1952-03-21

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Gordon Graydon (Peel):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Finance. In view of the fact that the province of Ontario is now permitting provincial public buildings to be assessed and taxed by the municipal authorities, will the federal authorities do likewise so far as federal buildings are concerned?


Hon. Douglas Abbott (Minister of Finance):: The answer is in the negative. I would point out that the municipalities are creatures of the provincial government.


Gordon Graydon: There are a lot of creatures having a lot of trouble getting along.


Mr. Macdonnell (Greenwood):: Mr. Speaker-


Mr. Drew:: I would point out that that was not-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


George Alexander Drew: I would point out-


Some hon. Members:: Order.


Mr. Speaker:: The hon. member for Greenwood has the floor.

On the orders of the day:


George Alexander Drew: If I may direct a question to the Minister of Finance, will he examine the basis upon which municipal taxation is applied to provincial buildings, in view of the fact that the principle upon which that is done has no relation to their being creatures of the provincial government?


Douglas Charles Abbott: The Minister of Finance is always happy to examine anything.



NATIONAL DEFENCE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
James MacKerras Macdonnell: Mr. Speaker, I desire to ask a question which I
shall address to the Minister of Finance, but I am not sure whether it should not be addressed to the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton). My question is based on a report which appeared in the Ottawa Journal of yesterday evening of an interview with a representative of the Department of National Defence. My question is this: What is the contingency fund referred to by the representative of the defence department in the Journal report? What does it amount to? Is this fund to be used, as stated by the department's-


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: This is my question-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. It seems to me that the question is one which should appear on the order paper.


Douglas Charles Abbott: If I may say so, I think the question is one of urgency and is not one which should be put on the order paper. I shall be happy to answer it.


Mr. Speaker:: I must then apologize to the hon. member for Greenwood. If it is a question which is very urgent and deals with an important matter of public concern and should be asked now, I shall allow him to ask it.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Mr. Speaker, I am not quite sure whether I am bound by your ruling or by the ruling of the Minister of Finance. Here is my question-and I shall begin again.


Some hon. Members:: No, no.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I think it is most desirable that the question should be understood by the house. What is the contingency fund referred to by the representative of the defence department in the Journal report? What does it amount to? Is this fund to be used, as stated by the department's representative, for acquiring land for a multimillion dollar underground army headquarters and for an armoury building or buildings? Can this fund be used without being revoted by parliament, which I must say seemed to be the implication of the report?


Mr. Speaker:: With due respect to the Minister of Finance, I think that my first impression was correct.


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.
660	HOUSE OF
Inquiries of the Ministry


Mr. Speaker:: However, since it is apparently the wish of the house that the minister reply, if there is unanimous consent I will permit the minister to do so.


Douglas Charles Abbott: The answer is very short. There is no such contingency fund; and I am told by the deputy minister of national defence, to whom I understand the remarks are attributed, that he made no such statements.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: On a
question of privilege, Mr. Speaker, apparently I am now left in the position of having it imputed that I made a statement which is not true.


Douglas Charles Abbott: Not at all.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: I maintain that I asked a question containing certain statements taken from a report in the Ottawa Journal and referring to certain statements which had been made. The reply by the Minister of Finance was that no such statements were made.


Douglas Charles Abbott: No. I said I had been informed by the deputy minister of national defence, who is referred to in the article, that he had made no such statements to the Journal reporter. I would not cast any reflection at all upon my hon. friend's veracity.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Now that
the matter has been raised I think I should be permitted to read the report on which I based my question.


Some hon. Members:: No.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I think the hon.
member should be permitted to state his question of privilege.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Otherwise
it seems to me I am left in the position of having brought to your attention, Mr. Speaker, and to the attention of this house, something which is now declared to be untrue. Therefore I ask to be allowed to read the report.


Mr. Speaker:: I gathered from the reply of the Minister of Finance that the statement in the press was incorrect, not that there had been anything untruthful on the part of the hon. member for Greenwood. I understand it is entirely a question of the accuracy of the statement in the press.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: No, Mr. Speaker; there is far more to it than that. The minister did not say the statements were inaccurate; he said they had not been made.


Douglas Charles Abbott: I shall be glad to say they are inaccurate.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: The minister therefore has not answered my question at all. I am asking these questions, and they have not been answered.


Douglas Charles Abbott: I answered the question. In reply to the first question I said there was no such contingency fund as is referred to in the question. As the hon. member will see if he reads his questions again, that answers the second two questions. I added that the deputy minister of national defence, who is referred to in the article as having made those statements, has informed me that he made no such statements.


Mr. Speaker:: Then I do not think there can be any reflection on the hon. member for Greenwood.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Then it
would seem that the onus is transferred to the Journal, and no doubt they will be able to look after themselves.


Mr. Speaker:: Probably this difficulty
would not have arisen if the house had accepted my first ruling.



GREAT LAKES LEVELS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Donald M. Fleming (Eglinton):: In the
absence of the Minister of Public Works may I direct a question to the Prime Minister? Will the government undertake an inquiry into the causes, as well as the present effects, of high water levels in lake Ontario, which are very serious and are causing extensive deterioration; and will the government give consideration to having such inquiry made by the international joint commission?


Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: The government will give consideration to the remarks made by the hon. member. I will not attempt to commit the government as to what may be the result of the consideration. There are some occurrences in nature over which the government does not pretend to have any control.



TUBERCULOSIS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. G. F. Higgins (St. John's East):: May I
ask the Minister of National Health and Welfare if he has taken any action with respect to the use in Canada of the new drugs used in the treatment of tuberculosis?


Mr. Speaker:: That is a question which, might appear on the order paper.

ILater:]
On the orders of the day:


Hon. Paul Martin (Minister of National Health and Welfare):: If I may revert to the question put to me a few moments ago by the hon. member for St. John's East (Mr. Higgins), Mr. Speaker, which you adjudged should be put on the order paper, that may have been because its significance was not fully appreciated. I think the matter is of some importance. I can only say that the two drugs in question, which are of such great interest at the present time to sufferers from tuberculosis throughout Canada and the world, are being given our closest attention. It is too early, however, to say whether or not the trials being conducted in a New York hospital can be described as definitive. The policy of the department might be described as one of interest, caution and hope.



UNITED NATIONS


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. John Decore (Vegreville):: Is the Secretary of State for External Affairs giving any consideration to Canada's ratification of the international convention against genocide, which passed the United Nations general assembly meeting some time ago?


Some hon. Members:: Order paper.


Mr. Speaker:: As I. understood the question, I think it is one that should appear on the order paper.



HANDLING OF OUT-OF-CONDITION WHEAT, OATS AND BARLEY

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Right Hon. C. D. Howe (Minister of Trade and Commerce):: In reply to the hon. member for Calgary West (Mr. Nickle) who asked a question on March 18 concerning the use of certain chemicals for the drying and fumigating of grains, the chief chemist of the board of grain commissioners advises me that scientific investigations have not yet produced a chemical that is reasonably effective and economical for preventing the heating in damp grain by control of mould growth. On the other hand, a number of effective fumigants for control of insects are available for treatment of insect infested grain. He agrees that a large number of chemicals are widely used in the United States and Canada for the fumigation of grain. He does not believe that any chemical is widely used, much less effectively used, in the United
Inquiries of the Ministry States or elsewhere, for low cost drying of grain. He is not aware of any barrier now in existence to prevent the importation into Canada of these chemical products.



SUGGESTED PAYMENT TO FARMERS OF PORTION OF DRYING COST

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. G. Diefenbaker (Lake Centre):: would like to ask the Minister of Trade and Commerce whether or not the government has given consideration to a recommendation by the interprovincial farmers union that farmers in the prairie provinces who dry their own grain on their farms be paid a portion of the drying cost on the basis of a certain amount per bushel, in order to assure that the farmers will be enabled to do as much drying as possible on their own farms.


Clarence Decatur Howe: So far as I am aware, the government has received no such representations from the farmers union. I understand representatives of the farmers union will be here next Thursday, and they may be planning to make those representations, but so far they have not done so.


John George Diefenbaker: The date is the 18th.


Clarence Decatur Howe: I have not received any representations from them. If the representations are made, they will receive such consideration as they appear to deserve.



LIVESTOCK


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. William Bryce (Selkirk):: Can the Minister of Agriculture make any further statement with regard to the lifting of the embargo on livestock in Manitoba?


Right Hon. J. G. Gardiner (Minister of Agriculture):: The only statement I can make is that Manitoba has removed any restrictions upon the movement of hogs and sheep from west of the Manitoba-Saskatchewan boundary into the plants in that province. That is the only change that has been made so far.



FISHERIES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. C. W. Carter (Burin-Burgeo):: I would like to direct a question to the parliamentary assistant to the Minister of Fisheries. Is he aware that foreign draggers are dragging over local fishing grounds in Newfoundland? What steps are being taken in this matter?

External Affairs


Mr. J. Walson MacNaughl (Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Fisheries):: The
Department of Fisheries has heard rumours to the effect that foreign draggers are dragging within the territorial waters of Newfoundland. We have dispatched the Eastern Explorer to make an investigation, and the Cygnus will leave Halifax today or tomorrow to assist in the investigation and see if the rumours are correct.


Douglas Charles Abbott: that the house go into committee of supply.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs):: This motion, Mr. Speaker, affords me the opportunity of making a general statement on international developments-a statement which I would have been happy to make earlier in this session. Owing to the suggestion that was made that there should be no such general statement during the debate on the address, it was thought wise to wait until this occasion arose when there could be a discussion devoted exclusively to external affairs. At the end of the debate I shall also be very glad to try to deal with questions which may arise during the course of the discussion, if I am given an opportunity to do so. This afternoon I shall not be able to touch on many external questions. I am afraid that those with which I shall deal will take too much time.
I shall omit from consideration this afternoon any questions arising out of the Japanese peace treaty, because we shall have a separate discussion on that measure shortly.
I shall leave to my parliamentary assistant on external affairs (Mr. Lesage) the responsibility of discussing the work of the United Nations assembly, though I may be able to touch on it briefly. He will deal also with questions of international economic assistance, such as the Colombo plan, which loom so large in our international relations these days.
There are two matters, however, with which I should like to deal specifically. One is the situation in the Far East, more particularly the situation in Korea and United Nations action there. The other is the recent meeting of the North Atlantic council at Lisbon.
In so far as that latter question is concerned, I should say at once that the government supports the decisions reached by the North Atlantic council at Lisbon. In so far as Korea and related questions are concerned,

the government will continue to support United Nations action in Korea. We do not support, however, any policy or any action which would extend that war to China without the assurance that such policy or such action would end it in Korea, unless the proposals in question are required by immediate military necessity and in order to ensure the safety of the United Nations forces in Korea, which include Canadian forces. On this question, Mr. Speaker, the policy of the government is clear. I hope that before this debate is finished the position of the official opposition, and of the other opposition parties, will also be made clear. We should know where we stand on these matters, and I hope that it will be shown that at least on essentials, and on principles, we stand together.
I shall deal with the Far Eastern questions first.
At the very beginning I think I should refer to some observations made by the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) concerning a statement which I made in New York on March 7, and which he said involved a question of privilege affecting every member of this house. Presumably he based that statement on his assumption that I had announced in New York new policies of the government on which, and I quote him, "this house has not passed." Even if that were an accurate statement, I am not sure that that is a question of privilege. The executive, of course, announces policy, in the House of Commons when possible, but wherever it may be announced parliament decides whether or not to adopt that policy and make it effective. The fact is that on this particular occasion no new policy of any kind was announced.
The argument of the leader of the official opposition is based on a paragraph from that New York statement which he has quoted in the house, and which had in it four suggestions. He proceeded to put an interpretation on those suggestions, which I claim to be a wrong interpretation, and drew from it the conclusion that I had announced new policy. Let us see what those suggestions or proposals were. The first is, and I am quoting from my statement:
. . . we-
That is the United Nations peoples and governments who are defeating aggression in Korea.
-should let the Peking government know that they must expect communist aggression to be met by collective resistance; . . .
The leader of the opposition says that by that statement I am in some form proposing a Pacific pact, and that that is new policy and contrary to the statements made

previously by me about a Pacific pact. I suggest that that is as inaccurate an inference to draw from that statement as it would be to suggest, for instance, that the foreign minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Eden, was proposing a Pacific security pact when he said in New York in January that if there were further aggression in southeastern Asia-he was .thinking particularly of aggression against Indo-China-it should be met by the solid resistance of the United Nations. All that could have been meant by the statement I made in New York on this matter was that aggression anywhere should be met by collective resistance. Of course, the form of such resistance, and the machinery through which it should operate, would vary according to the means at our disposal and the nature of the aggression.
This is already our obligation under the United Nations charter. How we are to discharge it may, as we know already from experience, have to depend on circumstances. There is nothing new in this. I have said the same thing many times in this house. We accepted this obligation of collective resistance to aggression when we signed the charter, especially in articles 1, 39, 42, 48 and 49. We also accepted this obligation when we accepted the resolution of the United Nations assembly a year and a half ago, the resolution to unite for peace, paragraph 1 of which states that if the security council is unable to do its duty the assembly will become the agency for collective security.
The second point which it was suggested meant that new policy had been laid down is found in the words which I used, and I quote:
... no government in Peking committing such aggression can hope to be accepted into the community of nations;-[DOT]
I have certainly said that before inside and outside this house. Indeed, on May 7, 1951, in the external affairs debate in this house, I said this-and I quote from my statement at that time as reported at page 2756 of Hansard:
The same, I think, applies to recognition of that regime in Peking. There can be no question even of considering it while the Chinese defy the United Nations in Korea and fight against our forces there.
So far as membership in the United Nations is concerned I have said the same thing, to the effect that the Chinese communists cannot shoot their way into the United Nations.
The third point to which exception was taken as stating new policy outside the house is found in the following words:
... on the other hand,-
External Affairs
This is from my New York statement.
-we ourselves did not intervene in Korea, or, indeed, in Formosa in order to overthrow by force the government in Peking. I think also that we should make it clear that while Formosa cannot be allowed to fall into Chinese communist hands while aggressive war is going on in Korea, we do not intend to use our own forces to restore to China the regime which is now in Formosa after being driven off the mainland.
It was suggested by the leader of the opposition that in those words I gave the impression that we were now engaged in the defence of Formosa, something which he said he was unaware of. In reply to that, Mr. Speaker, I would only say that the United States government has stated more than once that, arising out of United Nations operations in Korea and for the safety and success of those operations, the United States navy will prevent Chinese communists from attacking Formosa. There is nothing new in our association with that policy, because we have accepted it. I have said previously in the house, and no exception was taken to it, that we should neutralize Formosa while the fighting was going on in Korea.
The fourth point which is supposed to embody new policy is in the following words:
. . . we should make it clear,-
I said in New York.
-that we do not intend to use our own forces to restore to China the regime which is now in Formosa after being driven off the mainland1.
According to the leader of the opposition, that means that if aggression should stop in Korea, then this policy of keeping the Chinese communists by force off Formosa would change. In fact, I said exactly the same thing on May 7, 1951, in this house when I made quite a long statement on Formosa, and during which I included these words, as reported at page 2756 of Hansard:
I believe that this island should be neutralized while fighting is going on in Korea.
I then went on to say this:
It does not follow, however, that if and when the Korean conflict can be ended satisfactorily, we should refuse to discuss the future of Formosa within the context of international agreements that have already been reached concerning it, and indeed within the context of the United Nations charter.
There was therefore certainly nothing new in that part of the statement I made in New York. Indeed, there was nothing new in that statement at all in so far as Canadian foreign policy is concerned.
The hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon), speaking immediately after me in that discussion on external affairs in May, 1951, did not take exception to any of these statements. In fact, I believe he did not even mention

External Affairs
Formosa in that discussion. I therefore think that I now have the right to ask the spokesman of his party what their policy is with regard to these matters. Do they disagree with what I have said in this house on these matters to which I have just referred, things which I have said more than once and which indeed I repeated in New York? Or do they, on the other hand, take their stand on the concrete statement made in this house on May 7, 1951, in the course of the debate on external affairs, by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra, who during that debate said-and there is nothing ambiguous about this or about some other parts of his statement-as reported at page 2785 of Hansard:
Then I believe we should insist that Formosa must not be turned over to the Chinese communists.
And he made no qualification of that statement. That is an arguable position, Mr. Speaker, but we on this side of the house consider it to be an unwise position. I would therefore be interested in learning-and I am sure we shall do so later in this discussion-whether his party agree with that position, that notwithstanding previous declarations in regard to Formosa, that island should not be permitted to become part of China so long as a communist Chinese government is in power in Peking, irrespective of whether that government is committing aggression in Korea or elsewhere.
I would say at once, Mr. Speaker, that that is not the position of the government, and we think it would be rash to adopt such a rigid policy in a world of such rapid change. We think it to be wiser to hold open the question as to what will be the best solution for Formosa when the aggression ends in Korea. In that respect we subscribe to the principle laid down by the United States Secretary of State before a congressional committee on June 1, 1951, when Mr. Acheson said:
The president has stated that we are not prejudicing the future of Formosa. That is a matter which should be decided, he said, either in connection with the Japanese peace treaty-
Where, incidentally, it was not decided.
-or by the United Nations, and the view which has been taken more recently is that the United Nations is the appropriate place where it should ultimately be decided.
I also said ini the house last October- and I quote from my statement then as reported at page 254 of Hansard:
However-and this is important-before we can proceed to any of these further Asian matters which are dealt with in the United Nations resolution of last February, which I think is still valid, the aggression in Korea must first be brought to 
an end. That is the immediate danger, and that is our immediate purpose, to end that war on honourable terms. If and when that can be done we will not refuse to discuss any other Asian questions relevant to the situation out there.
I think the policy of the government on this matter has been made quite clear in this house.
Now, what is the situation at the moment in Korea? In a military sense it seems to be pretty well stabilized except in the air, and the stabilization has taken place along a line which is roughly the 38th parallel, some part being above that parallel and a small sector below it. But while the military situation in that sense is somewhat stabilized, the armistice talks which are going on are stabilized only in the sense that it is exceedingly difficult to detect much progress in them. They take the form of offensives and counter-offensives, attacks and counterattacks, and it is impossible to be either optimistic or pessimistic about an eventual satisfactory conclusion. Certainly we must all agree that they are being conducted by the United States negotiators on behalf of the United Nations with persistence and with patience.
Speaking the other day in this house, the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar expressed the view that as the military armistice talks had bogged down in non-military discussions, the Canadian government might take the initiative in suggesting that a political conference might be called without waiting for the conclusion of an armistice. I think that was the burden of his observations on this point at that time. Mr. Speaker, if that suggestion were adopted it might lay Canada open to the kind of criticism which is sometimes levelled against some schools of thought in the United States; we might be accused of seeking to submerge the problems of a military armistice into the larger problems of a political conference, just as some want to submerge -the military problem of Korea into the much larger and more difficult problem of a war with China.
The supplementary report of the United Nations group on cease-fire in Korea, which was made public on January 11, 1951, clearly proposed that the Far Eastern situation should be dealt with in three stages. The first, cease-fire in Korea; the second, the settlement of the Korean question, and the third, the settlement of other Far Eastern questions. All western dealings with the enemy in Korea have been based on this three-stage program, and we cannot now reasonably expect to ask our allies, particularly the United States, to abandon this

procedure. Therefore I suggest we must continue to try to get the armistice first and then political talks afterwards.
On the point which was made by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) that the armistice talks have already strayed into the political and non-political field, I would merely point out that the three main points still in dispute are, first, prisoners of war-a complicated and a very difficult question-the second, airfield construction and repair, and third, supervision of the armistice. The exchange of prisoners of war is a legitimate subject to discuss in military armistice talks, and indeed was one subject which the United Nations command insisted should be included in the military agenda. It would be hard now to accept the argument that the subject is non-military.
Points two and three are plainly within the military field. Indeed, the only really political subject on the agenda of the armistice talks is point five, recommendations to the governments concerned on both sides, which has been settled quickly and effectively, and which has resulted in agreement, at least in principle, that political discussions should take place over the Korean political settlement.
Certainly, all governments, and that includes the Canadian government, with forces in Korea, agree as to the desirability of bringing that war to an end as quickly as possible; but, as I have said before, on honourable terms which do not betray the purpose we had in intervening there in the first place. That purpose was-and remains -to defeat aggression there, nothing more. And we have not done that yet.
It is for that reason that the government supports as a possible first step to peace and the defeat of aggression, the armistice negotiations now being carried on. But also, Mr. Speaker, we must realize that if these negotiations fail, or if the armistice is successfully concluded and then a further aggression is committed by the communists, a new and possibly a very dangerous situation will arise.
I said in this house last April that if there were massive air attacks from Manchurian bases, retaliatory action might be required against those bases in order to safeguard our forces in Korea. But I then went on to say- and this remains our position-that the decision to authorize such action would have to balance very carefully local military considerations against the risk of precipitating a further extension of the war, with all its grim and incalculable consequences. We are not convinced in this government that
External Affairs
general retaliatory measures such as blockading of the Chinese coast, which was advocated by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green) last May, or helping Chiang Kai-shek back on the continent, would be as effective in ending the war in Korea as they would likely be of extending it to China. We feel this way because the best advice that we can get leads us to the conclusion that such measures as that might bring us to the position where, in the words of General Bradley, we find ourselves fighting the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time and with the wrong enemy.
War of course may be forced on us by the Chinese communists. That is another question. We shall have to take cognizance of that situation if and when it arises. Meanwhile, we should do nothing to extend the war that we can avoid doing. Meanwhile, also, discussions are going on between the governments most concerned-that is, the governments with forces in Korea-as to the best course which could be followed in preventing or in meeting a new aggression in Korea if that should occur, and also how to organize and carry on political talks through the United Nations if the fighting can be ended there.
I think, however, it is worth while emphasizing once again that United Nations policies are designed to end this aggression in Korea, not to extend it, and not primarily to overthrow by force the communist regime in Peking. Like other democratic governments, the Canadian government and the Canadian people detest communism in Asia or in any place else. We will do what we can and what we should, not only to eliminate it from our own country, but also to protect ourselves and to protect others from this aggressive and subversive poison from abroad.
But as a doctrine, communism in Asia- especially in Asia-will not be destroyed by guns, though guns have to be used when communist violence and banditry occur. It would, I think, Mr. Speaker, be a great tragedy if the policies of the free world, especially those of the United States and the nations of the commonwealth, should diverge on this Asian question. It is as important to work together in the Pacific as it is in the Atlantic, and with understanding of each other's problems. By complete and frank exchanges of views, we can do so. But let us not deceive ourselves; the problem of Asia may subject our coalition of peace-loving free states to difficult tests in the days ahead.
I now want to say something, Mr. Speaker, about the recent North Atlantic treaty council meeting in Lisbon. But before I come to

