1945-12-10

TRUST COMPANIES A.CT LENDING AND INVESTMENT POWERS

[Stage Direction]
Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of Finance) moved the first reading of bill No. 231 (from the senate) to amend the Trust Companies Act.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.
Mr. ILSLEY moved the second reading of the bill.
Mr. JOHN BRACKEN (Leader of the Opposition):: Can we not have a statement from the minister in reference to this bill?


Mr. R. W. MAYHEW (Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Finance):: I had hoped that an explanation would not be necessary at this time; it is not a very important bill, and a full explanation will be given when it goes to committee. Hdwever, if the leader of the opposition wishes a statement I am prepared to make it.


John Bracken: I was not asking for a full explanation, but surely we should have some explanation when we are asked to give the bill second reading.


Mr. SPEAKER:: Order. I must call the attention of the leader of the opposition to the fact that it is not usual to give explanations concerning bills coming from the senate, because they have been printed and distributed and are referred to the committee to be discussed. If the hon. gentlefnan insists, however, I will ask the hon. member to give an explanation, but it is not the usual practice.


John Bracken: Well, Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to insist if the procedure has been established of not doing it, but I do not think second reading should be proceeded with unless we have an explanation.


Robert Wellington Mayhew: Section 1 of this bill is designed to correct an obvious misprint in the present revised statutes, subsections (3) and (4) of section 3 of chapter 29. Section 2 of the bill is intended to make uniform the lending and investment [DOT] powers of all trust companies, regardless of the date of incorporation. The Trust Companies Act was first passed in 1914, and applied as a whole to companies incorporated after the date it came into force. It had only a limited application to companies incorporated earlier, the limitation being set forth in subsections (3) and (4) of section 3, in which two groups of sections, 62 to 88 and 83 to 90 are stated to apply to companies incorporated before 1914. These two groups overlap so that it is impossible to say what is intended as respects section 81. It seems probable that 88 is a misprint for 80. and that section 81 is not made applicable to those companies.
The amendment in section 1 o-f the bill will make it clear that section 81 applies bo all companies.
Section 2 of the bill will make uniform for the future the lending and investment powers of all companies. The reference to the Corn-
47696-202i
Maple Products

panics Act in the section, inserted by section 2 of the bill, is made necessary for the following reasons:
The special acts incorporating the older trust companies contain a provision making the former Companies Clauses Act, or part II of the Companies Act, revised statutes, 1906, chapter 79, applicable to the company incorporated and in the said act or part there was one section (revised statutes, 1906, chapter 79, section 167) declaring that the company should not lend any of its funds to any shareholder. This restriction still applies and is found in section 189 of the present Companies Act, 1934, chapter 33.
By amendments to the Trust Companies Act in 1922 (chapter 51, section 8) and 1924 (chapter 71, section 4) it was provided that all such restrictions on investment powers should be repealed, but unfortunately those sections were not carried into the groups of sections in section 3 of the act declared to apply to the older companies.
The Companies Act, section 146, still provides that the restriction in section 189 shall continue to apply to the older companies unless "expressly varied or excepted by the special act".
There has been an amendment proposed in the other house, in which the word "to" is changed to "by". That is the only change.
Motion agreed to and bill read the second time.'



MAPLE PRODUCTS


[Stage Direction]
Hon. J. G. GARDINER (Minister of Agriculture) moved the first reading of bill No. 232, respecting the manufacturing, inspection and sale of maple products.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.
Mr. GARDINER moved the second reading of the bill.
Mr. SENN:: Is this bill now before the committee on agriculture?


Mr. GARDINER:: This is one of the bills of which we gave notice early in the session. At that time however it was thought necessary to advance some other bills as quickly as possible, and this bill was sent to the senate. It was first dealt with there. It has been fully discussed in the senate, and has been before their committee. The discussions are on the records of the senate. It was not thought advisable to send it to our committee. As a matter of fact- it is just a revision of the
FMr. Mayhew.l
present act, with special reference to that part of it which deals with impurities in maple syrup products.	.


[Stage Direction]
Motion agreed to, bill read the second time and the house went into committee thereon, Mr. Macdonald (Brantford City) in the chair.
On' section 1-short title.
Section stands.
Progress reported.

[Stage Direction]
(Questions answered orally are indicated by an asterisk.)

[Stage Direction]
Mr. HEO.N:
1. What was the total cost of the D.T.L. recreation hall in Brownsburg county of Argen-teuil?
2. What was the cost of furnishings and furniture?
3.	Have the immovables been disposed of? If so. to whom and at what price? .
4.	Have the furnishings and furniture been sold? If so, to whom and on what terms?
Mr. McILRAITH:: 1.	$29,656.81.
2.	$7,388.17.
3.	Capital assets (plumbing) to the value of $803.38 were transferred to other government projects. The building itself has not yet been disposed of.
4.	No. Furniture and fixtures have been transferred to other government projects.


PURCHASE OF HORSES
Mr. McCULLOUGH (Assiniboia):: 1.	How many horses were purchased by the
dominion government for overseas shipment within the last six months at the following points in Saskatchewan:	Wawota, Kennedy,
Walpole, Maryfield, Langbank, Yanduna?
2.	From whom were they purchased and at what price in each case?


James Garfield Gardiner: I have discussed this question with the hon. member for Assiniboia and he agrees that the last part of question 2, namely the words "and at what price in each case" should be dropped. With that exception I am now answering the question.
1. (a) 36, (b) 37. (c) 18, (d) 18. (e) 37, (f) 36.	'
2.	(a) J. E. N. Jaeklin, 3; Art. Preston, 3; J. H. Garratt, 2; Robt, A. Preston, 3; F. L. Dennis, 1; W. L. Dennis, 2; W. C. Colborn, 1; C. Q. Husband, 1; D. A. Walker, 3; L. J. Swanson, 1; Nelson Currie, 1; Walter

Questions
Cudmore, 2; L. Haldenby, 1; Thos. Boyd, 1; H. C. Taylor, 1; E. T. Rawbone, 1; J. E. Bonar, 1; Henry Hamilton, 1; J. M. Heasman, 1; J. Richards, 1; H. C. Choquette, 3; G. C. Choquette, 2.
(b)	R. Robertson, 1; Thos. Slykhuis, 1; R. R. Warner, 3; S. C. Cummins, 1; W. G. Cummins, 1; W. D. Warner, 4; Rene Istace, 4; Alex Shoemaker Jr., 2; E. Blaise, 6; Art. Smyth, 1; Vic Dumonceaux, 1; Frank Wilton, 1; Thos. Wilton, 1; David Blackwood, 1; J. E. Cowan, 3; R. H. Smith, 2; Steve Varjassy, 1; Geo. Bergland, 2; M. Ohomey, 1;
(c)	N. C. McConnachie, 1; Donald Faulkner, 1; Spence Bros., 1; William Spence, 2; Ross Price, 2; Charles Olson, 3; K. Buehter, 3; Henry Shire, 1; Henry Cote, 1; Fred J. Boehmer, 3;
(d)	E. B. Johnson, 18;
(e)	John Colson, 1; A. Palendat, 2; Ken Cuddington, 2; Geo. Dodd, 2; R. B. Cairns, 1; Geo. Bergland, 3; F. Beauchesne, 1; A. Bourhis, 2; Albert Jensen, 4; John'Cloarec, 1; Harvey Potter, 1; Harry Gunter, 3; Thomas Duke Jr., 1; A. J. Heal, 3; Louie Bergland, 1; E. Blaise, 1; C. Cumming, 1; S. Cumming, 2; Gladys Wees, 1; Roy L. Fisk, 1; Ervin Johnston, 1; James Johnston, 1; J. E. Cowan, 1;
(f)	J. McMillan, 3; A. J. Moore, 1; Lloyd Hodgins, 1; D. Clark, 2; Alex Jacques, 1; B. Coffey, 2; J. A. Gibson, 1; F. Lamontagne,
1; Alex Gove, 1; R. J. Loiselle, 1; M. McLean, 1; Geo. McDougall, 2; Fred Flarnan, 1; Norman Flynn, 1; T. Johnston, 1; N. R. McRae, 1; J. A. Towill, 1; J. W. Stutt, 1; T. Boyd, 13.


James Horace King: Answered; the latter part of question 2 dropped.
ELDORADO* MINING AND REFINING COMPANY


Mr. STEPHENSON:: 1.	'Since the dominion government took over the Eldorado Mining and Refining Company at Port Hope, has there been any reorganization in the financial set-up of the company?
2.	If so, has the new company issued any stock ?
3.	At what price was it issued and to whom?
4.	Was any sold to the general public?
5.	Will this company continue to produce uranium for atomic bombs?
6.	Who is the manager of the Port Hope plant ?
7.	How many were employed at Eldorado plant in Port Hope during the months of September, November, December, 1944?
8.	How many are now employed at this plant?
9.	What is the intention of the government with regard to this plant?


Mr. HOWE:: 1.	Aes. By P.C. 535 of 27th January, 1944, all the issued shares of Eldorado Mining and Refining, Limited, were expropriated by the dominion government. By subsequent proceedings taken pursuant to this order in council, this company was converted into a corporation without share, capital and the assets became subject to the direct control of the dominion government. By P.C. 8256 of the 27th October, 1944, authority was given for the incorporation of a new company to be known as Eldorado Mining and Refining (1044) Limited, and the transfer to it of all the assets of the old company in consideration of the issue of shares of the new company to the amount of the net value of these assets.
2.	Yes.
3.	The new company has been duly incorporated under The Companies Act 1934 and has authorized the issue to the Minister of Munitions and Supply in trust for the Dominion government of 40,000 of its no par value shares, including the directors' qualifying shares, in consideration of the net value of the assets of the old company.
4.	No.
5.	This is a matter of government policy.
6.	A. H. Ross, effective December 1, 1945; formerly M. Pochon.
7.	September,	1944	-	211November,	1944	-	219December,	1944	-	2318.	155.9.	This is a matter of government policy.


WARTIME HOUSING-ALMAVILLE-EN-HAUT
Mr. HAMEL:: 1.	Have any houses been built at Almaville-eii-haut, county of St. Maurice-Lafleche by wartime housing?
2. If so (a) what was the average cost per unit of such houses; (b) what is the monthly rent collected?
3.	What are -the names and addresses of
persons collecting such rents and in charge of maintenance; when were they appointed; on whose recommendation and what salary is paid?
4.	When will such houses be put up for sale-and by what method?


Mr. McILRAITH:: 1.	Yes, ten.
2.	(a) $5,215.44; (b) $30.00.
3.	Mr. E. H. Desmarais was part-time administrator at Cap de la Madeleine and when ALmaviie was built he assumed responsibility for that project, so no appointment was necessary. Appointed August 6th,
Questions

1942. Remuneration $154.12 per month for both Cap de la Madeleine and Al-maville which includes the provision of office accommodation and stenographic service.
Henri Lapointe is employed as maintenance man at Both Cap de la Madeleine and Lac a La Tortue (Ahnaville). Appointed July 16, 1945 on recommendation of the administrator. Weekly salary $33.60 for both projects.
4.	The present policy is to retain these houses in the low-rental field.


RECONSTRUCTION ADVISORY BOARDS
Mr. STEWART (Winnipeg North):: 1.	How many advisory boards for reconstruction have been set up across Canada?
2.	Who are the representatives on each board?
3.	How many on each board represent labour,
and who are they?	.
4.	Are any labour representatives affiliated
with the Trades and Labour Congress or the Canadian Congress of Labour? If so, who are they?	.
5.	To which unions do the labour representatives belong?


Mr. McILRAITH:: 1.	Twelve.
2.	Reconstruction Labour Committee-J. W. Bruce, Labour Congress; P. Conroy, Canadian Congress of Labour; A. Charpentier, Canadian and Catholic Federation of Labour; A. T. Kelly, Railroad Transportation Brotherhood; H. Carl Goldenberg.
Regional Councils-
British Columbia-R. O. Campney, Dr. Norman D. McKenzie, Dr. Howard T. James, J. W. McCarter, Col. H. S. Tobin, Robert J. Filberg; Horace W. Mackey, Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers.
Alberta-Marshall M. Porter, Harold Long, Mervyn A. Dutton, Paul Famalls, E. T. Love, E. W. Brunsden, J. H. Sissons; Alfred Farmilo -Alberta Federation of Labour.
Saskatchewan-William Jeffrey, F. C. Cron-kite, P. C. Colquhoun, W. C. Wood, Wm. Walker; A. Mayer, United Association' of Journeymen, Plumbers and Steam Fitters; Aden Bowman, C. M. Willoughby.
Manitoba-W. H. Carter, H. B. Lyall, D. G. McKenzie, Percy' Beach all, John Spalding, John Dryborough, J. L. McBridge, 1037 and 436 International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers; Neal Brown, G. F. Jonasson, C. C. Miller, R. A. Pyne.
Northern Ontario-John A. MePhail, E. A. Collins, Wm. Plaunt, Wm. A. Thompson, John McVey, John H. McDonald, E. C. Popham, R. E. Dye; Wm. Mahoney, C.I.O.; Leo H. Timmins, Lynn Hollingsworth, Geo. W. McLeod, D. A. Clark, John Kilpatrick, I. N. L. Hill.

Industrial Ontario-Lt.-Col. W. E. Phillips, Allan E. Arscott, Senator G. Peter Campbell, G. A. Dobbie, Luther F. Winch ell, Ray Lawson, Dr. Thomas H. Hogg, J. Y. Murdock, Gordon C. Leitch, J. C. McFarlane; John Buckley, Federation of Labour; W. C. Good, A. 0. Thormahlen.
Quebec-Montreal Area-Wilfrid Gagnon, Hugh Crombie, Col. A. A. Munster, F. W. Collins, Hector Authier, C. N. Moisan, J. E. Gibault, John B. Challies, Hemy C. Bois, J. Ernest Cadieux, G. A. Gagnon, John T. Thompson, United Steel Workers of America.
Quebec-Quebec Area-J. A. Towner, Hector Cimon, Major Herve Baribeau, Maurice Samson, Gerard Picard, Federation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada.
New Brunswick-N. A. Hesler, T. G. Heath-erington, P. G. Carlin, Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees; Liguori Doucet, Industrial Pulp, Sulphate and Paper Mill Employees; Mrs. Muriel Ferguson, J. Hickman, R. G. Loughlin, A. D. Taylor, C. N. Wilson.
Nova Scotia-A. Murray MacKay, W. Victor Ay 1 ward, Elmer Bragg; D. W. Morrison, United Mine Workers; Norman T. Avard, G. D. McDougall, W. H. C. Schwartz, Allen Ferguson, John H. LeBlanc, C. J. Morrow, 0. F. MacKenzie, Donald F. Maclsaac, W. S. Wilson.
Prince Edward Island-Peter G. Clark, Lucas R. Allen, J. W. Boulter, N. W. Lowther, C. P. McCarthy, J. A. MacDonald, Murdoch MacLeod, Edwin Reid, Austin A. Scales, John A. Webster; James J. Trainor, Federation of Agriculture.
3.	Answered by No. 2.
4.	Answered by No. 2.
5.	Answered by No. 2.


SERVICE PERSONNEL-RAILWAY FARES
[Stage Direction]
Mr, LENNARD:
1.	Have any steps been taken to remove the reduced railway rate privileges now enjoyed by personnel of the armed services?
2.	If so, upon what date will such change take
place?
Mr. LAPOINTE:: No notification of cancellation of railway .privileges for service personnel has been received from any railway.


WARTIME HOUSING-PROVINCE OP QUEBEC
[Stage Direction]
Mr. GAGNON;
1.	How many houses have been built by Wartime Housing Limited (a) at Aryida; (b) at Chicoutimi, Chicoutimi county, province of Quebec?
2.	What was the total cost of each of such houses?

Questions
Mr. McILRAITH:: 1.	(a) 500. (b) 100.
2.	(a) 150 Type H 1 and H 2 at $2,917.38 each; 350 Type H 11 and H 12 at $3,591.02 each, (b) 30 Type H 1 and H 2 at $3,350.23 each; 70 Type H 11 and H 12 at $4,070.02 each.
Note: The cost of each house includes sewer, water lines and all charges.


WARTIME HOUSING-ARVIDA AND CHICOUTIMI, QUE.
Mr. GAGNON:: 1.	Has Wartime Housing Limited moved houses that were built by said organization:
(a)	at Arvida, Quebec; (b) Chicoutimi, Quebec; to other places in the province of Quebec, or elsewhere?
2.	If so, what was the cost of (a) demolition;
(b)	removal; (c) rebuilding?


Mr. McILRAITH:: 1.	(a) Yes. Sixty houses were moved to Ohalk River and 49 houses were moved to Montreal, (b) None.
2.	Costs of demolition, removal and rebuilding have not yet been determined.


FIBRES, TEXTILES AND TEXTILE PRODUCTS- EXPORTS
Mr. CASE:: What was the export value of fibres, textiles and textile products for the fiscal years ending March 31, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945?


Mr. MacKINNON:: Canadian export values of fibres, textiles and textile products during the calendar years 1941 to 1944, and period January 1 to October 31, 1945.
Calendar year 1941	$30,819,633
1942		 28,931,925
.	1943	 30,620,390
1944	 59,742,201
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31, 1945.	49,027,341
 Statistical records are on a calendar year basis.


IRON AND IRON PRODUCTS
Mr. CASE:: 1.	What is the amount of iron and its products imported into Canada .during the fiscal year ending March, 1945, and how does this compare with the amount imported in each of the fiscal years ending March 31, 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944?
2.	What is the value of the import of these products into Canada for each of the fiscal years ending March, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945?


Mr. MacKINNON:: 1.	Unit of quantity not recorded on some items of this group.
2. Canadian imports of iron and its products entered for consumption during the calendar
years 1941 to 1944 and October 31, 1945:
Calendar year 1941
1943
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31,
 Statistical records are
period January 1 to
	 $431,622,365
	 377,765,477
	 420,190,144
	 428,360,899
1945.. 328,605,327 on a calendar year
basis.


Mr. FERGUSON:: What amount of iron and its products was exported from Canada during each of the fiscal years ending March 31, 1945, 1944 1943, 1942 and 1941 and what was the value of this export for each of these years respectively?


James Angus MacKinnon: Canadian export values of iron and products during the calendar years 1941 to 1944, and period January 1 to October 31, 1945:
Calendar year 1941	 $239,900,848	'
1942		 467,121,439
1943		 716.644.883
1944		 772.935,430
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31, 1945... 520,568,907
Unit of quantity not recorded on some items of this group.
Statistical records are on a calendar year basis.


AGRICULTURAL AND VEGETABLE PRODUCTS
Mr. BRADSHAW:: 1.	What is the value of imports of agricultural and vegetable products into Canada for the fiscal years ending March 31, 1941. 1942. 1943, 1944 and 1945?
2.	How do these amounts compare with the value of agricultural and vegetable products exported from Canada during this period?


Mr. MacKINNON:: 1. Canadian import values of agricultural and vegetable products during the calendar years 1941 to 1944, and period January 1 to
October 31, 1945:
Calendar year 1941	  $171,835,408
1942		 147.739.504
1943		 176.446.946
1944		 212,654,961
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31, 1945.	190,363,323
2. Canadian export values of agricultural
and vegetable products during the calendar years 1941 to 1945, and period January 1 to
October 31, 1945:
Calendar year 1941	 $285,708,739
1942		 257,778,304
1943		 483,756,894
1944		 741,265,315
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31, 1945... 649,539,252
Statistical records are on a calendar year basis.
Questions


ANIMALS AND ANIMAL PRODUCTS
Mr. TUSTIN:: With the exception of chemicals and fibres what is the value of imports of animals and animal products into Canada for the fiscal years ending March 31. 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945?


James Angus MacKinnon: 
Mr. BRADSHAW:: What is the value of animals and animal products exclusive of chemicals and fibres, exported from Canada in each of the fiscal years ending March 31, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945?


James Angus MacKinnon: Canadian export values of animals and products during the calendar years 1941 to 1944, and period January 1 to
October 31, 1945:
Calendar year 1941	$201,7.30,555
1942		 2.56,725,462
1943		 289,566,022
1944		 372,925,562
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31, 1945	 317,772,760
Statistical records are on a calendar year basis.
Item	Country
Furniture, wood	United Kingdom
Other countries..
Furniture, iron	United Kingdom
Other countries. Electrical apparatus. .United Kingdom Other countries.


IMPORTS OF WOOD, WOOD PRODUCTS AND PAPER
Mr. HODGSON:: 1.	What is the value of wood, wood products and paper imported into Canada during the fiscal year ending March 31, 1945?
2.	How does this amount compare with the value of imports of wood, ivood products and paper in the years 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944?


James Angus MacKinnon: Canadian import values of wood, wood products and paper during the calendar years 1941 to 1944, and period January 1 to October 31, 1945:
Calendar year 1941	$36,739,071
1942		 38,176,983
1943		 40,284,4S9
1944		 43,635,511
January 1 to October 31, 1945.. 40,605,083 Statistical records are on a calendar year basis.


FURNITURE AND ELECTRICAL APPLIANCES
Mr. McKAY:: 1.	What was the value of (a) furniture; (b) electrical appliances produced in Canada during the years 1943, 1944, 1945, as far as records
show ?	'
2.	What was the value of furniture and electrical appliances exported from Canada to (a) the United Kingdom; (b) other countries during each of the above-mentioned years?


Mr. MacKINNON:: 1.	(a) Value of principal items of furniture
made in the manufacturing industries of Canada:	1943, $44,257,348;	1944, and 1945
not yet available, (b) Value of .principal items of electrical appliances made in the manufacturing industries of Canada:	1943,
$245,770,859; 1944 and 1945 not yet available.
2.	(a) and (b):
$	286,465
56,556
6,471,832
34,628,620
$	50,400
355.167 276,953 182,248 31,344,012 40,356,482
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31, 1945
$	142
372,926
197,283
34,567,047
22,340,349


IMPORTS OF NON-FERROUS METALS AND THEIR PRODUCTS
Mr. JACKMAN:: What is the value of non-ferrous metals and their products imported into Canada for the fiscal years ending March 31, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944 and 1945?


James Angus MacKinnon: Canadian import values of non-ferrous metals and their products

during the calendar years 1941 to 1944 and period January 1 to October 31, 1945:
Calendar year 1941	$ 94,758,269
1942		 82,415,670
1943		 115,566,684
1944		 106,650,546
Jan. 1 to Oct. 31, 1945	 86,175,073
Statistical records are on a calendar year basis.
i

Questions as Orders jor Returns


TRIALS OF AVAR CRIMINALS AT NUREMBERG
Mr. HANSELL:: 1.	Is the government of Canada represented at the trials of war criminals now taking place at Nuremberg? If so, in what way and who is the representatitve?
2.	Is the government provided with detailed transcripts of the proceedings of these trials?
3.	Are electrical transcriptions Being made of these trials? If so, are they available to the Canadian government?
Mr. ST. LAURENT:
1.	(a) No. (b) Answered by (a).
2.	No.
3.	(a) No information, (b) Answered by (a).


PRISONERS OF WAR AND INTERNEES-PORT ARTHUR DISTRICT
Mr. ROSE:: 1.	How many German prisoners of war and Japanese internees are employed in lumber camps in the Port Arthur district?
2.	What rate of wages is paid to these prisoners of war and internees for work in lumber camps?
3.	What is the number of registered unemployed in the Port Arthur district?


Mr. MITCHELL:: 1.	There are 2,572 German prisoners of war employed in lumber camps in the Port Arthur district, and no Japanese internees.
2.	The employer pays to the crown $2.50 per working day for the services of each prisoner of war, from which an amount of 50c per working day is credited to the account of the prisoner of war.
3.	As of November 30, 1945, there were 727 males registered for employment. Of these 269 have been referred to jobs but the results are not yet known. There were additionally 283 women registered for employment, of whom 6 have been referred to jobs but results are not yet known. It should be mentioned that these people are not necessarily unemployed. They may be changing from one job to another.
All of the males who have registered for employment in Port Arthur and Fort William have been given an opportunity to take a job in lumber camps and those that have accepted the offer have been sent to the camps.


CALGARY ROLLING MILLS-EMPLOYMENT
Mr. JOHNSTON:: Is the government taking any action to insure the employment of the workmen employed at the Calgary Rolling Mills in view of the announced closing of this company's operation on January 15, 1945?


Mr. MITCHELL:: If the employees of the Calgary Rolling Mills are laid off, the national employment service will do everything possible to place these men in suitable employment.



QUESTIONS PASSED AS ORDERS FOR RETURNS


Mr. McCULLOCH (Pictou):: 1.	What was the average tonnage per year transported over the Canadian National Railway lines between (a) Mulgrave and Truro, Nova Scotia; (b) Truro and Oxford Junction,
* Nova Scotia, prior to the outbreak of war in 1939?
2.	What was the average tonnage per year transported over the Canadian National Railway lines between (a) Mulgrave and Truro, Nova Scotia; (b) Truro and Oxford Junction, Nova Scotia, during the period 1939 to 1944?
3.	What estimated post-war expenditure will be made by the Canadian National Railways in reconstructing the line between Mulgrave and Truro, Nova Scotia?
family allowances


Mr. McMASTER:: 1.	Have payments under the Family Allowance Act been made to any child-caring agencies; children's aid societies; public or voluntary welfare agencies; on behalf of any children under their supervision?
2.	If so-to (a) what agencies in each province; (b) what number, of children in each province; (c) what aggregate of payments to each agency in each province up to October 31, 1945?
3.	Have any conditions been attached to such payments? If so, what are they, and who is administering and requiring observance of such
conditions?


EDIBLE REFUSE FROM MILITARY CAMPS
Mr. KNIGHT:: 1.	What is the general method of disposing of edible refuse from military camps?
2.	What is done with such garbage at the camp at Dundurn, Saskatchewan?
3.	Did the military authorities at this camp have a contract with one, Andrew Russell, for the disposal of garbage? If so, is it still in force?
4.	Has such contract been terminated? If so, for what reason?


EASTEND, SASK., IRRIGATION PROJECT
Mr. McCUAIG:: 1.	What was the cost of constructing the Eastend irrigation project at Eastend, .Saskatchewan?
2.	What amount of land was bought in connection with this project?
3.	What price was paid per acre?
4.	What has been the administration cost to date of this project?
Motions for Papers



MAPI.E CREEK, SASK., MILITARY CAMP

[Stage Direction]
Mr. McCUAI-G:
1.	What was the total construction cost of the military camp at Maple Creek Saskatchewan?
2.	How many men were stationed there in each of the years, 1941 to 1945?
3.	What was the total maintenance and administration cost in each of the above years?


Mr. BRUCE:: For a copy of the agreement made between Chance Brothers and Research Enterprises Limited, on June 1, 1941, and a copy of any subsequent agreements made between these parties.



EXPLOSION AT BEDFORD BASIN NAVAL MAGAZINE

Mr. BLACK (Cumberland):: For a copy of all orders in council, legal opinions, correspondence and other documents in the possession of the departments of National Defence for Naval Service, Justice and Solicitor General, in connection with the inquiry into claims for damages resulting from the explosion at the naval magazine at Bedford Basin, Nova Scotia, in July, 1945. Also a statement showing, all claims submitted; payments recommended; claims rejected, and total expenses of the inquiry.
Mr. MAY'HEW: Negotiations are still going on in connection with the settlement of claims at Halifax. It would be impossible to give the hon. member a complete answer at the present time. If there is any specific matter upon which he would like information, we will try to get it, but it would take some months to give the complete information, even after all claims had been settled. I would ask that this motion be dropped and rewarded.


Percy Chapman Black: I will accept the offer of the parliamentary assistant,
provided that I get a statement of the total claims for compensation and of those which have been settled already. I am anxious to get the instructions that were forwarded to the board of inquiry by the solicitor general's department. I am particularly interested in a claim for 129 pounds of broilers. This shipment was delayed and the chickens were completely spoiled. This wTas a loss just as definite as if you had put your hands-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Percy Chapman Black: -into the farmer's pocket and took out the money.


James Horace King: Dropped.


Robert Wellington Mayhew: What the hon. member has proposed will be taken into consideration and if it is possible to give the information, it will be done'. The motion should be dropped.


Mr. FRASER:: Carried with amendment.


Percy Chapman Black: I would ask for the partial return, but I do want a copy of the instructions from the solicitor general's department to the board of inquiry or whatever it is styled.
Mr. ST. LAURENT: There is no solicitor general's department; there is a Department of Justice in which there is a Minister of Justice and a Solicitor General. The Department of Justice could not and would not be disposed to table copies of any opinions delivered to another department, That would be quite contrary to the principle of professional secrecy between a client and his solicitor. If there is an opinion which it is sought to have tabled by the client who received the opinion, that might be another matter, but I would not like the impression to get about that the Department of Justice, upon being consulted by other departments of government, does not with respect to opinions it gives observe the rule of professional secrecy that prevails, in all domains everywhere with respect to relations between a client and his solicitor. [DOT]


Percy Chapman Black: I do not think the explanation given by the Minister of Justice covers this case. I have here the original letter from H. G. Cochrane, the administrator of the Halifax explosion claims. I should like to quote one short paragraph, as follows:
We have a number of eases similar to the one mentioned in your letter-
That is the case of Joseph Waurock of Oxford.	-
-involving loss on shipments of perishable
goods-


James Horace King: I am sorry to interrupt the hon. gentleman. I have allowed a certain latitude in the debate, but it is against the rules, because a motion for the production of papers is not debatable.


Percy Chapman Black: I am not
attempting to debate it. If you will allow me to read this other sentence-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Robert Wellington Mayhew: So far as the order in council goes, the information will be given to the hon. gentleman.

Motions jor Papers


Percy Chapman Black: I should like the permission of the house to read part of this sentence. It reads :
-which we have referred to the Solicitor General at Ottawa-*


James Horace King: A motion for the production of papers not being debatable, no point of order can be raised in connection therewith. If the motion is opposed, I must put the question.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: It is carried already.


Percy Chapman Black: -and have received his opinion that the order in council did not permit payment of claims in such eases.


James Horace King: Order. If it is the wish of the h-ouse that the motion be carried subject to the remarks made by the parliamentary assistant, I would note the motion as being carried subject to the remarks that have been made.


Percy Chapman Black: That is
satisfactory.


James Horace King: Carried.


Mr. ILSLEY:: I do not know how a motion can be carried with qualifications which contradict the motion. There is no legal opinion from the Department of Justice of which I have any knowledge whatever. I am willing to discuss it with-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I think the motion should be dropped and reframed.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: Carried as amended.


James Horace King: I did not hear what the minister said.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I think this motion should be dropped and reframed because the qualifications are so contradictory to the motion that it leaves a result that does not mean anything. To begin with, there are no legal opinions from the Department of Justice. The motion calls for the production of a statement showing all claims submitted, and the hon. gentleman does not propose to press this so long as he gets the totals. Surely the way to do this is to drop the motion and then reframe a motion with which we can comply.


James Horace King: Dropped.


Percy Chapman Black: Mr. Speaker-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Percy Chapman Black: On a point of order, sir, you gave a ruling that this was carried subject to amendment, and I want the house to acept your ruling. It was satisfactory to me, and it was satisfactory to the parliamentary assistant who has the matter in hand. I think that your decision should prevail.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Dropped.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


Gordon Knapman Fraser: Carried with amendment.


James Horace King: Is it the pleasure of the house that the motion should carry?


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Dropped.


Mr. CARDIFF:: I was paired with the hon. member for Chateauguay-Huntingdon (Mr. Black). Had I voted I would have voted for the motion.


Mr. STOKES:: I was paired with the hon. member for Chambly-Rouville (Mr. Pinard). Had I voted I would have voted for the motion.


Mr. DANIEL:: I was paired with the hon. member for Parry Sound (Mr. McDonald). Had I voted I would have voted for the motion.


Mr. McCULLOUGH (Aesiniboia):: Mr. Speaker, my vote was recorded by mistake in' the name of Mr. Archibald.


Mr. COTE (St. Johns-Iberville-Napier-ville):: I was paired with the hon. member for Lambton-Kent (Mr. Henderson). Had I voted I would have voted against the motion.


Mr. CHARLTON:: I was paired with the hon. member for St. Ann (Mr. Healy). Had I voted I would have voted for the motion.



CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS


Mr. GIBSON (Hamilton West):: I was
paired with the hon. member for Trinity (Mr. Skey). Had I voted I would have voted against the motion.


Mr. ABBOTT:: I was paired with the hon. member for Stanstead (Mr. Hackett). Had I voted I would have voted against the motion.


Mr. CHEVRIER:: I was paired with the
hon. member for Grenville-Dundas (Mr. Cas-selman). Had I voted I would have voted against the motion.


Mr. GREEN:: I was paired with the hon. member for Fraser Valley (Mr. Cruickshank). Had I voted I would have voted for the motion.


John Bracken: I regret, Mr. Speaker, that through an oversight I recorded my vote. I should not have done so, as I was paired with the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King).
On ' the orders of the day:


Mr. T. J. BENTLEY (Swift Current):: I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Labour. Is it still the policy of his department to order conscientious objectors back to the camps and pay them fifty cents a day?


Humphrey Mitchell: The answer is yes.



PRIVILEGE-MR. McIVOR

[Stage Direction]
REFERENCE TO STATEMENT IN TORONTO "gi-obe AND MAH."
Mr.'DANIEL McIVOR (Fort William): Mr. Speaker, I rise to a question of privilege. I am reported in the Globe and Mail as having played "The Protestant Boys" on the fife. That is incorrect. I played "The Girl I Left Behind Me" on a toy whistle. I am sorry the Globe and Mail has not a better understanding of good music on a toy whistle.
Mr, MACDONNELL (Muskoka-Ontario): I was paired with the hon. member for Labelle (Mr. Lalonde). Had I voted I would have voted for the motion.
Mr. McCULLOCH (Pictou):: Mr. Speaker, I regret that through an error I voted. I was paired with the hon. member for Lake Centre (Mr. Diefenbaker).



