1950-03-07

DOMINION-PROVINCIAL CONFERENCE TABLING OF FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE WITH PROVINCIAL PREMIERS

Right Hon. L. S. St. Laurent (Prime Minister):: I should like to table some further correspondence between the Prime Minister and the premiers of Newfoundland, New Brunswick, Quebec, and British Columbia, respecting the proposed general conference to be held in the autumn of this year. The previous correspondence was tabled on the 16th of February. Perhaps hon. members would wish, as has been done heretofore, to have this correspondence printed as an appendix to Hansard of today.


Mr. Speaker:: Is it the wish of the house that this correspondence should appear as an appendix to today's Hansard?


Some hon. Members:: Agreed.
(For text of correspondence, see Appendix, pages 559 and 560.)



ANNOUNCEMENT AS'TO RATES OF PAY FOR STENOGRAPHERS AND AMANUENSES

["The circumstances are important. This was an important occasion for Mr. Eden, who probably wanted to again become the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom. His opinion was delivered during the election campaign, when he intended to censure the government for what it had done.\nNow, there is an illustrious professor with a peculiar name who has been mentioned. His name is Lauterpacht. He may be a brilliant man, but he is not as great a man as Grotius.\nAt six o'clock the house took recess."]
Mr. Speaker:: I should like to make the following announcement:
I have the honour to report that at a meeting of the commissioners of the internal economy on Wednesday, March 1, 1950, consideration was given to rates of pay for stenographers and amanuenses in the House of Commons.
Although I understand that it is not customary at this time to bring before the house such a report, I desire to do so in view of the general interest shown by members of the house in this matter.
After careful consideration it was decided to initiate a policy whereby, the commissioners believe, the stenographers and the amanuenses of the house will be remunerated according to their ability and experience, which should be an incentive to them.
I would assure the house that, before establishing the rates of pay set forth hereunder, inquiries were made as to the salaries paid outside the House of Commons for similar positions and for work under similar circumstances, and I might also say that they have been established in such manner that they may be acceptable if and when any of our continuous temporary stenographers are made permanent in the future.
In future the members' stenographers staff, except stenographers allotted to parliamentary assistants, will be divided into three groups, as follows:
Group I-well qualified.
Group II-competent but lacking main qualifications.
Group III-not as experienced as group II, or lacking in co-operation, or without experience in the House of Commons.
Salary to be paid: Group III, $5.90; Group II, $6.50; Group I, $7.00.
The rating is to be done by the chief of the members' stenographers branch, under the supervision of the Clerk of the House of Commons.
All new appointees will be paid at the minimum rate of pay, namely, $5.90 per day for the first session, after which they may be promoted to a higher group in accordance with their qualifications; and these qualifications are to be reviewed from time to time.
The stenographers working for parliamentary assistants will receive the maximum rate established for stenographers of the pool, namely, $7 per day, but only as long as they continue to work for a parliamentary assistant. If later they work for private members, they must revert to the stenographic scale above established.
In so far as the debates amanuenses are concerned, as they must have special qualifications, and during some sittings of the house have to work from 11 a.m. to 11 p.m., they will receive the following rates of pay: $7.50, $8 and $8.50 per day; the present rate of $7.50 per day to be retained for new appointments, and employees who give satisfactory service and are reappointed in ensuing sessions may be granted an increase of fifty cents per day for each ensuing session up to a maximum of $8.50 per day.
The above changes are to be made retroactive from the beginning of this session.



Hon. L. B. Pearson (Secretary of Slate for External Affairs) moved:: That votes numbers 64 to 84, Inclusive, of the main estimates 1950-51 be withdrawn from the committee of supply and referred to the standing committee on external affairs, saving always the powers of the committee of supply in relation to the voting of public moneys.

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He said: Mr. Speaker, the motion I have the honour to move would refer to the committee on external affairs the estimates of my department, and therefore provide an opportunity for the work of the department and the policy of the government in external matters to be given the kind of examination by a committee which has in the past proved very useful. A similar motion also, Mr. Speaker, has in the past at times initiated discussion of our external relations generally.
A discussion on external affairs was initiated in the house ^last Friday on a motion to go into supply. As I understand it, the discussion was not completed on Friday evening, and therefore this motion will give hon. members a further opportunity to discuss our external affairs generally, if they so desire. It will also give me the opportunity, I hope, of which I am now taking advantage, to deal with some of the points raised last Friday, and to answer some of the questions addressed to the government at that time. I hope it will also give me an opportunity to clear up some of the confusion and misconceptions which I think might be created by some of the statements then made.
The hon. member for Peel (Mr. Graydon), in his interesting contribution to this debate, said that in discussions of foreign affairs the dice, in a sense, were loaded against speakers on the opposition side of the house because, naturally, they did not have access to all the confidential information at the disposal of the government. Of course, in a sense that is true, and up to a point must necessarily be true. But we do try to keep the house as fully informed as possible about these matters. When there are questions of very general interest and of great importance, I think it would be quite proper for leaders of the opposition parties to receive confidential information from government members on those questions; and if there are questions of a kind which preoccupy leaders of opposition parties or other hon. members, I hope I may be able to show to them confidential information bearing on these matters.
So far as loading the dice is concerned, I would only say that in the discussion we have already had the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) spent a good deal of time dealing with the situation in China and the recognition or non-recognition of the communist government in that country. I would point out that we had already supplied him with a memorandum which included a great deal of confidential and, in fact, top-secret information on that subject-a procedure which I think it was proper for us to follow.
The hon. member for Peel stated once again that it was time we told the House of Commons and the country more about the policies

of the government in matters of external affairs. The graphic expression he used was that we should roll up the blinds in the east block. I am not quite sure what he meant by that, but I hope he will take the opportunity to go into the matter in a little more detail, possibly at the hearings before the committee-because, so far as I am aware, there is no foreign office in any democratic government that makes more information available to the public and to parliament than we do. Not only are we willing to roll up the blinds, but, on appropriate occasions, we shall be happy to open the windows of the east block as well, even though it may mean that at times we will find ourselves sitting in a draft.
In the statement he made last Friday evening concerning external affairs the leader of the opposition complained that in the statement I had made earlier in the afternoon I had ignored China. In his words, it appeared as if I was almost unaware of China's existence so far as that statement was concerned. He suggested it would have been better if I had been able to give the house some information on the question of the recognition or non-recognition of the communist government in China.
On that point I would say that this is a matter now before the government for consideration. It is a verjr difficult and complicated question indeed, as will be apparent from the fact that countries such as the United Kingdom and India have recognized the communist government in China, while other countries such as the United States and France have not done so. Therefore the question arises whether the government, in the midst of difficult and somewhat delicate discussions on the matter, should make public at this time all the arguments for and against a particular course of action.
I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, that when in the light of all the facts a decision is made, it will be given immediately to the House of Commons and to the country. Of course under our parliamentary system that decision is the responsibility of the government-as indeed the leader of the opposition himself indicated the other night. At that time he warned us of haste in this matter. To use his own words:
We are under no compulsion to act hastily, but I believe we are under great compulsion as a nation to act with caution, with great care and after a full examination of all the consequences that would flow from recognition at this time.
I agree entirely with that, and indeed we are acting with great caution. One reason for delay-and it is only one reason, of course- is to give to hon. members a chance to state in this house their point of view on this ques-

tion. Indeed, the request was made to the government by hon. members opposite that they should be given an opportunity to express their point of view on this matter before we came to a decision. They have had that opportunity. The C.C.F. party has indicated its position. The Conservative party, through its leader and the Conservative members in the house, have had an opportunity to express their views. As a result, these views will be of value to the government in coming to a decision.
In his statement the other night it seemed to me that the leader of the opposition jumped to a completely wrong conclusion on inadequate evidence when he said that a decision seems to have been made. The evidence he quoted for coming to that conclusion was a statement made by General McNaughton. The leader of the opposition used these words, as reported at page 462 of Hansard:
Let us see what it was that was under consideration in the remarks of General McNaughton when he made it quite clear that early recognition is under consideration or has actually been decided upon.
Those remarks of General McNaughton, indeed his whole statement, meant nothing of the kind. In the statement to which reference has been made, General McNaughton said- and I quote from his speech as it was quoted at page 459 of Hansard:
Unfortunately the further progress of these meetings-
That is, meetings of the atomic energy group consisting of the permanent members of the security council plus Canada.
-has been held up by the Soviet refusal to participate as long as the Chinese delegate represented the nationalist government. However, there is reason to expect that the meetings will again be resumed shortly when this difficulty has been overcome.
That was a personal statement of General McNaughton with respect to the composition and the hearings of the atomic energy group, an agency of the security council of the United Nations. I can assure you, Mr. Speaker, that in those statements General McNaughton was not referring in any way to discussions on this matter by the Canadian government. General McNaughton has not been informed of, nor is he indeed greatly concerned with, such discussions. The meaning of his statement is quite clear. He was talking about a group appointed by the security council to discuss atomic energy questions. The composition of that group and the representation of China on that group would be determined by a decision of the security council of the United Nations. General McNaughton apparently thought at that time that there might be added, to the five members out of the eleven of the security council who have recognized 55946-331
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China, one or two others; that this would change the balance in the security council and might thereby make a change in the composition of the atomic energy group. But General McNaughton could not have been referring to Canada in that connection, because Canada is not now a member of the security council and would not be concerned in any such change in it.
In our discussion the other night the leader of the opposition devoted some time to "recognition" in international law. In discussing the question he quoted from a recognized authority in that field, Professor Lauterpacht. It seems to me, Mr. Speaker, that there has been a good deal of confusion in people's minds as to what is meant by recognition, and I think this might be a good opportunity to clear the matter up so far as I am able to do so. It is of immediate importance now in connection with this particular problem of China.
In considering this matter we must distinguish between recognition of a new state and recognition of a new government. The two things are quite different. Under recognition of a new government we must distinguish between de facto recognition and de jure recognition, between implied recognition and express recognition. We must distinguish between recognition of a government whose authority has been challenged and is still under challenge, and recognition of a government whose authority is no longer being challenged by any alternative form of government. Then finally we must distinguish between recognition on the one hand and diplomatic representation on the other-this is quite a different matter, although the two things were certainly confused, I thought, the other night.
In connection with China we are dealing at this time only with recognition of a new government, not recognition of a new state. In deciding whether recognition should or should not be given to a new government certain criteria-certain conditions, if you like-have been laid down by authorities on international law, such as Oppenheimer, Brierly, Jessup, Lauterpacht and others. But these conditions, of course, have never been, and were never meant to be, applied rigidly and without exception. I mentioned some of these criteria in my statement last December when I was talking about this Chinese question. I said then that if the particular conditions .which I mentioned were fulfilled in China to our satisfaction, and I quote from my words, we "would have to face the facts which confront us."
The four conditions-I think three of them were mentioned last Friday night by the

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leader of the opposition, but there are at least four-are as follows. One is the effectiveness of the authority of the government concerned. The second is the independence of the government concerned-something that is not always easy to determine, especially in the case of countries like Tibet, Viet Nam and China. The third is the ability and the willingness of the government concerned to carry out its international obligations. That condition, of course, cannot always be applied too rigorously and too exactly. If it were always applied in that way we might today be recognizing the government of Mr. Kerensky in Moscow. Finally there is the question of acceptability of the new government by the people over whom it exercises authority.
In dealing with this fourth question, acceptability-and it is an important question-[DOT] Professor Lauterpacht, the authority previously quoted, has stated, and I think he is right, that acceptability does not necessarily mean now acceptability by-and I quote his words-"freely expressed popular approval." There must be other evidence. There must be the question of the people's resistance to the challenger of the government, or the reaction of the people to the new government-how they accept the new government's rule. But in dealing with this question the other night the leader of the opposition said that the United Nations resolution passed in 1946 establishes once again the principle that acceptability must be by freely expressed popular approval. I should like to refer to that part of his statement. He said that in 1946 a resolution of the United Nations assembly was passed dealing with Franco Spain, and that its purport was that a decision was made by the United Nations that there would not be recognition of the government of Franco Spain until it was a government with the consent of the governed. He then went on to argue that it altered the existing system of international law in so far as this point is concerned, because this was a resolution of the United Nations, and as the leader of the opposition said at that time:
This-
The reference is to the resolution.
-becomes a most emphatic statement of international law, and remains so until it has been repealed.
On that point I should only like to remark that resolutions of the United Nations do not make international law by their passage at Lake Success. It has been well established there, and it is accepted by every delegation attending the United Nations, that a resolution of that body is not international law. It is an expression of international opinion, but it

does not of itself alter international law, and, as I understand it, it did not alter international law on this occasion.
Furthermore, Mr. Speaker, this particular resolution had nothing whatever to do with recognition. It was a resolution which concerned the government of Spain. Among other things it was a resolution against the participation of the present government of Spain in meetings of the United Nations, and it was a resolution for the recall of ambassadors and ministers from Madrid. It did not concern in any way, shape or form the recognition of Franco. As a matter of fact it did not even recommend a diplomatic break with Franco. It merely recommended that ambassadors and ministers should be withdrawn from Spain. It did not recommend that diplomatic missions should be closed, and they have not been closed since the resolution was passed.
Therefore I suggest there is no use, Mr. Speaker, in trying to draw an analogy on this occasion between our attitude towards Franco Spain and our possible attitude towards the government of China. As a matter of fact, the Canadian government recognized the Franco government of Spain in 1939, and has not withdrawn or altered its recognition since that time.
Another argument which was made the other night against the recognition of communist China by the leader of the opposition- and I quote him again-was when he said:
In that area recognition of China would be regarded almost as a fatal blow to Viet Nam. . . .
He was referring to the new state of Indochina. If that is true, then in that area Burma, India, Pakistan, Ceylon and the United Kingdom all have struck that fatal blow because they have all recognized the communist government of China. The government of Indonesia, now a very important state in that area, has said that it will be glad to recognize the government of communist China as soon as that government recognizes it. Nevertheless the leader of the opposition said, with reference to the opinion that it would be a fatal blow to Viet Nam:
. . . that is the view publicly expressed by men with a great deal longer experience than the Secretary of State for External Affairs in this government.
That might well be the case, but if so it would be helpful in our discussion of these matters if we knew who were the gentlemen who advocated that course. Furthermore, on this point the statement was made by the leader of the opposition that we had already recognized the state of Viet Nam, and when I shook my head the other evening to negate his statement I was met merely by the reply which I have just quoted. What I wanted to

point out at that time, and of course can point out now, is that we have not recognized the state of Viet Nam at this time.
In dealing with this matter the leader of the opposition rejected the argument that if we did not recognize communist China the Soviet delegation would walk out of the United Nations, and that would be blackmail. I entirely agree with him. It is blackmail, but it will have nothing to do with our decision on this matter one way or the other. I have already condemned as childish arrogance that kind of tactic on the part of Soviet delegations and their satellites, and I entirely agree with the leader of the opposition that we should not submit to such tactics.
In dealing with this point the other night the leader of the opposition added that such walkouts render the United Nations impotent. They are of course unfortunate in relation to the efficient conduct of the work of the United Nations, in one sense; they bring the United Nations into disrepute, but not as much disrepute as they bring on the delegations who walk out. They do not make the United Nations impotent, and should not be allowed to do so. Indeed, since these walkouts have occurred we have had continuous meetings of some of the most important agencies of the United Nations, including the economic and social council, which has never been able to do its work so expeditiously and effectively as on the occasion when there was no Soviet delegation present. Furthermore, the security council has been meeting since these walkouts occurred.
The situation in regard to recognition of communist China and its effect on the United Nations was referred to by the leader of the opposition the other evening when he said that only two proponents of recognition were now in the security council, and only three in the other agencies of the United Nations. As a matter of fact the situation is that in the general assembly of the United Nations there are fifteen members who have recognized communist China. Of the eleven members of the security council, five have recognized communist China. Of the twelve members of the atomic energy commission, five have recognized the government of communist China. In the economic and social council seven have recognized it; in the international labour office, seventeen; in the food and agricultural organization, sixteen, and so on. More members of the United Nations have taken this step than was indicated the other evening by the leader of the opposition.
The fact is that in some of these agencies we are approaching a position where a majority of the members concerned may be representatives of governments which have
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recognized the new government of communist China. If we reach that position in fact, those states which have not concurred in such recognition will be confronted by a very difficult situation indeed. If we find ourselves in the minority, should we walk out? Of course that would be absurd; but if we do not walk out and we do not recognize communist China, then the alternative is to remain there and work with delegations from communist China, and by so doing give them a form of recognition. All this shows how complicated and difficult the problem is.
In his remarks the other evening the leader of the opposition stated, with great emphasis, great eloquence and great impressiveness, I thought, that we had to stem the Red tide in Asia. Well, so we do; but how? When he attempted to answer that question I venture to suggest that he got into the same kind of difficulty I often get into when I make general statements and then try to follow them up with concrete observations. He did say, however, that in answering that question we should not fall into the language of diplomatic mumbo-jumbo. I entirely agree with that. When he attempted to answer that very important question himself he set out certain things * which I might just mention-and I hope I am putting them correctly.
First he said there should be no hasty recognition. I entirely agree; and I do not think we can be accused of undue haste in this matter. He said that recognition should not be granted until certain conditions were fulfilled, and those conditions he enumerated in his statement. I think the most important one-and I hope I am quoting him correctly -was that there shall be common action, that there shall be a clear and universal pattern of strategy which will be known to the people of the free nations, and which will be known in the clearest detail to the nations which threaten our peace and security. Certainly, he went on to state, there should be no recognition of the Mao regime until those conditions are fulfilled.
Well, Mr. Speaker, it is going to be a little difficult at this date to agree on a common policy, which was a condition he suggested before we could give recognition; because no such common policy is possible as long as some of the states out in that portion of the world have already recognized communist China. On that point the hon. gentleman quoted from a statement of Mr. Anthony Eden, the former secretary of state for foreign affairs in London, to the effect that we should be very careful on the question of appeasement and hasty recognition. I venture to read into the record again one paragraph of the


[Stage Direction]
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statement by Mr. Eden quoted by the leader of the opposition, as it appears at page 465 of Hansard:
As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. It is a real misfortune that in this, as in other Far Eastern matters, we should be acting piecemeal . . .
That was the quotation given by the leader of the opposition the other evening. The copy of Mr. Eden's statement on that occasion which I have seen, and which I would like to put on record, adds a few words to that quotation; and I now quote from the text of Mr. Eden's statement:
As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. The decision to recognize is no doubt eventually inescapable . . .
Those are the additional words in my text.
The third condition laid down by the leader of the opposition-though I do not know whether you could call it a condition- was that we should agree on help to the peoples of Asia; and I am sure there will be no difference of opinion on that.
The fourth suggestion he made was in his reference to a Pacific pact, and on that very important question he quoted me as follows- I refer to his words as reported at page 464 of Hansard:
The proposal has been put forward in this house on different occasions by the hon. member for Vancouver-Quadra (Mr. Green), that a Pacific pact to complement the Atlantic pact should be brought into being. Today the Secretary of State for External Affairs said that that could not be done because if the nations of the Pacific were to be invited to consider a Pacific pact it would be necessary to invite Russia and China.
That is not exactly what I said. I said that would be one consideration, whether it would be possible to invite Russia and China to a conference which would be discussing a regional pact in the Pacific. Of course I am not quite so naive as to suggest that if an invitation of that kind were sent, and if it had the conditions which normally attach to such invitations, the Russians would accept it. I am not even sure whether it would be of any use to send them such an invitation. My argument against a Pacific pact at this time, which is not mentioned in this statement, was that in my opinion it would be futile and unwise to proceed with a conference to negotiate a Pacific security and mutual guarantee pact at a time when the United States, the United Kingdom and India have indicated that they would not be able to participate in any such conference. Surely that serious argument is enough to explain why we have not accepted certain advice which has been given us in this house to push ahead with a Pacific pact at this time.
I thought I had made my position perfectly clear on this matter both on Friday

and on previous occasions, and that in doing so I had not lapsed into the diplomatic language of mumbo-jumbo. If, however, the situation in the Pacific should change and should become analogous to the situation that obtained in the Atlantic when we proceeded to work out the North Atlantic pact, then certainly we would have to reconsider Dur attitude toward this matter.
Finally the leader of the opposition made a strong and eloquent appeal against anything which might be interpreted as appeasement of communist aggression. I agree with him, though appeasement is one of those very difficult and dangerous words which can be interpreted in many ways. If by appeasement we mean prejudicing our own security or the security of the democratic world by making extorted and unnecessary concessions to a possible aggressor in the hope that it might keep him quiet; or if we mean assisting, encouraging and strengthening those whom we thought had aggressive designs, then of course I am sure everyone in this house is against appeasement. But it is a dangerous word, which should not be used carelessly. Appeasement is not the same as peace, nor is it the same as a desire for peace.
In his statement last Friday evening the leader of the opposition also said, as reported at page 465 of Hansard:
Every word I have spoken Is a word to urge upon this government the duty to say in no uncertain terms, no matter what may be said by other governments in the world: "Appeasement is going to go no further: we have learned the lessons of the past and there will be no truck and trade with tyranny of this kind unless and until they are at least prepared to accept the ordinary standards of international conduct."
In my statement I said, as reported at pages 429-30 of Hansard:
So far as Canada is concerned . . . there will never be any lack of willingness to search for a solution to this and the other problems which divide us from the communist world.
I suggest there is no contradiction between the two statements. In this connection I referred to the necessity of genuine compromise and accommodation; and I made it abundantly clear, I hope, that the Canadian government was fully aware of the danger of appeasement of the kind I have just indicated, but at the same time was conscious of a duty to keep searching for some way out of the present impasse.
Last Friday the hon. member for Peel spoke in a similar vein, with perhaps fewer qualifications than I gave, when he said, as reported at page 434 of Hansard:
. . . the most vital job at the hand of every responsible nation of the world today is somehow to find the way to stop the present aimless international drifting. . . .

