1938-05-24

[Stage Direction]
Hon. J. L. ILSLEY (Minister of National Revenue) moved for leave to introduce Bill No. 123, to amend the Excise Act.
He said: The bill simply contains a number of miscellaneous amendments to the Excise Act. They are almost entirely if not entirely administrative and involve no change in the rates of duty. It is very difficult to summarize the bill in any other way.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.


[Stage Direction]
Mr. PAUL MARTIN (Essex East) moved for leave to introduce Bill No. 124, to amend the Copyright Act.
He said: The purpose of the amendment is to give the minister administering the Copyright Act power to protect the public against abuses of the exclusive rights conferred upon copyright owners by the act. It is merely an extension of the powers conferred now upon the minister by the compulsory licence section of the act. The section proposed to be amended is applicable only to Canadian citizens, and consequently the amendment will not in any way affect international conventions. It is intended by the amendment to incorporate in the act remedial provisions analogous to those already in the Patent Act, 1935, to give relief against abuses by patentees.
Motion agreed to and bill read the first time.
Mr. MARTIN:: With the unanimous consent of the house I should like to move that this bill be placed on the order paper for second reading at eight o'clock this evening.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: No.


Mr. RINFRET:: It is not customary to accede to such a request. Moreover I would point out to the hon. gentleman that there are already on the order paper several bills that are very likely to be taken up to-night and it will make no difference if this bill is placed on the order paper to-morrow.
519S2-201



FOREIGN POLICY


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. J. S. WOODSWORTH (Winnipeg North Centre):: According to the press the new Japanese minister has publicly approved of the position taken by the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) in a recent debate in this house. That may be personally gratifying to the Prime Minister, but I should like to ask whether, in view of differences of opinion in Canada and in view of the delicate international situation, it is proper that the representative of a foreign government should discuss the policies of Canada.


Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister):: What is the particular policy to which the hon. gentleman refers?


James Shaver Woodsworth: The newspaper of yesterday-


An hon. MEMBER:: Which one?


James Shaver Woodsworth: I am quoting, I believe, from the Globe and Mail. This dispatch is from Niagara Falls:
Baron Tomii, who is accompanied by his wife and eight year old daughter, expressed appreciation of a recent utterance of Prime Minister Mackenzie King with regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict.
"I don't remember the exact words, but they were to the effect that Canadian people should be very careful in making remarks concerning the hostilities now going on in China," said the Baron. "I do realize how difficult it would be for people living thousands of miles away to understand fully the situation that exists in the Far East."
Discussing the mooted boycott of Japanese goods in Canada, the newly appointed minister said it would be ineffective as no boycott could be successful unless all countries embarked upon it simultaneously. He expressed complete confidence in an early Japanese victory and said he did not expect the "full-dress war" would be prolonged very long.
"When the military situation is cleared up, which I am confident will not be very far in the future, political stabilization and economic rehabilitation will follow," he said. "Japan will cooperate with the Chinese regimes recently established in Peking and Nanking. While we sincerely desire that these hostilities will come to an end as speedily as possible, Japan is fully prepared to meet a prolonged war."
And the interview proceeds on more general subjects. My point is that Japan is now at war with a recognized member of the League of Nations, a friendly country, but the new minister comes here


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Order.

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James Shaver Woodsworth: My point is, Mr. Speaker, that his first utterance is to commend one particular point of view that has been set forth in this house. I think it is rather serious, since there are many in the house who do not agree with the view to which the baron made reference.


Mr. SPEAKER:: Order. The hon. member must not make a speech.


James Shaver Woodsworth: I was asked to explain my reference to an interview, which I have tried to do.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I asked my hon. friend to state what statement or attitude or policy of the government it was which had been alluded to by the Japanese minister, as the one to which the hon. member took exception. As I gather from what my hon. friend has read, it was the attitude taken by myself as leader of the government with respect to the Sino-Japanese war. I have taken a certain attitude in this house on the responsible discussion of foreign relations which would include the Sino-Japanese conflict, and I have not known any hon. member of the house to take exception to it, and I think possibly the Japanese minister in the circumstances was quite justified in saying that an attitude to which no exception had been taken in this house, an attitude expressed by the Prime Minister of the country, was one he was right in seeking to follow.


James Shaver Woodsworth: If I may make just one other reference-


Walter Edward Foster: Order. I think the hon. member has stated his point.


James Shaver Woodsworth: I am sure the Prime Minister has not answered this point. The statement to which exception was taken is that we in this country should not discuss affairs that are going on in other nations. That view was expressed in connection with the debate on radio broadcasting.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I say at once to my hon. friend that I have never made any statement of the kind. He says that statement was made in the debate on radio broadcasting. No such statement was made in that debate. In the first place, in the discussion that took place during an afternoon I was not in the house, an allegation was made in the first instance that what I had said had reference to debates that had taken place over the radio. I had no thought in my mind of any debate that had taken place over the radio. The question of the debate which had taken place over the radio a few nights before, in which some hon. members of the

house had participated, was not in my thoughts, and I do not think it is possible to gather from my remarks that I was in any way referring to anything of that kind.
What I have said in regard to foreign policy is this, that I think it necessary at all times to be guarded in one's utterances. I have said that the government had to take full responsibility for what it said, and at a critical time like this hon. members must expect that the government will be very guarded in its language; also that in discussing the. foreign affairs of other countries I believe that the greatest service that can be rendered to Canada and the other countries themselves would be that we should do nothing in our discussions, whether in this parliament or over the radio, which will cause embarrassment.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Should not that
apply to a foreign minister?


Mr. LAPOINTE (Quebec East):: It should apply to the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre.


Right Hon. R. B. BENNETT (Leader of the Opposition):: The observations of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) in my judgment necessitate my making at least one statement. I am wholly opposed to any minister of a foreign power coming into this country and stating that that power proposes at an early day to defeat a country which, with this country, is a member of the League of Nations, particularly in view of the fact that a committee of that league has determined that the attack upon that other country was unprovoked and unwarranted. In view of that fact I desire to make it quite clear to the Prime Minister that I do not share his views. I think any statement made by the representative of a foreign power which, unprovoked and without warrant, attacks a friendly power, a member of the League of Nations, in view of its adherence to the Kellogg-Briand pact and the declaration made at Washington, is one with which I cannot associate myself and to which I must immediately say I am opposed.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I say to my right hon. friend that the statement I was replying to was the one that had reference to my statement of policy in this house.


James Shaver Woodsworth: No, no.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, that was the question.


James Shaver Woodsworth: As a matter of
privilege, my objection was to the minister from Japan endorsing publicly a certain statement of the Prime Minister an ex parte

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statement-well it does not make any difference what kind of statement. The point is that I am not discussing the Prime Minister's statement; I am discussing the statement of the minister from Japan publicly endorsing one particular Canadian policy.



PENITENTIARIES COMMISSION


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Mr. A. H. MITCHELL (Medicine Hat):: Could the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) indicate to us when we may expect him to table the report of the penitentiaries commission?


Ernest Lapointe: I think it may be possible
to lay the report on the table this week, or the beginning of next week. It is a voluminous document, and the work of printing and translating it has taken some time.



UNEMPLOYMENT


[Stage Direction]
On the orders of the day:
Hon. H. H. STEVENS (Kootenay East):: I should like to ask a question of the Minister of Labour (Mr. Rogers) regarding a Canadian Press dispatch indicating that Mr. Humphrey Mitchell, "director of labour transference in the federal Labour department," is in Vancouver consulting with the mayor and other authorities. My question is, what are the instructions that Mr. Mitchell has in this matter, and what is the attitude of the government to-day in regard to this very perplexing question, which according to the dispatch has not made any progress towards solution?
Hon. NORMAN McL. ROGERS (Minister of Labour):	Mr. Mitchell, who is an
officer of the Department of Labour, left for Vancouver on May 7. While in Vancouver he has been assisting in providing the Department of Labour here with information with respect to developments there. As I stated to the house yesterday, we have been proceeding upon the basis of consultation and cooperation with the provincial government in connection with this question of the single unemployed who are now in Vancouver. Mr. Mitchell has been a means through which that consultation is being effected.
As to the situation in Vancouver, I am informed that it has not changed since the statement I made yesterday.
51952-201 i


Henry Herbert Stevens: Would the minster say
what Mr. Mitchell's instructions are? He is described as "director of labour transference in the federal Labour department."


Mr. ROGERS:: I have nothing to add to
what I have already said on that point. Mr. Mitchell is there to keep in touch with the situation and to keep me advised of any developments.



FOREIGN POLICY-STATEMENT OF MR. MACKENZIE KING ON MOTION OF MINISTER OF FINANCE

[Stage Direction]
Hon. CHARLES A. DUNNING (Minister of Finance) moved that the house go into committee of supply.
William Lyon Mackenzie King: Mr. Speaker, as hon. members of the house are aware, I had intended to make a statement on external affairs at about the time of the Easter recess. One circumstance or another has rendered it inconvenient or inadvisable to make that statement until to-day.
In view of the very serious condition of affairs in Europe and the grave unrest that exists in many parts of the world, I am not going to attempt this afternoon to rely upon my memory for what I have to say. Rather I shall follow somewhat closely what I intended to say in a statement which I had prepared several weeks ago. It may be that the statement will be the more significant in the light of events of the last few weeks. I shall endeavour in what I say to be as concise and at the same time as comprehensive as possible. By that I mean I shall endeavour not to omit any of the subjects which I believe hon. members will wish to consider in discussing foreign policy or, better, external affairs. I use the words "external affairs," because our relations with different parts of the British Empire are affairs which lie beyond the dominion; they could hardly be called foreign affairs, but they are external affairs, while our relations with other countries come under the heading of foreign affairs. I shall endeavour, as I say, to anticipate what may be in the minds of hon. members in the way of questions as to the attitude and policy of the government with respect to situations that have arisen in which Canada may be expected to have some interest or to take some part.
It may be desirable at the outset to make some observations of a general character in
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view of the concern which events abroad have caused in all our minds. We look out upon a disturbed and seemingly chaotic world. Bitter and destructive wars are being waged in two continents. Force is openly glorified. Solemn pledges are disregarded. Armaments are mounting to fantastic heights. A war of propaganda is filling the air. We ask ourselves, how, within twenty years after a war to end war, is the war spirit so strong in many quarters? Why, after a war to make the world safe for democracy, has dictatorship attained such acceptance and momentum?
It is not possible to give a short answer to such questions. It is clear that no one factor and no single country can be held responsible. The fact is the great war never completely ended; the world is still suffering from its consequences. The effects of four years of world struggle and destruction and convulsion did not end in 1918. The results of a great war are usually entirely different from the intentions and the objectives of any of the peoples who embark upon it.
For a time after the war it appeared that a stable world might shortly be attained. A genuine passion for peace spread through all the countries engaged in the war, the losers as well as the nominal victors. In great part this new will to peace found embodiment in the League of Nations, but it found expression in many other movements as well. No one who visited Europe in the middle twenties could doubt the strength or the genuineness of that desire. But meanwhile other forces had been at work which in time overcame this will to peace in many quarters. Over a great part of Europe, except the democratic states fronting on the Atlantic, political and social revolutions were in progress. Countries which had not been fortunate enough to work out political freedom and economic progress by gradual effort found themselves compelled to face these belated tasks through revolution. The war had broken down the accepted social structure, the habitual conventions and restraints. The new controls were established by violence, by dictatorship of a class, dictatorship of an individual. New men, with new ambitions and new methods, were thrown up in the conflict; masters of violence and propaganda were given free hand. Inevitably the revolutions and class conflicts which have dominated the internal affairs of three countries out of four in central, eastern and southern Europe found reflection in their foreign relations as well. The new religions of race or class or social doctrine were as explosive, as expansive, as intolerant as Islam was a thousand years ago. The world was called 
upon to subscribe to their new creeds of communism or fascism or other isms.
The peace settlement had left problems and grievances which these explosive forces turned to account. It solved some territorial grievances, some nationalist aspirations, but it created new problems. Some countries or minorities when given freedom denied that freedom to others. Some countries which had lost territory or prestige were stirred up to plan for vindication and revenge. Some of the victors could not forget their fear or their pride. The fact that the earthquake of the war had disturbed the existing balance of world power, had given America and Asia new power relatively to western Europe, further complicated the organization of peace.
I do not believe these forces would have reached the explosion point if economic depression had not swept the world in 1929 and the years that followed. Depression sharpened every problem, shook the individual's security, increased the tension of international intercourse, provided the unemployed and discontented recruits for the new gospels. That depression, at least in its magnitude, was also a delayed consequence of the war, the war that left a crushing burden of debts and reparations, that broke down international credit and currency arrangements, that created new customs boundaries and new vested economic interests.
It may be that if the world had the last ten years to live over again the present breakdown might have been averted. A realistic settlement of war debts and reparations might have been effected. Trade barriers might have been reduced. Some would say the league should have attempted more strenuously to put down force by force, notably in Manchuria in 1931, while others would1 say the trouble lay in the very attempt to use collective force to maintain the Versailles settlement. Perhaps if any single cause and time might be isolated, it would most reasonably be held to be the failure, during the disarmament discussions in the early thirties, to recognize the futility of maintaining against Germany the one-sided policy of disarmament prescribed by the treaty of Versailles, the failure to make moderate concessions to a democratic regime in Germany, which later were grasped and far exceeded by a dictatorial regime.
It is a dark outlook, but not one that calls for despair. Some measure of internal stability survives even in states that have suffered many shocks. It may be years, however, before freedom and tolerance revive.

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The equilibrium of military force, which might have been secured at a moderate height five years ago, will be secured at a much higher level. Where resort to arms appears to be inevitable, every effort should and, I believe, will be made to circumscribe the area of conflict. The reversion to prewar or pre-modern age standards of internal and external conduct has not materially affected the western or north Atlantic world. No country in which democracy was firmly established has given up its ideal and its practice of liberty at home, its ideal and its practice of peace abroad, even if that peace has had to be assured by new outlays for defence.
The question is asked, What is Canada's foreign or external policy in such a world? In some quarters it is contended that Canada has no foreign policy, a contention which on analysis usually turns out to mean that the Canadian government does not make weekly announcements about other countries' foreign policies. Too often it is assumed that foreign policy is something that must be made in Geneva, or in London, or in Moscow, [DOT] according to the centre of the speaker's interests, and that Canada should line up in support of or opposition to other countries' foreign policies.
May I refer to some observations on this subject which I made at a conference in England some years ago. I intend to embody in what I have to say quotations from speeches made at imperial conferences in Great Britain and at Geneva, and some references to statements of policy made in this house at different times in the past. I do that lest it be assumed that what I am setting forth at this time is set forth in the light of conditions as we see them and know them to be to-day. I prefer rather that what has been set forth in the past as a statement of our position should be made clear at this time, particularly as I have had reason to say with pride and satisfaction that our foreign policy has remained to the present what it has been in the past.
This statement was made at the imperial conference of 1923:
Foreign policy I conceive as simply the sum of those dealings or relationships or policies which the government of one country carries on with other countries. It is in large part an extension of domestic policy. It depends upon the balance of social and political forces, upon the industrial organization, upon the whole background of the people's life. . . . Foreign affairs nowadays have to do largely with economic questions, trade or tariff, oil or railway concessions, international debts, migration, fishery or power or navigation rights in boundary waters. They are largely neighbours' disputes, arising naturally most frequently with the countries with which there is most intercourse.
The question whether a certain matter in dispute will lead to friction, or even to war, is frequently not so much a question of the character of the specific issue, as of the spirit and traditions and supposed general interests of the countries concerned.
No two countries have the same neighbours, the same relationships; no two countries can have the same questions to deal with, the same policies for their solution. Argentina and Finland, China and Switzerland, have widely different preoccupations. There are of course world movements, trade, cultural, military, which affect every country, affect all countries increasingly, but they affect no two countries alike or in the same degree. And so even in times of world disturbance, the policies of no two countries can be alike, provided they are rooted in their own interests or the ideals in which their interests are sublimated, and are not merely echoes of the policies of other countries.
So far as Canada is concerned, the question of foreign or external policy is at once extremely simple and extremely complex. Our direct and individual relations with other countries are important; they involve difficulties and differences of opinion; but the issues are issues within our knowledge and competence, issues for which we can find our own solution. Our indirect relations, as a member of the League of Nations, as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations, present issues of a more varied and complicated character.
Our direct relations with other countries are increasingly important. In large measure they are relations with one or other members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Questions which arise with these communities are frequently difficult, frequently involve, particularly in trade matters, conflicts of opinion between different sections or interests in our own country; but the frank and friendly attitude which exists, the understanding based on similar political and social and ethical standards and ways of life, ensure a settlement.
In large measure also our external relations consist of our relations with our great neighbour. These relations are so intimate and continuous that some people in Canada seem to imagine they are not foreign relations at all, that they do not constitute foreign policy at all; they unconsciously assume that foreign policy should mean to us the relations and. issues involved in some other country's foreign policy, or that our foreign policy should mean only relations with distant countries with which we have little contact and connection.
Foreign Policy

These relations with the United States, which constitute and always will constitute by far the most important part of our foreign policy in the strict sense, have not always been easy to carry on. Real differences of interest arise from time to time; these differences are expressed with an openness and frankness that leave nothing concealed; constitutional divisions of authority complicate agreement. Within our memory a good deal of friction has existed, exclusive trade policies and pin-pricking attitudes have roused resentment. But that attitude has largely disappeared. On both sides of the border there is a realization of common ideals and common interests, a genuine friendliness and increasing understanding, which facilitate agreement on most issues that- arise and make it no serious calamity if for the moment agreement is not reached on others.
Incidentally, I may say from my experience, and I am sure the right hon. the leader of the opposition would say the same from his experience, the existence of a Canadian legation at Washington and a United States legation at Ottawa have greatly aided in the growth of this understanding and the prompt and effective consideration of questions that arose. It is one of our national assets-and we need all our assets to offset some of our liabilities-that we have a good neighbour- a neighbour that any free country in the continent of Europe or elsewhere would thank its stars to have.
I need not refer to our increasingly close relations with other lands in Europe, particularly France, and in Latin America and Asia. They are largely, but not wholly, relations of trade. Here I might point out that the increasing intervention of the state in business in many countries abroad, the growth of exchange controls, of quota regulations, of state monopolies, make it increasingly difficult for the business man to do business in the old way, require the intervention of his government with the government of the other country to ensure a reasonably fair and definite opportunity to carry on business.
The Secretary of State of the United States, in the significant address which he delivered a few weeks ago on the foreign policy of the United States, declared:
The primary objectives of our foreign policy are the maintenance of the peace of our country, and the promotion of the economic, the social and the moral welfare of our people.
Within our more limited range of activity, we could, I think, say much the same thing. Our foreign and external policy is a policy of peace and friendliness, a policy of trying to
fMr. Mackenzie King.]
look after our own interests and to understand the position of other governments with which we have dealings. It is a policy which takes account of our political connections and traditions, our geographical position, the limited numbers and the racial composition of our people, our stage in economic development, our own internal preoccupations and necessities-in short, a policy based on the Canadian situation. It is not and cannot be under these conditions a spectacular head-line policy; it is simply the sum of the countless daily dealings with other countries, the general resultant of an effort to act decently on every issue or incident that arises, and a hope of receiving the same treatment from others.
Canada, it is hardly necessary to say, cherishes no design of aggression or expansion or revenge. We have no ancient grudges, no envy for others' possessions, no ambition for controlling others' destinies. We know and the world knows that we have neither the power nor the will to attack any other land for our own ends.
Nor are we inclined to organize or join in crusades in other continents. We are a part of the modern world. We cannot help but be affected in some measure by the policies and actions of other countries. We cannot be indifferent to the fate of democratic institutions, the suffering of unfortunate minorities elsewhere. But we must keep a sense of perspective. Resolutions or speeches on affairs in Austria or Spain or Santo Domingo may afford an emotional outlet, but they do not give our country any power to shape the destiny of other peoples. We have a tremendous task at home. Our eleven million people are trying to develop half a continent, to find a decent livelihood, to build up a distinctive national life. We have neither the power nor the knowledge to settle the destinies of countries thousands of miles away. We are no more likely of our own motion to intervene in Europe than Sweden or Bulgaria or Switzerland is to intervene in America. It is sometimes forgotten that in Canada itself we have an area as large as Europe, with problems of communication, of development, of adjustment of sectional and cultural groups quite as difficult to deal with as many of the problems of adjustment which the different parts of Europe are facing, and which constitute a great part of European "foreign affairs," that we are not asking and will not receive any help from outside in meeting these difficulties, and that we are unlikely to have any surplus of statesmanship or good fortune to bestow elsewhere.

