1951-10-22

KURT MEYER


Hon. Brooke Claxton (Minister of National Defence):: Mr. Speaker, on Friday, the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker) asked a question about the transfer of Kurt Meyer. The hon. member for Lake Centre said:
In so far as his incarceration is concerned, was he released or transferred under an order in council, and has there been any communication to the effect that he will now take his place in any army being formed1 in western Germany?
An order in council was passed on October 18, which I shall now table, authorizing the Minister of National Defence to commit a person convicted by a Canadian military court and sentenced to imprisonment for two years or more to a service prison, either in or beyond Canada. Pursuant to that order, and with the approval of the cabinet, I directed that Kurt Meyer be committed to Werl prison in Germany, which I designated as a Canadian service prison for that purpose. There has been no communication to the effect that Kurt Meyer will now take his place in any army being formed in, western Germany. It would be impossible for him to do so, as he is still serving the sentence of life imprisonment imposed upon him.
The hon. member for Eglinton (Mr. Fleming) asked this question:
Was any request received from any other government for such an order in council?
The answer is no; but I understand that some representations were made to the Department of External Affairs, which may be dealt with by my colleague the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson).
Then the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Cold well) asked:
Because of the importance of the matter, will the minister say whether he is still under the control and the jurisdiction of Canada or whether his incarceration has been transferred to the jurisdiction of another country?
The answer is that Meyer is still under the control and jurisdiction of Canada. The prison in which he is now incarcerated is under the control of the United Kingdom occupation authorities in Germany, but they have no power to interfere with his sentence.
The hon. member for Lake Centre said something about the secrecy connected with the transfer. So far as I know it is quite unusual to give advance publicity with respect to the transfer of prisoners, either civil or military.


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of Stale for External Affairs):: Mr. Speaker, supplementing what the hon. member has said, I might add that the German ambassador designate, Dr. Dankwort, called on an official of the Department of External Affairs on October 15 to make representations on behalf of his government for the granting of a pardon in the case of the German war criminal, Kurt Meyer.
The German embassy has since been informed that the ambassador's representations have been considered by the government and that they cannot be accepted. The German ambassador on this visit made no reference at all to the transfer of Kurt Meyer to the United Kingdom zone in Germany. The announcement regarding this transfer had not indeed been made public at the time of the interview.


Mr. Coldwell:: Under what authority was the order in council passed? I am not sure I understand that.


Brooke Claxton: Under authority of section 178 (2) and (6) of the National Defence Act.


Mr. Maclnnis:: May I ask the minister if Kurt Meyer can now be released without the express authority of the government of Canada?


Brooke Claxton: No.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE


Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister) moved:: That on and after Monday, October 22, until the end of the session, unless and until otherwise ordered, notwithstanding the terms of standing order 15, after the daily routine, government notices of motions and government orders shall have precedence on Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays over all other business, and on Mondays and Wednesdays over all other business except questions and notices of motions for production of papers and the debate on the address until concluded.
He said: Mr. Speaker, I hope my face is not getting too red in making a confession. There is no doubt that in this motion I have

Business of the House made a mistake. It has been pointed out to me that if the house adopted the motion in the form in which it now appears we would be precluded from dealing with the other motion fixed for discussion today. Therefore I shall ask one of my colleagues to move an amendment whereby we would substitute the words "Tuesday, October 23rd" for the words "Monday, October 22nd".
When this was pointed out I thought I might hold this motion until we had disposed of the other one. However, it was again indicated to me-and the rules are sometimes a bit tricky-that if that were done and we did not conclude debate on the other motion today we would have no right to proceed with it tomorrow.
Therefore I shall ask my colleague to move that "Tuesday, October 23" be substituted for "Monday, October 22".


Mr. Graydon:: Are you sure you are all right now?


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I hope I am. I saw a comment the other day about the present Prime Minister to the effect that he did not know any more about the rules of the house than any other hon. member and I must confess that that is true.
With respect to the merits of the motion itself, I am sure that hon. members feel that we should make a start on the government business for which this special session has been called. In the discussion with the leaders of the opposition groups held the other day I think it was made clear that hon. members need have no fear that a motion of this kind would preclude the discussion of any matter of general public interest which it might be appropriate to discuss, and that we were quite prepared to try out, at least experimentally, the procedure that has prevailed in the British house and set aside a day for discussion of any matter that comes up and that is felt to be of greater urgency than the ordinary matters on the order paper. So I should hope that this motion, with the amendment which I shall ask the Minister of Public Works (Mr. Fournier) to move at this time, will carry.


Hon. Alphonse Fournier (Minister of Public Works):: Mr. Speaker, I move:
That the motion be amended by replacing the words "Monday October 22" with the words "Tuesday October 23."


[Stage Direction]
Amendment agreed to.
Motion as amended agreed to.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: That this house approves the continuation of Canada's participation in the efforts being made through the United Nations to establish international peace, and in particular to defeat aggression and restore peace in Korea, and by the North Atlantic treaty nations to deter aggression and promote stability and well-being in the north Atlantic area.
He said: In moving this motion it is not my intention to speak at length, but I think hon. members will expect me to explain why this motion is made at this time and in its present form.
The house is not being asked to endorse any new policies. With respect to the United Nations action in Korea the Canadian position was enunciated in parliament in June of 1950 and the house was advised at that time of our intention to provide naval support without delay. In July the airlift to Tokyo was established and recruiting started for a brigade group for service with the U.N. forces in Korea.
Financial provision was made for these and other additional defence activities at the special session in September 1950, and the order in council providing for the dispatch of the brigade group to Korea was tabled in the house on September 9, 1950.
In the north Atlantic area a decision was maide at Brussels, on December 19, 1950, to establish an integrated force under the command of General Eisenhower. During the course of the last session, the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) advised the house that present plans for Canadian participation in this integrated force involved the dispatch to western Europe of an army brigade group and eleven R.C.A.F. squadrons to form an air division.
Financial provision was made at the last session for the development of these formations and for other expansion of our defences. In making this financial provision parliament was giving the most effective of all stamps of approval on the policy itself.
Recruitment of the 27th brigade was undertaken in the spring and, as was indicated in the order in council tabled by the Minister of National Defence on Thursday last, that brigade group has now reached a state of training where it can usefully be dispatched to western Europe. The first of the eleven air squadrons envisaged in the NATO program is also virtually ready for dispatch overseas.

Meanwhile, over the past year the government has made available to several of our north Atlantic partners very substantial quantities of military supplies and equipment.
While there is nothing specifically new in our program, and while hon. members are not being asked to approve any change or any expansion of existing policies-I might emphasize that the key word in the motion is "continuation", continuation toward achievement of our consistent objective, the establishment of international peace-it is nevertheless true that the course of world events, particularly in the past two years, has made it necessary for Canada, in concert with other free nations, to adopt fundamentally new measures in our external relations.
We have joined with other members of the United Nations in the basic activities of that world organization, and especially in its efforts to suppress active aggression and restore peace and order in an area where international security has been violated.
In the north Atlantic area we have undertaken to send armed forces overseas in time of peace, which is certainly something new. These Canadian forces will take their place in an international formation designed as a deterrent to aggression, a safeguard of peace in the whole north Atlantic area and a guarantee of the security of Canada itself.
In the course of the next few weeks, as the minister said when tabling the order in council on Thursday, it would be the intention of the government to have the whole of this 27th brigade dispatched to Europe.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) will be leaving Canada, probably at the end of this week, to attend meetings of the United Nations and the NATO council, meetings which it is possible will require him to be away most of this session. Before the session ends, or before we expect the session to end, there is a meeting of the NATO council scheduled to take place in Rome at which the Minister of National Defence will be expected to attend. As hon. members know, the Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott) was prevented from being present at the first stage of this session because of a meeting of a twelve-man committee which was taking place in Paris and which was the consequence of the deliberations of the NATO council which took place in Ottawa just before the session commenced.
It seemed to the government that to comply not only with the letter but with the spirit of the defence act it was advisable that there be some opportunity for parliament to discuss these plans which have been disclosed, and if
United Nations and NATO parliament felt so disposed it could indicate its disapproval of what the government was doing. Of course, it is the responsibility of the government to make these decisions and the defence act requires that when such decisions are made, if parliament is not then in session, it be called within ten days. We felt that that implied that an appropriate opportunity must be given to parliament to discuss the decisions the government has taken the responsibility of making and to interfere with their implementation if parliament felt that they should not be carried out.
It seemed to us also that it would be a source of encouragement to our forces in Korea and to the forces we are about to dispatch to Europe, as well as strengthening the position of those who will represent Canada at these international meetings, if there were an affirmation by this house of its wholehearted and, I would hope, unanimous support of the efforts our country is making to help maintain peace and security in the world.
There is one point I wish to emphasize. The motion has been carefully framed so that it invites approval only of those national policies on which, I think happily for Canada, all parties in the house have hitherto been agreed and on which I hope we will continue to be agreed.
We are very anxious not to embarrass any hon. members opposite by the slightest suggestion that we are asking for any blanket vote of confidence in the government, but we do believe it would be desirable at this critical time in world affairs to give to our own people and to the world a demonstration of the fundamental unity of the Canadian people in their determination to do their share to preserve peace in the world.
I have discussed with the leaders of the opposition groups what may be the most convenient order of procedure for this debate, and I have been informed by them that they would prefer to have the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) give us a review of the background against which these activities are being undertaken before they themselves are called upon to speak. I take it that would be regarded as the logical order of procedure. I shall not attempt to go any further at this time than to submit the motion, and I assume that after there has been a statement of the background situation hon. members will wish to put their views before parliament and the Canadian public.


Lester Bowles Pearson: Mr. Speaker, in rising to support this resolution, the terms of which I

United Nations and NATO think will commend themselves to all sections of this house, it is my purpose, as has been indicated by the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), to give a general and I am afraid somewhat lengthy review of the international situation at the present time and to discuss some developments in that situation which have taken place since we last met. I agree that it is important that this should be done early in the session. For that reason I found myself in approval with the observation of the leader of the official opposition (Mr. Drew) last week when he requested an early opportunity for this kind of discussion. As a matter of fact we would have been prepared to go ahead with this discussion last week, but after consultation with the various groups in the house it was considered this would be the best day on which to commence.
In making what I might call a "tour d'hori-zon", I think it is desirable that I should begin with our relations with that country which is nearest to us, the United States of America. The day-to-day problems between Canada and the United States are growing in complexity and number and scope, but are approached in almost every case from either side with a desire to find fair and mutually satisfactory solutions. It is natural that these contacts between our two countries, especially in the field of defence and defence supply, should have increased as we work together with other states in a closely knit coalition to safeguard the peace. The United States is the powerful leader of that coalition, I suppose by any test.
Of course it is quite normal that we in Canada should be preoccupied with that leadership and with the power behind it. Not long ago the spectre that haunted Canadian policy makers in this field of foreign affairs was that the United States would remain aloof from international efforts which were being made to protect the peace against nazi and fascist aggression. We sometimes worry now lest the United States may feel it necessary to pursue policies inside our coalition which the other members cannot wholeheartedly follow, or that inadequate co-operation from those other members may discourage American effort and leadership to the point where Washington may even decide, on some unhappy day, to go it alone.
Any Canadian government is bound to do what it can to remove either of these unhappy possibilities. This may mean at times expressing its own views forthrightly in other places, including of course Washington itself. This is indeed a first principle of Canadian diplomacy deriving from the inescapable fact that no country in the world has less chance of isolating itself from the effect of American policies and decisions than Canada. We must


recognize, however-and I am sure we do recognize-that a diplomacy of this kind, depending as it does on the influence we exert with greater powers, can only be carried out successfully if our interventions are restrained, responsible and constructive, and if we act in discharging our own obligations in a way which deserves the respect of pur friends.
In addition, all of us inside the coalition must avoid words, actions or reactions which will weaken our unity without any compensating advantage to the national interest. I do not mean by this that we should hide our differences by pretending that none ever existed. In any coalition, indeed in any neighbourly relationship, there are bound to be honest differences, and unless they are examined and discussed frankly they may fester underground and poison the relationship. It is, however-and I am sure all hon. members will agree with me-of vital importance that in any such discussions of differences we should act with good temper and in good faith; that we should always display a sense of responsibility, a sense of proportion, and indeed I suggest at times a sense of humour. Our efforts should constantly be not to score points at each other's expense but to come to agreed solutions.
There is one question in our relations with the United States, that of the St. Lawrence seaway, concerning which we have not been able to reach such an agreed solution. We would like to see that seaway built as an international project as a witness to our good neighbourhood and close co-operation. That, however, has not been possible, and the action, or rather the inaction, of the United States congress, which adjourned last Saturday night, shows, I think, that it is not going to be possible to secure agreement with the United States on this matter at an early date. Therefore we are prepared to recommend that this seaway should be built by Canada, and we shall soon request and expect to receive that co-operation from the United States government which it must be remembered is required under the boundary waters treaty.
The following steps remain in fact to be taken before the Canadian development can take place. In Canada, authorizing legislation, as announced in the speech from the throne at the opening of the present session of parliament, is required and will be introduced to provide for the construction of the St. Lawrence seaway and power project, and to provide for an appropriate agency of the federal government to deal with the construction of the seaway. Then an agreement, the terms of which have already been worked out, must be concluded with the government

United Nations and NATO
of Ontario for the construction by the Ontario Hydro Electric Power Commission, together with the appropriate authority in the United States, of the power development in the international rapids section of the river, and with respect to the division of costs between power and navigation. There must also be an agreed division of responsibility with the United States agency for the construction of these power development works. Then, although the situation is somewhat different because the international section of the St. Lawrence stops before the Quebec border is reached, steps are being taken to work out an agreement with the province of Quebec covering possible power developments in that province arising out of the Canadian waterways construction.
And, finally, from the point of view of Canadian action, an application by the Ontario authorities for the construction of the power works must be transmitted by the Canadian government to the international joint commission for approval there.
Then, on the United States side, a decision must be made-and I am now talking of the construction of the Canadian seaway-a decision must be made and approved by the president as to what agency in the United States will be responsible for constructing the United States part of the power project in the international section of the St. Lawrence river. That is a complicated problem in which many United States political considerations are no doubt involved, and the solution of the problem may take some time. At least, it cannot I suppose be reached overnight.
Secondly, for United States action, the agency which is to be responsible for the construction of the United States part of the power development must obtain a licence from the United States power commission. The procedure for obtaining such a licence involves public hearings before the commission, to which all interested parties must be given an opportunity to present their views.
And thirdly, for United States action again, an application by the agency responsible for the construction in the United States must be transmitted for approval by the United States government to the international joint commission in conjunction with a similar application by Ontario.
So far as Canadian action is concerned, that part of it which is a responsibility of the federal government will be pressed without any delay. That is all I wish to say this afternoon, Mr. Speaker, though I could say much more, if time permitted, on our relations with our great and friendly neighbour.
May I say a word at this time about our relations with the nations of the commonwealth? Those are, as usual, on a good and friendly basis. There is full exchange of information and adequate consultation. We are satisfied with the existing position. However, the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green), who brought this question up the other night and who, if I may say so, with respect, is apparently the leader of the dynamic wing of his party in foreign policy, is not satisfied with the present position. He pleaded on Thursday last that in Canada we should give a lead in the rebuilding, to use his own words, "the rebuilding of the strength of the commonwealth so that it might become a third world power". Well, as I see it, such a rebuilding of the commonwealth into a world power as such could hardly be attempted without centralizing the political institutions of its members, without a single centre of control and authority-


Mr. Green:: Was it not such a power in 1945?


Lester Bowles Pearson: In 1945 there was no single centralized power, legislative or executive in the commonwealth, but there was a single desire in 1945 to work together for the completion to a victorious conclusion of the war, and there is, at the present time, a single centralized desire to have the nations of the commonwealth work together. However, in the interests of the commonwealth itself I hope that no proposal such as that which I understood the hon. member to make the other night will be tried because it would break up the commonwealth.


Howard Charles Green: May I ask the minister a
question?


Some hon. Members:: Sit down.


Mr. Howe:: Make your speech later.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


Howard Charles Green: Was the commonwealth not in effect a third world power throughout the war, and certainly throughout 1945?


Lester Bowles Pearson: I would not agree with that interpretation of the commonwealth relationship even during the war. I ask the hon. member, does he really think that Pakistan, South Africa and India would be willing to be joined together as a third world power?
There is nothing static about our commonwealth of nations, nor is there anything static in Canada's attitude to this commonwealth of nations; but we are not moving in the direction proposed by the hon. member. Our attitude has I think altered somewhat toward the commonwealth in recent years. During the period when Canadian political leaders of all parties were

United Nations and NATO achieving and consolidating autonomy for Canada in her domestic, and later in her external, relations it was I think natural that appreciation of the value of the commonwealth association should not exclude in many quarters some degree of what I might call wariness. This wariness was kept alive by repeated proposals for centralized machinery which would have given institutional form to the very close and continuous, but often informal, co-operation which existed between the members of the commonwealth. Canada consistently opposed these proposals, because, to many Canadians, collective action in those days seemed likely to be overly influenced by imperialist interests, and also because such commonwealth arrangements might have appeared to be an obstacle to closer co-operation with the United States. Though Canadian opinion is I think as strongly opposed as ever to a separate and centralized commonwealth, that problem is no longer a serious one because the new commonwealth, with its three Asian members, lends itself less to centralizing proposals than the old one did.
The nature of the present-day commonwealth, based on complete freedom of its members, along with the accepted obligations of those members to work together to the greatest possible extent, is now well understood in all the member countries. For this reason, I think the reservations and indeed even the hesitations that have sometimes marked Canada's attitude in the past have largely died away. At the present time Canadians have been discovering new and positive advantages in their membership in this association of free nations. The life blood of the modern commonwealth is constant exchange of information, free and full consultation and a strong and genuine desire to co-operate. That process brings Canada into close and friendly touch not only with the United Kingdom and other commonwealth countries which share this heritage of western civilization, but also with some of the most important countries of Asia. In a world so plagued by division and misunderstanding as ours is today, it is no small advantage that Asian and western leaders should be able to sit down together in commonwealth meetings in an atmosphere of close, friendly and complete equality.
There are other links which connect the countries of Asia to the west, and in the course of time I hope there will be many more. Of those which exist at the present time, in my opinion, the commonwealth nations provide the most important. It is essential that it should be maintained in the interest not only of its members but of all free states.