External Affairs
that I should like to repeat what has already been said so many times, namely, that our North Atlantic Treaty Organization is not intended to replace the United Nations, but is complementary to, and indeed should be subsidiary to, the United Nations. It is easy today to be cynical and defeatist about the United Nations. Certainly the last session of the general assembly-and I am not going into it in any detail-was not able to do much to relieve the tension between the east and the west, between the free world and the Soviet bloc, or to reach satisfactory political settlements of differences by conciliation or peaceful negotiations. That does not mean, however, that the next session of the assembly, or the session after that, will be equally unproductive. We must keep on trying, and certainly this government intends to keep on trying to make the United Nations work effectively.
The general assembly of the United Nations and the security council of the United Nations, among other things, serve to remind the free world continuously that the purpose of its present policy of increasing its defence forces is merely to persuade aggressors to negotiate fairly and honourably. The United Nations exists to assist the free world to seize every possible opportunity for negotiation and settlement. The United Nations and its specialized agencies also provide the framework for social, economic and technical cooperation among all the countries of the free world. Through the United Nations and its specialized agencies the free world has already co-operated to promote general welfare, in particular by its assistance programs to underdeveloped countries, through the United Nations itself-through the world health organization, through the food and agriculture organization and through the international labour office.
It is true that the Soviet bloc is refusing to take part and to co-operate in this great endeavour. But the United Nations is still an indispensable piece of political machinery and cannot be replaced by any international organization on a more limited basis. These other organizations, however, under article 51 of the covenant have their value; and I suggest that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is the most important of them.
The council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has recently met at Lisbon, and) I should like to give, in as great detail as possible, the results of that meeting. Those results, in the form in which they have already appeared, do not seem at present to command the acceptance of all members of the house. Indeed, it would be, I suppose, surprising if they did.

The hon. member for Middlesex East (Mr. White) the other night thought that at the recent council meeting-and I quote his words-we were "overemphasizing the military aspect." The hon. member for Peel has been quoted as saying that at the NATO council meeting at Lisbon we acted too small and talked too big; while the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar seems to think that we might have acted too big.
Let us have a sober look at what NATO has been doing. It is of course possible, indeed it is easy, to exaggerate the results of the council meeting at Lisbon. It was the most effective and successful meeting we have had, in the sense that we reached unanimous decisions on matters which had been before us at previous meetings, but which we were not able to settle then.
At the same time we should not, I think, exaggerate the importance of what, after all, are only decisions which are yet to be converted into action. The prestige of NATO must not be based upon illusions. One easy and tempting illusion these days is that a resolution at an international conference is always the same as the result. A resolution is a decision to act; but it is action which produces results. Yet it remains true that if we had not taken these decisions at Lisbon -the ones we did take-the parliamentary and popular decisions which we now expect, and which will lead to action, would not have been possible.
Now, what were these decisions? The first, and the one that has commanded the most attention, deals with the military or defence program which we accepted there. The collective military goal for NATO, in the sense of total figures, had never been announced by NATO in any concrete form prior to Lisbon, although our own Canadian contribution to NATO had been put very definitely before this house last October, and accepted by the house; and the general NATO policy has, I think, been pretty fully explained in the house-certainly explained as fully as in the legislatures of any of the other members of the organization.
But the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Knowles), speaking on this subject the other night, seemed a little uneasy because not enough information was being given out. He made this statement:
We now come to the situation this year-
That is, 1952.
-and when we question the advisability of the figure of $300 billion that is NATO's proposed military expenditure, he-
Referring to myself.
-asks us where we got that figure.

And he went on to say:
He knows that we got it from responsible newspapers who are being permitted to suggest that figure as the NATO goal. He questions it, yet he will not tell us what the precise goal is.
That is the end of the quotation from the speech of the hon. member. Now, anyone reading that paragraph, in relation to the program for this year, might get the very mistaken impression, which was not intended, that our goal was $300 billion even this year. Of course that is not true. Nor is there any foundation or any validity for any press statement that NATO has given out either officially or unofficially at any time a figure of $300 billion as representing, in financial terms, the military goal to be achieved by NATO.
It is quite impossible, even in terms of the physical program we are trying to work out, to know how much this program will cost the fourteen countries concerned-or the twelve countries, if you leave out Turkey and Greece for the moment. But I have never seen speculation, or in any of our exchanges of views any figure, which approaches that of $300 billion for the three years in question.
But the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre said: Give us the details with respect to your program, so we can make up our own minds. What are our commitments? "Break through the secrecy." So far as the Canadian program is concerned, there is no secrecy. The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) was quite specific about our commitments when he spoke in the house on October 22 last, at which time he gave figures of our contribution to the integrated force as one brigade and eleven squadrons. Those figures were before the house, and were not objected to by the house.
Then, on February 26 last, upon his return
from Lisbon, he announced that we would ask that the number of R.C.A.F. squadrons to be committed to NATO by this country he increased from eleven to twelve. That is the only additional forces commitment, and it has already been announced, that arose from the Lisbon conference, so far as Canada is concerned.
The estimates which were tabled the other day indicate that our mutual aid figure, our payment for assistance, goes up to $324 million in the next year. But the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre wants details of the total NATO military program, and, presumably, details of the programs of other members. All I can say to him is that it is quite impossible to give those details.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.
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Lester Bowles Pearson: It seems to me the reason is quite obvious, and must commend itself to members of the house. Quite apart from the question of security-and I think it would be a breach of security if we placed those figures on record in the form in which he would like to have them-quite apart from that, it would not be appropriate in this house for a representative of the Canadian government to give in detail the military programs of other governments represented in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization-and certainly not appropriate without their consent.
But I will say this-and I tried to say it briefly the other day-that when we went to Lisbon we were confronted with new figures for military programs. Those figures, those programs, resulted from a very exhaustive examination of previous military-programs by the temporary council committee which had been set up in Ottawa, the executive committee of which was known as the three wise men. The very procedure of that committee, and its executive committee, shows how closely we co-operate in NATO. Such an inquisition, and I do not think it is an exaggeration to call it that, of the military budgets of one state by three representatives of other states, under which the ministers of a state were asked to explain their defence budgets, was a procedure which would have been quite impossible before the war.
Following that procedure the temporary council committee approved its final report and submitted that report to us in Lisbon. The resolution adopting that report was put before us and agreed to by us there. That resolution had in it-it is a secret document still-much besides the military goals and the military programs. I can assure you that in it economic matters were not overlooked, nor were they overlooked in the report. As a matter of fact the press statement, to which so much attention has been devoted, itself spent most of its time dealing with economic apart from military matters.


John George Diefenbaker: Who gave out that press statement?


Lester Bowles Pearson: It was issued by the North Atlantic council.


John George Diefenbaker: Under the minister's
authority as chairman?


Lester Bowles Pearson: The chairman of the council is responsible for all official press statements issued by the council.


John George Diefenbaker: Did he see that?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I was chairman of the council, as the hon. gentleman knows, and naturally as chairman I took full responsibility for any document or statement issued officially


Mr. Green:: Hew much is Canada to supply?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I have stated that already in terms of physical contributions, military programs and mutual aid assistance. I stated that a few minutes ago.


Howard Charles Green: No further commitments for 1952?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I stated that too. I said that we had indicated that we would try to get approval for an additional R.C.A.F. fighter squadron, but not necessarily for 1952. That is part of the whole program of eleven R.C.A.F. squadrons, which will now possibly be raised to twelve if parliamentary approval is obtained.
The vagueness of this paragraph has been criticized. It is obvious the paragraph is vague. I admitted that the other day in the house and of course I admit it now. Conscious of that fact, efforts were made almost at once to clarify what that paragraph meant. In the house the other day I repeated statements of clarification from the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom and from the president of 'the United States. Within twenty-four bourns of the issuing of that statement there was also a broadcast over the C.B.C., from which I quote as follows:
The T.C.C. report calls for approximately fifty divisions by the end of the year, the first time that official use of such a figure has been made in public. It was explained, however, that this does not refer to fifty divisions maintained in combat readiness. Some will be in combat readiness, others outfitted and equipped and capable of being brought into combat readiness in short order.


Mr. Knowles:: Was that a NATO release?


Lester Bowles Pearson: This was a C.B.C. news broadcast explaining the paragraph which I have just read from the T.C.C. press statement.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Then it emanated from one of the press services?


Lester Bowles Pearson: It emanated from the C.B.C. There was no Canadian press service represented at Lisbon during our council meetings. As I said the other day, there were statements issued in London and Washington. Last week in Washington Mr. Lovett referred to the earlier statements and I should like to read a couple of paragraphs from his presentation to congress in connection with the mutual aid program which was before congress at that time. I think it was last Thursday or Friday that Mr. Lovett spoke as follows:
I have previously stated that somewhat more than half of these divisions will be combat ready, while the remainder will be reserve divisions. A reserve division on the continental pattern differs from our American concept of the nature of a reserve division. The continental reserve division has its organization complete, although most of its personnel continue in normal civilian jobs. The reservists live in the vicinity of their unit assembly points. Each man has his mobilization assignment.

He knows exactly where to go to draw his individual equipment and just where to take his place in a gun squad, tank crew, or rifle platoon. It is the place he has already been trained to fill. Longterm officers and technicians maintain the equipment and the units have periodic training exercises.
A division of this type, which can be mobilized in twenty-four to seventy-two hours, is almost as ready for action as is the front-line division maintained at full strength. Some reserve divisions will not be ready that quickly. They will require a little more time for unit training. But in every case, a reserve division must have most of the major equipment available, as well as a reservoir of trained combat soldiers and specialists.
So much for our program for 1952, which I submit is now reasonably clear in our minds. As for the subsequent years, figures were talked about at Lisbon which have not been made public. These were, as I have said, for planning purposes only. We agreed at Lisbon that they should be reviewed periodically by NATO agencies to make sure *that they were realistic in the light of prevailing conditions; that if they could be safely reduced they would be; and that if they had to be increased recognition could be given to that fact. For that purpose we resolved at Lisbon that an appropriate NATO agency, not an ad hoc committee but an appropriate permanent agency of NATO- perhaps part of the secretariat, but that is to be worked out-should continuously review the requirements for building adequate defensive strength, and try to reconcile the military needs of the countries concerned with their political and economic capabilities. Surely, Mr. Speaker, that does not look as though the military are running away with our planning in NATO, or as though NATO has fallen completely under their control or under any sinister influence of any kind. That is all I want to say about that aspect of our work at Lisbon.
The second subject we discussed there, and a very important matter indeed, was the association of Germany with western defence. When we got to Lisbon the atmosphere with respect to this matter was not very propitious. There had been difficulties in some of the European capitals where the legislatures had been discussing these questions, and no one felt unduly optimistic that we would be able to reach agreed decisions at Lisbon with respect to this matter of German association with western defence. In fact, we were successful in reaching such agreed decisions. One resolution approved on behalf of NATO the principles of the treaty establishing a European defence community, which treaty included provision for a German defence contribution, and also provisions for certain security regulations after the peace contract takes the place of the occupation statute. We also agreed at
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Lisbon on principles governing the relationship between the European defence community, if and when it comes into being, and NATO itself. Our decision here was to this effect. We agreed that there should be two closely related organizations, one working-as far as the common objective of the defence of the Atlantic area was concerned-within the framework of and reinforcing the other.
I think we all felt before we went to Lisbon that there was a very real danger of the European defence community developing a separate existence from NATO itself, if and when the community was set up; and I think most of us felt that it would be disastrous to get away from the Atlantic concept even to achieve such a desirable objective as a European army. This resolution was to guard against the danger of that development. More important even than that, I think, was our agreement that each of the organizations should give reciprocal security undertakings to the other, so that by virtue of these undertakings the whole area of both organizations would be covered by a security guarantee.
The significance of this, if it is carried into effect, if the legislatures of the countries concerned agree, including the Canadian legislature, is that the area of guarantee will cover western Germany-that is to say if the defence community comes into being and if in the treaty establishing that organization there is a reciprocal guarantee on the part of that European defence community covering our present NATO territory. I do not think it is easy to exaggerate the importance of that decision. So far as guarantees and security are concerned it does bring western' Germany into very close association with NATO.
Then finally under this heading we agreed on a procedure by which there can be joint meetings of both organizations, a matter which caused a good deal of difference of opinion in the six months or so before the Lisbon meeting. These joint meetings can be called on the initiative of either organization and indeed, in certain circumstances, they can be called on the initiative of any one member of either organization.
I think all this is of very considerable importance in the development not only of European unity but of the north Atlantic concept; but none of these decisions can take effect until the treaty establishing the European defence community is ratified. I think we might reserve our most enthusiastic plaudits against that day, because there are obvious difficulties in the way of such legislative action, difficulties in Bonn, difficulties in Paris, and possibly difficulties in other capitals. In Bonn we know what those

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difficulties are: the German insistence that in the substitution of a peace contract for the occupation statute there should be a recognition of their equality of status with other members of the European community; the German insistence on unity between east and west, with all that implies in terms of boundaries and other things.


Howard Charles Green: East and west Germany?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, union of east and west Germany; the union or reunion of Germany.


Mr. Pearkes:: Could the minister say which are the countries in the defence community?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, Mr. Speaker; there are six countries in the defence community: France, western Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.


Howard Charles Green: On that one point, may I ask what would be the position if west Germany attempted to take over east Germany, once this community has been set up?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Even under the draft treaty which is now being discussed with a view to the setting up of a European defence community there is no provision which would obligate any member of the community or any member of any North Atlantic Treaty Organization associated with the European community to go to the help of any country which takes any offensive or aggressive action of any kind. It is purely defensive in character; the reciprocal undertaking is to help each other if attacked, and on no other occasion.
This question of Germany, which loomed so large in our minds at Lisbon and must continue to loom large in our minds in all the free countries, is very difficult, complicated and indeed explosive. There are two extreme trends which might develop dangerously in Germany at the present time. On the one hand there is the revival of militarism, nazi militarism; and there is the other extreme, the rejection of all defence responsibilities by the Germans and the creation of a power vacuum in the centre of Europe. We know what happens when a vacuum of that kind is created. We have a pretty good idea who would try to move into that vacuum in present circumstances. Nevertheless the fact remains that Germany, as I see it, is bound to become stronger and is bound to become united ultimately. Surely it is better that this should be done in association with the Atlantic powers than in isolation, or on a purely nationalistic basis, or in association with the communist east which would have no scruples about a Germany armed to the teeth, with nazi 
leaders back in harness, provided that was done by a communist government under Moscow orders.
There are also difficulties in the way of the ratification of these treaties in Paris. There is the financial difficulty facing any French government; and that was made very clear to us at Lisbon. There is the difficulty of the war in Indo-China, with its inevitable drain on the French economy and on France's human resources. There is the fear, which is still strong and still understandable in France, of a resurgent and remilitarized Germany against which there must be guarantees, which are being worked out. Then also in France today there is a hesitation in certain quarters over the whole European defence community concept. But, Mr. Speaker, I think we can be reasonably optimistic that as a result of our Lisbon decision, which makes this progress possible, Germany will be satisfactorily associated with western defence and in that way with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization before very long.
Another matter with which we dealt at Lisbon is called, and I hate to use this horrible word, the infrastructure problem. I disclaim any responsibility for the word. In fact, everyone who speaks about it now disclaims any responsibility for it, but it must have started somewhere. You may be even more shocked, Mr. Speaker, when I tell you that once at Lisbon we solemnly discussed a subject which was referred to on the agenda as "the solution of the hard core of the third slice of infrastructure." In plain English terms infrastructure means collective facilities. We were faced with the problem of deciding how many of these facilities were required for the 1952 program. It is not much use going ahead with a program, especially an air program, if we have not the facilities, such as airfields, with which to carry it out. We were confronted with the problem of finding out how many of these facilities were absolutely necessary in 1952, and how the cost could be fairly divided between member countries. We came to agreement on that point, and the Canadian proportion of that total figure for 1952 for the infrastructure program appeared in the estimates the other day as $27 million.
Then finally, Mr. Speaker, at Lisbon we completed our consideration of the problem of the association of Greece and Turkey with NATO. The Greek and Turkish representatives took their places there for the first time as full members of the organization. We began at Lisbon the consideration of the military planning which is required to bring them into the military organization. We

agreed that the land forces of these two valuable defence allies would be brought directly under the supreme commander of NATO for Europe, and the naval arrangements are to be worked out.
I apologize for detaining the house so long, but at Lisbon we considered other than military questions and I should report on them. The first and most immediately important of those questions was that of the reorganization of NATO or, as I would prefer to call it, the adapting of the NATO organization to its new functions and its new responsibilities. Probably the most important decision under this head was that, instead of having the council meet two, three or four times a year with deputies meeting in between, the council would be established in permanent session with the ministers attending when required. There were to be representatives of the ministers and the governments acting for them in between ministerial meetings. These permanent representatives are now being appointed by the various governments, and the Canadian representative was nominated the other day. I hope that, among other things, this will reduce the necessity for so many ministerial meetings.
In connection with this reorganization we approved the abolition of the existing civilian agencies, such as the finance and economic board, the defence production board and the maritime shipping board. These will now become committees of the council. After a great deal of discussion we also agreed that the permanent headquarters of NATO should be located in an area in which other international agencies were located whose work is important to or closely related with NATO, and with whom co-operation is essential. This brought us to Paris. We agreed also that there should be, as the senior permanent official of the organization, a secretary general who would be not only a secretary general in the usual sense of that office but a member of the council and, indeed, the vice chairman of the council. As you know, Lord Ismay has been appointed to that office, a man of wisdom, tact, experience and modesty. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is very fortunate in securing him.
Finally, under this head, we discussed nonmilitary co-operation. The committee of five, which was set up as the house knows some months ago, made its report on this subject. Just to remove any doubt in this house that we were only concerned with military matters, I should like to read some paragraphs from this report.
. . . The committee wishes to emphasize that the process of achieving cohesive relationships among the countries of the North Atlantic community is
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necessarily a slow one. and that it would be a mistake to expect rapid or spectacular achievements. In this field it is necessary to build carefully on a solid foundation. The immediate and urgent aim of the North Atlantic treaty is the common defence. The degree of success which is attained in defence co-operation will in large part determine the progress which can be made in strengthening the Atlantic community in its wider aspects. The sense of community, the experience, and the habits of co-operation which the development of collective defence has engendered form the essential basis for the growth of collaboration in fields other than defence.
The report went on:
The enduring nature of the North Atlantic community must rest on something broader and deeper than military co-operation alone. Indeed, this is explicit in the Atlantic pact itself, through article 2, and is reflected in the growing habit of consultation and feeling of community within the group. This concept of the "North Atlantic community" cannot easily be defined. Nor does it necessarily have to express itself always and immediately in institutional terms. But the idea itself is of vital importance and advantage should be taken of every opportunity to transform it into reality.
The committee feels, however, that this transformation, though essential, will not be easy, indeed, it may not even be possible if economic collaboration does not develop and increase; if the members of the North Atlantic community do not take early and concrete steps to liberalize and expand trade between them and with other friendly countries. They must give their peoples the hope of greater human welfare by increased production and exchange of goods on an easier and wider basis than is now possible.
The report also made certain concrete suggestions to avoid duplication and overlapping in this economic field, especially with the organization for European economic co-operation. We also discussed in this report co-ordination and consultation on our separate foreign policies, and the desirability-we have emphasized this before at NATO-of no one member of the organization taking a far-reaching decision on foreign policy without at least some consultation with the other members of the organization whenever possible. There was also a section in the report by the committee of five dealing with the movement of labour and manpower, subjects that are of very great importance to some European members of the organization. Certain proposals for social and cultural co-operation were made, such as the exchange of students, the encouragement of travel, the exchange of teachers, as well as other proposals for making NATO, its ideals and its purposes, better known.
Finally in this report, Mr. Speaker, we recommended our own disappearance as a committee of five. We felt that this subject of non-military co-operation could not be dealt with effectively on any basis smaller than that of the full membership of the

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council, and as the council will be in permanent session now it should take over the work of developing this field. That is what will happen.