HOLIDAY TRAVEL


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Lionel Chevrier: On Saturday of last week the hon. member for Vancouver East asked if I had received representations from certain student bodies, graduates of universities, col-

Bretton Woods Agreements
leges and the like, in favour of a reduction of fares on railways during the holiday season. I have personally received no such representations other than those from my hon. friend and from the hon. member for Vancouver South, and a resolution which the hon. member for Vancouver East sent me this morning.
I have canvassed the situation carefully, and I find that conditions with reference to the railways are such that it would be impossible to grant the request. In fact, the equipment, services and man-powrer of the railways to-day are taxed to such a capacity that it would, I think, at this season be a mistake to consent to the request. I am this day making a press release on the whole situation and I would like to call the attention of the house to one or two features of it. It points to the fact that the Queen Elizabeth is arriving at New York on December 27, having on board some 13,000 troops, and that will require movement from the port of New York to various parts of Canada of. about twenty-five full trains, including sleeping cars, diners, baggage cars and day coaches. Arrivals at Halifax include the Puncher on December 21, with 800 service men; the Lady Rodney on December 25, with 500; the Duchess of Bedford on December 29, with 3,000, and the Mauritania on January 3, with 6,000. It will take, to transport these troops from Halifax to various parts of Canada, every bit of available equipment. The army, air force and navy authorities are granting five days' leave at Christmas and New Years to fifty per cent of the armed forces, and that, together with the very heavy volume of freight traffic then moving in all directions and to -the seaports particularly, makes the position a very serious one.
While I sympathize keenly with those who have made this request, the university and college students, I am sure that hon. members and the house will agree that under the circumstances priority must of necessity be given the armed forces.



CHARLOTTETOWN HARBOUR


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day;
Mr. W. CHESTER S. McLURE (Queens): I wish to direct a question to the Minister of Public Works. What action has the minister taken with reference to the resolutions from the Charlottetown city council and the Charlottetown board of trade urgently requesting that the necessary money for harbour improvements at Charlottetown be brought down in the supplementary estimates?
Hon. ALPHONSE FOURNIER (Minister of Public Works):: This question was discussed on my estimates, and if I remember rightly I said that we had noted an amount for the ordinary estimates of 1946-47. Since that time I have asked my officials to prepare supplementary estimates to call for tenders a little sooner.


Mr. McLURE:: Thank you.



POTATOES


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. SOLON E. LOW (Peace River): I wish to direct, a question to the Minister of Agriculture. This morning I received a notice of a serious shortage of potatoes in the north country, particularly in the Peace River area. Will the minister let i the house know what the situation is with regard to the potato supply in Canada.
James Garfield Gardiner: The potato supply is short, but I will get information with regard to the northern part of Alberta.


[Stage Direction]
International monetary fund-international BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT
The house resumed from Saturday, December 8, consideration in committee of the following resolution-Mr. Ilsley-Mr. Macdonald (Brantford City) in the chair.
That it is expedient to present a measure to grant authority to accept on behalf of Canada and to carry out the obligations of Canada under the articles of agreement for an international monetary fund and an international hank for reconstruction and development prepared by the united nations monetary and financial conference held at Bretton Woods in July, 1944; to authorize the payment of the subscriptions required from Canada out of unappropriated moneys in the consolidated revenue fund to an amount not exceeding seven hundred million dollars; and to authorize the borrowing under the provisions of the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act, 1931, of sums not exceeding seven hundred million dollars.
Mr. BLACKMORE:: The stand which our group is taking is based in part oni the assumption that there is no real reason for rushing this measure through. There is no real reason for using any kind of high pressure methods in order to secure the passing of the Bretton Woods agreement. I am not implying that this has been done, but w'e do not
Bretton Woods Agreements

think that there is any urgency about the matter. In fact, we are inclined to believe that a royal commission should be appointed to consider the whole question of the Bretton Woods agreement. We have just had sitting in Canada a royal commission studying the question of the taxing of cooperatives. That commission has been at work for months. It has had the power to call witnesses and examine them. The taxation of cooperatives is so insignificant, in contrast with the question of the Bretton Woods agreement, as to be almost, contemptible comparatively. Yet we are supposed to be crowding this thing through. We have had royal commissions on various topics and they have sat for many months, though they have not been nearly as important as the question we are considering, nor has the truth been so difficult to arrive at. We believe that we are working in the best interests of the government in this matter.
In days to come this country, if it rushes precipitately into the acceptance of the Bretton Woods proposals, could be accused of helping to bring pressure to bear upon Britain in making her decision on the agreement. I do not wish to emphasize too strongly what I am about to say, but I am almost afraid that lurking in the minds of hon. members is the belief that for some reason or other Canada is bound to go through with this undertaking, that something terrible will happen if she does not accept the Bretton Woods proposals, that there is perhaps a threat of some kind on the part of some person or persons. I do not know. If the government is behaving as it is behaving because of external pressure brought to bear either by nations outside or by people within those nations it is an exceedingly serious* matter, and all I can say is that Canada ought to know. If we are to be hanged by someone, we ought to know who that someone is and why he intends to hang us, and we certainly should not be expected to go up docilely and put the noose round our own necks and draw it tight.
Canada is in the best possible position to oppose Bretton Woods. Except for the United States, of all nations that are being, I am afraid, high-pressured into the acceptance of the proposals Canada is the most nearly selfsufficient, Canada is therefore more able t-o offer successful resistance to any sort of attack, or any attempt to force her, than any other country. She is im an immeasurably better position than Britain, and consequently we should have courage enough to take a stand.
fMr. Blackmore.]
Furthermore, she is the eldest of the sisters in the commonwealth. What she does will have a special significance all over the world and particularly in Britain.
I suggest therefore that the government should act with the greatest discretion and moderation in considering this measure. I would even suggest that it would be well advised even now to withdraw the Bretton Woods agreement and give the house time enough to study the whole matter, at any rate until the next session. But if the government has made up its mind that it does not intend to withdraw this resolution we must go on with the problem before us. I want it clearly understood that this group is not necessarily putting up any fight against Bretton Woods. That is not the object of our action at all. The impression is being created in the country that the Social Credit group in the House of Commons is engaging in a filibuster, but that simply is not true.


An hon. MEMBER:: Tut, tut.


John Horne Blackmore: We can back up that statement, and if the hon. gentleman has any objection let him raise a question and not smack his lips. We can say that every speech delivered the other afternoon by this group contributed definitely to the matter under discussion. There were not very many of those speeches, only about five or six. Considering the silence of this group while the Progressive Conservatives were simply rampaging about the war expenditures measure, which they could not do a thing about except play politics; considering the way they carried on and the hours and days they took up while this group remained silent; considering that I think anyone with a sense of justice will grant that this group is fully justified in spending time on the important measure before us without being accused of carrying on a filibuster or of having any other ulterior or objectionable motive.
The Social Credit group merely desires to make certain that Canada reads the mortgage contract before she signs on the dotted line. It would be a most interesting question, Mr. Chairman, if it could be asked and honestly answered, exactly how many of the members of this house have read through the Bretton Woods Final Act. It would be an exceedingly revealing question and exceedingly revealing set of answers. If hon. members have never read the act through, or have read it through only once, it would be an exceedingly interesting and thought-provoking question to ask how in the world they can possibly understand this act and all its implications,

Bret ton Woods Agreements
when Paul Einzig. a recognized international authority, has declared that the expert, with years of experience behind him, must read through the act many times before he understands what it means. Yet an appalling number of hon. members of this house are prepared to vote recklessly on this measure without giving attention to the final results of their actions-


An hon. MEMBER:: Speak for yourself.


John Horne Blackmore: Well, I should say
the number of hon. members who are in this house at the present time is the best possible answer to the hon. member. They are not familiar with it; they do not want to be familiar with it; they do not care a bit about this thing. That is an appalling thing. A photograph of this chamber at the present time, showing the number of members in their places when this all-important measure is under discussion, would make mighty interesting reading about twenty years from now.


Mr. COLDWELL:: Some of us are hoping
to discuss the matter before the banking and commerce committee, it must be remembered.


John Horne Blackmore: That is so, and I
recognize the hon. gentleman's very sincere interest. However, I want to make clear the position of the Social Crediters.
Public servants can be guilty of culpable ignorance, culpable negligence and culpable cowardice. In regard to the Bretton Woods agreement it is dangerously easy to be all three. At the present time as far as members of parliament are concerned it is dangerously [DOT]difficult not to be culpably ignorant, culpably negligent and culpably cowardly in respect to the Brettton Woods agreement. I have read through the Final Act a dozen times at least. It is long; it is dry; it is technical and abstruse. It deals with matters unfamiliar to all but those with the most highly specialized knowledge and training. It bears evidence of having been drafted by a past master of the art of tricky phrasing to confuse, the mind, becloud the real issues and conceal the real purport behind the document. Paul Einzig points this out very definitely in a statement which I think we have put on record already and to which hon. members can refer. He says the return to gold has been covered up in this document, and goes on to talk about the almost incomprehensible jargon that is used.
Continuing to deal with the diffculties an hon. member faces in regard to this matter; the resolution was introduced on December 6, only nine days before the date agreed upon for the
closing of parliament and only fifteen sitting days before Christmas. Let us just recall the. number of days an ordinary royal commission spends considering the taxation of cooperatives, for example, and contrast that with the position of this house or the position of the banking and commerce committee, if the resolution gets to it. The resolution was introduced in the closing -weeks of a three months' session of a new parliament, including a very large percentage of new men attending their first session of parliament and consequently naturally unable to catch very much of an impression as to what it is all about, if they are anything like I was when I first came here. The Bretton Woods matter appears on a crowded and heavy agenda on which were such weighty matters as the Aeronautics Act; the housing and central mortgage act; the citizenship measure; the flag resolution; bill 15; the war appropriation bill and the united nations charter, a matter which alone should have occupied the house steadily for at least one month. I have not previously expressed my definite opinon with regard to the united nations charter and the way this house dealt with it, but I am going to say now that the way we dealt with the united nations charter was a positive reflection on this house and on parliamentary government the whole world over. Each of these considerations was a difficult matter, involving fundamental issues and unpredictable implications. Most of them required intensive reading and rigid concentration. And while the house was grinding its way through this repelling programme each member was literally beset with letters raising various problems requiring most careful attention and effort. How could the average member find enough energy and the opportunity to sufficiently study the problem of Bretton, Woods?
Then we come to the next aspect of it. It is unpopular to oppose Bretton Woods. Every hon. member who has been in this house for any length of time knows how difficult it is to keep one's foot on the ground and maintain a cool head when he begins to get letters, begins to read editorials, begins to read attacks reflecting upon his stand in the house and telling him. what he should do. I repeat, it is unpopular to oppose Bretton Woods. Propaganda agencies have laboured assiduously for five years conditioning public opinion. The hon. member for Peace River referred to this in his speech the [DOT] other day. Starting with "union now" and "federal union" and a whole library of books and periodicals they began to build up public opinion for this very measure. People have been lashed into almost a frenzy
Bretton Woods Agreements

about war and peace; they have been stampeded into the obsession that only the surrender of sovereignty would guarantee peace. The hon. member for Wetaskiwin pointed out the other night a number of cases in which obviously an attempt was being made to stampede public opinion. The people have been thrown into such a state of panic over their disease that they were prepared to swallow any suggested medicine without even examining the label or the directions on the outside of the bottle. In this day of free debate, this day of the radio and large scale methods of conveying information, this is astonishing; it is amazing that a people could be so much affected. But there it is. Anyone who calls for even a sense of caution is likely to be accused of committing some sort of sacrilege. This was quite obvious in the united nations discussions. One was not supposed even to talk about it. One mentioned it with bated breath, as he would the name of the divinity.
That sort of thing is not conducive to sane, reasoned behaviour. We find it in this instance. Members of parliament are faced with every temptation to neglect their duty in respect of Bretton Woods. Naturally they desire to get through and to go home. I want to get through and to go home too. I have just as lovely and pleasant a fireside to go back to as has any other hon. member. I want to be there. But I can remember when my boys were in the army-as one of them still is. They could not go home when duty called. And I might saj', incidentally, that my boy who died did not do it for such a base betrayal as Bretton Woods. My boy died for the British empire, that it might be great and free. And this wretched Bretton Woods thing has been foisted upon us-almost before he was buried.
These are matters of serious import. The government's whole attitude, as we gather from the minister's excellent speech, is based upon a fallacy. This may come as a shock to some people, but it is one of the best evidences that this house should proceed writh the greatest possible caution.
May I refer to a passage in the minister's speech-and I am sure he will follow me, and will correct me if I draw any false conclusions. I ask hon. members to tell me if I draw any false conclusions. At page 3089 of Hansard we find this:
When the great depression struck, each country had to cope as best it could with the situation. For all, the prime consideration was to deal with unemployment, and the means of domestic recovery which appeared most practicable consisted of measures whose effect was to thrust the burden of the depression abroad.
[Mr. Blackmored
With that there can be no fault. It is correct. The question which naturally we would raise is: What would they have done if Bretton Woods had been in? I appreciate what the minister has remarked about that. The result of what?-the depression? That is not made clear.


Mr.   LESLEY@: The measures.


John Horne Blackmore: The question is: What should have been done about the depression? The depression had not been cured, it was still in effect in 1939, when we went to war. The depression was upon us in its intensity when this Liberal government took office in 1935. What should the people have been doing? .What were the measures which should have been adopted to meet the depression? What, but tariffs, quotas, restrictions? Here is where the fallacy in reasoning begins. Something is assumed for which there is no justification.
I read on:
The result was the strangulation of world trade, and the mutual impoverishment of all countries.
The "strangulation of world trade", was that the result of protective measures, or was it the result of the depression? Well, I say a careful examination of the facts will convince anyone that the strangulation of world trade was the result of the depression, primarily not of protective devices. When prices fell in the United States, so she could no longer buy goods she produced, or goods she imported, that was the beginning of the strangulation of trade. You see the fallacious reasoning there, all the way through.
I shall read again, so that the minister's words may be exactly quoted:
The result was strangulation of world trade, and the mutual impoverishment of all countries. The characteristic features of world economic relationships before the war were high iand discriminatory tariffs, import quotas, export subsidies, depreciated currencies of uncertain value, discriminatory clearing agreements, multiple currency practices.
With that we can all agree. The important questions for us as responsible members of the house to ask ourselves is this: Were those practices the cause or the result? They were the result of the depression, and so long as the depression continued something had to be done, something like such measures had to be employed.
The question is raised: If Bretton ^ oods had been in operation throughout the world at that time, would Bretton Woods have stopped all that? This is ati important question. And until it is completely cleared up, this house had better proceed with the utmost caution.

Bret Lon Woods Agreements


James Lorimer Ilsley: The answer would be: not of itself, but it would have helped.


John Horne Blackmore: I think it is doubtful whether it would have helped. However, I accept the minister's statement. I doubt whether it would have helped, for reasons which I shall indicate.
Let us deal with the causes of that depression. [DOT] The minister will tell me whether I am correct. I think I have covered this matter with considerable care, and I have obtained my information from a number of sources which I believe to be accurate. The minister is a most honest man, and I know he wants to .have everything exactly straight. So am I an honest man-at least I like to think I am. I can learn from the minister, and perhaps between us we can improve our standards of understanding.
What was the cause of the depression? Well, the first important cause was the cessation of United States foreign lending. At the moment that the foreign lending, which during the roaring twenties had been so extensive, began to diminish, and the foreign lenders began to worry about their lending, they began to withdraw. Immediately many of the great business concerns in. the United States which had been, assured of markets abroad now saw where their markets were to be restricted. The result was that they began immediately to restrict their operations, and the banking system began to retrench. That was^ the first step toward the depression.
The second step is one about which there has been some discussion, and I am sure the minister will tell me whether he thinks I have been correctly informed or otherwise. Of course we must depend upon the works we read. The information I get is that the second step in the depression was the raising of the rediscount rate by the federal reserve board in the United States. Certainly that took place. AVhat effect did it have? Well, the very moment that the rediscount rate was raised by the federal reserve board, the banks automatical!}' began to recall their loans and to restrict their credit. This began to precipitate the deflation which resulted in falling prices, and all the other ills which came naturally with the depression.
The' third cause of the depression was a loss of confidence in securities by speculators. Hon. members will recall that in 1928 and 1929 the first sign of illness was the flutter on the Wall street stock market.


Mr. MacINNIS:: AVhat was the cause of
that loss of confidence?


John Horne Blackmore: I have already said that the first one was when foreign' lending began to ease off.


Angus MacInnis: And what was the cause of foreign lending easing off?


John Horne Blackmore: I shall answer that, in time. I am happy to have the hon. member ask questions, and just as happy to answer him.


Angus MacInnis: One of us apparently does not know much about- this matter, because we do not agree. I am not saying which one it is.


Charles Edward Johnston: The answer is obvious.


John Horne Blackmore: AVe will leave it to the house to decide.


The CHAIRMAN:: May I draw the attention of hon. members on all sides to the fact that, remarks from the floor must be directed to the Chair.	*


John Horne Blackmore: I appreciate your intervention. I wish to restate that I have no desire at all to say anything that is not entirely true.' I want hon. members of the committee to follow with me and tell me whether I am right or wrong. The hon. member for Vancouver East asked what had caused the flutter in the securities market. Naturally it was the two causes which I have already given. First, there was a cessation of foreign lending on the part of prominent people in the United States and, second, there was the raising of the rediscount rate by the federal reserve board which made it much more difficult for banks to get money with which to lend money. The result was that those who were dealing in securities were unable to get credit; they became cautious and they tried to get rid of their 'holdings. The result was a general lack of confidence in the securities market which caused a catastrophic fall in prices generally. I am speaking from memory, and the minister will correct me if I am wrong, but as I recall what Irving Fisher said in his "One Hundred Per Cent Money," of the 823 billion of purchasing power which was out in circulation in the United States at the beginning of the trouble, $8 billion were withdrawn, leaving only $15 billion of purchasing power or money in circulation to do the work which $23 billion had done. This was the result of this loss of confidence in the securities market.


Mr. MACDONNELL (Muskoka-Ontario):: Can the hon. member say to,what extent the
Brelton Woods Agreements

United States tariff, particularly the tightening of it in 1929 or 1930, had to do with the difficulties that arose?


John Horne Blackmore: It may have had
considerable to do with it, but I am not prepared to discuss that at present. That is a most pertinent question and I shall be happy to go into it. May I commend the hon. member for Musk oka-Ontario for asking a question of that kind. It indicates an honest and sincere endeavour to work one's way through to an understanding of the whole situation, an understanding upon which an intelligent estimate of the whole Bretton Woods question can be developed.
The fourth step in the coming on of the depression was the calling of loans and the withdrawal of circulating mediums. As I have indicated, $8 billion of United States circulating mediums were withdrawn. Fifth, was the fall in prices which resulted in $200 billion of value in the United States being destroyed through the fall in prices of farms and all that sort of thing.
I would like to ask hon. members of the committee this simple question: If Bretton Woods had been in full force at that time, would Bretton Woods have had any power whatsoever to prevent those developments in the United States? I think practically every hon member of this committee will have to agree it would not have had any power. It must be obvious that Bretton Woods would have been useless as a remedial or protective measure against that situation.
What resulted? The United States economy was so powerful, it filled such a tremendous place in the world's economy, that the minute this terrible depression developed in the United States it was able to throw out of gear the economies of all other countries. What happened in Great Britain was the natural result of what happened in the United States. Great Britain began to use exchange controls, currency regulations and all that kind of thing to protect herself in some measure against the condition of the United States.
Let me give a simple illustration. The prices of primary commodities fell in the United States, commodities such as beef. If beef had been shipped to England in 1931 or 1932 at the prices prevailing in the United States, unquestionably it would have displaced British beef and upset the whole economy .as far as agriculture in Great Britain was concerned. The only possible means by which Great Britain could prevent that sort of thing was some sort of exchange restriction or some sort of tariff or some sort of quota or some sort of anti-dumping measure. If , Bretton
[Mr. Macdonnell.J
Woods had been in operation at that time she would have been denied the privilege of using all those.	, \
What good would Bretton Woods have been? No good at all. It must be obvious to every member of the committee how completely fallacious is the reasoning that the minister has used here, or that the experts who wrote that speech have used in that particular passage. I am not reflecting on the minister at all, and L want hon. members to understand that. The marvel to me is that the man can live with the amount of work he has had to do. I am positively amazed that he can live. I am astounded that his health has not been smashed all to smithereens long ago because of the terrific pressure of work that is on him.
Of course he has to get the best expert advice he can in preparing his speech. That is a foregone conclusion. He is different from us. I wish to relieve the minister of complete responsibility. How in the world can the Minister of Finance be so well informed on everything that he can do every kind of work that is to be done? He must depend on experts. One of the main lines that this group has followed and is following is that those experts are wrong and, consequently, the minister, following the advice of the experts, and this house, following slavishly and docilely the advice of the minister, will be wrong. It becomes the duty of this house to be critical in the highest degree of the recommendations of these experts. That is not necessarily a reflection on the experts; it is a reflection probably on the training which they have had and which has not equipped them to cope with new situations. No one ever had to face such a depression as the great depression until it came along and the experts did not know how to deal with it.


Mr. JAQUES:: They caused it.


John Horne Blackmore: How could they be expected to tell all about the causes? We must realize that we are dealing with fallible men, men with limitations. The whole argument of Social Credit is to advocate that we should in the name of reason and common sense act like men and not accept slavishly every suggestion which is offered by the minister on the advice of his experts. Let us try to find out something about the problem ourselves, so that we may be intelligent in our own conclusions. The fallacy in the passage which I have indicated must be completely obvious to every single member of the committee.
Let me go a little bit further to show that this fallacy upon which the government is working is deep seated. The first definite

Bretton Woods Agreements
pronouncement which the government made, so far as I know, on the question of Bretton Woods was made in a white paper called Employment and Income which was presented to the house in April, 1945, by the Minister of Reconstruction. May I suggest to hon. members that they take that white paper and turn to page 7 and read what is said regarding Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks. I quote as follows:
Having regard to the widespread character of our trade, the government attaches special importance also to the reconstruction of multilateral trade on a permanent basis and arrangements under which the proceeds of our exports may be spent wherever we desire to obtain our imports.
With that no one can quarrel.
It is with these objects in mind that the government has participated in the development of the plans for the international monetary fund and the united nations bank of reconstruction and development on which agreement among experts was reached at Bretton Woods in July last.
I am not questioning that the government entered into the Bretton Woods agreement with full sincerity and actually believed that the Bretton Woods agreement would constitute a remedy or provide remedial action in the situation. What follows is significant in connection with our discussion:
The monetary fund plan would assure comparative stability of exchange rates and, where change was desirable, would substitute for competitive depreciation of exchanges an orderly proce'ss of change following international consultation.
That is all right, but it is a bit general to be of any value. Notice this next sentence, which reads:
It would outlaw the discriminatory currency practices which turned trade into economic warfare.
May I pause to point out to the members of the committee that right there the fundamental fallacy creeps in. The statement is positively made that it was the currency practices which brought on economic warfare, when as a matter of fact it was the economic warfare resulting from the depression which produced the currency practices. That is obvious. Just as soon as prices fell in the United States and she had to dump her goods and take other protective measures, the economic warfare resulted which produced these currency practices. That is abundantly obvious. Yet this statement is made by the experts, a statement which is an absolute and unquestionable fallacy. May I read it again:
It would outlaw the discriminatory currency practices which turned trade into economic warfare. When it was fully in operation, it would
assure the convertibility of the proceeds of our sales abroad into whatever currencies we required for our current needs.
No one will quarrel particularly with that statement. It goes on:
It would give to each member country for the purposes of its current balance of payments an assured, though limited, line of credit to serve as a buttress to policies directed >to the expansion of employment.
I do not need to read the next two paragraphs but I feel that if I do not, somebody will say that I am distorting by quoting paragraphs out of their context. So, if the committee will permit me, I will read the next two paragraphs, just to be completely fair to the writer of this article:
The regular transfer of capital from surplus to deficit countries for purposes of reconstruction and development is essential to the expansion and stability of international trade. The Bank of Reconstruction and Development would provide through an international institution for a needed revival of international investment.
I doubt that. I doubt whether the existence of the international bank and international stabilization fund would have caused those lenders in the United States to continue lending in 1928-29 when they began to realize that they could not. get their money back because the United States had a tariff that would prevent imports from coming in to pay for the interest on the loans, much less the loans themselves, as the hon. member for Muskoka-Ontario said. Does anyone imagine that United States public opinion as it is at the present time would allow the administration in that country to lower their tariffs sufficiently to allow goods to come in to compete with United States goods? It just is not common sense. So you see once more the fundamental fallacy of that whole attitude, the fundamental and inexcusable error and fallacy. It goes on:
In the interest of Canadian and world prosperity and of peaceful collaboration among nations, the government endorses these plans and hopes that parliament will in due_ course approve the draff agreements. In reaching this view, the government is mindful of the pos-sibity that Canada might, as a member of both institutions, occupy the position of a "creditor" nation.
I am deeply sorry, Mr. Chairman, that that statement was made. It is correct but it means this, as the member for Acadia so well pointed out the other day. The thing which destroys confidence, the thing which ruins the lives of nations is this, that they have goods thrown on to their markets by dumping, export subsidies and all that, which completely puts out of business their industries and throws men on the street as unemployed. That is the trouble. It is the fact that they have
321S
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to import more goods for one reason or another than they are able to export that constitutes economic warfare, and the creditor nations are in large measure responsible for that condition. They are the ones who are producing much more goods than they need and at much lower costs than other countries can produce them, and so they are able to engage in economic aggression and economic penetration and put other nations in an unfavourable position. I pointed that out definitely in my first speech and the words I used then were not recklessly used; they were studied, and so far as I know, they are scientifically accurate, every single one of them.
I think all members of the house and the committee can see very clearly that the government is proceeding on a false assumption, and upon that false assumption is drawing a false conclusion in this whole approach to Bretton Woods. Obviously the Canadian government is not the only government in the world that has done that very thing. The United States has done it. May I read a quotation from a speech by Henry Morgen-thau to the Bretton Woods delegates on July 22, 1944. Members will find this speech in the parliamentary copy of the monetary agreement. Unfortunately the speech is omitted from the copies issued to members of the Canadian parliament. That is regrettable, because the speeches of the late President Roosevelt and of Henry Morgenthau as introductory are very significant and would give the members of this house much reason for considerable reservation in their approach to this whole Bretton Woods affair. May I read the quotation from page 9 of the parliamentary copy?


William Ross Macdonald: 1 must remind the hon. member that his time has expired.


Mr. ROSS (Souris):: Mr. Chairman, I am
not going to discuss this question now because I do not know, enough about it. But in reply to the hon. member for Lethbridge who, said that the members of this house were docilely following the advice of the Finance Minister, let me say that it was clearly understood that in sending this measure to a committee we were not voting for or against the principle but that the whole question was to be gone into fully before the banking and commerce committee. Is not that right?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes. The principle would
be international cooperation to prevent us from getting into economic troubles in the future. It is so general that it would not be binding anybody to support this bill or this agreement in the banking and commerce committee or thereafter.


James Arthur Ross: But before we are
asked to pass this measure it will be considered in the banking and commerce committee?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes. .


James Arthur Ross: I happen to be a
member of that committee. At the moment I am not in a position to vote for or against this measure and I think it is not yet well understood in the country either. I have been a member of many committees of this house and I know that they do excellent work. Whether the public realizes it or not, we are not allowed to call expert witnesses before us here in this chamber; that can only be done in a committee, where witnesses can be called and examined. Then when the bill comes back into the house we can much more intelligently discuss the principle of the measure, after it has been threshed out in a committee of the house.


John Horne Blackmore: But if the majority
of the banking and commerce committee vote against calling witnesses, they cannot be called.


James Arthur Ross: That is true but I
have found that the committees have always been very fair, and I have sat on many of them. I have also found that on the committees there is much less partisan discussion than takes place in the house. That is true of every committee of which I have been a member
I do not want to be misunderstood in this matter at all. I agree with many of the principles advocated by the social credit members in this house; there is no argument about that, but on this question I am in exactly the same position as I was on the Canadian flag. I thought it was good business to have a committee discuss that matter and call witnesses and then report back to the house. That puts the member of the house in a much better position to debate and vote intelligently. Most members of the social credit group have already spoken on this Bretton Woods agreement, and it seems to me that we are not making much headway by prolonging this discussion in the house and that it would be far.better to let the bill go to the banking and commerce committee, where witnesses can be called and the whole question threshed out. We shall be in a much better position to vote intelligently upon it.


John Horne Blackmore: Mr. Chairman, as
another speech has intervened I am at liberty to have the floor again. But first I wish to deal with the hon. member's remarks. I appreciate what he has said, and appreciate his sincerity. I have the highest regard for the

Bretton Woods Agreements
hon. member in every respect, for his integrity, his intelligence and every other quality he
possesses.
Now may I discuss this question of the banking and commerce committee? I am very glad the minister gave the definition of the principle of the bill. I wanted that on record. Would it be out of order to ask the Hansard writer to read back to the committee the definition which the minister gave? I should like to hear that again.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


An hon. MEMBER:: Ask the minister.


John Horne Blackmore: Well, it is all right; I will repeat it and if I am wrong the minister will tell me. The principle of the bill-I am not using the minister's words but I want to know whether I am expressing his thought- will be international cooperation among the nations for the stabilization of economic conditions.
Mr. II.SLEY: Yes.


John Horne Blackmore: Very well; I am going to ask the members of this committee whether they think that the real principle of the bill is going to be that beautiful objective, with which everybody agrees, or is the principle not whether the Bretton Woods agreement is the right way to attain that objective?


An hon. MEMBER:: That is for the
committee.


John Horne Blackmore: There is the point. That is where the danger lies. Let me tell the hon. member for Souris that I have been a member of the banking and commerce committee for a long time; I have seen it in action and I have seen other committees in action, and I do not believe, unless this discussion had been brought about, there would have been one single pronouncement from anyone telling this house what was the principle of the bill until the house had-hastily- passed the first and second reading, approving of the principle of the bill. I will say this, that the men who designed Bretton Woods and the government that brought it in here are fundamentally trying to establish this principle, that the Bretton Woods agreement is the system by which to attain international cooperation. I will not disagree at all with the beautiful objective which the minister has announced. We of this group are all ready to have international cooperation; we all agree it is necessary. But does that mean that we have to assume that this horrible Bretton Woods mechanism is the means whereby we can bring about that cooperation? Well, the very farthest thing from . the truth is this second proposition, that the Bretton Woods
agreement is the way to accomplish it. The whole purpose of my argument here to-day has been along the line that the Bretton Woods agreement simply will not accomplish the objective, and the whole argument of the hon. member for Acadia .was to the same effect. The problem which has to be solved will not be touched by Bretton Woods; at the same time the nations will have been deprived of their sovereignty in the interests of something which has no value at all. That is a serious condition.
Now, may I deal for just a moment or two with what the hon. member for Souris said, in the light of what I have just said, and the definition which the minister gave of the principle of the bill? I wonder how many hon. members -would feel completely safe in accepting the principle of that bill, with the necessary rider or adjunct or appendix or conclusion that the Bretton Woods agreement is the means of accomplishing the objective. There is where the danger lies-fallacious reasoning again. We are not going to vote on the question of cooperation-not at all; we are going to vote on Bretton Woods, every single offensive detail of it. That is the point. Now, Mr. Chairman, that is a mighty serious matter.
Turning again to the subject of the banking and commerce committee. Suppose the house approves what is enunciated as the principle of the Bill by voting for the second reading. The bill goes to the banking and commerce committee. Probably that committee is not given rules telling exactly its terms of reference, they are not specifically stated; it does not know exactly what its functions are; and I have not been in a banking and commerce committee yet where they did know exactly what their terms of reference were. Supposing then the chairman says, to start with, "Now, gentlemen, the house has already decided on the principle of the bill, so we are not to be occupied at all with the principle of the bill". The members then say, "Well, what in the name of common sense are we to be occupied with, and what is the principle of the bill?" Let me point out to the hon. member for Souris that in a situation like that there is only one man who can determine what shall be the procedure in the committee, what witnesses shall be called, what kind of evidence shall be permitted, what kind of remarks shall be deemed to be in order; and that man is the chairman.


James Arthur Ross: No.


John Horne Blackmore: Just a minute. I have been on this committee, and I am making that statement. Hon. members do not need to agree with it.	>
Bretton Woods Agreements


James Arthur Ross: I should like to say, Mr. Chairman, that that is hardly correct. The chairman guides the procedure, and that is his duty; but I have sat during this session at as many as four or five meetings a week in committee. I know that we have reversed on certain occasions definite ideas and views expressed by. the Chair, and his actions are governed by a majority vote of the committee.


John Horne Blackmore: I am glad the hon. member said that. I expected him to make just that statement. Let me point out that the majority of the members of the banking ana commerce commitee will be Liberals and will be put there because they can be implicitly trusted by the Liberal government. What will they tell the chairman to do? There is not a doubt in the world that the attitude of the Progressive-Conservative party, as thus far expressed by those hon. members who have participated in the debate, would be identical with the attitude of the Liberals.


Norman Jaques: And the C.C.F.


James Arthur Ross: The hon. member for Broadview is not present, but may I say that in the debate the other day he spoke right along the lines expressed by the group the hon. member for Lethbridge represents.


John Horne Blackmore: He was an Independent Conservative, was he not?


James Arthur Ross: No.


John Horne Blackmore: I do not want to get into a political squabble, because the matter is too important. If hon. members object to anything I have said in this connection, I withdraw it, because I have some veiy important things to say. But I would point out that the hon. members for Muskoka-Ontario, York West, Grey North and others who participated expressed ideas that were identical with the Liberals in their attitude on this matter.


Norman Jaques: So were the C.CE.


John Horne Blackmore: The result is that
they would vote with the chairman, and that would mean that all these progressive ideas-


Angus MacInnis: Isn't that democracy?


William Ross Macdonald: Order.


Mr. ADAMSON:: Mr. Chairman, may I
say that I advocate the establishment of a free gold market so that we may return to a gold standard in the shortest .possible time.


John Horne Blackmore: I do not know how a man could have played into my hands any better. One of the arguments we were making here recently, one of the differences

between ourselves and the Liberals, was that we contended that this meant a return to the gold standard, and they contended that it did not.


Agar Rodney Adamson: I do not dislike it. I think it is definitely a step in the right direction. In fact I think it is fundamentally the only step towards the recovery of international trade which can now be taken.


Mr. IRVINE:: Let us have order; one
at a time.	.


John Horne Blackmore: Mr. Chairman, it does not hurt me to have these interruptions. The more questions, the better I am satisfied. But let me say this, that anyone reading Hansard, or sitting in this chamber looking on, can tell what chance Social Creditors would have of getting their point of view put before the banking and commerce committee.