Now, Mr. Speaker, there is another group of free states with which we are proud to be associated, namely, those of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The seventh meeting of the council of the organization took place in Ottawa in September last. I think we were proud and privileged that Ottawa should have been chosen as the scene of that meeting. It was the first time that the North Atlantic council meeting met under the new order by which it is a council of governments rather than a council merely of foreign ministers. On this occasion the countries were represented by two or three members of each government.
It was a successful meeting itself, and also a great deal of valuable preparatory work was done towards the next meeting which will take place in Rome near the end of November. This may prove to be an even more important session than the recent one. I believe it would be agreed by all those who had the privilege of attending this meeting that the habit of consultation is growing up amongst the North Atlantic group, and that a feeling of community is being developed. We have come to the conclusion that meetings of this council should be held, not merely to settle crises, but for the continuing business of co-operation. Meetings for that purpose, and it was agreed we should have more of them than we have had in the past, should become as normal as meetings of parliament.
At this council meeting two goals of the North Atlantic organization were discussed, the short term goal and the long term goal. The short term goal is how to increase our security against military aggression, and the long term goal is how to promote economic and social stability among all the nations of the North Atlantic community; how to bring those nations that make up that community closer together. As for the short term goal, Mr. Speaker, we reviewed our defence program, and we took an important step which is, I think, related to this program. We recommended the admission to the North Altantic Treaty Organization of Greece and Turkey. A protocol for that purpose was drawn up and signed in London on Wednesday last by, among others, our representative, the high commissioner. This protocol will be submitted to this parliament later for approval before ratification by the government.
In this connection it might be desirable to postpone that discussion until we see what happens in regard to ratification in other countries which are even more directly concerned with this matter than we are, the United States, the United Kingdom and France. To my mind there is no question

about the desirability of bringing Greece and Turkey into closer association with North Atlantic defence plans. In recent years these two countries have stood in the forefront of the common defence against communist imperialism and aggression. They have given proof of their devotion to the cause of freedom and collective security, not only at home but on the hills and plains of Korea. I believe it is true to say that a full-scale attack on either of them would vitally weaken the defence of western Europe, and would probably mean a general war.
The problem, then, is how to remove the temptation for such an attack by building up collective defence arrangements in the areas of the Mediterranean. It was felt by some members of the North Atlantic group that probably the best way to do this would be by agreement on a Mediterranean security pact which could have some form of association with the North Atlantic pact. That was a non-NATO solution, and was attractive to some members of the council but was opposed by others, more particularly the United States of America. Indeed, it was opposed by those countries most concerned with this matter, Turkey and Greece, as well as by the military authorities of the North Atlantic organization. It may be argued that the full membership of these nations in the North Atlantic group will mean the extension of our commitments. In theory, that is the case, but I suggest it is more than compensated for by the deepening of our security, adding greatly to our collective defensive strength and thereby making an attack on any one of us less likely.
In any event, the extension of our commitments in this way is more theoretical than actual. If an attack took place on Greece or Turkey, it would not really make very much difference in regard to the extension of the war whether or not they were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, whether or not they belonged to a Mediterranean pact, or indeed whether Turkey or Greece had only their existing treaty obligations. I, for one, agree it is normally unwise to extend the specific commitments of this country, in contrast with our general commitments under the United Nations charter which, as we know from Korea, can be specific enough. I agree it would be unwise to extend these additional specific commitments, unless such extension is effective from the point of view of enlarging the defensive strength of the coalition and strengthening peace. It was felt by the council that the admission of Greece and Turkey to the council would have this result. It is not, I submit, a provocation to any power that does not contemplate aggression, any
United Nations and NATO more than the membership of Norway on the north flank of the North Atlantic community is a provocation.
In any event, Mr. Speaker, the greatest provocation to Soviet imperialism is not strength but is weakness. It was Karl Marx himself who said that the Russian bear is capable of anything, especially when he knows the other animals are capable of nothing. Well, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will be capable of doing much more for the defence of peace with Greece and Turkey as members. I hope, therefore, that the Russian bear will be capable of doing much less against us.
Other defence questions were discussed at this council meeting. The council received the report of the financial and economic board and the defence production board, which were concerned with two more forms of the problem of creating the necessary military strength for General Eisenhower's integrated force in western Europe. It was realized by the council that the studies which had been under way in this field through subordinate agencies of the council had reached the stage where they should be co-ordinated, and that this could be achieved by a consultation on the high political level, to reconcile the political, economic and military aspects of the problem. This problem is not simply one of providing forces. The European members of the organization made that quite clear to us. It is also the problem of preserving the economic stability of the member countries, so a temporary ministerial committee was set up by the council to solve this fundamental problem. Lest it be thought that this is just another high level piece of international machinery being created for an indefinite time, it was made clear that this committee was set up for the single purpose of recommending a course of action and reconciling, and I quote:
. . . the requirements of fulfilling a militarily acceptable NATO plan for the defence of western Europe, and the realistic political economic capabilities of the member countries.
That committee is to report at the next meeting in Rome. As the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) has pointed out, our Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott) is a member of that temporary committee. He attended the first meeting in Paris on October 9.
So much then, Mr. Speaker, for the short term objective. The long term objective of the North Atlantic pact was also given much more serious discussion at this meeting of the council than it had received at any time previously. It was admitted by all that that is not an objective of prior and immediate importance. Defence must come first. In our preoccupation with anything else, we must

United Nations and NATO never forget that. We did feel, though, that it was important also to give serious examination to the non-military objectives of NATO, especially as some of them have a direct bearing on defence itself. They include the closer association of member countries for the promotion of collective well-being and economic and social stability. It became increasingly clear at the council meeting that particularly those countries in Europe which were feeling most the economic burden of their defence contributions needed a long term aim for the backing of faith and confidence which is so necessary if this organization is to succeed.
To them the problem is not merely to provide for military defence from an abundance of resources; it is a peacetime struggle for stability and indeed for survival after a period of great difficulty, distress and even destruction. So we thought that this required that attention should be paid to the nonmilitary aspects of the treaty which are described in article 2 of that treaty; to the building up of the North Atlantic community. One often hears this term "Atlantic community" these days without any clear idea what it means. I readily admit that I am probably one of those most guilty of using it without a definite picture of what path its development may follow. But I believe this lack of precision is the result of the healthy circumstance that this community is growing out of satisfactory and practical solutions to common problems, not from preconceived plans for a grandiose if airy structure. At the Ottawa meeting it was clear that a spirit of community, as I have already stated, was developing on solid foundations; that these foundations should now be strengthened; that they should form the basis for closer consultation on foreign policy matters so that decisions would not be made, or certainly would not be announced by any one member of the group without discussing that problem with the other members of the group.
It was also felt that we should work for greater co-operation in the economic sphere, for the strengthening of our free institutions, and for promoting a better understanding between and conditions of well-being among our various peoples.
To promote this development a ministerial committee of five was set up in Ottawa, representing Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands, Norway and Canada. It will begin its work at Paris on Monday next, though useful preparatory work has been done in London by -a group of officials under the chairmanship of a member of the Department of External Affairs. The chairmanship of this ministerial committee falls to me as the next president of the council; so, as the Prime Minister


(Mr. St. Laurent) has indicated, I shall have to attend its meetings when I am in Europe for the meetings of the United Nations assembly. We have welcomed the appointment of this committee but we do not expect, nor should we expect, immediate or, indeed, early concrete results. Indeed, the Atlantic community is something which will take many years, many decades to develop. That does not mean, however, that we should not work and plan towards this great end now.
To work towards the establishment of a North Atlantic community of nations, all sharing in the great legacy from the past, all with their own special contributions to make in the future, all pledged to be of mutual assistance to one another, is surely a task worthy of our finest efforts and of our greatest zeal. The goal of such a society, strong, varied and secure but not self-centred or exclusive, and anxious to profit by contact with other civilizations, is, it seems to me, an ideal which can support and encourage us all through all the difficulties of the present time.
There is, Mr. Speaker, one great western European state which was absent from our Ottawa meeting, but which was very much in our thoughts. I refer to Germany, a country which has made such a great contribution to the growth of and indeed to the destruction of European civilization.
At our Rome meeting the question of free Germany's association in our common defence will be considered, and some highly important decisions may require to be taken then.
I am sure that all hon. members of the house are familiar with the reasons which have made it impossible to conclude a peace settlement with Germany. The main one is the continued division of that country into two areas of occupation, and the refusal of the U.S.S.R., which occupies one area, to permit any German unity except on a basis which they think will ensure communist control-that is Russian control-of the united country. Unity, based on free selfgovernment, must one day soon come to Germany; and, if it is on the right basis, the sooner the better; but it must not come in such a way that a united Germany will be forced to go the way of a united Poland and Czechoslovakia, and become a united Russian satellite.
In the absence of a peace settlement, I think it will be agreed that this nation, whose continued democratic and peaceful development is so important to all of us and to the future of Europe, should not remain indefinitely in its present position. It is in all our best interests that Germany should

be encouraged to assume increasing responsibility for the guidance of its own destinies, on the basis of equality within but not domination of the European community. We therefore welcome the progress that has been made toward the closer association of western Germany with the free world, both at the political level and in terms of German participation in European defence. We also share the desire that a satisfactory conclusion of arrangements for a new contractual relationship replacing the present occupation statute should be achieved in the near future in such a manner as to secure the wholehearted co-operation of the German people. Yet it must be recognized that the path towards this goal may not be an easy one and that many difficulties lie ahead. However desirable may be the integration of western Germany in the European community, we must not forget, nor must the Germans forget, the fact that co-operation involves a sharing of responsibilities and that no encouragement should be given to any tendency in Germany to look upon the present negotiation as an opportunity to obtain unconditional guarantees of German security or to assume that we are willing to pay almost any price for German assistance in the defence of western Europe, even to the extent of accepting with complacency neonazi tendencies.
Now if I may, Mr. Speaker, I should like to cross the Mediterranean and say a few words about the Middle East, which is very much on our minds these days, and about which I spoke in a special connection in the house last week. The crisis in Egypt following close on the heels of another dispute in the Middle East which for a time threatened to erupt into violence and which still smoulders. This Anglo-Iranian oil dispute, which had been developing for some time, began its present phase on March 20 with the passage of the oil nationalization law by the Iranian parliament. It has since witnessed the complete shutdown of the vast Iranian oil industry, the expulsion of all United Kingdom oil personnel from that industry, and a reference of the dispute to the United Nations security council, the inconclusive result of which brings little credit to that body.
I do not intend to review in detail, because I have not sufficient time in which to do so, the events which have taken place in Iran, in Egypt and elsewhere throughout the Middle East in recent months; but I should like to refer briefly to some of the forces which are at play behind the present unrest in this strategic Middle East area and to try
United Nations and NATO to place them in perspective against the wider background of the security of the western world. The Iranian and Egyptian disputes have many elements in common; and indeed there is reason to believe that one is the emotional and possibly the political consequence of the other. Both disputes have been characterized by the unilateral breach of a solemn pledge, thereby injuring the structure of international law. Both have had as their original inspiration the natural and justifiable wish of states which have experienced periods of foreign intervention to assert their right to be masters of their domestic affairs, even if in the pursuit of this understandable objective they may do great damage to their own countries.
What is happening in the Middle East is another manifestation, if a distorted one, of the national awakening which in so many parts of the Middle East has led to revolt against outside influences, which often has very quickly deteriorated from legitimate nationalism to militant xenophobia, and indeed now threatens to upset by force all stability in the Middle East, and possibly also in North Africa.
It would be folly indeed to underestimate the strength of this movement, as it would be folly to misunderstahd the basis of its inspiration. The tragedy for these countries and a danger to themselves, and indeed to world peace, lies in their blind refusal to recognize that, in their anxiety to gain full control of their affairs by the elimination of foreign influence, they are exposing themselves to the menace of communist penetration and absorption-absorption into the Soviet sphere.
Certainly there is no assurance that countries of the Middle East are capable of defending themselves from outside attack, and with their present stage of economic, political and social development, it is doubtful whether, without the support which the west is able and willing to give them, these countries are capable of maintaining a sufficient level of internal stability to resist the relentless pressure of internatioinial communism. On the contrary the unsatisfactory social and economic conditions which prevail throughout this area render that whole area a fertile ground in which communism, which has already succeeded in falsely identifying itself with nationalism, will thrive and eventually dominate, if allowed to grow unchecked.
Surely it must be abundantly clear that such a development would remove at one stroke the independence which the countries concerned claim to be their only objective. The Middle East is strategically far too important

United Nations and NATO to the defence of the North Atlantic area to allow it to become a power vacuum or to pass into unfriendly hands.
It is therefore a matter of major importance to the security of the whole free world, and that includes us, and in the interest of the Middle Eastern states themselves, that the situation in the Mediterranean area be stabilized as quickly as possible, and that the principle of collective security and collective action be extended to embrace this vital area. And indeed a proposal to that effect, as I said last week in the house, had already been made to the Egyptian government just before they took the action they did take. As we know in the North Atlantic pact, there is no incompatibility between responsible participation in such a collective system and the full exercise of national sovereignty.
Now I turn for a moment, Mr. Speaker, to the Far East, to Korea, where a war sometimes called, but is not in our minds, the forgotten war, drags on its weary and bloody way. The aggressor there shows no disposition to cease his aggression. However, the United Nations forces, more broadly representative than when I spoke on the subject last, are showing at heavy cost to themselves, but far heavier cost to the enemy, that aggression does not pay.
The temporary optimism from the initiation of the cease-fire talks was not maintained for very long, but there has been better news in the last few days, and I hope that the period of delaying tactics by the communists may be now over, and that an armistice can be arranged. Certainly the United Nations are not rebuffing any move' which might lead to the end of the war. But certainly we also have to be careful in how we deal with any such proposal made from the other side.
If I may adapt a quotation, our motto in that part of the world at the present time might well be:	Trust in Kaesong but keep
your powder dry. I think it is fair to say also that the United Nations supreme commander in the field, General Ridgway, is handling these negotiations with skill, patience and an unprovocative firmness which must command our wholehearted admiration.
Korea is only one problem. There are other Asian questions. So far as we are concerned in this government, we remain willing to discuss these other Asian questions with all those concerned, and to negotiate in respect of them through the United Nations.
There is very real danger in having our diplomacy frozen in the Far East and allowing ourselves no room to manoeuvre. So I suggest we should keep our policy in that part of the world, even now, as flexible as


possible. However-and this is important- before we can proceed to any of these further Asian matters which are dealt with in the United Nations resolution of last February, which I think is still valid, the aggression in Korea must first be brought to an end. That is the immediate danger, and that is our immediate purpose, to end that war on honourable terms. If and when that can be done we will not refuse to discuss any other Asian questions relevant to the situation out there.
But aggression is not the only enemy in Korea. There is the enemy of hunger, poverty and misery, the source and the strength of that communism which the Russians have used in other countries for their own unworthy purposes.
I know the house will be glad and proud to know that in the matter of relief of distress in Korea in recent months no country has made a greater contribution than Canada. Indeed I do not know whether any country has contributed as much as Canada. I think however it is true to say that no matter what happens in Korea, the people there have already lost. They are disillusioned and desolate. In that sense the west has also lost; and this is not the least of the tragedies arising out of the Korean aggression.
In referring to this important matter of fighting communism by fighting distress hunger and privation in Asia I should-perhaps I should apologize for the length of time I am taking-say a few words about the development of the Colombo plan since we last met.
On May 14 last I reported that shortly after our contribution of $25 million had been voted by this parliament we took steps to implement our share of the plan by asking the Indian and Pakistan governments to send over representatives to discuss with us the projects we might finance, or help to finance, having in mind those items which Canada is best fitted to undertake.
Since then we have made some considerable progress, and have had discussions with representatives of those two governments. In the case of Pakistan, to which we have allocated approximately two-fifths of the total contribution, several interesting projects have been selected. Among those, to name only a few, are an experimental and demonstration livestock farm which we are undertaking, jointly with New Zealand and Australia, and for which Canada expects to supply machinery; an irrigation project for which we expect to provide some pumping equipment; a large colonization or settlement project in the Thai area of the Punjab, for which we hope to

provide such items of equipment as dump trucks, motors, pumps and some electrical and transport equipment.
So far as India is concerned, as was foreshadowed in my earlier statement, we have been asked by the Indian government, and have agreed, to make available a large part of our allocation to that country in the form of wheat. The provision of foodstuffs was clearly envisaged in the original Colombo plan report, and we think will provide a most welcome support to India in her efforts to combat famine and basically to strengthen her economy. The Indian government intends to set up what are known as counterpart funds. The rupee equivalent of the value of the wheat we are providing to them will be used as internal financing for development projects they are undertaking under the plan. Those funds would be available for purchases of material within India and of course for Indian labour. We are continuing at the present time to explore with the Indian authorities projects requiring external finance to which we could apply funds over and above those which are being used for wheat. One particular project is an irrigation project in west Bengal to increase rice production in that area.
I cannot leave this part of the world without making a reference, which I shall keep as brief as possible, to the Japanese peace treaty. If I did so the hon. member for Van-couver-Quadra would misunderstand. Therefore I should like to say a few words about that treaty which was signed at San Francisco on September 8. That was a conference called, not to negotiate a treaty but to sign a treaty. The signature took place only after eleven months of serious diplomatic discussions during which time all the governments concerned, including the government of the U.S.S.R., had ample opportunity to express their views. Certainly we expressed our views in regard to the draft which had been submitted originally to us by the United States of America. As a result of those views certain changes were made in the draft. Not all the changes were made that we wished to have made, but in a treaty of this kind you cannot get unanimity with perfection.
On the whole, the treaty as it was signed was considered by the Canadian representatives there to be a good treaty. Of course there were some important omissions in the countries represented at San Francisco, particularly China and India. As far as China was concerned, the reason for that omission was obvious. If the representatives of the Chinese government on Formosa had been invited to attend that conference, certain
United Nations and NATO delegations would not have turned up. If the representatives of the communist government in China had been invited to attend that conference, then more delegations would not have turned up. The obvious thing to do under the circumstances was to postpone the problem of Chinese representation and Chinese accession to the treaty. We regretted also the absence of India for reasons which seemed good to that government.
But there were other free Asian nations which were present at San Francisco and they spoke in no uncertain way. In signing this treaty we did so, not as a treaty of revenge but of reconciliation. Of course the treaty leaves Japan a much weaker state than she was when she entered the war, and that is as she should be. She has been stripped of all her outer islands and has been reduced to the four main islands. Her capacity to commit aggression again in the future has been very sensibly and very rightly diminished. But although Japan is weaker as a result of this treaty, she is not prostrate, nor, I hope, bitter. I like to think also that this treaty is one treaty after a war which does not bear within it the ^eeds of future wars. We do not know about that, of course, for sure, and we may not know for many years. In signing a treaty of this type you have to take a calculated risk, but in view of the alternatives those risks on this occasion were worth taking.
This treaty brings Japan back into the family of free nations on the Pacific and gives her an opportunity to contribute to the peace and security there. We hope that she will take advantage of that opportunity. In any event 83 million disciplined, frugal, hardworking and intelligent people cannot be ignored, whether we sign a treaty with them or not.
We also had some special interests in this treaty and we made those known at the conference. We expressed the hope that Japan would not return to certain international trade practices of before the war which had caused so much trouble to so many countries, including our own. We were also interested in the fisheries question. We had hoped at one time that a fisheries agreement would be included in the peace treaty, but that was not possible. However, there was included in the treaty a clause which made it incumbent upon Japan to begin discussions with the United States and Canada for a fisheries arrangement. Those discussions have been going on since the treaty was signed. Satisfactory progress has been made

United. Nations and NATO and I hope that an announcement in regard to that progress can be made within the next day or two.
The treaty is now ready for ratification. I think it would be wise on our part before it is submitted to parliament for approval or otherwise, before ratification, to wait and see what happens in Tokyo and Washington, especially in Tokyo where it is now being considered by the Japanese legislature. It opens a new chapter in our relations with Japan. I hope it will be a happier chapter than that which we have just closed. I think it also opens a new chapter in the security of ithe Pacific, which is just as much a Canadian interest as is the security of the Atlantic.
It may be asked, indeed, and it has already been asked, "why not try to guarantee peace in the Pacific with a pact as you have tried to guarantee it in the Atlantic?" Within a few hours of signing the Japanese peace treaty the United States signed a defence pact with Japan. Recently she signed a defence pact with the Philippines, I think on August 30 last. She signed a security arrangement on September 1 last with New Zealand and Australia. But none of these arrangements, not even the tripartite arrangement which I referred to last, constitute anything like a Pacific pact.
Mr. Truman called the New Zealand-Australia-United States security arrangement a natural initial step in consolidation of peace in the Pacific, and that is what it is. It differs from the North Atlantic pact in another way. The obligation assumed under this tripartite Pacific arrangement is to be found in article 4 which reads:
That an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and security and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.
As far as this government is concerned, I think we could almost accept that obligation at the present time, without any Pacific pact, with most of the countries with whose security in the Pacific we are concerned. But this is not a Pacific pact, so the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra asks why we do not take the lead in negotiating such a Pacific pact. Leaving aside for the moment the propriety of Canada taking leadership in this effort, I suggest that it would be impracticable at the present time to negotiate a Pacific pact similar to the North Atlantic pact. The best proof of that fact is that the United States has separate pacts with Japan, with the Philippines, with New Zealand and with Australia. If the United States has made


separate pacts with those countries she did so because she did not think it desirable or practicable to make a general pact.
I think this reasoning of the United States and the other governments referred to seems sensible. If you tried to negotiate at this time a general Pacific pact, whom would you include and whom would you leave out? What about China? Would you include the Chiang Kai-shek government in Formosa as part of a general Pacific pact, along the lines of the Atlantic pact? If you did not include that government, would it be easy in the eyes of some governments to leave them out? Would you include the three Indo-Chinese states? Would you include Thailand? Would you include an Asian state that wished to join? If not, how would you exclude them if they wished to join? I suggest, Mr. Speaker, that any attempt to negotiate that kind of general Pacific agreement at this stage would not strengthen but weaken security in the Pacific. But I can assure the house at the same time that this government is vitally interested in security in the Pacific. We are a pacific country in a geographical as well as in a political sense, and we desire to play our proper part in the Pacific in political and economic as well as in diplomatic matters because that area is becoming of great and growing importance to Canada.
Speaking in Vancouver immediately after the signing of the Japanese peace treaty, in a statement to which my hon. friend, the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green), made reference the other day I said:
We have now in the Pacific certain defence arrangements. The United States and Japan have one. The United States and the Philippines have one. The United States, Australia and New Zealand have one. Canada and the United States, both Pacific powers, have one. It may well be that in the future we will be able to gather together these arrangements into a general Pacific pact, and if that time comes-
And I suggest it has not come yet.
-I am sure that Canada will show her appreciation of the importance of collective security in the Pacific as we have already done in the north Atlantic.	.


