1952-04-09

Mr. Speaker:: I have the honour to inform the house that I have received a message from His Excellency the Governor General, signed by his own hand, reading as follows:
Government House, Ottawa, 9th April, 1952
Members of the House of Commons:
I have received with great pleasure the address that you have voted in reply to my speech at the opening of parliament. I thank you sincerely for this address.
Vincent Massey VACANCIES


Mr. Speaker:: I have the honour to inform the house that I have received a communication informing me that the following vacancies have occurred in the representation:
Of Joseph Alfred Dion, Esquire, for the electoral district of Roberval, consequent upon his acceptance of an office of emolument under the crown.
Of Henri A. Gosselin, Esquire, for the electoral district of Brome-Missisquoi, by decease.
Of Heber Harold Hatfield, Esquire, for the electoral district of Victoria-Carleton, by decease.
I accordingly issued my warrants to the chief electoral officer to make out new writs of election for the said electoral districts respectively.



APPOINTMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF COMMITTEES OF THE WHOLE

Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, as you know, standing order 56 requires that if a vacancy occurs in the office of chairman of the committee of the whole house the house shall forthwith proceed to elect a successor. In conformity with that rule I move, seconded by Mr. Howe:
That Louis Rene Beaudoin, Esquire, member for the electoral district of Vaudreuil-Soulanges, be appointed chairman of the committees of the whole house.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Mr. Si. Laurent:: I need not say, in view of the way in which this motion has been greeted by the house, that we all appreciate the experience the hon. gentleman has acquired in his role as deputy chairman of the committees of the whole and we hope he will be able to exercise in his new role the same urbanity and impartial fairness he displayed in his role of deputy chairman of committees.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.

Hon. F. G. Bradley (Secretary of State) moved:: That the report from the civil service commission respecting certain employees of the House of Commons, tabled on April 8, 1952, be approved.
He said: The report was presented by you, Mr. Speaker, yesterday.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


[Stage Direction]
Hon. Lionel Chevrier (Minister	of
Transport): Mr. Speaker, pursuant to section 23 of the Canadian Overseas Telecommunication Corporation Act I beg leave to table the annual report of the Canadian Overseas Telecommunication Corporation for the calendar year 1951, along with the budget of the corporation for 1952.
Printed copies of the annual report in English are being distributed, and copies in French will be made available as soon as received from the printers.


Hon. Stuart S. Garson (Minister of Justice):: Mr. Speaker, on March 31 last I informed the house that I had received the report of the committee appointed to study combines legislation, which has come to be known as the MacQuarrie committee. I explained at that time that I was delaying the tabling of the report until we could get the French translation of it. I am now tabling the final report, mimeographed in French and in English.

Support Prices for Beef
I may say that in the interests of early tabling the appendices, which consist of present and past legislation, are not included in the French copy, but will be tabled later as soon as they become available. While it is convenient to have them appended to the report for ready reference, they are not necessary to an understanding of it.
It is the intention of the government after the Easter recess to introduce legislation based upon the report.


Mr. George A. Drew (Leader of ihe Opposition):: I should like to ask the minister whether the report recommends the setting up of some body to examine matters coming under the Combines Investigation Act, which body will be an intermediate stage between the investigation division and the combines branch.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: No, I do not think I would put it quite in that way.


George Alexander Drew: I am sorry-between the combines branch and the minister.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: The report, which will of course speak for itself, proposes that the present functions exercised by the combines branch-of starting a preliminary inquiry, making an investigation and then reporting to the minister-shall be divided between two bodies. One body will make the inquiry and investigation, and then the reporting body will consider the evidence and make the final report to the minister.


George Alexander Drew: This is the last day before the Easter recess and the minister has indicated that legislation will be introduced. Inasmuch as consideration is being given to the form of the legislation, I should like to point out that when a similar proposal was put forward with respect to broadcasting it was turned down by the government as being a method that would not be satisfactory. It would seem that if it is consistent in the one case it would be consistent in the other. I hope the minister will bear that in mind in drafting the legislation he will bring forward.



ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPPORT PRICES FOR CATTLE

Mr. Robert McCubbin (Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Agriculture):: should like to make an announcement with respect to beef support prices.
The agricultural prices support board has been authorized to establish support prices for cattle on the basis of $25 per hundred pounds for good steers at Toronto, with appropriate differentials at other markets and
[Mr. Garson.}
for other classes of cattle. This price will remain in effect until July 1, 1952. The results of the policy will be reviewed before that date and monthly thereafter with a view to providing a proper measure of support until the United States embargo against Canadian cattle is lifted or modified sufficiently, or other markets are found to enable trade in livestock or meat to be resumed.
Differentials between markets will be based on differences which have prevailed in normal trade practice. In addition, cattle will be grouped into broad classes, and prices of the different classes will be supported in fair relationship to the price established for good steers.
While the support price will undoubtedly help to stabilize the cattle market and thereby give farmers the confidence necessary to enable them to spread their deliveries over a longer period, it must be clear that our cattle marketing difficulties can only be overcome by the reopening of the United States market or by some other arrangement for the disposal of surplus meat. In the meantime it is hoped and expected that large numbers of cattle which would normally come to market in the next few months will be retained on farms. With a holdback of even 15 per cent to 20 per cent of normal marketings there should be practically no surplus, and such a holdback would give the farmer the advantage of additional returns due to gain in weight which cattle will make pending the reopening of the United States market.
One purpose of this support price is to discourage heavy sales while the United States border is closed and thus prevent a chaotic condition in the market. If farmers and marketing agencies co-operate in the management of deliveries, well-finished cattle should be readily absorbed at reasonable rates in relation to the support price.
To assist the agricultural prices support board and the officers of the marketing service of the Department of Agriculture during the next few months, a special management committee will be set up. This committee will deal with operating policy. Officers of the marketing service will be responsible for all details of operation. In addition to the management committee there will be an advisory committee to which all provincial governments may appoint representatives. These special arrangements have been made to ensure that the interests and needs of each area will be fully considered.


Mr. Coldwell:: Has the management committee been appointed? If so what is its personnel? Are the producers of livestock represented on that committee or indeed on

the advisory committee? In the latter case I understand appointments may be made by the provincial governments.


Robert McCubbin: The members of the
management committee have not all been appointed yet but as soon as they are appointed their names will be announced.


Major James William Coldwell: I hope consideration will be given to the appointment of producers.


Robert McCubbin: Yes.


Mr. Fulford:: Is consideration being given to stabilizing the dairy industry which finds itself in a predicament as a result of cattle being excluded from the United States market?


Robert McCubbin: All these things are given consideration. I have no doubt this announcement will assist the dairy industry as well as the beef industry.


Mr. Catherwood:: Will the parliamentary assistant to the Minister of Agriculture say when these floor prices on cattle will become effective?


Robert McCubbin: They will come into effect immediately.



RAILWAYS, CANALS AND TELEGRAPH LINES CONCURRENCE IN SECOND REPORT OF STANDING COMMITTEE

Mr. H. B. McCulloch (Pictou) moved:: That the second report of the standing committee on railways, canals and telegraph lines, presented to the house on Tuesday, April 8, be now concurred in.


Mr. Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the house to adopt the motion?


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, it does seem that there should be some explanation. Yesterday when this matter was brought forward some explanation was called for, and it should be forthcoming now.


Mr. Abbott:: The report was tabled.


Mr. Robinson:: The report was tabled
yesterday.


George Alexander Drew: May I simply point out that I regard you, Mr. Speaker, as the Speaker of the house, and I was directing my remarks through you to the member moving the motion. If the reason for the motion is that the report has been tabled, and that is adequate, then I think the house could be told that by the member who is moving concurrence in the report.


Henry Byron McCulloch: Yesterday the hon. member for Kamloops made a mistake, and he admitted to me he had made a mistake. This
55704-89J
Questions
report was moved and adopted in the committee, and the same report was presented to the house yesterday.


Mr. Chevrier:: And they are routine.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


Mr. Lennard:: 1.	Have there been any shipments of baled or burlapped nursery stock consigned to any party in the province of Saskatchewan from Europe, Mexico or South America, during the period from June 30 to December 31, 1951?
2.	If so, from what countries?
3.	What precautions were, and are now being taken with regard to baled and burlapped nursery stock entering Canada?
4. What, if any, changes have been made since November 1, 1950, in the regulations relative to baled and burlapped nursery stock, entering Canada?


Mr. McCubbin:: 1.	Yes.
2.	214 azaleas from Belgium.
3.	The packing on all consignments of baled or burlapped nursery stock from foreign countries is examined for evidence of hay, straw or any other raw product of the soil. If such material is found it must be certified as disinfected in the country of origin or held for destruction in Canada.
4.	The regulations under the Destructive Insect and Pest Act have been amended to require that the certificate of health from the country of origin shall include a special declaration "that through official soil sampling, or other official investigation, the nursery stock included in the shipment was grown under conditions indicating apparent freedom from the golden nematode, heterodera ros-tochiensis."



INCOME TAX


Mr. Fair:: 1.	During each of the years 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949 and 1950, what is the income tax per capita for each province?
2.	During the same period what amount of income tax per capita was paid by (a) farmers: (b) industrial workers: (c) professional persons; (d) clergy, in each province?
3.	During the same period, what is the average tax paid by lawyers, medical doctors, dentists and opticians, in each province?


Mr. McCann:: 1.	No information available.
2.	No information available.
3.	The records of the taxation division are not maintained in such a manner as to show the average tax paid by lawyers, medical doctors, dentists and opticians in each province.

Questions



ANIMAL CONTAGIOUS DISEASES


Mr. Charlton:: 1.	Was the herd of cattle belonging to Leonard Waas, McLean, Saskatchewan, ever at any time since last December, challenged with the virus of foot-and-mouth disease to prove or disprove the existence of that particular disease within the herd?
2.	What was the exact nature of the inoculations made on these cattle on March 9, 1952, and what were the results which led to their ultimate slaughter and burial on March 14, 1952-[DOT]


Robert McCubbin: 1 and 2. The Waas herd was ordered slaughtered along with several others which had shown similar symptoms, but before the slaughter order of this herd was carried out, blood samples were taken and the animals inoculated with live foot-and-mouth virus for experimental purposes. Tests have not been completed.



DRUGS AND MEDICINES


Mr. Knowles:: 1.	What drugs and medicines are subject to import duty?
2.	What is the rate of duty on these drugs and medicines?
3.	What other taxes are drugs and medicines subject to, and what are the rates of such other taxes?


Mr. McCann:: 

FILM &quot;ROYAL JOURNEY&quot;

Mr. Macnaughion:: 1.	What was the cost of production and distribution of the national film board release "Royal Journey"?
2.	Has there been a profit or loss in connection with this film?


Mr. Winters:: 1.	Production costs of "Royal Journey" up to and including first print were $88,000. Distribution costs, including versions, prints and other distribution charges, total $101,143 to date. Total over-all costs to date, therefore, are $189,143.
2.	"Royal Journey" has not been in distribution sufficiently long to determine if there will be an over-all profit. The commercial distributors estimate about 2,100,000 Canadians have seen the film to date. The net Canadian theatrical revenue to March 31, 1952, was $33,816. Revenue returns have not yet been received from foreign distribution,



PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND NATIONAL PARK

Mr. Kickham:: 1.	How much money was spent by the Department of Resources and Development in the fiscal year ending March 31, 1951, and in the present fiscal year on the national park in1 Prince Edward Island, for (a) labour; (b) construction; (c) all other purposes?

2.	How many persons were employed by the Department of Resources and Development in the national park in Prince Edward Island during the fiscal year ending March 31, 1951, and during the present fiscal year; (a) permanent; (b) casual?
3.	Is it the intention of the Department of Resources and Development to build any new cabins in the national park in Prince Edward Island
during 1952? Mr. Winters: 1.		Portion of
	Fiscal year	last fiscal
	ended	year as of
	Mar. 31, 1951	Feb. 29, 1952
(a) Labour ..	, $29,192.83	$32,317.39
(b) Construction 86,180.64*		90,260.73*
(c) All other purposes	47,243.47	28,164.09
	$162,616.94	$150,742.21
2.		Portion of
	Fiscal year	last fiscal
	ended	year as of
	Mar. 31, 1951	Feb. 29, 1952
(a) 	... 3	3(b) 	... 105	64Totals 	... 108	673. Yes. Parliament will	be asked to
approve a vote in the main estimates for 1952-53 for five new cabins.
includes labour on new construction.

BUTTER, CHEESE, BEEF AND PORK IN STORAGE Mr. Diefenbaker:
How many pounds of (a) butter; (b) cheese; (c) beef; (d) pork, are In storage as of this date?