Foreign Policy
If we are unlikely of our own motion to take part in wars of conquest or wars of crusade, it is equally unlikely that at the moment, with the world as it is to-day, any other country will single out Canada for attack. The talk which one sometimes hears of aggressor countries planning to invade Canada and seize these tempting resources of ours is, to say the least, premature. It ignores our neighbours and our lack of neighbours; it ignores the strategic and transportation difficulties of transoceanic invasion; it ignores the vital fact that every aggressor has not only potential objects of its ambition many thousands of miles nearer which would be the object of any attack, but potential and actual rivals near at hand whom it could not disregard by launching fantastic expeditions across half the world. The truth of this is recognized in every country. At present danger of attack upon Canada is minor in degree and secondhand in origin. It is against chance shots that we need immediately to defend ourselves. What may develop no one can say.
Thus while it is well we should see our country and its security as viewed from other lands we should also have a clear vision of how dangers that threaten in other parts of the world may expand under circumstances which lie beyond any control of our own, and be prepared to meet any situation which may arise in a world of the character that our world is to-day.
If we are not likely to be directly involved in a conflict, are we likely to be drawn into European conflicts indirectly, for example, through our connection with the league? That is an important question which I think many Canadians are asking at the moment. I have pointed out that so far as we ourselves are concerned, being a country by ourselves, if we were confined to looking after ourselves we have little to fear. But we have other associations and out of those associations arise obligations. The question naturally arises as to what, in determining our attitude, the significance of those associations may be.
We are a member of the League of Nations which was founded for the purpose of advancing international cooperation and world peace. From the beginning, wide differences of opinion have existed as to the means by which those ends were to be sought and achieved. Successive Canadian governments have supported one of those views. In this house in June, 1936, and at the assembly of the league in September of that year, I restated that view. Developments since that time have only served to confirm the soundness of the position then taken.	[DOT]
Briefly, the Canadian government believes that the only feasible and constructive basis of league activity under present conditions is to develop all its possibilities of conciliation, all its possibilities of cooperation in agreed tasks, all its possibilities of shaping and focusing world opinion. As indicated in a statement made on behalf of the present government in October, 1935, we are convinced of the value and necessity of the league "as an indispensable agency for organizing and strengthening the forces of good will in the world, and for effecting the essential adjustment of conflicting national aims." As Lord Curzon declared at the first session of the council of the league, which has just held its hundredth session:
The League of Nations is the expression of a universal desire for a saner method of regu-. lating the affairs of mankind.
That desire, that need, continues. In some way we must adjust our international relations to the economic forces, the scientific inventions which have made all nations neighbours, adjust our theories and practices of national sovereignty to the requirements of world cooperation. It is not a task which can be performed in a day. It is not an end which can be attained by shutting our eyes to facts, by assuming that nations are ready to-day to resign their sovereign right of decision to a world superstate. We must build on what exists, must extend the habit of cooperation in steadily wider fields, must seek to remove .the causes of friction and fear.
Equally definite is our belief that at the present juncture of world affairs it is not possible to make the league an international war office, an instrument of force, military or economic. As I said at Geneva in 1936:
There is a general unwillingness of peoples to incur obligations which they realize they may not be able in time of crisis to fulfil, obligations to use force and to use it at any place, any time, in circumstances unforeseen, and in disputes over whose origin or whose development they have had little or no control. This difficulty of automatic intervention increases rather than decreases when conflicts tend to become struggles between classes, between economic systems, between social philosophies, and, in some instances, between religious faiths, as well as between states.
In recent years the peoples have become more aware of the difficulty of localizing and restricting a war once it has begun. They have come to realize that the consequences of wars are different from either their real or their alleged objects, that war is war regardless of the labels and the slogans devised at the outset. They have become more aware of the horrors and suffering involved for any people at war from indiscriminate air
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and gas attack. They have become aware of the strain on national unity and social order a long struggle may involve. They have become aware of the uncertainty, the very grave uncertainty, whether in any country engaged in a long war individual liberties can be maintained. They realize more clearly the difficulty of putting on economic sanctions unless the countries doing so possess overwhelming force and are firmly bound to apply military sanctions if the occasion arises, and prepared to exchange firm and explicit territorial and military guarantees among each other in advance.
In Mr. Eden's words in the British House of Commons last December:
There are two possible forms of sanctions, the ineffective, which are not- worth putting on, and the effective, which mean the risk, if hot the certainty, of war.
After stating:
I say deliberately that nobody could contemplate any action of that kind in the far east unless they are convinced that they have overwhelming force to back their policy.
Mr. Eden continues:
Do right hon. gentlemen opposite really think that the League of Nations to-day, with only two great naval powers in it, ourselves and France, have got that overwhelming force?
In other words, Mr. Eden recognized that a league which fell far short of the universality contemplated by its founders, could not hope to carry out the role of universal policeman.
In the statement at Geneva from which I have quoted, I made it as clear as possible that Canada could not accept the theory of automatic commitment to the application of force, economic or military.
The covenant as originally drafted provided alternatively for peace by conciliation and peace by collective coercion.
In its original conception the covenant was predicated upon the practically universal acceptance of its provisions. Without this assumption. the latter alternative of seeking peace by collective coercion, embodied in articles 10, 16 and 17, would not have found place. It was recognized that formal amendment of the covenant by the removal of those articles was not possible in view of the difficulty in securing action by the requisite two-thirds of the members even on amendments on which there is general agreement in principle. Nor was it necessary:
The powers and duties of the league-
I quote now from what I said at Geneva.
-develop by usage and experience as well as by explicit amendment. What its members will and will not do can be read more clearly from what they have done and not done than from fMr. Mackenzie King.]
the text of the covenant. What is now called for is to register in the light of actual facts the position which has developed during sixteen years of league history by the interpretations given and the action taken or not taken as occasion for decision arose.
It is a fact, as has been indicated by representatives of the Scandinavian countries and other members of the league, that many provisions of the covenant have not been observed, or have been applied unequally or ineffectively. The pledge of reduction of armaments in article 8 has not been honoured. The provisions for the revision of treaties "which have become inapplicable," contained in article 19, and which were in form and fact an essential complement to the provisions of article 10 for the maintenance of the territorial status quo, have not yet been applied. The sanctions provisions of article 16 were tacitly recognized at an early stage as unworkable in their entirety, and were modified by the assembly resolutions of 1921. Modified, or unmodified, sanctions against an aggressor have never been tried when the conflict took place in Asia or America. Applied once in an Afro-European conflict, they failed and were abandoned because of general unwillingness under the conditions of the day to press force to the point of war.
It has been alleged by some strong advocates of the collective coercion theory in Canada that Canada is responsible for wrecking this conception of the league. That view is part and parcel of the exaggerated idea of Canada's power and duty and the unwillingness to face the realities as to the attitudes of other states that underlies the advocacy of the 100 per cent sanctions doctrine. The influence of any small state at Geneva is definitely limited, except occasionally when it acts in the direction of one or another of the great powers' wishes. Every member of the league, whether from Europe, or from South America, or from Asia, has its own approach to the problems of the league, its own views of its interest or the league's interest. The Canadian government did not cause those countries to take the action or lack of action they have taken. It did in some measure realize what that course of action was likely to be. It was apparent years ago that in the opinion of many of the countries most influential in the league, the covenant was intended to be a one-way street, operating toward Europe, not from Europe. Chaco and Manchuria only confirmed that analysis. Ten years ago, the Canadian government, in a communication to the government of the United States on the relation between the covenant and the Kellogg pact, declared:
It is plain that the full realization of the ideal of joint economic or military pressure upon an outlaw power, upon which some of the founders of the league set great store, will require either an approach to the universality of the league contemplated when the covenant was being drawn, or an adjustment of the old rules of neutrality to meet the new conditions of cooperative defence.

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Not all the forecasts we and others made in 1928 have required as little alteration as
that one.
As relatively little attention has been given the matter in Canada-itself a significant fact -it may be worth while to refer to the latest occasion on which the varying views of members of the league on this question of sanctions were set forth.
The whole question was reviewed in the January meeting of the council, this year, and in the proceedings of the committee of twenty-eight in January and February. This committee, it will be recalled, was appointed by the 1936 assembly to explore the whole question of the application or reform of the covenant. Every phase of that question- the problem of universality, cooperation with non-member states, regional or continental organization of the league, methods of amending or interpreting the covenant, article 10 (territorial integrity), 11, 12, 13, 14 (intervention in disputes). 16 and 17 (sanctions), and separation of the covenant from the peace treaties, were studied by special rapporteurs.
The first question, the possibility of securing the participation of all states in the league, was surveyed in a report by Lord Cranborne, who envisaged three types of league, (1) a coercive league, (2) a non-coercive league, and (3) an intermediate league, in which any members would retain the right to apply sanctions in cases where they considered it advisable. This report on universality was the only one which was formally before the committee on January 31 and February 1, but the discussion covered the whole range of the covenant and par* ticularly the question of article 16; it was impossible to consider whether it was desirable to bring all states into the league without considering what changes would be necessary to accomplish that end, and whether such changes were desirable or practicable.
The discussion brought out radically different points of view, but on one point there was little dissent-namely, that article 16 had never been enforced in its entirety and only once partly attempted; that there was no proposal in any quarter to apply it in the conflicts now waging, and that member states are not now prepared to regard the provisions of article 10 and article 16 as binding. The delegates of Sweden declared:
The league in practice has ceased to be a coercive league. ... By the force of events, without any amendments to the covenant, the practice has been established according to which members of the league do not consider themselves bound to undertake coercive action against an aggressor state.
That position was not seriously challenged. There was, however, wide difference of opinion as to whether a coercive league was or was not desirable, and whether or not the existing practice should be translated into amendments to the text of the covenant. Mr. Paul Boncour admitted there was some ground for the fear of certain small powers that the great powers which had shown little zeal for article 16 might demand its strict observance in conflicts in which they themselves were concerned. Some small states also appeared desirious of maintaining the possibility of sanctions being used in their support, though not ready to pledge their use when others were in need.
Broadly speaking, the U.S.S.R., France, Spain, China, Iran (or Persia), Czechoslovakia, Mexico, Colombia, New Zealand, indicated they were convinced that ultimately, if not now, sanctions might be workable, and that it would be a mistake to take article 10 and article 16 out of the covenant in response to what might prove a temporary difficulty. Sweden, and in other connections the other Scandinavian states, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland, emphasized the danger of the present ambiguous position. Sweden and Holland proposed that article 16 be formally recognized as being at present optional and not obligatory in character. Poland indicated definite qualifications. Chile urged the removal of all sanctions to facilitate the entry or return of all countries to the league.
The Canadian government, through its representative on the committee, indicated its belief in the necessity of attaining substantial universality for the effective working of the league. It did not consider, however, that it was now possible to obtain universality by putting through formal amendments to the covenant. Some members of the league had indicated they were not prepared to consent to the explicit changes in the sanctions article necessary if some great countries were to enter. On the other hand, some countries outside the league had indicated their unwillingness to enter or re-enter the league, whether organized on a coercion or on a conciliation basis. The Canadian government therefore believed it desirable to keep the league operating as effectively as possible within the scope which experience had shown to be practicable, and to seek at a more opportune time such formal adjustments as may be required to secure the cooperation of all states which are prepared to renounce aggression and to cooperate in the peaceful settlement of international problems. Meanwhile, it was stated, the position of the Canadian government as to sanctions and the sanctions articles re-
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mained as set forth by the Prime Minister in the assembly in September, 1936. As has been indicated, no one in the recent discussion at Geneva ventured to hold that the sanctions articles were now in force. It would have taken considerable hardihood to make such a contention in view of the absolute refusal of league members, great and small, to invoke sanctions in the present conflict between Japan and China.
In fact, the present situation as to the interpretation of the sanctions articles was well summed up by the representative of Belgium in the committee of twenty-eight:
To-day is a grave conflict, the anxiety is to avoid procedures that might lead to the application of article 16, because account is taken of the obstacles that would be met with in its application.
At the same time, the possibility must be taken into account, that, in the phrase of another speaker, the article may be resurrected, or, as it has been put elsewhere, may be taken out of cold storage when it suits the interests of some of the members that now completely ignore its existence.
To avoid any possibility of ambiguity or misunderstanding, it is therefore desirable to repeat that the position indicated in the assembly of 1936 and in this house earlier in the same year remains the position of the Canadian government. We recognize the honesty and the idealism of those who call for a universal and automatic application of sanctions. We do not consider that it would make for honesty or decency or good will among nations to attempt an in and out interpretation of the covenant, based on the varying interests of some of the members of the league. So far as the Canadian government is concerned, the sanctions articles have ceased to have effect by general practice and consent, and cannot be revived by any state or group of states at will.
Now may I pass to the question of our relationship to the foreign policy of other members of the British commonwealth of nations, and particularly the United Kingdom. The task of the United Kingdom in the field of foreign affairs has been an extraordinarily difficult one of late years. Its own position has been modified by shifts in the balance of power throughout the world and the invention of weapons of war which have ended its own insularity, and introduced new factors into the Mediterranean area. As one of the great powers, it has had to consider not only its own protection, but the maintenance of peace throughout the world and particularly on the continent of Europe. There may be differences of opinion as to the wisdom of

some of the policies adopted to secure these ends in the twenty years since the war, but I think there can be little question of the unremitting care and anxiety which those responsible for the foreign policy of Britain have devoted to their task, or of their strong and determined effort to establish peace and maintain respect for solemn pledges and the principles of law.
No course of action adopted by the United Kingdom in foreign affairs can fail to have repercussions, great or small, upon Canada and the other members of the commonwealth of nations. The problem of adjustment this fact presents is one of the most difficult and complicated that faces Canada and other parts of the commonwealth as well. A number of courses have been urged or practised. It may be helpful to review these briefly. I believe that all of them have been mentioned in this house in the course of discussions on defence matters and other questions. They have been mentioned by one or another member who has been prepared to support the point of view he urged.
One attitude that has been proposed is to say that we will accept any policy adopted by the British government of the day, and give it our support, regardless of our own views and interests, and regardless of consequences.
It is only necessary to spell out the implications of this view to make it clear that even its exponents would hesitate to adopt it in all cases. The goal of United Kingdom policy may remain the same, but the paths by which that goal is sought vary widely. The view which I have mentioned would involve being prepared to follow every variation in the trend of British policy due to changing situations on the continent, changing party fortunes or changing ideas of national advantage. It would mean one year following a Conservative government, next year a Labour government; one year leaning toward collective security, next year perhaps toward isolation.
A second course would be to say that we will accept the policy of Great Britain whenever she acts through the league and in accordance with the covenant.
It was held in some quarters some years ago that the fact that all parts of the commonwealth were members of the league and that Great Britain would not go to war except under a league decision and in accordance with a covenant binding all parts equally and automatically, had conveniently and permanently solved the question of intracommonwealth war relations. Experience has shown that no such automatic solution is

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afforded by the league, that it does not operate automatically, and that the question whether an attempt is to be made to set its sanctions or war provisions in action depends in last analysis on whether influential European members of the , League wish to invoke these provisions.
A third course that might be advocated is to say we will advise Great Britain as to what course she should follow, so that we will not be involved in the consequences of a policy we thought wrong. I believe that position has been stated many times in this house.
This attitude has more to be said in its favour. Occasions arise where consultation is both necessary and possible, and where it will be open to each government and sometimes necessary for each government to indicate its attitude. The difficulty, however, is that a United Kingdom government, for example, must be responsible to its own people for its actions. The direct and main responsibility for its policy must rest with its own parliament. They are closer to the danger point, and must bear the main brunt of any misjudgment or failure. They might be prepared to take advice which fell in with their own views; but otherwise they would find it difficult to do so unless the adviser could guarantee them against the consequences. It could not be anticipated that Canada and South Africa, Australia, New Zealand and Ireland would always advise the same way. The necessity of the United Kingdom consulting certain other powers in Europe would not be affected. The danger would arise of intervening in controversies between the government and the opposition in Westminster. In many cases, there is not time or opportunity for such consultation or advice. A policy is not adopted at one stroke; it is the sum of many actions, accumulating decisions on what often appear points of detail, ordinary routine. Daily and sometimes hourly new situations must be faced, conversations held, decisions taken.
Again, it has been urged that we should say we will declare here and now our neutrality in any future conflict, decline to take part under any circumstances in any conflict in which the United Kingdom may be engaged.
I stated the government's position on this proposal last session in the following terms. I have stated it in similar terms in other sessions:
This would amount to tying the hands of parliament regardless of the circumstances of the war or the participants, what interests of
Canada may or may not be involved. Over and over again we have laid down the principle that so far as participation by Canada in war is concerned, it will be for our parliament to decide. Having taken that attitude in respect to participation, I think we might well take a similar attitude with respect to neutrality. At the present time there are no commitments, so far as Canada is concerned, to participate in any war. Equally there are no commitments . . . whereby we agree to remain neutral under all circumstances. The policy of the government with respect to participation and neutrality is that parliament will decide what is to be done.
That position has not been changed. To make such a declaration would be unjustified by the policies of British governments. It would be an unwise encouragement to potential aggressors.
Finally, we may take the position that parliament will decide upon our course when and if the emergency arises, in the light of all the circumstances at the time. In the meantime we should endeavour to keep informed upon the situation, to keep in touch with the United Kingdom and other countries striving for peace, to carry through a reasonable and effective defence program of our own, to support any constructive program of conciliation and removal of economic barriers to peace, and to strive in our own relations to build up friendships which will serve our need and the need of others.
I made a statement at Geneva in September, 1936, in the presence of British ministers and representatives of other nations, which later, on January 25, 1937, I declared was "a statement of the present administration's policy and the policy which the present administration intends to follow as long as it remains in office." It was as follows:
The nations of the British commonwealth are held together by ties of friendship, by similar political institutions, and by common attachment to democratic ideals, rather than by commitments to join together in war. The Canadian parliament reserves to itself the right to declare, in the light of the circumstances existing at the time, to what extent, if at all, Canada will participate in conflicts in which other members of the commonwealth may be engaged.	.
The Canadian House of Commons by unanimous resolution has made the adoption of undertakings to apply either military or economic sanctions subject to the approval of parliament.
What I have said and quoted-
I am still quoting what I said at Geneva two years ago.
-does not mean that in no circumstances would the Canadian people be prepared to share in an action against an aggressor; there have been no absolute commitments either for or against participation in war or other forms of force. It does mean that any decision on the part of Canada to participate in war will have to be taken by the parliament or people of Canada
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in the light of all existing circumstances; circumstances of the day as they exist in Canada, as well as in the areas involved.
It will be argued, it has been argued, that it is not satisfactory to postpone decision until the eve or the fact of an outbreak of war, that under such circumstances calm decision will not be possible, that the decision should be made in advance.
I do not agree with that view. In the first place it would be impossible to frame to-day the questions which might have to be decided later. Many "inevitable" wars have never happened. The opponents of one year may be the friends of the next. It is impossible to forecast what the issues abroad, the alignments abroad, the situations at home, may be in a year or five years from now. In Mr. Hull's address on foreign policy on March 17. to which I have already referred, after indicating his country's firm adherence to the faithful observance of international agreements, the settjement of international issues by peaceful negotiation, the scrupulous observance of the rights of others, and the maintenance of international law and order, he continued:
There is one thing that we cannot do. And that is, to prepare and place before every government of the world a detailed chart of the course of policy and action which this country will or will not pursue under any particular set of circumstances. No man, no nation, can possibly foresee all the circumstances that may arise. Moreover, to attempt to make such a detailed chart of future action would merely result in impairing our effectiveness in working for the one objective toward which we constantly strive and on which, I am certain, there is not a vestige of disagreement among the people of our country-the establishment of durable peace.
In Mr. Chamberlain's speech of March 24, referring to suggestions of assurances to France regarding Czechoslovakia, or assurances of military assistance direct to Czechoslovakia, Mr. Chamberlain declared:
From a consideration of these two alternatives it clearly emerges that under either of them the decision as to whether or not this country should find itself involved in war would be automatically removed from the discretion of His Majesty's government, and the suggested guarantee would apply irrespective of circumstances by which it was brought into operation, and over which His Majesty's government might not have been able to exercise any control.
Again, it should be plain to everyone, it is explicitly recognized by some of those who urge a decision now. that to force an issue like this upon the country would bring out deep and in some cases fundamental differences of opinion, would lead to a further strain upon the unity of a country already 
strained by economic depression and ether consequences of the last war and its aftermath. To invite this risk on a hypothetical question would be as great a disservice to Canada as any government could render.
It must be recognized that this policy is not wholly satisfactory, not free from difficulties, not a completely logical position. Like many other policies it is not an ideal solution; it is only the best of the available solutions. That, however, is not the fault of the policy. It is the inevitable outcome of the present stage in the relations between the several parts of the British commonwealth. It is inherent in the contradiction between -the recognized independent responsibility of the several members of the commonwealth, "equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affaire," to quote the declaration of the imperial conference of 1926, and the possibility that war proclaimed by the king as regards part of his dominions may involve other parts in the conflict. In other words, we have worked out a satisfactory and enduring solution of the relations between the several members of the British commonwealth in peace time; we have not yet worked out a completely logical solution of the position in war time.
Now may I turn briefly to some more specific comments on developments abroad, and first, the Sino-Japanese conflict. The terrible war now waging on the soil of China has aroused intense interest and concern in Canada. It is a conflict of great moment for the future of the Pacific and of the relations between the countries that border on the Pacific. It is a c]ash between two ancient and distinctive though allied civilizations, in which all the powers of destruction and terror which western civilization has made available to the whole world are being employed. Canada has many close ties with both countries-cultural and church and trade associations. The immediate tragedies have stirred deep feeling. Similar conflicts, with similar losses of life, have been waged in Asia over many thousands of years, but to-day the telegraph and the camera and moving pictures have brought home to millions on this continent a direct and poignant knowledge of the suffering and the horrors such a conflict involves, both for the tens of thousands who die in battle and for the tens of millions who are driven from their homes to wander and to starve. A distinguished Chinese visitor to Canada recently stated that he did not wish to dwell upon charges of atrocities in the conflict. It is true that, once the die is cast and war is