Howard Charles Green: May I ask the minister a question? What are the objections to Canada becoming a party to the pact between the United States, Australia and New Zealand? That was really the question I asked when speaking last week.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I suppose there is no particular objection to our becoming a party, but there are some circumstances which make it a little difficult even if we had an ardent desire to join that pact at the present time. For one thing, we have not been invited, and

our non-participation is well understood by those concerned. I am not raising that as a reason of major importance. Possibly if we pressed for an invitation we would get it, but the fact is this was meant to be a mutual defence arrangement between the three governments most concerned. We already have a pretty satisfactory arrangement for defence between Canada and the United States, and Canada, New Zealand and Australia are all member nations of the commonwealth of nations. Furthermore there is another reason against extending that tripartite arrangement at this time. The addition of one country may lead to requests from other countries to join that arrangement, and I believe that is not desired at this time by the three countries concerned.
My last subject in this survey-and it may be one I should have mentioned first-is our relations with the organization which still remains, with all its weaknesses and its disappointments, our best hope for peace, the United Nations. I do not think I should close my statement without some reference to our world organization, the assembly of which is to meet very shortly in Paris, and the Canadian delegation to which has already been appointed. In that delegation we have continued what I think is the useful principle of all party representation. This forthcoming meeting of the assembly may be a very significant one. There are a good many important subjects on the agenda, but even more important than the actual subjects on the agenda is, I think, the feeling in the minds of most delegations which will attend this meeting that the United Nations is now either at or coming close to the crossroads.
There are two main developments which lead me to say that. One is the division of the world which has now become hardened into competing and conflicting blocs, and which has been reflected at the last two assemblies in every discussion there. If this is going to continue indefinitely, it certainly is going to undermine the usefulness of the assembly as a universal organization. For that development we of the western world are not of course primarily responsible, but whoever is responsible is doing his part in undermining the foundations of our world organization. We are in danger of that organization becoming nothing more or less than an instrument in the cold war. We have to be on guard against that, because if it does become that then we will have completely altered the ideals which we had for this organization when we signed the charter, long years ago now, as it seems.
United Nations and NATO
Another danger, and it seems to be an increasing one too, is that some members of the United Nations, and not always those who do the most to promote its principles, treat its resolutions almost with contempt. They certainly ignore them if they happen to be against their national policies, and if it becomes the accepted practice of this world organization that any resolution which is against the national interest of any member state can be ignored because of that fact, then it will not be very long before the United Nations will go the way of the league of nations. We must be on guard against that development and do what we can to stop it.
On the more positive side, the United Nations has shown of course in the last year since the last assembly what it can do in stemming aggression in Korea. The Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) said in this house on April 29, 1948:
Our faith in the United Nations as an effective organization for peace and security has been pretty severely shaken.
However, he added:
What is unshaken is our determination to make of it or within it an effective organization for this purpose.
We have endeavoured to respond to this determination in Canada by supporting, as the security council becomes less effective, measures taken within the United Nations assembly itself to increase its capacity for dealing effectively with any active aggression it might be called upon to meet. However, far more notable than any resolution or any step of that kind taken at the assembly is the application of the principle of collective resistance to aggression by those men who are actually fighting for the United Nations in Korea. The Korean experience has provided the free nations with a number of lessons which, if carefully studied and properly interpreted, can be of great benefit to the United Nations in the days ahead. There can be little doubt that the first application of the principle of collective security-and this is an optimistic observation-has strengthened both the principle of collective security and, indeed, the United Nations itself.
There are developments of danger and developments of hope in this organization, and I hope that in the forthcoming assembly we may be able to do something which will advance the hopeful developments and cause the dangerous developments to recede. I believe, I have always believed, and most members in this house believe that collective security is a necessity for Canada, and so I believe that we should support all responsible and reasonable proposals for achieving it. Having said that, I would add that, though
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United. Nations and NATO aggression of all kinds and in all places should be met and condemned, we must face the fact that at the present time-and the lesson of Korea is very much in my mind when I say this-the free world may not possess the necessary strength to make that principle of collective action effective in every part of the world. Carried to an extreme degree, the theory of unlimited collective security everywhere might, because of the dissipation of strength its application would involve, mean no security anywhere. On the other hand, failure in any instance to defend collective security would deal a serious blow to the hopes of millions who have placed their trust in the United Nations.
This certainly involves us in a dilemma. Those of us who are charged with responsibility in these matters have therefore to exercise pretty careful judgment as to how on any given occasion this principle of collective security can best be put into effect without fatally weakening us for other and possibly more difficult tests. What is involved is essentially an ad hoc calculation of the political, strategic and moral factors which will be present in any particular issue.
I have covered a lot of ground, Mr. Speaker, very sketchily and in too many minutes I am afraid. But before I sit down I am sure the house would expect me to make a few general concluding observations on the situation as I see it, and what my own views are about the days immediately ahead. I think myself that there has been a little general improvement in the international situation in the last six months. I doubt, however, whether there has been any substantial easing of world tension in any respect. It is true I think that in the countries of western Europe, which I had the privilege of visiting this summer, and where I discussed with those concerned with foreign affairs the possibilities and dangers that lie ahead, it is true in those countries morale is higher, and the persistent and pressing fears of an immediate armed aggression seem to have lessened somewhat. However, against this possible brightening of the picture in one area is the fact that in the Middle East, as I have tried to indicate, there are grave and growing dangers to stability and peace, and that in the Far East the aggressive forces of communist imperialism remain as militant and as defiant as ever. Even in western Europe itself, the danger of military aggression is ever present, while economic and social difficulties remain a constant threat to stability, and one which the forces of Soviet imperialism are exploiting and will continue to exploit to the limit. Furthermore, if the strictly military picture has improved in the European area, that has been, I think, owing to the certain realization by any country


which may now be tempted to break the peace that a group of free countries stand together in resistance to any such aggression, and that the ground on which they stand is becoming firmer. The moral to be drawn from this is therefore not that we should slacken our efforts, but that we should go ahead steadily and with determination to complete the job.
However, there are two types of aggression that we have to fear. There is military aggression, expressing itself in armed action, but there is social and economic aggression which expresses itself through the subversive activity of international communism. As to the first, military aggression, our military weakness-and in the face of Soviet land and air strength it is still a weakness-has been a standing temptation to Soviet attack. In strengthening ourselves, as we have done, and rightly so, to remove that temptation, we have, of course-and this I suppose applies particularly to the European countries-to be careful not to weaken ourselves unnecessarily in the economic and social field, and by doing so encourage the other kind of aggression. How to maintain this proper balance in the days ahead between military power, economic stability and social progress is probably the paramount problem of the free world today, and will only be solved by co-operative action which takes into account every factor, moral, social and economic, as well as military, that makes for strength.
It may well be that the Soviet union, impressed by the action of the United Nations in Korea, and aware of the far greater residual strength of the west, will now wish, for tactical reasons, to avoid an open conflict, and try to sap our strength by other means. It may even attempt-indeed it has already attempted and with some effect-to deceive and divide us by false peace campaigns, by exploiting economic and social difficulties. In short, as it has been put very graphically, it may put poison in our soup instead of cutting our throats.
It is, I think, necessary for free countries to take counter-measures against this danger as well as against the danger of military aggression. We should, for instance, never lose a chance to drive home the fact-it may be more obvious to us than it is to others-that we are for peace alone; that while we in NATO, for instance, are determined to press forward with our defence program, undeterred either by threats of war or phony promises of peace, nevertheless our primary purpose is always to prevent war and not to fight one; to ensure that D-day like tomorrow never comes; to underline our desire to use our energy and wealth not for arming but

for peaceful, social and economic progress in a world where armaments will not be necessary.
In the kind of situation with which we are faced today, it may be that if we have achieved our defence objectives by, say, the end of 1954, we will have surmounted the most acutely dangerous period; but that in its turn may be followed by the longer term phase of the conflict, the marathon race as opposed to the sprint, and that may last for many, many years. It will require discipline, steadiness and perseverance; a refusal also to yield to the temptation to adopt the policies or even the tactics of those who would destroy us. We must not only maintain, as a normal part of national activity, the level of defence effort required, but also prove to our own and other people that our civilization and our way of life are worthy of this effort.
The achievement of military and social strength, of short-term and long-term objectives, is now a main feature of the policy of every free state. To secure these objectives there must be mutual understanding and confidence. This can be blocked by a feeling, on the one hand, that there is an unequal sharing of the burden of defence. It can be blocked by a feeling on the other hand that there is an unequal sharing of the burden of existence.
This partnership of the free world must then be founded on mutual respect, mutual understanding and mutual aid. It is now backed by increasing strength. With that strength, we can defend ourselves if we have to. From it we can negotiate, if we are given a chance. From strength, used with wisdom and restraint, through negotiation, carried on with realism and sincerity, to a peace which rests on a more solid foundation than any that we have today; that, Mr. Speaker, is the course which the governments and peoples of the free world have set, and one which this government in its foreign policy, and indeed which this parliament and this people of Canada, will do their best to follow.


Gordon Graydon: Mr. Speaker, I shall not this afternoon attempt to cover the rather extensive territory which the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) has so adequately dealt with on this occasion. However, in a moment or so I shall refer to some of the observations contained in his speech. Before doing so however I should like to make reference to His Majesty and the royal visit, and say that the deep concern of Canadians over the indifferent health of our king and the corresponding buoyancy of the people's hopes when it was learned that His Majesty had made a sufficiently remarkable recovery that 94699-171
United, Nations and NATO Their Royal Highnesses could continue their planned Canadian tour are significant illustrations of the belief of our people in the institution of the monarchy and our devotion to this form of democracy and freedom.
Their Majesties in peace and war have played their full part on the British commonwealth team. Despite the crumbling of many thrones in the last half century, it is refreshing to recall that the crown stands untarnished, and the wearer as well, in the loyal esteem and affection in which it is held among the peoples of the British commonwealth and empire. It is a refreshing experience, in days when so many divisive factors are abroad, to have a common point of sentiment and a non-controversial centre of our free form of government around which we may all rally. It gives a strength to the fabric of our way of life which is quite beyond commonplace appraisal.
Having in mind that Canada has extended to the royal visitors within our gates the most genuine welcome of which Canadians are capable, I shall not yield to the temptation of adding any inadequate words of mine to those which have been much better spoken across Canada. This is a new country, and a vigorous and virile people. If all who met Their Royal Highnesses did not curtsy or bow in the approved court manner, our hearts were, nevertheless, in the welcome that we accorded, and to us in Canada the form mattered much less. As a matter of fact I am of the opinion, Mr. Speaker, we could, on future occasions of this kind, strip our welcome of much of the old rigid and frigid formalities even at the most formal functions and make our own welcome in our own Canadian way. * This is Canada. We are Canadians, and proud of it. They are the Canadian royal family, and we are proud that they are.
I am not happy over the fact that members, of our Canadian royal family make their visits to this country so infrequently. A visit in 1901, another in 1919, another in 1927 another by Their Majesties in 1939 and now Their Royal Highnesses in 1951, would seem to indicate that those responsible both here and overseas have failed to assess the true significance of commonwealth evolution during the last three or four decades which has tended to stress the vital importance of the-crown and the royal house to Canadians and the other self-governing units of the vast commonwealth. Without desiring to add fresh burdens to an already busy household, I feel that those of the royal family who are able to travel should be in our midst more often. Air travel brings Buckingham palace within a few hours of parliament hill, and ought

United Nations and NATO to make it possible for informal visits from time to time, perhaps for the opening of our Canadian parliament by members of the royal family on some special occasions. If there are constitutional difficulties in the way of that, I suggest we have overcome some just as important constitutional difficulties as may be there involved, and there should be no difficulty on that score. The current experiences drawn from the royal tour now in progress, with all its heavy demands upon our beloved visitors, point up the need for the decent tralization of the royal duties and the more frequent appearances of members of the family in this important section of their realm. They will always receive a royal welcome among Canadians in the most informal and affectionate sense of the term.
I desire now to turn to the reason for the debate now in progress. It is the motion of the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent), which reads as follows:
That this house approves the continuation of Canada's participation in the efforts being made through the United Nations to establish international peace, and in particular to defeat aggression and restore peace in Korea, and by the North Atlantic treaty nations to deter aggression and promote stability and well-being in the north Atlantic area.
I may say at once that the party for which I am spokesman at the moment will give wholehearted support to that motion. In doing so, I should like to add just this word, that one of the occasions of this debate has been the government's desire for approval for the dispatch of the 27th infantry brigade to Europe in fulfilment of one of our commitments to the integrated plan of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It goes without saying that this party will give that approval, and it desires to express the confidence, which all members of this house will share, that these men will have our support at home and that they will uphold the finest traditions so well established by those who went from our shores in other critical days. We know they will keep the good name of Canada high among the nations of the world.
At this stage of the debate I should like to refer, if I may, to one or two matters mentioned by the minister in his speech a few moments ago. I was glad to note that the government had decided to make a start on the St. Lawrence seaway. I have always felt that there were many advantages, Mr. Speaker, in our proceeding with the St. Lawrence seaway as a Canadian project. I am not so sure that all the advantages which have been pointed out in connection with the project being on an international basis have held water. I am satisfied that there is abroad in Canada today an optimism and enthusiasm that this country is able to do great things


by itself. I believe that we have never faced a time when we had more pride in what we can do, more pride in our achievements, than we have today. I believe that one of the things that will be of importance in the St. Lawrence seaway is that the people of Canada will feel that at last Canada is tackling the job alone; she can do the job alone, and it will be in her economic interest, as well as in her interest generally, that she do so.
I want to say to the minister that the only pessimistic note he struck was that he seems to feel that perhaps the enterprise is going to get bogged down, at least temporarily, by old-fashioned red tape. I suggest to the minister that all the red tape he mentioned be cut to the best of his ability, because we should not allow this important enterprise of ours, whether it be from the standpoint of power, navigation or defence, to be bound up in red tape at this time.
I should like to make reference to one other matter which was touched upon in the minister's speech, and that is the question of the Colombo plan. I was glad to hear him indicate some of the advances that had been made in connection with the operation of that plan, because when the present impasse has been resolved we in the west will find problems with respect to the east, problems which it will require the best statesmanship and common sense to solve. In the generation to come, yes in less time than that, great problems will have to be faced. We cannot solve those problems while there are in the Orient people who, because of their underprivileged condition, look upon us as the people who live in the large, fashionable house on the hill while they live in the roughcast cottage across the tracks. That is just about as simple a way as I can describe what I have noted has been in some oriental minds, the differentiation between the position in the east and the position in the west. As to the Colombo plan, the Truman Point Four program for technical assistance to the underdeveloped countries, and all those plans that may be in operation, I think that we in Canada, the United States and other countries who are able to do so must not lose too much of the precious time that is still available to us in order to show our genuine regard for the people of the Orient and our deep understanding of their problems, and to show that we are their friends and shall remain so through the years that lie ahead.
I am not going to refer to any of the other points mentioned by the minister, with the exception of one matter upon which we are not in entire agreement. There was a time during the past debates on external affairs when I was of the opinion that at that stage perhaps It was not feasible to have a

Pacific pact among the nations of that area. On one or two occasions I called for an economic pact but not for a full pact. One of the reasons why I did not do so was that I had a deep conviction that perhaps it would not be helpful until such time as Japan gained her independence and joined the community of nations. This has now occurred. With deadlock after deadlock occurring in the Korean cease-fire parleys and the threat of imperial communism continuing unabated in the Orient, I think the public may be forgiven for wondering whether, while we take great pains, through the No-nth- Atlantic Treaty Organization, to bar the front door at the Elbe, we may be leaving the back door in the Pacific ajar.
I am fully aware of the arguments which have been propounded by the minister here this afternoon, namely that the situation in the Pacific does not stand on all fours with the situation in the north Atlantic area. I think that fact will be admitted, and it need not, I think, form the basis of a difference. But I am convinced that, with an independent Japan back in the community of nations, once more the government of Canada would be well advised to explore at once the possibilities of a Pacific pact. I was glad to hear the minister say that the matter was at least' in his mind. It may be that it is only a question of time as between his point of view and mine on this really important matter. But there are many-and I am one of them-who feel that the north Koreans would never have dared to cross the 38th parallel on that memorable June day of 1950 had the free nations plainly declared that an attack upon one would be regarded as an attack upon all. Perhaps the problem is not quite as simple as that, and the minister may say that it is not. But I think it is important that we leave no room for any mistake on the part of any would-be aggressor as to what will happen if an aggression takes place. It is true that, as the minister indicated, there are scattered pacts of a kind in the Pacific area now; but I do not think the Pacific problem can be solved entirely by a bits and pieces form of military and economic agreement in that area. It seems to me that the time has arrived when we should move to conclude a master pact of the Pacific free nations, in which Canada will have her normal role as a Pacific power.
I wanted to mention that matter because, when you speak of not making a master pact yet, it seems to me that we have gone a long way in bringing other nations into the North Atlantic organization. As the minister says, we have brought in Greece and Turkey
United Nations and NATO within the last short time, or are about to do so. I think it can be well said that, after all, there was little use in attempting to close the front door at the Elbe when leaving, as Churchill once said, the soft underbelly open to attack in the Mediterranean. If those arguments apply to Greece, Turkey and the Middle East, surely they apply to a just as inflammable area in the Pacific. I hope that the government will not lose any opportunity to explore the possibilities of a master pact in that region.
The major portion of my remarks today on foreign affairs will centre -not on those subjects to which I have just alluded but upon Canada's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. In placing my emphasis upon this vital segment of our external relations I should like to make it abundantly clear at the outset, however, that any such emphasis upon NATO does not reflect any weakening of my support of the United Nations organization; because, regardless of what the minister said-and he put the arguments pro and con clearly, I thought-and regardless of whatever may be said about the weaknesses and the failures of the United Nations organization, at least it -can be said that it is still the only organization on a wide, global basis in which the nations of the world can put their feet under a common table and talk things over instead of putting rifles on their shoulders to go to war and fight it out. For these reasons, if for no other, it seems to me that the peace-seeking nations and peace-loving peoples will still hold hard to the United Nations organization so long as there is a ray of hope for its success in the days that lie ahead. I am glad that the United Nations organization is the cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy. I hope it may remain so. But the north Atlantic community plans for social and economic integration and defence, it must be stressed, are all within the four corners of the San Francisco charter, and in the interests of world peace. I suggest they must remain there.
I like the way the Right Hon. Anthony Eden put it as he spoke at the university of Denver last August when he said:
The value of article 51, which is, of course, the link between the charter and the Atlantic treaty, became more and more obvious with each Soviet veto in the security council. Soviet abuse of the veto jammed the machinery of security; the Atlantic pact set it in motion again. This pact puts into practice for a defined area the collective security principle of the charter.
It has not been due to any failure of Canada or the other free powers that the world organization has failed to meet every expectation as a vital influence in the maintenance of world peace and security and Canadians have

United Nations and NATO no desire to join those who would further weaken that organization's constant endeavour to live up to the fond hopes of its founders and friends.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in my humble opinion, adds vital strength and power to the main objectives of the United Nations in its struggle to keep the peace, and meets the essential needs of the north Atlantic area in the field of defence and other related matters. It is a banding together of free powers for peace, not war. When one hears from behind the iron curtain that this new regional pact is provocative and hostile in character-and just imagine people from behind the iron curtain accusing others of being provocative and hostile-let us not forget that prior to the inception of the North Atlantic organization no less than fifteen firm treaties and agreements had been entered into and signed by the satellitic states of the Soviet union, with respect to defence and security, and that each of them tied in to the imperial Soviet capital at Moscow itself. And those are the people who accuse the North Atlantic organization of being provocative and hostile!
This constitutes a network of international commitments-that is, the Soviet system- such as to leave no legitimate ground for responsible criticism of the program of mutual protection and co-operation now embarked upon by the members of the North Atlantic pact. The indisputable foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is open for every unprejudiced world eye to see, came from the lunatic diplomacy of Molotov and his co-architects of imperial Russian foreign policy, following the close of the last world war and continuing down to the present time. It is their responsibility, and theirs alone, for striking fear and suspicion as to Soviet motives into the hearts of hundreds of millions of peace-seeking people the world over who wanted war no more. The Russians invited the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The free nations of that area had little option but to accept.
Since Canada was among the first to call for an integrated system of free-power defence and is a prominent participant in NATO, and provided the venue for the council meeting a few weeks ago, it is appropriate that in this parliament we should discuss and attempt to assess our position in that organization in its relation to the everyday lives of Canadians from coast to coast. I think Canadians generally feel that, while this new adventure into the field of power and might as a means of preventing a world breach of the peace may not be classed as an absolute guaranty against war, it at least represents a serious effort on the part of a very important section of the


free world to gain something from the lessons of realism taught by two world wars, where unpreparedness became virtually an invitation to attack.
The use of armed power to. hold a fretful band of aggressive nations in check has now been recognized as an effective factor in the keeping of the peace itself. Particularly is this so when there are abroad today governments who hear and understand only the voice of strength and might. Canada went into this North Atlantic organization for her own national security as well as to buttress the defences of other like-minded and peace-desiring peoples. We know that we cannot stand alone in this power-infested earth. We are fully aware also that, while we cannot hope to stand alone, we could easily perish alone; and that, Mr. Speaker, Canadians do not propose to do.
It would be nothing short of irresponsible optimism to say that all is sweet and lovely in the process of hammering out a collective policy of security among the North Atlantic powers. That was abundantly evident from the sketchy emanations which came from the closed meetings here in Ottawa. It was apparent that the United States had its plans laid with the military aspects far out in front. It was equally evident that the European powers were placing their main emphasis elsewhere.
It would be putting our heads in the sand if over here we were to dismiss without sympathetic examination the point of view advanced by those from overseas. The whole problem of defence in the very nature of things must be directly related to politics, economics, finance and the standard of living of the peoples providing that defence. It might as well be admitted at once that the imposition of a vigorous program of rearmament upon the base of a national peacetime economy, without a widespread mass war psychology to stimulate and support it, provides giant problems and massive obstacles even to a nation like our own. A few moments ago the minister referred to that fact.
With several other members of NATO which come to mind, the problems of this kind become obviously graver than ours. For all in the pact it is a new and trying experience, but it begins to look as if a long-range policy of protection against both the wartime and peacetime ambitions of Soviet imperialism has to be worked out in an integrated scheme which will bring the NATO powers together on a permanent basis in the fields of the military, economic and social. This can be no short-pull proposition,

