1951-02-02

[Stage Direction]
VISIT OF MR. RENfi PLEVEN AND HIS PARTY TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS
Right Hon. L. S. Si. Laurent (Prime Minister):: Mr. Speaker, amongst the first to follow upon your instructions of a moment ago, that the doors of the gallery be opened, we see His Excellency Monsieur Rene Pleven, president of the council of ministers of the French republic, and those who accompany him on a visit which does us honour, Their Excellencies ambassadors Parodi, Alphand and Guerin, the latter of whom is now in Canada, and Miss Sicard.
All our colleagues, I am sure, will wish to extend to them their most heartfelt greetings and to thank them for showing by their presence here the sincerity of the co-operation between European countries and those of North America in our common undertaking to build up a military force of sufficient strength, based on sound national economies, on economies so closely bound as to deter any aggressor.
(Text):
Mr. Rene Pleven, in common with many of us here, Mr. Speaker, boasts of an ancestry whose roots go deep in the soil of Brittany. He has all the qualities and qualifications which we value so highly, among them that of being perfectly bilingual. He is fluent in the two languages which are official in this house. I know from my own privileged experience in relations with them that those who are with him on this occasion are also bilingual. That can only add to the warmth of the welcome we extend to them on this occasion, because it will enable us to feel that, in whichever language the proceedings of our house are conducted in their presence, they will appreciate that our problems and our concerns are the same as theirs, and are the same as those of free men and women all over the world. Our own hopes for world peace are based1 on the prompt co-operative action of all of us, and the visit with which we are honoured at this time is concrete evidence that that action is being vigorously undertaken.


Mr. George A. Drew (Leader of ihe Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, it is a great honour to join with the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) in extending a most cordial welcome to the representative of a nation which is bound to Canada by so many ties of blood and affection. As the Prime Minister has pointed out already, it is perhaps a symbol of that understanding which means so much to all of us that Mr. Pleven comes from that part of France which gave to this country so many of its early settlers.
In joining in this welcome to Premier Pleven may I say also that there are reasons why thoughts of France are at all times in the hearts of the Canadian people. It is because in hundreds of thousands of Canadian minds there is always the memory that there is some part of France that is forever Canada. To all the friends and relatives of nearly 100,000 young Canadians who gave their lives in the common cause of freedom in two world wars, French soil is sacred soil, and the efforts of France to join with us and with the other free nations in preserving that freedom means not only the preservation of the proud soil of France, and all that it means to the people of France, but also, for us, the preservation of those bits of soil throughout that country which are so dear to many of us in Canada.
Mr. Pleven is a young man whom we welcome here not for the first time. We welcome him once again because at this time when there is the utmost understanding between France, Great Britain and Canada-in so many ways bound more closely together by ties of blood than any other nations-it is of maximum importance that in his high office as premier of France he should have a background of years of work in Canada and in Great Britain which gives to him a personal and working knowledge of the lives of the people of those countries, of their own problems, and also of their great strength and stability. Every one of us, not only here but throughout Canada, wishes him well in his high endeavours in this common cause, and we all trust that out of this time of peril and uncertainty France will carry forward into the years ahead her inspired traditions of freedom, industry and culture.

Inquiries of the Ministry MINES AND TECHNICAL SURVEYS



SURVEYS OF IRON ORE IN BRITISH COLUMBIA

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. Arthur Laing (Vancouver South):: should like to address a question to the Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys. Will he make a statement at this time with regard to the proposals of his department dealing with surveys of iron ore in the province of British Columbia? I make this request because of a statement heard on a C.B.C. station last night concerning export.


Hon. George Prudham (Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys):: Mr. Speaker, the hon. member for Vancouver South was kind enough to give me a few minutes' notice of his question, but I was not able to secure complete information. With your permission, sir, I should like to bring in a complete report at the next sitting of the house.



REPORTED DECISION THAT UNITED NATIONS FORCES SHOULD STOP AT 38TH PARALLEL

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Rosetown-Biggar):: should like to address a question to the Secretary of State for External Affairs. Will the minister indicate whether the report is correct that United States officials have decided that United Nations troops should stop at the 38th parallel? Is this not a decision which should be made by the general assembly of the United Nations?


Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of State for External Affairs):: The hon. member was kind enough to give me some notice of this question, which presumably refers to press reports in this morning's newspapers. I am not in a position to confirm the accuracy or otherwise of that report. The government has received no information, official or otherwise, concerning it.
As to the second question, Mr. Speaker, it is of course a hypothetical one. Under the circumstances which the hon. member contemplates, I would think it would be proper for the question to be discussed in the United Nations. The unified command is, of course, not precluded from deciding to hold the advance of the United Nations forces at any point which it deems advisable.



ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY INDIA FOR SUPPLIES FROM CANADA

[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. A. Earl Caiherwood (Haldimand):: I
should like to direct a question to the

Minister of Trade and Commerce. Has the government of India made representations concerning the urgent need of that country for wheat? If so, to what extent have such requests been carried out?


Right Hon. C. D. Howe (Minister of Trade and Commerce):: The government of India
has not made formal representations to the Canadian	government, but has	made
arrangements with the Canadian wheat board for supplies of wheat. The Canadian wheat board has contracted to supply the government of India with 300,000 long tons of wheat, which is now in process of being shipped in accordance with the terms of the contract.	Discussions have taken place
within recent days between representatives of the government of India and the Canadian wheat board with regard to the supplying of some further quantities.
I may say that the quantities of wheat that are now available for sale are limited to grades that are not considered to be milling grades; that is, they are No. 5, No. 6, and feed wheat. Discussions are now in process to ascertain whether India can use any of these grades of wheat.


Mr. Graydon:: Is this part of the commonwealth plan in which Canada is participating, or is it a collateral transaction between Canada and India?


Clarence Decatur Howe: Sales have been made directly between Canada and India under the international wheat agreement to which we are both parties.



REFERENCE TO &quot;VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS&quot; OF THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 1

Mr. Speaker:: It has been brought to my attention by the hon. member for Cape Breton North and Victoria (Mr. MacLean) that on page 17 of yesterday's Votes and Proceedings it is recorded that Mr. MacLean (Cape Breton North and Victoria) seconded the motion of Mr. MacDougall for leave to introduce a bill to amend the Dominion Day Act and the Victoria Day Act. That is a mistake. The motion was seconded by the hon. member for Huron-Perth (Mr. McLean). I can assure the hon. member for Cape Breton North and Victoria that the record will be corrected accordingly.



INDIAN ACT


Hon. W. E. Harris (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) moved: that the house go into committee at the next sitting to consider the following resolution:
That it is expedient to introduce a measure to amend, consolidate and clarify the Indian Act, and

to provide, inter alia, for band funds and expenditures therefrom, and for other appropriations in case of deficiency or lack of band funds.
He said: His Excellency the Governor General, having been made acquainted with the subject matter of this resolution, recommends it to the consideration of the house.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to.


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
George Alexander Drew: In view of the statement of the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) yesterday that it is not the intention of the government to set up a committee on defence, may I return to the earlier suggestion that I made. In view of the primary importance of national defence in the discussions of this session and of the desirability of having an orderly debate on that subject without the intervention of other matters, may I again urge that a day or a number of days be set aside on which national defence can be debated following a statement by the Minister of National Defence.


Louis Stephen St-Laurent: I know of no standing order under which that can be done before the special order with respect to the speech from the throne has been complied with. I understand that it is the intention of the Minister of National Defence to make a full statement early in that debate and the minister's statement can be followed by discussion of everything contained therein; it would not be within the power of the government, however, even if it felt so inclined, to prevent any hon. member from raising any other question that he might think warranted the attention of the house and of the country.



SPEECH FROM THE THRONE


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed, from Thursday, February 1, consideration of the motion of Mr. W. H. McMillan for an address to His Excellency the Governor General in reply to his speech at the opening of the session, and the amendment thereto of Mr. Drew, and the amendment to the amendment of Mr. Coldwell.
Lester Bowles Pearson: In beginning, Mr. Speaker, may I congratulate the mover (Mr. McMillan) and seconder (Mr. Breton) of the address in reply to the speech from the throne upon the way in which they performed their difficult duties. They did credit to themselves
The Address-Mr. Pearson and honour to the constituencies they represent in this house. They made some constructive and practical suggestions. Their speeches were short and to the point. I hope that mine this afternoon will at least be to the point. In view of the ramifications of the subject which I am discussing, I am afraid it may not be as short as I should like it to be, and as I am sure other members would like it to be.
We all know that these are fateful days in the relations between nations. Those relations involve many complicated and indeed dangerous issues which at times divide even friends. In dealing with some of them today-and I certainly shall not be able to deal with all of them-there are certain general considerations which I think we should keep in mind.
The first consideration seems to me to be absolutely fundamental: Our belief that freedom is valuable and precious in itself, and that the loss of freedom anywhere in the world means an impairment and indeed the endangering of our own freedom. We may not always be in a position to defeat attempts to reduce the area in which men can breathe freely, but we should never voluntarily give our consent to that process, because we know that by so doing we would be betraying the principle which is one of the chief inspirations of all free men. Freedom cannot be cloistered in one country, in one continent, or indeed in one hemisphere. To the limit of our resources, therefore, we must try to maintain and even hope to extend the jurisdiction where the writ of freedom runs. Only in that way can we be true to ourselves and to the inheritance we have received.
The second general consideration which I should like to mention is our faith in the United Nations. The aggression against the republic of Korea has tested the United Nations in a searching way and has led to a reappraisal of its role in maintaining the peace, of what it can and cannot do in a divided world of two superstates around which all others tend to group, on the one side willingly and on the other side by compulsion. It has certainly been made clear by recent events that our world organization is not yet in a position where it can safely undertake all the tasks which may be imposed on it by resolutions, and I think it is dishonest to pretend that it can. Whatever may be the result of this re-examination, however, it is certain that the United Nations still fulfils a number of functions which are indispensable if peace is to be maintained on any tolerable basis. For one thing, it holds out the promise of freedom to all. Second, it provides a framework in which men of good will