Mr. MACKENZIE:: They are doing pretty well this morning.


John Horne Blackmore: Before this committee, but I am speaking of their position in the banking and commerce committee.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The hon. gentleman had no difficulty when he was there before in getting his point of view expressed.


John Horne Blackmore: Well, yes, the hon. gentleman did have difficulty. Time and again in the last banking and commerce committee the member for Lethbridge was ruled out of order when it was all-important that he should say the things he wanted to say. I say this just to show hon. members what they will do if they let this measure go out of this committee and pass the second reading. They will tie their own hands and they will smother all possibility of intelligent and effective discussion. Not only that; by passing the second reading of the bill they will tie the hands of the banking and commerce committee so that it will be unable to act properly, because of the simple fact that they will have approved the principle of the bill. If this measure were to be referred to, say, an impartial royal commission whose members would vote in accordance with what they conceived to be right, and the vote were based upon their findings, that would be an altogether different matter. I am warning the committee that what I have said is true. If this measure goes past this committee, where we can freely discuss it and ask each other questions and get all the information necessary, . this house will have tied its hands and smothered effective discussion of the bill. Of course the minister wants this measure to

Bretton Woods Agreements
go through. Surely. He wants to get it out of this committee. Who would not, if he wanted to get the thing through? He wants to get first and second reading over so that he can put the measure into the Liberal-dominated and reactionary-dominated committee. Of course he wants to have the banking and commerce committee handcuffed when it undertakes discussion of the bill, and I suppose anyone in the house would if he wanted to get the bill through. But the question I ask is this: Is that what hon. members want, or do they want a frank and intelligent discussion back and forth over the floor of this house so that we may get at the facts?


Angus MacInnis: The hon. member has asked if that is what members want. My understanding of procedure in this house is that when a measure of this kind comes before it, it receives con. sideration here and in order that it may receive greater attention, where witnesses can be called and outside evidence brought in, we refer the matter to a standing or special committee. I do not know of any important measure that has come before this house in the fifteen years that I have been here that did not follow that procedure.


Mr. QUELCH:: What about the united nations charter?


Angus MacInnis: The united nations charter, perhaps, did not; but if my friends had asked that it be referred to a committee-I was not here when it was discussed in the house-I have no doubt it would have been. As a matter of fact, standing committees and special committees are part of the British parliamentary procedure which we follow, and, if we discussed the matter there the discussion would be just as futile as it is here, since we have been considering this measure. The member for Lethbridge has said that the Bretton Woods proposals are not the means by which we can restore and maintain economic prosperity. Well, I should be inclined to agree with him. I do not say that it can in itself. He has also put his position clearly before us, and the position of his party. His party has a programme that would restore and maintain or bring about economic prosperity.


Norman Jaques: That is not the question at all.


John Horne Blackmore: With freedom.


Angus MacInnis: All right, with freedom. I am agreeing with the hon. gentleman. But he is in pretty much the same position as I am. I believe that I too have a programme that would bring about prosperity with freedom, and it is not the same as my hon. friend's
programme. Our position in this house, however, is that the majority do not agree with either of us. I believe that the majority are foolish fn not agreeing with me, but as reasonable men, members who were elected not only to put our own programme into effect, not only to state our own programme in this house, but to take every advantage of the opportunities that offer to do as much as we can to improve whatever is put before us, I cannot-


Norman Jaques: On a point of order, the discussion from this group has had nothing to do with Social Credit. We are not talking Social Credit. We are discussing Bretton Woods, and the member for Vancouver East, in his anxiety to close off the discussion-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


William Ross Macdonald: The hon. member has not raised a point of order.


Angus MacInnis: I must apologize for my lack of understanding, but *in all the discussion that has taken place from that corner my understanding of it was that it was definitely associated with the Social Credit policy.


Norman Jaques: Not at all.


Angus MacInnis: I may be quite wrong-


Norman Jaques: You are.


Angus MacInnis: -but I can be excused when the member for Wetaskiwin is speaking. In this house we have an obligation to put forward our own point of view; but, according to the rules that we follow, a certain party in the house forming the government has been given a mandate to carry on the business of the country, and the business of the country, particularly to-day, in relation to the world conditions with which we are confronted, is tremendously important, so important that no group in this house, unless it is a matter of profound principle, and I am not saying that it is not so for my friends, should hold up the business.


John Horne Blackmore: On a point of order, may I say that there is no attempt on the part of this group to hold up the business of the house. I ask the hon. member to withdraw that remark.


Angus MacInnis: I am not going to withdraw anything of the kind.


John Horne Blackmore: The hon. member must withdraw.
The CHAIRMAN; There has been no reflection on any member.


John Horne Blackmore: He used the expression, holding up the business of the house.
Bretton Woods Agreements


William Ross Macdonald: There has been no reflection on any member of the house. The statement is made with respect to a group and not any individual member.
Mr. MaeINNIS: The point I make is that no one has a right to hold up the business of the house, and no one who does not hold up the business' can find fault with that.


Norman Jaques: Who is holding up now?
Mr. MaeINNIS: Surely if we followed the democratic procedure in all other cases, and if tHat is considered part of the freedom we enjoy, we should extend that freedom to this particular subject that is now before us and place the matter in such a position that we can bring outside evidence to bear. Some members of my own group, in discussing this matter, said that when it did go into committee we would have difficulty putting forward our own point of view because others would monopolize the whole time of the committee.	t


John Horne Blackmore: On a point of order-


An hon. MEMBER:: He,did not say you.


John Horne Blackmore: I had the floor and the hon. member rose with my permission, but he will talk past one o'clock and keep me from replying.
Mr. MaeINNIS: The hon. gentleman asked a question and I am trying to reply, and now he does not like the answer. He wants me to sit down. My suggestion is that we should follow the ordinary procedure, because if we did so we could get more information in the committee than in the house.


John Horne Blackmore: My contention is that the hon. member is one hundred per cent wrong, as he is on practically everything. The only way to get the truth is to stay here.
Mr. MaeINNIS: I am sure I am one hundred per cent right when the hon. gentleman says I am one hundred per cent wrong.


John Horne Blackmore: Article IX of the Bretton Woods agreement, if put into force, would make it impossible for the hon. member to bring in socialism-absolutely impossible-because the fund could get control of the movable goods or immovable property in the dominion and it would be impossible for any government to pass regulations with respect to it. The hon. member knows that much about Bretton Woods. If he does not, I suggest that he read that article.


Mr. TUCKER:: The hon. member has
stated, and he is quite sincere in his statement, that he wants information. He can hear the

evidence of witnesses. I submit the way to do that is to have this matter go to the banking and commerce committee, where it can be thoroughly studied and gone into. Then if the hon. members are not convinced, it has to come back into this house and go through committee of the whole; it has to be given third reading, and they will then have had ample opportunity to cross-examine witnesses and go into the thing very fully. I suggest the experience of the banking and commerce committee is such that everyone will have an opportunity there to go into the matter thoroughly. For the sake of getting on with the other business of the house I urge that before one o'clock this matter be permitted to go to the banking and commerce committee, which probably can meet at four o'clock and get started upon orderly consideration of the matter. Then if hon. members still are not convinced, they will have the same chance to fight this thing after it has been studied in the banking and commerce committee as they have to-day. I urge upon them that they give consideration to this suggestion and let the measure go to the banking and commerce committee right now.


John Horne Blackmore: I must tell the hon.
member for Rosthern that when he says we would have just as good a chance to discuss this matter when it came back again, he is telling us that which is absolutely wrong. And I would draw to the attention of the hon. member for Vancouver East, who said it was traditional British parliamentary practice to refer these matters to committees, the fact that it is traditional British parliamentary practice to ask the minister all kinds of questions at the resolution stage, when in committee of the whole in order to gather all the information hon. members need in order to enable them to form a sound decision with respect to the principle of the bill. That is why these questions are being asked, and why this discussion must come right here in com-, mittee of the whole.
At one o'clock the committee took recess.
After Recess
The committee resumed at three o'clock.


John Horne Blackmore: Mr. Chairman, before the committee took recess at one o'clock I was discussing the general attitude of this group toward the measure. I was pointing out that those who maintain that this group is in any way endeavouring to block the

Bretton Woods Agreements
measure, or carry on what is commonly known as a filibuster, is entirely not in accordance with the facts. All this group aims at is to have a full and thorough investigation of the whole matter of Bretton Woods. It is our opinion that this whole proposal is a pernicious one, and we think that the committee should give it most earnest consideration before even considering such a thing as adopting it.
At one time in my remarks I was pointing out the fundamental fallacy which is to be found in the government's position in the matter. I quoted a passage from the speech of the Minister of Finance, and also referred to a statement which is found in the white paper called Employment and Income, which was presented to the house in April, 1945, by the Minister of Reconstruction, Then I was about to read a passage from the speech of Henry Morgenthau, Junior, delivered to the delegates at Bretton Woods, in their closing plenary session in July, 1944. My object in reading this passage was to give the committee the background of the whole question, and to help show the attitude of the United States to the whole situation.
Before reading this passage may I point out once more in different language that there simply is no use in trying to apply what is supposed to be a cure or a remedy for a malady the nature of which we have not discovered. There is no earthly use, for example, in trying to prescribe a cure for the pimples of smallpox, until one finds out what is the cause of smallpox. If you wish to cure smallpox, you find out the cause, and then attack that cause: The same applies' to great international problems. We will grant that the world is suffering from a malady, and that it was' suffering from that malady as far back as 1925. The Bretton Woods proposal is supposed to be an important part of the remedy for that malady. We maintain that it has nothing whatsoever to do with the remedy for the malady. The malady must be remedied by measures altogether different from anything found in Bretton Woods.
May I now read the passage from Henry Morgenthau, Junior, where he says:
This is the alternative-
The alternative to Bretton Woods-
-to the desperate tactics of the past-competitive currency depreciation, excessive tariff barriers, uneconomic barter deals, multiple currency practices and unnecessary exchange restrictions-by which governments vainly sought to maintain employment and uphold diving standards. In the final analysis, these tactics only succeeded in contributing to world wide depression and even war. The international fund agreed upon at Bretton Woods will help remedy this situation.
He says it will help to remedy the situation. He does not maintain that it will be a complete remedy. We will grant that. But I wish to concentrate the attention of members of the committee on that second to last sentence, where he says-
In the final analysis, these tactics only succeeded in contributing to world-wide depression and even war.
As I said when dealing with the passage in the minister's speech, the things which caused the great depression-and I am going to list them once more, for the benefit of members of the committee who happened to be out of the chamber when I did it before-the causes of the great depression of 1929 on were as follows. First, Mr. Chairman, I am afraid there are some members in the committee endeavouring to out-talk me.


An hon. MEMBER:: That would be hard to do.


John Horne Blackmore: I grant that; but why do they try? The causes of the depression of 1929 on, were, first, the cessation of United States foreign lending. May I comment upon that, to this extent: The United States were lending money to borrowing nations to enable them to buy United States goods. It was a most preposterous proposal, but it was an idea indulged in for about ten years by the United States when they believed they could make themselves prosperous by lending foreign nations the moneys with which to buy United States goods. This helped them to keep up their rate of profit, and to keep employment on a fairly high level. But the time came when they began to lose confidence in that method; and as soon as they did, there was a cessation of foreign lending, which constituted the first move to bring on the depression.
The second cause of the depression was-


Mr. ZAPLITNY:: Why did they lose confidence in that method of finance? I have heard that statement two or three times, that they lost confidence in that method of lending money. Would the hon, member give us his opinion as to why it was that they lost confidence?


John Horne Blackmore: I shall be glad to.
I shall take time to answer; the hon. member is one of the new members, and is entitled to an answer. Let us suppose that the hon. member himself is lending money on a large scale to, let us say, Argentina. The only hope he would have of gaining remuneration from that loan would be this: He would have the hope that Argentina would be able to pay back to the United States the interest on the loan. Let us suppose, further, that Argentina

Bretton Woods Agreements

offers beef to the United States, in payment of the loan, and that the United States refused to accept that offer. Then* Argentina may offer wool, and again the United States may refuse to accept, because she already has too much wool. Let us suppose Argentina then offers shoes, but that the United States refuses to accept those shoes, because she already has too many shoes. Before long the total number of commodities Argentina could offer would have been rejected by the United States, by means of high tariffs, absolute quota restrictions, or an anti-dumping law'. Then all the products which Argentina could trade to the United States, through a multilateral trade arrangement, may have been refused by the United States, through a policy of high protection. It would soon appear clear to the hori. member that lending money to Argentina in the hope of getting a return which would have to come in the form of goods and services-returns which would be rejected by the United States-would be simply throwing good money away. The result is that, the hon. member would begin to lose confidence-and the same w'ould be true in all shnilar situations.


Frederick Samuel Zaplitny: I am sincere about this, and would ask w'hat method the hon. member would suggest instead of the method which he says has been discredited.


John Horne Blackmore: I would be afraid to say too much about that, for fear of being called to order. But I shall say just this, that the alternative is lend-lease or mutual aid. We have to come to a stage in which, if the nations of the world are to have enjoyment of freedom from want and fear, great producing countries like the United States and Canada will trade off all the goods tljey can trade off for goods they need in their respective economies; and their surpluses they will be prepared to offer to the world on a lend-lease or mutual aid basis. And they will pay for lend-lease goods by using their national credit, through a debt-free money system. Just as soon as that system is adopted by all the nations of the world, it is obvious to the hon. member, I believe, that the surpluses of all the nations of the world would be rendered available in a great international pool. Prom that pool the nations could draw in accordance with their need. That is the gist of the Social Credit proposal for international trade. The hon. member can see that with the adoption of an attitude of that kind by all the nations of the world there would be the end of competitive trade. The United States would not still be trying to penetrate the market of Great Britain and undersell her 
produce. Is that not obvious? There W'ould be no more object in underselling nations like Britain and putting her people out of employment. The trade of the w'orld would then gc on a cooperative trade rather than a competitive trade basis. I think the hon. member can see that that would have a great advantage in bringing about peace in the world.


Frederick Samuel Zaplitny: Would the hon. member say the key to the whole problem is the use of debt-free money?


John Horne Blackmore: The key to the whole problem is debt-free money both internally and externally. If I am permitted I should like to say a word or two along in that regard, because I think it is in order. The need of the situation to-day is distribution of goods internally and internationally. As the hon. member will recall, the hon. member for Acadia the other day asked the minister if he was prepared to bring about- a complete effective demand in Canada for Canada's production. Suppose Canada had twelve billion dollars' worth of production in a year after the war. The maximum need would be twelve billion dollars' worth of purchasing power in Canada available to buy that production. If Canadian people did not wish to buy all the production of Canada's wheat, for example, that surplus could be traded for bananas or other things w'hich Canadians need, and Canadians would be able to buy those goods when they arrived. Do I make that quite clear to the hon. gentleman?
I was pointing out the causes of the depression. Number one was the cessation of foreign lending. I thank the hon. member for asking me that question. I welcome questions of that kind from any member in the house, because Social Crediters are not condemning this proposal without offering an alternative. They condemn this proposal, and they condemn the whole present orthodox financial system, on the ground that it is absolutely impossible for it to distribute the goods of the world and to eliminate competitive trade, which means economic warfare, which in turn means military warfare in the end.
The second step toward the bringing on of the depression was the raising of the rediscount rate by the federal reserve board. The minute the rediscount rate was raised by the federal reserve board the banks were unable to obtain money as easily upon which to base loans for large investments, including security on speculations. That meant there was retraction of money immediately all over the country. That was the second step in the bringing on of the depression.

_________ Bretton Woods Agreements
The third step was the loss of confidence in securities by the speculators. Those who were ready to pay large sums for mining stocks, gold stocks and stocks of lumber mills and all that kind of thing began to be afraid because they said,' "We may lose." They then began to hesitate and began to try to sell., which immediately brought on the depression, and the consequence was a complete collapse of the 'economy of the country.
The fourth step was the calling of loans. The withdrawing of circulating medium naturally resulted all over the country, because the lending policy of the banks is intimately bound up with the lending policy of the banks to those who wish to deal in securities. Does the hon. member get that?
The fifth step was the fall of prices which naturally resulted from a withdrawal of purchasing power throughout the country. I was speaking from memory when I mentioned this a while ago, but I think I am right. According to Irving Fisher, a great economist, in his book called "A Hundred Per Cent Money", eight billion of the twenty-three billion dollars in circulation in the United States in 1929 were withdrawn, and this brought on a fall in prices and in values all over the United States.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


John Horne Blackmore: Oh, that kind of thing doesn't do a bit of good.


William Ross Macdonald: Order.


John Horne Blackmore: You know, I lived too long in the backwoods to be afraid of wolves when they call. In reading the passage from Morgenthau's principles I made it quite clear that the United States is proceeding on the basis of the same fallacy which is at the bottom of the whole Canadian government's policy. In other words, the United States, if it is honest and sincere, and you must suppose it is, is proceeding to apply a remedy which is not a remedy, a remedy which would only make the malady worse.
I have a little more to say at this time. I merely wish to make clear the position that I occupy. The leader of this group called me about two weeks after the session opened and asked me to take charge of the organization and conduct of the inquiry on the Bretton Woods question in this house. The result is that I am responsible for the conduct of this inquiry. The object of the inquiry is to elicit the facts. Long ago the great Creator said: "And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." If hon. members of this house will not know the truth, 47696-203J
it is impossible for them to be free. Consequently the very first step for this house to take is to learn the truth. It is my humble desire that I might aid in the divulging and eliciting of the truth. I have no conceivable motive for doing what I am doing but the object which I have indicated. I can gain nothing politically, because the people all over the country think that any one who opposes Bretton Woods must be crazy. They think that because they do not know about it, because they have been deceived by the press.
I can gain nothing politically. If I were* the leader of the group, it might be thought that I had some ulterior motive in taking the stand I do. I have nothing to gain in that respect. I simply stand as a plain citizen of the Dominion of Canada, a plain member of this house, a plain ordinary man. I represent those who have made, sacrifices in two wars, and who ask that there shall be found something or other which will eliminate the causes of war. I represent the men whose sons have died in this war, and I myself have given a son and risked the life of another in this war. And as I said in the early part of the debate, my son did not die for such a sordid betrayal of the interests of all nations as Bretton Woods constitutes. My son died for a condition in which there will be free men and a free and great British commonwealth of nations, a free and great nation of the United States, a world in which there shall not be trade competition among * nations, but a world in which men will discover how they can cooperate and trade their surpluses for each other's surpluses in a genuinely cooperative manner.
I wish to say no more at this time. The hon. member for Wetaskiwin was unable to finish his speech the other night. He had some important things that he wished to say on this general subject that is now under discussion. I should like to hear him speak. And then personally I should like to see the hon. member for Acadia go on with the fine work he was doing.
Some hon. MEMBERS. Carried.


John Horne Blackmore: No.


Norman Jaques: I am not going to make any apologies for speaking here this afternoon.


Mr. PROBE:: We are glad to hear you.


Norman Jaques: There seems to be an
indecent haste to end open discussion on this measure.


Mr. KNIGHT:: May I ask the hon. member a question?
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Norman Jaques: No, I prefer-


Robert Ross (Roy) Knight: Is this a discussion?


Norman Jaques: It certainly is.


Robert Ross (Roy) Knight: It is the kind of discussion I hear in church; I am in the pew and the preacher is in the pulpit.


Norman Jaques: There is considerable criticism from my hon. friends to my immediate right of the time we have taken over this measure.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Hear, hear.


Norman Jaques: On every subject that has come up in this house hon. members of the C.C.F. have taken all the time they wanted; they talked incessantly. You cannot say that about the members of this group. We have reserved what we might have said on less important subjects-


Major James William Coldwell: This is going to a committee.


Norman Jaques: -so that we might have our turn on this measure. With regard to putting this measure before the committee on banking and commerce and calling in the experts-


William Ross Macdonald: Order.


Norman Jaques: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do not mind reminding the committee that I would not be speaking did I not feel it my duty to do so. Those who are not interested might just as well remove themselves; they would not be missed.
Let me say this about calling in experts. I am not interested in the experts, not in the slightest.


An hon. MEMBER:: Why not?


Norman Jaques: I do not believe in suicide. Those who do believe in it can call in any experts in suicide they like, but they are not going to convert me to the idea of suicide, and I do not care whether it is painless or otherwise. The experts are not going to convince me against my own convictions.
So far this has been a one-sided debate.


An hon. MEMBER:: Right.


Norman Jaques: That is quite right. But we have established at least two or three principles in this discussion. One is that Bretton Woods means a return to the gold standard. We have also established the principle that foreign trade will be controlled by an international gold standard, and that foreign trade will control national prosperity. That has been admitted in so many words. We have also established the fact that Bretton

Woods means the surrender of sovereignty to an international government, and Bretton Woods is supported for that very reason by some members of this house, just because it means a surrender of national sovereignty. The other day the hon. member for Vancouver East, for instance, had this to say:
We have heard a great deal of talk about national sovereignty. Will some one tell me how many countries have to-day any national sovereignty that is worth while? I think I could count them pretty well with the' fingers of one hand. We have reached the stage where if we are to have peace; if we are to have that measure of cooperation that will bring about prosperity, not only for ourselves but for others, we must be ready to give up a great deal of our national sovereignty. Indeed that is the way world progress has been made. Not only have people given up things, but privileges have been taken away from sections or from groups in order that those privileges might be extended to even larger numbers of people. That is the way democracy has developed in nations; and that is the way it must develop in the international sphere.
I consider such a statement as that, in face of the actual conditions of the world, nothing short of criminal lunacy. There are only two or three nations that have preserved their national sovereignty, of which Canada is one, thank God 1 It is only in those nations where national sovereignty has been maintained that the people can meet in their parliaments and exercise freedom of speech. Let me remind hon. members of what the British secretary for foreign affairs said recently in the parliament at Westminster. But first let me remind hon. members of the Atlantic charter. It guaranteed four freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom from want, freedom from fear and freedom of worship, and as a guarantee of these freedoms the charter pledged to seek no territorial changes except by the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned and to see national sovereignty and self-government restored to those who had been deprived of them. That is the Atlantic charter. It guaranteed that sovereign rights and self-government would be restored to those who had lost them. Yet hon. members of this house get up and advocate the surrender of sovereign rights! To whom and to what?


Angus MacInnis: On a point of order, Mr. Chairman, surely when we accepted the united nations charter it meant that we were prepared to give up some of our sovereign rights if the charter has any meaning at all.


Mr. LOW:: What is the point of order?


Angus MacInnis: That is the point of order.


Solon Earl Low: That is no point of order.

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Angus MacInnis: It is a point of privilege then.	[DOT]


Solon Earl Low: It is no point of privilege.


Norman Jaques: In a moment I shall quote what the British Foreign Secretary said. More than four years have passed since Churchill and Roosevelt on a British battleship, somewhere in the Atlantic, on behalf of all peoples, offered to the world that charter of justice - and liberty in whose faith millions have since died. But president and Prime Minister stepped ashore to find that this charter of freedom was not approved by the real "bosses", and its sponsors were forced to admit that their charter was not to be taken seriously, it was merely wishful thinking. In these past four years the Atlantic charter, and its four freedoms, have been torn to pieces at the four conferences of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam.
Now, Mr. Bevin said this recently in the British House of Commons:
There are two kinds of hunger in Europe today; one is a physical hunger, and the other is the awful black-out, creating a spiritual hunger. If every country could get free parliaments and free expression without dictatorship or orders, [DOT]and if people could express themselves freely we might be able to make a better world for the future.
How are you going to guarantee any of these things if you surrender your sovereign rights? 'What has happened to those who have surrendered them? Another British labour member told parliament at Westminster:
Since Potsdam something different has been happening-we are contracting into a country very little larger than the United Kingdom, over 60 million people. It appears that some- * thing like the fiendish Morgenthau plan is being carried out.
The Russians already have stripped their zone of all industrial equipment. They are carrying out land reforms so as to get rid of the German Junkers but, unfortunately, their reforms are reducing this former food exporting area to a strip-farming proposition with disastrous results for future food production. Millions of refugees from Russian-controlled countries are flooding into that area and are dying from exposure and lack of food. These policies are being carried out with the most appalling ruthlessness and inhumanity.
Similar statements were made by other members, many of whom spoke as eye witnesses of the tragedy. That is the meaning of the surrender of national sovereignty. That is what happens. You become slaves to the biggest gangsters in the world. That is what is happening to-day. Who is this Morgenthau, the author of this Bretton Woods plan? He is a former secretary of the United States treasury. He is the sponsor of the international monetary plan agreed upon at Bretton
Woods. He is the author of the plan to reduce central Europe to a subsistence level. Furthermore, what right has any member of this house to advocate the surrender of what does not belong to him? Has this government, this house, or anybody in it? Have they received a mandate from the people of Canada to hand over Canadian sovereignty to an international government of international financiers? All I know is that I have not, and I am not going to do it if I stay here until this time next year.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


Norman Jaques: Carried? No.


John Horne Blackmore: Have we forgotten
to believe in free speech?


Norman Jaques: We have heard a lot in the past about the "iniquity" of International Nickel, but did you hear from the socialists about the iniquities of international gold? I never did. What a lot of people do not understand is the partnership between international finance and international socialism.
It is a partnership which too many fail to realize, that the one is merely a partner of the other, and that at the present time the world is in the position of a nut in the nutcrackers, one jaw of which is international finance and the other is international socialism, or communism, or whatever you like to call it-totalitariarism.
When I was speaking before in this debate I mentioned a statement I made two or three years ago with regard to the ownership of the gold reserve in the United States, and I quoted a certain authority I met in England when I was there the winter before last. I am sorry I am not in a position to give his name publicly, but as I said the other day, if anybody is interested I shall be only too glad to give him his name. More than that, if it is kept off the record and the press do not report it I shall be perfectly willing to give his name in this chamber right now. He is a man whose knowledge few people in this house would care to challenge. Now, I want to make this statement perfectly clear. Here is the annual report of the secretary of the United States treasury for the year ended . June, 1942. On page 638 the statement appears, in plain English: Money held in the treasury, 1942, $22,596 million. That is the total amount of money. In the next column is the statement: Held for the federal reserve banks and agencies, $17,750 million. Can you say that you own 'a thing when you are holding it for somebody else? That is the point. So what I said two years ago is true, that 85 per cent of the gold in the United States is not owned
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and controlled by the people of the United States; it is owned and controlled by the federal reserve banks, which are private institutions. I believe that any intelligent man in the United States would agree to that statement.
We have heard a lot about experts. I should like to recall the appointment after the first world war of a committee of experts, for the same purpose that this committee of experts sat at Bretton Woods last summer, namely to restore the prosperity of the nations in the post-war period. Let me read the names of this committee: Chairman, Lord Cunliffe, Governor of the Bank of England; Sir Charles Addis, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; the Hon. Rupert Beckett, Beckett and Company, bankers; Sir Tohn Bradbury, K.C.B., Secretary to the Treasury; Mr. G. C. Cassels, Bank of Montreal; Mr. Gaspard Fairer, Baring and Company, bankers; the Hon. Herbert Gibbs, Anthony Gibbs & Sons, bankers; Mr. W. H. N. Goschen, chairman of the clearing bankers' committee; Lord Inchcape, chairman of the National Provincial bank; Mr. R. W. Jeans, Bank of Australasia; Mr. A. C. Pigou. professor of political economy, Cambridge university; Mr. G. F. Stewart, ex-governor of the Bank of Ireland; Mr. William Wallace, Royal Bank of Scotland; Mr. G. C. Upcott, of the treasury and ministry of reconstruction.
That was an all-star committee; I do not think the present committee could match it. When one talks of experts, if these men were not experts I do not know where experts could be found. What was the result of their recommendations and their advice? We know what happened-years of depression. Of course anyone can be wise after the event; most people's hindsight is better than their foresight. But always there arises the odd man with the ability to foresee the result of- any policy. Such a man was Mr. Arthur Kitson, who was ,the author of a book which I have in my hand, and which I obtained from the library of parliament, called "The Bankers' Conspiracy." He presented in 1918 a brief before this committee on reconstruction, and in it he foretold exactly what would be the result of their policies if they were put into effect. He said afterwards:
If the present world crisis can be traced to the currency deflation policy pursued by the central banks of the great industrial nations since the war. Great Britain must be held mainly responsible for having taken the lead in the adoption of this suicidal measure. And the men who should be held responsible to the British people for urging the government to embark on this reactionary course are the members of these two committees.

But Arthur Kitson foretold exactly what would happen if the advice of the Cunliffe committee were adopted by the government -a government, let me say, just as intelligent as this present government, and advised by experts just as capable as any experts which could be brought before any committee formed in this house. I say that if we follow the advice of these experts there is every reason to believe that' we shall go the same way as we went after the last war.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


Norman Jaques: No; you will have to carry me out first.


Mr. CASTLEDEN:: Not a bad idea.


Norman Jaques: The statement is frequently made that money is international. It is not, and the attempt to make it so is part of a deep laid plot, a plot on the part of international financiers to control the world politically, industrially and financially by means of an international bank. This scheme would enslave all the people to a soulless dictatorship by anonymous international finance. This is what these planners are saying to the world, and what they have been saying for a long time: "Do you want another depression? Do you want to go back to the conditions that prevailed before the war?" Of course people say no; then the planners blackmail them by saying, "All right; then surrender your sovereignty to us." And the totalitarians, the international socialists are saying. "Do you want another war?" No; of course not. That is the last thing we want. Then the international socialists blackmail people and they say: "All right; you surrender your sovereignty to us or you will have another war and another after that." The world is being blackmailed by Shylock and Marx, and it is about time we faced the fact.
Does anyone think that after the war we wish to hand everything over to the very people who caused the war and who are the authors of the economic miseries that we have had for the last thirty or forty years? The member for Vancouver East talks about the progress of the world. I do not know what he calls progress. Compare for one moment the condition of Europe to-day with what it was at the turn of the century and before that. Is there any comparison? Three-quarters of the people have lost their sovereignty and their freedom. If that is progress then I say, in the words of an old Latin saying, "facilis descensus Averni", easy is the descent to hell. That is where Europe has gone and where we are in danger of following it.

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Let me quote one of the principal authors of this scheme, Mr. Maynard Keynes, or Lord Keynes as I believe he now is. Speaking of the clearing union he says:
It might become a pivot of the future economic government of the world. It might set up an account in favour of an international policing body. It would provide excellent machinery for enforcing a financial blockade, and we have here a genuine organ of truly international government.
These are the words of Lord Keynes. I do not recall the occasion on which they were spoken, but I think I am correct in saying that the present Minister of Finance admitted much the same thing during a debate in this house, if not last year, probably the year before. I do not remember the date, but I remember the occasion.
I believe that the big idea of the last decade or in the last decades has been largely this- and it applies more particularly to Europe, though it is spreading now all over the world. The first step was to confiscate by taxation. That is the scheme, the big idea of Shylock and Marx. I mean by Shylock the moneyed interests, high finance. People are at liberty to put whatever interpretation they like upon the word Shylock and they will not frighten me. I say Shylock and I stick to the word, and if they do not like it they can lump it. Their scheme has been to confiscate the land by taxation and death duties, forcing the land owners into the hands of money lenders, so that their political power would pass over to high finance. That is what happened in Great Britain. The second has been to tax manufacturers and traders so that they are forced to go into debt to the financiers, who thus gain control of industry. The third has been to tax the middle class so as to demoralize them by fear and reduce them to servitude and impotence. The fourth has been to tax the workers so as to prevent them from exercising their independence and to force upon them conditions calculated to drive them to communism, which also is controlled by anonymous high finance.
That very briefly is the scheme that has been working since the turn of the century and before that. It is certainly working now, for we have taxation that amounts to confiscation and I cannot see any prospect of its reduction.
We Social Crediters say that sovereignty is the quintessence of freedom and liberty, and we are absolutely convinced that that sovereignty and freedom are threatened by Bretton Woods. That is why we are making the stand we are. Neither this government, nor the Liberal party, nor the Conservative party, nor the C.C.F. party, nor the Social Credit party has any mandate, nor taken collectively
have they any mandate, from the people of Canada to surrender the liberties of the Canadian people to any body or control outside the dominion. That is the stand we take, and it is no excuse to say that the people do not know because that is our fault. We should make it clear to them. Instead of trying to smother this debate, why do not some of the other members get up and strike a blow for the liberty of the Canadian people?
A little while ago we had a discussion on a . Canadian flag. We were going to have a national flag and a national anthem, and at that time I said:	When we talk of a flag for
Canada and an anthem for Canada let us be sure that we have the sovereignty that goes with them. Some people say that we should have a maple leaf on the flag. I am perfectly agreeable to putting anything Canadian on it, but my opinion is, and it is shared by the rest of my group and by many more people, that if Bretton Woods goes through the only suitable thing you could put on the Canadian flag would be three brass balls.


John Horne Blackmore: Pawn shop.


Norman Jaques: You may take the union jack off, or take off what you like; but if this thing goes through all you should put on are the three brass balls. I do not know what will sting some members into a sense of their responsibilities. I can only suppose they are so cowed and so controlled that they dare not raise their voices. Already they have lost their will to defend their freedom and their sovereignty. Well, we Social Crediters have not, and we do not intend to lose them if we can prevent it.
Now let me quote a statement made in 1894, a long time ago. Anyone can be wise after the event, but it takes a good man to foretell the future, to judge a policy and the results of that policy. This is what Mr. Arthur Kitson wrote in a little; book called "A Scientific Solution of the Money Question" back in 1894, or fifty-one years ago:
The gold standard means inevitable war. Nations cannot possibly exist- for long under it.
The children born of it are fire and sword, red ruin, and the breaking up of laws.
The repudiation of debt will become inevitable. Nations must strangle this monster or it will strangle them. The gold debts of the world cannot be redeemed in gold. Although gold does not enter- in the slightest degree into those things that sustain life, by building industry upon this fickle basis, our civilization is in dangeT of being swept away. It is not a mere abstract question of economics. It does not merely concern statesmen, and students of finance. It is the greatest moral, the greatest social question which mankind has ever had to consider. It concerns the lives, fortunes and happiness of every human being in society, and of generations yet unborn. All other questions
Bretton Woods Agreements

sink into insignificance compared to this one. It is the "fin de siecle" problem, and our answer to it will determine the character of the drama we shall shortly have to witness, and upon which the curtain of the twentieth century is about to rise,
I would ask those hon. members who are indulging in levity to think over those words and ask themselves whether they are true or false. What has happened since they were written? We have had two wars and two or three terrible revolutions. Red ruin. I suppose I am not exaggerating when I say that at least a hundred million people have been killed since those words were written. If nothing else will bring hon. members to a realization of the question we are discussing to-day; if they ai;e careless about themselves then let them think of those who have died as a result of this and all those who may be called upon to die in the future.