1 am afraid. To succeed it will require dynamic, political, economic and social leadership, as well as military.
Up to date we have made some headway in the latter; but if we are successfully to meet the crusading spirit of imperial communism we will have to be crusaders, too. And may I point out that it has always seemed to me that it is very much harder to crusade for things you have than to crusade for things you have not. Nevertheless I think that if NATO is to play its full part in the long and serious days ahead, it will have to raise its sights and, by courageous and united leadership, bring its peoples' morale up to levels which thus far have not been achieved. What is needed now is something more than paper plans and hesitant policies. Leadership is an essential, if NATO is to work.
May I make the interjection that you cannot separate personalities from plans. One of the reasons it is so essential to have leadership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is that, after all, people follow people, as well as plans, programs and policies. And without leadership of personalities in that organization, particularly on the political side, I think we shall not advance as we ought. There are some who appear to think that the North Atlantic community ought somehow to achieve federation overnight. Such a goal, however desirable it may be, will come by slow and carefully-planned steps and stages. Armed attack by the Soviets would doubtless hasten that goal, but in the normal course of events undue haste might conceivably retard the attainment of the objective.
For my part I am convinced that the pattern of the British commonwealth might be employed profitably in the earlier stages of a plan for political federation. In that common association it has been found that nations sometimes work better together when formal bonds yield place to the natural ties of free association and friendship. Nevertheless, political collaboration as well as collaboration in other vital fields is essential for development of a well-balanced and well-led association, and we must not cease striving to that end.
It would be closing our eyes to realities were we not to recognize that some of the powers connected with NATO have a fight on their hands at home with powerful communist groups who will seize every chance to upset the present regimes if the standard of living or the social security programs are imperilled by excessively heavy drains on the country's finances for purposes of defence. That constitutes a factor in the very defence of the NATO community itself. Added to this, and our own nation is seriously unsettled over it.
United Nations and NATO the present inflationary trend with a cruel rise in the cost of living coming in its wake raises another problem which has to be met within each of the nations so afflicted; otherwise the cost of rearming becomes a heavier burden than ever. We cannot afford to take the reckless chance of pricing ourselves out of the plans we have for our own peace and security.
While we are laying appropriate stress on the obvious fact that if NATO is to become strong militarily it will be obliged to strengthen its political, economic and social position as well, and after saying that these four go hand in hand and are indivisible, it is essential that we do not becloud or confuse the more immediate and acute issue that faces freedom and democracy this side of the Soviet line fence. If General Eisenhower is right-and I would have preferred to see him present at the Ottawa meeting of the NATO council to give his views-it will be two years before the free powers can handle the situation militarily in Europe; and that time may be running out. Then it seems only sensible that military rearmament be given as high a priority as possible at this stage in order that the plans in other fields may not be interrupted by any invitation to aggression based on our military feebleness. Let us hope, however, that a common denominator can be found at Rome at the next conclave which will satisfy the present conflicting claimants in the various NATO fields of endeavour.
Having in mind the conflicting views of NATO powers and the immediate necessity of bridging the gap between them before any further drifting occurs, Canada should, in my humble opinion, take an aggressive position at once to see that a common-sense balance is kept. At the same time, we should take inventory of how we can, in other ways as well, be a most effective and valuable participant in these integrated plans for peace.
It must have come as a shock to world opinion

it certainly was to me

that no inventory or survey of the capacities and potentials of NATO members had been launched prior to the Ottawa meeting last September. This would seem to indicate that the sense of urgency has not been as keen as it should have been in the deliberations of the council during the last two and one-half years. We are either in a jam internationally, or we are not. If we are not, we have plenty of time and can take it easy. If we are, as I think we are. then it is a somewhat critical commentary upon the vision and initiative of the free powers that such a precious period of time has been lost.
One of Canada's main columns of strength lies in her economic potential. If we are to

United Nations and NATO pull our full weight in NATO, that potential must blossom into reality and our productive capacity be put to work for the common cause and for ourselves. It would be idle to suggest that we have much more than sampled the tremendous resources of this young nation.
At this point I desire to make what I hope may be considered a constructive and helpful proposal and I make it personally in the same spirit of non-partisanship with which I have attempted to approach every problem related to the serious subject of international relations. I urge that the government and this parliament after full consultation with the provinces give consideration to the following proposal:
That appropriate legislation be introduced setting up a national development and production board to be composed of representatives of government on the federal and provincial levels and of agriculture, industry and labour and other branches of our national endeavour, to achieve the following objectives:
(a)	To survey at once the natural resources of Canada in relation to their availability and the foreseeable demands as presently indicated by the requirements for our defence program, the anticipated demands arising from our international obligations and the domestic demands of an expanding economy.
(b)	To recommend with the least possible delay upon the basis of such investigation and examination how best this nation can meet the demands and obligations above-mentioned.
In making this proposal I want to pay a well-deserved tribute to the work in these fields which has been done by all levels of government in Canada and by private enterprise in every corner of the country down through the years.
This proposal is a measure designed to co-ordinate the activities of all these and to step up the economy of Canada in a united way to assure that the ever-increasing obligations upon us, both at home and abroad, are met. In such legislation it should be made abundantly clear that this new approach encroaches upon the rights of none, whether it be provincial, municipal or private, but is aimed at ascertaining the best means of mustering the facilities of this nation for the processing of essential materials and bringing Canada into a new era of full and expanded production.
It is a well known fact that the threat of potential shortages in relation to anticipated demands through NATO and here at home is contributing to the inflationary pressures bearing down so heavily upon Canadians generally.

It was fairly evident from the NATO council deliberations here last month that the members of the North Atlantic organization were not minimizing the possibility of a cold war of extended duration and that long-term demands on the economic front thus resulting would have to be carefully and realistically considered.
I have said before, and I repeat, that inflation can seriously affect our plans for peace and may continue to accelerate until production is brought more closely into relationship with anticipated demand both at home and abroad. Increased production requires expansion in capital goods, and Canada is perhaps in a better position in this regard than almost any other country in the world with natural resources awaiting development. It is estimated that the capital investment in Canada this year alone will be four and a half billions of dollars. Were we to seriously tackle the problem of production and put the full measure of our resources to work for us, the flight of the dollar would obviously be halted and we might yet avoid the unpleasant experience of bureaucratic direction of our economy in meeting the threat of either aggression, recession or unbalanced business conditions in the days of tomorrow.
I believe the survey I have proposed would reveal an abundance of natural resources, and would ascertain how accessible they are and how soon they can be made available. The board suggested would, in my opinion, go a very long way towards helping this nation to mobilize her material assets for whatever may be ahead for us in international events, and for a more buoyant economy within the borders of Canada itself. The threat of aggression has brought a powerful group of free nations together under the North Atlantic pact. It would seem only logical that a move now be made to integrate the efforts of our own Canadian team by strengthening the national capacity to implement our obligations in the international field. Moreover, when the current international impasse has been resolved and we have to face the inevitable problem of reconversion to a strictly peacetime economy, this board's survey and recommendations could easily result in providing the basis for a swift, orderly and economical reconversion to an economy of stable peace.
If the proposal I have made does nothing more than bring together under an appropriate ministry of the government the best brains of government, industry, agriculture, labour and others across Canada in an effort to meet a problem which our participation in NATO is very likely to aggravate, in my opinion it will have gone a very long way to

guarantee our maximum contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and an expanded, stabilized and free economy at home.


Major James William Coldwell: Mr. Speaker, this afternoon we have listened to a very interesting debate. The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) gave us a very thorough survey of Canada's relationships with and her participation in some of the great problems that confront the world, and I shall have something to say a little later with respect to some of them. I was particularly interested in the closing remarks of the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon). The proposal to survey our resources has been made in this house on a number of occasions by members of this party, and I am very glad to know that the hon. member for Peel, speaking for himself I understand, is in favour of the planning of our economy so that we can do the maximum job in connection with this important problem.


Gordon Graydon: You could not have been listening very closely.


Donald MacInnis: One Progressive Conservative in the house.


Major James William Coldwell: The resolution gives parliament the opportunity to express itself on the substance of the order in council authorizing the sending of a force, not exceeding 12,000, to Europe in fulfilment of obligations under the North Atlantic treaty which we accepted some time ago, and also of course on Canada's policies and place in international affairs. I want to say immediately that we support the purpose of the order in council, reserving the right to comment on the placing of our troops under various commands in Europe, and to comment on the equipment and so on, until a later stage in the session when we shall be discussing defence projects more thoroughly.
I am not going to cover any of the domestic matters referred to by the minister and the hon. member for Peel. I am thoroughly in accord with the minister when he says that any attempt to centralize the commonwealth would undermine the commonwealth as it exists today. We have the closest and friendliest relations we have ever had. Let us continue to retain these close and friendly relations without trying to impose rigidity upon the commonwealth countries. Believing, however, as we do that democratic socialist movements must ever keep in mind their aim and ideal of establishing a world community founded on social justice, we have consistently supported every step intended to strengthen the United Nations organization. May I say at once that we shall continue to do so in the future, for we regard this organization as 94699-18
United, Nations and NATO the beginning, humble it is true, of a world society which must be founded and supported by both political and economic democracy. Only within a society based on international justice, order and good will can the people of the world live at peace and make continuous progress.
This, I emphasize, is the basis of our approach to any discussion of international affairs. It explains both our opposition to communist imperialism which threatens the individual's right to freedom of thought, speech, religion and so on, and equally to capitalist imperialism which exploits masses of people for the benefit of a privileged few, and in doing so also limits the freedom of millions of individuals. The United Nations, through its economic and social council and its organs and agencies,' can enable us to work together to achieve step by step, and of course over a period of time, the betterment of human conditions. So far, of course, while some progress has been made, fears and hates, narrow nationalism or new and old forms of imperialism, have frustrated our endeavours and dampened our hopes. Yet an examination of the record of the United Nations since it was established six short years ago gives us reason for hope rather than for despair.
Uppermost in our minds at the moment is the world-wide struggle against the threat of war. I am convinced that no nation desires war. Indeed, all want to avoid it; yet all are steadily strengthening their armed forces for defence. But in doing this we must not overlook the fact that the success of our defence against totalitarian communism at the moment, and equally against some form of fascism which is also totalitarian if it should threaten the world again, will depend on much more than our armed forces. These are ideologies, as the minister pointed out this afternoon, that find fruitful soil where poverty, misery and want abound.
That was the lesson we should have learned between the two world wars, and which is being emphasized anew amid the recently freed and exploited peoples of Asia. We must beware lest the rearmament program of the North Atlantic treaty nations bears unequally and causes internal strain and unrest in some of the nations associated with us. Already there are indications that world inflation and the consequent increased cost of rearmament are major threats to the economies of the European members of NATO. While the United States, with little or no reduction in its normal standards of living, is pressing for increased military contributions, our European allies are reducing their already low living standards to a dangerous degree. Let us remember, I

United Nations and NATO repeat, that rearmament alone, while necessary, will not win the battle against communism.
It is because of this profound belief that again this afternoon, as on similar occasions in the past, I urge our government to bring still more pressure to bear upon the NATO council when it meets again for the adoption of an economic policy which will prevent the possibility of distress and collapse among any of our allies. Should such a calamity occur, the whole purpose of the alliance would be defeated. If this means, as it well may-and I want to emphasize this-that Canada in partnership with the United States must greatly increase her direct contribution to economic aid both to Europe and to Asia, we should not hesitate to do so. Surely this is one implication of article 2 of the treaty which pledged us to a closer integration of the economies of the signatories of that treaty.
Let me say here also that I hope in the course of this debate the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe), under whose direction this matter now largely comes, will tell us something more than the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) did about the Colombo plan and to what extent Canada has already actually contributed to it. We are told that some projects are under consideration. What we have done to provide food is good; but I would like to know more of what has actually been decided upon, and to what extent our contribution in financial terms has already been used.
May I say here that I think the choice of Mr. Nik Cavell was indeed excellent. He is a man who has spent many years in India, who has a progressive mind and wide experience in the business world in Asia as well as in Europe and Canada. I noted that only a month or so ago he was able to assume his duties as administrator of the appropriate division of the Department of Trade and Commerce in connection with the Colombo plan. I noted, too, that his appointment was for two years. That means, I hope, that the appropriation parliament made for this plan for the current financial year will be continued annually throughout the six-year period. Both the United Kingdom and Australia are so committed; but, as I understand it, our commitment is for only this one fiscal year. The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) or the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe) should give the house the assurance that the intention is to recommend to parliament that we contribute toward the plan for the entire six years. If that is the case, should parliament not authorize the expenditure of certain round sums for the period, as we have done with


our own rearmament program? I should like to hear from one of the ministers at least in this connection.
In view of the importance of Asia we think we should do everything possible, both as a nation and as part of the democratic world, to strengthen our ties with the Asian people. In my opinion we should consider the extension of our diplomatic relations with Asian nations to the greatest possible extent. For example, we should strengthen our contacts both economic and political with such new republics as Burma, the Philippines, perhaps, and certainly with Indonesia. To my mind Indonesia will play an increasing role in Asia and in the world, and Canada should endeavour to exchange diplomatic representation with this new and potentially rich republic as quickly as possible.


Lester Bowles Pearson: We might send Dr. Keen-leyside.


Major James William Coldwell: Well, as far as Dr. Keenley-side is concerned, I can understand the provocation, and I have a great deal of sympathy with what he did and said on that occasion. I hope the suggestion I have made regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations with Indonesia will receive early consideration. It seems to me that this sort of thing is vitally important because obviously Asia is in the throes of a social and economic upheaval, a revolution, in fact.
Recent events in Iran and Egypt have emphasized this. Unfortunately because of necessity during world wars I and II we associated ourselves with the most reactionary elements in the Near and Middle East. And may I add I am not saying this for the first time, because during the discussion of the recognition of Israel I pointed out that I thought probably one of the reasons there was such opposition to the establishment of the new state of Israel in that region was that the example which had been set and would be set in that new Middle Eastern country would be a challenge to the depressed peoples when this neighbouring republic started to raise its standards of living, and thus interfere with the reactionary, exploiting, controlling interests that governed the Arab peoples.
What happened recently in Iran and is now taking place in Egypt is an attempt on the part of these reactionary interests to use the understandable desire of the great masses of the people for improvements in their condition as an excuse to obtain control of the resources of these countries and to continue to exploit the common people in these regions. The United Kingdom objects to the unilateral setting aside of treaties that have been made, and we think quite properly is determined to

uphold the rule of law and, as the United Nations charter demands, refer disputes of this description, which may lead to international complications and war, to the international court of justice and to the security council. May I say to the minister that we too believe that Canada and other members of the United Nations should support every effort to settle these matters by negotiation through the appropriate United Nations channe's, and that in the meantime we should give every possible aid to the United Kingdom in the present crises.
The minister mentioned the peace treaty with Japan. I, too, wanted to say something about that. It has been signed. In my opinion it was a particularly generous treaty to a nation under whose emperor, the present emperor, and former government, many nationals of the western world, including both Canadian civilians and prisoners of war, had received cruel and harsh treatment. This is a criticism that one could make with better grace had Canada herself not been stampeded into an attitude toward Japanese Canadians which many of us regretted at the time and which I think more people regret now. I hope that Japan will do everything possible to justify the generosity of the democratic nations. Evidently several nations, and particularly Asian and Pacific nations, are not satisfied with either the terms of the treaty or the manner of its making. That was shown when the draft treaty was circulated by the United States. This is regrettable. In our opinion a far greater attempt should have been made to negotiate a treaty in co-operation with nations whose views were neither properly obtained nor considered.
The foreign affairs committee of the French national assembly adopted a resolution on August 10, shortly before the treaty was signed, deploring the fact that France had no part in the formulation of the treaty. On August 3, the Netherlands expressed serious objections to the draft treaty. Australia made it plain that it did not meet all that Australia wished, although it was accepted as a reasonable basis for a delayed settlement. Dr. Evatt, the post-war minister for external affairs and a former president of the United Nations assembly, strongly criticized the treaty as- and I use his words-"appeasement of a cruel enemy", and said that all parties viewed the "clearly intended rearmament" of Japan with anxiety and resentment. New Zealand shared the Australian official view. India and Burma both refused to approve the draft treaty; and of course it makes an improved relationship with China impossible as long as, among other things, the future of Formosa is uncertain.
United Nations and NATO
All parties in the Philippines indicated their dissatisfaction in a unanimous statement which was made by the president of the Philippines on their behalf. I believe that these misgivings and fears are shared by many Canadians who have given thought to these matters. I should like to ask the minister whether he can tell the house what opinions regarding this treaty Canada expressed prior to the public signing of the treaty last month. Canadians have viewed, too, with considerable anxiety the protracted negotiations concerning a cease-fire in Korea. It is almost four months since Russia-unfortunately gaining a great deal of propaganda value thereby-proposed a cease-fire and armistice. It has seemed that both sides have been unduly sticky about the matter and apparently more anxious to maintain prestige and position than to end the war. We know that cease-fire agreements must be negotiated by the military commanders in the field, but in this instance it has seemed at times that the discussions and disagreements concerned more general political considerations which should be rather the concern of the civil authorities among the nations represented in the Korean war.
Indeed, we share the view expressed editorially by the London Times on October 1. No one could accuse the London Times of either friendliness to the communist aggressor or a desire for appeasement when it said;
The best hope of progress lies in defining more clearly the political and military aims of the United Nations. The committee of nations with forces in Korea should meet to decide what in fact they are now fighting for. They could hardly fail to agree with Mr. Acheson's statement before the Senate committee last June that a settlement at or near the 38th parallel "would accomplish the military purposes in Korea." They could hardly fail to agree that the best that can now be hoped for is a division of Korea on the same lines as before the war. If that is so, nothing would be lost, and much might be gained, by proclaiming without delay their willingness to seek a political settlement recognizing the 38th parallel as the frontier between north and south Korea, as soon as the communists had proved their willingness to stop the war by accepting an armistice on the line demanded by Gen. Ridgway. There would be no question of the United Nations' forces withdrawing until mutual safeguards had been worked out and until a suitable period had elapsed. On the other hand the communists would realize that the United Nations had abandoned all idea of advancing to the frontier of Manchuria.
There is no guarantee that the communists would accept this proposal. They might still insist that the United Nations forces should withdraw to the parallel as proof of good faith. In that case the position would be no worse than it is now.
There is, however, something paradoxical in the United Nations continuing to fight, both on the ground and at the conference table, for a few miles of land which they do not in fact hope to keep afterwards. What is needed, perhaps, is an effort to realize that there are only two possible courses open to the United Nations-to fight on until the whole of Korea has been liberated, at whatever cost
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United Nations and NATO
is necessary, or to make peace on the 38th parallel. Since the first has already been rejected by the American congress and people as well as by the other members of the United Nations, there is everything to be said for accepting the second whole-heartedly.
In the resumed negotiations I hope that the suggestions contained in this editorial, which no doubt reflects a great deal of opinion in the United Kingdom and the United Nations, will be given serious attention. It is to be hoped that at least we may see an end to what the minister described this afternoon, the bloodshed and suffering of the Korean people. I believe our purpose has been achieved. We have stopped the aggression, unfortunately may I say not only at great cost to ourselves but still greater cost to the people of south Korea. We ought to do everything we possibly can as a member of the United Nations, in co-operation with the other members of the United Nations, to rehabilitate that country as quickly as possible and give the people an opportunity of living in peace in the years to come. The government should indicate clearly to this house what its views have been in relation to the Korean war, and to such proposals as those stated in the London Times. To what extent have our views been indicated to the United States government?
Among other matters that have engaged the attention of thoughtful people is the proposal for the participation of western Germany in European defence arrangements. While it is certain that if western Germany were attacked most people would expect the Germans themselves to play an important part in repulsing that attack, yet there is widespread fear lest a rearmed Germany, under a German military staff, should again threaten the security of France, Belgium, Holland and the Scandinavian countries. I mention those as the democracies most nearly affected by any threat of renewed aggression by Germany.
Various plans, I know, for the integration of German soldiers in a European defence force are under discussion, but so far no proposal has met with wide approval. It seems to us that any plan adopted must be, first of all, satisfactory to the European countries I have mentioned. Obviously if Germany is to be defended from military aggression some plan must be adopted to enable the Germans to join in that defence, but not under a German military staff or with complete, even if supervised, rearmament. I believe that would pave the way for a renewed control by the nazi military leaders who are again beginning to be vocal in Germany. May I say to the minister once again that we should like to hear what views, if