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entered upon, the difference between a humanely conducted war and an inhumanely conducted one may not be very great, though it will still be significant. Some armies may show greater arrogance, greater callousness in battle, greater recklessness as to attack on civilians, but with airplanes and bombs and gasses available, no modern war can be anything but mass slaughter, mass destruction, mass suicide.
It is natural that many Canadians have asked what they could do, what the government and parliament could do, in the face of this calamity.
So far as the government's action is concerned, Canada has a direct interest as a member of the League of Nations and as a signatory of the nine-power treaty. The covenant of the League of Nations provides under article 10 that the members of the league agree to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the league. Article 11 provides that any war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the whole league, which shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. Articles 12 to 15 of the covenant providing for means of peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the league, and article 16 providing for sanctions in the event of a member of the league resorting to war, do not directly apply, as Japan is not now a member of the league. Article 17, however, provides that in the event of a dispute between a member of the league and a state which is not a member, the non-member shall be invited to accept the obligations of membership. If it does not accept and resorts to war against a member of the league, the provisions of article 16 shall be applicable against it.
On September 12, 1937, the Chinese government appealed to the league under articles 10, 11 and 17. The assembly was then in session, with Senator Dandurand, Mr. Ilsley and Mr. Massey representing Canada. The council referred the question direct to a far eastern advisory committee of twenty-two members which had been set up in 1933 to deal with the previous Manchurian conflict. Canada is a member of that committee. On September 27 the advisory committee which included the United States, passed a resolution which was accepted the following day by the assembly condemning airplane bombing of open towns and cities in China by Japanese aircraft. On October 1 a sub-committee was set up, on which Canada was not represented. Four days later the sub-committee brought in two reports,
the first setting forth the facts of the present situation in China, and declaring that the action by Japan was a breach of its treaty obligations and could not be justified. The second report expressed moral support for China, recommended that members of the league should consider how far they could individually extend aid to China, and further recommended that the signatories of the nine-power treaty should be asked to examine the situation. The report and resolutions were adopted by the assembly on October 6 with the approval of all members represented except Siam and Poland, which abstained.
It must frankly be recognized that the league's treatment of the situation has not proved of very material benefit to China. The question whether the sanctions provisions of article 16 should be invoked was studiously avoided. The plain facts were, first, that with more than half the great powers outside, there was not the concentration of potential force within the league that had been contemplated when the covenant was framed, and, second, that given the unrest and the threats to peace in the Mediterranean and central Europe, the European countries that were in the league were not prepared to weaken their own position at home by taking steps which might involve having to despatch a large and possibly still inadequate part of their forces to the other side of the earth.
The league assembly, as has been noted, proposed that the question be further considered by the signatories of the so-called nine-power treaty. That treaty was one of the series of inter-related treaties and agreements signed at Washington in the winter of 1921-22, with the object of bringing about stability and security in the far east. It was signed for the United Kingdom and Canada, Australia, New Zealand, The Netherlands, Portugal, and Japan and China, and was later accepted by other powers. The contracting parties undertook to respect the independence and territorial integrity of China, to seek to maintain the open door in China and refrain from seeking for special privileges, or spheres of influence. Article 7 provided that when in the opinion of any signatory a situation arose involving the application of the treaty, there should be "full and frank communication between the contracting powers concerned." In view of some misunderstanding on the subject, it is necessary to remember that this treaty, unlike the covenant, included no provision for sanctions against a signatory which broke its pledges. It bound each party to refrain from aggression and intrigue, it provided for consultation if peace was threatened, but it did not involve joint action against a violator.
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The conference met in Brussels early in November, on an invitation by the Belgian government issued at the request of the British government and with the approval of the government of the United States, for the purpose "of examining, in accordance with article 7, the situation in the far east and to consider friendly peaceable methods for hastening the end of the regrettable conflict now taking place there." All the countries which signed or adhered to the treaty were represented, with the all-important exception of Japan. Earnest and repeated efforts were made to bring the warring parties into consultation. The services of the other signatories, or alternatively of a small group of states, were offered in an effort to suspend hostilities and work out a lasting settlement. Japan refused to take part, declared she was acting in self-defence and that the conflict therefore lay outside the scope of the treaty, and that a solution could be attained only by efforts between the two parties directly concerned. The conference found itself at an impasse. The members of the conference, with Italy definitely opposing and the three Scandinavian countries, while sympathetic, abstaining from voting on account of their limited direct interest, declared their right and interest to intervene in the issue, their condemnation of force and breaking of pledges, their rejection of the view that direct negotiation between the two parties could achieve a settlement, and their readiness to continue further efforts for suspension of hostilities and negotiation. They then adjourned at the call of the chairman. In the circumstances, nothing more was possible; it was probably worth while holding the conference to determine whether more was possible. Canada concurred in the action taken. It did not think less could be done; it did not urge the great powers represented to do more.
There is another phase of this question about which a good deal has been said in Canada. I have received a good many communications protesting against the shipment to Japan of munitions and of raw materials available for war purposes. Many of those communications reveal a common inspiration from sources more concerned with the welfare of certain other countries and systems than with Canada's welfare. But many are genuine, based on an honest hatred of war, disgust at atrocities, unwillingness to see profit made out of others' misery. Those views I respect. I think we all share the feelings that lie behind them. But they are also based on erroneous ideas as to the facts both of Canada's 
position and the position of other countries, and erroneous assumption as to what action by Canada alone would effect.
Perhaps before I give the facts with regard to shipments of munitions and the like I had better touch on the other conflict, the civil war in Spain, because what I have to say with regard to the shipment of munitions has a direct bearing on both. In Spain, the conflict is in form at least a civil war, not a war between independent states. It is not the first conflict that has marked the history of that unhappy country. The transition from mediaeval feudalism to a modern social order has been a slow process, marked by more than one civil war, more than one armed revolt. The conflict which began in July, 1936, has been particularly destructive because of the nature of modern weapons of warfare, and because of the intervention of outside governments in the struggle, the Italian and German governments directly assisting the insurgents and the soviet government assisting the government. There was imminent danger of the conflict spreading into a war of isms, of class conflict and of conflict of national strategic interests. On the initiative of the governments of France and Great Britain, a non-intervention committee of twenty-seven European states was formed to endeavour to prevent or restrict outside participation in that war. The committee has not succeeded in preventing continued extensive participation by outside states, all members of the committee. Its critics in England and France contend that it was unfair to put an unrecognized insurgent force on a par with a recognized government, that the committee has merely furnished a veil, an excuse for shutting one's eyes to a flagrant invasion of Spain with plane, tank, and heavy artillery, and that a serious danger exists of a threat to British and French communications in the Mediterranean and on the Atlantic coast. Its sponsors contend that it has lessened the amount of such intervention, that it has prevented an open break which would have led inevitably to a general European war, and, that whatever the outcome and whatever the assistance received, no Spanish government, when firmly in power, will tolerate outside control.
Canada of course did not take part in the establishment or the work of this European committee, nor did any other non-European country. But when the United Kingdom, the United States and other countries had prohibited the export of munitions to Spain, the possibility arose that orders for munitions might be diverted to Canada, and in order that the efforts to localize the conflict in Spain might not be frustrated in this manner, an

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order in council prohibiting such imports was passed in July last, under the authority of the amendment made last year to the Customs Act.


Richard Bedford Bennett: When my right hon.
friend said "imports," was he not referring to exports?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Exports from Canada, but imports of the country in question.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Yes.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Similarly, in order to prevent Canada from being drawn into this European struggle by the recruiting of Canadians for service in Spain, an order in council was passed in July, applying the Foreign Enlistment Act to the Spanish conflict, as had previously been done in the United Kingdom and administratively in the United States, and early in August the issue of passports to Canadian nationals proposing to go to Spain for the purpose of participating in the conflict was prohibited.
As there is some misunderstanding on the subject of both these measures, it may be advisable to refer briefly to their scope and subsequent application. The purpose of both measures was to prevent Canada from being drawn into foreign conflicts by the actions either of manufacturers of munitions or of organizers of recruiting.
The provision for the control of exports was based upon the reports of a Geneva committee, and an examination of the practice of other countries. An amendment to the Customs Act, which took the place of an old section which was comprehensive but not adapted to present conditions, empowered the governor in council to set up a system of permits or licences for the export of munitions or food or raw materials; to provide publicity for exports or imports of munitions; to register persons engaged in manufacturing or exporting munitions, and to prohibit the exportation of munitions or war materials. Under this authorization a system of permits was subsequently set up to regulate the export of arms and munitions, the definition of which was based substantially on the recommendation of a League of Nations committee.
No exports of munitions to any country can be made without a permit, and statistics of such exports are made public by the enforcing agency, the Department of National Revenue, every month. The licence system, it will be noted, applies to arms and munitions only. Further, the discretionary power given the government to prohibit exports, has, as I have already indicated, been applied
to exports of munitions in the case of Spain. The prohibition in this case does not apply to raw materials or any other class of goods- solely to arms and munitions as defined. The power thus given has not been applied by Canada, or any other country, as regards either munitions or any other materials, in the case of the Sino-Japanese conflict.
The Foreign Enlistment Act of last session, which took the place of an old act of the parliament of the United Kingdom extending to Canada, made it unlawful for a Canadian national to enlist anywhere for service against a friendly state, or for any person within Canada to induce any other person to enlist. This act contains many collateral provisions and empowers the governor in council to provide for its application to a civil war, and to facilitate these purposes by passport control.
An organized campaign for recruiting Canadians and foreigners living in Canada was under way, and a substantial number of persons had left Canada and proceeded to Spain. Since August no passports for Spain have been issued to Canadian nationals, though a small number of Canadians and of foreigners have made their way to that country by indirect routes.
I now come to a consideration of the shipment of munitions. First, as to Canadian exports. Arms and munitions are not made in Canada in any appreciable degree, and our export trade in this field is still more negligible. So far as exports to Japan are concerned, I am informed that the only shipment has been a single plane ordered before the war; to China, a few planes ordered since the war.
It is, however, the trade in raw materials and particularly in non-ferrous metals, against which complaint is mainly directed. Our exports of lead, zinc, aluminum and nickel to Japan are substantial, and take a leading place in the list of our exports to that country. They have increased since the war broke out, though in some cases they are again declining. The exchange restrictions introduced by the Japanese government before the war, in the endeavour to conserve its declining gold supply, have given that government a power of discrimination, and altered the proportions of the commodities imported into Japan. To China, our exports of these commodities are much smaller. It has been contended in some quarters that Canada's supplies and Canada's supplies alone are vital to the continuance of Japan's war effort, and that it is our duty as it is within our power, to take action to end this effort.
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Let us first get the facts in perspective. Our total exports to Japan have increased rapidly, but they are still far below the total of 1929. The recent increase in that trade is part of the general improvement in exports as a result of the industrial revival of recent years. Our exports to all countries are much nearer the high water mark than our exports to Japan:
1929	
1932	
1935	
1937	
Canadian exports to J apan $37,504,692 11,995,887 14,915,577 25,851,829
Canadian exports to all countries $1,182,412,313 493,808,841 729,293,800 1,110,192,151
In our exports, as in our production, and in fact in the revival of prosperity and stability in Canada, minerals have come to hold a relatively greater place in recent years as the result of new discoveries mainly in the pre-Cambrian shield. We are now among the world's important producers and exporters of gold, silver, platinum, copper, lead and zinc, as we long were of nickel. In many cases, as is generally known, these are joint products, lead or copper or zinc being found in the same veins with silver or gold, and recovered in the same operations.
So far as our exports of lead, zinc, aluminum, copper and nickel are concerned, there is nothing special in our shipments to Japan. Of nickel in the last two years we exported ninety-eight millions in all, of which only five millions were to Japan; of aluminum twenty-five millions, of which five million were to Japan; of lead, twenty-one millions, of which seven were to Japan; zinc, twenty-two, of which two were to Japan; of copper, over ninety-one millions, of which less than one million was to Japan. Incidentally, over 75 per cent of all these exports went to the British empire and the United States, (less than 10 per cent to Japan, Italy, and Germany, and the balance to other foreign countries). It is true we are the largest exporters of nickel to Japan as to most other countries, and important suppliers of aluminum and zinc. But it also is true that of iron and steel and scrap, and of copper, we supply only an insignificant fraction. (One single country's exports of iron and steel and scrap alone are three times in value our total exports of all goods whatever to Japan). It is also true that of the oil, coal, cotton and rubber which are equally necessary for mechanical operations, whether in war or in peace, we supply nothing whatever, nor of the wool necessary to clothe the armies in the field.
Some misconception exists regarding certain figures given out at Brussels by the Chinese delegation to the conference, showing the

percentage of certain materials-oil, coal, cotton, rubber, wool, iron, aluminum, antimony, manganese, tungsten, chrome, copper, zinc, tin, etc., exported in 1936 to Japan, with the object of showing that an embargo on exports would be effective if imposed by all parts of the British commonwealth, the. United States, France, Holland and a few other countries. Canada was said to have supplied 71.7 per cent of Japan's imports of aluminum, 97 per cent of the copper and 34.5 per cent of the zinc. It may be pointed out first that the figures referred to 1936, a period of peace; that only three items were listed affecting Canada, and that as regards copper, the statistics were highly erroneous, the percentage from Canada being one-half of one per cent instead of 97 per cent. These misconceptions formed the basis of much of the demand for a Canadian embargo on raw materials.
Having noted the facts in some perspective, the implications that are drawn may next be considered. In the first place, it is erroneous to assume that metals such as lead, zinc and nickel are used only for armament purposes; quite the contrary is the case; the vast bulk of these three metals is used for industrial purposes, though it is of course true that when a country is at war, the industrial uses will be rationed and restricted. In any case, an embargo would be economically futile. It must be evident to anyone familiar with foreign trade that no system of administrative control which we could devise in peace time could hope to prevent Canadian nickel, lead, zinc, copper, aluminum, scrap-iron, and the rest, sold to purchasers in third countries, from reaching Japan. Once these commodities leave Canadian territory and enter into the commerce of another country, this parliament has not and cannot have any further control over them.
It is equally evident that, except in the case of nickel, of which Canada produces about 90 per cent of the world's annual production, this country has no monopoly, nor even an approach to a monopoly of production. There are, with respect to all these commodities, including nickel, other producing countries, alternative sources of supply, to which Japan, or any nation desiring to place an order, could easily turn. In addition to other sources of production, there are-and this aspect of the question is frequently overlooked-enormous stocks of all these metals readily available, stocks far more than sufficient to fill any possible Japanese demand. It is clear, therefore, that an embargo on the export to Japan of nickel, lead, copper, zinc, aluminum, and other commodities neces-

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sary to the production of war supplies, on Canada's part alone, would not achieve the ends proposed.
As to concerted action for that purpose, there is no present prospect of such a policy being adopted. No proposal for an embargo either on munitions or on war materials was made either by the league assembly or by the Brussels conference. No country has placed an embargo on shipments to Japan or to China. In the circumstances it would appear there is nothing in Canada's position which would make isolated action on our part either necessary or effective. It has been stated that. New Zealand has placed an embargo on exports to Japan. This is not correct. Last year a New Zealand labour union refused to load scrap-iron on a vessel sailing to Japan. The New Zealand government induced the union to abandon this action. Later, the government prohibited the export of scrap-iron to any country. No embargo has been imposed on the export of wool or any other commodity to any country.
I have spoken of the conflict in the orient and of the civil war in Spain. But Spain is not the only troubled area in Europe. There are few countries on the continent that are not undergoing a social and political revolution. In some, the revolutionary forces of the left or of the right have already attained power more autocratic than the regimes they have displaced; in others, the struggle still continues; and even in those countries that still seek progress by ordered freedom, the repercussions of the upheavals elsewhere spread fear and confusion. No country, however distant and however preoccupied by its own problems, can be unconcerned with the revival of violence, intolerance and disregard of the rights of weaker states. To countries in the whirlpool or on its verge the situation is particularly disturbing and of overwhelming import. It is not surprising that in democracies such as Britain and France the imminence of these threats to national and social and individual security, and the close association and sympathy of groups in each country with one or other of the forces and theories warring in central and eastern Europe, have led to a wide and violent conflict of opinion as to the policy that should 'be adopted to meet these new conditions. There are many shades and variations of opinion, but two main tendencies have developed.
In the opinion of one group, Armageddon has already come, the forces of light and darkness are irrevocably swinging into battle line for the final test of destiny. Europe and liberty, it is contended, can be saved only if the democracies firmly and unitedly call a 51952-202
halt here and now. The other widespread attitude is to recognize the situation as dangerous, but to insist that the policy of dividing Europe or the world into two antagonistic camps, organizing a holy alliance against fascism, would be still more dangerous, and is neither possible nor necessary. There is no warrant, it is urged, for fighting a preventive war or for seeking to form a hard and fast alliance against the authoritarian states. If such an alliance could be formed, it would only drive the fascist countries into firmer alliance and put any possibility of peaceful settlement out of the question. The wiser policy, it is urged, is to try to bring all Europe back to sanity, to emphasize and strengthen the points of agreement, not of difference, to seek to adjust each specific difficulty in turn. In what I have just been saying I am not stating my own views, I am stating the views which I believe are contending against each other in Europe to-day.
I am sure that every government in Great Britain since the war, and certainly not least the present government, has striven for peace. Differences of opinion may exist as to the wisdom of the policies adopted toward that end at different times. Governments may have failed to appreciate the strength and trend of changing forces, but taken broadly they have shown a realism and a patience that few if any other countries can equal.
I do not consider we are called upon to pass judgment or to take sides in United Kingdom discussions. Inevitably the rise of such contentious issues, such party cleavages, lead to efforts to secure or to claim the support of Canada or Australia or South Africa or New Zealand for one or other view. Statements appear in the British press that the dominions demand this or that, that Australia supports the government or that New Zealand supports the opposition view. So far as the Canadian government is concerned, it does not consider that it is in the interest either of Canada or of the commonwealth to tender advice as to what policy the United Kingdom should adopt week by week, or become involved in British political disputes. We have expressed no opinion on that policy, and no one in London is authorized or warranted in interpreting us as doing so.
Incidentally, may I say that the time has come to cease speaking of "the dominions" as if they were some peculiar half-fledged type of community, and all alike in their interests and views. Such a usage leads to confusion at best, and to alibis and misrepresentation at worst. South Africa is South Africa, New Zealand is New Zealand, Australia is Australia and Can-

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ada is Canada, and it will help to good understanding if that elementary fact is borne in mind.
We have made clear our own policy as regards the league. We have indicated our own attitude toward the frequent demands that we should thrust ourselves into the European picture, take sides in the struggle of ideologies, make commitments in advance. We have equally made it clear that we are opposed to making in advance proclamations of neutrality or abstention that would be used to encourage aggressive designs. We shall try to maintain old ties and old friendships and at the same time be ready to enter into friendly relations with every country that will reciprocate. We shall try to keep in mind the difficulties and dangers that other countries are facing, but we shall not assume that it is our duty or within our power to work out their problems for them, to make over their social structure or their political ideas or their racial attitudes. In seeking within our own country, which constitutes half a continent, to build up a genuine democracy, to promote sound social relationships, to develop a tolerance and readiness to work together in achieving unity and furthering and maintaining the ties with the other members of the commonwealth, and the most friendly relations with our immediate neighbour and with all other countries, we shall be doing the task that lies to our hands, our Canadian task.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Mr. Speaker, I do not
propose to make any extended remarks. The party with which I am associated meets in convention at a not distant day, and will doubtless make a declaration regarding the foreign policy of this country. The views I express to-day are my own personal views and not necessarily the views of my party. I think every hon. member will understand quite clearly why I should make that statement.
I have listened, as every member of the house has, with very great interest to the observations of the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King). With respect to much of what he has said I think there can be no possible differences of opinion, but there are some matters about which our views are widely divergent.
In the first place, I wholly agree that it is not probable that this country, of its own motion and in the exercise of a choice, will be compelled to go to war. I cannot conceive it likely that the Dominion of Canada would find it necessary to resort to arms with respect to any matter that might arise in
fMr. Mackenzie King.]
the conduct of its affairs. But I am not ignorant of the teachings of history', and it well might be that by reason of Canada's trading and other relations with the nations of the world a situation would be created which would make the alternatives a resort to arms or the loss of prestige by the commonwealth of nations.
Yesterday I saw an issue of the New York Times, I think of Saturday' or Sunday'. On one of its pages devoted to foreign affairs was a map of the world. Radiating from Washington there were straight lines to all the centres in which the United States was vitally concerned and interested, and there was not one of them upon the north American continent-not one. There is one in South America. And there was concern in Mexico if you regard it as part of the north American continent; their interests were with China, Japan, Spain and elsewhere-in countries, ten I think in all. And not one of those points in which the United States was vitally' interested at the moment was, with the exception of Mexico, on this continent.
How did that condition arise? It arose because of conflicts of interest, because of the activities of citizens of the United States in trading and commerce, because of matters of nationality, the position of her people, in some cases missionaries-all these problems had arisen by reason of the United States being a world power and carrying on its operations in every part of the globe.
Now it well might be that the Dominion of Canada, with its business transactions extending to every part of the globe, if we carry out the idea that is suggested not only, I think, in the speech to which we have listened but by many members of this house, as to our complete isolation, our complete independence, might find that the situation which has developed in the United States has its counterpart in this country. To my mind there is no gainsaying that fact. Upon that first point to which I direct the attention of this house, I have no hesitation in saying that very many people in this country have forgotten that it is because we are part of the British Empire that we have attained the position we enjoy to-day in doing business abroad. Let there be no misunderstanding about that. Why is it that when questions arise affecting the position of our citizens, questions in connection with trade, commerce and nationality, the power which protects is not that of Canada? A frank recognition of that fact, sir, is essential to any understanding, in my private opinion, of the foreign policy of Canada,-the fact, whether we accept it