William Irvine: I am not going to make a speech, but I want to ask the minister a question or two just for my own satisfaction and in recognition of the fact that hon. gentlemen to my left want to make sure just what this thing means. I think we have been very patient with them in that regard, recognizing that this parliament wants to give them and all other hon. members a chance to get as much information as it is possible to get on the legislation we pass here. Before putting my question I might say that I do not think the hon. gentleman who just resumed his seat strengthened his position by the views he expressed. For instance, if this were an international socialist movement I should be voting for it with both hands, and so far I have not had the opportunity to do so. In the second place, if it implies the yielding of a portion of our sovereignty to ourselves as we are represented in an international agreement, I would be all for it. I am sorry the hon. gentleman did not quote what Mr. Bevin had to say a few days ago about the necessity for international government. I believe that would have been a very important quotation to give in this connection.
The point I want' to make is this. Has this parliament any power whatsoever to alter the agreement made at Bretton Woods by one iota? If it has not, the only thing we can do is vote for it or against it. and in order that we may be able to vote for it or against it intelligently we should have all the available information on the matter. Then I should like to ask tjie minister how many nations already have passed legislation similar to that we now have before us, endorsing this agreement; and, if he knows it, how many nations have signed as members of the international bank. I believe the final date in that
	.
connection is December 31 of this year. Then, since this is going to a committee, and my own group has agreed to vote for it in order that it may go to the committee, I should like to ask if the minister will assure hon. members that in that committee we shall have an opportunity to investigate it thoroughly. This raises a further question. Must this legislation be passed at this session of parliament? If it must, then to send it to a committee at this late hour seems farcical if we expect to make any study of the matter. These are some of the questions I should like the minister to be kind enough to answer.


James Lorimer Ilsley: As to the number of nations who have ratified or indicated 'by their action they are going to sign this agreement, I shall have to get that information,' and' I think I can do so m a few minutes. The only nation I know of that has done so up to date is the United States, but the agreement is now before the British parliament, and in that regard may I say that I read that three days have been assigned as the time for consideration of this agreement in the British parliament, not only the agreement but also the financial arrangements recently concluded with the United. States.


Solon Earl Low: That is in the house, not before a committee.


James Lorimer Ilsley: That is right, but I think it will be concluded then. I believe three days is the time assigned for consideration of this agreement.


John Horne Blackmore: Poor Britain.


William Irvine: Order. Let us have the answers.


James Lorimer Ilsley: While I am on that point, for some hours or some days I have felt that 1 should say something about our own course in bringing this matter before the House of Commons when we did. I want to remind hon. members that the draft of the Bretton Woods agreement was concluded and made public about fifteen months ago, and during all that time there has been an opportunity to study and discuss it. I also want to point out that this government announced its adherence to the Bretton Woods agreement as a matter of policy last spring, when we published the white paper on reconstruction and employment. Again, in August, I stated to a press conference that legislation would be introduced at this session approving the agreement. Then, in the speech from the throne it was stated again that legislation would be introduced at this session. The resolution was placed on the order paper early in the session-I do not remember the exact date.

___________*____Bretton Woods Agreements
I should have liked to bring the resolution before the House of Commons before December 6; but it must be remembered that there is a difference of opinion among members of the house as to what is most important. Bill 15 was regarded as very important by many hon. members of the house. The budget was regarded as important by myself. The war appropriation measure was regarded as extremely important, as was also consideration* of the civil estimates. We were constantly torn between the conflicting claims of various measures for proper consideration in the house. It never occurred to me that anyone would take the position that if we had a few days for discussion of the Bretton Woods resolution, under conditions which assure that no one in Canada could be taken by surprise, there would be objection. As I have said, there was over a year in which it was discussed in the press, and there could be no doubt that the agreement contained the policy of the government in this respect. This has been known since last spring. It never occurred to me that anyone would take the position, here in this month of December, that more than a few days would be required for the discussion of this matter, and that it could not be disposed of in that time.
We want full discussion, but not necessarily excessive discussion. There are thirteen members of the Social Credit party, eight of whom have made full-dress speeches on the subject; and some of those speeches have been repeated in committee. I believe I understand all those objections. I believe I have noted all of them, and I think every other hon. member has too. It is of great importance to us, we think, that this measure be passed.
Answering the question of the hon. member as to the time that could be consumed before the committee on banking and commerce, may I point out it would certainly be the determined endeavour of the government to get this matter back into the House of Commons at this session and have it voted upon and disposed of in one way or another.
Arrangements were made to have the committee on banking and commerce meet at four o'clock this afternoon. I do not know of any reason why it could not sit fairly long hours, so that the matter could be discussed fairly fully.
If this were something coming on for the first time I would not suggest that a few days before the banking and commerce committee would be long enough. But this is not something that is being brought up for the first time. It is not like some of the bills I bring before the house, and which hon. members do not know anything about before they 47696-204
see them. This is something the whole country has had an opportunity to examine for about fifteen months.
I should hate to have Canada fall down in the matter of disposing of this question this year. The arrangement is that if before the end of the year nations representing sixty-five per cent of the quota had not given their assent to the Bretton Woods agreement-and in respect of Canada, assent would be given by this legislation-it will not go forward. If the government is right in its stand with respect to this agreement, then Canada has an interest in it, and it will be most beneficial. On the other hand, members of the Social Credit group take the stand that it will be injurious to Canada. We hold the view that hon. members would be taking a great responsibility if they made themselves parties to a delay in disposing of the measure, one way or the other. If they feel it is bad, and convince the government that it is bad, that is one thing. If we are so convinced, then we say "It is bad; we will not sign it ourselves, and hope it will not go through". But to let it go along without having any disposition made of it at this session would, I suggest, expose everyone lending himself to that course to a great measure of criticism in the future.
These matters will come up; things are likely to happen which this agreement would have prevented. I should not like to be the person who took the responsibility of staving it off.


Mr. HANSELL:: The minister did not
answer the question of the hon. member for Cariboo as to whether parliament can change an article or section of the act itself.


James Lorimer Ilsley: It cannot change an article of the agreement. Parliament must vote either for it or against it. That does not apply to the act which will be introduced. It will be a matter for discussion. But the agreement must be either accepted or rejected.


Victor Quelch: I am sorry to note the attitude of the committee toward the endeavours of this group. I look back to the days frittered away in this session on matters of little or no importance; then when we come to a matter of this kind, which all must admit is of the greatest importance, we are criticized because we want to take a little time to discuss it. When I say a little time, I do not think a few days is more than a little time. I suggest to the minister that had the government taken a fair and reasonable attitude on this whole question, this might not have taken place. Let me remind the minister that when the government sent a delegation to San Francisco they deliberately left out any representation from this group. When

Bretlon Woods Agreements

they sent members to Bretton Woods they did not send any members from this group at all. Had we been there, perhaps we would nave been influenced in the same way the hon. member for Rosthern was influenced. Apparently after sitting in that committee and watching the experts, be became converted. If one of us had gone down, perhaps we would have had the same opportunity. But the government was most careful to see that we had no representation whatsoever, from this group, in respect of either San Francisco or Bretton Woods, or the conference which took place in England. I ask the minister if he thinks that is a fair way to deal with members of this House of Commons, or the different groups comprising it.
With regard to letting this matter go through to the banking committee, how many days can we spend in committee? Does not the minister think that the only fair way to deal with a matter of this kind in committee is to have in attendance experts representing both sides of the question? Does the minister think therg is time to have experts before that committee, who can give both sides? Certainly the government can have its experts, to explain their side of the matter. But we have men we would like to have called, and I do not know if it will be pos-sibe to call them. The minister will have experts to persuade the people to believe one thing, but no experts will be there to show the other side. Is that a fair way to handle this question?
There is no reason why this matter could not have been brought up at the beginning of the session and put before a committee, so that we could have had several weeks to discuss it and plenty of time to get witnesses.
We did a glorious job from 1914 to 1918 in winning the war. Everybody realizes that our politicians and diplomats made a ghastly mess of winning the peace. Again we have won another war. But we have to be most careful that they do not make the same ghastly mess that was made after the last war, or this second war will have been won in vain. We have endorsed the United States charter for peace. Let me emphasize the fact that it is of no use to make a political agreement for peace if at the same time we make economic agreements which are a declaration of economic war, as I consider this to be.
Before I concluded my remarks on Saturday I was asked a question by the hon. member for Vancouver East. He wanted to know whether the proposals which I had outlined by which an effective demand might be maintained against the production in the country could be put into effect without socialism. Let

me emphasize that when I outlined that programme I outlined it as it would be instituted under private ownership. If the hon. member is thinking of the question of the nationalization of the chartered banks I say that so long as the chartered banks are prepared to cooperate with the government I believe we can carry on the privately owned chartered banks. I believe this government feel that they have cooperated with them. Whether the chartered banks would cooperate in the same way if the government brought about certain changes in the financial system I am unable to say. Maybe they would or maybe they would not. I certainly do not think it is right to judge them before they have had a trial.
When the C.C.F. brought in an amendment to the budget I was surprised to see that they used the words "utilization of national credit" rather than "nationalization of chartered banks," because on every other occasion on which we have used the term "national credit" they have invariably moved an amendment to nationalize the chartered banks. When I was speaking I mentioned that, and the leader of the C.C.F. said the reason they had not done it was that they had already moved a motion during this session.


Mr. COLD WELL:: May I just say I was in error at that time.


Victor Quelch: I am glad to hear the hon. member say that. As the record stands today it looks as if I were making a false statement. I am glad to have his explanation. Anybody reading Hansard would think that I was deliberately making a charge which was not true.
The other day the minister criticized me for making statements in this house which had been made in certain committees without quoting the exact words. Probably he was justified in that criticism because I know it is easy to distort a statement when you give it from memory. Therefore in order that there may be no misunderstanding and in order that nobody may charge that I deliberately distorted statements made by any member of this house or any civil servant, I should like to put on record the one or two statements to which I referred.
The hon. member for Rosthern has gone to some length to eulogize Maynard Keynes in this house. In the past I have been a student of Maynard Keynes. We all appreciate that he is a great writer, but we also realize that some years ago he made quite a change about in some of his views. I mentioned that fact to the hon. member for Rosthern. I pointed out that whilst he apparently had great confidence in Maynard Keynes, that confidence

Bretton Woods Agreements
apparently did not rest with the former minister of finance or with the former leader of the Conservative party, although I did not mention the leader of the opposition at that time. Therefore I should like to quote from page 3563 of Hansard of 1936, when Mr. McGeer, now Senator McGeer, was making a statement. At that time he was referring to a book entitled "A General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money." All hon. members who have read that book will agree that it showed a tremendous advance in the thinking of Maynard Keynes. Mr. Bennett made this interjection with regard to Maynard Keynes:
He goes back, in terms, on all his previous opinions.
Mr. Dunning:	And says so.
Then Mr. Dunning goes on to make this statement which I wish to read to show that the hon. member for Rosthern has no justification for suggesting that just because Maynard Keynes says that this is so and so the [DOT]members of this house should accept it. He did say himself that Maynard Keynes said he would not support a return to the'gold standard, and that the hon. member was prepared to accept Maynard Keynes' statement. Now, I shall read what Mr. Dunning had to say on June 9, 1936:
My hon. friend surely forgets that John Maynard Keynes, to my certain knowledge, has been writing authoritatively on these subjects each year. He did not start with the days of the ox cart; he has been gradually developing and instructing his readers, of whom I am one and my hon. friend is another, all in the twentieth century. In the book to which my hon. friend refers Keynes says he knows it is competely out of line with all that he has formerly taught us. I have no objection to a man changing his mind, but surely if we are to look for light and leadership from my hon. friend from Vaneouver-Burrard to-day we do not expect that the day after to-morrow he will be telling us something definitely contrary to the opinions expressed to-day, and still expecting us to regard him as progressive and sound because he has done so. I am not criticizing Keynes, but I am saying that a teacher who changes virtually overnight in some of his cardinal teachings, I would hesitate to quote personally as an authority to-day as readily as I would before I read that book, and I say this without derogating at all from his right to change his mind. I am referring rather to his reliability as a teacher either yesterday or to-day.
I put that on record because some members might suggest that the statement I made the other day regarding Mr. Dunning was not quite correct.
While I am on the subject of Maynard Keynes I should like to refer to a press dispatch dated December 9, 1945, which is taken from the Globe and Mail. The statement has 47696-2041
to do with the agreement which has been reached between Britain and the United States. It reads as follows:
Lord Keynes obviously felt that the Washington agreement was not completely satisfactory to the British viewpoint, and that he would meet severe criticism when he returned to London. However it was clear that he believed no such problems could be settled to the entire satisfaction of either side, and that the concessions made by both American and British negotiators would not cause its rejection by either congress or parliament.
Therefore we do not want even to suggest that Maynard Keynes is over-enthusiastic about the agreement. He got the best agreement he thought he could get.
The point to which the minister really took exception was my reference to the deputy minister of finance, Doctor Clark. May I say in explanation that when I started on Saturday I did not believe the debate would carry on>
in the way in which it did. I did not start in that direction. The Minister of Finance and the hon. member for Rosthern kept asking me questions that I had not intended to touch on when I started to speak; otherwise I should have had the references with me. I refer to the fact that Doctor Clark had taken a certain stand in regard to the treatment of a creditor nation. In all fairness to Doctor Clark I think I should put his words on Hansard, as recorded in the report of the special committee on reconstruction and re'establishment dated Wednesday, March 8, 1944. In order that the committee may have an understanding of what his statement referred to. I shall quote my statement which brought forth his reply. It will be found on page 38 of this committee report. It reads as follows:
Perhaps Doctor Clark would like to say whether he agrees with the proposals put forward by the London chamber of commerce? No doubt Doctor Clark has made a study of those proposals.
Doctor Clark merely said in that regard:
I do not think I should be asked to go on with the London chamber of commerce programme this morning. If I were to do that I would want to do it at some length, and it is a long time since I read the programme. I would like to have it more fully in my mind again, and would not like to start on another long discussion at this stage when I have talked for so long already.
The next opportunity I had to speak with him was when I accidentally met him in the corridor. I asked him his attitude regarding the London chamber of commerce, and it was that which I put on record. Now to get on with the question of the creditor nation Doctor Clark said this:
Mr. Quelch also made a point about the difference in the treatment between debtor and creditor countries under the plans, suggesting
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that the treatment of debtor countries was far more strict and mandatary than in the case of the creditor countries. I do not think -that is really a fair reading of the three plans. I think all three plans recognize very clearly and emphasize very strongly the obligation that the creditor country is under to do the things that will get it out of -that chronic creditor position [DOT]and enable the world really to function as a whole. In the case of the creditor countries I might read very briefly what I said in this -address about what is provided in respect to creditor countries.
All three plans recognize that surplus countries may be equally responsible with deficit countries for creating disequilibria in international exchange. To illustrate the general -application of the plans to surplus countries, let me take the major provisions of the Canadian plan. When the union's operations have resulted in net sales of the currency of any member to the extent of 75 per cent of its quota, the union may attempt to arrange with that country a programme of capital investment or securities repatriation in order to increase -its reserves of the currency in question. When net sales of a currency have reached 85 per cent of a country's quota, -the union has the authority -and the duty to render to that country a report analysing the causes of -the depletion of its holdings of the particular currency and making recommendations in regard to monetary and fiscal policies, exchange rate, commercial policy, and -international investment, believed to be appropriate in order to restore the equilibrium of the international balances of the country concerned. The union has also the right to enter into arrangements with any country to borrow additional supplies of its currency on mutually satisfactory terms, and. when the hoard believes that the anticipated demand for any currency may soon exhaust the union's holdings, it is required to propose a method for the equitable distribution of the scarce currency together with suggestions for helping to equate the anticipated demand and supply. When it finds it necessary thus to ration a scarce currency the board is required to reexamine prevailing exchange rates and recommend such changes as it may believe appropriate to the changed circumstances.	,
Might I interject here that the question of scarce currency is dealt with in article 7 of the Bretton Woods agreement. He goes on to say:
True, several of the provisions I have read -are, as Mr. Queleh says, of an advisory character; hut if the fund had the power to enforce on a creditor country all these measures or had other equally drastic powers. I am afraid Mr. Queleh would say that we were suggesting a plan which too greatly impaired the national sovereignty of a country. So you could easily go too far in that direction, and I think what is provided for in these plans goes much farther than anything that has ever been done in the past to solve the problem of the creditor country, to bring the creditor country to a realization of what it must do if it is going to solve its own problems and not be a drag on the prosperity of the world.
The provisions are largely in the category of an advisory nature. He wants to know whether I would expect them to suggest that f\lr. Queleh.]
we should impair the sovereignty of a creditor nation. My argument is that wTe should treat the creditor nation in the same way as we treat the debtor nation. We have no right to impose conditions on the debtor nation and let the creditor nation go scot-free, but should recognize that they both should have a mutual obligation to try to balance their trade. I replied to Doctor Clark in this way:
Before we adjourn I would like to take up the question of impairing the sovereignty of a nation, because I agree entirely with Doctor Clark on -that point. To my mind one of the main objections to these proposals is due to the fact -that while they do not intend to impair the sovereignty of a creditor nation, they do so in the case of a debtor nation, and I say a creditor nation would be largely to blame because if the creditor nation refused to buy a debtor nation's goods the debtor nation is at its mercy.
Doctor Clark agrees that foreign investment is not a solution, that it just tides over the period of unemployment for the time being, that it cannot be considered a longterm solution.
I should like to quote a statement from the London Economist to show that people who have studied this question generally agree that foreign investment is not a solution but merely a temporary expedient. The London Economist of January 22, 1944. says:
Loans, unless the word is to be a euphemism for charity can never be a permanent solution. Interest has to be paid on that and in due course they have to be repaid. The world has tried once before to buttress the metallic system and the results do not encourage repetition of the experiment, especially as it would have to be a larger programme.
That is just what we are proposing to do under the Bretton Woods agreement.
In connection with the international stabilization of currency, I should like to show that Maynard Keynes recognizes the fact that the creditor nation has a responsibility, and he actually went so far as to say- that if a creditor nation refused to accept imports its credit should be cancelled. I quote from section 3, page 10, of this pamphlet on the international stabilization of currency:
It is not contemplated that either the debit or the credit balance of an individual country ought to exceed a certain maximum-let us say, its quota. In the case of debit balances -this maximum has been made a rigid one, and, indeed, counter-measures are called for long before the maximum is reached. In the case of credit balances no rigid maximum has been proposed. For the appropriate provision might be to require the eventual cancellation or compulsory investment of persistent bancor credit balances accumulating in excess of a member's quota.
I repeat that phrase: "the appropriate provision might be to require the eventual cancellation."

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Just to show that that line of thought has been followed by many other people besides Ive3'nes, I should like to quote a recommendation of the London chamber of commerce on this proposal. So that there may be no mis. understanding may I say that I have here two pamphlets, one of the report of the London chamber of commerce on "General Principles of a Post-war Economy", and the other a pamphlet entitled "A Twentieth Century Economic System," on the front page of which I read this:
The author has decided to remain anonymous, in the hope that his fellow citizens will insist, on this occasion, on doing their own thinking, and will consider these proposals on their merits, uninfluenced by the names and reputations of the protagonists on either side.
The reason I link these two together is because on page 11, section 27, of the London chamber of commerce report, I find this:
The chamber, having considered whether there is any system which would achieve, wholly or partially, the solution of all the above problems, generally accepts the principles laid down in "A Twentieth Century Economic System," especially in respect of blocked credits for the payment of international obligations.
I had better quote a paragraph from "A Twentieth Centuiy Economic System" dealing with this very question. It gives an explanation of bilateral trade on page 25, and then goes on to say:
The above is a simple example of bilateral trade, but multilateral trade could be provided for by the exchange controls of the participating nations having representatives at an international exchange where blocked credits in one country could be exchanged for those in another at the conventionally fixed exchange rates: the primary responsibility for establishing a contra account, by importing from the country to which a sale had been made, would remain with the exporting country. If it did not wish to do so that would be its affair and not that of the importing country, which would have done its part by establishing the necessary credit. The importing country would be entitled to cancel the credit, under a statute of limitations, if it were not used within seven years. The principle is that with which we are all familiar in internal trading: if you have a credit with a shop, you cannot take it out in cash but you clear it when you take goods.
A further comment regarding international exchange is shown at the bottom of the page. Perhaps I had better quote it, because several hon. members have the idea in their heads that we advocate bilateral trade. We have never advocated bilateral trade. We realize the benefits of multilateral trade; but we do feel this, that when a nation establishes a credit with another nation it should be under some obligation to see that that credit is cleared. Therefore, if we establish a credit with France, and want to buy goods from Germany. if Germany is willing to take goods from
France there is no reason why we cannot take goods from Germany and Germany can take goods from France. Here is a quotation indicating how goods could be traded on an international exchange:
The international exchange would be in no sense an international bank nor would it be the body with which all the nations would hold their debits and credits. Psychologically it is important that each nation should know in which countries it has uneancelled credits, so that it may take steps to clear those credits either by taking more imports or by restricting its exports to them. The responsibility which this scheme places squarely upon each nation to keep its own imports and exports in equilibrium, must in no circumstances be transferred to a central international clearing bank. If a central international bank were entrusted with this task instead of each nation being free to solve its own domestic problem in its own way, we should once more be back to the old condition of financial war to control a central monetary authority which, in its turn, would control the domestic affairs of so-called independent nations. In practice, such a system of central international monetary control means that whilst effective pressure cannot be put upon the strong creditor nations _ to take payment in goods against their wishes, great pressure can be brought to bear upon the weak debtor nations to lower their prices in an attempt to force their goods over the tariffs of creditors unwilling to receive payment in the only way open to the debtor, namely in goods.
The hon member for Rosthern interrupted when I was speaking on Saturday and tried to give the house the impression that provision was made in the Bretton Woods agreement for putting a very great deal of pressure on a creditor nation; and really, when I read his remarks in Hansard I was amazed that he would make a statement of that kind, because after all be did go to Bretton Woods, and therefore he should know what he is talking about. Where he got' this statement I do not know, because it certainly is not in the Bretton Woods agreement. Let me quote what he said-I am sorry the hon. member is not in his place at the moment-as reported in Hansard, at purge 3146:
The fundamental basis of this organization is that if a currency becomes scarce then the country whose currency has become scarce will be advised by the officials of the fund that they must take steps to -enable other countries to sell their goods in the country of the scarce currency, and they would advise that country that they must be prepared to correct that fundamental unbalance of trade. The whole basis of this agreement is designed to promote understanding between countries in order to permit balanced trade and the keeping up of high standards of living in all countries.
It is all very well to say that that is the understanding; but when you use the word "must",
I think one would assume there should be something definite about that in the agreement itself. I would, however, invite hon. members
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to note what article VII which deals with the question of scarce currencies, really says in regard to relationship with creditor countries. There is no compulsion, with the exception that they must be ready to sell their currency for gold. That is the only compulsion in the whole thing. I am quoting from article VII in order to show how far afield from reality the hon. member for Rosthern had got when he said that they must do this and they must do that:
If the fund finds that a general scarcity of a particular currency is developing, the fund may so inform members and may issue a report setting forth the causes of the scarcity and containing recommendations designed to bring it to an end.
That is the furthest they go. They issue a report containing recommendations; but for some reason or another the hon. member for Rosthern jumps to the conclusion that they must do this or they must do that. I continue to quote:
A representative of the member whose currency is involved shall participate in the preparation of the report.
Then, quoting from section 2 of the same article:
The fund may, if it deems such action appropriate to replenish its holdings of any member's currency, take either or both of the following steps':
(i) Propose to the member that, on terms and conditions agreed between the fund and the member, the latter lend its currency to the fund or that, with the approval of the member, the fund borrow such currency from some other source either within or outside the territories of the member, but-
Here is the important point:
-no member shall be under any obligation to make such loans to the fund . . .
They cannot even compel a creditor nation to lend its currency or to approve the borrowing of its currency by the fund from any other source. The only reference to compulsion is in subparagraph (ii), which states that the fund may:
. . . require the member to sell its currency to the fund for gold.
Apparently the aim of the creditor country is to get as much gold as it can; I do not think it is putting much compulsion on the creditor nation to say that it must accept gold in return for its currency. What is lacking there is that there is no provision whereby the creditor nation can assist the debtor nation by enabling it to pay in the only way it can, namely by accepting its goods and services. Under this system and under the gold standard the results are the same. When a nation has an unfavourable balance of trade, it has either to meet the unbalance of trade by gold, if it cannot get
[Mr. Quvlch.l
any currency by selling goods, or to accept a loan, and if it has to accept a loan, after a period of time the creditor nation will just be buying up its capital assets.


Norman Jaques: They have no gold.


Victor Quelch: If they have no gold. They would be advised to take a loan from the international bank of reconstruction and, maybe, give it security on their railroads and other capital assets. Systematically the creditor nations would be obtaining a stranglehold on the smaller countries. I would say that it is a modern form of imperialism by monetary penetration rather than by force of arms.
There is another point here. Not only does it not penalize a creditor nation, but it actually rewards the creditor nation for being such and penalizes the debtor nation for being a debtor nation still further, beyond an increase of interest rates; because if we look_ up the question of voting, referred to in section 5 of article XII, we find out how the votes are apportioned between the various members. I read section 5 on this point:
V oting.
(a)	Each member shall have two hundred and fifty votes plus one additional vote for each part of its quota equivalent to one hundred thousand United States dollars.
(b)	Whenever voting is required under article V, section 4 or 5, each member shall have the number of votes to which it is entitled under (a) above, adjusted:
(i)	by the addition of one vote for the equivalent of each four hundred thousand United States dollars of net sales of its currency up to the date -when the vote is taken, or
(ii)	by the subtraction of one vote for the equivalent of each four hundred thousand United States dollars of its net purchases of the currencies of other members up to the date when the vote is taken.
So we find that under that section the further into debt a nation gets, the less is its voting power; the greater creditor a nation becomes, the greater the amount of loans made by a creditor nation, the greater the number of its votes becomes. Therefore, after a period of time you find a great change in the voting strength. You will find that creditor nations are gradually accumulating more and more votes and debtor nations are getting fewer and fewer; and when you think of the possibilities of the future, the amount of money which in all probability the United States, for example, will be lending, you can see that the voting power of that country will be tremendously increased. No doubt the government has given some consideration to the question I am about to put to the minister. Has the government estimated what the voting strength will likely be five years from now, when the great programme of expansion has taken place? Will he tell us what the voting

_____[DOT]_________Bretton Woods Agreements
strength will be when the fund starts out and what he estimates it will be four or five years from now when we have gone a long way toward helping to reestablish the devastated areas?
On Saturday we were discussing three points, and I was trying to get the minister to give me an answer to the questions I was asking him. He accused me of constantly changing the question. That may have been true. I did not have anything on paper. It was the same thing that I was in effect asking for, although I may have changed the wording. To make sure that I do not repeat that mistake, I have written down certain questions which I will read to the minister and in reply to which I will ask him for answers. He is familiar with the questions I am going to read, because in essence they are the same as those I asked on Saturday.
Does the minister agree that we should be prepared to accept imports in payment for our exports as soon as the transition period is over? Does the minister agree that in order to make this possible the government must underwrite an effective demand in Canada for our production and the production of other nations for which our own production may be exchanged? Is the minister satisfied that the final act of the Bretton Woods agreement does ensure that countries will be willing to balance their accounts with the world in terms of goods and services?
Can the minister answer those three questions before I proceed further?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Will the hon. gentleman
send them over?


Victor Quelch: Yes. In the meantime, if the minister wishes to have time to consider them, there are other questions that I should like to ask him. Perhaps I had better wait until he answers those questions.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The first question the hon. gentleman asks is: Does the minister agree that we must be prepared to accept imports in payment for our exports as soon as the transition period is over? There may be conditions in which a country will desire, and in which it will be advantageous for that country, to continue to borrow money for development as well as for reconstruction purposes.


Victor Quelch: I say, must be willing, to accept imports. If a nation wanted a loan we would be willing, but I say that we must be willing to accept imports.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Must be prepared to accept imports in payment.	,


Victor Quelch: If the debtor nation needed a loan, that would let us out.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Generally speaking, I think it is true that we must expect, over a long period, to accept imports in payment for our exports. That is true generally speaking, with the qualification I have mentioned.


Victor Quelch: Will the minister agree that in the past we have not been prepared to do that? That was not the policy from 1935 to 1939? I am speaking from memory, but I think I am right when I say that on the average we maintained a favourable balance of payments of $219,000,000 a year for five years, and yet at the same time we had half a million people unemployed, a million on relief, and industry operating only to fifty per cent of capacity. When the governor of the Bank of Canada appeared before the committee on banking and commerce, I asked' Mr. Towers whether, in view of the fact that we had a favourable balance of $200,000,000 odd a year, the government would not consider issuing $200,000,000 to provide work for the people, so that the money paid out in those services would give the people money with which to buy imports that could be brought in in exchange for the credit represented by the favourable balance of payments. The reply that Mr. Towers gave at that time was that it was a matter of government policy. That is why I am not so keen about these banking committees. When you get into a committee with a bunch of experts and you ask them a question they tell you that it is a question of government policy and you do not get any answer. The only place in which you can get an answer is here from the minister. You cannot get an answer from experts because they will simply shirk the responsibility and put it on the government. This is an important point. It is fundamental, and I do not think we shall solve anything until we get down to it.


James Lorimer Ilsley: For a long time we had unfavourable balances of payments-


Victor Quelch: Before 1935.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes, and then we had these years of favourable balances of payments which helped to pay our indebtedness abroad. Now the hon. gentleman is suggesting that we should not pay off our indebtedness abroad?


Victor Quelch: No. If the minister will say that in future, now that we are no longer a debtor nation, we shall be prepared to balance our trade, I shall feel a great deal better about the whole thing. But at that time our production was only up to fifty per cent of capacity, and I contend that we could have expanded that production to the full extent so as to pay our debts and still increase

Bretton Woods Agreements
the standard of living. Why did we maintain a production of fifty per cent of capacity when we had a debt abroad which we could have paid? We could have expanded our production- and paid that debt and increased the standard of living of the people.


James Lorimer Ilsley: In the first place the hon. gentleman refers to us as a creditor nation. We are not.


Victor Quelch: The white paper on reconstruction states that Canada will probably be a creditor nation under the Bretton Woods agreement. I am not sure of the terminology, but she aspires, or expects, or hopes to be a creditor nation under the agreement.


James Lorimer Ilsley: In respect of current transactions.


Victor Quelch: It does not say that, does it? It says she will be a creditor nation.


James Lorimer Ilsley: But we are not a creditor nation. The figures speak for themselves. The *people of this country owe more to the people of other countries than the people of other countries owe to the people of this country. That can be demonstrated.


Victor Quelch: Could the minister give us any idea whether that would be a matter of one or two or three or four billion dollars?


James Lorimer Ilsley: No, I cannot.


Victor Quelch: It would not be above four billion dollars, would it?


James Lorimer Ilsley: I do not know.


Victor Quelch: I think we owe Britain somewhere in the neighbourhood of a billion dollars. The minister will remember that when we wrere discussing Mutual Aid I urged that before making that gift we should repatriate our securities, and I remember that the minister was quite harsh, accusing me of being somewhat um-British. On the other hand, I understand tha}. South Africa has abolished absentee ownership of her gold and diamond mines by repatriating her securities. Among the Canadian securities held in Britain were large holdings of C.P.R. stocks and bonds. We could - have brought- those back to this country ; then, after we had repatriated those securities, we could have gone on and given Britain ail the money she wanted. But what has happened to those securities to-day? I understand that instead of Britain owning them the United States has taken them.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Oh, no.


Victor Quelch: Is that wrong? I am very glad to have that assurance, because that, has been stated.


James Lorimer Ilsley: No, that is not correct.


Victor Quelch: To what extent have these securities been so dealt with?


Lionel Chevrier: It is a very small
fraction.


Victor Quelch: Does that apply to all other Canadian securities as well?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes, a very small fraction.


Victor Quelch: A small portion has been turned over to the United States?


James Lorimer Ilsley: The Canadian Pacific securities that eventually moved to the United States came back to Canada and were then sold by Canada to United States purchasers, but it is a very small percentage in relation to the total. The same movement has gone on to some extent, I think, in relation to certain other securities, but the money obtained for these British securities is applied in reduction of our $700,000,000 debt, which has been substantially reduced by the sale of securities..


Victor Quelch: Then we have practically repatriated all the securities held in Britain?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Well, in that sense. There are some purchases of those securities by Canadians, and the money the British get for the securities is used to reduce the debt which Great Britain owes to Canada; but then Canadians sometimes sell these securities in the United States.


Victor Quelch: Then our main debt to-day . is to the United States?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes, that is right.


Victor Quelch: Then did the minister
think it the part of wisdom on our part to keep expanding that debt all during the war? I understand that every time there is a victory loan the United States buys bonds in this country. The minister has always emphasized the fact that the purpose of a victory loan is to curtail spending. Surely when the United States buys victory bonds it does not reduce the amount of money in circulation. Actually more money comes into existence and defeats the very thing you are trying to accomplish.


James Lorimer Ilsley: We do not encourage those purchases.


Victor Quelch: But you do not prohibit them?


James Lorimer Ilsley: No.


Victor Quelch: Can you not prohibit them?
Mr. ILSLEYNo, we cannot. I cannot give the complete list of reasons, but we have discussed them time after time and decided it
DECEMBER 10, 1945	[DOT]
Bretton Woods Agreements
would do more harm than good to impose a prohibition on the movement of Canadian securities to the United States.


Victor Quelch: At the same time I think the minister will agree that it is not to the benefit of Canada to have that take place.
Mr. ILS'LEY: No, it is not in the interests of Canada. If the hon. gentleman were to ask me why it is not in the interests of Canada the only reason I could give would be financial rather than economic. That is, we lose the interest when Americans buy Canadian securities. Canada is liable to the holder or holders of the securities for the interest payments on them. The money we obtain for the securities is United States exchange which we add to the holdings of the foreign exchange control board, which are dead; that is, they earn no interest. Therefore there is a loss of interest to the extent that these securities go to the United States; otherwise I do no see that there is any disadvantage. We have the United States exchange and they have our bonds, that is all. We have an equivalent asset for the asset with which we part. We discourage it, as I say, for that financial reason alone, as far as I know; and if it reaches high dimensions there is that current loss of interest.