Mr. Howe:: As of March 1, 1952, the quantities in. storage were: (a) Butter, 25,582,000 pounds; (b) cheese, 29,683,000 pounds; (c) beef, 18,765,000 pounds; (d) pork, 60,896,000 pounds.
Note: April 1 figures for butter and cheese will be available April 10. April 1 figures for beef and pork will be available April 15.



LABOURERS AND FARMERS


Mr. Boisvert:: What was the total personal Income in 1949, 1950 and 1951 of (a) the labour class; (b) farmers?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Statistics of the total personal income of (a) the labour class, (b) farmers, are not available.
(a) Wages, salaries, and supplementary-labour income represent the chief source of personal income of the labour class. These figures are given below (with the adjustment necessary to eliminate employer and employee contributions to social insurance and government pension funds, which, although forming part of the compensation for services performed, are not actually received by the employee within the year). Other elements of personal income received by the labour class include transfer payments such as family allowances, and investment income such as dividends, interest, and rents, but no information is available with respect to the amounts of these latter forms of personal income received by the labour class.
1949	1950	1951
(millions of dollars)
Wages, salaries and supplementary labour income	 7,761	8,271	9,640
Deduct: Employer and employee contributions to social insurance and government pension funds	-239 -259 -316
7,522	8,012	9,324
(b) The chief source of personal income of farmers is "net income received by farm operators from farm production". These figures are given below. Information is not available with respect to the amounts of transfer payments such as family allowances, or investment income such as dividends,
Questions
interest, and rents, and salaries and wages from off-seasonal employment, received by farmers.
1949	1950	1951
(millions of dollars)
Net income received by
farm operators from
farm production .... 1,600	1,446	2,191



LAC DU CERF, QUE., WHARF

Mr. Couriemanche:: 1.	Has a wharf been constructed at Lac du Cerf, Labelle county, since February, 1951?
2.	If so, was the work done by contract, or by day labour?
3.	If by contract, what was the amount thereof, and to whom was the contract awarded?
4.	If by day labour, what was the amount spent for such work, and who was the foreman?


Mr. Fournier (Hull):: 1.	Yes.
2.	By day labour.
3.	Answered by No. 2.
4.	(a) $4,715.67; (b) Auguste Desormeaux.



ORDERS IN COUNCIL


Mr. Diefenbaker:: 1.	Have any orders in council been issued at the instance of both the Departments of Defence Production and Trade and Commerce, or either of them, that have not been published, and are not to be published, in the Canada Gazette, nor made public?
2.	If so, how many?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I am tabling an answer with an explanation. If there is any question about it, after Easter the hon. gentleman can either mention the matter again or place another question on the order paper.
The answer is as follows:
1.	All orders in council, including those emanating from the Departments of Defence Production and Trade and Commerce, which are required to be published by the Regulations Act or by any other statutory provision, have been and are published in the manner prescribed in the relevant statute, unless exempted from publication under section 9 of the Regulations Act, in which event the exempting order itself is published. In addition, all orders in council, including those not required to be published, are listed in the summary of orders in council which is tabled in the house monthly.
2.	Since this question contains no limitation as to time, it could not be answered without conducting a lengthy search dating back to the origins of the Department of Trade and Commerce. As a matter of current

Orders for Returns
practice and since the Regulations Act came into effect on January 1, 1951, all orders in council made in the exercise of a legislative power conferred by or under an act of parliament or for the contravention of which a penalty of fine or imprisonment is prescribed by or under an act of parliament, are published in part II of the Canada Gazette unless specifically exempted from such publication under the Regulations Act. Other orders in council, such as those authorizing contracts, leases, purchases, etc., are not usually published.



HOLLINGER-HANNA LIMITED    REFUND OF CUSTOMS DUTIES

Mr. Diefenbaker:: What is the total amount of customs duties paid by Hollinger-Hanna Limited which have been refunded, or for which refunds have been claimed and as yet have not been paid, since the first of January, 1951?


Mr. McCann:: No refund claims for customs duties have been filed by or on behalf of Hollinger-Hanna Limited since January 1, 1951, nor have any claims been paid.



IMMIGRANTS FROM BRITISH WEST INDIES

Mr. Noseworihy:: 1.	How many persons of British West Indies origin are at present living in Canada?
2.	How many persons have entered Canada from the British West Indies during each of the five years 1947-1951, inclusive?
3.	How many applicants for entry to Canada from the British West Indies have been refused entry during each of the five years 1947-1951, inclusive?
4.	For what reasons were these applicants rejected, and how many were rejected for each of these reasons?
5.	How many students were admitted to Canada from the British West Indies for the purpose of studying in Canada during each of the years 19471951, inclusive?
6.	How many of those students applied for permanent residence in Canada?
7.	How many of these student applicants were granted permanent residence in Canada?
8.	Are any statistics available to show how Immigrants to Canada from the British West Indies compare with immigrants from other warm climate countries in the following respects (a) health records; (b) wages or salaries earned; (c) unemployment records; (d) profession and occupation followed; (e) public liabilities?
Question stands.



QUESTIONS PASSED AS ORDERS FOR RETURNS


Mr. Fair:: 1.	During each of the calendar years 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951, how many annuity contracts were purchased from the annuities branch of the Department of Labour?
2.	How many of those were (a) single annuity contracts; (b) joint annuity contracts?
3.	In those cases where a husband purchased a single annuity contract for his wife or a wife pur-

chased a single annuity contract for her husband, were the amounts involved in each case assessed for gift tax by the Department of National Revenue?
4.	In how many cases in each of the above years were such assessments made?
5.	Were the amounts assessed in each case collected?
6.	If so, for what reason?


Frederick Gordon Bradley: Return tabled.


DEGREES IN VETERINARY SCIENCE
Mr. Laing:: 1.	How many degree granting institutions are there in Canada in veterinary science?
2.	Since 1945, how many D.V.Se. degrees have been been granted in Canada?
3.	How many of these (a) have taken employment with federal, provincial or university administrations; (b) are in private practice exclusively with commercial farm animals; (c) are engaged in private practice exclusively or predominantly dealing with pet stock?
4.	Does any Canadian institution offer post graduate special studies in specific animal diseases?


Frederick Gordon Bradley: Return tabled.


GOVERNMENT VETERINARIANS IN GREATER WINNIPEG AREA
Mr. Viau:: 1.	How many veterinarians are employed by the federal Department of Agriculture in the greater Winnipeg area?
2.	What are (a) their names; (b) date of appointment; (c) grade on appointment; (d) present grade?
3.	Are there any vacancies?
4.	If so, in what grade?


Robert McCubbin: Return tabled.



MOTION FOR PAPERS


Mr. Quelch:: For a copy of the final reports by P.F.R.A. officials to the federal government on the Red Deer river project.


Robert McCubbin: I wonder if this could stand until after Easter, until the minister returns?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.


Mr. Speaker:: Stand.



FISHERIES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. T. G. W. Ashbourne (Grand Falls-While Bay):: I would like to direct a question to tne Minister of Fisheries. Is he in a position to report on the outcome of the meetings held in Ottawa with the Newfoundland and maritime salted fish trade?


Hon. R. W. Mayhew (Minister of Fisheries):: The hon. gentleman was good enough to let me have notice of his question, and I am pleased to make the following answer:
For the past two days, useful discussions have taken place in Ottawa with representatives of the maritime, Quebec and Newfoundland salted fish trade concerning all matters affecting the salted fish trade of the area.
For the past several years the financing of sales of Newfoundland salted fish to certain European markets has been handled through an arrangement with the United Kingdom, whereby payment could be made in sterling rather than in dollars. This arrangement, which has always been considered as a transitional measure, has now come to an end. Therefore consideration was given these changed circumstances so this trade can continue without interruption. The new situation is simply that from now forward the sale of salted codfish to these markets will be on the same basis as all other Canadian exports to such markets.
Fortunately this situation has arisen at a time when the salted fish marketing picture is sound. There is no carry-over of last year's fish in Canada or other exporting countries. Demand on importing countries is good and prices have been rising throughout the past year. The 1952 world supply gives every indication of being below that of 1951. Canada's codfish is highly regarded in the European markets and consumer demand is strong. There is no reason to expect, therefore, that the changed position respecting payment should affect the volume of shipments to these markets. Indeed, in 1951 a substantial proportion of Canada's sales of salted cod to Italy was paid for in dollars.
In the light of these market conditions, we are confident that the changed position in European markets will not affect prices to be paid to fishermen this year. Production and marketing trends of salt fish will be carefully watched and the trade kept informed.



AMERICAN AIR LINES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mrs. Ellen L. Fairclough (Hamilton West):: Has the Minister of Justice an answer to the question I asked on Monday of this week in reference to some Toronto employees of American Air Lines?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I have made the investigation I mentioned then. Of course the Royal Canadian Mounted
Inquiries of the Ministry Police had no official notice of this matter, but on my instructions they made inquiries through their Toronto office, and the following are the facts they have gathered and reported to me.
American Air Lines found a shortage in a cash drawer to which only their office employees had access. The Toronto police were called in, but neither they nor the company's own detective were able to identify the person responsible for the shortage. The manager of American Air Lines in Toronto then called in the employees and asked them to submit to a lie detector test. All eight office employees went to Buffalo for that purpose and were subjected to this test, which did not reveal any employee as being responsible. The manager of the company then wrote a letter of apology to each of the employees involved. It was only after this letter of apology was written that any publicity was given to this matter.
I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that this is a problem affecting the administration of justice in the province of Ontario; and to the extent that it may involve possible claims by the employees against the employer company it is also a matter within provincial jurisdiction. Section 92 of the British North America Act reads in part as follows:
In each province the legislature may exclusively make laws in relation to matters coming within the classes of subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say:
13.	Property and civil rights in the province.
14.	The administration of justice in the province, including the constitution, maintenance and organization of provincial courts, both of civil and criminal jurisdiction, and including procedure in civil matters in those courts.
It would seem that matters arising out of the relationship between an air line doing business in Toronto and its employees would fall under either or perhaps both of these heads. So the matters the hon. member for Hamilton West has raised would appear to come within these two classes of provincial jurisdiction and therefore are not within the matters assigned to this parliament. I think her question might more properly be asked in the legislature of the province of Ontario.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, I must ask that I be permitted to point out what is really the effect of the statement made by the Minister of Justice. What happened in this case-


Stuart Sinclair Garson: Is my hon. friend asking me a question?


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, I submit it is time we took the muzzle off this parliament.


Lionel Chevrier: Order. You can't get away with that.

Inquiries of the Ministry


George Alexander Drew: Oh, is that so?


Lionel Chevrier: No, you can't.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. There is nothing before the house at the present time. The orders of the day have been called but have not been proceeded with. At this time it is permissible to ask questions of the ministry. I understand a question was asked by the hon. member for Hamilton West the other day, and today she asked the Minister of Justice if he had an answer. He has now given the answer.


George Alexander Drew: If it is not going to be possible to deal with a statement which disposes of something that could have very serious consequences, then I submit that to a substantial extent we should agree that questions and answers produce no result whatever. The suggestion that one could deal with statements of this kind by subsequent questions, by coming in through the back door as it were, simply disposes of the effectiveness of questions and answers of this kind.


Douglas Charles Abbott: A flagrant breach of the rifles.


Ellen Louks Fairclough: May I proceed now to ask a supplementary question? In his answer, has the minister taken into consideration the fact that these employees were taken across an international boundary line and interrogated in a foreign court?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: In matters of this kind it is always difficult to get at the real facts. My information, and it may be inaccurate, is to the effect that when this suggestion was made to the employees they went voluntarily to receive this test.


Ellen Louks Fairclough: No, Mr. Speaker; they were under the impression that this test was to be taken in the city of Toronto. It was not until after they had given their consent that they were aware they were being asked to go out of the country.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: All I can say is that the hon. member's source of information differs from my source of information.


Ellen Louks Fairclough: That may well be.


George Alexander Drew: Will the Minister of Justice state whether he has considered the fact that the air line concerned can only operate under agreement with the dominion government; that the conduct of that company is of necessity constantly under the supervision of the dominion government, and that the dominion government can therefore at all times exercise some measure of direction over the company's conduct in Canada?


Stuart Sinclair Garson: My impression is-and on several occasions I have understood the hon. member himself to say-that in carrying

on our business in Canada, we invite foreign companies to come into Canada to do business here. Those companies usually do business under our laws and are answerable to our courts as regards their relationship with their employees. Answering the hon. member's question, I had not thought he would regard it as proper that we should use licensing by an entirely different department of government to discipline a company in respect of a matter which one would have thought that the proper provincial authorities and the -company would if necessary have determined by the proper courts.


George Alexander Drew: Has the minister made inquiries as to whether in- any event the lie detector test and this fantastic procedure could at any time have been a method in Canada, no matter what arrangement was made?


Mr. Cruickshank:: It has never been made to apply here in any event.


