1924-06-09

HUDSON BAY RAILWAY

[Stage Direction]
Hon. GEORGE P. GRAHAM (Minister of Railways and Canals):	The other day I
promised to lay on the Table of the House certain reports concerning the Hudson Bay Railway, and I now do so.


Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING (Prime Minister):: I beg to lay on the Table of the House copy of the treaty for the suppression of smuggling operations along the international boundary, between the Dominion of Canada and the United States, and assisting in the arrest and prosecution of persons violating the narcotic laws of either government, and for kindred purposes.
Civil Service Salaries



PRIVATE BILLS FIRST READINGS

[Stage Direction]
Bill No. 167 (from the Senate), to amend the Act to incorporate the Board of the Presbyterian College, Halifax.-Mr. Duff.
Bill No. 168 (from the Senate), for the relief of James Koniaris.-Mr. Wallace.

[Stage Direction]
Bill No. 166, for the relief of Raymond Anderson Mashinter.-Mr. McQuarrie.

[Stage Direction]
On the Orders of the Day.
Mr. J. H. HARRIS (East York):: I desire to draw the attention of the government to a news item appearing in the Toronto Evening Telegram of June 7, which reads:
Still in the Dark
Civil Service Salaries to be House Announcement Word reached the city last night that the report of the commission on the civil service salary readjustment had been referred back to the commission and in turn handed back to the cabinet. The officials of the Postal Federation having been advised that an announcement will be made on the floor of the House by the Honourable Mr. King in connection with this matter and the intimation is also given that certain concessions that were objected to by the commission were insisted on by the cabinet as more advantageous to the civil servants.
I desire to ask, is the government going to make this announcement? This is a matter of national importance, to-day, inasmuch as it affects some 12,000 of our civil servants. Secondly, will the government's announcement contain an upward or downward revision of the earnings-not the salaries -of the lower paid civil servants in the postal service?
Right Hon. W. L. MACKENZIE KING
(Prime Minister):	The Civil Service Commission's final report to the government has been concurred in and approved by the government, and to-day an order in council was passed, which, however, has not yet been signed by His Excellency. As soon as it is signed by His Excellency I shall see that a copy of it is laid on the Table of the House. The order, I think, will give full particulars in answer to the question of my hon. friend.


Joseph Henry Harris: When does the Prime Minister think that will be done.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I think the
order in council will be signed this afternoon, so that it can be placed on the Table of the House before the House rises this evening.



CROWSNEST PASS AGREEMENT

[Stage Direction]
On the Orders of the Day.
Sir HENRY DRAYTON:: (West York): Can the minister inform me whether the press item to the effect that representations have been made by the railways in connection with the Crowsnest pass agreement have been received is correct and if so will these representations be tabled?
HON. GEORGE P. GRAHAM (Minister of Railways and Canals): I made the statement a few days ago in the House that such representations had been received. I did not consider the question of tabling them, they had not really been fully considered by the government. I think I also added the information that it was the desire of the government, and their intention, to name a day when the railways and those who took an opposite view might be heard before the cabinet, or a sub-committee of the cabinet. I think there is no objection to tabling these memoranda, if there is a sufficient number of copies. I think we only have a half a dozen copies. I will make inquiries.


Henry Lumley Drayton: I quite agree
that it is for the cabinet to deal with this, but I had not much hope that they would do so, having regard to past history. If they do not, I hope the representations will be tabled.



SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES

[Stage Direction]
On the Orders of the Day:
Henry Lumley Drayton: In reference to the Supplementary estimates, I will not ask the Acting Minister of Finance (Mr. Robb) why he is holding up these estimates, but I ask him when we may expect the Supplementary estimates to be tabled.


Hon. J. A. ROBB (Acting Minister of Finance) :: May I request my hon. friend and
others not to press too loudly the intimation that there may be Supplementary estimates.


Henry Lumley Drayton: I am glad to
accept that as an answer. I know that there will be such estimates, and it would certainly facilitate the business of the House and the passing of the other estimates if the House knew at the earliest possible moment how much it is expected to vote altogether.



WATER-POWERS OF ONTARIO

[Stage Direction]
On the Orders of the Day.
Mr. W. M. GERMAN (Welland):: I draw
the attention of the Minister of Railways and Canals (Mr. Graham) and the Minister of the Interior (Mr. Stewart) to a report in the

Consular Privileges
Toronto Globe of last Friday of a speech made by Sir Adam Beck at Prescott, Ontario, as follows:
Sir Adam announced to-night amid loud applause that at an interview in Ottawa to-day with Hon. George P. Graham, Minister of Railways and Canals and Hon. Charles Stewart, Minister of the Interior, these two ministers conceded to him on behalf of the federal government the full rights of Ontario as to the use of its water-power without litigation.
Will the hon. minister tell me if they made a statement of that kind or to that effect, or if they stated anything that would lead Sir Adam Beck to infer that the government would hand over the waters of the St. Lawrence river to the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario?
Hon. GEORGE P. GRAHAM (Minister of Railways and Canals):	Sir Adam Beck, as
we all know, is an optimist on the question of the supply of power for the province of Ontario. He certainly is mistaken as to my making any suggestion along the lines indicated in his speech. I would have no authority to make such a statement, and as it is altogether a legal matter, I would not have the knowledge requisite to warrant me in making such a statement.


Henry Lumley Drayton: The hon. minister will recollect stating in the House either early this session or late last session that, so far as water for power purposes was concerned, it was a provincial right.


Mr. GRAHAM:: I think, speaking from
memory, that my statement was that there were different parties interested, and I mentioned those parties, naming the provinces, the States, and the federal authorities. I have expressed the hope in this House that all interests might be harmonized in the undertaking of the great national work, but I would certainly have no authority to make the statement attributed to me by Sir Adam Beck.


William Manley German: Has the Minister of the Interior any answer to make?


Hon. CHARLES STEWART (Argen-teuil) (Minister of the Interior):: I have the
same statement to make. This is a legal matter. I have said, and I have no hesitation in saying again, that I think the people of Ontario have undoubtedly the first claim upon whatever power may be developed from these waters, but I cannot venture an opinion as to who owns the power.



LIQUOR AND NARCOTICS


[Stage Direction]
On the Orders of the Day:
Right Hon. ARTHUR MEIGHEN (Leader of the Opposition):: Has the Senate of the United States ratified the treaty to which the Prime Minister referred on Motions as having been laid on the Table now?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I understand the Senate
has not ratified the treaty.



CONSULAR PRIVILEGES

[Stage Direction]
On the Orders of the Day:
Mr. J. S. WOODSWORTIJ (Centre Winnipeg) :: I should like to call the attention of the government to a news item appearing in the Montreal Gazette of June 7 under the heading:
Arrest of Spanish representative officially protested by Norwegian consul.
The article states in part:
There are two points at issue. The first is whether a consul, duly accredited, and representing the country in a foreign land, can be arrested by the police. The consuls at Montreal, such as those of France, the United States, Spain, and others, are not only consuls, but consuls-general, and therefore as high in the deplomatic service in Canada as is possible in a colony.
The second point is:
Whether or not the consular service is to remain in doubt in the matter of consular papers being searched by officers of any police force.
In the first place, does the government concede that Canada occupies the status simply of a colony? In the second place, is there precedent for the arrest of a consul, and are consular officers exempted from search?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Replying to my hon.
friend's first question, whether the government regards the status of the Dominion as that of a colony, I would say: Most certainly not; the status is that of a self-governing Dominion. As to the second question, whether consuls are to be exempt from arrest, the particular case to which the hon. member refers is one of a consul having been arrested on a very serious charge, that of violation of the smuggling laws, also the Opium and Narcotic Drugs Act of this country. I do not think there is in our laws any provision which would exempt consuls from arrest under such charges. As to whether there is a right of examination of documents in consular
Lausanne Treaty

offices, I am not aware that consuls enjoy any immunity equivalent to that which is granted ambassadors.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Would there, then, be a protest against the Norwegian consul making such statement public as to the standing of Canada politically?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I have no
doubt my hon. friend's remarks will serve as such.



THE LAUSANNE TREATY

[Stage Direction]
On the Orders of the Day:
Arthur Meighen: Will the Prime Minister say whether there has taken place in relation to the Lausanne treaty any correspondence which is not now on the Table and which he may purpose to use in the discussion?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: As I intimated at the
time the correspondence was tabled, the correspondence is not complete. Such of it as was agreed upon between the British government and this government was brought down. I do not propose this afternoon to refer to more than one communication which is not before the House. It is a communication which I have already shown to my right hon. friend. I do not intend to disclose the contents of it, but I purpose making some reference to it. Apart from that, I shall not refer to any other of the correspondence not tabled.



FORTHCOMING LEGISLATION

[Stage Direction]
On the Orders of the Day:
William Lyon Mackenzie King: My right hon. friend (Mr. Meighen) asked me on Thursday last if I would intimate to the House at an early date what further legislation might be brought before parliament this session. I should not like to bind the government absolutely by saying that we will confine ourselves strictly to the list of bills that I may now refer to. Naturally, the government would wish some little latitude; questions may come up between now and the close of the session that will suggest the necessity for further legislation. But, broadly speaking, I think the statement which I am about to make will cover the important legislation that is likely still to be brought down. I shall make no reference to what already appears on the order paper; it is assumed that whatever is already there will be pro-
ceeded with. There is, also, of course, legislation that will arise out of the reports of the several committees that are sitting at the present time and that have not yet reported to the House. Most important in that connection will be the committee on Redistribution, the committee on Banking and Commerce, the committee to which has been referred the Superannuation Bill, the committee dealing with Soldiers' Pensions and Re-establishment, and the committee on Old Age Pensions. Then, there are contemplated amendments to the Dominion Elections Act; an amendment to the Yukon Act; a bill providing for the consolidation of the revenue collecting services of the government under one administrative head, as was announced in the Speech from the Throne, amendments to the Criminal Code; amendments to the Immigration Act, Feeding Stuffs Act, Dominion Lands Act, Land Titles Act, Inland Lakes and Freight Rates Act, Gold and Silver Marking Act, and Annuities. Possibly also legislation with respect to loans to one or more of the harbour commissions, and legislation to ratify commercial treaties, may be brought down.



QUESTIONS

[Stage Direction]
(Questions answered orally are indicated by an asterisk).
STEEL IMPORTS Mr. DOUCET:
1.	Has the government received from the Board of Trade, Sydney, Nova Scotia, a resolution protesting against the proposed tariff changes as embodied in the budget resolution dealing with the entry into Canada, duty free, of certain steel products?
2.	Does the government propose amending said resolution, so as to safeguard Canadian steel Industries?

Mr. RINFRET:: 1.	What amount was paid by the government to the Canada Colonization Association, for immigration and other purposes?
2.	How many immigrants has that company secured to date?


Hon. Mr. ROBB:: 1.	$140,000.
2.	The total number of immigrants from the field covered by the Canada Colonization Association during the years in which the above subscriptions were paid was 28,378.


CIVIL SERVICE RETIREMENT
Mr. RINFRET:: How many employees will leave, or have already left the civil service since January 1, 1924, in accordance with the government's policy of economy (a) in the Postal Department at Montreal, and (b) in the Customs and Excise Department, Montreal?


Hon. Mr. COPP:: Post Office department: (a) Twenty-two positions in the Montreal Post Office which have become vacant since the 1st January, 1924, owing to the resignation and retirement of the incumbents have not been filled and it is considered can be dropped from the organization of the office without impairing the efficiency of the service. Further positions will be dropped from the organization as they become vacant providing the requirements of the service permit.
Department of Customs and Excise: None.


UNITED STATES TARIFF
Hon. Mr. STEVENS:: 1.	Is there a clause in the United States tariff empowering the president to increase the duty against foreign goods entering the United States, under certain conditions?
2.	If so, has the said law been invoktd during the past two years, and how frequently and on what goods, and to what rate was said duty increased?


James Alexander Robb: The hon. member for
Vancouver Centre (Mr. Stevens) is not now in his seat. May I direct the attention of the leader of the opposition (Mr. Meighen) to the fact that this question is one which I do not think we as the government of Canada can very fairly answer.


Arthur Meighen: I do not see any difficulty in answering the first one.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: It applies to
all countries.


Arthur Meighen: I am satisfied the answer could be given in so far as Canada might be affected.
Question stands.


POWER DAM AT MORRISBURG
Mr. CHURCH:: 1.	Has an application been received by the government of Canada from the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario to construct a power dam at Morrisburg ?
2.	If so, is the application complete, or what remains to be done to complete the same?
3.	What action, if any, has or will be taken by the government, and has the government consented to the same?
4.	Will a decision be given on this application without undue delay?
5.	Has the government of the province of Ontario consented to the application and is it supporting the same?
6.	Has the government of the province of Ontario consented to grant the leases required for the construction of this work, and what communications have been received from them?


Hon. Mr. KING (Kootenay):: 1.	An application for approval of plans and site for dam and power development works at or near Morrisburg has been received1 from the Hydro-Electric Power Commission of Ontario.
2. No: the commission has advised that it will forward evidence of its interest in the
Questions

lands, covered by water, upon which the works are to be constructed, but has not yet done so.
3.	Completion of the application is being awaited.
4.	Yes.
5.	No communication on the subject has been received from the Government of Ontario.
6.	See Nos. 2 and 5.


MR. LOUIS GAUTHIER
Mr. DOUCET:: 1.	Has Mr. Louis Gauthier, caretaker of the post office at Matane, Quebec, been retired?
2.	If so, on what date did his retirement take effect?
3.	For what reason was he dismissed?
4.	Were any charges made against him?
5.	If so, by whom; what were such charges, and was an investigation held?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: 1 and 2. The services of Mr. Louis Gauthier were dispensed with on May 31, 1924.
3.	For unsatisfactory service.
4 and 5. Yes, charges of offensive conduct were made by Ange Paradis, L. 0. Roy, T. Joncas, F. Pino, F. Gagnon, pere, Miss A. Desjardins, Miss G. McLaren, J. R. Boulanger, R. St. Laurent, F. J. Pelletier, M.P. An investigation was held.


CANADIANS AND PASSPORTS
Hon. Mr. STEVENS:: 1.	Is it necessary for Canadians travelling to Great Britain to have passports?
2.	If so, where are these passports obtainable rnd is there a charge made for same?
3.	Has said charge been increased frnn $2 to $5 per person ?
4.	Has the government made any representations to the British government for the removal of this onerous formality?


Right Hon. Mr. MACKENZIE KING:: 1.	Yes.
2.	Passport Office, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa. A fee is payable on the issue of a passport.
3.	The fee on a passport has been increased from $2 to $5, but a passport may include more than one person.
4.	Representations were made to the British government asking that Canadians visiting Great Britain might be relieved of the obligation to carry passports, but it was pointed out in reply that if Canadians did not cany passports they would find themselves subject to more inconvenience at the port of arrival than they now experience in obtaining passports at the outset, owing to arrangements

made for controlling the entry of aliens, under which evidence of nationality has to be furnished by those entering the United Kingdom, experience having shown the carrying of a passport to be essential; and His Majesty's government was of opinion that it would not be either to the general advantage or in the interests of the passengers themselves to dispense with the requirements of passports.
SPEAKER'S SECRETARY Mr. SEGUIN:
1.	What amount did the Speaker's Secretary receive
for his last year of service (a) as a fixed salary; (b) as sessional clerk;	(c) as a bonus;	(d) in any other
capacity; during the last year that this position was filled?
2.	What amount is at present being paid for the whole year services of the two stenographers and typewriters who are doing the work of the Speaker's Secretary and belong to the stenographers staff?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: This question is merely a repetition of a question answered a day or two ago. It is somewhat differently expressed but the hon. member will find that the answer has already been given.