Victor Quelch: Then to come back to the original point, before the war why did we allow our production to run at only fifty per cent of capacity when we had foreign debt to pay off? We maintain a favourable balance of trade, you say, mainly to pay off our indebtedness; at the same time we had quite a low standard of living in this country, with a million people on relief. Surely with a foreign debt there would have been every justification for raising the standard of living in this country and expanding our production so that we could have paid off the debt and at the same time raised the standard of living of the people.


James Lorimer Ilsley: That statement assumes that a government can expand its productibn just by some easy method. It may be that governments were wrong before the war, but I think the argument is fairly good for the position that the mere distribution of money to the people does not necessarily set all the people to work.


Victor Quelch: 
James Lorimer Ilsley: That is just a matter of opinion; it is not self-evident. I know all through the years the Social Credit party have argued that this would have happened in time of peace, but in time of peace you have a different set of conditions from those that exist in time of war. In time of war you have a unified national purpose, and it does not deter industrial or agricultural activity at all for the government to spend large sums of money, put up taxes, increase the credit and to some extent inflate, because there has been some degree of inflation during the war. That does not alarm or retard investment and enterprise. But when you do not have that set of conditions that may not be the result. Therefore you have various schools of thought as to the best means to adopt to get all your people working with fair incomes. The C.C.F. has one view. They think it is a matter of the government taking over at least quite a lot of the big business of the country, that if you take it out of private hands you are more likely to get full employment. The Social Credit party I think believe that the application of the monetary remedy is sufficient of itself.
Those are the questions, and they are questions as to which there is a great difference of opinion. I do not think this is the proper ' occasion for us to get into a debate, which can be very far-reaching, as to what is the best programme to adopt to keep all your people gainfully employed. Certainly we have not been silent in the last twelve months as. to the means we are seeking to adopt or aiming to adopt. They are set out in the white paper on reconstruction on "Employment and Income," and they were fully publicized during the election campaign, and in speeches since that time. We would propose to do it by a variety of steps, not by one alone.
I think, that fact has a bearing on the second question asked:	Does the minister
agree that in order to make this possible the government must underwrite an effective demand in Canada for our production, and the
Bretton Woods Agreements

production of other nations for which our own goods may be exchanged? If I understand that question correctly it is predicated upon the assumption that by simply placing in the hands of the people of the country enough money, or* seeing that they get-


Victor Quelch: Not necessarily.


James Lorimer Ilsley: -enough money, either from private spenders or ourselves, that will achieve the result which is desired, or that that will keep our production up and keep markets for our production. Well, I do not want to give an answer to that question, which is based upon the assumption that the monetary exchange is the only remedy. What the hon. member is seeking is some policy which will keep all our people gainfully employed, or properly employed.


Victor Quelch: I do not mention financial matters at all. I just asked what the government's policy is, for example, in regard to controls, and any other things necessary to maintain an effective demand.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The suggestion is that the
government must underwrite an effective demand in Canada for production. I do not know that I just admit the repsonsibility for underwriting. It is not a very definite term. We have repeatedly admitted responsibility for using every method within our power to maintain a stable level of employment, sometimes referred to as full employment. That has been set out in our white paper on reconstruction and employment, and otherwise in the ways I have mentioned.


Victor Quelch: If I used the word "responsibility" rather than "underwriting", would the minister be willing to agree?-"accept the responsibility for maintaining"? That is, he would accept the responsibility for maintaining an effective demand, rather than pass that responsibility on to the provinces, or 'to some private enterprises.


James Lorimer Ilsley: There may be a division
of responsibility between the dominion and the provinces. The provinces may wish to assume and to undertake certain portions of responsibility. But I would be reluctant to assent to language which I do not fully understand. I would rather refer my hon. friend to what we have said in the document to which I have referred, namely our white paper on employment and income.
At page 23 thereof we say:
The government has stated unequivocally its adoption of a high and stable level of employment and income, and thereby higher standards of living, as a major -aim of government policy.
[Mr. Ilsh-y.J
And again, at page 7:
The government has pressed and is continuing to press actively for a wide collaboration in the reciprocal reduction -and removal of trade barriers, especially trade barriers of an arbitrary -and discriminatory type.
And a little later:
Having regard to the widespread character of our trade, the government attaches special importance also to the reconstitution of multilateral trade on -a firm basis and arrangements under which the proceeds of our exports may be spent wherever we desire to obtain our imports.
And at page 9:
In the view of the government, appropriate terms for repayment of these credits would recognize unequivocally the dependence of such international debt payments on the expansion of world trade and -ample markets for the exports by which credits must be repaid.	.
Then the third question: Is the minister satisfied that the final act of the Bretton Woods agreement does ensure that countries will be willing to balance their accounts with the world, in terms of goods and services? I do not suppose it does absolutely ensure it. I do not think that anyone ever contended that it does ensure it. But it encourages that development.


Victor Quelch: Does it even encourage it?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes, I believe so.


Victor Quelch: What pressure is exercised on a creditor nation to do it? There is pressure on a debtor nation; but I cannot find any on a creditor nation.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The hon. member read
sections 1 and 2 of article VII. But the effective provision with respect to scarce currency is-


Victor Quelch: It gets worse as you get down there.


James Lorimer Ilsley: It states:
(a)	If it becomes evident to the fund that the demand for a member's currency seriously *threatens the fund's ability to supply that currency, the fund, whether or not -it has issued a report under section 1 of this article, sh-all formally declare such currency scarce, and shall thenceforth -apportion its existing and accruing supply of the scarce currency with due regard -to -the relative needs of members, -the general international economic situation and any other pertinent considerations. The fund shall also issue a report'concerning -its action. '
(b)	A formal declaration under (a) above shall operate as an authorization to any member, after consultation with the fund, temporarily to impose limitations on the freedom of exchange operations in the scarce currency.
In other words, the authority which is given to the country in need of a scarce currency, after consultation with the fund, to

Bretton Woods Agreements
impose limitations on the freedom of exchange operations in that currency, operates as a pressure on the creditor nation. Then:
Subject to the provisions of article IV, sections 3 and 4, the member shall have complete jurisdiction in determining the nature of such limitations, but they shall be no more restrictive than is necessary to limit the demand for the scarce currency 'to the supply held by, or accruing to, the member in question; and they shall be relaxed and removed as rapidly as conditions permit.
That sentence, while protective of the creditor nation, is not unreasonably sy.


Victor Quelch: Actually what would happen would be that the debtor nation would impose restrictions so that they would lower their standard to the extent that they no longer brought such imports in, and the creditor nation that had been exporting such goods would probably have more unemployment and conditions would get worse. Unless the creditor nation were prepared to change their policy to one of expansion; unless they were willing to develop an expansionist policy internally, why do they have to wait until currency is scarce before they do that?
We might as well face the fact that the greatest menace in the world to-day is the policy of the United States in trying to export its unemployment problem upon the world. I cannot see that this will help the situation. It would just mean that the exports from the United States would be reduced, while the standard of living would be reduced in the debtor nations. If the exports were reduced, then the United States would have that much more unemployment.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The basis on which the United States comes into this arrangement is the desirability of avoiding import and exchange restrictions by other nations, the blocking of currencies and so on by other nations. If that looms up and is authorized under this provision the United States will try to avoid it. The hon. gentleman is suggesting some compulsory provision in the fund-


Victor Quelch: Acceptance of imports.


James Lorimer Ilsley: -which will operate against a country. I think that would be quite an interference with sovereignty. There is no compulsory-


Victor Quelch: I merely suggest a business ' transaction. When we establish a credit in another country by selling it goods we have a definite responsibility to accept goods in payment, or at least to provide that if we take goods from another country that pountry will utilize the credit which we have established in the former country. Surely it is not a question of sovereignty; it is a question of fair and square dealing. I would point out that the provision which the minister has read would not operate if a creditor nation sold unlimited sums of its currency for gold. Then the debtor countries could obtain the currency which the creditor country sold, and they would still be going steadily further into debt. By the creditor countries selling their currency for gold the debtor countries would obtain currency from the fund, but they would go further into debt. I do not understand why anybody would advocate that. Keynes recognized the danger and so did the London chamber of commerce. I think we all recognize the danger of the creditor nation not being under obligation to accept payment in goods. I cannot understand why that provision is not in the Bretton Woods agreement, whilst it was not in the Morgenthau plan, the Keynes plan or the Canadian plan. I am speaking from memory; I believe they provided for a slight tax upon the creditor nation. Under this plan there is absolutely no pressure on the creditor nation apart from the two sections which the minister read, and that is a slight pressure.
There are one or two points with which I should like the minister to deal. I think he will realize that it is something that should be dealt with.


William Ross Macdonald: Order. I must draw the hon. member's attention to the fact that his time expired some time ago. He cannot continue unless he has the unanimous consent of the committee.


Victor Quelch: I am satisfied that if the Chairman read Hansard he would find that I have not spoken for anything like forty minutes. There were many interruptions. I was asked a number of questions. The minister will be speaking next, and I wish to ask him one or two questions to which I should like some answers. I know that very few members in the house know what this is all about. I will admit that I myself have only a hazy idea of just how this is going to operate. As far as I understand it, normal trade will be carried on without utilizing the fund at all. The fund comes into the picture only when a nation has an unfavourable balance of trade. Let us suppose that the fund has opened its doors for business. What is the immediate effect upon Canada? In the first instance do we immediately have to establish a gold backing for our money? Before the war we had a twenty-five per cent gold reserve. Is that reestablished immediately, or shall we carry on the way it was?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Just carry on.
Bretton Woods Agreements


Victor Quelch: What will be the procedure if a nation has an unfavourable balance of trade? Will the transaction be carried on between the central bank and the fund? Would the minister explain what takes place.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The hon. gentleman seems to be talking about some transaction between our central bank and the fund.


Victor Quelch: The central bank of any nation which has an unfavourable balance of trade. If a nation should not have a central bank there will have to be some authority to deal with that situation. I should like to know how that operation is dealt with. The Bretton Woods agreement states that it will be done through the central bank or some other organization.


James Lorimer Ilsley: That country buys from the fund the currency which it needs. If it desires currency to pay for goods and cannot get it otherwise it buys it.


Victor Quelch: As I understand it, it issues a cheque to the fund; a cheque will be issued against its own central bank. Suppose Canada was a debtor nation; the Bank of Canada would issue a cheque to cover its unfavourable balance of trade and deposit with the fund.


James Lorimer Ilsley: A debtor nation.


Victor Quelch: Suppose Canada was a debtor nation.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes.


Victor Quelch: Ahd we had an unfavourable balance of trade of $100,000,000, or an unfavourable balance of payment. We would issue a cheque on the Bank of Canada and deposit it with the fund; is that the procedure?


James Lorimer Ilsley: That is oversimplified.


Victor Quelch: If we needed the currency of a particular country to pay for imports from that country we would issue a cheque? That is how we would do it, is it not? We would not take a bunch of dollar bills and pay them over. We would issue a cheque on the Bank of Canada, and that cheque would be deposited in behalf of Canada.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes.


Victor Quelch: We would not have to send currency. I think all members are interested in this point. We would look like a bunch of nitwits if we went back to our constituencies and were asked to explain this agreement and could not tell them how it works. Let us proceed and examine section 8 of article V. May I usq Canada as an example.
I do not for one minute ever expect Canada
 '
to be in this position; but suppose Canada got further and further into debt and subsections 1, 2 and 3 were applied. Then finally section (d) was applied and the rates of interest were increased to four per cent. It goes on to say:
The fund and the member shall consider means by which the fund's holdings of the currency can be reduced.
In all probability what would be the
means?


James Lorimer Ilsley: To what section is the hon. mem'bdr referring?


Victor Quelch: It is found on page 36, and reads as follows:
Whenever the fund's holdings of any member's currency are such that the charge applicable to any bracket for any period has reached the rate of four per cent per annum, the fund and the member shall consider means by which the fund's holdings of the currency can be reduced.
Would the minister consider the most likely recommendations to be a reduction in the price level; that is, would it be a deflationary policy in order that the creditor nations *would be more likely to buy their goods.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I could not give an exhaustive list of means. I should think that a depreciation of their currency might be one. That would encourage their exports, discourage imports and help their exchange position.


Victor Quelch: The minister thinks that would be employed rather than a deflationary policy.


James Lorimer Ilsley: A deflationary policy would work the other way, would it not?


Victor Quelch: No; if the price level were reduced internail}' it would be apt to encourage other nations to buy those goods which would offset the unfavourable balance of trade.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I do not know.


Victor Quelch: Theoretically it should. I admit creditor nations might set up tariff walls to make sure our goods did not come in. I should now like to go a step farther. What happens if that does not work out, and I think it would not. The section goe^ on to say:
Thereafter, the charges shall rise in accordance with provisions of (c) above until they reach five per cent and failing agreement, the fund may then impose such charges as it deems appropriate.
I think that is a most vicious section! I cannot understand a section like that being in the agreement. Imagine anybody signing an agreement that if they could not meet a certain obligation in a certain period of time,

Bretton Woods Agreements
then the creditor can charge any rate of interest he likes. If I read it rightly, that is what it means.


James Lorimer Ilsley: It is to prevent an indefinite use of this fund by a country for financing purposes; that is all.


Victor Quelch: Surely the logical way
would be to say to the creditor nation, here is a nation which has a surplus of goods. It is prepared to pay you in goods. It is up to you to accept payment in goods. Surely that would be the logical thing to say. It would be a different thing if that nation were buying more than it could pay for. That would be one thing; but supposing it were a nation which had the goods to pay, but which the creditor nations would not buy, and that may easily happen; under an ordinary multilateral system that is apt to happen. Let us say that England bought one million dollars worth of goods from us under it. We might turn around and use that money to buy from the United States. Who is going to buy from England? There is no guarantee at all in a multilateral system of this kind that there will be a fair distribution of the credits. Some countries may be left, out entirely unless there is a definite obligation on us that a creditor nation clears the credit with the debtor nation. I find no obligation in this agreement to that effect. I cannot find any obligation in this act.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Would the hon. gentleman not be tying up a trade agreement with a currency agreement if he did that If we had some provision here by which a nation agreed that it would take a certain quantity of goods, would that be an appropriate provision in a currency agreement? This agreement states repeatedly that it is not complete, that it is ' only a part of the picture. It is to facilitate trade. I just want to make that clear, because it seems to me that a lot of the discussion is based on the assumption that this is designed to be a cure-all . It is not that at all. One of the resolutions passed by this umied nations monetary and financial conference, to be found in article VII of the Final Act contains this:
Whereas, in article I of the articles of agreement of the international monetary fund it is stated that one of the principal purposes of the fund is,*to facilitate the expansion and balanced growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy;
Whereas, it is recognized that the complete attainment of this and other purposes and objectives stated in the agreement cannot be achieved through the instrumentality of the fund alone;
Therefore the united nations monetary and financial conference recommends:
To the participating governments that, in addition to implementing the specific monetary and financial measures which were the subject of this conference, they seek, with a view to creating in the field of international economic relations conditions necessary for the attainment of the purposes of the fund and of the broader primary objectives of economic policy, to reach agreement as soon -as possible on ways and means whereby they may best:
(1)	reduce obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations;
(2)	bring about the orderly marketing of staple commodities at prices fair to the producer and consumer alike;
(3)	deal with the special problems of international concern which will arise from the cessation of production for war purposes; and
(4)	facilitate by cooperative effort the harmonization of national policies of member states designed to promote and maintain high levels of employment and progressively rising standards of living.
My hon. friend may say that there are no teeth in that, and there are not; and to the extent that you do have teeth in these provisions you do deprive member nations of their sovereignty. But I can think of some imports into Canada that certain members of the hon. gentleman's own group would not let us bring in if they could avoid it, and if we started forcing other nations against their will there would be a terrible rumpus in this house of the ground of the destruction of local agricultural effort. You can only go so far in forcing nations to do these things. This is a statement of principle and an undertaking on the part of the member countries not to rush into this competitive depreciation of currencies and so forth that had such bad results in former times. I think we are bound , to try to organize the world so, as to avoid as much of that as possible.
I am sorry that I have not been able to get alarmed at anything that my hon. friends in their speeches have outlined as bad consequences likely to follow from this agreement. All I can get out of it is that it is not perfect, that it may not do the whole job. But what harm it is going to do anywhere, I do not know.


Victor Quelch: You try to stabilize currencies; and you try to prevent nations from imposing restrictions. In other -words, you. remove their defences from them against the very thing that made it necessary for them to impose those restrictions. That is what the London chamber of commerce charges. It says:
It is the gravamen of the chamber of commerce criticism that the international monetary fund does in fact seek to deprive the nations / of their defences whilst failing to remove the perils which called them into use.
Bretton IFoods Agreements

That is exactly what you are doing. If we are to say to a nation that she cannot devaluate her currency in the future, we should make sure that it is not going to be necessary. The only reason for it is to balance their trade in. the long run.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The perils the hon. gentleman mentions are to be removed by trade agreements rather than by this, are they not?


John Horne Blackmore: What guarantee have we that they will be?


James Lorimer Ilsley: We have not any guarantee.


Victor Quelch: If the fund is going to act as referee to see that every nation that establishes a credit for another nation will Have it cleared, I would be assured.


James Lorimer Ilsley: No.


Victor Quelch: Then are you not placing nations in ah impossible position where they will be forced into debt and then have these excessive charges applied against them? Remember, this fund is apparently a law unto itself, immune from all action. Just to whom exactly is it responsible? If a nation feels that it is not getting a square deal, to whom can it appeal?


James Lorimer Ilsley: It can withdraw.


Victor Quelch: Then article XI applies. Let me read article XI:
Each member undertakes:
(i)	Not to engage in, nor to permit any of its fiscal agencies referred to in article V, section 1, to engage in, any transactions with a non-member or with persons in a non-member's territories which would be contrary to the provisions of this agreement or the purposes of the fund;
(ii)	Not to cooperate with a non-member or [DOT] with persons in a non-member's territories in practices which would be contrary to the provisions of .this agreement or the purposes of the fund; and
(iii)	To cooperate with the fund with a view to the application in its territories of appropriate measures to prevent transactions with non-members or with persons in their territories which would be contrary to the provisions of this agreement or the purposes of the fund.
I think we all realize that Great Britain is going to be in a most difficult position. Suppose they are not able to meet their obligations and in order to defend themselves they devaluate sterling beyond the limits allowed and as a result have to withdraw from the fund. Then under this agreement the rest of the dominions have, to all intents and purposes boycott Great Britain, as they cannot participate in business with any country contrary to the fund. The other nations would not be able to enter into transactions

with her. If the British pound were devaluated, beyond the limits allowed, then for a nation to do business with her would be contrary to the laws of the fund.


James Lorimer Ilsley: If it were contrary' to the provisions of the agreement.


John Horne Blackmore: There is no telling
what the stipulations of the fund are.


Victor Quelch: To whom can they appeal if they feel that the decision is not fair?


The ACTING CHAIRMAN (Mr. Golding):: The hon. member's, time has expired.


Victor Quelch: I am not making a speech, Mr. Chairman; I am asking questions.


William Henry Golding: It is not in order for an hon. member to take the length of time that the hon. gentleman has taken.


John Horne Blackmore: I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that you read the first part of standing order 58. It would be good for you to read that. That gives an individual an opportunity to speak as often as he wishes in this committee; and the hon. member has been asking questions of the Minister of Finance, and has had those questions answered. There stands the rule; it is the greatest safeguard of democracy and freedom in parliament, and if that rule is broken we are on the way to tfye destruction of democracy.


William Henry Golding: I wish to read another rule. Paragraph 306 of Beauchesne states:
It is not in order to read articles in newspapers, letters or communications emanating from persons outside the house and referring to, or commenting on, or denying anything said by a member or expressing any opinion reflecting on proceedings within the house.


Victor Quelch: Have I done that? I have not read one document covered by that section. The documents I have' been reading have emanated from the house itself, Hansard, the reconstruction committee-


John Horne Blackmore: The hon. member is
completely in order.


Victor Quelch: As for suggesting that I
have spoken for forty minutes, I have not spoken for five minutes at a stretch. I have said a few words for two or three minutes and asked questions of the minister, and he has replied. However, if that is your ruling, Mr. Chairman-


William Henry Golding: The hon. member will agree that he has been occupying the floor for almost an hour and a quarter.

Bretloii Woods Agreements


Victor Quelch: I have not been on the
floor for anywhere near an hour and a quarter. However, if that is the ruling, the hon. member for Lethbridge can take the floor. I want to stop now. I am only asking questions, and I can put through this series of questions in about a quarter of an hour.


William Henry Golding: The hon. gentleman can ask a question.


Victor Quelch: My question is: if a disagreement occurs between a debtor nation and a creditor nation on account of section 8 of article V, to whom can that nation appeal?


Mr. LESAGE:: You will get your answers
in the banking and commerce committee.


Victor Quelch: That is just where we will
not get them. I have been in the banking and commerce committee probably more than the hon. member has, and I know what the answers are in these committees. The minister is probably the one man, on behalf of the government, who can speak with authority. The experts will be just giving their opinion; there will be no backing behind it. I have a good deal of confidence in the minister; I would far rather have his word than that of any departmental official. I should like to refer him to article IX. page 28, which states:
Section 1. Purposes of article
To enable the fund to fulfil the functions with which it is entrusted, the status, immunities and privileges set forth in this article shall be accorded to the fund in the territories of each member.
Going to section 3:
The fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.
In other words, this fund is a law above all the governments of the world. Is that not right or am I exaggerating?


John Horne Blackmore: It is above the united
nations charter.


Victor Quelch: Whaf is the relationship
between this fund and the united nations charter? Is it under the authority of the security council? Is it not a law unto itself? Is it subject to the decisions of the international court of justice? It seems to be above all law. Here we are setting up an organization which is a law to itself, above every other government in the world, and above every court. It is immune to action in any court. It is an absolute and complete dictatorship. Yet hon. members are suggesting that we should endorse a principle of that kind.


James Lorimer Ilsley: It is no mere so than any other agreement between nations. There is an authority set up here to decide on a dispute between a member and the fund; that is, the governing authority of the fund itself. When we make an agreement with the United States of America-


Victor Quelch: Yes, but you can rescind that type of agreement. Here is something which, when one nation rescinds the agreement, the rest of the members are obliged to apply a kind of boycott against it.


James Lorimer Ilsley: No, no. not a boycott at all. The members who stay in the fund must not use a non-member as a means of defeating the purposes of the fund; that is all. That does not mean a boycott against them.


Victor Quelch: Just explain what it means, then, because the provisions are pretty stringent, and there has been a great deal of objection to article XI. What is the purpose of putting it in there? Just let me read the views of certain authorities in Britain who consider that this agreement may affect them adversely. Again I quote from a man who the minister will admit is quite an authority- Sir Charles" Morgan-Webb. He has this to say:
Britain need have no fear for the revival of her export industries if the entanglement of Bretton Woods can be avoided, and if her overseas pounds sterling are kept off a gold basis. As long as they are redeemable in goods, they provide an expansive currency capable of meeting all the requirements of an expanding world trade. But if they are made redeemable in old they become a deadweight deflationary urden that can never be redeemed. The linking of the war debts of the first world war to the capricious medium of gold inevitably made them unpayable. The linking of the present overseas cash debts owing by Britain to gold, as proposed at Bretton Woods, will transform them from an obligation to redeem them in exports into an unpayable obligation to redeem them in gold. As they stand, they are payable in British exports. Transformed into gold obligations,^ they will fulfil the expectations of American high finance, and drive Britain into default.
As soon as Britain got into a position where she had exceeded her quota by 200 per cent, the only way this scarce currency could be obtained would be for gold, and Britain would be forced still further into debt. A man of this writer's standing would not make such a statefnent as I have quoted without ample justification.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I am not asking for this; but if speeches have to go on, I should like to have someone point out the disadvantage of this to Canada, instead of to some other country, all the time. The case of a country in a different situation fro'm Canada, is being argued all this time.
Bretton Woods Agreements


Victor Quelch: We will take that up in a minute.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Let the hon. member not get excited. My hon. friend is quoting British authorities all the time who want Britain to be in a position to discriminate, and to discriminate against Canada, in favour of the sterling bloc, and so my hon. friends are supporting it. We are trying to get a different kind of world-trading world and monetary world-from the kind of world in which these authorities which my hon. friends are supporting 'believe. It is true that perhaps our interests in these matters may run a little more parallel to the United States than they do to Great Britain. But after all, this is Canada; this is not Great Britain.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Hear, hear.


Victor Quelch: I think the minister will be sorry for this statement when he reads it later on. Personally I do not want to take any part in helping to liquidate the British empire.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Neither do I.


John Horne Blackmore: That is exactly what you are doing.	.


Victor Quelch: The Bretton Woods agreement is definitely the first step to doing it.


James Lorimer Ilsley: It is not.


John Horne Blackmore: It is designed to destroy it.


Victor Quelch: The minister says, why do I not talk about the advantages to Canada? I will make it quite plain-and I am sure this statement will please the minister-that in so far as Canada is concerned I do not think the Bretton Woods agreement will do it any harm. I have studied carefully, shall 1 say, tried to find some place where it might be detrimental to Canada, but I do not think the Bretton Woods agreement will in itself be detrimental to the Canadian economy. Apart from the fact that we are supposed to be keen on maintaining peace in the world. We have sacrificed thousands of lives to secure peace; we have endorsed the united nations charter; we have signed a political agreement for peace. Well, I do not think it would be advantageous for Canada to sign an economic agreement which may stir up international friction and lead to another war. After all, the greatest benefit to Canada will be to help build up an economy in the world which will maintain peace. To that extent Bretton Woods will be detrimental to Canada along with the other nations of the world, in that it is bound to lead to international friction, which is one of the root causes of war.
'Mr. Ilsley.3


James Lorimer Ilsley: If you do not have something like this, the kind of trading practices you are going to get between countries are the kind which Germany had-the Schacht practices. That is what you will get; and a lot of these authorities in England who are opposed to Bretton Woods want just that.


Norman Jaques: No, they do not.


James Lorimer Ilsley: They want that. And let it be borne in mind that in speaking thus I am not attacking Great Britain or the majority in Great Britain; I am attacking a group there. I believe that the larger group are in favour of the Bretton Woods agreement, because they believe in multilateral trade practices instead of bilateral, and they believe that they are more likely to have peace under multilateral practices than under bilateral ones.


Victor Quelch: Have I said one word in favour of bilateral trading? I have criticized bilateral trading and advocated multilateral, but I have been advocating that form of multilateral trading whereby all nations will be obligated to clear their credits. Does the minister suggest that the proposals endorsed by the London chamber of commerce are bilateral? I have tried hard, and Senator McGeer has tried hard, to get an expression of opinion from the deputy minister regarding these proposals. We have tried to get an analysis of them.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The London chamber of commerce proposals?


Victor Quelch: The twentieth century system is endorsed by the London chamber of commerce and the proposals will be found in the booklet entitled the "Twentieth Century System." Senator McGeer gave the deputy minister a copy of it and asked him for a report on the book. I do not know whether he got one, but I have never got one. Will the minister tell us what his criticism of the twentieth century system is? Why is he opposed to it? That system is multilateral; it is divorced from gold, and it places the responsibility fairly and squarely on the creditor nation to clear its credits by taking goods or trading credit to another country that will take the goods of the debtor nation.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I do not know what the proposals of the London chamber of commerce are; I am not in a position to discuss them. Is it not significant, however, that the British government has not advocated or suggested them, that the United States government has not advocated them, nor has any other government that anyone has ever heard of advocated them? What possible good would there be in the

Bretton Woods Agreements
dominion starting out with some twentieth century plan or chamber of commerce proposals and endeavouring to convert forty or fifty nations of the world to those proposals? Where would we get? Could we waste our time more flagrantly than by trying to do that? Why not adopt something that has some chance of succeeding?


John Horne Blackmore: Certainly not Bretton Woods.


Victor Quelch: The minister knows why Britain has not advocated such a system as is outlined in twentieth century. He knows why Britain has accepted the Bretton Woods agreement. The last time I spoke I quoted Ernest Bevin who was critical of Bretton Woods, but in order to get certain benefits from the United States, the British apparently have given in on Bretton Woods, partly for the cancellation of war debts, and partly to get the money which they require. That is the price they are paying for these benefits. The price is their coming in under the Bretton Wqods agreement. Maynard Keynes, in his book "International Stabilization of Currency," makes it clear that he is not keen about the idea of gold entering into the scheme, but he points out that it would no doubt be impossible to get the United States to agree to any programme that did not bring gold into the picture. He makes that clear. He points out that nations are agreeing because of the insistence of the United States. Appeasement in the past has always failed. We got ourselves in a mess from 1935 on as a result of trying to appease others. We shall get nowhere now, I suggest, by trying to appease the United States at this time. In doing so we are only laying up trouble for ourselves in the future, and I am quite satisfied that the result is bound to be international friction. The minister asks me, will it be detrimental to Canada? I say, so far as our trading is concerned, no; but so far as helping to destroy peace in the world, I say definitely yes. I would remind the minister that these experts and international financiers, in whom apparently he has such faith, have been harsh taskmasters in the past. I have here a copy of what'occurred. I do not think I need to read from it, but I would remind the minister what happened when the Niemeyer mission went to Australia in 1939. This shows the kind of treatment a nation gets when it places itself in the position outlined by section eight of article V. This is the treatment it will get from Otto Niemeyer. Perhaps it is just as well for me to put this on the record. Hon. members will find it written in a book,
by J. T. Lang, leader of the Labour party in New South W'ales. The book is entitled "Why I Fight":
The mission consisted of Sir Otto Niemeyer, a representative of the bank who had acted in the similar capacity of official assignee in the case of many European countries; Professor T. E. Gregory, of the London school of economics and Mr. R. N. Kershaw, former Australian Rhodes scholar, designated as "liaison officer".
Then I quote.
Extracts from Sir Otto's address make interesting reading after an interval of four years: "It is a serious problem," he said, "the practical solution of which is not rendered any easier by the natural optimism of the Australian. So long as it is generally believed in Australia that there is an unlimited market abroad for Australian goods, and that something will turn up, it will be difficult to face the realities of the position."
Australia had an unfavourable balance of trade. Sir Otto points out that they had a surplus of goods, but they are in difficulties not because of scarcity of goods, but because they could not get creditor nations to lake those goods. This committee, the Niemeyer mission, met with the premiers of the various states of Australia and this is what happened:
Submissively the premiers carried a series of resolutions at the dictation of Sir Otto, declaring:
(a)	their fixed determination to balance their respective budgets for the financial year 1930-31

I had said 1939.
[DOT]-and to maintain a similar balanced budget in future years;
(b)	that no further overseas loans would be raised until current short-term indebtedness was dealt with;
(c)	that future loans will be for reproductive works only.
These were the steps which the mission assured the conference were essential to "place Australia on the road to prosperity". Time has surely proven them to be steps of the treadmill.
That is the kind of difficulty you get into when you put yourself under the dictatorship of a certain kind of authority. I should like an answer from the minister as to what recourse nations will have from action by the stabilization fund. Surely the stabilization fund is not a superior law above every government in the world. Does the minister suggest to the house that he accepts the idea of the stabilization fund as constituting a supergovernment above the united nations charter, above the security council, above the international court of justice?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Article XVIII is the one to which the hon. gentleman probably refers. It will be found on page 36:
Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this agreement arising between any member of the fund or between any mem-
324S
Bretton Woods Agreements

bers of tbe fund shall be submitted to the executive directors for their decision. If the question particularly affects any member not entitled to appoint an executive director it shall be entitled to representation in accordance with article XI, section 3 (j).
(b)	In any ease where the executive directors have given a decision under (a) above, any member may require that the question be referred to the board of governors, whose decision shall be final. Pending the result of the reference to the board the fund may, so far as it deems necessary, act on the basis of the decision of the executive directors.
(c)	Whenever a disagreement arises between the fund and a member which has withdrawn, or between the fund and any member during the liquidation of the fund, such disagreement shall be submitted to arbitration by a tribunal of three arbitrators, one appointed by the fund, another by the member or withdrawing member and an umpire who, unless the parties otherwise agree, shall be appointed by the president of the permanent court of international justice or such other authority as may have been prescribed by regulation adopted by the fund. The umpire shall have full power to settle all questions of procedure in any case where the parties are in disagreement with respect thereto.
From that I gather that in the normal course matters of disagreement would be settled by the executive directors or the board of governors, and that if a member felt it was unjustly treated it might withdraw from the fund. But the members have the right to representation; they participate in the selection of this board, and it must not be thought that these executive directors and the board are some authority outside the membership of the fund at all. They are acting for the membership of the fund, and to me there would seem to be nothing unsatisfactory in that respect. When you make agreements with other countries you assume that those other countries will carry them out.	[DOT]


Victor Quelch: If possible.


James Lorimer Ilsley: You do not go to law about it if they do not, because there is no way to go to law. They usually do carry them out; in fact I cannot remember instances where they have not. There have been disputes from time to time, but usually they are settled by discussion. Here they are settled by the executive directors or by the board of governors of the fund.


Victor Quelch: Is this one of the special
agencies referred to in the united nations . charter?


Major James William Coldwell: It may become so, but it is not as yet. Is that not right?


Victor Quelch: That is what I wanted the minister to answer, as to whether it may be one.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I do not know.
rMr. Ilsley.]


Victor Quelch: If it may become one, does it then become subject to the regulations of the united nations charter?


James Lorimer Ilsley: I cannot answer that.


