squadrons of the R.C.A.F. in Europe, and six more shortly to follow, and at a time when many countries throughout almost every part of the world
CMr. Garson.]

give fresh evidences every day of a continuance of violence and actual or potential war, we continue in a position of emergency which justifies the continuance of this act.
That is not only our opinion. Just the other day the Leader of the Opposition expressed these views, as reported at page 2952 of Hansard of March 13, 1953:
These are grave and serious hours. The news that comes to us from Europe today removes any suggestion that we are in a comfortable period where there are no great dangers in front of us. The events of yesterday and today, the cold-blooded murder of British airmen and the interference with the flight of a civilian aircraft going into Berlin, indicate the extent of the danger which is there all the time.
Again, the hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes), the military critic of the official opposition, has expressed the present position in even more forceful terms when he says that there was real war in Korea and apprehended war in Europe. I do not think that it is necessary, before a group of intelligent people, to harp upon such a notorious fact. I would not do so but for the circumstance that perhaps the strongest argument which has been made in opposition to the extension of this bill has been that by the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming), and made with his usual eloquence and cogency. But it was weak only in one important respect, and that is that it was based upon the single premise that there was now no emergency, that there never had been an emergency. My hon. friend's premise does not exist in fact. Now, faced with this emergency, what was the position of the-


Donald Methuen Fleming: I think the minister has agreed that his question to me and my answer related to whether there is such an emergency as justifies the government in invoking the War Measures Act. I said very clearly that there is in my submission no such emergency.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Well, is my hon. friend's
present interjection to be taken as an admission upon his part that he thinks that there is some emergency of a lesser character?


Donald Methuen Fleming: There is certainly none that
justifies the introduction of this measure.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: But my hon. friend will not
deny that there is an emergency.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Well, again the minister has asked me a question that is rather hypothetical. I am prepared to make my answer perfectly definite, that with respect to these two measures that have been referred to, namely, the War Measures Act and this Emergency Powers Act, I say most categorically that in my view there is no such emergency as justifies the government in

invoking the War Measures Act, or in asking parliament to extend the Emergency Powers Act.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I was quite clear upon that point, and I think that I frankly admitted in the remarks that I made just a moment ago that that is my hon. friend's opinion, and I thought that in this he was in pretty solitary splendour, that there is no emergency which would justify the extension of this act at the present time.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, may I make it clear that he is not in solitary splendour in that view. We have been supporting it right along.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I suppose my hon. friend the
Leader of the Opposition would probably contend that that was his attitude when he made the remark in this house that I quoted to him a moment ago. I will deal with that in a minute. The hon. member says he denies there was such an emergency.


George Alexander Drew: I did not.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: The hon. member cannot rise unless it is a point of order.


George Alexander Drew: On a point of privilege, Mr. Speaker.


Mr. Speaker:: The Leader of the Opposition is rising on a point of privilege.


George Alexander Drew: On a point of privilege, I wish to make it clear that the minister has misrepresented what I said. I did not say there was no emergency.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I will quote to my hon.
friend what he said, himself. And then will he get up in indignation and say that he is misrepresented?


George Alexander Drew: I will be up, don't worry about that.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: This is what my hon. friend
said, and I will repeat it:
He has indicated that the emergency is the increased menace in the Far East, which demonstrates the full extent of the threat of communist imperialism. He has quoted from some words I used in the debate on the speech from the throne. I agree that those words were intended to convey my own belief that there is an emergency of the nature which he described.
And this emergency which the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) described was an emergency which he was invoking then under the Emergency Powers Act, and which he said at that time that he could have used to invoke the War Measures Act. And it was discussed by my hon. friend in these terms, because he went on to say this:
I would point out, however,-
Emergency Powers Act
The Prime Minister did not go far enough to- suit him.
I would point out, however, that this emergency is not new. I would point out that when another bill was introduced in this house last September we sought to emphasize that there was an emergency of this very nature. True, the seriousness of the emergency is being recognized more generally, but the emergency that exists today was the emergency which existed in just as definite reality last September.
Now will my hon. friend get up and explain away that language? As I was saying the government in 1951 was faced with the alternative of remaining in a position where it could at a moment's notice, if an emergency arose which required the exercise of extraordinary powers, invoke the very wide powers of the War Measures Act. At that time the Prime Minister made it perfectly clear that we were seeking to have much more limited powers under the Emergency Powers Act than were then available to us under the War Measures Act, and that we were seeking to surround those powers with much greater control by parliament than parliament might exercise under the War Measures Act.
The powers that are given to the governor in council under the War Measures Act are so extensive as to enable him to exercise almost any of the wide powers which are ordinarily exercised by parliament, and he could do so secretly and in derogation of civil liberties, freedom of speech and so on.
When therefore the hon. member for Eglinton, with a lack of grasp of legal principles which is not characteristic of him as a rule, gets up and says in this House of Commons that the essential differences as between this measure, the Emergency Powers Act, and the War Measures Act-and I would ask hon. members to listen to this-are relatively insignificant, and that virtually, to all intents and purposes, this Emergency Powers Act is the War Measures Act-now, if that is the view held by a competent legal member of the Conservative opposition, you can imagine what sort of views are held by some of his colleagues. And that very view is a totally erroneous one.
For what are the powers which are withheld by the terms of the Emergency Powers Act? They are the powers, first of all, of arbitrary arrest, detention, exclusion and deportation; second, the powers of censorship or the control and suppression of publications and writings and, third, the powers of spending money without the authority of parliament.
Perhaps the language of the Emergency Powers Act is so plain- and clear that my hon. friends are not too much impressed by it. But perhaps if we put that same language in the terms of Magna Carta, and say
3300	HOUSE OF
Emergency Powers Act that the powers of arbitrary arrest, arbitrary detention, arbitrary exclusion and arbitrary deportation are a denial of those provisions of Magna Carta which say that no free man shall be taken or imprisoned or be outlawed or exiled or otherwise destroyed nor will we pass upon him nor condemn him but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. It might then make a greater impression upon hon. members.
Do they not attach some importance to that kind of freedom? My hon. friend the Leader of the Opposition, when he is displeased with the utterances of some gentleman-Mr. Barkway, for instance, over the radio-could if his party were in power and by order in council under the War Measures Act have Mr. Barkway thrown into prison and left there, regardless of habeas carpus or remedies.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Or your comments with respect to the editor of Saturday Night.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Yes, I would be glad to make reference to the editor of Saturday Night. By virtue of the provisions of the Emergency Powers Act Mr. Barkway, Mr. Woods-worth and the editor of Toronto Saturday Night can make all the speeches they like, and can write all the editorials they like, however false or offensive they may be, and there is not a thing that the Leader of the Opposition or I can do about it-and I am very glad that that is so. And I hope it always will be so.
Because surely, Mr. Speaker, if political liberty, if freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom from arbitrary detention, freedom of speech and freedom of the press is relatively insignificant, then what is significant in a free country?


Donald Methuen Fleming: May I ask a question?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: No, not until I have finished with this paragraph. If that is not important, then what is important? The fact of the matter is that by virtue of the Emergency Powers Act we have forgone and we have deprived ourselves of the power to interfere with freedom of the press and freedom of speech by the provisions of this act. And so far as the editor of Toronto Saturday Night is concerned, he is in the position of an editor in every free country. It is up to him as a patriotic and responsible citizen to supply the discipline from his own integrity that is not imposed by the state. But if he wishes to misrepresent the laws of his country in writing an editorial, although I may disapprove of it, there is not a thing I can do about it. That is the way we want to keep our freedom of the press.


During the course of the debate upon this subject the Leader of the Opposition brought in a reference to Charles I and his difficulties with parliament. I think that allusion to Charles I was particularly unhappy because the very thing which this Emergency Powers Act, to which he is objecting, provides and assures is that parliament shall continue to have control over the expenditure of public moneys. If I remember rightly, the main problem of Charles I arose from the fact that he was always trying to get money that parliament would not vote him-, and when he made promises to parliament in order to get a vote from them and broke his promises, when there was a long continued course of breaking such promises, that was one of the main causes which led up to his being dethroned.
My hon. friend had the whole course of English history to which to refer in order to get an example and yet with his usual sense of fitness he picked upon Charles I as his reference in support of his argument in this particular matter, when in point of fact one of the main causes of the difficulties of Charles I was the expenditure of public moneys in accordance with an appropriation by parliament, which is guaranteed and protected by the Emergency Powers Act.
I should have thought that a measure of this sort would in the third year of its existence continue to receive the same measure of support which it received from the opposition parties during the first two years of its existence, because they all supported it then and, if I may express the view with deference, I think they should continue to support it.


Donald Methuen Fleming: They did not support it.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Is my hon. friend still saying that they did not support it?


Donald Methuen Fleming: I still recall to the minister what he apparently continually forgets, that two years ago this measure was passed on division on third reading and again last year it was opposed.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker, I did not intend to deal with this aspect of the matter but since my hon. friend has interrupted me I think perhaps I should. A couple of days ago we heard my hon. friend speak in this chamber. I have heard him make some excellent speeches here from time to time, but I thought that he was far from being at his best two days ago.


Donald Methuen Fleming: That is not what you told me afterwards.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: No; what I told my hon. friend afterwards in a private conversation was that I could not object to his main legal points,

but I expressed no opinion about the matter that I am now going to discuss.


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) referred to the private conversation and the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson) has replied. I do not think it is customary to refer to private conversations in the house.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I referred to it only to leave a correct impression. My hon. friend made a most remarkable argument here the other day. He showed his great patriotism to his party by appointing himself its scapegoat in connection with the point he made of his not having voted against this bill. Metaphorically speaking, he drove himself out into the wilderness. What he told us was this: On the second reading of the bill I must take some personal responsibility-


Donald Methuen Fleming: There was no division in 1952.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: He said in effect: here was every member of my party wrought up about this bill, violently opposed to it, going to fight it to the last ditch, but I was not there to give them the nod and therefore they did not do it.


Donald Methuen Fleming: On a question of privilege, those were not the facts. The facts are on the record. That is not what I said. It was not a matter of my giving the nod. The facts do not admit of any difference of opinion because they are there on the record. As I said, the Leader of the Opposition had spoken strongly opposing the continuation of this measure. I said that I was to continue the debate when the next turn came around to the official opposition, and that that was to be followed by a division. I was not here at the very second by reason of a misunderstanding with the hon. member who was speaking for the C.C.F. I arrived about ten seconds later and the measure was passed by that time. It was not because anybody was waiting for a nod. There was to have been a division.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: We have heard this story before. Under the rules of the house we have to accept it, and I do accept it. I say that it makes my hon. friend not only the scapegoat but the bell-wether for his party. What he is saying in effect is that a party which is strongly opposed to a measure and is fighting it tooth and nail will not get up and vote against it unless he is there to move a motion or make a speech or something of that sort.
I do not think that there is any member in this house of any party-including the Conservative party-who if he is strongly opposed to a bill, is not quite capable and
Emergency Powers Act has not enough sense to get up and vote against it when the proper time comes. The same remarks could be made about the excuse he made on the extension of the legislation in 1952. In that connection I think the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) has a question of privilege which he could raise. The explanation was given to this house by the hon. member for Eglinton that he thought that the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre was going to speak a lot longer than he did and that it was his fault for making that mistake.


Mr. Knowles:: An error in judgment. Can I not shorten my speeches once in a while?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: That is what I thought. In 1951 we had the support of all parties. If the Leader of the Opposition wants me to do it, I can read page after page from his speech in 1951. But I have read a lot of it on previous occasions and I think we can dispense with that now.


Donald Methuen Fleming: That was before the bill had come in.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: That is right, before the bill came down.


Donald Methuen Fleming: No one then had seen the bill.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: My understanding of the position of the Social Credit party and the C.C.F. party-they will correct me if I have misunderstood it-is that they supported the bill, like the Leader of the Opposition and his party, in 1951, because they were anxious to have controls put on at that time for the protection, as they claimed, of the Canadian people.


Stanley Howard Knowles: You did not do it.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Being anxious to have controls put on, and recognizing as intelligent people that the governor in council would have no power to put on controls unless he was given emergency powers, they said, "We agree to give you emergency powers in order to put on controls." Now, the best that can be said for the argument of the hon. member for Eglinton, if effect is given to the whole of it, is that the position of his leader and his colleague-I do not include him in this because he was opposed to controls-was that they took the position:	We are all in
favour of controls. We admit that to put on controls you have to have emergency powers. We are opposed to your using the War Measures Act for this purpose. Yet we will not support the Emergency Powers Act. Well, if the Conservative party would not
33U2

Emergency Powers Act support the emergency powers how were they going to get the controls they were then advocating?


Donald Methuen Fleming: They could not support that bill after they saw it.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: My hon. friends from the C.C.F. and Social Credit parties say that they are not against the principle of these emergency powers, but they supported them in 1951 and, if I understood my hon. friend the leader of the C.C.F. party the other day, he would be inclined to support them now if we would only use them.


Mr. Coldwell:: Well, that is when parliament is not sitting-and if you used them in the interests of the people of Canada. I mean use when parliament is not sitting.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: When parliament is not sitting. So, my hon. friends of the C.C.F. and Social Credit parties are not opposed to the matter in principle. They are voting against it-if they do vote against it-not because they feel that we were wrong in seeking the powers but because we have not used the powers in the manner in which they thought we would use them. That is very different from opposing the emergency powers in principle.
Now, I would say to them that for all they know and for all we know, we in a government such as ours which, frankly, does not believe in controls if they can be avoided may be faced within another three weeks, six weeks or nine weeks with the iron necessity of introducing some limited measure of control over some segment of industry. I want to ask my hon. friends of the C.C.F. and Social Credit parties whether they think, in accordance with principles which they have enunciated and the support which they have given this measure on previous occasions, it is a consistent principle with them to say to the government now: Because you, as a majority elected by the democratic votes of the Canadian people, have not exercised these powers in the way in which we, in the minority, have said you should exercise them, we should go so far as we can to take them away from you-so that you will not have them to meet an emergency or exigency if it arises.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Is that a consistent course to follow? I submit not, Mr. Speaker.


Major James William Coldwell: Is the minister asking me a question?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Yes.


Major James William Coldwell: The hon. gentleman states he does not believe in the principle of this measure, yet he is asking for power under it.


Having received that power once, he failed to use it in the interests of the Canadian people. That is why we say: If you do not believe in the principle of controls, and as you have not used the powers we gave you, then why should we renew these powers so that you may use them against the people?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I am sure that my hon. friend misrepresents the position when he says we do not believe in controls.


George Alexander Drew: You just said that.


Mr. Ross (Souris):: Yes, the minister has just finished saying that.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: As a matter of fact, this government in the period of the war, when circumstances were such as to warrant a system of control, had one of the most thoroughgoing and successful systems of controls in the civilized world.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Under the War Measures Act.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Yes, quite right, under the War Measures Act. However, from the fact that we do not, under present circumstances, concur with my hon. friend in thinking that we should now put in a system of controls pursuant to these powers it does not by any means follow that circumstances in the kind of world in which we live today might not arise, under which a month from now we would think it just as necessary to put in controls as we did on previous occasions.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Would the minister be good enough to indicate circumstances under which he conceives that might be necessary?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker, I said before and I repeat again that the asking of a question of that kind indicates that the questioner does not understand the basic characteristics of emergency legislation. The real reason that we have to have emergency powers is precisely the fact that we are not able, not being prophets, to prophesy what exigency may arise under which the emergency powers will be necessary. If we could prophesy that, then it is quite true that we could bring down amendments to our existing statutes and we would not need the emergency powers at all.


An hon. Member:: He knows that.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Why does my hon. friend think the War Measures Act, passed in 1915, with much greater powers than the Emergency Powers Act which he is getting so indignant about, has remained on the statute books since that date, even in times of genuine peace? It is because, when you have to deal with war or any other serious emergency, it is impossible to foretell the circumstances you will have to face. A man who would be simple enough to answer the type

of question my hon. friend has just asked should not be discussing this subject at all.


An hon. Member:: He wants it for election propaganda.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Yes, I think my hon. friend asked it to see if I was simple enough-but the answer is that I am not.
Now, Mr. Speaker, in view of these facts and in view of the fact that we have curtailed our own powers, that we have subjected them to a much greater and closer scrutiny in parliament than they would receive under the War Measures Act, at a time when we have to face an indeterminate period of cold war, this legislation is the proper course to follow in the interests of the civil liberties of the people of Canada. We think we are entitled to support from every member of this house on second reading of this bill.


Donald Methuen Fleming: The minister said he would answer a question which I sought to ask at an earlier stage when he was speaking about arrest. We will all agree with him about the importance of that provision, but I would like to ask him, in the light of the importance which he attaches to the exclusion of that power from the bill: why did the government in the first instance bring down in this Emergency Powers Act a measure which gives them unlimited power of arrest? What then did he have to say about Magna Carta?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I do not know what my hon. friend is trying to do unless he is attempting to embed in Hansard some gag which he can drag out on a later occasion for political purposes. My hon. friend knows perfectly well I have answered that question twice already.