The Address-Mr. Pearson can work for their collective defence and for the coming of the day when the rule of law will replace the rule of force in international relations. Third, by reason of its universal character it keeps alive the idea of the human community.
I do not feel that it should be a reproach to the United Nations that its reach exceeds its grasp. None of us can have doubted that the effort to form a world community under the rule of law would be long and difficult and strewn with disappointments. If that were not the case, there would be neither need for faith nor any credit in cherishing it in bad times as well as in good. This is no time to give up on the United Nations. Indeed we would be betraying the United Nations forces fighting in Korea if we denied the loyalty and faith which we owe to the principles of our charter and our world organization.
There is another debt-and this is the third of the general considerations which I think we should bear in mind. We owe it to those men in Korea and to ourselves to make as cool and rational an appraisal as we can of the dangers which threaten the free world, not only in Korea but at many other points as well, and, in the light of that appraisal, to decide what is the proper policy for the United Nations to pursue in the Far East. For many weeks now the headlines have kept us vividly aware of the fighting in Korea. Unless, however, we are careful to cultivate and maintain a balanced judgment, we may forget that there are forces poised at many other points which could quickly strike against the free world. Only if we remember these other dangers can our policy toward China and Korea be soundly based. There is a depressingly large number of such danger spots, and I should like to mention only a few of them.
Moving westward from Korea we must, I think, take into account the danger that overshadows Indo-China. The Chinese guerrillas and volunteers-"volunteers", an ominous word-have long been assisting the Viet Minh in their attacks on the three new associated states of Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. Such indications as we had before June 25 of the possibility of an attack on the republic of Korea are now appearing in the case of Indo-China; and a full-scale attack on that country must be regarded as a real possibility. If the valiant efforts now being made by France to defend and complete the independence of Indo-China were to fail, the whole of southeast Asia, including Burma, Malaya and Indonesia, with their important resources of rubber, rice and tin, might well come under communist control, and the posi-

tion of India and Pakistan in that event would in the long run, or in the not so long run, be precarious indeed.
Persia and the Middle East are also vulnerable. At the present time the armed forces of the Soviet union face this area and those vital oil fields, in strength sufficient, I think, to overrun it without too much difficulty.
Across the Mediterranean another country immediately threatened is Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito's government is facing great economic difficulties, partly as a result of the serious drought there last year, and partly as the result of the economic blockade imposed on that country by the cominform. Moreover, Roumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Albania are now, contrary to the provisions of the peace treaties, in possession of sufficient military forces to make them collectively powerful, as well as threatening and aggressive, neighbours.
But the danger to the free world, Mr. Speaker, is still greatest in western Europe itself. Recognition of that fact was the reason for the signing of the North Atlantic pact in the spring of 1949. Since that time progress has been made in increasing the military strength of the countries associated in that pact; but this progress, although it is being accelerated, has not been swift enough to remove anxiety. Western Europe is still relatively weak, and still stands open to Soviet conquest. It is a glittering prize. Its capture would put the Soviet union in possession not only of the source and centre of western civilization, but also of industrial capacity which would enable them to rival the productive resources of the whole of the western hemisphere. We over here would then be in a desperate position indeed.
It is therefore of the utmost importance that our involvement in other areas of the world should not prevent us from recognizing that western Europe is the key point for the defence of the whole of the free world- which includes, incidentally, India and Pakistan as well as Canada and the United States; and we should co-operate with our allies in the North Atlantic treaty in building up forces large enough to deter the Soviet union from launching an attack in that area.
We in Canada hope and believe that the North Atlantic treaty, founded as it is on the common values of our common civilization, will also grow into something far deeper than any military alliance-into an enduring association among nations which share the same aims and the same aspirations. We in Canada are making, and will make, the best contribution we can to that end, and we are encouraged, Mr. Speaker, in that resolve by developments of the last two or three months.

Hon. members will have had an opportunity of reading the statement of General Eisenhower before congress yesterday on the subject of north Atlantic preparedness, and the efforts which are being made, and still greater efforts which will be required, to build up our defensive alliance against any threat of aggression. So far as western Europe is concerned-and this, I repeat, is the most vital area in the front line of our defence- the effort required is partly military and partly, in the broader sense of the term, political. The free nations of Europe are profoundly aware that their future security and prosperity depend in large measure on the unity which they can achieve among themselves. In this development, Mr. Speaker, French statesmanship is playing a great part indeed, under the wise leadership of Prime Minister Pleven, whom we delight to honour in our assembly today.
If there were no other reasons for pressing ahead with these policies of European unification, the problem of Germany itself would make imperative the need for some form of European unity. If democratic Germany is to play her constructive part in a free Europe, it is essential that she should do so within the framework of a freely co-operative Europe coming closer together, economically, politically and militarily.
The present state of the European continent is, as we all know, one of tragic division. The lines which Soviet aggressive policies have drawn across the continent run contrary to the political, cultural and economic interests of the European peoples. This unnatural division, which may hold within it the seeds of future conflict, could be ended tomorrow if the Soviet government sincerely wished to bring it to an end. The three western occupying powers in Germany-the United Kingdom, the United States, and France-have now received from the Soviet government proposals for a four-power meeting on Germany. I do not intend on this occasion to discuss the character of the Soviet invitation, or the terms of the replies which the western occupying powers have returned to the Soviet government. Suffice it to say that if a satisfactory basis could be found for their talks-and it has not been found yet-the Canadian government, and, I am sure, the Canadian parliament, would welcome such a meeting. On the other hand I think it would be a very great mistake indeed to build great and optimistic hopes on the outcome of any such meeting. The truculence and falsehoods contained in the cominform declaration on Germany issued at Prague not long ago are not a foundation upon which any genuine negotiation can be founded. Nevertheless we believe that no
The Address-Mr. Pearson occasion should be neglected to attempt to achieve an enduring and honourable settlement of differences with the Soviet union.
These western European dangers andi developments must, then, never be forgotten in determining our Far Eastern policy. In formulating that policy-and this is another general consideration-I think we should bear in mind also that here is a new and great tidal movement of nationalism sweeping Asia. In some countries, China for example, it is mingled and confused with, and possibly it is at the moment dominated by, the aggressive forces of Soviet communism. But it is operative in other Asian countries besides China, and it has a vitality of its own. It is something which I believe is deeper and more lasting than communism. Indeed, nationalism-allied to a restless and insistent demand for a better life-is the most important political phenomenon in Asia today. Therefore, in framing our policies we must try to avoid offending the legitimate national and social aspirations of Asian peoples, or their desire to have a chief part in the determination of Asian affairs.
We must also do what we can to improve the economic conditions and human welfare in free Asia. We must try to work with rather than against the forces struggling for a better life in that part of the world. Such co-operation may in the long run become as important for the defence of freedom-and therefore for the defence of Canada-as sending an army to Europe, in the present immediate emergency. Economic and technical assistance is one form of such co-operation. Many members in the house will have read the Colombo plan for co-operative economic development in south and southeast Asia. This imaginative, and, I think, well-founded report, which was published last November as the result of the work of the commonwealth consultative committee, points the way to the kind of effective assistance which we in the west can offer to the free peoples of Asia. They stand in very great need of capital for economic development, and of technical assistance. For Canada to supply either the capital or the technical assistance in any substantial volume would mean considerable sacrifice, now that the demands of our defence program are imposing new strains on our economy.
On the other hand, I personally have been struck by the modesty and good sense with which such countries as India and Pakistan have shown in drawing up plans for their own development for the next six years. The countries of south and southeast Asia which have drawn up programs for inclusion in the report-with populations involved including nearly one-quarter of the population of the

The Address-Mr. Pearson world-state that they require, over the six-year period, external finance to the amount of $3 billion, the greater part of which will be supplied by the release of sterling balances held in London. I believe that a Canadian contribution to those programs, even if it has to be smaller than we might be able to make if we were not bearing other and heavy burdens, would have a great effect, not only in doing something to improve the standard of living in that part of the world, but also in convincing the people there of our sympathy and our interest. It is for these reasons, Mr. Speaker, that the government has decided to seek the approval of the house for an appropriate Canadian contribution to the Colombo plan.
In dealing with these Asian problems we sometimes run the risk of differences with tried and dependable allies. And that brings me to another of the cardinal considerations which I think we must keep in mind, the necessity of preserving solidarity with our friends in the west-above all, of preserving unity of purpose and action between the United States and Canada and the commonwealth of nations.
During the past few months we have had some differences of opinion with our friends in Washington on Far Eastern questions. While I do not gloss over these differences, I should like to warn against exaggerating their importance, because they have not weakened the basic good understanding between us, resting as it does upon a harmony of abiding interest, and on the recognition of common values and common rights, one of which is the right to disagree as friends with each other, and the other the obligation, again as friends, to resolve these disagreements peaceably.
In spite of certain differences there is complete agreement between the Canadian and the United States governments on, among other things, four fundamentals: we agree that peace is now in jeopardy; we agree that the extension of soviet imperialism must be opposed; we agree that the principle of collective resistance to aggression must be maintained; and we agree that the main front which must be defended is western Europe.
Those, then, Mr. Speaker, are the general considerations shaping our policy-unshaken faith in freedom and realistic faith in the United Nations; awareness of the world-wide scope of the danger threatening us; respect for Asian opinion, and a desire to help the Asian people achieve a better standard of life; solidarity with our partners in the commonwealth and in the north Atlantic alliance; the determination to do everything possible to maintain peace.