Victor Quelch: I think it is quite obvious
that it cannot become one, due to the fact that it is practically a law unto itself. How could it possibly come under the united nations charter when you have article IX, which gives immunities and privileges as follows:
To enable the fund to fulfil the functions with which it is entrusted, the status, immunities and privileges set forth in this article shall he accorded to the fund in the territories of each member.
The fund shall possess full juridical personality, and, in particular, the capacity:
(i)	to contract;
(ii)	to acquire and dispose of immovable and movable property;
(iii)	to institute legal proceedings.
Mind you the fund can institute legal proceedings .against anyone, but no one can institute legal proceedings against the fund. It is immune from all legal action.
The fund, its property and its assets, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that it expressly waives its immunity for the purpose of any proceedings or by the terms of any contract.
Property and assets of the fund, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall be immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form of seizure by executive or legislative action.
The archives of the fund shall be inviolable.
To the extent necessary to carry out the operations provided for in this agreement, all property and assets of the fund shall be free from restrictions, regulations, controls and moratoria of any nature.
It is to be free of all regulation and restriction within any country in the world; yet we are seriously giving consideration to setting up a body which is to be above al! laws and all governments and apparently even above the international court of justice. The only provision is that arbitration may be carried out by a member of the fund, the fund itself and a third person appointed by the court of international justice, but no legal action can be taken against the fund. Surely in view of the fact that we are setting up an international court of justice a nation should have the right, to take legal action against the fund before that- international court. Does the minister not. agree that there should be some possibility of action in that regard, and that a nation should be allowed to take legal proceedings against the fund? In recent years we have been very bitter in denouncing dictatorships and totalitarian states; but those were only the dictators of nations. We are now proposing to set up a dictator of the

Bretton Woods Agreement's
whole world. Then, when I raise a protest in this house and say that this is one way of liquidating the British empire, the minister suggests that I am reading quotations from British authorities.


An hon. MEMBER:: No; you are
obstructing.


Victor Quelch: Well, the Liberal party are quite expert at obstructionist tactics. I think we should page the hon. member for Winnipeg South Centre, who talked out resolution after resolution on private members' days. So let not any hon. member on that side begin to talk about obstructionist tactics, because they are experts at that job and I have never indulged in that sort of thing.
I suggest to the minister that in the dying days of the session it is not fair to send a bill of this kind to the banking and commerce committee, on which they will have their experts, while it will be impossible for us to call experts whom we should like to have present the other side of the picture. I know two or three men I should like to call, but I also know very well there will not be time for that to be done. Then, what right has the government to say, "You can have a free discussion in the banking and commerce committee," when they know very well that just one side of the story will be told? Does the minister consider that British justice? Is that giving hon. members a fair opportunity to hear both sides of the question? Many hon. members even object to our trying to give the house what we consider to be the true picture of this measure.


John Horne Blackmore: And how can the minister possibly consider that he is being fair to the members of this house in asking them to vote on the principle of this resolution on second reading, when, the resolution contains so many dangerous stipulations and is obviously just bristling with uncertainties? Did anything like this ever occur in all the history of parliament? I am really astonished.
Progress reported.



TRADE AND FINANCE


James Lorimer Ilsley: Mr. Speaker, I wish to make a brief statement. I take the earliest opportunity to inform the house that over the week-end discussions were held with representatives of the United Kingdom who had participated in the recent negotiations in Washington. We received from them full explanations of the terms of the financial agreement reached in Washington
and of the course likely to be followed by the further discussions of trade policy envisaged in the United States proposals for expansion of world trade and employment, which I expect will be tabled to-morrow.
The United Kingdom representatives have engaged also in exploratory talks with Canadian officials on the financial arrangements between the two countries with a view to preparing for more formal discussions as soon as possible after the beginning of the new year. Particular attention was given in these discussions to the implications of any financial arrangement for 'immediate and future trade relations between the two countries. It is planned to give more detailed consideration both here and in London in the next few weeks to the problems causing immediate concern.
At six o'clock the house took recess.
After Recess
The house resumed at eight o'clock. BRETTON WOODS AGREEMENTS



INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration in committee of the following resolution-Mr. Ilsley -Mr. Macdonald (Brantford City) in the chair.
That it is expedient to present a measure to grant authority to accept on behalf of Canada and to carry out the obligations of Canada under the articles of agreement for an international monetary fund and an international bank for reconstruction and development prepared by the united nations monetary and financial conference held at Bretton Woods in July, 1944; to authorize the payment of the subscriptions required from Canada out of unappropriated moneys in the consolidated revenue fund to an amount not exceeding seven hundred million dollars; and to authorize the borrowing under the provisions of the Consolidated Revenue and Audit Act, 1931, of sums not exceeding seven hundred million dollars.
Ernest George Hansell: Before six o'clock the hon. member for Acadia had been discussing certain features of the final act of the Bretton Woods agreement. He called the attention of the committee to article IX, which refers to status, immunities and privileges.
Perhaps hon. members may think that we in this corner of the chamber seem to be particularly incensed at this agreement; but
Bretton Woods Agreements

when attention is called to some of the tremendous powers granted to this central organization, we have indeed reason to be alarmed.
In the matter of immunities, the hon. member for Acadia has already pointed out to the committee that ,the fund is here personalized, according to section 2, which states:
The fund shall possess full juridical personality and, in particular, the capacity . . .
And so on. We must consider that they have almost all power, and that no other organization, no other nation and no other sovereign power have, the right to sue them In other words, no nation has any recourse, no redress, when once those in charge of the fund have made a decision. That is an alarming thing.
May I call the attention of the committee to some other sections under this article, so that hon. members may see the extent to which we are handing over authority and power to this fund, without having any right of redress whatsoever, even as a nation. In section 8 we find the heading "Immunities and privileges of officers and employees". The section states:	'
AH governors, executive directors, alternates, officers and employees of the fund
(i)	shall be immune from legal process with respect to acts performed by them in their official capacity except when the fund waives this immunity.
I a.m not so much concerned about that clause, because perhaps an individual cannot be permitted to be sued, if it is the decision of the entire body. But look at the next clause:
(ii)	not being local nationals, shall be granted the' same immunities from immigration restrictions, alien registration requirements and national service obligations and the same facilities as regards exchange restrictions as are accorded by members to the representatives, officials, and employees of comparable rank ot other members.
I hope I understand that. Perhaps I do not; but it appears to me that you have men in control of this fund who can travel all over the world, and that we, as a nation, cannot even ask what right they have here. That seems to me to be tremendously irregular.
I am often reminded that when some visitor goes to the United States, our good neighbour to the south, very often an hon. member will rise here and ask if the government has taken any action to invite such person to this country. That has been done on a number of occasions. When that is done I often feel like asking myself, "Well, since when do some of these other nations rise in their legislative assemblies and ask if the government have invited any of our men to look over what they may have to show?"
[Mr. Hansell.l
Here is a. section under which these people may come and go as they wish. That seems strange to me. Are we to permit it? If we sign the agreement it looks as though we will.
Paragraph (iii) says:
(iii)	shall be granted the same treatment in respect of travelling facilities as is accorded by members to representatives, officials and employees of comparable rank of other members.
If I have not got that right, I would ask the minister to say where I am wrong.
But one of the most startling sections of all, to my mind, is section 10. I want the minister to read that. I suppose he has already done so, but I suggest that he should refresh his memory. The title of that section is "Application of article," and it begins in this way:
Each member shall take such action . . .
"each member"; that is, each nation which signs the agreement and becomes a part of the whole. Each member, each nation, shall take such action. It does not say "may" take such action. "Shall" seems to me to be obligatory. It states:
Each member shall take such action as is necessary in its own territories for the purpose of making effeotive in terms of its own law the principles set forth in this article and shall in-^ form the fund of the detailed action, which it* has taken.
It seems to me that if Canada signs this article we are signing away our right over certain of our own laws and our own legislative powers, and that the moment we sign the agreement we must then readjust any legislation on our statute books that' may, in any way, hinder the smooth functioning of this fund.
To me that is strange language. It - is strange if we- cannot be master of our own legislation. It means that if we have on our statute books legislation which is considered in the interest of our nation but is found to conflict with the operations of this fund, as part of the agreement we are forced to change our law. We are forced to change our laws so that we can. be told by this outside power what to do. If that is not the right interpretation of this section I want the minister to tell me what is wrong with it. We have heard a good deal about sovereign rights, which I believe in, but surely it is going too far toward giving away our sovereign rights when we give some other body the right to say what legislation we should have and to permit that outside power to say that -we can or cannot have this or that legislation.
The other day we were asked to give power to our own government to control certain matters. What are we being asked to do here? If our government goes too far we

Bretton Woods Agreements
can. check them; we have some recourse in this parliament; but when this is done we are giving away our sovereign rights and power to an outside authority with regard to certain legislation. We shall have no control over that power, and I think that is a serious matter. I do not think we can be blamed for being as incensed as we are in a matter of this kind.


William Ross Macdonald: Shall the resolution
carry?


John Horne Blackmore: No.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


John Horne Blackmore: No. If hon. members want to spend half an hour saying "carried" they are welcome to. What nonsense for grown men to indulge in!
I wish to ask the minister several questions based on the remarks he made in the discussion. Our object is to find out- whether the minister can really defend this measure. We have no desire to be extreme in regard to it, but on the face of it this measure looks to me to be the most preposterous thing ever conceived in the mind of man.


An hon. MEMBER:: That is your opinion.


John Horne Blackmore: And it is a pretty good opinion. The hon. member cannot give a single reason why it is fallacious. In fact I wish to say that the hon. member who spoke knows nothing at all about the act. I will challenge him to show that he knows one specific thing about the act.


An hon. MEMBER:: Who is the hon. member talking about? '


John Horne Blackmore: The hon. member
who spoke over there. It is easy enough to let the head rattle, but to get something in it is a different matter.
I should like to ask the minister two or three questions pertaining to certain aspects of the fund. In his discussion with the hon, member for Acadia the minister read a passage which appears in the final act. I read . it over several times before I. believed such a thing as that could be put into an act which was accepted by intelligent men, brought along and proposed to be adopted by an intelligent legislative body. May I read from page 17 of the act which was distributed in the house. The minister read portions of it before the dinner recess. I am going to read the recommendations, so that tho'se who read Hansard will know just exactly what is here. They read as follows:
Whereas, in article I of the articles of agreement of the international monetary fund it is stated that' one of the principal purposes of the fund is to facilitate the expansion and balanced
growth of international trade, and to contribute thereby to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income and to the development of the productive resources of all members as primary objectives of economic policy;	_
Whereas, it is recognized that the complete attainment of this and other purposes and objectives stated in the agreement cannot be achieved through the instrumentality of the fund alone; therefore
The united nations monetary and financial conference recommends:
To the participating governments that, in addition to implementing the specific monetary and financial measures which were the subject of this conference, they seek, with a view to creating in the field of international economic relations conditions necessary for the attainment of the purposes of the fund and of the broader primary objectives of economic policy, to reach agreement as soon as possible on ways and means whereby they may best:
(1)	reduce obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations;
(2)	bring about the orderly marketing of staple commodities at prices fair to the producer and consumer alike;
(3)	deal with the special problems of international concern which will arise from the cessation of production for war purposes; and
(4)	facilitate by cooperatitve effort the harmonization of national policies of member states designed to promote and maintain high levels of ^employment and progressively rising standards of living.
If those four recommendations could be implemented they would simply attain the promised land so far as social crediters are concerned. If we could only learn how to attain those objectives all would be well. The minister must have given this a good deal of attention, and surely the experts who went down there so nobly and performed so ably for twenty-two days and did this wonderful thing in drafting the Bretton Woods agreement, must have reported to him something about this. How does the minister propose to reduce obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations? Will the minister tell us how that is proposed by any measure other than Bretton Woods?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes.


John Horne Blackmore: Exactly what does he conceive to be the meaning of this? How is it to be attained? What mechanism is proposed to attain it? What progress has already been made? Why was this matter not taken care of before Bretton Woods was drafted? Obviously the harness was got before either the cart or the horse. We often hear of that cart being brought out before the horse; but here the harness has been brought in before the cart and before the horse. The harness is all ready to bind us hand and foot, but we
Bretton Woods Agreements

have not the horse or the cart. Will the minister answer these questions? I shall repeat them for him. The first one has to do with the reduction of obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations. It is recommended by the committee that that be attained. Will the minister tell us exactly what he means by this?


James Lorimer Ilsley: The outstanding one was United States government, with the approval of the British government, indicates the methods that will be adopted to reduce obstacles to international trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations. Then a trade conference is to be held looking to the reduction of trade barriers.


John Horne Blackmore: By that I gather the
meaning is just a reduction of tariffs; is that it?


James Lorimer Ilsley: That is the main thing, but
in this reciprocal trade agreement there are also provisions about quotas. There is a wide variety of provisions. I forget exactly what they are. Our trade agreement with the United States and Great Britain contains .provisions other than strictly tariff provisions. But the reciprocal trade agreements will be the main thing under No. 1.


John Horne Blackmore: I am trying to get a toehold so that I can really get hold of this thing. Is there anything different in these trade agreements from what we have had in the last ten or twenty years? What is there new in what is here proposed as compared with what we had in 1928 or 1927? All that the minister has said is that these proposals will mean reduced tariffs. That does not mean very much. That is a very general thing. The minister knows that the Liberals in this country have been talking about reducing tariffs ever since there was a Liberal party, and when they have got into power they have raised the tariffs. Merely talking .about these things does not accomplish anything. I know that some of the new Liberal members do not know that they have the highest tariff structure there ever was in Canada, that they out-tariffed the high Tory tariffs by a substantial margin, and that probably will merit their investigation. Just talking about lowering tariffs does not get us anywhere. I want to know whether or not some new principle has been brought in, different from the principles obtaining in the last twenty years.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I did not send the hon. gentleman the United States statement, but I sent one to his leader.


Solon Earl Low: Yes, I have one.


James Lorimer Ilsley: If the hon. member for Peace River will just show that document to the hon. member for Lethbridge he will see how far-reaching are the proposals that are made for a multilateral reduction of tariffs and with reference to subsidies and quotas and all kinds of things that would interfere with the flow of trade. I should like my hon. friend not to make such loose statements about the high tariff structure in Canada. The idea that we have the highest tariff structure the country ever hgd is highly incorrect.


John Horne Blackmore: 
James Lorimer Ilsley: I do not know just what the tariff level was in 1925, nor can I be expected to.


John Horne Blackmore: If the general principle is that we are to have lower tariffs, what we need to know is who is to lower them and how far. Great Britain was virtually a free trade country until after the first great world war, and the United States has always been a high tariff country. If the United States undertakes to lower her tariffs and 'Britain lowers hers a little, what advantage will that give? That is what we want to know.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Does the hon. gentleman think it should not be tried? It is all right for a member of this house with no executive responsibility to sit back and pour cold water on what the nations are trying to do to improve international conditions. Those who do have some sense of responsibility and some authority have to do the best they can, and these proposals of the United States, concurred in by Great Britain, are a basis for far-reaching trade discussions for a reduction of trade barriers.
My hon. friend comes along and says that the Bretton Woods agreements should have waited until the other was done, that to proceed with the monetary agreement first was an illogical course. I think nearly everybody thought the contrary, and I think the contrary. I do not think there is much use in entering into trade negotiations and arriving at trade agreements until some machinery is

Bretton Woods Agreements
set up for preventing competitive depreciation of currencies, discriminatory trade practices, and so on, which the Bretton Woods agreements are designed to prevent.


John Horne Blackmore: This question may be a little off the beaten track, a little off the point we are discussing, but can the minister tell us which nations have indulged in these discriminatory currency practices?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Before the war?


John Horne Blackmore: Yes.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The outstanding one was Germany, as. the hon. member knows.


John Horne Blackmore: We have destroyed Germany, and now w'e are trying to destroy Britain. Did Britain engage in these discriminatory practices to any extent? If so, would the minister give us some examples so that we can understand.


An hon. MEMBER:: Don't answer him.


John Horne Blackmore: Of course-anything he can't answer, don't answer. But if there j,s a general understanding in the Liberal party of the fundamental principles of international economics they should rejoice in having questions like that asked of the Minister of Finance, because he should be able to name instances right off if he knows all about these matters. Surely it is a preposterous situation, may I tell the members of the Liberal party, to have here a minister who has at his service a' highly trained staff of experts who have specialized on this matter and can give him information instantly at his call, and yet' the minister is unable to answer the questions of a person who has never specialized in that kind of thing but is just an ordinary member of parliament.
Let me say once more that I represent the man who pays for these wars; I represent the man whose son dies in war; I say here and now that the kind of people I represent have just seen their sons die in war, and they want to find out whether the measures we now propose to adopt will not produce wars rather than cure the cause of wars. How are we to determine whether they will produce wars or cure the cause of war unless we can examine the fundamental economic basis upon which wars are built up? That is all I am asking the minister. Here the Bretton Woods delegates recommend that the nations adopt measures to accomplish four objects which are set out on page 17, and if hon. members will turn to them they will be astonished at their generality. I should like anybody on the Liberal side to tell me the real difference between recommendation No. 3 and recommendation No. 4. It is a collection of high-sounding
phraseology that, might pretty nearly mean anything under the sun. What I am trying to do is to find out whether there is definitely any meaning, so far as the finance minister is concerned, in this first statement, and whether anything has been done beyond talking about these matters. That is what I want to find out. There is nothing unreasonable in my question. If the minister cannot answer it, and if the Liberals cannot answer it, it is evidence that they do. not know enough about the situation to be able to handle it at all.


Mr. DECHENE:: What a man! What a man!


John Horne Blackmore: I am glad you are beginning to appreciate it. The minister ought to be able to tell us something about what has been done, instead of leaving it in these general terms.


James Lorimer Ilsley: My hon. friend knows as well as I do that quite a large number of countries during the thirties adopted discriminatory trade practices.


John Horne Blackmore: In economic selfdefence, was it not?


James Lorimer Ilsley: It may have been. I do not know whether it was self-defence.


John Horne Blackmore: As a result of the depression.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The hon. gentleman -wanted me to give a list of these countries?


John Horne Blackmore: Just one or two. Never mind a list.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I named Germany.


John Horne Blackmore: Well, we have destroyed her.


James Lorimer Ilsley: There were a number of other countries. I would have to brush up my recollection on that. I do not think that one is expected to have a complete recollection of it, because everybody knows what happened. It has been repeated a hundred times in this house; I have heard it often. People have talked about the export of wheat to European countries being prevented because several or many of them put on embargoes and import quotas and subsidies of their own production, in some cases export subsidies, and milling quotas, and of course exchange restrictions, which interfered with the importation of goods into those countries and made trade terms more favourable in respect of some countries, countries with which they made a bargain, than
Bretton Woods Agreements

with others. The hon. gentleman knows that; everybody knows it. It has been talked about for the last ten or fifteen years.


John Horne Blackmore: I agree with that. What I want from the minister is this: Why did those nations adopt those measures? Why, (for example, would Holland, why would Belgium, restrict the importation of Canadian wheat and subsidize the production of their own wheat? Simply because Belgium- to take one case-had to become as nearly self-sufficient as she possibly could in case of war, which would disrupt her trade, and she had by some means or another to avoid importing more goods than she could pay for with her own exports. She knew that if she imported more than she exported she would go into debt, and that debt would be unpayable. Does the minister agree with that?


James Lorimer Ilsley: That is only one reason. Often there was the pressure of local interests that desired higher prices for what they could produce and wished to get the local market and had to have higher prices than the goods could be bought for if they could be imported. We had a lot of that in this country. Sometimes countries wanted to develop self-sufficiency in case war should come; and there were, I think, other reasons as well. I do not pretend that the list of reasons is exhaustive. Sometimes there were people who believed in self-sufficiency as a national as well as an economic doctrine or creed.


John Horne Blackmore: Now, then, what I want to ask the minister-and he is well informed in these matters, and I am not entirely unfamiliar with them-is this: would the Bretton Woods arrangement propose to destroy the ability of Belgium so to protect her internal economy?


James Lorimer Ilsley: No, the Bretton Woods
agreement does not. That is a matter of trade agreements or commercial arrangements. In fact, the paramount necessity of something of that kind is recognized and has been recognized by everybody throughout. But that is not enough in itself. There has also to be a monetary agreement, and that is provided for in the Bretton Woods agreement.


John Horne Blackmore: That is a very good answer and I am well pleased with it. That is the kind of thing I want to get. Now what I want to know is this: if the Bretton Woods agreement presupposes, which apparently it does because of this recommendation, that adequate reductions of tariffs and international trade restrictions shall be made, it must presuppose that there is to be another agreement

which will come under recommendation No. I and which will oblige Belgium to cease to protect her economy. Does it presuppose that? To me, one of the dangers of Bretton Woods is that it presupposes that there shall be, for example, another convention-I do not know what they will call it this time-in which these tariffs and exchange quotas and all the other means by which Belgium tries to protect her economy shall be abolished, leaving Belgium unprotected in the trade of the world. If that happens, how will Belgium's economy be protected? That is something we have to ask ourselves. If Belgium's economy is not protected, Belgium will begin to fall into unpayable debt, and the first step to war will be taken, because Belgium cannot continue indefinitely, to go into debt, under Bretton Woods or under any other arrangement..


James Lorimer Ilsley: Bretton Woods proposals do not presuppose free trade.


John Horne Blackmore: Then obviously the whole meaning of this recommendation is uncertain, is it not? It does not propose free trade. If a nation is to protect its economy at all, tariffs wall have to come in to a certain extent and exchange controls and quotas will have to come in, and, in fact, every other kind of protective device which the nations have, had to employ in the past; otherwise something else must come in to take the place of that protection. The fundamental position which social crediters take and which new economists generally take is that there must be a distribution of goods in the world under a system which will render it possible to aid nations like Belgium so that they will not have to impose these restrictions. If we could find a single hint anywhere in all the deliberations of all committees which are at work to-day, that there is any idea in their minds as to how that distribution of goods could be brought about, we would be reassured; but I cannot find any sign of that;
I cannot find a hint of it. So that I say. as far as I can see, unless something is explained more than has been explained up to the present time, this first recommendation is just pure piffle and does not have any effect at all. It talks of reducing the obstacles to international trade, at the same time that everybody knows perfectly well that they cannot be reduced without the destruction of the world's weaker economies. If they cannot be replaced without the destruction of those weaker economies, then certainly the cause of war is not being removed, and to bring in Bretton Woods and make it still more difficult for them to protect their economies is simply to aggravate the situation. Surely that must

Bretton Woods Agreements
be plain to every hon. member in the committee. What we are arguing is that there is in Bretton Woods no solution of the problem. The problem is international trade war, and the devices the nations have adopted to protect themselves are the devices which we are supposed to remove, without giving them any means whereby they can remove the need for protection. There is the difficulty. If the minister can give us any reassurance on that matter we should like to have it.
May I just illustrate this for the committee, to give us something to put our teeth into. In the 1930's Japan managed by a device which she was using to bring down the price of her goods for export. I have read this, although I am speaking entirely from memory, that Japan enabled herself to offer a bicycle for S5.75 for which we would charge $50 here in Canada. If we had not adopted a method of practical embargo, of absolute exclusion against Japan, we people in Canada and the United States, with all our productive potential, would have found ourselves buying Japanese goods, and the first thing we knew our people would have been unemployed and the Japanese would have been employed producing our goods. The minister knows that is the , case. The minister knows that Japan invaded the British markets until she undersold British manufacturers right in Britain. She did the same thing in India.
That occurred in 1934 and 1933, and the only possible means of resisting it was the embargo and the quota method. How would you propose to deal with a situation like that? What Japan did was this. She had a population who were able to live on a ration of rice, so that she could produce ever so much more cheaply than the rest of us. We could not reduce our people in North America to the level of a rice diet. That is plain common sense. Not only that, but Japan discovered a means of subsidizing exports; she used her national credit for that purpose, so that her exporters could undersell all the rest of us. The result was that she beat us in every market of the world, and the fact that we adopted the system of quotas and embargos, which stopped her, was what seems to have driven her to war.
What would you do with a situation like that under the Bretton Woods agreement if you did not use quotas and embargos in the United States and in the Dominion of Canada? That is what I am trying to get at. The minister, I think, sees that is impossible. He said that he did not propose to interfere with freedom of trade. It cannot be proposed that we have trade entirely free from quotas or trade restrictions, or entirely free from other kinds of protective devices, for if we adopted 47696-205
such a system we would immediately put a great many nations in an impossible position. Would the minister comment on that aspect of the matter so as to remove our anxieties on that score?
From the information I have I am positive that the cause of the last war was traceable to these very things. It was traceable to the fact that there were certain economies in the world that were unable to protect themselves successfully against stronger economies, and so they went to war. That is my information regarding the economic basis of the war. What does the minister think? Is it really feasible that any real teeth can be put into this first recommendation about reducing the obstacles to international trade and in other ways promoting international commercial relations that shall be mutually advantageous? Is there any hope of that?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes, I think so.


John Horne Blackmore: The minister thinks there is.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes.


Mr. SMITH (Calgary West):: Mr. Chairman, I rise to take up just three or four minutes of the time of this committee, and really for one reason. I would not want the House of Commons to think we are all that way.


John Horne Blackmore: There is no anxiety; we have never claimed you.


Arthur Leroy Smith: Please do not misunderstand me. I have a wonderful admiration for the hon. gentleman, so that I say to him, do not become bad tempered. In the speech made by the last speaker, or one of the many speeches made by the last speaker, I have observed certain things-and those which I have not heard I have read. There is one thing I do love and that is an intellectual approach to idealism. Let us not lose that. The hon. gentlemen in the far corner are to be credited, I think, with making that approach, and the only criticism, a soft criticism, I make is that they utterly forget realities in endeavouring to put forward certain theories. That is not a harsh criticism; I think the hon. gentleman will agree with me there.


John Horne Blackmore: Very gracious.


Arthur Leroy Smith: Thank you; I appreciate that. Addressing myself to the minister, may I say that I am sorry to have heard the statement that we destroyed Germany, and the question, do we want to destroy Britain? Surely all of us in this House of Commons credit one another 'with the inten-

Bretton Woods Agreements

tion of doing the best we can for this Dominion of Canada and for Britain and the commonwealth of nations. We are entitled to our differences, but our ideals being the same -and they must be the same or we would have no right to be here-the only respect in which we can differ is in matters of method. That, I think, is a fair statement as between the government side on the one hand and, on the other, our group and the two groups of hon. gentlemen to my left.
I am not a financial expert; very far from it. The only achievement I have had in that way is to have made a reasonable income and probably spent ten per cent more every year than I earned. But that is ordinary government financing; it is what we call debt financing, as I understand that expression. What is Bretton Woods to a very humble person like myself who is not en famille, or 'en raport or en something or another with all these fancy fellows who write books and pamphlets? I have the largest waste-paper basket in the House of Commons. I do the best I can to read these things, which are gratuitously sent me

I do not pay for any of them-and yet that basket seems to grow day by day. The strong man who empties it must be a man indeed.
Here is my only thought of Bretton Woods, from my humble point of view. It is far from perfect. It has not these sanctions and so on. It does not compel one country to deliver such and such goods. What is it? It is a meeting of the minds of many nations. You do not get the end result there; but you perhaps get a start, and to me that is all that Bretton Woods is. It is a start in the control of exchange or currencies, so that, that start having been made, other trade agreements, multilateral I hope, may flow from it. I wish it had gone farther. I am sure there is no one in this House of Commons who does not so wish. But when you get all these people together you do not expect the maximum; you may get the minimum, but you expect the greatest amount of agreement that can be attained. I am for Bretton Woods for that reason. I have either listened to or read everything that has been said, and I have not yet heard one definite alternative to Bretton Woods.
It is all right to talk theories. We are told we should get all nations together and have an agreement of this or that kind. We had them together and this is the agreement we got. I am not for a moment discussing certain theories, and I probably could go a great deal farther with them than some hon. gentlemen to my left believe. They will at least admit that in the province of Alberta, in which I have lived all this time, I never

made one public utterance against social credit until the election that took place on June 11. At least I can say that in friendliness to those people down there.


An hon. MEMBER:: Why?
' Mr. SMITH (Calgary West): Why? There is a very good reason for it. For a good part of the time I was crown prosecutor, and I felt that in my position I would not create the slightest impression of a breach of faith, So I did not do it. That is a fair answer to whoever asked the question. He may not be able to justify it, but I have at least given an honest answer.
Are we in this House of Commons not in this position, to be very practical. We cannot have a new Bretton Woods conference, so that in the interests of this country itself there is only one thing to do, and that is to go along with the other nations which have gone this far in trying to make a beginning in the handling of the situation. Anyone who suggests that we can go back to the old conditions which prevailed after the last war has, in my judgment, not learned anything in the last twenty-five years. I am one of those people who believe that economically we are in a new era, and I am sure my hon. friends will agree with me in that. We cannot go back and make trade agreements with A, leaving out B, and making other agreements with C and D but not with G and probably Q; we cannot do that without destroying not only our own economy, because we would be the last to go, but the economy of the whole world.	-
Therefore I am with the minister in this. It is not a cure-all, and no one ever suggested it was. But I am with the Minister of Finance in saying that if we in this House of Commons do not go with the other nations as far as they have gone-and remember, Bretton Woods was not developed undter the new British government-then what are we doing? We are putting a spoke in the wheel of progress. This country and the world cannot wait. We must progress. To turn down this proposal now means that we start all over again; we gather the nations together again, and in my judgment by that time it may be too late.


John Horne Blackmore: I have only the deepest respect for the hon. member for Calgary West and I appreciate his remarks, but let me tell him that Bretton Woods is not a step forward; Bretton Woods is a step backward. It is a device for forcing the old system on people so that they cannot change at all. Every hon. member within the sound of my voice will some day acknowledge the truth of what I am saying.

Bretton Woods Agreements


Arthur Leroy Smith: You believe chaos is inevitable, do you?


John Horne Blackmore: No.


Arthur Leroy Smith: It is chaos without Bretton Woods. If it is chaos with it, let us have it.


John Horne Blackmore: I believe that with Bretton Woods you will have chaos.


Arthur Leroy Smith: And you will have chaos without it?


John Horne Blackmore: Of course.


Arthur Leroy Smith: Then chaos is inevitable.


John Horne Blackmore: You will have chaos unless you adopt a sound system of distribution.


An hon. MEMBER:: What is your system?


John Horne Blackmore: It would not be in order for me to tell you now what the sound system is; I would be out of order. The first great thing is to point out the fearful dangers of adopting Bretton Woods. Even those who drafted the agreements recognized that Bretton Woods is dangerous unless these other four recommendations can be implemented, but they make no suggestion as to how these recommendations can be implemented, and the minister has not a suggestion, not a single idea. All he can tell us is that there are arrangements for tariff reductions, but he cannot give a detailed answer to questions in connection with any of these matters. He cannot show that Belgium, for example, to protect its economy will not have to use every one of these trade restrictions to keep out cheap goods from the United' States. He cannot say that Great Britain will not have to adopt all these devices to keep the United States from literally flooding the British markets, putting the British people out of employment, and gaining such a control of British money that they can buy up British fixed assets to such an extent that they can own Britain outright. He cannot show us that this will not be necessary. Then to jam Bretton Woods in at a time when he cannot show that these things will not be necessary is simply for us to put on a strait-j acket when we should be giving nations freedom at least to fight for their existence.
Now may I say to the hon. member for Calgary West-and I did admire the speech he made-it is true that we have gone into a new age; and the new age we have gone into is an age of abundance. But unless we so manage our affairs that we can enable all the people in the world to partake of that abundance, the abundance itself will smother and strangle us.


Arthur Leroy Smith: I agree with you; do not get mad.


John Horne Blackmore: I am not mad. Unless we properly manage our affairs, that abundance will strangle us; and the anxiety which is filling the soul of virtually every individual in the world with dread to-day is the fear that we shall not be able to handle our abundance. The minister referred to this document which was sent over to the hon. member for Peace River just a moment ago. I must confess that, realizing I had to face the whole of parliament in a struggle of this kind, I have been concentrating to some extent on the sort of things I would have to do to bring out the truth-and I think a good deal of that truth has been brought out to-night-so that I have not had the chance' to read this pamphlet, but let me read some of the things which are in it. I will just turn to the page at which it opens as an example, to let the committee see the kind of thing being advocated. I am reading from paragraph 3 on page 6:
During the transition, it may be necessary to restrict production . . .
Now do hon. members see the kind of thing these men are thinking about? There is no reference to a means of making our abundance available to the peoples of the world, but to a means of restricting production. It is the same old mentality which caused them to shoot swine and drop them into the river, to burn mountains of oranges; exactly the same mentality, the mentality of' scarcity. Where could you get a greater condemnation of the whole thing? I suspected that I would find some pretty shabby timber down under this fine veneer. All we have here is just a beautiful veneer, which could make it appear a fine, solid piece of furniture; but dig down under the veneer and you find nothing but jackpine. I am reading from page 6 of this little pamphlet, "Proposals for expansion of world trade and employment," which was sent over to us. I suppose it is one of the pamphlets that have been issued in evidence of good faith that this first item here, this first objective, is to be implemented.


William Irvine: Read the rest of the
paragraph.


John Horne Blackmore: I am going to complete the paragraph. It is not all as bad as that first part, and I had not intended to leave it incomplete:
During the transition, it may be necessary to restrict production or exports, to fix prices, or to allocate shares of markets among producing countries.
In this there is not a hint of increasing markets by increasing the purchasing power of
3258	COMMONS
Bretton Woods Agreements ________
the people. They are going to take the present markets and divide 1 them up. Can one think of anything more desolating? And that is supposed to be guaranteeing freedom from want. Now I read on:
*Controls of this sort should not be applied in any case unless the need is real and serious-
No one knows when it will be considered real and serious, how many people would have to be starving to death before it was considered such.
-affecting many people, and not curable by the normal process of competition-
There is no hint here of cooperation; it is all competition again, and competition is the thing that has brought on wars in the past. Competition means cutthroat competition and economic war; yet the men who wrote this pamphlet, who are supposed to be introducing the new era, are thinking of nothing in the world but the past. How can anyone, including the hon. member for Calgary West, suppose that what is being proposed here is a step into the new order? It is a step backward, and we could not get better evidence than this. I am glad someone sent this to the horn, member for Peace River. Let me read on:
And when they are set up they should be strictly temporary, lasting no longer than required to carry out the necessary shifts.
But what will happen when the tremendous productive capacity of the United States is liberated . and they find they are not able to sell their oranges among their own people? Will they pile up mountains of oranges again and burn them within sight of the needy? What will they do when they find themselves returning to the conditions of 1935, when they were able to produce enough goods to supply every family in the United States with 84,400 worth a year and they actually had 23,500.000 people on relief? What will they do when they get a condition like that?