any, concerning this matter Canada has expressed to our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Because of the rumours regarding General Kurt Meyer's future, rumours which perhaps were discounted to a large extent by the statement made in the house this afternoon, the country would like to know those views. May I say that nothing undermines faith in the professions of democracy regarding our defence of freedom more than the liberation of Hitler's friends, powerful nazis in Germany, talk of a rearmed Germany and Japan, and a proposal to invite General Franco to provide facilities to aid in defending the free world. Indeed, this together with a deepening economic crisis in western Europe could play completely into the hands of the Soviet union, and make a mockery of the professions we have made.
I believe this should be made clear to our friends in the United States who seem to be unaware of the misgivings that are felt primarily among the members of the powerful labour and social democratic parties in Europe, and indeed are shared by very many others of all parties across the world. Let us remember this. Whatever the ebb and flow of political fortunes may be in the democratic world, labour and social democratic parties and leaders continue, and will continue, to play a vital role in the world, particularly in western Europe and southeast Asia. It is, I believe, a misfortune that no such party has risen to influence in the United States, and that often those who share such views in that country are suspected and persecuted.
I should like to conclude my remarks this afternoon by quoting the final paragraph of a most interesting book I have just read. The author is Edward Crankshaw, who was attached to the British military mission to Moscow, 1941-43. In 1947 he returned to Russia as a correspondent for the London Observer. From his statements I would judge him to be a supporter of the British Conservative party. The book is entitled "Russia by Daylight". His concluding paragraphs are, 1 think, worth recording because they express views that certainly I myself and those associated with me hold. He says this:
Few people. I suppose, are more sharply critical than I am of certain aspects of the American way of life, of the way in which Americans seem incapable of realizing their own strength and of the extent to which they are unconsciously imposing their way of life on the nations of western Europe, or of the way in which, for example, American fiscal and tariff policy has contributed to the breakdown of the west. But if it comes to the choice between America and Russia there simply is no choice. For better or for worse the "we" defined in the first chapter of this book include the vast majority of Englishmen and western Europeans and Americans. We believe, fundamentally, in the same values, though, heaven knows, those values are

often distorted and almost lost; and they are the values which Stalin is out to kill. It is as simple as that. We do not have to admire each individual characteristic of our friends, nor they of us. But we know who are our friends.
I can think of only one way in which the Kremlin may still conquer us, and that without war. It is by so frightening us (but it is we who allow ourselves to be frightened) that for fear of the enemy within we transform our own society imperceptibly into an apparatus of totalitarianism indistinguishable in essence from the society of Soviet Russia-a system which may not be criticized, whether the British parliamentary system or the American way of life, for fear of damaging national unity, the unity of the grave; a system in which the bully and the corrupt may not be denounced or the underdog uplifted because nobody will dare risk being called a red. This, it seems to me, is a very real danger. Already in western Europe and America, but above all in America, the communists have been allowed to monopolize the advocacy of a fair number of desirable reforms. Should the day come when we are afraid to pursue each and every enlightened course of action because the communists, for their own deplorable reasons, are associated with them too, then Stalin will have won.


Mr. Solon E. Low (Peace River):: Mr. Speaker, at the outset I should like to say that again this year I greatly enjoyed the encirclement of the globe that was indulged in by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), in which he gave us a comprehensive picture of world affairs. Most certainly he portrayed to us here this afternoon the very heart of a good many of the difficult problems which the nations of the world are facing at the present time.
I was gratified with the attitude the minister seemed to take with respect to some of those problems. Before I enter upon the things which I had thought it necessary to say in connection with the resolution, I should like to mention briefly just two or three things by way of support of certain phases of the minister's speech. In the first place, the minister spoke at some length with regard to relations with the United States. He said the St. Lawrence seaway should be built by Canada if the United States does not see fit to co-operate with our country in the building of that great project. With that statement we are in thorough agreement. I myself feel that if Canada presses forward with the greatest possible dispatch in the building of this seaway the United States will soon overcome, shall we say, those political forces that are now preventing the decision by the officials of the United States to join with us; and I hope we shall eventually see that they will join their forces with ours and that the seaway and the power development will be built in co-operation with us.
The minister also mentioned the matter of the meeting which took place in Ottawa; and I was glad to get his explanation of the short range as well as the long range objectives of
United Nations and NATO NATO as they were discussed or decided at that meeting in September. He mentioned the provision which NATO had made for bringing Greece and Turkey into membership. We think that is a most desirable step. I do not believe that anyone who is at all familiar with the writings of the great strategists of the world could come to any other conclusion than that the area in which Greece and Turkey find themselves is strategically tremendously important to the western nations. The Mediterranean area has always had an important place in any defence plans that involved western Europe. I am therefore personally happy to see provision made for bringing Greece and Turkey into membership; and when the house is given an opportunity to discuss that matter in detail I may have something further to say about it. But at this stage I wanted to let the minister know that we think it was a good thing.
As to the Japanese treaty, I certainly do not share the views and the fears of a good many people who have commented on it. I think the world has seen enough of treaties of revenge and their aftermath. I do not believe that any sensible person today could take issue with the determination, at least as expressed by the minister-and I suppose he was speaking for the government-to see to it that any treaties we conclude with any of these nations which have_ been our enemies are treaties of reconciliation. It is not necessary for me to point to what happened after the first world war in order to convince hon. members of this house of what happens when treaties of revenge are entered upon. World war II doubtless had its roots deep in the treaties that were concluded following 1918 and 1919. I am therefore glad to see that the Japanese treaty has been concluded, and I support essentially the terms of that treaty. As I proceed perhaps other things the minister said this afternoon will come to my mind and I will comment just briefly on them.
We are discussing the resolution which appears on the order paper in the name of the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent). The resolution divides itself into two natural divisions. The first division is this;
Resolved, that this house approves the continuation of Canada's participation in the efforts being made through the United Nations to establish international peace, and in particular to defeat aggression and restore peace in Korea . . .
I should like to discuss first that portion by itself, Mr. Speaker. In 1945 the government of Canada, along with a good many other nations of the world, became intrigued with the idea of collective security; and they committed this country to support the United Nations. Ever since that time Canada has

United Nations and NATO played the game to the best of her ability. I do not believe any nation on earth can say we have not. I think no one can honestly say, either, that we have fallen down in any way on any of our commitments under the charter of the United Nations. No one can say, in truth, that our country did not discharge fully whatever obligations and responsibilities we undertook as a result of signing the San Francisco charter. Along with fifty-nine or sixty other nations we found ourselves involved in this pact to resist aggression, and to defeat it wherever and whenever it took place on the face of the earth. When South Korea became the object of communist aggression in June, 1950, Canada began moving to fulfil the pledges she had made. We were slow; but eventually we did move; and, consequently, Canadian boys found themselves engaged in the struggle in certain naval units and land forces which have now been either in or around Korea for quite a number of months.
I think we did right in raising a force to send to Korea. By supporting the efforts of the United Nations at that time to deter the aggressors in Korea we honoured our obligations much better than did most nations of the world. I refer particularly to nations that indicated their firm belief and confidence in the principle of collective security when they signed the San Francisco charter. I am convinced that if there had not been so many laggard nations the war in Korea might have been over a good many months ago. Too many of the signatory nations to the United Nations charter have been long on talk but short on performance.
In addition to that, in my view communist China might never have ventured into Korea if there had been solid support of the United Nations from the very start of the trouble in Korea by all or most of the member nations. Instead of allowing the United States to carry the brunt, and for many months to stand almost alone-and eventually only thirteen or fourteen nations did get in to help with any sizeable effort-if forty or fifty of those nations had been ready to do something at once, ready to send everything possible by way of material and manpower and other forms of help I am satisfied China never would have come in.
It became perfectly clear within a very few months after the end of world war II that the world was becoming engaged in a power struggle. That power struggle has come to be known as the cold war. Evidently that fact has tended to stay the hand of the United Nations. Its policies have been diffident and vacillating and, to a great degree, ineffective. While we are in favour of a continuation of


Canada's participation in the efforts of the United Nations to establish international peace, and to defeat aggression in Korea, we do not agree with the present policy of the United Nations of a limited war for an unlimited time. Evidently that is an expression coined by people in responsible positions to describe what they think will be the continued policy of the United Nations in connection with the struggle in Korea. We believe that policy will have to be changed, without further delay. I would ask hon. members here assembled this question: How can any sensible group of men expect the fighting forces to be activated by the will to win and the determination to do their best if they have to struggle on under a hopeless policy such as a policy of a limited war for an unlimited time. That is just impossible.
Some new policy will have to be adopted to bring the Korean struggle to a successful end, from the standpoint of the United Nations. The objectives in the struggle must be defined and made known, as a means of steadying the minds of the fighting troops and the folks back home who are backing those troops. It is our view that the military effort of the United Nations should not be limited to the country in which the aggression takes place. For all too long that seems to have been the attitude of those in high places in the United Nations. We think that when the United Nations decide to take action against an aggressor nation the area of their activity should be limited to nothing less than the area used by the aggressor nation or nations for the concentration of troops and supplies, and as a jumping-off place for the continuation of the aggression. In my opinion MacArthur was absolutely right in this regard.
We believe that every effort should be made to work out an armistice in Korea, and that nothing should be left undone to bring about a cessation of war there. At the same time we believe the United Nations should lose no time in laying down a policy which will make possible an early termination of the war in Korea by military action, if armistice negotiations fail. If such a policy is not adopted, then I do not need to tell hon. members and the people of Canada how the United Nations will suffer in prestige. In future no nation upon which aggression has been committed would come to the United Nations for assistance, if it had nothing but the lessons of Korea, to the present day, before it. So if we are to keep the United Nations organization alive and prevent its dying a natural death as a consequence of having no dynamic policy to be followed, through which it can

terminate any struggle, then surely we had better begin getting some sort of specific policy and putting it into effect.
Before I leave this part of the resolution I do wish to say a word about the conditions under which our valiant Canadians are living and fighting in Korea. I think the government and perhaps hon. members ought at all times to keep themselves informed about those conditions. One hears repeated from time to time stories about the intolerable conditions in certain parts of Korea. I am not laying any charges at all, but these things have come to my attention from people who have relatives or friends there. The government should make available to the people of this country at all times complete information about actual conditions under which our boys are fighting and living. If there are conditions which are unjust, unfair or intolerable, then those conditions ought to be cleaned up and made tolerable, and this done just as quickly as possible. Moreover, at no time should we surrender our right as a sovereign nation to protest against any unnecessarily bad conditions under which our boys fight either in the Korean or European theatres of war. If those conditions are not soon improved; if we find the stories about them are true, then we should withdraw our troops if we consider it necessary and desirable to do so. We should never surrender that right.
The second part of the resolution is in these words:
Resolved, that this house approves the continuation of Canada's participation in the efforts being made through the United Nations to establish international peace . . . and by the North Atlantic treaty nations to deter aggression and promote stability and well-being in the north Atlantic area.
I refer to that part which makes reference to the North Atlantic treaty nations deterring aggression and promoting stability and wellbeing in the north Atlantic area. It is perfectly clear that some nations have steered away from the principle of collective security which was embodied in the United Nations charter. They have been steered into a new balance of power arrangement. I know the argument is used that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been developed within the framework of the United Nations, but the principle upon which NATO is built is the balance of power principle. That change which has been made by a number of nations, including Canada, is quite significant. The old league of nations lulled the nations of the world into a feeling of false security. It was touted to us as the one organization that could bring peace and security to the peoples of the world. Under the barrage of propaganda that was spread over the world the nations began to disarm.
United Nations and NATO They said, "Oh, well, we will leave it to the league of nations." It was not long until disarmament had gone so far as to present an opportunity for the Mussolinis and the Hitlers of that time. We know now with what disastrous results the opportunity was accepted.
World war II put an end to the last vestige of influence of the league of nations. We heard about it no more; but it was strange that when the war was over in 1945 we began another attempt to build an organization just like the league. It may be true that we extended its base and perhaps some of the policies that were to be followed, but we organized the United Nations. Again we let loose a barrage of propaganda that spread around the whole world, and again most of the nations seemed to be lulled into a sense of false security and disarmed at a time when they never should have disarmed so completely. This disarmament by the nations of the world presented an opportunity to Russia and her satellites. All through the years we have been gullible enough to place our confidence in an organization that was hamstrung right from the beginning by the veto and things of that sort. When all is said and done it certainly is clear to me that a power higher than man is guiding the destinies of certain nations of the world. Maybe that accounts for the fact that they have realized the illusion they have been following and have got on to something solid like this balance of power arrangement, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which is a much more realistic thing.
We favour Canada's participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We believe that an integrated military, naval and air force should be established and built up in Europe just as quickly as it can be accomplished, and the sooner the better. I am satisfied that only a strong integrated force of the kind we envision will be sufficient to deter Russia and her satellites from the thoughts of aggression that I am quite sure they have been nursing all through the years; and the hope that they will be able to take advantage of our weakness to destroy us as sovereign powers.
In my judgment Canada ought to contribute to those forces to the extent of her ability. Indeed we support what the government has done already by way of contributions of arms and equipment to other member nations as well as the decision to send the 27th brigade to become part of General Eisenhower's forces. I think Canada should do all she can to ensure that forces capable of defeating any combination of restless imperialistic nations shall be built up at the earliest possible time. I believe the Canadian people

United Nations and NATO are prepared 'to make whatever sacrifices are necessary to achieve this objective. As I went about the country this past summer talking to people I found very few who were opposed to the idea and who were not prepared to make whatever sacrifices are necessary. Of course they are all concerned about making sure that the tax dollars we spend shall be spent properly and that any burden of taxation that might arise from waste, extravagance and foolishness shall be obviated. I think we can do that by watchfulness. I believe the Canadian people generally, at least so they have indicated to me, realize something of the nature of the dangers which beset us. Their one hope is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, because it is realistic.
There is just one thought I think I should voice again. Canada should retain and maintain the right to ensure that the conditions under which our fighting forces must operate are of the highest possible standard. Further, Canada must see that Canadian personnel making up part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces, and their dependents, shall receive the best possible care of which a great and wealthy country like ours is capable. Nothing less than that will satisfy our people. In building up the military side of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization particularly the greatest possible measure of caution should be taken, as I have said already, to save the taxpayer from any extra burden that may arise from waste and foolish expenditures.
The minister told us it was unfortunate that Germany had no representative at the Ottawa meeting in September.


Lester Bowles Pearson: I just said that we noted her absence.


Solon Earl Low: I will go so far as to say it w.as unfortunate. I do not want to attribute any words to the minister which he did not say, but to me it was unfortunate. I think, with the minister, it is desirable that there should be a united Germany integrated into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. I cannot help saying, though, that it is funny that this should not have been foreseen at the time of the partitioning of Germany. So much for the short-term goal of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
I should like to turn now for a moment or two to what the minister has said are the longterm objectives of NATO. I liked his address in the main, but I did not like it when he came to discuss these long-term objectives and I shall tell you why. I think he skirted around and did not come straight out and tell the people of Canada what he had in mind. I think it is about time the minister


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took the people of Canada into his confidence, particularly in view of what has happened during the last summer.
I recall that just prior to and during the early part of world war II addresses were made by churchmen and others which stressed that the last war was a fight against evil. In the first war we were fighting to save democracy, but the last war was said to be a war against the forces of evil. I believe that is true. While I heard many people say that, I have not heard many speakers express the conviction that the evil against which we were struggling resided not in the multitude of the world people but in the hearts of a comparatively few of the 2,000 million human beings on this earth. I am quite certain I am right when I say that ninety-nine and nine-tenths per cent of the 2,000 million people on the face of the earth want to be left alone to work out their own natural destinies without having anybody try to impose their will upon them. I believe that the greatest evil in the world today is that spirit of unmixed hatred against existing social classes, the spirit that benefits from any widespread disaster that overtakes humankind. It is the spirit that is to a great extent against all forms of individual initiative. It is particularly directed against those countries whose ways of life have been for centuries based upon this initiative and individual freedom.
Certain historic influences down the years have played an important part in the exercise of the forces of darkness and evil, and have given them opportunities, as a matter of fact. I cannot take time to deal with all of them today, but I should like to mention one or two. Back about the year 1778 there arose in the country of Bavaria a movement that eventually came to be called the Illuminati. Its leader was Adam Weishaupt, a man who has been described as the profoundest conspirator that ever existed. Weishaupt declared that civilization was a mistake. He declared that man is fallen from the condition of liberty and equality, the state of pure nature. Man must cast off, he said, the trappings of civilization and return to a nomadic life. Even clothing, food and fixed abodes should be abandoned. Kings and nobles should be abolished. Religion must be abandoned. Family and national life must cease so as to make of the human race one happy family. Patriotism and love of country, according to him, were vices and must be abolished in favour of a universal society.
In these words we find the expression of internationalism as it is expounded by various groups throughout the world today. You hear them, you see them almost every day, either in the spoken word or in printed form.


Weishaupt founded a secret society known as the Illuminati to give effect to his teachings. Reduced to its simplest possible formula, the aims of the Illuminati were these: first, the abolition of the monarchy and all ordered government; second, the abolition of private profit in enterprise; third, the abolition of inheritance; fourth, the abolition of patriotism; fifth, the abolition of the family, of marriage and all morality, and the institution of communal education of the children; sixth, the abolition of religion.
I only mention these things to illustrate what I meant when I said that certain forces down through history have been ready to take advantage of the weaknesses of the nations of the world, and of opportunities to fasten themselves upon the people with one object, and one object alone, to satisfy a craving for power and a hunger for a hold on the very necks and lives of the people. The Illuminati were suppressed by the government of Bavaria but a good many of its members and those who adhered to the secret society were prominent for many years in revolutionary activities throughout Europe, and their influence extended down to comparatively recent times in various ways.
About 1931 another movement was born, and I should like to quote a brief extract from an address by Professor Arnold Toynbee of the Institute of International Affairs to the fourth annual conference of institutions for the scientific study of international relations on June 8 to 10, 1931, at Copenhagen, Denmark. Professor Toynbee, who was then and I understand has since been at Oxford, had this to say:
In the spirit of determination which happily animates us, we shall have no inclination to underestimate the strength of the political force which we are striving to overcome. What is this force? If we are frank with ourselves, we shall admit that we are engaged on a deliberate and sustained concentrated effort to impose limitations upon the sovereignty and the independence of the fifty or sixty local sovereign independent states which at present partition the habitable surface of the earth and divide the political allegiance of mankind. The surest sign, to my mind, that this fetish of local national sovereignty is our intended victim is the emphasis with which all our statesmen and our publicists protest with one accord, and over and over again, at every step forward which we take, that, whatever changes we may make in the international situation, the sacred principle of local sovereignty will be maintained inviolable.
This, I repeat, is a sure sign that at each of those steps forward, the principle of local sovereignty is really being encroached upon and its sphere of action reduced and its power for evil restricted. It is just because we are really attacking the principle of local sovereignty that we keep on protesting our loyalty to it so loudly. The harder we press our attack upon the idol, the more pains we take to keep its priests and devotees in a fool's paradise, lapped in a false sense of security which will inhibit them from taking up arms in their idol's defence. Perhaps, too, when we make these
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protestations we are partly concerned to deceive ourselves. For let us be honest. Even the most internationally minded among us are votaries of this false god of local sovereignty to some extent. It is such an old established object of worship that it retains some hold even over the most enlightened people.
Then, Mr. Speaker, he continues, and I want members of the house to note these words particularly. He says:
In the world as it is today, this institution can hardly be a universal church.
He is speaking of some institution that is to arrive to take over.
It is more likely to be something like a league of nations. I will not prophesy. I will merely repeat that we are at present working, discreetly but with all our might, to wrest this mysterious political force called sovereignty out of the clutches of the local national states of our world. And all the time we are denying with our lips what we are doing with our hands.
The dragon of local sovereignty can still use its teeth and claws when it is brought to bay. Nevertheless, I believe that the monster is doomed to perish by our sword. The fifty or sixty local states of the world will no doubt survive as administrative conveniences. But sooner or later sovereignty will depart from them. Sovereignty will cease, in fact if not in name, to be a local affair.
There you have the statement of one of the founders of what is now known as federal union, union now, Professor Arnold Toynbee. Evidently from his own statement "denying with our lips what we are doing with our hands" is the policy which he follows. All right. He has followers today who under certain circumstances are just about as brazenly forthright as was Toynbee, and yet they seem to be working in a mysterious way, denying with their lips what their hands are doing. I should like to refer to something that involves the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson). It is an article published in the fifth anniversary issue of Freedom & Union, the magazine which I hold in my hand. There is a good picture of the Secretary of State for External Affairs by Karsh; he looks just a bit mysterious, but I do not suppose that was his fault nor of his making. The article is on page 11 under the caption, "Ottawa Atlantic Council Marks Federal Milestone". It is written by Clarence K. Streit, the editor of this magazine, and a dose follower of Professor Arnold Toynbee. He is a man who is pushing as hard as he can for what we call government at the world level, internationalism in its extreme form. All right; what does he say?
Atlantic union marked a milestone at the six-day session of the Atlantic council at Ottawa which ended September 20. For the first time since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was created, the possibility of Atlantic federation was talked about officially and the talk was followed by action which, though it did not mention "union''-



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Note there again the mysterious, sinister insinuation. I continue:
-clears the way for it. The session left strong reason to believe this action will move still further forward in the coming months.
Mr. Streit goes on and involves the minister and all the members there; and this is a thing that must not be taken lightly by anybody. I think the minister owes it to the house to set this straight. He says:
The form taken by the council's action was proposed in the secret session-
How does he know it was done in secret session?


