1951-05-09

Mr. Pearkes:: 1.	What quotas were allocated to the university naval training divisions of the various universities during 1950?
2.	To what extent were these quotas filled?


Mr. Blancheile:: 1 and 2.
Quota Quota
University or college	Allotted Filled
Victoria college	
30	30University of British Columbia	75	95University of Alberta	
40	40
Regina college (including Luther and Campion
colleges)	
20	20University of Saskatchewan ..	50	50University of Manitoba	
100	100Lakehead Technical institute	5	0Assumption college	
30	30University of Western Ontario	60	70MoMaster university	
55	65Ontario Agricultural college	55	24University of Toronto	
160	185Queen's university	
80	80
Ottawa university and colleges
in Ottawa	
50	50McGill university	
70	80University of Montreal	70	70Laval university	
50	50University of New Brunswick	25	25Mount Allison university ....	25	25St. Francis Xavier university	55	55Acadia university	
20	20
University and colleges in
in Halifax	 60	60
St. Dunstan's college and
Prince of Wales college	30	30Memorial university	
25	25Total	
1240	1279



LABRADOR IRON ORE DEVELOPMENT


Mr. Higgins:: Is the unemployment insurance office at Amherst, Nova Scotia, arranging for the employment of men for work at the iron ore development at Labrador?


Mr. Cole (Verdun-La Salle):: There are no
orders placed with the unemployment insurance office at Amherst, N.S., for employment of men for work at the iron ore development tat Labrador.



RESERVE UNIVERSITY FLIGHTS

Mr. Pearkes:: 1.	What quotas were allocated to the reserve university flights of the various universities during 1950?
2.	To what extent were these quotas filled?


Joseph-Adéodat Blanchette: 1 and 2.
Quota Quota
University	Allotted Filled
Queen's university	
27	24University of Montreal	
30	30McGill university	
40	46University of Toronto	
60	57University of Western Ontario	30	22University of Manitoba	40	36University of Saskatchewan ..	25	29University of Alberta	
35	36University of British Columbia	45	54Total	
332	334
The following universities and colleges have not a sufficient enrolment to establish a flight but quotas are allotted and personnel are selected who take summer training with the reserve university flights:
University or College	Quota Allotted	Quota FilledAcadia 	
4	3Dalhousie	
6	11St. Francis Xavier 	
7	2St. Mary's	
3	7University of New Brunswick 13	9Mount Allison 	
5	1Laval 	
8	12Carleton college 	
2	1Ottawa university	
3	3McMaster university ....	
3	2Sir George Williams ....	
1	1Total	
55	52
ARMED FORCES INFORMATION BUREAU Mr. Diefenbaker:
1.	Has an information bureau for the armed forces been set up?
2.	If so, when, and what is the name of the
organization?

Questions
3.	Has a director of current affairs been appointed?
4.	If so, who, and at what salary?
5.	What is the present size of the director's staff, and what additions are contemplated?
6.	Is such information bureau now operating?
7.	If not, when is it expected to do so?


Mr. Blanchette:: 1.	Yes.
2.	March 12,	1951-Bureau of current
affairs.
3.	Yes.
4.	Mr. H. R. Low-$7,500 per annum.
5.	Director and secretary. Approval has been given for five additional members of a staff and five members of a substaff, such as stenographer, typists and clerks.
6.	Yes.
7.	See answer to No. 6.



QUESTIONS BY MR. BALCOM ANSWERED ON APRIL 26  FURTHER ANSWERS NOW TABLED

[Stage Direction]
Hon. Edouard Rinfret (for the Secretary
of State): Mr. Speaker, two questions placed on the order paper by the junior member for Halifax (Mr. Balcom) were incompletely answered on April 26 last. I wish to table the complete answers now.

Mr. Balcom:: 1.	What firms were awarded contracts, and what was the amount of each contract, during 1950-51 for (a) new construction and repairs; (b) catering; (c) supplies for H.M.C.S. Cornwallis?
2.	Were tenders called in each instance?
3.	If so, who submitted tenders, and what was the amount of each tender?


Mr. Bradley:: Contracts for new construction were awarded by Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation during 1950-51 as follows:
Landscaping
Log crib at buildings 81-94 fire hall
Surface drains and catch basins at buildings 81-94 fire hall
With respect to landscaping:
1.	June 22,	1950, Rosehall Nurseries
Limited, Brantford, Ontario, $16,984.00.
(Storm damage-by change order to Rose-hall Nurseries Limited for $11,250.00, August 25, 1950. Concrete walks and steps- by change order to Rosehall Nurseries Limited for $10,216.58, September 25, 1950.)
2.	Tenders were called.
3.	Rosehall Nurseries Limited, $16,984.00.

With respect to log crib at buildings 81-94 fire hall:
1.	January 11, 1951, George Mabee, Saint John, $3,350.00.
2.	No.
3.	See answer to No. 2.
With respect to surface drains and catch basins at buildings 81-94 fire hall:
1.	January 13, 1951, George Mabee, Saint John, $2,052.00.
2.	No.
3.	See answer to No. 2.
R.C.A.F. HEADQUARTERS, GREENWOOD,	N.S.'-


CONTRACTS FOR CONSTRUCTION, REPAIRS, ETC.
Mr. Balcom:: 1.	What firms were awarded contracts, and what was the amount of each contract, during 1950-51 for (a) new construction and repairs; (b) catering; (c) supplies for the R.C.A.F. headquarters at Greenwood, Nova Scotia?
2.	Were tenders called in each instance?
3.	If so, who submitted tenders and what was the amount of each tender?


Frederick Gordon Bradley: 

QUESTIONS PASSED AS ORDERS FOR RETURNS

[Stage Direction]
PORT AUX BASQUES-SYDNEY FERRY Mr. Fraser:
1.	Were tenders called for the construction of the freight and passenger ferry to be used between Port aux Basques, Newfoundland and North Sydney, Nova Scotia?
2.	If so, what firms submitted tenders?
3.	What firm was awarded the contract?
4.	What are the terms of the contract?
5.	Were Vickers engineers employed in the designing of this ferry?
6.	Was an outside naval architect employed?
7.	If so, what architect or architects were employed?
8.	What amount is to be paid to such architect or architects?
9.	Were any other technicians, engineers or others employed1 in the designing of this ferry?
10.	If so, who were they, and what will each receive for their work?
IMPERIAL SERVICE AND CANADA MEDAL AWARDS Mr. Fraser:
1.	How many imperial service medals have been granted to Canadians since 1930?
2.	How many of such medals were granted in each year from 1930 to date?
3.	How many were granted to persons in each department of the government during this period?
4.	How many of these medals were conferred or granted to Canadians who had retired from the civil service after serving less than twenty-five years?
5.	What are the names of the persons to whom they were granted, and in which department did they serve?
6.	Have any awards of the Canada medal been made?
7.	If so, to whom?
['1.\tWhat firms supplied or contracted to supply the advertising and publicity in the fiscal year 194950, for (a) Trans-Canada Air Lines; (b) Canadian National Railways?\n2.\tWhat amounts were paid for these services to each of the firms in the fiscal year 1949-50?']
Joseph-Adéodat Blanchette: Return tabled.



Mr. Fulton:: 1.	What was the total paid by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police for professional and special services in the fiscal year 1950-51?
2.	What person, persons, firms or companies received payments of $10,000 or more under this heading in the said year, what was the actual amount of each payment, and for what service was the payment made in each case?


DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS
Mr. Fulton:: 1.	What was the total paid by the Department of Public Works for professional and special services in the fiscal year 1950-51?
2.	What person, persons, firms or companies received payments of $10,000 or more under this heading in the said year, what was the actual amount of each payment, and for what service was the payment made in each case?

Inquiries of the Ministry


DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND WELFARE
Mr. Fulton:: 1.	What was the total paid by the Department of National Health and Welfare for professional and special services in the fiscal year 1950-51?
2.	What person, persons, firms or companies received payments of $25,000 or more under this heading in the said year, what was the actual amount of each payment, and for what service was the payment made in each case?


DEPARTMENTAL SOLICITORS
Mr. Gillis:: 1.	How many departmental solicitors were appointed to government departments from January, 1950, to April, 1951?
2.	How many of them are ex-servicemen from (a) the first world war; (b) the second world war?


TRANS-CANADA AIR LINES AND C.N.R.-PUBLICITY
Mr. Knight:: 1.	What firms supplied or contracted to supply the advertising and publicity in the fiscal year 194950, for (a) Trans-Canada Air Lines; (b) Canadian National Railways?
2.	What amounts were paid for these services to each of the firms in the fiscal year 1949-50?



MOTIONS FOR PAPERS


Mr. Fulton:: For a copy of any correspondence prior to December 31, 1944, between the Department of Justice and/or the Department of Veterans Affairs or any other department of government and any lawyer or firm of lawyers in the city of Toronto or elsewhere in Ontario, containing offers or discussions of the terms of employment as solicitor for the Veterans Land Act to do the work subsequently undertaken by Mr. W. C. Thomson.



PORTUGAL COVE, NFLD., WHARF

Gordon Francis Higgins: For a copy of all correspondence, telegrams and other documents exchanged between the government of Newfoundland, the resident engineer of the Department of Public Works at Newfoundland, the Department of Public Works, or any minister of the government, and any person, persons, or organizations since April 1, 1949, relating to construction or repairs of a wharf at Portugal Cove, Conception bay, Newfoundland.


Mr. Fournier (Hull):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to ask the hon. member to allow this motion to stand until the next sitting when motions are called.


Mr. Speaker:: Stand.
(Translation):



POSTAL SERVICE


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Paul E. Gagnon (Chicoutimi):: Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of privilege.
[Mr. Fulton.)
Some time ago I placed two questions on the order paper. The first one was:
1.	Who has the contract for carrying the mail between Chicoutimi and Grande Baie via the offices of Bagotville and Port Alfred, Quebec?
2.	What is he paid for this service?
3.	When does the contract expire?
Here was my second question:
1.	Who has the contract for carrying the mail between Saguenay airport at Bagotville and the post offices of the counties of Chicoutimi and Lapointe?
2.	What is paid for this service?
3.	When does the contract expire?
On April 30 last, the parliamentary assistant to the Postmaster General (Mr. Langlois) replied as follows:
These two questions refer to the following service: Jonquiere-Kenogami and airport at Bagotville, via; Arvida, Chicoutimi, Bagotville, Port Alfred, Grande Baie.
I regret to inform the parliamentary assistant to the Postmaster General that his answer applies only to the second question and that the first has remained unanswered.
I really would like to know who has the contract for carrying the mail between the C.N.R. station at Chicoutimi and the post offices of Grande Baie, Port Alfred and Bagotville.


Hon. Edouard Rinfret (Postmaster General):: Mr. Speaker, I have made a note of the remarks made by the hon. member and I shall see to it that he gets a reply in due course.
(Text):


Alphonse Fournier: that the house go into committee of supply.
Motion agreed to and the house went into committee, Mr. Dion in the chair.
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENCE Defence forces-[DOT]
245. To provide for the defence forces of the navy, army and air services and defence research and development, and to authorize total commitments for this purpose of $3,831,270,000 including authority notwithstanding section 29 of the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act, to make commitments for the current year of $1,924,170,835 and commitments against future years of $1,907,099,165 against which commitments it is estimated that actual expenditures in 1951-52 will not exceed $1,595,050,000 of which $183,050,000 will be provided from section 3 of the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950, as supplemented by item 246, $1,412,000,000.