Donald Methuen Fleming: No.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I simply refer him back to Hansard of two days ago for one of those occasions, and I just cannot at the moment closely identify the previous occasion. However, it was my hon. friend who raised this point, and properly so, when the bill was before the house. He, the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) and I worked on the section of the bill as it reads at the present time in order to meet the point which he raised then and, as well, the point that we had to have protected.
There is no sinister reason whatever for the omission of the word "arrest". It was because we were informed by the law officers of the crown that if we did not omit the word "arrest" we would not even have any way of enforcing orders in council which we passed under the Emergency Powers Act. I told my hon. friend when the bill was going through 68108-210J
Emergency Powers Act the house; I told him two days ago, and I will tell him again if it will serve any purpose, that the power of arbitrary arrest is not of much value to a tyrant without the power of arbitrary detention. Under the laws we have in this free country, if you arrest a man arbitrarily and put him in jail, his lawyer goes down and takes out a writ of habeas corpus and obtains the man's release.


Donald Methuen Fleming: How can you have detention without arrest?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: You cannot have detention without arrest. All the provincial statutes, and the Criminal Code, provide for arrest. The only arrest that is contemplated under this act is the ordinary arrest that takes place all the time where a man is taken and put into a cell, and his lawyer comes along if necessary with a habeas corpus application. He does not need that in most cases as he just goes down to the jail, provides bail and the man gets out. All this pother that my friend has created certainly has no point to it at all.


Donald Methuen Fleming: It has a great deal of point. You know it does, and that is why it troubles you.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, if there had at any time been any uncertainty in the mind of any hon. member about the danger of passing legislation of this kind, then that doubt should have been removed by the extraordinary argument made in this house by the minister who will be primarily charged with the responsibility of the enforcement of this act. I have only been in this house a few years compared with a number of the hon. members here, but I doubt if at any time since confederation there has been an argument by a supposedly responsible minister of the crown which has borne so little relation to the reality of the case.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I was quoting you a lot of the time.


George Alexander Drew: The minister has said he was quoting me on a number of occasions. He did, but in a manner that is unfortunately becoming too habitual with him. He left exactly the opposite impression to what the facts actually were. The words he quoted concerning what I said on this act were at the stage when we were called upon to consider a resolution that it was expedient to introduce a measure to empower the Governor General to do and authorize such acts and things as would be provided for under an emergency measure. The act was not before us.
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In supporting the resolution which stood in the name of the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), we were told by the Prime Minister himself that the government intended to define the authority given by the measure, to give us an indication of what it was that the government proposed to do. At that time we were under the impression, and this is very clear from what is on Hansard, that we were going to have a 'bill placed before us which clearly defined the circumstances under which any emergency measures could be adopted. My words very clearly indicate that this was our thought, and that this was the basis upon which our remarks had been made. There can be no doubt about that. On page 501, a short time after the words quoted by the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson), as recorded in Hansard of February 20, 1951, I said this:
I very much prefer that there should he presented to this house legislation which will make it clear what powers are being assumed by the government. I shall go further and say that it is of the utmost importance that such powers as the government seeks and as this parliament is asked to approve should be defined with the utmost clarity so that the public is not left in doubt as to what those powers are. Also, the area of our economy within which legislation of this kind is to operate should be stated clearly so that those who are likely to be affected by legislation of this nature are not going to be in doubt as to whether they will be affected or not, and by that very fact possibly contribute substantially to the inflation which has disturbed this country so much today.
That was what was said when we were dealing with the resolution to the effect that it was expedient that an emergency measure be brought in.
Then, on March 1, the bill was brought before the house. On page 800 of Hansard for March 1, 1951, I had this to say:
At the time the resolution was before the house, which resolution had the effect of bringing into the house the bill itself, and while the bill was not yet before hon. members, the Prime Minister in his remarks indicated that it was desirable that this bill should place before this house and before parliament their responsibility for legislation and for what would be done. Following his remarks I expressed my own approval of the thought that had been expressed by the Prime Minister, to the effect that parliament was to be called upon to exercise its responsibility, and that parliament was to have the opportunity to deal with whatever measures were to be taken.
I then pointed out that was not the course that was followed. I could not have made it clearer that we were opposed to a bill of the kind that was introduced. I am not going to read extensively from that debate, because on that occasion I quoted Lord Hewart's famous book "The New Despotism", and pointed out by quotations from that book, and their application to this present measure, the danger of the course that was being recommended to this house by the


Prime Minister and the government on this occasion. That was when the bill was before us.
Then, on March 5, the bill was in committee, and there again I dealt with this subject and left no doubt whatever about our opposition to a bill which gave such wide-open power to the government. On March 6, this bill was up for third reading, and on that occasion there was no doubt whatever as to what our position was. The only reason that at this stage of this discussion I am called upon to go back to what was said on this earlier occasion is the complete misrepresentation by the Minister of Justice of what did take place, after that misrepresentation has been brought to his attention time and time again.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Will the hon. member-


George Alexander Drew: Unless it is a point of order or a point of privilege, I propose to continue my remarks.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: On a point of privilege, Mr. Speaker, I was going to ask my hon. friend a question. If he does not want to answer it, I am content.


George Alexander Drew: I shall proceed with what I was going to say.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Perhaps I might ask it before my hon. friend takes his seat.


George Alexander Drew: The minister can follow whatever course he sees fit at that time. On page 952 of Hansard for March 6, 1951, I had this to say:
Over and over again throughout history there have been tragic examples of free legislative bodies handing over their authority to meet an emergency and then not being able to recapture that authority at some future time when those with a different point of view were unwilling to surrender those powers.
To the statement that I have just made the Prime Minister can answer that this bill will terminate next year. In that respect may I point out, Mr. Speaker, that if in the present emergency this bill is necessary, then it will be necessary next year to renew the measure, or an even stronger one, because we are passing a complementary measure, the Defence Production Act, which is to continue for five years and which obviously will go in double harness with this bill now before us. Therefore unless the government is going to introduce or bring into effect by proclamation a still stronger bill, this legislation will continue for some years, and there may come a time when, through pressures, through force of circumstances that we cannot now envisage, a government of another day might be unwilling to abandon the powers so obtained.
The Prime Minister may also say: This is in the hands of parliament. In answer I would say that we have not seen too much evidence, during this session or preceding ones, that there is that measure of independent expression of opinion by the large number of supporters of the government in this house which would suggest to those who are

concerned about the trend we now see that we might hope that within this house there would be a vote which would place any effective restraint upon a government which commanded a majority of that kind. Unless we return to established and tested principles of parliamentary democracy we may in fact at this hour be in the twilight of freedom here in Canada, no matter how much we believe in freedom itself. We Canadians can pay the penalty of surrender just as other people have paid the penalty of surrender of those principles which protected the freedom in which they believed.
Then, Mr. Speaker, having indicated in such clear and unequivocal terms our objection,-


Stuart Sinclair Garson: May I have the page number?


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to be interrupted in the middle of a sentence nor do I intend to be interrupted except on a question of privilege or a point of order.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a question of privilege. I think it has been the custom, among courteous members of parliament, that when another member wishes to know the page of Hansard which is being quoted, the hon. member who is quoting will give it to him.


Mr. Rowe:: That is not a question of privilege.


George Alexander Drew: That was not a question of privilege and the minister well knows it. The minister well knows that I gave the date and the page from which I was quoting; it is 952.


William Earl Rowe: The hon. member gave it before he started quoting.


George Alexander Drew: May I just point out that, having indicated clearly our objection to this measure and our objection to the principles that were inherent in a wide-open bill without any definition of the circumstances under which these wide powers could be invoked, we indicated our objection to the bill by the accepted practice of saying "On division".
Mr. Speaker, I do not intend to discuss at all the extraordinary process of reasoning by which the minister has once again, in spite of the fact that this has been pointed out to him before, tried to distort the facts as to what took place in this house by suggesting that we supported the measure on that occasion. We opposed the measure, and we opposed it on every possible occasion when the measure was actually before us. The words he quoted by way of indicating our approval were words that were used at the time that the bill was not before us and when we presumed that the bill was going to define the authority of the government.
Let me now come to the remarkable mental gyrations of the Minister of Justice in the
Emergency Powers Act contentions that he has put forward. He has said: They approved this measure before- which of course is not so-and then they say, "Because you did not do what we, a minority, think you should have done, we now say that we will not support what we supported on an earlier occasion."


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I rise on a question of privilege, Mr. Speaker. I never said any such thing as applied to my hon. friend's party. My remarks were entirely confined to the Social Credit and C.C.F. parties; they had no reference to my hon. friend, and his statement is quite wrong.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, my statement is not wrong in any word. My statement referred to what the Minister of Justice-


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker-


George Alexander Drew: I insist on finishing my sentence, Mr. Speaker.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Speaker, I have stated what I said and I believe that, by the rules of the house, my hon. friend, whether he likes it or not, is under obligation to accept my statement.


George Alexander Drew: The minister well knows that I am compelled to accept a statement that was made, but the statement he made was not earmarked in relation to anyone in this house. The statement he made was a general statement. Since he now says it referred only to others besides the members of the Conservative party, that in no way changes the purport of what he said. It does not change it in any way. It is an equally distorted form of reasoning.


Stanley Howard Knowles: It makes it worse.


George Alexander Drew: It only makes it worse, in fact; because he apparently thinks that we are mind-readers and that we know which of these mental gyrations of his is intended to relate to one part of the house or another.
In that particular case let me remind the minister that I heard no suggestion that this bill was not now being supported because the government had not said that it would do what the minority said it should do. As I recall it, what was said in that respect was that there was a great deal of objection on this side of the house to the fact that the government had put forward this bill with the assurance that it was going to deal with controls and that we objected to the government's asking for a renewal of the same bill when they had shown that that was not their intention and they had never invoked the powers for that purpose.
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Alphonse Fournier: The government never gave that assurance.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: And the Leader of the Opposition knows that perfectly well.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, that was the reason that was given on behalf of the government as a reason for putting this measure forward. It was stated on behalf of the government that this would be stand-by power so that they could deal with this extremely important question; and on many occasions-


Alphonse Fournier: That is not an assurance.


George Alexander Drew: -and by different members of the government that was stated.
Mr. Speaker, the fact is that the only supportable reason why emergency powers of that kind could properly have been adopted on that occasion was the argument put forward by the government; and the very words that I have read from the Hansard of that day indicate quite clearly that what was in our minds on that occasion was the statement of the government that they were going to employ this measure for the purpose of dealing with inflation by some type of controlling measures under this act. That is perfectly clear. The fact is that if it was not their intention, then, in so far as we may accord some freedom of judgment on the part of the hon. members of this house on the other side, this bill was passed under false pretences; because the argument that was put forward long before the time it was discussed in this house was an argument which indicated that the government proposed to deal with the dangers that were in everybody's mind at that time because of the pressure imposed by the dual demands on our economy of defence and peace requirements.
The Minister of Justice has, with his customary graciousness, referred to my concept of history and has, with his customary accuracy, pointed out the fundamental difference between what is now before us and what was in issue at the time of Charles. He tells us that the expenditure of money, which was very much in the minds of those who were discussing constitutional issues in the time of Charles, is removed from consideration here. But the Minister of Justice forgets the act that he is supporting and forgets the exception in that act.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Oh, oh.


George Alexander Drew: Because in. section 2, subsection 2, paragraph (c), we find that the third of the general exceptions provides that the 

power conferred on the government does not include power to make orders in relation to:
(c) expenditure of moneys otherwise than in accordance with an appropriation by parliament-
And these are the important words:
-except expenditure of moneys from any fund or account established by order or regulation in connection with a scheme of control for the purposes of that scheme of control.
Mr. Speaker, that exception makes it possible for the government to deal with almost any plan it seeks to put into effect, because it could put into effect a plan of general control which would embrace any particular part of our economy and then proceed to allocate money without coming back to parliament for approval of one cent of that advance. I wish to make it quite clear that I am not suggesting for one moment that at some subsequent time the government would not have to come back to parliament and place that item before parliament. But that would be too late for parliament to exercise its fundamental and primary power to advance moneys at all and to control the expenditures before they are made.
Then we have heard a lot about arrest and the extent to which the government has gone to deny this power of arrest in the act now before us. But there again we have a joker and a very powerful joker indeed, because the exception in this case is to be found in section 2, subsection 2(a). There we find that the subject matter excepted from the power of the government to pass orders in council or regulations under this act is as follows:
Arrest, except as incidental to proceedings under section three, detention, exclusion, or deportation of any person.
Now, arrest; that is the word which the Minister of Justice emphasizes. The exception in regard to arrest to arrest except as incidental to proceedings under section 3, and section 3 reads:
*-and regulations made under or pursuant to authority conferred under this act have the force of law while this act is in force.
In other words, this act may make orders in relation to any of the daily activities of our people, and having made that order, it has the force of law, and if there is a breach of that law, then there can be arrest in relation to that law under the very section to which the minister has referred with such emphasis.
This act is an act which extends once again emergency powers that were supposed to be granted for a particular purpose and at a particular time. It was pointed out at the time this act came before us that there was danger that it was not just going to be for two years, but that it would be extended

indefinitely once it got on the statute books. Let us see just what has happened. First of all there was the emergency legislation during the war itself. Then the National Emergency Transitional Powers Act; it was put forward not because of the need of emergency legislation so much as simply a device to continue the orders still in force. And then when all these orders had disappeared and had been rescinded we were asked to support a new emergency order, and that order was passed in 1951.
It is true there was not the same extended opposition to that measure that there has been on this occasion, because it was recognized that if there were to be those steps taken which the government indicated it proposed to take, then it was necessary that some emergency authority be granted. May I remind the government on this occasion, and the minister particularly who puts this argument forward, that we have made it clear on this occasion that we believe it may be desirable to have certain emergency powers clearly defined under specific acts which will mean that the government can act only in circumstances known in advance by the members of parliament who delegated that authority to them.
We have pointed out that even if the problem of box cars arises, which is so much in the mind of the Minister of Justice, he can deal with them by an amendment to an act that already deals with box cars. And if there are to be certain other emergency provisions, they may be included in other legislation now on the statute books which would make it possible for the members of this parliament to know within what general range of circumstances the government is going to be able to take the emergency action that is contemplated.
I repeat that we cannot disregard the fact that there is emergency legislation already in existence of which we do not know the details, and in regard to which we certainly have no idea as to the steps that have been taken under that secret order. I repeat that if one secret order can be made, any number of secret orders can be made in exactly the same way. I point out that, when the minister speaks about the way in which we have been assured that any measures passed under this act will be subject to the review of parliament, this is a meaningless assurance in view of the fact that it would be necessary for those who object to what the government had done to be able to obtain a majority vote from the members of this house.
Without saying anything about the voting habits of hon. members which might incur the
Emergency Powers Act displeasure of Mr. Speaker on this occasion, may I simply say that we have not had any evidence which would support our belief that we would be likely to gain the support of the majority of hon. members when we must in that case have a large number of those who in the ordinary course of events do vote so regularly in support of the government. And yet any real power of review, any real power of change, any real power of protection on behalf of the people of Canada is entirely dependent upon that reality which not one of us can disregard. Therefore we have in the first place the possibility of secret orders, any number of them, although there is only one today, or so we are told; and also the reality that in the case of these orders not placed under terms of secrecy by an order in council under the Regulations Act, we have in fact no real chance to change them, and in any event steps would already have been taken which would have committed the government very substantially before any discussion could take place in regard to these matters.
I indicated before, Mr. Speaker, that we were not suggesting that this is a problem that is related only to our parliament. I pointed out that this is a problem that relates to all parliaments which have been called upon to exercise emergency powers during those past few years, and I should like to read into the record words that, even in spite of his susceptibility in respect of anything that he thinks might savour of politics, cannot be regarded as an adverse political comment when I say that what I am quoting was put forward in the British House of Commons by the leader of the Liberal party there. This is what Mr. Clement Davies had to say on October 23, 1950, in the British House of Commons in regard to this trend about which I believe more concern should be expressed by hon. members, not just those who are members of the opposition:
It was sad to see how little interest was being taken in a matter that concerned the sovereignty of parliament by members of all parties. During the last thirty years the tendency had been to surrender back to the executive powers that had been won from them over the centuries. There was a tendency to initiate a new judicial power, to create administrative laws, making the executive to a large extent judges in their own case. The sovereignty of parliament was threatened. All the time we were being called on to surrender more and more of our rights and privileges to the government of the day. This continuous erosion was far more dangerous to liberty than any attack from the other side. We were awake to that and could resist it, but the drip, drip, drip of erosion was more likely to destroy the house.
Mr. Speaker, it is this erosion of the powers of parliament that should cause more concern

Emergency Powers Act to private members on the other side of the house than has been displayed at any time during the discussion of the measure now before us. It is this erosion of the powers of parliament which is indicated by the fact that a measure which was brought forward under different circumstances in 1951, and with different arguments, is now put before us with the suggestion that we should concur in the extension of the order, without any resistance, because it has already found its way onto the statute books, and as a result of arguments in its support that have no validity today.
Let us repeat that while the government may regard this as an emergency, the emergency today is not in the nature of the emergency that was before us at the time this matter was under discussion in 1951. At that time the Korean situation was extremely uncertain. At that time there was none of the combined strength that now does give ground for hope that the free world presents a sufficiently united front to defeat aggression.
At that time we did not have the great and powerful organizations which today bring together so effectively the strength of the nations of the western world. True, the situation is serious. True, there is a war, and a terrible war for those who are engaged in it, now taking place in Korea. True, there is a threat in many parts of the world. But the simple fact remains that, with that measure of stabilization which has come about, short of war, invasion, insurrection, or apprehended war, it is not likely that any one of us is going to live through a period which will be any less of an emergency than that through which we are now living.
We know that there is an act on the statute books that can be employed, if invasion, war or insurrection, real or apprehended, should occur. That being so, we believe that the government should now be trying to find ways and means by which we can create longterm plans under this kind of life which we are going to live probably for the rest of our lives, which will preserve the rights, powers and sovereignty of parliament; and, particularly in this country of ours, not only preserve the sovereignty of parliament but protect and continue, in its full balance of authority, that federal system which is the basis of our national unity.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a few, I hope, fairly brief observations and in doing so I would call a few witnesses from outside the chamber.
Sometimes the duty of the opposition is a little frustrating. Often we feel there is a kind of iron curtain dividing this chamber, so that 

arguments that we feel are convincing seem to get stopped in transit.