Lester Bowles Pearson: All the sessions are secret.


Solon Earl Low: They were all supposed to be secret, but this man got under the table. Somebody dropped him some crumbs. I should like to find out who it was. How did he get in there? Was he a privileged character? How was he able to get there?


Lester Bowles Pearson: He was not there.


Solon Earl Low: He was under the table just the same. He reveals that. Let me read what he says:
The form taken by the council's action was proposed in the secret session September 17 by Dirk Stikker, Dutch foreign minister and president of the council of Europe. He was the first delegate to speak of "Atlantic federal union'' He urged the council to issue a "declaration of intention" to unify the Atlantic community not only militarily as heretofore but politically, economically, socially, culturally, and to set up a committee to report on how best to do this. After a brief but warm word of approval from Secretary of State Dean Acheson (which is another unpublished fact),-
I want the house to note another mysterious thing. He says it is another unpublished fact. Who gives him the right to publish it? This man seems to be everywhere. I continue:
-the council unanimously adopted the Stikker proposal.
This "Ottawa declaration" was deemed so important that it was issued separately when the session ended. Excerpts are given in another column. It was thus summarized in the final communique of the council:
We will just skip over that. Let us go to another part of this which needs some explanation. He mentions a committee that was set up by the council composed of the foreign ministers of Belgium, Canada, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway. He goes on to name them as follows:
Messrs. Paul van Zeeland; L. B. Pearson; Alcide de Gasperi; Stikker and Halvard Lange.
Then says:
Every one of these men is known to be strongly in sympathy with the Atlantic union idea.
That is the idea he has already announced. Then he says:
So important is this committee considered that it was decided its chairman would be the chairman of the Atlantic council itself. At Ottawa, Belgium

held this double post, but by alphabetical rotation it fell at the end of the session to Canada. And so, during the critical twelve months ahead, these two key positions in Atlantica will be held by Mr. Pearson, one of the strongest, most outspoken believers in Atlantic federation in the council.
If this thing is so good, Mr. Speaker, why is it being done with such stealth? My opinion is that this article was supposed to be a report to the faithful, and that nobody but the faithful would understand. I suggest it is a report that you could call progress by stealth. I suggest that when the Secretary of State for External Affairs winds up this debate in rebuttal he should come clean with the Canadian people and either confirm or deny what is on the pages of this magazine. I will put it this way. I am not accusing the minister of anything, but I am accusing Clarence K. Streit of writing an article of this kind and stating a lot of things that took place in secret sessions, if they are false. If he did know them then we ought to And out how. Second, if these things that took place at this meeting last September were secret, how did this man Streit learn about them?
There is one other thing I should like to say. I do not believe the minister would knowingly allow himself to be used as a tool by these foolish people, but evidently that is what they are trying to do, from this article. If these things said by Mr. Streit are not true, then that is what they are trying to do to the minister. If they are true then either the Secretary of State for External Affairs is a willing collaborator in world government plans, or he is one of the leaders in what I consider to be a nefarious movement. It has not been made clear to the Canadian people exactly what the long-range program or objectives of the NATO organization are.
I submit, Mr. Speaker, that the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the government ought to take the people strictly into their confidence and say in the most unequivocal terms what the long-range objective of NATO is. We in this group favour the closest possible co-operation amongst the nations in NATO to improve the cultural, social and the economic conditions of the various countries. Indeed we think it is just as important that we build up the economic strength and social well-being of these nations as it is to build up the military forces, and the two things should go hand in hand; but it ought to be very carefully defined how that cooperation is to be achieved; whether or not the idea is eventually to do exactly as Mr. Streit says, namely sink completely our national sovereignty and surrender to some supranational state the control over our armed forces, over our finances and over a good many other things that touch the lives of the people very, very closely.

I cannot help feeling, Mr. Speaker, as the people of western Canada feel. They have not been able to see too many advantages coming out of centralization. They are thinking now in terms of how long it took them to get redress from the overburdening structure of freight rates, and they are only two thousand miles or less from their government in Canada. I have in mind that these people are wondering when they will ever get relief from the terribly unjust burden of tariffs that is imposed upon them by virtue of decisions taken by the central government here not very far from them. What chance would they have to get relief from anything if the government is removed outside the borders of their own country? Centralization is a thing they fear until such time as there are many more checks and balances against possible unfairness and oppression than there are today. I should like to know for my own satisfaction, and I am sure hon. members would like to know, just exactly what the long-range objectives of NATO are in the field of co-operation and union amongst the member states.
In closing let me just suggest to the Secretary of State for External Affairs that he wake up to these historical facts that I have mentioned here today, this pressing move, this almost hysteria in favour of political, cultural, economic, social, military and otherwise union of a great many states which now have their local sovereignty, and when he thinks of these things let him think of this poem I ran across just a few days ago, Mr. Speaker, from which I have taken one stanza. The poem is called, "The Coming of Lucifer". Let the minister and others ponder over this. In all he did, in all he taught He kept this aim in sight,
To have the deeds of darkness done Disguised in terms of light.
He spread his poison far and wide Among many a specious sect,
And made the Evil seem the Good Bamboozling God's elect.
Let us be aware of how some of these movements that appear to some people to be so good, to have in them such great prospects for the happiness of human beings, may be the very instruments which the forces of evil plan to use to gain their ends. Let us find out who is behind them. Let us make absolutely certain we are not bamboozled. I invite the minister, when he speaks in rebuttal, to make it abundantly clear exactly where this government proposes to lead Canada so far as the long-range objectives of NATO are concerned.


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Speaker, by this motion the house would approve a continuation of Canada's participation in the attempt to
United Nations and NATO defeat aggression and restore peace in Korea, and the efforts by the North Atlantic treaty nations to deter aggression and promote stability and well-being in the north Atlantic area, l'he Secretary of State for External Affairs t.Mr. Pearsonl built up the background of events and policy to enable the members of the house to consider this resolution. He was followed by spokesmen for the three parties who made very helpful and constructive speeches. We in this house, and the people of Canada generally, have reason to congratulate ourselves that on a matter of such tremendous national and international importance all the parties represented in this house can speak with one voice and in complete unanimity.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs has dealt with questions of policy regarding our participation in the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. To me falls the duty of bringing the house up to date on recent developments in connection with our defence activities in order to carry out that participation. ,in the first place in Korea, and in the second place, under the North Atlantic treaty. Full information has been given from time to time to keep hon. members and the country abreast of all events and developments as they have occurred, but this debate creates an opportunity for us to see what has happened in the two and a half years that the North Atlantic treaty has been in existence, and particularly in the months since the act of aggression was committed in Korea. In my view, because of its subject matter and because of the development of events, it is one of the most important debates in the eleven years I have been here.
Since the United Nations charter came into effect on June 26, 1945, one of the objectives of defence policy in Canada has been to carry out any undertakings into which we might enter under that charter. Perhaps I might refer to a statement I made in the house on June 9, 1947, at page 5270 of Hansard. I said that one of the objectives of our defence policy was-
.to carry out any undertaking which by our own voluntary act we may assume in co-operation with friendly nations or under any effective plan of collective action under the United Nations.
Ever since then that has been one of the three main objectives of our defence policy. But under the United Nations, as it has operated since its organization in 1945, no measures have been taken to carry into effect the provisions for collective security laid down in articles 42 and following of the charter. No action has been taken to implement the general undertaking of the charter entered into by the nations that had united

United Nations and NATO together at San Francisco. The reason, of course, was that there was a steady obstruction to any such course by the Soviet union and her satellites. Canada, like every other country, had no specific undertaking under the United Nations charter, and did not participate in any action for collective security because no such action was taken. It is regrettable that it was not. I may recall to hon. members that it was a Canadian spokesman, who, on more than one occasion, suggested that such action should be taken. It was not; and the lack of concerted action contributed, I am sure, to the steady deterioration of international relations, which was marked by the march of aggression around the whole perimeter of the territory of the Soviet union that finally resulted in the attack on South Korea on June 25, 1950.
This motion brings to the forefront the development in the general attitude of the peace-loving, freedom-loving nations toward the problem of preserving their security and defending their country by deterring aggression. It brings to mind how recent this development has been. Let me remind you of two dates. The first is June 25, 1950, when the act of aggression occurred in Korea, resulting in action being taken at once under the leadership of the United States. The second date is October 28, 1950. I doubt if there are many hon. members in this house who can associate that date with any event, yet I suggest it marked a most important change and development in our collective action. It was the date of the meeting of the defence committee under the North Atlantic treaty, held at Washington, at which we agreed on a military plan, agreed to set up an integrated force, and agreed to have a supreme commander. That was followed by a joint meeting of the defence committee and council, held at Brussels on December 19, 1950, at which General Eisenhower was recommended for appointment. It is a matter of great satisfaction which I shall always remember that I was privileged to move that motion.
On returning from Brussels, following the decisions jointly arrived at there that we all should get on with the job, the Department of National Defence continued the examination it had been making of our plans to see what could be done, with the means that might be made available, to expand and accelerate our defence program. During the Christmas holidays-they were not holidays for many of us -discussions went on in the cabinet defence committee and in the cabinet as to what could' be done so that we might meet, not only all possible indications of requirements made


by any agency of the North Atlantic treaty, but so that we might do more than that if we could; whatever we felt, as Canadians, was desirable in order to carry our full share of the load.
The result was that on February 5 I was able, with full cabinet approval, to announce the expansion of our defence policy and program. It was possible to work this out because of the fact that since 1947 we had been preparing plans of which this formed a part. But now, under the added impetus of Korea and the fact that the countries were prepared to work together to meet the threat against all, it was possible for us to put forward at that time plans which we had not expected to implement until some future diate.
In those two events, the participation on the part of the United Nations in stopping aggression in Korea and of the twelve Atlantic nations in the new North Atlantic treaty, we have I believe for the first time in the history of the world a considerable group of major powers-forty-seven nations in the case of Korea, of which twenty-three are contributing forces or material assistance and twelve nations in the case of the North Atlantic treaty-grouped together to build up their security against the threat of communist aggression, and doing this despite communist obstruction, while making it plain that their only object is to preserve, strengthen and build up the broad bulwark of peace so that on this foundation we can build that kind of world the search for which is the reason most hon. members come here to parliament to work together.
This is not only a military operation. We must strengthen the bulwarks of peace by ever broadening the areas of human freedom and by strengthening the bases for the security of the family and the home. But we are not going to have much of all that unless we do whatever is necessary to prevent aggression and defend ourselves against aggression should it take place.
The extent of this development in the case of Canada can be measured in financial terms by the striking fact that until the act of aggression against Korea on June 25, 1950, the amount appropriated by parliament for defence was $425 million, whereas the amount available through one source or another for defence expenditures during the fiscal year 1951-52 is over $1,900 million. That is four times as much as it was a year ago, up to the additional vote at the second session in 1950.
This has resulted in great developments in our armed forces. They were reported to hon. members in statements to the house at its last session and also in a white paper

which was laid before the house during that session. That white paper has been revised to give effect to further developments up to June 30, 1951; and with the permission of the house I should like to table that revised edition at this time. I understand that copies have been distributed or are available in the distribution office.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.
Brooke Claxton: Mr. Speaker, Canada's active participation with the other United Nations associated in stopping aggression in the Far East began most appropriately with the Royal Canadian Navy. Its claim to being the senior service is not recognized by statute. Here, however, they were first on the job, and, owing to the fact that they were prepared to go to sea rapidly, a flotilla of three destroyers left Esquimalt on July 8, 1950. Altogether five destroyers have been involved in the operations. These are the Sioux, Cayuga, Athabaskan, Huron and Nootka. There have always been three on duty in the Far East, working in rotation. Altogether 1,780 officers and men of the Royal Canadian Navy have taken part in these operations. During the period July 8, 1950, to September 30, 1951, these five ships have sailed a total of about
280,000	miles. You can imagine what this means, in terms of service of men crowded in these small ships in the Far East, a long way from the shores of our country, when I report that in the 90 days ending September 30, Cayuga had 74 days at sea and steamed 21,485 miles. Their operations have rightly earned a number of decorations and high commendation from the officers of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy with whom they have been working. A film of the operations of the ships of the Royal Canadian Navy in the Far East will be shown in the railway committee room on Thursday evening, along with some other service films. Hon. members will be interested to see the fine job our navy -your navy-has been doing for us in this battle to preserve freedom.
The air force was the next to take part. Our 426 squadron started flying the long route from McChord field over to Japan and back, with 12 heavy transport aircraft, all North Stars, putting in a good performance which reflected great credit on the aircraft and the men. I saw them twice at McChord field and was able there to appreciate what they were doing in terms of machines and men as well as in terms of comparison with some
United Nations and NATO of the other aircraft and aircrews engaged. Officers of the United States Air Force with whom they worked at McChord field were astonished by the performance of the men and machines.
Altogether, up to September 30, 1951, a total of 816 officers and men of the Royal Canadian Air Force took part in this operation. Last summer the base for the operation was moved from McChord field, near Seattle in the state of Washington, back to Dorval. Since that time the service has continued making three round trips a week. A round trip from Dorval means something pretty close to 15,000 miles. They have had no forced landings due to failures of engines or crew. They have had no loss of aircraft and no loss of personnel, though the country over which they travel is some of the most difficult in the whole world. Altogether during this period the 426 squadron has flown 3,500,000 miles, carrying nearly 2,000,000 pounds of freight and 6,000 passengers.
The army element in our contribution was provided by the 25th Canadian infantry brigade group. That group, as hon. members know, was raised for this purpose. For raising this brigade we used the existing fabric and traditions of the permanent force battalions of the Royal Canadian Regiment, the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry, the Royal 22nd, the Royal Canadian Artillery, and other permanent force units. To these were attached second battalions including in the end about 1,500 permanent force personnel, until we had a force of well over 10,000.
The first unit to enter action was the Princess Patricia's, on February 17, 1951. It has already been reported to parliament, and the country knows the fine record made by that fine regiment. But the records of the others have been equally good. Judging by what we have heard from our friends in other countries, judging by what we have seen ourselves, this element of our forces is living up to the reputation gained by the Canadian army in two world wars. Up to October 20 there were killed in action, died from wounds or missing, a total of 82; there were deaths from other causes totalling 21; wounded or injured in action, etc., totalled 275, making the total number of battle casualties 378.
At all times we have had sufficient reinforcements to meet any reasonable need that might arise for the brigade. Altogether there have been in action or in the theatre, either in Korea or in Japan, a total of over
9,000	officers and men of the Canadian army. We have decided that as far as military conditions permit we will replace officers and men after they have served a period of about
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United Nations and NATO a year or a winter in Korea. That replacement or rotation operation has commenced. We have sent to Korea to replace the second battalion of the Princess Patricia's elements of the first battalion, and they are now arriving there. Some 250 men of the second battalion have arrived back to take paratroop training. In this way we will build up not only one mobile striking force for the defence of Canada but the equivalent of two or even three in officers and men trained in airborne warfare.
Throughout this operation there has not been, nor will there be, any weakening of the mobile striking force which was designed and trained especially for the defence of Canada. On the other hand, members of that force will go to Korea to take their posts and gain battle experience while their places will be taken either by new recruits or by returning members of the second battalion. As a matter of fact we have in Canada in the mobile striking force more fully trained men today than we had when the Korean activities began. That condition will continue. In this way we are going to strengthen the forces available for the defence of Canada or for any other purpose.
One of the matters which have given us great concern is how to preserve the relationship between the men who are serving under most difficult conditions in Korea and the country at home. One thing we have done is arrange with the Canadian Press for a daily dispatch by telegraph of a thousand word summary of the news in Canada. That is made available to the forces edition of the Japan News issued for the commonwealth forces. They have made excellent use of the Canadian material supplied. Taped broadcasts by the C.B.C. are flown to Korea and broadcast when that is possible. We are greatly indebted to publications like Maclean's and the Standard of Montreal, which have supplied large numbers of their publications free which are either flown or transported by ship to our troops there. The Canadian Legion has done good work in collecting books to be sent to the forces in the Far East. Other activities have been carried on, such as the blood bank operated by the Canadian Red Cross. I bespeak the support of the house and the Canadian people for this project. We need blood in large quantities, not only for the use of our troops but to build up supplies against any emergency. I ask the wholehearted support of all the Canadian population of the forthcoming and continuing campaign of the Canadian Red Cross. As would be expected, a great source of blood is the members of the armed forces in Canada, and we will continue to make that available.


I have to report that the leaders of the churches accepted with enthusiasm the invitation to visit members of the armed forces in the Far East. His Excellency Maurice Roy, O.B.E., archbishop of Quebec and bishop ordinary to the forces of Canada has already arrived in Korea. As you all know, he had a distinguished service career beginning as a captain in the 22nd regiment. The Most Rev. W. F. Barfoot, primate of the Church of England in Canada and a combat soldier who won the Croix de Guerre in the first world war, is on his way. Also the Right Rev. C. M. Nicholson, moderator of the general assembly of the United Church and the Right Rev. N. D. Kennedy, moderator of the general assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Canada, who won the Military Cross to the first world war. The invitation to these distinguished leaders of their churches had only to be extended to be accepted instantly. They undertook the arduous trip by air in order to visit the members of our armed forces. Their visits will be an inspiration and encouragement to the men in the field and will also be a great source of comfort and reassurance to their relatives and friends at home.
Like everyone else I know nothing as to precisely when the fighting in Korea will end. We must be prepared to change our plans and arrangements to meet any circumstances that may develop. Of one thing I feel sure, based on the military intelligence available to me, and that is barring acts of participation by the forces of communist Russia, which might very well lead to a general war, the forces of the United Nations, that is of the United States, Britain, France, Canada, Turkey and all the others making up the twenty-three countries taking an active part, will be able to stay there and do the job to the end.
So this operation has been successful already. It has stopped aggression, and has indicated that the aggressor will not succeed there. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) indicated today, this means a strengthening of the ties between the members of the United Nations. They have shown their willingness to respond to the challenge. They have shown their ability to respond to the challenge. In consequence of that challenge they have added materially to their strength. While we may deplore, as we do, everything that has happened, particularly the fact that our troops, our gallant young men, should have to be engaged in this business, we certainly have no cause to regret their gallantry, their courage and their willingness to do it because this is our battle. It is a battle for our freedom.