Stuart Sinclair Garson: I am very glad to answer the hon. member's question. I have made that inquiry and my information is that a lie detector test has no probative value in our courts, and I believe it has no probative value in most United States courts.



HOUSING


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. George H. Hees (Broadview):: I should like to direct a question to the Minister of Resources and Development. In view of the statement in the Ontario legislature yesterday, is the -government considering cooperation with the provinces to make -possible low rental housing in centres of less than 5,000 population?


Hon. Robert H. Winters (Minister of Resources and Development):: The hon. member was kind enough to send to my office the -clipping to which he has referred. I have no knowledge of -the statement beyond what was in the clipping. I presume the particular point the minister of planning and development in Toronto was discussing -in fact, as I recall it, the clipping so stated-was operations under section 35 of the National Housing Act, and, as hon. members know, that is the public housing section. This section is designed to meet a need normally arising out of metropolitan conditions wherein it is -considered that all the taxpayers should be asked to provide housing for those citizens who are not otherwise able to obtain it. In such cases it is the responsibility of all the levels of government concerned to determine whether such -conditions exist in any municipality.



PUBLIC SERVICE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
A. Earl Catherwood: On
Tuesday, April 1, the hon. member for Ottawa East (Mr. Richard) asked the Secretary of State if a holiday would be granted to civil servants on the Saturday following Good Friday. I understand that yesterday the cabinet discussed this matter. Will the minister state what action has been taken?


Frederick Gordon Bradley: Consideration has been given to the suggestion of the hon. member for Ottawa East, but in the circumstances it has not been found feasible to accede to his request.



JAPANESE PEACE TREATY


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed, from Tuesday, April 8, consideration of the motion of Mr. Pearson:
That it is expedient that the houses of parliament approve the treaty of peace with Japan, declarations (2) of Japan and protocol, all as signed at San Francisco on the eighth day of September 1951, and that this house do approve the same.
Major James William Coldwell: Mr. Speaker, we have before us this afternoon what is indeed a very important resolution. I regret that, because of the arrangements for debate in this house during the first part of this session, it has not been found possible to debate this resolution before.
I want to join immediately with the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) and the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) in expressing the hope that the treaty now under consideration will do all that they, and all the rest of us, desire.
The treaty before the house is, I suppose, one of the most magnanimous in history. So far as I am able to discover, what we usually call punitive clauses are almost entirely absent, and presumably the treaty is intended to lay the foundation for the building of a democratic and peaceful nation. Indeed, I think that is what the Department of External Affairs had in mind when, on page 23 of their report for 1951, they said this:
The treaty was generous, restoring sovereignty to Japan and placing no restrictions on its economy or on its ability to defend itself. Reconciliation, and not revenge, was the main goal. The signatory powers agreed that Japan should, in principle, pay reparations for the devastation and suffering it caused during the war.
Then, it added this:
However, they recognized that Japan lacked the physical capacity to recompense its wartime victims if it was to achieve a viable economy.
Japanese Peace Treaty
We join in the hope that the generous treatment thus accorded to Japan under this treaty will produce the desired results. Canadians generally, I am certain, will support the principle of treaties of this kind- treaties of reconciliation rather than revenge.
When we look back over the post-war years we remember that certain military and political leaders were tried and executed for what one must describe as the terrible atrocities and indescribable conditions which were made known to us both during the war and upon the return to their respective countries of those who suffered at the hands of the military arm of imperial Japan. And I want to make that distinction, because I do not think that the atrocities and cruelties that were inflicted on our nationals, and those engaged with us in the war, represented the will of the Japanese people.
I do not propose to recount the horrors reported from Hong Kong, Singapore and other parts of the Orient which the Japanese invaded. Suffice it to say that these were a repetition of the barbarities which the late prime minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, described to this house on March 10, 1942, which had aroused the horror of the civilized world at the time of the Nanking massacre in 1937, but of which the rest of the world took little heed when they occurred, and were perpetrated on the Chinese.
We accept the treaty, and we support, with some reservations, Canada's approval of it. We remember, too, that the armament of Japan was assisted by powerful commercial interests in North America including our own country. We of the C.C.F. protested against the export of vital war materials to that country in the years prior to the attack upon Pearl Harbor.
I do not propose to place upon the record the numerous references that can be found in Hansard between 1930 and 1941 to that effect, to confirm the attitude I say we consistently adopted throughout those fatal years. Suffice it to say that we protested vigorously against the strengthening of the Japanese army and armaments industry by large and continuous exports of basic materials such as copper, nickel, scrap iron and the like, all of which left our shores almost until the time of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and our declaration of war.
I remember that a clever versifier who writes under various names in British journals said this, shortly after the attack upon the Dutch East Indies:
We sent too little and too late
To save ourselves, to save the Dutch,
Because, unconscious of our fate,
We'd sold the enemy too much.

Japanese Peace Treaty
I think that little verse describes exactly what happened prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It is true that Canada was the first of the allied nations to declare war on Japan. The Canadian cabinet, as I remember it,- and I remember it well-after consultation by telephone with the then leader of the official opposition, the late Hon. R. B. Hanson, with the then leader of the Social Credit group, the hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Blackmore) and with myself, issued a proclamation on the evening of Sunday, December 7, the very day Pearl Harbor was attacked. Canada thus proclaimed that a state of war existed some hours before the United States or any other country was able to make a similar declaration.
Nor must we forget today, or fail indeed to pay tribute to, the ill-equipped Canadian troops at Hong Kong who suffered such serious casualties by the unprovoked attack, and the several thousands of them who languished, suffered and died in Japanese prison camps. We should remember these things-not for the sake of demanding revenge, but to remind us that any steps we take now should make it certain that neither we nor the rest of the world shall again be subjected to sudden and unprovoked attacks from that quarter.
So, in approving the generous treaty now before us, we are, as it were, forgetting and forgiving the sufferings which a militarized Japan inflicted upon a large section of the world. And I hope that no nation will endeavour to persuade the Japanese people again to militarize themselves. Indeed, the first acts of their own post-war Diet indicated that it was their wish to pursue a peaceful course; and we should help them in that desire.
This, I may say, is in line with our attitude throughout the post-war years, and indeed, if I may say so, stems too out of the feeling we had during the war that Canadian citizens of Japanese origin were subjected to hardships in our own country

but, of course, nothing comparable with what happened to our nationals who happened to be in Japan and the countries controlled by Japan during wartime.
Well, we are happy to note that there are indications that the Japanese people appreciate the fact that there are no humiliating and punitive provisions such as were to be found in the Versailles treaty signed with Germany in 1919. This of course is owing to the desire of the people in the democratic countries to promote good will among their former enemies, and also to the realities of the world situation. Japan is too vital a country strategically to be alienated from friendship with the democratic powers.
fMr. Coldwell.J

I have read carefully the testimony of Mr. John Foster Dulles before the committee on foreign relations of the United States senate when he appeared before that body on January 21 of this year. It is obvious that in his opinion the treaty has been made with an eye to the international situation, the struggle for men's minds, and the necessity of strengthening Japan against the possibility of communist aggression from the mainland.
Mr. Dulles implied-and from what I have been able to read of his statements from time to time, this opinion of mine is confirmed-that all encouragement must be given to the overthrow of the present government at Peking in China. In order to confirm my opinion, or at least to bring some authority to it, I think it would be well to place on the record a more extended quotation of what Mr. Dulles said before the senate committee on foreign affairs in the United States. At page 12 of the official report Mr. Dulles is quoted as having said:
I can say to you with complete assurance that the best informed Japanese are totally convinced, as X think we are, that the alien doctrine of communism cannot permanently conquer the Chinese spirit or liquidate the innate individualism of the Chinese race. The Chinese nation will not permanently suffer the imposition of a tyranny which places it in the service of alien masters.
There will be an end to a tyranny which the Chinese themselves will come more and more to hate. We should assume the impermanence, not the permanence, of the present Moscow oriented rule of China.
And note this:
We cannot expect that this change in China will take place automatically.
To realize that change will require something besides negative and purely defensive policies in Asia on the part of the free world, notably the United States. It will require a determination to promote freedom and independence in Asia and-
Note these words:
-action consistent with that determination as opportunities arise.
"The mood of the people of Japan, like the mood of other free peoples who are close neighbours of Asian communism, will, in the long run, largely depend on the attitude and action of the other free nations. If they persevere in positive policies in support of real national independence in Asia, Japan will be a dependable and able coadjutor."
I 'think this bears no other interpretation than the one that I placed upon it in my speech of March 6 last. This, too, I think, was emphasized by the United States approval of the tentative decision of the Japanese government to recognize the Formosan administration headed by Chiang Kai-shek as the government of China.

Of the Formosan situation and possible settlement Mr. Walter Lippmann says in his feature article in the Montreal Gazette today:
"First, that the Cairo declaration must be honoured, and that the Chinese suzerainty over Formosa will have to be recognized in a final peace settlement: and, second, that the Formosan people, who have never been governed from China, should not now be put under Chinese administration, but should be made into an autonomous state, guaranteed by the United Nations though under Chinese suzerainty -demilitarized except for a local Formosan militia, neutralized for military purposes against all the great powers including China, Japan, Russia and the United States; and, third, that Gen. Chiang Kai-shek and his family and retainers should be allowed to depart in safety from Formosa and granted asylum, preferably not in the Far East; and, fourth, that Chiang's troops should be demobilized and that those wishing it should be repatriated to their homes in China.
Proposals of this sort, if they were agreed to, could provide a basis for an armistice and a working arrangement in Korea, and for an approach to a cease-fire and an arrangement in Indo-China."
These are Mr. Lippmann's views with regard to the final settlement of Formosa's future as part of the general Far Eastern settlement after the Korean armistice has been achieved; and it is indeed in line with the policy that we have from time to (time suggested here and elsewhere in the last six or seven months.
Of course this treaty with Japan, which is now before us, cannot be excluded from the discussion when the nations make any permanent Far Eastern settlement. I wish to say at once, as I have said before, that we support the policy enunciated from time to time by the Secretary of State for External Affairs on Canada's neutrality in connection with Formosa and the Formosan situation. The treaty now before us is not one which has been enthusiastically accepted by some nations which attached their signatures to it at San Francisco. I do not think we can accept it enthusiastically either.
It will be remembered that the French foreign affairs commission of the French national assembly, on August 10 of last year, passed a resolution, by twenty-one votes to two, deploring the fact that France had had no part in drawing up the outline of the treaty from the beginning. On August 3 last the Netherlands government made serious objections on the ground that no provision was made for reparations and there was no protection of the tuna fisheries off the coast of Dutch New Guinea^
The Australian, government, as the hon. member for Peel said last night, when he quoted so extensively from Mr. Menzies' address on the occasion of the treaty coming before the Australian house, accepted it as a reasonable basis on which to bring about a settlement. But Dr. Evatt, who was the
Japanese Peace Treaty Australian minister of external affairs during a good part of the war and in the post-war period, strongly criticized it-and I use his words-as "appeasement of a cruel enemy", and stated that Australians of all parties viewed-and again I quote-the "clearly intended rearmament" of Japan with the deepest anxiety and resentment.
New Zealand made a somewhat similar protest. All parties in the Philippines joined on July 14, 1951, in a unanimous statement describing the treaty as calculated to restore Japan to a dominant position in Asia. Burma refused to sign it, as did India. On August 27, 1951, Prime Minister Nehru sent a message to the United States, in which he gave the reasons why India would not participate in this treaty. He said then:
"Throughout the negotiations that have taken place between the two governments-
That is, the government of India and the government of the United States. I continue: -on the subject of the treaty, the government of India have laid emphasis upon two fundamental objectives: (1) The treaty terms should concede to Japan a position of honour, equality, and contentment among the community of free nations; (2) They should be so framed as to enable all the countries especially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the treaty sooner or later.
It goes on:
The government of India have, after most careful thought, come to the conclusion that the treaty does not in material respects satisfy either of these two criteria.
3. Condition (1)
(a)	It is only natural to expect that Japan should desire restoration in full of her sovereignty over the territory of which the inhabitants have a historical affinity with her own people and which she has not acquired by aggression from any other country. The Ryukyu and Bonin islands fully satisfy this description. Nevertheless the treaty proposes that, until the United States government seek and obtain trusteeship over these islands, they should continue to be subject to the legislative and administrative control of the United States. It is apparent to the government of India that such an arrangement cannot but be a source of dissatisfaction to large sections of the Japanese people, and must carry the seed of future dispute-and possibly conflict-in the Far East.
(b)	The government of India recognize that, as a sovereign nation, Japan should have the right to make arrangements for her defence as provided in article 5 of the treaty. If, in exercise of this right Japan should decide to enter in defensive agreements with friendly powers, no one could reasonably object to this. But such right should be exercised by the government of Japan, when Japan has become truly sovereign.
I think the point Nehru is making is that defensive alliance should await full sovereignty. I continue:
The provision in the treaty which suggests that present occupation forces may stay on in Japan as part of such defensive agreements is bound to give rise to the impression that the agreements do not represent a decision taken by Japan in full