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or not, that to-day we are the trading nation we are and enjoy the privileges and advantages we enjoy because we are part of the British Empire. If any gentleman questions that statement, I invite him to study the historic position of this country. I will not traverse it myself to-day, but I invite him to consider it carefully, and as he does so I am sure he will be satisfied that our position today as individuals as well as that of our country is attributable to the fact that we occupy a place amongst the commonwealth of nations that is known as the British Empire.
But I accept and always have accepted as a foundation point of my conception of national policy that it would be an extraordinary situation which would drive this country into the position of having to resort to arms. That is the direct side of our foreign policy. The Prime Minister referred to the implications of certain activities of ours; and there is clearly an implication there. It was contended in this house by an hon. member, and it is frequently stated outside,-indeed the Prime Minister this afternoon directed attention to the fact-that the likelihood of our being engaged in war arises from our peculiar relationship to other parts of the world. He dealt with that from two angles: first, our position with respect to the League of Nations; second, our position with respect to the British Empire.
I have said, Mr. Speaker, in this house on more than one occasion that in my judgment there would have been no League of Nations had it been thought by those who were responsible for its creation that the United States of America would not become a continuing member of it. I have grave doubts whether the United Kingdom or many parts of the commonwealth of nations would have become signatories to the covenant had they not believed that the great republic to the south was to become one of the dominant figures in the league. When the president of the United States executed the covenant, when he succeeded in inducing other nations to agree to its being made a part of the treaty of peace, they had the clearest view that it would be accepted and adopted by the country which he represented. It was not accepted, and from that refusal consequences have flowed that are of the gravest moment to the world. To-day I do not personally regard it as of tremendous importance, because the League of Nations has fallen to pieces. The withdrawal of Germany and of Japan, and I think one might say the virtual withdrawal of Italy, means 51952-202i
that the League of Nations has ceased to function for the purposes for which it was created. Therefore, our obligations to the League of Nations have become much less than they were when in the full flood of public opinion it was launched upon the world as the organization that would cure many of the evils from which we suffered.
Its history has been very interesting. I am still an incorrigible optimist with respect to some of its operations. I believe that consultation, discussion between the representatives of the nations of the world, and cooperation of a limited character have achieved very beneficial results. That these results can no longer be very important follows, I think, as a necessary corollary from the fact that the United States is not a member of the league, and that other great powers have withdrawn from it. It is very difficult to think that our relationship to the League of Nations could indirectly impose upon us military operations. But, sir, I must deal very briefly with one point raised by the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) and that is with respect to sanctions. For it is a matter about which so much has been written and said that it might appear that I was endeavouring to escape making any observation about it at all if I did not refer to it.
Everyone knows that a statute without sanctions is valueless. I can remember reading a great address by Edward Blake dealing with the question of the value of sanctions with respect to legislation. What good is it to place upon the statute books a number of prohibitions unless you also provide that a breach of them shall involve penalties and punishment? "Thou shalt not" was thundered from Sinai, and has found a place in our statute books; but unless there is some punishment following a breach of any prohibition, whatever it may be, then the prohibition becomes of little value.
A sanction determines largely the value of a statute. If you read the criminal code you will have a clearer appreciation of what I mean. For the breaches of statutes we provide adequate penalties. The sanction for ncn-performance of an obligation in our criminal law is well understood, and a sanction sounding in damages in civil matters is not unknown to most of us. But I will agree with every member of this house that sanctions no longer became a reality with respect to the covenant of the League of Nations when the United States withdrew, when Germany withdrew, when Japan withdrew.
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What was the whole theory of sanctions? The whole theory of sanctions as expressed in the covenant of the League of Nations was that an offender should have the world massed against him. And he could not withstand it; certainly he could not withstand it. With all the might and power of Great Britain, the United States. France and Italy- Germany was not then in, but came in later- with all the power of these nations massed against the wrong-doer, who could stand against it? It was an application of something that is the basis of all our law. We talk about our liberties. They are grounded, our freedom is grounded, in respect for law and order and the orderly administration of the law of the country; and the law of the country depends upon an enlightened public opinion providing sanctions for violation of provisions made by the people themselves. Whether they make them in parliament or whether they are the growth of common law matters not. There you have on the one hand the great body of common law, which includes part of the criminal law of England, and on the other hand you have statute law as embodied in criminal codes; and behind it we have an enlightened and powerful public opinion. That public opinion provides the sanction that enforces the penalties for breaches of the law.
When this covenant of the League of Nations was prepared, when the nations of the world met together and agreed unanimously what action should be taken against nations who violated the provisions, then the sanctions provided by the covenant of the league were all-powerful-the massed power of the world, the massed public opinion of the world. The power of a world demanding peace, a world weary of war, shocked beyond expression at the results of war, the destruction of millions of men and of billions of treasure-all this found expression in that enlightened and ennobled public opinion that was embodied in the covenant of the League of Nations. I think therefore, without going into the matter in detail, that one might say that the likelihood of Canada being involved in warlike activities by reason of our relationship with the League of Nations is very remote. In fact, it is so remote as to be almost improbable. But we come to what is after all the vital point in the foreign policy of this country. We are part of the British Empire, and that relationship involves responsibilities. I wonder whether we have clearly appreciated what the responsibilities are that we have accepted. They were not imposed upon us. They were of our own seeking. We settled them in 1926. The long fMr. Bennett.]
process of evolution, the long years of effort, the resentment against what we regarded as subordination, the desire for equality of status, the desire for self-expression; all these, coupled with our magnificent achievements during the great war-the achievements not of Canadians alone but also of the thousands of Australians who crossed leagues of sea; of the New Zealanders; of the great Botha and Smuts, in crushing not only a rebellion at home but the German power in southwest Africa, the first victorious campaign of all the war-all these united to induce the representatives of the dominions in conference to suggest that the time had come when we should endeavour by some form of words to define our relations one to another. You will recall, sir, it was suggested that after the war there should be a great empire constitutional conference. But conditions in South Africa hastened the search for a solution. I have no doubt that the Prime Minister has been told by General Hertzog, as I have, that but for the settlement of 1926 he believed that civil war would have been inevitable in South Africa. I think that view was also held by General Smuts.
When the imperial conference was held in 1926, attended on behalf of this dominion by the right hon. the present Prime Minister and others, an effort was made to formulate an expression of the position and mutual relations of the various parts of the British Empire. If, sir, you ask me what the foreign policy of this country is, I say that is found in the declaration of 1926. I listened this afternoon to the Prime Minister reading a portion-and a portion only -of that declaration. I now propose to read it in its entirety. In the report which was made by the committee presided over by the late Earl of Balfour, the second section deals with the status of Great Britain and the dominions. It proceeds:
The committee are of opinion that nothing would be gained by attempting to lay down a constitution for the British empire. Its widely scattered parts have very different characteristics, very different histories, and are at very different stages of evolution; while, considered as a whole, it defies classification and bears no real resemblance to any other political organization which now exists or has ever yet been tried.
There is, however, one most important element in it which, from a strictly constitutional point of view, has now, as regards all vital matters, reached its full development-we refer to the group of self-governing communities composed of Great Britain and the dominions.
I interpose there to point out that the words are "composed of Great Britain and the dominions," placing Great Britain and the dominions upon a parity.

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Their position and mutual relations may be readily defined. They are autonomous communities within the British empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs. . . .
It is not sufficient to stop there. That ended the declaration of position. There follows a statement of responsibility:
. . . though united by a common allegiance to the crown, and freely associated as members of the British commonwealth of nations.
What are the governing words of that section? "Freely associated"-not by force, not by coercion, but freely associated together. And free association means that in every action that is taken there is at least an understanding with the persons with whom you are associated.
Let us proceed a step further. It continues :
A foreigner endeavouring to understand the true character of the British Empire by the aid of this formula alone would be tempted to think that it was devised rather to make mutual interference impossible than to make mutual cooperation easy.
Such a criticism, however, completely ignores the historic situation. The rapid evolution of the oversea dominions during the last fifty years has involved many complicated adjustments of old political machinery to changing conditions. The tendency towards equality of status was both right and inevitable. Geographical and other conditions made this impossible of attainment by the way of federation. The only alternative was by the way of autonomy; and along this road it has been steadily sought. Every self-governing member of the empire is now the master of its destiny. In fact, if not always in form, it is subject to no compulsion whatever.
But no account, however accurate, of the negative relations in which Great Britain and the dominions stand to each other can do more than express a portion of the truth. The British Empire is not founded upon negations. It depends essentially, if not formally, on positive ideals. Free institutions are its life-blood. Free cooperation is its instrument. Peace, security, and progress are among its objects. Aspects of all these great themes have been discussed at the present conference; excellent results have been thereby obtained.
And mark these words:
And though every dominion is now, and must always remain, the sole judge of the nature and extent of its cooperation, no common cause will, in our opinion, be thereby imperilled.
Equality of status, so far as Britain and the dominions are concerned, is thus the root principle governing our inter-imperial relations. But the principles of equality and similarity, appropriate to status, do not universally extend to function. Here we require something more than immutable dogmas. For example, to deal with questions of diplomacy and questions of defence, we require also flexible machinery- machinery which can, from time to time, be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world. This subject also has occupied our attention. The rest of this report will show
how we have endeavoured not only to state political theory, but to apply it to our common needs.
That declaration of 1926 was a declaration in which the present Prime Minister took his part. The right hon. Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) took his part in formulating it. In its ultimate expression and form it contemplates complete autonomy and freedom of action on the part of the dominions, subject to limitations, each of which is expressed so clearly that he who runs may read-"though united by a common allegiance to the crown," and "freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations"; (1) a common allegiance; (2) a free association. Association does not mean separation. It means unity of action and of purpose.
I recall the language used by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Mackenzie) in making his statement to this house on March 24 last. What did he declare to be the security for Canadians on the high sea? He reviewed our foreign trade and referred to our position as an exporting country.. Then he used these very impressive words, at page 1650:
In regard to the exact position of Canada it is only fair to say that to-day the main deten-ent against a major attack upon this country by a European power is the existence of the British fleet in north Atlantic waters.
He referred to that fleet again in these words:
Just as the British navy on the Atlantic is our greatest security in that quarter-
Then he went on to say that we might have some hope that our neighbouring friends would not desert us in time of peril. The British fleet! Who maintains it? Who is being taxed to death that it may live? From what quarter is it maintained? Yet, speaking for the government of this country in a moment of great peril and crisis, we are told that the British fleet is to protect us on the Atlantic. Sir, there you have the application of the declaration of 1926, "free association." Just as the minister pointed out that we would freely associate with others in maintaining our position, so he relies as of right, because of free association, upon the British fleet to protect our great trade and commerce to which he referred as being largely an export business sent from these shores. Have we not there, Mr. Speaker, the foreign policy, the external policy of Canada?
Then the Prime Minister put to this house live propositions, at least one of which I think must have been the creation of his own mind; for I have not heard anyone in this
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house suggest that we should supinely follow the policy of the United Kingdom in any matters of foreign concern. In fact the whole conference of 1926 was the negation of that. The Prime Minister said there was a certain class who accepted any policy of Great Britain, regardless of what it might be, and followed it blindly. Well, I have not seen any people of that sort in this country. In that regard I recall a communication sent to me by the late Sir Robert Borden containing a letter which he had received from the late Sir Austen Chamberlain. It was a very simple statement, but it embodies the very view that I have expressed so poorly. These were the words, and they were written in February, 1931:
If I allowed myself a further observation, it would be this. As regards the liberties and status of the Dominion of Canada you have achieved all that you set out to secure. But your policy had two sides-while insisting on the one side on the rights of Canada, you consistently coupled them with the duties and responsibilities which were inseparable from the exercise of those rights.
That again is but an expression on the part of a foreign secretary, to one who had been prime minister of this country, of the thought contained in those words "freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations."
I proceed a step further. That first class of persons to which reference has been made, who in peace or war would blindly follow any policy initiated by the United Kingdom, in my judgment are not to be found in this country; at* least if they are, I have not come across them. Then there was the second class of persons to whom the Prime Minister referred, who accepted Great Britain's policy when it was within the principles of the League of Nations. I agree with what has been said in that regard by the Prime Minister, and I need not do more than say that when it was suggested that because all the dominions of the British Empire and India were, with Great Britain, members of the League of Nations, any action that might be taken looking toward conflict- was action that could be taken only with the approval of the league, and therefore there was no further necessity for our giving great concern to our inter-imperial relations, since they were covered and governed by the provisions of the covenant of the league.
The third class referred to was the class that would consult and advise with Great Britain through the governments of the dominions and thus hope to be able to arrive at a common policy. Well, I think that is not an unsound view to take. I cannot but think that in view of what we said in 1926

it would be the essence of sound common sense that we, by kindly suggestion and by discussion antecedent to events, should arrive at a common policy with respect to matters touching the life itself of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I think most people believe that possible and desirable.
Then as the fourth class the Prime Minister suggested those who believe in the complete neutrality of this country. That raises an issue at once, sir, of tremendous import. The late Sir Wilfrid Laurier regarded that as hardly worth even discussing; for he held the view that when any part of the British Commonwealth of Nations was at war Canada also was at war. He expressed that view in this house in terms so clear as to admit of no possible doubt. How could this country be neutral and remain in free association with the other members of the commonwealth of nations? Yet it is to this free association that the Prime Minister very properly committed this country in 1926. It is to this that the house gave approval. It is this that parliament has accepted. How, sir, eordd you have anything such as the neutrality of Canada and a free association with the other members of the commonwealth, which includes the United Kingdom?
Then there was the fifth class of citizen to which reference was made, and that reference was summed up by the statement of the Prime Minister that parliament would govern. He said that we would keep in touch with the other dominions, but that parliament must determine these issues. If the view taken by Sir Wilfrid Laurier was a sound one-and it was a view which was accepted by constitutionalists in every part of the world -then, sir, this parliament would in such event be dealing with a reality, not a theory. For if war were to result by reason of difficulties between any of the other self-governing dominions or Great Britain and any other part of the world, then, as Sir Wilfrid pointed out, we also would be at war, and parliament would be dealing with an actuality, not a theory.


Ernest Lapointe: But he said more than that.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Yes, much more than
that; but I am talking about what he said in this connection.


Ernest Lapointe: But that was not the whole sentence of Sir Wilfrid Laurier. He said, "but it does not follow that Canada will participate in any war."


Richard Bedford Bennett: I was just coming to
that point, and I thank my right hon. friend

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for bringing it to the attention of the house. He made a declaration, one which I say is accepted by constitutionalists as sound, that if any part of the British Empire were at war-and within that expression, we of course are included, as is the United Kingdom- then also Canada is at war. But whether or not Canada should participate in that war is a matter to be determined by the Canadian people and the Canadian parliament.


Ernest Lapointe: That is right.


Richard Bedford Bennett: : There never has been a doubt about that.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That was my fifth point.


Richard Bedford Bennett: I am sorry it was not put quite in that way.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That was the intention of it.


Richard Bedford Bennett: I think what my right hon. friend said was hardly consistent with just that view, but I will accept at once his statement that that was what he intended to say.
Now, sir, there are some lessons we might learn from the last war. How many members realize that mines were laid by the Germans within a few miles of the coast of Nova Scotia? How many realize that some of our ships were destroyed by mines laid by the Germans off the coast of Nova Scotia? The Minister of National Defence will know it because of his access to his archives. But I suggest there are very few hon. members in the house who realize that off the coast of Nova Scotia the Germans were able to sow mines, after crossing the Atlantic ocean. I wonder how many realize that batteries planted, for instance, on Anticosti Island would completely command the St. Lawrence river? I wonder how many have realized that a dozen shells fired from ten miles at sea would make the habitation of great cities impossible, through the destruction of sanitary amenities? I wonder if it is realized that, in the language of the late Lord Asquith just before he died, science has been but lisping the alphabet of destruction?
To-day we know about the great progress that has been made in instruments of destruction. We know the effectiveness of bombs. The other day a high military officer said that the effects of one bomb would be felt for a distance of fifteen miles or more. When I read that statement I regarded it as almost incredible; I think yet there must be some error in connection with it. But, be that as it may, we know from the Ethiopian campaign
the power of gas. We know for instance what bombs may do, from the recent campaigns in China and Spain. We know what submarines almost did to Great Britain. All you have to do is to read the life of Jellicoe and you will learn how nearly-how very nearly-that submarine campaign succeeded.
All these are matters we must think about very carefully. For while we may not participate in a war, let it always be remembered that the nation or nations opposed will participate against us. It is their participation I am concerned about. This parliament is not going to be able to prevent an enemy from throwing shot and shell, bombs and gas, if that enemy is at war with the British Empire. It was that point which the hon. member for Grey-Bruce (Miss Macphail) brought out the other day in this chamber in the clearest fashion I have ever heard it put. It was, sir, in essence, that because we are part of the British Empire we are subject to that risk and danger, and it is a question of balance. We must not delude ourselves. Beautiful phrases and platitudes will not save us. I wonder if anyone has forgotten the language of Chatham? No, that will not save us. We are confronted with a possibility as real as any possibility can be, and it is this, that if any part of the British empire is engaged in war, we are subject to the operations of the modern scientific devices and the forms man has created for destruction through harnessing those great inventions of the human mind for destructive purposes.
I am not thinking about our participation; that is for parliament to decide. But what I am thinking about is the participation of our enemy, and that is what we should be thinking about. Who planted the mines off the coast of Nova Scotia? Was it the parliament of Canada? Did the parliament of Canada have anything to say about it? Did the parliament of Canada raise its voice and say, "You cannot put your mines here?" No; the German high command placed their mines off the coast of Nova Scotia, and our shipping was destroyed. True, only a small quantity was destroyed, but the fact remains that the mines did have their effect. There is the record. Therefore I say when we speak of participation we can only ask ourselves this question:	What shall we do in
self-defence ?
That is all it is, stripped of everything. It is not for this parliament to say whether or not we shall permit our shores to be invaded, our commerce to be destroyed, our ships to be blown to pieces, our population to be gassed or bombed. That is for the enemy.
Foreign Policy

But it is for us to say:	Shall we defend ourselves? That is what we have to say,-and how shall we do it?
I wonder if my fellow members from Quebec realize how great an achievement was that of Sir George Etienne Cartier in the framing of the Militia Act? It is true he was defeated; but he left behind him a Militia Act which is practically the act of today. What does it provide? It does not provide for a foreign policy being made by parliament, for parliament never makes a foreign policy. His majesty's advisers make the foreign policy of the country and parliament approves or disapproves. Parliament says yea or nay. That is the old constitutional practice, a practice as old as the hills themselves. Ever since our institutions have developed to what they now are we have provided that his majesty's government, always with a majority in the commons, shall initiate and formulate policies-foreign policies. It is not given to me nor to any private member of this house to indicate the foreign policy of Canada. You can express your views, as I am expressing mine; you can offer your criticisms, as I am, but the declaration of external policy in this country must come from his majesty's advisers, the government, the crown in reality. You will find the matter much discussed in the speeches that took place in the time of Palmerston. It is the crown's policy. The crown no longer speaks as the sovereign; the crown speaks on the advice of the ministers of the crown, and the policy is the policy of the government of the day.
Let us see how that was exemplified in the Militia Act of long ago. Let us see how it still finds its place in the statutes of our country. The Militia Act is chapter 132 of the revised statutes of Canada, of which section 63 reads:
The militia or any part thereof, or any officer or man thereof, may be called out for any military purpose other than drill or training, at such times and in such manner as is prescribed.
Then follow the sections which recognize that the foreign policy of the country is the policy of the crown as advised by the government of the day. Section 64 reads:
The governor in council may place the militia, or any part thereof, on active service anywhere in Canada, and also beyond Canada, for the defence thereof, at any time when it appears advisable so to do by reason of emergency.
The true significance of this section is to be found in the words, "and also beyond Canada, for the defence thereof." I have endeavoured to make clear the point that participation in war was determined by our enemy and not by our

parliament, and that the question to be considered was the question of the defence of our country. The government of the day is clothed with authority to defend this country. It may be that defence will be made, as it was, in the fields of France, or Flanders; it may be on the high seas; it may be somewhere in Africa; it matters not where it may be as long as the government of the day risks its life and stakes its fortune upon the policy of defence of Canada beyond her shores.
But it is not left to chance that parliament shall control. I accept the statement of the Prime Minister, although I do not think he made it quite clear, that at all times since the passing of the Militia Act this parliament has been in control. Section 66 of the Militia Act reads:
Whenever the governor in council places the militia, or any part thereof, on active service, if parliament is then separated by such adjournment or prorogation as will not expire within ten days, a proclamation shall be issued for the meeting of parliament within fifteen days, and parliament shall accordingly meet and sit upon the day appointed by such proclamation, and shall continue to sit and act in like manner as if it had stood adjourned or prorogued to the same day.
It must be within the memory, Mr. Speaker, of some hon. gentlemen present this afternoon that that is just what took place in 1914. There is a provision in the Militia Act for a levee en masse, for the calling up of every ablebodied man under the age of forty-five years and over the age of eighteen, I think, for the defence of the country.


Mr. MACKENZIE (Vancouver):: Eighteen years and upward, and under sixty years.


Richard Bedford Bennett: I thought it was under forty-five years?


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: Sixty
years.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Thank you. That being so, let us recall what happened in 1914. At that time the government of the day took appropriate steps to offer to defend this country abroad and to raise a contingent for that purpose. Parliament had not assembled when Sir Robert Borden sent that cable. He . thereupon called parliament to meet at once. Notwithstanding the fact that parliament may formally stand adjourned to a day far beyond the fifteen days, this section provides that it shall be called together within fifteen days. So parliament met and many of those who were present will never forget the unanimity with 'which parliament approved of the action taken iby the government. For my own part

Foreign Policy
I can recall, as can many of the hon. members whom I see about me, Sir Wilfrid Laurier standing in his place and making his declaration of support of the action of the government of that time.
When you leave the field of military endeavour and go to that of naval operations you find the same provision. As I have endeavoured to explain, that statute was not the outcome of bitter partisanship, it was a real effort to provide that we should arrive at a common understanding, supported by all the peoples of the country. Of course, there is one step further. You get back to the root principle that you cannot escape the responsibilities of government whether you would or not. For the crown must take the action and the crown is advised by the government. The government places its life at stake in the House of Commons of the day. Just as on that occasion Sir Wilfrid Laurier supported the government, I doubt not that if the time should ever come again when it should be thought essential to take steps for the defence of Canada abroad, there would be such unanimity of opinion as to make it quite apparent that we had a common purpose and a common need to serve, namely, the maintenance of the integrity of our people and our country.
If I have been correct in what I have said, and I have endeavoured to put it as fairly as possible, it will be necessary to depart from the general plan followed by the Prime Minister and refer briefly to the present situation. It must be known to all that it was five years after the armistice was signed before the last treaty of peace was signed with an enemy. The treaty of peace with Turkey was signed in 1923, after five long years of uncertainty, unrest, discussion and negotiation. Then followed, during the twenties, what the Prime Minister has designated properly as an era of peace-loving activities on the part of the peoples of the world. Peace, peace-public opinion wanted peace. With peace you had the demand for disarmament, and the action taken by the League of Nations looking to that end. The covenant of the league provided for disarmament. I have always thought, and I still think, that a great mistake was made in not making it perfectly clear that while we were going to disarm Germany, we would also undertake to disarm ourselves. When I say "ourselves," I do not mean the British Empire; I mean ourselves, the rest of the world, the world in arms. It did not happen. And there gradually grew up, instead of that demand for peace, a sense on the part of
Germany's sixty million people that they had not been fairly treated, until in the end Germany began to rearm.
Then Great Britain-let us not limit it to Great Britain-the British Empire, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, South Africa, each of which was thinking not of arms or armaments, but of the creation of a public opinion, for peace, good will cooperation, expansion of trade and business, of the time when the war drums would throb no longer and the battle-flags would be furled, was confronted with this new condition. We saw gradually growing up in Germany and other countries that sense of injustice whose final outcome we see to-day. This great commonwealth of nations found itself unarmed and unprepared. It had kept its word, and it had created a public opinion such as the world had never seen before. I wonder if it is generally realized what was meant by that great ballot which took place in England, a year and a half or more ago, when public opinion demonstrated its desire for peace, a desire shared by all the countries of the commonwealth.
But to-day, sir, I say deliberately that the German will or mind is the will for war, not the will for peace. My observation as well as my reading lead me to that conclusion. Instead of the old theory that prosperity and peace go hand in hand, we see feverish activity in arsenal and factory, the creation of artillery and bombs and aircraft for the purposes of destruction, and appeals to that sentiment which since the dawn of history has been one of the most powerful to which an appeal can be made, the appeal of patriotism; of achievement by force of arms; the broadening of acres; the extension of the national territory. So to-day we find a situation which I shall not discuss, any more than to say that I entirely agree with the statement concerning it which has been made by the Prime Minister.
In this very country to-day there are emissaries of Germany-I say that on my responsibility as a member, of this house- talking to minorities about their rights. A friend of mine in the legal profession was consulted on this matter by an old German; it is the younger ones, not the older men who are swaj'ed and moved by such appeals. Look at what has developed in Czechoslovakia. A minority is demanding-what? Action on the part of its national homeland, military action if necessary, for the purpose of giving that minority wrhat it desires. No language that can be used in this house would be too strong a statement of the difficulties of the situation in Europe.
Foreign Policy