Mr. Wright:: Can the minister say, in concrete terms, what has been done to date?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I cannot give any information in concrete terms as to what has been done in the field to which I just referred. Indeed, very little has been done in the field of nonmilitary co-operation. I admit that, and I think we must all be disappointed that more has not been done. But we have laid the foundation for a growing feeling of community in these matters, and I think if we are patient we shall find that results will be achieved. Some progress has been made, for instance, in the field of migration, but that is of more concern to the European countries than our own. Then there is the question of the exchange of labour between European countries. On this occasion in our report we did make to the council certain concrete and specific suggestions for action. It is not, however, appropriate for me to tell exactly what they are until the council decides what action it can take in regard to them.


Percy Ellis Wright: There is no military secret about them.


Lester Bowles Pearson: No, there is no military secret about them; but the hon. gentleman must surely be aware that in a committee reporting to an international organization, it is not normal to give out all the information in that committee report until the organization itself has had a chance at least to consider it; and that has not yet been done by the North Atlantic council in respect of this report which was adopted in Lisbon but not acted on at that time.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Will the minister permit one more question on that matter?


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Can he say whether there was any discussion of any budgetary arrangements for carrying out any of these economic proposals?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, there was a discussion of budgetary arrangements for NATO generally and there was an estimate made by the experts who worked with us on this committee as to how much these proposals would cost. They will cost a considerable amount. They include such items as exchanges of students and that kind of thing. But I am not in a position to give exact figures in that regard at the present

time. They will not cost much in relation, I might add, to our total defence program.


Stanley Howard Knowles: You are saying that before we do.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That is the survey which I was anxious to make of our results at Lisbon. That is what we tried to do at that meeting. Summing up, I would merely say that our military goals in NATO must remain-and we all agree on this-the minimum necessary for defence; and they must be reached, if possible, in such a way as not to prejudice the economic and social stability of those countries which are not yet strong enough to sustain the high costs that would be entailed by too large a military program-costs which might have been much lower before the war and much easier for them to undertake then. I am thinking now particularly of the European countries.
We must not sacrifice and we are not sacrificing our social, political and economic objectives to an exaggerated and false emphasis on armaments. I believe that there is nothing exaggerated, false, militaristic or provocative in our plans or our programs. The burden of carrying out these programs and these plans has, I think, been quite fairly distributed. But we must also remember that in attacking NATO the communists have concentrated on two things, and they are the enemies of NATO. They have concentrated on the danger of German rearmament and the unnecessary militarization of the west, with its consequential unnecessary tax burden, which they allege is being forced on the rest of us by United States power policy. By this propaganda they hope to isolate Germany from the west and, far more important, they hope to isolate the rest of us from the United States. I suggest that we in this country, as elsewhere, must be on our guard against these divisive and dangerous tactics and must do our best to defeat them.
This government feels strongly that we must continue building up steadily and unprovocatively in NATO, and in accordance with realistic programs, the strength necessary to neutralize and to defeat, if we are forced to fight it, Russian communist aggression. We think that this policy remains the best deterrent to war, and we are not weakening in our support of it. We also recognize, however, that the menace is more than military. It might also express itself in economic and social strains which will at once be exploited by the communist conspiracy-a conspiracy with agents in every land and designed to undermine and


to destroy our western Christian civilization which is based on human freedom, co-operation and tolerance and then to replace it by totalitarianism, autocracy, and a brutal police state.
I believe that we made good progress at Lisbon in the organization of collective security. I think the decisions we took there were wise and realistic. I hope that we shall all be able to agree in this parliament to support these decisions and to move steadily ahead to achieve our objective of a peace which will mean something more than merely the absence of war. A NATO policy based on a program of adequate but no more than adequate defence, on the desirability of doing everything possible to develop a sense of community and partnership, and which also takes into account the necessity of acting effectively to promote greater human welfare is, I believe, one that should and will command the support of all parties in this house and of the great majority of the Canadian people, in the future as it ha,s in the past.


Gordon Graydon: Mr. Speaker, I suppose this debate on Canada's foreign relations takes on more significance and is laden perhaps with more importance than almost any similar debate in which we have been privileged to participate, through these years, in the House of Commons. The gravity of our international situation, the position in which Canada finds itself with respect to the general pattern of world difficulties, is something which, of course, makes what is said in this chamber perhaps more significant and perhaps more vital than normally would be the case.
This afternoon I am going to speak mostly on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and I hope that this parliament, and all parties in it, will be able to make it unmistakably and abundantly clear to the world that Canadians are able to stand together in the pursuit of international peace. This country has not a single ambition which can be gratified by war. All of its ambitions can be gratified only by peace. All our well-laid plans for economic and social development in this country are predicated upon our being able to live, to do business and to carry on our affairs in the atmosphere of a just, lasting and durable peace.
More than that, Mr. Speaker, there is today a cloud hovering over our deliberations which perhaps most of the membership of the House of Commons will be unable to dissipate and to banish from their minds. Whether we as members sit on the government benches, whether we belong to the official opposition 55704-43
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or belong to some other group in the house, the fact is that we are trustees today in parliament for those hundreds of thousands of young boys and men in Canada whose lives, whose existence and whose future depend upon whether we are able to do our full part in seeing to it that they are able to live in an atmosphere of peace in the days that lie ahead. We are in a sense their trustees, Mr. Speaker. With that sobering thought in our minds we realize that their interests must have more priority in this debate than any other single thing that permeates this chamber this afternoon. After all, over 100,000 Canadian boys lie in cemeteries in alien countrysides today as mute testimony of what Canada was prepared to do over the last half century that we might have freedom, liberty and all that goes with it in the days of tomorrow.
As for our point of view and our approach to these serious and sobering challenges, I want to sound a note of warning. It is that statesmen generally, no matter in what country they may be found, owe some responsibility to the things they say at a critical time like this. We know that some allowance has to be made, perhaps; nevertheless there have been made in other countries statements which ought not to have been made. It does not apply to only one country in the world; it applies to several. I was very much concerned when I read in the paper during this week a statement made in public by a leading statesman in the United Kingdom, a man who has been prominent in the socialist government of past times, a man who has ambitions, I understand, to reach the position of prime minister of Britain if fortuitous circumstances should permit him to do so in the days that lie ahead. Speaking in London on March 16, Mr. Aneurin Bevan said:
United States economic policy is doing more damage to western Europe than Stalin can ever do.
I don't believe the American nation has the experience, sagacity, or the self-restraint necessary for world leadership at this time.
I want to say to Mr. Bevan, and to all those who may follow a similar plan and pattern, that this is not the time to try to divide peace-seeking nations who band together for the purpose of preserving the peace. This is no time for nations to be making faces at one another, or to be indulging in transatlantic name-calling, no matter who they may be. This is no time to foul the nest of NATO or to foul the nest of peace itself. That is not international statesmanship. It comes very close to international mischief. In the days that lie ahead men and women in all parts of the free world owe a responsibility to see to it that they

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guard and guide their statements in this matter in a way that will best promote peace and unity rather than trouble and division.
I should now like to say a word with respect to the events which lead up to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself. When the second world war drew to a close there was a great reservoir of good will, so far as the Soviet people were concerned, right here in Canada itself. Many people of course felt that the Soviet armies had performed great achievements, and that the endurance of the Soviet people themselves had a great part in the victory that came over Hitler's nazism. But why was that reservoir so quickly dissipated by the Molotovian diplomacy at the end of the war? It was dissipated by steps that I need not detail to hon. members: steps where we saw the absorption of Poland, and the Balkans; then, the capture of Hungary and finally democratic Czechoslovakia. Then there was the interference in Greece, in the elections in Italy and the elections in France, and the Berlin blockade. One could see the steps one by one which indicated very clearly that the march was on, and that the democratic world was in serious danger of a threat from several quarters.
Added to that of course came the work of the dreaded cominform. It worked like a termite boring into every national structure in the free world. Well, it was only a matter of time until the free world, and particularly the North Atlantic community, had to make up its mind that, in ordinary street terms, it could no longer take that kind of thing lying down. After some intermediate steps, which I shall not dilate upon at this moment, there came the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, a creature of sheer necessity and circumstance. There is nothing nebulous about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; there is nothing uncertain about it. We are tied in, and properly tied in, so that an attack upon one means an attack upon all, and we judge ourselves and govern ourselves accordingly if that time were to come.
I want to say this to you, Mr. Speaker, and to hon. members and to those who may feel that the heat is off-and there may be people who feel that the heat is off: So far as further Soviet imperial expansion in Europe or elsewhere is concerned, in my opinion the heat is not off. My answer is that if we underestimate the plans, the potentialities and the ambitions of these world revolutionists, we in this country are playing with fire. The staggering gains which they have made over the last seven years, during which they have brought under communist domination more than, and quite a bit more than, one-third

of the world's population, should be sufficient to shake the most complacent of our Canadian people and people in other parts of the free world. The Soviet's dogged perseverance, and determination to put the free world under their heel never flags and never falters. They have a system whereby they can control their people so that they dare not flag and dare not falter. That I suppose is one of the strong points so far as their might is concerned and their policy of perseverance through the years. But may I say, too, they believe that time is on their side; that they have the option either of fighting now or of waiting out eventualities in the achievement of their aims. And we must be prepared in this country, and other free nations must be prepared, adequately to meet whichever course they may choose to adopt. That of course brings us to some of our most important problems so far as this government and this parliament of Canada are concerned.
We would make a mistake, I think, if we did not see in that movement of theirs what amounts to a modern crusade. Evidence of that crusading spirit filters through even from the Korean front, from which stories are brought from time to time indicating the fanatical conduct of the communist fighters there. These Soviets mean business; and I say to you, Mr. Speaker, we must accept the challenge and mean business too if we are to survive. I know it is harder to crusade for the things you have than it is to crusade for the things you have not. That, I think, is perhaps one of the great truths that one learns from experience in the world. But this Kremlin threat, with all its sordid implications, means that we must crusade for the things we have and for those things that are treasured in our way of life. And we have been given little choice with respect to the position we take in that regard.
With these factors in mind the Progressive Conservative party pins its hopes upon the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as the most effective instrument in our hands at the moment for peace. No one will say that NATO has achieved everything we would wish. There are many things which must be done, and which remain for improvement. No one is more conscious than we are of the necessity for including in NATO's long-term plans those other essential bastions of defence ranging all the way from the economic, financial and social to the moral and spiritual fields. But right at this moment, if I say nothing else with respect to our position in this debate, I wish to make it abundantly clear-and perhaps there is no need for us to make it clear-that at this time we feel strongly that the emphasis must be laid on

and the urgent priority given to military preparedness and rearmament; because only behind a wall of military security can these other desirable objectives be achieved.
I shall return to a further discussion of NATO in a moment, but before doing so I shall address myself to hon. members with respect to some of the aspects of our Far Eastern policy, and one or two other matters relative thereto. I shall then return to my discussion of NATO before concluding my remarks.
I was interested in the speech delivered this afternoon by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson). I thought that at one stage he sounded a rather hostile, and certainly a rather provocative note that, to my mind, was not justified in the circumstances. I hope he did not mean his words to be provocative; but, having in mind the fact that very recently he has been in another quarrel with another party in the house, I was wondering if he thought that perhaps he ought to even up the score, and suggest that some academic discussion should take place on some matters in connection with the Far East.
I can understand the minister's point of view. I imagine that, in some of the remarks I shall make toward the latter end of my speech, he will perhaps understand, if indeed he does not now do so, why there may have been very good reasons for deciding, from his vantage point, that there should be something else discussed in addition to plans, goals, targets and hopes of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. After all, I imagine that if I were in his position, and had his responsibilities in connection with the chairmanship of the NATO organization, and had given to the people of Canada as little real or detailed information as he has given, I would want everyone to discuss the Far East too.
There is one point in connection with this matter, however, with which I had intended to deal, a matter which is not entirely academic, either. I fancy all of us want to be sensible and sound. I do not think we want to encourage any more divisions of opinion in respect of foreign policy than are absolutely necessary. But I do think that, in connection with one matter with which I shall deal, clarification is due.
I did not take down the minister's words in toto this afternoon; but in the speech he delivered in New York on March 7 there was one paragraph that fascinated me, from the standpoint of what the minister meant when he referred to the famous island of Formosa. I shall read that sentence from 55704-43i
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his speech in New York-and I believe he quoted it this afternoon-in which he said:
I think that we should make it clear that while Formosa cannot be allowed to fall into Chinese hands-
I underline the words which follow because they are the words about which I wish to speak.
-while aggressive war is going on in Korea-
And then he goes on to say:
[DOT]-we do not intend to use our own forces to restore to China the regime which is now in Formosa, after being driven off the mainland.
It may be that the minister felt he had clarified some of these statements this afternoon. But it was not clear to me. It is not clear whether he meant to convey the impression that, once a truce had been agreed upon in Korea, Formosa ought to be allowed to fall into Chinese communist hands at once. If that was the meaning, then I would not hesitate to say to him and to the house that a policy of that kind would seem to be a dangerous one to pursue, in the face of further possible plans for aggression on the part of red China in other sections of the Far East.
I would hope that we would not take any hasty step leading to the delivery of Formosa into red hands, to become a potential key factor in their plans for further breaches of Far Eastern peace. The reason I mention that this was, to a large extent, academic in its nature is the fact that, as I see it today, neither this nor any other government can do more than simply to formulate its Far Eastern policy with respect to Formosa and to red China, on a day-to-day basis.
I think that to indulge in a long and academic discussion of some hypothetical matter relating to Formosa at this time not only does no good but perhaps might do incalculable harm in the days ahead, while at the same time it might leave the government in the position in which they almost placed themselves when they pretty nearly recognized red China and had diplomatic exchanges with them in the latter part of 1949.
That is why I say that, in the fluid state of conditions, in a situation of this kind, I fancy the government would not want to provoke an academic discussion of that matter. I do wish to point out clearly our position with respect to the matter the minister raised.
I would say, too, that the leader of the C.C.F. advanced a proposal with respect to the Far East which I feel is unacceptable in present circumstances. He proposed that the present negotiations between the United Nations and the reds with respect to Korea
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should be taken out of the hands of the military and placed in the hands of the civil authorities.
I am afraid we cannot agree with that point of view. There are negotiations taking place for a truce. In the very nature of -things, they are matters of a purely military nature, and should remain with the forces in the field, acting on instructions from their own governments, until agreement is reached. That has been the well accepted course followed down through the years, and I do not think there -should be any departure from it today.
As a matter of fact we are now in one of those periods of recurring optimism with respect to the truce talks, and any drastic change in the structure of the present negotiations might hinder rather than help a speedy settlement.
The leader of the C.C.F. went further and indicated that the time was ripe, not only to pursue the course mentioned but also to accord diplomatic recognition to red China. In my opinion, to give such recognition to a *declared aggressor would be to reward aggression itself. It should not be done at this stage. It will be time enough to consider diplomatic recognition, the taking into membership in the United Nations and a number of Far Eastern issues when communist China gives evidence to the world that she has abandoned her program of aggression and has entered into a satisfactory peace settlement which will guarantee stability to the Far East.
I should like to point out if I may something I said in the debate on February 5, 1951, with respect to our position concerning red China. My speech was made just after I came from -the meetings of the United Nations general assembly in New York. I have no intention of reading into the record more than one paragraph, but I think this is closely allied to some of the matters which I have been discussing. I quote from page 75 of Hansard of February 5, 1951, as follows:
Canadians will hope fervently that the free world will continue to leave no stone unturned to bring the Orient and the Occident into peaceful and harmonious relationships. The door to further negotiation must still be left open for an honourable and just settlement. If I were to underline any part of the speech I am making this afternoon, it would be those two sentences. We do not want a war with Asia; we do not want a war with anyone. We want to help Asia. But naturally we want to be certain that we are not assisting in the building of a giant Soviet empire designed to overthrow us and the rest of the world when we are offering the hand of genuine help to peoples who sorely need it. So we say to the red Chinese government: Get rid of your Muscovite masters, and be your own. We can deal with Chinese as Chinese, but their membership in the imperial

Soviet family puts unnecessarily high hurdles in front of free democratic assistance. Take those hurdles down and let us work together in peace, harmony and understanding. We all have much to contribute together, but less to contribute alone.
I come now to another point, a Pacific pact which was a matter mentioned by the minister of external affairs this afternoon, although he did not enlarge upon government policy with respect to it. It may be that that policy is static, that it remains the same as it was previously. It seems to me that our foreign policy, looking toward protection by strength of our free way of life, should not neglect the Pacific area in any plans that are made. The red planners for world domination appear to heed the language of power and might above everything else. Nothing seems to encourage them more than evidence of hesitancy or uncertainty in the policies of others. It was the failure of the free world- to make plain their feelings to these diabolical planners in June, 1950, that played a big part in their decision to cross the 38th parallel in Korea. The Far East of today, as well -as other areas of the free world, could be placed in jeopardy through a division of views on free-power policies.
We must not take the chance of having another Korea. This party has previously called for the consideration of a Pacific pact. It believes that as time moves on the argument in its favour becomes more convincing than ever. The implementation of such a policy would give a measure of stability in the Far East and would enable us to proceed with our plans for the rehabilitation of those areas in the Asiatic free world which are so essential to peace itself.
There are further problems which arise and we must make it abundantly clear that we are ready to deal with them as well. I should like to refer to another part of the Far East. When people discuss in a loose and sometimes critical way the contribution which the British commonwealth can make to world peace, they quite often seem to overlook one part of that commonwealth which perhaps can make the greatest contribution toward better relations and stability as between the east and the west. Something like four out of five people in the British commonwealth of nations are Asiatics. That means that the commonwealth becomes an effective and practical link between the free powers of the western world and the free powers of the Orient. In my opinion part of the keystone in the arch of our efforts to save democracy in the generations to come is that link provided by the commonwealth between Canada, the United Kingdom, India, Pakistan and Ceylon.