UNOPPOSED MOTIONS FOR PAPERS
Mr. RYCKMAN:: For a copy of all telegrams, letters or other messages, or documents, despatched from the Department of Justice to the authorities of Portsmouth penitentiary respecting the non-infliction of lashes on the person commonly known as Red Ryan.
BANK OF COMMERCE; BANK OF HAMILTON


Mr. COOTE:: For a copy of all correspondence, letters, telegrams and other documents passing between the government or any member thereof and the Canadian Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Hamilton or any of the directors of the said banks or any other parties, in any way relating to the amalgamation of the Canadian Bank of Commerce and the Bank of Hamilton.


MR. D. D. CAMPBELL
Mr. CHAPLIN:: For a copy of all correspondence, telegrams and other documents referring to the dismissal of Mr. D. D. Campbell as Postmaster at O'Leary, Prince Edward Island, and if charges were made and an investigation held, a copy of the evidence taken and the investigator'* report.
LUDOVIC GERMAIN Mr. DOUCET:
For a copy of all correspondence and other documents relating to the inquiry on Ludovic Germain, chief of the city distribution branch, Montreal Post Office; also a copy of evidence given at said inquiry, together with the investigator's report.

Supply-Lausanne Treaty


TRADE COMMISSIONERS
Henry Lumley Drayton: For a copy of all correspondence, telegrams, letters and other documents, passing between the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Civil Service Commission respecting the matter of the necessity of a person being a university graduate before appointment as trade commissioner.


Henry Lumley Drayton: For a copy of all letters, telegrams and other documents passing between the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Civil Service commission respecting the matter of an age limit for appointments as trade commissioner.


MAJOR J. B. HARDINGE
Mr. JOHNSTON:: For a copy of all reports, correspondence, telegrams and other documents, passing between any officer or officers of the Indian Department, from September, 1922, to date with respect to the suspension, and subsequent resignation of Major J. B. Hardinge, Indian Agent of the Touchwood Agency at Punnichy, Saskatchewan.


MR. S. BRICKMAN
Mr. SUTHERLAND:: For a copy of all correspondence, telegrams and other documents relating to charges of political partisanship preferred against S. Brickman, Postmaster at Sebring-ville, Ontario, together with a copy of the evidence taken, the investigator's report, and showing what action was taken by the government on said report.


MR. WILLIAM BOYD
Donald Sutherland: For a copy of all correspondence, telegrams and other documents relating to charges of political partisanship preferred against Wm. Boyd, postmaster at Kagawong, Ontario, together with a copy of the evidence taken, the investigator's report, and showing what action was taken by the government on said report.


MR. W. L. TROTTER
Donald Sutherland: For a copy of all correspondence, telegrams and other documents relating to charges of political partisanship preferred against W. L. Trotter, postmaster at She-guinadah, Ontario, together with a copy of the evidence taken, the investigator's report, and showing what action was taken by the government on said report.


NORTHWEST TERRITORIES ACT AMENDMENT
[Stage Direction]
Hon. CHARLES STEWART (Argenteuil) (Minister of the Interior) moved that the House go into committee at the next sitting to consider the following proposed resolution: Resolved, that it is expedient to amend section eight of the Northwest Territories Act, Revised Statutes, 1906, chapter 62, by adding to the subjects on which the Commissioner in Council may make ordinances as therein designated, the levying of an export tax on furs within the Territories.
Motion agreed to.

[Stage Direction]
The House in committee of Supply, Mr. Gordon in the chair.
Department of External Affairs-Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Deputy Head, $8,000.
['Before the\nHouse adjourns, I should like to lay on the Table copy of an order in council referred to this afternoon which has since been signed by His Excellency, setting forth rates of compensation to be paid to certain classes of employees in the postal service.\nOn motion of Mr. Mackenzie King the House adjourned at 1.30 a.m. (Tuesday).\nTuesday, June 10, 1924.']
Arthur Meighen: Does the Prime Minister expect the discussion to take place under this item? If so, does he propose to make a statement respecting Canada's relationship to the Treaty of Lausanne and the recent controversy that has arisen upon it? As yet he has merely outlined the letters that have passed.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Mr. Chairman, as I mentioned to the House some days ago, I thought it would perhaps afford hon. members more latitude in discussing matters pertaining to the Lausanne conference and treaty if this subject were brought up when the estimates of the Department of External Affairs were under consideration. Perhaps it would facilitate discussion if I were at once to anticipate some of the points that may possibly arise in connection with the subject and endeavour to remove some misapprehensions and, I might add, misrepresentations, and also give to the House a clear statement of the government's attitude and position in regard to the treaty.
Hon. members have had placed before them in printed form a copy of most of the com-n munications that have passed between the British government and the Canadian government with reference to the conference and the treaty. I had better direct the attention of the House immediately to the communication in which the government was made aware of the holding of the conference and the nature of the invitations which were extended to the conference by the parties who had in hand the arrangements with reference thereto. The communication setting forth the essential facts in this regard will be found as the first in the return which has been brought down. It is dated London, October 27, 1922, and is from the Secretary of State for the Co! mies, addressed to myself as Prime Minister of Canada. It is as follows:
Yesterday invitations were sent by the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to the Japanese, Roumanian, Jugoslav, Greek and Turkish governments, " both of Constantinople and Angora," to send representatives to Lausanne, November 13th to conclude treaty to end war in the East which will replace Treaty of Sevres. Russian Soviet government and Bulgarian government also being invited to send to Lausanne, at any date to be fixed, representatives to take part in discussion on question of the Straits which the conference will undertake at a later stage. Inquiry (?) is also being addressed
Supply-Lausanne Treaty

by the three governments to the United States expressing hope that they will permit United States representative to be present during Lausanne negotiations in a capacity similar to that in which United States representative was present during negotiations at San Remo in 1920, or to take more active part in the negotiations, specially on the question of the Straits. According to arrangements agreed upon with French and Italian governments each government would be represented at Lausanne by two plenipotentiaries. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will personally act as chief British plenipotentiary and it is proposed he should be accompanied by the British High Commissioner at Constantinople. Dominion governments will be kept informed from time to time on the general lines of policy on which British plenipotentiaries propose to proceed and of course of negotiations and in case of other treaties arising out of the peace will of course be invited to sign new treaty and any separate instrument regulating the status of the Straits. His Majesty's government trusts that this procedure will be in accordance with the wishes of your government. Plenipotentiaries are fully acquainted with the Imperial aspect of the problem and with the keen interest taken by the Dominion governments in its solution. Similar telegram sent to other prime ministers. Ends.
Devonshire.
Hon. members will observe that this communication begins with the words, "Yesterday invitations were sent"-not, as has been interpreted in some of the press discussions which I have seen on the subject, "are being sent" -which would indicate that the governments mentioned were considering sending certain invitations and were desirous of consulting in the first instance with the government of Canada in reference to them. Our informa-[DOT] tion was of un fait accompli-the statement given to us was to the effect that the invitations had been sent the day before. I would ask hon. members to notice the wording of the first sentence-"were sent by the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy." The dispatch does not say that the invitations were sent on behalf of the governments of the British Empire; the meaning is clear.
-were sent by the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to the Japanese, Roumanian, Jugoslav, Greek and Turkish governments to send representatives to Lausanne on November 13, to conclude a treaty to end the war in the Near East.
A little further on in the dispatch is the paragraph:
According to arrangements agreed upon with the French and Italian governments, each government will be represented at Lausanne by two plenipotentiaries.
"Each government" refers to the governments mentioned in the opening sentence of the dispatch, namely, the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy. There is no mention there of the governments of the British Empire; in particular, there is no mention there of the Dominion of Canada, nor indeed, will there be found anywhere within the four corners of this dispatch the least

intimation that in any way it was intended that the Dominion government should be represented at this conference by the plenipotentiaries that are named therein.
My right hon. friend asked me early this afternoon if I intended to refer to any other communications. It is an embarrassing feature of this situation that all the correspondence cannot be placed on the Table of the House, but hon. members will appreciate that in matters of international concern there may be communications which, while there is no reason why they should not be known to the different governments of the same Empire, it might not be advisable to have made public as against the rest of the world.
There was, accompanying this dispatch, another communication, also of a confidential character, which had a distinct bearing upon the reply which was sent by this government. Indeed, both communications should be read together in order to enable those who are interested properly to appreciate the full significance of the reply which the.. Canadian government sent. Now, I am precluded from giving the text of the other communication to which I have referred, but when this matter first came up in the House I sent a copy of all the correspondence to my right hon. friend, the leader of the opposition so that he would be aware, being a member also of the privy council, of the full nature and extent of the correspondence that had passed between the two governments, and I wish to say in his hearing that that communication gave reasons why the government of Canada was not being invited and why representatives from this government should not and could not be present at the Lausanne conference. That fact, I think, should be made clear in view of the discussion that has taken place in the Old World as well as in this with respect to the stand taken by the government of Canada. I think it should have been made clear in the British House of Commons that there had been a communication which, in so many words, gave reasons why Canada could not be represented at the conference.
Having received this intimation, we had to consider the nature of the reply which we would send. Had we wished to create an embarrassing situation, we might possibly have taken strong exception to the manner in which this whole subject had been brought to our attention and to the course adopted, but we realized that there were many serious aspects of European politics which it was advisable for us to take into account. We were in no way anxious to add to the difficulties of the

Supply-Lausanne Treaty
British government in dealing with these matters; indeed, we were desirous of doing all in our power to assist in removing any sort of embarrassment, and in that spirit and wholly from that motive the following message, of date October 31, was sent by His Excellency the Governor General, as coming from myself, in reply to the Duke of Devonshire's message:
I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Grace's dispatch of the 27th instant, informing our government of the invitations to the Lausanne Conference which have been sent to the governments of other countries by the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy, and setting forth the procedure in reference thereto.
Our government has no exception to take to the course pursued by His Majesty's government with respect to the conclusion of a treaty to end the war in the Near East. As, however, it is proposed to keep our government informed from time to time of the general lines of policy on which British plenipotentiaries propose to proceed, and of the course of negotiations, and to invite us to sign a new treaty and any separate instrument regulating the status of the Straits, we deem it advisable to avail ourselves of the earliest Opportunity to inform His Majesty's government that in our opinion the extent to which Canada may be held to be bound by the proceedings of the conference or by the provisions of any treaty or other instrument arising out of the same, is necessarily a matter for the parliament of Canada to decide and that the rights and powers of our parliament in these particulars must not be held to be affected by implication or otherwise in virtue of the information with which our government may be supplied.
This was signed by His Excellency, Lord Byng.	I would direct the attention of the
House to the use in this dispatch of the words "a treaty to end the war"-
Our government has no exception to take to the course pursued by His Majesty's government with respect to the conclusion of a treaty to end the war in the Near East.
The intimation that had been given to us concerning the Lausanne conference was that it was a conference for the purpose of bringing the war to an end. When this first communication was being considered by council, the question naturally arose, how did Canada come to be in the war?-was it at the instance of some action of our Governor in Council, or was war declared by His Majesty the King on the advice of his ministers in Britain? I think the facts will disclose that	His	Majesty	the King acted	onthe advice of his ministers in Britain in declaring war against Turkey. That being the	case,	it did	not	seem to us	an
unnatural thing that His Majesty's ministers in Great Britain should deem that they were in a position to conclude a treaty which would end the war without feeling the necessity of insisting upon other parts of the British Empire also sending representatives to Lausanne. We therefore made it clear that 185
we did not propose to take exception to the course which had been pursued, of arranging a conference to end the war. But, as the intimation went further than merely dealing with the question of ending the war, and indicated that there might be new obligations arising out of some new treaty, we felt it our duty at once to avail ourselves, as the dispatch says, of the earliest opportunity to tell His Majesty's government that, with respect to new obligations that might be created, obligations of a nature other than those which merely related to the question of the ending of the war, our parliament would wish to exercise its right to say to what extent it would be bound by those obligations-there being no representative of Canada at the conference and there being no opportunity for real conference or consultation in connection with its proceedings.
I think a great deal of the misunderstanding and misapprehension which has arisen in this matter has grown out of the circumstance that when the public were first informed in the British parliament of the attitude of the Canadian government they were informed in words that did not accurately represent the facts. Indeed, the Prime Minister of England, Mr. MacDonald, has given me authority to state to the House that if his words in any way conveyed the impression that Canada had been formally asked to be represented at the conference and that we had concurred in such a course, they were conveying a meaning which was not in accordance with the facts.
Let me read from a journal of high reputation which contains an article that has been much quoted and which I think will help to explain wherein the different parts of the British Empire have received an entirely erroneous impression of the Canadian government's action. I refer to the article which appeared in the London Times on Wednesday, April 9, 1924, headed "Lausanne and Canada," I shall not read the whole editorial, but in order that hon. members may have the context of the facts I desire to quote I will read the first part of it:
The House of Commons will have a further opportunity this afternoon to discuss the attitude of the Canadian government towards the Treaty of Lausanne, but the light which is needed can come only from the Canadian government itself, which undoubtedly has acted wisely in welcoming the publication of the correspondence which has passed on the subject between Great Britain and the Dominion. The question asked by the Montreal Star, "Is Canada at War with Turkey?" may seem absurd. Yet it is a legitimate constitutional comment on Mr. Mackenzie King's refusal to recommend ratification to his parliament, and really goes to the root of the Imperial problem. Nothing is easier than to pick holes in the

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Turkish Treaty, and particularly in the Straits Convention, which forms part of it; but Mr. King's objection, on his own showing, is not so much to the treaty itself as to the manner in which it was negotiated. The history of the Lausanne Conference scarcely sustains that objection-
Now, this is the part to which I wish to direct special attention:
-for Mr. King himself appears to have been a party to the arrangements made for the representation of the British Empire in general and for Canada in particular. According to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, all the Dominions, including Canada, were asked if they consented to Lord Curzon and Sir Horace Rumbold attending the conference as " Imperial representatives." To this they agreed-indeed, we have it on the authority of Mr. King himself that Canada " did not desire separate representation." In other words, to quote Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, " Canada was represented by Lord Curzon at Lausanne with her full knowledge and consent."
Those statements are entirely erroneous. Canada was not represented at Lausanne. I was not, as this editorial says, any party to representation. No word was sent to us in any dispatch asking us if we would accept Lord Curzon or Sir Horace Rumbold as " Imperial representatives." Language of that kind was not used in any of the dispatches. We were told that Lord Curzon would represent the government of Great Britain and we were given reasons why Canada could not be represented. These were the facts as they were before us at the time we were considering what reply we should send to the dispatch that had been received. The Times editoral goes on:
In due course the treaty was signed and if Mr. King had a word of protest or of criticism the people of this country and of his own have still to learn the fact.
The correspondence which has been brought down will show, I think, that so far as the British government was concerned there could be no mistaking our attitude. Such criticism as we had to make was set out in the clearest language in the communications that passed. I think I may leave it to the hon. members to judge for themselves whether there could have been in the minds of the British government, or to any of those to whom these dispatches may have been referred the slighest doubt as to our position. The Times article goes on:
Then came the Imperial Conference. On October 5 Lord Curzon delivered a very full explanation of the treaty and its terms to the Prime Ministers, with the happy result that, in the official words of the summary of the proceedings, " the Conference recorded its satisfaction at the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey." If Mr. King dissented, the report is silent on the subject.
One would gather from this that at the Imperial conference I had not dissented from

the view that Canada was represented. Now here again I am placed in a position of very unfair embarrassment. The proceedings of the conference are, for the most part, secret. If I undertake to disclose to the House what took place at the conference then it is made to appear that I am betraying the secrecy of the conference itself, and be-4 p.m. cause I have not done this, where it suits the occasion or the par, ticular line of attack which opponents may wish to make, it is stated, because of my silence, I have acquiesced in all that has been done, that I have taken no exception to a particular course. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think I am right in saying that one understanding that existed at the time the conference held its proceedings was that while there was to foe secrecy with respect to the transactions from day to day, every member present at that conference was to have full liberty when addressing his own parliament to make perfectly clear to its members the position he took in regard to any matter of concern to them. I purpose to taike advantage of that right and privilege to tell this House and the country, and to tell the people of Great Britain-and I think it should have been told before this by a British minister-that at the Imperial conference I distinctly stated that Canada was not invited, I distinctly stated that Canada had not been represented at Lausanne, and I distinctly gave the reason why we did not take exception to not being represented, intimating that we had felt that probably these matters, in the opinion of those who had sent out the invitations, had not the same immediate and direct interest for Canada as matters such for example, as those which were discussed at Versailles were supposed to have. I think one will find in these dispatches here language which conveys unmistakably that view and impression. In order that there may be no doubt on this matter, let me say that I not only took this position at the conference, but more than a month or two ago I cabled the British government and directed the attention of the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the passage in the conference proceedings where my words would be found which asserted that Canada had not been invited and was not represented at Lausanne. I drew attention to a part of the proceedings which makes it clear that in the presence of the Prime Minister, in the presence of Lord Curzon the Minister for Foreign Affairs and of the president of the Privy Council and other British ministers,

Supply-Lausanne Treaty
I used words very much along the following lines:
In referring to International conferences, I stated that when we came into office the conference on the limitation of armaments was being held at Washington, that Sir Robert Borden was representing Canada, that Sir Robert's report had been made to the government, and that I would like to draw the attention of the members of our conference to two or three of its pages, more particularly where Sir Robert Borden sets forth his views on the matter of treaties, as they represented a point of view which I thought we in Canada all held in common:	That at
Genoa and at The Hague we were represented -that we had been invited to be present at those conferences and, considering their nature, we felt it would perhaps be not only of interest and benefit to ourselves, but also to others if we were represented there; that at Lausanne we were not represented, that we were not invited; that we had taken and took no exception to not being invited; that we felt that the matters that were being discussed there were not of the same immediate and direct interest to ourselves as they were to those who were represented at the conference, and that therefore we had no exception to take to the course that we adopted.
That was the substance of my words at the Imperial conference, representing Canada's voice in this matter, and I think it was owing to our government and to our country that when the government and the country were being criticised in England for nothing having been said at the Imperial conference on this matter, it should have been made perfectly clear at Westminster exactly what statement was made by me on behalf of Canada at the Imperial conference.