Now I come to our policy on certain specific matters concerned with Korea and the Far East.
Almost the first issue which arose in this field after the house adjourned last September concerned the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations. This presented itself in a concrete form at the general assembly on September 19 last. A draft resolution was presented that day by the Indian delegation calling upon the assembly to decide that the Chinese government in Peking should represent China at the United Nations assembly. Persuasive arguments could be adduced both for and against such action.
It could be maintained, and it was maintained, that the United Nations would have more chance of dealing effectively with the situation that then existed in the Far East if the Chinese government, which had effective control of the mainland of China, were represented in its deliberations. It was argued that the United Nations would be a healthier organization if dissenting views were stated within rather than without the organization. On the other hand, it was difficult for governments which had not recognized the Peking regime to see representatives of that regime seated in the United Nations. To seat representatives of the Chinese communists had also become far more difficult after the attack by North Korean forces on the republic of Korea had taken place. It was apparent that the Indian resolution, on which our delegation abstained from voting, would not command the required majority in the assembly, and it was suggested-the suggestion in fact came from the Canadian delegation-that the question of Chinese representation should be considered by a special committee. It was hoped that in this way the question could be deferred for a short time until a suitable solution could be reached.
It may be asked why, if our abstention on the Indian resolution showed that we did not actively object to China being represented in the United Nations by the people's government in Peking, we had not taken previous action in Canada to recognize that government. We had in fact, as the house knows, given serious consideration to such action. We had been impressed by the argument that recognition by Canada and other countries would facilitate the representation of China within the United Nations, and consequently might make easier the peaceful settlement of certain Far Eastern issues. We had nevertheless also been influenced by what still seem to me to be valid views about making such a change at that time, and by advice which we had received from

many quarters, including many quarters in this house, to proceed very cautiously in this matter. Furthermore, a number of countries which had recognized the Chinese communists had had great difficulty in getting the Chinese communists to recognize them, at least to the point of entering into effective diplomatic relations with them. For example, the United Kingdom had recognized the regime in Peking but it was far from clear that that regime in any effective sense recognized the United Kingdom. Then came the attack on Korea in June. There was much evidence that that attack had been prepared with the approval, and indeed with the support, of the Chinese communists, and we did not feel justified in taking any action toward recognition until the circumstances surrounding the aggression in Korea had become clearer. I need hardly add that when late last year the Chinese government in Peking joined in the aggression in Korea, it was inconceivable that countries which had hitherto withheld recognition would at that time decide to change their policies.
I feel, however, that the Far Eastern problems could be more readily solved if diplomatic relations existed with the government of China, which has the whole of the mainland of China under its control. But the Peking government can hardly expect recognition now from those member states of the United Nations against whom they are fighting in Korea. The remedy for the situation now lies with the communists themselves. They should not think that they can bludgeon or blackmail their way into recognition or into the United Nations.
The next specific and controversial issue which arose at Lake Success on Far Eastern questions, and which I want to discuss, was whether or not General MacArthur should be authorized by the United Nations to extend military operations beyond the 38th parallel in Korea. The 38th parallel was not important from the military point of view, but it was obvious that its crossing would have political and symbolic significance, indeed as its recrossing would have even more significance. At this time I do not need to remind the house that it was never intended by the United Nations that Korea should be cut in two along the parallel. In resolutions of the general assembly of the United Nations the objective of a free, independent and united Korea had been clearly laid down. Nevertheless, in spite of those resolutions this line, which had originally been merely a line of military convenience, had become a Rubicon, the line which marked in that part of the world a division between the Soviet world and the free world.
The Address-Mr. Pearson The decision to authorize the United Nations forces to cross that line could not be taken lightly, and it was not taken lightly.
There were strong reasons at that time for giving such authorization. Although the North Korean forces had been badly defeated by General MacArthur's skilful campaign, large elements had escaped, and those remnants could not be made harmless unless the United Nations commander had the opportunity of pursuing them into North Korea. If they were not overpowered, the risk would remain that after they had regrouped and been re-equipped they might once again fall on Southern Korea after the United Nations had been withdrawn. Moreover, as I have stated already on a number of occasions, the United Nations itself had passed resolutions in favour of a united and independent nation in Korea.
The members of the Canadian delegation were impressed by these arguments, and by certain military information given to us, and we agreed, along with a great many other delegations, with the resolution proposed in the United Nations assembly authorizing the United Nations forces to take any action which was necessary to unify the whole of Korea. We, along with others, realized that risks would be involved, and efforts were made in the United Nations to reduce those risks to the minimum. For that purpose we proposed sending a mission which would have been the last appeal to the North Korean government to give up the fight before the line had been crossed, but we were not successful in establishing communications for that purpose.
After that line had once been crossed, the possibility of an early settlement depended on the campaign in North Korea itself. During the discussions which were had on the crossing of the parallel we had reason to believe that it was not the intention of the unified command to pursue the North Korean forces right up to the Manchurian border. We had reason to believe that a defensive line could be established across the narrow waist of North Korea, and that the two northern provinces of Korea would be left, for the time being at least, as a kind of unoccupied frontier area. That scheme seemed sensible to us, and we hoped it could be carried out.
With many other delegations, including indeed the delegation of the United States of America, we felt that very great care should be taken to avoid offering any unnecessary provocation, to the Chinese government at Peking. At the same time we realized, on this and on other occasions, that the unified command was responsible for the operations
56	HOUSE OF
The Address-Mr. Pearson of a force which was very largely composed of soldiers of the United States. That command and those soldiers were bearing the brunt of the responsibility and of the fighting, and they had the full right to make the military decisions within the limits of the authority given them by the United Nations. When those decisions turned out well, we all rejoiced with them. When they were wrong, I think it would have been improper and ungrateful to be unfairly critical and emphasize our own lack of responsibility. However, all of us who supported the action of the United Nations in Korea had not only the right but the duty to make our views known to the unified command through the positions we took at Lake Success, and also through our contacts with the United States delegation there.
In this connection it will be recalled that on October 5 last the foreign minister of the Chinese people's government, Mr. Chou En-lai, stated that his government would not stand aside if the United Nations forces crossed' the 38th parallel.
That warning came to us through the Indian ambassador at Peking. We ourselves did not think it a sufficient reason for refusing the United' Nations commander permission to complete the task which had been assigned to him; but many delegations, including our own, considered it to be a good reason for conducting military operations in North Korea, with, shall I say, great circumspection. So when we began to receive indications that it was intended to carry the campaign to the Yalu river, we expressed our misgivings confidentially to the United States authorities in Washington as early as November 6. It may also be recalled that I publicly made clear the position of the government on this matter when I spoke in Windsor on November 15. On that occasion, after stating that the marches where the free world rubbed together with the soviet world were obviously the most critical points, I went on to voice this hope:
Those primarily responsible for safeguarding the security of such areas of the world should carry out their mission in as steady and unprovocative a way as possible.
In keeping with this point of view we supported, in private discussions at the United Nations, the proposal that a buffer state should be left along the northern boundary of Korea in order to avoid giving any excuse for suspicion on the part of the Chinese government that its legitimate interests might be in danger.
Intervention by China in this war in North Korea on an increasing scale throughout the whole of November brought sharply into view the third of the critical issues with which we


have been asked recently to deal. Should we at once condemn this as aggression, or should we enter into discussions, on certain conditions, with the Chinese communists in an effort to bring it to an end? It seemed pretty clear that a stable settlement in Korea could hardly be achieved without some agreement, even though a tacit one, with the people's government of China; but after the Chinese government at Peking had intervened in force and were driving back the outnumbered forces of the United Nations at the end of November, some voices-and this is quite natural-were immediately raised in favour of whatever United Nations military action against China itself might be necessary in order to end the war.
Well, Mr. Speaker, we opposed at that time and have continued to oppose any such action against Chinese territory which was not dictated by the most urgent considerations of immediate military necessity. Already such large forces have been committed in Korea that the risk of Soviet or Soviet-inspired attacks at other points, strategically far more important to the free world, is serious. For this and other reasons we have joined from the beginning those who urged that the conflict in Korea should be limited and localized as far as possible; and we still believe that the arguments in favour of that course are as strong as ever.
If, then, a war with China, in which a decision could hardly be achieved, had to be averted by every means possible, what alternative methods were there for reaching a settlement in Korea? Speaking over the air on December 5, I stated my own belief that nothing should be left undone which might conceivably result in an honourable and peaceful settlement in Korea. I went on to say:
If, for example, provided the military situation is stabilized', there could be a cease-fire followed by negotiations-possibly covering more subjects than Korea-in which the Chinese communists would participate, there might still be hope of reaching such a settlement. At least we would have done our best and the responsibility for failure could be placed' where it would belong.
In that same speech, however, I insisted that a cease-fire must precede and not follow peace negotiations, and that is the position from which we have never wavered. I believe we in this government, in this house and in this country are as anxious as anyone to secure a peaceful settlement in Korea, but I think we know that such a settlement would be bought at too high a cost if it denied and betrayed the obligations we as a member of the United Nations had already undertaken in respect to Korea.
In my view it would have been such a betrayal if we had entered into political