Anyone who overlooks the vast possibilities of bringing the east and west together under the aegis of the commonwealth is overlooking something which is practical and which should always be uppermost in our mind. Along with other hon. members, I was interested in the Indian elections which resulted in a great victory for Prime Minister Nehru. One feature of that election which was of some concern to the western world was the large communist vote polled in certain sections of southern India, particularly in the provinces of Travancore and Cochin. I understand from those who come from India that the reason for the communist vote being heavier in those provinces than in some other places was that there was an unsatisfactory type of provincial government there. This indicates not only that, communism can be a positive thing in certain places but that it can be a vehicle for a negative expression against existing institutions, existing forms of government and existing political parties.
One lesson that should be taken from these Indian elections is that we in this country and in the commonwealth must see to it that we use every means at our command to see that the free democratic parties of India, Pakistan and Ceylon are given every help possible so that they remain the governments of those countries in the days that lie ahead and so that communism will not have a chance to take control. I regard India, or perhaps I should say the subcontinent of India, as being the bulwark and bastion of democracy for the next twenty-five or fifty years in the Far East. They will have a great opportunity to provide leadership for that part of the world which is moving toward independence and shaking off from their necks the yoke of domination. I think we can be mighty proud of the Indian, Pakistani and Ceylonese people for the stand they have taken and the way they have held out. At a time when less courageous people and those with less vision would not have held out, they have provided us with at least a first-class bridgehead for democracy where, during this period, we otherwise might not have had a bridgehead at all.
So I think when we are considering the question of our contribution to the Colombo plan we should have these things in mind. I was very interested last Monday night to hear the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker), in a brilliant exposition over the air with a number of press representatives, stress one of his favorite themes, that we ought to increase our contribution to the Colombo plan. Our estimated expenditure for
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next year is $4,300 million, half of which is to be devoted to the effort to save democracy and the peace. Of that $2,100 million only $25 million is to be used in an attempt to salvage and help India, which occupies a key position in the world today. I believe the government should carefully consider the allocation of money for various expenditures, because in some respects it would seem that we are doing our utmost to close the door on one side of the world while leaving it ajar on another. Not much would be required. It would not be a matter of interfering with our military preparedness program in respect to NATO. I have no doubt that if the minister were to go through the various departments and comb out all unnecessary expenditures, we could give another $25 million to India without scarcely requiring even another vote by parliament. I think we must face that situation, because if India gets on her feet democracy will prevail in the Orient. If India does not get on her feet, then of course we and they are in peril.
Now for a moment I want to return to our obligations with respect to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I for one believe we should do everything we can to achieve a united Canada as far as the prosecution of our plans for world peace is concerned. There is enough division in the world now without our contributing further to it. In that connection I think the government must bear its full share of responsibility for the promotion and continuance of a united program. It is all very well for the minister and the government to say they are watching vigilantly to see how many people on this side of the house are going to support them in their Far Eastern policies and so on. Why, you would think he was trying to catch some of the people off guard on some of these academic questions. Instead of that, if I may say so, the minister should be recognizing his own responsibility for the confusion that exists in the public mind right across Canada.
I was very interested in what the minister said today. To tell the truth I felt rather sympathetic toward him when the hon. member for Lake Centre asked who was responsible for that bad NATO press report. It took the minister a while to get around to it, but he finally said, "Yes, I am the bad boy." He did not use those words, but I imagine everyone knew what he meant. When you have been in diplomacy all your life it must be easy to use language some of the rest of us do not always understand. There has been far too much loose and unconnected talk, if I may say, about NATO goals, NATO plans, NATO blueprints, NATO targets, and NATO hopes. No doubt some of these things have to be done in the

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ordinary course of events, but my great complaint is that not enough emphasis has been laid upon giving the public of the free world the bold, clear and understandable truth. It is one thing to throw a lot of big, fancy words on the pages of Hansard; it is another to understand them. Today the minister almost apologized for his use of the word "infrastructure", which I thought meant a kind of undercarriage but which he says has something to do with collective facilities. The public rebels against that kind of description of what NATO is doing. If the North Atlantic governments want to ensure a powerful and united public opinion behind them in their policies, they can best achieve that by telling the people in ordinary terms what is going on and what is proposed to be done.
That is all we are asking. I do not think you will get unity of purpose across the country unless the government takes the lead and does its share. Everyone in this house, no matter to what party he belongs, has as much interest in seeing that we keep out of war and that peace comes in our time as the minister or any of the other top brass in the cabinet. No one has a monopoly on that. We may not be quite as well informed, because after all we have not the battalions of technical people behind us that they have; but that is no reason why we should not pound this government to find out what is going on. And that is exactly what we are trying to do.
Accepting the view that communist imperialism may or may not necessarily march next week but that it nevertheless constitutes a positive threat to our security, the question arises as to how we can best meet the problems caused by a protracted period of cold war. A solution of that problem will come much more easily if the government will tell this house, and through it the Canadian people, the full extent of cabinet commitments made on behalf of the Canadian people to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I know it will be said that some of these details must be kept secret, that it is not in the interest of NATO generally to disclose them. Well, when the last war was on I seem to recall that similar words were uttered. There were governmental objections from time to time on that very basis, but in the end parliamentary pressure was able to compel the disclosure of at least many of the essential details so the public could gain a fuller understanding of what the nation faced and the reasons underlying the heavy taxation. If that could be done in war-and it was done partially anyway-surely there is no reason why it should not be done in peace. I do not need to tell the government there is confusion in the public mind over fMr. Graydon. ]
these matters; they are quite well aware of that fact themselves. That is plain from the approach of the minister of external affairs, his tone of voice and his anxiety to see that this confusion is removed. My own feeling is that without in any way jeopardizing the position of NATO with respect to security or secrecy, parliament should be made aware of the following essential facts:
1.	What have Canadians been asked to contribute to the North Atlantic peace pool in terms of military assistance, processed materials for defence, money, raw materials and other forms of help: (a) before the Lisbon meeting and (b) at the Lisbon meeting?
2.	Of these, what have we undertaken to provide?
3.	What plans has this government instituted to discharge these undertakings?
Parliament should be assured also that all waste will be eliminated, if we are to build up a high public morale and enthusiasm and resolution and determination to see this NATO thing through.
Do not make any mistake about that, Mr. Speaker. The public are going to ask this government not to spend one extra five-cent piece by way of extravagance and waste in the process. I think that has an important bearing on the whole problem of public relations and public morale which is so necessary at this time. I feel that parliament should be assured that waste and extravagance in defence and non-defence expenditures will be eliminated, and that the practice of overstating progress in rearmament, which tends to create a sense of false security, will be discontinued. After all this afternoon the minister admitted issuing this statement from Lisbon which had so many booming and buoyant characteristics about it. No doubt he had learned that lesson from this government; that has been their tendency. I want to say that that ought to be discontinued, whether it is here, whether it is in NATO or wherever it may be. Really no progress will be made by overstating the case. What the people want to know are the clear understandable facts stated in language that ordinary people like ourselves understand.
When I last spoke on this subject in this house I made a proposal to the minister which he more or less shrugged off. I suppose he was thinking about the Far East at that time. In any event, he shrugged off my suggestion about a national development and production board. I went into detail with respect to that before, and I am not going into detail about it this afternoon. I do feel that a national development and production

board, set up in co-operation with the provinces tor the purpose of making a survey of our natural resources, would be useful. Such a board should contain some of the best brains in the country in agriculture, industry, business, labour and the important professions as well as other sections of our national life. It would be of some help to Canada today in preparing to meet its commitments to NATO. It would be an important step in connection with the development of our mineral and other strategic resources, and a means of enhancing our capacity to shoulder many of our obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I have examined this proposal with a good deal of care and consideration, and I put it forward with all the earnestness that I can summon. I hope that the government will see in it some measure of benefit and advantage to this nation in these critical times.
I am the first to admit that the problem facing this administration, and indeed every other government participating in NATO, of keeping at high enthusiastic levels the national resolution and determination to see this thing through, is a gigantic one. It will not be done merely by a government saying it has to be done. It will be done by the masses of our people, with a full realization of the magnitude of the threat to our security and in possession of the information as to how comprehensive is our part in the combined pool and as to what steps are required at home to carry it out. There is no point in deceiving ourselves that the superimposition of a program of defence preparedness on top of a normal peacetime economy, without the mass psychology of war to support it, is going to be any easy policy to carry out.
I do not propose to make the task of this government any more difficult than it is by anything that I shall say or do. I do say to the government in conclusion that my main reason in asking them to take fully into their confidence the people who man our defences and pay the shot is in order to present to the world a united Canadian team for peace.


Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Rosetown-Biggar):: First of all, Mr. Speaker, I wish to comment on one remark made at the very outset of the minister's speech. He said he hoped that, in principle, all parties would stand together on international affairs. If the principle he had in mind is that Canada should resist both communist aggression and a revival of fascism or nazism throughout the world, we accept that principle, and I hope other members of the house do also. We believe that wherever human freedom is threatened, those of us who believe in individual liberty and
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democratic institutions must stand together. But in carrying into effect that principle we believe that there are other than military means which must be taken into account; in other words, that the raising of the standard of living, the feeding of the hungry, amongst the depressed peoples everywhere is the best insurance in the long run that we shall have against both communism and nazism or any other form of totalitarianism.
One result of the criticisms that we have made of the Lisbon conference statement has been the achievement of considerable clarification of the NATO objectives agreed to by the Atlantic nations at the recent conference. After all, Mr. Speaker, I have always believed that the functions of an opposition should be to criticize the statements of the government, and to endeavour to get at the real facts in any situation with which we are faced. As a matter of fact, there are some matters which are not yet clarified, even after the minister's speech of March 13 when he gave information of a type very much like that which he has given us this afternoon, and when he took responsibility to some extent for the Lisbon press conference statement and admitted that it was ambiguous. The Toronto Globe and Mail of last Saturday went further than that and said:
Ambiguous is hardly the word for the communique and the summary. If Mr. Pearson is correct, these documents were a pack of nonsense, not to say a pack of lies.
That is pretty strong language. I would not go that far myself, although I was very critical of the minister about the statement that was issued at Lisbon. I think it was a statement that was wrapped up in such language that it was deliberately designed to mislead the people, particularly those on the North American continent. The London Times, the London Economist and other papers with an international reputation considered that there had been a vast increase in the targets. They had been discussing, as we all had been discussing, 25 or 30 divisions in 1952 and 60 divisions in 1954, as the target which the NATO countries had in mind. Those goals, may I add, did seem both attainable and reasonable. Then the communique seemed to indicate there would be an increase and that view, let me add, was reinforced by an address that many of us heard over the air by the United States secretary of state for foreign affairs, Mr. Acheson, on February 29 when he said there had been an increase, and that was taken at its face value. I want to say to the minister that up to now I believe there has been a great deal of confusion and that, in any event, I think that the chairman of the conference-in this case the minister-and his colleagues are to be criticized because,

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knowing that this confusion existed, they were so tardy in removing the cause of it. Unless the matter had been brought forward in a striking manner not only here but in several other places, no clarification might have been made for a considerable time. It is apparent that for a whole year the real goals or targets were higher than we in this parliament and elsewhere were led to believe. I say that when a condition of this sort is exposed it has a bad effect, because it undermines confidence in such organizations and the statements which they issue from time to time.
Of course, if this was done last year in the interests of secrecy, I submit that it was bound to fail in its objective because, I think, probably from our own published reports, our own statements made in this parliament and those made in other parliaments of the Atlantic nations the Soviet union understands perfectly well what our rearmament program is, what our manpower situation is, and what the economic circumstances of all the NATO nations really are. I therefore say that it could not fulfil the objective if that was the objective that was in mind during the last year. I am also certain that if the information had been given at the time, that information might have been understood. But because the targets were large I think that there was a fear on the part of the Atlantic nations that some of the countries at least might be filled with consternation. I am equally sure that had these military targets that evidently were in contemplation a year ago been revealed, there would have been more insistence upon the part of many of us-and I include myself in this group-on the giving of more economic aid to the nations in order that they might bear the burden being imposed upon them.
Apart from matters that must of necessity, in circumstances of this sort, remain secret lest there be given to the enemy information which the enemy should not have, I say to the minister that democratic peoples have the right to know all the facts; that is, as I say, without jeopardizing the security that we must carefully guard.
The minister said again this afternoon that he did not know where the idea came from that a budget of some $300 billion had been adopted at the NATO conference by the NATO nations; that is, $300 billion for the next three years. As a matter of fact, that information was headlined in all the Canadian papers. It was carried in the great papers across the world. Indeed, we were told that this budget had been adopted unanimously at the Lisbon conference.


Lester Bowles Pearson: That was not accurate.


Major James William Coldwell: What is that?


Lester Bowles Pearson: That amount was never
adopted and no figure was suggested.


Major James William Coldwell: No; but I say that all the newspapers reporting the conference told us that was so. As a matter of fact, failing any other authoritative statement from the Lisbon conference, we naturally accepted that as being the true state of affairs. I must say at once that when you look at the budgets of the nations already for their military equipment and so on over the next three years, as has been outlined from time to time, you can understand why it was that there was considerable criticism and indeed a great deal of misgiving in the minds of most of the people who read those stories from Lisbon. The United States' budget for armaments is $171 billion over the next three years, as far as we are able to find out from reliable sources.


Lester Bowles Pearson: For all defence, including the Far East.


Major James William Coldwell: Yes, that is for all defence, including NATO defence. The defence budget of the United Kingdom for all purposes is about $13 billion; that of France about $12 billion; our own we set last year at $5 billion; Germany, recently, $7-2 billion; Italy, $3 billion; Netherlands, $2-82 billion. If you omit the smaller countries and their contributions- such as Luxembourg, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, Belgium and so on-you still have a total of some $213 billion previously approved.


Lester Bowles Pearson: For total defence.


Major James William Coldwell: For total defence, including Korea, domestic defence, NATO and every other form of defence. When we picked up the newspapers and read $300 billion for NATO defence, you can understand that most people were thunderstruck at the target the NATO nations had in mind. Of course it was not possible to contemplate the spending by these nations of even another $80 billion or $90 billion for all defence purposes. I suppose that Britain-indeed, I will not suppose it; I know that it is true-is in a better position economically than is either France or Italy. Yet within the last two weeks Mr. Churchill made it clear that his government could not fulfil in the three-year period the commitments made for defence by the previous government. He says that it will need at least four years to complete the three-year program which was adopted last year. Consequently one can readily understand that the budget published by the press was as misleading as it would have appeared to be phony if there had been any truth in it.

I can understand why the figure had been given, if for no other reason than perhaps to give our United States friends the idea that other nations were doing much more than they were doing or indeed could undertake.
I now want to say a word or two about something for which the minister took me to task last week. In the course of my remarks last week I asked him if he did not feel that the rearmament of Germany, before the integration of that country into the European family, would be disastrous. When the agreement was reached on Germany's financial contribution to rearmament and for the integration of the European defence community into NATO-and he explained that the European defence community would involve western Germany-surely it was not wrong to infer that agreements had been reached among the governments, of which Canada was one, even if the parliaments of, we will say, two or three of the nations did not subsequently ratify the agreements. I want to ask the minister this question. Is it not a fact that, as early as September, 1950, in New York the foreign ministers of France and Great Britain agreed to accept in principle the rearmament of western Germany? Was not a protocol even signed to that effect among them? Certainly an agreement was reached among them in principle. As the minister says, certain things are done in principle. I believe that was agreed upon in principle as early as in 1950. Why I raise this today is that I believe these suggestions for the rearmament of Germany have been and are dangerous to the rest of the world.
It is now reported, and authoritatively reported, that Russia is proposing, as part of a German unification plan, the remilitarization of Germany, setting up a German army, and granting the right to manufacture instruments of war and indeed the remilitarization to the extent that former German officers, even if they were former nazi officers, shall have the right to regain positions in the new German army. The Russians are proposing that the proposed army shall be free of association with any other army in Europe. If that is the case then it seems to me that the talk about the rearmament of Germany that we have been indulging in on our side has enabled the Russians to do something that is rather clever, and to outbid us for the support of the German people. We are now faced, and I think possibly Dr. Adenauer is faced, with a very difficult problem regarding the rearmament of Germany. It seems to me that the proposal for German rearmament had at its root of course the desire of the United States to withdraw as far as possible their own manpower from western Europe, and 55704-44
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now the chickens are coming home to roost. I hope they will not be crows that will pick our bones again later on.
If I were to sum up what I have already said I could not do better than quote the London Economist in regard to these matters. In an article in the London Economist of March 1 last, I read these words:
It is a pity that NATO nowadays puts so much into the shop window without stating either the price or the quality of what it offers. During the Lisbon meeting of its council that ended this week statements were made to the press which were as woolly as the speeches of Gladstone's declining years.
Round figures, flat assertions, and high aspirations tumbled into print together, and it will need some plain speaking by Mr. Eden if the House of Commons is to get a clear and firm picture of the state of North Atlantic defence. It is right that a certain secrecy should surround NATO's diplomatic and military discussions, and that this should be proof even against the appalling inquisitiveness of congress. But to counterbalance this secrecy by talking airily of fifty divisions this year and a hundred in 1954, by giving the impression that the German defence contribution has been settled when it clearly has not, and by pretending that Franco-German difficulties over a European defence community are not so serious after all, is a dishonest practice. It will not frighten the Russians but it may well lull the Europeans. It is all very well to build up the prestige of NATO in American eyes: but if it is based on illusions there will be bitter disappointment one day.
That is the view I expressed in this house and our own national council expressed, and it caused us to use the words that the statement from Lisbon was irresponsible and disastrous. All this of course brings into sharp focus something to which the minister did not refer today, but I shall refer to it very briefly. I refer to the need for an attempt, and a continuous attempt, to reach a progressive disarmament agreement among the nations, and particularly with Russia. After all, the burden of rearmament must be as great on the Russian people as it is on the western nations.
If Mr. Churchill's recent statement, and indeed the statement of our own Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), that war is neither imminent nor inevitable is true-and I want to join them in saying that I think it is true -then with the strength we have already attained, every attempt should be made to clear up international disputes and reach agreements to disarm and build our common collective security through the United Nations.


Mr. Bradette:: They tried that at the end of the war.


Major James William Coldwell: This will be a difficult task, but we should turn down no opportunities, no matter how inadequate they appear to be, to achieve this result, and no matter how and by whom these offers are made.

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The hon. gentleman interrupted me, but I am in good company when I say that.


Mr.   Bradelle@: We tried that since the war.


Major James William Coldwell: I am in good company when I say what I have just said. Let me quote Mr. Acheson. He made a statement on March 13. Of course he was calling attention to the forthcoming meeting in New York of the new United Nations disarmament commission, on which we have a representative, I believe. It began its meeting on March 14, last Friday, under the chairmanship, incidentally, of one of our own Canadian representatives, Mr. Johnson. This committee was established by the general assembly in Paris recently. This is what Mr. Acheson said. Some hon. gentlemen were inclined to laugh when I made the suggestion just now. Will they laugh at what the secretary of state in the United States said?


Mr.   Bradelle@: I was not laughing. We
have been trying to do that.