This, I remind the house, is a quotation from a speech made by the hon. member for Peel.
. . . which is causing no end of alarm to the ordinary citizens of the world, because they have a revolting fear that a continuation of this squaring off of one group of nations towards another may end in another armed holocaust.
With those words, Mr. Speaker, I entirely agree.
Mr. George A. Drew (Leader of ihe Opposition):: Mr. Speaker, the motion now before us has just been moved and therefore was not under discussion when this broad subject was being discussed on Friday night. I shall now, therefore, deal with the motion and with the remarks which the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) has made.
First of all I regret that, on so important a subject, the Secretary of State for External Affairs should have spent so much time in quibbling about what he said last Friday. I should start by removing the wholly improper impression he sought to convey-that any words had been withheld from the quotation of the statement by Anthony Eden. I shall correct that impression by reading the whole statement into the record, although it involves some repetition.
So far as this government is concerned, so far as this parliament is concerned, each member is responsible for the fulfilment of his duties. It is not for us to follow anyone else blindly. Nevertheless I do not hesitate to say that Mr. Anthony Eden, who had the courage to resign from the British cabinet over the Italian issue, has had longer experience than the present Secretary of State for External Affairs for Canada. I attach a good deal of importance to the views he expressed. Although it will take a few minutes to do it, I propose to read into the record, because of the suggestion that words had been left out which might have changed the effect of the quotation, the whole of the statement.
I need hardly point out to those who either have read Hansard or have followed the course of this debate that I quoted a great deal more than the Secretary of State for External Affairs mentioned. This article appeared on January 16; it was syndicated and was published in a great many newspapers throughout the world. It appeared exactly ten days after the recognition by Britain of the Mao regime-it is important to remember that it was not before that time. The article reads as follows:
The Far Eastern policies of the Atlantic powers and their friends are in a rather dismal tangle. They all apparently intend the same thing but they are moving at so different a pace that they are jerkily out of step.
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Recognition of the communist government in China provides a recent example of this inconsistency, though not the most important. The divergence of view and discrepancy of action between the British and American governments in this instance may even do good if they draw attention in both countries to the urgent need to coordinate policies without further delay.
As regards actual recognition, there is a fair field for argument on practical as well as on legal grounds. It is a real misfortune that in this, as in other Far Eastern matters, we should be acting piecemeal both within the commonwealth and as between the commonwealth and the United States.
At this point I should say that that was the quotation in respect of which the Secretary of State for External Affairs read further words. This is what immediately follows:
The French, too, appear to be embarrassed by our timing. I regard all this as deplorable, not for any reasons of diplomatic neatness, but because it emphasizes that there was no agreement between friends on handling Far Eastern affairs.
This is tempting to those communist forces who seek to drive a wedge between us.
On my return from Malaya last spring I gave warning that the communist challenge in southeast Asia was growing in force. I urged that common policies should be agreed upon within the commonwealth and with the signatories of the North Atlantic treaty in an attempt to hearten and sustain anti-communist forces.
Unfortunately, the last year has been largely wasted. The Colombo conference has given the first sign of any positive co-ordinated plan to meet this threat. There are some who have regarded resurgent upheavals in the Far East as no more than the growing pains of a new nationalism, but even they must surely now accept that in this disruption may be found seeds of mortal weakness.
We must first determine the nature of our problem	in southeast Asia	and	next consider	how
together we can make headway toward its solution. In the first instance, the problem is economic.
We should make a fatal error were we to underestimate the extent of the challenge free nations have to meet. The overwhelming triumph of Mao Tze-tung in China has transformed the whole position	in the Far East.	His	methods have	now
become the blueprint for communist plans and the pattern for communist action throughout the Orient.
For the time being, at least, China is taking the orthodox road mapped out by Lenin, and that is the	road which starts	and	finishes in Moscow.
Independent nationalist communism is certainly possible later, but we should be unwise to count upon it.
The problem that confronts the powers in southeast	Asia is infinitely	more	complex than	that
which Marshall aid is combating in Europe. These eastern countries have widely contrasting resources in wealth, wisdom and statesmanship. Their traditions, experience, religions and sense of purpose and responsibility are poles apart. They have scarcely a common denominator, yet all must be gathered in and helped to build together with the limited contribution that other free lands can bring to the economic life upon which their political resistance to communism can be founded.
We must make a broad plan for economic help for southeast Asia that takes account of the free world's existing commitments and remaining resources. Such a plan must facilitate foreign investment, without exacerbating national feelings, without treating such investment so roughly as to make sure that it is never repeated. There should be provision for capital equipment and new plans for irrigation, transport and communications. In all

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these matters the Atlantic powers and the nations of the commonwealth can help in the material and in the technical sphere.
Aid to the east should therefore take three forms. The first is essential to give that financial and economic support without which we cannot hope to create conditions that can successfully withstand the challenge of communism. Second, some military help will be necessary in the form of military missions, arms and equipment. Here close coordination between neighbouring countries is urgently needed. Third, there should be an agreed strategy in all this area between the powers principally concerned, and their burden both in troops and political responsibility fairly adjusted.
It is equally necessary that our several intelligence services in the Far East should be reviewed and co-ordinated.
I therefore repeat that the most urgent need is for us to have a common policy in these affairs. No nation can, by itself, save the Far East.
Our common policy must be founded upon determination to help the peoples of southeast Asia to live in freedom from want or fear. Without our aid they are doomed to all the consequences of communist rule, and if they should fall, who can doubt that the danger to the peace of all the world would move nearer and yet nearer to home?
That is the complete quotation from the great wartime foreign secretary of Great Britain. I might say that appeared, as I have read it, in the New York Times of January 20, 1950, a paper that I believe will be regarded by everyone as a completely reliable publication.
When the Secretary of State for External Affairs, in a rather jaunty manner, talks about the difficulties that he has encountered when he makes general statements and then tries to follow them up with positive statements, he is quite competent to speak for himself. I have no doubt that is an accurate description of the situation in which he usually finds himself; but I followed with the very clear statement that here was the answer to the problem. This was not a statement made before there was British recognition. When he suggests that British recognition and the recognition of India, Pakistan and other countries makes it impossible now to have a uniform pattern, he is challenging the common sense and accuracy of the statement of Mr. Anthony Eden, which I have read, in regard to this very subject; because these other recognitions had been made at the time that this positive statement was made.
Let me deal with some of these points that have been brought up today-because this is not a situation that can be disposed of by quibbling or by badinage. It is a subject that, as has been pointed out by Mr. Anthony Eden, presents a critical challenge to the whole world at this hour. It should be the first concern of this parliament and of the government of Canada to recognize that, if this critical situation should lead to an explosion, then our full compliance with every other undertaking we have accepted, and our full

and wholehearted support of the Atlantic pact, will have proved completely unavailing to preserve that peace which is the aim of every sensible person in this country and of every thoughtful human being throughout the world.
I just want to make one point quite clear. I do not for a moment question the fact that the Secretary of State for External Affairs has acted in his official capacity. with courtesy to the members of this house with whom he has dealt and to those who have no official positions, whether on the government side or on the other side of the house. I want one thing to be quite clearly understood. I have received no information from him on this subject which would adequately explain to me what knowledge the government now has in regard to this extremely important subject. The Secretary of State for External Affairs did present to me a memorandum dealing with the Chinese question, which was a confidential memorandum. He said it was top secret, and it was so marked. It was delivered to me on November 29, 1949. It was delivered before he was in the Orient, and incidentally before recognition had taken place by India, the United Kingdom, Pakistan or the other nations he has mentioned. A great deal has happened since that time-a very great deal. There has been a wholly changed situation in China and in the Orient. For one thing, there has been an agreement between the Mao regime and the Soviet union. I was under the impression it was suggested that the government was not fully informed in regard to that agreement. Was I correct in that?


Lester Bowles Pearson: Apparently there are secret clauses.


George Alexander Drew: The reason I asked the question is that the whole text of the agreement was published on February 15 in the New York Times. There may be secret clauses, but there is a very full agreement which does indicate the nature of the thirty-year alliance that has been signed between the Soviet union and the Mao regime following some two months of negotiation in Moscow. And as I recalled the other night, there is a startling similarity between many of the terms in this agreement and those of the agreement that was signed on August 26, 1939, between Hitler's government and the government of Russia.
I would commend to the earnest consideration of those who are following the course of history the photograph that appeared in the New York Times of February 16. There they will see Mr. Stalin, Mr. Molotov and Mr. Vishinsky taking their part in the signing of this agreement in the presence of Mr. Mao.

I commend that picture to their attention because of the extraordinary similarity of it to a picture which appeared after Ribbentrop had signed an agreement on behalf of Germany on that fateful day of August 26, 1939.
So far as that memorandum was concerned, the Secretary of State for External Affairs did make it available to me, but 1 want it known that I am not informed secretly of any information which would assist me in understanding what course the government is likely to take in the light of subsequent events, and it is within that period that there have been important events. Certainly we have gained no information from the three speeches made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs that would assist us in that respect.


An hon. Member:: Mumbo-jumbo.


Mr. Pouliot:: Jumbo yourself.


Mr. Smith (Calgary West):: Jumbo's baby.


Mr. Fraser:: He has not opened the window yet.


George Alexander Drew: The Secretary of State for External Affairs has tried to create the impression that General McNaughton's statement was simply a personal statement in regard to what was taking place at Lake Success. General McNaughton cannot divest himself of his official position. He is there as an official appointed by the Canadian government, and he is still Canadian representative on the atomic energy commission of the United Nations. He still is the chairman of the Canadian section of the permanent joint board on defence. He occupies these official positions, and he cannot on one occasion wear the cloak that indicates his responsibility in that respect, and on another occasion divest himself of it.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs says that General McNaughton was referring to the discussions of a group dealing with atomic energy questions. General McNaughton was referring to the walkout of the Soviet delegates and of the delegates of the satellite nations-and this was not just once; there were fifteen walkouts from different committees. When the Secretary of State for External Affairs indicates that Canada is not concerned, I should think Canada should be very much concerned about this pressure that is being exerted to have the other nations bow to their will in a matter of this kind. It is not something that might take place; it is something that has taken place. And when we talk of the position that Canada would be in if they did it, I say they have done it. They have walked out, and they have walked out for the particular purpose of asserting their position in regard to the Chinese situation.
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What I said the other night, and what I repeat now, is that this is a form of blackmail; and if the other nations accede to that procedure, then the discussions there will become practically meaningless. I said the other night, and I repeat today, that Russia has a way of presenting its case. It can make arguments; it has a right to make arguments if it does not think that the present Chinese representative should be there and that the representative of Mao should be there, and that that is the way they should proceed.
No; I never suggested that Canada should walk out. As the Secretary of State for External Affairs has said, it would be an absurd suggestion; and frankly I think it is absurd for him even to indicate that anyone would think of it. We do not suggest that for one moment. What was being suggested was that this is a new set of events since Great Britain and India recognized the Mao regime.
Let me come back to the statement of General McNaughton. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has read it. It states:
Unfortunately the further progress of these meetings has been held up by the Soviet refusal to participate as long as the Chinese delegate represented the nationalist government. However there is reason to expect that the meetings will again be resumed shortly when this difficulty has been overcome.
What I said when I mentioned this before, and what I say again, is that General McNaughton's words on that occasion have no meaning unless they were intended to imply that this difficulty, the presence of the present Chinese representative, would only be disposed of by his being replaced by a representative of the Mao regime. The Secretary of State for External Affairs nods his head in seeming approval. That is exactly what I said the other night, and it is what I say now. General McNaughton was saying that the Soviet delegate and those supporting him were pointing out that we were holding things up. The Secretary of State for External Affairs says nothing is being held up. General McNaughton said, "further progress of these meetings has been held up." Well, perhaps he does not know, but he is the Canadian representative at those meetings. He is referring to a situation which relates to fifteen separate acts which were part of a common pattern.
The Secretary of State for External Affairs went on to deal with the question of recognition. He said we have to distinguish between a government whose authority is being challenged, and a government which has just been formed; also that there is a difference between the recognition of a state and the recognition of a new government. He said
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what we can see taking place almost before our eyes in this house, and what can be seen in similar parliaments, I think at this time there should be an urgent appeal to wake up before it is too late and act together to save the peace for which so many men and women have died.


Mr. M. J. Coldwell (Roseiown-Biggar):: Mr. Speaker, my first word must be to say that we support the reference of these estimates, as proposed by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), to the standing committee on external affairs. I believe that the house should be supplied with all available information that can be given to hon. members from time to time in order that we may understand, better than we have in the past, the external relations of this country and the international situation. I am glad indeed to note that there is a greater interest in external affairs in this parliament than in former parliaments. In the days before the last war we usually had a debate for half a day which was most often asked for by the former leader of the C.C.F., Mr. J. S. Woodsworth, and it usually petered out in a few hours. It is indeed good to see the house interested in this subject as evidenced by those who were here on Friday last, although I was absent myself, and again today.
I was hoping that the debate today might range over a rather wider field than the relationship between Canada and China. It has taken that course, however, and I propose to say something about the situation a little later. What I should like to say first of all is that too often in the past and even at the present time we have been inclined to discuss international affairs apart from certain economic realities. After all, I think we should have learned by this time that economic realities are responsible to a greater degree than possibly we have appreciated in the past for the political and other disturbances that arise internationally. In my remarks I do not intend to confine myself to one type of totalitarianism because in the past twenty-five years we have seen two types, that which is called soviet communism and that which is called fascism. The seeds of both have been implanted deeply in the world and are still there, and we cannot tell when fascism may appear again in opposition to communism.
For a good many years we have tried to drive home the fact that we must pay attention to the economic conditions all over the world, including those in our own country. It was out of the misery and oppression of the czarist regime that the present form
[Mr. Drew.l
of communism arose in Russia and spread across the world. It was out of the misery and poverty of the Italian people that Mussolini was able to organize the march on Rome and set up the fascist regime. It was equally out of the unemployment and misery of the German people that Hitler and his nazi party, to our sorrow, were able to rise and obtain power in that great country.
Today the threat of communism is serious because millions of people in the world are existing in the direst poverty, misery and want. In a dispatch, for example, from London, dated March 6, Lord Boyd Orr, the former director general of the United Nations food and agricultural organization-and incidentally the 1949 Nobel peace prize winner- is reported to have said:
Hunger and not politics is responsible for the spread of communism in Asia.
May I point out that we have also been saying the same thing continually over the years. I recollect that in discussing the government's white paper on the war appropriation bill in April of 1945 I said:
No financial agreement can be successful unless a solution is found for the distribution of the real wealth of the world, across the world, and for raising standards of living everywhere in the world. This world cannot remain at peace; this world cannot remain free, as we call free, if one-half of the world is underfed, underclothed, underhoused and, indeed, underprivileged in any respect.
We believe that. We have tried to bring this truth before the House of Commons and the country again and again. I believe it is because nations have failed throughout the years to meet this fundamental requirement of human existence that we are faced with the serious challenge of soviet communism all over the world today. We know that the acceptance of such communism by depressed peoples involves a surrender of something that we consider to be very precious indeed, freedom of speech, freedom of thought and freedom of worship, which are the very fundamentals of the kind of democracy in which we believe. We may discuss plans for military rearmament, and unfortunately we must; we may set aside vast appropriations for the building up of war supplies, for the making of atomic bombs and all the rest of it. But we shall not have met the challenge of totalitarian communist or fascist propaganda until we have improved the standards of life for millions of people all over the world. Under present circumstances and because of our past failures we have to play our part-and I am not complaining about it-among the democratic nations of the world in preparing to defend our free institutions and our democratic way of life if they are threatened by military aggression. But if we fail to play our part in the removal of poverty, misery and

want in our own country and elsewhere we shall lose the battle in which we are now engaged. I think this is the fundamental position from which we should view Canada's international relations.
A great deal of discussion has taken place in the house today and on Friday last about the recognition of China. The article by Professor Lauterpacht, K.C., F.B.A., professor of international law at the university of Cambridge, which was published in the London Times, has been referred to on several occasions. What did he point out therein? He pointed out that the problem of recognition of governments is one of the crucial issues of international law. I think we all agree with that. He said that to decline to recognize a government is to withhold from the community which it governs most of the advantages of international law. It involves, among other things, a refusal to acknowledge the validity of its legislative and judicial acts; and the denial to it and its organs of the ordinary jurisdictional immunities. On the other side it involves the government refusing recognition in a series of difficulties since it is unable to use the ordinary international methods of protecting its own nationals and interests in territory controlled by the governments which it refuses to recognize.
And if I may quote directly, he says this:
There are some who maintain that, all this notwithstanding. recognition is a purely discretionary act of policy-an act of grace which may be withheld at pleasure and may legitimately be used as a weapon of political intervention or of economic pressure. There is no support for any such view in the bulk of the practice of this-
That is, the United Kingdom.
-and other countries. On the contrary, overwhelming authority points to the fact that, provided that the conditions presented by international law are fulfilled, there is a legal duty to recognize.
Then he goes on to discuss what are those fundamental conditions of international law. First of all he says that recognition is of course a declaration of an existing fact. Once a revolutionary government enjoys the obedience of the mass of the population and is in effective control of the bulk of the territory, it is entitled to recognition. Then he adds, and again I quote directly:
Its revolutionary origin or the method of the revolutionary change is irrelevant.
Then, second, he says that recognition of a revolutionary government is prohibited so long as the lawful government has a reasonable prospect of reasserting its authority; and I do not think anyone will contend that at the present moment the former lawful or legal government of China has any possibility of regaining control over its territory. Then he goes on to say, thirdly:
The government, by consent of the governed, is not a condition, though it was insisted upon in the
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early part of the present century. It was abandoned after the first world war and is not at present part of the law.
He also stated there was an impression that a lawful government holding out in one isolated fortress-perhaps I should have said this earlier-is entitled to continued recognition de jure; and went on to say that to hold this view was to strain to the breaking point an otherwise unimpeachable rule. Then he said that it was a question of fact, to be ascertained in good faith, whether the authority of the lawful government has become purely nominal; but it was the fourth point to which the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) drew attention on Friday evening, and I quote from page 460 of Hansard where he is reported as saying:
I should like to read that fourth point again.
"There is finally the question of the willingness to fulfil international obligations and of assurances to be given to that effect by the government recognition of which is under consideration."
Even if the first three conditions were met, a question might well be asked as to whether the fourth condition can be met at the present time by the Mao regime in China.
Well, what does Professor Lauterpacht say? At the risk of reading a little more than I usually do I am going to quote the paragraph which refers to this fourth point. I think it is important, particularly since that point was under discussion, and since the other day I suggested that the time had come when we should recognize the new government of China. He says:
There is, finally, the question of the willingness to fulfil international obligations and of assurances to be given to that effect by the government recognition of which is under consideration.
He goes on to say, and this is important:
That particular test of recognition has been often resorted to, and has recently loomed large in the public discussion, including leading articles in The Times. But it is extremely doubtful whether it is a sound test and whether it forms part of international law. It was absent from British practice in the nineteenth century. It is a condition of recognition which has often been abused, in relation to weak governments, for the purpose of extracting unilateral advantages and concessions. In relation to the government of a large state its futility is obvious, for it is a clear rule of international law that a newly-recognized government is bound by the obligations of its predecessor and of international law generally.
No special assurances are required. Neither can it be expected that the government of a great state-will be induced to give them unless on a basis of mutuality and equality. The value of any such assurance, if not accompanied by good will, is insignificant. The proper course is to assume that the government of a sovereign state will fulfil its obligations in good faith. Failing that, it is open toother states to adopt such methods of persuasion as circumstances and international law permit.
There I think we have an explanation of the fourth point, to which reference has been made. Then he goes on to say something else I should like to quote:

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The distinction must be asserted between recognizing a government and entering into diplomatic relations with it. No state is legally obliged to enter into and maintain diplomatic relations with a state or government which it recognizes. On the other hand, it cannot enter into full and normal diplomatic relations with a state or government which it does not recognize.
Recognition of a new governmental authority, accompanied as it must be by automatic withdrawal of recognition from its predecessor, necessitates an invidious decision which, in relation to old friends, may be distasteful and not free from anxiety. But decisions of this nature are unavoidable. They do not become easier by dint of being postponed.
Then he adds this:
It may be of importance, in the case now before His Majesty's government-
That is, recognition of China.
-to reassure public opinion that the decision at which they have arrived is not arbitrary or intended to minister to what may be a transient advantage, but that it is in accordance with principle and with the practice of enlightened nations, including that of our closest friend and ally.
The reference there is to something he said a little earlier in the same article in regard to the historical background of the United States with respect to the recognition of revolutionary governments. Apparently the London Times agreed with this view that China should be recognized because of the conditions laid down in this article, and because of the necessity. Indeed I have here a report which appeared in our local newspapers as an Associated Press dispatch dated London, January 7, the day after the British government granted recognition to the new Chinese government. These are the main points in the dispatch:	The British press, in a chorus of
approval, greeted Britain's recognition of the new government of China. All papers, including Labour and Conservative, gave approval. Lord Beaverbrook's Daily Express termed the recognition wise. The London Times said Britain was accepting a communist regime in China as she already had done in Russia, but would resist any attempt by the Chinese government to enforce communism on other countries.
Thus we see that in a country with long experience in international matters and the way these things are done in the field of international affairs, all the newspapers from the London Times through to the Daily Herald, the Labour paper, welcomed recognition and approved of it. Consequently I say that under international law, and in the interests of their own nationals, this recognition was granted.
This afternoon the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) referred to the article by Mr. Anthony Eden which appeared some ten or twelve days after recognition had been granted. But note this, for it is on the record: If one reads Mr. Eden's article, one finds that what he was criticizing was not the recognition of China as such, but the timing of that

recognition. He was deploring the fact that all the commonwealth nations, indeed all the nations with interests in the Pacific, did not act together. As the leader of the opposition indicated when he read the article, and as the Secretary of State for External Affairs pointed out in his speech, Mr. Eden stated that recognition was inescapable. It had to come. The only criticism he made was of the timing of that recognition. Mr. Eden thought a common policy should have been agreed upon. I know that for a long time that had been the position of the British Conservative party. They had always thought that there should be an imperial foreign policy, which would be controlled from one central point. None of the commonwealth nations, at least in the last 25 or 30 years, have felt inclined to co-operate in sending representatives to one point, or in the setting up of any organization, which would bring about a common foreign policy of this description.
I am certain of this, that the people of Canada would not have wanted to have this parliament approve of the establishment of a super-cabinet to deal with foreign policy on an imperial basis. I feel that this is a relic of the old plea for an imperial foreign policy, an idea which, fortunately or unfortunately according to one's viewpoint, was discarded long ago. As a matter of fact, even if we liked the idea, it is not possible to put it into effect now, because our economic and geographical circumstances are so different. A policy that is suitable for the United Kingdom would not necessarily be suitable for Canada. Certainly, as we have seen, it would not be acceptable to the new republics of the commonwealth, India and Pakistan. In my opinion it is far better to have the type of commonwealth association we have, an association of free peoples and free governments, than it is to have something rigid, because in time it would break, and we would find ourselves with no real association at all.