Mr. Adamson:: An ivory curtain, not iron.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I shall bring witnesses from outside. Sometimes I believe delay is a good thing; and in this instance, owing to the delay, there has been time for public opinion to begin to catch up.
As I said a moment ago, often in the opposition we seem to be frustrated because we do not seem to get the help to which we feel we are entitled from outside the house. I am happy to have here some clippings which will show that apparently there is a widespread feeling throughout the country that this is a bad measure. It would seem that the country is beginning to realize we are not just talking about words, when we oppose emergency powers, but that we are talking about things which can be real and important.
I should like first of all to read a leading editorial, or part of it, from the Calgary Herald of February 10, which is headed "The Prime Minister Uses Strange Words", and states:
Last week the House of Commons debated a government motion to extend the emergency powers bill for another year. This bill, in effect, gives the cabinet dictatorial powers, enabling it to-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I do not think it is customary to quote from sources outside the house opinions as to what is taking place in the house. That has never been permitted. It is true that I have allowed reading of a limited number of factual editorial opinions; but I cannot allow a controversy between someone outside the house and someone in the house. I think our rules are clear on that point. Citation 265 in Beauchesne's third edition states:
It is not in order to read articles in newspapers, letters or communications emanating from persons outside the house and referring to, or commenting on, or denying anything said by a member or expressing any opinion reflecting on proceedings within the house.
Also see citation 266.
An hon. member is expected to express his own opinions; but I think he can see the position in which the house would find itself if a debate were to be permitted between someone in the house and someone outside the house.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I am surprised, Mr. Speaker, because it seems to me I have heard scores of quotations read by hon. members during the course of debates. Indeed, I myself in the budget debate, I recall clearly, read during the course of my speech twelve or fifteen comments referring to the effect of the budget, and commenting as to the wisdom or the lack of wisdom in what was contained in the budget.

I find it difficult to understand why comment concerning the wisdom of the government in introducing an emergency powers bill is different from comments concerning its wisdom in introducing the budget. I have vivid recollection of quoting freely from the press in my speech in reply to the Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott).


Donald Methuen Fleming: May I say a word on the point of order. Surely the essential difference is that an editorial which comments upon a measure before the house may be read. It is perfectly proper for an hon. member to read an editorial under such circumstances. It may not be proper to read editorial comment upon a debate or upon the course of a debate in the house. My understanding is that where editorial comment is to be found in the press relating to measures before the house, it is perfectly proper to read it. As I understand it, that is what the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Macdonnell) was about to do, to read a comment on the measure, not on the debate.


Mr. Speaker:: I heard the hon. member's opening remarks and I think he is commenting upon a speech made by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent).


James MacKerras Macdonnell: No, Mr. Speaker, a comment on a speech by the Prime Minister, a very short speech. As a matter of fact, it was a comment on the Prime Minister's comment that he did not want to listen to the debate. That is what I referred to here.


Mr. Speaker:: I do not think that should be permitted at this time. That is the type of remark made outside the house which I think should not be referred to within the house.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I must defer to your ruling, of course. I pass on to a quotation from Mr. Elmore Philpott in the Vancouver Sun, which I think you will pass because it certainly is merely a comment on the measure and has nothing whatever to do with the debate. This is from the Vancouver Sun of February 15:
It is no doubt true that there will be no serious abuse of the emergency powers, if they are granted for another year. But it is worth remembering that neither this Prime Minister nor this government will last for ever.
I hope that is not unparliamentary, Mr. Speaker.
Nobody knows who will head our government a year hence. A bad principle is a bad principle- and this is a very bad principle. A bad precedent is a bad precedent-and this is a very bad precedent.
Now I wish to come to a quotation from the Post-Record, of Sydney, Nova Scotia. I think you will agree that this is discussing
Emergency Powers Act the principle of the measure and is not in the remotest degree discussing the debate. There is one brief reference to the debate, but the article is discussing the principle. It reads:
Thoughtful Canadians will endorse George Drew's timely reaffirmation that parliament is the supreme authority representing the people and that authority should not be delegated to a handful of cabinet ministers.
It is somewhat alarming that a major principle of our freedom-something that is perfectly obvious -has to be stated firmly in the Commons to a cabinet that shows disconcerting signs of forgetting it.
The Progressive Conservative leader would have failed in his plain duty had he not protested against extension of the government's Emergency Powers Act for another year. Mr. Drew has called attention to an unfortunate trend in Ottawa. An aroused public opinion needs to remind the government it is assuming too much.
The government says it has good reason for holding on to a law which gives it wide power of emergency action over almost all phases of Canadian economic life. It has, however, not given parliament any reason whatever and has failed to convince the nation.


Mr. Speaker:: I think that is commenting upon what the government is proposing with respect to the matter.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: It is merely this writer's opinion of the measure on which we are asked to act.


Mr. Speaker:: I gather it is that writer's opinion of the proceedings in the house with respect to the measure, not on the merits of the measure itself.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: With deference, it seems to me it is commenting on the merits, on the whole principle involved.


Mr. Speaker:: May I read this reference again?
Paragraph 265 of Beauchesne's third edition reads:
It is not in order to read articles in newspapers, letters or communications emanating from persons outside the house and referring to, or commenting on, or denying anything said by a member or expressing any opinion reflecting on proceedings within the house.
Surely that article is referring to and commenting upon what has been said by an hon. member in the house.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: As I listened to what you were reading I thought it might refer to some statement made about somebody. This is merely referring in a general way to the principle which is involved here.


Mr. Speaker:: I think the article was referring to the debate. I have allowed factual editorials to be quoted here, but not where it raises an opinion about or criticizes the actions of some member of the house or of the government. That is for the members here to do.

Emergency Powers Act


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I confess that I am in difficulty because I understood you to say that you objected, not to the quotation of an editorial opinion on the subject but of an editorial opinion as to statements made by people in this house. I submit that I have not been doing that except possibly in the case of the first editorial. I now come to the Ottawa Citizen where the editorial is of the same nature according to my view. I will read it for your approval or otherwise. It reads:
In 1950 and 1951, shortly after the fighting in Korea began, most Canadians would have agreed that a state of apprehended war did indeed exist. The government was obliged then to exercise special power to rule by order in council in the interest of security. But there is some doubt, at least in parliament, that a state of "apprehended war" still exists. It is a shifty definition of an emergency, changing with the times, and meaning almost whatever the government wants it to mean.
This was disclosed in Wednesday's debate. Mr. Garson, the Minister of Justice, said-
Perhaps I should pass over that. I continue:
This seems to mean that in the government's view, unrest anywhere in the world-
I should have said that the reference was to the Minister of Justice's worry about unrest in South Africa:
This seems to mean that in the government's view, unrest anywhere in the world results in a state of "apprehended war", is a threat to Canada's security, and warrants passage of the Emergency Powers Act. Yet surely this cannot be what the government actually means. Clarification of the circumstances which would justify the Emergency Powers Act is badly needed. Otherwise, a Canadian government could seek very wide powers on the ground that oil expropriation in Iran, disturbances in Bolivia or-


Stuart Sinclair Garson: On a point of order-


Mr. Speaker:: It seems to me that the hon. member is now raising a point which is argumentative as between somebody outside the house and somebody in the house.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I will pass that over.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I was not objecting to my hon. friend's quoting from the newspaper; I was objecting to the substance of what he was saying which does not correctly represent my viewpoint on the matter. I must repudiate what he is quoting.


Mr. Speaker:: That is the difficulty which arises when the opinion of someone outside the house is quoted with respect to what an hon. member has said in the house. That is what I am endeavouring to prevent.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: It is all subject to your approval. I just read a short paragraph and I shall continue with the closing paragraph from the Ottawa Citizen

which I think will escape your ruling. It reads:
The world being what it is, there will always be an excuse to ask for emergency powers, whether the threat to Canada's security is real or fancied. This cannot be what parliament wants.
Here is one from the London Free Press of February 9 which I think is all right.
It is strange that Canada should be re-enacting wartime emergency powers at the same time Washington is freeing its economy from wartime controls.
The Emergency Powers Act, which was passed in Ottawa after the outbreak of the Korean conflict, runs out on May 31, and the government is asking that it be extended for another year. All opposition parties object to this, largely on the grounds that there is no definite emergency, and that the government has used the emergency powers for purposes that might well be served by regular legislative channels.
That is not editorial comment on the merits of this bill; it is a statement referring to opposition parties in the house.


Mr. Speaker:: It is something in the editorial columns, but it is more or less a news item, and I do not think 1 should permit the hon. member to continue.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I am sorry, Mr. Speaker; I thought it was quite free from the difficulty of comment from this or that member, and that it was a general statement. However, I will leave the matter and quote from a short paragraph which occurs later.


Mr. Sinnoit:: Mr. Speaker, I rise on a point of order. On three or four occasions you have requested the hon. member for Greenwood (Mr. Macdonnell) to refrain from reading from newspapers but he continues to do so. I would like the house rules adhered to.


Mr. Ferguson:: Beauchesne, 3,444!


Mr. Speaker:: I have never ruled that no extracts whatsoever could be read.


An hon. Member:: He would not understand anyway.


Mr. Speaker:: I think the house understands the rule.


Mr. Hees:: Not the member for Springfield (Mr. Sinnott).


Mr. Speaker:: I am sure the hon. member for Greenwood does, and I will leave it with him.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I thought the hon. member for Springfield would have realized that I was trying very, very hard to fit myself into your ruling and read nothing to which you would object. There is just a short paragraph from the London Free Press which I think is all right. It is an expression of editorial opinion.
It would seem as though there Is some wisdom in the opposition plea that emergency powers

should only be .granted in a real emergency, and there is considerable doubt whether the present "cold war" constitutes such an emergency.
Mr. Speaker, these extracts do not seem as popular as I had hoped they would be, and perhaps I will not read any more of them. I have read enough to show that there is quite a widespread feeling in the country that we are not just discussing a long word, "emergency", that does not mean anything to anybody, but that it does concern things which very importantly affect our day to day ' life.
I would like to make a few brief comments resulting from the extracts that I have read. I have only been in this house a short time, but even in the short time I have been here I sense a constant increase, almost subconscious perhaps, almost automatic perhaps, of executive power. I suppose this was inevitable when there is such an overwhelming majority as against the last parliament, when the majority was quite moderate and when I think once it fell to as little as five. Whatever the reason is, the change is there.
Perhaps what has impressed me as much as anything is the incident to which I was going to refer when you stopped me. It is the fact that a man as courteous and considerate as the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), conscious of his duty, should feel that this matter of emergency powers was not of sufficient importance to warrant him staying and listening to two members on our side of the house who, I think, are as competent as any two people in this house to discuss this all-important question. The very fact that the Prime Minister did not stay made me feel more than ever that we have reached a stage where it is assumed that you have the power and you hardly need to justify it at all. The government are so used to getting what they want.
Now I just want to spend a few minutes examining what need there is for this government to have these powers. I would like to know how many of us have actually taken the trouble to find out what power the government has, and I will confess that until I tried to prepare myself to make this short speech, and until I had read the Emergency Powers Act and what is much more important the Defence Production Act passed in 1951, I was not aware of the extent of the powers which the government had. At least I was not aware of them in any real detail.
I would like very briefly, and I know that this is not the first time this has come up, to refer members to a few of the chief powers contained in the Defence Production Act. After all, the emergencies we are thinking
Emergency Powers Act about are associated with war and defence. If in fact this Defence Production Act gives the most far-reaching, comprehensive and almost unlimited powers to the minister in connection with matters of defence, then I think it is very relevant to consider whether further powers need to be granted. Let me draw attention to a few of the powers which are contained in this Defence Production Act. I shall read just a few words to give you the flavour. Section 11 states:
The minister shall examine into, organize, mobilize and conserve the resources of Canada contributory to, and the sources of supply of, defence supplies and the agencies and facilities available for the supply of the same . . .
Later on in the section these words appear: . . . and generally shall take steps to mobilize, conserve and co-ordinate all economic and industrial facilities in respect of defence supplies and defence projects and the supply or construction thereof.
I shall now read just part of section 14:
The minister may, on behalf of His Majesty and subject to the provisions of this act, acquire, store, maintain and transport and sell, exchange or otherwise dispose of such materials or substances as may be designated by the governor in council as materials or substances essential to the needs of the community of which it is advisable to maintain stocks to safeguard against possible shortages . . .
Section 15 is a long section and I shall only read the beginning:
The minister may, on behalf of His Majesty and subject to the provisions of this act,
(a)	buy or otherwise acquire, . .	. supplies;
(b)	manufacture . . .;
(c)	construct or acquire defence projects . . .;
(d)	arrange for the performance of professional . . . services;
(e)	purchase or otherwise acquire, sell, exchange or otherwise dispose of real or personal property . . .;
(f)	make loans or advances . . .
And so on. Section 16 provides the money. The minister has a defence production revolving fund. Section 17 gives the minister wide powers to contract.
The minister may . . . enter into contracts for the carrying out of anything he is authorized to do under section 14 . . .


Mr. Speaker:: The bill before the house is the Emergency Powers Act and the hon. member is now discussing another act. I have no objection to him making brief reference to it, but I do not think he should continue further with that act.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Well, with deference, Mr. Speaker, my argument is, as I shall seek to show, that these further powers are not necessary. I seek to show that partly by drawing attention to the very wide powers which the government has outside the Emergency Powers Act altogether.
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Mr. Speaker:: I might just stop the hon. member there and say that I thought he had quoted quite extensively from the other act.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I wish to make only one further reference and I shall put this act away. I point out that there is embodied in the Defence Production Act what was formerly called the essential materials act, under which additional wide powers are given. I will say no more about that matter.
There is, of course, the "offences" section about which I wish to say a word. It is a section which I suppose governments must always have, with the ugly word "guilty", and appropriate punishments are provided.
All these powers were given by parliament to enable the urgent problem of defence to be dealt with. I have just stated the real purpose for which they were given. I defy anyone who will read the Defence Production Act to suggest any power which is lacking to carry out defence measures-short of the case of the great emergency which would bring in the War Measures Act-under the Defence Production Act, of which we have all approved and under which we have given these wide powers to the Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe). He is very good at getting powers and we are very good at giving them to him, but it should not become a universal habit.
There is another thing I should like to mention. We are now eight years from the war. One would have thought that the time had come when transitional emergency powers might be at an end. If we extend them this year it seems to me we are almost slipping into the situation to which the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) referred earlier, we are almost recognizing them as the normal accompaniment of the situation in which we are now and which is likely to continue for a good many years. In other words, if we are willing to let them go through this year it would be much more competent for the government to say next year, "You did it last year, why don't you do it again now?"
I want to say a word about the original speech delivered by the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson), in which he gave the reasons for the passage of this act. I must say, with deference to him, that I did not think he gave us many reasons which were very effective. It was a long speech. I did not count the words, but it looked to me like several thousand. I did not find any very convincing reasons. He did one thing which surprised me. He laid great stress on the fact that the orders in council would be tabled in parliament. Well, does the minister think


there is much significance in that? Does the minister think that when these things come to parliament as faits accomplis the opposition is going to be able to do anything about them? It is really secret legislation.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: That is up to the opposition.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: It is secret legislation passed without discussion and without the public having any knowledge of what is happening. Surely the minister does not seriously ask us to think it is much help when, some time later, these orders in council are tabled. I wonder if there is any case on record in any democratic assembly, in which the government has a substantial majority, where the action of the government was voided? In other words, it seems to me it is just the old business of locking the door after the horse is stolen, except that we would not even be able to lock the door. We would just know that the horse was stolen. As I say, I find it difficult to believe that the minister was serious about that.
The minister and the hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) have spoken already about the War Measures Act and this act. I must say the words are extraordinarily similar. I appreciate the differences as set out by the minister; nevertheless there is a broad similarity. Both acts start with words that are so familiar in any act with broad powers:
The governor in council may do and authorize such acts and things, and make from time to time such orders and regulations, as he may by reason of the existing international emergency deem necessary . . .
I am not going on with that. The powers are broad, and if I may say so the minister seemed to go back again and again to the idea that we should give him great credit because the government refrains from invoking the full powers of the War Measures Act but is taking this instalment instead. My argument is that it does not need either. The Defence Production Act gives ample powers, and if a real emergency comes the War Measures Act is there. We do not need this in-between measure at all.
At page 2093 of Hansard for February 19, 1953, the minister went over the orders in council that were passed, and they were trivial enough, as he said. Most of them were repealing previous ones. There was nothing of substance there. I think the minister will admit that. Indeed, one of the great arguments the minister makes is that the government has done really very little so there is nothing to worry about, but it is desirable nevertheless to have these powers.