negotiations, as distinct from cease-fire negotiations, with the Peking government while its troops were still attacking United Nations forces. We have been willing to have the United Nations discuss with the Chinese communists a settlement in Korea and throughout the Far East, but we have not been willing at any time to ask members of the United Nations to participate in such discussions under duress while their men were being killed in Korea. The point of principle here, and the practical consequences of abandoning it, I think are of such crucial importance that this is one issue on which we have never been prepared to compromise.
There are those in this country who assert, and do so quite often and quite vehemently, that our willingness to seek an arrangement on the issue of a cease-fire first and talks afterwards was dishonourable and, as they called it, "appeasement". Those who hold such views I think are mistaken about the character of our policy and about the nature of appeasement itself. What they have in mind, no doubt, is such action as was taken at Munich in 1938. Appeasement as defined by those events begins with illusions about the potential aggressor, and ends with the betrayal of a friend in response to pressure exercised by that aggressor in the hope that such yielding will give one immunity from attack. How different such a course is from the policy which has been advocated by this government in this matter may be seen by examining the same broadcast in which I suggested negotiations with the Chinese communists. Having made that suggestion I went on at once to say:
We must not allow this process-or the situation which makes it necessary-to weaken our resolve or interfere with our plan to strengthen our defences. Above all, we must not allow it to weaken the unity or friendly co-operation of those countries in the free world who are now working together so closely for the good purpose of establishing conditions of stability and peace in the world.
In that, and in other statements made at the time, I stressed the danger in which we stood and the sacrifices which it demanded of us. Far from trying to lull our people into a sense of false security by a move which could rightly be interpreted as appeasement, I have said, and other members of the government have said time and again as I say now, that the free world is in the greatest possible danger. A cease-fire in Korea would not have removed that danger, but it would, however, have put us in a stronger position to meet it.
If those of us who have advocated negotiations of this kind with the Chinese communists are appeasers we are in very good company. It will not, I think, be argued in this house that Mr. Churchill is a man likely to
The Address-Mr. Pearson truckle to or appease aggressors. What are his views on the present situation? Speaking in the House of Commons at Westminster on December 14, he said:
The only prudent course open to the United States and ourselves is to stabilize the local military position . . .
That is in Korea.
. . . and if the opportunity then occurs, to negotiate with the aggressors . . .
Later in the same speech he said:
Appeasement in itself may be good or bad according to the circumstances. Appeasement from weakness and fear is alike futile and fatal. Appeasement from strength is magnanimous and noble, and might be the surest and perhaps the only path to world peace.
The United Nations in Korea, Mr. Speaker, as events have now shown is, thanks primarily to the magnificent effort of the United States, not weak or frightened, and it is getting stronger. From that strength I think it will always be wise to negotiate, to "appease," to use Mr. Churchill's words, in order to bring this diversionary and weakening struggle to an end on honourable terms as soon as possible.
One of the vehicles for this so-called appeasement, Mr. Speaker, was the United Nations cease-fire committee, on which I had the honour to be associated with the president of the assembly, Mr. Entezam of Iran and Sir Benegal Rau, the Indian delegate. I assure you, Mr. Speaker, in taking on that work I was no volunteer. I was the victim of conscription, because it was not a job which anyone would willingly choose. I do not intend today to go into the details of the work of that committee, but there are some things about this particular initiative which I should like to make clear.
In some quarters it has been assumed that this was a sterile, if not dangerous, exercise undertaken by naive idealistic persons merely to placate Asian opinion. It is quite true that the Asian countries had taken the lead in suggesting that a committee should be set up to determine the basis upon which a satisfactory cease-fire could be arranged. It is also true that many other members of the United Nations, including Canada, had been anxious, whenever possible, to take advice from Asian countries as to the best method of restoring peace in the Far East.
I should like to point out, however, that the resolution to establish the cease-fire committee secured the support of all members of the United Nations with the exception of the Soviet bloc. The United States in particular actively assisted and encouraged the members of our committee in their work. The task of the committee was an uphill one, and often a frustrating one. In one

The Address-Mr. Pearson article which I read not long ago we were referred to as three men in search of a ceasefire. Our search was not successful. After we had secured from the unified command in Washington a basis for stopping the fighting which we thought reasonable, we tried to enter into effective contact with the people's government at Peking. But for a long time our efforts were unavailing, and I must say we were not treated even with very great politeness.
However, on December 21, the Chinese foreign minister broadcast a reply to our approaches in which he claimed the ceasefire committee had been illegally constituted. He demanded that negotiations for a political settlement should precede rather than follow a cease-fire in Korea. Such a procedure, of course, was totally unacceptable to us, and to the United Nations. Nevertheless, in spite of this somewhat sharp rebuff it was felt by the United Nations that it might be worth while for the cease-fire committee to make another attempt to convince the regime at Peking of the genuineness of our offer, to which the United States completely subscribed, to enter into negotiations on a wide range of Far Eastern issues if a cease-fire could only be established. After considerable difficulty, we drew up a statement of principles which was presented to the political committee of the assembly on January 11. This statement combined proposals for ending the fighting in Korea with others for political negotiations of outstanding Far Eastern problems. The proposal secured the approval of fifty of the sixty member nations, including the United States and India.
A great deal of the credit for securing such widespread approval of the statement of principles must be ascribed to the fact that, at the time it was being prepared, the commonwealth prime ministers were meeting in London. This was an occasion on which the commonwealth association was extremely valuable in harmonizing the views of the free nations of the east and west. I hope I may be permitted to say, Mr. Speaker, that our own Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) played a central role in the discussions in London to reconcile the various points of view.
The first reply from Peking to our statement of principles was certainly ambiguous, though it seemed to be a rejection since it contained an apparent reaffirmation of the theory that a cease-fire must follow rather than precede negotiations. In order to try to remove what we thought might be ambiguity, and indeed turned out to be ambiguity, our Prime Minister suggested to the Prime Minister of India, in a message on January

18, that since the government of India maintained an embassy in Peking it would be helpful if clarification could be sought through Indian channels to certain points in the reply which the Chinese communists had returned to our statement of principles. It was in answer to this initiative on the part of our Prime Minister and Mr. Nehru that the Chinese government provided the clarification requested in their message of January 22. That clarification seemed more hopeful, since it stated for the first time in fairly clear language that a cease-fire could be agreed upon in the first meeting of a conference called to discuss Far Eastern issues and that this discussion of political issues would not take place until after the cease-fire had been agreed on. That reply was considerably encouraging to some of us.
During the time that these cease-fire discussions were going on, proposals to name the Chinese communists formally in the United Nations as aggressors had remained in abeyance. As soon as the first reply, that of January 17, was received from Peking, the United States, considering that reply to be wholly unsatisfactory, pressed the other members of the United Nations to proceed without delay with such condemnatory action. That presented our delegation with the fourth and final issue of critical importance about which I wish to say something, especially in view of the amendment to the address in reply submitted yesterday by the leader of the C.C.F. party. We felt at that time, as indeed the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell) said yesterday, that the passage of such a formal resolution of condemnation in the United Nations at that particular moment, when we had just received the second reply from Peking, would be both premature and unwise. If it were not followed by some action against China, it would throw into high relief the sharp limitations of United Nations' resolutions. On the other hand, if it were followed by the imposition of sanctions, however modest, against China, the risk of the west becoming involved in a war with China would be increased; and we were and are determined, along with other delegations, to do everything we can to prevent a war with China, whether limited or unlimited. We were all also loath at that moment to support a formal condemnation of China in the United Nations because we felt that the clarification which had come from Peking afforded some possibility of satisfactory negotiation with that regime. There was also a real danger at that time that a resolution of condemnation in the United Nations, in the terms of the United States' resolution as it stood at that time, would unnecessarily highlight and