Arthur Meighen: I do not like a misconception to go out on this point. Was the criticism which the Prime Minister himself read from The Times, not a criticism that there was no objection taken to the terms and provisions of the treaty? I did not read into it, as he read it, nor have I read elsewhere, the criticism that he did not state at the conference that Canada was not invited. The criticism was that he raised no objection to the terms of the treaty.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I think I can
point to a dozen papers which state emphatically that at the conference nothing was said by me as to Canada's attitude. I will read the wording of this particular editorial again; the wording may possibly bear out what my hon. friend has just said, but what
185i
I would like to make clear is this, that so far as the general public of Great Britain and of other parts of the British Empire are concerned, the impression that is left in their minds from its reading was that at the Imperial conference, when Lord Curzon and the Prime Minister of Great Britain were present, I, as Canada's representative, had said nothing as to Canada's attitude, whereas, as a matter of fact, I made the position very clear, as I have just intimated to this House. I quote from The Times again:
In due course the treaty was signed, and if Mr. King had a word of objection or of criticism, the people of this country and of his own have still to learn the fact.
I think after that statement was made and debates occasioned by it were taking place in the British House, when the attention of the British government had been drawn exactly to what I said at the conference, it was owing to an accurate and full statement of the posi-. tion that some explanation should have been made in this regard in the British House of Commons. The article continues:
Then came the Imperial Conference. On October 5 Lord Curzon delivered a very full explanation of the treaty and its terms to the Prime Ministers, with the happy result that, in the official words of the summary of the proceedings, "the Conference recorded its satisfaction at the conclusion of peace between the Allies and Turkey." If Mr. King dissented, the report is silent on the subject.
Lord Curzon did deliver a statement as to what had taken place at the conference. It was the first intimation, apart from the communications that had been received during the course of the conference itself, that the Dominions prime ministers had had of what had taken place, and when we were informed that a treaty of peace ending the war with Turkey had been concluded, when we were told this by Lord Curzon, naturally we expressed satisfaction at such an announcement, and we were only too pleased to have it recorded in the proceedings of the conference. But the point that attention is here being directed to is that the attitude Canada is now taking is something different from that which was taken at the conference, whereas the contrary is entirely the truth of the situation. The Times article goes on:
The Canadian parliament has now been asked to ratify the treaty and Mr. King has suddenly discovered that the Dominion was not even a party to the contract.
As though there had been a complete change! I have suddenly discovered we were never a party to the contract!-when from the very first dispatch up to the last, we were making our position absolutely and wholly clear on that point. The editorial goes on:
According to his argument, Canada was "not invited" to Lausanne, and therefore cannot be bound by the

Supply-Lausanne Treaty
treaty. That statement, which in itself implies a grievance, can hardly be reconciled with his admission that the Dominion "did not desire direct representation," and with his acceptance of Lord Curzon and Sir Horace Rumbold as "Imperial representatives."
Now if it were true that I or the government had taken any such position or had accepted Lord Curzon as an "Imperial representative," certainly we would be entitled to this kind of criticism and attack. But we have never at any time understood that Lord Curzon in any sense of the word was representing this Dominion; and, as I have already said, we had very special grounds for knowing that, so far as the Dominions were concerned, they were not being represented at Lausanne. Further than that, not only did I take that position in discussing foreign affairs at the main sittings of the Imperial conference, but at least at two subsidiary conferences I again spoke with reference to Canada's attitude on the Lausanne treaty, and the minutes of the proceedings of one of the conferences contains a direct statement which will be found in the Foreign Office at the present time to the effect that the Prime Minister of Canada intimated that it might not be possible for the Canadian government to express formal concurrence in the ratification. This statement will be found as part of the record of the proceedings of a conference called to consider amongst other things the Lausanne treaty.


Arthur Meighen: Have these minutes
been laid on the Table of the House, or made public in any way?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: No they have not, and that again evidences the limitations of the situation. I contend I am not violating any right of secrecy when I avail myself of the opportunity, as leader of this government, of telling parliament when the question is raised as to my not having said anything concerning representation or ratification at the Imperial conference, exactly what took place. I have communicated with the British government, directing attention to this statement, which will be found in the minutes of the conference. In the presence of the prime ministers of the other dominions and the members of the British government, I made it clear that because we were not represented, and because we had no part in the conference, this government did not feel that it could! bring into the House a treaty negotiated as this treaty had been negotiated, and expect to have the approval of parliament of the obligations it carried with it. I made that clear, but I also made clear that we did not intend to embarrass the British government in the matter when it came to the final

ratification of the treaty, and that whatever position the British government might wish to take with regard to it, we would raise no objection. In other words if the British government recommended the ratification of the treaty, so far as Canada was concerned, we were quite prepared that ratification should bind us. We never raised the question as to Canada not being bound by ratification. If hon. members will look through the correspondence, they will see that our attention was specifically drawn to the fact that the treaty when ratified would bind us. Let me refer to the dispatch which appears under date December 8, 1922, and which reads:
Any treaty resulting from the Lausanne conference will of course replace the treaty of Sevres, and until it comes into force, a state of war between the British Empire and Turkey will technically continue. Treaty must, therefore, be binding on the whole Empire when ratified.
There was a specific statement made to us. We have taken no exception at any time to that statement. We have never stated that the Lausanne treaty would not bind the whole empire. Out attitude is being construed at the moment as if in some way we were acting in a manner which would dismember the Empire; as if we were seeking to break away, and to have Canada separate herself into some little community by herself. We have never taken that attitude. We have never questioned the fact that when the treaty was signed it would bind us. When His Majesty the King declared war, Canada was brought into war as a consequence of the declaration, and -when the King ratifies the treaty, Canada will be brought out just as she went into war by the action of the sovereign without any consultation with our ministers in that regard.
Hon. members of the House may ask why the government has watched this matter so carefully, and why they take the particular position they do-


Mr. SHAW:: Before the Prime Minister
proceeds further:	I understand from the
Prime Minister that the ratification of the treaty by the king will bind Canada. Do I take from his observations that Canada will be bound to maintain, for example, the demilitarized zone in the Thracian frontier, and also in the Dardenelles?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I shall have
a word to say about that a little later. So far as the British Empire is concerned, internationally in relation to Turkey and other countries, the action of the king in signing this treaty binds to my mind the whole Empire.

Supply-Lausanne Treaty
As to the extent of obligation arising between different parts of the Empire, in other words, considered intra-imperially, in the carrying out of its provisions, the government takes the position that it will be for this parliament to decide what, should occasion arise, in the light of all the circumstances, and in the light of the manner in which this treaty was negotiated, and the discussion we are having at the present time, its obligation may be under the terms of the treaty.


Arthur Meighen: Would not that be exactly the effect if we expressly ratified the treaty?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: No, I think
there is a great difference, with all due respect to my right hon. friend. It is one thing for the government to be represented, as we were at Versailles, by ministers who . were given full powers in virtue of an order in council passed by the government of Canada, requesting that such full powers should be given by His Majesty's ministers who were present at Versailles through ^11 stages of the negotiations, who understood the Canadian position and the Canadian attitude, and saw that it was maintained, and then signed with full powers given by the king with authority to sign, in respect of the Dominion of Canada. It is quite a different matter where a treaty is negotiated, drafted and concluded as this was by a conference which had been arranged before any member of the government knew it was being called, and at which no representative of Canada was present to take any part in the proceedings.


Mr. MARTELL:: Is the whole question
not this:	That whilst Canada by an order
in council made a request of the British authorities to be represented with full plenary powers yet we merely have colonial status, in spite of what the right hon. leader of the opposition (Mr. Meighen) and the right hon. the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) might say? We are simply as regards these matters, colonial in our status, and even though we try to get away from that, we find we still remain in that position.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I think my
hon. friend has at the back of his mind something which bears on the point I am making, but I do not know that he grasps what I said. Were we to hold the view that a minister at London, without any conference with or the consent of the Dominion of Canada, without being in any way a representative of Canada in connection with the proceedings of a conference which he might attend, could bind
this country, then we would enjoy simply a colonial status, but if, on the other hand, we take, as we do, the position that the government took in this matter, and which Sir Robert Borden has taken, that since the war there has been a fuller recognition of the rights of the Dominion, namely that there is equality of status between the self-governing dominions and the British government on matters which are of like concern to all, then there is a getting away from the colonial status into a status of partnership within the Empire, which is an entirely different thing.


Lewis Herbert Martell: I quite admit that the
parliament of Canada has been asserting, both under Sir Robert Borden and under my right hon. leader (Mr. Mackenzie King), the right to full partnership with all the British dominions, yet nevertheless we are all confronted with the fact that we are still colonials. Of course, we go on pressing and saying we have a right to be treated as members in a co-partnership, but in the final analysis we find that we are still colonials.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: If I may be
permitted to complete the statement I am making it might facilitate understanding of our position. The House is in committee; there will be ample opportunity afforded for full discussion of this particular point.
I should like to make clear just what is in the mind of the government in the position that we are maintaining.	I referred a
moment ago to a report of Sir Robert Borden, a report which I brought to the attention of all who were present at the Imperial conference. It is the report which was made of the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments held at Washington from November, 1921, to February 6, 1922, a report of the Canadian delegate including treaties and resolutions. On page 42 of this report under the sub-heading Dominion Representation in the British Empire Delegation, Sir Robert Borden sets out very clearly and concisely the stages which he believes should be followed in negotiation of treaties of an interimperial character by which the Dominion of Canada is to be bound. Broadly, Sir Robert presents the matter as follows: That, as respects negotiation, the government of Canada should be consulted before preliminary arrangements are finally concluded; that Canada should be represented by one who is duly authorized by her own government, by one who holds full powers from His Majesty the King at the request of the government of Canada; that the treaty to be binding should be signed in respect of Canada by such representative, and that as regards
Supply-Lausanne Treaty

ratification it should be left to the government to decide whether they wish to make it an executive act without reference to parliament or to follow the procedure which was followed in the case of the Versailles treaty of referring the treaty to parliament in the first instance for approval before ratification.
Our dispatch to the British government on December 31, 1922, with reference to the signing of this treaty is based on the position as stated by Sir Robert Borden in his report to this parliament, which report was accepted by this parliament. In other words, arising out of the war, as a consequence of the war, there was developed a fuller recognition of the doctrine of equality of status between the different parts of the Empire. Had this government taken a course which would have failed to maintain that status, no one would have been so strong in his denunciation of its course as my right hon. friend opposite. Assume that we had not drawn the attention of the British government to the position that Canada had attained as a consequence of the part taken in the war, to her recognized right in the matter of the negotiation of international treaties to be consulted and represented by her own representative, and that we had then brought the treaty into this House and asked parliament to approve it prior to ratification, I need not tell the House how strong my right hon. friend would have been in his denunciation of the government, and rightly so.
We are asked why we do not bring the treaty into the House for approval. The reason the government have not brought the treaty into the House for approval is that we believe that if the House were asked for its approval, that approval would not be given in view of the circumstances I have mentioned and the manner in which the proceedings were conducted. We have to take the responsibility for submitting to parliament any treaty for approval. Equally we have to take the responsibility for refusing to submit a treaty to parliament for approval. If my right hon. friend thinks that we have not taken a right course in not submitting this treaty for approval, let him bring in, at any time between now and the conclusion of this session, a resolution condemning the government for not submitting the Lausanne treaty and we shall debate the question, and see what the result will be. I think as respects treaties which bind this country in a manner which may lead to participation in future foreign wars, hon. members will agree that there is only one way in which such treaties should be negotiated from the first stage to the last, and that parliament will insist on (.Mr. Mackenzie King.]
seeing that all precautions are taken in matters that mean the assumption of great obligations. The dispatch sets forth the line of proceeding which we think should be followed in treaties which bind different parts of the Empire, based as I say on the report of Sir Robert Borden already approved by this parliament. The dispatch which is from His Excellency the Governor General to His Grace the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies, reads:
Ottawa, December 31, 1922. Following from Prime Minister for you. Begins:- Treaty with Turkey. Your Grace's telegram of December 8 begins: Quote. Our message of November 10 was framed on the assumption that the Canadian government would wish to follow the procedure adopted in the case of treaties with Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. End quote.
The procedure referred to is, we understand, that adopted with respect to the Paris Peace Conference, and followed later with respect to the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armament. As regards Canada's participation there were in that procedure four separate, distinct and essential stages.
One. Direct representation of Canada at the conferences at which the treaties were drafted, and participation in the proceedings of the conferences by Canada's representatives, each representative holding a Full Power signed by His Majesty the King in the form of letters patent authorizing him to sign (quote) for and in the name of His Majesty the King in respect of the Dominion of Canada (end quote) any treaties, conventions or agreements that might tend to the attainment of the object of the conferences, the Canadian government having by Order in Council sanctioned the issuance of these Full Powers by His Majesty.
Two. Formal signing of the treaties on behalf of Canada by the plenipotentiaries so named.
Three. Approval by the parliament of Canada of the treaties thus signed on behalf of Canada.
Four. Assent of the government of Canada to the final act of ratification by His Majesty the King of the treaty signed on behalf of Canada and approved by the parliament of Canada.
Your Grace is quite right in assuming that as regards treaties in which Canada is supposed to have a direct or immediate interest, the procedure here outlined is the one which our government would wish to follow. In the case of the main political treaties concluded since the War, in general the rule seems to have been followed that, wherever the dominions could be said to have a direct or immediate interest, the procedure was shaped to include their participation in, and signature of, the proceedings. That in the case of the conference at Lausanne a like procedure has not been followed with respect to representation and participation by Canada, has been regarded by us as evidence that in the opinion of the countries by whom the invitations to the conference at Lausanne were extended, Canada could not have been believed to have the direct and immediate interest which she was supposed to have in the conferences at Versailles and Washington.
To the course pursued with respect to the Lausanne conference, we have, as mentioned in my telegram of October 31, no exception to take. As regards procedure, however, it must be apparent that quite apart from any action or representation on the part of the government of Canada, a different procedure has been followed in the case of the present conference at Lausanne to that followed at Versailles and Washington. In so far as one stage in procdure is necessarily dependent upon the