Japanese Peace Treaty enjoyment of her freedom as a sovereign nation. The effect of this, not only on the people of Japan-
In my opinion what follows is equally or even more important.
The effect of this, not only on the people of Japan, but upon large sections of the people of Asia, is bound to be most unfortunate.
4. Condition (2). As already stated, the government of India attach the greatest importance to the treaty providing that the island of Formosa should be returned to China. The time and manner of such return might be the subject of separate negotiations,-
This is of course in line with what our Secretary of State for External Affairs has said. The paragraph goes on:
-but to leave the future of the island undetermined, in spite of past international agreements, in a document which attempts to regulate the relations of Japan with all governments that were engaged in the last war against her, does not appear to the government of India to be either just or expedient.
Again, I say, perhaps expedience may be a consideration which in the eyes of some might be the more impressive.
Mutatis mutandis, the same argument applies to the Kurile islands and to South Sakhalin.
The final paragraph which I shall read goes on to say:
For the foregoing reasons the government of India have decided with regret that they cannot be parties to this treaty. It is their sincere hope that a lasting peace will prevail in the Far East, and to that end they will continue to co-operate with the United States and other governments in such a manner as may be open to them consistently with the principles on which their foreign policy is based. As a first step, it is their intention, as soon as this may be practicable, to put an end to the state of war between them and Japan, and to establish full diplomatic relations with that country.
As I have said on more than one occasion, in dealing with Asian problems we should give considerable weight to the opinions of the government of India. Here we have a treaty which the governments of India and Burma have refused to sign and which that other great Asian nation, China, has not been invited to sign. We can see therefore that the great populations of Asia are not in agreement with this treaty, which is more vital to them than it is to Canada or perhaps even to any of the nations which attached their signatures to the treaty at San Francisco.
Thus the Pacific nations which ordinarily might be considered to be the most concerned in the provisions of the treaty were either critical, like the Philippines or Indonesia or some of the other powers that were interested, or refused altogether to approve it. As I have said, Japan's great neighbour, China, had no part in it. I say that this is a serious matter for the rest of the world.

What Canada's part in the actual making of the treaty was, of course, we do not know. We do know that consultations were held between our minister of external affairs and the Department of External Affairs, and Mr. Dulles and the state department of the United States; but what suggestions, what considerations or what modifications were advanced we do not know. Certainly our interest lies to a very large extent, not only in the political implications of this treaty, which are great, but in certain specific fields which are mainly economic.
Our trade with Japan prior to the war placed us in the position of fourth among the nations trading with that country in 1938, and third in 1951. Perhaps 1938 is not a good year to take as a criterion of our trade with Japan, because in that year our exports were largely of raw materials and potential war supplies, but 1951 is a criterion. In both those years our exports were mainly minerals, lumber and other raw materials. It is certain that if Japan is to improve her standard of living she must have raw materials. To improve her standard of living is in our opinion the best way to combat totalitarianism of any description. It must be remembered that there is more than one form of totalitarianism and Japan may be threatened by more than one form. Consequently she must have access to raw materials and to markets. Indeed her main market must be China and the Asian mainland.
Competition from low living standard areas is a threat, of course, to the higher standards of living of other countries. Japan's main market should be where manufactured articles from Japan are so badly needed, on the Asian mainland.
Indeed the United States as the occupying power has recognized this because she has not forbidden all trade with the Chinese mainland. The Japanese are trading with the Chinese today for raw materials and food in return for certain manufactured goods and materials.
To what extent the occupation forces in Japan have been able to improve living standards since the end of the war is problematical, but I believe they have done something toward this end. It is in this field that I think every effort must be made by the western powers to raise as rapidly as possible the standards of living of the Japanese workers, peasants and people generally. Indeed that is our protection against competition from all low living standard areas.
Canada's principal interest, as I said, is at the moment economic. Canada's principal economic interest in the text of the treaty is

in connection with the conservation of our halibut, salmon and herring fisheries off the Pacific coast. I know that an agreement was made subsequently, but I contend that this treaty should have contained specific clauses binding the Japanese to observe any international conservation treaties that exist or are essential to the well-being of this great industry and this great source of food supply, not only for Canada but for the rest of the world.
Article 9 of the treaty only compels Japan to negotiate with the nations interested in conservation policies in the north Pacific, not to accept a treaty. I repeat that we believe the treaty should have committed her to the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty or treaties in this regard and on a long-term basis. I think our government can be criticized for its failure to secure a more specific understanding on this important matter before we attached our signature to the treaty. The temporary five-year agreement signed in December will be reviewed by our standing committee on marine and fisheries and then we shall have a better understanding of it. I hope it is a better agreement than I believe it to be at the moment.
What we are doing in approving this treaty, I take it, is to make a gesture of unprecedented good will and to help build a democratic Japan which will co-operate with the rest of the democratic world in promoting peace and good will among men in the Far East, in North America, in Europe, in Africa or wherever men may live. That is our hope in giving approval to this treaty, and only time will tell whether we are justified or not in placing so much faith in this country so soon after a long and aggressive war which brought so much suffering and inflicted so much cruelty upon the rest of the world, a war carried on under the leadership of the former militaristic government of imperial Japan.
I should like to read another comment by Walter Lippmann in an article from which I have already quoted appearing in today's Montreal Gazette. While at the moment it applies to Korea I think it has equal application to the treaty with Japan that we are now discussing. Indeed if we substituted Japan for Korea I think it has a bearing which we should take into consideration. Of course he is dealing with the present situation in Korea, but it applies equally to the Japanese treaty we are discussing now.
He says:
A Korean treaty, which was not underwritten by the real government of China and the real government of Japan, is manifestly not going to be more than a very provisional arrangement. Fictitious governments can make only fictitious treaties. No
Japanese Peace Treaty matter how superior they may be morally to the actual governments, the treaties they could sign about the Far East would be like the cheques drawn by a high-born gentleman who has overdrawn his account.
To what extent the present government of Japan is, in the sense in which he uses the word, a fictitious government I am not in a position to say, but it is a government that has been elected while the country has been under the control of an army of occupation. It may not of course be a fictitious government, but the point he makes is well taken. Let us hope that the cheque we are endorsing this afternoon will not one day prove to have been drawn on an already overdrawn account.


Mr. Fraser:: A rubber one.


Major James William Coldwell: While we have, as I have said, important reservations about this treaty, we accept it. We accept it as a gesture of reconciliation and an expression of our desire for a peaceful settlement not only of the war with Japan but of Far Eastern problems. That under the circumstances is indeed all that we can do, though we are far from satisfied with the treaty and far from satisfied, in view of the absence of India, Burma and China from the signatories of the treaty, that it will endure. However, with such reservations we accept it.


Mr. Solon E. Low (Peace River):: Mr. Speaker, at first glance the Japanese peace treaty, which is before us for consideration today, appears to be a soft treaty. Perhaps that is why so many people have spoken of it as a soft treaty, meaning, I take it, that they think it does not impose upon the vanquished nation the same kind of retributive conditions which we are accustomed to seeing victor nations impose in the form of so-called peace treaties. I have learned that there is ...'.ch resentment amongst the Japanese people over this soft treaty talk. They do not think it is an easy treaty in any respect, and unless the rank and file of the Japanese people can feel easy in their minds about it and can be brought to accept it without too many reservations then the treaty itself is bound to fail.
In my opinion there are features of the treaty which indicate that we have learned a few things as a result of the mistakes that victor nations have made in the past. The treaty in some respects does mark progress toward real enlightenment since the days of the treaty of Versailles which ended the first world war. The severely retributive nature of the treaty of Versailles prepared the soil and sowed the seeds of world war II. But I cannot agree with those who claim that the Japanese peace treaty is soft and that it does not contain the seeds of future war. I am

Japanese Peace Treaty convinced that it does contain seeds of discontent which may lead to war in the future. In my judgment in one respect at least the treaty is retributive; and, since it is retributive, no matter to how small an extent, then I claim it does not lay down a solid foundation for peace nor a reasonable basis for firm faith and good will between the Japanese people and the western Christian nations.
Today the Japanese people are openly and volubly complaining about the territorial losses imposed by the treaty. I have to ask myself whether these complaints are justified or whether they are merely the protest of a people who are expected to put on a show but who know that they have not much, if any, real reason to kick. I suggest that the answer must be sought in the facts about Japan's productive capacity, her food problems, her population and her history. I should like to refer briefly to the section of the treaty purporting to adjust territories, chapter II. The first subsection of article 2 reads as follows:
Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet.
With respect to Korea, Mr. Speaker, note that according to the treaty Japan recognizes the independence of a Korea the southern part of which Japan has held more or less tightly or loosely since the Empress Jingu put it under Japanese rule late in the fourth century. That is a long time. Japan has never abrogated the rights she obtained by conquest in Korea. Yet we come along and shear away territories she has held and rights she felt she was justified in holding and in claiming that have their roots away back in the fourth century. Subsection (b) of article 2 reads:
Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
I would point out that according to Japanese history Formosa has been held bv Japan since it was ceded to her by the treaty of Shimonoseki, I think it was called, in 1895 at the conclusion of the war with China. That goes a long way back. Suppose we began to shear away territories from Great Britain that she obtained through treaty no longer ago than 1895.


Mr. Blackmore:: Or the United States.


Solon Earl Low: Yes. I wonder what the situation would be. Subsection (c) of article 2 reads:
Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile islands-

Let me interpolate that Japan exchanged Sakhalin for the Kurile islands in 1875.
-and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.
That goes back a long way, to the end of the Russo-Japanese war.
So it goes on. I will not weary the house by reading the remaining portion of article 2, but I do point out that we are doing a serious thing when we shear away territories to which Japan obtained right and title many years ago, which historically she has never abrogated at any time. Then it seems to me article 3, still dealing with territorial adjustment, gives Russia and the communist leaders every opportunity to say here is a fine example of high-handed United States imperialism. Are we going to play into the hands of Moscow? I feel we should have used better judgment than this. Note the words:
Japan will concur-
How? By having her nose stuck right in it.
-in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29 degrees north latitude (including the Ryukyu islands and the Daito islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin islands, Rosario island and the Volcano islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.
That gives these people in the communist nations behind the iron curtain plenty of scope to make the claim, and document it to some extent, that the United States is indeed imperialistic in its designs. I should have thought we would avoid such a thing in days as dangerous as these. I believe some of these territories have been of tremendous importance to Japan for many years. They are areas in which Japan has been very largely able to build up her population, and when contemplating this treaty I am led to ask myself: Can Japan afford to lose them? Can she possibly feed, clothe and shelter her present population without these territories? Can she do that with any degree of success, as measured by the happiness and well-being of the Japanese people? Let us just take a quick look at the population of Japan and the food problem, in order to reach some sort of judgment on these questions. The estimated population of Japan today is 83 million, exclusive of Korea and Formosa. The average density of population for the whole country is close to 500 per square mile. Think of that. Then when we calculate the

density of that population in relation to the cultivated area, the Japanese density is around 3,000 per square mile, which is twice that of Belgium and four times that of England.
Let us look at these things squarely. Japan has experienced a tremendous increase in population since 1852, when Commodore Perry signed a treaty with the shogun. At that time the population stood at 27 million; but after 1852 improved living conditions, progressive improvement in agriculture, industrial growth, the expansion of their territory and the intelligent colonization of the territories that were acquired stimulated the population increase so that by 1927 there were 61,316,000 people in Japan, again exclusive of Formosa and Korea. So that we can have a basis for comparison. Since 1927 the population is estimated to have increased at the rate of 750,000 per year.
What about emigration? What has' it done to relieve the situation? Emigration has been negligible. Not more than 20,000 a year of that 750,000 increase have emigrated from the country.


John Horne Blackmore: Or been permitted to
emigrate.