Mr. Macdonnell (Greenwood):: Would the hon. member permit a question?


Major James William Coldwell: Yes.


James MacKerras Macdonnell: Am I not
right in understanding that what Mr. Eden meant when he spoke about common action and agreed strategy, was not merely a reference to the nations of the commonwealth but would include, among others, the United States?


Major James William Coldwell: Yes, but what I am saying is that probably it is again a reflection of the old concept of the British Conservative party. May I just say this, and I was going to add it because I have a reminder in my notes, that the proposal he made in January was wider than agreement among the commonwealth

countries. I intended to point out that anyone who has been following the situation in the United States, the discussions in congress and Mr. Acheson's speeches over the last few months, is bound to come to the conclusion that the United States has no settled policy in relation to Far Eastern affairs. At one time it seemed as though they were going to send aid to the Chiang government in Formosa, in conformity with General MacArthur's advice. At another time, it was quite obvious that plan had been abandoned.
On January 12, I think it was, Mr. Acheson made a speech in Washington, in which he seemed to imply that the United States had to wait for the situation to become clear, and he emphasized the need of the people in southeastern Asia for economic aid in order to meet the threat of communism. Consequently, it only reinforces the point I was making that, however desirable a common policy might be in relation to Asia and the other external matters affecting all our countries, under the present circumstances it is quite impossible to agree upon a single policy. May I add that that is largely due to the uncertainty of United States policy, and the situation in the United States congress.
When we are discussing these matters, I believe we have to remember two factors mentioned by Mr. Acheson. In Asia, there is a revulsion against the poverty, misery and want under which the people have suffered for so long. Second, there is a revulsion also against foreign control. In so many countries of southeastern Asia, foreign control has been overthrown. It may be said that China has exchanged one sort of foreign control for another. Bear this in mind, however, that the control exercised over China by the Soviet union is a control of ideas rather than a control of its economic life, though indeed that may follow. The very fact that India was so anxious to recognize the new government of China was, in my opinion, an indication that India believed, and still believes, that the way to checkmate this attempted control by Russia is not to build a fence around China and refuse to have anything to do with the teeming millions in that country. What is true in the economic sense in southeastern Asia is true of Europe and the remainder of the world. At the moment communism in Europe is being contained because of the Marshall plan and the progress that has been made in economic and social relationships in the United Kingdom.
I tremble to think what would happen if there were a breakdown of the British economy, and that were followed by great social difficulties in that country. It would destroy the hope of the whole of the continent of Europe that progress can be made
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under democratic institutions and by democratic regimes. The danger in Europe, of course, is still the danger of economic collapse. May I say that such a collapse would inevitably follow the failure of Britain to recover, and to make the kind of progress she has been making over the last few years. We must always remember that Russian foreign policy, indeed all her policy, is based upon the assumption that sooner or later the economies of the non-communist countries will collapse, and out of that chaos communism will spread, ultimately controlling the whole worid. It is because of this that, from time to time, we emphasize the need for economic aid, rather than vast military expenditures. I do caution, however, that I realize that, as long as we are threatened and are part of an alliance, which we all agree was absolutely necessary, the Atlantic alliance, we have to bear our part in the preparations that must be made for general defence.
There has been a great deal of talk about China, but one of the sets of conditions, if I may put it that way, which worry me a good deal, is the set of conditions to be found in Western Germany today. There are two million unemployed in Western Germany at the moment, and on the other side of the iron curtain there is a communist government sending out communist propaganda. We do not know exactly what is going on behind that iron curtain. But there is unemployment in Western Germany. In spite of the fact that the general output and the general exports of the rest of western Europe have increased and are something over what they were in 1939, German production is still low, about seventy-six per cent of her prewar production. The goods that were expected to have been exported in order to gain the raw materials and food supplies that Western Germany needs are being used within Western Germany.
As a matter, of fact for several years the United States particularly urged the return to a free market, to the elimination of rationing and of controls. Well Germany returned to that under the new government, and today the shop windows are full of goods that should be exported. The people of Germany who have the money can buy more, and we are told can live better than the people across the North sea in Britain where there is rationing, where there is control and where every attempt has been made to bring up the level of exports in order to obtain supplies of goods from abroad.
In Germany they have discontinued rationing; they have discontinued controls; they have gone back to the free market. The result

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is that German exports have failed, and two million are unemployed. People with money are eating and living well, while a large percentage of the population is in misery. There you have the seedbed for some form of totalitarianism. Consequently you see rising in Germany again the old nazi party under a new form. You see too an increase in the influence of communism. What is true in Western Germany is true in Italy, and to some degree also in France. Therefore I say we have to see to it that we give close attention to economic relationships, and assist those countries to build up their economies so that they can resist the spread of soviet communist or fascist control in those countries. I firmly believe that Canada's whole safety and whole defence is linked of course with the improvement in conditions in Asia, in Europe and indeed across the world.
I was going to say something once again about atomic power and the hydrogen bomb, that fearful weapon with which the world is threatened at the present time; but I do not think I will do so this afternoon, because another opportunity will arise in the near future. What I did want to do today was to try to put in focus in my own mind, and, if I could, place in focus before the house the international situation as I see it, and the desirability for the recognition of China as I see and understand it. We cannot forget of course that the Chinese people were on our side during the great struggle that ended in 1945. When we look back over the last hundred and ten years or so, since the British obtained possession of Hong Kong, and other nations obtained great concessions on the mainland of China, we cannot forget the record that we have. It is not a record that we can look back on with satisfaction. We have to try to obliterate the black spots in that record and do everything we can to help the people of China and the people of the other nations of southeast Asia, of India, of Pakistan, of Indonesia, of Indo-China and the other countries of Asia, to build up their economies, to improve their standards of living, and to aid them in every way we can, giving them as far as we are able assistance in the way of food and other supplies that they need for their economic life. If we can do that we shall have done far more to defend ourselves from aggression, to defend the world from the totalitarian regimes, than we can do by building up armies, navies and air forces to defend our territorial integrity.


Mr. J. H. Blackmore (Lethbridge):: Mr. Speaker, we in this group support the minister's resolution to refer the estimates of his department to the committee on external affairs. That practice has been followed for some years past with considerable success.
[Mr. Coldwell.l
Before commencing what I was going to say I should like to refer to the quotation from Anthony Eden that was put on the record by the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew). He noted that Eden had said that the great need of southeastern Asia was mainly economic. Now, everyone at all well-informed on earth knows that. Why it should be such an important thing for him to say it I cannot quite understand. How to give the needy help is the inescapable question. It is a question that must have an unequivocal answer, an answer conveying a practicable method, adequate and realistic. Such an answer, Mr. Speaker, has not been even hinted at by any of the political figures authorized to speak for any one of the western nations from the United States down. This conspicuous fact must fill every less fortunate nation and people with a feeling akin to dismay, even to despair.
I do not quite see, Mr. Speaker, why it is that responsible officials, from the Secretary of State for External Affairs, all through the Canadian government, and similar figures in the other governments, do not realize this. What is the matter with them? Are they afraid? Do they not dare come out and say what they think ought to be done and how it should be done? Are they restrained by some outside force from facing realities as they should be faced?
If I were in another nation, say France, I would find this indisposition to be frank, not facing the future and speaking about events as they are, as one of the great causes of the troubles with which we are faced.
Let us examine our national neighbourhood. We are discussing external affairs. What sort of people are we living among internationally? May we consider somewhat realistically some of the important neighbours whose actions must modify our own? This is the question to which I should like to devote what time I am permitted this afternoon in the house. First, let us look at the United States. "America's Needs and Resources," a very important and authentic publication of 1947, contains at page 675 a statement to this effect, that the capacity of United States agriculture will be more than equal to any conceivable requirement.
First may I say this concerning the United States. One impressive fact about the United States to me as just an ordinary Canadian and a member of parliament, as the United States occupies her place in the world's economy, is the tremendous productive potential or capacity of that country. I said the other night that I thought the Prime Minister (Mr. St. Laurent) went down to the United States and was impudent in

his speech. Maybe I was a little too severe in what I said, but here are some of the considerations which led me to make that statement. It was impulsive; it was not planned, but it was based upon some facts which I shall now give.
In 1935 in the United States they were capable of producing enough goods and services, $135 billion worth of them, to give every family in that country $4,400 worth of goods and services a year. That was possible without in the slightest degree adding to their equipment. Those who desire to find authentication for that statement will find it in a first-class publication in our library called "The Chart of Plenty" by Dr. Harold Loeb, an unchallengeable authority. This book was published in 1936.
According to President Truman, in the United States in 1954 it is going to be physically possible for them to give to each family $5,000 worth of goods and services a year. That is not in money, but in goods and services. This condition is discussed in the Ottawa Citizen of January 6, 1950, page one.
This is No. 1:	What conceivable use has a
nation like that for some of our goods, except a few such as asbestos and other things they may need, to supplement their own tremendous resources and productive power?
Secondly, the United States is a great industrial nation, as well as a great primary producing nation. One of the major blunders, in my judgment, in the thinking of men around me is that people somehow or other, both in the United States and outside it, have the idea that the United States is going to be able to import goods, just as Great Britain was able to import goods when she was the great creditor nation of the world. There is as much difference between Great Britain, almost a have-not nation, and the United States which is almost completely selfsufficient, and becoming more so every day she exists, as there is between the poles.
Until we can think clearly enough to adjust this colossal error in our thinking, we shall never be able to approach a solution of the problem which confronts us, as that problem arises out of the facts concerning the United States.
Thirdly, as a consequence the United States has an enormous urge towards exporting.
Fourth, she has a strong resistance against importing. In a publication called "The Measure of a Nation" we find at page 3 that by 1960 the United States will be able to turn out six times as much per man-hour of work as she was able to turn out in 1850. At page 90 of this book we are told that in 1944 the United States harvested 10 per cent more acres and
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produced 20 per cent more crops and livestock products than she did in 1939, but with 17 per cent fewer workers.
Here is another source of serious error on the part of men who think about the United States. She is in an age of abundance in which she is likely to have unemployment, a shortage of purchasing power and a lack of home markets, which helps to explain her general attitude. It has been estimated that at the present time there are upwards of $4 billion worth of surplus agricultural products now in the hands of the United States government.
Fifth, the United States found it necessary to lend abroad through private investors on an extensive scale right after world war I. The productive capacity of that country has vastly increased since that time, and her selfsufficiency has been enhanced. She is going to be forced to engage in a policy of foreign lending, if she is going to be able to sell her goods abroad, on a far wider scale than that which she used after world war I.
May I read two short excerpts from an excellent booklet to which I have referred, and to which other members of my group have referred but to which, strangely enough, no one from any other group has ever referred, although from time to time they have been told about it. This is a publication called "The United States in the World Economy" which was issued as a United States government document in 1943. It bears directly upon post-war conditions. At page 5 we find this:
During the lour years from 1926 through 1929 the amount of dollars supplied ranged between $7,300 million and $7,500 million, and foreign incomes and spending habits and the international debt structure were fairly well adjusted to this level.
That indicates the extent to which the United States had found it necessary to go in her foreign lending by 1926. Then she discontinued that foreign lending policy and thereby brought on the calamitous depression. This quotation on the same page indicates the cause of the great depression:
The abrupt fall in the dollar supply by some $5 billion, or 68 per cent, over the short space of three years, necessitated vast changes in the foreign use of dollars and in the economic systems from which the demand arose.
May I pause to comment at that point. The United States by withdrawing those $5 billion from the European countries and from other countries forced them to put up tariff barriers of all sorts to protect their economies, forced them for example to begin to raise wheat, no matter what it cost-as happened in France and Italy. Then the important United States officials had the incredible gall to blame those

External Affairs
tariff restrictions in their campaign of 1945, at Bretton Woods conference and in other situations-to blame those tariff restrictions on a desire on the part of western Europeans to fight against the United States economy.
If there ever was fabricated and propagated a more colossal falsehood than that, I must say it has never come to my attention. Yet hon. members have risen in this House of Commons consistently and participated in that fantastic falsehood.
No. 6: The need to lend abroad is even greater now; but there is this difficulty, that today such loans cost the nation money. The United States, in order to advance those loans nationally, must either increase her tax structure or increase her debt, something which the people of the United States are not going to be disposed to do, and which they are going to resist with more and more determination as the days go by.
So that the device of foreign lending for the United States as a means of mitigating the discomfort she will feel because of her need to export is going to become decreasingly available to the United States government. That is a solemn fact, and cannot be disregarded by anyone who is careful in his estimate of the situation.
The question arises: So what? That is what we ought to be talking about in this House of Commons, instead of a lot of foolish froth about recognizing this, that and the other nation, fighting communism and all the rest of it, which, when all taken together, does not amount to a teaspoon of concentrate. That is the sum total of what we have listened to in two debates; it is just so much froth. It has no meaning at all, having regard to the real problem which faces the nation.
What are the trends in the United States? Does it look as though she is going to change her ways? In the first place she has become more self-sufficient through synthetic industries. To all people who come in contact with this statement, I recommend a fine article in the Reader's Digest of December, 1949. This article is called "No wonder the world is short of dollars" and is written by C. Lester Walker. He names a large number of essential commodities which the United States at one time was obliged to import, and which she no longer needs to import because she has discovered synthetic processes by the use of which she can produce these various commodities in her own land.
Cryolite is the first one named; it is used in the manufacture of aluminum. The United States imported from Greenland 11,000 tons in 1939; but the United States developed synthetic cryolite in world war II, and will

manufacture 27,000 tons in 1950. The United States is therefore going to have cryolite to sell abroad. Greenland, a colony of Denmark, will send a mere few thousand pounds. What does that mean? That means that Denmark and Greenland at least will be denied access to United States dollars to the extent of the cryolite not exported.
Then as to rubber, which she used to buy from such countries as Malaya, for example, from which Canada used to buy hers mainly,
1	am informed. In 1940 the United States imported 1 [DOT] 8 billion pounds of rubber. In 1944 United States plants were turning out
2	billion pounds of synthetic rubber. Where did the United States dollars go for those countries that used to supply that rubber? They evaporated. Can they ever be brought back? Of course they cannot. Does anyone pretend that the United States would be so egregiously stupid as to begin to buy her rubber abroad and to discontinue her manufacture of synthetic rubber? Do you think that we would do that? Would we dismantle the Sarnia rubber plant? Not a member of this house would vote for such nonsensical behaviour. Well, so many United States dollars are gone!
Then as to mica. In 1939 the United States imported from India 95 per cent of what she used. But the United States armies captured from the Germans the process for making synthetic mica; and so good-bye to the mica source of United States dollars and India's share therein, with all the possibilities of Britain's trading goods to India for United States dollars which she got for India mica, thus rendering moneys convertible.
Then as to camphor. Before 1933 the United States imported camphor from Formosa. Since 1933 the United States has come to produce more camphor than she can use, so she has camphor for sale on the world market. Probably she will send it in to Formosa and compete with Formosa's camphor. Who knows?
Those four commodities are merely examples of what has been going on in the United States economy during the last thirty years. At page 36 of the Reader's Digest Mr. Walker states:
That country has now developed an almost fantastic economic self-sufficiency. No other people in history has anywhere near equalled it. The United States, always rich in many basic materials like coal and iron, has become almost literally the Colossus of Everything.
May I just say this, Mr. Speaker. As we sit here in the House of Commons, if the people of the country could just look down now upon our Conservative friends, the very

men who should be well informed on this matter, and see how few of them are here, and how almost none of them are paying any attention to this vital point, I think they would be impressed.


Jean-François Pouliot: The hon. member's speech is most interesting.


John Horne Blackmore: It faces actual facts; it has meat; it contains the things that must be met, and that is all.
Optical glass used to come from England, France and Germany thirty-five years ago. By world war II the United States used $12,500,000 worth annually. She bought abroad only $2 million worth. That shows how fast she has grown with respect to optical glass. Now the United States produces any and all types, so good-bye to another source of United States dollars for England, France and Germany.
Then as to cigarette papers; the United States used to get them from France. She used to buy $10 million worth of them annually. Now she produces all she needs from flax fibre, and good-bye to some more United States dollars for France.
If I may, I should like to stop and say just a word or two to my Conservative friends. I hope we do not hear any more of them talk aimlessly about convertibility until they realize that convertibility is absolutely impossible unless goods are traded back and forward so that convertibility would be justified; and that is just exactly the situation that does not exist in the world. There is not the necessary interchange of goods and there cannot be. When we face these things, we shall stop talking in this house about vapour.
Silk used to be obtained from Japan. The United States used to get 80 million to 90 million pounds annually. The United States now produces nylon, from coal, air and water of which she has a superabundance, to the extent of half a billion dollars worth a year.
The United States used to buy soya beans from Manchuria; now she produces 200 million bushels a year. The United States used to buy figs from Turkey and Greece. Now she produces over 60 million pounds of figs annually.


Jean-François Pouliot: They are pretty smart, those Americans.


John Horne Blackmore: That is right. Not only are they smart but they have the resources; and above all they have sense enough to protect their own industries so that their industries can develop. They do not do as we did with our celery producers this year. We had celery producers in Ontario who produced a great deal of celery and who went to the expense of putting it in cold storage. Then we brought
External Affairs
in a great deal of celery from the United States, causing our producers to lose the whole thing. If you can imagine a finer example of just exactly how not to run a country, I should be glad to have you call me up and tell me about it; I am interested in monstrosities. But the United States had sense enough not to do that; hence she has grown.
The United States used to get their dates from North Africa and the Middle East. Now the United States produces more than 20 million pounds of them annually. She used to get chicle from Mexico and Guatemala. Now she produces it synthetically. She used to get tungsten from China and Bolivia; now she uses molybdenum in large measure. She used to get shellac from India. Now she makes shellac from synthetic resins or she displaces it by substances which she draws from corn gluten. She used to get jute from India. Now she makes burlap bags from tough, long-fibre spruce kraft paper.
There is an indefinite list of items in addition to those I have mentioned, including Christmas tree ornaments she used to get from Germany and Czechoslovakia, which she now produces. She used to get pig bristles for brushes from China. Now she uses nylon bristles. She used to get dried pyrethrum flowers, for use in insecticides, from Japan and Africa. Now she has synthetic, American-made chemicals. Indeed, economists estimate that the United States produces 94 per cent of its needs. Economists predict that the United States will soon be producing one-third of the world's goods, with only a small percentage of the world's population: it is something like one-sixteenth or thereabouts; I have forgotten the exact figure.
These are weighty facts. Will the United States import much in the future? In the article in the Reader's Digest, the writer is whistling in order to keep up his courage. Mr. Walker talks about the few things which the United States will have to import such as critical minerals for the military stockpile, bauxite for aluminum, platinum, tin, chromite, cobalt, manganese, a few foods like tea, coffee, and bananas, and French perfumes, laces, champagnes, and china. Then there will be the "invisible" imports which will result from shipping space in foreign vessels which the United States will hire-and she is getting rid of them as fast as she can-and dollars spent by United States tourists. All things being considered, I am afraid Mr. C. Lester Walker is rather optimistic when he finds some comfort in that aspect of the whole question. He presumes, too, that the United States is not going to make any more discoveries about how to make synthetic substances.