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stage preceding, it is difficult to see how a like procedure can be followed. Canada has not been invited to send representatives to the Lausanne Conference, and has not participated in the proceedings of the conference either directly or indirectly. Under the circumstances, we do not see how, as respects signing on behalf of Canada, we can be expected in the case of a new treaty or of any separate instrument regarding the Straits, to follow the procedure adopted in the case of the treaties with Germany, Austria and Bulgaria. Ends.
I should like hon. members to notice that this dispatch is dated December 31, 1922. The treaty was signed on July 24, 1923. Fully six months before the treaty was signed, we made it clear to the British government that in view of the fact that we had not been invited to send representatives to the Lausanne conference, had not participated in the proceedings of the conference, either directly or indirectly, we did not, under the circumstances, propose to sign the treaty. That was before the Imperial conference was held. I think I am entitled to say that if the British government held a different view of our obligations or were inclined to question our attitude, they should have raised that question at the Imperial conference. Before the Imperial conference was held, we had placed our position on record very clearly; we had intimated in dispatches that we did not intend to sign the treaty; but no question was raised by any member of the conference controverting that point. Similarly, as I have said, our position was made still more plain at the conference itself. In passing I should direct the attention of the House to a dispatch of January 27, 1923, from the Secretary of State for the Colonies:
Your telegram dated December 31. Lausanne conference. Please inform your Prime Minister that in the circumstances His Majesty's government willing to fall in with his suggestion that any treaties with Turkey resulting from conference should be signed only by the British plenipotentiaries who have negotiated them, if it is generally acceptable. I am ascertaining whether it will be agreeable to the Prime Minister of the Commonwealth of Australia and the Prime Minister of New Zealand.
Hon. members have just heard my dispatch; I leave it to the House as to whether it contained any suggestion that the signature should be in any sense a signature other than that of the British plenipotentiary acting in accordance with the authority which he had at the time the invitations were sent out.
I hope I have made it clear that the government in its attitude on this matter has been trying to maintain logically and consistently the position which was fought for, gained and held by Canada's representatives at the Versailles conference, which was followed in subsequent treaties, which was followed in the international conference that was
held at Washington on the question of armaments, and which was followed in the conferences at Genoa and at The Hague. If we had departed from that procedure we should in our opinion have been justly entitled to such measure of criticism and censure as this House might have seen fit to pass upon us. We were simply seeking to maintain that equality of status which had been gained, and which we have been in the habit of asserting, as between the self-governing dominions and the Mother Country, in matters of a kind that are supposed to affect us all.


James Shaver Woodsworth: If there is an
equality of status why are all these communications as between this government and the government of Great Britain, conducted through the Secretary of State for the Colonies?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: They have to be conducted through someone, and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who holds an historic position, has been the customary channel of communication. And happily there have been in that position on occasions gentlemen who have been particularly well acquainted with some of the outlying dominions. I cannot see the point of my hon. friend's remark.


James Shaver Woodsworth: If the ministers
of this government occupy the same relationship to the king as do the ministers of the British government there should be direct communication by this government with His Majesty.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Well, members of the British government in communicating with this government do so through the Governor General, so that it is as long as it is broad; each has to communicate through some agency. It is a matter of convenience, and no doubt as time goes on there will be changes in methods of communication, possibly more in accord with new developments. But I cannot feel that at the present time this country is in a position of subordination merely because communications go through one particular channel in the Old Land rather than through some other. However, that is a point that may be debated further on some subsequent occasion.
Now, not only is the position which this government has taken with respect to this treaty in accordance with precedent which we believe to have become well established, but it is also entirely in accord with the agreement which was reached at the Imperial conference with respect to negotiation,
Supply-Lausanne Treaty



signature and ratification of treaties. Let me quote to the House from the summary of proceedings at the Imperial conference the following paragraphs respecting negotiation, signature and ratification of treaties. First as regards negotiation:
It is desirable that no treaty should be negotiated by any of the governments of the Empire without due consideration of its possible effect on other parts of the Empire or, if circumstances so demand, of the Empire as a whole. Before negotiations are opened with the intention of concluding a treaty, steps should be taken to ensure that any of the other governments of the Empire likely to be interested are informed, so that if any such government considers that its interests would be affected it may have an opportunity of expressing its views, or when its interests are intimately involved, of participating in the negotiations. In all cases where more than one of the governments of the Empire participate in the negotiations there should be the fullest possible exchange of views between those governments before and during the negotiations. In the case of treaties negotiated at international conferences where there is a British Empire delegation on which, in accordance with the now establshed practice, the dominions and India are separately represented, such representation should also be utilised to attain this object.
In other words, the conference recognized it as an established practice that if an international conference related to a matter which immediately affected all parts of -the Empire the different dominions should be individually represented at that conference. Tne following paragraph relates to signature:
Bilateral treaties imposing obligations on one part of the Empire only should be signed by a representative of the government of that part. The full power issued to such representative should indicate the part of the Empire in respect of which the obligations are to be undertaken, and the preamble and text of the treaty should be so worded as to make its scope clear. As regards treaties negotiated at international conferences, the existing practice of signature by plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the governments of the Empire represented at the conference should be continued, and the full powers should be in the form employed at Paris and Washington.
The form employed at Paris and Washington was a full power granted by His Majesty the King at the instance of the government of Canada requesting that such full power should be given and containing in itself the right of the representative of Canada to do in respect of the Dominion of Canada all that His Majesty could do were he present for the purpose.
I do not wish to detain the House for any length of time on this matter but I believe that it is well that hon. members should appreciate the serious phases of it. Either the treaty we are discussing by which this parliament is to be bound is purely nominal and technical, or it stands for something substantial and carries certain obligations with it. If it carries obligations which involve both

the honour and the resources of the country then this treaty should receive from parliament the most careful attention in all its aspects before any action should be taken in the nature of approval of its provisions prior to ratification.
There is one feature I wish to mention before leaving the matter of signature and representation, because it is somewhat significant. I hold in my hand what I believe to be evidence beyond all contradiction as to whether in the view of the British government itself, Canada and the other British dominions were represented at Lausanne. I have taken the trouble to look at the Debates of the British House of Commons and House of Lords, and I have here the report of the debate that took place in the House of Lords on Thursday, February 28, 1924, on the second reading of the Treaty of Peace Bill in which Lord Parmoor, Lord President of the Council, gave a full statement-the first full statement given to the British parliament-of the negotiations respecting the Lausanne treaty and those who were represented there. At page 428 of the Lords Hansard of February 28, 1924, will be found the relevant part of Lord Parmoor's statement in this regard. His Lordship said:
The modern history of this matter begins from the Mudania armistice or conference which took place in October, 1922, after the Greek forces had been driven out of Asia Minor. Then, on November 20, 1922, the first Lausanne conference was held under the presidency of the noble Marquess. I notice that he states in the speech to which I have referred that he was kept eleven weary weeks at Lausanne in connection with that conference, which, of course, was a very important one, raising as it did a considerable number of international questions. There were present representatives of France, Italy, Japan, Rumania, Jugo-Slavia and Greece, in addition to the representatives of this country.
Not in addition to the representative of the British Empire but, "in addition to the representatives of this country"-Great Britain-which is entirely in accord with the announcement as to the nature of the conference which was sent out. I ask hon. members to listen to this:
The Turks were present and also representatives of some other countries who had, or who thought they might have, an interest in the matters which were to be discussed at the conference.
Now, in the light of that statement do my right hon. friend and those who sit about him feel that Canada was represented at that conference?
In addition to the representatives of this country the Turks were present and also representatives of some other countries who had, or who thought they might have, an interest in the matters which were to be discussed at the conference.

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Matters which they thought they had or might have an interest in-all who so thought had their representatives present.
At this conference a treaty was prepared and placed on the table ready for signature, but at the last moment the Turks refused to sign, and, finally, nothing was done on that occasion. The discussion was recommenced at Lausanne in April, 1923. I am not quite sure whether the noble Marquess was himself present on that occasion.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston: No.
Lord Parmoor: On this occasion the chief work of the representation of the interests of this country-
Not of the British Empire.
On this occasion the chief work of the representation of the interests of this country was in the hands of Sir Horace Rumbold, who was the head of the British High Commission in Constantinople. At length a treaty was signed on the date which is mentioned in the preamble of the bill, July 24, 1923, and at the present time it only awaits ratification.
As if that were not enough we have also the statement of Lord Curzon who was there as the representative of the British Government. Let us see according to Lord Curzon's own words whether his lordship represented the British dominions. If he did represent them, they were singularly absent from his mind when he was telling the House of Lords how this treaty had been negotiated. On page 434 will be found the Marquess of Cur-zon's speech. He is reported as follows in reference to the Lord President of the Council :
In the opening stages of his speech the noble Lord observed with truth that the measure of which he proposes a second reading is not in itself a ratifying bill. The power of ratifying treaties is inherent in the sovereign and this bill is designed merely to carry into effect certain conclusions and provisions arising out of the treaty of Peace.
As regards the latter, I have risen at this stage, not in the smallest degree with the idea of discouraging any questions that may be put by any noble Lords who are interested in the matter, but because it seems to me that, although this is not a ratifying bill, this is emphatically the occasion on which this House of Parliament is asked to give its assent to this Treaty of Peace, terminating the long, devastating and disastrous war between Turkey and the Allied powers, and that it would be unseemly in the highest degree if your Lordship, confronted with a situation like this, were not given some exposition, not merely of the financial concomitants and conclusions of the treaty but of what the treaty itself is-how it was concluded, why it was concluded, what are its broad features, in what way they ensure the due protection of British interests, and in what way they make for the peace of the world. That is the great issue we are deciding to-day and your Lordships will pardon me if I devote my remarks in the main to endeavouring to give an answer to those questions.
The noble and learned Lord, the Lord President of the Council, said with truth, that the treaty of Peace which we are now, in effect, ratifying was the result of two conferences, or rather a conference conducted in two stages, between the Powers and Turkey in the years 1922 and 1923. In enumerating the powers who were represented at Lausanne I think he omitted, no doubt by accident, to say that not merely were the Allied powers there represented-Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan-but America was also represented, and, in addition there were the other states who had been at war with Turkey or whose territories were contiguous to the Straits or the Black sea.
These are Lord Curzon's own words. He was
correcting the leader of the government in the Lords in his enumeration of the parties who were present at the conference, and he said-and this is on February 28 of this year-
In enumerating the powers who were represented at Lausanne I think he omitted, no doubt by accident, to say that not merely were the Allied powers there represented, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan- but America was also represented, and in addition there were the other states who had been at war with Turkey or whose territories were contiguous to the Straits or the Black sea.
Now, I ask my right hon. friend again: Does he think that Canada was represented at Lausanne? Does he think that Lord Curzon believes that Canada was represented at Lausanne?-Lord Curzon who was conducting the negotiations on behalf of Great Britain. And does he think in the light of this statement, which is a true statement of the situation, that this government is at fault in not bringing in to the House the treaty for formal approval, which approval, as I said a moment ago, is either a mere matter of form or carries with it vast and grave obligations in which both the honour and resources of this country are involved?
I think, Mr. Speaker, that some who in the Old World follow these constitutional and international questions more closely and accurately than some who write very freely on them in this country have come a little nearer to appreciating the Canadian point of view and the attitude of the government in reference to this matter than have our own writers. 'Apropos of this I should like to read to the House a letter addressed to the editor of the London Times by Mr. A. Berriedale Keith, of the University of Edinburgh ,It sets out our attitude in the clearest way. When this article was written there had been no communication whatever with Mr. Keith by any member of the government, so far as I am aware, and I might add that I do not think that at that time the correspondence had even been brought down. His article is in the form of a letter to The Times and appeared in the issue of April 26, of this year. Mr. Keith is a careful student of and a recognized authority on international law, and the author of several important works. He saw very clearly what was in the mind of the Canadian government, and he expressed it in these words:
Imperial Treaties-Canada and Lausanne-Attitude to Straits Convention.
Sir, It is easy to understand Mr. Mackenzie King's reluctance to ask the Canadian parliament to approve ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, since such
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action would imply the undertaking by Canada of a definite and positive responsibility to render aid in case action became necessary under the Straits convention, and, as the controversy over Article X of the League of Nations Covenant proves, Canadian opinion is united in the view that Canada should accept no o bligation to action which would fetter the decision of future Canadian parliaments.
But the parliamentary discussions leave obscure the vital question whether Mr. King really holds that the treaty of Lausanne, if and when ratified simpliciter, will be binding upon her because it was not signed by Canadian representatives acting eo nomine for Canada. This, of course, is the view suggested by the opinion of Mr. Doherty in 1919, when he explained to the Canadian House of Commons the doctrine of signature of treaties, and asserted that Canada could be bound only by treaties concluded in this manner. But I am unable to find any doctrine of international law on which his views could be supported and it appears clear that, unless and until international recognition is accorded to this new doctrine, a ratification without express exclusion of Canada must bind Canada in	international law, as
much as it binds the rest of the Empire. On this view, however, though ratification will bind Canada, it will remain open to Canada, as freely as in the past, to decide what steps she will take to assist activity in securing the observation of the Straits convention, if the need should ever arise, and for all practical purposes this position should be satisfactory enough for Canada.
The alternative, the exclusion of Canada from ratification, would raise such grave issues that it may be assumed Mr. King does not contemplate asking for such action.
He is entirely right in that. Mr. Berriedale Keith states the position of the government exactly when he says:
A ratification without express exclusion of Canada must bind Canada in international law, as much as it binds the rest of the Empire. On this view, however, though ratification will bind Canada, it will remain open to Canada as freely as in the past, to decide what steps she will take to assist actively in securing the observation of the Straits Convention, if the need should ever arise, and for all practical purposes this position should be satisfactory enough for Canada.
What I want to make clear, in answering the hon. member for West Calgary (Mr. Shaw) is this: There is a distinction to be drawn between the purely legal and technical position in which this Dominion may be placed and the moral obligations which arise under treaties depending upon the manner in which such treaties are entered into, upon the parties who are present, and the representative capacities in which they acted while negotiations were proceeding. Legally and technically Canada will be bound by the ratification of this treaty; in other words, speaking internationally the whole British Empire in relation to the rest of the world will stand as one when this treaty is ratified. But as respects the obligations arising out of the treaty itself, speaking now of inter-imperial obligations this parliament, if regard is to be had to the representations which from the outset we have made to the British government, will in no

way be bound by any obligation beyond that which parliament of its own volition recognizes as arising out of the situation.


Arthur Meighen: Does the prime minister consider Canada as much bound by the treaty as Great Britain?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I certainly do not; I thought I had made that clear. I would like to know whether my right hon. friend does?


Arthur Meighen: I was just observing that he was complimenting Mr. Keith on how accurately he had described Canada's position. I notice that Mr. Keith, referring to a doctrine which he regarded as possibly held by the Prime Minister, uses these words:
I am unable to find any doctrine of international law on which this view could be supported, and it appears clear that, unless and until international recognition is accorded to this new doctrine, a ratifica-cation without express exclusion of Canada must bind Canada in international law, as much as it binds the rest of the Empire.
I had thought up until now that Great Britain was part of the rest of the Empire.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: My hon. friend's
interruption is characteristic.