Solon Earl Low: By nature the Japanese have
been a stay-at-home people. They have not been inclined to settle even in Korea and Formosa, their own territories, without having considerable pressure brought to bear upon them. The question is this, and in my judgment it is a very serious question: how to feed the rapidly growing population of Japan. I say that is the beginning and the end of the population problem for Japan; how to feed and clothe them. The country must be considered poor by comparison with most countries of the world. Japan has only a small tillable area with fertile soil, as everyone knows who is familiar with her geography. Most of Japan is rough volcanic rock; and the Climatic conditions and soil are such that no edible animals have ever been indigenous to the country. Few acres of grass lands exist on which to pasture cattle or sheep or other meat producing animals. Consequently the Japanese have rarely been able to consume much meat. In 1931 the per capita consumption of meat in Japan was two and one-half pounds. That seems unbelievable, doesn't it, when we realize that in the same year the average American consumed 280 pounds of meat. Stop to think about it and you begin to see the magnitude of the problem faced by 83 million people. It is true the lack of meat is compensated for to
Japanese Peace Treaty some extent by rather extensive fisheries, and of course we recognize that fish is good food.
The main universal article of diet in Japan is rice; but in spite of a fairly large production of this grain Japan has by no means become self-sufficient in its diet. Even while holding Korea, Formosa and the islands and territories now being shorn away by this treaty, the Japanese were greatly worried over the problem of feeding their hungry millions. The ever normal granary in that country, I would think, decade after decade was never more than 25 million bushels of rice. That is a rather slim resource with which to take care of 83 million people.
So I say that even before the war the Japanese were greatly worried about the rapidly growing population in relation to their available food supplies. Even at that time the Japanese people realized only too well that it is difficult to be happy and contented on a beggar's ration. So even before the war of 1939-45 considerable scientific discussion took place in Japan as to the possible need to return to the birth control measures which were practised fairly extensively and in various fonms in earlier times, I imagine if one were to travel through Japan today he would find such discussions going on in intellectual circles.
In the light of all I have said about food and territories, and many other things that could be cited-of course I am only touching the surface-what terrible consequences are bound to follow the imposition of the territory reduction clauses of the treaty now before us? Is it to be considered that the Japanese race have not the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness? Or are we to force upon them a peace treaty parts of which must be couched in punitive terms because Japan went to war against the United States m 1941 and lost that war?
Let us make it abundantly clear that in anything I have to say in connection with 'this treaty this afternoon I want it to be understood that I deplored at that time the growth of Japan's military junta which, in so many respects, resembled the German war lords, the Junkers machine. I did not in any way defend the sudden development of fascism and the fascist state which was Japan in 1941, nor did I excuse Japan's lightning attack on Pearl Harbor nor the bestial atrocities committed during the war. I condemned those things in the strongest possible way then as I condemn them now. In spite of all those reprehensible things I must say that the territorial adjustments in this treaty are

Japanese Peace Treaty punitive. If Japan had a hard time feeding, clothing and housing her millions of citizens while she held Korea, Formosa, the Kuriles and all those other territories that are being shorn away by this treaty, how can anyone in his right mind expect her to look after the people adequately after such drastic territorial reductions as we are now asked to approve? If that does not contain seeds of discontent and war, then I should like to be set right.
Let us take a look at another feature of the treaty which I feel sometimes escapes notice. For just a minute or two I am going to speak about trade, which takes me over to article 12 in the treaty. In my judgment article 12 definitely puts a limitation upon Japanese trade. In the first subsection, Japan declares its readiness to promptly enter into negotiations for the conclusion with each of the allied powers of treaties or agreements to place their trading, maritime and other commercial relations on a stable and friendly basis. Well, that is good.
Section (b) of article 12 states:
Pending the conclusion of the relevant treaty or agreement, Japan will, during a period of four years from the first coming into force of the present treaty,
(1) accord to each of the allied powers, its nationals, products and vessels
(i) most-favoured-nation treatment with respect to customs duties, charges, restrictions and other regulations on or in connection with the importation and exportation of goods;
And so on. This only imposes; what the United States has been itching to impose upon other nations in the world, the unconditional most-favoured-nation trading clause in treaties. Let me say this. This section of the treaty imposes a serious limitation in Japan's trade. It imposes or seeks to impose upon Japan utopian ideas which, because of the United States refusal to be realistic, are utterly impossible of successful application in a world such as we live in today. That being the case, Mr. Speaker, it contains the seeds of discontent which may at any time-


Mr. Pearson:: Will the hon. member permit a question?


Solon Earl Low: Yes.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Will he read section (c) of article 12 on that point?


Solon Earl Low: Yes, I noticed the escape clause. But, Mr. Speaker, just let me suggest as a reply, and I do so without strong feeling one way or another, that the minister say whether it is not true that the sole judge as to what constitutes essential security or unreasonableness will be the United States of America, who imposed the most-favoured-nation clause upon Japan in the first place. Now, it is quite correct, and I shall read section (d) -


Lester Bowles Pearson: Section (c).


Solon Earl Low: Sections (c) and (d). I should like to read section (d) as the answer to any application of this article. It reads:
In the application of this article, a discriminatory measure shall not be considered to derogate from the grant of national or most-favoured-nation treatment, as the case may be, if such measure is based on an exception customarily provided for in the commercial treaties of the party applying it, or on the need to safeguard that party's external financial position or balance of payments (except in respect to shipping and navigation), or on the need to maintain its essential security interests, and provided such measure is proportionate to the circumstances and not applied in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner.
Now, Mr. Speaker, who is it that judges that? It is one nation. Under those circumstances, the escape clause means nothing. If Japan is going to trade at all she will have to accept what is set out in article 12, section (b)	(1), the unconditional most-favourednation clause. We hope that Japan in the days ahead will do just exactly as the minister said he hoped she would do last night, that is follow internationally accepted fair trade practices. I hope .that that will be true, and I feel quite sure that unless her trading relations are too severely circumscribed Japan will have that will. But imposing upon Japan the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause in trade treaties is not the way to ensure this fair trade practice. This clause will place drastic limitations upon Japan's trade, and Japan is already having plenty of trouble in this field.
For a moment I should like to point out an article in the April 5 issue of "Foreign Trade", put out by the Department of Trade and Commerce. On page 411 we find this information concerning Japan's trade pattern changes:
Japan's exports for 1951, according to the Ministry of Finance, were valued at $1,365 million, 64-9 per cent above the 1950 total of $828 million. On the other hand, imports were valued at $2,043 million, 111-3 per cent over the previous year's total of $967 million.
The uneven distribution of Japan's imports and exports between the dollar and sterling areas presents a serious problem. In 1950, 47 per cent of Japan's exports went to the dollar area, 29 per cent to the sterling area, and 24 per cent to the open account areas. Japan's imports that year followed much the same pattern; 44 per cent from the dollar area, 31 per cent from the sterling area, and 25 per cent from the open account areas.
Let me emphasize this part of the article on page 411 of "Foreign Trade".
The pattern changed in 1951, with 24 per cent of Japan's exports going to the dollar area, 42 per cent to the sterling area, and 34 per cent to the open account areas. Against this, 56 per cent of imports came from the dollar area, 25 per cent from the sterling area, and 19 per cent from the open account areas. As a result, Japan's foreign trade with the dollar area showed a large unfavourable balance, while trade with the sterling area

showed a substantial credit balance. The sterling balance accumulated rapidly in the final quarter of the year and the government took action to encourage more imports from the sterling area and, where possible, to switch the purchase of essential materials from the dollar to the sterling countries.
Then, in conclusion the article says this, and it seems to me it is very pertinent:
Japan cannot continue to buy from the dollar area and sell in the sterling area. Efforts must be made to increase exports and to bring prices into line with those in world markets. The country must be able to produce, economically and efficiently, goods of a standard acceptable in world markets.
I ask, Mr. Speaker, how can they do that if they suffer limitations on their trade, and if they are circumscribed by the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause which I think aggravated, if it did not cause, the war between that country and the United States. I do not wish to take up too much time on this occasion, but once again let me say that I believe the treaty, in many of its features, is a good treaty. I believe that in perhaps most of its features it can be said to be a fair treaty, and it is gratifying to me today to see the end of a state of war with Japan.
We approve of the resolution, but we do so with some reluctance and with some reservation. It may be, as the minister said last night, the best possible treaty under all the circumstances. I do not know. But we warn all men that the treaty, generous as it is in some respects, still contains the seeds either of another war or of the destruction of the nations and the peoples who, with reasonable Christian treatment, could be induced to stand solidly with the democracies and the western nations, and to contribute substantially to the welfare of humanity. We denounce, of course, those parts of the treaty which we believe sow the seeds of dissension and possibly of war.


Mr. J. M. Macdonnell (Greenwood):: Mr. Speaker, I do not rise at this time to make a lengthy speech, but merely to say that I have been keenly interested in what has been said by the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low), and the aspect of the matter with which he dealt. I do hope the minister will, as I have no doubt he intends to do, answer in considerable detail what has been said.


John Horne Blackmore: Mr. Speaker, I had hoped there would be considerably more discussion of this important treaty, and a great many more members in the house to consider it than we see here this afternoon. As the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) has indicated, now is the time when we lay or do not lay the foundation
Japanese Peace Treaty for world war III-when we are considering the treaties of peace, by, through, and as a result of, which we terminate recent wars.
This treaty must be judged in the light of the answer to these questions: To what extent is the treaty likely to sow the seeds of an inevitable future war? To what extent is it likely to give the Japanese encouragement to become the great and friendly Christian nation we hope for-or, if not a Christian nation, at least a religious and God-fearing nation, observing the principles of righteous living?
Before proceeding to what I intend to say, I am tempted to refer briefly to the atrocities committed by the military caste in Japan. I believe in this connection I can use a homely illustration. If you torment a bull until you get him so angry that he is almost utterly mad, do not be surprised by anything he does to you, once he starts.
That must be borne in mind. The great question we need to ask ourselves is this: In what sort of absolutely impossible position were the Japanese people placed, and for how long had that impossible position been developing? What evidence did they have that there was utterly no way out of their difficulty, except by the bloody arbitrament of war, and how fully were they convinced that if they did not destroy their enemy, then ultimately their enemy would utterly destroy them?
Those are the questions which must be asked. If a man is sufficiently convinced that another man wants to destroy him, and is going to destroy him, then the first man will do everything within his power to destroy the second, before that second man acts. It is much the same with nations.
Having said that, I think we must look with a measure of indulgence or, shall I say, charity, on the atrocities committed by the Japanese as well as by the Germans in the great struggle. I am not condoning those things. I am merely seeking to understand, and to make allowances for them.
Turning to the treaty under consideration I would say that as an instrument having for its purpose the termination of hostilities, the present peace treaty might be acceptable; but as an instrument for establishing peace and prosperity and freedom among men, it is gravely deficient, and therefore unacceptable. This does not mean I propose to vote against it. The position I shall take has been expressed admirably by the hon. member for Peace River.
Let me lay down a few general and fundamental principles-and for anyone who happens to be interested I would refer him to my speech of April 2 which, in a way,

Japanese Peace Treaty was simply the procedure of laying the foundation for the speech I intend to deliver today. This is a practical application of the principles I therein laid down.
Every nation, every people, every community on earth has an inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness-pursuit of happiness regardless of race, colour, creed or geographical position. This is the situation, provided, first, that the world's resources are adequate to support such a standard of living and, secondly, that the community under consideration is willing to pull its full share of the load of production, distribution and management of the goods and services required by mankind.
There is some argument among men as to whether the world has the resources. I think from the evidence at my disposal it is beyond all shadow of doubt that the world does have the resources from which people now living on earth can, if they so choose, produce all the goods that all the people of the whole world need, in order to give them life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
Anyone who is at all familiar with the Japanese will freely acknowledge that individually and collectively the Japanese willingly and effectually pull their share of the load, and have done so ever since we first knew them. They are energetic, skilful, resourceful, sober, industrious and patient. They are highly intelligent, highly conscientious, highly talented, honourable and highly ambitious. They are earnest, sincere, self-sacrificing and realistic. They are deeply religious and reverent, nobly proud, sensitive and loyal. They are admirably cultured, refined and law-abiding.
I have had the advantage of having taught scores upon scores of Japanese boys and girls in schools. I have the honour of representing thousands of them who live in my constituency, whom I have seen in action, and who have proved the truth of what I say concerning them.
Beyond all shadow of doubt the Japanese have pulled adequately their load, or their share of the load, and are willing to continue to do so if we white people can only somehow or other acquire sense enough to set up an economic system in the world under which they will have a chance to pull their share. And this latter "if" is a major consideration in all our discussions at the present time. Such facts being borne in mind, we must agree that the Japanese have, and should be guaranteed.-and I repeat "guaranteed"-their inherent right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. By that I do not mean that we necessarily need to give them goods. I do not even mean that we need to accept their


goods in exchange for our goods. I mean that we must set up such an arrangement of circumstances as will give them the full chance to work to earn their way. That will be all they will ever ask. Does this present Japanese peace treaty adequately support them in that right which I have laid down and which I believe all people will freely concede?
To all those who have read through the treaty with impartial care, and who have studied the meaning and implication of certain of its clauses, studied them with understanding and appreciation, against the background of Japanese and United States history over the century just past, to all those, it is patently evident that in the economic field the treaty deprives the Japanese of that economic freedom of action which is indispensable to them, if they are to gain for themselves a fair share of the good things which the world's peoples could and would and should produce.
Furthermore, the treaty makes no apparent provision for the removal of the great basic, inescapable, unsupportable and intolerable cause which impelled the Japanese to enter world war II. That cause, as I will later develop, was the unconditional most-favourednation clause, as insisted upon by the United States, and I propose to prove it.
The punitive, the punishing clauses of the treaty, as the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) has so well pointed out, wrest from Japan numbers of possessions which, in her struggle to make a living, were of substantial assistance to Japan. They thereby leave Japan, economically speaking, much more vulnerable than she was before world war II, unless compensatory measures, ample and adequately perpetual, be guaranteed that nation, until such time as Japan might, with realism, be said to have acquired the actual means of earning her living among the nations.
Unfortunately, I had to be out of the house for a minute or two. I was called out and I am not just sure what the hon. member for Peace River put on the record, but I am impressed with article 10 of the treaty. Let me read article 10 to show how far afield the great United States went to wrest from Japan the advantage which she had gained through the years:
Japan renounces all special rights and interests in China, including all benefits and privileges resulting from the provisions of the final protocol signed at Peking on September 7, 1901,-
Imagine going back there. I continue:
-and all annexes, notes and documents supplementary thereto, and agrees to the abrogation in respect to Japan of the said protocol, annexes, notes and documents.