Major James William Coldwell: I did not say the hon.
member was laughing. Some others were. Mr. Acheson said:
It is not inconsistent to talk about reduction of armaments in this time of world tension and while we are still hard at work building our military strength.
We are rearming because we have been forced to do so by the threat to world peace and security stemming from the existence of huge armies and armaments in the Soviet Union and its satellites. But we are ready, as we have always been, to take the other and-from our viewpoint-much preferred way toward international peace and security: to cut down our forces if agreement can be reached on an effective plan of balanced disarmament.
We should keep that offer m our minds whenever we are discussing rearmament, as we were doing this afternoon. We should again turn our minds, as Mr. Acheson did, to the problem of disarmament. I am aware of the difficulties. I was present in 1946 when this matter was discussed before the general assembly in a very striking manner. I remember the atmosphere. I remember the hands of friendship that were stretched out to the representatives of the Soviet union by Sir Hartley Shawcross and by others, and I remember the manner in which the offers were spurned by the Soviet representative at that time, Mr. Molotov. But I say that whenever we are talking about rearmament we should not overlook the desirability of doing everything we can to promote disarmament.
Mr. Acheson said it was the business of the United Nations today to try to find a way to do that, and he added:
So that when the time is ripe nations may achieve international order without the burden of tremendous defence budgets.

As I said a moment ago, I know how difficult it is to discuss such matters with the communist representatives at the United Nations. Having sat and listened to them often enough I know that there are great difficulties. But sometimes I have thought this, that when something is suggested to our western delegations by the Russians, even though we have been inclined to suggest that proposal ourselves, it is not well received and, indeed, turned down.
A case in point, I think, was something that happened at the last assembly. I was sitting one evening at home listening to the radio, and I heard a press report from Paris in which it was stated that the Russians had suggested that all the nations that had not been admitted to the United Nations should be admitted as a bloc of nations. That was characterized as blackmail on the part of the Russians.
I remembered that before the committee on external affairs our Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) had made that very suggestion. I looked up the record. Instead of summarizing what was said, I shall quote it. I asked him the question about the admission of certain nations to the United Nations, and the discussion that took place is to be found at page 64 of the official report of the proceedings of the committee on external affairs for the year 1950. It is as follows:


Hon.   Mr. Pearson@: I think there is a growing
feeling that we should reopen this question of applications and let in everybody that applies. That would mean an admission of another thirteen or fourteen states which would include certain communist satellite states, but it would include Italy, Ireland, Portugal and other states which are not communist.
In fact, a majority of the states were not communist at that time.
My own view is that we should reconsider this whole question of applications and possibly accept all of them.


Major James William Coldwell: That seems sensible.


Mr. Dickey:: Would it be possible, Mr. Minister, to get around the Soviet veto?


Hon.   Mr. Pearson@: Yes, I think it would be
possible. I do not want to be too dogmatic on anything the Russians may do but I think it would be possible if we said to Soviet Russia: we will accept all your nominees if you accept the other nominees. I think it would be possible to have them all admitted.
That, I thought, was a very sensible procedure. Yet, when the suggestion came before the general assembly at Paris we heard it characterized-and I hasten to say, not by the minister or by any Canadian officials, but rather by news services-as an attempt at blackmail on the part of the Russians. When it came to a vote, as I believe it did, we abstained, on this particular issue.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Yes, we did.


Major James William Coldwell: Yes; and may I say to the minister that the Canadian delegation is getting quite a reputation for abstentions in the United Nations. Here was a case in point where, when something that has been acceptable to us is proposed by people we do not like, we do not support the proposal when it comes from that quarter. I think that is a mistake.


Lester Bowles Pearson: May I ask a question? Would the hon. member read the list of states the Russians proposed for admission at that time?


Major James William Coldwell: I have not that list with me; but they are about the same as they were before.


An hon. Member:: Outer Mongolia.


Major James William Coldwell: There are two or three states to which I know we have objection-Outer Mongolia, for example. But there are some states to which they have objection, too. They might consider that some of these states are satellites of ours. And, after all, if you are making a horse trade you have to trade on the most advantageous basis possible. I do not think there has been any material change in the complexion this year of the number of nations from what there was in previous years.
I have felt that at times we have made a mistake in not giving consideration to suggestions that are made from the other side. And now, Mr. Speaker, I wonder if I might call it six o'clock, because I wish to say something about the Far Eastern situation, and this would seem to be the appropriate place to break off.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock. STATUTORY HOLIDAYS
Mr. J. L. MacDougall (Vancouver-Burrard) moved: the second reading of Bill No. 2, to amend the Dominion Day Act and the Victoria Day Act.


Howard Charles Green: Is the sponsor of the bill not going to make a statement?


John Lorne MacDougall: Mr. Speaker, on previous occasions I have made statements with respect to similar bills, but in order to conform with
55704-HI
Statutory Holidays
the request made by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green) it might be well if I said a few words at this time and dealt with some of the objections that were raised when the bill was first brought before the house in 1950. I might say that on a previous occasion a similar bill reached third reading but was talked out.
We are now in the sixth session of the twenty-first parliament. At the last special session a similar bill got first reading; on a previous occasion a similar bill got second reading; on another previous occasion a similar bill was talked out. One of the main objections raised when I first presented a bill of this type was that sufficient time had not elapsed to give the people of Canada an opportunity to think about the results of the bill. The desire was expressed by several hon. members that there should first be something in the way of an educational campaign in the various newspapers and over the radio so that the people could give the matter a thorough study.
I brought down with me only a few of some 250 letters, telegrams, resolutions, and so on which I have received since I first introduced this bill. I shall not take the time of the house to read them, although I could read some of the editorials and letters if hon. members so desired.


An hon. Member:: Read them.


John Lorne MacDougall: I do not think that is necessary, but with your permission I should like to refer to some of the organizations and newspapers which have been in support of this bill.


An hon. Member:: Read them all.


John Lorne MacDougall: I was ruled out of order last year for referring to this, but I might say that on October 9 last year a Gallup poll showed 73 per cent of Canadians in all walks of life as being entirely in favour of the adoption of the bill. The Victoria Colonist, which certainly is not favourable to me, has indicated its approval of this bill, as has the Edmonton chamber of commerce, the Toronto board of trade, the Brantford board of trade, the Vancouver News-Herald, the Vancouver Province, which wrote no less than three lead editorials, the national committee of the commercial travellers of Canada, the Financial Post, the Halifax board of trade, the Canadian tourist association, the Canadian chambers of commerce at their national convention, the Montreal Gazette, which wrote some lead editorials, the Montreal Herald and so on. The large labour organizations in Canada are 100 per cent in support of this bill.

Statutory Holidays
There is nothing intricate or devastating about the bill; it is most simple. It provides that instead of celebrating the 24th of May on the 24th of May or July 1 on July 1, those holidays will be celebrated on the following Monday. Last year July 1 fell on Sunday and by statute it was celebrated on the Monday. That resulted in a series of editorials and articles across Canada commending this bill. That gave the small man an opportunity to enjoy an unbroken week end.
We have royal precedent for changing the date of statutory holidays. Our late beloved sovereign, King George VI, decreed that his birthday should not be celebrated in December but in a more pleasant month during the summer. That in no way destroyed the attachment of the people of the United Kingdom or the commonwealth to their king, but it did give a greater opportunity to the subjects of His Majesty to enjoy the pleasures of a longer week end.
I do not wish to say much more about this matter. As was suggested, there has been a period of waiting and since the bill was first introduced we have had an opportunity to see what the reaction of the people of Canada was to a bill of this kind. I think I can leave the bill to the fair and impartial minds of this house to decide whether or not a measure universally acclaimed as this is, should be passed.
Not that this means the bill has any special merit, but in the thousands of instances in which I have personally discussed the matter with people I have not met anyone, with the exception of some of the members of the house, who is opposed to the adoption of this measure. There used to be an old saying that forty million Frenchmen can't be wrong. Surely 73 per cent of the people of Canada can't be all crazy. I would ask the house to consider this bill, to give it an opportunity of doing what three out of four people in Canada think it will do; that is, give them and their children a happier and more contented holiday week end from the Atlantic to the Pacific.


Mr. Mclvor:: I would ask the hon. member if there is anything in this bill which tends toward disloyalty to our queen.


John Lorne MacDougall: I shall be happy to answer that. I do not think the hon. member for Fort William (Mr. Mclvor) heard all I said about the royal prerogative in connection with this bill; but I do not think it is an overstatement for me to say that if it contained anything of a disloyal or divisive nature I would be the last man in this house to bring it up.


Howard Charles Green: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Vancouver-Burrard (Mr. MacDougall) has put his case in support of this bill very fairly, and I should like to bring to the attention of my fellow members a few of the arguments against it. In effect this is a double-barrelled bill; it seeks to amend two statutes, in the first place the Dominion Day Act, which is chapter 49 of the revised statutes of 1927, and in the second place the Victoria Day Act, which is chapter 204 of the same statutes. The proposed amendment would set the holiday for the Monday following June 30, in the one instance, and for the Monday following May 23 in the other.
I think the argument of the hon. member may be summed up in these words: Give us two more long week ends. In effect that is the sum and substance of his argument. Tonight I am not going to deal particularly with the Victoria day holiday, but I do intend to refer to Dominion day, July 1. As we all know, July 1 is Canada's national birthday, our one truly national holiday. For many decades it has been celebrated as such. That is one of the fine traditions of this nation. Before we do away with this or any other tradition in this country I think we should have a great deal more reason than merely to bring about one more long week end.
This is a day we all celebrate, a day for Canadians of all origins, French-speaking Canadians, English-speaking Canadians and the hundreds of thousands of Canadians of other racial origins. This is one national tradition on which we all agree. It can be made something to draw us closer together. Why just throw it away, particularly at this time when we are welcoming to Canada many thousands of people from other parts of the world, people who I believe will have had national holidays in the countries from which they come? Surely we should keep our own national holiday for the benefit of those people, if for no other reason. It will help them learn to love this country of Canada.
Let us follow the example of our great and friendly neighbours, the Americans. They celebrate July 4; that is their great national holiday. Would anybody in this chamber be rash enough to say that the Americans would be willing to do away with their 4th of July and celebrate it on the nearest Monday? I suggest that the national spirit of the American people is so strong and they are such a proud people that they would never even consider such a suggestion. I think it is an indication of some lack in the spirit of the

Canadian people that they should give serious consideration to doing away with the Canadian national holiday on July 1.
If the change advocated by the hon. member for Vancouver-Burrard is made, Canada will be asked to celebrate her national birthday on July 4 as often as she does on July 1. How ridiculous that would be. Take this year, 1952. If this bill should become law we would celebrate our national holiday on July 7; and if my calculations are correct we would not celebrate our national holiday on July 1 until 1957.
In many parts of the country we now have a five-day week. I know in British Columbia that is becoming almost universal. Even the lawyers are working on a five-day week, at least so it seems with the exception of my firm. Canadians who are on a five-day week have Saturday and Sunday free anyway. They now have a three-day week end if July 1 happens to fall on a Friday, a Sunday or a Monday. Already we have quite a few long week ends, and I do not know why we should be in such a great rush to get another. We have a long week end for the queen's birthday, another for Labour day and another for Thanksgiving day. If the change were made in connection with Victoria day, that would make four. Why should we go so far as to wipe out our national holiday in order to get a fifth long week end?
I suggest that if this bill is carried we will get one more long week end and lose our national holiday. Not only do I feel very strongly that this bill should not carry, and that we should not sacrifice our national holiday, but I believe we should take active steps to further the celebration of our national holiday. Other countries celebrate their national holidays. I remember when I was a youngster living in a small town in British Columbia we celebrated Victoria day and the adjoining town of Nelson celebrated July 1. I think that practice was universal throughout the whole of the Kootenay country. One town would celebrate one holiday, and another town the later one. They were great events, and certainly great days for the children in those communities. The result was that we had our attention focused on the nation and this helped build up in us great pride in Canada.
I believe that was a custom which should never have been abandoned. Just a few years ago we had an outstanding mayor in the city of Vancouver, Gerry McGeer, who as members know subsequently became a member of this house and then an hon. senator. As a matter of fact, he represented the riding of Vancouver-Burrard. While he was mayor he decided that Vancouver should
Statutory Holidays
revive her old practice of putting on a celebration on the first of July. Many people scoffed at the idea and said, "Oh, we want to go away for a week end; we are not going to stay in the city to take part in a celebration which is just a lot of poppycock." But Gerry did not allow himself to be influenced by the people who took that attitude. We all know what great energy he had, and what an organizer he was. He went ahead and put on a first-class show. Not only the residents of Vancouver but thousands of people from the surrounding territory turned out for this celebration, and saw a bang-up first of July national holiday celebration which did a great deal of good to everyone who was there.
I believe that the leadership should come from members in this house in promoting celebrations of that kind on our national holiday. We would be much wiser to be trying to work out plans for such celebrations than to be trying to work out some way in which to get rid of the holiday and get a long week end. This question is important now, Mr. Speaker, but it is going to be more important as the years go by. These traditions will mean more and more to Canada. Today we have one day on which we can all unite; a tradition which helps to build up the national spirit of this country. I do hope that this house will not take the backward step of doing away with Dominion day in order that we can get one more long week end.


Mr. George H. Hees (Broadview):: I think
it is unfortunate, Mr. Speaker, that in our language we have only the one word "holiday" to describe occasions with widely different meaning. A holiday may be a day of pleasure and relaxation, or it may be a day dedicated to solemn remembrance. Civic holiday in August is an example of the former, and Christmas day is an example of the latter. It would destroy the meaning of Christmas if we were to change the celebration of that day to suit our convenience. On the other hand, it would be foolish not to change the civic holiday date if we so wished, because that holiday was instigated purely for our pleasure.
I do not believe that Dominion day and Victoria day should be considered together because they are holidays that have very different reasons for existing. Victoria day celebrates the birthday of that great queen, and was given to the people of the commonwealth as a day for pleasure and relaxation.
Dominion day, on the other hand, commemorates the most significant event in the history of this country. The holiday that

Statutory Holidays
celebrates Dominion day is a most important day, and I think it is one on which we must remember the very important event that happened 85 years ago on July 1. It was never meant to be merely a cheerful break in the routine of our lives.
Victoria day was given as a holiday to be simply cheerful and relaxing in the routine of our lives. In that case the important thing is not the date. Some people may attach importance to Victoria day and feel that it should remain on May 24, but there are many precedents for changing the birthday of a monarch so that the celebration can be a holiday for the people. Edward VII changed the celebration of his birthday; so did George VI and recently our present monarch, Queen Elizabeth II, changed the celebration of her birthday from April to June 9 so that the people could enjoy a holiday at a more pleasant time of year.
With these precedents before us, I say let us change the celebration of Victoria day to the Monday immediately before May 24 so that the people may derive the greatest benefit from that holiday. I say the Monday before May 24 because the queen's birthday is to be celebrated on June 9, and I think it is advisable to keep the two holidays a reasonable distance apart.
Industrial workers have very few opportunities to take their families away for a holiday. A long week end in May would give them this opportunity at one of the nicest times of the year. When they get a holiday in the middle of the week, there is very little that working people can do, especially those with large families. They simply have to spend the holiday in or near their own neighbourhood, with very little benefit to themselves or families.
Now, if the holiday is added to the week end, those in industrial areas can take their families into the country to visit relatives and friends, or go to the cottage, as so many people do today if the holiday happens to fall on a Monday or Friday. This means a very real holiday for working people. The same thing applies to people living in the country, because they get a chance to visit the cities and towns, and enjoy a temporary change.
I think it is important for people to be able to get away from their usual surroundings once in a while. The more opportunities we can provide for them to do so, the more everyone will benefit. Victoria day was meant for everybody's pleasure, and therefore if that day is changed to the Monday before May 24 people could make plans to
IMr. Hees.l
derive the maximum benefit from that holiday. I therefore hope that section 2 of this bill will be passed. But, Mr. Speaker, I believe that the Dominion day holiday is a different matter. It commemorates a solemn national event and the holiday on July 1 has become a precious national tradition. I should be loath to see this holiday removed from the significance of its special date. It would then become indistinguishable in importance from the August Civic holiday and the September Labour day, and would be just another holiday.
I believe that Dominion day should remain a special day. It should be a kind of solemn rededication to our country and, as such, I believe it should be as immovable as Christmas. As to the Victoria day, Civic holiday and Labour day, it is the happy holiday that counts, not the day; hence they may be arranged to make them the best and most convenient holidays possible. As to Dominion day, it is the day, and the significance of that particular day, that counts.
Let us therefore not belittle our great national day by changing it to meet our convenience and pleasure. Rather let us set aside this particular day to remember with thanksgiving the founding of our nation.


Mr, J. A. MacLean (Queens):: Mr. Speaker, there are a few remarks that I should like to make with regard to the principle involved in deciding which date we should choose in the case of our public holidays. Should we govern our thoughts mainly by tradition or should we bow to convenience? In this case I think that the purpose of the bill is to arrange to have these holidays fall on a Monday so that two more long week ends could be provided. That suggestion has a great deal of merit, as has been pointed out by the hon. members who have already spoken. Nevertheless, I think we are in danger of becoming too practical and of forgetting the great traditions which are the cement which hold us together as a nation. These holidays should remind us of the great traditions which we follow and of the great heritage which is ours as a free and democratic people.
Six years ago I had the honour and the pleasure of representing this country in an informal and quite happy way in the south of France where Victoria day was first celebrated. I refer to the town of Aix-les-Bains where Queen Victoria used to go for her holidays in the summer, and where Victoria day was celebrated for many years before ever it was celebrated anywhere in the British empire under that name. This experience made me realize the value of those traditions of which we are reminded when we celebrate our national holidays. I

saw there what that day meant for the people of that community and the great importance they attached to it; I found that it was a symbol of their attachment for the British people and for the cause of freedom which we fought together to defend during the last war.
In the town square there is a monument of Queen Victoria. It consists of a bronze bust of the queen. When that part of France was occupied, the French maquis or underground workers risked their lives in order to save that monument and to bury it until France was again liberated. I had the pleasure of being present when that monument was reinstalled in the town square in that delightful little town in the south of France. It made me realize that I had seen Victoria day celebrated in a much better and more noteworthy fashion than I had ever seen it celebrated in Canada. It made me realize that perhaps we take these holidays of ours somewhat too lightly, that we forget their real significance, and tend to let our children do likewise.
As the hon. member for Broadview (Mr. Hees) has pointed out, I think we could afford to be practical enough, in the case of Victoria day, to let the day on which the birthday of Queen Victoria is celebrated be flexible enough so that it would fall on a Monday and thereby provide an additional long week end for the people in the cities. Incidentally, I may say that it would give the hon. member who sponsored this bill-I refer to the hon. member for Vancouver-Burrard (Mr. MacDougall)-the opportunity to go to Victoria on Victoria day, if he saw fit to do so.
But when we come to Dominion day, I think we would be making a poor move to consider celebrating it on any other day than the first of July. After all, if the event has any significance at all it should be celebrated on the day that gives it its significance. I do not believe that we would be wise in celebrating confederation on any other day than the first day of July. After all, we would think it exceedingly strange if the people of the United States decided to celebrate the fourth of July on the seventh of July or something of that kind.


Mr. Byrne:: Are we going to ape the Americans?


Mr. MacLean (Queens):: We are not aping the Americans. I do not think we are aping the Americans. But at the same time I do not believe that just because a thing is American it is automatically wrong or that it is incapable of being the best thing because it is the tradition which Americans happen to follow. In
Statutory Holidays
this case the Americans follow an excellent tradition and I think we would be well advised to retain our national holiday of Dominion day on the first of July.


John Lorne MacDougall: Mr. Speaker, if I may make a statement, with the unanimous consent of the house-


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I recognize the hon. member for Medicine Hat.