Arthur Meighen: What is the matter with it?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I read this
passage and I said I agreed with it; I said it represented, as it does ,the legal and technical point of view. It says:
Ratification without express exclusion of Canada must bind Canada in international law-
In international law.
-as much as it binds the rest of the Empire.
Certainly; and the whole purport of my remarks has been to draw a distinction between the moral obligation which would rest upon this country, which was not represented at Lausanne, and the position of Great Britain which was represented by a representative carrying full powers and authority from His Majesty the King. That is the whole point in question. Let me read the paragraph following what my right hon. friend has just read but which he has been careful to omit:
On this view, however, though ratification will bind Canada, it will remain open to Canada, as freely, as in the past, to decide what steps she will take to assist actively in securing the observation of the Straits Convention, if the need should ever arise, and for all practical purposes this position should be satisfactory enough for Canada.


Arthur Meighen: Will the Prime Minister say that Great Britain has not an equal right to decide what practical steps she will take?

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William Lyon Mackenzie King: Great Britain, in deciding what steps she will take, will have regard for the fact that her minister plenipotentiary was present, that he conducted the negotiations, that he signed the contract, that this was all done with the full knowledge of her government from beginning to end; and the government of Great Britain will naturally be expected to recognize to the full every legal and every moral obligation arising therefrom. I say in that regard, the position of this country is very different, its government not having been represented, not having been invited to be present, not having had anyone present with authority to speak in the name of Canada. That is the position I take. About two years ago, my right hon. friend was taking the position that regardless of-well, I will not say regardless of the non existence of a treaty, but having regard to the terms of a treaty which had been signed but had never been ratified, this country ought to go to war with Turkey -and go to war why?	To drive the
Turk out of Europe.	He	took the
position on the public platform of condemning my colleagues and myself because we did not instantly respond to a dispatch that had been sent broadcast from England to the dominions to inquire whether they would not send troops to the Near East. A week or two after that dispatch had gone out the right hon. gentleman bravely and heroically shouted that the answer should have been. "Ready, aye Ready." and that it was our job to get into the fight.


Arthur Meighen: Why does the Prime
Minister put words in my mouth that I never used? Will he quote what I said?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Then will my
right hon. friend tell me what words he did use?


Arthur Meighen: I used the words "Ready, aye, Ready when there was need"; so did Sir Wilfrid Laurier in 1914. The latter words I did not use. If the prime minister will read exactly what I said he will do me justice. He won't do it otherwise.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I am quite
prepared to let my right hon. friend's words do him justice. Now it appears he said "Ready, aye Ready," when there was no need and that is why he was there with those words at that time. The point I wish to make is this:	My right hon. friend was laying
emphasis on a treaty which had been signed by a Canadian representative. He was basing his whole case on the fact that Canada had been represented at Sevres by a minister fully empowered; that the minister had put his
signature to the treaty. That treaty had not been ratified and was not binding in any sense, yet on the basis of signature alone he was urging that it was the obligation of this country to go to war to drive the Turk out of Europe. Now, after another conference-


Arthur Meighen: Will the right hon. gentleman read what I said as to going to war, and tell us if Australia went to war?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: What did my right hon. friend mean?


Arthur Meighen: If the Prime Minister
will read what I said he will see what I meant.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I apologize;
I thought my right hon. friend was taking a stand that really meant something.


Mr. CLARK:: It was a case of union
within the Empire.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: What? Union within the Empire? We are now getting thoroughly characteristic Tory attitudes on these imperial matters. Hon. gentlemen opposite are putting themselves in their true light. They think that all that is necessary is to shout loyalty, to wave the flag and all the rest of it, when there is no danger. When they come to these questions of obligation binding the country for the future, then they would act regardless altogether of the obligations which may be involved. My right hon. friend took his position when it was a question of driving the Turk out of Europe; now he condemns us because we do not ask parliament to become parties to a treaty to keep the Turk in Europe, and to see that he is preserved in the position that he holds at the entrance to the Straits.


Arthur Meighen: The right hon. gentleman seems to know my position. I have not expressed it yet, but I congratulate him on his success.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I accept the
congratulations of my right hon. friend; they are among the very few I have ever received from him. Now may I read a statement signed by another university professor, Mr. G. L. Haggen, of the Law Department of the University of Leeds. This is also a communication to The Times; it is dated Wednesday, April 23rd, 1924, and is entitled, Imperial Treaties; the Dominions and Ratification; Mr. Mackenzie King's Position. I shall not read the whole article; I will simply quote a pertinent paragraph:
Presumably, Mr. Mackenzie King would rnot deny that the treaty is legally binding upon Canada; he would merely contend that, since Canada was not represented at Lausanne, Canada is not morally bound to
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give any active assistance to the other parts of the Empire should active measures become necessary at any time to honour our obligations under the treaty. Active assistance would involve expenditure of money, and it is beyond question that the dominions have the right to judge for themselves the measure of the contributions which they will, on any occasion, make to the common cause.
Canada, one feels sure, would not stand aside in a crisis, but Canada is within her rights in refusing to be committed in advance by the treaty if in fact the Canadian government was not consulted, as we are bound to assume if we are properly to appreciate Mr. King's point of view.
Those communications are not communications written by partisans in this country. They are the carefully considered opinions of scholars in the Old World itself.
I think, Mr. Chairman, I have said enough to make clear the position the government has taken, and why we have taken that position. Let me repeat. We have not in the past, we do not now hold the view that Canada as a part of the British Empire will not be legally bound by this treaty when it is ratified, but we do say that the moral obligation resting upon this parliament and country under this treaty, when it is ratified, having regard to the different manner in which the whole negotiations were carried on, will be vastly different to the moral obligation which is imposed upon the country under the Treaty of Versailles.


Mr. LADNER:: Would the Prime Minister be good enough to distinguish between the moral and the legal obligation? I have always thought there was considerable consistency between them.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I am afraid
I shall have to leave it to somebody else to educate my hon. friend on that point. If parliament were considering at the moment the practical question of honouring the obligations of this treaty by the resources of this country, my hon. friend would very soon be able to distinguish what the difference was having regard to the facts that I have just mentioned.


Leon Johnson Ladner: I do not want the Prime Minister to think I was raising this question in any spirit of levity. It seems to me it is the point on which the whole debate turns, and the one which will chiefly concern the country-if in making treaties you can say at one time there is a moral and a legal obligation, and the next time something different.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I think as I
have already indicated, it will all depend upon the manner in which a treaty is negotiated. 
the part taken by the country in the negotiations, in the signature, and in the final approval of the treaty itself.
Before I resume my seat, let me say one word as to my own attitude in regard to the future of this country in its inter-imperial and international relations. Hon. gentlemen opposite in their press and in their speeches never lose an opportunity to misconstrue and misinterpret my position on these questions, and I should like my position to be clearly known from one part of this Dominion to the other. As I see it, looking to the future of Canada, and having regard to the kinds of discussion that have taken place, there are at least three possible avenues of political development:	One leading to complete independence, another leading to annexation with the United States, another leading to a more clearly recognized nationhood within the community of nations comprising the British Empire or the British Commonwealth, by whichever term you may wish to call it. I can conceive of only one other possible alternative, and that is the Dominion reverting back into its original parts and there then being two or more separate colonies or dominions, whichever you wish to call them, within what are now the confines of the one Dominion. That possibility, I think, is not to be considered for an instant. For my own part, I believe that the future of this Dominion will be happiest and best, most prosperous, and in every way most to the good, if its development is along the line on which it has been thus far, towards a fuller recognition of national status within the community of free nations which comprise the British Empire; and it is because I hold that view, it is because I believe in it so strongly, that, in this particular matter, I have been prepared to risk whatever in the way of misunderstanding and criticism and censure might come from those who have not had a full knowledge or appreciation of the significance of the facts. I have been taking my stand from the point of view of Canada a nation within the British Empire, not Canada a colony, not Canada in any inferior or subordinate position, but Canada a country which has gained and which merits equality of status with other dominions and with the Mother Country in these interimperial relations.
Now in regard to the manner in which that community of nationhood may be best maintained, there have been some who have thought that that end would be best served by an Imperial parliament meeting at Westminster. Others again have thought that that end would be best served by something in

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the nature of an Imperial council sitting in London and issuing decrees which would bind all parts of the Empire. There is a third view which is that that end will be best obtained by the several dominions having full recognition given to their status of selfgoverning dominions, within the full meaning of these words and in there being worked out in the best possible way as respects interimperial affairs, effective means for consultation and co-operation between the dominions and the Mother Country, as units possessing equality of status within the British Empire. Now I do not believe that an Imperial parliament is a possible thing; I think an Imperial council would be a thoroughly bad thing; I believe it would lead to the destruction of the British Empire, and not to the making of it. But I do believe that within the British Empire every step we take to make clearer to each other that we believe in our nationhood and realize to the full our rights of self-government, will make for that future development on safe and secure lines, and I believe, as against the rest of the world, it will make for the unity and strength of the Empire itself.
But what above all else is needed is a united Canada, a Canada that as a nation will stand as one, recognizing its responsibilities and its duties, as well as its rights, a Canada that will have one aim and one purpose;, a Canada which is united within itself and finds its unity within the unity of the British Empire as well.


Arthur Meighen: Mr. Chairman, this subject is one that requires the most careful thought, and most cautious treatment at the hands of all members of this House, and particularly of those in whom special responsibility is rested. The whole history of the Lausanne negotiations, their consummation and the subsequent correspondence, has involved, unfortunately, some misunderstanding, if not friction, between the government of this country and that of the United Kingdom. That there should be any misunderstanding of our respective positions is always regrettable; that it should be unnecessarily incurred is still more regrettable, and in this case both these facts are true, both these conditions are present. I do not think that in the history of many decades an occasion can be found where there has been any misunderstanding at all, much less anything in the nature of friction. The relations have been harmonious in every way. There has never been disputing as 'to the real position of our Dominion, or the real position of Great Britain as respects this Dominion of Canada. Why it
has occurred it is for hon. members to judge and to come to their conclusions from the wording of the various communications which have passed between the governments. ^ The Prime Minister some weeks ago laid before the House a resume of what might be called the official correspondence on the subject. I have no fault to find with that resume It was faithful to the actual letters. There were, however, other communications which did pass, and which have never yet been made public, but to which reference has been made to-day by the leader of the government.
I am free to say that those communications were, as stated by the Prime Minister, laid before me. I had an opportunity to read them. I have no right to disclose their contents. My limitations in that regard are exactly the same as the Prime Minister's limitations. I do not think the Prime Minister was within his right in the references he made to these communications to-day.
May I refer for a moment to the letter which passed, disclosing the reasons why, as he expresses it, we were not invited to the negotiations? I only add this to what the Prime Minister said:	That the reason given
was not a new one. It was a reason which had been advanced in previous negotiations. It was a reason that had anteceded even the Paris conference. It was an obstacle which then was met and surmounted, but which in my judgment could have been more easily surmounted on this occasion. The Prime Minister complains that in respect of this whole discussion he has been under a severe handicap because he madte certain statements and took certain positions at the Imperial conference and dispatched certain letters which he is not now free to give to the public, and he intimates indeed what those statements were and what the communication was which he dispatched. Unless this parliament has a right to see them, this parliament has not a right to hear them indirectly; if they are still surrounded with any secrecy, let them remain so surrounded.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I referred to
no communication dispatched. I stated in reference to the Imperial conference that the understanding there was that every member present was to have full liberty to state to his own parliament the position he took with reference to any important question which came up. I have exercised that liberty and nothing more.


Arthur Meighen: The reference was to
some communication which he dispatched comparatively recently. He has forgotten it
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for the moment. As to what took place at the Imperial conference, I commence with this affimation:	The Prime Minister had no
right to leave that conference or the records of it in such a position that his stand in any way could be misstated or misconstrued by the public of Canada.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I claim I
have not done so. The records show the
position.


Arthur Meighen: I mean the records that can be made public. He had' a right to state what should be made public and what should not. It was his duty to see that such material was contained in the correspondence to be made public, in the booklet of the proceedings of the conference to be made public, as fully and clearly to set out his position in that regard. If he failed in doing that he failed in his duty to the Dominion. He said there was an understanding-I have not read it and I do not recall it-that any Prime Minister could make clear to his parliament what his position was. If such a statement is contained in the records, clearly it would mean that he could make clear to his parliament information in so far as revealed in the public records of the conference. It could not possibly be that he could invade the secret records of the conference and thereby add any factor to the presentation of his case, or that he could invade that upon which the conference had put the seal of secrecy, provided he were in the confines of his own parliament.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Does my hon. friend mean to say that if a representative of the country should take a position at the conference, and that position is questioned, he has no right to refer to the stand he took and explain his position?


Arthur Meighen: ISIot if he agrees that
it should be secret.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I never agreed.


Arthur Meighen: Then my hon. friend
should have insisted upon it being public in the records of the conference for what is published is published with the concurrence of all.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: With the understanding I have mentioned.


Arthur Meighen: That would mean that
the whole veil of secrecy could be lifted, at the behest of any one, and the whole record of the conference shows the contrary. I pass 
from that. I do not know that the Prime Minister really did anything of importance that was not revealed. It is shown that at the conference he stated his views with regard to representation at the negotiation of the treaty of Lausanne in much the same language as he stated previously, in the correspondence now on the Table. But this gets us no further. It does not show that he was frank with the British government, and I do not think the whiold correspondence shows he was frank.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: If a British
minister who was present at the conference said that anything was stated on my part to indicate that Canada held a different view to what I am presenting here, is my hon. friend prepared to give him that privilege and deny me the right to state anything to the contrary?


Arthur Meighen: I had not observed that
any British minister had stated anything inconsistent with the public records of the conference.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I have Lord
Curzon's remarks, which I read to the House, which state that there was no objection raised.


Arthur Meighen: To what?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: To the matter of his having represented the Dominion. The point was not questioned.