External Affairs
There is one important thing to bear in mind in considering this situation of the bringing in of these substances and raw materials from other nations. When other nations export their minerals such as aluminum they deplete their own resources. No nation can continue indefinitely to export its vital minerals and deplete its resources for coming generations. To what extent then can we balance our economy with the United States or other nations by sending to the United States these vital minerals which our own children are going to need? Furthermore, when a country exports its primary products, as we do when we export cattle or barley, what we actually do is to send raw materials with which the United States can manufacture goods and probably sell them back to us, making money in the process. Any nation that engages in the wholesale selling of primary products and the buying of manufactured products from abroad soon makes itself a hewer of wood and drawer of water. We have an example of that within Canada. The four western provinces have been obliged to send their raw materials, their primary products, to markets in the two central provinces to be manufactured, and what has happened? The four western provinces have become hewers of wood and drawers of water for the two central provinces of Canada, and that is exactly where they will stay until they industrialize.
Another aspect of the whole question is that not only do the United States tend to self-sufficiency but they tend to be determined first of all to distribute through foreign trade. President Roosevelt said in a great speech over the radio in October, 1944, that he intended to find jobs for sixty million Americans by trebling exports abroad. They are determined to send more and more exports abroad. What for? To bring money into the United States to buy their own goods. That is exactly the policy that Canada tries to follow, but it just does not work, and besides that it tends to destroy other nations.
In addition to that, the United States people, just the same as the Canadian people, have a fanatical attitude towards money. The Secretary of State for External Affairs and the leader of the opposition no doubt have the same attitude. They are completely fanatical about money. They will not even give consideration to the idea of creating money debt-free and using it for the benefit of their nation. They will not give a minute's thought to it, no matter how scientific it may be. The result is they abuse the minds of the people all over the country in this regard, and consequently there is apparently no hope in the world for the bringing in of that reform at least for a long time. The United States 
is not going to adopt the only method which she could adopt to solve her problem under the circumstances, namely, the distribution of purchasing power by social credit within the nation to buy the goods which she can produce, thus raising the standard of living of the whole nation and finding markets at home. She will not adopt that course. She shows no indication of intending to do so. There is not much hope of relief in that direction.
The United States also tends to a policy of non-discrimination, which means unconditionally the most-favoured-nation policy of the United States which was introduced in 1922, as a result of the application of which she forced world war II, and particularly forced the Japanese into war. That statement can be completely documented, and before anyone questions it I suggest that he had better write to me and get the documentation, because it is on record. The unconditional most-favoured-nation clause in the hands of the United States has caused more trouble in the world in the last thirty years than any other one thing that you can name, and she is not giving it up. Then we have our Minister of Finance (Mr. Abbott) coming into the House of Commons and telling us that he believes in non-discrimination which just renders it utterly impossible for have-not nations and weaker nations to live.
For example, let us see how it worked out in Great Britain. She came to the United States to borrow money after the close of world war II because they cut her right off lend-lease, and the United States in the course of the years during which Great Britain was spending that loan forced Britain to buy a lot of useless Yankee books instead of important things like the cotton that Great Britain wanted to buy. They forced the British people to buy a lot of tobacco from the United States when they could have just as well purchased their tobacco from Rhodesia and paid for it in their own goods. That is non-discrimination running wild. That is exactly what is in the minds of the United States officials. It means a lot to us in our external policy.
Furthermore, the United States tends towards an expansionist policy. They are not quite satisfied with the great big share of the world they have. They want to get still more and more, and monopolize markets in various parts of the world to the exclusion of other nations which absolutely must trade in order to get the things they need. What does that mean? There was a good example of it just recently in the newspapers. We are told that just recently France has had to adopt protective measures to protect her wine

against Yankee Coca Cola. That shows how the United States is actuated by an expansionist policy in this matter.
Another very important consideration is the fact that the United States is unlikely to change this policy and to become informed. One of the difficulties in the way of a change of heart in the United States is the fact that there are a lot of politicians down there as there are in Canada who, when they go out on the hustings, are not concerned at all about telling people the truth. All they are concerned about is to get back into office. Therefore they misrepresent, distort and suppress the truth right and left, and the result is that people become more and more confused. All you have to do is listen to the speakers in a United States election campaign, and the nonsense they talk, in order to be impressed with that solemn fact.
In addition, the United States naturally fears unemployment, debt, taxation, insecurity of supply, shortage of purchasing power and a consequent lack of markets within her own borders, and poverty among her people, which obtains there in a very large degree. These considerations naturally make the United States tend to hold to the policies which she has embraced up to the present time.
United States reactions and attitudes are based upon sound reasons arising from solid actualities facing her under her present iinancial and capitalistic system. If she were to change her financial system, if she were to adopt Social Credit, she would realize that she could distribute her goods within her own country without adding to her debt, and she would change her whole impact on the world.
Having said so much about our great neighbour, let us now take a glance at some of the other nations, and especially the problems of the have-not nations. Let us take Japan as an example. I was a little unhappy when the Secretary of State for External Affairs told us, as I recall it, that trade unions had been organized in Japan, and they had done various other things that were going to force up the cost of Japanese goods so that the Japanese will not be able to compete successfully with our goods. I do not want them to compete with our goods, but will someone who thinks he knows tell us how in the world the Japanese are going to be able to sell enough of their goods to secure the things their country needs if their prices are forced up automatically in that fashion? There are seventy-seven million people in Japan in a constricted area and with very meagre resources. How are they going to live? If we want a real problem in external affairs let us just work on that one for a while.
External Affairs
Japan tried to reduce her costs by various means, and according to information I have, as an example of what she did, in 1935 she built a bicycle that Canada could have purchased from Japan for $5.75 when Canadians were producing and selling a similar bicycle for $50. That is what the Japanese were prepared to do in order to live in this world and get the goods they needed. I think that if we had been in the position the Japanese were in we would have been thinking of something like Pearl Harbor too, don't you?
Now I turn to France, another type of nation, which may be said to be typical of Spain, Germany, Holland and a number of other countries. What happened to France? Well, according to the Christian Science Monitor of February 20, 1950, the French are quite uncertain in regard to their industry. In 1949 they produced 26J per cent more steel than in 1948, an output of 9,000,000 tons, while also producing 6,000,000 tons more of coal in 1949 than in 1948. But they produced that coal with 187,000 workers, whereas in 1948 they required 217,000. What does that mean? It means that great numbers of the people who produced coal were turned out of work and consequently had no buying power in 1949. What were they to do about those people? If you are looking for the causes of communism, there is one. We think that is all right. Well, it may be all right, but it causes a great deal of trouble. France also increased its hydroelectric production far beyond that of 1938.
Now it seems that French industrialists are facing the necessity of competing in foreign markets; and with whom? With the United States, for example; with Great Britain, for example, in markets where already there is more of their kinds of goods than are needed. A large section of the French people have only enough money to pay for rent and food. France faces the danger of overproduction. What are they to do about it? They are faced with the same problem the United States is faced with.
According to the Christian Science Monitor of February 27, 1950, the Marshall plan is imperilled by the flow of foreign goods to the United States. Congressmen are now objecting to foreign goods, and are insisting that countries getting Marshall aid be required to buy United States goods. Senator Tom Con-nally is even said to be urging that European countries buy United States oil with Marshall plan money instead of Near East oil. Henry Cabot Lodge, junior, is asking why Britain should be permitted to send certain textiles to the United States when many New England textile mills are likely to be closed, with resulting unemployment. According to the same newspaper a leading British electrical

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manufacturer outbid his nearest United States competitor by $250,000 on equipment for a Seattle power plant, yet the British bid was rejected. Still we have men, including our Minister of Finance prattling away about how Britain should lower her costs and prices in order to compete in the United States market!
Well, what does it amount to? In the same newspaper there was a story about the United Nations building being constructed in New York city at a cost of $65 million, which was appropriated by that organization. Sixty per cent of that money comes from overseas; and congress, feeling that the necessary goods should be permitted to enter the United States because of that fact, waived all import duties in connection with that building. But what has happened? Contracts to the value of $42 million have been let already, and not a cent is going to anyone outside the United States. Is that the way the United States is going to co-operate? A committee of experts recommended a British synthetic insulating material for the building. That recommendation was rejected because of fear that the New York unions would refuse to handle it. That just goes to show how deep-seated these problems are. When bids were asked for facing material the British Bath and Portland Stone Company had the low bid, but Vermont marble was accepted, apparently for similar reasons. Some contracts have been awarded even without bids. The construction of the United Nations building is in the hands of a New York firm, Harrison and Abramovitz. Foreign bidders are still making the lowest bids, but they are getting no contracts. Let us face those facts in relation to the possibility of getting the United States to change her policy toward us.
Now I come to the question of communism, but I do not think I will say anything about it at the present time. We need only see what Russia is doing with the communist government in China to realize how the communists are setting about to win the sympathy and confidence of the peoples of the world; whether rightly or wrongly, I do not know. However, there is the cause; and if you want to fight communism you can fight it there.
Now, what needs to be done? I say there are three things which must be done if we are to solve our problems. In the first place we must have a scientific distribution system here at home, that is in Canada and the United States, corresponding to the social credit system. Then we must have a real, scientific distribution system abroad which would involve the exchange of ICCH goods to be paid for with debt-free money, so it would not involve an increase in the taxation or debt of the contributing nation. We simply must have debt-free money created if we are to do these things.
[Mr. Blackmore.l
The next thing we must work for is national self-sufficiency. I know many people in this house have held out against that idea; but what did we do during the war? We produced our own rubber. Well, if we have right good judgment, I say that in the next war we will produce our own sugar and other commodities, much as the United States has done.
That country is going to be nationally selfsufficient, and is forcing that policy upon us. She has already forced it upon Britain, as the hon. member for Selkirk (Mr. Bryce) showed last night.
Then Canada must stimulate production, and we must have the optimum internal distribution on principles similar to those of social credit.
We must be ready to bear our full share of responsibility for assisting the less fortunate peoples, and must finance our contributions not with tax money or borrowed money but under a system which in due time will eliminate debt and taxation. We simply must adopt a realistic financial system, making financially possible that which is physically possible.
That, Mr. Speaker, is my contribution to this discussion of the vexed problems of external affairs.


Jean-François Pouliot: Mr. Speaker, I have listened with great attention to the remarks of the hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Blackmore), and I am in some embarrassment as to his conclusion. In the first place he read a lengthy article from the Reader's Digest to the effect that the United States had become self-supporting in many fields in which they were not so before the war. His conclusion, in that part of his speech, was that the policy of the United States was wrong; and it was my intention to send copies of his speech to President Truman and Mr. Dean Acheson.


John Horne Blackmore: You could not do anything better. I will supply the copies.


Jean-François Pouliot: Now I shall send only that part of the hon. gentleman's speech, because if I sent his whole speech they would be just as embarrassed as I am; they would wonder at his other conclusion, that Canada also should be self-supporting. In the first place he said the United States made the blunder of becoming self-supporting.


John Horne Blackmore: No, I did not say that.


Jean-François Pouliot: That was the inference I took.


John Horne Blackmore: Oh, no.


Jean-François Pouliot: Their blunder was in discouraging international trade by producing at

home some goods they previously got from other countries. That is what the hon. gentleman said.


John Horne Blackmore: I am sure the hon. gentleman does not wish to misrepresent me. I was not criticizing the United States for becoming self-sufficient; I was simply setting out the fact that this is what has happened. That is the bare fact facing us.


Jean-François Pouliot: The hon. gentleman looked very indignant when he made those statements, from which I took it that he was dissatisfied with that policy. Afterwards, he recommended that Canada should be selfsupporting. He was right in the second conclusion, but it prevents me from sending his speech to Mr. Truman and Mr. Acheson.


John Horne Blackmore: I shall have to do it myself.


Jean-François Pouliot: Yes, the hon. gentleman will put them to some embarrassment.
Mr. Blackmorer They need embarrassing.


Jean-François Pouliot: They will not know what the hon. member's conclusion was. I want him to tell us whether he believes it is a good policy for the United States to be self-supporting, and whether it would be a good policy for Canada to be self-supporting.


John Horne Blackmore: Yes, I believe in both of those.


Jean-François Pouliot: I am very glad to hear that. Then, I shall send the speech, and I shall refer to the page on which this correction has been made.


John Horne Blackmore: It needs no correction. It is all there when you read it.


Jean-François Pouliot: It is all there, but I did not know what my hon. friend meant.


John Horne Blackmore: The hon. member must have gone out of the chamber when I said that.


Jean-François Pouliot: I was here all the time, and I listened with great attention. The hon. member has quite a voice, and I missed nothing of what he said. It was because of that that I was puzzled by what he said. It might have been the opinion of the Digest and not his own. His opinion, therefore, must be that Canada should be self-supporting, and, to a large extent, Canada is now self-supporting. Industry has made great progress. In passing through Toronto yesterday, I saw the new industries that have grown up on the west side of Toronto. I suggest the hon. gentleman should see them, and ascertain what happened in Toronto as well as many other places in Canada.


John Horne Blackmore: I am happy to hear it.
External Affairs


Jean-François Pouliot: I am glad the hon. member is happy to hear that. What has happened is due, in large part, to the encouragement this government has given business. It has tried to see that Canadian business prospered. The policy of the government in that field is sound.


John Horne Blackmore: That is right.


Jean-François Pouliot: I am glad to hear the hon. gentleman say so, and I congratulate him on being so broadminded, if not always logical.
There is one thing for which I want to praise the hon. gentleman, and that is for citing facts. I have no objection to the citation of facts. We must base our arguments on facts. I cannot understand, however, the citation of other people's opinions. An opinion is merely an opinion, whether it be that of a professor with a strange name who is teaching international law at Columbia or Mr. Eden. Perhaps the hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Blackmore) knows that the first and most important author on international law, I do not mean private international law but public international law, was an old man who died a long time ago named Grotius. He published a book in Paris in 1625 about the right of war and peace. It was entitled "De Jure Belli et Pacis".


Mr. Low:: What does it mean?


Jean-François Pouliot: It means, the right of war and peace. At the time, the French language was the recognized international language. This book was also called, "Les Droits des Gens",- the rights of the peoples. I have been told it is an interesting book, but I have never read it. I know that all the treatises and textbooks that have been published on international law since that time were merely explanations and commentaries and the fundamentals were the same as those contained in that book. If there are new principles of international law, therefore, and my hon. friend knows that there are, they must come from agreements amongst nations. They are based on the fundamentals established by Grotius more than three centuries ago.
I am. not ready to agree with the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson), when he says that the nations are not bound by what is said in the United Nations assembly, or in the security council. I was surprised when some hon. gentlemen applauded that statement. Naturally, all that is said in those meetings is subject to approval by the various parliaments. According to any strict interpretation, these statements may not be binding, but on the other hand they enunciate principles of international law. We will find most of those principles already enunciated by Grotius, who is the acknowledged authority on the matter.

Alberta Natural Gas Company
Turning again to what I said before, the member for Lethbridge has been wiser than the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew)-


John Horne Blackmore: I hope so.


Jean-François Pouliot: -in that he has mentioned facts. The United States is producing more mica and more jute. Instead of importing rubber, they are making so much synthetic rubber. These are facts. The leader of the opposition gave us the opinion of Mr. Eden, delivered in a pre-election speech. What was that? Mr. Eden was just boosting his chances, and the chances of his party, in opposing the policy of the Attlee government which had just recognized China. It is worth little to quote the opinion of an expert, unless we know the circumstances in which that opinion was delivered.


John Horne Blackmore: That is right.


Jean-François Pouliot: The circumstances are important. This was an important occasion for Mr. Eden, who probably wanted to again become the foreign secretary of the United Kingdom. His opinion was delivered during the election campaign, when he intended to censure the government for what it had done.
Now, there is an illustrious professor with a peculiar name who has been mentioned. His name is Lauterpacht. He may be a brilliant man, but he is not as great a man as Grotius.
At six o'clock the house took recess.


[Stage Direction]
AFTER RECESS

The house resumed at eight o'clock.


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed, from Tuesday, February 28, consideration of the motion of Mr. Maybank for the second reading of Bill No. 7, to incorporate Alberta Natural Gas Company.
Arthur Leroy Smith: Mr. Speaker, I heard some rather imposing sentences expressed, but having the floor I still think I should give further reasons for favouring one sentiment which was expressed rather than another, and which happened to come from close to me on my right-hand side.
When I adjourned the debate on this matter a week ago tonight I had discussed the uses which might be made of natural gas. In the interval something has happened, sir, which I feel compelled to bring to your attention. If the paper which I hold in my hand is to be believed I am now a very rich man.


I hold in my hand the Calgary Herald of March 3, and I shall read from a dispatch from Edmonton. The first paragraph reads: Arthur Wray (Ind. S.C.) -
I will explain that in a moment.

Banff-Cochrane, started a hubbub in the legislature Thursday afternoon, when he quoted a "man in Calgary" as having told him $200,000 in bribes has been paid out by the Westcoast Transmission Company to pave the way for its franchise.
Reading the article further down I find that the names mentioned are those of my brother and myself. It says that my brother, who is the solicitor and counsel for the board in Alberta, which deals with the export of natural gas, had stopped this gentleman from answering questions before the board which was sitting, and which I shall discuss later. Then he went on to say that this fellow, C. E. Smith, was a brother of A. L. Smith who had conducted the filibuster against this particular bill in the House of Commons. I confess that this bad man is my brother. He is one of His Majesty's counsel, one of the ablest lawyers I know-[DOT] and sir, that is a plug for my firm; we are not doing so well these days since I left there, but that is what the man says. Well, I have not got the $200,000 yet. My only suggestion is that I should adopt the method of the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner) who, when he was asked about the sale of butter yesterday, gave one of those lucid and clear answers. He said that he would sell it if, as and when he could. Therefore I am going to make an assignment of my $200,000 to this Mr. Wray if, as and when I get it. I think that should satisfy him. On the other hand, sir, I am inclined to think that he should pay for the trouble and the legal fees incurred in making the assignment because although I have not got any money, and I have no hope of getting any, I do not want to be out of pocket on the $200,000 deal that I am supposed to have now.
I admit, sir, with great frankness that I have never seen $200,000, although if I stay in this house long enough, a matter of thirty or forty years, and I get the $6,000 with which we are honoured here, and I do not eat anything in the meantime and I do not pay for a house to live in, at the end of those thirty-five or forty years I may get close to the $200,000. Of course I realize I am making some assumptions there which perhaps I am not entitled to make, because if I lived that long I would be one hundred years old. In the second place, I will probably be licked at the next election that takes place in the community from which I come.
I want to pay a compliment to the hon. member for Fraser Valley (Mr. Cruickshank). He crossed the floor yesterday and came to

see me. He told me that the dispatch to which I referred had also appeared in a Vancouver paper. The compliment I wish to pay him is this, and I assure you, sir, it is true. With his innate modesty, and his studied generosity, he did not ask me for quite all of it. Therefore I pay him that compliment.
Strange as it may seem, through circumstances over which I have no control, this vile thing may possibly come to a vote in this House of Commons. Therefore I want to state-and I hope for the last time-why I think this bill should be defeated. This is one time when all hon. members from Alberta and British Columbia should tell us why, for example, we have had no one from the province of British Columbia on the government side, with the exception of the hon. member for Fraser Valley, adopting a position which must be to the benefit of both those western provinces. They could do it in a moment or two. In case this may be my last effort I want to explain to you, sir, and to the house, why I take this position, and why I think anyone taking any other position owes to you and to this house an explanation of that position.
When I opened a week ago I said I hoped I would not be repetitive in what I shall say on this matter. Therefore I shall try to confine myself to developments since last I spoke in this House of Commons on this same matter. I say that because the bill we have before us now is exactly the same bill with which we dealt last year, although the incorporators are different. I notice that in the meantime they have been joined by Mr. Austin Taylor and Mr. H. R. MacMillan of Vancouver, perhaps the two wealthiest men out there. There are only four. I wonder why the promoters did not get my old friends Tammy Hamber and Ronnie Graham into the picture too, because I think the four of them own almost everything that is loose in those western provinces of ours. I have no doubt that that was done in order to give a little Canadian colour to this vicious steal which is attempted to be perpetrated upon the people of western Canada.
I am indebted to the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre (Mr. Maybank) for his frankness-and I do not limit that to this occasion alone for, in my short experience, he has always been frank in this so-called deliberative assembly. I use the word "deliberative" because it implies that members of the House of Commons hear certain facts and from those draw certain conclusions. On the conclusions they have drawn they then vote.
There are many funny fables published in this world, but the one I have just given I think takes first place. My name is not
7, 1950	537
Alberta Natural Gas Company Aesop, but his fables were much simpler than mine and were absorbed only by gullible people. Here of course there are no gullible people. We all form our judgment on the facts as they are presented to us. With his usual frankness the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre, when I asked him where this line was going, said he did not know.


Mr. Maybank:: That is right.