Mr. W. D. Wylie (Medicine Hat):: Mr. Speaker, I want to say a few words on this bill. I might say that I have had a speech on it ready for two years. I can assure the sponsor of the bill, and also the house, that it is not my intention to talk the bill out. If that event should be the net result of my efforts, however, I should not be too unhappy about it. It is not often that I speak in this house, and I might say that I was not particularly anxious to get to my feet tonight and speak. I feel, however, that this is an important bill.
During the last few days-although I perhaps should not refer to the matter-we have discussed a resolution which was sponsored by a member of the opposition. What happened? We saw what happened last night.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I think the hon.
member should address his remarks to the bill before the house.


Stanley Howard Knowles: He is just pointing out that it was talked out.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: Mr. Speaker, I was just comparing the bill we are now discussing with some other bills. I know I should not do that and that I should not have done it. I should like to see the same thing happen tonight with regard to this bill. I think it would be a good thing.
We talk about provincial rights; but if this bill goes through the house, what is going to happen? This provision is going to be forced on every province in the dominion. That is something we should keep in mind. The sponsor of this bill says that there was not very much opposition to it.


Mr. Fulton:: There is.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: He mentioned many organizations that are not opposed to it, but agree with it. I heard a lot of opposition to the bill, and many who were opposed to it belonged to the organizations that the hon. member spoke of. Many members of the chambers of commerce of western Canada and others do not believe that this bill should be passed.
I notice that the hon. member for Vancouver-Burrard (Mr. MacDougall) did not mention the Imperial Order Daughters of the

Statutory Holidays
Empire. That is a very strong organization. They have done a lot of good work in this country and will continue to do so. While this order may be a little bit out of date, I know that they feel the same way about it, and I am going to read what they have to say. I hold in my hand a document addressed to the leader of this group, which reads as follows:
Mr. Solon E. Low,
House of Commons,
Ottawa, Ontario.
Dear Sir:
At the March 7 meeting of the national executive committee of the Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire I was instructed to forward to you the following resolution:
"That the national executive committee, Imperial Order Daughters of the Empire, in session, go on record as being strongly opposed to Bill 2, 'An act to amend the Dominion Day Act and the Victoria Day Act,' for the following reasons:
1.	The observance of Dominion day, July 1, birth date of Canada, is vital because of its historic significance in our national life.
2.	The observance of Victoria day, May 24, the birth date of Queen Victoria, is essential as a link in empire unity.
3.	Because it is important to foster a Canadian national spirit, no utilitarian purpose in the observance of these statutory holidays should be permitted to outweigh or obscure the traditional significance of these two patriotic days. The true anniversary dates should be fixed1 in the minds of all Canadians."
It has been mentioned tonight, and rightly so, that some of our new Canadians, some of the immigrants coming to this country, not only from the British isles but from other parts of Europe, will ask us: what does Dominion day mean; what does Victoria day mean? We tell them in our schools what these days mean, and those schools are set up especially to train those coming from Europe. They are told the significance of those days. If this bill passes they will -say: Apparently it does not mean very much; your national holidays do not mean what our national holidays mean. That is exactly what they are going to say, and you cannot blame them.
We want good citizens; we want our citizens to know what Canada is, and we want them to know that we have national unity in this country instead of disunity. In my opinion a bill of this kind will foster one thing, namely, disunity.


Mr. Mott:: Nonsense.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: Someone says "nonsense", but what I say is right. We have heard much about provincial rights. If one province can talk about provincial rights so can another. If this bill passes, its principle will be forced on all of us.


Mr. Dewar:: It will not go through.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: I hope not. I hope we have your support.


Austin Edwin Dewar: You have.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: We had a good deal of support from that side of the house the other day; we need it tonight.
It has been suggested that one thing this bill will do is to celebrate two national holidays on a Monday, which will give us a longer week end.


Mr. Shaw:: A lost week end.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: The hon. member for Red Deer says "a lost week end". I remember two years ago when the hon. member for Fort William (Mr. Mclvor) was speaking he supported the bill. At that time he said you could go to church on Sunday and go out and fish on Monday. I would suggest that they go to fish on Saturday and then go to church on Sunday and they will be fit for their work on Monday. I think that is what the hon. member really meant instead of what he said.


Mr. McWilliam:: When do you fish?


William Duncan McKay Wylie: What about a farming community? What about the farmers who are doing summer fallow or are busy at field work at that time of the year, as many of them are? We know that in many towns today a farmer can do very little business on Saturday except in the few stores that happen to be open. They cannot do banking on Saturdays any more.


William Malcolm Mott: They work on Saturday.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: Yes, they do; they work on Sunday. Suppose they are working in the field on Saturday morning and their machinery breaks down. If this bill goes through they will have to wait until Tuesday before they can get repair parts for that machinery. That is something we must think about.


George Roy McWilliam: It will soon be nine o'clock. Keep it up.


William Malcolm Mott: Take your time.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: I am not worrying about the time I am taking in talking on this bill, Mr. Speaker. The more interruptions I have the better it will be. One good thing about it is that I can talk the bill out, and I do-not mind doing it.
It has been said by the sponsor of this bill that it will mean a longer week end. That was said previously by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green). We have many long week ends now. May I ask the sponsor of this bill whether he discussed with.

the ones who are going to be spending these long week ends if they have the money to do so? And may I ask him whether he is sure that if our friends come to see us they are going to be welcome over the long week end?
There are many labourers in the country today whom we describe as industrial workers. The Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott) has pretty well taken care of them so they must stay at home. Many of them would like to work longer hours, but it is impossible for them to do so. I know lots of our own industrial workers who would be glad to work on Saturdays, but they do not do it.


Mr. Smith (Moose Mountain):: Why?


William Duncan McKay Wylie: Someone asks why. I am not sure who it was. A farmer from Moose Mountain asked why. Well, that farmer from Moose Mountain should certainly know the answer to that question, without my telling him.


John James Smith: I do not, or I would not ask you.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: He is a farmer, and he certainly knows the answer to that.


John James Smith: What is the
answer?


An hon. Member:: Is there an answer?


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: Many industrial workers who work five days a week do not get enough to take a holiday.


William Malcolm Mott: If they took it in the middle of the week, they would get less.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: If you were an industrial worker, you would not know it.


William Malcolm Mott: I am, and I know it.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: I do not believe you are; and I believe I am right when I say that. One thing we must do is to retain Victoria day and Dominion day on the days upon which they fall, and not on any other days. Just because I was born on Saturday, on the first of April-


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Stanley Howard Knowles: You cannot change that.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: -should I celebrate my birthday on Friday, rather than Saturday, or on Sunday? I think that is entirely wrong. The same applies to these two statutory holidays. After all, we must keep in mind our ties with the British empire. We must keep national unity in mind, and keep before us the new Canadians who come to this
Statutory Holidays
country. As a matter of fact I was greatly surprised when the hon. member for Van-couver-Burrard (Mr. MacDougall) introduced the bill again this year.
I have a note on my desk saying that the liquor stores are closed three days a week. What does that mean?


Mr.   Moll@: Tell us.


William Duncan McKay Wylie: You should know, without my telling you. I do hope, Mr. Speaker, that this bill will be talked out tonight, and that if it comes to a vote, it will be defeated.


John Lorne MacDougall: Mr. Speaker-


Mr. Speaker:: If the hon. member speaks now he will close the debate. Does the hon. member for Vancouver-Burrard have consent of the house to make a statement? If so, he will not be closing the debate.


Frederick Davis Shaw: Is it his intention to answer certain arguments which have been advanced?


John Lorne MacDougall: Yes.


Frederick Davis Shaw: I would object, then.


John Lorne MacDougall: The statement I wish to make, with the unanimous consent of the house-


Mr. Speaker:: Without unanimous consent I cannot allow the hon. member for Vancouver-Burrard to make his statement.


John Lorne MacDougall: I have it.


An hon. Member:: No.


Mr. Speaker:: I am afraid the hon. member has not unanimous consent.


Edmund Davie Fulton: Mr. Speaker, I must say that the arguments advanced against this bill indicate to me that the present would be a most unfortunate time to proceed with it, because even those who say they are in favour of parts of the bill are not quite sure they are in favour of the same thing.
The hon. member for Broadview (Mr. Hees), who made an interesting speech, offered a suggestion-which I think should be entertained-that if the bill is proceeded with at all, it should be divided into two parts, one of which would deal with Victoria day and the other with Dominion day. But while he is favourably disposed toward changing the date for celebration of Victoria day, he does not agree with the idea of the hon. member who introduced the bill. One of them would prefer to have the holiday celebrated on the first Monday after May 23, while the other would prefer to have the holiday celebrated on the last Monday before May 24.

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So it can be seen that, quite apart from the division of opinion between those who want to change these dates and those who do not want to change them-and among the latter group I number myself-there is no agreement amongst those who do want a change. For that reason, if for no other, I think we should not proceed with the bill. But to me the compelling reason is that I agree with those who say the date should not be changed because of the importance of the tradition of celebrating our national holiday Dominion day on its proper date, and that is the first day of July.
For this reason, and because of the lack of unanimity, I think it would be most inadvisable to proceed with the bill at this time- or, as a matter of fact, at any other time that I can think of.
On motion of Mr. Fulton the debate was adjourned.


Mr. Speaker:: It being nine o'clock, we snail return to the business before the house at the dinner recess.



[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Abbott for committee of supply.
Major James William Coldwell: Mr. Speaker, just to complete the record, the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) asked me before the dinner recess the names of the nations that might have been admitted, had the first committee approved of the resolution recommending them all to the security council. I have those names before me, and I find that they are Albania, Mongolia, Bulgaria, Roumania, Hungary, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Jordan, Austria, Ceylon and Nepal. They were also asked to consider Libya's application. I take it that the group of nations would not have been less favourable from our point of view than the group we were discussing in 1950.
I said at six o'clock that I wished to say something about the Far Eastern situation, and particularly something further because of the remark of the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) regarding the Korean armistice negotiations. I suggested a week ago that, the Korean armistice negotiations now having spread over a period of nine months, it might be well to consider getting together the political representatives of the nations actually engaged in war in Korea, to see if an armistice could not be reached in that way. I did that because I felt that there was a stalemate, and some fresh attempt

should be made to break it. In my view that was a positive suggestion, particularly as the hon. member for Peel had suggested that we should not take negative positions in connection with international affairs. And, after all, having achieved the original objective which, as the minister pointed out this afternoon, was to drive the aggressors beyond the 38th parallel, we I think could afford to negotiate an armistice at the earliest possible moment-because I think all the nations are tired of the stalemate in Korea.
I know that it is a bit risky to discuss the Far Eastern situation, and particularly if one feels that once matters in Korea are settled an attempt should be made to obtain a general settlement in the Far East. People who have said that are described as fellow travellers, communists and so on. I am sorry to say that in our neighbouring country, the United States, some people have almost been silenced on that account. Recently we have noted the manner in which Mr. Owen Latti-more, for example, has been pilloried before the senate committee. Five years ago he warned his country that Chiang Kai-shek was out, that the Chinese people would have nothing further to do with him. Like General Marshall he said that they should endeavour to find democratic personnel in China and support that personnel in the formation of a government, or failing that to endeavour to get a coalition government, which would perhaps have some communist representatives, that would prevent the country falling into the arms of the communist leaders in China.
Unfortunately support for the corrupt regime now in Formosa drove the Chinese literally into the arms of .the Soviet union and upset the balance in Asian affairs, to which the hon. member for Peel referred this afternoon, and jeopardized the leadership which democratic India might have given to the Asian people. There was a possibility of bringing the Asian people as a whole to our side after the statesmanlike manner in which self-government was granted to India, Pakistan and Ceylon and the manner in which subsequently Indonesia was granted self-government. I am glad to see that the new government of Great Britain under Mr. Churchill, despite the fact that Mr. Churchill once said that he did not wish to preside over the liquidation of the British empire, is following the same policy in the Far East which his predecessors followed. As a matter of fact, in yesterday's papers there was a dispatch from Malaya quoting the new British high commissioner, General Sir Gerald Templer, as having called for the extension of common citizenship to Malaya's two million Chinese

and six hundred thousand Indians, and other measures leading to more self-government for this British country. He stated further that the emergency cannot be fought by military measures alone.
That is exactly what we have been saying in this House of Commons ever since the difficulties arose with the Soviet union. If we want to contain-I do not like the expression- communism, it cannot be done by military means alone. The minister has stated again and again that economic aid is a weapon that we must use. My criticism of the minister and the government to some extent is that insufficient attention has been given to article 2 of the NATO agreement, the Colombo plan and to Point Four of Mr. Truman's statement regarding aid to backward peoples.
I think much more attention has to be paid to that if we are to win the world to our democratic way of life. The Asian peoples are determined to throw off the age-old domination and exploitation by their own domestic reactionary rulers or representatives of imperialistic power. No military aid that we give to the reactionary elements in Indochina or anywhere else in the Far East will help us and our views. We shall play into the hands of the Soviet union unless we take other steps to meet the crisis that faces the world in the Far East.
Because of the fear of Soviet imperialism the democratic powers have been supporting reactionary regimes like that of the Syngman Rhee in South Korea. While we are not engaged in a war to put Syngman Rhee back in power, nonetheless there are elements among us who look upon that as a solution to the Korean situation. Then there is Chiang Kai-shek, and so on. The people of Asia are determined to throw off their bonds and we should be giving much more attention to this side of the problem than we have.
If there is any disillusionment among the Chinese people at the present time, and I think there may be, regarding their new communist rulers, we certainly cannot expect any support from the Chinese for the return of Chiang Kai-shek. Certainly we should have no part in any such attempt, nor do I believe from what the minister said today that Canada intends to give any support to a solution of the Chinese problem of that description.
It seems to me that all the western nations, including Canada, should endeavour once the Korean matter is brought to an end to find a settlement that will do two things. First, give the Asian peoples an opportunity of choosing their own forms of government. We cannot dictate to them what that form of government shall be.
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Mr. Browne (St. John's West):: How are
the Chinese people to form their own government?


Major James William Coldwell: As a matter of fact, they have chosen sides now.


William Joseph Browne: How have they chosen?


Major James William Coldwell: They drove out Chiang Kai-shek in spite of the fact that he had billions of dollars' worth of equipment from our nations, particularly from the United States, and at one time had as many as eight million men under arms. Yet he had to leave the mainland of China-I will put it that way- and find refuge on the island of Formosa. Consequently I think it is logical to assume that even if the present government of China obtained complete control of that country by force of arms, nonetheless the majority of the people supported the victors over the former regime in China.


William Joseph Browne: Where does Russia come in?


Major James William Coldwell: My hon. friend wants to know where Russia comes in. Probably Russia helped to arm the Chinese, but a large part of their armour came from our countries. This had been delivered into their hands by the Chinese soldiers of Chiang Kai-shek who wanted to overthrow his corrupt regime. Indeed many of the weapons bear the marks of North American factories. That is where many of the arms came from.
I agree with those people who believe that neither the Soviet union, the United States nor any other power will eventually control China. China never has been controlled by a foreign power. China never will be controlled by an outside nation. The Chinese people themselves will eventually settle the form of government which they will have in China. In any event we should not be a party to using young Canadian lives, weapons of war or our resources in a hopeless endeavour to inflict the Chiang Kai-shek regime upon the Chinese people once again. That is the point I am making; and I say it is generally true throughout Asia that the people are on the march, determined to achieve selfgovernment.
Well, Mr. Speaker, I would have liked to deal with several other matters in connection with international affairs. I would have liked to say a word about the Middle East.


Some hon. Members:: Go ahead.


Major James William Coldwell: No. Some other opportunity will present itself, and I always try to remain within the time allotted to a private member of parliament.

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Mr. Solon E. Low (Peace River):: Mr. Speaker, I always approach these external affairs debates with some trepidation, because I realize how easy it is in the heat of debate on such matters to say something that might be interpreted as perhaps dangerous to the unity of the Canadian people in regard to the policy the government wishes to follow in connection with the relationship of Canada to the other nations of the world. It is because I feel my responsibility in that matter that I very often approach these debates with some misgivings. I am quite sure, however, that the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) was sincere and earnest when he said he wanted the position of each party on the opposition side of the house set forth clearly, and I think he is entitled to know just exactly where we stand. I also think he is entitled to have us say what we feel in language that is not diplomatic. I could not use that kind of language anyhow, so I will just have to be as blunt as usual.
I think it should be recognized, Mr. Speaker, that no matter how much unity we may have as to the fundamental principles of our external affairs policy, there is an area for fairly comprehensive discussion and indeed for some criticism of details within the boundaries of those principles. I do not think the minister would expect us to conduct ourselves otherwise than in a critical way if we feel there are criticisms to be offered or suggestions to be made. I have always found him ready to take a look at those criticisms at any rate. If in anything I say I do sound critical I want the minister to know that it is not with a view to making his job more difficult than it is. I am sincere in that. I want him to know that I would not consciously do anything to make it harder for him to carry forward the job he is undertaking to do in the international sphere. He represents Canada. He is our spokesman in most of our international relationships. He wants to know what the Canadian people are thinking, and one way he can get to know that is by listening to what we have to say here in this house.
With that as a background I would like to proceed to tell the minister just how we regard some of the matters he brought into the debate this afternoon, to tell him where we stand with regard to Korea and the Far East, let us say; with regard to China and these other things. We stand, as we have stood from the beginning, in support of the objectives adopted by the United Nations as stated by the minister himself on various occasions, relative to the situation in Korea and the Far East. I hold in my hand a

document coming from the fifth session of the United Nations general assembly, and from page 2 of this document I read a resolution which was adopted by the assembly on October 7, 1950, I understand by a very large majority. This is the part I wanted to quote:
Recalling that the essential objective of the resolutions of the general assembly referred to above was the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government of Korea (the assembly) recommends that
(a)	all appropriate steps be taken to ensure conditions of stability throughout Korea;
(b)	all constituent acts be taken, including the holding of elections, under the auspices of the United Nations, for the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic government in the sovereign state of Korea;
(c)	all sections and representative bodies of the population of Korea, south and north, be invited to co-operate with the organs of the United Nations in the restoration of peace, in the holding of elections and in the establishment of a unified government;
In a speech at the plenary session of the United Nations assembly on September 27, 1950, the minister himself had this to say; and I quote from page 2 of the white paper containing the documents on the Korean crisis:
In the first place, the general objective as we see it of the United Nations in Korea should be to fulfil now the purposes which have repeatedly been stated at previous assemblies-a united Korea, a free Korea, a Korea which the Korean people themselves govern without interference from outside. This should be achieved by United Nations action and not through decisions reached by certain of its members.
In our judgment these statements of objectives are clear and unequivocal. But this afternoon the minister spoke as though the objective now is merely to defeat aggression. The question I have to ask, therefore, is: have we backed down from our original purpose, namely to establish a free, unified, independent and democratic government of Korea? I am sure the members of this house can distinguish between putting down aggression in Korea, which was the subject of the minister's talk this afternoon, and on the other hand achievement of the objective set out by the United Nations assembly and by the minister himself before the plenary session on September 27, 1950.
If we have backed down, if the United Nations Organization is going to be satisfied merely to stabilize the situation by agreeing to a dividing line let us say at the 38th parallel, would that be achieving the objective as set out by the United Nations? What about the armistice negotiations? If those negotiations which are going on right now should fail, then I ask how can we hope to achieve the objective as decided upon by the assembly without having the armies of the United Nations advance to the Yalu river and there

stabilize their position? Beyond that point how far must the United Nations go? Is it going to be necessary to go as far, let us say, as to bomb and destroy the Manchurian bases and accumulation points in order to secure their position at the Yalu river?
I know that when such things are mentioned they cause considerable hysteria amongst certain people. We are warned that if such action as the bombing of bases beyond the Yalu river were taken, it would inevitably bring us into an all-out war with China. Well, something that has been pretty hard for me to understand right from the beginning is this. We all knew that if we did intervene in Korea we would run a chance, right from the beginning, of coming into conflict with China. Why did that not stop us then, if we were unwilling to run the chance involved in fulfilling our obligations under the United Nations charter and the assembly's resolution? That is a question that requires an answer.
Now, to make our position clear, we believe that the United Nations should make every effort to achieve the objective as laid down in the assembly's resolution of October, 1950. What means they propose to take to achieve it, we shall have to leave to the United Nations and their command. We must say that no policy of a limited war for an unlimited period of time, according to our view, will ever achieve that objective.
I turn for a moment to the question of recognition of the Peiping regime in China. I think that the western nations made some terrible blunders in dealing with China during world war II, and especially after that war closed. Had there been the slightest good judgment amongst the advisers to the top men of the leading nations of the world, and had there been an honest effort directed towards this end, China would not be in the hands of the reds. But there she is. The Peiping regime certainly-I support the minister in this statement-should not be allowed to shoot its way into membership in the United Nations. Those are the words he used.