Mr. Jones:: Mr. Chairman, just before
eleven o'clock last night I had quoted an extract from a statement made by General Worthington to the effect that the next war would be fought in our own back yard. When

General Worthington made that statement I think he fully believed it. It is a serious statement to make, and we are compelled to agree that if war does break out it will be in our own back yard. Therefore the question of protection of that yard becomes a matter of paramount importance to every one of us, and I claim that today it is totally inadequate. No one knows that better than the gentleman whom I have quoted. To my mind we need a master plan immediately under which every citizen of this dominion can contribute efficiently his time, skill and effort to the protection of that back yard. Every citizen should be given a clear analysis of all the risks involved, and should be clearly informed of the personal responsibility within the defence plan of his particular community.
With proper information and clear instructions given to our citizens, we could avoid the confusion that otherwise must necessarily prevail. I think it is very important that the government should commit itself immediately to seeing that proper instruction is given. Confusion is responsible for more casualties than would occur from the actual bombing by a potential enemy. I shall not deal with civil defence needs in detail beyond urging the government to speed up the work of organizing nursing and other health services, air raid wardens, rescue squads, communication workers, ambulance, telephone and transportation services, light, power, and a thousand and one other things that are of primary importance in case of an attack by a potential enemy.
I would further urge upon the government that it should clarify its position with respect to its plans, if any, for aiding provincial governments to carry out their part of the over-all plan. Dissatisfaction is general in this regard. Practically every province is kicking about the present arrangements and is not satisfied with them. I think the position was forcibly expressed by the province of Ontario as reported in the Globe and Mail of February 23 last. I should first like to refer to the words of Premier Frost. The article reads as follows:
"We have a right to know what are the facts," said Mr. Frost. "How can the federal government leave this matter hanging in the air? This is a matter for national direction, for expert attention. If Ottawa does not want to spend any money, why not come out in the open and say so? We'll sacrifice gladly if we are told what to do. I'll prune my budget before next Tuesday to cut out every nonessential item if I am told it is needed. But we want to know: we feel we are entitled to clarification and guidance."
The report continues:
C.C.F. leader Jolliffe agreed that this was mystification in a high degree. If Mr. Welsh's report
80709-182J
Supply-National Defence
accurately covered the accomplishment of a conference of ten provinces and the dominion, it showed nothing but a lot of vague implications that the federal government would do a little in some cases, maybe a bit in others, and hadn't even considered some. He felt that no "half-baked" program should be launched by anyone; on the other hand, Ottawa had knowledge not held by others and it should impart that to the provinces in sufficient degree to assure them of what must or must not be done. Actually, he felt, Ottawa was about three years late in calling a conference; civil defence planning should have been started when the director of such work was appointed more than three years ago.
The article goes on to say:
Liberal leader Oliver agreed that Ontario was left very much in the air, and Mr. Frost's comments were very reasoned. He felt that the over-all direction of civil defence should fall within the jurisdiction of civil defence, despite what arguments might exist as to jurisdiction regarding property rights and damages assessments. "We will go along with the premier and leader of the opposition in expressing the belief that the situation must be clarified," said Mr. Oliver. "After all, the problem of civil defence arises as a result of international policies over which province and municipality have no control. This house should press for clarification of civil defence policy, and I feel it should come from the federal sphere."
I quite agree with that article. It puts in a concise form my argument that the federal government must clarify its position so that the provincial governments and municipalities can co-operate to the fullest extent while there is still time.
While it is true that the greatest need is to protect our larger cities and more vulnerable manufacturing towns, at the same time we must not forget the rural areas. In the event of -evacuation becoming necessary, the rural areas would be a very important cog in the scheme of civil defence. I believe steps should be taken now to investigate and list all available accommodation in rural areas so the information would be available in case of need. First aid classes should be started in those districts immediately, and the residents should be trained to take care of evacuees so that they would be able to play their part if such an evacuation should take place.
Naturally the question will be asked, who is going to pay for all this? To my mind that is clear. This is plainly a matter for the federal government, which under the British North America Act is entrusted with the care and protection of the people. In any event the cost would be very small if the co-operation of municipal and provincial governments were sought at once. Such things as welfare services, nursing services, fire fighting services and so on, already established within the municipalities, could be improved

Supply-National Defence and expanded through federal aid and assistance. In the event of war, failure to act now could be far more costly, not only in money but in human lives as well. So I urge the government to give this aid and assistance as quickly as possible. I believe the cost would be a fair charge on the billions we have already voted for our national defence program. If suitable plans for the welfare and protection of our people in the event of attack were prepared and made known, it would go far to reassure and give confidence to our people. I make this suggestion not on a political basis but as a Canadian seeking ways and means to protect our homes and our people from the danger that threatens.
Naturally the next thought that comes to mind is whether we are doing all we can for our protection, particularly from air attack, should another war break out. I am not satisfied that we are doing all we can. I am not satisfied that we have sufficient jet fighters ready to take to the air to keep the enemy from this country. I am not satisfied that they are strategically placed to carry out that task. Their distribution has been too haphazard; they are bunched in large centres and not strategically placed across the country. I feel that we have to step up our defences by means of speedy jet interceptors and jet fighters, together with a complete radar screen right across this dominion. We have been led to believe that we can rely completely upon our air force, and that we need not worry; but I was alarmed, as no doubt other [DOT]hon. members were, by an editorial in the Globe and Mail of yesterday, which I should like to read. If the minister has not already read it I think he should hear it read so that he may reply to it and reassure the people. If the position is not as set out in the editorial, the minister should tell us that something is being done, because I am more afraid than ever that we are not properly protected. The editorial states-


Mr. Claxion:: I do not want to be technical, Mr. Chairman, but I call your attention to the rule against reading editorials.


Owen Lewis Jones: Then I will not read it, but I direct the minister's attention to this editorial in which his department is charged with providing totally insufficient protection for this dominion; with promises that have been made and not carried out, and so on. We are told that we have not the air force we should have, that we have not the men, the planes, or the equipment. I believe such a charge should be answered. If the statements are
true, the minister should admit it and take steps to remedy the situation. If they are not true, this article should be answered and the public should be given some reassurance that something substantial is being done.
I am quite prepared to pass this editorial over to the minister, and I should like to hear his reply. I assure him that as a citizen of Canada I am anxious to co-operate to the fullest extent to bring our protection to the highest level possible within our means and capacity as a nation with a small population.
I repeat that in my opinion if we have full co-operation on all sides we can bring about a system of protection that will reassure our people and permit them to sleep in peace without worrying about Russian domination.


Mr. Coldwell:: There is a point, Mr. Chairman, which I believe should be clarified immediately. The minister objected to the reading of an editorial. If an editorial reflects upon the proceedings of this house of course it should not be read; but citation 265 at page 108 of Beauchesne, third edition, says:
It is not in order to read articles in newspapers, letters or communications emanating from persons outside the house and referring to, or commenting on, or denying anything said by a member or expressing any opinion reflecting on proceedings within the house.
I submit, Mr. Chairman, that while I do not know what was in the editorial, if it does not reflect on the proceedings within the house -the hon. member should have beer, permitted to read it. I am raising the point because I would not like the minister's objection to remain on the record without some challenge.


Brooke Claxton: Perhaps I was wrong; I will look it up later. I have seen the editorial.


Mr. Hunter:: Mr. Chairman, as I have listened to the speeches in this debate, some informative and some merely interesting, I have sometimes wondered whether those speaking have tended to lose sight of what we are attempting to do, why we are arming and to what extent we should arm at this time in view of the international situation.
As we all know, Russia has two alternative plans, either of which it can slip into from the other. The first obviously is to take all it can get by armed aggression when it chooses to use that method. The second is to take what it can get by infiltration and propaganda. At the present time we are not fighting Russia physically, and it would be silly, unnecessary and inadvisable to arm to the point where we would be prepared to carry on an all-out conflict. That is not what we are aiming at. We are aiming at putting ourselves into such a position that if war should

come we would be able to make a maximum effort within a short time afterwards. We are placing ourselves in a position to rearm. In other words in three years, including this year, we hope to be rearmed, so that from that time on, provided no war breaks out, we can maintain a state of armament which would permit us to go quickly into full production should an actual war occur.
I sometimes think some of those who keep saying we are doing too little too late fail to keep that objective in mind. Russia has those two alternatives. One is to beat us by force; the other is to beat us by propaganda, by fear; to convince us that we must have an all-out war effort and must maintain that all-out effort for a period of years, so as to bring about an economic break-down. Then, when our standard of living is reduced, they hope to be able to achieve what they desire without having to go to war. That is obvious to everyone. Most people see it, but they sometimes tend to lose sight of that fact. We in Canada do not intend to lose this struggle either way. We do not intend to lose it through armed force, nor do we intend to lose it through an economic break-down engendered by fear and helped along by people who cannot quite understand what we are attempting to do.
Canada's policy in Korea is clear and extremely simple. We are trying, through the United Nations, to stop aggression there in order to prevent it elsewhere later. Nothing could be more simple. People are criticizing the United Nations for having got themselves into a hopeless mess by resisting this aggression in Korea; that they see no end to this fighting for years-we certainly hope that will prove to be incorrect. Nevertheless we shall have accomplished something if we can stop them from going into Indo-China, or by this resistance stop them from going into India or any other country. Such an event would more than justify the expense and the loss of human life, for which we all grieve, in Korea. The action is so transparently advisable.
There is a tendency to criticize the United Nations and say the organization is washed up; that they are not able to enforce their demands. Surely we have gone through this situation often enough in the history of Canada and in the history of the world to realize that any international organization has to creep before it can walk, has to walk before it can run. You do not develop an international organization overnight. It may never really develop to the point that we hope it will during our lives; it may not develop under the auspices of the United Nations, but the thing will continue. It is an ideal that is going to continue, and that is irresistible.
Supply-National Defence
Until people thoroughly understand that international law is not only desirable but has been established, we shall not have achieved what we hope to do under the United Nations or through any other international body. Sooner or later, just as the common law crept up in England and was adopted by Canada, an international common law and statutory law will creep up. When that day arrives, we shall have achieved something. You do not do that overnight, nor would it be advisable to give those powers to the United Nations now. The United Nations lack the experience in the administration of international law. It will only get that when, with international law behind it, it has gained the experience and confidence of the peoples of the world.
There has been some criticism of our defence effort, and I should like to quote a few figures for the year 1951. Comparisons are sometimes misleading, and sometimes they are odious; nevertheless I do not think these figures are unworthy of quotation in this house.
First of all, the defence expenditure expressed as a percentage of the gross national production for 1951 is as follows: France, 7-2 per cent; Belgium, 4-4 per cent; United Kingdom, 9-0 per cent; United States 15-3 per cent; Canada, 9-4 per cent. Canada is second only to the United States. The 1951 defence expenditures per capita expressed in Canadian dollars are as follows: France, 51-9; Belgium, 35; United Kingdom 75-9; United States, 330-6; Canada, 138-4. It is true that while we are second we are a considerable distance behind the United States, but we are also a considerable distance ahead of the other three nations named. I believe those figures are interesting. They may have some significance, but it is difficult to know what significance to attach to figures of that sort. I do believe, however, they have just as much significance as, and probably more than, many of the adverse figures which I have heard quoted.
There has been a criticism that we have rearmed far too late. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that is a question of opinion. I do not know how anyone can prove whose opinion is right until the event happens. The event has not yet happened. We hope we are right, and we are sincerely trying to do what we consider to be right. The suggestion of the hon. member for Nanaimo may be perfectly correct. It may be that we should have rearmed more heavily two or three years ago. On the other hand, it may be that five years from now the hon. member for Nanaimo and others may be suggesting we have armed too early. I do not think this is
2852	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence something that can be defined accurately as a mathematical problem can be defined. It is a very difficult question, but it is one upon which we are acting with the best advice possible. I suggest it would be a strong criticism to keep telling us that we have armed too late. The situation is not one that is capable of accurate calculation.
The hon. member for Nanaimo suggested also that if we had armed three years earlier, it might have curbed the present inflationary trend which has been caused by our intensive rearmament. I am not an economist, although I studied economics at the university. The only thing I gained from my study of economics was a suspicion of economists. While I regard economists with great interest and I like to read what they say, I would hesitate to adopt what they recommend in my business for fear the Bankruptcy Act would apply very shortly.
Another one of the criticisms that is often aimed at the government by all parties in opposition is that they have too little information, and that from the little information they are able to obtain they are unfortunately strangled to the point where they cannot make proper criticisms. Well, that is what I call a negative argument. It is an excuse that I have seen from my earliest school days. It is an excuse that has been used I think since the time of the Greeks. If people are not willing to work sufficiently hard to digest the information which is furnished to them, then they say: We have not the information, so we cannot criticize. Mr. Chairman, what information do they get? First of all, they get the estimates, which are in some detail. They can have a great deal more detail any time they care to ask for it. Second, they have the public accounts. It is rather enlightening if one looks at the attendance of the Progressive Conservative members on the public accounts committee. There does seem to be a certain reluctance on their part to attend meetings.
Then, there are questions. Any hon. member in this house is entitled to ask a question, unless the information is top secret and should not be given in public. Members may ask any number of questions and receive answers accordingly. That is a method that provides a lot of information. This year the estimates were tabled early in order to meet the convenience of the leader of the opposition and others who requested that that be done. When they were tabled the leader of the opposition was asked whether he wished to proceed with them immediately, and his answer was in the negative.
The form of government which we have is not one which allows the government to


delegate authority. It is true that in certain other countries the cabinet is not representative of the people, but is appointed. In our own country the cabinet is composed of elected representatives. The Minister of National Defence has the responsibility of discharging the functions of his cabinet post. His task is not to govern with the consent of the opposition or with the advice of the opposition. Having been appointed as a minister of that department by the party which has been elected to power in this country, he is given that responsibility and he must exercise it. He is not supposed to throw it into some committee and say: "Here, what do I do?
I have seen nothing so far-and others may agree with me-put forward by the members of the opposition that would lead me to believe the forming of such a committee would be to the advantage of Canada. The criticisms and suggestions they have made, if incorporated in one small volume, would not seem to me to justify the appointment of a committee. I suggest that they write them on a single piece of paper and send them to the minister. I suggest that, under the form of government which we have, and having regard to the manner in which our defence department is set up in this country, there is actually available to the opposition member who cares to put some work into it far more information than is available in the United Kingdom. I would say there is available far more information than one gets in the United States. This government provides the members of the opposition with more information about what is happening in national defence, I believe, than any other government in the world.
It is not my task, Mr. Chairman, to suggest things to members of the opposition, but I would just ask the leader of the opposition to consider this one thing and to consider it seriously: Is he not confusing lack of information with his lack of assimilation thereof?