exaggerate differences of view between the Asian and the western members of the free world and indeed bring about a formal division between the members of the western world in the United Nations. Nevertheless there could be no doubt that the Chinese communists had engaged in aggression and had attacked the forces of the United Nations; and in the last resort we could not refuse, as I saw it, to recognize that situation in a resolution of condemnation if that resolution were pressed to a vote, if it stated the actual position fairly, if it were not couched in unnecessarily provocative terms, and if it included within it provision for negotiation. In all of my discussions with the Indian delegate at the United Nations-and I have had a great many with him in the last two or three weeks -I made that position perfectly clear to him; and he at no time was under any misunderstanding or misapprehension about the Canadian position.
Last week we had two resolutions before us at the United Nations and we were faced with a decision as to what we should do about them. We realized that that decision might indeed have far-reaching consequences. The first of these two resolutions was the Asian resolution providing for a seven-power conference in which both the U.S.S.R. and communist China would be represented, a seven-power conference not only for political discussions but for cease-fire discussions and a seven-power conference the terms of the invitation to which seemed to us to be couched in a form which might have made possible protracted discussion with Peking before the conference ever met. For that reason we did not find that resolution satisfactory, and in a speech last Friday we suggested certain points which we thought would remove the danger from the Asian resolution if those points could have been included in it, because they would have laid down in a resolution a concrete and definite program for talks without delay. In those points we even suggested a date for the convocation of a conference, a place where it might be held and a time limit after which, if Peking did not reply, we would assume that they would not accept it. In those points we tried to remove from the aegis of this seven-power conference-which included a good many states who were not joining in the police action in Korea, including the U.S.S.R., which had refused to support action from the beginning-the negotiations for a ceasefire and send them to a more appropriate body of three: the United Nations commission in Korea, the United States and the Peking government. If those points which we put forward and had discussed previously with the Indian delegation and the United States
The Address-Mr. Pearson had been included in the Indian resolution, we would have voted for it. One of them was included. The others were not, I presume because it was felt that the inclusion of those other points might have made it more difficult for Peking to accept the resolution.
The United States' position with regard to our points was a simple one. They felt that the time for any further approach to Peking was over until the resolution of condemnation and setting up the good offices committee had been passed. So when the Asian resolution came to the vote, we could not vote for it, for the reasons which I have indicated. We could not vote against it because the principle of negotiation was one which we had stood for. Therefore we abstained from voting. In our attitude on this matter, so far as Canadian policy is concerned, I do not think anybody in India has any reason to feel that they were let down.
The second resolution was submitted by the United States. We had been unsuccessful in our efforts to secure postponement of that resolution. We had been successful in our efforts to get that resolution changed and also to get it clarified and interpreted by the United States delegate, which interpretation removed most of the doubts we had with regard to it at the beginning. Our first objective, postponement, was not successful. Our second objective, to get the proper kind of resolution voted on, I think was reasonably successful. We were anxious to make clear beyond any possibility of doubt that any resolution which the United Nations passed on this subject would be exceedingly clear indeed on the following points. We were anxious that it would not establish any new aggression but would emphasize that the Chinese government at Peking had merely participated in an old aggression and therefore was guilty of that but not of starting a new aggression in any other part of Korea. We were also anxious that the paragraph of condemnation should be couched in unprovocative terms, and it was. That paragraph does not brand anybody as an aggressor. It is a finding of fact that, by assisting the aggressors in Korea and by invading North Korea from China, the people's government in Peking had itself engaged in aggression. That was a finding of fact which we cei tainly could not deny. The third point we were anxious to make clear was that the collective measures committee set up by this resolution and as to which many delegations had grave doubts, would not be a vehicle for rash and unwise action but might indeed become a brake on such action; and that this collective measures committee, far from jumping into resolutions and reports on sanctions at once, should not even report to the

The Address-Mr. Pearson United Nations general assembly as long as there was any possibility of the good offices committee completing its work satisfactorily. That was made clear by an amendment to the United States' resolution proposed by the delegate for Lebanon. Fourth, we were anxious to make it quite clear in this resolution that the work of mediation and conciliation could go on after the resolution passed, and indeed that that work would be given priority over any enforcement. We wanted to make it clear beyond doubt that, so far as the United Nations was concerned, we had not slammed any doors on anybody. And then finally we want to make it quite clear that this resolution did not give anybody any authority to take any action which he did not already possess. It certainly does not give the United Nations, or any agent of the United Nations in Asia, any power or right to use United Nations forces to liberate Asia from communism. The mandate of the United Nations in this operation remains the same, namely, to defeat aggression in Korea, and nothing else.
Well, having had these amendments put forward, and having received these clarifications from the United States delegation, which removed most of our doubts, we felt, Mr. Speaker, that to vote against this resolution, or to abstain in regard to it, would have been to refuse to accept as true the statement that the Chinese government had participated in aggression-something we had no right to do without denying the justice of United Nations action in Korea. Furthermore, it would have meant breaking the unity of the western nations on an issue of timing and tactics. We did not take that course. We voted for the resolution, and I think we were right in doing so. Forty-four other countries, including every member of the north Atlantic alliance, agreed with us.
But we have made our view abundantly clear that this resolution does not give anyone on one side any shadow of excuse for rash and adventurous courses, or anyone on the other any shadow of excuse for refusing to discuss an ending of hostilities or a peaceful solution of this problem. Why should it? It was said at Lake Success by the Indian delegate, and it was said yesterday by the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell): "You have now branded them as aggressors. How can you expect them to talk to you?" Well, they have been branding us in the United Nations as aggressors steadily for the last two or three months, and they have shown no reluctance to talk with us on their terms, or any feeling that we should not talk with them because they have called us aggressors in very rude and uncivilized

tones. So I am optimistic, and I hope my optimism is justified, Mr. Speaker, that the passing of our resolution will not be followed by the catastrophic consequences that some people sincerely believe it will.
We do not believe that by passing this resolution we are slamming the door to subsequent negotiation, or that the government in Peking would have any justification for interpreting our action in this way. I hope, Mr. Speaker, and I expressed this hope in my last statement at the United Nations before I came back to Ottawa, that whatever happened to this resolution-and it is now part of the law of the United Nations-the work of cease-fire, discussion and peaceful settlement, through the machinery provided in the resolution, will proceed with a view to ending the war in Korea and removing the causes of war in other areas of Asia.
That, Mr. Speaker, is our position. It is not one which, in my opinion, warrants support for the amendment of the C.C.F. party which is now before the house. To support that amendment, Mr. Speaker, would, I think, be to accept the despairing but sincere plea of that wise and saintly gentleman, Sir Benegal Rau, that by passing this resolution we had ended all hope of a peaceful solution of Far Eastern questions. I do not accept any such counsel of despair; and I hope that the Indian government, on second thought, will not do so either, and will continue to participate in the work of negotiation and conciliation, to which it has already made such a magnificent contribution. We in this government will do what we can, in any way open to us, to assist that work, and to prove that the prophets of impending calamity are wrong. And events may, I think, work in our favour along this course. I am even bold enough to think that the Chinese government in Peking will come to realize before long that the true interests of the Chinese people cannot be served now by an alliance with Russian communist imperialism, as they could not be served in the past by Russian czarist imperialism.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I return from Asia to our own western and north Atlantic world. Here we are now entering the period of greatest danger in the months ahead. Our hope of coming through this period without war lies in the growing collective strength, military, economic and moral, of the free world. If we increase that strength, and use it wisely, we do not need' to fear. There are in the hearts and minds and souls of free men qualities which can never be matched by slaves. If we use them we shall accomplish our own salvation. If we do not, but give way to smug complacency on the one

hand or unreasoning panic on the other, we shall become, and deserve to become, slaves ourselves.
May I end with a paragraph from a magazine often quoted in this house and elsewhere, namely, The Economist. Writing on January 20 last, the editor said:
Nothing is certain about the course of events in 1951; and anyone who questions this should ask himself frankly what he was prophesying for 1950 just a year ago. The die is not cast for war or peace; events can still be controlled and minds influenced, but only if the leaders of the Kremlin can be convinced that they have equally little to hope from pressing an armed attack on the free worldl or to fear from withholding it. Neither strength, alone nor peace alone is an adequate cry for the west-neither rearmament alone, which is the means of the one, nor negotiation alone which is the means of the other. The only hopeful policy is peace through strength, arms and diplomacy.