Major James William Coldwell: Nobody wishes that.


Solon Earl Low: No. Nor, indeed, should they be allowed to shoot their way into recognition by other nations. But let us make it abundantly clear that when we are taking that position it is the communist leaders and their aggressive and inhuman policies which we resist and dislike, and not the Chinese people. The door should not be closed between the decent, freedom loving and intensely nationalistic Chinese peoples and the West. Indeed, the western nations ought to use every effort within their power to get over to these people our sincere desire to
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assist them, if we can, to become liberated from the tyrannist dictatorship under which they have fallen, and to raise the standard of living of the Chinese people. Those things we must get over to them.
I come now to Formosa. We would strenuously oppose the return of Chiang Kai-shek and his army to the mainland at this time. We believe that the United Nations should defend Formosa and prevent it from falling into communist hands. Certainly, we should not hand over that island to the Peiping regime. What happens to Formosa after peace has been restored and through proper negotiations is another thing, but that represents our position. There are a good many people, Mr. Speaker, who feel that upon the outbreak of aggression in Korea it might have been better for the western nations to have established a line somewhere between the groups of islands making up the Japanese group and Formosa and the mainland, instead of intervening in Korea. These people may have some good points in their arguments to the effect that under such circumstances it would have only been a naval operation. Of course, it is too late to talk about that now. If a blunder has been made, it has been made and we have to try to correct it somehow.
Now, Mr. Speaker, with respect to Lisbon. I am glad I waited to find out a little more about the press report and what actually was contained in it before I said anything. I have never yet listened myself into trouble, but I have seen many people talk themselves into it. I think the minister has had an experience now perhaps that might be good for him, and in the future I suppose press liaison officers will be more careful about how they issue statements. To come back to the outcome of NATO, I am speaking entirely for the moment of military objectives. We support the military objectives as they were made somewhat more clear by the minister this afternoon, but we do object strenuously to what appears to be, in all too many quarters, only a half-hearted effort to make ready to successfully defend the free Atlantic nations against an aggressor or combination of aggressors. There are a good many people throughout the world who are feeling this way. I picked up the last two issues of U.S. News and World Report. I do not know how many millions of people this publication represents, but I know there are a good many millions who read it and will be influenced by this sort of thing. Listen to what it has to say on page 8 of the issue for March 21:
Armament is to become more and more a pumppriming project-

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Every now and then you have to inject something into the bloodstream of the economy, so they start the old armament pump.


Mr. Poulioi:: How do you spell that word?


Solon Earl Low: Pump-priming?


Jean-François Pouliot: Oh, yes, pump-priming. With a hyphen?


Solon Earl Low: Yes, that is right, with a hyphen. The article continues:
Arms money tends to be turned on or off, to be directed this way or that way, depending on economic weather vanes. Armament, as the planners set it, can become a great stabilizer of the future.
Does that mean to say that we have to go on indefinitely priming the pump, and not attempting to come to any conclusion with respect to the struggles that are going on? Just let them go on as a sort of stabilizing influence? Is that the idea-a limited war for a limited period of time?
The article continues:
Arms race is something of a phony. Instead of sprinting to get arms with which to win, attention is on jogging along, using arms money to keep business on a fairly even keel. Economic effects and opportunities in arms are getting more official attention of planners than the military effects.
The planners figure that they've really got something in arms money.
This is United States opinion right within the nation that is supposed to be leading the nations of the world today. We are supposed to be following this nation. Then they say:
War itself obviously is to go on simmering. War tempo in Korea will remain slow. Bigger war is not intended. Blockade for China seems vetoed as of now. Bombing of China as well.
And so on. We can hardly be blamed, Mr. Speaker, ini the light of such things as this for wondering if the haste to get into Korea back in June 1950 might have been because a lot of the planners saw some economic depression in the offing. The old pump has to be primed.
Then I turn to page 45 of the issue of March 14, and I read this because it does support the idea of a simmering war about which I have talked.
It is a strange kind of arms race, this one between Russia and the west. It begins to look as if only one side is really running.
After the invasion of Korea set off the race, some twenty months ago . . . Russia, at the start, had the troops, tanks, planes to sweep across Europe, go deep into Asia. Russia now has many more tanks and planes-plus A-bombs.
The west, at the start, didn't even have enough to stop invasion of Korea or Indo-China, let alone halt Soviet sweeps across Europe or the Middle East.
The west, now, after 20 months of the arms race, can hold in Korea but not win, and still lacks forces in being to turn back a Soviet invasion of Europe.

As the west is running this race . . . Britain is tiring on the first lap, cutting its speed by a third, taking four years to cover a three-year course. France, limping badly, has stumbled on the first turn. Western Germany, counted on heavily, isn't even in the race yet. U.S., far out. in front with the dollars, appears to be talking a better race than it is running. U.S. is lagging, too.
Mr. Speaker, it is not I who say those things. That is criticism being published in a prominent magazine which comes from the United States. Can a person therefore be wondered at if he begins to express some concern about the sincerity of purpose being displayed by those nations which are supposed to be out there doing their level best to build up a defensive arrangement, an integrated army in western Europe?
I fear that the western nations have not. been and are not now taking advantage of the breathing spell which Providence has granted to them within which to get themselves ready to meet the dangers that we have seen coming for a long while. I do not know whether we shall ever be able to make up that time, but the speed at which we seem to be going would indicate that we have lost most valuable time. The real danger, in my judgment, is that time will run out before we are ready. If we are going to take collective action-and we want to see collective action of such magnitude as is required for the safety of these nations, including Canada-then we have got to shake off uncertainties, or any diffidence that is besetting us, and must plunge into the preparations with all our energy. This warning applies to the leader nations, more especially the United States and Canada; but, Mr. Speaker, while we support and urge strong defence-defence which is just as strong as we need to turn back any aggressor or combination of aggressors-we at this time want to utter a few words of caution.
We think that every effort will have to be made to cushion our economy against the terrible impact of defence and other demands that are being made upon it. That statement holds true, I suppose, for other nations in the world, particularly those that are within the NATO group. We think that care will have to be exercised to see to it that we do not destroy productive incentive- that is, the incentive to produce in an all-out fashion-within our own country, by imposing on our people heavy taxation that they just cannot bear. There is no necessity for it. It can be financed in other ways. We ought to induce all-out productive effort by every good policy that can be laid down. I must say, Mr. Speaker, that therein lies a realm for some serious criticism of this government. They are not offering the proper inducement

'to all-out production, especially of foods; and foods are a vital necessity in this war against communism.
My colleagues the hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Blackmore) and the hon. member for Acadia (Mr. Quelch) already this session have put on the record some vital and potent material with respect to their views and our views in connection with the importance of food in the winning of this struggle. If we take a realistic view of the situation, we are going to note that the farmers of this country are ready to make that all-out effort to produce food in abundance, as we can produce it, if we assure the farmers that there will be a market for it.


Mr. Blackmore:: At a fair price.


Solon Earl Low: Yes, at what to them represents a fair price. But the farmers take a realistic view and they say this: What is the use of making such an effort if the markets are not there? We can-and I am sure that everybody who knows the situation will agree-substantially increase our production of foodstuffs and we can set up that kind of organization that will distribute those foodstuffs into the hands of people, within this country and in other countries, that can use them and that need them.
My colleague the hon. member for Acadia the other night, speaking in this house, impressed upon the members three steps that he thought we should take. May I just take one moment to review them. It appears to me that this is one of the things that we have got to keep in our minds as we make this defensive effort to try to build ourselves into a strength sufficient to resist aggressors.
The first thing the hon. member for Acadia impressed upon us was this. He said that we can find a ready market for much of our surplus agricultural produce right here in Canada if we see to it that every Canadian is given the opportunity to consume a fair amount of our production; in other words, if we see to it that he has a decent living. Thousands of our people, he pointed out, are today not getting sufficient in view of these high prices which prevail; and he was referring to those people who have to live on fixed small incomes, as many of them have to do. There is within our own country an almost unlimited market for much of our agricultural products.
The second thing he pointed out was this. In so far as we cannot market our own produce in Canada or exchange it for the goods of other nations, we must be prepared to sell our surplus to other nations in exchange for their currencies, and not haggle about the necessity for convertibility, which
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the Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott) tried to shove down the throats of the people at the conference that was held in London not long ago. By demanding that everything be done on the basis of convertibility, he forced Britain to cut back her exports by one-third. That is not the way to do business. We ought to be prepared to accept their currency. Someone may say: What good will that currency do us? In reply I would say: Maybe not any immediately. But the third point that the hon. member for Acadia stressed was this, and it is a practical one. To the extent that those currencies cannot be spent for goods which we would want to bring back and consume in Canada, we must be prepared to invest those currencies within the countries-like Britain and other countries-that want our goods, in order to expand their production so that they will be in a position to pay for their imports with exports, eventually; and that course would redound to our advantage.
There is plenty of scope within which to develop markets for the products of our farms as an incentive to all-out productive effort. Then we can look to the Colombo plan and other economic-aid programs to take some of the production of food which we are capable of producing and are willing to produce in these days. Much has been said about the Colombo plan and our participation in it. Last year we gave something like $25 million to assist in the technical aid or Colombo plan program. I do not yet know just exactly the details of how it was spent. I do not know just how much the other nations gave. I have not been able to get the details of that as yet. Perhaps they are available. There is, however, one thing that I want to say. We supported that contribution of $25 million to the Colombo plan, but we thought it was only a drop in the bucket as compared with the needs of the people of the world. Hungry people are the finest soil for communism and its growth.
There is one thing that I should like to mention in connection with our assistance under the Colombo plan.


Jean-François Pouliot: Before my hon. friend proceeds, may I ask him a question?


Solon Earl Low: Yes, indeed.


Jean-François Pouliot: With regard to the payment for Canadian goods in foreign currency, would he be ready to recommend the acceptance of Spanish pesetas in payment of Canadian goods, and would he add Spain to the list of countries which has been read by the previous speakers, and which should be admitted to NATO?

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Solon Earl Low: I certainly think that we should be prepared to expand our trade with Spain on an even basis with every other country that wants to trade with us and that would mean the acceptance of their currency, if that is all they have to offer us at the moment. If by accepting that currency there is any hope of obtaining increased production within Spain out of which they could buy or pay for our goods sometime in the near future, then we should do so.


Jean-François Pouliot: Exactly.


Solon Earl Low: Yes, I certainly will agree; but as far as admitting Spain to the United Nations is concerned, I cannot understand anybody who will fight against Spanish membership in the United Nations and yet be prepared to accept Russia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and those others.


Jean-François Pouliot: Very good.


Solon Earl Low: It is something I cannot understand. If I were going to fight against a membership in the United Nations I would fight it on a principle, and not on my prejudices.


Jean-François Pouliot: You have no prejudices.


Solon Earl Low: I hope not in this respect, and I hope that I can rid myself of prejudices.


Jean-François Pouliot: You have just proved that you have none.


Solon Earl Low: I said that within the realm of NATO we have to consider not only the military program but the non-military. So far as we in this group are concerned, we support any realistic non-military program for the closer co-operation of the nations making up NATO, and also, Mr. Speaker, any organization, in such a way as to get food into the stomachs of hungry people and help to lift them out of the slough of despond into which they have been thrust by circumstances.
There is one thing further I want to mention in connection with the Colombo plan. I hold in my hand one of the international conciliation booklets put out by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. I am reading at this moment from page 3 a little statement made by Trygve Lie, secretary general of the United Nations. It is in an article written by Dr. Arnold G. Huth, who appears to be somewhat of an authority on this particular phase of the work of the Colombo plan. This is Mr. Trygve Lie's statement:
I believe that the whole technical assistance program will depend to a great extent for its lasting success on the degree of confidence and support that it can command at the local community level and its ability to stimulate local action.

This is obviously true, but Dr. Huth says this:
The degree of confidence in the technical assistance program and the degree of support by the people largely depend upon the understanding and approval of the program, and thus upon the use made of the media of communications and information. The words of the secretary-general of the United Nations, spoken at the opening session of the general conference of UNESCO in Paris, in June, 1951, thus emphasize the importance of communications in economic development.
It has become more and more evident that the greatest obstacle to the technical assistance program is perhaps not the lack of funds and equipment but rather the lack of interest and support by public opinion, frequently indifferent, ignorant or hostile. How can this problem be solved as long as the media of communications necessary to inform and to arouse public opinion are so deficient, particularly in those areas where they are most needed?
Dr. Huth goes on to make a comparison of the communications in the underdeveloped areas of the world with those in the highly developed areas such as the United States. I was amazed when I saw this:
While the United States has 40,709,389 telephones, India with more than twice as many inhabitants has only 128,911 telephones. Indonesia with seventy-eight million inhabitants only 35,750 telephones and Pakistan with seventy-five million, only 17,445.


Lester Bowles Pearson: They are probably much happier.


Solon Earl Low: Yes; I can imagine that the minister oftentimes feels that he would like to take his off the wall and throw it in the waste-paper basket. I often do myself. But I think on more careful thought we would hate to do without them. I can imagine how much more tired the minister would be if he had to hop around to wherever his voice can be thrown in two or three minutes. It just points out, however, Mr. Speaker, the vast difference between the United States and many of these underdeveloped parts of the world when it comes to trying to get information out to the people to remove whatever prejudice or opposition there may be in their minds toward assistance from other countries, particularly when we are trying, under the technical assistance program, to go into these underdeveloped areas and help them to help themselves. If we run up against opposition we have to depend upon communication to educate the people, and that is one of the things that have not been done. Unfortunately we have not attended to the basic things first, and this may be one of the reasons why these technical assistance programs have been so slow in taking hold.
A further comparison, Mr. Speaker:
The United States has 1,773 daily newspapers with a total circulation of 54,017,938 copies, Saudi Arabia has not a single daily newspaper.

When the minister issues his communique from Lisbon he has not one newspaper in Saudi Arabia. Perhaps he wishes there were only one in Canada. I continue:
The United States has 19,796 motion picture theatres with 12,384,150 seats, as contrasted with 4 cinemas, seating 2,500 people, in Afghanistan. The United States has 2,890 broadcasting and 108 television stations; in many countries there are only one or two radio stations.
And so the contrast goes. Dr. Huth sums up in this way:
While problems of transportation have received a great deal of attention during the last few years and increasing efforts are being made for their expansion and improvement, problems of communications-mass communications in particular-have been almost entirely neglected in the plans and programs for economic development and technical assistance. It is true that some countries have requested audio-visual specialists and that the projects for fundamental education include some provisions for the use of mass media. But the whole question of mass communications in underdeveloped areas-and more particularly the problem of public information through the mass media -is still largely unexplored.
If we are really going to do the job of the Colombo plan we shall have to start with first things first and undertake to improve the communications so that we can get over to the masses of the people that we intend to do some good, and then we will remove that opposition and perhaps the Colombo plan can be expanded. But Canada is in a position to do more than she has done. Perhaps the minister will say that we did not do more last year because of that very thing, the fact that there was not a chance to spend the money any more quickly under the circumstances.
Well, we ought to take that into consideration, if we are ever inclined to criticize the minister. But there is one thing certain, that through better methods of trade, more sensible trading arrangements, we must also get out into fields of assistance by way of such things as the Colombo plan, if we ever expect to help underdeveloped countries of the world and to raise their standard of living. And Canada is in a position to be of real help to them.
Now, I have only one more observation to make. Let me sum up briefly in one sentence or two our position: We support any sensible and realistic effort by NATO to build up adequate defences in western Europe. We do say, though, that the people of the various NATO countries have every right to be informed, in the utmost detail consistent with safety, of all those things that the council decide, and which the NATO organization undertakes to do.
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Now, Mr. Speaker, I have not taken note of the time left at my disposal. However, I have only one more point to make.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: The hon. member has now exceeded his time.


Solon Earl Low: Very well; I shall just leave it at that. There will be another occasion.


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Does the hon. member have unanimous consent?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Solon Earl Low: I certainly do not wish to impose upon the time of the house. However, there is one thing I had thought I would like to say briefly, because I believe it is of great importance and has not yet been mentioned either this afternoon or this evening in the debate.
I am not one who believes that a third world war is inevitable, or that a third world war is the only means of dividing or destroying communism. I certainly am not. As a matter of fact I am convinced that world conflict would be the very means of spreading the virus of communism into those parts of the world which are not now so seriously affected by it.
What has been the history of the past? What has been the experience of the past? Well, world war I thoroughly established communism as a world movement, and gave it a motherland-Russia. World war II provided an opportunity and a means for the spread of communist influence into all parts of the world, and for the unfolding of imperialistic designs of the communist leaders in Russia. Those same leaders have now at least partially achieved their primary objective-that is, the objective they set first- namely that of uniting all the proletariat of industrial Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia with those of Russia, the object being of course to create a mighty, industrial-agricultural combination that would stretch from Vladivostok in the east to the Rhine in the west, and from the gulf of Finland in the north to the Danube in the south.
This they dreamed of as a self-supporting and terrible front, capable of withstanding the capitalistic countries of the west. Now the ultimate goal of course is world dictatorship under Soviet rule. They hope that such a thing will emerge as the result of a third world war; if that should come. It appears to be the aim of Russia, the aim of Russian communist leaders-and	I differentiate
between Russian communist leaders and the Russian people, because we ought to make

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it known that we are not fighting the Russian people, but that we are opposed to the Bolshevik leaders and their program of imperialistic expansion-I say it appears to be the aim of communist leaders to bring on a war at a time and under circumstances of their own choosing.
While their satellites have become nuisance spots in different parts of the world, it is the aim of course of the Russian leaders to capitalize on the weaknesses of the western world, and on the hunger and discontent of the southeast Asiatic countries, and the spread of communist influence far and wide.
In his message to congress, and dealing with what has come to be known as a mutual security program, the President of the United States said that there are only two alternatives, namely premeditated and deliberate war, or an American withdrawal to the western hemisphere.
I would not like the Secretary of State for External Affairs to share that view. For that reason we in this group at various times have warned the government not to allow themselves to be too much influenced by the American attitude. I say there are other alternatives to that of premeditated and deliberate war on the one hand or withdrawal into isolation within the western hemisphere by the United States.
I say there are other alternatives. Evidently President Truman does not see a third area within which real and earnest effort ought to be made to defeat communism and to establish the world under a rule of lasting peace. And it is that third area, that area of negotiation and of most careful psychological effort to get to and to influence the many millions of people behind the iron curtain who are still determined to regain liberty, and to let them know that we are their friends and are interested in helping to liberate them-I say it is within that third area where we can do so much by way of economic aid and technical assistance.
We have not begun to explore the possibilities within that third area. I say that that is an area in which today we ought to be most interested. If we are not, then I am afraid that either we are going to be led into a premeditated war or, on the other hand, we shall find ourselves deserted by an isolationist neighbour. That would not be good.
I think the minister and the government ought to feel that the people of this country are behind them in every single thing they do within this third area to keep us out of war, but at the same time to see that aggressors shall not menace any of the peoples in the NATO countries.

One closing suggestion: I have often wondered why we shelved the Atlantic charter. What has happened? We never hear of it any more. But I am going to tell you this, that we have become accustomed to fighting against something a whole lot harder than to fighting for something. And that is a dangerous attitude to get into.
Why should not the western nations adopt and proclaim a charter of freedom-call it the Atlantic charter or any kind of charter you like-a new charter, describing in detail what it stands for? Let us show our good faith by applying it within our own countries -all of us in the NATO organization. To my mind, one good demonstration is worth a million declarations. Give our people the kind of democracy they can believe in and that they are willing to fight for, just as hard as the communist is willing to work and fight for communism. Do that, and we shall not have to worry much longer about the spread of communism.