Arthur Leroy Smith: And for the
second time he has confirmed it-which simplifies the problem with which members of the House of Commons are dealing. It is not a government measure, and I emphasize that, but rather a private bill.
Since we were here last we have heard much about certain steps which must be taken to export gas from Alberta to Vancouver over various routes, one Canadian and one 80 per cent American. Since that time the gas and oil conservation board in Alberta has been sitting. They adjourned a couple of weeks ago until April 3, the reason being that under our act all the members of the legislature must be notified of a sitting of the board in order that they may attend. However, the legislature having been called together in the meantime, these gentlemen could not' attend, so that the adjournment was made until such time as it was presumed the legislature would cease to sit in that province.
Many things happened there. Let me say first that the progenitors, if I may so describe them, of the present bill were there at all times. They are very charming people. I met them socially on occasions, and found their habits were very much the same as mine. We got along rather well together. Mr. Dixon was there, who I believe is the deus ex machina, and Mr. Logan, a New York lawyer for whose ability I formed a very high opinion. They were represented by a Canadian lawyer, Mr. H. G. Nolan, who has many letters after his name and is well known to this government, having rendered great service here in Ottawa throughout the period of the war as adjutant-general to our forces.
So that these poor boys were not little lads away from home who were being run on by these rough Canadians, or anything of that nature. They were there and heard what I heard-and a great deal more, because I attended only occasionally. I visited the west coast and was snowed in for eight days in that evergreen playground of Canada. I simply could not get out because there was no way of getting out. The hon. member for Nanaimo (Mr. Pearkes) points out to me that I could not get to the island. The reason is that the snow storms were so heavy and the
538	HOUSE OF
Alberta Natural Gas Company winds so high that nobody got to the island. As a matter of fact, most of them were blown off it.
If I may be permitted a slight deviation from our regular procedure I would point out that I heard my good friend from Kenora-Rainy River (Mr. Benidickson) say that he represented a company that would build a line in Canada if someone told them to. That is outside my comprehension, when someone wants to build a gas line, knowing it is going from here to there, which is more than the bills themselves say, and that they will build it at a certain place if the transport board tells them to. I have had a good deal to do with railway boards, and I have always found that I am asking for something. I am not asking for general powers which include expropriation of your lands and mine without telling whose lands I am going to expropriate, and in what direction, and all that sort of thing, which knowledge is completely lacking in this particular case.
The argument has been used by these New York slickers that we have got to take this through the United States, because we cannot take it through Canada. I listened out there to a number of gentlemen who belong to the firm of Ford, Bacon and Davis, the biggest engineering firm in the world. They simply said it could be done. But I was more impressed by an engineer of our own, a retired chief engineer of the board of transport commissioners, whose name at the moment escapes me. He knew the country well, had been over the ground and felt that any suggestion that this gas line has to be built across American soil is not only nonsense but completely insulting to those of us who live in the interior of British Columbia or the northern part of Alberta.
There I saw plans presented, and prepared on a basis of one-tenth of a mile. Those who have had some experience with surveys of large areas, or great distances being traversed, will find no more careful examination of terrain than on a scale of one-tenth of a mile. That is the sworn and uncontradicted testimony which was given at that time.
Then we have heard a good deal of nonsense about the length of the line, and the cost. May I say at the outset that I am not particularly concerned how much the people of Seattle, Portland, Spokane, Tacoma or Bellingham pay for gas. If they can use it cheaper than any other fuel, they will use it. But I point out this suggestion, that this mid-British Columbia line-because that is what it is-this Canadian line, means this, that anybody who is going to transport gas in quantities from Alberta to the United States market and to the Vancouver market 

must have regard to the real picture which exists. As you no doubt have read, Mr. Speaker, all recent discoveries of gas are in northern Alberta. I would ask hon. members to picture in their minds this situation: a tremendous gas field near Pincher Creek, which is practically on the United States border, not much gas in the Calgary area, and then these immense quantities in trillions of feet which have been proven around Edmonton and north. All that must be integrated. It must be one great pool upon which this export business must be able to draw.
If you just look at any map, and take a line from Pincher Creek up above and even into the Peace river district of British Columbia and into the constituency of the hon. member for Cariboo (Mr. Murray) where the gas arises, when you are talking about the length of a pipe line, it will be seen that it all depends on where you are going to tap that pool. I say this in a sense in opposition to my argument. If you are going to use in Vancouver gas which is produced in Alberta, you do not know whether that gas is coming from Pincher Creek or from four or five hundred miles north, which carries you perhaps 150 miles or so north of Edmonton. Hence these arguments about the length of pipe lines lose practically all their validity.
I am going to say something else along that line which I think favours the all-Canadian route, and it is this. One thing will be noticed about all of these bills. May I pause here to say that when we passed one of them at the first session in 1949, and I think it was a mistake, we made no proper examination of it. That is the company which today is applying to the conservation board of Alberta for the right to build a line, and that line goes over the Yellowhead, down the north Thompson into Kamloops, down the Okanagan covering Penticton and those three cities there; it goes across to Princeton and then down the Princeton-Hope highway which is already constructed into Vancouver.
I would ask you to remember this, Mr. Speaker. I am speaking now of oil, and these bills permit both oil and gas lines. Vancouver and the west coast of British Columbia, and to some extent into the interior of British Columbia, are getting their crude oil from California. It is a notorious fact that the California production is fast reaching its end. Hence we in Alberta have a real hope that we may some day supply the west coast of Canada with crude oil which will be refined there and sold as gasoline in that province.
Edmonton being the centre of oil production, and I hope some of my friends from northern Alberta will at least admit the truth

of that statement, an oil line over the Yellow-head, down the north Thompson to Kamloops, south to Princeton along the Princeton-Hope highway, is 325 miles shorter than any other route which could be taken for oil by taking it away down through Calgary, through Pincher Creek, crossing at Kingsgate and so on. You want oil as close to the refinery as you can get it. The distance is 325 miles shorter by the northern route than it is by the southern route.
I want to say this because I am a little bit disappointed in my Social Credit friends from Alberta. Their premier says there are three classes of consumers. He says first there are Albertans, and I agree with him; and that we must have proven reserves for fifty years, having regard to increase in population and all these other factors. Second, he says the oil shall be used by Canadians. These are public statements that no one can deny. Third, he says if we have gas for export, we go ahead and export it.
I pause here to ask this simple question. If this company whose bill is before us now intend to use a Canadian route, why do they not say so? This is the time to say so. This business of passing the buck to the Alberta government, to the transport board or to the Minister of Trade and Commerce (Mr. Howe) is a lot of arrant nonsense. We members are sitting here in this deliberative assembly. In this bill we are going to decide one thing: Do we want an all-Canadian route or do we not? That is all there is to be decided at the present moment. Last year I said again and again-and I am sure that some hon. members may think I had too many "again and agains"-that if a five-word amendment were made in this bill to the effect that the line be built on Canadian soil between Alberta and Vancouver, I would withdraw every opposition, that I would welcome it. I made that plain. I do so again now. Could any proposition be fairer than that?
The answer of course is plain. While the sponsor of the bill, with his great honesty and frankness, told us he did not know where it was going, I know their one intention is to take the line out of the south end of our province, through Kingsgate, Spokane and so on, leaving Vancouver on the end of a little stub line. They have their plans so prepared. There is not any question about it. I will say that outside if there is any question of liability. I know where it is going. It is going out the south end to serve the United States, and the rest of western Canada be damned. That is the bill that we are likely to vote on. I think this will come to a vote. I say that because I am not in complete control of whether it will or not. But if these men
7. 1950	539
.Alberta Natural Gas Company behind this business will in their bill come out for an all-Canadian route, I will vote for it with both hands.


Mr. Cruickshank:: Hear, hear.


Arthur Leroy Smith: You are looking at me, Mr. Speaker; but I also noted my time.
I will accept your calculation, of course; you are so accustomed to race tracks and that sort of thing, yours will be exact. Are you suggesting that my time is up?


Mr. Speaker:: I had not suggested it, but it will be up shortly.


Arthur Leroy Smith: I have apparently been given second sight or something of the kind; because I looked at the Speaker a moment ago and the expression I saw in his eye was not friendly toward my continuing my discourse, although he did not say one single word about it.
At this time I am not going to ask for any indulgence from the House of Commons, but I want finally to make this plain. Here we are sitting in this chamber. We were sent down here. Nobody needed to twist our arms to get us to come. We came down here to represent the people at home and also to represent the interests of the Dominion of Canada. This is a time when every Alberta member and every British Columbia member should stand up in order that he may be counted. On what? Does he favour an allCanadian route or does he want to go outside Canada by way of Kingsgate? Let us have no nonsense about the thing. That is the simple proposition on which we shall vote.


An hon. Member:: Time.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I will inform the hon. member, or any other hon. member who may have the floor at any time, when his time has expired.


Arthur Leroy Smith: I think the voice I heard must have been that of a distant relative of yours, Mr. Speaker, because I thought it was your voice just a moment ago. We come to this simple proposition. I want to answer the silent attitude of my Social Credit friends who received a telegram from Mr. Manning, their excellent premier in Alberta, saying that he would like to see lots of companies incorporated in order that they might make the best deal they could. The government of Alberta has not a choice between A, B and C of saying to them, "Will you produce this gas for so much money?" There is only going to be one pipe line, a monopoly, if you like. There are lots of monopolies. The government of Alberta has a whisky monopoly and they do not fail to get a profit from it- $10,300,000 from that sparsely populated area last year. The situation is just this. The
540	HOUSE OF
Alberta Natural Gas Company Alberta government, through its public utilities board, controls the sale price of gas in that province. It controls the charges that are made with reference to the pipe lines in existence today, and it has been doing so for years from the Turner valley into the city of Calgary. Imperial Oil bring oil from the Turner valley to their refinery in Calgary. It is a common carrier and the price is fixed by that board. There have been no complaints about it.
Therefore it is not a question of holding an auction sale and saying, "What do you bid?" It does not make one five cent's worth of difference to the government of Alberta. The premier of Alberta is one of the finest men I have ever known and one of the ablest, but I do not think he has given this question the consideration which he might have given to so important a matter if he had had more time. I have glanced at the Speaker and he will not need to rise. I have not finished what I intended to say. Therefore I am glad that I did not give you an undertaking that I would not speak again. There is another chapter, and when I have recited it I am sure hon. members from Alberta and British Columbia will stand up and be counted at the appropriate time in the history of this parliament.


Mr. J. L. MacDougall (Vancouver-Burrard):: Mr. Speaker, on October 28 last I addressed ' the house when we were considering this bill. Since then I have heard a great many speeches both last session and this on the subject of pipe lines and natural gas and oil.
I must confess, however, that very few of them have shed much light upon the problem, and very few of them have taken into account the exact nature of the matter which we have to decide.
This bill, Mr. Speaker, is an application to parliament pursuant to the Pipe Lines Act to incorporate a company. The purpose of the company is to build a pipe line for the transportation of natural gas. The application is made to parliament because the laws of Canada require parliament to grant the kind of charter which this company now seeks. A charter granted by any other authority than parliament would not enable the company to do the work it proposes.
The bill does not authorize the building of a pipe line. Even if a charter is granted to the company there is no assurance whatsoever that it will ever build a line. It would be impractical for it to do so without first having a permit from the government of Alberta to remove gas from that province. It would also require the assurance of an export permit from the Department of Trade and Commerce before it could export any gas


from Canada. To serve markets outside Alberta, and assuming that these markets are in other provinces of Canada as well as in the United States, a company requires both these permits. I think we are entitled to assume that before permits are granted by the authorities concerned the interests of the citizens of Alberta and of Canada as a whole will be protected. I have said that the house does not issue permits, and I would emphasize again the fact that the passing of the bill does not imply that any permit will issue.
I have also said that the measure does not authorize the building of a pipe line. If hon. members will look at the Pipe Lines Act, which was passed in the spring session of parliament of 1949, they will see that before a pipe line can be built the company must secure from the board of transport commissioners permission to build it. Section 11 of that act provides in part:
A company shall not . . . begin the construction of a section or part of a company pipe line, until, (a) the board has by order granted the company leave to construct the line.


George Alexander Cruickshank: I rise on a point of order, and it is something in which I am rather interested. Is it permissible to read speeches in the house?


Some hon. Members:: Oh, oh.


Mr. Speaker:: I understand that at the present time the hon. member for Vancouver-Burrard (Mr. MacDougall) is quoting a section of an act.


John Lorne MacDougall: I continue to read the provisions of section 11:
(a)	the board has by order granted the company leave to construct the line.
(b)	the plan, profile and book of reference of the section or part of the proposed line have been approved by the board.
In his speech on February 28 last the hon. member for Calgary West (Mr. Smith) is reported as having asked the sponsor of the bill the question-


Mr. Lennard:: You are not quoting the act now.


John Lorne MacDougall: -"Where is this line being built?" The hon. member who replied as the sponsor of the bill definitely told him that he did not know, which was quite true. No one in the house knows where this or any other line is going to be built.


George Alexander Cruickshank: Oh, that is nonsense.


Mr. Speaker:: Order.


George Alexander Cruickshank: There is no statute about that.


John Lorne MacDougall: I believe the hon. member for Calgary West did not place the proper interpretation upon the answer of the sponsor of the bill.


Arthur Leroy Smith: Well, if I have misinterpreted anybody I should like to know about it.


John Lorne MacDougall: The fact of the matter is that no one can say where this pipe line is going to be built. At the moment the company is doing nothing more than seeking incorporation. If it does not get a charter, it must get its permit to export gas from Alberta. Then it must get approval for construction of the pipe line from the board of transport commissioners. No one can say in advance where the board of transport commissioners will direct the pipe line to be built. Subsection 3 of section 12 of the Pipe Lines Act contains this provision:
Upon the application, the board shall have regard to all considerations that appear to it to be relevant and in particular to the objection of any party interested, to a public interest that in the board's opinion may be affected by the granting or the refusing of the application, and to the financial responsibility of the applicant.
Hon. members will note that under this section the board of transport commissioners must consider any public interest which may be affected by the granting or refusing of an application to build a pipe line. Certainly the question of route is a factor which affects the interests of the general public. A route over rough terrain which is impossible to maintain without incurring enormous expense means that the consumer must pay a higher price for his gas. This would not only affect the consumer in Alberta; it would affect every British Columbia consumer as well. If the cost of building a pipe line is increased by several million dollars by reason of the choice of the route, then definitely that is going to be a cost factor to every consumer who utilizes the gas put through that pipe line.
From a perusal of this section hon. members will further realize that the board is required to listen to the objection of any party interested. In view of the many speeches that have been made in this house on the subject of the route of the pipe line, it is obvious that many hon. members are interested in the matter of the route; but I put it to the house, Mr. Speaker, that this is not the place to debate what route a line should follow. By passing this section pf the Pipe Lines Act, parliament has said that the board of transport commissioners will decide where the pipe line shall go. I should think it would be proper on a point of order for you, Mr. Speaker, to declare out of order any further discussion on the question of route on the ground that this is not a matter with which parliament can now deal.
Many hon. members have stated that they would approve this bill if it contained a section providing for an all-Canadian route. If
Alberta Natural Gas Company such a section were included in the bill the functions of the board of transport commissioners would be usurped. Suppose for the sake of argument that this bill should provide for a route to Vancouver entirely over Canadian territory, before any line is built into the United States; and suppose that with such a proviso the company applied to the board of transport commissioners for approval of its route and the board decided that the route in question would not best serve the interests of the Canadian public. In that case it is quite obvious that the board would not be able to deal with the company until its charter was amended.


George Alexander Cruickshank: What statute are you reading from?


John Lorne MacDougall: Mr. Speaker, I must say that a week ago tonight I was not so rude as to interrupt the hon. member for Fraser Valley (Mr. Cruickshank) or any other hon. member.


Mr. Speaker:: Order. I think I should point out that all interruptions are not necessarily rude, so I would ask the hon. member to withdraw the implication of that remark.


John Lorne MacDougall: I withdraw with pleasure. When I addressed the house on October 28 last I also said I wanted the interests of Canadian consumers to be protected. I want Canadians to have first call on this natural gas, and in particular I want citizens of British Columbia, more particularly those of greater Vancouver, to have a call upon the gas before a call can be made on behalf of citizens of the United States. I believe that can be accomplished by the authorities who grant export permits; and that these authorities, both in Edmonton and in Ottawa, will see to it that this is done. I said also at that time that I hold no brief for any company in particular, but I am against the creation of a monopoly on behalf of any company already incorporated, through the refusal by parliament of this or any other application.
I say further that we in this parliament are looked upon as a democratic and eminently fair body. I believe that the people behind the Alberta Natural Gas Company have relied upon our fairness in coming back at this time. In doing so they have incurred additional expense. I understand it has cost them several thousand dollars extra just to advertise in the newspapers of this country their intention to make this further application to parliament. If they were not sure of our fairness of mind, and if they were not sure of their ability to serve the interests of the Canadian public, they would not have come back.

Alberta Natural Gas Company
Now I should like to quote a few sentences from the oldest publication in British Columbia. This article appeared in the Columbian of New Westminster only last week:
Large scale discussion of the great Alberta reserves of natural gas and the chances of exporting some of that valuable fuel to consumers in British Columbia has come out of the pipe line hearings in Calgary recently. And with the discussion some new facts have come to light.
To those close to the subject it might not be new, but to the B.C. citizen who just wants to see Alberta gas piped in to this province, it is interesting to note one fact on which everyone apparently agrees. Piping natural gas from Alberta to the coast is not going to be economically possible for anyone unless they also pipe some of the gas into the more populous area south of the border, the state of Washington. It may wound our provincial pride a bit, but we'd do better to accept this fact for what it is, the key to our own chances for getting Alberta gas.
So, Mr. Speaker, for the various reasons I have already enumerated, in order that this debate may be brought to an early conclusion I move, seconded by the hon. member for Burnaby-Richmond (Mr. Goode):
That this question be now put.


Mr. O. L. Jones (Yale):: Mr. Speaker, I feel I would be remiss in my duty if I did not enter into a discussion of this particular bill, on behalf of the people I represent in British Columbia. The last speaker put the controversy in a nutshell, when he said that no one knows where this pipe line is going to go. The trouble is that no one knows, and no one seems to care, providing the bill passes. We in British Columbia want to know, and we do care. It is for that reason I am speaking tonight.
Our objection to this pipe line going directly to the United States is the same as that expressed at the last session. On that occasion, we expressed the opinion that the pipe line would go directly to Spokane, and thence across country to Seattle and Tacoma. That has not been denied, nor has a good case been put up by the other side refuting our claim that this would be to the detriment of the province of British Columbia. The absence of that denial indicates to me that our claims are correct. In speaking against this bill, I want to make it quite clear that I cast no reflection on the company or the personnel forming the company. I have heard of most of them, but I do not know them. So far as I know, they are just the usual company whose motive is profit, and in order to get the most profit they want to get to the biggest market in the cheapest possible way, disregarding the people of British Columbia as well as the people of Alberta, who have a great stake in what is to be done with this natural resource.
[Mr. MacDougall.l
Not only does this application before us tonight ignore all the suggestions we have made, but I believe it ignores the expressed views of this house. I know that one group has been quite silent, but possibly some of them agree with our point of view. I can assure you that until the clause for which we have asked is inserted in the bill, to the effect that the pipe line will follow a Canadian route, we will continue to raise our objections.
Public opinion in British Columbia is really aroused about this issue. I think I can do no better than to read to you an editorial which appeared in the Vancouver Sun on the third of this month. The Vancouver Sun has the largest circulation of any paper in our province. I believe it is Liberal in its politics, and would naturally try to indicate to the British Columbia Liberal members the course that they should follow. The editorial reads as follows:
Ordinarily we'd be ashamed of the spectacle of a filibuster in which MP's waste the time that Canada's parliament might usefully devote to other issues.
But in the case of the filibuster now under way at Ottawa, under leadership of George Cruickshank of Fraser Valley and A. L. Smith of Calgary West, we are merely ashamed of the necessity for it.
These members believe that desperate situations require desperate remedies. They are struggling, in the only way open to them, to hold the line against American interests which seek to siphon off the petroleum resources of Alberta to the detriment of British Columbia.
So Mr. Cruickshank and his associates are trying to block the incorporation bills of these American companies.
The issue is whether surplus gas from Alberta shall be piped to Pacific coast markets through British Columbia or directly south into the United States. One company already incorporated has undertaken to route its pipe line through the interior of British Columbia. The other applicants will give no such undertaking. There is every reason to suspect that they have no such intention. Apparently the majority of MP's-other than Mr. Cruickshank and his group-don't care.
The matter is vital to the development of British Columbia. The outcome will strongly influence our economic future. With so much at stake, we wish to convey sincere thanks to the filibustered and1 to wish them all the strength and volubility that may be necessary to thwart a major economic injustice.
That, Mr. Speaker, is the view of the Vancouver Sun, and it expresses quite well the view of the people of British Columbia regarding this particular bill. In common with the editorial writer, I believe we should not waste the time of the house in discussing this bill. Unfortunately, there is no other way in which we can stop such a bill passing than by talking it out. We are quite willing to discuss it, or to have the other side come forward and give logical reasons why they are unable to take the pipe line through British Columbia. So far, I have not heard any reason. I have before me a report, but

I shall not read it at the moment, indicating the feasibility of taking the pipe line through the Cariboo to Vancouver.
I should like to draw to the attention of the members the fact that we are dealing with possibly the last great pool of oil on the North American continent. When I read the newspapers, I sometimes feel that we are developing it rather irresponsibly, like a bunch of drunken sailors. I am glad to note that the government of the province of Alberta has taken steps to conserve the supply of gas and oil. I sincerely hope that the provincial government will do what the government at Ottawa is obviously failing to do, and that is to conserve our natural resources for future generations. The irreplaceable nature of these resources should be appreciated. There is nothing more desolate than a worked-out area, whether it be oil, timber, or anything else. The area becomes a bunch of derelict homes, empty schools, and empty stores. There is a movement of people away from the area.
We have not taken a great deal of interest in the conservation of our natural resources. I thank the province of Alberta for having filled the gap with proper conservation measures. The resources of that province can be responsible for a high degree of prosperity for over a hundred years to come; but, at the present rate of consumption, I doubt if they will last more than 30 to 50 years. It is true that great wealth can be accumulated, and great use can be made of these natural resources before they peter out. Those of you who remember what happened in the Turner valley and in California, where the natural resources were exploited without any conservation measures, will look with dread at the indifference of our government in allowing the products of our wells to be siphoned off to the United States.
It being nine o'clock, Mr. Speaker, I should like to move the adjournment of the debate.
Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.