I shall not deal with conditions in Spain. I have always looked upon the Spanish trouble as a civil war in which, unfortunately other nations have supported the warring factions. The committee of non-intervention have had indifferent success in their desperate efforts to achieve a certain measure of restriction of the warring operations. Ships have been sunk in the Mediterranean. Nationals of other nations have been killed. The situation has developed in such a fashion that some untoward or unseen act might be a spark which would cause an international explosion. I do not desire to say anything which might add to that difficulty.
I hold strong views, Mr. Speaker, personally, with respect to the Sino-Japanese situation. I listened with great attention to the language of the Prime Minister. I must say that I found it a little difficult to agree with him. Having read the letter written, when he was Secretary of State, by Mr. Stimson, after listening to his discussion of the nine-power agreement, remembering speeches made in this chamber expressing sincere belief in the Kellogg-Briand pact, the pact of Paris, with respect to resort to war as an instrument of national policy, and remembering that a Canadian sat at Geneva on a committee of the League of Nations which unanimously condemned the unprovoked and unwarranted attack upon China by Japan, I find it difficult to stand in this house and say that we can have anything like the state of mind which has been suggested. Is no value to be placed upon the plighted word of a nation? Are treaties to be scraps of paper? We went to war on that issue. Is the language employed in the Kellogg-Briand pact to be entirely forgotten? Are we to condone this nefarious conduct, reminding us of the barbarous days of the middle ages when nations treated agreements as merely scraps of paper? Can I forget the Washington treaty, the nine-power treaty? Have we forgotten how solemnly Japan promised she would protect the integrity of China? Can I as a Canadian forget that? Our government signed it on behalf of Canada. Can I disregard it? Can I treat with those people as I would with the power which they have struck down without notice?
China is invaded, destroyed, and I am asked to condone it, and to say, "We must be very careful, though it is true that we are co-signatories; though it is true that, according to a decision of the committee of the League of Nations on which Canada was represented, Japan has violated that treaty." 
I honour the action of the Canadian who sat on that committee. I believe his finding was right. I believe that in Senator Dan-durand, for instance, we have as skilled a man with respect to these matters as any man in this country. He has been dealing with the League of Nations all these years. And when I find his condemnation of that unprovoked and unwarranted action against China, I cannot place myself in a position where I am prepared to have the minister of the other nation stand in my country and say, "We are going to defeat these Chinese." "We are going to defeat them!" There was no declaration of war; there has not been one yet; and still they talk about "defeat" and "the end of the war." Sir, we either are a nation or we are not. We either respect ourselves or we do not. We have a sense of honour or we have not. For my own part, and speaking now for myself alone, I say I cannot bring myself to a state of mind other than a feeling of deep-rooted resentment against the violation of its plighted word by that great people, the Japanese, who have invaded China, sacked its cities, murdered its civilians, and now talk in Canada about the ultimate "defeat" of their "enemy" and victory for their cause.
I have not forgotten Manchuria. I have not forgotten the Lytton report and its findings. Has any hon. member forgotten it? Sir, it is there that the right hon. the Prime Minister and I part company.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I say
to my right hon.. friend, I hope no word of mine can be construed as in any way condoning what Japan has done. The very opposite is the case. I agree entirely with him in his denunciation of the action that Japan has taken. I agree with everything that was done at Brussels, what was said by the leader of the senate; in fact, he took his instructions from the government here. No words of mine are capable of the interpretation that is being put upon them.
At six o'clock the house took recess.
After Recess
The house resumed at eight o'clock. PRIVATE BILL



SECOND READING

[Stage Direction]
Bill No. 120. to incorporate The Workers Benevolent Society of Canada.-Mr. Thorson.

Japanese Immigration


[Stage Direction]
The house resumed from Tuesday, May 10. consideration of the motion of Mr. Neill for the second reading of Bill No. 11, respecting Japanese immigration.
Mr. A. W. NEILL (Comox-Albemi):: I
am closing the debate on the second reading.
I understand I have twenty minutes to go, but I intend to take much less than that.
I have gone over the matter already and I am not going over it again. I only want to introduce two new points. In the debate on the second reading of this bill in its earlier s'tages the right hon. leader of the opposition (Mr. Bennett) said he could not approve it unless it contained a provision that it would not come into effect until July, 1939. By referring to page 2740 of Hansard he will find that I then made a definite pledge to accept that amendment in committee. The other point I should like to introduce is a statement contained in a Canadian Press dispatch. Canadian Press news as regards international affairs are generally reliable, because they are checked up, and if they are not correct they are contradicted. This is from Geneva, May 13:
.	.	. Chinese sources declared some powers,
including Great Britain and France, had agreed to grant China credits for purchase of arms and also assurance of aid in getting the arms into the country. In a secret session the council arranged to go on public record as refusing material aid to China. . . .
Doctor Wellington Koo, Chinese delegate, who had asked the council to help organize an international boycott of Japanese goods and to forbid league members to sell war materials to Tokyo, was said, however, to have won the war credits fight in behind-the-scenes negotiations.
That has not been contradicted. I might make this point, that if the British government grant a credit to buy arms, and give assurance that they will be delivered, they surely cannot be seriously embarrassed if Canada takes a step towards taking possession of her right to control immigration into her own country.
This bill comes before us after nearly four months of stormy passage and many vicissitudes. Another private member's bill introduced the next day passed all stages in two hours. I fear the vote to-night will be an adverse one, judging by what the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) stated, unless, as I hope, he has been influenced by many representations that I know have been made to him from British Columbia and
elsewhere. I made a serious attempt to meet his objection by the introduction of Bill No. 112. But that was thrown out by a strained interpretation of the rule which, if impartially administered, would have also killed nine other bills, six of them important government measures. However, the race is not always to the swift, nor the battle to the strong. The treatment accorded those two bills I find has created a wave, first of interest and then of sympathy, throughout Canada- not British Columbia alone-which no effort of mine could possibly have secured, except by the exercise of an eloquence which I do not possess and a strenuous campaign which I could not have undertaken. I am myself surprised at the telegrams and letters I have received expressing approval, promising support and asking me to address meetings and so on. The Canadian temper was rather sleepy at first, but was first stirred, then it murmured and then woke up with a roar to a consciousness that the rights of the people, the privilege of a free people to express their wrongs through their elected representatives, were in danger. The people of both east and west became interested; they realized that it was no longer a British Columbian question but one of interest to all of Canada. Many editorials on the subject were printed. The Sun, a leading paper in British Columbia, in a long editorial some weeks ago, used this language: ... a grave doubt arises in our minds as to the democracy that exists at Ottawa. Do the men we elect to parliament represent us or do they not represent us? . . . Do they go down there as free men representing a free people or under the handicap of being able to say or do only what the Prime Minister permits them to say or do?
They ended by expressing the opinion that the attitude taken to the bill. savoured more of tyranny than democracy. Then an eastern paper, after going very fully into the matter and supporting the stand I took, ended with these significant words:
But the government had to throw over an old friend. Neill had to be sacrificed to appease the Japanese government.
Well, I want no loftier epitaph on my political tombstone than those words, "sacrificed to appease the Japanese government." Very often these forlorn hopes require a martyr, and perhaps I might start a movement which, when I am no longer here, will go on to success.
I do not want to detain the house. Therefore, with no sense of bitterness to the government or threats of reprisal, I only want to appeal for the bill on its merits. I have an appeal which I think should be made all across Canada. I appeal to the maritimes; we
Japanese Immigration

demand their sympathy because they are a sister province; they too go down to the sea in ships and do business in great waters, and they know what an influx of a couple of thousand fishermen voting and acting with one mind would mean to their interests. I appeal to the province of Ontario, the home of industrial workers, getting more and more powerful in their unions; they know the effect of allowing a large influx of oriental labour with its low wages and low standards of living. They are beginning already to experience the effects of the competition of Japanese-made goods, sold in Toronto at prices for which the raw material could not be purchased there. I appeal to hon. members from Quebec, that home of Canadian chivalry, and I tell them they have no more loyal friends in Canada than the people of British Columbia, who will be beside them in any movement in support of minority rights, because we too are a minority and we feel that we too should get such treatment as our special conditions require, just as the people in Quebec ask the government that they shall be given such treatment as their traditions and history warrant. We ask their sympathy in that regard. As far as the prairies are concerned, it is a matter more of self-interest because, being nearer to British Columbia they visit backward and forward, and they are beginning to realize that what is our trouble to-day will be theirs to-morrow; they will be the next victim.
As regards British Columbia, I do not need to appeal to them, because they know. I voice the sentiments of British Columbia, I speak with the united voice of British Columbia to-night. It may be asked, by what right do I, an ordinary private member, claim such a right. I have no written authority from the people as a whole, other than those of my own district, but I do voice the sentiments of a man fully qualified to speak for the people of British Columbia, that is their premier. What is his record? He was elected by a large majority at a general election held some eight months ago. He presented his brief not long ago to the Rowell commission; I have a synopsis of it here, and the very first item on it was: Oriental immigration prohibited and orientals returned to their home countries. Since then he fought a by-election about a week ago, and that program was a prominent feature of the campaign. He won an opposition seat, and this program formed perhaps a not insignificant part in that victory. Therefore I quo'te
fMr. Neill.]
him; only I am asking something much more moderate than he asks.
There is growing up in British Columbia a feeling that will not be allayed by promising them a commission of three members to investigate themselves. The time for that has gone by. I am going, if the right hon. gentleman will allow me, to plagiarize a sentence from the speech delivered by the leader of the opposition before six o'clock this afternoon. Speaking of post-war conditions in Germany he said: "There gradually grew up in Germany a feeling that they had been unfairly treated." That is the situation in British Columbia. There is no more fatal and bitter resentment than that caused by the gradual growth of a feeling that people have not been fairly treated. It is far more desperate and dangerous than a sudden flare up of resentment over a single overt act; there is no question about that. It may be that the Canadian historian of the future, when he comes to record the dismemberment of the nine provinces of Canada, will have to begin a paragraph or chapter with these words: "There gradually grew up in British Columbia the feeling that they had been unfairly dealt with." And that feeling is there. It is not confined to British Columbia alone; it exists for other reasons on the prairies as well, and it would be well if the government took steps to quench that flame before it reaches a point at which it cannot be quenched.
I am going to leave the issue to the house. Democracy, according to the dictionary, is a system of government under which the power rests in the hands of the people and is exercised directly or indirectly by them. In my own language it is the duty of the government to carry out the wishes of those governed. To support my views I quote the Bishop of Liverpool, who in a recent speech said:
-it was a democratic principle of this country that if a sufficient number of people wanted a thing sufficiently and pressed for it, they would get it.
If not, as one man wrote me, it ceased to be democracy and became "demockery."
I await the issue of the house on this bill with the anxious hope of an innocent man on trial for his life; but I tell the government that the people of British Columbia are determined to get some measure along the lines I have indicated. The issue is now up to the house and the government.



IMMIGRATION ACT


[Stage Direction]
Mr. A. W. NEILL (Comox-Alberni) moved the second reading of Bill No. 112, to amend the Immigration Act.
He said: Mr. Speaker, this is Bill No. 112, and it is really a revival of Bill No. 38. As I spoke fully on Bill No. 38, I shall not detain the house by talking for another forty minutes as the silly rules would allow me to do.
However, for a few moments, for the benefit of those who were not here on that occasion, I shall go over it briefly. The former discussion is to be found on Hansard at page 2735 and following. For many years in the Dominion of Canada we have had an immigration law which prohibits the entrance into Canada of people able to see but unable to read the English or French language, or any other language or dialect. That has been our established law for many years. I am amplifying that law to the further extent that the other language in addition to English or French must be one commonly spoken in some portion of Europe. Whatever may have been said against the previous bill does not arise in connection with this one. It is not aimed directly or indirectly against any one nation. It applies to 74 per cent of the world's population, and does not name any one nation. It merely applies the educational test, one which has been in effect in New Zealand and Australia for twenty years or more. This provides for about the same test, only in Australia it is somewhat more drastic. That is the only difference.
This is a way out which would meet the situation, be a stepping-stone to peace in British Columbia, and yet avoid any suggestion of international complications. The British Columbia government voiced their views before the Rowell commission and asked for something much more drastic. I might say that the word "exclusion" is not used, nor indeed is exclusion effected except by virtue of an educational test. It does not say that this or that nation shall be excluded; it provides merely that an educational test shall be applied. This test would apply equally to our own vast sister dominion of India; it would apply also to Australia, to New Zealand, to China, to South America, to the Malay peninsula and to those countries neighbouring thereon. There is no suggestion of an attempt to discriminate against Japan or any other nation, either directly or indirectly. The law is of general application and is
Immigration Act
[Stage Direction]
similar to that which has been enforced for thirty years in New Zealand and Australia. It is ridiculous to say that we shall offend anyone by exercising the provisions which have been applicable to orientals for many years so far as Australia and New Zealand are concerned. When the bill was up the other day I moved the second reading and there was no discussion as a point of order was taken. I shall say no more at this time, reserving my right to close the debate should any debate take place.
Ian Alistair Mackenzie: Mr. Speaker, I desire to say immediately that whatever merits the previous bill which we have just discussed may have had, and I believe it has many, this bill has nothing by way of merit. In the first place, it would bring about the very opposite to what the hon. member for Comox-Albemi (Mr. Neill) seeks to attain. The implied inference of this bill is to achieve a measure of exclusion by means of a language test. Any one who compares this bill with the legislation in force in Australia will realize immediately that there is a great difference between the two. The prohibition brought about by the legislation in Australia is well known to everyone here. This bill names the two languages which must be known, and it would be the simplest thing in the world for an oriental nation to train its intending migrants in the use of either one of the two languages mentioned here. Instead of having only 130 immigrants a year from the nation not named but designed to be named, we might have thousands and thousands coming into British Columbia under the provisions of the bill now before the house for consideration.
I was prevented from speaking on the previous bill because a point of order was raised the other night, but I desire to say now that after twenty years in public life in British Columbia I yield to no one in my realization of the gravity of this oriental problem. I desire to say further that this problem cannot be solved by the present measure of exclusion. It is a deep economic problem affecting the life and welfare of the people of British Columbia. I may say that I am charged with certain responsibilities as a minister of the crown, particularly with reference to the province of British Columbia, and there are certain aspects of the work of my department which at the moment I do not care to emphasize. It was with a full consciousness of those responsibilities that I took the somewhat difficult step of opposing the measure introduced by the hon. member for Comox-Alberni. Considering the problems that face us at the [M'. Neill.!
present time in this dominion, I am convinced that I have done the best thing for British Columbia and for the Dominion of Canada.
I shall go even further than that. We heard a most glowing and eloquent appeal this afternoon by the right hon. leader of the opposition (Mr. Bennett) in connection with the responsibilities that must be ours as Canadians for the preservation of the interests of the British Empire. He quoted with emphasis some of the words of the declaration of 1926 with reference to the evolution of responsibility in connection with that famous declaration known as the Balfour formula, the reference to free association within the British Empire. My right hon. friend might have gone further and read the preamble to the constitution of the Dominion of Canada. The preamble of the British North America Act contains these words:
And whereas such a union would conduce to the welfare of the provinces and promote the interests of the British Empire.
We have two great duties to perform to-day in Canada. First, we must preserve the welfare of the union of confederation, the British North America Act itself. Then we have another duty, and in this I agree largely with what my right hon. friend has said, to preserve and maintain the interests of the British Empire. After twenty years of public life, I feel confident that the people of British Columbia know my feelings with reference to this matter. I feel confident I have taken the right position with reference to my province, with reference to my country and with reference to the interests of the British Empire. I feel I have taken the right stand in connection with this important but delicate, difficult and complex situation.
At the same time I desire to make this further observation. No government of the Dominion of Canada can afford to ignore this problem. If this problem cannot be solved by the means offered by the hon. member at the present time, it must be solved by other methods by whatever government is charged with the responsibility of the administration of the affairs of this country. I agree with my hon. friend in what he desires to achieve, but I believe that conditions are too grave and too serious at the present time to achieve the objective he has at heart by the method he has offered. From the point of view of British Columbia in particular this bill would make our position many times worse than it is today. This is a long range economic problem, and I hope that those of us who represent British Columbia in this house, regardless of our political persuasions or associations, will

Immigration Act
be as one in a desire to arrive at a real remedy that will be in the best interests of British Columbia, of the Dominion of Canada and of the British Empire.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Mr. Speaker, a few minutes ago I voted in favour of a bill to exclude, but I shall have to vote against this bill. Perhaps it is only fair to give my viewpoint and reason for taking an action that may seem to be not quite consistent. In the first place, I do not think the hon. member for Comox-Alberni (Mr. Neill) has been quite candid in presenting his bill. He says that there has been no attempt to discriminate against any one nation. We all know that the Chinese are excluded; we all know that there is an arrangement under which the people from India do not reach Canada; we all know that in practice the only people from the orient who are coming in are the Japanese. I believe if I had the hon. member for Comox-Alberni by himself he would admit quite frankly that this is an attempt to exclude the entry of Japanese.


Alan Webster Neill: That would be incidental.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Yes. I shall leave the hon. member to put that in his own way Perhaps I could use the phrase used a good deal by my legal friends and say that this bill comes close to being colourable legislation. It is an attempt to achieve something which could not be accomplished by more direct action. I do not like the idea of rigid exclusion, but knowing British Columbia as I do, and as I have known it for some years, I realize that a feeling exists there at the present time that makes it unwise to allow any more Japanese to enter that province. We have to be realists in this matter; we have to recognize that there are a considerable number of Japanese already in the province who have not been assimilated. Under these conditions I do not think it would be in the public interests to admit more orientals to British Columbia.
I believe, and I have long urged, that those who are there should be admitted to the full rights of citizenship. I do not think we ought to allow people to come to this country, and become naturalized here, and have children born here and then deny them and their children the full rights of citizenship. As we in this comer have said again and again, we do not think there should be a law by which those people should be placed in an inferior position. But that is a different matter from allowing any large number of orientals, or any number, I think, at the present time, to come to Canada.
I agree with the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Mackenzie) that this bill would not in effect accomplish the purpose for which it is designed. Several years ago I spent some time visiting Japan, and in the larger cities I did not find any great difficulty in getting around by myself because such a large number of the people spoke English. If I recollect aright, English was a second language in the high schools, at least it was very commonly taught in the schools. As the minister suggested, it would be comparatively easy to train people in a knowledge of the English language; in fact, I do not think they would need to be trained, and hence there might be a much larger influx than under the present arrangement.
It seems to me that we have in this bill a great many undesirable features. If there is likely to be any criticism from Japan of our actions that might be dangerous in these critical times, undoubtedly the same criticism would apply to this type of legislation.
Under these circumstances I personally feel that I shall have to vote against this measure.


Alan Webster Neill: Will the hon. member allow me a question? Does he not realize that the bill would not take the place of a quota agreement; it would be extra?


James Shaver Woodsworth: I do not know
whether I quite catch the import of the hon. member's question.


Mr. J. S. TAYLOR (Nanaimo):: I feel
that before this bill goes to a vote I should say a few words. On a former occasion I took the very definite stand that no people should be allowed in Canada as citizens of I his country who were not assimilable; and I cannot find in ethnological history any definite instance of Asiatics being fused with Europeans. I think that should be very carefully borne in mind, because the two continents are juxtaposed; and if the peoples, in thousands of years of association with each other have not produced a definite fusion, how ran we expect orientals to fuse with our own European peoples? On these larger issues I very definitely' pronounce my'self opposed to the idea of introducing into Canada Asiatics to become citizens with ourselves. But if Japan, China or any' other country having nationals in this country will forsake them, and if they will be prepared to qualify for citizenship in our country and be prepared to be assimilated into the citizenship of Canada, then I have nothing to say against them. But on principle I shall vote against this bill.


Alan Webster Neill: Mr. Speaker,-
32U4
Immigration Act


Walter Edward Foster: I draw the attention of the hon. member to the fact that if he speaks now he closes the debate.


Alan Webster Neill: I shall take only a few
minutes.
The argument put forward by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Mackenzie) is undoubtedly founded upon a misconception of the situation. That is astonishing to me, he being a lawyer. The Immigration Act, chapter 93 of the revised statutes, contains a list of prohibited people; some are lunatics, some persons of other descriptions, professional beggars and so on; and then it says that people who cannot read are excluded The gentleman's agreement existing with Japan to-day would still exist, under which it is supposed that not more than 150 come in. This does not take the place of the gentleman's agreement; it would be on top of it, and it would say that of those 150 allowed to come in under the gentleman's agreement, so many must be cut out because they cannot read. It is ridiculous and unfair and most unwarranted to suggest that this would allow the influx of a huge mass of orientals- not to mention that you cannot train orientals in the English language in six months, and in six months' time or perhaps a little longer there will be a general election, and British Columbia will have pronounced itself with such force and energy that the succeeding government will hurry to bring in legislation such as was turned down a few minutes ago. And whose blame is it? The minister himself says he preferred Bill No. 11. He very nearly voted for it. I could see his conscience working on him; but some more subtle influence overcame his natural goodness of heart and intelligence, so he says he preferred the other one, and he very nearly voted for it. Now, however, he says I am "all wet" in introducing this second one; but whose blame is it? If Bill No. 11 had gone through, this one would not have taken its place. I quite admit that. I preferred Bill No. 11 to this present one.
As regards the suggestion made by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Woodsworth), he said he had an objection, and one which many honourable men do have; I believe it is expressed in a principle of law that you cannot do a thing indirectly which you cannot do directly.


Ernest Lapointe: Hear, hear.


Alan Webster Neill: My hon. friend, the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) says, "Hear hear."


Ernest Lapointe: (Quebec East): Is there anything wrong in that?
[Mr. Neill. 1


Alan Webster Neill: We are informed that that is a fundamental basis of law.