It would take a panel of "Philadelphia lawyers" to prove that that was not punitive; it strains in the matter of being punitive. It looks as though it were dictated by a nation which was literally determined to destroy Japanese power and national independence and efficiency outright, regardless of the pretty words-most of which are weasel words-which might be used by the United States in this or any other connection by that nation.
Are such punitive measures warrantable? Some will say: "Well, look what the Japanese did to us. They deserve to be treated that way!" Well, those who know history raise this question: Look at what we did to the Japanese for fifty years! Let us get that out into the open and see what allowances we ought to make for that.
Is this neglect to provide for the removal of the fundamental cause of Japanese participation in world war II justifiable? I will say certainly it is not.
This brings us to the question: What caused the Japanese to strike at the United States at Pearl Harbor? The cause of world war II between Japan and the United States was the United States' insistence, as I indicated a moment ago, upon Japanese acceptance of the unconditional most-favourednation clause in trading.
Japan is a "have-not" nation. Long experience had convinced the Japanese that if they were ever to be able to give their people a standard of living consonant with an age of abundance through machines, technological skills such as plastics, and the use of solar power, in a world as richly endowed as this in which we dwell, if she were ever to be able to give her people an equitable share of the good things our world can produce, then she must co-operate with other "have-not" nations by the use of devices resembling imperial preferences which the British empire had employed so successfully through the years, and especially since 1932.
Now, the great question when we undertake to appraise the iniquity, or lack of it, in the Japanese, in attacking at Pearl Harbor, the great question we have to look at is this: Did the Japanese have a perfect right to work with other little nations, other "have-not" nations, by the use of imperial preferences or something resembling them? Did they have the right to do that? Were they committing a crime which deserved to be punished by the outrageous measures which I have indicated, when they insisted they ought to be able to use imperial preferences, preferential treatment, such as the British had used? I doubt whether any member in this house would rise and say
Japanese Peace Treaty that they did not have the right to use preferences such as we had used, and such as we shall use again if we have right good sense, and can ever get ourselves out from under the domination of the United States long enough to do it. That is what Japan insisted on, the right to work with other little fellows like herself through employment of preferences.
Because the United States refused to grant her that right, and insisted, as I will show, then the Japanese decided there was only one thing to do about it. Probably we should be appreciating the fact that they were so long-suffering before they made up their minds to that extent. Japan conceived of making such arrangements as imperial preferential arrangements with her neighbour "have-not" nations, particularly China. The United States was determined that the Japanese people should not use imperial preferences in dealing with China. The Japanese held out with the obstinacy of despair, just as, Mr. Speaker, I will warrant any group of men from this house would do if they were placed under the same set of circumstances. The United States insisted right up to November 26, as I will show, if I have time enough to put on record the quotations at my disposal.
The United States had already seriously hurt the Japanese. How? First, she froze Japanese credits in the United States in 1938. Second, the Anglo-American trade agreement which she forced upon Great Britain in 1938 rigidly applied the unconditional mostfavoured-nation clause against Japan. Third, she gave notice to Japan in July 1939 that she would terminate in six months the United States-Japanese commercial treaty of 1911 because the United States felt that that treaty was not affording adequate protection to United States commerce, either in Japan or Japanese-controlled areas in China, and because the most-favoured-nation clause in that treaty-not unconditional in that case- was a bar to the adoption by the United States of retaliatory measures against Japanese commerce-what do you think about denouncing a treaty because of those two reasons? Fourth, she applied moral embargoes against the Japanese in 1938 and 1939. The result of this move on the part of the United States, together with the conditions prevailing generally throughout the world as a result of the depression, rendered the position of Japan practically intolerable.
The United States, because of her economic strength, was in a position to hurt the Japanese even more seriously. The Japanese chose what appeared to them to be the most advantageous time for success, and they struck. They struck while we were occupied

Japanese Peace Treaty with Germany and Italy so that they had the best chance of succeeding that probably they would have in a hundred years.
What evidence can be brought forward in support of my position? There are three main classes of evidence. First are the documents bearing directly upon the United States-Japanese war which provide unanswerable evidence that the United States demands as regards the unconditional mostfavoured-nation clause caused the war. Second, incidents from recent history illustrate the results of United States policy as a result of the unconditional most-favourednation clause from, we will say, 1922, when she declared it, and began to put it into operation, right down to the present time. All of which goes to show that the United States was already causing painful difficulty to nations all over the world because she was insisting on the application of that iniquitous unconditional most-favoured-nation clause.
The third set of evidences would be made up of the pronouncements of United States public men during the last twenty years which proved that they were convinced of the efficacy of the unconditional most-favourednation clause and were resolved to force it upon other nations. Their declarations concerning the Bretton Woods agreement are a good example. Their declarations concerning the importance of the Geneva trade agreements and the international trade organization, which I referred to the other day, are also evidence. Probably I shall not have time enough to go into these two latter matters in detail, although I have the information under my hand so that I could do so if it were considered fitting, or if we had time.
Now, what caused the Japanese to go to war? I should like to read from a United States source, the conclusions of the U.S. army Pearl Harbor board issued on October 20, 1944, and published on August 29, 1945. I shall read only one conclusion, which is as follows:
C. We turn now to responsibilities:
1.	The secretary of state-the Honourable Cordell Hull. The action of the secretary of state in delivering the counter-proposals of Nov. 26, 1941, was used by the Japanese as the signal to begin the war by the attack on Pearl Harbor. To the extent that it hastened such attack it was in conflict with the efforts of the war and navy departments to gain time for preparations for war. However, war with Japan was inevitable and imminent because of irreconcilable disagreements between the Japanese empire and the American government.
No statement, as you see, as to what is the nature of the disagreement! I shall have to turn to other documents to find that. I read now an extract from a "memorandum of a conversation between the secretary of state

and the Japanese Ambassador Nomura" on October 2, 1941, in Washington. I quote:
The ambassador said that he felt that the only point on which he anticipated difficulty in the two governments reaching an agreement was in regard to the question of retention of Japanese troops in China. He thought that, with regard to the question of discrimination, the Japanese government would meet us. The secretary emphasized that in his opinion no country would stand to gain more than Japan from the general universal application of the most favoured nation principle. The secretary added that he would like to give the ambassador a report of the Lima conference containing the resolutions adopted in regard to economic matters and he suggested that the Japanese government might be interested in adopting similar policies in the Far East. The ambassador said that Japanese present-day thought with respect to regional economic blocs-
Which of course is the principle of little-boy nations getting together and playing the game according to their own little-boy rules. -was the result of circumstances, that is to say, of measures taken by other countries such as the empire preferences introduced at Ottawa. The secretary replied that he had been fighting such measures as those taken at Ottawa and he would like to have Japan join with the United States in fighting for liberal economic policies.
How could the cause 1 have named be more clearly indicated than in that passage? I turn now to an extract from a memorandum of a conversation between the secretary of state and Japanese Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu at Washington on November 18, 1941, and I quote:
The secretary pointed out also that we are even now engaged in efforts to induce the British empire to reduce its empire preferences. He said that what we desire is to put our people back to work in a way that can never be accomplished through permitting armies to overrun countries. The secretary observed that many Japanese spokesmen had spoken of Japan's desire to have a controlling influence in Eastern Asia, but the only kind of controlling influence which was worth anything was one which could not be achieved or maintained by the sword. He dwelt briefly upon what we have accomplished in South America through our peaceful policies and through renouncing the employment of gunboats and armed forces.
Once more we have a reference to the imperial preferences which the British had been using, measures which would be in violation of the unconditional most-favourednation clause!
I quote now from a document handed by the secretary of state to Japanese Ambassador Nomura at Washington, November 26, 1941. I think I shall have to give these excerpts more in detail than I intended because otherwise people may think that I am not quite fair. This reads:
Outline of Proposed Basis for Agreement Between the United States and Japan
Section 1.
Draft Mutual Declaration of Policy.
The government of the United States and the government of Japan both being solicitous for the

peace of the Pacific affirm that their national policies are directed toward lasting and extensive peace throughout the Pacific area, that they have no territorial designs in that area, that they have no intention of threatening other countries or of using military force aggressively against any neighbouring nation, and that, accordingly, in their national policies they will actively support and give practical application to the following fundamental principles upon which their relations with each other and with all other governments are based:
I skip the first two principles and read the third. It is as follows:
The principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment.
These 'are the same weasel words which the United States uses all the time and which mean the destruction of the imperial preference principles <amd the application of the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause. I continue:
4. The principle of reliance upon international co-operation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. The government of Japan and the government of the United States have agreed that towards eliminating chronic political instability, preventing recurrent economic collapse, and providing a basis for peace, they will actively support and practically apply the following principles in their economic relations with each other and with other nations and peoples:
1.	The principle of non-discrimination in international commercial relations.
That is just as clear as words can make it.
2.	The principle of international economic co-operation and abolition of extreme nationalism as expressed in excessive trade restrictions.
3.	The principle of non-discriminatory access by all nations to raw material supplies.
4.	The principle of full protection of the interests of consuming countries and populations as regards the operation of international commodity agreements.
5.	The principle of establishment of such institutions and arrangements of international finance as may lend aid to the essential enterprises and the continuous development of all countries and may permit payments through processes of trade consonant with the welfare of all countries.
A well informed person reading No. 5 ithinks immediately of Bretton Woods, the international monetary fund.
Section 2.
Steps to be taken by the government of the United States and by the government of Japan.
The government of the United States and the government of Japan propose to take steps as follows:
(1) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will endeavour to conclude a multilateral non-aggression pact among the British Empire, China, Japan, The Netherlands, the Soviet Union, Thailand and the United States.
From No. 2 I select the following words in the interests of brevity:
Such agreement would provide also that each of the governments party to the agreement would not seek or accept preferential treatment in its
Japanese Peace Treaty
trade or economic relations with Indo-China and would use his influence to obtain for each of the signatories equality of treatment in trade and commerce with French Indo-China.
Once more the most-favoured-nation clause simply screams out. Then I come to No. 6 which reads:
(6) The government of the United States and the government of Japan will enter into negotiations for the conclusion between the United States and Japan of a trade agreement, based upon reciprocal most-favoured-nation treatment and reduction of trade barriers by both countries, including an undertaking by the United States to bind raw silk on the free list.
May I make the comment that the United States has a tariff protection and a system of import restrictions which is so high and so efficient that any other nation on the earth can reduce its trade by a certain amount and the United States can reduce correspondingly and still beat that nation hands down. No. 8 reads as follows:
(8) Both governments will agree upon a plan for the stabilization of the dollar-yen rate, with the allocation of funds adequate for this purpose, half to be supplied by Japan and half by the United States.
That is pretty conclusive, is it not? It does not leave very much room for doubt.
I come now to quotations from a memorandum handed by Japanese Ambassador Nomura to the secretary of state at 2.20 p.m., December 7, 1941. From this rather extended document in which the Japanese realistically and factually, and I believe truthfully, discussed the issues at stake between the United States and Japan I select one or two salient passages. The Japanese are talking. My first quotation reads as follows:
The American government advocates in the name of world peace those principles favourable to it and urges upon the Japanese government acceptance thereof. The peace of the world may be brought about only by discovering a mutually acceptable formula through recognition of the reality of the situation and mutual appreciation of one another's position. An attitude such as ignores realities and imposes one's selfish views upon others will scarcely serve the purpose of facilitating the consummation of negotiations.
How could the case be more beautifully and realistically put? I find my time is passing. I shall have to leave out some of what it would be appropriate to read into Hansard. I shall however read two more passages from this document:
Apart from the fact that such a proposal totally ignores the position of France, it is unacceptable to the Japanese government in that such an arrangement cannot but be considered as an extension to French Indo-China of a system similar to the nine power treaty structure which is the chief factor responsible for the present predicament of East Asia.