Mr. F. H. Larson (Kindersley):: Mr. Speaker, no matter in what direction one casts his eyes these days, he can see a war going on, or a war about to start, or trouble of other kinds. I feel our government is taking a very proper view in that we are concentrating on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I feel that if we are to stay out of trouble, since our affairs are so closely bound up with the old country and with the western European nations, it is absolutely essential that we be strong in this particular field.
There are some which are personal to me and personal to a lot of members of this house. We sent many of our friends and relations to fight in two wars in Europe and we did not see them come back. A lot of us saw fighting at close range and we would not like to get into another war. I for one take a good deal more than academic interest in these matters. I have also had the honour to represent Canada at the United Nations assembly and have seen what efforts are being made to make war impossible. After a lengthy period of development I feel that the United Nations can do a lot toward making the world a real community. However, there are still many reasons why people in America and western Europe should band themselves into a group such as the North Atlantic treaty group. I think they have every right, morally and legally, to do this in spite of what some people in the United Nations have said against NATO.
Every type of federation is divided into states, provinces or other types of groups. In the United Nations we have the Middle East group, the Latin-American- group, the Soviet group and others. I feel we will

make ourselves felt to a much greater degree within the United Nations if we have a strong North Atlantic group.
Referring to our own affairs in this country, we would like to have the luxury of being free of these international obligations. I think everybody agrees with that. We would like to be free to develop our own country. With the technological skills that we have today we can produce in abundance everything that the people of this country could possibly want and we can supply many things to many nations of the world. Our natural resources are second to none. We are an industrious people and I do not think there is a country where the man-day produces as much as it does in Canada. Our banking arrangements through our central bank are such that it would be practically impossible to return to the economic difficulties experienced in the thirties.
As a young nation we should be free to develop the possibilities which stand out before us like a shining light. The United States had a free hand to develop her resources when she was growing because Great Britain and other countries were there to take the brunt of dealing with world affairs. I see no reason why we should not have that same freedom. We should be able to construct the public works which we have on the shelf. We should be able to carry out such projects as the South Saskatchewan river development which would produce revenue. We should be able to do these things as fast as we can.
This government has been accused of making decisions with political advantage in mind. In what better way could that be accomplished than to reduce taxes drastically, build all the public works we want, institute all the public services we feel are desirable and carry out many other projects? We could take full advantage of our bountiful resources. By doing that the government could really make political capital if that is what they had in view.
What is this government doing? It is carrying out things which require sacrifices. It is leaving itself open to criticism such as we hear every day. Why? Because it is taking seriously its international responsibility. It feels that its paramount obligation is to take the steps that are necessary to protect peace and security.
It may be that the Soviet union does not want war any more than we do. Hitler did not want war, but he wanted things which he had no right to want. He wanted nazi control of Europe. He wanted a ring of satellite states around Germany. He wanted Germany to have a place in the sun. But
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the time came when decent thinking people could no longer hold up their heads and permit the achievement of Hitler's ambitions.
The western world thought that the British navy and the Maginot line were sufficient protection, but the blitzkrieg and the luftwaffe went over and around the navy and the Maginot line in a matter of hours and days until Great Britain stood with physical equipment not much greater than the oratory of Winston Churchill against bombs and armour. Thank God that Winston Churchill was given the moral power to sustain the free world at that time.
My short incursion into international affairs certainly does not equip me to render fundamental judgments, but I can see and hear and I am able to apply a certain amount of common sense and judgment to what I see and hear. We appear again to be faced with an aggressive nation which is suspicious of the consequences of our reaction to its aggression to the point that a string of oppressed buffer states are felt to be necessary for security. We have Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the other satellite countries.
The ideals which were enunciated at San Francisco are disregarded. Capital is made out of the differences between nations, between classes, between the Asiatic and western races. Over 200 divisions are ready to take the field and a tactical air force of high efficiency is ready to support those divisions. But the decent thinking people of the world have made another decision- they are going to get collectively strong enough to stop this. Responsible people on this side of the Atlantic and in Europe have determined that next time we will not have to rely on the British navy, the Maginot line and the inspiration of a Churchill.
The decisions that these people are making are proving expensive. It seems a pity that we have to put into NATO all the energy and national income that is required to make us strong enough to be able to talk from a position of strength. I think if we can keep our internal thinking straight, if we can get ourselves into a position where no one will think he can gobble us up, we will be able to talk with authority and eventually settle these international issues which perplex and frighten us today. If we are in that position, in my judgment it is almost certain that we can stop this irresponsible show of power and still avert war. That is our only purpose in gathering our strength.
If every shade of thinking in this country were as non-political about these things as this government we could pull through the present situation and come out with flying colours. I am sure that any government


George Randolph Pearkes: Mr. Speaker, like the hon. member for Kindersley (Mr. Larson), who is a very good friend of mine, it was my privilege to attend the sixth session of the general assembly of the United Nations. Being an adviser of the opposition perhaps I was able to take a slightly more detached point of view than the hon. member for Kindersley. Though I share a great many of the opinions he has expressed, I have never been able to share his enthusiasm for the present administration. However, I do want to take this opportunity to express my thanks to the official members of the Canadian delegation from the minister down to the junior stenographer for the kindly assistance they gave me. No obstacles whatever were placed in my way. I was free to attend any committee I chose. I was granted the privilege of entering into many of the discussions the delegation carried on, and I do feel indebted to all the members of the Canadian delegation without whose help I could not possibly have obtained as much information as I think I did obtain during my attendance at that general assembly.
I would like to give some of my impressions and some of the conclusions I drew from my visit to Paris last fall. I think the first thing that struck me concerning the United Nations was the fact that while many countries were represented, the representation was by no means universal. Reference has been made to that fact already in this debate. Many important countries still are not represented in the United Nations. While 1 share the view already expressed this afternoon that no country which is at least associated with an enemy of the United Nations should be admitted to this family of nations while aggression is still going on, I express the hope that in future it will be possible to embrace more nations of the world and have perhaps a fairer representation of those vast numbers of people who today are not represented at that assembly. But, I repeat, we cannot consider that until such time as aggression has ceased.
The next thing which struck me was the high percentage of the member nations coming from Asia, Africa and areas which might be generally termed, without any disparagement to the individuals concerned, the place of coloured people. The thing which impressed me tremendously was the ability of the delegates from these countries. I could never have believed before I went to Paris that a gentleman 'hailing from Mexico could have maintained discipline in that gathering of many hundreds of delegates in the way that the president of the general assembly did in this last session, and Mr. Nervo came from Mexico.
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The third point which struck me was the division of many of these member nations into blocs. I feel that that is regrettable. You had the South American bloc, the Asian bloc and the African people. You had also the Soviet bloc. You had the NATO bloc, if I might call it that, and you had also the British commonwealth bloc. One of the unique things about that group was that quite frequently the various countries agreed to differ on special points, yet at the same time the closest friendship existed.
The fourth point concerned the equality of voting. There was one vote for each representative nation. There again, one has to pause and wonder because there is that bloc to which I have just referred, the Asian and African countries, Abyssinia, Afghanistan and Dominica-all these small countries have the same voting power as the larger countries have.
Then we come to the question of the debates as they were carried out in the general assembly. One could not help feeling that there was a bitterness engendered in many of these debates which were referred to as polemics by Mr. Anthony Eden. I cannot help but think that representatives from countries who go there and indulge in these tactics will soon lose the confidence of the people who have sent them there.
Lastly, there was the question of the proposal for the progressive limitation of arms. It was discussed at considerable length both in the plenary session and in the meetings at the ad hoc and No. 1 committees. I feel that in this case they were doomed to failure before they started because of the unfortunate timing of the NATO meeting in Rome. It gave opportunities for those countries who had suspicions to point to the fact that in Paris certain delegations were talking of the limitation of arms and peace, while a few days later representatives from those same countries went to Rome and talked about rearmament. I repeat that I feel it was unfortunate that those two conferences were arranged to coincide.
I wish to devote a few minutes to discussing the relationship which exists between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the United Nations itself. We find 'that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has the appearance of being partly within and partly without the United Nations Organization. For instance, there are certain countries which are not members of the United Nations but are members of NATO. I refer particularly to Italy, for example, and Portugal. Neither of those countries is a member of the United Nations, although both are members of NATO. Then, in a slightly different category you have west Germany, which is not actually

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a member of NATO but is becoming closely-associated with that organization, although she is not a member of the United Nations. Spain is coming closely into that orbit. Within the last few days we have read about the United States of America securing bases in Spain for their air operations. No matter how strategically sound that may be, I think it is politically dangerous so long as Spain is not a member of either NATO or the United Nations. I should like the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), if he can, to say whether those bases were obtained for the United States or for the NATO organization. There might be a difference between those two.
The first article of the United Nations charter tells us that the objective of the United Nations is to maintain peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression. When the United Nations was first organized immediately after the second world war the objective of the United Nations was not only to endeavour to maintain peace, but to take collective action for the suppression of acts of aggression. Essentially, therefore, the United Nations, in its first conception, was an attempt to deal with the aggressor. We had a rather rude awakening when operations started in Korea, and the United Nations immediately branded the North Koreans as aggressors.
But there was an obvious weakness in the general charter of the United Nations, in that it was only possible to brand North Korea as an aggressor beoause by fortuitous circumstances Russia was not able to exercise her veto. Quite obviously if one of the great powers who, as far back as 1944, were expected always to work in unison-experience has shown that is not practical-were to side with an aggressor, then the United Nations would not be able to designate that country which had committed the act of aggression unless there was some other means than those which existed when operations in Korea broke out.
The second weakness which became so evident was that the United Nations had no force immediately available to suppress that aggression. It was fortunate that the forces of the United States of America were stationed in that area of the world and had been given certain responsibilities for the administration of South Korea. They put in such forces as they had immediately available while the other member nations of the United Nations Organization assembled1 and made such contributions as they were able to make.
[Mr. Pearkes.)
However, the result of the first few months of fighting in Korea was such a close thing that it was not possible to allow similar circumstances to happen again in the future. The United States forces fought rearguard actions down the peninsula of Korea and were at one time threatened with being thrown into the sea and with perhaps the possibility of a "Dunkirk" occurring there. It was too close a thing for the peace-loving people of this world to permit similar circumstances to happen again.
Thought was therefore given as to how these weaknesses could be circumvented. Suggestions were made that if a veto was used in the security council, then immediate reference should be made to the general assembly which could be called in short order for a special session. The suggestion was also made a year ago that the member nations of the United Nations should designate certain -units or formations of their national forces to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations so that they could deal immediately with an aggression. I think that Canada took a lead in that respect. I am not sure how far other countries have followed because since those days the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been developed. While it may be highly desirable that the United Nations should declare their determination to suppress acts of aggression, no matter where those acts of -aggression might be carried out, we must view that principle with a certain degree of realism. The principle of collective security, applicable the world over, is no doubt extremely desirable; but we cannot allow ourselves to dissipate the limited forces which, in the first instance, would be available to the United Nations, in order to deal with aggression which might break out in some out of the way part of the world. Every hon. member can think of places where an act of aggression- might be committed and where it would be strategically unsound to make large commitments in order to suppress that act of aggression in that particular part of the world. However, if we want to have world opinion behind the United Nations, it is desirable that we endeavour to adhere just as far as it is possible for us to do so, to* this principle of suppressing aggression wherever it may occur.
When the outbreak in Korea took place, we in the west were facing a situation in which our countries had been disarmed to a large extent. Our forces had dissolved immediately after world war II. The traditional policy of Great Britain and other countries has always been to reduce the armed forces, even below

a state of reasonable preparedness to guarantee the security of the country, as soon as peace has been declared. That historic policy was followed out after world war II. On the other hand, however, we found that the Soviet dictatorship maintained huge forces and in their countries worked tirelessly in order to equip those forces they still maintained. We therefore found that time appeared to be at a premium. For that reason I think this North Atlantic treaty was drawn up, in order to meet a possible immediate threat in western Europe.
Had war broken out then, or if war broke out in the immediate future, it would appear that the supreme headquarters of the allied powers in Europe-usually referred to as SHAPE

acting under the instructions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, would undertake the direction of the operations that they carried out in Europe. Just how the machinery of the United Nations would be employed has not been clearly defined; but it would seem to me that that machinery would have to work in order to obtain the co-operation of members, if any, who were not actually taking part in the operation or were not participating in the various operations.
It is worth while inquiring how we could influence those countries which, in the first place, not being members of NATO, could be influenced to join, to participate and at least to give their moral support. In order to achieve this end, I personally feel that it would be highly desirable if the United Nations could declare the enemy country as the aggressor before any action was taken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I realize that there might be serious military objections to a delay which might take place; but those military objections would have to be weighed in the balance in order to see whether the assembling of world opinion on the side of the NATO nations might not compensate for the inevitable delay which would be almost certain to occur had we to wait until the United Nations could designate the enemy as an aggressor. I do stress the fact that it is extremely desirable that we should have world opinion behind us if we are to get the other member countries of the United Nations on our side.
I have referred earlier to these various blocs of countries. I referred to the Asian and African blocs of countries. I had also called attention to the fact that each of these countries has a fighting power equal to the fighting power of any other member country. That great bloc of countries, not closely welded together as yet, but ever growing in importance, is not at the present moment
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prepared to accept the philosophy of communism as applied in Russia as being the most desirable form of government or economy for their own countries. Nor are they prepared to accept the western or the American way of life as being that which is most desirable for the future development of their own lands. And so you may say, if you like, they are sitting on the fence, they are undecided and uncertain; that they are not in the position which was held by England in the past, where they are rapidly going to exercise the balance of power between the Soviet bloc and the NATO organization.
If the trend of events develops along that way and we see this large bloc of Asian and African countries waiting to decide which system of ideology they should support, and particularly in a case where perhaps the aggressor has not been named, then I see how very important it is that we should do everything in our power to gain the good will of that bloc of people. At the present moment they are uncertain which way to look. There has been a lot of propaganda coming from Russia, stirring up bitter racial hatred against the so-called colonial powers. There is little recognition of the fact that the so-called colonial powers had raised those countries out of slavery. On the other hand, there is too much talk of the fact that they have taken our natural resources and sold the manufactured goods to us at great profit.
However, we must remember that there is that feeling of nationalism, which the hon. member for Kindersley (Mr. Larson) referred to, growing up amongst these countries. It is particularly evident in the Arab countries. There is difficulty amongst these Arab countries of the Middle East. For five hundred years they had been under the domination of Turkey. Turkey has now become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I do not think it is going to make these Arab countries one bit more friendly to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They are suspicious of Britain; they are suspicious of America. At the present time thousands of them are almost on the verge of starvation in countries surrounding Israel. But I do regard this bloc of Asian and African countries as being a tremendous influence in the immediate future.
Possibly India is the leader of that group. The last half of this century may be India's. I feel that the opportunity which is offered to Canada and to Great Britain of influencing that bloc through our associations in the commonwealth with India is tremendous.

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Therefore I feel that, in discussing this question of the relative position of NATO and the United Nations, we must stress the fact that NATO is complementary to and in no way competitive with the United Nations. I am not certain that that viewpoint is held by all. There is the possibility, rightly or wrongly, that NATO will be viewed as a rival of the United Nations Organization. I hold in my hand a heading from the Montreal Star of March 5 as follows: "NATO now replaces UN, says Pearson." I give the Secretary of State for External Affairs the benefit by stating at once that the text of the report would not justify, in my opinion, such a heading being given.


Lester Bowles Pearson: It would not.


George Randolph Pearkes: But, at the same time, it is indicative of a feeling which perhaps exists and a feeling which may exist amongst those other countries that are not members of NATO. That will apply not only to the military commitments, but also to clause 2, which deals with the economic side, because many of these countries that I have been referring to are underdeveloped, backward countries, and are jealous of seeing any money which they think should come their way being sent in another direction.
I have referred to the organization of the allied command, SHAPE, which exists with headquarters just outside of Paris. That organization consists of three main parts, the allied forces of northern Europe, the allied forces of central Europe, and the allied forces of southern Europe. The grouping of these nations which are forming part of NATO, or the forces of these nations, into these three, may I call them commands, needs no more elaboration. In the north, naturally, you have the forces of Norway and Denmark; in the south, until recently, you had the forces of Italy and Portugal. I presume that the forces of Greece and of Turkey will be added to that southern European command. What I would like to ask the minister is to what extent are the Canadian forces-because I do not think we should ask him for information about other forces- committed to the allied forces, central Europe? Would it be possible for the commander-in-chief of the supreme headquarters to transfer these forces, we will say, to Norway or to Italy, to the northern or southern command without a reference to the council of NATO? That is a question which I hope he will be able to explain at a later date, because I do feel that it has a very definite bearing upon our commitment. The people of Canada should know whether the commander in chief has full authority to

transfer our forces from, shall I say, one theatre of operation to another without reference to the political authority which is supreme over the military forces.


Mr. Claxton:: In the terms in which that has been put, he has no such authority.


George Randolph Pearkes: I did not hear the minister.


Brooke Claxton: In the terms in which I understand the hon. member has put it, he has no such authority.


George Randolph Pearkes: That is the information that I wanted to have.


Brooke Claxton: On the other hand, we regard his recommendation.


George Randolph Pearkes: Naturally, his recommendation would carry weight. But he would have to go to toe council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, on which we have a responsible minister representing the country.


Brooke Claxton: And the Canadian government would make the decision, in the end. But on the other hand, we will co-operate.


George Randolph Pearkes: That is the information I wanted to obtain. I should like to close my remarks with one word of warning, if it might be considered as such, with respect to the employment of our own forces which are in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I do not suppose there is any sphere of human activity in which the lessons of history are more worthy of study than in that of military operations. It is common knowledge that the influence of Britain in wars in the past has always been most effective when small, yet highly trained forces have taken advantage of Britain's command of the seas. The result has been that these forces have influenced; operations to an extent out of all proportion to their size.
In world1 war I the armies of the commonwealth bogged down in the mud of Flanders and there, for several years, we suffered heavy casualties. Dunkirk saved the armies of world war II from another war of attrition. Bearing in mind those lessons, I do suggest that any excessive or premature commitment of Canadian troops, and particularly air force, to the continent of Europe, may find us once again shackled to continental and land-bound operations.
The principles that applied to the army and navy in the past apply with added force to the air force of today, the service which has as its greatest attribute its flexibility and its ability to strike in unexpected places. If the surrender of freedom of action of the R.C.A.F. is the price we must pay to increase

European morale, then I say it is indeed' a high price. Therefore I urge that periodically the policy of dispatching our jet fighter squadrons to Europe be reviewed in order to see that we consider fully the principle of retaining our flexibility to manoeuvre and the ability to send our squadrons where they are most required as well as the retention in Canada of sufficient squadrons to defend effectively the many important industrial targets of this country, the loss of which would be not only a crippling blow to the NATO organization, but also fatal to Canada.
I know that, according to the plans, there are these twelve jet squadrons which ultimately will be sent to Europe. I do suggest that that should be contingent upon the development and progress made in the squadrons which are required primarily for the defence of Canada. We should not send over to Europe the first twelve squadrons we get, and leave Canada unprotected. There should also be review time and again with regard to
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the necessity for having such a high percentage of our very mobile air forces tied down to airfields in France, airfields which at the present time have not been constructed or are not available, and which France up to now has shown some reluctance to make available-and which under any circumstances could only be regarded as being highly vulnerable, owing to the disturbed conditions which exist, particularly in France, but also on the continent as a whole.
I offer that suggestion in the light of historical experience which time and time again has emphasized the importance of utilizing the manoeuvrability that in bygone days was provided by the command of the seas by the British navy, and is today available to the air forces of this country.
On motion of Mr. Viau the debate was adjourned.


[Stage Direction]
At eleven o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
707
[Stage Direction]
Monday, March 24, 1952