Arthur Leroy Smith: What has Bretton Woods to do with that?
Mr. BLACKMOfiE:	Bretton Woods is
supposed to be one of the measures which are to introduce a new order. It is supposed to be one of the steps of progress. I am just showing how shabby that progress is.


Arthur Leroy Smith: The hon. member said that it was a backward step.


John Horne Blackmore: Yes.


Arthur Leroy Smith: The way you paint the picture, you cannot go back farther than that-the S25 million worth of oranges. It cannot be worse; so Bretton Woods cannot be backward. It might be static, but otherwise it must be forward, surely.


John Horne Blackmore: A very fine question. And might I offer this challenge to anyone in the committee who thinks that it must. '


Arthur Leroy Smith: I will take it, before you tell me what it is.


John Horne Blackmore: That is the kind of
men we produce in Alberta. These are the people who fight for what they believe is right. Since the hon. member for Calgary West has accepted the challenge, I am going to ask him to tell me what Bretton Woods would do to help the United States to distribute her abundance in 1935?


Arthur Leroy Smith: And I will
tell you. In 1935-yes, I will go back to 1935, and farther if you wish.


John Horne Blackmore: If there had been a
Bretton Woods in 1935, what good would it have done to. the United States?


Arthur Leroy Smith: In the first
place it .is not supposed to distribute goods. But even that does not matter. I will tell you what it could do back in 1935. We had a depression. It was a world depression. It was the first one we ever had-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: No, no.


Arthur Leroy Smith: Oh, yes, it
was. You can go back to 1929, if you like; I am not going to argue over a year or two. But go back and find out what brought on the depressions in this world, in the various countries. What happened. Labour moved here and there. And they were always able to borrow money outside. That depression you have been talking about is the first one this world ever knew where governments could not borrow money outside. Just take a good slant at this picture. You ask: What would Bretton Woods do in 1935? Perhaps nothing.


John Horne Blackmore: That is what I think.


Arthur Leroy Smith: Oh, please
let me finish. You know we could not borrow money over there in 1935. We borrowed in London and in New York; practically all our borrowing was done there. I agree with you- do not misunderstand me-when you say there should be no hungry people in the midst of plenty. Well, I was called a big-shot once, but I am not one of them. I am not one who has argued otherwise. I agree with that; I have no doubt about it. Certainly there should not be hunger in the midst of plenty.
But what have we done? We have an economic system which did certain things. But that system got us hospitalization; it got us radio; it got us telegraphs; it got us rail-

Bretton Woods Agreements
roads; it got us a lot of things-a lot of social services. So why damn it and throw it out the window? Just remember that it improved civilization up to that time.
Do not just throw it away like an old shoe. My view is that we can take the absolutely good things in the system, and we can take care of 1945. You ask, how? I say, by government intervention and by government guidance. What we can do is this: We can work on the good things in the system, and never have another 1935. That is where the government comes into the picture. That is my view of it.


John Horne Blackmore: What I am going to
have the hon. member for Calgary West tell us is this:	What are the good things in our
system which we would keep, and what changes should we have to make?


Arthur Leroy Smith: Well, keep
one of the things you want-and that is individual enterprise. You have that, so that is not too bad.


John Horne Blackmore: What next would you have? Remember, we are talking about the United States for a few minutes. Let us remember that the United States started! the depression. Yes, it started right in the United States. There were five steps which caused it, and which I have outlined.


Arthur Leroy Smith: And I do not agree with them. I doubt them.


John Horne Blackmore: As soon as you can prove they are not correct, come along. I will prove that they are correct.


Arthur Leroy Smith: I think I had better come to your room to finish this.


John Horne Blackmore: Yes, I can understand that. The trouble is we have not the time to go on talking now. But this is an important question. We have to ask this: What would have to be done in the United States, first of all, to avoid having that depression come on? Remember, she started it.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.


John Horne Blackmore: I told you she ceased foreign lending. Is anyone in this chamber prepared to challenge the statement that the cessation of United States foreign lending
started the depression?


Arthur Leroy Smith: I am prepared to challenge that statement at any time.


John Horne Blackmore: I will refer you to the banking and-


Arthur Leroy Smith: But I would rather go to your room and do it.


John Horne Blackmore: I refer you to the banking and commerce committee of last year, in which Mr. Graham Towers, president of the Bank of Canada, positively said that was the beginning of the depression.


Angus MacInnis: And you do not agree with him?


John Horne Blackmore: I gave those steps before.


Arthur Leroy Smith: I know what started the depression.


William Ross Macdonald: Order. I must again remind hon. members in the committee that remarks must be addressed to the Chair.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Question, question.


Mr. McIVOR:: Carried.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


John Horne Blackmore: If I were wasting the
time these hon. gentlemen are they would be accusing me of blocking.


Daniel (Dan) McIvor: Mr. Chairman, if you will pardon me; I said "carried", because I like to make a short and intelligent speech. I have not been making any all day.


John Horne Blackmore: If the hon. member
would like to have intelligence in his words, I would suggest that he learn another word, one different from "carried", because that is very foolish.
While we have had a little good-natured passage this evening, I believe there is essential value in this question. What would the United States have to do, first of all, to prevent an onset of another depression? If Bretton Woods would not help the United States, or prevent her from going into a depression, then it cannot help the rest of the world from going into a depression. And if the rest of the nations went into a depression, they would be forced to adopt every one of the trade restrictions which they would have to use to save their economies, and to save the lives of their people-instead of Bretton Woods. Then just imagine what would happen. There just is no answer to that, at all.
I pointed out, and showed this morning what the causes of the depression were, and that they came on in the United States. Bretton Woods would have no effect whatsoever on them. I think we showed the absolute futility of Bretton Woods.


Arthur Leroy Smith: Well, then, it is just futile-no harm.


John Horne Blackmore: The chief trouble is that it is suggested there was no harm. I say that it will do harm because it is designed.
Bretton Woods Agreements

after all, to establish a monetary fund with a great deal of control of every nation of the world.


Arthur Leroy Smith: How can you have currency stabilization, without control? Tell me that.


John Horne Blackmore: Such a fund as that with a lot of control will certainly hamper nations. They will find that, in their effort to protect themselves.
And now, if we have finished with number one, I shall turn to number two. The minister has not done much for us on number one. I do not think any of his staff can do anything for us. As a matter of fact, I will challenge the best authorities that sat in Bretton Woods, and the best authorities of the government to show how any substantial change in the world's trade can be made, and still*go on from generation to generation, as an implementing of the suggestion made in number one.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Would the hon. member tell me, frankly: Does he intend to keep this up all evening? How long does he intend to keep this up? I should like to know. I have made my plans pretty clear. I wanted to get this measure before the banking and commerce committee, by four o'clock. The hon. member would not accommodate me, although I think others in his group were willing to do so. Does he mean to keep at it indefinitely? I should like to know. I shall have to make different arrangements.


John Horne Blackmore: I wish to make it
abundantly clear-and I have already done so twice to-day-that I am not attempting to block or hold up the committee. I am attempting to elucidate the facts. A lot of them have certainly come out here to-night.
I will wager that few enough people, whether they were in this country or not, knew what the causes of the depression were.


An hon. MEMBER:: Did you?


John Horne Blackmore: Those causes of
depression have a tremendously vital bearing on this question, because this is supposed to be one of the means of preventing war, and the war came on because of the depression. I think there is hardly any doubt about that.
I have scores of questions which I think have a vital bearing on this whole question that I should like to put to the minister.


John Oliver Probe: Send him a letter.


John Horne Blackmore: I may be presumptuous in doing so, but I believe if I ask those questions and if hon. members would listen to them they would find food for thought in
(Mr. Blackmore.]
them, whether they would find any truth or not. I have given considerable attention to this matter for a number of years. I do not approach this matter entirely without information. I believe it is the duty of those who understand something of these things to ask these questions 'and elicit the information which will aid the people generally throughout the country to come to a better understanding, to get more truth. Therefore I am answering the minister in this way. I am going to ask him questions to elicit the truth and What information I can get. As soon as I am satisfied that he cannot tell me any more I shall go on to another question. I am satisfied he cannot tell me anything more about number one. -What he has told us indicates that he knows almost nothing about it. He has not had the-


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.


John Horne Blackmore: That is perfectly true. I will defend that statement. As an example the minister has not shown how under Bretton Woods the United States could protect her economy from imports from Japan in 1933. If Japan offered bicycles at 15.50 or S7.75 each, the United States would have to shut them out by an embargo, and that would be a quota; she could do no other thing, because no matter how high a tariff she put up she could not keep them out.
The world faced a serious danger with respect to Japan of having that country take over the manufacturing business of the world. Japan could have and would have done so because of the peculiar nature of her people.


Mr. COTE (Matapedia-Matane):: Would the hon. member permit a question?


John Horne Blackmore: Yes.


Antoine-Philéas Côté: Forty-five nations have subscribed to Bretton Woods. Mr. BLACKMORE: Yes.


Antoine-Philéas Côté: Has the hon. gentleman the pretension to say that if the house followed the advice of him and his group it would change in one iota the structure of the world; that the Bretton Woods agreements with regard to the world would not be carried forward? If not, why carry on this discussion any longer?


John Horne Blackmore: My hon. friend is a Christian, is he not?


Antoine-Philéas Côté: Yes.


John Horne Blackmore: Suppose after the
death of the Saviour the Christian world had asked such a despairing question as that, do you suppose that Christianity would ever have advanced?


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.

Bretton Woods Agreements
Mr. BLACIvMORE: All right. Take the Chartists. We shall go to politics now. We shall have you all saying, "oh, oh" about this in a minute. Let us go back to the Chartists' proposals in 1848.


Walter Adam Tucker: I rise to a point of order.


John Horne Blackmore: I am answering the hon. member's question.


Walter Adam Tucker: This is a debate' on the question whether we shall approve the signature of the international monetary fund and the international bank of reconstruction and development. My hon. friend is dealing with items cm page 17 of the final act. Those items set out certain things which should be be done to pro-mote further the purposes of the fund. In -other words, the fund is designed to do certain things in the way of promoting prosperity in the world. This was a further recommendation to promote the purposes for which the fund is also to be established. It is a recommendation in order that certain things shall be done. You might just as well discuss the criminal code in regard to this act, because you must have a certain measure of honesty and integrity in the country if you are to have prosperity. You might just as well discuss anything that might come before this house on this question of an international monetary fund as to discuss the principle of social credit as to whether this fund should be set up or not.
If we look at this thing carefully it will show that by asking questions about things set out on page 17 of this final act my hon. friend has deliberately got away from the discussion as to whether this monetary fund should or should not be set up.
I wish to read it to you, Mr. Chairman, to satisfy you that it is definitely out of order. It reads as follows:
The united nations monetary and financial conference recommends:
To the participating governments that, in addition to implementing the specific monetary and financial measures which were the subject of this conference, they seek, with a view to creating in the field of international economic relations conditions necessary for -the attainment of the purposes of -the fund and of the broader primary objectives of economic policy, to -reach -agreement as soon as possible on- ways -and means whereby they may best:
(1) reduce obstacles -to international -trade and in other ways promote mutually advantageous international commercial relations.
Note, Mr. Chairman, it says this:
That, in addition to implementing the specific monetary -and financial measures which were -the subject of this conference, they seek, with -a view to creating in the field of international economic relations conditions -necessary for the attainment of -the -purposes of -the fund -and of the broader primary objectives of economic policy . . .
In other words, what my hon. friend is discussing is something that is outside the international monetary fund altogether, something that is outside the international bank for reconstruction and development. He is seeking to discuss the broad question of economic policy within the country, the question of international trade and all those other matters which this conference said should be dealt with in order to help promote the purpose of the fund. The fund is just one means whereby this purpose may be promoted; my hon. friend is definitely out of order, Mr. Chairman, when he seeks to discuss this other means whereby this objective is sought to be promoted, and I ask you to rule him out of order on this discussion. I definitely say to you that when he is seeking to take this attitude; when he knows that t-he purpose of this house has been expressed by a definite and overwhelming majority that this nation wishes to adhere to this fund and he seeks to prevent us by talking and talking and refusing to go to the committee where he can get the information which he claims he wants, he is seeking to frustrate democracy in the only way in which it can work, namely, by putting this thing to a committee where it can be studied. For that reason, when this house has definitely shown its intention, I ask you to-


John Horne Blackmore: On a point of order, I ask the hon. member to withdraw.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Sit down.


John Horne Blackmore: I ask him to withdraw. The hon. member has attributed a motive to me which he has no right to do.


Walter Adam Tucker: If I have said anything that offends my hon. friend-


John Horne Blackmore: On a point of privilege I request the hon. member to withdraw his statement. He attributed to me the motive of seeking to thwart the purposes of democracy.


Walter Adam Tucker: I said that the effect of what the hon. member was doing was that very thing. I repeat, that is what he is doing.


John Horne Blackmore: The hon. member said that I sought to do it.


Walter Adam Tucker: The hon. member knows very well that unless at least those nations contributing sixty-five per cent of the total subscription adhere to this by December 31 this attempt at an international project is going to fail. More than that, it may very well be that the failure of Canada to adhere to it by
Bretton Woods Agreements

December 31 may mean the destruction of this great work to promote international cooperation in this field.
My hon. friend knows just as well as he is sitting there that the overwhelming will of this parliament is that Canada shall do its share in this great international work. If he by talk, knowing that the time is limited, seeks to prevent our democratic country from doing its part in this work, although he knows the vast majority wants it to be done, he is certainly thereby thwarting the will of democracy. It has been suggested that I attributed motives to my hon. friend. I said that what he was doing was to prevent the will of democracy as represented in this parliament from prevailing. I do not think my hon. friend would want to prevent democracy from functioning, but in the Evening Citizen of December 10 I find this:
Parliament will be here till Christmas if the government doesn't withdraw the Bretton Woods bill, declared Solon Low, [Social Credit leader, to the Evening Citizen this afternoon.
They know that if it is the will of parliament to adhere to Bretton Woods it must do so before December 31. What are we to say to a group in this house, Mr. Chairman, who say that they will sit here and prevent us from carrying out the will of the majority of this parliament?


Ernest George Hansell: It does not say that.


Walter Adam Tucker: I will read it again.
Parliament will be here till Christmas if the government doesn't withdraw the Bretton Woods bill, declared Solon Low. . . . This was his comment on the filibuster the Social Credit party is waging against the government.
"We are prepared to fight this thing right through till after the New Year," he asserted. /The government introduced the Bretton Woods bill last week. This would enable Canada to participate in an international money agreement. The Socreds want none of this at all.
"We're out^ to kill it," said Mr. Low. "We want to kill it in the best interest of Canada, the best interest of the commonwealth, the best interest of Britain." . . .
"We believe we have a plan which is better for everybody-"
And so on. I repeat, Mr. Chairman, that if that is correctly quoting the leader of the Social Credit party he is saying that this little group he leads to-day is undertaking to thwart the will of the majority of this parliament, representing as it does the people of Canada. That, I suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, is the essence of dictatorship. It is the very denial of the democracy in which we believe. As has been well pointed out by various members of the opposition, the Social Credit party were not elected by the Canadian people to conduct the government of this country, and having

put forward their views, if they now seek to thwart the ordinary functioning of government and continue to do so-


Ernest George Hansell: We are not doing that or seeking to do that at all.


Walter Adam Tucker: That is the very thing that brought France down in ruin and destruction, the unwillingness to let the majority conduct .the business of the country, the insistence on using any power they had to make their will prevail against the will of the majority. The will of the majority has been expressed by the overwhelming majority of all the members of this house, joined in by all parties in the house except the Social Credit group. I appealed to them this morning and1 I appeal to them now: Show that you do believe in democracy, that you do believe what you say, that you are asking just for information by letting this measure go to the banking and commerce committee.


John Horne Blackmore: Where it can be all hidden.


Walter Adam Tucker: Where everything can be brought out fully. Let it go to the banking and commerce committee, and then, after you have heard it discussed there, if you are still not convinced, I suggest that you have a certain duty to the people of this country if you believe in deihocracy. If the majority will of the people is to go through and Canada put her signature to these agreements in time to do her part to bring into effect this great international effort at cooperation., I suggest to hon. members of the Social Credit group that if they believe in democracy they should not attempt to thwart this measure because the time is short.


Solon Earl Low: I am sure that the hon. member for Rosthern could very well have saved a good deal of wear and tear and could have approached this matter in a calmer and more dignified manner.
I want to say right here and now and with all the finality I can give it, that there is no such thing as a motive on the part of this group to obstruct. But I will tell you, Mr. Chairman, that if this matter has reached an impasse and is embarrassing the government, as it obviously is, it is nobody's fault but their own. They have been in session here since the 6th of September. They have had plenty of opportunity to bring in this measure early; in fact, the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar in the debate on the address asked the government to bring down the Bretton Woods agreements at the earliest possible day. But the government disregarded that request.

Bretton Woods Agreements
I quite well appreciate that, with the Prime Minister away and heavy duties falling upon the shoulders of the Minister of Finance, he had perhaps more than he could look after, but that is no excuse for having delayed bringing down this resolution until the dying days of this session. As I said the other day, and I will continue to say it, a vote of censure should be passed on this government for holding up this measure until these last days. The people in this country will be the judge-


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: They were.


Solon Earl Low: I know they were, but they did not know about Bretton Woods then; they were not told anything about Bretton Woods. It would have been a simple matter for the Minister of Finance to have brought this resolution down in the early days of the session or even six weeks ago. Then he could have got it into the banking and commerce committee where we could have had three or four weeks to examine this measure, which is of such far-reaching consequences. The penalties for the failure of this measure are of such grave concern that we should have been taking four or five weeks in the banking and commerce committee to get all the information we possibly could, so that we could make up our minds. I say to you, Mr. Chairman, that the government is bringing down upon itself exactly what it asked for in withholding this measure. I am not going to impute any motives, but the people right across this country will probably be doing so in connection with the government's trying to rush this thing through at the last minute. I have sitting around me a group of men with deep convictions who have been anxiously awaiting the bringing down of this resolution, and I do not like to see motives imputed to them.


Walter Adam Tucker: Did the hon. member make the statement that I quoted from the Evening Citizen?


Solon Earl Low: Yes, I did. I am not saying that I used the exact words quoted, but I said that this group are determined to fight this thing to the bitter end. I do not know, nor does any member whether the majority of the people of Canada want Bretton Woods; but I say that it is our duty as the representatives of the people of Canada to find out for ourselves whether it is a good measure, and if we do not we are derelict in our duty. We are trying to do our duty so that in future decades we shall not have to look upon a mess that we did not warn the people about in this country.
I suggest to you, Mr. Chairman, that the
Minister of Finance and his experts answer
the questions that have been asked. They 47696-206
can be answered and should be answered if the government are anxious to get this measure through. Some attempt should be made to elucidate it and to tell the house and the country what it is all about and what the government hope to gain by it. I have sat here and expected that the answers to these questions would be forthcoming, but the minister is either unwilling to answer them or he does not know. That is what we are complaining of. We are not getting the information.
A word further in connection with what was said by the hon. member for Calgary West.
I deeply appreciate the fact that the people of this country are anxious for some form of international cooperation, and when the proper time comes we shall be able to propose in its entirety a complete plan for international cooperation and the alleviation of the great difficulties that have arisen in connection with international trade and what-not-and it is not the Social Credit programme either. It is the programme of the London chamber of commerce, proposals similar in many ways to ours, which will remove many of the difficulties embodied in these Bretton Woods agreements. We have that in our hands. The minister,
I am sure, has seen it. His deputy has seen it. It is quite true, I admit, that it will be somewhat difficult perhaps at this stage to get the support of all the other nations. But may I ask you this, Mr. Chairman, would it not be far wiser to start with something we know is sound and good and has a fair chance of success, than to commit ourselves to something which is questionable, and in which we can have only at the very best a fifty-fifty faith? There are three or four more questions which have to be resolved before it is humanly possible for Bretton Woods to work; and that is what we are trying to get over to the committee. If we wait to get it over, then I am quite willing, and so is my group, to submit to the will of the majority, but we demand a fair opportunity to discuss this matter.


Douglas Charles Abbott: You have had it.


Solon Earl Low: The Minister of National Defence says that we have had it. I should just like to ask the minister how much longer we have taken on this than the government took on some most inconsequential matters.


John Horne Blackmore: The war appropriation bill.


Solon Earl Low: Particularly, the matter in which the hon. member for Rosthem helped to talk out a resolution which was of very great importance-talked for a solid hour, during which he said nothing.

Bretton Woods Agreements


Walter Adam Tucker: I said in fact what the
legion in Saskatoon, the Saskatchewan legion, recently agreed to and carried by resolution.


Solon Earl Low: I do not like to hear hon. members, such as the hon. member for Rosthern, who live in a glass-hbuse accuse us of tactics of which he has been guilty.


Walter Adam Tucker: I ask the hon. member, did he say this:
Then after we all have spoken in the commons


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.


Walter Adam Tucker: The hon. member made a statement, and I should like to ask him this question-


William Ross Macdonald: Order. The hon. member for Rosthern may ask a question, with the permission of the hon. member for Peace River.	.


Solon Earl Low: Yes, Mr. Chairman; certainly I will permit a question.


Walter Adam Tucker: It is reported in the Ottawa Citizen, in quotation marks, that the hon, member said this:
Then after we all have spoken in the commons this time, we shall talk again in the banking and commerce committee. As a matter of fact, we intend to call witnesses before this committee from Great Britain.
Also in quotation marks:
With vehemence he exclaimed: "We're going to fight, fight, fight-right to the last!
"We're prepared to sit right through till next January if necessary to stop this bill."


Solon Earl Low: Mr. Chairman, essentially those are my words; and that comes from the definite conviction on the part of the members of the Social Credit group that they are determined to do their duty until they have been overwhelmed.


James Lorimer Ilsley: That is obstruction. .


Solon Earl Low: Just a minute. I did not say in so many words that we would talk again; I said that we would fight in the committee; and so we will.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Will the hon. member permit a question?


Solon Earl Low: Yes.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I really did not realize, until I heard that, that the hon. gentleman who represents Peace River and leads the Social Credit party had publicly stated that he would conduct a fight until after, the 31st of December in order to kill this. If he does Lhat, he is-


Solon Earl Low: I did not say that.
[Mr. Low.l


James Lorimer Ilsley: If he is taking advantage of a time element there it makes his action reprehensible.


Solon Earl Low: Again, sir, I say that there is a glass-house and those who live in those houses ought not to throw stones. I did not say that we were fighting this in an attempt to hold it over until after the 31st of December.


Walter Adam Tucker: You have just mentioned it.


Solon Earl Low: I said that we would fight to the bitter end, until we are overwhelmed.


Ernest George Hansell: And we are prepared to.


Solon Earl Low: We are prepared to sit, if necessary, until we have had it proved to us definitely that this is a measure we should adopt. I do not go back on that for one second. I had a chat with the minister to-day, and I, to say the least, was disappointed that I was not able to convince him that this matter should be held over until another session. I still do not see why this thing has to be rushed through. The fund will not be held up. The progress of this thing will not be delayed because a nation like Canada, in the seventh place on the list, has not signed and indicated the ratification of the resolution by the 31st of December. If the other nations are prepared to go ahead, let them go ahead and indicate their good faith; but it does not sound like good faith to me, when one nation -and that the United States, which stands to gain the most-is the only one which has ratified it to date.


James Lorimer Ilsley: I will correct that. I will give the hon. member the facts.


Solon Earl Low: Go ahead. If I am wrong I should like to have them.
Mr. ILSLEY': I was asked that question to-day.
Four countries have speeded legislative action toward ratification, and it now remains for the executive to produce that instrument. They are the United States, China, the Philippines, and Venezuela. Two countries have stated that executive action is pending in that case and have promised it; they are Cuba and South Africa. South Africa indicated its willingness to submit its system to ratification when it would find company in doing so. Yugoslavia has indicated that it is prepared to ratify; whether by executive process or by immediate legislative action is not known. Colombia: a committee of the chamber of deputies has reported the agreement to the chamber with unanimous approval. France: the committee on foreign affaire of the consultative assembly has recommended the agree-

' Bretton Woods Agreements
ment to the constitutive assembly when it meets. It is understood that the constitutive assembly is now in process of discussing the agreements. The agreements are at present before the United Kingdom House of Commons.
With regard to the delay, I do not know whether my hon. friend was in the chamber this afternoon when I dealt with that matter. But I want to point out that this agreement has been public; it has been before the people of Canada, and of the world for that matter, for about fifteen months; and in this country it has been known that it was part of government policy since March or April of last spring, when we issued our paper on reconstruction and employment. In August it was stated by myself at a press conference that legislation would be introduced for its ratification at this session. It was foreshadowed in the speech from the throne; a resolution was placed on the order paper at an early stage in the session, and the reason it was not reached until now is that other legislative matters, which appeared to be of at least equal importance, were taken up.
The opposition led by the hon. member for Peace River is only one opposition in this house. Other oppositions felt that other matters were more important, and we did deal with some extraordinarily important matters. Bill No. 15, the emergency powers bill, the budget, the War Appropriation Act, the San Francisco conference; and these were things which in the minds of most hon. members had as much importance as this measure.
I wish to point out, now that we are censured for not bringing this on until now, that we brought it on before it was brought on in the United Kingdom. I wish to point out also that in the United Kingdom it is not felt by the opponents of the Bretton Woods proposal that they must take week after week in an endeavour to defeat it. Three days are assigned there for a discussion of the Bretton Woods proposal and the loan agreement with the United States.
If we are to cause parliamentary institutions to command the respect of the people we must restrain ourselves a little bit in these discussions. It is not for me to advise the Social Credit party, but it seems to me that if I had been connected with the Social Credit party when this came up I would have had two or three of the best speakers to make speeches on it and then I would have let it go forward; because the performance, with the course which is being taken now, whatever my hon. friends will say and however much they will deny that they are obstructing this, coupled with the December 31st date and the statement of my hon. friend, will mean that, 47696-2061
if anything happens to this proposal and this agreement fails as a result, the Social Credit party of Canada is taking the responsibility of sabotaging a proposal which in the years to come we shall be very sorry we have not approved.


Solon Earl Low: There are one or two things left that I wanted to say. I appreciate the answer which the Minister of Finance has given, because when I talked to him he did not have that information. The United States, I thought, was the only nation that had ratified the agreement. I am prepared to accept the answer given and I am glad to have it, but it only bolsters my argument that they do not need Canada in order to complete the sixty-five per cent of the fund. If all these nations have already ratified or are prepared to ratify, it is all the more reason why Canada should have ample opportunity to go into the matter thoroughly and ascertain whether it is worth ratifying. That is the position we have taken from the start, and we came to that conclusion only after my failure in conversation with several officials of the government to get consideration for the suggestion of standing the matter over until we have had such time as to go into it completely. We have only had a short time to discuss it in committee. Indeed, the time at our disposal would be regarded by the people of Canada as a travesty. We could not take it into committee at this late stage and bring it out of the committee with a recommendation that it be adopted. That could not be done in the short time at our disposal, and that is why I made that statement. If the government will still give us the right to call our witnesses and have the committee go as fast as possible, after we are through with this discussion we are prepared to stay as long as it is necessary instead of rushing the matter through. That is what I meant when I talked to the newspaper man to-day. We do not want to block it; that is not our intention at all. But I would not feel that our group had done their duty if they did not take this stand and try to get the support of the committee. We are only a small group, but small groups have been known to do great things for their countries in times past. History is full of proof of that statement, and the people of this country, I am satisfied, will rise in their admiration for a group that will stand by their convictions and fight to the end, even if the government thinks we are obstructing. We are fighting on the ground of deep conviction, and I want that known.. We feel that very important matters have to be resolved before Bretton Woods can begin to do what it is claimed it will do.
Bretton Woods Agreements

and those matters we are trying to get before this committee. That is all. I am sure that in due course we shall get them.
One word about the banking and commerce committee. I have not been able to get an assurance from anyone that when we get into that committee there will be ample opportunity for discussion. I have seen these committees work before. I appeared before that committee once and I know what a difficult task I had. I came here in 1940 and appeared before the committee with a request for a charter for an Alberta bank, and I. was there for two solid weeks with that matter, which was called inconsequential. What hope can we have of being able to complete the evidence in a short time with respect to a matter of such wide implications as Bretton Woods, where we are asking for a world bank. We are expected to dispose of such an important subject in three or four days. It is ridiculous. That is all I have to say.


Angus MacInnis: I do not know where
we are exactly on this question. A point of order was raised, but I do not know whether a decision has been given upon it. If the decision has not been made, I should like to say a few words. I believe my hon. friends to the left, according to parliamentary rules, have every right to, carry on as they are doing, but whether they are justified in the national interests is something that they will have to decide. Until we change our rules, or use the rules that we now have for the purpose of ending the debate, they have a perfect right to carry on. The strongest point was made just a moment ago, and if it had been made by somebody else it would have had some force. That point is that the minister of Finance should have introduced this legislation earlier. That point was raised by the hon. member for Peace River, and yet when it was suggested that the matter should go to the committee on banking and commerce, the hon. member for Lethbridge said that was just what he did not want to have done.


John Horne Blackmore: Because it would be hidden there.


Angus MacInnis: Then why blame the Minister of Finance for not introducing the legislation earlier, with a view to having it go to the banking and1 commerce committee, when at the same time you do not want it to go to the committee? That is the kind of argument we have had during this debate. In lieu of this measure my hon. friends have a programme of their own which they want to put into effect. But how long would that take? First of all, they would have to convince this

parliament that their programme was one that parliament should accept. After that was done this parliament would have to convince the majority of the other important nations that it was a good programme. Then there would have to be another monetary conference, and that conference would have to deal with that programme and approve of it. Then, finally, it would have to come back here again, and perhaps there would be another group in this house ready to oppose it.
Time and time again I have heard the statement that the proposal before us is preposterous. Well, if there is anything more preposterous than that sort of argument I should like to know what it is. As I have said before, and as the hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar, the leader of this party, has said, we are prepared to let this go to the banking and .commerce committee and we are prepared to vote for it as approved by the committee. In my opinion it has one virtue if nothing else, and that is, it brings the nations together in cooperation in dealing with economic and monetary problems. Unless we have that, each nation will be dealing with its own problems as best it can. Each nation will be trying to advance its own interests, regardless of whether it defeats the interests of other nations. Surely the mere fact that we are bringing the nations together where the concern of one nation will be the concern of all is a factor of such importance that we should allow this matter to go to the committee where we can get the evidence. I admit the time is late, and if the point had been raised by some other hon. member, that legislation should have been introduced into the house long ago, that point would have been exceedingly well taken. But it is not well taken by my hon. friends to the left because of their refusal to refer it to the banking committee.


John Horne Blackmore: Mr. Chairman, you have not ruled on the objection raised by the hon. member for Rosthem. He endeavoured' to get you to call me out of order. If you, sir, took such a responsibility as to do that, I would lose a great deal of the high esteem for you that I have so far displayed.


William Ross Macdonald: Order. I must remind the hon. member that I cannot be concerned about the esteem that any member has for me. I must abide by the rules that govern debate in committee. This committee at the present time is considering a certain resolution to carry into effect an agreement with respect to an international monetary fund and

Bretton Woods Agreements
an international bank for reconstruction and development. Standing order 58, section 2, reads:
Speeches in committee of the whole house must be strictly relevant to the item or clause under consideration.
Perhaps in the debate that has so far taken place I have allowed too wide a latitude and too much freedom of discussion. Since the hon. member for Rosthern has brought certain matters to my attention, I take it to be the feeling of the committee that in future I should see that the attention of hon. members is kept directed to the rule that speeches must be strictly relevant to the item under consideration.


John Horne Blackmore: If hon. members will turn to the resolution now under discussion it will be seen that this house is asked to consider the expediency of adopting this resolution. What do we mean by "expediency"? One of the questions I am going to ask the minister after a while, when we get around to it, is what he means by "expediency." May I read the first two or three lines of the resolution?
Resolved, that it is expedient to present a measure to grant authority to accept on behalf of Canada . . .
And so on. What do we mean by "expediency"? My definition of "expedient" is this, that it is in the interests of those who are considering the proposal. In the speech he delivered the minister himself laid a good deal of emphasis on the fact that the one matter we are considering above all others in this connection is peace. Do I misrepresent the minister's stand? The minister laid a great deal of stress on the fact that our objective in these considerations was peace, did he not?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes.


John Horne Blackmore: Then, if the minister was arguing along the right line we should judge of the soundness or otherwise of the Bretton Woods proposal by reference to its ability or non-ability to ensure peace, and the very thing I was discussing when the hon. member for Rosthern went off on a tangent was the question of whether this Bretton Woods thing could guarantee peace. My contention is that it is impossible for this measure to guarantee peace. As a matter of fact, it is the greatest, guarantee of war and revolution that one could conceive. The argument I was following was absolutely pertinent and relevant, because I was considering the whole matter, of the possibility of the Bretton Woods proposals meeting the difficulty which brings about war. If the hon. member for Rosthern
thinks he can argue that away I will give him an opportunity to try. What is the use of passing a. thing that we are told is going to help bring about peace when all those who know about actualities in the world as they are to-day know perfectly well that this thing has no chance in the world of guaranteeing peace? What is the use of doing that? Why * delude ourselves? We should be like those misguided people who placed such implicit confidence in the league of nations after the last war and, by reason of that fact, allowed themselves to fall into a fatuous policy of unpreparedness which almost resulted in the complete destruction of the British empire. Are we now to be deceived again so soon after the cessation of the second great war, and repose our confidence in a measure like this which cannot possibly accomplish the objectives it purports to accomplish? That is the question. Let the hon. member for Rosthern answer that if he thinks he can.


Walter Adam Tucker: I still think the hon. member is out of order.