There is one other thing the minister said to which I take great exception. At page 2093 of Hansard for February 19, 1953, he
says:
They are powers which are taken in an emergency to deal with matters which must be dealt with more rapidly than parliament can deal with them whether it is in session or prorogued.
Now, Mr. Speaker, I seriously question those words. The suggestion there is that parliament is not competent to act promptly in an emergency; that it would not recognize an emergency when it saw one. My recollection is that in 1940 when real war descended upon Britain, in a matter of hours they passed unprecedented legislation giving the government full power over the economic life of the country. That is my recollection. If I were better informed about the proceedings in this house I am sure I could adduce instances just as striking. I do not know whether the minister quite intended to say that, but to me it is a rather shocking suggestion that the government must have powers independent of this parliament, even if this parliament is sitting, because this parliament cannot be trusted to have enough sense to exercise its powers. Therefore they have to give them up to people who are competent to exercise them. I resent that suggestion very much.
It seems to me the suggestion makes parliament a laughing-stock. We do not stand too high in public esteem now, and I am sometimes humiliated to think that our position is not what it should be. I think our position would be degraded still further if the people believed we had accepted that view. They would say "you accepted that; you voted for that, did you, after the minister had said that even when you were in session you were not competent to act promptly?"
The other argument the minister made-I am sure he made it with great sincerity-was when he said, "well, just look at us; do you think we could ever do anything wrong?" I would say, Mr. Speaker, that if this government could be sold at its own valuation of itself I think all the members of it would emerge rich men. I do not know that the rest of us are obliged to take that view. One of the worries is that there are people who say, "well, these are men you like; you know they are men of standing; you know they will never do anything wrong." I think it is in circumstances of that kind that the most foolish sort of legislation can be passed.
I am going to go back six or seven years and remind hon. members of something which was done by a government-some of the same members are in this government now-most of the members of which we knew and liked and
Emergency Powers Act in our private life respected. They did, however, take high-handed action of the kind which I think, in retrospect, they must question themselves. Actually they did a gross injustice to innocent men. I am going to read a paragraph or two from a speech made in this house on the spy trials by a former desk-mate of mine, whose death we all regret, the late A. L. Smith. I do feel that when we are asked to pass legislation on the grounds of, "Oh well, you know to whom you are giving the power; they will never misuse it", the matter should be investigated. The minister gave two reasons for passing this measure. He said that the government will scarcely ever use it and, second, if they do use it they will always use it right, if that is good grammar.
I want to read briefly from a speech delivered by Mr. A. L. Smith. I read, first of all, from Hansard of March 19, 1946, page 83.
I should like to remind those who did not have the privilege of knowing Mr. Smith that he was a man of great experience in legal matters, and he spoke with weight in this house. He said:
What has happened historically is this. On September 5 last, or early in September some time, the Prime Minister became apprised of some information in the hands of a man who was an employee of some sort in the Russian embassy here. The only point I make about that is this: That information has been in the hands of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for a period of over five months.
Then I read from page 85 of Hansard for the same date:
Prior to February 15 certain people were detained. In short, they were arrested. They were arrested without warrant, and they were arrested not because, as in a case under the Criminal Code, as the Postmaster General (Mr. Bertrand) well knows, they were actively caught committing a crime. They were arrested under the special provisions, if I may say so, contained in the order in council which I have just read.
I wish to remind the house now, in case I forget, that my recollection is that of the eighteen who were charged and who were treated in the way I propose to set out, seven were acquitted. I think the figures are eighteen and eleven. To continue reading from Mr. Smith:
The fact that people are arrested does not normally mean very much. People are arrested every day. I have been arrested myself. As a matter of fact, it was not a very serious charge and I got out of it without any difficulty. But 1 really know what the thing means. When you are arrested you cannot do what you want to do. You do what the policeman tells you, or else. That is the position of a man when he is arrested. But here is where we really start to differ with the normal procedure. These people were held incommunicado. What does this mean? We all know it means that they were not allowed to communicate with anyone, and I am quite sure their movements, their letter-writing and all that sort of thing, would receive excellent supervision, not to use a stronger word.
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Emergency Powers Act
The next thing I wish to read from Mr. Smith is this, at page 87:
Just what has happened? We read In the newspapers that when Mrs. Woikjn, the lady who came from Blaine Lake in Saskatchewan, appeared before the magistrate she was quite distracted and greatly disturbed, and endeavoured to plead guilty. I do not know Magistrate Strike but he must be an awfully good chap, because he refused to accept that plea. That was the physical and mental condition of this woman after having gone through experiences which I can perhaps better imagine than speak about. I am not going to use my imagination, but I have some idea of the things that run through the minds of people who are incarcerated in lonely silence.
And here is the last thing I wish to read:
May I close by saying just this. It is true that we have had this commission. It is true that persons have been suspected of crime because, as the Prime Minister indicated, the documents pointed to them. It is true that they have been brought before the commission without warning, without protection, without an opportunity to see their families or to get legal advice. In six months, Mr. Speaker, this spy scare will be forgotten. Unfortunately our people are a bit too apathetic about matters of this kind. But I say to you, sir, that during your lifetime and mine the people of this country will always regret and will never live down the fact that we threw aside and abrogated the rights and liberties of our citizens.
Mr. Speaker, I have thought it right to read those excerpts because I feel earnestly that-although happily there are some signs of public awakening-the public have grown apathetic to these things. I think they should be reminded of exactly what has happened and, as I say, what has been done by men who were prepared to say, just as is the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson): "Look at us, see the kind of men we are, and don't be afraid to hand us power."
Mr. Speaker, I conclude by saying that I think the government has all the power it needs. It has the Defence Production Act, with the wide powers that I have attempted briefly to indicate. It has in reserve-if the terrible emergency really comes-the War Measures Act, and in the meantime it has parliament. I do not think there is any need for anything else. In my opinion no valid reason has been given.
I feel disappointed that we are asked to pass this measure again. Perhaps the best one can say is that if this legislation is forced down our throats again, we at least have the satisfaction of believing that we have made some impression on public opinion.
I hope it will go on spreading with a kind of chain reaction until the public wakes up to the realities of this thing.


Major James William Coldwell: Mr. Speaker, may I say to the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson) that I think this debate would have been considerably shorter had he not


risen this afternoon and made a rather provocative speech. He said he had to make a speech because otherwise he could not reply; but I believe the very fact that he moved the second reading of the bill would have been sufficient to give him a right to reply. I think the speech he made when he initiated this afternoon's debate could have been made perhaps at its conclusion, if he wished to make it.


Mr. Maclnnis:: Or not at all.


Major James William Coldwell: Yes, or not at all; but if he wished to make it, I think it could have been made at the conclusion of the debate. In that way I think the business of the house would have been facilitated. I am not one given to lecturing other people, because I know my own failings at times. But I do say this. The ministers who have been most successful in the past in getting their estimates and their bills through were the ministers who were least provocative in introducing their measures. I mentioned Mr. Motherwell the other afternoon. He comes back to my mind in that connection. When Mr. Motherwell was dealing with his estimates, hon. members used to come down in the house looking forward to a rather pleasant afternoon, because in the pleasantest possible way he would talk about everything under the sun except the matters in his estimates, and he would get them through more rapidly than would any other minister in the cabinet. I remember this distinctly. I think it is not a bad bit of advice for one to give a minister at the present time.
We are opposing this measure at this time, as the minister stated this afternoon. We are not doing it because we feel that, as a minority, we should have, in 1951 or 1952, imposed our will upon the majority or upon the government. I think we have a right to give our support to a measure because we believe that measure is going to be used in a manner in which we expect it to be used. Equally we have a right to withdraw our support when we see, after the experience of several years, that the measure has not been used as we anticipated it would be used.
We anticipated-and indeed we believed in 1951 that this was largely implied in the remarks in support of the bill from the government side of the house-that it would be used to protect the people of this country from the rising prices of foodstuffs and other commodities and particularly in relation to sky-rocketing rents which were then beginning to afflict the people of Canada and which have risen much more since that time. For those reasons we gave our support initially to this measure. Because our hopes

have not been fulfilled, we withdraw our support at this time. In other words our support was given because we believed that something was going to be done. When that something was not done I believe-without being in any way accused of trying to impose our minority will upon the majority of this parliament-we are equally bound to withdraw that support.
Having in view what the government has failed to do under this measure, I cannot anticipate any emergency arising as to which, under the various statutes that have already been mentioned this afternoon, the government would not have all the power necessary to deal with any situation that might arise. If a situation arose with which the government had not the power to deal, then the War Measures Act is there-if it is insurrection, civil strife, war or apprehended war- and parliament can always be called. The minister may say: "But what is going to happen if parliament is dissolved and we have two months without a parliament?"
I admit immediately to the minister that, on the surface, that would seem to create a difficulty; and I may tell him quite frankly that we have discussed this measure from that angle. But we believe that, under the statutes that have been enumerated this afternoon

and I am not going to put them on the record again-the government has the power to do all that is necessary. One statute that has not been mentioned is the sedition act under which the government can deal with acts of sedition quite adequately at any time. Then of course there is something which I know the government does not wish to rely on but which is there for an emergency. They have always the power inherent in the constitution to deal with matters that arise under peace, order and good government.
Consequently I do not think the government has made out a case for the continuance of this act under the conditions that we have today or that may be apprehended in the future. It seems to me the only thing which could happen in the future which would involve those powers, the greater powers, is war or apprehended war. I do not think we are likely to have insurrection or civil strife in this country. Indeed I sincerely hope not.
A great deal has been made of a secret order in council. I referred to it the other afternoon, and I said I had neither seen it nor read it. That is the truth. I was searching my memory to recall if I knew anything about this measure which I had forgotten, which was passed on July 4, 1951. My good friend the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles) returned
Emergency Powers Act yesterday, and he reminded me that in the autumn of 1951 he put a question on the order paper, and the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) approached me and asked if I would suggest to the hon. member that it would be in the public interest not to press that question. I suggested to the Prime Minister that he see my hon. friend at that time.
Well, I have no knowledge even now of what that order contains, yet I do know that it had to do with the matter of external security. I must leave it at that because that is the extent of my knowledge of the measure. I would like to say that because I may have left the impression the other afternoon that I had no knowledge such an order existed. My memory was not as good on Tuesday afternoon as it usually is, and I want to say that I did know in a general way something about the order in council.
I do not like the idea of secret orders in council under any circumstances. I admit there are occasions when the government must act with the knowledge that to give all the information to the press openly would defeat a desirable national objective. I admit that immediately.
Of course this is not the first time orders in council have been passed that were put secretly in the drawer. I would remind my hon. friends to my immediate right that on December 31 of either 1931 or 1932 I am speaking entirely from memory without having looked it up this afternoon-Right Hon. R. B. Bennett passed two orders in council one of which permitted the banks to publish balance sheets that were substantially false, in other words to value securities at a level that was not warranted by the situation that then existed, and the same thing was done for life insurance companies. Those two orders in council came to the attention of this House of Commons. I remember when the Right Hon. Mr. Ilsley, Mr. Justice Ilsley now, and the hon. member for Quebec South (Mr. Power) raised the matter a couple of years later and brought the situation to light.
I did not like that being done. The contention was made that that was done in the public interest, to prevent a panic and a run on one of the great banks-I am not going to name it-and to reassure people who had held policies particularly in one of the great insurance companies, and again I am not going to name it.
But ^whether or not these orders in council were justified is not what I am discussing. I am merely saying that I do not like the idea of secret orders in council, and the emergency powers bill now before us, approv-

Emergency Powers Act ing an extension of the act, would give the right to pass such orders in council, that is to say secret and confidential orders, and I do not like the idea of it.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Will the hon. member permit a question? I should like to ask him this. My recollection of what happened is perhaps not perfect. He referred to the returns as false returns. I wonder whether he would alter that. I think they were allowed to use arbitrary valuations.


Major James William Coldwell: I will change the word from "false" to "incorrect". I think that is the correct statement.


Stanley Howard Knowles: They were still secret orders in council.


Major James William Coldwell: Never mind the secret orders in council. The fact was that the balance sheets that the banks and insurance companies were authorized to publish valued *certain securities at incorrect and inflated figures, and if my use of "false" appears to be too strong, then I will ask the hon. gentleman to accept my statement that the balance sheets or the valuations were incorrect. I think I am justified in saying that.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: May I interject for a moment? I have a fair knowledge of what the hon. member is speaking about. I think the hon. member would be on surer ground if he said they were correct values on that date. The values were there, but they were not the market values of the securities, because the market values of those days were not the true values of the securities.


Major James William Coldwell: I have always understood that the market value a person could get for his security was the value of it on a given date, and I must leave it at that.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: What the hon. member is discussing is a very serious thing, and I can prove what took place.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: The hon. member must not make a speech.


Major James William Coldwell: I do not think we need to argue the point. My point was that these were secret orders in council, and indeed it may have been contended that they were in the public interest; but they were more substantially in the interests of the institutions that were protected from runs on them at that particular time. They had an element of hope for the future in them, if that will satisfy my hon. friend.


Julian Harcourt Ferguson: That is fine.	[DOT]


Major James William Coldwell: What I was also going to say was this. Parliament can always be called to deal with any matter that the 
statutes at the present time do not give the government the right to deal with in respect to powers that are granted under the war emergency measure; and because the powers we granted in 1951 have not been used as we hoped they would be used we feel that parliament is not justified in extending them now.
I was interested in the historical argument this afternoon between the Minister of Justice and the Leader of the Opposition. My impression of the reign of Charles I was that the main problem was not how money was spent but how money was raised. The right to levy taxes formed the principal point of contention between Charles I and his parliaments. However, that is by the way; but I always like to have history more or less correct when it is referred to, and I think that is really the historical position. I merely want to say, in conclusion, Mr. Speaker, that we are going to vote against the second reading of this measure if and when a vote is called.


Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, I intend to take-


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: If the Prime Minister speaks now will he close the debate?