Mr. George H. Hees (Broadview):: Mr. Speaker, first of all I should like to congratulate sincerely the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) on a very clear and straightforward statement of the situation today. I feel that we always get the facts from the Secretary of State for External Affairs. I should like to congratulate him on a clear address today.
Last June, when the Secretary of State for External Affairs returned from a meeting of the Atlantic pact nations, he outlined to this house the principle which had been accepted by that body. It was to the effect that in future member nations would not be permitted time to build up their defences behind the bulwarks of overrun nations. The understanding arrived at by the twelve member nations was that they would build up their armed forces now so that they would be able to come immediately to the aid of a member nation should that nation be attacked. That decision was roundly applauded by those in this house and throughout the country. It seemed that at last the free nations of the world were going to take practical steps to combat aggression.
Let us see what we have done during the intervening eight months to implement the decision arrived at at that time. Today our armed forces total 62,000, and the target we nave set for ourselves is 69,000. How does this effort compare with that of our two closest and greatest allies, Great Britain and the United States? Our forces, compared to theirs, should be in direct proportion to population. In other words, because the population of Great Britain is three and one-half times that of Canada, the size of their armed forces should be approximately three and one-half times those of Canada. In the same way, because the population of the United States is
The Address-Mr. Hees eleven times our population, the size of their armed forces should be approximately eleven times greater than ours.
How do they actually compare?
First of all, I shall refer to Great Britain. Last October the armed forces of Great Britain totalled 1,023,000 men. On January 1 of this year our armed forces totalled 62,000. The armed forces of Great Britain are sixteen times greater than ours, instead of three and a half times greater, as they should be in proportion to population. Therefore their effort is four and one-half times greater than ours.
The target set in the United States for the end of June in this year is to have 3,500,000 men under arms. Our ceiling is 69,000. Therefore their target is fifty times that of Canada, instead of eleven times, as it should be in proportion to population. We see therefore that the effort of our two closest and greatest allies is in each case four and one-half times our effort, having taken full consideration of the difference in population of those two great countries and Canada.
Why is there such a great difference in national effort? The Prime Minister speaking in London on January 10 made the following statement:
The north Atlantic countries must build up their military resources to prevent a world war by removing the prospect of successful aggression.
Is the performance I have just outlined the Prime Minister's idea of building up our military resources and playing our part to prevent a third world war? Great Britain and the United States face exactly the same problems we face in raising armed forces. All three countries must produce war materials both for themselves and for their allies, and in addition maintain the production of their civilian goods. In those two countries, as well as in Canada, they enjoy full employment. In those countries they have no extra men to put into their armed forces, any more than we have. Their problems are exactly the same as ours; and therefore there is absolutely no excuse for our not matching their efforts in proportion to population.
Does the government believe that we can enter into associations such as the United Nations and the Atlantic pact and not bear our share of the responsibilities involved? Judging by their action, or lack of action, apparently they do. A parasite has been aptly described as one who goes through a swinging door on somebody else's push. If the government believes that we can go through this period of preparedness, or a third world war, if one should come, on

The Address-Mr. Hees somebody else's push, it will be jeopardizing not only our national security but also our national honour.
If we continue to act like a poor relation we shall not be fooling the people of the United States or of Great Britain for one moment. We shall simply be making sure that in future we shall be treated not as a medium power but as a small power, because the people of Great Britain and the United States recognize the difference between talking big at international conferences and acting small when action is called for.
I believe it is about time the government realized that the only kind of action communists understand is strength and preparedness, and that the only chance this or any other free nation has of avoiding a third world war is by being ready to repel aggression when it strikes. I believe that if war should come it would be far better for us to have trained forces in proportion to population, ready to dispatch to other parts of the world to defeat aggression there, and to do so outside this country.
The alternative is to wait until our enemy gobbles up our allies one by one and then, with the industrial capacity of Europe and Japan and the oil of the Middle East at his disposal, to take on this continent with a war machine that has never yet been dreamed of. There may be those in the house who believe there is no obligation upon us to match the efforts of our two great allies, in proportion to population. If that is so, it will be interesting to hear their views to back up those feelings and beliefs.
I am convinced that the great majority of people in Canada feel we are morally obligated to match the efforts of our two great allies, in proportion to population. Without their strength, our position in the world today would be a precarious one indeed. The least we can do is to bear our share of the responsibility of the load. The forces we need to have in being today can be raised if the following conditions are met:	First of all,
the government must tell the people the true gravity of the situation and stop lulling them to sleep by quoting odds of fifty to one against our becoming involved in a general war. You simply cannot expect young men to take the situation seriously if they are continually being told that there is only one chance in fifty of their being needed. The truth is that this country has never faced a more serious situation than it does today. If the people are told, they will not fail to respond.
The second requirement is that the basis for raising the forces we need to have in being today must be our present reserve forces which have been training for the past


five years for just such an eventuality. Units and formations can be chosen evenly across the country and they can recruit and basically train the men they need. Formation training can be carried out at the various training camps across the country. Incidentally this would give a tremendous boost to the morale of the reserve forces, of which they are greatly in need.
Third, during the training period the rates of pay and conditions of service would be the same as for the regular forces.
Fourth, if no national emergency should exist when training has been completed the units and formations could be returned to reserve status and the men to their civilian jobs. They would be subject to immediate recall in case of a national emergency.
Fifth, their training would continue on a reserve basis of one or two nights a week, with two weeks of formation training in the summertime.
Sixth, legislation should be re-enacted to protect those who enlist by ensuring their release for necessary training or service by their present employers without jeopardizing their jobs or seniority.
This plan would provide forces in being, ready for immediate call to duty, at a minimum cost to the taxpayers. It would also provide maximum manpower which would be available for both civilian and war production until such time as a national emergency would require their being called to active duty.
In conclusion I should like to say this: Let us for heaven's sake bear in mind that it takes a full year to recruit, train and equip a division, that it takes many months to train navy and air force personnel. Let us also bear in mind the size of the communist forces today and the speed with which they strike. Then let us get on with the job. Our national honour and our ultimate survival as a free nation demand it.


Mr. Daniel Mclvor (Fort William):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to repeat that I always have great delight in representing the banner constituency of Canada, Fort William. This may be only a statement to some, but it is a fact to us and we can prove it. My first words will be of congratulation to the mover (Mr. McMillan) and the seconder (Mr. Breton) of the address in reply to the speech from the throne. They did a fine job with dignity, respect and courtesy to the Chair and to every hon. member of this house.
I should like also to congratulate those hon. members who have been promoted and I especially thank the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) for not leaving northern Ontario wanting. We sometimes blame the provincial

government of Ontario for forgetting northern Ontario, for seeming to treat it as a place where only fishermen and tourists and wolves and wild beasts abound, but we believe that northern Ontario is the coming part of Canada in the future.
I want to congratulate the newly elected hon. members. Those of us who listened last night to the splendid speech of the hon. member for Calgary West (Mr. Smith) could not help but realize the responsibilities that rest upon anyone who is elected to represent a constituency. We cannot treat those responsibilities lightly.
In offering congratulations I do not want to pass over another group which is perhaps of equal importance, perhaps not because of its responsibilities but because of the service it renders. I am speaking of your staff, Mr. Speaker. I join with others in welcoming the new page boys. They do a good job and certainly they have a record to follow.
I appreciate the reference which has been made in the speech from the throne to old age pensioners and that it is likely, if there is co-operation by the provinces, that the means test will be removed as far as persons of seventy years and over are concerned and that those in need at sixty-five years will receive a pension. I note also that price controls will have consideration, whether in the way that a great many of us would expect or in another way that may be better.
There are those who think that Canada is treating with complacency the matter of military preparations, but I cannot agree with that. Anyone who listened to the speech just delivered by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) must realize what the government has been doing, and what he has been doing. It is known in other quarters that I have been interested in the training of youth in athletics and our national games. I have learned a lot from the executives who plan these games. I am sure we were not too greatly surprised to hear that the leading executives of the great national game in the United States had picked out the minister of external affairs as being the man worthy of receiving $65,000 a year instead of his present salary. If he is suitable for that position and if the sportsmen all over the United States are willing to back up their vice-president, surely to goodness we must admit that he is doing a good job for the United Nations and especially for Canada.
I was pleased to note in the press last evening that the Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg), backed up by his deputy, is planning to provide aid for those who are physically disabled. Pensions are provided for our older
The Address-Mr. Mclvor citizens and other help is provided for other citizens, but those who are incapacitated through no fault of their own receive nothing.
We were pleased to note that the Minister of Transport (Mr. Chevrier) put considerable energy into his statement when he said that Canada would go ahead with our great lakes navigation development. This may have stimulated the United States, and we in Fort William are very hopeful that this great scheme will be put through this year.
It is my duty, I think, to say a word about my own constituency, because I know its possibilities. Any hon. member who regularly looks over his constituency will find many things that are good. We find that Fort William is a great place for a young father and mother to bring up their children. They will be looked after from their earliest days. I should just like to outline what has been done by our city council to take care of our youth, following the voluntary work of many of our citizens. We have organized centres for both summer and winter activities. We have nine parks where our boys and girls are looked after during the holiday months, under the supervision of twenty-one people who are paid by the city council. Once a week these boys and girls get a trip to Chippewa park, our tourist centre, in buses supplied free. There, under trained supervisors, they are taught swimming, games, and nature study. It has been my pleasure to see an officer of the mounted police, representing the youth department of that organization, spend a week each year helping these young people develop their bodies and minds, and giving an example of how they should conduct themselves. Every night there is a moving picture show in a cosy corner where, when the lights are all out, you can almost feel the spooks round about.
It is well said that Fort William is the bread basket of the world, with our thirty or more elevators and our splendid natural water works provided by Loch Lomond on mount McKay, from which the water is distributed all over the city practically without cost. We have a splendid hydro system, and we have great farms. I do not know of any district in Canada that is more progressive. The farmers have been encouraged to develop their land so that now many of them raise more than one hundred bushels of oats to the acre. We also have our potato club, and many of those farmers raise more than five hundred bushels to the acre. This encourages our farmers to cultivate properly and fertilize as they should.
Any tourist coming to Fort William and going to the tourist bureau will obtain information that will lead him to the most charming places: the sleeping giant; the sea

The Address-Mr. A. Stewart lion of Silver island; the peeping squaw; the princess of the mist, and the three sisters, to say nothing about Kakabeka falls, which are higher than Niagara though they have less water.
When I consider the question of war, Mr. Speaker, I must say that I am not afraid of Russia nor of communist China. It is not heads that count; it is wills that are consecrated to do what is right. I think back to the first time I read the story of how the children of Israel were enslaved by the Midianites. Gideon got his commission from the right source. He called Israel together, and 32,000 men rallied to the support of the old flag. But there were too many, and those who were fearful and afraid of the campaign were given a chance to go home. Twenty-two thousand went home, but there were still too many. They had to be tested; and the men who went down to the brook were not so anxious to get a good satisfying drink; they had their eye on the hills beyond, and wanted to get after the enemy. Finally only three hundred were left, but they put to rout the armies of the Midianites.
What happened to the nations of the past? What happened to Hitler? He left God out of it, and because of that he made outstanding mistakes. The greatest was when he attacked Russia. What about Napoleon? He had burning ambition, but he left God out. Any nation like Russia or China which treats God as a myth and follows the teaching of Karl Marx is bound to make mistakes, and sooner or later it will find itself down and out.
In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I should like to pay my tribute to the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) on his address yesterday and also to the Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Drew), because he has some practical common sense. As to the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) I can only say we are thankful that we have men like him; and baseball cannot buy him for $65,000 a year.