Mr. Speaker:: The hour reserved for private and public bills having expired, the house will resume the business that was interrupted at six o'clock.



BUSINESS OF THE HOUSE


Hon. Alphonse Fournier (Minister of Public Works):: Before resuming the business which was interrupted by the six o'clock recess, Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a suggestion to the house, which is less contentious than the subject we have been discussing for the last hour. Last night, when I announced the
Business of the House business of the house for today, I mentioned that some time during the day we would move to go into supply to call two departments, transport and finance. I gave as my reason for doing so that on Friday many members had asked for a discussion under the first item of the Department of Transport. At that time, we thought we would try to meet the wishes of those members. The other reason is, if we carry the motion to refer the estimates of external affairs to the committee on external affairs there will be only two departments left that we can discuss on Friday, and I am not too sure that I could have the two interested ministers here on that date. Therefore, what I would wish to ask the house right now is to move to go into supply and to call these two departments. Necessarily, if there were discussion on the motion I would withdraw it immediately, because I would not even think of carrying it through. We would rather continue with external affairs.
If we cannot move tonight, and this is the last day this week that we can move to go into supply formally, the position will be that I do not know exactly what estimates we can take up. If it were the unanimous consent of the house to adopt this motion I would ask the hon. member for Temiscouata (Mr. Pouliot) whether he would adjourn the debate on the motion to refer the estimates of external affairs to the committee on external affairs.


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, no matter how much anyone might wish to accommodate those who desire to follow a particular course, there is a debate before the house at the moment, and it can only be disposed of by a motion to adjourn. No one is in a position to state what will happen in regard to another debate when we have not even disposed of the debate that is now before us.
I would suggest that there is only one course that can be adopted, namely, for the decision to be made as to which course is to be followed and the motion made appropriately.


Alphonse Fournier: Mr. Speaker, just to explain, I have mentioned that the hon. member for Temiscouata has assured me that he would be ready to move the adjournment of the debate on this motion of the Secretary of State for External Affairs; but I would not request that unless I had the assurance that there would be no debate on the motion to go into supply. I have the assurance of certain groups that they will not discuss this motion. I know that if the leader of the opposition would just throw a kindly word to his supporters I would have no difficulty in that direction.

External Affairs


George Alexander Drew: Mr. Speaker, the very suggestion that has now been made is a child of events of the first day. At that time there was an indication of an intention to depart from the established rules of this house. Since then we have been seeing one effort after another made to keep the procedure in this house in some sort of order, as a result of the confusion which followed that original step. The rules have been long established and for a definite reason. It is only because of the departure from those rules that a suggestion of this kind presents itself. I am not in a position to give, nor do I intend to give any undertaking or to make any suggestion as to what any member does. It is for the member who is speaking to determine whether he proposes to proceed, or if he does not, to move the adjournment.


Alphonse Fournier: Mr. Speaker, this is really as contentious as the pipe lines bill, and I will not move to go into supply.


EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Pearson for reference of certain estimates to the standing committee on external affairs.
Jean-François Pouliot: Following what was said before six o'clock, the hon. member for Lethbridge (Mr. Black-more) was in order in discussing trade under external affairs, because the consuls and the trade commissioners are under the Department of External Affairs. In my humble view, all those who are connected with the development of our trade should be under the direct supervision and control of the Department of Trade and Commerce, and it would simplify the work of the Secretary of State for External Affairs.
When the house took recess I had just reached a point where I was saying a word about Professor Lauterpacht. Did it not come to the mind of the leader of the opposition that the opinion expressed by that gentleman was in line with the external policy of the United States government? I am not imputing motives to anyone, but I would not be surprised at all if Mr. Acheson had asked that professor to give some elaborate opinion against the recognition of China, just to serve his own political purposes. I do not know Mr. Acheson; I do not know the professor; but I presume that the thing might have happened, and it is of the order of possibility.
Since my hon. friend, the leader of the opposition, was gracious enough to insist on the continuation of the debate, at this point

I should like to be useful to him. I shall tell him that not today but Friday I was greatly surprised when he spoke as he did, although he made a very fine speech. Before the last election he was rather dogmatic, but since then he has become academic, and I like him that way. He and I are in the same position. Neither of us is a member of the committee on external affairs. The leaders of the other groups, the leader of the C.C.F. group (Mr. Coldwell), and the leader of the Social Credit group (Mr. Low), are members of the committee on external affairs. Therefore when that committee sits, the members will have the opportunity to express their personal opinions as well as those of their respective groups.
When the estimates of the department were called on Friday the first item was the administration of the department. I was really surprised that the leader of the opposition did not give his views and those of his party on the estimates as they are. Sometimes they complain about high taxes. There are some increases and decreases in the estimates. It would have been most interesting to have had his views and those of his party on these matters. They meet every morning in caucus. I am not in a position to say that the conclusion of their caucuses is collective truth or collective wisdom or collective error. I will not go so far as to say that. I give everybody the benefit of the doubt. But if he had said, for instance, "There is an increase of over $91,000 for departmental administration; what is that for?"-he could have asked that question. He did not do so. Then there is a decrease of $708,571 for representation abroad. Why that drop? Why that decrease in the amount? These would have been interesting questions, and the genial Secretary of State for External Affairs would have been only too pleased to inform the leader of the opposition and the committee about it.
There are other matters. I shall bring item 71 to the attention of the leader of the opposition. There is an item of $7,500 for the chairman of the Canadian section of the Canada-United States permanent joint board on defence. That is an interesting matter. Who is the gentleman to be selected? Why is he to be paid now when nobody was paid before? He might have asked that question. I am trying to help him. The minister would have answered, and we would not have had to wait for weeks before receiving the answer. I speak as one who has an interest in external affairs and who receives no secret information. I cannot complain about the fact that the minister does not give special information to the leader of the opposition. He has no right to get more information than any private

member in the house. One of my complaints in the last parliament was that when the former prime minister was secretary of state for external affairs he took the leaders of the opposition into his confidence more than he did any of his supporters. I remember he was telling secrets to Mr. Hanson, and to my friend Mr. Graydon, but none of his supporters knew anything about the inner workings of external affairs policy.
Now it is different, and I am glad the leader of the opposition has complained about it because I believe it is a sound policy that he should not have more information than is given to those who support the government. Why should he be given secrets? It would be impossible for the government to give him secrets, because the ministers are bound not to tell what happens in council before policies are enunciated in the house. If a minister were to take the leader of the opposition into his confidence and to tell him what happened behind closed doors in the east block, he would be betraying his oath.
The leader of the opposition has had enough experience as leader of his party and as the premier of his province to know that. Another thing I wish to tell him, and I may hurt his modesty in doing so, is that I cannot conceive why he has quoted with such gusto from Mr. Eden. Mr. Eden is no more than I am; he is a member of parliament. He was more before when he was foreign secretary.
The leader of the opposition occupies a position of trust. His party has appointed him leader, and he now stands as leader of the great Progressive Conservative party. Therefore he is much more in the commonwealth than Mr. Eden could be. Besides that, I give him credit that when he speaks in the house I am sure he is in earnest, and would not have the same motives as Mr. Eden had when he made his statement. Therefore it is not for the leader of the opposition to quote Mr. Eden; it would be for Mr. Eden to quote the leader of the opposition. That is clear; no one could object to that.
We have heard a good deal about the recognition of China and about a pact on the Pacific along the lines of the Atlantic pact. The leader of the opposition makes fine speeches outside the House of Commons.


Some hon. Members:: Hear, hear.


Jean-François Pouliot: It is better to wait until I have finished before applauding. He makes fine speeches. He spoke the other day to the Dominion United Church men's association in the church hall, and referred to the Atlantic treaty and what it should mean to us. The Atlantic treaty was a good thing and, may I add, was sponsored by the Prime Minister 55946-35
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(Mr. St. Laurent). As there was a failure in what happened at San Francisco, because of veto, and the required unanimity of the United Nations on important matters, it became necessary for those who believe alike to join together and to present a united front for the defence of democracy.
I understand it that way. As the leader of the opposition knows very well, it was the Prime Minister who made that move, which found a response in many countries of the world. Now we have the Atlantic treaty signed by many nations who seek peace.
The leader of the opposition referred to a Pacific pact. Would he sign such a pact if he were secretary of state for external affairs or prime minister of Canada? For instance, would he sign a pact with Japan at the present time? A couple of weeks ago some representatives from Japan came here. They belong to the liberal-minded people of Japan, were well received here, and I believe it was a good thing that they came.
Our minds turn to Australia, a country which is doing well at the present time. New Zealand is in a similar position. A short time ago Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India, addressed us in this chamber, and was received with all the honours due him. If there is no pact between Canada and those countries it does not mean that they are not friendly with us-far from it. In addition to India, Pakistan, Australia and New Zealand, there is China. I shall not remind the leader of the opposition of what I have said in the house on other occasions. Perhaps when he was not here he was engaged in other business and did not have time to read my speeches. However, some time before Madame Chiang Kai-shek came to Ottawa I mentioned in the house that all that had been done for China was completely useless because of the mandarins, the men who had exploited the Chinese people for so long.
The leader of the opposition knows that in China thousands if not millions of people die of hunger every year. Naturally those people who were suffering in China were not very enthusiastic when they saw our government and the governments of other countries supplying funds, arms and other materials to Chiang Kai-shek, because they knew that those around Chiang Kai-shek were enriching themselves with that which was to have been given to the poor people. That is a well-known fact. It is not necessary to read all the books that have been published about China. Everyone knows the facts-and those are the facts.
Therefore there was a feeling against the Chiang regime, and the Soongs and all the other exploiters of China. That was the


[Stage Direction]
External Affairs
beginning of the revolution. It is because Mao appealed to them and represented them that he overturned the regime. Now Chiang is in Formosa. The name "Formosa" means beautiful-and it is a beautiful island. Next to it is Hainan. But what are the populations of those two islands compared to the hundreds of millions of people who live in China?- nothing at all.
In international law, just as in ordinary business, what counts is the accomplished fact. In this instance the accomplished fact is that Mao now is the acknowledged authority in China and he has signed a thirty-year pact with Russia. I hope that we shall come to real business in order that we may have peace in the world. What is the use of denouncing any country from one's seat in the House of Commons? What does it change? Where have we been since the end of hostilities? What is the news we read in the papers? It is always the same thing, with the same denunciations; and the more it changes, the more it is the same thing. Why is everybody a challenger instead of trying to come to some understanding with the other powers of the world? I do not think there are any communists here in the house. I will not say of any one of my colleagues that he is a communist. But if we are to have peace, should we work for war all the time? Should we challenge the other nations of the world, as was done the other day by the leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) and as some other members have done? If we do, we shall have here the same atmosphere that prevails among the diplomats at Lake Success, at Paris and other meetings, with the same result. I hope that, in the future, when diplomats and representatives of nations meet together, they will try to understand each other, and come to some agreement in order that war may be postponed as long as possible.
Who can speak with authority about what happens behind the iron curtain? Who knows about it? If the minister knew, I am sure that he would tell us. He does not know any more about it than we do. It is a close secret. When someone asks the minister to tell him secrets of that kind, it is pure humbug; I regret to have to say that. The discussion of such important matters of life or death for millions of Canadians should be considered more seriously, and not in a dogmatic or academic manner. It is time to put politics aside when we discuss questions of life or death for the whole Canadian people. Are we to stand aside? What can we do if we stand aside? We have the United States, which is our ally. We have the United Kingdom, which we cannot trust more than necessary after what has happened in connection

with Hong Kong. Everybody knows about it. I do not come with long quotations. I appeal to everyone, and I ask every member to recall what he has read in the press at one time and another. Everybody knows that if China has been recognized by England, it is precisely because England was afraid of losing Hong Kong. We know that.
What happened during the last war? Not long ago we read in the press that Alger Hiss had been found guilty and sent to jail because he was considered to be a traitor. He was defended by Mr. Acheson. But nevertheless Alger Hiss was the adviser of Roosevelt at Yalta and it was because of the representations of Alger Hiss that Mr. Roosevelt made so many concessions to Russia. And why was the United States government wrongly informed about the strength of Japan during the last days of hostilities? Everybody knows that; it is no news. But one feels obliged to assume a solemn tone and to look dogmatic when we discuss that matter. Mr. Roosevelt unquestionably was a great man but he had some wrong advisers. He was like the leader of the opposition in that respect. I will make a special appeal to the leader of the opposition. I will ask him to put politics aside every time such momentous problems come before the house. He can do that, and do it well. I have had great respect for him since he said that Canada is a sovereign nation. He said that last year, and I congratulated him. It was a great change from the Tory policies of the past.
I should like to mention one other thing, namely, what was said by Mr. Churchill about the representation of the United States and of Canada to France. At page 508 of Mr. Churchill's book on the second world war, entitled "Their Finest Hour" I read as follows:
At the same time it was necessary to keep in touch not only with France, but even with Vichy.
It is not a question of opinion; it is fact.
I therefore always tried to make the best of them. I was very glad when at the end of the year the United States sent an ambassador to Vichy of so much influence and character as Admiral Leahy, who was himself so close to the president. I repeatedly encouraged Mr. Mackenzie King to keep his representative, the skilful and accomplished Mr. Dupuy, at Vichy. Here at least was a window upon a courtyard to which we had no other access.
We had as representative at Vichy Mr. Dupuy who is now an ambassador of Canada somewhere else.
Mr. Fleming:: To the Netherlands.


Jean-François Pouliot: Yes, to the Netherlands. He was doing the errands of Churchill at Vichy. Canada recognized Vichy, and Vichy was recognized by the United States; it was implicitly recognized by the United Kingdom

because Mr. Dupuy was representing the United Kingdom in an official capacity at Vichy. If you ask me why I say that, my answer is that I find that some erroneous statements and declarations have been made about Marshal Petain, the head of unoccupied France during the war. He was treated just the same as if he had not been recognized by the United States, by Canada and unofficially by the United Kingdom. As those facts must be true, and I use the evidence of Winston Churchill himself, I wonder why people do not admire the old man who has done his best to save the largest possible number of lives of his countrymen? Who could have done any better than he has done to save the lives of Frenchmen who were there? It was a sacrifice for him to accept that position at his age. Not only that, but my colleague the hon. member for Bonaventure (Mr. Arsenault) the other day made a speech about de Bernonville. I do not know him. All I know about him is what has been said in the house by the hon. member for Bonaventure. Those who complain about him do not know any more than does the average citizen. It is easy to utter abominations against any man. Who are the Canadians who have died on account of de Bernonville? Why do we not have the names? Tell us who they are. It is said that Canadians have been killed on account of de Bernonville, but no name is given. What is most important, Mr. Speaker, is that he has been condemned in his absence by the court of Toulouse, and Toulouse is a city of France which is in complete control of the communists. Recently there was a seizure of arms there. We hear denunciations by the communists; and when a man is attacked by the communists, everybody is credulous enough and naive enough to say, "Let's get rid of him".
The behaviour of the former French ambassador to Canada on the question of de Bernonville was shameful. I do not know what was the matter with him but let us remember at the present time France can expect much more from Canada than Canada can expect from France.
In referring to the estimates a moment ago I thought of one thing. So far as external affairs are concerned it is not so much the Department of External Affairs which is the most important. It is the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. I congratulate the new Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Harris). He must realize the importance of the tasks that have been assigned to him by the Prime Minister of Canada (Mr. St. Laurent). He must educate those who are not real Canadians, who may be good citizens but who have not in their hearts a real pride in their country, and
External Affairs
who do not yet consider Canada first when matters of importance have to be decided.
I noted what the leader of the C.C.F. group (Mr. Coldwell) said about the mentality of Anthony Eden. He said it in a discreet manner but I was in agreement with him. When I think of the progress that the Conservative party has made with regard to a Canadian spirit since the present leader of the opposition (Mr. Drew) has been at its head in the house I am surprised. I never expected that to happen, and I say that sincerely. For a time I thought the great division between the party would be on the one hand a Canadian party and on the other hand a party composed of imperialists, all those who have an inferiority complex, communists, everybody. Now I see there is progress, and I congratulate the leader of the opposition and the leader of the C.C.F. group. I see that there is some progress being made in the other corner also. Let us be Canadians; let us be proud of our race and of our great country and let us not be frightened by the false declarations that are made by some people who cannot support them.


Mr. Knowles:: No progress on your side?


Jean-François Pouliot: This is a good side; come over. As I said, this is a new era. It is a complete change, and hon. members know that very well. That is why I am prouder than ever of my party.


Mr. Johnston:: You had better be careful or you will not stay there. You will be over here again.


Jean-François Pouliot: No. I say there is progress, and no one is more blind than he who will not see.


Stanley Howard Knowles: The hon. member ought to know.


Jean-François Pouliot: The hon. member for Bow River (Mr. Johnston) is too clever, too bright, and has too much experience in politics to deny it. He would not deny evidence. I will not insist on it. I am just about finished. I rely on the spirit of justice, patriotism, dignity and pride of the new incumbent of the office of Minister of Citizenship and Immigration not to do something that he would regret all his life. I thank you, Mr. Speaker, and I thank the house for having been so kind to me once more.