With regard to our contribution to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, it was planned from the start that all national contributions would be by stages, as you can see, with the reported announcement of the dispatch of a British or American division or a Canadian brigade group, that that is the way it is taking place. The build-up is occurring. You and I may regret that it is not occurring faster but good progress is being made when you consider that the plan was arrived at, the decision made and the supreme commander appointed just ten months ago.
Our own program of participation was announced in a speech I made in the house on February 5. It provided for a three-year program to be covered by appropriations totalling $5 billion. We hope to do the program in advance of the three years. The rate of build-up in some directions indicates that we may do it in advance of that period. In others the results are less encouraging, and we must expect that. In any such plan we are dependent upon circumstances which cannot be foreseen or which often are outside our control.
Whether or not we can do this program for the $5 billion estimated I am not too sure, but I am certain of one thing. Based on the experience of the six months beginning with April 1 of this fiscal year, since we have been making expenditures out of the $5 billion, I am sure that we cannot do any more than we have so far indicated except with additional appropriations. Whether or not that is desirable or necessary, or would be authorized by parliament, remains to be seen; but we in the Department of National Defence and the armed forces themselves are going to do everything possible to squeeze out of the current appropriation the means whereby to add here or there, or to accelerate here or there. But even if that is done I am sure the present program will cost at least the $5 billion we estimated and announced last February.
Like every other nation we would very much like to have in existence today what we aim to get by 1954. However, to do that, to be in that position today, we would have had to start the present program on the present scale, from the place where we were at the beginning of this year, back in 1948 or 1949. Today we have about 85,000 officers and men in the active armed forces. In 1948 we had 41,000. To have done this job so as to have completed today the program that we want to complete by 1954 we would have required 85,000 in the armed forces three years ago or more.
To give an example, we would have had to be producing for three years aircraft of the
United Nations and NATO type of the F-86E Sabre or the CF-100 Canuck and the radar stations we are building at the rate of today. Three years ago the F-86E was not even being flown for testing purposes. The CF-100 was still in development and the radar equipment we now are building had not yet been developed, let alone built. The fact is that we are producing the F-86E as early and as fast as the United States under arrangements made by them with us. If we had then decided to produce other aircraft of existing types we would have been producing what today is an obsolete aircraft, instead of which we are rolling off the F-86E at the full planned rate of production for the present period.
As the Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe) said in his speech on Friday, limited only by the amount of government-found property, engines, armament and instruments, that we have to obtain from the United States, the rate of production is the equivalent of enough aircraft to provide front line equipment for a squadron every month. Again I emphasize that if people say that today we should be in the position we want to be in by 1954, then we should have had three, four, five or six years' advance notice in order to develop aircraft of the types that we now have in production, because they did not exist three years ago any more than did the radar equipment.
We are producing the aircraft and the radar equipment step in step with the United States. The CF-100 of course is unique, and it has already been reported upon by the Minister of Defence Production. Beyond question it is of its type greatly in advance of any other. There is no doubt about that; but it will not stay that way indefinitely because there is a constant flow of development, so much so that it is frequently said that any aircraft is obsolete by the time you begin the production line. It is only obsolete in the sense that already the designers have on the drawing boards something that will be better, more powerful, more versatile and so on when it is produced, four or five years later. Fortunately, we did not adopt the course at the end of the second world war of keeping a very considerable number of squadrons of the air force in being. If we had done so-and we could have-we would have had ten, fifteen, twenty or thirty squadrons equipped with aircraft that have since become obsolete, manned by aircrew who would be about to reach the end of their flying years when it comes to flying jets. We would have got ourselves into a state in 1946 or 1947 which would have used up all the resources of men, machines and money made available for defence and would not have provided the capacity for growth which we

United Nations and NATO have since shown. Ours was a deliberate policy. It was that we should create after the war the staff, the training establishments and the cadres on which we could build up our full wartime potential as rapidly as possible.
In the middle of that operation we had to meet first the challenge of Korea and then the challenge of the North Atlantic treaty build-up. The fact that we are meeting both is in part a result of the plans that were laid in 1946 and in 1947, and on the administrative organization, training and above all equipment programs that were decided upon then. I repeat, had we adopted the suggestions then made for the purchase of various types of aircraft, or for the continuation of various types of formation that we had during the war, we would not today be in a position to produce two aircraft, the F-86E and the CF-100, each of their type unquestionably well in advance of any others. Our idea was that we should spend the time and money we had in compressing the spring so that we could push forward in the event of an emergency. Well, we have had a degree of emergency in Korea, and another one over the North Atlantic treaty; not an all-out one, but those challenges were met well because of the soundness of the arrangements which had been made.
Since February 5, when I announced this extended program, we have continued to work on the threefold objectives of the Canadian armed forces; first, the defence of Canada against direct attack; second, the implementation of any undertaking we may make under the charter of the United Nations or the North Atlantic treaty, to defeat or deter aggression and preserve peace by collective action; and third, to build up the mobilization establishments, training schools, equipment and stores necessary to enable us to do our utmost in an all-out war in the shortest possible period.
With regard to the North Atlantic treaty we have, as the house knows, transferred the equipment for three divisions to the Netherlands, Belgium and Italy, and provided the guns and ammunition for an artillery regiment to Luxembourg. We have made available quantities of other military supplies either out of our stores of surplus or out of new manufacture. Also, as the house knows, we have undertaken to train up to a maximum of 1,400 aircrew a year for other North Atlantic treaty nations. More important than this, we have undertaken to contribute a brigade group to the integrated force which will be built up-it is being built up today-under the supreme commander, General Eisenhower, for the defence of the north Atlantic area of western Europe. We

undertook this because we regarded it as an important step in our own self-defence; but also one of the means whereby we might help to prevent war itself.
In addition to the brigade group, we have undertaken to furnish an air division of eleven squadrons of fighters to the integrated force. On May 4 I announced the raising and composition of the new brigade group. That appears at page 2703 of Hansard. The brigade was speedily raised through the loyal and effective co-operation of forty-two units of the reserve army. The major units of the brigade were trained at Valcartier, while various specialist troops were trained at different schools across the country. Here we adopted a different method, one well suited to the purpose, which I might say was very well received and supported by the reserve units, that of asking them to cooperate in this operation.
The 27th brigade took part in a parade on the Plains of Abraham on Tuesday, October 9, when they passed in review before Her Royal Highness The Princess Elizabeth. Her Royal Highness asked me to communicate the following message to the brigade on her behalf:
Her Royal Highness was most impressed with the smartness of the brigade. She asked me to convey to you her appreciation and also her best wishes in your tour of duty overseas where she knows you will acquit yourselves admirably.
An advance party of that brigade left Canada on Saturday, and it is planned that the remaining units will leave by four ships beginning early in November, so that the whole operation will be completed in December.
As I announced in the house, the intention is that this brigade should be grouped with the British forces, with which the Netherlands and Belgians also are grouped. This was decided upon after a review of all considerations and after taking the advice of the supreme commander. I think everyone is most happy that this wartime association of Canadian forces with not only the British but also the Belgians and the Netherlands forces should result in this decision on our part on the advice of the supreme commander. Our intention is that, subject to the military situation, we should rotate the forces in Europe by having men serve for limited periods, single men would serve for not more than two years and married men for one year.
As regards the air force, our undertaking to furnish an air division of eleven squadrons of fighters is very considerable indeed. An air division of eleven squadrons is a formation used to support an army. We are not going to have an army there, and from a military point of view we will have no reason

lor operating our brigade group and our air force together except in the event of war. Therefore in this case we decided, again on the advice of the supreme commander, to group the air force with the United States air force, largely for the reason that they are using the same aircraft, the F-86E Sabres. We use the same procedures, and both of us have to work closely together, integrated in the closest possible way in the defence of this continent. However, these arrangements with regard to grouping are not necessarily permanent. As everyone knows the grouping of divisions and corps and armies changed throughout the second world war. The arrangement made we believe is in the interests of building up the utmost strength at the earliest possible moment. For the present there will not be adequate airfields and accommodation for our air force units when they are progressively sent to Europe beginning with 410 squadron due to leave in November on the Magnificent. These squadrons will fee stationed at North Luffenham in the Midlands of England until there is adequate accommodation and airfields in Europe.
This operation of having a brigade group on one side of the world, engaged in operations in Korea, and another in Europe draws attention to the importance of the subject I touched on a minute ago, that is keeping our forces informed of what goes on in Canada, and giving them every possible opportunity to secure information about the cause they are serving, the country they are visiting and the people they are going to have to work with.
I mentioned what we are doing about informational services in Korea. We have instituted a directorate of current affairs in the Department of National Defence under the direction of Mr. Harry Low, who did a. similar job for the Royal Canadian Air Force during the war and then was deputy minister of education in the province of Manitoba. We will be issuing pamphlets under the heading "Current Affairs" or in French "L'Actua-lite" every fortnight; conducting lectures; showing films, and the like.
Not long ago a course was held at Borden for officers who will lead in discussions of this kind. We are grateful to Mr. Lionel Shapiro, the distinguished war correspondent of the second world war, who lectured at Camp Borden to the troops of the 27th brigade and at Valcartier, as well as to the senior officers and personnel at defence headquarters. From his own experiences in Germany he has prepared a booklet on how the troops should conduct themselves in western Europe. A copy of this booklet, in English or French,
United Nations and NATO will be handed to every soldier as he goes aboard his ship. On the ships, lectures and group discussions will take place. In this way every Canadian soldier will be informed as to the cause and about the people with whom he will have to work.
This operation has resulted in a considerable expansion of the armed forces of Canada. In the twelve months ending July 31 and dating from Korea, the total strength of the active forces, navy, army and air force, has increased from 46,886 to 81,727, a net increase of 34,841 or about 75 per cent. This is a considerable increase to be achieved in so short a time. During that time the number of officers has increased from 7,310 to 11,017, an increase of 51 per cent. Under one arrangement or another we have in training a total of 6,552 officers. During the twelve months up to the end of August the strength of the reserves for the three services has increased from 50,717 to 54,061. Some 2,200 members of the reserve have joined the 27th infantry brigade group, and many other members of the reserve forces have joined other elements of the permanent forces. I remember that back in June, 1950, when the strength of the reserve forces was 49,000, I said I thought we should try to get another 4,000 or 5,000 that year. We have done better than that, but still I am not satisfied. We must go on building up the reserve forces. They are doing a great job.
Looking at the picture broadly, of the total strength of officers and men in the navy, on the average about 40 per cent are at sea. This is a higher percentage than ever before in the history of our navy, either in peace or war. Of the strength of nearly 45,000 in the army we have, in what may be called operational formations of the 25th and 27th brigades, their replacement groups, the mobile striking force, in the schools and pools of men going through for these units, a total of about 30,000. Judging from the experience here during the war and at other times, that is a very fair proportion indeed.
With regard to the air force, the build-up is taking place now with the production of aircraft and the obtaining of aircrew. On the average we shall be producing a fighter squadron every two months, that is aircrew, full equipment and the latest aircraft. During the summer of this year we began recruiting women for the permanent air force. Up to September 30 we had taken in a total of 1,196, and in addition a considerable number of key personnel for the navy and army.
This build-up of strength in the armed forces from 41,000 three years ago to about
85,000	today has meant greatly increased construction. The population of our armed forces has increased from a town of 41,000 to
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United. Nations and NATO a city of 85,000. We have today the wives and children of the members of the regular forces of Canada totalling some 85,000, and for them we have built or have under construction a total of some 16,000 married quarters. Altogether 16 per cent of the defence expenditure has been on construction.
This has been accomplished by an even greater investment in equipment and machinery for the production of equipment. I shall not deal with that further, because it was adequately covered by the Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe) in his speech on Friday.
We are engaged in this operation of maintaining our forces in Korea, sending and maintaining a brigade group in Europe, and having in Canada the elements we consider necessary for the defence of our country against direct attack and for the building up of our utmost potential in the event of war. It is a large scale operation. There is a fundamental difference in our position from that of the countries of Europe. Every man that one of the North Atlantic treaty nations in Europe trains for the defence of his own country helps directly in the building up of the integrated forces. On the other hand every man such a country puts into the integrated force is directly available for the immediate defence of his own country. Here, however, we must, as part of our defence operation, provide forces for the defence of Canada which would not be available for the defence of Europe, just as the forces we are sending to Europe would not be immediately available for the defence of Canada. Our distance from the European countries greatly increases the cost of the operation to us, both in men and in money, and greatly increases its complexities.
Notwithstanding that, I believe everyone in this house, as well as the great majority of the people of Canada, regard these two things as part of the same operation. They are for the defence of Canada; they are for the defence of freedom, because the two are inseparable. But that should not conceal from us the fact that for Canada this involves an undertaking of great complexity and heavy expenditure in peacetime.
I have spoken in terms of the numbers of the men in our armed forces, how they have increased and where they are. I do not think there is much need to speak here about their quality. That has been shown in the work of the navy, the army and the air force in Korea and the Far East. I have seen the work probably more than anyone else in visits I have made across the country. So have all hon. members seen it. You have all seen at first hand what these men are
[Mr. Claxton.l

like, and you can testify to their competence and their qualities from operations like the Winnipeg and Fraser valley floods, the Rim-ouski and Cabano fires, the rescue of Canon Turner, the precision squadron at the Canadian National Exhibition, or the part played by the armed forces in the reception of Their Royal Highnesses not only in the fine ceremonial parades, the like of which I think we have never before seen in Canada, but also in the excellence of such arrangements as they have been responsible for. You have seen something of this yourselves in the trips that were arranged, such as those to Canadair at Cartierville or Petawawa or Churchill. There will be another next Saturday when we hope a number of senators and hon. members will see something of the training of the army and air force at Borden where there are a number of schools and where there will be a number of interesting demonstrations.
The motion we are debating bears particularly on the movement of the 27th infantry brigade. The parade that brigade had on the Plains of Abraham before the Princess was symbolic. Two hundred years previously a battle had been fought there between the French and the English, which in part determined the fate of this continent. But out of that battle and what followed grew the unity which is Canada today. In the parade of the 27th infantry brigade we saw on the Plains of Abraham descendants of the French and British soldiers who had been there two hundred years before. The men of that brigade are now going abroad to take their part, shoulder to shoulder with British and French soldiers, now together in the same cause, standing on guard for Canada and for freedom. Had anyone said in advance that these developments would occur during the period that has been under review since June 25, 1950, his word might have been doubted, and I would have been surprised. That is the story; but it does not stop there, because we are going on to build up our strength as rapidly as it can be done. The leaders of the various parties have indicated their support for this motion. I have no doubt that hon. members will support in every way they can, just as will the people of every part of Canada, the continued building up of the strength of the armed forces which are serving you and their country.


Mr. G. R. Pearkes (Nanaimo):: Mr. Speaker, I deem it an especial privilege to be permitted to take part in this debate because of the high level at which the discussions during this afternoon and evening have been carried on. I shall endeavour to keep to that high plane, though of course it will be realized that it is not quite the task of a member of His Majesty's loyal opposition to

United, Nations and NATO
explain all the advantages of government policy. Rather it is his task and responsibility to ask questions, to require explanations and perhaps offer alternatives to what may have been done. I remember, as a small boy, reading a book written by Charles Kingsley entitled "Madame How and Lady Why". It will be rather in that strain that I shall address my remarks to the government today, in asking them to tell us how and why these things are going to be done.
First of all, I should like to join the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Claxton) in paying a humble tribute to the work that has been done by the men of the armed services both in Korea and in this country in preparation for the tasks that lie before them. In the navy, the army and the air force the men of Canada in Korea have acquitted themselves well. The men in this country who have volunteered to play the part Canada is expecting her armed forces to play have entered into their training with an enthusiasm the like of which I have never before seen in peacetime; and I say that as one who has been connected with peacetime soldiering for many years.
If I may venture to single out one particular incident, I should like to call to the attention of hon. members a report in this evening's paper concerning a former member of the staff of the House of Commons who is mentioned in dispatches. I refer to Corporal Paul Gingras who, as I say, is mentioned in dispatches for courageous action in Korea, the citation coming through today.
From the remarks which were made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) I gather that the role of the defence forces is to defeat aggression wherever it may occur, and to take such action as is possible to deter aggression, particularly in those lands whose governments have joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Minister of National Defence then went on to explain the implications of of that general policy and how he was endeavouring to mould the defence forces of this country so they would be able to implement it. We know perfectly well that the idea of collective security is the predominant lesson that should have been learned during the first fifty years of this century. We learned that lesson, or should have done so, during the first world war. In the period between the first and the second world war there were many demonstrations that this lesson had not been realized, and in consequence dire results were suffered. So we come to the second world war. Gradually out of that, and out of the endeavours made following the great conference at San Francisco, on down to today, little by little, the nations have been
groping toward the final development of the machinery which will make collective security
effective.
I am quite certain the steps mentioned by the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of National Defence show how progress has been made. The Minister of National Defence referred particularly to the defence committee which had been set up. Anyone who, even in a most casual way, has followed the development and work of that committee will agree at once that it is a great step toward implementing this ideal of collective security. But we are not likely to see in the course of a few months the full realization of these ideals. It is only bit by bit and little by little that human nature is overcome and the great ideals of collective security achieved.
I think it would be perfectly fair to say that never since the conclusion of the second world war has His Majesty's loyal opposition put any obstacles whatever in the way of the government endeavouring to carry out that task. We have always subscribed to the policy of collective security. We have never in any manner or form suggested that Canada should play the part of a nation satisfied with her own defence and capable of standing alone in this world. I should like to read the remarks made on February 5, 1951, by the hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon) when speaking in a similar debate. At that time, as reported at page 75 of Hansard, he said, speaking not only for the party he represents but for the whole of Canada:
. . . we should not be a party to weakening public opinion as to the necessity, so well recognized when the North Atlantic treaty was signed, for our own defence, of cur assisting in the defence of the free nations of western Europe against Soviet designs, pressure and attack.
And later on the same page:
. . . we Canadians must fulfil our pledged North Atlantic obligations to the spirit and the letter of the pact, and we must be satisfied with nothing short cf cur maximum effort to ensure that we play our full part in this integrated challenge to further Soviet designs.
So when reference has been made by the two ministers who have spoken to the fact that, so far as this general ideal is concerned, there is unanimous feeling in the house, I suggest that these references to which I have referred and the record of this party show that we are in accord with those general ideals. Never at any time have we put any obstacles in the way of providing the funds the government has considered necessary to implement its defence policy. We have questioned how those funds have been spent. We have sought additional information which at times we have felt the government has been somewhat reluctant to supply. We have done

United Nations and NATO that because we realize that this is a democratic nation, and that our armed forces are supported by a voluntary system. And without a full knowledge of the obligations and the way the money is being spent, as well as the need for those expenditures, we will not have the public support which alone can maintain the forces considered so essential.
The Minister of National Defence told us the amount of money spent a year ago. I think he said that up to June of 1950 there was a total of $425 million.


Brooke Claxton: Appropriated for that purpose.


George Randolph Pearkes: Yes; and that during 1951-52 there had been an appropriation of $1,900 million. That is an increase to four times the amount spent in the previous year. I was rather surprised when he took credit for that. I could not help feeling it was an admission of failure. He had to wait until trouble broke out in Korea before he made any provision for the extra expansion of our forces. Surely the time to prepare, as I think is being done now, is before the outbreak of an emergency.
In the past we have criticized this government for not being ready. I suggest that very statement by the minister is a confession that we were not ready, that they had to wait for this emergency before they were prepared to ask the people of Canada to provide the additional funds. Unfortunately that has come at a time when it has placed additional burdens upon the people, because already we are in a period of inflation, and these additional expenditures are likely to increase that inflationary trend.
Then there was the question of the 25th brigade group. The minister suggested that this was created around the existing fabric of the active army at that time. Well, it may have been created around the existing fabric; but it was a very, very small portion of that fabric or skeleton around which the special force for Korea was built. He gave the figures, stating there were some 1,500 men of the active army in the special Korean force of something over 10,000 men. I think it will be agreed that that is a very sketchy fabric. There are many who believe, and perhaps experience has shown, that had a larger percentage of the existing active army, or even a regiment of the active army, been dispatched to Korea in the early days, results might have been achieved more rapidly. That special force had to be recruited, it had to be trained in an expensive and new method of recruiting its force to take part in those special operations. I believe it is generally conceded now that it was unfortunate the special force had to be raised, and that many attempts have been made to integrate it with the active army. So much for that.