Arthur Meighen: I do not know that he
would be very far wrong there. I want first to discuss the question of the treaty and the policy therein disclosed. The Prime Minister has virtually made no reference to the treaty, though he says we are bound by it, a statement which heretofore I have not seen attributed to him or to the government of which he is the head. If we are bound by the treaty we are interested in its terms, whether we ratify it or not. Its terms vitally affect us. Anything we are bound by vitally affects our Dominion, particularly if it c ncerns the issues of peace or war. As an introduction to what I have to say as respects the treaty itself, let me agree-if I understood my hon. friend correctly-with the aspirations of the Prime Minister as respects our position within the British Empire. I think he expressed what is a common attitude of mind of the entire Canadian people. I think he reflected what is really in the hearts of the Canadian nation, namely that we should pursue our destiny within the circumference of the Empire, as a self-governing Do-

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minion, and that in doing so we should seek honourably to discharge our .part by an honourable co-operation with the other dominions and the motherland. This position Canada takes well knowing all that is involved therein. We take it first of all because it is in harmony with the traditions of our country, and with the heart's desire of our people. We take it secondlly because we believe it is for the good of the world that this destiny should be ours. We believe it makes for world peace, that the British commonwealth of nations should hold together, and should exert their united force towards such world policies as make for the peace of all; and we take it thirdly because we feel that along these lines Canada's ultimate ends are best served and Canada will gain at the present time as well as ultimately more than she can in any other way, that the burdens of nationhood will be lighter, and the rewards of nationhood will be greater than they can be by any other course we can pursue.
The alternatives the Prime Minister has suggested are the only alternatives, nor is there very much difference between them. If we swing into independence, we are really in the orbit of the great republic and subject to the will of that- republic, to a far greater degree than, perhaps, at the moment we care to contemplate. Let us then take it for granted that from all standpoints we want to stand within the orbit of the British Empire and to comply with those requirements involved in that relationship. If this is to be our position and our future, there are two pillars upon which the future can be erected. We must first of all insist, as we have always done, the insistence year by year becoming less necessary, on the full exercise of our full governing powers, on the most complete autonomy for this Dominion as respects matters which concern ourselves. We have never been slow in following this requirement. Parenthetically may I add, that never was there a time when anything in the nature of abbreviation or subtraction from those full autonomous powers was less in the minds of the people of the British Isles.
There is another corner stone, though, upon which this future must be built. This is the one referred to by the Prime Minister himself. There must necessarily be cooperation, and a cordial co-operation, for the common purposes of empire between all the parts thereof. We cannot build a future on the basis of autonomy alone. It is impracticable; it is not possible and. further, it does not savour of honour. We must necessarily adopt the principle of co-operation.
We must seek, by pooling our judgment, by review of facts and by common outlook upon the future, to gain common ground with the other Dominions and Great Britain as to what should be our general course in respect of foreign policy and of matters of common concern. We must approach this necessarily in a spirit of friendship and of confidence, we cannot approach it in a spirit of suspicion, distrust; if we do, we can never succeed. I do not think we have any reason for lack of confidence; I believe the past and particularly the recent past afford us every ground for the fullest and most ample mutual trust.
Assuming that these two are basic requirements, let me ask first of all: Have they been lived up to? Have we been true to them in relation to the Lausanne negotiations? Is this correspondence permeated by a spirit of co-operation, or. is there not rather emerging out of every letter, the spirit which says: "Go on, dio what you like; if you get into trouble, we will decide then what our course shall be?" We not only willingly, but apparently gladly stepped aside and let the British plenipotentiaries, or as the Prime Minister chooses to describe them to-day the representatives, of Great Britain take what line they liked. We received day by day communications informing us of all that was going on. We laid them to one side. We offered no presentation of view at all; we offered no assistance; we contributed not the least to directing the policy of the Empire upon lines that we considered honourable and safe. We simply stood aside and said': "Go on at your own risk; if you run into the marshes, you are there, we are not; if you run into fire, you are there, we are not; we are not involved in any degree." Is that a spirit of cooperation? As a consequence, where are we now? We have a treaty that is binding upon us; we have a treaty that is equally binding on every part of this Empire,-in the words of Mr. Keith, whom the Prime Minister quoted, in the negotiation of which treaty we have not had a single word to say, in the terms of which we have never had the least voice or breath. All of those obligations binding upon us, as the Prime Minister now admits, are framed aside from us and we have never ventured even to express our views.
The Prime Minister's speech is quite consistent with the theory that he does not think the terms of this treaty are of any importance to us at all, because those terms he has not even deigned to discuss. As I speak of these terms, I do so with the full sense of the re-ponsibility and full appreciation of the fact that one must tread ground of this kind ex-
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ceedingly ' warily, because one necessarily is not in immediate and direct possession of all those facts and surrounding circumstances that give certainty to judgment; but subject to that consideration, I say that the policy involved in the treaty itself and especially in the Straits convention is, I think, a mistake and a policy from which it was the duty of this government to endeavour to avert the British plenipotentiaries. It was the duty of this government to see to it that they adopted such means of communication and in-temegotiation as were clearly open to them to present the viewpoint of Canada.


Mr. LAPOINTE:: Does the right hon.
gentleman think that Canada should signify its disapproval of the treaty?


Arthur Meighen: No, I do not; I do not think we are in position now to do so. But the reason we are not in such a position is the fault of my right hon. friend, (Mr. Mackenzie King). What we should have done is this- we ought to have sought, as we did at the conference of 1921, to avert the British government from a line which affected interests peculiar to Canada and directing it along a line which more suited Great Britain as a world Empire.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The treaty is not yet ratified. My right hon. friend has plenty of time.


Arthur Meighen: I have told my right hon. friend that we are not in a position to complain of the treaty now, and the reason that we are not in such a position is the fault of himself. The reason the treaty is as it is, in some degree at least, is the fault of himself.


James Shaver Woodsworth: In what respect, may I ask?


Arthur Meighen: I am just coming to that.
I do not think, generally, Great Britain is well advised to pursue a policy of European commitments ; Great Britain is not distinctly a European country-and there, unconsciously,
I refer to Great Britain, as a "country", meaning the whole Empire, just as those authorities do to whom the Prime Minister referred. Often in speaking of this Empire as distinct from another country, we refer to it as "this country." We do that in Canada and they do it in Great Britain. I do not think the British Empire pursues a wise course in launching upon European commitments, and I think this statement is all the more supportable to-day, more so than it would have been two, three or more years ago. Great Britain, [Mr. Meighpn.)
as I was saying, is not distinctly a European country. It is true she is within the orbit of Europe; but Great Britain is a world Empire, She bestrides the seven seas of the globe. At all points of her vast domain she has interests sensitive and peculiar, interests that may be involved sooner or later in commitments which she is making quite unconsciously and in good faith and which appear to affect the Empire only in Europe.


Mr. PUTNAM:: What does the hon. member mean by the word "unconsciously" in this connection?


Arthur Meighen: I mean unconsciously
in this sense that, without the viewpoint of the outer dominions being presented, she is not aware how they are particularly affected by these commitments; she does not see the objections to these commitments as clearly as the dominions naturally would. Can I illustrate the point better than by referring to the negotiations of some two and a half years ago on the subject of the Anglo-Japanese alliance? The natural, indeed the primary, attitude of the British government was most decidedly in favour of a renewal of the alliance. The public correspondence and the proceedings clearly disclose this fact. And British policy was so directed, wholly in good faith, wholly in the belief that thereby Great Britain could best serve the interests of the Empire as a whole. This Dominion took a different view, and did so, certainly not because of any superior experience, nor because of any superior mentality on the part of its representatives; it was merely because we, living here in the western hemisphere, saw more clearly and intimately certain dangers that would ensue from such a policy. We understood better the great republic to the south and its attitude of mind towards the alliance; we understood why it looked askance at that alliance; we better understood their point of view than could any other portion of the Empire without our assistance. Therefore Canada presented her viewpoint and insisted upon it; and her viewpoint so impressed itself on the British representatives and the representatives of the other dominions that the whole line of policy was diverted; and what would have been in my judgment a dangerous line was abandoned in favour of one leading more certainly to peace. I refer to this matter only by way of illustration. I believe that in order that Great Britain''s position as a world power may be appreciated, and that 6he may most wisely determine her general lines of policy,

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the dominions of the Empire owe it to her to present their viewpoints on all subjects that concern the issues of peace and war.
A treaty is now binding on us or will be shortly-I fancy it is now binding on us- under which Great Britain enters into certain special engagements as respects the demilitarized zone of the Straits, certain special engagements which may involve her in conflict with great nations to the East and possibly indeed with great nations further away. Those engagements she has entered into for a purpose which to her mind is thoroughly justifiable, because I have not the least doubt she believes they are the lesser price, by paying which she better avoids conflict than by adopting any other course. But having regard to her responsibilities the world over, and having regard to our peculiar position and the position of the dominions as a whole,-having regard, in a word, to the fact that Great Britain is not nearly so much a European nation as a world power, the course she has pursued is in my judgment not wise.
In venturing these opinions I said that I wanted to do so cautiously and subject to reservation, all the circumstances not being before me. But those circumstances should have been before this government; this government should have made itself aware of the whole environment, the whole of the relative facts, and should have been in a position to advise the British government aright. I make these statements also in full appreciation of the tremendous achievements of the British plenipotentiaries at Lausanne. I have some knowledge of the difficulties which surrounded them; I know that they were pressed and torn by all sorts of conflicting forces; I know that they confronted a Turkey drunk with the wine of military success, a wholly different Turkey from that which faced Britain at Sevres. I know that Lord Curzon and Sir John Rumbold had around them about as mountainous and insuperable obstacles as ever surrounded plenipotentiaries in any negotiations. And if it had been essential to secure the main purposes of the treaty, possibly it would have been wise then to have made these special European commitments. But looking at the matter from this distance it would appear to me that these commitments were not the price of other things of greater value obtained, other securities for peace which were deemed essential. If they were, then I would say, very well; we will have to stand by them. They looked rather to be something which were peculiarly the objective of Great Britain. I am inclined to believe that this was something which could have been 186
surrendered without affecting substantially the greater objects of the treaty itself. I say therefore that it was our business to have taken the very best means which it was within our power to adopt to make known the viewpoint of this Dominion in this respect. We should have taken every means of seeking to divert British policy from any course which we felt, having regard to our peculiar circumstances, might lead to danger.


Ernest Lapointe: For purposes of information, will my right hon. friend say what means should have been adopted?


Arthur Meighen: There were a good many means, but this government's state of mind was to keep outside of all means, to keep outside of the circle. It was not the intention of the government to sit in with our other negotiators and representatives, not to. make known even to those who finally were decided on as Empire representatives the attitude of Canada towards any feature of the treaty at all.


James Shaver Woodsworth: Will the leader of
the opposition suggest that the government should not have acceded 11 the request of the British government and should have declined to send any special representative?


Arthur Meighen: I will come to that in a moment; but for the present I say emphatically in reply to the hon. member, no.


Mr. MacLEAN (Prince):: What attitude
did the other dominions take, if Canada took none?


Arthur Meighen: The matter has been so handled that we know nothing about it. But Canada is the leading dominion. Canada takes the lead in these matters; she did so at Versailles in all the negotiations leading up to the treaty.


Mr. SPEARMAN:: Had Canada made such representations to Great Britain as would substantially have altered the terms of the treaty, had they been acceded to, and had those representations not been accepted by the British plenipotentiaries, would Canada still be bound by the terms of the treaty?


Arthur Meighen: Just as she is bound today. Let us understand once for all that while we are within the Empire we mu* be bound by the terms of high political treaties. There is no way in the world of avoiding it; and the consequences of trying to avoid it would be far worse for us than the consequences of cheerfully assuming it. I thought it was established, and established at great price, that Canada has gained the right-a

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right now cheerfully conceded for years-to have a say in all these negotiations, and to have some word in the direction of the policy under which the British Empire seeks to secure herself and to attain world peace.
The first we hear of these negotiations is by the letter dated October 27, 1922. That letter extended no invitation to Canada to send representatives to Lausanne; it merely stated that invitations had gone out the day before at the instance of Great Britain, Italy and France, to certain powers asking them to Lausanne to negotiate the terms of a treaty to end the war with Turkey, and to certain other powers asking them to Lausanne in respect to certain less distinctly important relationships-I refer to the United States and to Russia. Now, the Prime Minister seems to think that if it was intended that we should have anything to say in regard to the treaty there should have been an invitation to Canada right then to have separate representation at Lausanne-that those three powers should have sent out invitations to us. And because they did not he said in effect:	"All
right, you go ahead; we are outside now watching, we have nothing to say, but if you make a mistake beware of the consequences so far as Canada is concerned.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I do not think my right hon. friend is quite accurately stating the matter. Before any invitations were sent by any one part of the British Empire in conjunction with other countries, I think that the dominions should have been consulted and asked whether they wished to be associated with the invitations.


Arthur Meighen: I do not know what
occurred before, consequently I am not making any criticism of what happened prior to the letter of October 27. What I say is that Canada has never been invited to negotiations of this kind. Canada was not invited to Paris by the inviting powers; France sent the invitations to the various powers. Canada was not invited to Washington by the inviting powers; those invitations were sent by the President of the United States to Great Britain and to the other powers.


An hon. MEMBER:: What about the Genoa conference?


Arthur Meighen: I know what my hon.
friend has in his mind, but it does not appertain to treaty-making at all. Canada nevertheless was separately represented at Paris and at Washington; Canada was separately represented on the British delegation which represented the entire Empire there. Consequently
[Mr. Meighen.l
the time for Canada to have spoken was when this notification came from Great Britain advising us that these invitations had gone forth. True, Great Britain suggested- and I do not defend the suggestion, I think it was dn error, a very natural error which has been made many a time before-Great Britain suggested that we should be content with the personnel of the British representation. That was the meaning of the suggestion contained in the letter of October 27.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: It was not.


Arthur Meighen: It was not?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: There was no
suggestion at all. There was a positive statement as to the reasons why we could not be invited. My right hon. friend knows that.


Arthur Meighen: That is in the other
letter. There were reasons given there why there should be only two plenipotentiaries and why Canada should not have distinct representation'-reasons which I cannot divulge, and which the Prime Minister has not divulged, but reasons which were given before and which were surmounted before. But what should have been the reply of the Canadian government when the communication of October 27 came? The reply should have been:	It is for us to say whether we are
interested in this treaty or not; we were interested in the war which makes the treaty a necessity, and we are interested in the conditions now which are to tell for peace or war in the days to come; we have just as much interest in peace as we had in war. But, if we could not be at the conference table -what reason was there why we could not have been in closest touch with the British representatives from the beginning? What reason was there why we should not have been there to advise the British representatives of the view point of Canada? We knew right well that whatever those British representatives did they did as representatives of this Empire. Does the Prime Minister mean to say that they did not sign that treaty as representatives of the Empire? They certainly did.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: They signed as representatives of Great Britain.


Arthur Meighen: I have the treaty. It
is not made between Great Britain and all these other countries, it is made between " The British Empire " and all these other countries. I do not know that anything more is necessary to make clear not only that we are bound, but that the signatures appearing there are signatures representing the Empire,

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which is a party to the treaty. Not only is the treaty of Peace so made, but all of those which might be called the subsidiary treaties contained in the blue book which embraces the treaty, are made between " The British Empire " and the Other countries, and the signatures there are necessarily on behalf of the country which is stated in the whole preamble and headline of the treaty and in its contractual part to be the country that is negotiating and signing. So, this government knew-that the men who signed the treaty were signing it on behalf of the Empire. The government knows and admits, that it binds the Dominion of Canada and every other part of the Empire.


Mr. EULER:: The word "bind" has been
used very frequently in the course of this debate. May I ask the right hon. gentleman to define just exactly what that means? For example, would it mean that the treaty binds Canada to enter into war without the consent of this parliament?


Arthur Meighen: It binds us just as it
binds Great Britain. The treaty does bind the whole of the British Empire to preserve that demilitarized zone. I would much prefer that it did not, and I do not believe it ever would have bound us if the will of Canada had been properly represented and pressed; but it does bind us to do that, and it binds us to take the consequences that may follow such action.


Mr. McMASTER:: Suppose Canada had
gone to this conference and made her views emphatic, but that those views had not been accepted, what would the hon. member say as to our responsibility in that event?


Arthur Meighen: Canada might have secured this result-I do not know that it would have been any very great achievement-we might have had a clause inserted, whidh frequently was inserted in treaties before, that it did not bind any dominion unless that dominion expressly ratified it.


Andrew Ross McMaster: Is not that the position now?


Arthur Meighen: Not one whit. It binds
us just the same as every treaty in the days of our colonial history bound us. That is the position which this government has led us into, precisely the position we were in thirty years ago, when we were bound by every treaty although we had no say in it at all. The whole achievement of the ad-186*
ministration is to take the lead not in progress but in retrogression, to lead us back exactly where we were in our colonial days.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: The right hon. gentleman
stated, and quite correctly, that the treaty is between the British government and the other contracting powers. But I should like to draw his attention to article 18 providing for eventualities in case the demilitarized zone is imperilled, where he will notice that the special reference is to Great Britain alone. Has my right hon. friend considered the question as to whether Canada is bound there?


Arthur Meighen: I had not observed that, but I accept the statement of the Prime Minister, which in this respect is right: we are bound, in the words of Mr. Keith, in international law just the same as the rest of the Empire, and the same as Great Britain herself. I do not think the wording there would make any difference, for the reason that the treaty itself is between those contracting powers.


Ernest Lapointe: The words my right hon., friend mentions are in a separate convention known as the Straits convention.