Japanese Peace Treaty
This is the Japanese speaking. I should like to read one more quotation, the closing words, reading as follows:
Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through co-operation with the American government has finally been lost. The Japanese government regrets to have to notify hereby the American government that in view of the attitude of the American government it cannot but consider that it is impossible to reach an agreement through further negotiations.
That is pathetic, is it not? There are the last words that passed between the two nations before they were in a state of war.
I should like now to read a quotation from a memorandum with respect to the conversation between the secretary of state and the Japanese Ambassador Nomura and Mr. Kurusu. It reads as follows:
After the secretary had read two or three pages-
That refers to the document I have just been quoting.
-he a-ked the ambassador whether this document was presented under instructions of the Japanese government. The ambassador replied that it was. The secretary as soon as he had finished reading the document turned to the Japanese ambassador and said, "I must say that in all my conversations with you (the Japanese ambassador) during the last nine months I have never uttered one word of untruth. This is borne out absolutely by the record. In all my fifty years of public service I have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions-infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them.
The Japanese all the way through had been realistic and truthful. The Americans simply imagined they themselves were, just as they do today. It must be obvious that the reason why the Japanese struck was, as they said in the closing words of the second last document from which I quoted, that there was just no real use of trying to reason with the United States in a realistic manner at all. Having been brought to that conclusion by decades of experience and by months of negotiations and conferences, what is the degree of culpability which must be attached to the Japanese for the attack on Pearl Harbor? And what is the degree of inescapable culpability which must be attached to the United States? I suppose no person or combination of persons alive can possibly answer that question exactly right. Even if they did, the answer would probably be disagreed with by pretty nearly everybody. Nevertheless I quote all this to show that the trouble is not all on one side, and that the trouble is not going to be all on one side in the days yet to come, if the United States insists on the senseless attitude she is now

adopting in respect of the unconditional mostfavoured-nation clause in the trade arrangements among nations.
Just before I conclude, in addition to the fine array of evidence the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) marshalled before us this afternoon I would like to recall to hon. members that the Japanese people are living in a territory no larger than the state of California. Tell me, any member on any side of the house: how would you feel about trying to cram 83 million people into California and provide for them? How would you like to govern California with 83 million people in it? If you did have 83 million people crowded into the state of California, under such restrictions that not one of them could 'leave and go to any other country because the other countries would not accept them, any more than Canada would, so they had to stay there and ultimately die there-


Mr. Sinnott:: That is why they attacked Pearl Harbor. They wanted to get out of Japan.


John Horne Blackmore: How would you feel about that? And suppose you were ruling California with 83 million Japanese in it trying to find food, clothing and shelter for them, cut off from all the world; suppose you were able to create industrial plants as a result of which you could produce nearly any manufactured product better and cheaper than almost any other nation in the world, and then found yourself hampered and trammelled on every hand by a monster nation like the United States, with not quite twice the number of people in the most productive and resourceful land on earth. If you found the United States interfering with you at every turn when you undertook to trade with other nations to get the raw materials you needed and sell your products: what would you think?
Would you consider a treaty which fixed you in such a restricted and unjust position a good treaty? Would you consider it a generous treaty? Would you consider it a fair treaty? Would you consider it a treaty in the interests of the future welfare of mankind?
Then if you knew that only one nation, your mortal enemy for decades, had drafted the treaty and imposed it upon you, and that this nation by reason of its predominant position in the world was going to impose it upon the various nations of the British commonwealth so they would pass it like a rubber stamp as we are going to pass this treaty soon without careful examination at all, how would you feel? Then if you saw Russia not very far away, making the promises she has been making of late to India and other countries, and apparently ready to keep those

promises, I ask how long you would be able to resist the temptation to go behind the iron curtain, as Czechoslovakia did.
I am not altogether condemning the treaty, Mr. Speaker. I am merely stating reasons why we should give this treaty the utmost study. I am glad we are going to be at peace with Japan; but I urge with all the sincerity of my being that we give the most careful consideration to the realities which confront Japan and ourselves in looking towards the world of tomorrow.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker-


Mr. Deputy Speaker:: Order. I must inform the house that if the minister speaks now he will close the debate.


Lester Bowles Pearson: In a very few minutes I am going to try to deal with some of the points which have been raised in the course of this discussion. I need hardly say, I think, that I do not agree with the interpretation of the events leading up to the Japanese war or the analysis of the politics and history of the United States in regard to this matter which were given by the last speaker. Nor can I agree that this treaty in some of its territorial aspects is an evidence of what was referred to by the hon. member for Peace River (Mr. Low) as high-handed United States imperialism.


Solon Earl Low: I know the minister wishes to be fair in all these statements. I said that would give the Russian bolshevik leaders some ground upon which to make that claim.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I recall that. I thought the hon. gentleman used those words in describing not the treaty as a whole but one or two of the territorial aspects of it; but I gladly accept his explanation of his use of that phrase. Territories mentioned in this treaty, Mr. Speaker, which were taken from Japan, and which were described by the hon. member, were won by Japan as a result of conquest, at least as far as Formosa and Korea and one or two other islands were concerned. On the same basis by which the Japanese acquired these territories the victors in this war might very well have taken them themselves. Instead of that, the islands mentioned were not taken as territorial acquisitions by the victors but were put under United Nations trusteeship, with the United States as the trustee.
Reference was also made to article 10 of the treaty as an example of rather high-handed injustice against the Japanese. Article 10, which refers to the Peking protocol of 1901 and abrogates that protocol as far as any 55704-90
Japanese Peace Treaty benefits acquired by Japan are concerned, merely releases the Chinese from an intolerable situation under which they have suffered, if you like to use that word, for fifty years. The Peking protocol gave not only Japan but other countries the right to station their own troops in China, a right arising out of the Boxer rebellion; and I do not think it is any injustice to Japan to have that right abrogated in this treaty as far as Japan is concerned.
Also a good deal has been said by one or two previous speakers about the tyranny of imposing upon the Japanese the unconditional most-favoured-nation clause; and for that purpose article 12 was read. But though I tried to tempt the hon. member for Peace River into reading section (c) of that article, he read only sections (b) and (d). I would like to read the first part of section (c), which I think will throw a rather different light on the matter.
(c) In respect to any matter, however, Japan shall be obliged to accord to an allied power national treatment, or most-favoured-nation treatment, only to the extent that the allied power concerned accords Japan national treatment or most-favoured-nation treatment, as the case may be, in respect of the same matter.
It is a reciprocal engagement, not a unilateral engagement, which Japan undertakes as a result of that article.
The hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) mentioned one or two matters last evening to which I should refer. Incidentally he indicated that definitive action had not been taken in the other place in regard to this treaty. That is not quite accurate. If he will read the proceedings of the other place for April 2 he will find that the motion of approval was adopted on that date and action was taken in that respect. The treaty itself is to be referred to a committee of the other place for subsequent examination, even though approval has been given.
Then, as I was expecting, the hon. member for Peel mentioned the Pacific pact. He indicated that as a result of this treaty another link has been established in the security of the Pacific, and he hoped that we might use this treaty, in the words of Mr. Acheson which he quoted, as a point of departure for a general Pacific security pact. I have very little to add to what I have already said on that matter. If the hon. member were interested enough to read an article by Mr. John Foster Dulles on a Pacific pact which appeared in the issue of "Foreign Affairs" from which he quoted Mr. Menzies last evening, he would get a very good argument from Mr. Dulles himself against the practicability of a Pacific pact

Japanese Peace Treaty at this time. In that article Mr. Dulles, who is a great advocate of Pacific security, said:
... it is not at this time practicable to draw a line which would bring all the free peoples of the Pacific and East Asia into a formal mutual security area.
Then he went on to explain why, and I shall not quote from his explanation except the last part of the paragraph where he says:
Lastly, but perhaps not least, is the fact that the United States should not assume formal commitments which overstrain its present capabilities and give rise to military expectations we could not fulfil, particularly in terms of land forces.
Mr. Dulles repeated that point of view in a radio broadcast on February 10 last when he was asked whether a Pacific security pact like the Atlantic pact was, in his judgment, feasible. He replied:
I don't think it is feasible on any quick timetable to put together the countries of Asia in the same way as the countries of the Atlantic.
That remains the position of the government on this matter, Mr. Speaker. Ultimately it may perhaps be the best, most practicable and most useful way of guaranteeing security in the Pacific but at the present time, like Mr. Dulles, we do not think so.
There has been general approval given in the house to the treaty, although that approval has been qualified by the leader of the C.C.F. and the leader of the Social Credit groups. Of course we must all feel, whether or not we approve of this treaty, that there are possibilities of danger arising out of it. It is a calculated risk we have to take. In this case 1 believe it is a calculated risk towards peace rather than towards war, because I do not believe this is a punitive treaty which has in it the seeds of future war. Nevertheless, we should not indulge in any excessive optimism as to what may happen now that Japan is going to be free to conduct its own affairs. The Tokyo correspondent of the Economist writing in the last edition said something which is very true and which we should keep in mind. He -said that the lacquer-thin coating of occupational reform is cracking and peeling off in most places. Japan, then, is beginning to withdraw into itself. I believe this is inevitable once occupation comes to an end.
We hope that this process will not result in the consequences for peace that Japan's policy had in the years before the war. There are of course problems ahead. In the case of Japan, these are both political and economic. There is a problem of Japan's relations with the continent of Asia and the western world. We in the west must do everything we can to make it in Japan's interest as well as to our advantage to choose the western democratic

world as her vehicle of international cooperation rather than the Asiatic communist world.
The economic aspect of the treaty, which has been so often emphasized in this discussion and quite rightly so, has within it elements of danger. As was pointed out, Japan is a country of 83 million people and must trade with the rest of the world in order to survive, even to feed herself. It is interesting to note in this connection that food production in Japan has steadily increased in the last few years, and that of course is an encouraging sign. But Japanese material prosperity does not necessarily mean that Japan will not develop the aggressive tendencies which, unfortunately, she developed in the past. The higher standard of living which we must hope the Japanese people will be able to achieve does not necessarily make for peace. In our discussion of international affairs we sometimes overlook the fact that a nation does not have to be underdeveloped to be overaggressive. In the years before world war II Japan had the highest standard of living of any Asiatic people, and whatever may have been the reason they were the most aggressive of Asiatic people.
Although we must do our part to assist Japan to build up her economy, I suggest we must not take it for granted that Japan's prosperity, of itself, means peace in Asia. It depends upon how that prosperity and how that power will be used. It is the purpose of those who drew up this treaty, and it is the hope of those who are in favour of it, that because this is the ending of a chapter Japan will use its new power and developing economic strength not for those purposes which have caused so much harm, so much damage, so much cruelty and so much suffering in the past but for the purpose of international co-operation in a great area of the world, which will lead not only to peace but to prosperity for all of us.


Mr. Graydon:: May I ask the minister a question? Has he given consideration to finding some means whereby we can have this treaty referred to the committee on external affairs, if the minister prefers, in a way similar to that which is being followed in the Senate.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I see no objection, Mr. Speaker, when the committee on external affairs meets-I hope to be present at its next meeting-and when we discuss items in our estimates perhaps referring to diplomatic representation in Japan, why we should not discuss this treaty to our heart's content.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


Robert Wellington Mayhew: I should like to have unanimous consent of the house to move the following:
That the subject matter of the Japanese fishing treaty, negotiated in Tokyo last December between the United States, Japan and Canada, be referred to the standing committee on marine and fisheries.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: [DOT]
That a select committee be appointed to consider the results of the census of 1951 and the readjustment of the representation in the House of Commons necessitated thereby, with power to consider whether the said readjustment should be made in strict accord with the rules presently set out in the British North America Acts 1867 to 1951 and the other statutes in that behalf, or whether it is desirable
(a)	to provide that the representation of any province in the House of Commons on the readjustment of the representation of the provinces therein on the completion of each decennial census including that for the year 1951 shall not be reduced by more than 15 per cent below the representation to which such province was entitled under rules 1 to 4, inclusive, in subsection (1) of section 51 of the British North America Act at the last preceding readjustment of the representation of the province; and that there shall be no reduction in the representation of any province as a result of which that province would have a smaller number of members than that of any other province which, according to the results of the then last decennial census, did not have a larger population; and
(b)	that there shall be assigned separately two members instead of one to the Yukon and Northwest Territories or any part thereof, and that the total number of members as provided by the aforesaid section 51 of the British North America Act and the terms of union between Canada and Newfoundland from time to time be increased or decreased accordingly; with instructions to prepare a bill or bills with schedules to give effect to its findings and conclusions and to contain and describe the several electoral divisions entitled to return members to this House of Commons; with power to send for persons, papers and records and to examine witnesses, and to report from time to time; and that notwithstanding standing order 65, the committee shall consist of thirty-seven members to be designated by the house at a later date.
He said: In the few minutes that are left before six o'clock, Mr. Speaker, I do not expect to be able to make all the statement that I intended to submit to the house on this motion. Perhaps I can just outline the situation and complete it then at the earliest opportunity after Easter. I understand that the Monday of the first week we return here is private members' day, and that on Tuesday the financial critics of the official opposition and of the other groups wish to deal 55704-904
Redistribution Committee with the budget. I would hope that, if we cannot dispose of that motion to go into committee of ways and means on Tuesday, after the position of the various critics has been stated to the house and to the country, the debate may be adjourned so that we may revert to this motion to set up a committee to deal with this problem of redistribution. I am not asking the house to make any decision, but I am just throwing that out as a suggestion, because I think it would be desirable to have this committee set up at the earliest possible moment.