Now we come to the events in Korea described by the Minister of National Defence. He told us there had been a total of some 378 battle casualties. I am sure we all regret the loss of those gallant men, either by death or by wounds. I hope every step will be taken by the government to make provision for those men who have returned disabled as well as for the dependents of those who have been lost.
I could not quite follow the figures which were supplied by the Minister of National Defence regarding the number of men who had actually seen service in Korea. While he has given us the number of battle casualties, I do not think that gives a true picture. We should have before us the total wastage of personnel in Korea, not only battle casualties but injuries as a result of operations and training, losses through sickness and the many other reasons for which men are withdrawn from field units. It is only by knowing the wastage that we can decide whether adequate replacements are available to take care of that wastage. Personally I have not seen any figures which would indicate what that total wastage is; therefore I find it most difficult to decide whether adequate replacements or reinforcements are available. I have talked to men who have returned from Korea, and while some have told me their units are under strength in the field, I discount that because I know only too well how difficult it is to maintain a unit in the field right up to strength. But on the other hand I do feel that before we send other troops away from Canada this country should have definite assurance that not only are there reinforcements for the Far East but for Canada, that there are sufficient trained men capable of taking the place of all those lost through wastage in Korea and at other places in the future. I do not believe the house has been given that assurance, and I hope the minister will tell us clearly before this debate is finished that there are sufficient troops to take care of the normal wastage which goes on in any theatre of war; that there are sufficient troops, both in the Far East and here in Canada, to meet that need.
Next comes the question of the rotation of the units in the Far East. We have been told that this rotation has started already, that some of the personnel of the first battalion have already been sent to Korea while some of the personnel of the second battalion -the minister gave the number as 250-had been returned to Canada to fill up the depleted ranks of the striking force which was left here when the second battalion of the 25th brigade went to Korea. I appeal to the minister to give us definite assurance that there are sufficient trained men coming

back who have volunteered to remain in the Jirst battalion to take this air brigade training to ensure that the forces retained in this country against the possibility of a diversionary raid are adequate to meet that need.
It was considered a year ago that this airborne brigade was sufficient to meet the threat. I cannot believe that there has not been a weakening of this mobile striking force. Personnel have been drained away, not only to provide the 1,500 men of the second battalion but also to provide the instructional cadres of the 27th brigade who will soon be leaving this country. I do not think the threat of raids on or invasion of this country is any greater than it was a year ago, but we still cannot afford to leave the country defenceless in any way. So I hope the minister will be able to reassure me that sufficient personnel from the second battalion have volunteered to join the airborne or mobile striking force, and that there are also adequate recruits joining up for that purpose.
I presume that in six months' time the majority of this first battalion will either have gone to Korea or be on their way back. The fact that only 250 men, if that was the figure mentioned by the minister, have come back to join the first battalion would seem to indicate that there is not a very strong desire by men in Korea to join the active army here in Canada.


Brooke Claxton: Will the hon. member permit me to interrupt? I know the importance of not having any misunderstanding about the question of reinforcements. He has asked for assurance on that point and I give it to him. In the field, in the theatre there are ample reinforcements to take care of any foreseeable battle needs. At home we have in the armed forces in Canada sufficient personnel to replace in Korea or Europe either casualties or rotation needs to an amount of more than 100 per cent of the strength of the two brigades, the 25th and the 27th.


George Randolph Pearkes: I thank the minister for that information but he still has not cleared up the point as to the strength of our home defence units.


Brooke Claxton: I could do that now, but I did not think that was so urgent.


George Randolph Pearkes: I hope the minister will be able to indicate that. There are two other small points in connection with Korea that I should like to mention, the first being the question of mail. This is a very vexed question. There is a double obligation here. There is the obligation to send mail from Canada, but there is also an obligation on the troops in Korea to keep their families informed.
United Nations and NATO
One or two cases have been brought to my attention where nothing has been done on that score. Therefore I should like to appeal publicly through this house to the troops in Korea to maintain the morale of their families at home in Canada by frequent and regular letter writing.
Along the same line there is the question of the auxiliary services, and I have heard complaints regarding the auxiliary services supplied to our troops in Korea. Apparently the Canadian Legion made an offer to supply these auxiliary services, but the government did not or could not see fit to accept that offer. I feel that now the troops in Korea are almost entirely dependent for auxiliary services upon those of other forces taking part in the conflict there.
We come now to the main point of the resolution that we have before us. As I said earlier in my remarks, we of the opposition are wholeheartedly in accord with the principle of collective security. We believe it is essential that we support the government in its proposal to live up to the undertaking it has already given to supply troops to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. We were told last February, after there had been a consultation with General Eisenhower who had just come back from visiting those countries of Europe which were then members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, that Canada would make certain commitments. Today we are being asked to consent to the dispatch of the 27th brigade in order to carry out the promise already given.
I feel it my duty to call attention to the fact that five years ago members of the official opposition deplored the rapid demobilization of Canadian troops in Europe, what seemed to us to be the somewhat hasty recall of the troops, and the failure of Canada at that time to provide personnel to maintain the security of western Europe, to play our part in the reconstruction of Germany and western Europe and to make a contribution to the stabilizing effect which was brought about by the presence of allied troops of other nations. I remember very clearly the debate in which I and the then member for Van-couver-Burrard took part. We deplored the fact that Canadian troops were being withdrawn from Europe rather prematurely and hastily. I know the reason given at that time was that the Canadian forces were not being allocated a special sector in Europe for which they would be responsible, and that an indication was given that the Canadian troops were not wanted to share in the responsibility, or did not want to share in the responsibility, of guarding other sectors. It is interesting to see that the government

United Nations and NATO is now reversing that policy completely, when some five years ago in a somewhat stormy scene in this house they turned down the recommendations of this party. It was never suggested that troops which had been serving for a long time in Europe should be retained there. The suggestion was that troops in training at that time in Canada should have replaced men with long service in Europe. Perhaps one might express regret that such a policy was not followed. If it had been, the personnel would have had five years of experience in co-operating with other allied forces, and during those five years they would have been able to show that Canada was ready to oppose any aggressor.
But that is water under the bridge. One does not want to labour it, but I do call attention to the fact that it was the policy of premature withdrawal of our troops from Europe to which this party objected at that time. There are one or two questions that I should like to ask regarding the dispatch of the 27th brigade to Europe. As the minister indicated when he was speaking in February last, the time the 27th brigade would go was dependent upon events in Korea. I gather from the minister's remarks this evening that he is satisfied that we can live up to our commitments in Korea and that there are enough replacements, reinforcements and other troops available to take part in any rotation scheme, so that Korea will not now affect the dispatch of the 27th brigade.


Brooke Claxton: We must keep up recruiting, of course. We must keep up the flow.


George Randolph Pearkes: Yes, there can be no let up.


Brooke Claxton: No let up.


George Randolph Pearkes: In fact I would suggest that it is not only a question of keeping up but now is the time when we have to redouble our efforts. Not only do we have to maintain reinforcements, replacements and rotation troops for Korea; it will be only a few months until we will have to provide replacements for Europe. We will have to make provision for troops to rotate to Europe. I suggest it would be dangerous to rely upon the same troops providing the rotating units for both Korea and Europe. That would be giving one group of men a double task to do. We have had the assurance that all will be well providing recruiting is maintained. Before the end of the debate I hope the minister will tell us what steps he proposes to take to maintain the system of recruiting so that we may be assured sufficient men are available.

Reference has been made to the reserve army. Some efforts were made to obtain recruits for the reserve army, but I do not think anyone can say they have been entirely successful. The minister himself said he was not satisfied with the results, though some additional recruits had been obtained. From the observations I was able to make this summer I felt that the training of units as units was extremely weak, and that very few units went to camp or did any form of unit training, although there was a good deal of emphasis placed upon the training of personnel, either personnel of reserve units or high school or university boys in special schools. I was just wondering whether there is a tendency at the present time to rather play down the unit training of the reserve force and build up a form of school training for the men who were perhaps not in reserve units but in some of the vocations, such as high school boys who gave a vague promise that they would attend reserve units, or university boys who might provide a pool of semi-trained officers. I do not know whether or not that is the tendency at the present time, but I did feel that the unit training of the reserve force left very much to be desired this year.
There is one other question I should like to ask the Minister of National Defence. First, are any limitations being placed upon the service which this 27th brigade may be called upon to perform? Are they being placed unreservedly at the disposal of the commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers, or are there some limitations imposed on where and how he may employ these troops? For instance, this afternoon the Secretary of State for External Affairs told us that Turkey and Greece were about to come into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. They are very much the exposed right flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization powers. Are our Canadian troops placed under the command of the supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization so that, without reference to Canada, he might dispatch this 27th brigade, after it had landed in Germany and come under his command, to let us say Greece or Turkey, since these powers come within the treaty organization? I admit they are not actually in the treaty organization, but I understood the Secretary of State for External Affairs to say that during this session this house will be asked to ratify their joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. If that is so, and if our troops are placed unreservedly under General Eisenhower, it would seem to me there is no reason why he might not, if he saw fit, dispatch them to Turkey or Greece or any other country, unless some limitations are placed

on them. There is no good telling me they would be available to go there if war broke out and Turkey was invaded. Obviously these troops are being sent to Europe with the idea of deterring aggression; and the threat of aggression on the right flank of the North Atlantic treaty nations might require additional strengthening of the forces in the Near East. Therefore I ask the question: Are any limitations placed on the employment of this 27th brigade? Can they be sent anywhere in any country of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or is their employment restricted solely to what we might describe as northwest Europe, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, west Germany? That is a point on which this house should receive some enlightenment.
The last question I have is one of dollars and cents. How much more is it going to cost Canada to train these troops in Europe than it would have cost to train them in this country? Quite obviously we will have to rent training areas. We will have to rent camps. There will be the supply system which we will have to depend upon other countries to maintain because this is only a very small force, only a brigade group. I believe the total strength will be somewhere in the neighbourhood of 6,000 troops with additional reinforcements available. Because they are a small group all their rearward services will have to be supplied; and the minister in his address at the last session emphasized the point that he was going to keep the tail as light as possible because the tail too frequently wagged and affected the rest of the body of the troops, or some remarks to that effect. We realize that the system of maintenance, the system of medical supplies, the system of replacements and all that will be carried on by higher formations. It is not unreasonable to believe that these other formations, be they British, United States or European, will expect Canada to pay for these services. Therefore I ask the minister whether he can give this house some idea of the additional cost to us of sending these troops overseas.
I have already referred to the necessity of rotating these troops in Europe as well as those in Korea. I would recall a remark made by the minister on February 5 of this year at page 94 of Hansard, when he said:
The force we propose to send will initially be a brigade group or regimental combat team.
Are there any plans now to start recruiting other forces which would supplement or augment this initial contribution which Canada is making?


Mr. Alistair Stewart (Winnipeg North):: Mr. Speaker, I judge the house is going to give
United Nations and NATO unanimous support to this resolution, and it is all to the good that these nations which are going to gather in France shortly should know there is general unanimity throughout the country in our support for the United Nations. The United Nations is and must continue to be, so long as it functions adequately, the very keystone of our foreign policy.
There is general support in principle for the policy which is being pursued. There is, and there ought to be, disagreement on detail. It is horrible to even think we should all be united in every detail of what we ought to do. Such a condition would remind me more of death than anything else. However, despite our support for the United Nations, it is obvious that it has made mistakes, regrettable mistakes, though as the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) suggested this afternoon its very last mistake will be when it fails to uphold the rule of law. Despite the mistakes it has made, one hesitates to think what the situation would have been had the United Nations not been in existence.
There is one aspect of the United Nations which merits some attention, because it presents a couple of problems which demand an answer. A short time ago a subcommittee of the United Nations collective measures committee made a report, at the request of the parent committee, I assume, dealing with the military authority, how it should be appointed to co-ordinate and direct any military action undertaken by the United Nations, and pointing out of course that a supreme commander of any United Nations armed force should be appointed by the United Nations. But there are still two points which have to be answered. The vexing question of civilian control over armed forces is one. How are we going to give policy directions clearly and quickly to commanders in the field? They have to be clear; that goes without saying when we recall the mess we got into last year in Korea. ' The United Nations itself has to make the interpretation of orders, and not depend upon the commanders in the field to do it. But we have not, as yet, arrived at any solution as to how these things are to be done. The second question is: in the event of aggression somewhere else, which we hope will not take place, how are the forces fighting that aggression to be supplied? These are questions which sooner or later the United Nations organization has to answer. When it does answer them adequately I believe the organization will be that much stronger.
What I want to deal with now is the matter which the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) referred to this afternoon, the Japanese peace treaty. He
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United Nations and NATO said it was a good treaty, and that it was a treaty of reconciliation. Both of these things are true. As a treaty, one could say it is a model. It is generous, indeed much more generous to the defeated foe than it is to many of the allies of the victorious nations. It is a treaty which is not vindictive. It is a treaty which demands no reparations amounting to any sizeable sum. It is a treaty which imposes no restraint upon the sovereignty, no restraint upon the economic life, of Japan, yet there seems to be something fundamentally wrong with that treaty judging from the reaction of the people of Asia. The reason something is wrong with it is not in the treaty itself but in the fact that, rightly or wrongly, the people of Asia are convinced that this treaty does nothing else but make Japan an outpost for United States policy in the cold war. Nothing could be more regrettable.
The minister stated he hoped that this treaty would write a new chapter in the history of the Pacific. I should like to think so too, but I fear our hopes are doomed to frustration. The trouble really is that while the United States with great single-mindedness of purpose is engaged in a struggle against communism, so many people in Asia are engaged in the struggle against poverty. They do not share the United States ideas as to who is the real enemy. We have the situation in Australia, the Philippines, Indonesia and New Zealand where these countries have the strongest of reservations about a rearmed Japan. On this continent we are much more worried about Stalin and what he does than about what we want to do ourselves. So long as that situation obtains we are not going to be able to suggest constructive and progressive policies.
Some time ago General MacArthur said that the democratization-that is a word which I dislike-of Japan had been accomplished. Yet to me, and to many much more competent observers, the facts are that the forces of the old Japan are gathering together again in administrative positions. Today we see men in office whose thinking is precisely the same as that of Tojo. When we are asked to believe that Japan has gone through its purge and has become a new and shining democratic state, reason is strained to the point of rupture and I cannot accept it.
This afternoon the minister stated he hoped Japan would not turn to the trade practices which we had seen in the past. We all share that hope. Yet the fact is that a nation has to live. When a nation feels that its very existence is at stake, whatever laws are in the books are torn up. These are the facts which we must bear in mind. The pressures which in 1931 caused Japan to start on its career of


aggression are mounting. During the 1930's the Japanese population increased by a million extra mouths every year. Today she has a population of some 83 million human beings contained on three islands which, for all practical purposes, are poor and barren lands. In the next fifteen years Japan will have to absorb into industry some 8 million who are today children or babes in arms. The Japanese are going to find that their need for markets in this decade is going to be just as acute as the need for markets in the past. They have to get foreign markets. Are we in Canada going to welcome cheap Japanese imports?	Are the people of the United
States going to welcome cheap Japanese imports?	Are the people of the United
Kingdom? I doubt it very much. That being so, Japan will have to find some area with which she can trade and to which she can export.
The minister said the treaty does not bear the seeds of a future war, and that is true of the treaty itself. What might bear the seeds of a future war is the economic stupidity of the nations of the west. The fact is that Japan, whether we like it or not, is going to trade with China. After all, the industries of Japan were geared to Chinese raw materials. Today China will accept with gratitude any manufactured goods and machines which Japan can export. Indeed the Prime Minister of Japan, Mr. Yoshida, said recently:
In some quarters fear is entertained that a separate peace might permanently sever Japan's trade with Red China. Red or white, China remains our next-door neighbour. Geography and economic law, will, I believe, prevail in the long run over any ideological differences and artificial trade barriers.
These are words worth thinking about. It is true that, for the time being, we can expect Japan to support the policy of the United States; but I suspect it will only support it until that day comes when it has achieved independence. Japan knows very well that the United States needs it. Japan knows very well that it was Mr. Dulles who, despite what was written in the constitution about no more arms, insisted that Japan should rearm. I believe it was Mr. Yoshida who insisted that if Japan were to rearm, then the United States would have to do it. This would leave Japanese industry free to compete still further with other nations, the logical outcome in a world of power politics. Japan cannot afford to rearm herself because taxes are already high, the cost of living is rising and the standard of living is falling. By devoting a large amount of production to armament very serious unrest would be

caused in Japan, which perhaps would cause an incident such as we saw at Mukden some time ago.
What might conceivably happen, and what I believe will happen unless there is a tremendous change in philosophy amongst the governments of the west, is that Japan will very skilfully play the west off against China and Russia, attempting to get the best of both worlds. The picture I draw, the blueprint I sketch, may be rather pessimistic but I believe it is one which will prove to be reasonably accurate unless we change our way of working.
Now, why does Asia so strongly suspect the United States and the western powers? I believe the reason is that the people of the United States, by and large, do not seem to have realized that in their fight against communism they are aligning themselves with every group which is opposed to social and economic change. As a result we are all going to suffer, because the impression is that the west stands against something whereas we have got to stand for something. Now, what about the present danger? The minister himself suggested that it was not as serious as it had been some time ago. He suggested that it was still serious, heaven knows, but not as acute as it had been, and not as bad as in 1948 when the economies of Europe were on the verge of cracking and the communist parties were growing in almost every country on that continent. Indeed, it was so bad in 1948 that some commentators could almost forecast the entry of soviet troops into western Europe. Today we are stronger. Today we are told by the minister-and it is true-the morale of Europe is high. Today the fear of aggression is somewhat less. Yet at this time when Europe is getting back on its feet there is this request by the United States that there must be a still further effort at rearmament. In view of what the Europeans have done, it is possible that if further rearmament is to be imposed upon them it is going to come into violent collision with social and economic realities. Indeed Mr. Paul Hoffman recognized that in his book "Peace Can Be Won" when he said at page 111:
. . . too great a pressure for rearming on a nation of full employment, like Britain, could unduly drive down the standard of living . . .
That is the very thing Europe fears; because if we depress their standard of living far enough, as my leader said this afternoon, we play completely into the hands of the communists. Mr. Kent Cooper, the executive director of the Associated Press, said on July 30 of this year that Europe is frightened of United States defence pressure. Europe is 94699-19
United Nations and NATO frightened of other things. Europe is frightened of Soviet aggression, but today that fear is not quite so great as it was, although it is just as real.
I have not altered my views at all. The men of the Kremlin believe that war is inevitable between east and west; therefore we must prepare for that eventuality. But it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that these same men believe they can win the war without fighting. They may suggest peace programs which have been described so correctly as being phony. There are some who think that soviet diplomacy over the years has been skilful, not to say Machiavellian. I think that basically and fundamentally soviet foreign policy, if it tjesired to achieve its ends, has been stupid; for obviously what would have served the soviet rulers much better than having full employment in the western world is a depression and the hopelessness that comes from it.
The economic indications of a year ago last spring were interesting. Had one made a graph of the unemployment figures in Canada in each spring since 1946, one would have seen that they were steadily rising until in 1950 they had reached the critical stage, indicating that 7 or 8 per cent of our working population were unemployed. One could see the same thing in the United States; and there was no answer to the problem of unemployment until Korea. We now find ourselves with full employment, with a prosperity which I fear is synthetic but which has completely destroyed Russia's hope of conquering us by throwing us into a depression. Yet despite these lessons of the past can we say that we have really presented to the world a creative, progressive idea for which men will fight and die? I do not think that is the case; and until it comes about we are not going to be victors in any war, be it cold or be it hot.
I have here a copy of the July issue of "External Affairs", in which is reported a speech that the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) gave at Northwestern university. One may say: here is the idea for which men are groping. The Prime Minister said:
A defensive effort designed; only to safeguard the material and moral advantages enjoyed by the inhabitants of this continent and of western Europe will not give us the security we want.
There can be no objection to that sentence, which is true. The next sentence is:
It is the essential first step.
That is true. The Prime Minister then continued:
But if we hope to provide enduring safeguards of those moral and material advantages we must, in a true spirit of equality and co-operation, join

United Nations and NATO
with the less favoured areas of the world in a concerted effort to give their inhabitants greater material advantages and greater hopes for the future.
Again, that is profoundly true; but still it is only words. It is true that we are going to give $25 million to the Colombo plan. It is a start which we welcome. But we do not yet know how much is going to follow. I echo the hope of the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) that the government will make it amply clear that we are going to play our full part in the six-year program. Then the Prime Minister went on to say: Some of you are probably asking yourself: When can we hope to get back to normal? When can we return to living decent American lives without having to worry about the problems of the rest of the human race? Well, I am afraid the answer to those questions is: Not in my day nor in yours.
When I read those remarks, it was first of all with approval. I read them again, more critically; then I saw the gulf which seems to separate the thinking of members of the government from that of the C.C.F. When can we hope to get back to normal? What is normal? Were conditions normal in 1946, when we were emerging from the throes of war? Can one say that 1939 was normal with its tens of thousands of unemployed who had to wait until war came in order to find work? Were times normal in the depths of the depression in 1932 and 1933? Or were times normal in 1929 when we had in this country
a false prosperity which burst like a pricked balloon? Is there any such thing as normal times? I suggest there is not. I believe it is really a waste of time to look backward toward those times instead of looking toward the future.
Then, "when can we return to living decent American lives without having to worry about the problems of the rest of the human race?" My answer to that question is "Never" because I think we are morally bound to worry about the problems of the rest of the human race. I believe that we are our brothers' keepers.


An hon. Member:: Ten o'clock.
On motion of Mr. Stewart (Winnipeg North) the debate was adjourned.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Alphonse Fournier: Tomorrow we shall continue the debate on this motion. Then we shall proceed with the resolution to amend the Railway Act; then the second reading of Bill No. 6, to amend the Canadian National-Canadian Pacific Act, 1933; then if we have more time, we will take Bill No. 7, to amend the Maritime Freight Rates Act.


[Stage Direction]
At ten o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to the order of the house passed on October 12, 1951.
[Stage Direction]
Tuesday, Ociober 23, 1951