Mr. Gillis:: Mr. Chairman, I feel diffident about taking part in this discussion after the lecture we have just had, inasmuch as I am not an economist nor a lawyer. To me as a member of an opposition party it sounded as if we had no business to be talking at all. But in order to justify our existence we must express opinions on matters that come before parliament, and that is what I am going to do at this time. I think the Minister of National Defence gets a great deal of value out of the suggestions that are made here.


Brooke Claxton: That is quite true.


Clarence Gillis: During the period in which I have been a member of parliament I have

seen enacted a great deal of legislation that had its origin on this side of the house. In the task that the Minister of National Defence has today I am reasonably sure that he welcomes the opportunity of spending a little time in sitting down and listening to members who have not much to do except to think about these matters. As hon. members know, the minister is a busy man; he is the minister for air, for naval affairs and for the army. He also has a great deal to do with civil defence. The matters that he is required to go into, dealing with the problems of organizing defence in this world today, are such that a great deal of thinking is required. It is for that reason that I am going to say a few things to the minister at this time.
I should like to emphasize once again what has already been emphasized on two or three occasions in this debate, namely, that you cannot divorce national defence from external affairs. The two matters are closely bound together. Our defences today go all over this world, and the external policies of the government can either buttress or upset the defence plans of the country. I think the truth of that statement is clearly indicated by the MacArthur incident in the United States. Unless those who administer external affairs and those who plan defence inside and out of this country are close together and much in agreement about what is to be done at a given time, one group can upset the other.
There is one thing that I should like to emphasize in this debate, in which members are rather restricted because of lack of information. As I see it, the thing that has not been emphasized by the government or by anyone else-and definitely not by the press-is the question whether we are justified in spending $5 billion over the next three years in preparing the defences of this country. Anyone who gets out around in the country and talks about this matter of defence-the huge expenditures, and the inflation that we are experiencing at this time-will find that the people in the country have little knowledge of it. One opinion is that it is just another way of keeping out of a depression; that if it was not for the defence spending at this time we would be in a depression; that it is only an alibi. Not many people in this country are convinced that there is any danger or that there is any necessity for spending that large amount of money on defence. One thing that I think the government should do, and should continue to do, is to keep before the people the dangerous aspects of the present international situation.
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For the purpose of pointing up that suggestion, I should like to give a few figures that were put on the record of the House of Commons in Britain in February of this year. What are we up against? What has our potential enemy? What are his possibilities of overrunning the territory facing him? What are -his chances ultimately?-because ultimately the goal is this continent. If the situation develops as it is developing, then the final battles of this present era will be fought out on this continent. What is the strength of the people against whom we are today aiming to protect ourselves by arming?
According to Prime Minister Attlee, speaking recently in the House of Commons in Britain, the military strength of the Soviet union is as follows: He stated that Russia had an army of 2,500,000 men, or 176 divisions. These divisions were dispersed in the following manner: Eastern Germany, 22; Austria, 2; Hungary, 4; Poland, 5; Roumania, 3; western Russia, 49; central Russian front, 20; the Caucasus, 21; central Asia, 19; the Far East, 31, including 4 divisions in Manchuria. There were an additional 600,000 men in the MVD and another 600,000 men in the air force. While there are no figures for the navy, it is known that that country has one of the largest submarine fleets in the world.
That is merely the strength of the Soviet union as such. That is not saying anything about the satellites she has around her. You will notice that the Soviet armed might is dispersed in strategic spots from which she can step off in any direction at any time, with terrific force. In my opinion those figures alone are something that should be pounded into the minds of the Canadian people generally, and of the members of the House of Commons particularly. I do not expect the Minister of National Defence or his officials to be propaganda agents trying to put that kind of thing over. I think that every member of parliament has a responsibility, regardless of where he sits; and if he is trying to build up the idea, as many are, that there is no hurry about this matter of arming, he is making a mistake. The hon. member for Parkdale did that a moment ago. He said: We will just take our time; we will do it for three years. This fellow, our potential enemy, is ready; let us not make any mistake about that. Our_ enemies have a timetable. They know exactly what they are going to do this month, next month and next year; and when they figure that the time is ripe for them to step off, they will do it. As the Minister of National Defence said in his statement on his estimates, we do not know whether we have three years; we do not know whether we have
2854	HOUSE OF
Supply-National Defence a week. That is absolutely correct. But the other fellow has a timetable. He is working on it every day.
We often hear it said that there is no war. That is another statement that is made quite loosely. In 1914 a man was shot and a war was started all over the world. Today men are being shot all over the world. There are four or five wars going on in Asia at the present time. There is a major war going on in Korea. In Germany there are armies facing each other with all the weapons of destruction that are known; a fire could be lit here at any moment. There is a war on all over the world. Let us not make any mistake about it; the communist party have a timetable and they are working on that timetable week by week. They are marching on, taking over where they can without bloodshed, as they have done in Czechoslovakia and in many other countries, and they are fighting it out where they have to, as they are doing today in Korea. We talk about there being no war. No; there is no shooting at the present time in Canada, but all the moves that are being made today in places such as Tibet, Indo-China, Korea and other countries are merely strategic moves that are bringing them closer and closer to the time when they may be able to step in and hit this continent. That is the ultimate goal; do not make any mistake about it.
That answers the question whether these defence expenditures are necessary or not. They are necessary. We should be driving every day and every hour of the day in preparing the people of this country psychologically to realize that they have something to fight against, and that is an invasion of this continent; because our final preparations are for the defence of this continent. I should like to leave that thought with the minister and with the members of the house.
There was a time when I thought we might avoid an over-all conflict, but since the United Nations declared China an aggressor I have not that hope any longer. When you declare a country an aggressor and start to fight a war with it, then you have to continue until one side or the other is defeated. Fighting a war presupposes that somebody is going to win and somebody is going to lose. There is no such thing as stopping in the middle. We must understand that and make our preparations accordingly.
Another thing I should like to emphasize to the minister is that we should not have any timetable as to when we are going to start this or when we are going to stop it. The defence program upon which we are embarking is in my opinion a long-term program. I can see the defences we are


building today continuing, and the men we are putting into uniform today being in uniform perhaps for the next fifteen or twenty years. It is a long-term program; and when we are thinking in terms of raising a brigade and that brigade going to Europe and another brigade going to Korea, we may be just picking up enough replacements for casualties. I do not think it is a realistic approach to the thing at all. The government has to start thinking in terms of equality of sacrifice in the business of defending this continent, and that is what we are preparing for at the present time.
I believe the minister's department or the government should consider a survey of our manpower and of our resources. That is one of the main requirements in preparation for defence. You may call it national registration, you may call it what you wish, but a survey of our resources and our manpower is necessary. The government is also going to have to start thinking in terms of this question: are we going to put a certain small percentage of our people in uniform and keep them there for the next ten or fifteen years at the pay they receive and at the inconvenience of being separated from their families and all that will entail, and are we going to leave everybody else back in Canada who is not in the services to go along with business as usual, making money for himself? If we are to embark on the kind of program that we feel is necessary, then everybody in this country should understand it, and there should be equality of sacrifice. Everybody should be obliged to pull his weight. That is another matter on which the government has not done very much thinking. It is about time we started to do some very serious thinking on this point.
When we talk about this business of democracy, our attitude to the people in the countries into which we have gone to liberate them requires considerable overhauling. For example, our record in Europe, in Germany and in Holland after the liberation was not good. According to reports, we were not the democratic gentlemen that we should have been. A lot was wrong with our attitude toward the people. Reference was made last evening by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar to an article that appeared in the Ottawa Citizen a few days ago in the form of questions and answers which left much to be desired. The attitude indicated there was: Well, you came in to liberate us, but instead of liberating us you exterminated us. The people of South Korea have been walked over and run over five or six times in the last year. Our attitude toward the people in selling democracy to them has left much to be desired. It is not very good. We must be

careful, in using democracy as a slogan, that we do not get back something which we have been fighting against for the last ten years.
Take a look at the elections which took place in Germany just a few days ago. Along with the United States and Britain we have been in western Germany selling democracy to them. The recent elections in that part of Germany showed that the nazi party is coming back very strongly in western Germany. On the other side, in eastern Germany you have the totalitarian set-up that is indoctrinating all the people in that part of the country; but on our side, where we should have been selling democracy and exemplifying it to them and building a democratic country, all we have succeeded in doing is to bring back the nazi party. In that election the three different nazi parties were able to capture at least twenty per cent of the votes. Political observers consider that a pretty bad development.
You pick up a press report and you find that under the guise of fighting communism and maintaining democracy, dictatorial powers are assumed to combat reds in Panama. The president throws over the democratic government and assumes dictatorial authority. He has a little revolution on his hands there today. We cannot sell democracy, in these countries that have never had it, by the use of semi-dictatorial powers and by pushing people around.
Another thing we have to be careful about-and apparently we are not sending the right kind of people into these areas to sell democracy-is this. Great emphasis has been laid on the question of economic aid. That is important, but it does not solve the whole problem. It seems to have been assumed that if we can build up these backward countries, give them plenty to eat, raise their standards and all that kind of thing, they will be our friends and will go along with us. A very good example is Korea itself, because that country was given a lot of aid during the time it was under the United Nations commission. The sum of $98,775,000 worth of economic aid was given to these people. One-third of it went for fertilizer to help them grow more food. Fourteen million dollars went for raw cotton; $7 million for coal, and other millions for wheat, flour and so forth. Yet, in the face of that huge expenditure, that huge gift in the way of economic aid, whenever the North Koreans were well fed and well armed they did not consider for a moment which side they were on. They attacked South Korea. They lighted the fire that is raging there at the present time.
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While I am in favour of helping to feed these people in backward countries under the Colombo plan, I think that assistance should be properly supervised and distributed. We must not forget that billions of dollars worth of economic aid was given to China, and we are now being repaid for that. We should be careful not to make the mistake we did in building up China, in arming her, so that she could come back and fight us when it suited her. We should have that aid in the hands of our friends, not in the hands of our enemies. I want to emphasize that point most strongly.
Let us not forget for a moment that today we are facing guns. Unless we can get as many guns handled by people who are just as efficient with them, we are not going to come out of this with a whole skin. We did not start this business. Canada and the United States have always been peaceful nations. As Mr. Mackenzie King said at the outbreak of the last war, he was reluctant to declare war and send young Canadians to Europe every generation to rescue countries who apparently were not able to look after themselves. That was a realistic statement to make. That war was'forced on us, and what we are up against today was forced on us. I do not think the people of this continent want to fight. But if a war is forced on us, we should fight with everything we have. There should be no quibbling about it. If we are to get in there to the full, then let us get in to the full.
I do not want anyone to assume that I am objecting to anything this government is doing by way of economic aid. But I contend that it should be organized, supervised and distributed in such a way as to bring returns to this country. It should not be placed in the hands of people who will use it to build up machinery in an attempt to bring about our ultimate destruction.
One thing we should watch very closely is the device being used by Soviet Russia- they know quite well how to use it-of splitting the allies who indicate a willingness to fight her. If hon. members have been following press reports for the last few weeks they will know that that device has been used quite successfully. In my opinion the MacArthur incident was a great victory for the communists. When they could get Truman and MacArthur in a public battle on vital issues in Korea, when they could cause such turmoil within the United States, they achieved a great victory. In my opinion they probably had a lot to do in bringing that about.
Many divisions have crept into the United Nations in connection with the Japanese
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Supply-National Defence treaty. The North Atlantic pact countries do not see eye to eye on this, nor do they see eye to eye on an arms embargo against China. Ever since the supposed end of the last war the communists have used the United Nations as a sounding board and as a means of dividing the allies. That war was never really ended; the shooting has never stopped.
I think the officials of the Department of External Affairs are levelheaded, and they should assume leadership in. the United Nations and step in whenever they see these divisions cropping up. They are No. 1 on Mr. Stalin's list. He wants to divide the allies and take them one by one. That was Hitler's technique, and the technique used today by Stalin is no different. Hitler's theme in the last war was never to fight again on two fronts, but the aim of the communists today is to divide the allies and get them fighting on as many fronts as possible. Stalin has sat back and has used none of his own men. He is using the satellites all over the world to start little wars here and there in the hope that he can get one going that will be big enough to involve the United States and Canada in particular and deplete the economies of these countries. If he can do that, there is nothing left to fight for. The Department of External Affairs can make a contribution by preventing differences between the North Atlantic pact countries.
I think the limiting factor in this country in connection with our defence program is the idea that we should have business as usual. No one thinks that he has to make any sacrifices. Everyone feels that he is going to have the same supplies of civilian goods, and that he is going to get more money for them. Everyone feels that we are going to equip and build' new plants for the purpose of turning out peacetime goods. That is the limiting factor. No one is pushing the program.
I was glad to hear the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar indicate yesterday that the Ford Motor company had been refused a permit to establish an auto parts plant in Windsor, a project which has been under consideration for at least -a year. I was glad to hear that the Department of Defence Production had refused this permit, because it would take such an enormous amount of steel. I know that at the other end of the scale a very small building requiring a small amount of steel was treated in the same way just a week or two ago. No building requiring steel is given a permit by the department. The priorities branch of the Department of
[Mr. Gillis.l