George Alexander Drew: Without interrupting the Prime Minister, I do feel it is the wish of the house that the committee be set up as soon as possible. I think that consideration might be given even to the possibility of this debate's proceeding on Monday, if that is agreeable to the house. However, I will leave that as a suggestion for consideration.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: If that were the wish of the house, then on Monday I would be happy to comply with that wish and to try to have the committee set up at that time.
This motion is being submitted to the house in furtherance of the statement I made on March 10 about redistribution. I stated at that time that it was at least my view that this matter of redistribution, the matter of the readjustment of representation in the House of Commons, was not a responsibility of the executive branch of our constitutional set-up, but that it was a responsibility placed by the constitution on parliament, generally. I pointed out that it had always been the custom for the leader of the majority group in the house to provide an opportunity for members to discharge that responsibility, by submitting a bill for consideration by the house and which was drawn in accordance with the rules then applicable to the matter of readjustment and which, after it had received second reading, was referred to a committee composed of members of all the groups in the house, to determine the schedules that would describe the territorial divisions entitled to return members to parliament.
I therefore had a bill prepared in that form, and it received first reading on March 10. That bill was prepared in accordance with the rules set out in the British North America Acts, 1867 to 1951. Those rules now fix the membership of the house at 262, of which 255 were provided by British North America Act of 1946, and seven additional members being provided by the British North America Act, number one, which confirmed the terms of union with Newfoundland, and provided that that province would be entitled to seven members in the House of Commons, and

Redistribution Committee would be thereafter subject to the general provisions of the rules in the British North America Act.
Because of the results of the last census, there would be a reduction in the present membership from the province of Saskatchewan to the extent of five, in the representation from the province of Manitoba by two, and in the representation from the province of Nova Scotia by one. On the other hand, the province of Quebec would be entitled to two members more than at present, the province of Ontario to two more than at present, and the province of British Columbia to four more than at present, and all other provinces would remain with the same numbers.
This is because, from the very outset, the principle has been that representation from the various provinces was based upon the population as ascertained in the decennial censuses. That rule was set out in express terms in the Quebec resolutions, numbers 17 and 19-and I shall not take the time to read them now. But they provided in express terms that readjustment would be based upon the population of the respective provinces.
The same was set out in express terms in the London resolutions, numbers 18 and 20, and also in the original section 51 of the British North America Act. Hon. members will recall that the original rule was that Quebec would have a representation of 65 members, and that to determine the representation of the other provinces the population of Quebec would be divided by 65. The quotient thus obtained would serve as a divisor, and would entitle the other provinces respectively to as many members as the quotient went into the number of their population.
That quotient in 1871 was 18,331; in 1881 it was	20,908;	in	1891	it	was 22,900;	in	1901,it was	23,367;	in	1911	it	was 30,858;	in	1921it was	36,317;	in	1931	it	was 44,225;	in	1941it was	51,259; and, according to the last	census, it would have been 62,395.
The application of the rule with respect to proportionate representation was qualified in the original British North America Act by the one-twentieth rule. In the resolution it had been provided that, by the readjustment, representation of a province would not be reduced unless the proportion of its population, as compared with that of the total papulation, had diminished by five per cent. "Five per cent" were the words used in the resolutions-the Quebec resolution and the London resolution-tout in the statute, instead of using the percentage, it was stated that-the
tMr. St. Laurent.]

representation would not be diminished unless the proportion of the population had diminished by more than one-twentieth.
That was intended, I am confident, to carry out the view of the fathers of confederation that representation should be roughly in proportion to the population. It will be recalled that "Rep by Pop" was one of the motivating reasons for wanting some different constitution from that which resulted from the Act of Union between Lower Canada and Upper Canada.
The one-twentieth qualification, as expressed in the British North America Act, though perhaps it had not been intended to operate in that way, was not cumulative. Unless the reduction in the proportion of population of a province was more than one-twentieth or more than five per cent between two censuses, there was no reduction in the representation of a province.
The result was that the rule did not protect the smaller provinces, but it did bring about for Ontario this curious situation, that from 1911 onward there were progressively at each census diminutions in the proportion of population in Ontario as compared with the to'al population, but at no one census did it reach five per cent, or one-twentieth. On the other hand, by 1911 the proportion of the population of the maritime provinces had commenced to decrease between censuses by more than five per cent. In 1911 the population of Prince Edward Island, which was 93,728, was only three times the quotient arrived at by dividing the population of Quebec by 65, and Prince Edward Island would appear to me, from my calculation, to have then been entitled to only three members, or a reduction of three from the number it had at the time of confederation. There were serious controversies and debate over that reduction and the contention that Prince Edward Island had come into confederation with six, and that their representation should never go below six, and that if readjustment applied to them, it would apply only when *they had gone beyond six, but could not apply to reduce them below six. They were so confident in that point of view that they carried their contentions to the foot of the throne. The privy council having decided against them and made the decision from which it was afterwards understood that the five per cent diminution had to apply between one census and another, and that otherwise there should be no reduction, the contention was made in parliament that some floor should be

provided to prevent Prince Edward Island from getting too small a representation in the Commons.
In 1914 an address was submitted to the houses of parliament to increase the number of senators for the western provinces, and at the same time to provide that no province would at any time have a smaller representation in the House of Commons than it had in the Senate. That was to apply immediately. I do not know what the reasons were-I have not read all the debates-but the Senate at that time refused to agree to the resolution in that form unless it were provided that it would not take effect until after the dissolution of parliament, and the resolution was not adopted in 1914. But the next year-the matter, I have no doubt, had been considered perhaps more calmly during the recess and all parties were agreed-an address was moved requesting that there be passed a provision which became section 51A of the British North America Act, and which provides that no province may at any time have its representation reduced below the number of senators it is entitled to have appointed from its territories. That was the situation at this time. By 1941 the representation from Ontario had remained at 82 by virtue of the one-twentieth rule. To apply proportionately the representation based on 82 for Ontario and its population would have given Saskatchewan 19 instead of 16, Manitoba 16 instead of 14, British Columbia 18 instead of 16, Alberta 17 instead of 16, Nova Scotia 12 instead of 11. Hon. members will recall that an address was presented to His Majesty in 1946 asking the parliament at Westminster to amend section 51 to provide that there would be a total membership of 255, one number being allotted to the Yukon and Northwest Territories, and the others distributed in the proportion of the population of each province, but to respect the rule of section 51A, and that if the rule of 51A operated for any province the population of that province would be deducted from the total population in making up the quotient which would determine what representation every province would have.
That restored the principle of representation in proportion to population but without any qualification other than section 51 A. If the old rule which applied before 1946 were applied to the census of 1951 the result would be that Ontario would still retain 82 instead of the 83 that it got under the rule of 1946; Quebec would remain at 65; Saskatchewan would lose 7 of its 20 members; Manitoba would lose 4 of its 16; Nova Scotia would lose 3 of its 13; Alberta would lose 2 of its 17; and Newfoundland would lose
Redistribution Committee 1 of its 7. It is therefore quite apparent that the new rule is not as harsh as the application of the old rule would be; nevertheless, applying the new rule of 1946 has appeared to some to be harsh, though Bill No. 8, which I introduced, was made up in accordance with the new rule just as it is.
Now, it was suggested that there had been from confederation and right through to 1946, some qualification to prevent too rapid a reduction in the numbers of members representing any province. I had thought that on the motion to set up a committee, after the second reading of the bill, any member who felt that the rule should not be strictly adhered to, but that something else should be done, might move an amendment to consider some other solution, because since 1949 parliament has jurisdiction to do something else if it is the will of parliament to do so. But it was pointed out to me that once Bill No. 3 got second reading it would probably be contrary to the precedents and standing orders to accept any such amendment.
I did not want to do anything else but put before the house the problem in such a manner that the views of hon. members could be expressed and the decision of the majority obtained. lit was in an effort to do that that I drew the notice of motion which was withdrawn yesterday. It had been suggested that there might be a ten per cent limitation on the reduction that could take place in the membership from a province at any one time. Well, at this time that would not have worked for two reasons. It would have left Saskatchewan with a larger representation though it has in this census a smaller population than Alberta. I think it would be an intolerable rule that brought about a situation where a province -with a smaller population was entitled to a larger representation than a province with a larger population.
There was another objection to ten per cent. It would have given Newfoundland a permanent floor of seven. Under section 51A as it stands, Newfoundland can, if circumstances of the growth of population require it, see its membership reduced to 6, and it would then be getting the benefit of the same rule that applies to the other maritime provinces, and it seemed to me it would not be proper to introduce a rule that would give Newfoundland a preferential floor over the other maritime provinces.
Then, fifteen per cent was suggested as the maximum reduction. Well, at the present time fifteen per cent does not bring about that kind of a result. Fifteen per cent would still leave Saskatchewan to be reduced to seventeen, which would not be greater than the

Redistribution Committee representation of any province having a larger population, and would not 'affect the floor of Newfoundland. I drew the first notice on that assumption, but it was pointed out that, if parliament decided that would be the rule that would govern future redistributions, it might very well in the future, because of the cumulative effect of applying the fifteen per cent more than once, bring about the result where one province with a smaller population would have a larger representation than another province with a larger population. It was for that reason that the present motion was drawn.
It has been suggested to me that the suggested new rule is not very clear in its terms. It was intended to be as clear as possible in its terms and was intended to provide that if parliament decided that there be a change and decided to make a rule to apply to the future, that rule could not bring about a situation where a province with a smaller population would have a larger representation than another province with a larger population.
When this motion is submitted I am not going to argue for the adoption of the motion. I am going to vote for it because I feel that I could not sponsor something before the house that I could not vote for. I am prepared to vote for the resolution as it is, but I am not arguing that anybody else should. I am only submitting that each one of us has his own responsibility in that regard and should adopt the position which he feels in conscience will discharge his responsibility to the country and to his own constituents.
Possibly parliament will decide that there will be no change whatsoever, that in spite of the fact that it requires a reduction of 25 per cent in the representation of Saskatchewan, that being the rule, it should be applied. On the other hand, parliament may decide that there should be some limitation on the proportion of reduction made in any one redistribution.
I have tried to draft this in such a way that if there are other views that hon. members feel should be applied to this problem they can be substituted for the consideration of the house. The house will decide by its majority, and not I hope a party majority but a majority reached because each individual member will feel that he is free to express his own opinion as to how he should discharge his responsibility to the country and to his own constituents.

I hope that there will be that kind of decision and that the committee set up will *be able to carry it out. I have avoided any suggestions as to what procedure should be followed. I think the committee should have the power to send for the law officers of the government and then make its own decision as to how its conclusions can be carried out in a reasonable manner.
I would hope to have some further information to put on the record when the matter is called again, but I would hope that it could be disposed of by the majority of the house, made up of individuals who will each decide what is best to be done under the circumstances. I move the adjournment of the debate.
Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Jean-Paul Stephen St-Laurent: If it is the desire of the house to have the debate continued on Monday I would be prepared to move that it be so continued. Of course that would require unanimous consent because Monday is a private members' day. If not, I would suggest that after one day's debate on the budget, that debate might be adjourned so that we could deal with this motion to set up the committee.


Mr. Knowles:: May I say a word with regard to the suggestion of continuing this debate on Monday, April 21? If the government does accede to the request of the leader of the opposition that that be done, would the government consider substituting some other day later on in the session rather than taking away another private members' day? I am not asking for a decision now. But when the Prime Minister asks for unanimous consent on Monday, April 21, it would make it easier for hon. members to decide what to do if some alternative suggestion could be made with respect to-


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: It might not be unfair to provide that as soon as it could be arranged without too much inconvenience such time as was taken on Monday for public business be taken on some public business day for private members' business.


Stanley Howard Knowles: Fair enough.


[Stage Direction]
At six o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, until 3 p.m., Monday, April 21.
[Stage Direction]
Monday, April 21, 1952