Mr. Alistair Stewart (Winnipeg North):: Mr. Speaker, I should like to bring this debate back to the realm of international affairs. Almost the concluding words of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) were that this house should turn down the amendment offered by my leader, the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), yesterday, which reads:
We further regret that while Your Excellency's advisers have generally followed a constructive course in relation to the Korean dispute, they have in relation to the resolution branding China as an aggressor supported a course which is premature and unwise at this particular moment, and which should not have been pursued until the methods of peaceful negotiation had been completely exhausted.

Until a day or two ago I thought we had some quite good company in those sentiments. Those of us who listened to the C.B.C. broadcast on Tuesday night from Lake Success by Peter Stursberg heard Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, who spoke in a voice which was strained and tired. Unquestionably he spoke with sincerity, and he said he thought it was premature and unwise at this particular moment to pursue this policy, until the methods of peaceful negotiation had been completely exhausted. Not only did the minister believe those words to be true on Tuesday, before the vote; he believed them to be true last week, and since we believe his words are true today we have accepted them. Now we find it is he who has recanted.
I think it is a good thing that as far as possible there should be in this house a reasonable approximation to unanimity as to the foreign policy we pursue. That has been so in the past, and I think it will be so in the future. But when there exists such a major difference of opinion as we have we would be untrue to what we believe, untrue to those who agree with us, if we remained silent and uncritical, even although the times may be dangerous. What we have advocated in the past should be known. It is on the record.
We have said that our policy should be designed towards keeping China neutral. We were not convinced we could make an ally, let alone a friend, of China; nor were we convinced that China was yet in the orbit of Russia. Indeed, the differences between China and Russia even today are obvious. Unfortunately we have pushed these two countries closer together, although their differences may not be so clear as has been the case in the past or as will be in the future. It is not without significance that Russian influence in North Korea has practically disappeared, and its place has been taken by that of China. It is not without significance that the quarrels which have existed between China and Russia over Manchuria are not yet patched up, and may possibly break out again in 1952. It is not without significance that Chinese nationalism is today stronger than Chinese allegiance to communism. With a strongly nationalist China, I do not see much possibility of China becoming as subservient to the Kremlin as have other powers which could more accurately be described as satellite countries.
In other words, what we have asked for, what we have advocated, is patience. Since we desire peace and the improved welfare of the world, patience was demanded of us even in the face of extraordinary provocation. What did the minister say this afternoon? He said that we called China an

aggressor, and why not? Have they not consistently called us aggressors? Is it wise to respond with a tu quoque in differences such as we have? I do not think it is.
I believe we were wrong in pursuing a policy which would have as its effect the forcing of China and Russia closer together. In so doing we are really pursuing Russian desires. We would be terribly wrong if we played still further into Russian hands and, following the logic of events, became embroiled in a war in Asia. We are wrong I think at this moment in following any policy which will add fuel to the flames of suspicion, and fear of the motives of the west which occupy so many Asian minds. Unhappily almost every day the fuel is being provided, and one of the most regrettable examples was that quoted by the member for Rosetown-Biggar (Mr. Coldwell), when he reminded the house that India had asked the United States for two million tons of wheat. One or two Americans in responsible public positions have been so ill advised as to say that unless India followed the policies laid down by the United States she should not get the wheat. I am certain that word has flown around Asia, that the Americans are prepared to use human starvation as a political weapon. I do not believe that is the sentiment of the United States, but unfortunately rash and loose tongues give that impression. It does nothing to bring the people of Asia nearer to us.
One other thing we have to realize is that, even were the relationship between the United States and the Soviet union the most friendly, the most amicable, we should still have revolution in Asia. The people there are determined to overthrow the domination of those under whom they have suffered so long. Today we see rising in Asia the same thing which we in the west are leaving, but it is new in Asia, and there it is the resurgence of a powerful nationalism. It is a force which we cannot ignore.
The minister laid down three general considerations in the opening part of his speech. They were the necessity for the maintenance of freedom, with which we all agree; the necessity for our continued support of the United Nations, to which we subscribe; and third, he asked for a cool and rational appraisal of the present crisis, as he is entitled to ask and as we should be prepared to grant. So, I am going to try to look as objectively as is possible at the situation, first of all from the point of view of China.
If I were to be asked that very stupid question, is China an aggressor, answer yes or no, I would find tremendous difficulty in answering. I believe that Cbma was wrong 80709-5
The Address-Mr. A. Stewart in crossing into Korea. I believe, however, there are extenuating circumstances of which the minister himself was well aware in his speech, from which I shall yet quote several extracts, before the first committee of the United Nations on January 26. At page 11 he said:
It may still be that the Chinese consider that they are engaged not in aggression, but in self-defence: and that they are so imprisoned by their own dogma and their isolation, so influenced by bad advice and misled by wrong information, that they do not understand the intentions of the United Nations in general and of the United States in particular.
I think that is generous. I think it may be correct. The Chinese are perhaps ignorant of the good intentions of the western world. We have to realize that they have always regarded Korea as a particularly Chinese sphere of influence. Their memories are not so short that they have forgotten that, on more than one occasion, Korea has been used as the gateway for aggression on China proper. China regards us with suspicion. They may have reason. They have seen the western world, and to them the western world appears to be the United States, tied in with the enemy of the present regime, Chiang Kai-shek. They see the United States going beyond its powers and declaring that it is going to defend Formosa, although by the Cairo agreement it was specifically mentioned that Formosa should revert to China.
And if we are entitled to assume there is a certain amount of ignorance on the part of the Chinese as to our intentions, is it not possible that the actions of General Mac-Arthur may have raised in them a feeling of real fear? General MacArthur started his last big offensive when the Chinese delegate was leaving for the United Nations, and the timing of that offensive was most unhappy. I think that we in this country, and possibly the people in other countries, have become somewhat used by now to the braggart and bumptious communiques which were coming out of Tokyo. We knew that what was really in our minds was being spoken in London, Washington and Ottawa where responsible ministers were trying to assure the Chinese that we did not have any intention of going into Manchuria or affecting Chinese rights so far as power sites on the Yalu river were concerned.
Nevertheless, here were the communiques of MacArthur, and he added to them only last Sunday when he said he was going to free Asia from communist domination. Those statements were not guaranteed to make the Chinese feel we were as frank and sincere as we professed to be. At the same time there was another difficulty experienced by certain nations, ours amongst them. There

The Address-Mr. A. Stewart was the difficulty we had in trying to talk to China when China was not a member of the United Nations. It was in refusing such recognition that the first blunder was committed. I agree that we have a right, perhaps even a duty, to be sceptical about the genuine nature of Peking's desire for peace. But the point we want to make is this, that so long as there were doubts and so long as those doubts were not resolved one way or the other, it was the responsibility of our leaders at the United Nations to do everything possible, to try to arrive at some honourable agreement whereby the peace of the world could be preserved. That is our main argument. On the other hand, consider the position of the United States. We see a nation which is still young and virile, with perhaps all the faults of youth and virility; a nation which is not used to defeat, a nation which has not known, as others have, the necessity for withdrawal and retirement and which is unused to it; a nation which is smarting under the blows of those who were so contemptuously described as gooks and Chinks not only by soldiers of the United States but by soldiers of other nations who are in Korea just now. Once again we are displaying the arrogance of the whites which the people of Asia must find intolerable. Then the United States believes, and with great justification, that there has been such a long period of friendship between China and the United States that the Chinese ought to realize that fact. I think that American policy towards China, except in the last few years, has been generous. But unhappily, when the Chinese come to think of American friendship, what do they see? They see American bombs, in American planes with American markings, being used by Chiang Kai-shek to obliterate Chinese cities. What is regarded as friendship by the United States may be regarded as enmity by the Chinese.
I want there to be no mistake whatever as to where we stand. We yield to none, either collectively or individually, in our admiration for the people of the United States. They are capable of extraordinary generosity, and they have shown it. Just after the war ended the Americans had within their possession this most devastating weapon, the atomic bomb. Nowhere in recorded history has it ever been shown to me that a nation with a mighty weapon of destruction such as this in its own hands has said to the world "We are prepared to give it to you" on terms which the great majority of the countries of the world found highly acceptable indeed, only the Soviet union dissenting.