Defence Production is limiting the construction of anything that will take steel from essential defence requirements.
I was glad this permit was refused. This particular controversy indicates that the Ford Motor company are not co-operating very much when they want to start this peacetime project rather than tool up for vehicles and machines of war which are needed at this time. The argument is that they have no contracts, but at least a year ago I heard that they had contracts for many things which they should have been tooled up for at this time.
The supply of machine tools may be a big problem in this country. I have in my hand a report published in one of our local papers indicating a labour shortage in the machine tool industry. Machine tools are the very basis of our defence production program. If you are going to swing over twenty-five per cent of peacetime industry to a war economy, one of the first things you have to have is machine tools. Without machine tools you cannot tool up for the new production. It is an industrialist who is being reported in this news item, and he points out that there is a terrific labour shortage in the machine tool industry. You cannot develop a toolmaker overnight. He must serve an apprenticeship of nine years, even longer than a medical doctor. We should have had an apprenticeship program going for some considerable time.
While it is all right to find fault about the fact that there is no plane production, no tank production, or no production of this and that, the fact is that we should have a manpower and resources survey to pinpoint exactly what we are short of and what we should be giving priority to. That is one of the main requirements of an effective defence program. Unless that is done you are working in the dark. All of your planning is haphazard because you do not know what you are doing, and it is not going to be done from the ivory towers in Ottawa. You have got to get somebody else outside working with you. As I suggested to the Minister of Labour on his estimates, one of the things he should have is industrial councils covering the auto workers, mine workers and steel workers, the men who work in these plants and who can tell you what to do. They are the only people who can tell you.
Mr. Sale, the head of the Ford Motor Company of Canada, is a member of the manpower committee, but he did not tell you very much except that from the standpoint of his own organization he wanted to build a big

peacetime plant in the lace of defence production shortages in steel. If we had had industrial councils covering our industries the machine tool makers could have told us a year ago when we were talking defence that unless we did something about the developing shortage in that particular trade there would not be very much that we could do about defence, but we did not have anyone to tell us about that. The Department of National Defence should get together with the Department of Labour and form industrial councils. I am not objecting to what you have now. They are all right. Let them stay there, but augment them by men direct from the plants and shops who do the actual work and know what work has to be done.
I should like to say a word or two about standardization of arms, something which I think is very important. Other members have mentioned the matter but nobody stated very definitely whether they favoured standardization on the United States pattern or on the British pattern. As I heard it, the suggestion was that we should stick with the United States pattern where we are fighting with the Americans, and that our brigade to Europe perhaps should follow the British pattern. I am no expert on the matter, but I have read something about it. I have read what was said in this house in the years before the last war. The argument always has been that we should standardize on the United States pattern. Many years before the last war this matter came up in the House of Commons and very good arguments were made for following that course, but I think that today the reasons are much stronger why Canada should standardize on [DOT] the United States pattern.


Mr. Wright:: Why not one pattern for all?


Clarence Gillis: I would say that if the North Atlantic pact countries mean business, if they are going to stick together, if it is going to be a case of when one is at war the others are at war, then no matter where these countries are engaged they will be fighting together, and there should be the one standard of equipment for all the North Atlantic pact countries. Of course the commercial aspect enters into the picture, and every country will want to do the manufacturing. That could be farmed out. No priority should be given any one country. Every country should manufacture an equal share, but there should be complete standardization for the North Atlantic pact countries.


Mr. Blackmore:: Would my hon. friend permit a question?


Clarence Gillis: Yes.
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John Horne Blackmore: I am greatly interested in his remarks. Suppose it were decided to standardize arms for the North Atlantic pact countries. That would include Great Britain. Would my hon. friend go so far as to suggest that it would be better to have Great Britain accept the United States standard of arms? I am particularly interested in the discussion.


Clarence Gillis: I am not saying whether Great Britain should accept United States standards or whether the United States should accept British standards. I think there is some equipment that perhaps can be turned out more economically and better in Great Britain, and there is perhaps other equipment that the United States can turn out better. These details are thii gs that would have to be worked out. I am merely talking about the principle. If these countries are going to hang together then I think there should be one standard. No matter where they are their equipment should be interchangeable.


John Horne Blackmore: Would my hon. friend permit another interpolation?


Clarence Gillis: Yes.


John Horne Blackmore: The reason I asked the question was that I gathered from what the hon. member said that he felt there was a controversy between the ideas of those who believe that the British standard should be the one adopted and those who believe that the United States standard should be the one adopted. I saw there was a difficulty there that my hon. friend probably would like to explain away.


Clarence Gillis: There is a controversy right now. For example, the proposal was made that a uniform rifle should be adopted. There is an argument now between Great Britain and the United States on that point. Great Britain thinks that a Belgian rifle offered at the present time is a better rifle. They think it is lighter and easier to handle and, so far as I know at the present time, Great Britain is going to adopt the Belgian rifle and equip her forces with it. On the other hand the Americans say that they are going to stick to their own rifle. It is heavier, and it is an automatic rifle. They claim it is better and therefore they are going to stick to it. There is a controversy at the present time. I am raising this matter now because of that controversy.
As the hon. member for Melfort suggested, there should be one standard for the North Atlantic pact countries; that is the ideal thing. But on the other hand if war develops and there is going to be any standardization so far as Canada is concerned it should be

Supply-National Defence on the United' States pattern. If those we expect to fight succeeded in their objective of invading this continent, and we were standardized on the British pattern of equipment, one of the first places to be isolated and cut off from us in the event of invasion of this continent would be Great Britain. Americans and Canadians would be fighting all over the continent and we would be stuck with the British pattern, a pattern that was not interchangeable with that of the United States. If we are going to accept any pattern I think it should be the United States standard, I mention this matter because it requires some thought by the Department of National Defence.
I have noticed that at the present time the department is sending out of the country considerable equipment-and rightly so-to Belgium and other countries. That presupposes that we are going to develop new patterns and equipment for ourselves. The matter of standardization has been brought up twice but no one made very emphatic recommendations on the subject. My own opinion is that if any standardization for defence purposes is going to be considered by the Canadian government, our best bet is to stick with our neighbours in the United States. I think that I am pretty well to the end of my time, Mr. Chairman.


John Horne Blackmore: I have interrupted you.


Clarence Gillis: I should like to say one other thing to the minister before I sit down. In his speech he made reference to the fact that recruiting would be carried on right across the country. He said that he was basing his recruiting centres on the reserve army, and that the new brigade was to be raised through the reserve forces. I agree with that. However, he also told us the centres where training is going to take place, and in looking over them I find that the minister has very carefully excluded any training centres in the maritime provinces. So far as eastern Canada is concerned the training is to be done-


Brooke Claxton: There is all the training for the navy and two big training centres for the air force.


Clarence Gillis: Well, I listened to the minister's speech, and I have a clipping here dated May 4 with the heading "No brigade training for camps in maritimes." From this I gather that all the men from eastern Canada will be trained at Valcartier. I would ask the minister not to let his department get into the same frame of mind the government appears to be in, with respect to the centralization of his forces in this part of Canada. That is the economic development.


Brooke Claxton: Proportionately we have
more forces in Nova Scotia and spend more money there than in any other part of Canada, I think.


Clarence Gillis: Since when?


Brooke Claxton: In the defence department
in 1950-51.


Clarence Gillis: Well, you built a number of
good camps down there during the last war, but you destroyed them when the war was over; they were obliterated.


Brooke Claxton: More than half the total
operations of the navy are centred in Halifax.


Clarence Gillis: I am talking about the army
now; I do not know what you are doing in the navy. I have been up and down that province quite a bit in the last three years, and I have not seen any naval men there at all. There may be a few hidden away in Halifax, but they are'pretty carefully kept out of the way. You know, navy boys get around when they are ashore. I am talking about your training camps. Valcartier is quite a good camp. I spent a considerable time there, camping in the sand, some years ago, and it is not a bad spot. At the same time I suggest to the minister that he should still consider Debert, which was one of the best camps in Canada for the training of troops that were to go overseas. I believe he should give that matter further consideration.
Now I am going to offer a few recommendations which I think would stimulate recruiting. Today I do not think very much is offered the average man to make him leave his employment, uproot himself, and leave the country for an indefinite period with the armed services. A moment ago I said what I thought of the minister's policy of using the reserve force as the basis for the organization of this new brigade. I also want to tell him that one of the greatest stumbling blocks in the way of building up the reserve force is the fact that the money these men are paid is taxed. You do not have to leave this city to find that out; you can get that information from any of the boys in the reserve army here. I understand the amount paid members of the reserve army is to be stepped up a little. A recruit comes in and says, "We get paid so much per drill. Is that money taxed?" He is told that it is taxed, so he says, "O.K., I am not coming in." That man has a job; he is in a certain income tax bracket. If he joins the reserve army he will be paid $20 or $25 a month, which must be added to his income. That puts him in another income tax bracket. At the end of the year, instead of the reserve army paying him something,