Ernest Lapointe: Yes.


Alan Webster Neill: And yet our statute books are full of evasive legislation whereby we do something indirectly which we cannot do directly. Look at our tariff laws. How many of these tariff items are worded with the idea, as the phrase goes, of "trying to whip the devil around the stump,"-get at the object to be attained without interfering with some other rights such as favoured nation rights? Our tariff is full of things like that. Or take the exclusion of our own nationals from India, to some extent people of our own race, because one or more of the nations of India can be called Aryan in their origin, and ethnologically they are white people, yet we exclude them. How do we do it? We exclude them by an obvious trick-that is just the word to use-which the Minister of Justice says cannot be done because it is doing indirectly what we cannot do directly.
We cannot pass a law preventing our own fellow subjects from coming into Canada, so how do we keep them out? I do not want this to be used against us in the years to come because we had a satisfactory arrangement; that is, it has given satisfaction. We made objections to their coming, and we passed a law that they would have to come in a ship directly from the country of origin. We had not the courage or we had not the legislative authority and jurisdiction to say flatly, "We will not let natives of India, a part of the British Empire, come into another part of the empire," so we introduced this ridiculous theory that they had to come in a boat directly from the country of origin. Can you, Mr. Speaker, conceive of any condition which would make a man a more desirable immigrant to Canada if he came in a boat which started at Bombay and docked at Vancouver than if he went from Bombay to Hongkong and then took the regular line of steamers from there to this country?
But we went further than that. Shortly before the great war broke out, a boat full of natives of India, appeared in Vancouver harbour. I forget their particular nationality, whether they were Hindus or Sikhs; I think they were Sikhs. There was a large number of them; they had come direct from the country of origin in a boat; and it was more than hinted, it was currently believed, that they had been financed by the German empire with a view to promoting discontent in India and in Canada, because it was not desired to admit a couple of thousand of these immigrants, and if they were sent back they would be a fruitful source of discontent and

Immigration Act
dissatisfaction in India. I forget the exact method we adopted in order to stop them, but I remember that fire hose figured considerably. After a good deal of discussion the boat did go back to India, and no doubt the purpose intended by the people who instigated the affair was served, that is to say, of causing a great deal of discontent in the Indian population.
That evil was foreseen as was also a recurrence of it, and we wondered what we could do about it. We again used that subtle, indirect method which the Minister of Justice says we must not use-we made an addition. We said that not only must the native of India come in a boat directly from the country of origin but he must also obtain a ticket direct from the country of origin to Vancouver. I do not know how we managed it, but I assume it was by arrangement with the consular agents. At any rate, we saw to it he could not get a ticket right through. If that is not an indirect way of doing something which we cannot do directly, I do not know what is. And that is with our own nationals in our own country. But there are a great number of other instances that could be given.
I go back to the suggestion emphasized by the Minister of National Defence, that they would be entering in hordes. May I point out that you cannot teach a horde of orientals English in a short time. It is true that in Australia it was provided that they might use some language-


Ian Alistair Mackenzie: Specified.


Alan Webster Neill: -some language specified by the government. The government took care to specify some language which the man seeking entry into Australia could not read or write, and if they found that he could write one language they tried him with another. As I told the house on a previous occasion, some inspired Scot tried an unhappy Chinaman with Gaelic. The Chinaman took the matter to the courts, and it was decided in the higher courts of Australia that the Gaelic language was not a language of Europe. And then the trouble broke out. The wigs were on the green; kilts were donned; the pipes were played; the claymores were in evidence, and there was very nearly a revolution. The government hastily got the cabinet together, capitulated, and agreed that at the next session of the legislature they would bring in legislation to do away with the provision for specifying a language of Europe and would simply provide that any language might be specified. The result is that now Gaelic may be specified as a test. In New Zealand there was not a similar incident, so that the provision 51952-253
there still is that a language of Europe may be specified. An attempt was made by a Japanese in Australia to establish the claim that he could specify the language and that also was taken to the higher courts, but it was decided that the government alone had the power of specifying. I do not know whether that was not taken to the privy council. Then a rule was passed that until there was legislation which defined the language, the immigration officer in question had the right to do the specifying.
If there is anything at all about this bill which the Minister of National Defence does not like, all he had to do was simply express his desire in the committee and we would have amended it. It would have been easy to put in words similar to those used in Australia if he so desired. He says that he will not be satisfied, that British Columbia will not be satisfied, until this matter is settled on a right basis. I agree with him. Then, why not let us do something about it? Why should we simply talk about it? The other day we had an illustration in British Columbia of what happens when there is too much talk; there was too much talk about the labour situation and it resulted in an unfortunate occurrence.
I am not at all pessimistic, but the feeling in British Columbia in this matter is becoming intense. There are two things more than anything else for which a man will fight; that is, the protection of his wife and family and his home; and if he thinks that his wife and family and his home are in peril, and he believes that a government three thousand miles away is indifferent or is not showing that concern for his welfare that it should, while a menace is threatening him across the ocean, he is more than likely to take steps to protect himself. That would be very lamentable in this case, something that might lead to riots and to far more international trouble than anyone might anticipate from Bill No. 11. Of course, it is too late to go back and revise our opinion about that, but even now the government could bring in a measure sufficiently different from my bill to conform to the rules of the house.
I do plead with the government to do something. I am not going to quarrel with them about the nature of it, the means they take, so long as they do something to meet the situation. Simply sending a delegation of three people to British Columbia to investigate the activities of officials will not placate the people of that province. As the minister knows, they are not in their childhood; they are not lacking in intelligence, and they will resent any suggestion that they can be pla-

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cated as children can be by being given a toy as a means of getting them to think of something else.
British Columbia wants legislation to exclude Japanese. Vancouver is the third biggest city in Canada; probably one-quarter of the population of British Columbia is centred there. Well, did we not find the city council, composed of all varieties of political opinion, passing unanimously a strong and vigorous resolution, containing half a dozen whereases and concluding with the declaration, "We want the total exclusion of orientals from British Columbia?" That is what the city of Vancouver wants, and no eloquence from the Minister of National Defence, who is far more able than I am to smooth over these difficulties and troubles, will alter that bedrock fact.



FOREIGN POLICY-STATEMENT OF MR. MACKENZIE KING ON MOTION OF MINISTER OF FINANCE

[Stage Direction]
The house resumed consideration of the motion of Mr. Dunning for committee of supply.
Richard Bedford Bennett: At six o'clock I was referring to the Lytton report as indicating the reason why I found it so difficult to follow certain aspects of the attitude of the government with respect to the present situation in China and Japan. It will be recalled that that report was made to the League of Nations and that after very careful investigation by a well qualified committee it was found that the action taken in Manehukuo by Japan was wholly unwarranted and was unprovoked. The effect was that in the end Japan left the League of Nations. Therefore we still continue to be a member of the League of Nations. Our signature still remains upon the Kellogg-Briand pact. Our signature still remains upon the Washington nine-power treaty, and we adopted the Lytton report, whereupon, as I say, Japan withdraws. And that country, which has dishonoured its obligation and its signature in the manner I have indicated, is bold enough to send to this country an emissary who a few days after he arrives makes a statement which is a far more offensive observation than that made by Sackville-West which resulted in his recall -from Washington. I mention that because frankly I cannot understand it.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Perhaps my
right hon. friend will allow me to say a word?


Richard Bedford Bennett: Certainly.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: When my right hon. friend was speaking earlier in the evening, and took exception to the government's attitude, I was not aware whether he was referring to what I said in speaking on external affairs, or whether it was to what I had said in reply to the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Woodsworth) this afternoon. I gather it is what I said in reply to the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre.


Richard Bedford Bennett: It was not so much a
question of reply, as the language itself.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Well, what I
want to make clear at the moment, and to have the house understand, is that my right hon. friend is not taking exception to what, in speaking on external affairs, I said in relation to the Sino-Japanese war, but rather to the remark I made or something I failed to say in reply to the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre on the orders of the day. May I say at once that when the hon. member asked the question he did of me I had not seen, nor had my attention been drawn to the statement made by the Japanese minister. That was why I asked my hon. friend what statement it was he alluded to. He said he was referring to the Japanese minister having said he agreed with the statement I had made in this house, a statement of policy. I am prepared to stand by any statement of policy I have made in this house as to the attitude we should assume towards other countries.


James Shaver Woodsworth: My criticism was
not with regard to the Prime Minister's statement of policy, but rather that the Japanese minister had commented on what had been said in a debate in this house.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I was trying
to find the particular point to which reference was made. However, I have since obtained the reported statement of the minister from Japan. It appears in the press as follows:
Baron Tomii, who is accompanied by his wife and eight year old daughter, expressed appreciation of a recent utterance of Prime Minister Mackenzie King with regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict.
" I don't remember the exact words, but they were to the effect that Canadian people should be very careful in making remarks concerning the hostilities now going on in China," said the Baron. " I do realize how difficult it would be for people living thousands of miles away to understand fully the situation that exists in the far east."

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In the first place I think hon. members will agree that while I have made a statement as to the attitude which should be assumed generally towards critical situations in other countries, I have, as far as I can recollect, made no statement referring particularly to the hostilities now going on in China, as suggested in the words attributed to the Japanese minister. My statements from time to time have been that in dealing with critical situations that exist in other parts of the world we in Canada, which is a neutral country, should be particularly careful in our discussions in this house, or over the radio or in the press or elsewhere, to be guarded in our utterances and not say things which may unnecessarily embarrass those who have to deal with these situations. That is the kind of statement I have made, and I think it is what the minister from Japan must have had in mind, because I see in another paper, the Ottawa Citizen of yesterday, the minister is quoted as follows:
When asked about the situation in China, the minister quoted Prime Minister Mackenzie King's remark made recently in the House of Commons that it was misleading and caused " a suspicion of our neutrality " for Canadians to comment on the foreign policies of other nations.
Evidently the same thought was in the mind of the minister when speaking in the one case at Niagara Falls and in the other at Ottawa. What doubtless the minister had in mind has been some statement that in relation to these two countries which are at war we are neutral; Canada is not at war with Japan; Canada is not at war with China; and our position of neutrality should be respected.
I want to say at once that I think the Japanese minister, if, as reported, he went beyond that statement and began to speak of the hostilities as between China and Japan, and indicated what he thought would be the outcome of the war, and referred to China in the course of his remarks, was forgetting the very attitude and policy which I had suggested here should be followed.


Richard Bedford Bennett: And which he himself
had taken.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, quite so, which he himself had taken. In that I think he was entirely wrong; I do not for a moment hesitate to say that. Perhaps I might add that an almost humorous aspect is given to what is perhaps a very serious matter, by the fact that when the new Chinese consul arrived in the city some little time ago he made some remarks at a luncheon reflecting pretty strongly on his country's 51952-2031
enemy, and it was thought at the time that those remarks should not have been made


Richard Bedford Bennett: He was only a consul.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes. I think, however, that they have now had a sufficient round of controversy in our country, and I hope no further reference will be made by any foreign representative in this country reflecting upon other lands with respect to which we are trying to preserve as impartial an attitude as possible.


Richard Bedford Bennett: I am sure every hon.
member will be pleased to think that the interruption of my remarks has afforded an opportunity for the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) to make the observations he has made. I found it a little difficult to accommodate my mind to the thought that we in this country were to listen to a statement of the war aims of a country which had signed with us a document at Washington agreeing that it would protect the integrity of the country with which it is now waging war. That is my trouble; and I deny the right of any man, whose nation has signed a document guaranteeing with the Dominion of Canada the integrity of China, to come here and talk about the defeat of China in a war which was not declared and for which there is no justification. That is the reason I made the statement I did. The Prime Minister is right when he assumes that I was not criticizing him for not having complained of the action of the minister from Japan in pointing out that he agreed with the Prime Minister, although frankly I would not feel at all complimented by having one who represents a country which has violated every international obligation it has entered into saying how much he appreciated my attitude of mind towards anything. I desire to make that observation as strong as it is possible for me to make it. I am not one of those who believe that you serve any useful purpose by forgetting your own dignity and the honour of your own country in order to placate any power, however powerful it may be. As I was sitting here I could not but recall the words of a great Englishman who was attacked in Germany by von Bulow. He said, "I am answerable to my sovereign, and not to the citizens of a foreign country." I feel perfectly certain that in our desire to maintain neutrality the Canadian people have no desire, in the interest of trade expansion or otherwise, to sacrifice their sense of national honour and of the decencies of international relations.
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There is only one more thing I desire to point out, and it is that when dealing with a certain phase of the situation, in my judgment-and I express it only as my judgment -the Prime Minister entirely overlooked the fact that we have bound ourselves, in a manner that was acceptable to all governments, to successive parliaments and to the Canadian people, to a free association with the other elements of the British Commonwealth of Nations. I cannot but think that this was not answered by the language of the Prime Minister when he said, "Canada is Canada; South Africa is South Africa; Australia is Australia, and we have no interest in United Kingdom policies."


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I never said we had no interest in United Kingdom policies. We have interest in the policies of all countries.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Then I shall put it in this way, that while the Prime Minister says we have an interest in the policies of all countries, he made it clear that we had no special interest in the policies of the United Kingdom-


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Not at all.


Richard Bedford Bennett: -or of the other component parts of the commonwealth of nations, and he developed the idea-


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I rise to a point of order?


Richard Bedford Bennett: Surely.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The right hon. leader of the opposition cannot misinterpret what I said and expect me to remain silent.


Richard Bedford Bennett: I would not expect it and would not want it.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I have made no statement of a character that would permit such an inference to be drawn. I have given the house every reason to understand that we have very special cause and every desire to cooperate with all parts of the British Empire and to be interested particularly in matters that pertain to any part of the empire.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Well, I was dealing only with the speech I listened to, not with the observations just made.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Hansard will show it.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Hansard will abundantly clarify any difficulty there may be on that point, for the speech was prepared and typewritten; therefore it cannot be subject to any difficulties of expression. What was said, as

I took it down, was: Canada is Canada; South Africa is South Africa; Australia is Australia; the United Kingdom is the United Kingdom, and that with respect to the policies of the United Kingdom it was not for us to make representations or in any sense to interfere in their expressions of policy.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I say to my right hon. friend that he entirely missed the point that was being made. I was at the time taking exception to the dominions being lumped together as one and to their policies being regarded as essentially one, to be described in that way. I did not even refer to the United Kingdom. I was pointing out that each dominion of the empire has matters of immediate concern to itself.


Richard Bedford Bennett: It is so unfortunate that it was not so stated in the speech. I think the Prime Minister should be very grateful to me for having, by not being able to follow him, afforded him an opportunity thus to clarify something that might be regarded as a little, shall we say, cloudy in expression.
If anything was clear during the progress of the observations made this afternoon by the Prime Minister, it was that it was for the people of the United Kingdom, of Australia, of South Africa and so on to determine their own policies, and that Canada was Canada, Australia was Australia, and so on and so on. I only desire to make clear that for good or ill this country saw fit in 1926 and 1930 to declare for free association between the component parts of the commonwealth of nations known as the British Empire. In order that there might be no misapprehension about that, I thought I would look up the Statute of Westminster itself during the recess. I find that the statute, which is chapter 4 of the statutes of 1931, contains this preamble:
Whereas the delegates of His Majesty's governments in the United Kingdom, the Dominion of Canada, the Commonwealth of Australia, the Dominion of New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland, at imperial conferences held at Westminster in the years of Our Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-six and one thousand nine hundred and thirty, did make certain declarations and resolutions, which are set forth in the reports of the said conferences. . . .
And whereas it is meet and proper to set out by way of preamble to this act, that inasmuch as the crown is the symbol of the free association of the members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, and as they are united by a common allegiance to the crown, it would be in accord with the established constitutional position of all the members of the commonwealth in relation to one another that any alteration in the law touching the succession to the throne or the royal style and

Foreign Policy
titles shall hereafter require the assent as well of the parliaments of all the dominions as of the parliament of the United Kingdom.
The words there to which I direct attention are, first, "the crown is the symbol of the free association of the members of the British commonwealth" and, second, "they are united by a common allegiance to the crown." Compared with the language used in the declaration of 1926 we have only a reversal in words; that is, the allegiance to the crown is first and the free association is second.
All the nations that comprise the commonwealth, Canada, Australia and the others, agreed to the preamble to that statute. It is true that the present Prime Minister was the head of the Canadian delegation at the time of the declaration of 1926. It is true that another government was responsible for the acceptance of the preamble in the Statute of Westminster in 1931, following the conference of 1930. But I point out that, running through the whole, from the beginning of the conference of 1926 which had to deal with these matters because of the conditions in South Africa, is the commitment to a free association between the members of that commonwealth. I always like to refer to it in terms of a family. It may well be that many hon. members do not quite accept that view, but I have always thought that we might refer to this commonwealth of nations composing the British Empire as a family. Some might say it is more a partnership than a family, but I like to think that the members of the family are of varying ages and that they represent different forms of development of our common civilization.
The oldest member of the partnership, or the head of the family if you will, is Great Britain. We are the senior dominion, the other dominions being junior to us, and this family is scattered throughout the world. The partnership extends over the world, and freedom of association upon which the declaration is predicated is a freedom that, in my judgment, contemplates consultation. It contemplates solidarity; it contemplates unity of purpose and harmony, and it contemplates unity of action. That is how I have thought of this family, this partnership of ours in which we share with the oldest member of the partnership certain obligations and responsibilities; in which the oldest member, by reason of her great age and her long series of accomplishments, is looked to by us, as the minister speaking for the government said the other day, for support on the Atlantic; just as General Smuts down in
South Africa said, we have told the other members of this commonwealth that we can care, for our part, South Africa, on land, and we rely upon the other member of the family or partnership, namely Great Britain, to supply the navy. That is what we are doing here. But this, in my judgment, involves consultation. It involves not criticism after the event. It involves in every question that affects the well-being of the Dominion of Canada as a world entity consultation with those other entities which comprise the British Empire or the British Commonwealth of Nations.
That consultation at times is difficult; it is not as easy as some people suggest, and I am not for a moment minimizing the difficulty. But in these modern days of wireless telegraphy, in these days of the telephone, it is not very difficult to maintain communication between every member of this family, between every member of this partnership. I recall that at the imperial conference in London the Prime Minister of Australia was frequently in communication by telephone with his government. I recall that I was able to speak from Cape Town to Ottawa, without difficulty. I know how frequently we are in communication with Great Britain by telephone and by other means as well- because government communications on the wireless have priority.
These consultations should be held and should be maintained, as I say, antecedently to action being taken, so that the free association, referred to in the extract of the letter of Sir Austen Chamberlain which I read this afternoon, which indicates responsibilities and duties, should not be lost. That is what I meant when I said that the foreign policy of Canada has been determined by the unanimous action of governments-in 1926, in 1930 and by the Statute of Westminster in 1931. But how that policy shall be carried into effect is a matter with which successive governments must deal. I think it is so abundantly clear as not to require discussion- the mere statement is sufficient-that the foreign policy of the government is not made by parliament antecedently to being a policy. I wonder if my right hon. friend the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) does not at once realize that the foreign policy of this country has been made by the governor in council and approved by this parliament during the last eighteen months?


Ernest Lapointe: i do not know, but I should like my right hon. friend to illustrate what he has just stated, namely that the foreign policy of Canada was deter-
Foreign Policy

mined in 1926, meaning that from 1926, on, we have had to abide by the foreign policy which is framed in Great Britain.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Oh, no, not at all.


Ernest Lapointe: Then what does my right hon. friend mean?


Richard Bedford Bennett: I am sure the right hon. the Minister of Justice is far too astute to assume that I would even suggest anything of that sort. I have already indicated to him that Great Britain is not making our foreign policy. I have indicated to him that we are not making Great Britain's foreign policy. But I have endeavoured to point out that in 1926 we undertook to be freely associated with one another, and that free association means just what it says-consultation, understanding and cooperation. That is what it means. I am not going to redevelop that point, but I would point out that we have a declaration of what we received, and the conditions under which we accepted it, namely that we are united in our allegiance to the crown and freely associated together as members of this commonwealth of nations, which sometimes I have referred to as our family.
The method of giving effect to a foreign or external policy is one which varies with the government which gives effect to it.


Ernest Lapointe: The
foreign policy itself is a method. The foreign policy of the country is the aggregation of the measures and methods by which that country is dealing with another country.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Yes. I think perhaps my right hon. friend misunderstood me. For instance, we are the Dominion of Canada; we have imposed upon us the obligation to maintain its status and its integrity. The methods to be devised to accomplish that end vary with governments. Some practise one method and others practise another.


Ernest Lapointe: That is different from a foreign policy.


Richard Bedford Bennett: No.


Ernest Lapointe: Oh, yes.