Stanley Howard Knowles: No; he did not move the motion.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: It will be the Minister of Justice.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I would not ask to intervene at this moment, but it so happens that there are other requirements that will prevent me from being in the house this evening, and it may very well be that this debate will conclude before the end of the day.
I wish to take only a very few minutes. I find it fortunate that the debate today is quite objective, and that opinions are being expressed as to the desirability or otherwise of there being this continuation of the Emergency Powers Act. I suppose if we were on the other side of the house, and had been on the other side of the house in 1945 and since, we would have been repeatedly, in 1945 and since, predicting dire consequences for parliamentary institutions and for the Canadian constitution by the existence of such emergency powers. But I do not think anyone would contend seriously that our parliamentary institutions today are any weaker than they were before 1945, or that our constitution is not on as firm a base or not as fully respected now as it was in 1945.
It is, I think, a legitimate part of our parliamentary institutions that there t should be criticism of anything out of the ordinary that is proposed or recommended by the government, and it is wise that there should be

constant reminders in this national forum, from which reports go out that help to shape the opinions of people throughout the country, and constant warnings that we must never consent to abandon the democratic forms that have been won, through centuries, for the common people in our free democracies.
But we in the government have the responsibility of watching over the safety and security of the state. We hope we will have no more occasion to use emergency powers than we have had in the past, just as we hope we will have no occasion to use those forces being built up by ourselves and the 13 nations associated with us in the North Atlantic alliance. Nevertheless times are such that we do not dare do without the upbuilding of those forces. We do not dare do without the power and responsibility to do such things as might be required for the safety of the state.
Reference has been made to the words of the constitution-"act for the peace, order and good government of the country". Well, the government cannot do that. That is a general power given to the Canadian parliament. The government can act only if it has a delegation from parliament to do so. And this emergency power is a delegation by parliament to do that which might be necessary for the peace, order and good government of the country.
We hope there will be no occasion to use it. But we feel that, having the responsibility of watching over the security of the country in these troubled times, the power to act promptly and effectively should exist. No one can challenge the right and propriety of any hon. member at this time to say that in his opinion the situation is not sufficiently grave to warrant or to require this measure, whatever may have been his views in previous years. We have become a little bit inured to the existence of the cold war, and there are moments when we are inclined to regard the situation as fairly calm and stable. I think that was the frame of mind of the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) when, speaking in the house on February 20, he said:
We are asked to declare that it is expedient that emergency legislation of this kind should be reenacted. Not one argument has been placed before us to demonstrate why it is expedient. Not one illustration of any kind has been submitted to the members of this house to indicate why the government needs this emergency legislation, and could not deal with any situation that might arise by the ordinary processes of parliament.
Then three weeks later, on March 13, as reported at page 2952 of Hansard, he expressed this warning:
These are grave and serious hours. The news that comes to us from Europe today removes any
Emergency Powers Act suggestion that we are in a comfortable period where there are no great dangers in front of us. The events of yesterday and' today, the cold-blooded murder of British airmen and the interference with the flight of a civilian aircraft going into Berlin, indicate the extent of the danger which is there all the time.
And it is there all the time. We are becoming used to living under this threat. Nevertheless the threat is there; and we believe that, just as it is necessary to continue to recommend to parliament the appropriation of more than two billions of dollars to provide for our part of the strength that is being built up by ourselves and our associates, because of that threat, likewise we feel it is advisable to have the power which the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) implied might exist in the government to do those things required for peace, order and good government.
This cannot be done without a delegation of power; -and we think that the delegation of power does not destroy the power of parliament and does not diminish the power of parliament, but rather that it is an exercise of the power of parliament that the circumstances still justify and still make it prudent to have in existence.
Hon. members have said: Tell us the circumstances in which this power would be used. Well, if we could do that we would not need emergency powers. It is just because we cannot foresee what will happen and what may arise, or what may have to be dealt with, that the emergency power was granted in the first place and, in our view, continues to be a proper precaution to take under existing circumstances.
There have been references to a secret order. The Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew), the leader of the C.C.F. group (Mr. Coldwell) and I think the leader of the Social Credit group (Mr. Low) have said that they had not seen the order. That is quite true. We had to pass the order, and take the responsibility for passing it. But I mentioned what it was. I am not sure whether I spoke to the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar or whether, in his absence, I spoke to the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles). However, I did mention to one or other of them, as I mentioned to the Leader of the Opposition and to the leader of the Social Credit party, what the order dealt with, and what the order that was going to be tabled, showing that it had been exempted from publication, referred to.
I did not feel at that time, nor was it suggested to me by any of the three of them, that I should ask them to take the responsibility of considering the order. However, it is an

Emergency Powers Act order which is a part of what we are doing, in company with our associates, for the common defence of ourselves and of them. Without it, it would leave a gap in the concerted arrangements for their security as well as for ours. If any one, or all three, of the leaders of those parties would like to see the order, confidentially, I have no objection. As a matter of fact I would feel happier if they had seen it. But I did not think it was proper to put that burden upon them unless they suggested that they should share the responsibility which was ours.
That order has been in existence since July of 1951. It is enabling us to do what all the other governments and associates in this North Atlantic treaty alliance are doing. We have been doing it to our satisfaction and to their satisfaction. May I not ask if any hon. member in this house has had any indication from any source whatever that as a consequence of that order there has been any disturbance to the freedom or the conduct of our Canadian citizens? It is an order that was passed under the Emergency Powers Act. Because it was passed under the Emergency Powers Act it cannot have to do with censorship, it cannot have to do with the taking of property, and it cannot have to do with the detention of individuals.
The Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) says that the word "arrest" is qualified by the words "except as part of proceedings under section 3". When the act was introduced we did not think that the word "arrest" was required because arrest is nothing but detention that commences simultaneously with the arrest. However, that view was not accepted by some hon. members in the house who are most competent lawyers and who felt that the word "detention" was not enough to exclude arbitrary arrest. There was a provision worked out to exclude arbitrary arrest. The only arrest that can be made is as a part of court proceedings.
That being the situation I can only repeat to the Leader of the Opposition that I would be only too glad to show him this order, confidentially, because if it were not a secret and confidential order it would not be effective, it would not serve the purpose for which it was passed. I would be glad to show it to the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) if he felt that he wished to see it. Personally if I were not a member of the government I would prefer not to see it. All those who have anything to do with it would prefer that there be no occasion for having orders of that kind, but we do have to assume our responsibility.

The hon. gentleman referred to the events of 1946. I had something to do with the events of 1946, and I think I have as much concern about my own freedom, my own civil liberties and the civil liberties of my fellow citizens as the average citizen. I have never felt that any apology was required for the proceedings that were taken to break up the spy ring that was discovered at that time. Views may differ upon that. It may seem to some that the absolute inviolability of the rights of the individual should be preferred to the security and safety of the state, but I cannot agree. There do come times when it is necessary to do things that you regret to have to do but that seem to be required for the safety of the state.
Fortunately when I joined the government it was no longer necessary to order any further internments. I know that a very substantial portion of the burden that my predecessor as Minister of Justice carried from the outbreak of the war until his premature death arose out of the responsibility he had to take to apply the defence of Canada regulations and order the detention of persons upon suspicion.
That is something we are not brought up to do. That is something we shudder at having to consider. Nevertheless there was not much sabotage accompanying the outbreak of the war, and I think our security officials and the R.C.M.P. are doing a very effective job to suppress or prevent disastrous sabotage in the event of the outbreak of another war. All those who are parties to the North Atlantic alliance share with each other top secret information because of our confidence that there are measures being taken for the proper protection against or the anticipation of sabotage and espionage.
It is unfortunate to have to live in a world where that has to be done. It is unfortunate that we cannot feel that everybody in the world is going to behave in a manner befitting a Christian gentleman. But that is not the world we are living in. There are certain things that we are reluctantly forced to do if we attempt to discharge the responsibilities that happen to be ours.
Some have said to me, "Why do you not say that if the existence of this secret order is objected to we will repeal it?" As long as I have any responsibility as a member of a government I will not take that position. Whatever may be the criticism we have to bear, if what is required seems to be required to discharge an appropriate responsibility, I believe we should discharge it.
I remember that when the question of conscription arose, for several months I had to bear the onus of having done something that

most of the people in my province thought was wrong because I could not tell them why I had done it. In 1945, when the fighting had ceased, I was then in a position where I could use the information which had motivated my conduct and explain to them why I had acted as I did. The response was satisfactory and I felt that I was vindicated by the applause which greeted the explanation that I gave at that time. But for months my repute was not very high among the people of my race. If I had to do it again, I would do it again. I think one must do what he thinks is right. One must accept the consequences. One may make mistakes, but if he thinks that what he is required to do by his responsibility is right, he should do it without fear of the criticism that may be the outcome of such conduct.
I know that our people do not like secret orders in council. I do not, and I know that our people do not. I know that some of them will be worried about what may be in this secret order. If the Leader of the Opposition, the leader of the C.C.F. group and the leader of the Social Credit group were to say that they would look at it, it would mean some sharing of the responsibility and might be some reassurance to the public that what is there is not a threat to the things which we hold so precious. We have no right to ask anyone to share that responsibility.
That order has to continue in existence or we have to go to our associates and say we are not going to do our part to discharge the responsibility that has been assumed by the 14 countries of the North Atlantic treaty. That is not something any member in this house wants to have done.


George Alexander Drew: May I ask the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) a question? I followed with great interest his explanation with regard to this particular secret order in council; but our contention, of course, is that, whatever this secret order might have been, a similar one could be passed. However, in regard to what the Prime Minister has just said, I thought we had made our position clear. If not, I ask this question now. Would it not be possible to have an act which authorized the government to pass such measures as would be required to carry out their security or other definite requirements in relation to the mutual obligations of the North Atlantic treaty or other matters? I ask this question in relation to our repeated proposition that we would like to have a specific order defining certain authority without disclosing what that might be, instead of a general thing under which this is done. Obviously this legislation was not passed
Emergency Powers Act originally in contemplation of the enactment of that secret order.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: No, and that just illustrates my point. When this legislation was originally contemplated, I may say, we asked the law officers to make it just as restrictive as would be sufficient to meet unforeseen circumstances. They told us we would have to make it very sweeping or we could not be sure that it would suffice for anything we might have to do under it but which we were not able to forecast at that time. That is the reason for its sweeping terms.
I am not quarrelling with the law officers but they do use very sweeping language so they may not at any time be open to reproach because what they did was not broad enough to meet a situation which might develop. Not later than yesterday I was considering, with one of the isenior officials, whether we could not have something else that would not appear to be so sweeping. Well, so far we have not come to the conclusion that we can take the risk-and it does involve a risk-of something less extensive; because we are not in a position to foresee how and when and for what purpose the power may have to be used. It has been very little used in the past and I hope it will not have to be used at all, just as we all hope that these armed forces that are being built up by the North Atlantic nations will not have to be used at all. However, they exist, and without them we would not feel the security we do feel because of their effect upon world affairs.
I am not complaining of the criticism, of the warnings, of the appeals to the public to watch against the building up of any autocratic machine. Here we are appropriating over $2 billion a year just to ward off any possibility that we, or our successors, may have to be subject to any regime of that kind. But the warnings are frequently couched in words that remind one somewhat of the young shepherd's cry of "wolf!" when there was no wolf.
It is not advisable to exaggerate dangers. At the end of this year, or when we come back, whether we are on -this side or the gentlemen opposite are on this side, or if some gentleman sitting farther down from the Speaker's chair occupies my place, I do *not think any of those Canadians would misuse the powers that were given for the purpose of enabling them, if circumstances should require, to act promptly and effectively for our common safety.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Mr. Green:: Mr. Speaker, may I ask the Prime Minister a question? If the government insists that this measure must be
3320	HOUSE OF
Emergency Powers Act continued as set out in the bill before the house, why should it not be for only one year?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: It is only for one year.


Howard Charles Green: No. The provision is that it may be extended for a further year simply by an address to both houses, which means that there can be no questioning but merely set speeches in one debate.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I am sure there would be no objection, if that were satisfactory to the house. What we feel is that the legislation should be in existence; but there are sufficiently frequent sessions of parliament to renew it from year to year as long as it may have to be in existence. If it were more satisfactory to have it only for one year, without any statement about how it can be further continued, there would be no objection. That is a matter of form and procedure that can be dealt with. But I understand that the real objection is to its existence at all beyond May 31, 1953.


Howard Charles Green: That is right.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: That is the real objection. We have given, perhaps, not reasons but just fears; and there have been newspapers which have said that this is just the result of fear. It is. It is just the result of fear that makes us recommend these huge appropriations for our defence services. Perhaps we are too fearful, but most of us prefer to continue even though the inspiration may be fear of what might happen, though that is coupled with the hope that it will not happen.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Chairman, in the debate on second reading the point was made by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra that this bill departs from the form of extension contemplated for the present year. When the bill was first enacted in 1951 it provided for extension after the end of one year by addresses of both houses of parliament. Last year the bill was extended for one year by that method. On various occasions during the debate on the resolution stage and on second reading, something has been made-or an attempt has been made to do so-by the Minister of Justice of the fact that more was not done in 1952 in the way of opposition to the bill. One reason was that there was only one opportunity. The address simply provided one opportunity for debate; and when that passed rather unexpectedly or suddenly, the opportunity was gone for the entire session.
The house has now approved-in my opinion erroneously-the idea of an extension for one year. With respect, Mr. Chairman, I urge that if this section is to be approved in the committee in any form at all, it should not be approved in a form that contemplates still further extensions of the extraordinary powers conferred by this bill upon the governor in council.
This section does two things. In its present form it does extend the life of these powers for another year, until May 31, 1954. That was the effect of the resolution which the house approved and which paved the way for the introduction of this bill. But this section does not stop there. It goes further and provides for a still further extension-and lays down a method by which it can be achieved-beyond May 31, 1954. At the various stages when this measure has been under debate already this session we were told in the most soothing terms that the government had no thought whatever of extending these powers beyond a year. Now when we see the bill, Mr. Chairman, and in this committee have an opportunity of examining it in detail, we find that the government's intentions with respect to the extension of these powers are not nearly so innocent as the house was led to suppose by the statements made on behalf of the government.
The extension is there, of course, to May 31, 1954. But the government are preparing for further extensions, and they are preparing to make them in the most simple and expeditious manner possible, and one that will admit of the barest minimum of debate in the House of Commons. We of the official opposition are just as strongly opposed to the extension of these powers for one day as
Emergency Powers Act we have been at any time. We are absolutely opposed to it.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The committee resumed at eight o'clock.
Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Chairman, just prior to the dinner recess I was drawing attention to the fact that the bill, as we examine the provisions of section 1, goes further than the terms of the resolution. That resolution which was approved by the house, and which was the forerunner of the present Bill No. 279, simply proposed the extension of this act for the period of one year to May 31, 1954. Now we find on examining clause 1 that the bill does more than that. It not only extends the effective operation of this bill to May 31, 1954 but it goes on to contemplate and provide for further extension beyond that date.
We have been told from time to time in this debate, Mr. Chairman, that the government were simply proposing the one-year extension and were not asking this house to commit itself in any particular beyond that date. If that be the case, Mr. Chairman, then there is in my submission no justification for making provision in this bill for further extension at all; and there is no reason, in my submission, why this additional provision should be allowed to remain in the bill.
We had experience last year of the continuance of this measure, with the extraordinary and virtually absolute powers which it confers upon the government, when we had opportunity of considering it on only one occasion. That is the fundamental flaw, it seems to me, in a provision of the kind we have here, that the bill may be extended simply upon addresses passed by both houses. That means there is only one stage of debate, only one opportunity. It is a sudden death matter as far as that one stage is concerned, and if I may be permitted once more to refer to a certain occasion that has already been referred to several times, I will assure the Minister of Justice that if it had not been such a sudden death matter last year he would have had his full opportunity of seeing divisions, and more than one of them.
This year this matter has come before the house in what I think is in procedure the proper way, namely a resolution followed by the introduction of a bill which is open to debate at several stages. Therefore I propose that section 1 of the bill should be amended; that the new clause 4 should have all the words including and following the word "except" stricken out so the section
3322	HOUSE OF
Emergency Powers Act cannot then be -made the excuse for going beyond the one-year extension.
In making that observation, Mr. Chairman, I hope no one will think that we on this side of the house are receding one iota from the position we have stoutly taken throughout this debate, that there should not be any extension at all now; that this measure is completely unjustifiable as an extension of those vast powers under present conditions. But so far as the point I am now dealing with is concerned, this rider that has been tacked on to the one-year extension should, in my opinion, 'be stricken out.
I will so move, Mr. Chairman, or if the government wishes to have someone over there move that Bill No. 279 be amended by striking out all the words in clause 1 thereof after the words "one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four" I shall be content. That would leave the clause confined simply to this extension to May 31, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I have listened with a
great deal of interest to my -hon. friend's remarks, and I think he will agree that all this present bill does is to extend the act for one year more. It is true that provision is made for a method of further extension, but there is no further extension at this time. In order that there should be no doubt as to our bona fides in this matter we are quite prepared to accept the amendment which my hon. friend has suggested; and if my colleague the Minister of Public Works would so move we might have both clauses 1 and 2 of the bill amended accordingly, which would mean that section 4 of the Emergency Powers Act would read:
Sections one to three of this act expire on the thirty-first day of May, one thousand nine hundred and fifty-four.
The remainder of the wording would be stricken out. Then in part II clause 2 would read:
Sections 1 to 3 expire on the 31st day of May, 1954.
The remainder of the section would be stricken out.


Stanley Howard Knowles: On that point, since the Minister of Justice has just drawn attention to the fact that in clause 2 the reference to sections 1 to 3 and the 31st day of May, 1954 are in numerals rather than in words, I should like him to explain why it is in numerals in one place and in words in the other.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: The hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre will recall that at one time we had quite a lengthy colloquy with regard to the method by which the Revised Statutes of Canada are being drafted. The necessity for having part II in this bill arises from the 

fact that we have to amend the Revised Statutes of Canada at the same time that we amend the statute,, and that in the Revised Statutes of Canada we are adopting the very sensible procedure of using numerals instead of spelling out the numbers in words.


Alphonse Fournier: I move accordingly, Mr. Chairman.


Louis-René Beaudoin: Are these amendments agreed to?


[Stage Direction]
Amendments agreed to.
Sections 1 and 2, as amended, agreed to.
Section 3 agreed to.
Title agreed to.
Louis-René Beaudoin: Shall I report the bill?


Stanley Howard Knowles: On division.
Bill reported on division.


Louis-René Beaudoin: When shall the bill be read the third time? By leave, now.