he pays Mr. Abbott something. He really loses in the transaction; he has drilled tor nothing, because the money is taken back in income tax. I think the Minister of National Defence, who has the responsibility of raising this force-and a very serious responsibility it is-should say to the Minister of Finance that the little bit of money he is getting out of this by way of tax should be forgotten; that in order to stimulate recruiting he should announce that the money paid the men who drill in the evenings, and who will form the basis of the next army, will be tax free. Then I think you will get a lot of them to go in who will not go in otherwise. It seems to me that a government so mercenary and parsimonious that it will not relinquish the little bit of money it gets by taxing the pay of the reserve army deserves very little consideration when it appeals to men to take the training necessary to form the basis of the next army, the very men who would be necessary to defend this continent if and when the over-all thing develops that we all expect.
I suggest to the minister very seriously that if he hopes to get recruits his department should not just sit back and say, "Well, we have done it before; we can do it again." Unless some serious thinking is done, unless there are more practical advances in the next two years than we have seen in the last two years, I suggest to the Canadian people that they had better join the moral rearmament group and start to pray for guidance. Very little has been done except talk and put schemes on paper. What I have recommended would be one practical step. It would recognize the fact that it is unfair to expect a man to join the reserve army and drill, and for that privilege and pleasure pay the income tax department at the end of the year.
Then there is this matter of the attestation form, which was mentioned yesterday by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar. There is not a uniform attestation form today. That form is a pretty important thing to a man going into the service, because it lays the basis for a lot of things that can happen to him after he comes out, such as pension rights, whether he has any disabilities that are considered hereditary, and all that kind of thing. Most of the boys joining up today either were in before or know something about the importance of that form. Surely that would not be a difficult thing to remedy. I imagine it would not be hard to get a uniform form ready and ship it out to the centres where recruiting is carried on. This may not sound very important, but anyone who has been in the service, or anyone who
Supply-National Defence has fought pension cases, knows the importance of an attestation form. It pretty well forms the basis for everything that happens when you go before a board, unless your disability consists of a big hole that has been shot into you, or something like that. Generally they pull a statement from the form that the boy's grandfather had mumps or his grandmother had housemaid's knee, and when considering any kind of disability they say it resulted from the mumps or the housemaid's knee. I believe we should have an attestation form that would eliminate that sort of thing. A man is either fit when he goes into the service or he is not fit; and we still have a great deal of trouble at the present time from that sort of thing in connection with the last two wars.
I want to bring another point to the minister's attention, and I feel perhaps stronger on this one than on any of the others. Many of the young men in the service today, including many in Korea, are boys who left a home with a father, a mother and a dependent family. That boy was the only source of income, but there is no dependents' allowance in his case. If he has a wife he gets an allowance for her, though it is not too big. He gets an allowance for his children, if any. Most of the boys who went in the special force, however, were single. Let us not forget that many young men in this country today are maintaining families. They do not marry for that reason; they have families on their hands already. I know several who left mothers and fathers and younger children at home and joined that special force, and are now in Korea. In the first war and the second war there was a dependents' allowance available if there was an assignment of pay; today there is nothing but the assigned pay. There is no dependents' allowance board, as such. Those matters are handled through the national defence department, though handling dependents' allowance is a job by itself. You do not want it done by a brigadier or a colonel or a general, who may know all about the military angles of everything. You want someone who has some humanity about him, who understands the social problems that can be created by taking the breadwinner away from the family.


John Horne Blackmore: Will the hon. member
permit a question?


Clarence Gillis: Yes.


John Horne Blackmore: Would the member care
to state whether or not the same thing applies to the boys who would be enlisting in the army today, whether or not they would be going to Korea?

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Clarence Gillis: Yes, the same thing applies
to the brigade that would be going to Europe.


John Horne Blackmore: That is a mighty serious
matter.


Clarence Gillis: I would say to the minister
that if you are going to raise an army by voluntary means, you are only going to get the boys of this country to put on a uniform who have some patriotism in their hearts and who recognize the fact that this country is worth fighting for. If these boys leave dependents behind and go out to do that kind of job, I do not think it is asking too much of the fellow who stays at home in order to make more money, and who has the comforts of a home, to pay a little tax to look after the family the chap leaves behind. If the man who volunteers is willing to offer his life, as he is doing in Korea today, I think his father, mother, dependent brothers and sisters are entitled to some subsistence allowance from the government. The precedent is there, because we did it in both of the last wars. We even had auxiliary dependents allowance boards and committees across the country with power to make grants in addition to the basic allowance given by the government. I am telling the minister that that is a very strong point when you go out to sell voluntary enlistment to the young men of this country, as you are doing today. Their fathers have gone through a war, and we are asking these boys, twice in one lifetime, to volunteer. This time it is necessary. It is our war this time. If we do not go out and meet it somewhere else, it is going to meet us here. We have to get away from this philosophy of "business as usual, and I am not going to make any sacrifice because a supernatural something is going to inspire the people of this country to do the job themselves". That is not going to happen.
We have to show the young man who leaves this country that we are interested to the extent of granting an allowance that will replace, to some extent at least, the obligation he accepted before he decided he had a greater obligation in the service of his country. I strongly urge the Minister of National Defence to consider those three points. There should be a manpower survey, and a resources survey conducted as soon as possible. I believe that is the basis for our whole defence set-up. As long as you are getting recruits on a voluntary basis, at least you should not make the reserve army pay taxes. Then we should follow that up by granting a dependents allowance where young men were maintaining homes before going into the service. I know that most of


these boys fully expected there would be an allowance. Perhaps some of them would not have volunteered if they had known otherwise. I have had letters from them, and I have made representations to the deputy minister. The deputy minister informs me there is no regulation covering the situation, and there is no dependents allowance board. If we are going to get a defence program going which will take us over the next ten or fifteen years, then we had better commence setting up the mechanics necessary to administer it. We should do something to meet the requirements of those who are expected to leave this country to meet the enemy somewhere else and stop him before he gets here.
These points are not very difficult, but you have to do something about them. You cannot put them on paper and file them away in a desk. When the minister speaks in closing the debate I shall expect him to tell us that he has considered these three points, and to give us his assurance they are going to be taken care of immediately.


Mr. Hees:: Mr. Chairman, I should like to deal with three aspects of the defence program. They are:
The raising of a larger reserve army,
Making that reserve army more effective, and
The pay for the active forces.
First of all, I should like to deal with the raising of a larger reserve army. I believe all members will agree that if we are to raise an active force quickly, we must rely on a large and well-trained reserve. For the past five years, Mr. Chairman, I have been a staff officer in the reserve army. From my observations, I would say that the great majority of reserve units would not, on an average, parade more than twenty-five per cent of their authorized strength, and a large part of the numbers on parade are made up by the band.
Why is it that our reserve army is so small today, during a period which is vitally critical, and which adds up to undeclared war? Why is it, we must ask ourselves, do our young men not volunteer in larger numbers than they have for both our active and reserve forces? I have come to the conclusion that it is simply because they have not been told by this government that today the situation is critical. In fact, the government has attempted to lull the people into a false sense of security.
An outstanding example of that, I believe, is the statement which was made by the Prime Minister last December 12, and which was recorded by the Canadian Press all

across this country. I intend to put it on the record, so there can be no doubt about it. This statement appeared in the Ottawa Citizen of December 13. The headline reads: "P.M. Optimistic General War Will Not Come at This Time." That is a big three-column heading on the article, and it reads:
A reporter asked Mr. St. Laurent if he was satisfied with Canada's defence progress.
He smiled and said:
"I think the progress is satisfactory."
Then he added:
"I am just as optimistic as Lloyd's." He noted that the London insurance firm had quoted odds of 50-1 against a general war breaking out. He concluded:
"I am just as optimistic as they are."
Now, Mr. Chairman, this statement was interpreted by people right across this country as meaning that the Prime Minister was saying he believed the chances were 50 to 1 against our becoming involved in a general war. I know that the Prime Minister has denied any intention of conveying that impression. However, as so often happens in these cases, the original statement gets the headlines, and the denial makes no news at all. That was the case in this instance. The result is that people only remember the Prime Minister's original statement, and it remains very clearly in their minds today.
I have talked to a great number of young men about joining the active or reserve forces. Time and again I have heard them say, "How can you expect me to take the situation very seriously if the man who is supposed to know most about the situation tells me there is only one chance in 50 I shall be needed?"
What is needed immediately is a statement by the Prime Minister which will outline, without the shadow of a doubt, the gravity of the situation today, and which will issue a clear-cut call to duty that the young men of this country can understand. Then, and only then, shall we begin to get some worth-while results from the hundreds of thousands of dollars we are spending every month in advertising designed to get young men to enlist in both the active and reserve forces.
What I believe we want to hear a great deal more of from this government is the kind of statement which was made by the Minister of National Health and Welfare yesterday morning while he was addressing a meeting of civil defence workers. I should like to quote what he said, as it was reported in the Ottawa Journal of last evening. The heading is "Whip up Fury against Soviet Threat" and the report reads as follows:
Civil defence minister Paul Martin, in a sizzling preparedness speech tliis morning, lashed out at
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what he termed Canada's "over-defence-minded-ness" and urged a campaign to "whip up fighting fury" against the Soviet threat.
"You can't win wars by hiding behind trees," Mr. Martin told a group of civil defence instructors at the opening of a training course at Connaught ranges.
"Defence alone never results in victory," Mr. Martin added.
The minister-who was accompanied by civil defence co-ordinator Major General F. F. Worthington-made it plain the prospect of atomic fire raining down on key Canadian target centres was no idle dream
"Now, if ever, we must take this thing seriously. God knows what the situation will be within a year." .
I believe it is regrettable that we have had to wait for so long for a statement containing some realization of the gravity of the situation today, and that that statement would have to come from the Minister of National Health and Welfare, instead of from the Prime Minister and the Minister of National Defence, from whom it should have come many months ago. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, it indicates that there is an imminent cabinet shake-up in the offing, in which the present Minister of National Health and Welfare is going to follow in the steps of the former minister of national health and welfare. But whether that is the case or not, the present Minister of National Health and Welfare has certainly well earned the nickname of "the Windsor Warrior" which is being bandied about the parliamentary lobbies and corridors today.
The second matter with which I should like to deal is the making of our reserve forces more effective. I believe that if our reserve units are going to become effective fighting formations, capable of taking their part in the defence of this country if needed, they must train as complete units each year for a minimum of two weeks at a summer camp. In order to make this possible, it will be necessary to pass legislation requiring employers to grant to employees who are in the reserve forces a two-week leave of absence during the period of the camp each summer, without jeopardizing the employee's job or seniority. This was found to be perfectly feasible during the last war, and the results were highly satisfactory. I believe it is the only way that units can become effective, so that they can take their place in the defence of this country, if that eventuality should ever arise.
The third point with which I should like to deal is pay for the active force. I should like to deal with it under two separate divisions: first, the freeing from income tax of the pay of those who serve outside of this country; and second, the paying of danger pay to those who serve in the front line.

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First, as to the question of freeing from income tax the pay of soldiers who serve overseas, may I say this. The Minister of Finance, during the debate, when this question arose, stated that he believed that no group of earners within this country should be exempt from income tax. I think we will all agree that that is perfectly satisfactory in so far as it affects those of us who live and work in the comfort and security of this country; but it is quite another matter when you are dealing with those who risk their lives every hour on some foreign battlefield, to fight our battles for us. I believe that these men should be allowed to retain intact what they earn while fighting our battles overseas. I believe it is the least we can do in repayment to those gallant men, for their magnificent efforts on our behalf.
The second matter is the payment of danger pay to those who serve in the front lines. During the last war members of air crew in the air force were paid flying pay; and it was quite right that they should be so rewarded because of the danger which their job involved. The paratroopers were paid jump pay, and I believe that was quite justified because of the danger involved. Also, those who served on small ships in the navy were paid hard-lying pay, because of the discomfort involved in serving in those small ships.
I do not think that anybody undergoes any more danger-in fact, I do not think that anybody undergoes as much constantly -or that he undergoes as much discomfort over a long period, as do forward troops who are in slit trenches, under almost constant bombardment, as is the case in the forward areas.
During the last war, in the army, you could receive trades pay if you were a motor mechanic, a driver mechanic, an artificer or an orderly room clerk, or if you were skilled in any one of several trades, most of which were performed in the rear areas. But there has never been any trades pay for proficiency in the most important job of all, namely, killing the enemy, without which we cannot win battles. That job involves by far the greatest chance of getting killed or maimed, and it involves living in what are, in many cases, almost unendurable conditions.
I therefore strongly urge on the minister that he and his department seriously consider the question of paying danger pay to those who serve within a reasonable distance of the front line, and in this way properly reward those upon whose courage and skill we must rely for the winning of our campaigns.
[Mr. Hees.l

In -conclusion, I should like to say to the minister that the suggestions I have offered arise out of a certain amount of experience in these matters, and that they are offered as an attempt to be constructive. I sincerely hope that they will be considered in that light by the minister, and that he will comment on them when he sums up at the end of this debate.