Richard Bedford Bennett: It just falls within the ambit of my statement, namely that we in 1926 and 1930 made a broad and comprehensive declaration. That declaration involves (1) common allegiance to the crown and (2) freedom of association of the members of that commonwealth. That is the broad declaration. How Canada may desire to effect that purpose is a question that we shall describe as the foreign policy of the government. But
(Mr. E. Lapointe.)
the foreign policy of the government can never be antecedently declared, and no one has learned that better than the Prime Minister with his wide experience; for he established this afternoon that the government had passed orders in council dealing with questions of foreign enlistment, with questions connected with neutrality, and with questions of exports.
All these are matters on which the executive, the advisers of the crown, take action. These policies are the policies of the crown. His majesty's government in Canada assumes the responsibility for making the proper recommendations, and the orders in council that are passed are the visible evidence of that policy. Then it is for parliament to declare whether or not that policy meets with its approval. The Prime Minister knows that not only have those policies to which I have referred met with the approval of a majority in this house, but in the main they have been commended unanimously, because they represent the considered opinion of both the larger parties, and many members of the other parties in the house.
For instance, no one has heard a complaint from any hon. member with respect to the order in council concerning foreign enlistment passed by this administration. Then, with respect to the type of goods which might be exported we know there have been some comments and some criticisms on details- concerning nickel, lead and copper, with which the Prime Minister dealt this afternoon-but on the principle involved there has been general unanimity. Questions of licences, questions of authority, questions of limitations and of prohibitions-all these are questions to which the executive-and, mark you, the executive are the advisers of the crown

have given effect by order in council. And they have risked the approval of this house by their action. They have never had reason to contemplate any possible difficulty on the score, because they have always secured it.
That is what I mean when I endeavour to make it clear that foreign policy cannot be anticipated. It is quite clear the Prime Minister was right this afternoon when he said that you cannot declare the details of your foreign policy in anticipation. I have heard some suggest that it could be done, but obviously that is impossible. Why? Because from day to day events occur which necessitate the cabinet meeting together and discussing and considering just what action shall be taken, whether or not this or that shall be done, or whether some other action should be taken. All these are questions which the executive, the advisers of the

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crown, must consider. And they finally conclude to give their advice. That advice is not the advice of one man; it is the advice of the government as one government, the government as a whole, the advisers as one of the crown. Upon that you have your indication of policy. I submit there can be no successful denial of that fact. Every day this government has been formulating its foreign policies. It has been formulating its policies external to Canada and within the British Empire by orders in council, by the advice tendered and reduced into form by those orders in council. This parliament, if it had so desired, could have taken action to indicate its disapproval of the action thus taken. It seems to me that is the basis of the whole of our position.
It is quite obvious, without tiresomely reiterating and restating it, that with respect to most nations of the world this country cannot develop a foreign policy until we are in position to be recognized as a power, about which I shall speak again when the estimates of the Department of National Defence are under consideration. All the nations of the world, even those with populations half that of ours, even those with populations one-third that of ours,, have found it esential to provide themselves with those means which are necessary for selfdefence. That is the reason why you find them able to speak through their consular agents at various places, whereas we have none. We have our trade commissioners, but we have no consular agents. We rely upon the assistance given by other members of the British commonwealth to help and sometimes even to guide us in our new ventures or endeavours. It seems to me that is all that need be said so far as those factors are concerned.
I should like to summarize my own appreciation of the situation, and I think I can do this by stating a few propositions. First, it is the duty of government from time to time, in the light of facts as ascertained, to determine its policy and to submit that policy to the judgment of the House of Commons, within which at all times it must be able to command a majority. Second, with respect to matters affecting our external relations with foreign powers, as well as with other members of the commonwealth of nations, I submit that we have committed ourselves, and properly so, to consultation and cooperation. From free association there arises the duty and responsibility of consultation, cooperation and maintaining at all times the fullest possible information with respect to every matter that has to do with
the welfare of the Canadian people in connection with foreign countries. And with respect to the nations that comprise the commonwealth, the same may be said, although it is impossible that the same results may accrue in the one case as in the other, from failure so to do.
The third proposal is that so far as it lies within our power, having regard to the obligations of free association which we have assumed, we should maintain our neutrality to the fullest possible extent, remembering that there can be no neutrality, in so far as being involved in conflict is concerned, where any part of this commonwealth of nations becomes involved in war. And lastly, that participation in any conflict always rests with parliament, which means the people. But no action that we can take while still remaining within that empire or within the commonwealth will preclude or prevent those who are opposed in conflict to the empire or to any part of it from taking such steps against us as they may be advised and think desirable as belligerents.
I conceive this to be not an unfair statement of our position. Far be it from me to indicate that it is a policy. It is not a policy at all in the narrow sense of the term because I have pointed out that policy changes from day to day in the light of events that control policy. But it is a broad statement of the position which the Dominion of Canada occupies in the northern half of this continent.
We have our alternative. We have always had an alternative. There is no power that keeps Canada within the British Empire or within the commonwealth of nations. Canada has had the right to withdraw from the British Empire, and successive British statesmen have said that if we so desired they would not raise a finger against our starting our own household and setting up our own establishment. It was said as far back as the days of Mr. Gladstone and it was said at one time by Disraeli, who modified his statement in his later days. It has been said by more modern statesmen. But let it not be forgotten for a single moment, that this must be the free choice of the Canadian people. For myself, I do not believe that in my lifetime they will make such a choice. I cannot speak for another generation.
I believe we were endowed with riches that were purchased at great price by men who gave their lives and their treasure to accomplish these things. It must not be forgotten for a single moment when we speak of our great mineral resources, as the Prime Minister did this afternoon, that at one time they were
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the property of the crown in the right of the sovereign at Westminster. But when the sovereign sent his representative abroad with the commission in his pocket to govern any part of his dominion, before confederation, he had the power to alienate the land, the mines, the resources, and he alienated them to those who were entitled to them under regulations made, not in London or "Downing street," but by his advisers in Canada.
So we Canadians were given this heritage. England, about which some critical reference was made by a gentleman not long since, spent not thousands but millions of pounds on fortresses and guns and ships, for instance at Esquimalt and at Halifax. Those fortifications were paid for by the British taxpayer. In the year after confederation-I will go back just to that year-the British taxpayer provided more money for the construction of defences in Canada than we did for many years afterwards. It is within my memory when British garrisons were withdrawn from Halifax and Esquimalt. I can recall also when the north Atlantic squadron ceased to be based on Halifax.
These were contributions made by the British taxpayer to the maintenance of Canada. These vast expenditures were the free gifts of the British people to those who settled and made here a new home. That leaves out, of course, the part of the province of Quebec where French sovereigns had made grants long prior to that time, which of course were recognized, at least to some extent, by the treaty of 1763.
So we to-day still have the choice-unity in common allegiance to the British crown, freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations or, for a time, an independent nation. And I believe, sir, rightly or wrongly, that as we preserve and maintain that association, so we shall assist in preserving the peace of the world.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Mr. Speaker, let me say that I appreciate keenly the difficult position in which the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) is placed in these critical times. He must carry a very heavy responsibility. I congratulate him upon the general survey of the international situation which he gave in the earlier part of his speech this afternoon. It seems to me that the debate to-day marks a decided advance in the conduct of the affairs of our country. I have known sessions when the estimates of the Department of External Affairs were passed without any discussion whatever. Surely we have passed

beyond the stage where that ought to be possible.
The speeches which have been given thus far in the debate by the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition (Mr. Bennett) reveal very divergent points of view with regard to what ought to be the foreign policy of this country. It seems to me that nothing is gained bj' minimizing the differences which exist in Canada. The Prime Minister speaks about the policy of his government being one of peace and friendliness. Well, I assume that we can all subscribe to that, but as soon as we begin to get down to concrete cases we shall differ very widely indeed. I would urge that to-day phrases are not enough; that the situation is too serious, and that we must try to outline much more definitely than we have yet done what is to be our policy in future. Personally I am inclined to think I would be much nearer the policy of the Prime Minister than to that of the leader of the opposition, -I was going to add' if I knew what the Prime Minister's policy really was!


Richard Bedford Bennett: Hear, hear.


James Shaver Woodsworth: I would, however, say very frankly that I appreciate the forthright way in which the leader of the opposition has set down his policy. We know where he stands; and I think it is time that the whole country knew where the government stood as regards this and also some other matters.
There was one thing said by the Prime Minister which, I think, was advanced for the first time, and that is that foreign nations are not likely to pick out Canada for attack. I am glad he has taken that position, because in a great many quarters the main reason for an enlarged defence program has been that we might be attacked in force by Japan or by some other nation located a long distance away. If the Prime Minister is correct, we may very well ask why we should have any very considerable defence in this country, and we should require that what defence is necessary in the opinion of those who advocate defence, should be limited to one particular kind.
The Prime Minister, I thought, stated one matter very clearly when he asked, are we likely to be drawn into war through our connection with the league? And he came to the conclusion, after considerable argument that he did not think we would be. I might point out that if we in Canada interpret in future our obligations as lightly as we have done in the past, I can easily understand that the keeping of our obligations is not going to

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get us into any difficulty. However, that was the conclusion arrived at by the Prime Minister.
But there was another proposal which he did not put quite so clearly, and that, is this: Are we likely to be drawn into war through our connection with the empire? For me that is a much more important question. I think the leader of the opposition is right when he said that that is the vital point. Yet that point, in my judgment was evaded, consciously or unconsciously, in the Prime Minister's speech, and that is the thing which sooner or later will have to be settled. It is all very well for the Prime Minister to say that the solution of our relationship to the empire has been worked out so far as peace time is concerned, and he has no doubt that some solution as to our relationship to the empire in war time will also be worked out. But it is going to be a great deal more difficult than that, and now is the time to set up whatever machinery is necessary or to come to whatever understandings are necessary so that, if war should come, we should at least know where we stand.
I am not sure that the leader of the opposition is right when he says that there are simply two alternatives-either that we must be wholly in the empire or that we must withdraw. As a practical matter, I do not believe that we are faced with these alternatives, but I do urge that the present relationships between the dominions and the United Kingdom are very unsatisfactory and may lead at any time to considerable difficulty. If we do not propose to participate actively in another war, that is, if we are not, to use the Prime Minister's phrase, going crusading again to Europe as we did in 1914 to 1918, then we ought to advise Great Britain to that effect and to do so now. That should be clear-cut. If the British depend upon Halifax or Esquimalt as ports into which their ships may come and we declare our neutrality, what will be the situation? There will be a complete mix-up which neither we nor any other nation will understand. It seems to me that the first step which should be taken now if we are indeed a thoroughgoing autonomous nation is to ask Great Britain to revise the agreement with regard to Esquimalt and Halifax and make these entirely Canadian ports. Then we shall be in a better position to say whether or not we wish to maintain our neutrality.
The Prime Minister praised the policy of Great Britain since the war. I shall not attempt in the time at my disposal to enter into that matter; but from my standpoint, I
suggest that Great Britain's policy since the war, like the policy of all the great nations, has been one long succession of blunders. I do not think we can very well study the history of Europe since the war without coming to some such conclusion. The Prime Minister is quite right when he says that the war did not end promptly when peace was concluded. The war has not yet ended. If we had been wiser we would have taken a different course. The last war sowed the seeds of the war that is to come.
If I understand the Prime Minister aright, he rather deprecated that in this country there should be discussion of United Kingdom affairs. I cannot quite understand that. If he is going to praise the United Kingdom and suggest that everything it does is for the best, then surely some of the rest of us who have different opinions have a perfect right to voice these opinions, and that more particularly when the action of the United Kingdom, under the conditions that now exist, may drag us into another war.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I have never
tried to put any bar upon discussion of any question in this house. I have repeatedly said I hoped that the tone of discussion would be such that it would not embarrass very critical situations in other parts of the world. That is the extent to which I have tried to direct discussion. I have no objection, if my hon. friend thinks it best to criticize British policy, present or past, for him to do so; but so far as I am personally concerned, and speaking for the government, I feel that in the light of the knowledge we all have of the situation as it is in Europe to-day, we cannot be too careful of the manner in which we express our criticisms.


James Shaver Woodsworth: I quite agree with
the Prime Minister in that statement.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That is all
I suggest.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Well, if that is
all, then we agree; but I certainly thought the Prime Minister meant something more than that. In this connection I think he meant more than that. I am quite sure that what is in the back of his mind is more than that.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.


James Shaver Woodsworth: I am not reflecting on the Prime Minister, and hon. members need not take me up in that way. My point is that the Prime Minister is constantly taking the position that we, a com-
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paratively small nation, must take a back seat with regard to the affairs of the empire and in the league at Geneva.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: No; my hon. friend is quite wrong; I will tell him what is in the back of my mind. What is in the back of my mind is what I read in the dispatches I receive from day to day, sometimes many in a day, all of which emphasize over and over again the extraordinary and exceptionally critical nature of the European situation. That is what is in the back of my mind when I suggest to hon. members to be very guarded in what they say, lest the word spoken here may carry a very different or unfortunate interpretation in other parts of the world.


James Shaver Woodsworth: I quite appreciate
the position taken by the Prime Minister in that regard, but I should like to emphasize what is in the back of my mind.


An hon. MEMBER:: There is nothing.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Well, there may
be nothing, though in that case it would be hard to express it. I do urge that if the leader of the opposition is correct-and I think he is-that if Great Britain is at war Canada is automatically at war, whether or not we participate actively, then we ought, as a more or less autonomous nation and having in our population an intelligent people-


Ernest Lapointe: Not
more or less, but autonomous.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Autonomous, if you like, and with a population of intelligent people. Under these circumstances we ought to be able to discuss these affairs that concern the welfare of the empire and have some part in them, at least so long as we remain a part of the empire. I do not think we can be both in and out of it; that is what I want to emphasize to-night. But as matters stand we do not quite know where we are.
So far, external affairs and military defence have been very closely related. The time may come when they will be entirely separate, when external affairs will not involve military defence; but to-day they are inextricably involved. I regret that we had the defence estimates introduced this year before we had the discussion on foreign affairs. It seems to me the proper order was reversed, and already we have had to some extent a discussion of external affairs. I will refer to some of the debates of the last few weeks. The hon.. member for Beauharnois-Laprairie (Mr. Raymond) says that he will vote for the defence estimates on two grounds. In fMr. Woodsworth.]
the first place they are $2,000,000 less than those of last year though they are still $34,000,000. I have some sympathy with him so far as that is concerned, and choosing the lesser of two evils I should have to vote with him for the smaller estimate. He refers to the Prime Minister's stand at the imperial conference and feels confidence in voting defence supply. I wish I could be so reassured. It may be true that, as the Prime Minister has said, we are under no very definite commitments; yet I can hardly help thinking that the very close relationships which exist between our departments and the British departments must almost inevitably involve us in certain responsibilities.
Take the matter of war munitions. We are now making preparations, I understand, for our Canadian factories to ship large quantities of munitions to Great Britain. It is being quietly assumed that Canada is to become an arsenal for Great Britain. That is a very important question of foreign policy, which was not touched on by the Prime Minister and has not been considered by this house. Before long we shall have vested interests at work on the side of war; Great Britain will be looking to us to carry out certain obligations. Again, I have no definite idea why all this gold is being shipped here. I can conceive that probably credits will be needed in this country. Through these international arrangements, whether we like it or not, we are already taking on obligations. Hence it does not mean a great deal that the Prime Minister of Canada says that Canada has no definite commitments. The people of this country and parliament should know definitely where we stand in regard to these matters.
Consider the statement made by the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Mackenzie). The Globe and Mail's summary of his speech was, "Canada must stand with Britain." I ask him, is that a fair summary of his speech? He was speaking not for himself but for the government. It is a catchy slogan. But one might ask, which Britain must Canada stand with-the Britain of Chamberlain, the Britain of Eden or the Britain of the Labour party? They represent three very different types of thought in Great Britain to-day. "Canada stands with Great Britain." Has Canada no opinion of her own? We ought to know that. Otherwise it is a case, as in the last war, of "Ready aye, ready." Is that the position at which we have arrived? Has the Liberal government taken that stand? If it has not, I would like the Liberal government to say so.

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Ernest Lapointe: My bon. friend is wrong in his history. "Ready, aye, ready" arose in 1923, in connection with the Chanak incident.


James Shaver Woodsworth: I believe that is
correct.


Ernest Lapointe: And the government of the day was not "ready, aye, ready."


James Shaver Woodsworth: That is quite true. But I say, have we reached to that point? Is that to be our policy? Let me instance another reaction to the statement of the government's policy, an editorial in the Montreal Daily Star of March 25. The article stated that we had had a formal statement of government policy, and says:
It officially recognized several definite facts which the isolationists, the purblind pacifists and the whole fat-headed fraternity of confused thinkers commonly refuse to recognize ... it is only fair to recognize the political courage of the ministry of Mr. Mackenzie King in going as far, as fast and as steadily as it is.
So apparently the Prime Minister and French Canada are no longer isolationists, but we are going as far and as fast as we can in the imperial direction. That is apparently the view of the Star, founded upon what was said here a few weeks ago. The same issue of the Star quotes Earl Baldwin:
Our frontier no longer is at the cliffs of Dover, but at the Rhine.
I would ask, Where is Canada's frontier? Is it the Atlantic or the Pacific, or is our frontier going to the cliffs of Dover, or some other external point? Is it going to be outside of our own geographical boundaries? When I study the details of our defence estimates I have to ask myself that question: Are our frontiers to be the Atlantic and the Pacific, or are we preparing, if occasion arises, again to send troops overseas? After listening carefully to what the Prime Minister said this afternoon, I confess I am still at a loss to know just what our foreign policy is.
I read again a few weeks ago that lengthy speech which the Prime Minister made last year. I shall refer to it, if briefly, rather than to to-day's because I have not the copy of to-day's speech at hand. In truth I do not see that there is any great difference in the point of view expressed this year and last year.
The Prime Minister referred to our obligations under the League of Nations, and spoke of the failure of the league. Referring to the pact of Paris, he said that the nations which were parties to that instrument agreed from that time on to renounce war as an instrument of national policy. He considered that
our relationship to the league had become a liability rather than anything else. He took the position that certain nations put no faith in contracts. "Some nations avowedly are placing their confidence in might, not in right; in force, not in reason." He then stated, as he repeated to-day, that economic sanctions would inevitably lead to military sanctions. He spoke of the league in these words:
But a league which in the light of the developments of the last few _ years continues to place its reliance on force is going to be a very different institution from that which most of us have conceived the league of nations to be.
If I understand those statements aright, the Prime Minister has come to the rather curious conclusion that since it is wrong for the league to use force it is right for the individual nation to use force. He has apparently come to the conclusion that since some nations have failed to live up to their obligations we should follow suit. I recall a passage in the book of Psalms commending the man that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not. I agree with the leader of the opposition when he deprecates the way in which Canada, with other nations, has regarded her obligations so lightly. The Prime Minister I think would take this position; that since, according to Doctor Dafoe, whose words he quotes but whose advice he does not follow, we are back to a conception that excludes all considerations of morality in international relationships, we should, to use the Prime Minister's own words, take cognizance of our obligations in the light of the world situation as it is today. I confess that smacks very much of the words which were used recently by Lord Halifax in rejecting the appeal of the former Emperor Haile Selassie who came to make a last plea that the nations would honour their obligations. In that connection I noticed a remarkable statement in the Winnipeg Free Press. I have not been able to get away from the set-up of this page: Death knell of a nation.
"May God forgive them."
The garden of Gethsemane could not have been more bleak and forbidding than was the council chamber of the League of Nations yesterday when a cold and hostile "family of nations" rejected the last, cogent appeal of a fellow member for consideration at the bar of international justice-an appeal that the nations of the world keep alight the torch of collective security by withholding provision for the honourable recognition of the most dishonourable act of aggression in modern times. But the nations, with two notable exceptions-New Zealand and China turned their backs on the pathetic, despairing figure of Emperor Haile Selassie of ravaged Ethiopia, too ill himself to deliver his speech but seated

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there in silent solemnity in the very place once occupied by Italy-and instead they cleared the way to extend the hand of good fellowship to gloating Benito Mussolini of imperial Rome.
And these were the words that were uttered before the blinded Goddess of Justice.
On the one side are set the words of Selassie, and on the other the words of Lord Halifax. At the foot of the special article appear these words from holy writ:
And He, bearing His cross, went forth into a place called the place of the skull . . . where they crucified Him.
This is one of the few times an the recent history of Canada when I have seen the public press take the stand that something like personal morality must be carried into the realm of international affairs. In that connection I am glad to say that the representative of one Pritish dominion did not agree. Mr. Jordon of New Zealand had this to say:
This is a return to the laws of the jungle.
[DOT] [DOT] * We sometimes seem to be but little different from brutes. . . . The plan is a direct denial of collective responsibilities which are a fundamental part of the league.
I do not know what part Canada took; so far that has not to my knowledge been divulged to us, but I wish I could have held up this paper to-night and said that Canada had stood out on that occasion as New Zealand did.


Ernest Lapointe: There is
a good explanation. Canada is not a member of the council; New Zealand is.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Would the minister give us a statement as to what the position of Canada is and has been in that regard?


Ernest Lapointe: Make your speech.


James Shaver Woodsworth: I am trying to make it, but I should like to know that. It would certainly help me to make my speech.
With regard to empire obligations the Prime Minister said to-day what he has said previously, that he was not in a position to bind Canada to anything; that each member of the commonwealth must decide the nature and scope of its defence policy. Yet the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Mackenzie) is prepared to accept the assistance of the British fleet, as was mentioned by the right hon. leader of the opposition. The minister declared:
[DOT] [DOT] [DOT] it is only fair to say that to-day the main deterrent against a major attack upon this country by a European power is the existence of the British fleet in north Atlantic waters.
. . . Just as the British navy on the Atlantic 
is our greatest security in that quarter so I think it might be reasonable to assume that in a major conflagration we should have friendly fleets upon the Pacific ocean. . . . Our major defensive buffer on the Pacific coast is not the Pacific ocean alone but the existence there of friendly fleets.
Last year, when I attempted to suggest that Canada was particularly favourably situated and that we need not expect an attack because we had Great Britain on the one side and the United States on the other, who in their own interests would prevent any major nation from attacking Canada, the Prime Minister said we must not sponge. If my statement was an advocacy of sponging, I wonder what about the statement of the Minister of National Defence. The Prime Minister then said:
I submit that sponging by a nation is, in the eyes of other nations, exactly the same as it is in the case of individuals.
Yet the Prime Minister, who says that, looks to Great Britain and the United States to defend us in case of emergency. I quote his words:
While it is our good fortune to have both the United States and Great Britain as close friends ready to come and help us should we ever be the victims of aggression, let us realize that if we are to look to them for help all the more we must be prepared to lend a hand ourselves, and that certainly in the defence of our country.
I should like to know exactly what the Prime Minister means by such a statement. To-day he seemed to imply that we are at the end of our "crusading in foreign countries," as he put it. Well, if we are not going to crusade in foreign countries; if we are not going to come to the aid of Great Britain in other parts of the world, now is the time to say so. I do not think it is of any great help to Great Britain if we encourage the idea that we stand behind her, while at the same time in our own minds we have decided that we will do no more crusading in foreign countries. It is these positions that seem to me so inconsistent. On another occasion the Prime Minister said, "What we are doing we are doing for Canada alone." Are we going to help the other members of the empire if they are in a tight box, or are we prepared simply to look after Canada alone? Frankly, these statements puzzle me; I cannot reconcile them.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I ask my hon. friend if he can tell us in advance what the situation is going to be six months or a year hence, or even three weeks hence? How can you possibly decide what you are

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going to do until you know what the situation is in which you are proposing to intervene or not to intervene?