Mr. L. T. Stick (Trinity-Conception):: Mr. Speaker, it may be a task for a new member of the house to address this gathering on the question of external affairs. Much has been said about the eastern situation during this debate. The complaint has been made that we do not receive sufficient information on foreign affairs so that we may intelligently debate the issue. At first sight we may be in

External Affairs
agreement with that statement. I take the view that today foreign affairs are so important that we should consider having a united foreign policy supported by all members of the house so that there will be no contention among us as to what our policy should be either in the east or in the west in the interests of the maintenance of peace.
As a member of the committee on external affairs, I am in agreement with the chairman, the hon. member for Cochrane (Mr. Bradette), when he intimated on Friday night that he could not be responsible for receiving confidential information from the department without proper safeguards having been made. As I understand it, one of my duties in the house is to safeguard the safety of the nation. Much as I might desire more information on external affairs, I agree with the statement of the hon. member for Cochrane, and I am not prepared to receive such information if by any chance it might get into enemy hands and thus endanger the state. In view of what has happened in the past in Canada so far as espionage is concerned, and in view of recent world events, I take the view that we cannot be too careful about what information is given in this respect. We have had the spectacle of the Alger Hiss trial in the United States. In recent weeks we have had the spectacle of Dr. Fuchs in London. Lo and behold, we now have a secretary for war in England who a few years ago had communist leanings. Where are we going? Whither are we tending?
The communist peril is a serious question for Canada and the whole world, and we will do no good unless we recognize it for what it is. I should like to quote an article from the New York Times of February 12, 1950, which may open the eyes of some members of the house as to where we stand on the question of eastern policy, and where the great nation to the south of us stands. It may open their eyes to the peril in which we both stand from communist activities in the world. The article is written by Arthur Krock, political correspondent of the New York Times in Washington, who is commonly known as the dean of the correspondents there and as the pundit. He writes as follows:
The president, and1 secretary of state Acheson, reviewing the bases of American foreign policy in the light of recent and dynamic events, said in substance this week:	The United States cannot do
business with Soviet Russia (just as it could not do business with Hitler) except where a set of facts creates entrenched realities that force the Kremlin to adjust its aggressive policies downward. This happened and was proved in Berlin, Greece, Turkey and Iran; and all our efforts are to be directed toward increasing the number of such areas in the world.
To which important democrats as well as republicans in congress, some of whose demands for
[Mr. Stick.!
affirmative policy produced the executive statements, responded about as follows: You reject the concrete proposal by Senator Brien McMahon that a new approach be made to the problem, offering $50 billion in gifts and loans over ten years to nations everywhere, including Russia, in exchange for effective suppression of atomic weapons. You say experience has demonstrated the futility of attaining such an agreement with Russia, or of Russian adherence to any agreements that could be made.
By the same reasoning you reject the concrete proposal by Senator Millard E. Tyddngs that a general disarmament conference be attempted.
On the ground that the moral commitment of this government makes it dishonourable as well as self-defeating to diminish or abolish the sovereignty of the Chinese nationalist regime on Formosa, you decline at least one hopeful opportunity to confine the international communists to the territory which they have now acquired in Asia.
Now I should like to mention the situation in the state department in Washington, as it is set out in this same newspaper:
In other executive departments and at the capitol, however, nerves show signs of high tension. This correspondent does not attribute that to panic in any degree or to lack of any of the items in Mr. Acheson's formula. Many of the president's subexecutives are frankly worried over security, not only with respect to atomic secrets but with reference to general fifth-column activities in the government itself.
One such official told this correspondent he felt certain there was such a column at work in the department where his jurisdiction is just short of the top, but that he was still unable to bring persuasion for forceful purging. Another said he would be uneasy over the successful execution of any foreign policy, however sound and strong, until "five or six individuals" are removed from a very important government office indeed.
Then I should like to quote a dispatch from the New York Times correspondent in Paris:
The United States' attitude is that there is no use beginning once again an exchange of words when it is clear that the Soviet union has no intention of implementing them by actions. Premier Stalin himself once said:
"Institutions and systems are not changed by words-they are changed by natural causes."
The "natural causes" which appear to be predominant in the minds of the Soviet politburo belie the "words" of amity. The U.S.S.R. is pressing a cold war against the United States and its friends. Until such deliberate hostility ceases, mere "words" can be of no avail.
We have heard a great deal said in this chamber about peace, from a humanitarian standpoint; and we all agree with what has been said and the way it was said. We all desire peace; we desire it now more than ever. But we must be realistic about this peace, and I contend that Canada must speak with a united voice. If she speaks with a divided voice advantage will be taken of that fact. If we are not united, no matter what policy we adopt it will not contribute to the peace of the world.
Much has been said of an eastern policy for Canada. I served in the east for two

years, and I know what rioting there is like. I know what a wrong policy adopted by the western nations can mean to the east. The late President Wilson adopted a policy of self determination for all people. It was a high-sounding policy; and how was it received in the east? That news went through the bazaars like wildfire, and they interpreted it to mean that they could do as they liked, that they could disregard law and order. That was the way they acted, and troops had to be called in.
We do not understand the eastern mind. We in the west have developed the material or practical side of life, while the people of the east have developed the abstract or mystical side. If we think we can adopt a policy here, with our western ideas, without fully understanding the eastern mind, we shall fail and fail badly. Let me give just one simple illustration. A carpenter in Canada saws from the top down. A. carpenter in the east saws from the bottom up. In other words they view life from the opposite standpoint, and we must understand their point of view; we must understand their civilization, their religion, their social problems, if any policy we adopt is to be successful.
I was in India when the London Times came out with a policy to which, on the face of it, every man in the western world could subscribe; but if that policy had been adopted in India it would have led to untold trouble, and we who lived there knew it. I was through the riots in India. I was through Delhi, Amritsar and Lahore shortly after those riots took place, and I know how bad they were. I know how serious the eastern problem is, and I believe that any policy Canada adopts must be undertaken with a thorough knowledge of the eastern mind. One reason the Russian policy has been so successful in the east is that the Russians are half oriental themselves, and understand the eastern mind.
We have a situation in China which is not clear. We have a communist government, but we have the two islands of Hainan and Formosa held by the nationalist forces. The problem before us today is what to do about those islands. If we support the nationalist forces in China we will be accused of meddling in the internal affairs of that country, because Formosa was ceded to the Chinese republic after the war. If we decide to support the nationalist forces there it will mean that we will have to supply them with munitions and money to carry on the struggle. The best military advice in the world today is that Formosa cannot be held by the nationalists once the Chinese communists re-arm and reorganize their air force with Russian help.
External Affairs If that situation arises, Formosa cannot be held.
What do we do then? Do we send men and munitions to hold it? And if we decide on such a policy will the people of Canada and the United States back us up? If we do not support the nationalists and Formosa becomes communist territory, it will provide a springboard for communist propaganda and infiltration in the Philippines and the eastern islands. I do not know the answer, but there is the problem. I agree with the leader of the opposition when he asks for caution, and for time to be taken in order that consideration may be given all these matters.
We have more or less the same problem in Indo-China. We are fighting a guerrilla war against communism in the Federated Malay States. We have Siam not knowing which side of the fence to stay on. She has 30,000 communist troops within her borders, and she is afraid that if she disarms and interns them she will become unfriendly with the communist regime in China. Like so many of the weak states in the east, she is sitting on the fence waiting to see which way the wind will blow. We have chaos in Burma, and a situation in India which requires careful consideration.
How many men in this house know how India is composed? When we speak of Canada we think of it as one nation; but when we speak of India we must think of it as a conglomeration of peoples. In India and Pakistan over three hundred dialects are spoken. There is more difference between a Mahratta and a Sikh than between a Frenchman and a German. There is a greater difference between a Bengali, a Rajput, a Tamil and a Punjabi. How is Mr. Nehru going to bring all these people together?
He has our sympathy. He spoke here, and he, received a grand welcome. Mr. Nehru has a problem which is colossal in the extreme, and just as complex. The United Nations decided they would send a mission to settle the Kashmiri dispute. They are trying to settle it according to western ideas. They said, "We shall take a plebiscite, and let the people decide for themselves." This mission has been there for many months, but no plebiscite has taken place as yet. Kashmiri is a thorn in the flesh of India. If this question is not settled promptly, it may well lead to civil war between Pakistan and Hindustan. You have a situation there which is fraught with great peril. If we can help Mr. Nehru and the Indians to solve this problem, by all means let us do it.
India is the bastion of democracy, such as it is, against the communist influence filtering down from Afghanistan through the Khyber

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pass. We must support Mr. Nehru in any move he makes to keep the communist influence out of that part of Asia, because if it gets down there it will spread further.
Much has been said here about peace in the world. I have dreams about the peace of the world. Last fall the Prime Minister made a statement that war was not imminent. His statement was received with a great deal of relief by all the members of this house. The Prime Minister cannot guarantee future peace, nor can anyone else. As the article in the New York Times states, that has been demonstrated time and time again. The holding of conference after conference and getting nowhere is not the way to peace. What are Russia's intentions in the world? Hitler wrote a book called "Mein Kampf", in which he set out the plans he intended to carry out. When people read that book, no one would believe he would be foolish enough to tell us what he was going to do, and then do it. But he tried to do it. Lenin has written that communism and the Christian ideology cannot exist side by side on this earth; one must go. We would do well to believe that, whatever policy Russia has, and however she may trim her sails to suit this mood and that mood, the basic principle of communism is that Christianity must be destroyed or communism will be destroyed. We have to face that fact. To sign pacts with people for whom the ten commandments and the sermon on the mount have no meaning is useless. They can but be binding on us, and they will not be binding on them.
If we call a conference now at the higher level, and trust them, we shall be sadly left. The only language they understand is the language of force. This nation, and all the other democratic nations, must be strong; strong to resist aggression and show these people in the Kremlin that if they do start a war they may destroy, but they will be destroyed. One of the reasons why gas warfare was not begun by the Germans during the last war was that they were afraid of the retaliation the allies would make. We have to get it into the minds of the people in the Kremlin that if they do start a war we shall retaliate; that is the only language they understand. If we cannot penetrate their minds, we must penetrate the minds of the Russian people, and of the people who are under communist domination. We must impress upon them that the policy they are adopting is a policy of destruction, and that, while they may destroy, they will be destroyed. Nobody wants to commit suicide. That is the language they understand, and that is the language which we must put across to them if peace is to be maintained in this world.

We in. Canada together with the other democratic nations of the world, must be strong or we shall have a war. That is the road we are travelling, so let us admit it, whether we like it or not. I do not want a war. I have seen enough of it. Any man who has seen anything such as I have seen does not want war. But I do not want my wife ravaged or my children taken to God knows where, if that is the price of communism. I want freedom in this world. I fought for it years ago, and 1 am prepared, old as I am, to fight for it now. I want peace in the world, but I also want freedom. If we think we can have peace without freedom, we are making a grave mistake. During the interval between sessions, I have travelled this country from the east coast to the west coast. I have met many Canadian people, and I have talked with many of them. I say to you that this is a grand land; it is a good land. I could describe it as a land of hope and glory; hope, because of the faith that the people of Canada have in the future of their country; glory, because of the achievements of the people in the past. Thank God, it is still a land of the free. Let us keep it that way.


Mr. Clarence Gillis (Cape Breton South):: Mr. Speaker, there are a few remarks which I should like to make at this particular time. This foreign affairs debate is generally reserved for the experts. I have been in this house sufficiently long to come to the conclusion that there are no experts. It is mostly because of the experts that we get into difficulty. I rise at this time because of a speech which I read that was made by the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) at Lake Couchiching. It was reported by The Canadian Unionist of September, 1949. This speech is a masterpiece, and I recommend that every member of this house secure a copy and read it, particularly the members opposite. In that discussion, and it was quite lengthy, the minister covered practically all the obligations of a free society. If, in the administration of his department, he follows the mechanics described in that talk, he will not go very far astray.
I accepted that speech as the embodiment of his opinion, so I was rather disappointed, when he opened this debate, to get the impression that he was not as free as I had seen in the house on former occasions, when he had returned from the field behind the scenes of external affairs. In this speech the minister seemed to be a bit shattered. I got the impression that, as a member of the cabinet, he was placed in the position of attempting to apologize for internal government policy by using external matters to cover up. I hope I was wrong. It seemed to

me he was doing a bit of clever footwork, and I was a bit disappointed. One of my reasons for rising at this time was to recall to the minister's mind that particular speech, and the mechanics outlined in it so that he could reset his sights.
As I said a moment ago, this business of external affairs should hold no mysteries for the members of this house. I am reasonably sure it does not for most of the citizens of Canada. Within the memory of most of us in this house, we have seen two wars-wars that have come to us from the outside. We have seen Canada's position in those wars, and we had a fairly good idea of the things for which we were fighting. I well remember the old league of nations. I was a member of the league of nations society. I decorated many platforms between the two wars in preaching the gospel of collective security. I thought we had everybody in the world convinced. I remember very well the leader of the opposition being in that organization before he became a politician. He too used to take a stand on matters of collective security. We remember these things, and there is nothing mysterious about it. We know how we get into depressions and what brings about wars. We have seen the machine of propaganda at work twice during our lifetime building a country up and then tearing it down. If you read the press today it is difficult to be sure where propaganda ends and facts begin.
I should like to go back over the speech of the Secretary of State for External Affairs a little bit. All through that speech-and I think correctly-the minister suggested that there were two extremes in the world; and the safe and sane and only course for this country to pursue was to provide a cushion between the extremes, so that there would not be any fear of a clash or a war during our lifetime. I agree with him on that. But I cannot see the government to which he belongs following that particular course at this time. I myself do not think that we are doing all we could. I do not think that we are living up tt) our obligations under the United Nations charter. I agree with the last speaker that psychoanalyzing the East, understanding them, solving their difficulties, and all that kind of thing, is a pretty tough proposition so far as we are concerned. But we have made certain commitments within the United Nations Organization that we as a country can live up to. I do not think we are living up to them. I want to qualify that by saying that I think the main requirement in the world today is to feed hungry people. With that in mind the United Nations have set up the food and agricultural organization. That body of experts from all over the world
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decided on certain policies; they decided on certain things that should be done with regard to feeding hungry people. At some time in this debate I should like the Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner) to tell us whether we as a country are doing all we can to live up to the proposals made by that particular branch of the United Nations. I do not think we are, and that is something we can do.
Secondly, I do not think we are living up to our obligations under the United Nations charter in not accepting the report of a committee of experts on economic affairs, which was recently made. The main consideration of the committee in that particular report was to devise ways and means within each country to maintain full employment. Certain recommendations were made. They are rather lengthy. I imagine most hon. members have read them. I am not going to quote them tonight. Boiled down, the committee recommended that in each country, in so far as it was possible, full employment should be maintained. They recommended certain measures that should be adopted if employment was slipping. For example, they recommended a public investment program. They recommended some social security measures; they recommended keeping purchasing power as high as it possibly could be kept if the unemployment figure went above what they considered a normal level which was, I think, around 4 or 5 per cent of the working population. Our figure has gone beyond that. We have a large number of people unemployed in the country. I do not think that any of the main recommendations of the committee have been acted upon by this government. The fact of the matter is the reverse is true, because our representative in that particular field did not agree with them. I have a copy of his statement to the committee on the measures that they recommended for the purpose of maintaining full employment. He disagreed with them completely. He told them that as far as he was concerned they should lie in abeyance until such time as the government had an opportunity to study them, and so forth. He felt that the recommendations made by these experts from every country in the world in that particular field were impracticable and could not be applied in this country at this time. If they could not be applied in this country at this time, or back in September, 1949, then they could not be applied in any country in the world; because, in my opinion, this is the only country that has surplus resources on which people could be put to work. I think we are falling down in that respect. The least we can do is to do the things that are possible within our own country that come within the structure of the United Nations.

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It is not hard to disillusion people and to make them sceptical and doubtful. We have heard a lot of high-sounding talk in the last ten years, and particularly in the last three or four years. I heard the leader of the opposition refer to the Atlantic charter. In his election campaign Churchill claimed great credit for the writing of the Atlantic charter. What did it mean? It did not mean anything. It was merely a propaganda statement, drafted for war purposes, on the eve of the invasion, to stimulate the troops in that invasion. It was only a formal document. It meant nothing legally and the people have come to that conclusion. They know that now because in effect Roosevelt said so himself. It was merely a propaganda document to stimulate people and to spur them on to a greater war effort. All of the language that was contained in the Atlantic charter about free access to raw materials of the world, and so forth, was just so much eyewash. It did not mean a thing. We have to start doing things if we are to come through this period right side up.
The discussion brought on by the Secretary of State for External Affairs at this time on the question of the recognition of China is an important one. It is one that should be thoroughly understood. I got the impression that in bringing it on at this time the minister is merely flying a kite for the purpose of getting all the information he can on the subject. I think he is testing public opinion and is looking at the editorials in the press. That is exactly what I would be doing if I were in his place, and had to deal with this particular subject at this time, because I know-and we might as well be quite frank in admitting this-that there is a lot of pressure being put on at this time by sectarian sources. So far as I am concerned I do not let these things influence me. There is a certain world condition, and if in the judgment of a majority of the members of this house and of the government a certain something should be done, then so far as the house is concerned that is what should be done, because in handling this particular situation we may be hitting the key to the future; and if we strike the wrong key and someone starts throwing atomic bombs around, they will not be either Catholic or Protestant; they will be straight atomic bombs without any discrimination, and we had better have a thorough understanding of it.
The leader of this group has already said that so far as he is concerned he thinks we should recognize China at this time. The leader of the opposition has taken an adamant stand to the effect that he does not think we should. He thinks it is the road

to appeasement. Well, no one should know the route to appeasement better than that party-and I am not saying that to cast any reflection upon the present leader of the opposition. But I do know they were behind appeasement as it developed before the last war, and leading into it. However, I shall not comment further upon that.
Then the government are doing exactly what I said they were doing. They are flying a kite-and I do not blame them because, in the final analysis, it is their responsibility. They are the ones who have to make the decision. I cannot see much similarity between the position developing now and the one which prevailed before the last war on the question of appeasement. I do not think we are appeasing anyone.
I am not concerned about the legal aspect of the matter. Someone said this afternoon that some professor had made a decision based upon international law to the effect that we have to recognize the fact that a certain government is there-and that that is international law. The question which arises in my mind is this: Who writes the international law? Certainly there is no international government, nor is there any statute as such. It is merely the opinion of someone who is a "supernatural" lawyer. He hands it on and some think it must be accepted as gospel. I am not concerned at all about that aspect of the matter.
I am concerned about the position of Canada, and her relations with China, and whether we are able to give the Canadian people an intelligent lead from the House of Commons. We have recognized many satellite countries, not because we liked them or because we liked their philosophies, but simply because they are there. We have established trade relations with them, and that is about all.
Our position with respect to China, as I see it, is this: In that country there are 450 million people who, because of mismanagement in the past, a lack of the means of life, and a high degree of manipulation, are prepared to accept anything in preference to what they had. That is the kind of government they have in China today.
There is much, talk about an iron curtain, lack of opportunity, and getting in to tell the people what we are trying to do. Well, instead of appeasement, as set out by the leader of the opposition, are we not in a position where we must ask ourselves whether we are willing to close the door on China, have another iron curtain, and cut them off completely from any relationship with the outside world, thus throwing them directly into the arms of Russia?

Is it not better for us at this time to recognize the fact that, so far as China is concerned, there is no complete control of that country today?-and I do not think anyone, at least during our lifetime, will have complete control of it. It is in a fluid state. The armies of a certain section representing communism are in there, but they have not much to work on. My recollection of the Chinese people is that they are most versatile, and it will not be easy to ignore them.
Is it not better for us now to recognize what Great Britain recognized? She recognized China because she was faced with an immediate war, with the possibility of being driven out of Hong Kong. Indeed, I do not believe she could have held on. So, was it not better for her to stay there and to hold that section of China so that she could open up trade relations and have people in that country working along with the Chinese people at this time, while the situation is still fluid within that country?
Would it not be better for us to do that now? Would we not be wise to establish trade relations because, whether we like it or not, we are part of the United Nations set-up? In my opinion the delegates from the present government of China will be recognized and within the near future will be seated within the United Nations. Where is there any appeasement in our wanting to take the only logical step we could take at this time, that of keeping in there and helping the Chinese straighten out the mess they have at the present time?
I come from a riding which is well informed on international affairs, and in which there is an old established union with a co-operative set-up. They have studied this question thoroughly. I was in touch with them on it while I was home, and I have no hesitation in making the statement here that they believe this is the responsibility of the government.
The minister has set out certain definite steps which must be taken before recognition is granted. When these steps are taken and when the government is assured that the government they are going to recognize and with which they are going to establish relations can live up to its international obligations, then I believe it would be proper for this government to take those steps and thus keep as close as possible to the Chinese people.
I have no hesitation in saying that, and I believe the great majority of people outside the house would support the government, if they understood the situation. However, most people are confused by the double talk they hear on this matter. So many people are afraid to take any stand until they see which way the straws are blowing, with the result
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that people do not have leadership and do not understand. Then, they are confused by th'- editorials in the different newspapers, one pulling this way and the other that-not because they are particularly concerned with the government's responsibility but because they can make certain propaganda and capital out of the subject. The result is that people are confused. This question is so serious and can create so much confusion that I believe the minister and the government are entitled to the expression of definite opinions, without any double talk, as to where each member stands. In this way the people outside may be enlightened and have a clear lead from the House of Commons.
Ninety-five per cent of those who sent us here have not the time to read and understand the implications of all these matters. Members have that time, and should make a study of these subjects. It is my belief that members of the House of Commons are morally obligated to give the people some understanding of what should be done when a matter of this kind comes up-because this question may become the key to the future, so far as war is concerned.
I should like to see the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson) take strong steps within his own party for full implementation of the recommendation of committees within the United Nations structure, because I do not think in the world today there is any country in a better position to carry out the recommendations with regard to full employment and the recommendations made by FAO. I believe if we can show our people, people outside and those within the structure of the United Nations, that Canada is accepting her commitments and living up to them, it will be the best way to influence the Czechs, the Yugoslavs and the Chinese, and all those who go with them.
I believe I have said in the house many times that I am not afraid of a shooting war. First, I do not think the United States will ever take aggressive action to start a war. Secondly, I do not think there is any country in the world more afraid of war than Russia. As I see Russia today, and as I have seen her for some time, she is in much the same position as Germany was in 1944. She has spread herself-and the farther she spreads the weaker she gets. Today I see her as the fly who captured the flypaper-he was there, and he was stuck with it. When a country has to police half of Europe, and then pitch in and help China, and has her forces scattered all over the world, she is not getting any stronger.
If someone wanted to shoot tomorrow, what do you think the Czechs would do, or the
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Poles, or the Roumanians, or the Bulgarians? Do not make any mistake about it, nobody knows better than Joe Stalin what will happen. There will be a roorback. These people are not subjected. They are under the hand of the Soviet for the time being. I cannot see Uncle Joe wanting to start a shooting war and perhaps open up his own borders to counter-revolution. I do not think the United States of America will ever toss either an atomic bomb or a hydrogen bomb. I do not think they are built that way. I do not think they have any imperialistic, expansionist aims.
This cold war that Russia has been throwing at us is all part of the game. Anyone who has read the philosophy of the program of the communist party-and I think most hon. members here have-will know that the period they are in now is known as the period of national revolutions; that is, promote revolution within each country as you go along, and have your satellites take over. That is their program now. Their program is not to start shooting. But if they can create unemployment and bring about the inevitable break-down of capitalism, as they say-create confusion and chaos and soften the people up -that is good propaganda for Russia. It is good propaganda to build up their machine within this country.
Hitler did the same thing. It is not new. It is the totalitarian method of conquering a country. They are doing now exactly what Hitler did prior to the outbreak of war. The people in Europe were starving. Hitler was offering them bread. He asked them to give up their freedom. All we have ever said to them is, "Cling to your freedom"-freedom to go hungry when you have not any bread. We must offer them both freedom and something to eat. The game is the same today as it was prior to 1939. It is just being played by a bigger and a better card player; that is all. But I think we have learned something ourselves in the meantime. I trust that the minister will have good luck and good health in the administration of his department, and I hope that he will occasionally pick up this copy of The Canadian Unionist, have a look at it and read back his speech. In my opinion that speech is a masterpiece; it is worth reading. I advise every member of the House of Commons to read it. I hope that he will apply the philosophy contained in that speech at every step of the way as he goes along, both nationally and internationally.