Mr. Decore:: Mr. Chairman, I intend to be brief. I should like to -draw to the attention of the minister the importance of finding a place in the defence of this country for those resident in Canada who have not yet been able to become Canadian citizens or British subjects. My information is that, to date, there are to be found in this country some 40,000 men who are between the ages of 20 and 40 years, and who are not yet British subjects. Nearly all those people are newcomers who have arrived here in this country since 1945. Many of them came from d.p. camps. The majority of them belong to the following ethnic groups:	Polish, Dutch,
Ukrainian, Italian, Hebrew, Lithuanian, French, Czechoslovakian, Belgian and others. I also understand that some have come in from the United States who have not become Canadian- -citizens. My information is that it is not the policy of the Department of National Defence to admit into the Canadian armed- forces, both active and reserve, any person who is not a British subject. I should like to point out some of the reasons why I think these men should be permitted at least to train in the reserve army. To begin with, many of these men have important qualifications which should be considered. Many of them came from countries which in the last war were right in the midst of fighting. Many of them are acquainted with life under war conditions. Many of them served with various armed services, and are therefore familiar with military technique. Some of them had a very wide experience and have held high positions in the army. Admitting these men now into our reserves would, I think, do two thing from the military point of view. It would first of all give them a degree of military training, and those with battle experience would become acquainted with the Canadian military technique; and, second, in the event of war it would- prepare them for their task before they are needed, thereby saving precious time.
In -addition to the military advantages, perhaps the greatest advantage to Canada would be in the realm of Canadian citizenship. I have met many of these -newcomers, and they are anxious and willing to serve this country. In reserve services a newcomer would be a member of a purely Canadian organization. He would intermingle with

Canadians and become better acquainted with our way of life. I think it would be the best school for him in Canadian citizenship. The newcomer would feel that he is not merely getting certain advantages in this country, but that in addition to other services he is prepared to offer something more to this country,-he is prepared to defend it.
There are certain arguments that I have heard people use against the admission of these non-citizens. One argument is that serving in the armed forces is a prerogative of a citizen and should not be extended to others. The other argument against admission is for security reasons. Dealing with the first objection, my point is that the admission of non-citizens is not urged as a matter of course, but in the light of the present grave international situation I think it is essential that Canada use all the possible means at her disposal to prepare for defence. May I point out at this time that in the United States male non-citizens are required to register for service between the ages of 18 and 26 under the compulsory service act of 1948. But at the same time I am informed' that United States military intelligence is actually encouraging United States residents with only the "first papers", which is equivalent to our declaration of intention, to enlist for special duties with the army.
Dealing with the other objection, namely, the question of security, those who use this argument seem to disregard the fact that newcomers have already been screened before they were allowed to enter Canada. We must not forget that most of these people are political refugees; that they are therefore the greatest opponents of Russian communism that we can find in this country. Many of them have been victims of Russian brutality, and have actually witnessed the workings of Russian communism in its worst form.
May I add further that if they were allowed to join the reserve army they would undergo further screening before they were admitted. Other important qualifications of these newcomers are that they are specialists to this extent, that they have a knowledge of a language which is other than English or French; that they are acquainted with the geography and the way of life of some country other than Canada; that some of them have lived for many years in countries now behind the iron curtain, and they are well acquainted with the lands and with the people. I think that this type of people would indeed be an asset for our defence purposes.
I should like to point out that although the admission of the newcomers to the Canadian reserve forces may be accompanied by certain difficulties, yet I feel that the
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(Translation):


Mr. Balcer:: Mr. Chairman, we are asked today to concur in the adoption of the defence estimates which will not only add tremendously to our national budget but also endanger the economic future of our country. Every man, every woman, every family in the country will therefore be forced to shoulder a heavy burden of taxes for a period of at least three years.
Together with the rest of the house I deeply regret that it should be necessary to devote such enormous sums to our national defence preparedness when that money could be put to such advantageous use in promoting our economic development and the social progress of our country.
It may very well be necessary to buy radar equipment, fighter planes, guns, and so on, but who holds that such production is creative and productive!
One has but to consider the military operations taking place in Korea, Indo-China and the Malay peninsula, to realize the menace which hangs over our free world. All the free nations of the world must unite against such aggression.
It is now impossible to mistake isolation for national interest. Canada's obligations are those of a great sovereign nation. Without committing ourselves beyond our means, or without imitating the frog that wanted to be as big as an ox, we nevertheless have a responsibility in this search for world peace.
Unfortunately, I regret that the present government, which likes to take all the credit with regard to Canada's status as a sovereign nation, has not yet seen fit to give our country a truly Canadian flag as a symbol of such sovereignty. Canadian soldiers are being asked once more to fight abroad and shed their blood under a flag which is not theirs.
Besides, the problem of choosing a national anthem to honour Canada, both at home and abroad, has not yet been settled.
Obviously such a state of affairs is inconsistent with Canada's present status as a sovereign nation.
Furthermore, the selection of a flag and national anthem, both truly Canadian, would help considerably in this recruiting campaign which has been launched by the Department of National Defence.

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I was pleased to learn yesterday from the minister himself the part now taken by the French-speaking Canadians in the Korean war and their representation in the Canadian army.
I also wish to congratulate the minister for his reply to the unfounded articles which have appeared in the Contemporary Review and in Foreign Affairs.
I agree with the minister that we should avoid and condemn anything that might create friction between the various racial groups of this country.
Like the minister who quoted these figures in order to reply to unfounded accusations and also to help the recruiting campaign which has just been launched, I would like to make a few remarks prompted by these same feelings.
Voluntary enlistment should supply the recruits needed by our armed forces. But if we want the recruiting campaign to be really successful in my province, we must see to it that in serving his country Jean-Baptiste is not given the impression of being a sort of mercenary.
And yet, if upon enlisting Jean-Baptiste gives our general staff a glance, he will most certainly be struck by the fact that the Department of National Defence does not go overboard, as far as generosity and national spirit are concerned, in the choice of superior officers.
Here is what he will find. At national defence headquarters in Ottawa: 2 lieutenant generals, both English-speaking; 7 major generals, all English-speaking; 33 brigadiers, of whom only 2 are Frenchspeaking; 43 colonels of whom only 4 are French-speaking; 220 lieutenant colonels of whom 18 are French-speaking, and 560 majors of whom only 57 are French-speaking.
Turning to the different army services and looking over their staffs, one will notice that the representation is about the same.
Consider, for instance, the staff of the Royal Canadian Ordnance Corps, with headquarters in the French-Canadian city of Montreal; there, one finds 20 lieutenant colonels, of whom only 1 is a French-speaking Canadian, and 50 majors of whom only 4 speak French.
The same state of affairs applies to the headquarters of the different branches of the Canadian army. But when one considers the Quebec command headquarters, located
[Mr. Balcer.l
in Montreal, it is even more surprising to find that the commanding general is an English-speaking Canadian, as is the chief of staff. The G.S.O. 1 and G.S.O. 1 (planning) are both English-speaking. If one examines the various services of the Quebec command, one finds exactly the same situation.
Let us now deal with the reserve army. Montreal has a population of about a million and a half, of whom 70 per cent are French-Canadians. Only four reserve regiments are actually French-Canadian regiments. There are nine English regiments where roughly 50 per cent of the soldiers are French-speaking Canadians; yet hardly 1 per cent of them are officers.
In so far as the Canadian navy is concerned, the situation is even more deplorable. There is not a single French-speaking officer above the rank of commander.
There is no excuse for this. Not only does it harm recruiting in the province of Quebec, but it shows how senior officers of this service are utterly devoid of the spirit of national unity.
Besides it is not surprising When it is remembered that, to instil a little Canadian-ism in the navy, near-mutinies and a strict investigation were required.
This situation should be improved as soon as possible, not only because of the present recruiting campaign, but also for the good of the services themselves.
Again, it is a situation like this which provokes articles like the one that the minister answered yesterday. Seeing so very few French-Canadians in senior positions, strangers cannot but draw conclusions such as those evidenced in these two articles.
I trust that the minister will make a note of those few remarks and that the situation will soon improve. In closing I wish to make a few suggestions. May I be permitted to request again, as was done several times in this house, that a military college be established in the province of Quebec in order to provide the necessary officers to ensure a fair representation within the general staffs of our different units.
I also wish the department would consider the advisability of creating French-Canadian naval units along the lines of the French-Canadian regiments in our army. During the last war, the R.C.A.F. established French-Canadian squadrons and everyone knows that this arrangement produced excellent results.
It is recognized that the establishment of such French-speaking units has a valuable effect on the new recruits, as our young men

obviously do not feel at home at the beginning of their military careers and it is easy to understand that they feel less at home when they are not surrounded by people who speak their language and who received the same kind of education.
Undoubtedly such units could not be established without difficulty, but experience has shown that the results secured are worthwhile. I hope that the hon. minister will be able to solve that problem.
(Text):


Mr. Thomas:: Mr. Chairman, on a question of privilege, the five o'clock edition of the Ottawa Journal today contains an article from which I should like to quote in part as follows:	*
Reference to the Martin speech, as reported in the Journal, also was made by O. L. Jones, C.C.F. member for Yale and by Ray Thomas, C.C.F. member for Wetaskiwin.
I want to express my appreciation of the write-up given to me by the Journal, but I do not like the added title of C.C.F. that I have been given. I am afraid they might go just a little bit further and refer to me as a Liberal.


Mr. Graydon:: Mr. Chairman, I shall occupy only two or three minutes of the time of the committee, but coming from a constituency which is so keenly interested in the matter about which I desire to say a word, I want to rise at this time and take part in this general discussion with respect to national defence in order to place my own personal views upon the record.
Linked closely with our plans for national defence is an issue which because of its overriding urgency requires government action at once. I am fully aware that the minister and the cabinet have been considering their course of action very carefully relative to the vital St. Lawrence seaway development. Members like myself and others, including members of the government, have during the last few weeks stressed the urgency of immediate action on the treaty which is presently before congress for ratification. I want to stress it again while we are considering the nation's defence program.
Time is rapidly running out for planning the needs of power for the production of war materials, to say nothing of the strategic necessity for this new means of water transportation from the mines to the mills for the iron ore so urgently needed for defence purposes.
It now appears that the chances of a favourable congressional decision are becoming more remote. That means Canada is faced
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National Defence with a decision of her own. The premier of Ontario yesterday pointed out in clear terms the advisability of Canada doing the job herself. Construction of the seaway alone was not our original plan but the government has arrived at a point now where in my personal view a new all-Canadian development should be announced at once.
The Prime Minister in the house last week expressed confidence that Canada could handle the undertaking without help from south of the border and he will have heavy support for that view.
The risk in delaying commencement of the project as an all-Canadian one arises from several factors. One is that a favourable decision by congress might conceivably mean a long series of delays with respect to appropriations and the like which could well nullify the objective of urgency surrounding the work and put back the completion for an embarrassingly long time. Another is that many time-consuming procedures are required', such as an application before the international joint commission which should be started if the project on an all-Canadian basis is to be initiated in the early future. Time becomes therefore a vital element from a defence point of view. In my opinion the decks should be cleared for action. Otherwise the deep waterway may well get bogged down and lost in a maze of international negotiations and delays beyond description. We have waited many years for the treaty to be ratified and implemented. No one in the United States could reasonably expect us to wait longer in this atmosphere of acute and compelling urgency. In my own humble opinion we should go it alone.
I want to impress upon the minister now the great urgency and concern with which those in my part of Canada view this very important matter. I know that he, charged as he is with providing for the defence needs of this country, will realize that the situation has become alarmingly acute. I urge the government to make that declaration now, and to proceed on an all-Canadian St. Lawrence deep waterway scheme.