John Horne Blackmore: I am not out of order; I am strictly in order. Everything I am saying is directly relevant to the word "expedient."
Even, if I understood the minister's remarks aright the other reason he urged to establish the expediency of this measure was that it would give Canada a certain advantage. I am going to turn to that matter now. Up to the moment the minister has not shown this committee a single, solitary respect in which this measure can give us any advantage whatsoever. He said that it would, but he has not shown it. Saying a thing will do something and proving it are two entirely different things.
If you, Mr. Chairman, will permit me to go on with the line I was following, I should like to take up the next matter. My general line of argument was that if the people who drafted Bretton Woods, the experts from forty-four nations, saw that this agreement could not possibly succeed in attaining its objectives unless four other proposals were implemented1, then the first thing they should have done was to concentrate their attention on how to bring the other four principles into operation and then bring in Bretton Woods. The line I was following just before the hon. member for Rosthern interrupted was simply that the other measures are not being introduced, and nothing is known about how they are to be introduced. The result is that Bretton Woods is to be passed and allowed to dangle in the air with all its objectionable features obvious and none of the advantages
Bretton Woods Agreements

which it purports to obtain for the country.
I am now going to ask the next question. The second proposal these experts say should be implemented is this: to bring about the orderly marketing of staple commodities at prices fair to producer and consumer alike. That again is so broad, it has no meaning at ill. Does it mean prices within Canada? Does it mean a policy should be adopted within Canada the application of which will result in prices of wheat and wool and mutton and other primary products in this country going up to the level at which they should be, and prices of manufactured goods coming down to a level which will bring about price parity as between primary products and secondary products? Is that what this thing means? Is it meant to apply to prices within our country, or is it meant to apply to prices as between countries? I wonder if the minister would be able to tell us that. Does this have reference to prices within countries, or does it have reference to prices as between countries?


James Lorimer Ilsley: I would think it referred primarily to international arrangements such as wheat agreements, or something of that kind.


John Horne Blackmore: Well, you See it is not definite, is it? It must be obvious to all hon. members that the minister's experts have giveh almost no consideration to this matter. Here is one of the four proposals which the experts at Bretton Woods themselves foresaw would have to be implemented, and here is the Minister of Finance of Canada proposing that we adopt Bretton Woods without having given any attention whatsoever, apparently, to the possibility of implementing that second proposal. Well, does that not show that altogether too little thought has been given this whole matter? If the Bretton Woods proposal is not likely to succeed without the implementing of these four proposals, as the experts tell us, and if apparently the nations concerned have not given any attention to the implementing of those proposals, then obviously to pass Bret-ton Woods is reckless procedure. Why not go to work on the other four proposals? Social Crediters will be the very first-to shout "Hear, hear" with respect to the second proposal I have mentioned.
We are constantly emphasizing the need for just prices-giving fair prices to producers and to consumers. But up to the present time, as the minister knows, in this country our primary producers have just been tortured by the fact that there has been a spread between our primary prices and our secondary production prices, a spread which has been ruinous

to our farmers and primary producers. The government has not been able to cope with that situation. They have not been able to cope with the situation in the United States. I do not know of any government in all these connected with the Bretton Woods agreement which has been able to cope with the situation. Yet they imagine that somehow or another, by joining their problems together, and taking away some of their freedom of action, they will be able to solve this problem. Where would you go to find more recklessness in public men?
Here we apparently propose to rush blindly into this matter, without giving full consideration to such wide considerations as that.
Let us have the third one:
3. Deal with the special problems of imter-na.tion.al concern which will .arise from the cessation of production for war purposes.
We do not know anything at all about what that means. Maybe the minister can give us some enlightenment on that. What is being done, internationally? Is there any international machinery contemplated to deal with that particular subject? What would be the nature of that machinery, if it were implemented? How would it affect the ordinary man in Canada? How would it affect our employment problems? Has the minister heard of any international arrangements for implementing that principle?


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Question.
Some hon. MEMBERS. Carried.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The hon. gentleman is asking me questions, but not on the Bretton Woods agreement. These are objectives, which are very important, and with which he says he agrees. He is asking me to outline what is to be done under these. This particular item No. 3 is to reach an agreement in respect of ways and means whereby they may best deal with the political problems of international concern which will arise from the cessation of production for war purposes. That was written in 1943, I believe.


John Horne Blackmore: It was 1944, was it not?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Yes, that is correct-1944. Of course the war did not end until 1945. There is no doubt that problems do arise from the cessation of production for war purposes.


John Horne Blackmore: We agree.


James Lorimer Ilsley: And I 'believe, although I cannot give my hon. friend particulars, that with respect to property owned by the United States in Canada, arrangements are made bet-

Bretton Woods Agreements
ween the two governments with regard to its disposition. I should think this means that anything that covered the disposition of surplus production, built up to a high level during the war, and then brought down to a lower level as a result of peace, would be properly the subject of international discussion.


John Horne Blackmore: Before the minister sits down, would he tell us what discussions have been conducted on this problem-discussions of which he is aware?


James Lorimer Ilsley: I cannot give my hon. friend any information on that.


John Horne Blackmore: That is exactly why I think this whole procedure is simply wrong.


James Lorimer Ilsley: Well, we have had discussions with countries as to the disposition of surpluses we own in those countries.


John Horne Blackmore: What were some of those discussions, what were your decisions; and what were the problems you discussed?


James Lorimer Ilsley: The problem of military
equipment in the Netherlands, for example, was one. But it is futile for the hon. gentleman to ask me about something outside the Bretton Woods agreement entirely, not in the Bretton Woods agreement at all. I would just have to send for the information, and then try to answer the questions. And this, with respect, is not the forum in which to da that. Where does my hon. friend hope to get, if he does that?


John Horne Blackmore: What I am trying to do is to find out whether there are conditions which the Bretton Woods authorities themselves said would be necessary in order that Bretton Woods should succeed-whether those conditions have been complied with. If the minister will refer to the recommendations, from Which he himself read, he will find that they say:
To the participating governments that, in addition to implementing the specific monetary and financial measures which were the subject of this conference, they seek, with a view to creating in .the field of international economic relations conditions necessary for the attainment of the purposes of the fund . . .
Obviously these four sets of purposes have to be implemented, before the objective of the fund can be achieved. We judge that, from the very words.
Mi;. ILSLEY: No; that is not what it says. It does not say that to enter into agreement under each of these four headings is necessary before the fund will be of any good, or
before the fund should be instituted. It does not say that. It does recognize that there are conditions necessary-
. . . for the attainment of the purposes of the fund, and of the broader primary objectives of economic policy.
It does recognize that. Then it says that it is recommended that the governments seek-
. . . to reach agreement as soon as possible on ways and means whereby they may best-
Do these things. Number 3 is a prospective thing-long before the end of the war. It was passed in 1944. I do not know just what has happened there. Hostilities ceased in August 1945, and there has been dealing among governments as to surpluses, in the various countries.
But, again, what is to be gained by digging out a lot of details about the disposition of those surpluses, when dealing with the Bretton Woods agreement?


John Horne Blackmore: May I read once more the words. Remember, this is a special committee appointed by the Bretton Woods people, the people who have their experts, to make certain supplementary recommendations, as I recall it, after having read it two or three times. This committee is giving advice to the various nations. And it says specifically this: Recommends:
To the participating governments-
And Canada would be one, if she joined this group.
-that, in addition to implementing the specific monetary and financial measures which were the subject of this conference, they seek ... to reach agreement as soon as possible on ways and means whereby they may best-
Do certain things. They seek this:
. . . with a view to creating in the field of international economic relations conditions necessary for the attainment of the purposes of the fund, and of the broader primary objectives of economic policy, to reach agreement as soon as possible on ways and means whereby they may best-
And then these four recommendations are given. If we pass this Bretton Woods agreement before we deal with these four recommendations, look at the position we shall be in.


James Lorimer Ilsley: What position are we in?


John Horne Blackmore: We are in the position of trying to get the harness before we have the cart.


James Lorimer Ilsley: You have to start somewhere.


John Horne Blackmore: Why not start with the hors^ and the cart instead of with the( harness or the halter? We started with the harness and the halter before we had the horse or the cart. It is obvious that the minister has not given a great deal of attention to
Bretton Woods Agreements

these four recommendations. I will wager that the other nations have given just about as much attention to them as that. In other words, they are simply not going to do what they recommend. Then they expect the whole thing to succeed. They will tie us up to the obligation of Bretton Woods, but they will not do the other things that are necessary to make Bretton Woods a success.
May I deal for a moment with No. 3 and state what I had in my mind? I may be all wrong. No. 3 says:
Deal with the special problems of international concern which will arise from the cessation of production for war purposes.
I would say that the chief interest to the world to-day arising from the cessation of war production is unemployment. Does the minister think I am very far out when I make that statement? We of this group have already gone on record to the effect that the Falk foundation in the United States has made an estimate that there will be 20,000,000 unemployed1 in the United States by the time a return to normal conditions has been reached.


Walter Adam Tucker: Mr. Chairman, again I rise to a point of order. This resolution sets out:
That it is expedient to present a measure to grant authority to accept on behalf of Canada and to carry out the obligations of Canada under the articles of agreement for an international monetary fund . . .
And so on. It does not say "to carry out all the resolutions of the Bretton Woods conference"; it just says that it is expedient that Canada should adhere to the international monetary fund agreement. It is quite true that the Bretton Woods conference passed a subsidiary resolution which said:
Whereas, it is recognized that the complete attainment of this and other purposes and objectives stated in the agreement cannot he achieved through the instrumentality of the fund alone.
Therefore we recommend these additional measures. When all that we are being asked to do is to adhere to the international monetary fund, by what manner of reasoning can the hon. member bring in these other recommendations? It is true that a subsidiary resolution was passed that we do certain other things to carry out the same purpose; but by what reasoning can the hon. member say that he is in order - when he persists in discussing these other subjects which the Bretton Woods conference recommended? They recommended the international monetary fund; they recommended the international bank for reconstruction and development. Then they said it was realized that this could

not carry out all the purposes which the conference had in mind, and therefore they recommended these other things.
When my hon. friend persists in discussing these other recommendations he is not discussing the international monetary fund and the international bank for reconstruction and development. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, when he is discussing these subsidiary resolutions which were to promote the same objective and which had no other connection except they were passed at the same conference, when he persists in discussing these collateral matters I suggest that he is out of order.


John Horne Blackmore: Before you make
your ruling, Mr. Chairman, may I ask the hon. member whether or not he gathers from the language used in the recommendations that the fund will be a success without the four recommendations?


Walter Adam Tucker: I gather this, that it will contribute to the welfare of Canada and to the nations of the world and that these other things will also contribute to that end. You have to go one step at a time. To-day this parliament is being asked to approve one step only, and my hon. friend is seeking to discuss all the other steps which this conference said that it would be desirable to take.


John Horne Blackmore: Would the hon. member answer the question I asked? I ask the hon. member if in his opinion and in the opinion of the committee these recommendations indicate that the men who drafted them believed the fund would succeed without their being implemented.


Walter Adam Tucker: I shall read the actual resolution:
Whereas, it is recognized that the complete attainment of this and other purposes and objectives stated in the agreement cannot be achieved through the instrumentality of the fund alone.
In other words, they said that complete attainment of the high objectives of Bretton Woods could not be attained by the fund alone. They also recommended the international bank for reconstruction and development. Then they went on to recommend the other four measures which my hon. friend is discussing. In other words, they recommended several things. All that parliament is being asked to do to-day is to approve the adherence to the international monetary fund and the international bank for reconstruction and development. My hon. friend is trying to discuss these collateral issues which are designed to promote the same objective, but

Bretton Woods Agreements
which by no means will prevent the monetary fund from doing a great deal of good, whether they are carried out or not.


John Horne Blackmore: The point the hon. member persists in disregarding or sidestepping is this: Does he believe that the fund can succeed without these other four recommendations being implemented? From his remarks I gather that he is agreed that the fund will not succeed without these other four principles being implemented.


Walter Adam Tucker: I say it is the opinion of the representatives and the experts of the forty-four nations that the complete purposes and objectives which the fund strives to work for cannot be attained without some of these other things, but it says actually-


John Horne Blackmore: All these other four.


Walter Adam Tucker: -a complete attainment of these purposes cannot be achieved through the instrumentality of the fund alone; that is all. It can do a great deal of good. All we are doing is seeking to go one step at a time. We are asking parliament to approve this international monetary fund and international bank for reconstruction and development. At this particular moment we are not asking parliament to approve these other four recommendations. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that when my hon. friend persists in discussing these other four recommendations he is definitely out of order.


Major James William Coldwell: May I say a word. What are we discussing? Is it not a resolution which begins in this way:
That it is expedient to present a measure
It is either expedient to present the measure, or it is not. Most of us in this house take the view that it is expedient to present the measure in order that we may understand what the measure contains, and that when the measure itself is referred to the banking and commerce committee, which we hoped would be done quite early in this debate, then all of us who are interested in certain features of this proposed measure would have an opportunity or inquiring into those features. It seems to me that this debate is running along on the assumption that we are discussing the measure when, as a matter of fact, we are merely discussing whether it is expedient to give authority to the government to present the measure. I suggest that what we should do is to allow the government to do that. By our vote on second reading we indicate that we should allow the government to present that measure, to send it to the committee
where we can call the people who were involved in the drafting, if you like, of the measure, so that we might understand it more thoroughly.
At the rate we are going here we are really understanding nothing about the measure. We are discussing broad principles, and we have not yet seen the bill that the government proposes to introduce following the resolution. I wish we could proceed and get down to some real understanding of this matter.


Mr. MACKENZIE KING:: Mr. Chairman, hon. members will recall that some days ago I made a statement to the house as to the business for the remainder of the session. That statement was made after a conference I had with the leaders of the three groups of this house as to how we might best expedite the business so that it might be possible for this particular session to be prorogued about the 15th of this month.
My recollection is that at the time we considered carefully in a general, but not in any final way, how much time should be allotted to different measures. At the same time the government was asked to make a statement to the house as to what measures, if any, might be dropped from the sessional programme so as to help ensure the prorogation at the time I have just mentioned.
Some days later I stated to the house that there were certain measures we were prepared to drop. I recall at the moment that the important measure respecting citizenship was one. I also mentioned that if another bill, the emergency powers bill were passed, it would be possible for us to do by order in council with respect to certain measures that were desired by the Department of Veterans Affairs what otherwise it might be necessary to have done in the form of legislative enactment. It was agreed then that we would endeavour to bring forward the emergency powers bill before we brought forward some other measures. That has been done and that measure has left this house.
Mention was also made of the resolution which is now before the house, and unless I am greatly mistaken there was a general understanding that this bill based on this resolution would go to the banking and commerce committee, and that until after it had gone to the banking and commerce committee there would not be prolonged discussion at the resolution stage. If I am wrong in that I hope I shall be corrected. But that was the understanding as I recall it, and we have all been working toward it. Cooperation of the kind is the only way in which the House of Com-
Bretton Woods Agreements

mons, especially now that it is composed of four parties, can get through its work; that is, by working together in accordance with a general understanding.
I would appeal to my hon. friends of the Social Credit group to recall what was said at that time. In the first place may I point out that they have already adopted a course in regard to this resolution which is most uncommon, namely, that of long debate on the first reading of the resolution. The house gave an expression of its view on the, first reading of the resolution. The house was divided on it and the division was n.0 uncertain one. As I look at the record, the vote was 124 to 12 in favour of the resolution. In the light of that expression by the house, I would submit that my hon. friends ought to realize that the House of Commons as a whole is anxious that progress should be made, and made with this particular measure. There can be no objection at all to my hon. friends registering their opposition as strongly as they may wish to register it, but there is nothing to be gained by repeating and repeating and repeating; much less is there anything to be gained by unnecessarily straying to some extent beyond the motion which is before the committee for discussion and following also a course of procedure which causes many points of order to be raised.
I think it is essential and important in the business of parliament and in the interests of every hon. member of the house that at this time I should make plain that while the government is anxious to get through its business by the date I have mentioned, we are quite determined that what I have stated would be the remaining legislation for the session must be carried through before we prorogue. If we cannot conclude our work this week we shall have to go on before proroguing, and the government will have to consider whether we shall continue next week, or adjourn until after the Christmas recess, or until after the New Year. But we do intend to proceed with the rest of the measures I have said would be gone on with. That was understood and must be adhered to. In saying this, I am not saying anything that has not been already stated. It is not some new device to hasten the progress of any particular measure. It is simply to put the position clearly to the house.
What I should like to say to my hon. friends of the Social Credit group is this. The house knows now that they feel very strongly about the enactment of this measure. They have shown that, by opposing the resolution on the first reading, and they are showing it by debating it at considerable

length on the second reading. They have made their position very clear. But as the leader of the C.C.F. party has said, the bill itself has not yet been introduced, and my hon. friends know, particularly the hon. member for Lethbridge, that the right place at which to receive full information and details in regard to any bill, if it is going to a committee of the house, is before that committee, when the minister can have present the experts he may wish to have present, and where information can be given in detail. But it is not customary in the procedure of the house to take up the time of the house by seeking to get details on the resolution which precedes a bill, when it is understood that the bill itself is to go to a committee.
May I say one word further as to procedure when the bill comes before the committee. The government is placing no restriction on what may be done before the committee. Hon. members may seek all the information they desire and propose any amendments, and ,then when the bill comes back to the house from the committee it will go before the committee of the whole of this house. The government is placing no restrictions at all on what is to be discussed in the committee except the restrictions that the rules impose. There will be opportunities there for hon. gentlemen to express further their views and if they so ' desire to propose amendments. Again there is an opportunity for debate on the third reading of the bill, at which time, if hon. members feel necessarily so disposed, they can move amendments and vote against the measure.
With all that opportunity before them and realizing what the position is at this particular stage and what they know to be the wishes of hon. members generally, I ask my hon. friends of the Social Credit group if they could not be content, so far as this resolution is concerned, to register their position at this stage once and for all, and, having done so fully, allow the resolution to pass, the bill itself to be introduced and as it is now understood it will be, sent, after second reading, to the banking and commerce committee. Unless they adopt that course I am afraid that their position will be understood by this house to be one of obstruction and will be so viewed by the country.
Up to the present time it has not been necessary for this government to take advantage of some of the rules which are intended to prevent obstruction.
I noticed in listening to the remarks of my hon. friend the member for Vancouver East, who is an old parliamentarian, that he said there were rules to stop unnecessary discussion. I hope I shall never have to suggest to the

Bretton Woods Agreements
house that we take advantage of certain rules to shorten unnecessary debate. That is the last thing the government would wish to do. But if debate does reach the point where it ceases to be debate and becomes by endless and unnecessary repetition and irrelevancies obstruction, the rules are there to protect the house and may have to be applied.
I again say to my hon. friends that I hope they will cooperate with all the other members of this house in enabling us to make progress at this stage. We can take only one stage at a time.


Solon Earl Low: I should like to say just one
word with respect to the understanding that was had among the leaders of the groups who met with the Prime Minister. I think the group around me have respected that understanding. In fact I believe, sir, if you look over Hansard, you will find that we have built up a pretty substantial bank account on which to draw in respect of this measure. We have tried to observe that understanding and we did, I am sure, with respect to all the measures that preceded this one. But, I recall that at the time the further business of the house was discussed I asked that this measure be held over. I also suggested that it would probably touch off a pretty heavy discussion. I believe both the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance will recall my mentioning that.
My recollection of a study of parliamentary procedure tells me that we have been drifting farther and farther away from what used to be one of its ancient and honourable practices, that of having the fullest possible discussion in just such a committee as this. Here is where the finest discussion can take place, and here is where the ministers who are under fire, as it were, are supposed to answer the questions that are put to them by the members. Otherwise how in the name of common sense can anybody ever determine whether or not the principle of a measure which is to be introduced is worthy of being introduced? That is exactly what we are trying to, establish. It is not obstruction. All the information we have tried to obtain is relevant to the whole problem. I believe I did make this statement a few minutes ago, and I wish to go this far in impressing it on the committee, that three important things have to be resolved before Bretton Woods can hope to have even an even chance of success.
The first is this: can the United Kingdom, for which we are very much concerned, pay its way with or without being relieved of the nightmare of its huge war debts?


An hon. MEMBER:: What about Canada?


Solon Earl Low: Well, Canada is in the same
position in a way.
The second thing which has to be resolved is this:	can the United States find ways of
increasing the stream of spending within its domestic economy sufficiently fast to employ its new-found producing power, indisputable evidence of which I presented in this chamber last Friday night and Saturday?
The third question is: can the the United States create an import surplus large enough to prevent a chronic shortage of dollars?
I suggested that these questions ought to be weighed extremely carefully, because the penalties of the failure of Bretton Woods will be extremely heavy penalties for succeeding generations. It is in that spirit that we are attempting to establish here a basis of judgment; so that when the measure is brought before the banking and commerce committee we can have something to gO' on, some information which the minister is in a position to supply, in order that we can elicit from the witnesses there information which will enable us to make up our minds.
I would say this on behalf of my group: I will attempt to facilitate the business of this house to the utmost of my capability; but since I have around me men of undoubted integrity and deep convictions I cannot bludgeon them, and I do not intend to try to bludgeon them in this matter. They have the right to speak; it is their undoubted right in a committee of this kind to speak and get the information which is necessary for them to make up their minds and to know definitely what the situation is. I will do, my best to facilitate action; I just ask the committee to give us a bit more time to round up the case, and we will see what we can do about getting this out of committee.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I thank my hon. friend for his promise of cooperation. My purpose in rising is to touch a little further on a- point of procedure which he himself has raised and which is the main point I am raising at the present time.
My hon. friend has said that this house is drifting, that we are getting away from ancient and honourable tradition. May I point out that this may be true, but if it is true it is the fault of his group, for this reason, that the ancient and honourable tradition of this house is not to debate a measure of this kind on the resolution; it is to debate it on the second reading of the bill or when the house is in, committee on the bill or on the third reading of the bill. It is not the tradition in this house, nor has it been the tradition in the British House of Commons to debate a measure at length upon the mov-
Bretton Woods Agreements

ing of the resolution which precedes its introduction. My memory goes back a certain distance in this house, and I can remember quite well that Sir Wilfrid Laurier-as far back as that, and there were also others before him-took very strong exception to the house spending its time in debating a resolution before the introduction of a bill. The' custom has changed to some extent, but I just want to say that I hope we shall not drift farther in that direction, especially when we have four parties in this house; otherwise we shall never get through its business. What I am pleading for is the fullest opportunity of every party to make its position perfectly plain, but that we follow if we can the custom of the British house, which is based on ancient and honourable tradition, and do what they do there: fix as largely as possible, a limit of definite time within which a debate is to take place. In a most important debate such as has been mentioned by the Minister of Finance to-night this very subject of Bretton Woods, combined with the great question of financial relations between the United * States and Britain, only two or three days has been set apart. It is the only way business can be carried through. We have taken nearly three days, as I understand it, on the resolution, and we have still to send the bill to the banking and commerce committee and to deal with it when it comes back from the committee. I do not wish to cause any hon. member to hesitate to speak; I do not think it will be thought I am attempting to bludgeon anyone; I am seeking to persuade hon. members to follow a course prescribed by the rules, which is in their interest as much as it is in the interest of all hon. members of the house to have strictly followed.	*


John Horne Blackmore: Until this session, as hon. members know, I have been leader of the Social Credit group in this house. Now I am going to ask if the Prime Minister or anyone in this house can accuse me of having been non-cooperative here with the government in its efforts to get through the business.
I think no one will raise a word against the record which our party has in this house. Indeed, we have been so cooperative that one man, whom I would name were it not for the fact that he has passed beyond the veil, went out into the election campaign in Alberta and told the people of that province that we were a weak and ineffective lot who did not really make our opinions felt. That alone ought to be sufficient answer to the Prime Minister, and it ought to be sufficient justification in this,, house for the amount of attention we are giving this measure.

It just happens that, because of the peculiar nature of the social credit movement, it has become necessary for that movement to understand finance and trade. The result is that this particular measure is one upon which we are more or less specialists.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.


John Horne Blackmore: A fine lot of reward a person gets for being cooperative! I say that we see in this measure dangers which the ordinary individual in the house does not see because he has not had the training we have had.
In answer to what the Prime Minister said-of course he has not been in the chamber during this discussion-I am going to ask hon. members of the committee on any side, what were the Social Credit group doing during the long and tedious days of wrangling over the war appropriation bill? Were we talking or were the Progressive Conservatives doing the talking?


Mr. HOMUTH:: Well, now, wait, and do not bring us into this argument, or this will certainly go on.


John Horne Blackmore: If the hon. member wants to take the floor I will sit down. The point is, as the hon. member for Peace River says, we have a substantial time bank account, which we have carefully preserved. We sat still during the long discussion on the war appropriation bill, because we doubted whether it would make a bit of difference to the conduct of the administration. In other words, in our opinion the discussion that went on there was utterly idle and a waste of time, and the bill after all did not affect the country except so far as taxation was concerned.


Mr. SMITH (Calgapr West):: Surely it is not permissible in this debate to resurrect argument made in another debate on an entirely different subject.


John Horne Blackmore: It is permissible to point to the records of the various groups in this house.


Arthur Leroy Smith: Mr. Chairman, may I ask for a ruling on that point. It is the only way we can get this stopped; I am sure of that.


William Ross Macdonald: Some question has been raised as to the amount of time taken up, and perhaps the hon. member is not entirely out of order in pointing out how much time he and his colleagues have consumed. I think he has already done that, however, and I would again call his attention to the rule

Bretton Woods Agreements ___
I previously quoted, standing order 58, section 2, which states that discusson must be relevant to the matter under consideration.


John Horne Blackmore: When it comes to discussion of the Bretton Woods agreement I an& perfectly at home. I will turn to the speech which the minister himself gave, which surely is relevant to the question under discussion.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: My hon.
friend has made a reference to myself, and before he proceeds I should like to supplement that I have said by quoting from Beauchesne's Parliamentary Rules and Forms, third edition, page 168, section 439:
The object of the resolution recommended by the crown is to give the house a first opportunity to discuss the advisability of making a certain expenditure. The details of the projected measure are not then disclosed and debate is confined to the resolution, which should not be lengthy, although care must be taken that the terms used are sufficiently wide to cover the whole of the bill which will be subsequently introduced.
It is perfectly clear that the rules of the house are that a resolution is simply to give members an opportunity to discuss the advisability of making certain expenditures, reserving for other stages fuller discussion. That is all I ask my hon. friends to do.


John Horne Blackmore: I must be impressed by any reading of the rules of the house; yet I wish to read another rule. Before I do so, however, I would call the Prime Minister's attention to the fact that the item under discussion at. the present time is not money that is to be spent-not by any means. If it were an offer to spend five billions I would not object. It is not the spending of money; it is the risk of liberty-that is the point-and the risk of war. We are not discussing a money problem at all. If we were, the rule which the Prime Minister has read would apply. But since we are discussing what we are, may I read to the house standing order 58:	[DOT]
The standing orders of the house shall be observed in the committees of the whole house so far as may be applicable, except the standing orders as to the seconding of motions and limiting the number of times of speaking.
If that rule does not indicate quite clearly that the committee of the whole, on a resolution, is for the purpose of allowing members to ask every kind of question they deem advisable, in order to get information of every kind which they desire to obtain from a minister, then I should like to know why the rule is there. I think that is an answer to the Prime Minister.
Let me now turn to the speech which was made by the minister when discussing Bretton Woods. I would quote from page 3040 of Hansard, and I will ask the minister for explanations of certain terms which he uses.
I presume that the speech which the minister gave in the house was designed to convince the house of the expediency of the measure. It is important to know what he meant by the terms he used when he said:
This conference was held after a couple of years of intensive discussion among the treasury officials of a large number of united nations.
May I ask the minister who originated the Bretton Woods agreement. Was it originated in Canada, and, if so, by whom? In the United States, and, if so, by whom? Or in Great Britain, and, if so, by whom, and at whose instigation, so far as is known?


James Lorimer Ilsley: It originated as set out in the papers that were tabled in this house, the document entitled, "International stabilization of currencies", which was printed and tabled in this house, I believe in 1943. There were two or three papers prepared. The document contains the text of a paper setting out proposals by British experts for an international clearing union, and the text of the statement on international stabilization of currencies presented to the United States senate committee on April 5, 1943, as well as the text and draft outline of a proposal by United States experts for united and associated nations stabilization fund. Then the Canadian experts produced, about that time or shortly afterwards, a document entitled "Tentative draft proposals of Canadian experts for an international exchange union".


John Horne Blackmore: That is very good, but what I wish to know is which one of the nations originated this thing. Did Canadh? Did the United States? Did Great Britain? Or did the thing spring up like an epidemic?


James Lorimer Ilsley: The British and Americans were both working on the proposals about the same time and they came out about the same time.


John Horne Blackmore: Which one came first?


James Lorimer Ilsley: They were within a day or two of each other.


Victor Quelch: When I spoke the other day I asked the minister to give me the terms of reference under which the Canadian experts first of all drew up their plans.


James Lorimer Ilsley: There were no formal terms of reference.


Victor Quelch: Surely the minister does not mean to say that he called a number of men
Bretton Woods Agreements

together and told them to draft plans for some sort of monetary stabilization fund. Were they advised to draw up a plan on the basis of gold, or were they advised to draw up a multilateral plan on the basis of national currencies or on the basis of an index of . prices? There must have been some instructions.


James Lorimer Ilsley: The United States plan and British plan came out and there was a wide divergence between them. We thought we could render some service in devising plans which would not be the same as either but would give to some extent the views of our experts. They were instructed to go to work on it and see what they could produce.


Norman Jaques: What was the date of it?


James Lorimer Ilsley: The 9th day of June, 1943; that is the Canadian plan.


Norman Jaques: I should like to remind the minister that in April, 1943, Mr. Morgenthau published his plan.


James Lorimer Ilsley: That is right.


Norman Jaques: I brought the matter to the attention of this house, and I was blackguarded from one end of Canada to the other by the press. So that this idea goes back a little longer than the minister is saying.


James Lorimer Ilsley: No. I stated that the British plan and the United States plan came out before the Canadian plan was prepared. I stated that the Canadian plan was published in June, 1943, and the others were somewhat before that. As a matter of fact, the United States plan was published in April, 1943. I do not know when my hon. friend was blackguarded or what for.


Norman Jaques: The plan to surrender the sovereignty of Canada was certainly started by April 1, 1943, if not before, because Mr. Sandwell addressed a meeting of the league of nations society and said that the loyalty of the Canadian people would have to be weaned away from the crown to an international authority, and a few days later Mr. Morgenthau published his plan in Washington which called for an international bank that would be above parliament and above congress. I brought that to the attention of this house and was roundly abused for so doing.


Victor Quelch: Will the minister say
whether Canada to-day is definitely committed to this Bretton Woods agreement?


James Lorimer Ilsley: It is government policy, yes.
	,


Victor Quelch: Is Canada committed?
Have any definite commitments been made to the United States in regard to the Bretton Woods agreement?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Oh, no. We cannot do anything like this, except subject to the approval of parliament.


Victor Quelch: Could the minister tell the committee exactly what the experience has been in regard to the attitude of Russia? I remember that when we had the London and Washington conferences Russia refused to participate. They sat in, and that was all. Then finally I understand at Bretton Woods they gave in, shall I say, or at all events signed the agreement. To-day Russia is a signatory as far as her exports are concerned, but has the Russian government signed the Bretton Woods agreement or definitely committed itself to it?


James Lorimer Ilsley: No, not as far as I know.


Victor Quelch: Have they asked for any special consideration in regard to this agreement? I received notification from London that they had refused to have their internal currency tied up to gold in any shape or form. Has Russia asked for any different treatment from that to which the other nations have agreed?


James Lorimer Ilsley: Not to the knowledge of the Canadian government.


William Ross Macdonald: Shall I report the resolution?


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


John Horne Blackmore: No; it is not anywhere near carried. I wish to find out what the minister meant by certain expressions he used in his speech, but I will tell the committee what we in this group think with respect to the origin of this whole matter. We believe that this thing originated in the United States; we believe that certain powerful citizens in that country got the ear of the administration and caused that administration to originate these proposals. We believe that from the beginning the proposals were definitely for the United States, and that probably the only reason the British brought out a plan was that they were terrified at the possible impact of the United States proposal and brought out one of their own in selfdefence, for the United1 States proposal is based upon gold and the British proposal is based upon goods and services. The British proposal was sane in that respect. If the minister can give us any information that would dispel these fears, it would help. As a

Privilege-Mr. Low
matter of fact, I have a source of information which I think justifies me in believing that this whole proposal originated with the administration of the United States. Can the minister give us any information on that?


James Lorimer Ilsley: No. My impression was,
and I always thought, that the British started working on their proposal at least as soon as the United States government started working on its proposal; in fact, if I had not checked when the question was asked me I would have said that to the best of my knowledge the British started first. Certainly they started about the same time. We have no reason to think this originated with certain individuals in the United States. I do not know the individuals to whom the hon. gentleman is referring; I have no idea.


Victor Quelch: There is one article that is of considerable importance to the debtor nations; that is article VIII, section 4. This is another section which undoubtedly will greatly embarrass the debtor nations, and I quote:
Convertibility of foreign-held balances.
(a) Each member shall buy balances of its currency held by another member if the latter, in requesting the purchase, represents
(i)	that the balances to be bought have been recently acquired as a result of current transactions; or
(ii)	that their conversion is needed for making payments for current transactions.
The buying member shall have the option to pay either in the currency of the member making the request or in gold.
The question I should like to ask the minister is this. If a member does not possess gold, how can it buy its currency with gold? It merely states that a member shall buy its currency in gold. Who is to provide , that nation with gold if it is not a gold producer? That is all very well for nations like Canada, the United States, Russia and South Africa and the nations that are heavy gold producers, but what about those nations which are not gold producers? How can they buy currency with gold if they do not possess any?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Will the hon member pardon me? I have to interrupt him for what I have in mind. I know the committee is anxious to have this business concluded, and I wonder if hon. gentlemen would agree to have the committee sit after eleven o'clock in order that we may make progress.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Carried.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Then I would move when the Speaker is in the chair that Mr. Speaker do not leave the chair at eleven
o'clock. Perhaps we would have it understood that we will conclude the debate on the resolution this evening, and get this measure to the committee.


Major James William Coldwell: I have no objection to extending the sittings of the house, provided that we can get through to-night.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That would
be the understanding.


Major James William Coldwell: But if we are not going to get through to-night I see no object in sitting any longer. If there are just a few more questions that have to be asked and we can finish in half an hour or so I would be quite agreeable, but if we cannot get that understanding I am going to say no to the suggestion.


John Horne Blackmore: The hon. member for Rosetown-Biggar has intimated the truth. It will not do any good to stay here until two o'clock; we will still be here asking questions. As long as the house remains here and discusses Bretton Woods we are going to be here asking questions, until all our questions are answered. I think the new set of questions we started on, as to who originated this plan, are eliciting information which should be of great interest to hon. members. So that I suggest we rise at eleven o'clock.
Progress reported.


[Stage Direction]
At eleven o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
Tuesday, December 11, 1945.