Mr. Alistair Stewart (Winnipeg North):: After listening to the hon. member for Cape Breton South (Mr. Gillis), Mr. Speaker, I always find that he has expressed a certain amount of common elementary horse sense

which is most refreshing. Once again he has done so in this debate on international affairs. It was opened last Friday by the minister, and much of the discussion which has followed has centred around the recognition of China. It is not a matter about which I am greatly excited. Last November, during the course of the last debate, I said that the recognition of China had to be an ad hoc business, that we should recognize China before it was too late to get advantage of the recognition but not so early that we might give aid and comfort to a regime that we disliked. Obviously that last qualification has disappeared. I still repeat that the recognition of China is not a matter of ideology. It is a matter of assessing the facts of the situation and acting accordingly.
I was asked by a friend on Saturday afternoon what I thought of the minister's speech and about what he had to say in it. To some it may have appeared to be a rather prosaic statement of the facts of the situation, but I could only describe it by an analogy, by saying that he started off with a pack of hounds along a certain defined track, and on occasion one of the hounds would pull away from the pack and go into the brush; but before he got too far the minister had whistled him back to join the pack and at the end of the journey they were once again all together. I think it would have been much more interesting had the minister permitted some of these intellectual hounds to wander still further into the underbrush; but for his own good reasons he has refrained from doing so.
Following upon his statement there was a speech made by the leader of the Conservative party. On listening to it I came to the conclusion that the hon. gentleman was asking for a jehad, for a holy war against the infidel. When I read the speech, however, I was much less certain that I was right; and when I reread it, I must admit that I am still even more uncertain as to what he meant. I think that his whole statement might be boiled down to this sentence which I quote from page 466 of Hansard:
But the highest duty of every government today ... is to demand that there shall be common action, and that there shall be a clear and uniform pattern of strategy which will be known to the people of the free nations, and which will be known in the clearest detail to the nations which threaten our peace and security.
But what form of common action? Does he envisage common action under the United Nations or common action under the Pacific pact which he would like to see but which is, as yet, impossible. If not, under what aegis does he envisage this common action

and how would he like it to take form? It is hinted at again at page 462 of Hansard where he is reported as saying:
The territorial ambitions of the Soviet empire . . . are not limited except by recognition of the fact that there may be some point beyond which they dare not go.
But again he left questions in my mind. What is the point at which the Soviet union will stop? Does the leader of the opposition know that point; or does Mr. Stalin, for that matter, know it? I do not know, and I think the leader of the Conservative party ought to give his opinion as to where that point is. Is it in Viet Nam? Is it in Malaya? Is it in Thailand or is it even as far as India?
Then as reported at page 463 he talks again of firm action and he says:
When I say "firm action" I mean the kind of united action to preserve peace which the Russians will recognize today just as the Germans would have recognized It either in 1914 or in 1939.
But again he has left too many "i's" undotted and too many "t's" uncrossed. It seems to me as though he desires to impose his terms upon the Russians, and I do not think there is any nation in the world today which can impose terms of any kind on that country. As reported at page 465 of Hansard, for instance, he tells us this:
Appeasement is going to go no further: we have learned the lessons of the past and there will be no truck and trade with tyranny of this kind unless and until they are at least prepared to accept the ordinary standards of international conduct.
Again the hon. gentleman seems to wish to impose upon the Russians his desire and his conception of the ordinary standards of international conduct. I am afraid that his standards and mine differ, because only too frequently the standards of international conduct which we have seen in operation are the standards of the jungle. He asks for peace, yes. He tells us that his speech is geared to peace. But again I suggest that the peace which he envisages is peace on our terms; and the Russians I think have already made it amply clear that they are not prepared to accept those terms.
He stated that there should be no recognition of Mao until common action is decided upon. The view has already been expressed, I think, that common action now is impossible in view of the fact that certain members of the commonwealth and of the Pacific area have already recognized Mao while others, including the United States, have not. I suggest further that common action is impossible in a world of national sovereign states, where what will most appeal to a state is its national interests. The British have recognized Mao not because they like him but because they thought it was essential for trading relationships that they should do so. The Americans
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have not recognized him for their own good reasons, not the least of which is the matter of prestige.
How then can we reconcile these two national views? The leader of the official opposition (Mr. Drew) also asked members of the house to express their views on the matter of recognition. He stated that the Mao regime was imposed by force. I am not prepared to dispute that, but nevertheless it is very obvious that it was a force which was acceptable to the great mass of the Chinese people. It was a force which was acceptable to the peasants and the workers in the cities, and also to the intellectuals of China. Obviously the Kuomintang regime had little hold on the loyalty or affections of the Chinese people. One has only to consider the defections of the Chinese armies, and the constant surrender after surrender of Chinese cities to realize that Chiang had little hope of holding either these towns or the loyalty of the people. The reason he had little hope was that the communists offered the people of China food. A bowl of rice today in China is an infinitely greater argument than all of the ideologies which the wit of man has devised. We have to learn again the lesson that the strongest argument against communism in Asia today is food. And now we see Formosa groaning under the bureaucracy of nationalist refugees, and also under threat from the Peking government. I think there is little doubt but that island will eventually fall.
There are certain arguments for recognition. I have already advanced one of them, the national interests of our country. I am not prepared to say exactly when and at what time China should be recognized, but there is another aspect of the situation which must be considered and that is that the recognition of China undoubtedly is a weapon in the strategy of the cold war which is being waged all across the globe. Non-recognition by the western powers may mean a surrender by default to Moscow of leadership which we ought to be giving Asia. That is one of the dangers which we face.
We know that Mao signed an agreement with the authorities at the Kremlin. On the face of it, it appears to be not unfavourable to the Peking government. They are going to get the help of certain technicians from Russia. They are going to be given back certain cities in Manchuria, and we shall have to wait until 1952 to see if that promise materializes. They are getting a loan of some $300 million spread over five or six years which, so far as the rehabilitation of China is concerned, is nothing but a drop in the bucket. Nevertheless one can adduce that as evidence to show that there is close integration between

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Peking and Moscow. I should like the house to remember that even although that agreement exists China is not necessarily lost. If Moscow is going to behave towards China as it has behaved towards other countries which communist parties have taken over; in other words, if Moscow is going to try to make China another satellite nation, then I am [DOT] certain that the Russian policy is doomed to failure.
On the other hand, I am equally certain that we cannot make an ally of China. Therefore our policy should be designed to try to ensure its neutrality, and anything which looks like hostility towards that country will have the effect merely of pushing it further into the arms of the Russians. Today in Asia communism is not the strongest force. Nationalism is the strongest, and after nationalism the desire for economic progress. We have to realize these things, and if we do then I think the west is capable of giving the lead which is so essential.
There was another part of the argument of the leader of the opposition which rather intrigued me. In part he objected to the recognition of China on legalistic grounds, but at the same time and in the same speech he welcomed the recognition which had been accorded Viet Nam. I do not know on what grounds he did so because there is infinitely less reason in law for recognizing Viet Nam than there is for recognizing China. On the other hand, it may be that his argument is the moral one that we detest and despise communism and therefore we should not give the accolade of recognition to any such regime. If we are going to argue on a moral basis then we must be consistent, and we must be prepared to withdraw recognition from those communist-dominated nations to whom we have already accorded it. I will go much further than that and say that communist-dominated nations are not the only ones whose customs I dislike intensely. I would think if we are going to be thoroughly logical in our moral condemnation we have to go the whole way, and if we do that we will have to cut down our diplomatic staff until it is perhaps the size of a corporal's guard.
I said that Viet Nam does not satisfy the legal conditions necessary for recognition. Again that is not a matter which worries me unduly because recognition of Viet Nam is not a legal matter. It is a diplomatic maneouvre and another step in the cold war.
I think we ought to give some consideration to what is happening in that country because of the consequences of the actions of the western powers and of Russia. There are two factions in Viet Nam. The first is headed 
by Bao Dai. He is a French puppet who was educated in Europe. I am informed he is a bit of a playboy, but then he is youthful. He abdicated in 1946 and afterwards served under Ho. On the other hand there is Ho Chi Minh, his great rival. He is a communist agent, one who worked with Borodin in China, one who is playing a very skilful and cagey game today. He is the one of course who is recognized by Russia, and that is important because I do not think Russia would have recognized Ho unless the Kremlin had been reasonably certain that he was going to be successful in his struggle. The house will remember that Russia did not recognize the insurgents in Greece, but they have given recognition to Ho who may of course have received the kiss of death recently when he found that Tito had also accorded him diplomatic recognition.
There are certain arguments in favour of the recognition of Bao Dai. The first is that recognition by the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, as one would expect, has raised his prestige amongst the native population, an argument which is probably quite valid. Another is that he controls the large centres of population in Viet Nam. Nevertheless over the whole picture I doubt very much whether he controls the loyalty of 25 per cent of the people of that country, and certainly he does not control the majority of the land mass. It has been argued that he is the only alternative to Ho and that we could do nothing else. It is perhaps also true that we are endeavouring to support France, that the French wished to recognize Bao Dai to preserve to some extent the stability of the French government on this matter, and it was essential to go along with their desires. Perhaps the best argument of all is that the reality of the cold war demanded that recognition.
On the other hand-and I am presenting these alternatives to the house-there are arguments against it. In the first place Bao Dai is obviously a French puppet. He does not control the foreign affairs of his country and he does not control the armies of his country.
He does not control the finances of his country, nor does he control the judiciary. All these come under the control of France; and until the people of Viet Nam have more control and more to say in their own country I doubt very much whether it will be possible to persuade the nationalists to swing in behind Bao. What we in the western world seem to have done is try to bolster a colonial regime. We are faced with the fact that the Russians have recognized Ho; and having recognized him, they may feel it right and proper to support him. The western world has recognized

Bao, and having done that they have to support him or suffer another loss of prestige. Thus we who wish Bao well may find that whether we like it or not we have become mixed up in a civil war in this country in southeast Asia; and that is a great and grave responsibility for us to undertake. Once again we seem to have been manoeuvred into the support of a regime whose only merit is that it is anti-communist; and that is not a good enough way either to contain or defeat communism. This is a distinct testing ground if ever there was one; and if we wish to see Bao successful he will require something more than good wishes. The western world will have to realize that it has material obligations to him as well.
Perhaps if the minister is going to close this debate he will be able to enlighten us still further as to what happened at the Ceylon conference when the majority of the commonwealth members agreed to recognize Bao but Mr. Nehru held out against them on the ground, which I think was good and sufficient, that Bao's position is something more than precarious.
In his speech the minister dealt with another matter that is worthy of careful thought. He gave us a resume of Russian proposals for the control of the atomic bomb and pointed out that there has been no significant change in the Russian position over the last two or three years. Two things are obvious. In the first place the Baruch plan- I call it that though it has been amended-is not acceptable to Russia. In the second place they are not prepared to agree to full-time inspection. That is not a new position but one they have taken right from the beginning; and these are facts which must be considered. In his remarks the minister said Vishinsky's proposal does not give us that security under international control which is essential if we are to sign any international agreement. That is true; it does not give us very much security. But there is no security at all today; and perhaps even the most limited degree of security will offer a little more hope than the nothing we now possess. Since Russia obviously has the atomic bomb I suggest that there is less reason than ever for expecting her to accept the United States proposals which were put forward two or three years ago.
What then is going to be our answer to this Russian refusal? We must have some answer. Again the minister gave a glimmer of hope when he said we must keep open every road and every path in the search for survival. I think we may agree that today there is no complete defence against enemy attack; but unfortunately the only answer of the west is
External Affairs
to find greater means of destruction in the hope that we can make an enemy suffer more than we do. That is not the most constructive or most sensible approach to the problem. We in the west seem to be obsessed with the idea of increasing our military power under the illusion that it is going to make us safe. I maintain that it will do nothing of the sort; that if that is the extent of our answer to the Russian "no" there is no safety at all.
So we must have some sort of control, no matter how inadequate it may be. While I am not prepared to accept everything the Russians suggest, at the same time I do think we have to settle down a bit ourselves until we can find some common ground for discussion. We must find some sort of control not only over the atomic bomb but over the right to wage war. Even if Russia accepted the Baruch plan, can one say there is any fully proved method of achieving security under it? I doubt it, with a nation the size of Russia. So we have to start again.
There has been a change in tactics and also, in certain quarters, a change in outlook. I read an editorial in yesterday's Ottawa Journal commenting upon something which Mr. Lilienthal said in condemnation of certain scientists who feared that the advent of the hydrogen bomb might mean the end of the world. He called their statements intellectual nonsense. This editorial went further, and said that Hiroshima was a pin point in the world, and that even if the hydrogen bomb should be a hundred thousand times worse it could not be very much more devastating. Hiroshima was not a pin point, and here is surely an example of the moral stultification which many have reached. What happened at Hiroshima was that thousands of innocent people were murdered in the name of war. I do not attack the use of the bomb, nor do I defend it, but surely in heaven's name Hiroshima was something more than a pin point on this map. In the body physical a pin point may mean the beginning of a cancer which will cause death. In the body politic that sort of pin point may also lead ineluctably to the same sort of death. Hiroshima was not a mere pin point. Time after time in this same newspaper I have seen the editors invoking Christian beliefs; yet by their own moral paralysis they have shown that these beliefs have very little meaning to them, when they count the death of tens of thousands of innocent people as merely a pin point. That perhaps is an interpolation, yet I felt I had to say it.
I say there has to be a change in tactics. Containment in the negative sense obviously is not enough. Containment allied with a desire to improve the condition of peoples throughout the world might have worked, but I do not think we are doing quite enough to

External Affairs
help. Growing sums of money are being spent on weapons, but surely we should learn the lesson of history that when we spend more money on weapons our possible antagonists also are going to spend more. The eventual result must be growing fear, growing tension, and the distinct possibility of war.
Today almost everything is being placed second to the illusion of national security. In the North Atlantic pact we are trying to provide ourselves with security, but again we have not gone far enough. Here Canada has a grave responsibility, because the government, rightly and properly, insisted on the insertion of article 2 in that treaty. That is the article which deals with closer economic collaboration. Unless we can get rid of the economic rivalry and economic war which now exists, we are not going to find the security we want in military co-operation. We must have economic as well as military co-operation; then there may be for us an element of safety. I believe it is the responsibility of the government to press that view not only in private but also, if necessary, in public.
So far as I am concerned, I firmly believe that it is national sovereignty that is keeping the world in a turmoil. Until we get rid of national sovereignty, I see no hope of ultimate security. We have learned a lesson in surrendering some of our own individual rights in our communities. Each of us has been required to give up some part of his individual sovereignty to the community, so that it could maintain law and order. In that way, security and freedom have been maintained. We have not yet had the intelligence to project that lesson into the field of international affairs. Until we have seized
the initiative, and attempted to catch the imagination of the people of the world, we shall not succeed in containing communism. The suggestion I have to make may be greeted with a certain amount of derision in some quarters, but I do think we could seize the initiative by suggesting at the United Nations that an element of national sovereignty be surrendered to that collective body. This element of national sovereignty would, of course, deal with national defence.
I do not think for a moment that the offer would be accepted by the Russians or by their satellites, but at least we would have made the offer. If that does not work, then we have to try to achieve something within a narrower group. The only group I can see is that composed of our allies in the North Atlantic treaty. If we do that, if we collectively give up part of our sovereignty then I can see hope. I believe this government has to give leadership, not only to the people of Canada, but as we can and as we must do, to the people of the world.


Mr. Speaker:: Is it the pleasure of the house to adopt the motion?


Mr. Hansell:: No, Mr. Speaker, I would beg leave to move the adjournment of the debate.
Motion agreed to and debate adjourned.



Alphonse Fournier: the adjournment of the house.
He said: Tomorrow we shall resume the debate on the address.
Motion agreed to and the house adjourned at 10.50 p.m.

Appendix



APPENDIX


[Stage Direction]
OFFICE OF THE PREMIER Province of British Columbia
Victoria, February 10, 1950
Right Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Parliament Buildings,
Ottawa, Canada.
My dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have for acknowledgment your letter of January 27, and may say that the government of the province of British Columbia will be pleased to participate in a conference to discuss questions of common concern to the provincial and federal governments at a time to be designated.
I note your desire to have my views regarding matters to be discussed at the conference in the fall. I shall be pleased to forward you my comments regarding the agenda following the prorogation of the British Columbia legislature.
With kindest personal regards,
Yours faithfully,
*	Byron I. Johnson

[Stage Direction]
Province of Newfoundland .	St. John's, February 17, 1950
Right Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent, K.C., M.P.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
This government will be most happy to attend the dominion-provincial conference which you have called for the coming autumn. We have at the moment nothing in particular to suggest for the agenda, but will govern ourselves largely by the suggestions which our sister provinces will submit to you.
With all good wishes,
As ever,
Cordially yours,
J. R. Smallwood
Translation
OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER Province of Quebec
Quebec, February 22, 1950
Right Hon. Louis S. St. Laurent, K.C., P.C.,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa.
Mr. Prime  Minister@: The very important additional work necessitated by the session of the legislature of Quebec has prevented me from writing you before today on the
subject of your letter of the 6th of February, concerning the new Canadian intergovernmental conference in September or October next.
I wrote you December 14 last:
"The government of the province of Quebec is always pleased to co-operate in the pursuit of the provinces' and the country's welfare and prosperity, on a basis of fairness and within the framework of constitutionality.
"The Ottawa conferences obviously involve a considerable amount of trouble and inconvenience for provincial authorities. Nevertheless we accept that with pleasure, when it results in greater prosperity and progress for the Canadian confederation and for the provinces of which it consists and which have given it birth."
In your letter you say:
"But there are other problems of interest to both the federal and the provincial authorities. It is with a view to discussing these problems that I made my proposal of a general conference next fall."
Do you not believe, Mr. Prime Minister, that it would be opportune to proceed in a way that would not complicate or delay the solving of our constitutional problems? In our humble opinion the multiplicity of conferences could result in making the situation more difficult.
Assuredly, apart from the constitutional questions which were the object of the conference in January, and the vital questions mentioned in the letter which I wrote to you on the 1st of February, there are numerous other problems in this connection. To mention just a few-and this is obviously not complete-there are the problems relating to the exclusive rights of the provinces in the matter of insurance, unemployment, radio broadcasting, etc., etc.
Are you of the opinion, Mr. Prime Minister, that it would be practicable to consider all these problems together? Don't you think that we should first study and decide the fundamental questions in respect to the rights of the federal authorities and provincial authorities in fiscal matters? It seems to us necessary to establish first in a precise and incontestable manner the fiscal powers of each authority, that is to say, our means of action and possibilities of realization.
You may rest assured, Mr. Prime Minister, that it is the sincere desire of the government of the province of Quebec to co-operate diligently and in a friendly way in the study and the settlement of all these problems on a just and constitutional basis.
It is our firm conviction that these problems ought to be studied and decided without any partisan approach. It is our most ardent wish, respectful of the rights of all, to co-operate for the progress and prosperity of Canada and of the provinces, and of ours in particular.
The cordial invitation of the government of Quebec to hold these conferences in the old capital applies to each and every one of them.

Appendix
Accept, Mr. Prime Minister, our sincere greetings and the assurance of our complete willingness to do everything possible to solve these various problems in a friendly, just and constitutional way.
M. L. Duplessis
Translation
OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINISTER Canada
Ottawa, February 28, 1950
Hon. Maurice L. Duplessis, M.L.A.,
Premier of the Province of Quebec,
Quebec, Que.
My dear Premier:
I have received your letter of the 22nd of February with further reference to the conference between the federal and provincial governments proposed for next September or October.
The federal government is, like you and your colleagues, convinced that it would not be desirable to complicate or delay the solution of our constitutional problems. We believe, however, that the procedure agreed to at the conference in January constitutes an important step in that direction. We have no desire for a multiplicity of conferences, but, like several of the provincial governments, we are of the opinion that there exist many other problems which require consideration as soon as possible.
As for the particular subjects mentioned in your letter, namely, insurance, unemployment and radio broadcasting, the federal government would certainly have no objection to their being placed on the agenda of the proposed conference, if that is generally desired by the provincial governments. We hope, however, that the question of unemployment will not assume proportions which will make it bulk very large at that time.
It is obvious that any general conference would inevitably be primarily concerned with fiscal questions. While the federal government does not see any possibility of any definite renunciation of constitutional rights in fiscal matters, we do feel that there is plenty of scope for practical workable agreements based on a general desire for co-operation.
In conclusion I may say that we fully share the conviction expressed in your letter that these problems should be studied and decided without the intervention of any partisan considerations.
Louis S. St. Laurent
THE PREMIER New Brunswick
Fredericton, February 23, 1950
Right Hon. Louis St. Laurent,
Prime Minister of Canada,
Ottawa, Canada.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
On January 27 you wrote regarding the proposed dominion-provincial conference suggested for the autumn of this year to discuss general questions of common concern to the provincial and the federal governments and inquiring as to any suggestions we might care to advance for a tentative agenda. This letter was acknowledged on January 31 by my secretary in my absence from Canada.
Since my return I have given thought to this matter and it is my present intention to direct a study by our appropriate departments to the end that this government may shortly advance suggestions in this connection.
I shall be in further communication with you with reference to it shortly.
Yours sincerely,
John B. McNair

Wednesday, March 8, 1950