James Shaver Woodsworth: I am not suggesting that we can tell exactly what we may do, but I think we can and should determine our general policy. In my judgment that is not clear to-day-despite the lengthy statement of the Prime Minister this afternoon and his statement a year ago. I for one confess my absolute inability to know where the government stands with regard to our obligations to the British Empire.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Are we to infer from what the hon. gentleman has said that he has changed the position he took last year, that in any event and in all events-


James Shaver Woodsworth: I am coming to that I believe a little later. I am discussing the Prime Minister now, and do not intend to be diverted by the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin). The Prime Minister said, "What we are doing we are doing for Canada alone." For a moment I want to glance at that "Canada alone" policy. A year ago the Prime Minister gave a statement of the Canadian legion which, he said, set forth the views of his administration. It read:
(4) That we, therefore, believe that it is essential that Canada should, forthwith, develop a defence policy which, in the first place, would be designed to enable us to effectively defend our neutrality in case of war and protect our trade and commerce, and ultimately enable us to defend our eastern and western coasts from aggression by enemy forces.
My criticism is that this whole policy is one of compromise. The Prime Minister says:
If we have not proposed more, if we have not proposed less, it is because of that guiding principle, we have sought to keep the country united.
I think the cat is out of the bag. If we proposed more, we would be siding with the imperialists. If we proposed less, the government would be accused of being isolationist; so there is the policy. Let me read the Prime Minister's statement again:
If we have not proposed more, if we have not proposed less, it is because of that guiding principle, we have sought to keep the country united.
It seems to me the government is refusing to take responsibility. It is all very well for the Prime Minister to say that there will be no participation in an overseas war except by the consent of parliament; but if war came, instead of maintaining unity, this country would be split from stem to stern. There is no doubt of that. It would be a reasonable thing for the government to face the
question of a diversity of opinion in this country and come out with one or the other policy, instead of keeping us in suspense as to what is the real policy of the government.


Ernest Lapointe: Does my hon. friend want to split the country right away?


James Shaver Woodsworth: No; I do not want to split the country right away; but I want to know where this government stands, and I think the country has a right to know where it stands. I suggest that the Minister of Justice, after listening to the speech of the right hon. leader of the opposition, would have no doubt where he stands. We know where he stands, but we do not know where the government stands.


Ernest Lapointe: I know where I stand.


James Shaver Woodsworth: That may be; I wish the minister would tell us when the time comes. As regards having a war-time election, think what would happen. We would be faced with a fait accompli, and probably we would be into a khaki election. Would that keep the country united?
I should like to direct attention to the resolution of the hon. member for Vancouver North (Mr. MacNeil), which I think ought to be considered very carefully. This resolution reads as follows:
That in the opinion of this house the Canadian government should take such steps as may be necessary to make clear to the other members of the Commonwealth and to the world that the right either to declare war or to remain neutral, in any war that may occur, is vested solely in Canada.
I submit that is a step which we should take to clarify the situation. South Africa has done that in her Status of Union Act and Royal Executives Functions and Seals Act. Why do we not do it in Canada? I for one do not want to be dragged into another imperialistic war.
I put briefly two or three considerations, the first of which is that from a military standpoint our defence is wholly inadequate. It must be inadequate. How can we, a comparatively small country from the standpoint of population, a great, scattered country, possibly defend ourselves if, as the leader of the opposition suggested, someone were determined to come in. Let us recognize that fact. We cannot by ourselves have any real measure of security. I will go farther than that and say that to-day no nation can successfully adopt an isolationist policy. We may possibly have to do it for the moment; but I would urge that the world to-day forms a community,
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and we are all living more or less in that community. No nation, Canada or any other, can for long successfully adopt an isolationist policy.
Another point I should like to place before the house. I am sorry I have not time to develop these points further. I would give the warning that if another war does come, that war must mean not merely conscription of men but conscription of wealth. Let us give warning to people who to-day are profiteering out of war. Life is worth more than property. To-day we have returned men begging on the streets, while the profiteers from the last war go still unpunished.


Paul Joseph James Martin: Who suggested the conscription of man power?


James Shaver Woodsworth: That would come, inevitably, in another war. With that conscription there will come conscription of wealth; I mean by that not merely money, but mines, factories, stocks of goods-all titles to wealth. Gradually there is growing among our young people the realization of the truth that, after all, life ought to be worth more than property. If they are to sacrifice, others will sacrifice with them!
In one of his speeches the Minister of National Defence said:
The purpose of the armed forces of any country, I think, may be threefold. In the first place to support peace time diplomacy.
Here we seem to be back again to the old power politics. I was told in my childhood days that the custom of shaking hands gradually developed because, if a man stretched out his open hand, he could not keep his hand at his dagger or sword. I do not know whether or not that is correct, but for the 'purposes of the illustration it is sufficient. We cannot genuinely outstretch our hand in the direction of peace if we keep it firmly on our dagger or within reach of our dagger. We shall have to recognize that, if we are going to bring about peace, we must go a long way in the direction in getting rid of armaments.
The hon. member for Vancouver North put it very well on one occasion:
I consider that our first line of defence is our external relations, the foreign policy which keeps us out of war and enables us to settle international conflicts and live on terms of peace with other nations.
An hon. member asked me a little while ago as to what our policy would be. In answer I should like to read the policy of the organization with which I am connected, as adopted by resolution of the national convention of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation last year in Winnipeg:

Foreign Policy and World Peace
The imperialist powers have betrayed the principles of the League of Nations and are feverishly preparing for another war. The situation is so serious that it is no longer possible to content ourselves with vague declarations about our devotion to peace. A clear and conscious foreign policy has become of paramount importance.


Walter Edward Foster: The hon. member has
spoken forty minutes.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Go on.


Walter Edward Foster: With the consent of
the house the hon. member may proceed.


James Shaver Woodsworth: It continues:
Government policy and the people: The C.C.F. strongly condemns the secrecy with which foreign policy has been conducted by Liberals and Conservatives alike. Under Mr. King as under Mr. Bennett, it has been the practice to delay and avoid discussion of what our Department of External Affairs has been doing and of what commitments it may have undertaken. Yet upon these secret decisions may depend the lives of ten of thousands of young Canadians. Such conduct is a denial of all the democratic principles of responsible government. A C.C.F. government will take the Canadian people into its confidence on this as on other matters.


An hon. MEMBER:: Oh, oh.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Yes; someone says, "Oh, oh;" I feel like saying it myself. However, I shall continue reading the resolution:
Canada and the empire: At present Canada has not legally achieved complete control over her foreign policy because she is technically at war when Great Britain is at war. The C.C.F. therefore favours legislation similar to that recently passed in South Africa, which will remove the legal and constitutional obstacles to independent action by the Canadian parliament and will make it clear to the world that Canada is free to be neutral in any war, even in one in which the other members of the British commonwealth are engaged.


Paul Joseph James Martin: That represents a change
of attitude.


James Shaver Woodsworth: This was drawn
up two years ago.


Paul Joseph James Martin: And it represents the
change of attitude.


James Shaver Woodsworth: No, none at all.
This resolution was passed, with only one word different, two years ago, and reaffirmed last year. I continue:
Canada and the League of Nations: The C.C.F. reaffirms its belief that the principal causes of war in the modern world are economic competition, the struggle for raw materials and markets, and the class conflicts, which are an essential part of the capitalist system. It is evident that the most socialist countries to-day are the strongest influence for peace, while militarism, aggressive nationalism and war

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propaganda are flourishing amongst the capitalist and fascist powers. The change from capitalism to a socialist economy planned in the interest of the people will be the best protection against war.
It is however clear that a properly organized league of nations can be of great help in organizing world opinion against war and in establishing a system of collective security to prevent aggression. The present league has failed because imperialist governments have used it as a screen behind which to play the old game of power politics. To be effective the league must provide machinery for the peaceful change of treaties; it must deal fearlessly with economic conflicts arising from trade rivalries and from the struggle for raw materials; it must work out in advance a clear policy for collective action against an aggressor; and its members must disarm. The C.C.F. will actively support any policy which aims at such developments in the league.
Neutrality: The C.C.F. believes that Canada should remain strictly neutral in case of imperialist wars, regardless of who the belligerents may be. The Canadian government should avoid all commitments in any schemes of imperial defence and should confine its defence policy to local Canadian needs.
Mr. Speaker, if the house will bear with me for just a few minutes more-and I appreciate the courtesy it has extended-I shall indicate in a few words my own personal convictions. Perhaps those convictions are more akin to a religious faith than to a political program. Yet I am convinced that they will ultimately prove to be more practical than those generally held.
I should like to adopt as my own, some words I came across written by Lord Lothian:
The lesson of the last war is that you cannot get democracy, nor liberty, nor peace, out of a world war however noble the ends for which it is fought.
I am firmly convinced that that is true. We cannot get democracy, liberty or peace from war. Again I am firmly convinced that war settles nothing. As I said earlier in my remarks, the impending war is a direct result of the last great war. Then, one other thing-and some may not agree with me- armaments are no insurance against war. If we have a loaded gun, it is likely to go off.
I believe that there are other and more effective methods of dealing with outlaw nations. When the Prime Minister speaks of economic sanctions leading inevitably to war, I commend to him the following statement which appeared in the New York Times of November 30, 1937:
Understandings on trade, money, and credit will serve as certain weapons against treaty breakers. . . . The sure shadow of economic starvation on spendthrift governments which cannot wage war unless we supply them, and deny supplies to their victims, can be made sufficiently effective as a deterrent without resort to the substance of sanctions or war.
I believe that to be true. We have not tried out such a policy and since the league has failed we have no machinery by which we can apply it to-day.
I urge a scientific approach to this whole problem. We are living in a scientific age and we are accustomed to get at the causes of things. There are very definite causes of war, either psychological or economic. We can do something to avoid the psychological causes of war by speaking cautiously, as the Prime Minister has advised, or by not setting up barriers to trade and immigration, as we have all been more or less forced to do. We can avoid regarding other people as lesser breeds without the law and so on, but un-doutedly the main causes of war are economic in character. It is all very well for us to be proud of the British Empire; it is all very well for us to denounce little Japan-I denounce her with the rest-but after all Japan is doing only what most nations did a little earlier.
The western powers control 84 per cent of the earth's surface. Just think what that means. Great Britain controls 25 per cent of the world's population. Do we imagine that situation can go on forever? What should be our policy? First, let me urge that we must set our own house in order. Mr. Harold Burtler, director of the international labour office, says:
War is not caused only or mainly by lust for territory or booty or prestige; it is also caused by low standards of living, by the feeling of economic insecurity, by the desire for moral or social emancipation. The founders of the organization were right when they discerned an indissoluble connection between peace and social justice.
There you have it in a nutshell-we cannot have peace until we have social justice. As the Prime Minister said recently:
In all that pertains to justice, we must look to reason rather than to force. Let us never forget that there can be no genuine democracy where the doctrine of force prevails; neither can there he a Christian civilization.
Second, I suggest that we must act as a good neighbour. Canada has refused to submit to any scheme looking to a more equitable distribution of the world's raw materials. Canada, like most other nations, has imposed trade restrictions, which are always the cause of friction. Further, we have allowed certain groups of Canadians to profit out of the troubles of others and apparently are proposing to permit this on a more extended scale. Recently Stephen Leacock is reported as saying: "Europe's preparation for war in a cold, mean, business sense helps us immensely." Something more than a recognition that this
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is a cold, mean, business proposition is necessary if we would avoid the inevitable consequences of such a policy. "Be not deceived, God is not mocked." That nation which permits its citizens to profit through the miseries and bloodshed of others is headed for disaster and deserves its doom. If we want peace, we must be prepared to pay the price of peace.
Specifically with regard to the league, I would suggest that although it has been a miserable failure, we must try to build up slowly and painfully a reconstructed league. Nations must surrender what they now regard as their sovereignty. I think the hon. member for Essex East (Mr. Martin) pointed that out not long ago in a speech which he made. We can no longer maintain absolute sovereignty in a world where we are living in community. We must seek to remove the causes of friction. I do not know whether an international police force would help greatly, but I would rather have an international police force than national armies. Arrangements of this kind must be very temporary because we must depend upon something else.
With regard to the empire, it does seem to me we must recognize that the empire as we have known it was built largely on conquest. Only recently I came across an almost prophetic statement by Sir Thoimas More. He said:
Everywhere do I perceive a certain conspiracy of rich men seeking their own advantage under the name and pretext of a commonwealth.
Read J. A. Hobson's considered statement:
The decades of imperialism have been prolific in wars; most of these wars have been directly motived by aggression of white races upon lower races by forcible seizure of territory. Every one of the steps of expansion in Africa, Asia and the Pacific has been accompanied by bloodshed.
If I can do anything to prevent it, our Canadian boys shall not shed their blood in any more imperialistic schemes-all under the guise of patriotism.
We must claim our right to be neutral. I have not time to develop this point.
Lastly, as I said before, we must be willing to pay the price of peace. We have been paying an enormous price in attempting to get security through war. Canada is one of the least armed nations, and yet we are paying an amount for war that would largely settle the problem of the unemployed in this country. We are loaded down with debt, a no small portion of which was incurred in the last war. Why cannot we learn the lessons of the past and at least seek a new way? We should be prepared to pay the price of peace.

The thing that most distresses me in my own country to-day is the fact that if we can get orders for raw materials from Japan or for aeroplanes and there is money in it, we propose to get the money. If we can get orders for British munitions, we are willing to head straight into that sort of enterprise. We want to keep out ourselves, but we are not willing to pay the price of losing any trade. It may prove to be a costly price that will have to be paid in order that we can win peace.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Whom does my hon. friend mean by "we."


James Shaver Woodsworth: We in Canada. This government has it in its power to control the activities of industry in this country. In my judgment they should be controlled.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: My hon. friend says that we must find a new way, but is not that exactly what the League of Nations sought to do? If the new way was the best and it had the support that it had, why did it not succeed?


James Shaver Woodsworth: I think we all recognize that the League of Nations did not have the support of the nations. Mr. Woodrow Wilson, who was so largely instrumental in forming the league, could not carry his own country with him. The great nations of England and France for many a year after the war took the stand that Germany must be punished. I do not need to go into all that. There were the forces on the Rhine, the ships that were sunk, the trade that was destroyed and the colonies that were taken. We were out to punish Germany. In my judgment it was the action of the great empires towards Germany that produced Hitler. One thing has led to another. If we had been a little bit stronger in the case of Manchuria, we should not have had the difficulty which to-day exists in China. However, I do not intend to go into these matters; the house has been very patient.
Undoubtedly the league has failed. The league was based on the idea of force. Perhaps centralized force for such a purpose would be preferable to the national armies which are being set up to-day, although I do not think that primarily the league should have been based upon force. However, if the league has failed, why cannot we reconstitute it?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: My hon.
friend says "we." That is the point I am trying to get at. Who is "we"?

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James Shaver Woodsworth: The world.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: If the hon. member means the world, I agree with all he says, but if in saying "we" he means Canada I fail to see the point at all.


James Shaver Woodsworth: We in Canada can give our assistance.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: We always
have. We have done the best we could.


James Shaver Woodsworth: No; I'm afraid we have not. We have not done the best we could. We have followed almost slavishly the lead of other nations; we have not even been in the forefront in some matters which might be named. I hope the house will not think that I am trying simply to blame. I am not talking party politics at all. If the league has failed, instead of in desperation reverting to the old isolationist position, with the idea of certain groups of nations getting together, of achieving a preponderance of power and playing the same old game again, why should not we in Canada patiently and definitely set ourselves to try to discover some other way.
To-day we are living in peace alongside the great American republic to the south of us-a wonderful example of how nations can live in peace. I venture, however, to say that if cannon were placed on the international border along the forty-ninth parallel we should have trouble. We are at peace because of the very lack of any armaments or border patrols. Think of the effective work of our International Joint Commission. There is not a better example anywhere in *the world of what can 'be accomplished through having a joint body to deal with troubles as they arise. I had intended to go further into that, but I have not time tonight. Why cannot we extend the application of such a principle?
Surely we can do something. If we cannot attain to a world wide league, which perhaps is too much to expect all of a sudden, at least we can build up very friendly relations with a number of the democratic nations, not with the idea of enforcing our own purposes and points of view, but with hand outstretched even to some of those nations whom to-day we must denounce because of their actions. Call this pure idealism if you will, but after the experience of the last war and the misery and tragedy which has come since, surely we ought to try to find some other way. If to-night I proposed to spend $34,000,600 upon a peace program, setting up a peace department, people would simply laugh, and yet, in allocating this money to 51952-204
defence, we are merely going along on the same old lines that in the past have led to disaster. Cannot we use our imaginations a little; cannot we begin, even though in a small way, along lines which may mean material sacrifice to us and which may even be risky? Somebody has to take risks. We take enormous risks when we go to war. Why not take some risks in an effort to bring about peace?
Mr. Speaker, I thank you. I think this is the only time that I have so far transgressed the rules of the house, but the occasion is an important one. I appreciate very much the courtesy extended to me by the house.


Ernest Lapointe: I have neither the will nor the time to offer any extended observations. I merely desire to say a word in answer to one or two remarks of my right hon. friend the leader of the opposition (Mr. Bennett) and to one remark of the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Woodsworth). I should not even say "in answer"; I am going to direct a word or two to my hon. friends.
First, I was surprised to hear the right hon. leader of the opposition commend in rather kindly terms the declaration of the conference of 1926, and speak of the obligations which he contends it involves, because of the "free association" which is mentioned in it. Those who were in this parliament in 1927 will remember that my right hon. leader and I were strongly criticized, not perhaps by my right hon. friend-for I do not believe he took part in that debate; he was absent from the house-but by the then leader, the Hon. Mr. Guthrie, and the hon. member for St. Lawrence-St. George (Mr. Cahan). The description which was then made of the work of that conference was that it was a sort of separatist movement from the British commonwealth, and far from being a bond of association, as my right hon. friend has described it to-day.
Further, after the conference of 1929 on dominion legislation, when we discussed the report of that conference in 1930 I well remember the strong words of my right hon. friend at that time with regard to its work. Of course I am not proficient in the English language, and I learned some words as I listened to my right hon. friend. I clearly recall his speech at the time because it was the first occasion when I heard the word "painter." He said that we had "cut the painter and let the mooring go"; that we were drifting from the little island in the North

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sea, and that sort of thing. That was the description he gave at that time of this beautiful work which now he describes as an association and which confers the obligations of which he has spoken.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Will the right hon. gentleman permit me? He will recall that in the Statute of Westminster we had inserted a provision that no power was conferred to amend the constitution of Canada. That was the whole point.


Ernest Lapointe: That is right, but I do not think it has much to do with what I was just saying. We have the right to frame our own policies. We are, as my right hon. friend has said, an association of free states. He said we have to carry on the obligations of the free association. Well, "obligations" and "freedom" do not go very well together. We have the right to devise our own policy in everything; we are autonomous in matters internal and external, and that includes defence policies. I believe that I am really serving the aim of the preservation of that association, of that bond, by claiming absolute freedom in all matters of policy whether external or internal. There could be no more deadly blow to the preservation of the free association than the claim and the contention that Canada or any other dominion should be bound blindly by any policy of the United Kingdom or of any other part of the commonwealth with which we would have nothing to do.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Has anyone suggested that?


Ernest Lapointe: Well, it is really an inference. I am glad that my right hon. friend does not suggest it. If he does not, we are more in agreement than I was afraid we were. I am always pleased to be in agreement with the right hon. gentleman.
Freedom is the bond, and it is the safest guarantee of association and of union between the various parts of the commonwealth. My right hon. friend says, no criticism after the event. Well, the foreign policy of Britain is criticized there every day after it has been devised and framed. Anyone who has read the newspapers lately must have read the violent, bitter words of Lloyd George, of Mr. Attlee, and of other prominent members of the commons with regard to the measures which had been taken by the British government. Is it to be said that here we cannot even criticize the policy, that we have to accept it without having anything to do with it and without having any policy of our own?

With that I cannot agree, and if my right hon. friend will permit me, I will say it is very different from the Canada-first policy which I heard so eloquently expressed in 1930.


Richard Bedford Bennett: And I still make the same contention.


Ernest Lapointe: I am more Canada-first to-night than my right hon. friend.


Richard Bedford Bennett: Not a bit.


Ernest Lapointe: And now a word to my hon. friend from Winnipeg North Centre (Mr. Woodsworth), for whose views I have every respect. The leader of the opposition is at least logical, but I cannot see the logic of the stand taken by the hon. member for Winnipeg North Centre. He does not like our attitude of saying nothing, doing nothing, not criticizing other countries that are invading some other parts of the world. We ought to be aggressive at least in our words, in our attitude, in our stand; but he does not want us to have anything to do with preparing to defend our own country, or with preparations to guarantee the security of our coast from attack. We will defy the world; we will challenge other countries, but we must not be ready if they take up our challenge.
There is another thing. My hon. friend says that the policy of Great Britain since the war has been a succession of blunders. I do not agree with that. Great Britain has saved the world from war at least twice. The policy of Great Britain has averted war. I have no hesitation in making that statement. I know the criticism that has been leveled against the British government on two or three occasions, and I know that criticism has been most unfair. I will allude to one of them, at the time of the invasion of Ethiopia by Italy. Great Britain has been criticized bitterly even in this parliament. I do not know whether I have the right to say something which is rather of a confidential nature, but I have heard two ministers connected with the foreign affairs department in Great Britain, in answer to a criticism made by one delegate of one dominion with regard to that very matter, make this statement: "Yes, we have done all we could to prevent war, but at a certain time when we were urged by other countries to go to war on that question, we said, 'All right, what help will you give?' And not one of them was ready to give any help." They all wanted Britain to go and wage war in a certain part of the world, but none of those who were so free to offer advice was ready to help. I say that Britain since the war has not deserved the

Halifax Inshore Fishing
criticism which we have heard in this house and seen in the newspapers and in other countries. I repeat, I believe with all my heart and soul that if the world has been saved from war since 1921, Britain is responsible for having maintained the peace of the world.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: And it is
equally true to-day.


Ernest Lapointe: I think
the same is true to-day. It is now eleven o'clock, and I shall conclude with this question:	What is the foreign policy of Canada?
The foreign policy of Canada is to keep Canada out of war; to try to keep Canada at peace; to be peaceful with all the countries of the world; to have those family relations, of which my right hon. friend speaks, with the other members of the commonwealth; to avoid offensive language towards other countries, and to save Canada for the destinies which are ahead of her.
Motion agreed to and the house went into committee of supply, Mr. Sanderson in the chair.
Progress reported.


[Stage Direction]
At eleven o'clock the house adjourned, without question put, pursuant to standing order.
Wednesday, May 25, 1938