Stanley Howard Knowles: By leave.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: that the bill be read a third time.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Speaker, very briefly on this motion for third reading I wish to set forth, not by way of restatement but rather of re-emphasis, the reasons for our opposition to this measure. The matter has been debated at all stages, and I have no wish to repeat the very sound and -numerous arguments advanced from this side of the house against the measure.
Nothing the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) said this afternoon removed any of the objections to the bill. Undoubtedly he was at his soothing best in his speech this afternoon. Unlike the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson), in the -contributions he made to the debate at various stages, the Prime Minister appeared to be seeking to avoid being provocative. I believe he did his best to make the house feel that this was not a very serious matter, and that hon. members should be content to put their full trust in the government.
We are not prepared to legislate on trust after that fashion. In the first place we say there exists today no such emergency as justifies either the invoking of the powers set out in the War Measures Act or the extension of the very wide and virtually absolute powers conferred by this bill upon the governor in council.
This afternoon the Minister of Justice was at pains, in a repetition of an attempt put forward frequently, and always in futility, to make it appear that, after all, the measure is not so very sweeping. Well, I simply leave

it to hon. members to compare this measure with the War Measures Act, and they will see that, with the exception of arrest, detention, deportation and censorship, there is no difference in the measures. The powers, with those exceptions, conferred by this bill upon the governor in council are just as sweeping and just as absolute as the virtually unlimited powers conferred upon the governor in council by the War Measures Act, and which were exercised by the government during the second world war.
We say to this parliament that nothing in the present situation could possibly justify such an abdication by this sovereign parliament of its powers in favour of a group of people we call the government. We say the whole approach to this matter has been unparliamentary. The Prime Minister this afternoon, again in soothing terms, asked us to believe that, after all, the government was preserving, as he said, the forms of parliament; and he said no one would suggest at all that our parliamentary institutions in Canada are in danger, or that there is any danger to the constitution.
Well, it is unfortunate that the Prime Minister was not following the course of the debate more closely, because that is precisely what we in the opposition have been saying about the measure; that it is of a kind that strikes at the very foundation of our whole parliamentary system. We say this measure is of a kind that strikes at the foundations of the constitution of this country, because if you accept the fact that an emergency exists, then under the Nolan decision by the privy council a year ago it follows that all parliament needs to do is to say that a national emergency exists, and then it remains for parliament to take over virtually all powers, regardless of whether they are of the provinces or of the dominion. Then, with a measure like this, those powers virtually flow to the governor in council.
So if we give legislative sanction to this bill in its present form we are saying for another year that this government may enjoy virtually untrammelled powers, powers that cannot be challenged in the courts, powers that will be beyond challenge by parliament- certainly beyond challenge by parliament until it meets in 1954-and beyond challenge by the provinces, regardless of the extent to which the government, in the exercise of these powers, may trespass upon the constitutional rights and prerogatives of the provinces.
All those things are possible under the bill. It is not enough to have a statement by the Prime Minister saying, "Oh, these things are not likely to happen unless circumstances arise which we cannot adequately foresee and cannot sufficiently define now". Well,
Emergency Powers Act we need not worry about the coming of some supreme emergency, because that situation could be taken care of in the same way the situation was met in September, 1939. We therefore need not have any fear about that supreme peril arising while parliament is not in session. We say again, and say with all possible emphasis, that we do not believe in vesting these powers in the government, at the expense of the powers of parliament and at the expense of the powers of the provinces under the constitution.
We do not believe powers should be given to the government to legislate by order in council, even while parliament is in session. That is what it has been doing from the time of the enactment of this measure two years ago. It mattered not whether parliament was in session; the government went ahead and legislated by order in council.
The essence of the parliamentary system is surely this, that the elected representatives of the people make laws that are to be binding upon the people, and make them in public so the public may see how those laws are made and may criticize them. It is surely the very antithesis of the parliamentary method that laws should be made in secret and, in cases such as the one referred to, and admitted this afternoon by the Prime Minister, have these secret laws binding upon the people of this country, who are expected to know the laws. Yet even the House of Commons does not know what that law is, a law that is just as binding upon us and upon all the people of Canada as any measure enacted in parliament in the proper constitutional and parliamentary manner.
The Prime Minister this afternoon asked us to believe that this was necessary. He pointed to NATO, as though that were some precedent that should lead this parliament into the vesting of these untrammelled powers in the government. That is no precedent for this measure of parliamentary suicide.
On the contrary, whatever is necessary to be done in that respect can be done by parliament. The day is long past when it can be said that the summoning of parliament is a slow process. When a national emergency arose in connection with the railway strike two years ago it was found possible, even when there was not a train running in this country, to bring parliament together within 48 hours. So it cannot be said any longer in Canada that there need be delay in summoning parliament, if it is necessary .that laws be enacted to meet any situation.


Mr. Boisvert:: It does not take long to sabotage the railways.


Donald Methuen Fleming: The hon. member for Nicolet-Yamaska (Mr. Boisvert) has touched upon
3324	HOUSE OF
Emergency Powers Act another question. That point was dealt with specifically by the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew) this afternoon. We all want steps taken to deal with the possibility of sabotage. We should not wait until sabotage has happened before we take measures to deal with it. Those measures must be taken in advance. But the point is that if legislation is required in that respect, let parliament be asked to make specific provision for it. Surely we are not to be told that we must turn the whole constitution upside down and put confederation in jeopardy just to clothe the appropriate authorities in this country with the power to anticipate and prevent sabotage. The hon. member for Nicolet-Yamaska (Mr. Boisvert) is not going to contend that that is necessary, that the whole constitution should be turned upside down in order to meet that situation.


Maurice Boisvert: Is the constitution turned upside down?


Donald Methuen Fleming: I am saying to my friend that this measure puts it within the power of the government to subvert the whole constitution.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, no.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, yes.


Donald Methuen Fleming: I say that is the effect of this measure. I am saying to my hon. friend that whatever steps are required to be taken to deal with or to anticipate the possibility of sabotage and to prevent it do not require a measure of this kind. A measure adequate to deal with that subject could be passed in the ordinary course, just as we are passing legislation all the time, without vesting these untrammelled powers in the government.
As the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Maclnnis) says, you cannot prevent sabotage simply by legislation. Surely what is required is action on the part of the authorities; and if there is any power required by the authorities to deal adequately with the possibility of sabotage and to prevent it, then certainly the government will have the utmost co-operation from every part of this house in passing the necessary legislation with that end in view. No one need have any doubt about that.
We will not be misled by pleas that measures of this kind are necessary. They are not necessary. If the supreme emergency arises we are equipped with the provisions of the War Measures Act to deal with it. As has been pointed out, there are ample powers vested in this government under other measures to meet everything that may arise in the period before this parliament may be called upon to meet again.
' 

The Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) talked about necessity, and in effect asked this parliament to assume that it is necessary that a measure of this kind be taken to safeguard the national safety. It will take a much stronger case than the Prime Minister put forward today to justify the plea that the safety of Canada is in such peril and jeopardy today that this parliament should be called upon virtually to abdicate in favour of the government, and to put it within the power of the government to subvert the constitution.
A great statesman, Pitt, recalling that necessity has been made the plea for every infringement of human liberty, said, "Necessity is the argument of tyrants, it is the creed of slaves". It is going to take more than the kind of speech we heard this afternoon, the soothing speech of the Prime Minister, to justify this parliament enacting a measure of this kind.
We are the custodians of the parliamentary processes, of the parliamentary institutions of Canada. What justifies this parliament in putting it within the power of a group of men in the cabinet to subvert, if they choose to do so, the whole parliamentary system and the constitution of this country? It may very well be that they are all prepared to stand up here and tell us they do not intend to do it, but that is not the basis upon which any parliament should proceed to enact far-reaching legislation of this kind. It is not what they are likely to do, it is a question of whether in principle we as a parliament can justify this abdication of power. I say we cannot.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Mr. Speaker, when the debate on this measure commenced away back on February 6 the hon. member for Vancouver East (Mr. Maclnnis), speaking for this group, made it clear that we were prepared to listen and give consideration to whatever case the government was able to make for the continuation of emergency powers. I think it is fair to say that during the weeks that have elapsed since February 6 we have given serious consideration to the attempts that have been put forth by the Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson), the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) and others to persuade parliament that this legislation should be enacted. But I must say that we in this group are not convinced.
I suggest that perhaps there is considerable significance in our opposition to this measure in view of what has been pointed out on a number of occasions, namely that we have

supported this sort of legislation in previous years. But as we considered the failure of the government to use this legislation to meet the needs of the people of the country, and as we considered the way in which they have used it simply as a convenience, we feel it is time that parliament should rethink its position with respect to this matter and should discontinue the granting of emergency powers.
In our view no case has been made out for the necessity of this legislation. In fact it seems to us that the government simply finds it convenient to have this kind of legislation on the books, and it has been used only as a convenience. Having had it for so long they cannot imagine themselves without it.
This afternoon the Prime Minister made a fairly interesting speech. One thing he said was that in his view it was the right of the opposition to level legitimate criticism at anything that was out of the ordinary. To me that was a most revealing comment. In using those words the Prime Minister made it clear that in his view this request is not out of the ordinary. That is precisely what is wrong with it. This government is asking for these emergency powers for its own convenience, and the tragedy of the situation is that this legislation has become not extraordinary but ordinary in so far as this government is concerned.
The Prime Minister said something else this afternoon of which I took particular note. He said that if the situation had been reversed over the last number of years and the Liberals had been sitting on the opposition side of the House of Commons they would have fought legislation of this kind. Truer words were never spoken. Just imagine for a moment members like the hon. member for Spadina (Mr. Croll), the hon. member for Charlotte (Mr. Stuart), the hon. member for Skeena (Mr. Applewhaite), the hon. member for Marquette (Mr. Garson), as the Minister of Justice would be in that case, and the hon. member for Quebec East (Mr. St. Laurent), as the Prime Minister would be in that case, sitting on this side of the house and some other government asking-


Mr. Slick:: Don't leave out the rest of us.


Stanley Howard Knowles: There are quite a number who would take the same position. There would be the hon. member for Trinity-Conception (Mr. Stick), the hon. member for Quebec South (Mr. Power) and others who would be railing for all they were worth against any government that would ask parliament to give them the kind of blank cheque that is involved in this legislation. I suggest that 68108-211
Emergency Powers Act it is a very sorry picture when the Liberals, of all people, have become so used to asking for wide powers of this kind that even when they realize that if they were on the other side they would oppose them, they go on asking for them year after year.
The Prime Minister, after he had admitted that the Liberals in opposition would oppose legislation of this kind, in the very soothing manner he adopted this afternoon said this to us: But can anyone say that parliament is any weaker because we have had this kind of legislation enacted several times in the years since the end of the war? The Prime Minister asked that question in a tone of voice that seemed to imply that he could not imagine anyone saying yes. But I rise, Mr. Speaker, to say that parliament is weaker because it has become so accustomed to passing this kind of legislation. The very fact that it can be passed without any criticism or objection from any Liberal member of the house suggests that parliament has become accustomed to providing the government with this convenience, this easy way of dealing with problems which they find it awkward to bring before parliament in the usual way.
To the extent that parliament has become accustomed to granting powers of this kind to the executive, I suggest that this institution has in fact become weaker; and that the time has come when parliament should rethink this whole question and should call a halt to the granting to the executive of these powers to take steps of this kind without coming to parliament.
This question has been debated at length, and all the issues have been rehashed over and over again. It is not my purpose to continue further at this time, but I do once again express the view that the time has come for parliament to reassert its position, to reassert its strength in this matter, and that in fact we should defeat this measure at this time.



CROWN LIABILITY


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed, from Wednesday, March 25, consideration in committee of Bill No. 105, respecting the liability of the crown for torts and civil salvage-Mr. Garson-Mr. Beaudoin in the chair.
On section 3-Liability in tort.
Donald Methuen Fleming: In section 3 we find the central section of this bill. I am sure there are many in this house who welcome the opportunity of legislating in the terms of this section, for many on this side of the house have been urging for years that the immunity enjoyed by the crown in respect of torts committed by the crown or its servants does not coincide with the facts of this day. We have moved in this parliament by slow stages to the moment we have now reached.
The exchequer court was established in 1875 and the Petition of Right Act was passed in 1876, but still the immunity of the crown continued. Section 19 of the Exchequer Court Act in 1887 opened the way for actions against the crown in certain limited cases of negligence. By degrees that provision was widened but was still confined to claims arising out of the negligence of servants of the crown.
Then in 1945 I recall a debate in this house, Mr. Chairman, when it seemed that the present Prime Minister had closed the door on any hope of removing what is, under present conditions, surely an anachronism in the medieval conception of the immunity of the crown from processual coercion and what Maitland has called "the grandest of the sovereign's immunities". This position certainly does not reflect the mind of the people in this day when there has been a change in the public attitude toward the royal prerogative and the royal immunity from process, a change in circumstances reflected in the extent to which the crown is engaged in business of all kinds and crown corporations are functioning alongside privately-owned corporations, and also reflected in the great increase in civil wrongs that the increasing number of employees of the crown have committed.
In 1945 I said that the present Prime Minister seemed to have dashed all hopes that this anachronism of the law might be removed. On December 13, 1945 during the consideration of the estimates of the Department of Justice, as recorded on page 3467 of Hansard for that date, I had the temerity

to ask the then minister of justice this question:
When may we look for some action in the direction of elimination of petitions of right in actions against the crown?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: Not while I am Minister of Justice.
Then further down, in reply to a further question upon the same point, he said this:
What would be involved in abandoning that position would be an acceptance of the jurisdiction of the provincial courts in claims against the crown.
Now, at long last, we have in this bill the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the provincial courts, up to a point, in claims against the crown.
Then in 1947 a major forward step was taken in the parliament of the United Kingdom with the enactment of the crown proceedings act, and the way was thereby opened for actions to be brought against the crown in the United Kingdom, without flat, in respect of all torts committed by servants of the crown.
In this parliament in 1950 an important step was taken when, in the amendment to the Petition of Right Act, the requirement of petition of right was dispensed with. But it still left the crown with immunity against any possibility of action being brought in respect of torts committed by servants of the crown in any case except one of negligence under the provisions of section 19 of the Exchequer Court Act. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in this step that is taken in this present bill, we may see the culmination of a good deal of effort, the fruit of many pleas put forward by hon. members of the House of Commons that this old anachronism should be swept aside and the way should be opened to bring action against the crown in the courts in respect of torts committed by servants of the crown.
I think the Minister of Justice was quite right in referring to this as a far-reaching bill. There are some aspects of it which will call for comment, Mr. Chairman; but unquestionably the attitude of this committee will be to welcome this measure and to say that we are glad to see it. We should like to have seen it before, but we welcome it now.
May I now come specifically to one or two points in connection with section 3 of the bill.


Louis-René Beaudoin: In order to facilitate orderly discussion, may I suggest that we take the subparagraphs seriatim. For instance, the first will be section 3 (1) (a).


Donald Methuen Fleming: Mr. Chairman, by section 3 (1) (a), and perhaps by others as well, the question is raised generally as to the legal 68108-2UJ
Crown Liability
test of torts. In section 3 (1) (a) we have the provision that the crown is to be hereafter liable in tort for the damages for which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would be liable in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the crown.
Legislative jurisdiction in respect of torts in Canada is vested in the legislatures of the provinces. In this respect I take it to be the intention of the government to submit itself to the law of the province. Indeed I do not think the measure would be very meaningful if that were not the full intention of the bill. But it occurs to me that we should have in this bill more explicit provision with respect to this matter; for when parliament legislates for the purpose of making the crown liable in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the crown, parliament might in effect be legislating in ten different ways in ten different provinces. It happens that the laws of most of the common-law provinces of this country, in the field of tort, are quite closely parallel. They are not identical in all respects. But so far as the common law with respect to torts is involved here, it is reasonably uniform in the nine common-law provinces. But no one will say that the law in relation to delicts in the province of Quebec is the same as the common law in relation to torts.


Mr. Lesage:: It is very close.


Donald Methuen Fleming: It is very close indeed, but it is not precisely the same. I think in a provision of this kind some plainer words are required to make it quite clear that we are to submit the crown in the right of the dominion to the law of the province in each case. We are simply enacting a general provision here that the crown is to be liable as it would be if it were a private person in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the crown.
Let us carry this matter a step further and consider the extent to which the problem could be complicated by provincial statutes in relation to torts. For instance, let us take the case of negligence. We have the negligence act in the province of Ontario-which about 23 years ago introduced important changes in the law of negligence in relation to contribution between joint tort-feasors and in respect to the old doctrine of ultimate negligence and contributory negligence. Now when we are legislating in terms like these, making the crown in the right of the dominion liable for torts just as is a private person, are we to understand that we are in any province submitting the crown in the right of the dominion to provincial statute law in respect of torts?