Arthur Meighen: Yes, I know that, but
the separate Straits convention is also mad* between the British Empire and the other contracting powers; consequently the British Empire is bound, just as the binding is accepted by the government this afternoon.


William Daum Euler: May I ask another question? Would the treaty be binding had it not been ratified by the parliament of Great Britain?


Arthur Meighen: There is a sense in
which a treaty is binding before ratification, but the formal ratification must take effect before there is a final binding; that is true.


William Daum Euler: The point I want to make is this: if it is not binding until it is ratified by the parliament of Great Britain, then if we are co-equal with great Britain it is not binding upon Canada until it is ratified by the parliament of Canada.


Arthur Meighen: Yes, but this government has acquiesced in a condition of affairs under which we are not co-equal at all. They have acquiesced, apparently cheerfully, in the old colonial situation. They have said: "We are quite content; you go ahead; you make a treaty in the name of the Empire. True, that binds us, they now admit but we are prepared to allow that to go on and have no say at all." Such was the manly attitude adopted
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by this administration in the name of Canada! Now, am I not right? I appeal to the clear mind of the hon. member for North Waterloo (Mr. Euler):	I do not think he can take
the least exception to my statement.


Ernest Lapointe: Yes he can.


Arthur Meighen: Well, he is more likely
to be master of his own mind than the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) would be.


Ernest Lapointe: My right hon. friend
knows that the power of ratification is in the king, not in the parliament either of Great Britain or of Canada. The parliament of Great Britain did not ratify the treaty, does not ratify it. Parliament merely approves of the ratification.


Arthur Meighen: Very good; that is not
the point at all.


Ernest Lapointe: It is the point.


Arthur Meighen: Not at all. I was not
on anything having the least relationship to that point. It is true that the act of ratification is the act of the high contracting power, His Majesty. The moving of His Majesty to act is by the government, and the government before moving gets the approval of parliament. But all this has nothing, to do with the point. The point is this, that we are bound to-day by the terms of a treaty in the negotiation of which, in the final terms of which, we have not had the slightest say. Now, what is our improvement over the position we were in long ago? I had not thought that all the advance made in these years was an advance for nothing. I thought it was an advance, first of all, in elevating the dignity of our Dominion; in putting us in a more consistent and self-respecting position; in providing that as we could not by any means escape responsibility in the event of a war, we should have something to say as to the direction of policy, as to whether that direction should lead to war or to peace. This is the advance that we achieved all through these years, but it has been thrown overboard by the present government and we are back now to thirty or forty years ago; we are back to the position we were in before we were a confederation. There Is not a member of the government who can distinguish between our relationship at this hour to this treaty and the relationship which would have existed before we were even a confederation.
How is it that we had to wait until this afternoon for even an admission from a member of the government that we were bound by any term of the treaty at all? We were led to believe by the Prime Minister's speech of
(Mr. Meighen.]
April 2nd that we were not bound by any part of the treaty. I appeal to hon. members behind the government:	Did they not
come this afternoon, having listened to the Prime Minister on the second of April last, in the belief that we were bound by no part of the treaty or at least in the be>-lief that such was the position of the government? What the Prime Minister said on the second of April was that the treaty did not impose any obligations on Canada. Now we are asked to draw a distinction between the imposing of obligations and the binding. Is there a distinction? The Prime Minister seeks to draw this distinction; when you bind a country you only do it legally, but when you impose an obligation you put a moral obligation into it. If I got the Prime Minister's conclusion-I had almost said, argument, but there was no argument; on this point there was none-what the Prime Minister sought to say was this:	We are
bound now by the treaty, but we are not bound in the event of war to do anything. We are able to do something if we like, depending on what we consider our moral obligation to be. Because we stood outside and allowed British policy to proceed in matters concerning us, in matters concerning the very issues of peace and war; because we stood outside, now we axe free in the event of war resulting not to do anything if we choose, or to take such part as we like. I wonder when we were not so free? I wonder when the time ever wTas that hon. members of the government at least did not insist day in and day out that we were absolutely free? We are free; we are absolutely free to-day, Our decision depends only on our sense of obligation as to what we should do should war come about as a result of any treaty. Will the Minister of Justice say we are not free?


Ernest Lapointe: It is the first good word my right hon. friend has pronounced this afternoon.


Arthur Meighen: Well, I pronounced it
many a time before-never pronounced anything to the contrary. It wholly depends, whether we sign or whether we do not, upon our sense of the moral obligation involved, upon our appreciation of what our duty is and what our interest is; and we are the judges in all events both of our duty and of our interest. This supposed achievement is nothing on earth; we are not one whit ahead, so far as our freedom is concerned, of where we were before. There is this difference

I concede it freely-when we sign a treaty we then express our approval and we are not in a position

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subsequently to complain of its terms. We express our belief that they are the best terms we can get, the best line of policy under all the circumstances that we can agree upon. This follows from signature, and nothing else on earth follows from signature. We always decide whether we enter a war by our measurement of our obligation and by our measurement and appreciation of our duty. But no matter what we may think of the terms of a treaty, if the peril is great enough, n peril which if it involves Britain involves ourselves, then in our own interest, no matter what other considerations may surround us, we would participate. We are guided by the location of the conflict. We are guided by what is to be guarded thereby. We are guided by what other parts are able to do in the circumstances. We believe that within the realm of empire wTe avoid far more perils than we encounter. We believe that by co-operation with them and helping to direct their course we are more likely to make for world peace; that is why we stay within the Empire. We believe the burdens are lighter and the rewards are greater. But the obligations upon us are moral in all events. The (Obligation is an obligation decided by our own sense of moral responsibility and of our interest. So this government, for the sake of a mere shadow, has permitted misunderstanding and friction to arise. This government, for the sake of a mere shadow, has abandoned all that we have achieved over ten rather weary and bloody years.
At six o'clock the committee took recess.
After Recess
The committee resumed at eight o'clock.


Arthur Meighen: In opening what I said
this afternoon, in my comment on the merits of the treaty itself, I regretted that it included certain commitments in the way of certain guarantees applicable to European territory which I feared might ultimately emerge as dangerous. May I make a little further comment on that subject to avoid misunderstanding?
I gave the general reasons which applied against such a general course of policy, namely, those reasons which had particular application [DOT]to Britain as a world Empire rather than as a European power. It may be in the mind of some that these commitments are not new, that they have been made in the past, and indeed certain appeared in the peace treaties proper themselves. There were certain such commitments in the treaty of Versailles, not
many; there wras one commitment in the treat}' of Sevres of which this parliament and the Empire generally approved, a commitment of very great consequence, a commitment which preserved the neutrality of the same Straits. It was not the same as the present engagement. It at that time was essential, and if I could be persuaded that the present one was essential as a security for peace, I would express no word against it, but I want to call the attention of the committee to a very substantial difference between the circumstances which prevailed at the time of the treaty of Lausanne, and the circumstances which surrounded the plenipotentiaries at the treaty of Sevres. At Versailles, at Sevres, the whole lines of policy were agreed on early in the proceedings. The general limitations in respect of this feature and that, reparations, military engagements, the labour treaties, all in various compartments, and the lines of policy as to each were determined upon and agreed upon, and-and this is the point- they were all laid down upon the great basic assumption that the future of the world's peace was to rest on the secure foundation af a League of Nations of world-embracing scope. This at least was the fond aspiration of the British people. Consequently, the same care need not have been taken against any special European engagements, for the reason that if the hope of the British people and of the treating powers of that time were realized, then the sanction of a world-embracing league would be behind. However, in this hope, in this dream, we have been doomed to very severe disappointment.
We have a League of Nations, it is true. That League I do not disparage. That League I am anxious to support, and I hope that Canada will continue in its support, but it is not the League of Nations that we first believed it would be. Outside its scope now are three great powers, three powers of the first magnitude. I do not need to mention two, but I do mention the United States of America. While the United States of America stands outside, outside the League and outside all the sanctions that the League implies, any special commitment of this Empire has a different meaning altogether. Then it is much more incumbent upon us to see that we do not attach ourselves to any particular group at all, and do not bind ourselves to engagements in Europe which afterwards may lead us to this side or to that wholly independently of what the immediate circumstances of the time may be. This feature I will not dwell on further now; nor
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have I anything very special to add to what I stated this afternoon.
The intervening time, though, has only added to my bewilderment as to what may have been in the back of the head of this government from beginning to end of this negotiation. I was astonished this afternoon to hear from the Prime Minister, although I was glad, because it removes one subject of controversy which would doubtless be very, very embarrassing in days to come-I was astonished to hear from him this afternoon that the government regards Canada as bound by the provisions of the treaty; Looking over the correspondence I am all the more astonished. Can it be believed that Canada was in this mind at the time this correspondence was indited? Surely the government was of a different mind altogether then. The correspondence is wholly inconsistent with the stand the government takes now, and the government's position now in this respect is right.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: It never
changed.


Arthur Meighen: I know the Prime Minister will have to say that.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: It is true.


Arthur Meighen: But certainly the
British people could not understand it on that hypothesis; not only the British government and the British Prime Minister, and the. leaders of the other parties, could not understand it on that hypothesis, but newspaper after newspaper could not; none of them could, and nobody in this country could.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: They all attributed motives to us we never suggested.


Arthur Meighen: It has been the puzzle
of commentators ever since. Let me read what the Prime Minister said in this House and see if it is consistent with the theory he now advances that we are bound by the provisions of the treaty. I will read the whole of the last paragraph of his speech on the 2nd of April, because I think this new decision has been born since the 2nd of April. It is of very recent birth. He says:
We take the position that, not having been invited to the Lausanne conference, not having been represented there, not having, for the reasons that I have mentioned, signed the treaty, the treaty does not impose obligations on Canada.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Hear, hear.


Arthur Meighen: The Prime Minister
stated this afternoon that it did impose

obligations on Canada. I know the distinction he is drawing now. He says that its provisions bind us, but in the event of trouble arising out of them later, then the obligation to execute or to protect the treaty is different. Is that not what he says now? If it is not, he does not say anything now.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: If my hon.
friend will look at the dispatch of December 8, 1922, he will find the British government said:
Any treaty resulting from the Lausanne conference will of course replace the treaty of Sevres, and until it comes into force a state of war between the British Empire and Turkey will technically continue. Treaty must therefore be binding on the whole Empire when ratified.
We have never raised a question on that point. We have never taken the slightest exception to it. We recognize the legal obligation.


Arthur Meighen: The Prime Minister
did not repudiate it and say, "We do not agree with you," but repeatedly in the correspondence he says, "The" extent to which Canada must be bound by this treaty must be determined by the parliament of Canada."


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Hear, hear.


Arthur Meighen: And now he says we are wholly bound. How can the extent be determined by us if we are wholly bound?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I think I made a distinction there. There is a difference between the position of the British Empire in its relations to Turkey and other countries in the effect of this treaty upon them in bringing about a relation of peace, and the obligations that may arise within the Empire itself having regard to the manner in which the treaty has been negotiated.


Arthur Meighen: Obligations as to what?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: As to the provisions of the treaty with respect to obligations and otherwise.


Arthur Meighen: Does the Prime Minister say we are not bound by the obligation of the Straits convention?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I say this parliament will determine just how far it wall recognize any obligations in the matter of the Straits convention, if it comes to a question as to which part of the Empire will see that these obligations are enforced.


Arthur Meighen: That is precisely the interpretation I put upon the Prime Minister's conduct. I am not seeking to misstate his

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case, I am seeking to state it properly. I have understood that the Prime Minister and the government took the ground that we were not bound by the obligations of the treaty. Now it is clear his position is this: In so far as the treaty is concerned, the whole Empire is bound. In international law we are all bound alike. But when it comes to a later time, when the necessity arises, if it should1 arise, of protecting the treaty against violation, or maintaining the securities which the treaty establishes then what we will do depends on the parliament of Canada. As to the latter, I have not the slightest doubt that what we will do will depend on the parliament of Canada, and it would equally depend on the parliament of Canada, even though we were represented in the negotiation and finally ratified.
But does anybody imagine that this was in the mind of the Prime Minister and the government at the time all the correspondence took place. Read into that correspondence any reference to such a distinction as this. Did the Prime Minister, in reply to the invitation of October 27, 1922, say to the government of Great Britain, "You have told us you are going to negotiate a treaty, and who the representatives are going to be. You have stated to us that when the ultimate time comes, if we succeed in getting a treaty for signature, we will ask you to sign, and you have also stated that you will ask us to ratify." Did the Prime Minister add "No, we are not of the treaty, we are not of the negotiations. We will be bound by i-ts provisions, as long as nothing arises out of it, but if trouble ever arises, if ever the necessity to protect the treaty arises, then the extent to which we will participate, if at all, must be decided by the parliament of Canada"?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: My hon. friend will find in the very first dispatch that it is stated in these words:
We deem it advisable to avail ourselves of the earliest opportunity to inform His Majesty's government that in our opinion the extent to which Canada may be held to be bound by the proceedings of the conference or by the provisions of any treaty or other instrument arising out of the same is necessarily a matter for the parliament of Canada to decide, and that the rights and powers of our parliament in these particulars must not be held to be affected by implication or otherwise in virtue of the information with which our government may be supplied.


Arthur Meighen: That is what is stated and that is precisely what he has not been stating this afternoon.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That is precisely what I said.


Arthur Meighen: No. Will the Prime Minister permit me to proceed? This afternoon he said, "We are bound by the treaty only in event of it being necessary to take positive action to carry it out". Does the right of the parliament of Canada intervene? I wait for those who smile to answer me. Is that not precisely what he said? Is that consistent with this statement I have read?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Absolutely.


Arthur Meighen: My hon. friend was not frank with the British government.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I take exception fo my hon. friend's words. I have in my hand a communication sent by this government to the British government, saying we availed ourselves of the earliest opportunity of stating that we would recognize no obligations under any treaty that might be effected otherwise than what this parliament decided. My hon. friend has no right to put contrary words into my mouth.


Arthur Meighen: I have not done so.
Does the hon. member for Brome (Mr. Mc-Master) think I have put contrary words into his mouth? If not, why does he applaud? I have not put a single contrary word into his mouth, and the Prime Minister knows it. He says in this first telegram:
The extent to which Canada may be held to be bound by the proceedings of the conference or by the provisions of any treaty or other instrument arising out of the same is necessarily a matter for the parliament of Canada to decide.
I know he said that. That is wholly different from saying that when the treaty is made we know that as part of the Empire we will be bound by it, but, we warn you that later if it is necessary to protect the treaty the extent to which we will participate, if at all, must be decided by the parliament of Canada. Now I do not need to appeal to intelligent men to see the very great, wide and vast distinction. The British government would have understood that. Does the Prime Minister suggest that in the telegram of the 25th of November which followed, he only had it in mind to warn the British government that though we would be bound by the treaty and its terms until the time came to enforce it, or the time came to take care of a danger that arose out of it, we would not be so bound to act until the parliament of Canada decided that we should.
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Mr. MoMASTER:	Is not that pretty
clearly set out in the telegram of the 31st of October?


Arthur Meighen: Not at all. I am speaking as well of the telegram of the 25th of November. He uses this language:
Our government has not expressed a desire to have any treaty with Turkey which may result from the conference, submitted to the Canadian parliament for approval, before His Majesty is advised to ratify it. Nor do we wish to be understood as preferred any such request. My message was intended to make clear that we had no exception to take to Canada not being invited to be represented at the conference, but inasmuch as we had been informed that we would be invited to sign a new treaty and any separate instrument regulating the status of the Straits, we wished to make it perfectly clear that in our opinion the extent to which Canada may be held to be bound by the proceedings of the conference or by the provisions of any treaty or other instrument arising out of the same, was necessarily a matter for the parliament of Canada to decide.
So far that is precisely what he had said before. But this statement and what 'he says to-day differ. What he says to-day is a full statement of the position, and what he said before is not, and for this reason I read what follows:
We deem it of the utmost importance that there should be no misunderstanding as to our position with respect to Canada's obligations in this and kindred matters. In our opinion parliament will desire, as respects the treaty with Turkey and any other instruments arising out of the Lausanne conference, to reserve to itself the right to decide upon the merits of the case what action on the part of the government is right and proper. In this connection we shall be pleased to have authority to place before parliament all the information with which we may be from time to time supplied.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: We did not
get any of it and thej' would not give us any.