Brooke Claxton: Mr. Chairman, in the course
of the debate a number of very helpful suggestions have been made, and I can assure members of the committee that all of them will receive the most serious consideration. I appreciate too the constructive attitude taken again by the official critic for the opposition, the hon. member for Nanaimo, and I take this opportunity to congratulate him on his reformation. For a long period of his life he has been a very gallant soldier in a branch of the services which we respect
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Supply-National Defence as the queen of them all, the infantry, but recently I took advantage of a vacancy in the honorary colonelship of an artillery regiment to approve his appointment to it, so that now at last he is a gunner.
At the outset I do not want to say anything much by way of general remarks except that this time the discussion has followed extraordinarily closely those of the last four years in which there have been charges of no information and that we should have done something before. As to information, I have answered that, and so have some other hon. gentlemen. Certainly the complaint I have from persons outside the house is that far too much information is given for our own good. Certainly far more is given than in any other country I know of with the only possible exception of the United States. I wish hon. members would1 look at the debates on defence matters in the parliament at Westminster. They would see how restricted they are on questions of policy, they do not go into matters of detail. There is no reason why we should follow them, but I suggest that when we are criticized on that account on this side of the house it would be well to look at what the mother of parliaments considers desirable.
For example, this year the debates on the defence estimates took place on March 6, 1951, for air, March 8 for the army and March 12 for the navy. They occupied a total of twenty-three hours. So far as I know, that is all the time that will be spent on defence estimates by the British House of Commons. As we know, their select committee on estimates, which has a subcommittee on defence, deals only with matters of finance and the like. This year, in addition to the list of public announcements that I gave at the outset of my statement yesterday, we have had the white paper which was tabled in the house on Monday, and which gives much more comprehensively and in greater detail than ever before information about the work of our defence forces, about what has been done, what is planned and what the money is needed for. I think it should enable all hon. members to see the picture very well,
In addition, this is an occasion when hon. members can secure additional information, and during the last day and a half they have not been backward in asking for it. I will endeavour to answer every question.
There is only one other general comment with which I wish to deal. It was said that we should have done more in 1946, 1947, 1948 and 1949, Let me give an illustration. If we had preserved in the air force, for example, ten or eleven fighting squadrons at full strength, equipped with the aircraft


they were using at the end of the war, we would now have an air force with personnel almost entirely over age for the job they had to do and out of date with respect to equipment. Instead we deliberately set about, starting with our wartime experience and war-trained officers, to build up the training establishment and depots, and also to develop aircraft which would enable us, as I believe they will, to be right among the leaders of the world as we would expect to be in that field.
The same thing applies to the other services. We have very good' schools in practically every line of activity teaching officers and men to do the best kind of work. If we had not had those schools we would not have been able to train the Korean force or to keep on training our men at the rate we have. Notwithstanding the overhead required for administration, training, supply and transportation, I submit that we still have a lower overhead than other countries with which I am familiar with the single expection of countries behind the iron curtain.
Coming to the questions asked, the hon. member for Nanaimo remarked that the present method of recruiting was haphazard. He said we were taking on men whom we should not enlist, and he referred to the wastage which resulted in taking on the special force. Wastage in the army this year is by no means abnormal. During the first half of the year it was 4-3 per cent and in the second half
5-	3 per cent. These figures may be compared with 3-4 and 4-2 for 1949,
6- 1 and 5-1 for 1948; 10-2 and 2-2 for 1947; and for 1939, which in some ways perhaps was a comparable period from the point of view of defence preparedness, 10-9 and 9-9 per cent. There is no evidence whatever that we are taking on men who should be engaged in industry. In point of fact we are not taking on as great a proportion of tradesmen as we would like to have. This matter is thoroughly worked out with the Department of Labour and my colleague, the Minister of Defence Production. It is felt that the present system is working as well as anything we could devise.
With respect to quotas for the C.O.T.C., the hon. member suggested they might be higher. These quotas are worked out on a local basis through the commands in discussion with the universities. The universities have co-operated magnificently in these plans, which I think are unique in the world. They have asked for more members whenever they felt they could get men who were desirable. Quotas have not been a limiting factor and, as the hon. member will see from the figures given, whenever a quota is

reached it is increased. Quotas are fixed for purposes of planning, pay, allowances, supplies, equipment, and the supply of army and training staff. We can really congratulate ourselves that some thirty-two universities and colleges are co-operating most wholeheartedly in this plan. However, we hope to expand it, and to that end a conference is being arranged with the heads of the university contingents and the representatives of the services for the end of this month, which will be followed immediately by a conference jointly with the universities conference military committee, with which we work very well.
Then the hon. member asked whether we were getting full value from the service colleges, whether they were meeting our more urgent needs. Well, it is too early to say. The first class to have taken the full four-year course has just graduated, and we do not know yet how many are going into the active and reserve forces; but so far we have no reason to regret this development in tri-service officer training. It may be that it should be modified. It may be, for example, that the curriculum to cover in four years the equivalent of four years of arts and three years of engineering, with an additional 15 per cent on military subjects during the school year, is too heavy; but the combination of academic work during the seven school months and four months of practical work with the services has worked out very well.
The next question was whether we can afford to have such colleges which do not insist on the men continuing with the active force. We believe that so far it has been useful to have these men train in this way and then mix with the university men during the summer months. Some of them, of course, go on to the universities. They are all available. They are trained officers, qualified to take the rank of captain in the reserve force or lieutenant in the active force, and so far we have no reason to regret this very important development.
Then the hon. member regretted the failure to standardize, which was mentioned by half a dozen hon. members. I also exceedingly regret the failure to have more standardization. If there were any way in which one in Canada could force the United States to standardize with Britain or Britain to standardize with the United States, I would be glad to use all the persuasive force possible to bring that about. That is what we have been doing for five years in joint committees and joint activities, but it is an exceedingly difficult operation. For one thing both the United Kingdom and the
Supply-National Defence United States have large stocks of equipment on hand. They have those stocks at a time when the world is short of military equipment. Nobody is going to dump any equipment into the sea; nobody is going to give it away to any country behind the iron curtain. So until we can gradually build up our stocks of military equipment there is no possibility of standardization to any great degree. But what is disappointing is that in the adoption of new weapons the United Kingdom and the United States have not seen eye to eye.
Faced with this, and remembering all the difficulties we had during the second world war, a good many months ago we decided to standardize our equipment-not right across the board but generally-with United States-type equipment. It so happened that we had the armament equipment for practically five divisions in mobilization stores, equipment of the latest type in use at the end of the second world war. We were probably unique in that respect. When the North Atlantic treaty organization was developed we saw at once that the one chance we would have to standardize with the United States would be by giving away this equipment of United Kingdom type to the North Atlantic treaty nations, and we proceeded to do so. Equipment for one division was given the Netherlands; for a second division to Belgium; and equipment for a third division is to be transferred to Italy, as well as artillery for Luxembourg. This is a practical way of getting on with the job, and at the same time each weapon we have put into the hands of a European has armed a soldier who is there waiting for a weapon with which to defend his country and ours. So we did a double job very quickly.
I should say that we have made good progress in standardization with the United States, in addition to weapons, which are on the way. To mention a few items hastily, there are aircraft fuels, oxygen equipment, photographic equipment, instruments and personal flying equipment, mapping and charting, air force training equipment, vehicles for the northland, pilot handbooks, geographic reference systems for maps, navigation tables, 3-5 rockets and rocket launchers, confidential signs and symbols, and many other things which are on the secret list. Some of these are Canadian products, or the procedures and techniques have been worked out in Canada.
The next question was with regard to unification, and the statement was made that we seemed to be going into reverse in the matter of motor vehicle maintenance. The fact is that in 1947 we decided on the unification of motor vehicle maintenance,

Supply-National Defence and determined that it should be done by the army for the three services. That was my decision, and I put it into effect. We tried' it for a year and a half, and it was found that it did not work. We had gone too far in unification. We have reversed it in part; but as in the case of other services common to the three branches, we avoid duplication just as much as possible. These are the principles on which we have made this decision: (a) the peacetime organization of each service should be capable of rapid expansion in war without major reorganization or reallotment of functions; (b) maximum economy is to be achieved in peacetime without prejudicing either efficiency or ability to mobilize rapidly for war; (c) administrative functions necessary to each service in war should be performed to an appropriate extent by each service in peacetime to ensure familiarity with the function and provide a nucleus for expansion in war.
With regard to motor vehicles we found this, to give a concrete example. The air force has to keep its runways open the year round. They have to contend with very heavy snowfall in many parts of the country, and they have very good heavy equipment for this purpose. When that equipment had to be maintained and supplied by the army, the air force would sometimes say they were not given a sufficiently high priority because we had too much to do in connection with motor vehicle maintenance with the personnel we had. We found that where a service had an essential special function to perform in peacetime, it was desirable that the service must be responsible for that performance.
With regard to avoiding duplication I can tell my hon. friends that we have gone very far indeed, both in respect to this and other matters. We have the following motor vehicle workshops across Canada. The navy has two workshops, at Halifax and Esquimau, and both workshops look after army and air force equipment. The navy also has one other workshop at St. Hubert in Quebec, where the navy does its own work. That is combined with an armament workshop there. The army has workshops at Halifax, Saint John, Lachine, Ottawa, Kingston, Picton, Petawawa, Toronto, London, Winnipeg, Macdonald, Shilo, Calgary, Vernon and Vancouver, where it does any work there may be for the navy and air force as well. At Quebec city it does work for the navy; there is no air force at that point. At Kingston it does work for the navy; there is no air force there. At Churchill it does work for the R.C.A.F.; the navy has no motor vehicles there. At Rivers it does work for the R.C.A.P. At Regina it does work for the

navy; there is no air force. At Fort Nelson it does work for the R.C.A.F.; there is no navy. At Whitehorse it does work for the R.C.A.F.; there is no navy. The air force has depots at Calgary and Trenton, where it does work for all three services.
So hon. members will see that in this respect there is no duplication, but there is sound military reason for maintaining the three maintenance activities.
The next question was, when will the new anti-submarine vessels be commissioned? It is very hard to make an estimate, and I do not know that we should make any announcement of this kind. It is not usual, but we can tell him that some of the new antisubmarine vessels are expected to be launched this autumn before the close of navigation. We expect it will take a considerable time longer before these are commissioned. These anti-submarine ships are of a new type. They were worked out with the British and Americans, but we are the first country to make them. The British are making a somewhat similar vessel but are about a year behind us in their production. There is no corresponding vessel, so far as we know, anywhere in the world.


John Horne Blackmore: Will the minister permit a question?


Brooke Claxton: I think I had better go ahead because my time is getting very short, if you do not mind. Then, with regard to the Magnificent, it is suggested she is out of date, because she has sixteen Sea Furies and twenty Fireflies and cannot take modern jet aircraft necessary in chasing subs. The Magnificent is not out of date at all. It has three or four more years of useful life, and is of the same type as several carriers the Royal Navy has in commission. The Sea Fury is still an effective aircraft for protecting aircraft carriers and ships against attack by the kind of aircraft that could make that attack. It must be remembered that the range of the jet fighter possessed by the Russians is not very extensive. Then, too, the carrier is also equipped with Avengers which are still in front-line use in the United States, and are considered to be an effective weapon in anti-submarine work. It is not considered desirable to have jet aircraft at this time for work against submarines.
It was suggested that we should have an aircraft carrier on the Pacific coast. There is a limit to what a country of 14 million people can do, and I am afraid this is one place where that applies. So far as I know, no country of our size has one aircraft carrier, still less two. Incidentally, I do not know if I am breaching security, but to provide that

type of protection in that way is not a part of our assigned role in accordance with our arrangements with our allies which have been worked out in detail with regard to the employment of each ship and the times at which it will be available.
Why is a second cruiser being commissioned? It is immediately- for training purposes but it would also be useful in the event of war. We find it is much more satisfactory to give the first training to officers when they go to sea in the larger ships, because there is accommodation for them to take a much greater number. There is also room for classrooms, and there is every kind of instrument they would have to use on a small ship. Also we can handle, in proportion to the cost, very many more officers for training in this way. Without putting the Quebec, as the ship is called- I hope the member for Three Rivers will recognize this change-into commission, we could not possibly train all the officers we shall have to take in to meet the build-up of the navy. In the small ships such as destroyers, frigates, minesweepers, there is very little room indeed for the officers and men necessary to operate the ship. At a later stage, when the officers have had some sea training, they are fitted into the crew and they continue their training on the job in the small ship. This is considered to be the fastest way to take care of the biggest number.
What types of ships are now being operated by the navy? I should think hon. members would be fully familiar with that, but I shall list them: The carrier, with its naval air groups, cruisers, destroyers, anti-submarine escorts first class; anti-submarine escorts second class; minesweepers; seaward defence craft; Fairmile training vessels at selected reserve divisions; supply ships; tankers; research experimental ships; auxiliary vessels and harbour craft; loop layers; gate vessels, in reserve; repair ships, in reserve. Then there is the northern patrol icebreaker which is nearing completion. We have some 27 ships under contract, and there will be many more ordered shortly to be proceeded with as soon as we build the prototypes of the new vessels and learn by experience what modifications are needed.
The suggestion was made that we should not keep ships in reserve if they are obsolete, because it costs money. It costs much less money to keep ships in reserve than to keep them in commission. We keep in commission the number of ships we can man, and the ships in reserve are of the same age and class as corresponding ships in commission, and I cannot regard them as obsolete, as we
Supply-National Defence would want almost everything that was available in the event of war. If we scrap any ships that are seaworthy and useful to the navy at a time like this, I would regard it as a retrograde step.
The hon. member said that we should not have gone to Fort Lewis because it was a waste of money to go there with the additional expense to the United States government and the additional pay of the men. I should like to refer to a speech which the hon. member made and which is reported in the Calgary Herald of April 11, 1951, under the heading "Pearkes Criticizes Use of U.S. Training Base". It reads:
Failure to provide a proper training centre in Canada tor the Korean forces had cost the Canadian people an extra $200,000 a day for the forces under training at Fort Lewis, Washington, Major General G. R. Pearkes, V.C., C.B., D.S.O., M.P. for Nanaimo, told a public meeting in the Canadian Legion west end branch hall Tuesday night.
I do not know where the hon. member got his information or how he made his calculation, because generally he is exceedingly careful and very responsible indeed. The cost of our being in Fort Lewis was not $200,000 a day, but a bit less than $20,000 a day. About $13,000 was paid to the United States government for food and accommodation and the provision of services of every type, at a capitation fee of $2.46 per man day. I hope the United States congress and the United States quartermaster general will not hear me say this-you have to say unwise things sometimes in answer to criticism- but we could not have done it for that cost in Canada. We had a generous and fair arrangement. Moreover, we could not have put our troops in any quarters in Canada without spending millions of dollars on the rehabilitation and winterization of those quarters. We have never had a force of seven to ten thousand people training during the winter in Canada as a brigade. Our experience in this connection indicates it will be very difficult to do it in any part of Canada and have really effective training. In almost every part of Canada there is such a heavy snowfall that in training men, particularly to fight in Europe, they would have to spend a big part of their time in shovelling snow and keeping themselves warm. That does not apply to the same extent to individual and sub-unit and even company training, but as soon as you get up to unit and brigade training you need a lot of space with roads for vehicles so as to correspond to something like the terrain in Europe. For good training on a brigade scale we would like to have an area twenty miles wide and a hundred miles deep. We use live ammunition fired from 155 guns over the heads of the troops, and they fire up to