Crown Liability
That is something which I think is of great importance. For instance, with regard to the law of defamation, are we making the crown in the right of the dominion subject to the provisions of the libel and slander act. There are many other statutes in relation to the whole field of torts that one could enumerate.
It is a much simpler matter for a provincial legislature to enact legislation of this kind. For instance, in the province of Ontario the legislature passed similar legislation in 1952 under the title of "An act respecting proceedings against the crown." Like the bill now before us, it owed its inspiration largely to the legislation in the United Kingdom in 1947. But there is no problem of this kind in the way of a provincial legislature passing laws to make the crown in the right of the province liable for torts of servants of the crown, because you have no problem of two legislative bodies making laws in the same field there; you have no problem of territorial overlapping. It is simply a case of the provincial legislature passing laws in a field in which it has exclusive jurisdiction.
In this dominion field we are in a quite different situation, and it seems to me that what is required here to carry out the intent of the legislation, as I understand that intent, would be a further provision or an amplification of the present provision to make it quite clear that when we legislate to make the crown liable for torts of servants of the crown, we are doing so with respect to each province and making the crown liable for a tort according to the law of the province where the tort was committed.
I am sure this matter must have been considered by the law officers of the crown; but it seems to me, with all due respect to them, that we want some more explicit provision than we have here. I can well foresee that, under a provision of this kind, there will be a good deal of litigation arising, perhaps calling for interpretation in the highest court of the land, as to the extent to which parliament, by a general enactment of this kind, intended to submit the crown in the right of the dominion to legislative enactments of the legislatures of the provinces.
Before I pass on and deal with another point, perhaps the Minister of Justice would like to deal with that question.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Chairman, I am sure I agree with my hon. friend as to the difficulty which is posed in a federal state like Canada in passing a federal law of the character of the one which is now before us. It is more difficult here, for example, than it was in Great Britain which is a unitary state.

It is much more difficult here than it is in the province of Ontario where the provincial legislature, which has jurisdiction to pass the law making the provincial crown liable, has jurisdiction also over property and civil rights, and the one jurisdiction meshes with the other satisfactorily.
In applying ourselves to that problem here we were convinced that we had no authority to attempt to foist upon the provinces a separate federal code of laws with regard to the torts applicable in those cases in which the federal crown was the defendant in the provincial courts or in the exchequer court. Nor could we hope to have the laws of any one province adopted and applied in all the other provinces under this act. The problem really is by apt words to make the crown liable in each province as if it were a private person of full age and capacity.
My hon. friend should not jump to the conclusion that because the draftsman has achieved this in a few words these words are necessarily inadequate, because good draftsmanship at times can be both succinct and accurate, and this is one of the occasions on which I think that is true. Section 3 reads in this way:
The crown-
That is the federal crown, the crown in the interpretation section is defined in this way:
"Crown" means Her Majesty in right of Canada.
In effect, then, clause 3, subclause (1) reads:
Her Majesty in right of Canada is liable in tort for the damages for which, if she were a private person of full age and capacity, she would be liable first in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the crown.
And so on. My hon. friend is a lawyer of some eminence himself. If he -can suggest any -other wording that would be more apt here I am sure we would be glad to give it consideration; but I think if he will reflect upon the matter he will find that this wording is suitably -applicable in every province in which a claim may arise. The purpose of this legislation is to create a liability upon the part of the -crown which -did not formerly exist. We have created that by saying that the crown shall be liable in Canada as if it were a (private person of full age and capacity. To me that means that in any -province, whether it be Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba- or British Columbia-, the plaintiff who is seeking a remedy against the crown can treat the crown in that province -as if it were a private person of full age and capacity, and proceed to enter suit -against the crown; and on the strength of this legislation which states that the crown is liable.

Although we have no power here over property and civil rights, I do not think it would be disputed that we do have the power in respect to liability upon the federal crown in the manner which we have done in this legislation. And with great respect to the rather important point which my hon. friend has brought up, I think it is very fully covered in the wording which is now before him.


Donald Methuen Fleming: With respect to the view expressed by the minister and the law officers of the crown, who I am sure have advised the minister on this matter, it seems to me that something further is required to make it quite clear that the crown in the right of the dominion, or as it is put here, Her Majesty in right of Canada, is submitting herself to the laws of the provinces. Now you simply have a provision that the crown is liable in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the crown. We have to refer to the provincial law to determine what a tort is.
When you legislate, when you consider what a tort is, Mr. Chairman, are you in a common-law province simply considering the common law, or how do you determine what a tort is, having regard to these expressions used in this section, in the light of the substantial body of statute law in reference to torts that has been enacted in each of the provinces and which is not completely uniform? There is a substantial measure of uniformity in the common-law provinces, but we have not uniform legislation in all the provinces with respect to torts. Would it not meet the point, and is it not necessary that we should clearly stipulate here that we are submitting Her Majesty in right of Canada to the law of the respective provinces in this regard because otherwise there is going to be litigation to determine what we mean by a tort. You have to refer to the provincial law for that.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Let us take a concrete case. Suppose John Doe in the province of Ontario has a tort committed against him by a servant of the federal crown in that province. Relying upon this section 3, he brings an action against the federal crown either in the exchequer court or perhaps in one of the district courts or county courts in Ontario.


Donald Methuen Fleming: County courts.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: In that action surely it would not be difficult on the part of the judge who is hearing the case to read this clear language and come to the conclusion that the crown is, as it states, liable in tort for the damages for which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would foe liable in respect of the tort committed by a servant of the crown. All that the judge has to ask himself is whether if this tort that is in question in
Crown Liability
this action had been committed by the servant of a private person of full age and capacity, would that private person be liable. That is a simple question. And if the private person would be liable in that province according to the law, either common law or statute law, then the requirement of the section is applicable and the plaintiff has his case against the federal crown. We can put this provision in five or ten times as many words, but I do not think it would foe any clearer than it is now. Indeed, I think it would be much 'less clear and not any more accurate.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Perhaps there is no point in prolonging the discussion. I do not think the interpretation of this section is nearly as clear as the Minister of Justice thinks. I think there may be some very real questions raised in some of the courts with respect to the meaning of this clause.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: May I ask my hon. friend this question. What argument would he bring up as a lawyer involved in the case to the effect that the section was not applicable and the crown was not liable? What would be the basis of his argument?


Donald Methuen Fleming: It would run to this effect, if I were arguing against liability-that would be the way in which the point would arise.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: That is right.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Parliament had not submitted the crown in the right of the dominion or, as it is put in the bill, Her Majesty in the right of Canada, to the full scope of the provincial law unless it were spelled out in plain words in this legislation. When we talk about torts are you going beyond the common law, for instance, in one of the common-law provinces in relation to torts, or are you submitting Her Majesty in right of Canada to provincial legislation with reference to torts? Because provincial legislation has sometimes destroyed common law torts. It has oftentimes varied them drastically and in other instances has expanded and created offences which did not exist under the common law.
If I were trying to prepare an argument against liability in such a case, I think I would urge that the prerogative of the crown is not limited in any legislative enactment except in plain terms, and that when parliament enacted legislation in the terms of this bill it did not go so far as to submit the crown to provincial legislation. I think quite an argument could be made, with the exercise of a little thought and a little ingenuity in trimming down what I understand to be the intent of this measure.

Crown Liability
I take it we are on common ground as to what we hope to achieve in the bill. We hope to achieve unlimited liability in respect of torts in so far as the crown is concerned. There are limitations in some respects later on in the bill, but so far as its general enactment is concerned my understanding is that it is intended that there should be no limitation whatever upon the liability of the crown in respect of torts committed by servants of the crown.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Perhaps the liability could be stated with somewhat greater precision than the hon. member has just stated it. There is a limitation. That limitation is the one imposed by the provincial laws. But the intention is to make the federal crown liable to the full extent to which a person in a private capacity would be liable under the provincial law.
My hon. friend says an argument of that sort could be made. He has just finished making it, in fact. But if he does not mind my saying so, I think it is a somewhat specious argument. I do not think it would get very far if challenged. The language is clear when it states that the crown is liable in tort for the damages for which, if it were a private person of full age and capacity, it would he liable (a) in respect of a tort committed by a servant of the crown.
I suggest to my hon. friend that a tort in any province is what the law of that province says is a tort. And what might be a tort in one province might not necessarily be a tort according to the law of another province. But in a given case in a court in the province in which the tort has been committed and action is being held, I do not think any judge would have difficulty in deciding what "tort" means there.
In proof of the reasonableness of that argument-because I admit I cannot prove it is right, due to the fact that it has never been tested; nor can my hon. friend prove that his argument is right because, as I say, there has been no decision made on this legislation -we have in the Exchequer Court Act and have had for many years section 19, which defines a claim against the crown as follows:
The exchequer court shall also have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine the following matters: . . .
(c) Every claim against the crown arising out of any death or injury to the person or to property resulting from the negligence of any officer or servant of the crown while acting within the scope of his duties or employment upon any public work.
There is no reference to any provincial law at all. This section is applied from province to province. I have heard of no difficulty experienced in that regard in the exchequer

court. We think, on the basis of the experience of the Exchequer Court Act, that we do not have to worry much about the wording which has been adopted in the crown liability act.


Donald Methuen Fleming: I should like to raise a further point, relating to liability in respect of torts committed by members of the armed forces of the crown, or what would otherwise be torts if they were committed by civil servants of the crown.
It seems to me this bill is lacking in that it does not make some provision with respect to that subject. I have not heard put forward any explanation as to why the bill does not deal plainly with it. There are detailed provisions in the United Kingdom act, the crown proceedings act of 1947, in relation to this subject. Section 10 of the United Kingdom act has extensive provisions in relation to injuries suffered by persons as the result of wrongs for which members of the armed forces, while on duty, have been responsible.
We are not dealing with the converse case. The converse case is dealt with in section 4 of the bill, where some wrong is suffered by a person such as a member of the armed forces, who then has the right to pension. I am not dealing with that case but rather with a wrong or damage suffered by some person which, if it had been committed by a private individual, would be considered a tort. In this instance it is committed by a member of the armed forces.
On previous occasions when this subject has been under discussion I have drawn attention to some of the orders in council passed during the war dealing with this matter. I do not need to review them in detail. There were wartime orders in council, and there were orders in council passed under the War Measures Act subsequent to the cessation of hostilities.
For instance, I have before me a certified copy of order in council PC 43/1880, passed on May 14, 1947. And I have another one, PC 254^/2727, passed on May 28, 1949. I had some experience in this connection several years ago as the result of being consulted by a citizen who had sustained substantial damage in consequence of acts on the part of members of the armed forces which, if they had been committed by private persons, would have been definitely tortious.
This was the case of a man holding a fishing licence in lake Ontario. He had his nets out, suspended by floats; and although this area was not within the range of the ships on which naval ratings were then being trained, nevertheless they did engage in gunnery practice over his licensed area, with

the result that not only was his fishing take for that year destroyed but there was also substantial damage to his nets. As a matter of fact his nets were rendered virtually useless. The concussion shattered the floats supporting the nets and, as a result, he sustained substantial damage. I recall taking the case up with the Minister of National Defence, and putting very strong evidence before him. I had a substantial number of affidavits from eyewitnesses. The attitude taken was: There is no liability here. The result was that there was no remedy open to that man, none whatever.
Whatever justification there may be in time of war for absolving the crown from any responsibility for damage inflicted by members of the armed forces under circumstances which, if the act were committed by a private individual, would be tortious and actionable, I submit most strongly that in time of peace when such acts are committed by members of the armed forces a right of action against the crown should result in favour of any citizen whose rights are thereby affected.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: What was the nature of the tort committed against my hon. friend's client? Would it be the tort of trespass or the tort of negligence?


Donald Methuen Fleming: I would not wish to define it too closely. There was an act of trespass, and negligence may be involved. However, I do not think in a case like that one need be confined by definition in the manner suggested. After all there may be damage to equipment or property. If the Minister of Justice came along and I happen to have a heap of fishing nets out in lake Ontario and he destroys them, I believe I have a right of action against him for the damage he has done to my personal property.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: My hon. friend would have to bring an action in court against the defendant. I always hesitate about committing myself to a definite opinion upon the basis of just an oral presentation of the facts like this, but I would think that under the new statute my hon. friend's client would clearly have a claim against the crown under those circumstances. I would think it would be for the tort of trespass on his property so damaged. I do not think my hon. friend entertains any doubt that under this new statute he would have a claim.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Yes, I have; because this statute is confined to torts committed byservants of the crown. The definition in section 2(c) is that a servant includes an agent, but there is no reference to its including members of the armed forces. I do not
Crown Liability
think the members of the armed forces are treated as servants of the crown in this statute.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Yes, they are; if that is my hon. friend's difficulty, it is covered.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Is the minister prepared to have it clearly provided for here? The definition of servant should certainly be expanded if it is intended to include members of the armed forces.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I grasp my hon. friend's difficulty now. If his difficulty as he now states it is that members of the armed forces, whom his client suspects were guilty of this wrongful act, would not be considered servants of the crown in his opinion, I would point out to him that by an amendment to the Exchequer Court Act passed in 1943, section 50A was inserted, which reads as follows:
For the purpose of determining liability in any action or other proceeding by or against His Majesty, a person who was at any time since the twenty-fourth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight, a member of the naval, military or air forces of His Majesty in right of Canada shall be deemed to have been at such time a servant of the crown.
That has been the law now for nearly ten years and I think that would have taken care of my hon. friend's difficulty.


Donald Methuen Fleming: I am not at all sure that it would, because here we are opening new ground and making provision for actions to be brought in the provincial courts as well as in the exchequer court. It seems to me that the better method to deal with this would be to expand the definition of servant in section 2(c) of this bill and provide that it shall include members of the armed forces.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Surely my hon. friend will agree that a provision in a statute does not lack force because it happens to be in one statute rather than another. Could you get anything that is clearer than this:
For the purpose of determining liability in any action or other proceeding by or against His Majesty,-
That is pretty broad.
-a person who was at any time since the twenty-fourth day of June, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-eight, a member of the naval, military or air forces of His Majesty in right of Canada shall be deemed to have been at such time a servant of the crown.
How could you make it any clearer than that?


Albany M. Robichaud: Following the main argument of the hon. member for Eglinton I am convinced that there is need for further clarification of section 3 with reference to jurisdiction. In my submission the addition

Crown Liability
of a few words after the word "liable" in line 3 of subsection 1 would make the section much clearer. I have listened with much interest to the explanation given by the minister to the effect that in the Exchequer Court Act there is no such specific provision.


The Deputy Chairman:: Do I understand that the hon. member is introducing an amendment to section 3?


Albany M. Robichaud: I am not introducing an amendment, I am simply referring to the argument put forth by the Minister of Justice when he said there was nothing specific- and he is right, and that is the very point- in the Exchequer Court Act. He said there was no necessity of having more specific words in section 3 of the bill. I submit that under the Exchequer Court Act any actions in tort in all the provinces, that is actions arising from negligence, are now triable in one forum only, the exchequer court. Nevertheless it was felt necessary to provide in the general rules and orders of the exchequer court that when such suits or actions arose in common-law provinces then the practice had to conform with and be regulated by the practice and procedure in force at the time in His Majesty's supreme court of judicature in England. When a matter arose in the province of Quebec it had to be regulated, as to practice and procedure, by the laws in force in His Majesty's superior court for the province of Quebec, or in the absence thereof by the laws in force in His Majesty's supreme court of judicature in England. In the rules and orders different provisions are therefore made for cases that might arise in the common-law provinces and, on the other hand, in the province of Quebec.
Under this bill tortious acts are triable in all provinces of Canada. I agree with the point raised by the hon. member for Eglinton, that unless more specific provisions are embodied in the section there will be room for argument and certainly room for confusion. If words such as "under the laws of the province where the tort or offence was committed" were added after the word "liable" in the third line of section 3, in my submission it would cure every possible confusion in the section. We would then have in the section specific words making the laws of each province applicable to the tort in issue. I bring this, with due respect, to the attention of the minister.


[Stage Direction]
Subsection agreed to.
Louis-René Beaudoin: When I left the chair we were on section 3, subsection 1 and were passing on to subsection 2. Have subsections 2 and 3 been carried?


Some hon. Members:: Carried.

Subsections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 agreed to.
Section 3 agreed to.
On section 4-Special provisions respecting liability.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Will you follow the same procedure and call the subsections seriatim?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
On section 4, subsection 1-No proceedings lie where pension payable.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Does not the minister think that in a case of this kind it would be fair to extend the right of choice to the individual concerned? Here we have the provision that if pension or compensation has been paid or is payable out of the consolidated revenue fund in respect of the tort in question, there is no right of action.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: That has been considered, Mr. Chairman, but the purpose of the pension act, where there is a pension act, is to treat every one of a class of people in respect of death or injury, etc., on an equal basis. We think that upon balance it is preferable to leave them to rely on their pension rights. Then everyone in that group of people is treated on an equal basis.


William Joseph Browne: But I wonder if the minister has thought this out very carefully.


Mr. Dickey:: He has.