There are few examples of generosity such as that which has been shown by the people of the United States in the Marshall plan, in taxing themselves for funds to raise the standard of living in Europe, in order to bring Europe back to a high productive level and to conduct the fight against that misery which must inevitably lead to communism. That they are a friendly people, we know. That they are an idealistic people, we know. That the leadership they gave at the beginning of this crisis was most commendable, we know. That they are an emotional people, we know. But it is because we are so friendly with them that on occasion it is advisable that we speak to them frankly as friend to friend. They should have this knowledge by now if they do not possess it, namely that we in Canada-and, I think, the other members of the North Atlantic treaty group-will always be at the side of the United States. But that does not mean to say that we desire in any way to be subservient or to be placed in the position of apparent satellites. We wish to be treated with the degree of equality which free men expect. What the Americans feel today is that there should be expressed in the United Nations-and there has been expressed-a moral condemnation for this aggression of China; for they fear if it is not done, then the green light will be given for further aggression. As I say, it is most important that we try to understand the position and the feeling of the United States which almost unanimously is in favour of this decision to vote on Chinese aggression.
What about recent events in the United Nations themselves? One or two of the comments made by the minister were most interesting. I refer specifically to his comments about the resolution which was passed on October 7 and which gave the United Nations and General Mac Arthur the tacit right to cross the 38th parallel. It was not much more than tacit. In the Winnipeg Free Press of January 9-and the Free Press has been carrying on a bitter campaign against the policy of the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) until the last day or two-Mr. Freedman, writing from Lake Success, said this in discussing the 38th parallel:
Nowhere in the eight-power resolution adopted by the political committee and later confirmed by the general assembly in plenary session is there any mention of crossing the 38th parallel as such. But that was clearly implied in the resolution's numerous references to a unified Korea.
That is true. There was a tacit assurance given to General MacArthur that he should go ahead. But as the minister told us this afternoon, there was the strongest reason for

believing that the troops of the United Nation would not go to the border of Manchuria, would not go to the Yalu river and thereby precipitate the situation in which we have found ourselves. In other words, I would be inclined to argue, if there was this tacit admission of the right to go ahead, there was also the tacit realization by a great number of the nations that we should go ahead only a certain number of miles and then stop. Unfortunately the United States saw fit to refuse the advice of colleagues and allies, which was offered in all sincerity. By doing that they may have altered the whole course of history. One of the things which some of us fear is that America's allies may be immolated on the altar of a policy which is a weird mixture of good intentions, the China lobby, offended pride, Time, Life and Fortune and the desires of presidential aspirants. These things form a bad basis on which to build a policy. Perhaps the United Nations has also been weak. We can learn and profit from what has happened. To my mind it is obvious that there has not been enough civilian control over the commander in chief of the allied forces; and as far as strategy goes I will always insist that the last word be left with the civilians. There was the mistake, despite the decision of the United Nations, of allowing Syngman Rhee back into North Korea. There was the mistake in giving Syngman Rhee sufficient power so that he could carry on mass executions of those with whom he disagreed and whom he called traitors. These efforts by Syngman Rhee are not the basis on which to build up the friendship which we desire to see between Asia and ourselves.
If as a result of the passing of this resolution the Chinese people's government still decide to go ahead, to negotiate, to have a cease-fire, to settle outstanding problems, none will be happier than I to find that my doubts are unfounded and that my fears are unrealized. But I share the fears of Sir Benegal Rau, namely, that the Chinese will accept this rebuff, as it is for all practical purposes, and decide not to negotiate further. In that case, what do we do? Again I come back to the logic of events. The United Nations has declared that China is an aggressor. No matter in what watered-down form, the declaration is there. The United Nations has declared that China is an outlaw. Outlaws must be punished. Otherwise we lose respect for law and order. What punishment do we administer? Collectively we administer punishment by means of economic sanctions. As the minister pointed out today, following upon economic sanctions there is the gravest danger that war may arise. Suppose, as a 80709-5J
The Address-Mr. A. Stewart result of economic sanctions-if we go as far as that- Mao decides to retaliate in Formosa, what then does the United States do? Suppose, as a result of sanctions, Mao decides to retaliate on Hong Kong, what does the United Kingdom do? Suppose as a result of economic sanctions Mao decides to retaliate in Viet Nam, what do the French do? What do we do as a member of the United Nations? These things which I fear may conceivably be part of the logic of events.
There are groups in Canada which have been often more fervent even than the State department in their advocacy of moral condemnation of China. One of the groups concerned is in Winnipeg, an organization known as the Free Press, which I have followed with a certain interest through the years. The Free Press clings frequently to its moral principles, but I rather think that it regards them much as others regard their dentures, to be taken out, admired, washed and then replaced. The Free Press insists that China must be declared an aggressor, and anyone who disagrees with this point of view is automatically an appeaser a la Munich. The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) answered them quite adequately today. He answered them also in that speech of his on January 26, when he said concern-, ing Munich:
The tragedy was in what was done there, and our-statement of principles did not, I think, recommend doing anything that meant the betrayal of a people-or a principle, nor was it a weak surrender to armed pressure or a naive misunderstanding of a political situation or of the dangers ahead if it were handled the wrong way.
The Free Press today does not appreciate the fact that the voice of a diplomat is only as loud as the calibre and the number of the guns behind him. Again I refer to the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs because there is so much in it with which I agree. He said:
ine second draft resolution, proposed by the United States of America, finds that the people's government of China has engaged in aggression in Korea. If this resolution is pressed to a vote without further consideration of other measures, delegations will have to take a decision in regard to it, and that decision is not as easy or as simple for my delegation as it seems to be for some other delegations around this table.
ura ne goes on:
It may be right and necessary to pass a moral judgment on the aggressor, even if there exists a situation such as the possibility of another and far more dangerous aggressor which may affect the enforcement of that judgment; it may be right and necessary to do that providing we recognize the circumstances and state the position accordingly That course is honest and straightforward. But we have, I think, on the other hand, no right to pass

The Address-Mr. A. Stewart a judgment and at the same time give the impression that we can and will immediately and effectively enforce it no matter what the consequences may be, if we are not prepared to do that.
In other words, the Secretary of State for External Affairs was asking us not to repeat the error which we perpetrated in the league of nations with Italy. The Free Press does not yet accept that viewpoint. On January 26 it quoted from the London Times as follows:
Simply to dub China an aggressor without being able to take further, more decisive, measures would achieve nothing.
In other words, much the same as what the Secretary of State for External Affairs said. Then the Free Press went on to say:
Once the moral and legal position is established, the crime recorded and the criminal identified, what follows will inevitably be governed by strategic and military considerations.
I think this newspaper knows, as well as we do, that military considerations are such that they do not permit us to protect all the interests which we may have over the world. We have neither the troops nor the weapons. So that in effect what the Winnipeg Free Press is asking for is moral condemnation and no more, and yet if nothing is done beyond that-again I try to speak logically- if nothing is done beyond that, the United States may be happy at having had its own way, and the Free Press can wallow in its own moral rectitude, but the effect upon the United Nations may well be devastating; for as the United Nations may weaken, so will China be strengthened.
What we are doing is still to some extent playing the not very astute game asked us to be played by Russia. We are shoving China into Moscow's arms and we may have to fight a futile war in the Orient.
I now come to the position of the C.C.F. We do not think the real enemy in this world today is China. So far as we are concerned the threat to the world lies in the Soviet union. We believe that war in China means the wasting of human and material assets and a consequent weakening of our own position; and the position in which we are most engrossed, I imagine, is that of our membership and responsibilities in the North Atlantic treaty. But if our position there is weakened the North Atlantic grouping becomes weakened, and the green light is given to aggression, but not the aggression
which the United States has in mind. Should we become sufficiently weak the green light is given to the Soviet union in western Europe.
I am convinced that the majority of Canadians know that, as I am convinced that the great majority of the people of Canada do not want war with China. The majority of the people of Canada do not want war- period. But if war has to come we realize with whom it is going to be. It is going to be with these men in the Kremlin, who have made a mockery of human dignity, a travesty of human liberty and a shambles of every hope we had for a peaceful world following the end of the war.
In our opinion our national interest demands that our strength be not frittered away. Our national interest demands that our determination to defend ourselves be not deflected by secondary events. Why then are we pursuing this policy which may conceivably land us into a morass from which I can see no way to extricate ourselves? I think there is only one answer. Again I am speaking bluntly because I think between friends we can speak with a degree of candour as long as it is recognized to be honest and sincere. The reason is American pressure. But what sort of American pressure could conceivably be exercised to persuade our delegate at the United Nations to support the course which he admitted to be premature and unwise at that particular time? The pressure was the fear that the United States would revert to isolation, and that we could no longer count upon the United States as an ally in our common fight to maintain our freedom and our ideals. The inference, which I do not take, but the inference which undoubtedly will be taken in certain areas in Europe unhappily, is that the United States is perhaps not so reliable an ally as many had hoped, but that in fact it can only be relied upon so long as it gets its own way. I am convinced that there are many Americans who would be horrified at such an interpretation of what has been done. My only hope is that time will not make them even more horrified by a realization that they may have won a battle and lost a war.
On motion of Mr. Fournier (Hull) the debate was adjourned.
On motion of Mr. Fournier (Hull) the house adjourned at 5.42 p.m.

Monday, February 5, 1951