Supply-National Defence 20 miles. To provide for advances with all arms working together we should have, if we can get it, an area 100 miles long.
We have searched Canada ever since 1946 to find such an area. We have our eye on one or two that might be suitable, but only at tremendous expense to put them in shape, with accommodation, roads and so on. It was extremely fortunate that we were able to go to Fort Lewis. However, that was not the real reason for going to Fort Lewis. We went there because that was the staging point for the shipment of troops from Seattle to the Far East. When our movement was arranged for there we did not know whether they would move immediately to the Far East or stay there for training. Hon. members will recall the statements of a rather optimistic character that were made at that period when it appeared to some that the war was virtually over. We had to be prepared either to move the brigade off almost at a day's notice to the Far East to complete training there or to remain where they were but with uncertainty as to when the brigade should move forward. On that account it was highly desirable that the brigade should be at Fort Lewis. Further, we had exceedingly good experiences with our United States friends at Fort Lewis which was under the command of Brigadier LeRoy Watson. No. 426 squadron was at McChord field nearby, which was under the command of Colonel Bennett. I should like to pay this tribute to these officers and all working with them for the magnificent co-operation they extended to us. They treated us just as well as friends could be treated. Anything we wanted in the way of facilities, changes in rations-because our ration is rather different from theirs-or the like, was put through at once. It was as fine a demonstration of partnership in our joint defence as anyone would want to see.
The actual cost for the other item that the hon. member mentioned, of the extra pay for officers and men while they were out of Canada, is estimated at $6,000 per day; so that the item of $13,000, for the $2.46 capitation fee and the $6,000 for extra pay, total $19,000, not $200,000.
Then the hon. member suggested that we need now to provide winter quarters for training. I agree, and we are doing that. We are making substantial changes at Valcartier, Wainwright and other places. We hope that it will not be necessary to use those places for training units as large as brigades. Valcartier is not suitable for that purpose at the present time. Wainwright is the only camp in Canada of sufficient size [DOT] and having the terrain suitable for this purpose. We hope to get another camp for this


purpose in the east, but so far we have not been able to get the area. There is the question of fire hazard; and that is something which is highly important.
The next point was that in the air we should concentrate on essential types. We believe we are doing that. With regard to the supply of aircraft, the priority that is generally recognized is: Fighters, bombers, tactical aircraft, transport and maritime reconnaissance. We do not think that it is desirable at this time, particularly when there is no aircraft specially designed and in production for this purpose, to build in Canada the relatively small number of planes required for maritime reconnaissance. We have therefore worked out an adaptation of the Lancaster, the modifications in which are either completed or well under way at A. V. Roe Canada Limited; and it is considered to be a highly desirable aircraft for the purpose. It has good range with the additional tanks we put on it; and it carries weapons, equipment, cameras and so on quite well. It is an economical way of doing this particular job.
Another question was: What percentage of officers trained by D.V.A. are now serving? I think that is the only question that I have been asked during the past two days as to which I have not an answer. D.V.A. has not the answer. It is necessary to go through either all the army officer cards or all the D.V.A. cards in order to find it out, and that would be a large job. I am trying to have an estimate made; and I am sure the hon. gentleman would accept this.
I think that concludes the questions put by the hon. member for Nanaimo.
The next come from the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar. He asks what has been done to inform young men what they are fighting for. Lectures have been given right from the outset by trained officers who were given special publications and briefing on current affairs. Every camp has a library and a number of them are very good. They are extensively used. A number of them have a wall map service and special magazines on current affairs, and these supplement the lectures. We have doubled the size of the chaplain service, and the chaplains are useful indeed in giving general talks. But we felt that the time had come, in view of the formation of the Korean force, to give direction in this matter. Accordingly, two months ago we appointed Mr. Harry Low as director of the bureau of current affairs. He served with the air force in this capacity during the war. He is responsible to the chiefs of staff committee. He will be holding courses for

officers and N.C.O.'s of various types, to instruct them in the job of passing on the information, organizing study groups, classes, and the like.
As to the charge that the young men joining our forces are confused as to why we are fighting in Korea, I am surprised that they are not more confused than I have found them to be, in view of the conflicting ideas, as to why we are fighting in Korea, expressed by, say, the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the hon. member for Vancouver -Quadra. While some of the young men may not be able to express themselves like a college professor, I think they are rather in the position that anyone would be in if someone came up to him in the street and asked: Why are you a Christian? You find it difficult to answer that question in a few sentences. They know why they are fighting but they would find it difficult to express the reason in a few sentences. But that does not prevent their being fine, understanding and intelligent in the work in the armed forces.
It was suggested that we should make an appraisal of our manpower resources. These appraisals especially made for a special purpose can soon become out of date. The dominion bureau of statistics and the Department of Labour have continuous appraisals, and I have been told that from most points of view the information they have is adequate for statistical planning with regard to manpower in this country. To have a further survey for this purpose may be desirable, and it may be done. That matter is being considered by the advisory committee on manpower; and if they report in favour of it, no doubt the government will see that it is done. But the information so far put before me from the point of view of planning-and we have planned it out for several years ahead-is that the information is fully available on which to do the job.
The hon. member asked about motor vehicle contracts, apropos the remarks of Mr. Sale. This is a complicated subject which falls under the jurisdiction of the Minister of Defence Production. I am not sure that I have the whole picture; hence anything I say must be taken subject to that qualification. I can say this, however. For some time we have desired to manufacture in Canada a limited number of motor vehicles of military type. We in the defence department provided in our estimates a considerable sum of money-I think it was $21 million-for this purpose. The reason was not so much to supply ourselves with these motor vehicles, because it would have been much cheaper to buy them from the United States. The reason was primarily to tool



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Supply-National Defence up for their production in Canada. We had in mind particularly the one-quarter ton, the three-quarter ton and the two and a half ton vehicle. The one-quarter ton vehicle is the jeep. Our own requirements were not great. Having regard to the cost of tooling up and the number required, each motor vehicle would have cost an almost fantastic sum; but we thought it was desirable to tool up to manufacture those cars in Canada, and we requisitioned the Minister of Trade and Commerce in September, 1950, to obtain these. He entered into negotiations with the United States authorities and the industry both to secure the right and to make arrangements with the automotive industry to do it. It was found that the cost of tooling for the production of these cars in toto in Canada was far more than the sum estimated. I am speaking from recollection, but I believe that the cost of tooling for quantity production of cars of these types, the smallest military types, would be well in excess of the amount provided. I mean by "well in excess" much more than twice as much as the amount we had estimated. From the outset it was apparent that this would not be an economic move unless we could secure orders for these cars from the United States either for delivery to meet United States needs or for shipment to Europe at United States expense, because we had already committed all the money we had voted or were in process of doing that. However, United States military requirements for these vehicles now were not sufficiently great to justify their production in the United States and here. These discussions took some time; and in the end the Department of Defence Production decided to make part of the cars in Canada and buy part from the United States, and to tool up to make the parts which we could do most economically and most efficiently in Canada, just as was done at the commencement of the commercial automobile industry in Canada. But before we made that decision we wanted to explore every possibility with the United States of getting orders which would enable us to do as much as possible of the job in Canada. I understand that arrangements have now been worked out and that we shall be going ahead on that basis.
The next question is: Do we have to pay customs duty on war equipment, personal effects of service personnel, et cetera? Yes, we pay sales tax and duty on all purchases of war equipment, with the exception of the equipment we purchase from the United States to replace divisional and other equipment released to countries which are members of the North Atlantic treaty under the Defence Appropriation Act, 1950. On all
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Supply-National Defence other military equipment we pay sales tax and customs duty to the Department of National Revenue. Personal effects of service personnel generally enter duty free under reciprocal arrangements.
Then the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar said that it was stated in the public accounts committee that on March 31, 1950, we did not possess a single modern tank.
I was not present at the public accounts committee, and I have not yet seen the report of the proceedings for that day, so I am speaking without exact information. But I would doubt very much whether the statement was made in that form. At the end of the second world war we had a large number of worn-out tanks. We scrapped these and we arranged to buy from the United States a very considerable number of the very latest tanks that were available at that time. Since then these have been maintained for training and are available today, except for those that we have shipped already to Europe, for two divisions, namely, the self-propelled guns, Which are on tank chassis.
It would have been utterly ridiculous for us either to have contemplated the manufacture of tanks of an intermediate type or to have bought tanks from the United States when these tanks were still in the process of development, and were not yet in large-scale production in the United States. We have now the opportunity of buying from the United States the latest tanks, and they will be coming with the equipment for the two divisions we transferred to Europe. But our tanks are by no means obsolete. If a war were to come tomorrow this would be the kind of weapon that would be in most current use on our side, the Sherman Mark IV, with modifications, but there are more modern tanks. I hope hon. members do not think for a second that it is possible for any country, United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, Canada, France or any other country in peacetime to keep up to date on every development. Why, the number of developments and the modifications of radar sets would keep us poverty stricken on that account alone. What we have to do is to plan and make our replacements when we think a type has been developed that is going to be in good use for five years, or ten years or fifteen years, and then to keep up to date as far as we can with modifications. But these modifications cost a fantastic sum. Take the 3 * 7 heavy anti-aircraft gun that we have, the United Kingdom type. To modernize it to standards that we would regard as up to date
would cost upwards of $200,000 per gun-the gun originally cost about $100,000-and the result would be a cost per gun of more than that type of weapon completely new at some future indefinite date when we get into another sphere. We cannot follow each weapon through every development. We must get from period to period.
The hon. member asked whether the manufacture of jeeps was held up because of difficulties with patents. The answer is no. He referred to standardization. I have gone into that. He said:	If we are working
with the United Kingdom in Korea will not there be complications through the use of United States equipment? No; our forces in Korea are supplied almost entirely with United Kingdom equipment so that they can work with the British, as was planned from the outset; but we use a number of United States-type motor vehicles and mortars and some other weapons just as the British do. There will be no difficulty or very little difficulty there. Since we will always be working with the British or with the Americans usually in a theatre where both are represented, we will not have quite as great difficulties, through having either equipment of one type or mixed equipment, as would otherwise be the case. During the second world war we had in the Canadian army at one time a division of United States troops using American equipment, a division of British troops using British type of equipment and others, and provided that you have a unit as big as a division it can be worked out. Of course it is much better to have it all uniform, and Canada has a greater interest in seeing to that than any other country, and we have worked harder to bring it about than any other country. I only regret that we did not succeed to a greater extent in bringing about standardization.
Some hon. Members:: Six o'clock.


Brooke Claxton: I am afraid it will take a few more minutes to answer hon. members' questions.
Item stands.
Progress reported.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE

Alphonse Fournier: Tomorrow we will continue with this debate.


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At six o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
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Thursday, May 10, 1951