William Joseph Browne: Supposing a person, has only been in employment a short time. He would not have paid very much into the fund and not very much of a pension would be payable, yet he might have an action for several thousands of dollars in damages. Is that not so? I am thinking there might be a case where an employee of the government, through some neglect on the part of his fellow servants of the crown, received an injury that resulted in death. His widow would therefore have an action in tort against the crown which might run into several thousand dollars whereas the pension to his widow would be insignificant. Would you not be prepared to give this further consideration on these grounds?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I am speaking from memory now, but I think in a case of that sort there would not be any pension payable to the widow which would interfere with the action in tort.


William Joseph Browne: Is the pension not in itself a bar? Because a widow would have a right to pension might she not be debarred from taking action in court, if she were entitled to a pension under this clause?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Perhaps I did not make myself clear, but where a civil servant should happen to injure another civil servant there is no pension payable in respect of that injury and therefore there would be a claim for damages in tort, with no offsetting pension payment to complicate the matter in a case of that kind.


William Joseph Browne: Then supposing an employee on a government ship is injured and is entitled to compensation, for instance a merchant seaman's compensation. He might have an action for many thousands of dollars, which would be superior to the pension he would receive or that his widow would receive in case of death. His widow only receives $50 a month, so would it not be right in such a case to give an election to the person concerned?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: If my hon. friend is asking my personal opinion I would think not. The parallel I would draw there is where, in those provinces that have workmen's compensation acts, the amount of pension that is payable to workmen in industry for different types of accident or death, without any lawsuits or difficulties of that sort, is received by him at the cost of not having any action for damages against his employer on the basis of employers' liability.
We have in our own government service here what we call the Government Employees Compensation Act which is the same as the workmen's compensation act in the provincial sphere. It applies only to our own civil servants. These are cases of one not being able to have his cake and eat it too. If a fund is set up to compensate people for injury or losses of one kind or another, the justification for devoting tax moneys to the support of such a fund is that the problem is taken care of by that payment of such compensation, and any rights which the injured person may have to recover damages from the person responsible for his injury are at the same time extinguished.


[Stage Direction]
Subsection agreed to.
On section 4, subsection 2-Liability for acts of servants.
Donald Methuen Fleming: On subsection 2, and the same remarks apply to subsection 3, are we to understand that the second part of the subsection following the word "unless" has reference to the provincial law?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Yes.


Donald Methuen Fleming: Again I am saying that I think appropriate words ought to be inserted there not only for the sake of clarity but I think to carry out the intent that has been 68108-212
Crown Liability
expressed and is generally shared. I think it would be highly desirable to have in subsection 2 after the word "would" in the fourth line such words as "under the law of the province". Similarly in subsection 3, the same words might be inserted after the word "unless" in the fourth line. I am not at all sure that difficulty is not going to arise over this question of provincial law in ways that we may now not be able fully to take account of here. It is so easy to pass these enactments without seeing the opportunities for dispute over them later on when people come to determine their legal rights in the light of the words we are using.
I just offer the suggestion again, and I am only trying to make this measure as effective as possible for the purpose which has been described and which all members of the house support. I think words such as I have suggested would make it much clearer.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I appreciate indeed my hon. friend's solicitude in the matter and acknowledge the helpfulness of his suggestions. However, I would not want him to think that these points he has named, and some others that he has not yet named, had been ignored when the words of this section were being considered by the draftsmen.
There are a number of problems that arise which perhaps have not occurred to him. For example, what would the situation be if the tort took place on a Canadian ship on the high seas? What provincial law would apply in a case of that sort? What if the incident took place on Sable island? If you say that the law of the province applies, is it the law at the time this present bill is passed here, or is it the provincial law as that law may be amended in the future? If any amendments are passed to our law, how do they dovetail into amendments to relevant provincial amendments which are also passed?
When one weighs considerations, and others, I think my hon. friend would agree that if they were put on one side of the scales, and on the other side of the scales was placed the section I quoted from the Exchequer Court Act, which is in simple language and has stood the test of time for a number of years without any of these difficulties which my hon. friend speaks of having occurred, then on balance the prudent thing to do is to follow the successful precedent in the case of the Exchequer Court Act and adopt the simple language we have here.
In recent years, amongst other things, since we set up the drafting branch in the Department of Justice we have been trying where possible to simplify our laws and thereby make them a lot easier for everyone to read.

Crown Liability


[Stage Direction]
Subsection agreed to.
On section 4, subsection 3-Motor vehicles.
Howard Charles Green: Does this subsection mean that a person who has been injured must sue the driver of the motor vehicle and obtain judgment against him as well as suing the crown in order to recover anything from the crown? It reads:
No proceedings lie against the crown by virtue of subsection (2) of section 3 in respect of damage sustained by any person by reason of a motor vehicle upon a highway unless the driver of the motor vehicle or his personal representative is liable for the damage so sustained.
Now, the driver of the motor vehicle can only be held liable if there has been a decision against him. For that reason I take it that the driver has to be a party to the action.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Would my hon. friend just elucidate that point a little?


Howard Charles Green: My doubt arises out of the wording of the clause. In effect, the clause says that the crown will not be liable for damages unless the driver of the car is also liable. The driver of the car can only be found liable if he is a party to the action and judgment is obtained against him. I am asking whether the result is not that, in each case, the plaintiff will have to sue not only the crown but also the employee of the crown who happened to be driving the car. Furthermore, he would have to obtain judgment against that driver.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Chairman, this is a case where an attempt has been made to follow a provincial provision which seems to be uniform in all the provinces, to the effect that the owner of a motor vehicle cannot be made liable unless the driver is liable. We have adopted that provision, which is in nearly all the motor vehicle traffic acts of the various provinces, and made it applicable to the proceedings here so there would not be any doubt on this point.


Howard Charles Green: In effect, then, the plaintiff would have to sue the driver personally as well as the crown; that is correct, is it not?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Yes.


Howard Charles Green: Then on section 4, subsection 4, I should like to ask the minister to give some thought to the time within which persons who are injured must give notice to the crown. The clause, as it is worded, sets the time limit at seven days. I know from experience that, for example, a person may be injured in a government building or outside of a government building because it has not been kept in proper shape. He may be

taken to the hospital, and the first consideration is to see that proper medical attention is given to him. Probably his people do not even think of going to a lawyer for ten days or even two weeks. I suggest that this seven-day limitation is very unfair and should be extended to, say, thirty days.
I notice that in the explanatory note the reason given for this short time is that otherwise the employees of the crown will not be able to check up on the condition of the building. However, if this injury is such that it will give rise to a proper claim, then the crown employee will know about it at once. There is the opportunity for him to examine the premises and make his report. On the other hand, if the crown employee does not know anything about the accident, then when the plaintiff comes into court his story is going to be looked upon with a great deal of doubt by the judge if nothing whatever was said to the crown employees who were in the building.
I know that in the case of a claim arising in British Columbia it would be very difficult to get notice off within the seven days. I do not think it is a reasonable time, and I would ask that an extension be given.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Chairman, take the case, for example, of a claim made against the crown by a plaintiff who alleges that he stepped upon the sill of a doorway that was covered with ice and was not properly sanded. He fell and injured himself severely. I am sure the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra would agree with me that the validity of that claim would depend upon whether the plaintiff could establish that the defendant crown was negligent in not sanding the doorway. If, in respect of an ephemeral condition like ice, the defendant is not given prompt notice so it can inform itself as to the facts, it is going to have little chance when the case comes to court of establishing its version of the condition of the doorway at the time of the accident. Seven days is quite a long time in relation to a condition which can pass away in much less time than that.


William Joseph Browne: Would you make the time shorter, then?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: The information will get
around amongst lawyers that there is this sort of limitation, and they will see to it that that notice is given. Then, as the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra very cogently says, the plaintiff's case is a lot better if he *can show-or his lawyer could do that-that he went to the employee of the crown and said, "Look, I have hurt myself. Here is where I fell and see this ice here; there is

no sand on it". This clause, if it is properly applied and if the plaintiff is well advised and diligent, will help the plaintiff's claim rather than hinder it. I think my hon. friend is quite right when he says that if there were no provision like this at all, and it developed that no complaint had been made to the crown for a period of ten days or two weeks, the judge would be rather sceptical when no other person had seen it, as to whether the injury was actually caused by this allegedly icy condition or whether it was due to the plaintiff's own negligence.


Howard Charles Green: But I do say that in most cases there would be an employee of the crown right on the premises at the time of the accident. He would know about the accident, and it would be his duty to make a record of the condition at that time. This would be the normal case. If the person has been seriously injured he may be in hospital for quite a long time. In fact, the more seriously injured he is, the less likely it is that he will be able to get off any written notice with the details of his claim within a period of seven days from the time of the accident. There certainly should be some leeway given so that a man would not be necessarily out of court after the seven days. There should be some provision so that in a bona fide case, where the person was unable to get in a notice within the seven days, he would not be deprived of his action. I think the section is too tight as it is worded at the present time.


Donald Methuen Fleming: 
Stuart Sinclair Garson: Can my hon. friend give any further details with regard to the modification of the bar in the case of the Ontario statute to which he referred?


Donald Methuen Fleming: Yes. I have not the exact language of the statute here but it runs to this effect. If the court-and it is left to the court to decide when the case comes before it in due course-is satisfied that no prejudice has resulted to the crown from failure to give the notice within the prescribed period, the court has power to relieve the plaintiff from the effect of the failure to give the notice. I think that is a reasonable provision.
I would urge on the minister that even with such a saving provision, a period of seven days is still too short. It is going to take some considerable time for the general public to come to know of this new legislation which is creating new rights. It seems to me that a period of seven days is unreasonably short in the case of new legislation giving rise to new rights. If the minister will follow a suggestion, I would propose that this section should not be written in terms of absolute bar but only conditional bar, and that the

Crown Liability
period within which notice may be given should be considerably extended beyond the seven days.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Chairman, Mr. Driedger, the parliamentary counsel to the Department of Justice, has heard this discussion and I have just suggested that he might retire for a moment and see what he can do to modify that clause in accordance with the suggestion made by my hon. friend.


William Joseph Browne: Before he retires, Mr. Chairman, I should like to make a suggestion. Heretofore in some workmen's compensation acts a similar provision is made, that notice must be given within seven days. But it is also provided that if a plaintiff can show that the failure to give due notice was not owing to any fault of his or was owing to reasons for which he can give a full and valid explanation, then the court may extend the time in which notice may be given, or at least it is not obliged to throw out the action because the limit of seven days was not observed.
May I add another suggestion and say that I have never heard of any complaint because a period of at least two years-or six years perhaps in some jurisdictions-is allowed to a private person within which to take action for negligence. I therefore believe it is imaginary and theoretical to speak of the damages which might accrue to the crown because a longer period than seven days was allowed.


Louis-René Beaudoin: Shall section 4 stand until later?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
Section stands.
Section 5 agreed to.
On section 6-Proceedings in rem.


Albany M. Robichaud: I wish to submit to the minister that, in my opinion, section 6 is taking away a privilege which heretofore was enjoyed by the subject in proceedings under the Exchequer Court Act; because under the provisions of section 6, proceedings in rem are not authorized. In rule 4 of the general rules and orders of the exchequer court, not only were proceedings in rem allowed but there was provision for a joinder of proceedings in rem and proceedings in personam.
I can quite imagine, even under this statute now, a case where as the result of the commission of a tort by a servant of the crown, anything involved in the commission of the offence may be liable to condemnation, as we call it under the exchequer court practice,

and the offender may be liable as well to answer for his act. Why would not this condemnation and claim for damages for an unlawful act of the offender be joined in one and the same action? In other words I cannot understand why, on the one hand, we say in effect that we give the subject more privileges now in an action against the crown because we give him another forum-we give him the privilege of suing in his own province-but on the other hand we whittle away some of the rights which he heretofore enjoyed under the practice of the exchequer court. In this one instance, under the exchequer court practice, the subject had the right to an action in rem and to condemnation of the matter involved. But now under this bill the action in rem is not authorized. I should like to have some explanation from the minister as to the reason why an action in rem is not now authorized under the statute.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Mr. Chairman, although I am by no means an expert in admiralty law, I understand that the purpose of an action in rem is that the ship or thing itself may be attached by the process so that the damages which are recovered in the lawsuit can be obtained or the payment of them can be exacted before the ship or thing is released. Where a ship is in a harbour, if you do not attach it in rem and it sails away I can understand you will have a hard time collecting judgment. But there is great permanency to the federal crown as compared with a ship of that kind. Therefore there is no purpose in tying up a crown ship by an action in rem because the federal crown will always be able to pay any damages that are charged against it. The purpose of the action in rem therefore never having existed
in relation to	the	federal	crown,	there is	noreason why retained.	the	action	itself	should	be


Albany M. Robichaud: Why	then,	under	the
present practice in the exchequer court, is this rule 4 still in existence? I will quote it for the record:
Rule 4
Joinder in rem and in personam
Where, by reason of the commission of any offence, any thing is liable to condemnation, and the offender is also liable to a penalty, such condemnation and penalty may be enforced and recovered in one and the same proceeding; but no judgment for any such penalty shall be given against any person who has not been served with the information.
That is the present practice of the exchequer court, Mr. Chairman. With the minister I quite admit that the crown is not likely to run away; and I quite admit that

it is a different case from that of a ship belonging to a foreign power or a foreign company. I am willing to admit all that. But what I wish to know is why, when we have an action in rem authorized under the present practice of the exchequer court, this right of the subject has been taken away under the present statute. In the minister's comments so far I see no explanation.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: If my hon. friend will read the section he will see that its wording is as follows, and the first four words in the section are extremely significant.


Albany M. Robichaud: I have read it carefully.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: The wording is:
Nothing in this act authorizes proceedings in rem . . .
It may be that we are indebted to my hon. friend for having pointed out this section in the exchequer court rules, and it may be that they should be repealed now; I do not know. We will have to look into that, but there is nothing in this act which authorizes proceedings in rem.


Albany M. Robichaud: That is exactly my argument. I thought I would bring to the attention of the minister the existence of rule 4.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Could we revert to clause 4 and see if this would meet the objection?


Louis-René Beaudoin: Clause 4, subsection 4.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: There would be subsection (5) to read as follows:
(5) In the case of the death of the person injured, failure to give the notice required by subsection (4) is not a bar to the proceedings, and, except where the injury was caused by snow or ice, failure to give or insufficiency of the notice is not a bar to the proceedings if reasonable excuse for the want or insufficiency of the notice is established and the court or judge before whom the proceedings are taken is of opinion that the crown in its defence was not prejudiced by the want or insufficiency of the notice and that to bar the proceedings would be an injustice.


Howard Charles Green: I suggest that the minister have this looked over again before we deal with the bill on another occasion. There is an exception in there, snow and ice. It so happens that I know of a case where a woman was quite badly injured because of the ice and snow not being removed from an immigration building at the boundary near Vancouver. She was taken to hospital quite badly hurt. I do not believe her husband came in for some days. Certainly in that kind of case the seven days might easily have gone by, yet the immigration officials were right there. They knew about the accident that had happened. They knew exactly the condition of the building, yet if the section is worded as the minister now proposes to word it there would be no chance to sue.
26, 1953	3337
Privilege-Mr. Adamson


Louis-René Beaudoin: Shall clause 4 of subsection 4 stand?
Subsection stands.


Louis-René Beaudoin: Shall we agree to carry clause 7 which is the last clause of part I? Shall section 7 carry?
Section 7 agreed to.


Louis-René Beaudoin: On the next occasion we shall consider part II, clause 8. Shall I report progress?
Progress reported.



PRIVILEGE


Agar Rodney Adamson: May I
rise on a question of personal privilege? I do so at this late hour tonight in order to get it in today because the article which I find offensive appeared in Saturday's Financial Post, which came out today, and I wish to make this correction as a matter of personal privilege, Mr. Speaker. The article appears on the front page of the Financial Post under the heading "Opposition girds to fight all-Canada gas line plan." The paragraph I object to reads as follows:
The activity centred on a movement to oppose trade minister Howe's recent pronouncement of federal gas policy:	An all-Canadian east-west
route via northern Ontario.
I was the last to speak for the opposition, and what I said was the very antithesis of what the article suggests. I wish to protest against this suggestion as a matter of personal privilege. I advocated the greatest use of the natural gas, the quickest way to market the gas and the way which would give the greatest service to all Canada, particularly that part of Canada which is deficient in fuel at the present time. That is the purport of what I said, Mr. Speaker.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Alphonse Fournier: I move that the house do now adjourn. Tomorrow we shall take up first interim supply, further supplementary estimates; then Bill No. 105, respecting the liability of the crown for torts and civil salvage. Then another matter we should like to bring up is the resolution of the Minister of Fisheries providing for the approval and confirmation of the international convention for the high seas fisheries of the north Pacific ocean, signed by Canada, United States and Japan in Tokyo, and if we have time we will take up Bill No. 107, to amend the Post Office Act.
Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at 10.08 p.m.

Friday, March 27, 1953