Arthur Meighen: Any information?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: No.


Arthur Meighen: As to the negotiations?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I draw
my right hon. friend's attention to the concluding remarks of the telegram in reply:
I do not think that it would be possible to publish any of the telegrams now being sent to you concerning the proceedings at Lausanne seeing that they often contain records of confidential interviews and impressions and other material intended only for private information.


Arthur Meighen: I am aware of that. The British government did not consent that this information should go to parliament. I agree with that, but information was sent to the Canadian government. My point is this: The Prime Minister here asks the British government, in order that parliament might be in a position to decide how far we might be bound

by this treaty, for permission to lay before parliament the information which the British government had undertaken to supply. What in the world would parliament want with the information except to enable parliament to decide what to do about the treaty? What was in the mind of the signer of that communication is as clear as day. The Prime Minister said:	Before we are bound by the
treaty, parliament must act. You ask us to ratify. You say that you will submit the treaty to us for ratification. You say that you will want us to sign. These things parliament must decide. Therefore we want to lay the facts before parliament. If it was for parliament to decide whether we should sign or not, it was logical that parliament should know the facts. Does anybody imagine that it was in the Prime Minister's mind, when he asked that the information be laid before parliament as received by the government, he was not asking for it so that parliament would know what to do about the signing and ratification of the treaty? Certainly that was in his mind. Imagine his suggesting now that what was really in his mind was this: Inasmuch as we have had nothing to do with negotiating the treaty, Canada not being represented, we will neither sign nor ratify it, for this reason and this alone; but afterwards if anything happens out of it, if there is any danger, any need for its protection, any cause for its enforcement, then parliament will want to know how the thing was brought about, and therefore I want to lay these communications before parliament. This position is absurd. What the Prime Minister had in mind was the necessity of being in a position to lay the information before parliament when parliament was called upon to decide whether Canada would be bound by the treaty or not.


Lewis Herbert Martell: Is it not the fact that whether we are represented or cot at any conference, the British authorities can sign a treaty or enact a law which can be made applicable to the whole British Empire? I do not think that can be gainsaid as a matter of constitutional law. Then, whether we are represented or not, we are bound by what is done. Therefore, the only way in which we can get out of it is by resenting what the British authorities have done, and if they will not accept our protest, the only way is by rebellion or otherwise.


Arthur Meighen: I do not think the hon. member is very far out. The British authorities, in making a treaty, especially in signing a treaty in connection with a war in which we took a part, can bind the rest of the Empire.

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The hoe., member is quite correct in that regard, and this afternoon when he was putting those questions to the Prime Minister after much of the comment the Prime Minister had made, questions that indicated that we were really in colonial status now, I thought he indicated a pretty fair appreciation of the position,. That is exactly where we are.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: We have never been out of it.


Arthur Meighen: We have been out of it. We have had the right of a self-governing dominion until now, but the Prime Minister not only abandbned that position but cheerfully abandoned it. He said. You did not ask us and we do not find any fault with you at all. He acquiesced in the most cheerful manner in the position which reduces us to the colonial status again.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Let me direct my right hon. friend's attention to this wording:
In our opinion parliament will desire, as respects the treaty with Turkey and any other instruments arising out of the Lauzanne conference to reserve to itself the right to decide upon the merits of the case what action on the part of the people of Canada is right and proper.
"Upon the merits of the case" refers to any further instrument which may arise in which reference may be made to the Lauzanne treaty with Turkey and parliament reserves the right to decide what action is right and proper under the circumstances. That is what those words were intended to mean and that is what they do mean.


Arthur Meighen: I was just going to argue upon those words myself. If they mean that, then they have misled not only every commentator that I have read, but myself. I took them to mean, and the British government evidently took them to mean, that parliament would decide on the merits of the treaty.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: What nonsense!


Arthur Meighen: If the Prime Minister
meant:	You have not invited us to the
conference and therefore we shall not sign and we shall not ratify the treaty, why did he not say so in his first message?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I said quite
as much. I said everything that meant that.


Arthur Meighen: Nobody took it to mean that.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, they did
and there was no mistake. I appeal to my
right, hon. friend; I made the statement at the Imperial conference, that this government did not intend to concur in the ratification of the treaty. That statement was never questioned there. It was never misunderstood excepting by those who wished to have it misunderstood.


Arthur Meighen: I can not dispute that
the Prime Minister made the statement. I have no means of disputing it. I believe he did, because he says he did. That is included, however, in the secret report of the conference. The Prime Minister, if he took that position at the conference, should have seen that it was included in the record. He should not have left the record in such shape that that statement was in the secret report. Besides there is no indication or hint of it. in the correspondence.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I had not the
shaping of the record.


Arthur Meighen: The Imperial conference met long after these communications were sent out. If the Prime Minister intended not to ratify and to base his refusal to sign or ratify the treaty, not upon the merits of the treaty, but upon the mere fact that we were not represented. then he should have said so in his first communication without any equivocation at all.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: He did.


Arthur Meighen: He did not. He said:
"No. you go ahead and make your treaty and we will decide on the merits of the case what to do about it. The parliament of Canada will have to act and to decide before we are bound by the treaty." The Prime Minister should have said, if he had the mind he has this afternoon: "You have not invited us to the conference, and because you have not, we are out of the picture; you go ahead; you will get no signature, no ratification." This would have been understood. Nobody understood such a thing from the Prime Minister's dispatches, and now after months of disputing, misunderstanding, schisms between the two governments, the Prime Minister says that he has found two university professors who can define where Canada is at to-day.


Andrew Ross McMaster: I was going to suggest
that the interpretation given in somewhat colloquial language by the right hon. member seems to interpret pretty well the first telegram of October 31.


Arthur Meighen: That was a notification
that we would not sign, would not ratify the treaty?
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Andrew Ross McMaster: Yes.


Arthur Meighen: Nobody in the world
took it up in that way, and nobody after all the discussion has taken it up in that way yet. After all these communications, I would not take it up in that way.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That settles it.


Arthur Meighen: I am in agreement with every other commentator I have ever read. The Prime Minister cannot name me one who has taken it up differently from myself. The Prime Minister should at least have been frank with the British government and said: If you do not invite us to the conference, we shall not sign and we shall not ratify." The right position however for him to have taken was to represent to the British government that we had vital interests in the treaty with Turkey. We had interests in the war and we had consequently interests in the treaty which was to close the war. But the Prime Minister did not even tell them he did not intend to ratify the treaty. He led them to believe that it was going to be for parliament to decide whether or not we should ratify the treaty. In that statement I put myself in the judgment of hon. members of every party in this House. I say, the Prime Minister led the British government to believe that it would depend upon the will of this parliament how far we should ratify the treaty or be bound thereby.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: He did not.


Arthur Meighen: They evidently believed that.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That is not so, although my right hon. friend may give it as his opinion if he wishes to.


Arthur Meighen: I give it as their opinion and mine and the opinion of any one who looks into the matter. Why were the British government misled? Did they deliberately mislead themselves?


Andrew Ross McMaster: I hope not.


Arthur Meighen: No one across the floor
apparently knows yet why they were misled.
I know there are men now who know what our position is, or claim they do; but any one who has a clear interpretation of all the correspondence that passed on the subject will take the ground that the matter of ratification and the whole matter of being bound by the treaty was represented by the Prime Minister to depend upon the will of the parliament of Canada. I have stated that the right course for us to have followed was to have 
declared our interest in the matter and our right to be represented, at least on the British delegation, and our right to present our views. And in my judgment we could have obtained that right to representation there, even though there could1 have been only two sitting at the conference table. At all events we should have asked for that right and led the other dominions in the request; and in my opinion if we had done so we could have succeeded.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The treaty is
not yet ratified. If my right hon. friend thinks that this parliament ought now to approve of it and be bound by all the obligations involved in it, he has only to move that we be so bound, and let us debate the matter.


Arthur Meighen: I have answered that
two or three times, and I do not know what relevancy it has to the point I am discussing unless the purpose is to divert me from that point. I have already stated what should have been done. Imagine any one but the government of Canada moving in the House to ratify a treaty! We cannot take exception to-day to the terms of the treaty. Does the Prime Minister take exception to the treaty or to any of its terms? He says now that because we have not ratified it we are in a better position. But I have shown the House that when we do not sign a treaty, when we have nothing in the world to do with it and no opportunity of influencing the framing of it, we may be in a position to take exception to its terms afterwards, if event arises, and to complain of its policy. This is the only difference, and1 there is no other. And if this is worth gaining at the expense we have gone to, of a reversion to our old colonial status, all well and good. But such is not the judgment of the people of Canada; and anyway we have not gained even that. We are not in a position to-day to complain of the terms of the treaty. Does any one think we are? Does the Prime Minister say that we are in a position to complain of any single sentence or any obligation of the treaty?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Most certainly.
Mr. .MEIGHEN: W^e are?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Certainly.


Arthur Meighen: Did the Prime Minister complain of the terms of the treaty at the Imperial conference?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I have taken the position from the beginning that we were not present at the conference; those who

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extended the invitations thought we were not interested as it was not a matter that concerned us.


Arthur Meighen: I know the Prime Minister has difficulty in answering the question. But what I asked him was-and if he feels he cannot answer it because of secrecy at the conference, then it is a misfortune but it is his own fault-what I asked him was whether he had taken exception to any of the terms of the treaty as being unwise or on any other ground. Did he take exception at the Imperial conference when the treaty was fully explained and all the circumstances of its negotiation were revealed? Did he take exception to the terms of the treaty or did he not?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I took the
position that this parliament would not approve of the treaty; I do not know in what more emphatic way I could have stated the position of this country.


Arthur Meighen: Surely the Prime Minister does not press that statement. Did he state at the conference what was wrong with the treaty? Did he point to any feature of the treaty, as I have done this afternoon, and say, "This does not receive my approbation"? Did he refer to any specific sentence or clause of the treaty and object to it? He will not say he did; I am fully convinced that he did not. And if he did he should have seen that his objection was noted in the records to the public.


Andrew Ross McMaster: Does not the leader of the opposition see that the Prime Minister, having taken the view that, not having been invited to the negotiations we were therefore not called upon to express an opinion, he would have been unwise in offering one?


Arthur Meighen: Not in the least. We had an opportunity to express an opinion all through the negotiations. Our government was supplied with all the information; I have never heard that it was complained of as being incomplete; I have seen repeated statements of British ministers to the effect that information was given daily. So that we were certainly supplied with the information and we knew the tendency of policy; we knew what was contemplated and we had a right to interpose an objection then. We did not do so; we sat by in a sort of sullenness and said nothing.


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, no.


Arthur Meighen: Perhaps not sullenness,
but lonely, questioning isolation.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Taking no
exception.


Arthur Meighen: Certainly-taking no exception, when we should have taken it. We should have contributed our part to the terms of a peace for which our men died. Does any one suggest that we had no interest in the terms of peace-a peace that concluded a war in which many of our own men had fallen? Certainly we had an interest in the terms of peace. We have an interest in the terms of every treaty which sets out the security for the future peace of the Empire and of the world. But the Prime Minister took no exception, he offered no objection at all to the course pursued or the intention manifested by the British government; he sat at the Imperial conference and heard the terms of the treaty; in fact, he had had them before him three months prior to the time he attended the conference. Yet he took n'-exception to any one of the terms of the treaty. All he objected' to, as stated for the first time this afternoon, was the fact that we were not invited to participate in negotiating the terms of the treaty.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I stated the
position to this country.


Arthur Meighen: In other words, so
long as we are not invited to participate we have no interest at all and no comment to make on the terms of a treaty affecting our future happiness. Now, Mr. Speaker, our future happiness and peace depend upon the rightness and the soundness of the terms of that treaty, as upon the rightness and the soundness of the terms of other treaties. Are we not interested in the peace securities stipulated in that treaty? Were we not interested in the treaty of Paris? Were we not interested in the securities obtained at Washington? Of course we were. And we are interested in this treaty, perhaps not in an equal but in a like degree; and never will this country submit to having to sit outside when terms are negotiated concluding a war in which we have participated and fixing the securities on which the peace of the future is to rest. Therefore I say that this supposed gain that we have achieved- if any one can imagine that we have the right to complain if trouble afterwards arises as to the terms of the treaty-this supposed phantom is gone, because the time at which we could have complained with advantage is past, and the government can offer no objection now. This government therefore has hot, been frank with the British administration nor with the people of Canada; it did not
(
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take in the correspondence the position it now assumes; it did not make its course clear, unequivocal and unmistakable. Consequently we have landed now in the position where after a series of months of disputation we find ourselves bound by a treaty in which we took no part at all, we find ourselves bound by the provisions of a treaty in the negotiation of which we had nothing more to do than had Chile; we find ourselves, in a word, back to the status of the old colonial days.


Ernest Lapointe: Oh, oh.


Arthur Meighen: My hon. friend is laughing.


Ernest Lapointe: Yes, I will explain the reason later.


Arthur Meighen: We are back in the old
rank, and that by the admissions that were made this afternoon. There is not a whit of difference between the obligations we are under now and those we would have been under by a treaty negotiated by Great Britain fifty or seventy-five years ago.


Lewis Herbert Martell: I do not want to be
interrupting my right hon. friend for he knows more about this subject than I do- but when were we ever under the colonial status?


Arthur Meighen: When we did not have
a part and say in the negotiation of British treaties, in the determination of the foreign policy of the Empire.


Lewis Herbert Martell: But we are still bound
by British treaties with other countries whether we are represented in the negotiations or not, exactly as we were a hundred years ago.


Arthur Meighen: Very good; but we had gained the right to be represented, and we ought to be represented.


Lewis Herbert Martell: Whether we are represented or not we are still bound.


Arthur Meighen: We ought to take advantage of what we have secured. All this the present government has abandoned. That is what I complain of. From this afternoon on, the people of Canada will have some very serious thoughts as to the direction towards which this government is tending. If we want friction this is the course to pursue. If we are looking for future difficulties this is just the line to follow: Do not ask for any representation. Hastily acquiesce in the suggestion-in the stipulation, if you will have it that way-that we do not have representations on British delegations. Cheerfully 
step aside and say: We will not have a word to utter about the policy at all, but when the time comes that any difficulty arises out of the policy which you are pursuing, then we will decide whether we will take any part or not as one of the self-governing dominions of the Empire. This is just the policy which will lead to friction, if it is friction we are looking for.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Does my right hon. friend mean to say that if to-morrow a difficulty arose between Great Britain and Greece or Roumania or Jugo-Slavia we ought of necessity to get into that difficulty at once?


Arthur Meighen: The Prime Minister does not imagine that I mean anything of the kind.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, he does.


Arthur Meighen: No, we do not want to
get into any difficulty.


Andrew Ross McMaster: Hear, hear.


Arthur Meighen: We do not want to be
in any difficulty whatsoever. But you do not get out of difficulty by keeping your eyes blind to what is going on, you db not get out of difficulty by permitting Empire policy to pursue a line which is ultimately bound to involve us, you do not get out of difficulty by remaining heedless of whether such policy involves us or not. In matters that we are concerned with let us present our view, and let our view every time be dictated by the interests of peace, and of peace alone. This government has abandoned the whole undertaking, this government has abandoned all responsibility, this government has abandoned its duty to the people of Canada.


Mr. ROBERT FORKE (Brandon):: Mr. Chairman, the remarks which I shall make will be along the line of trying to realize in some way just what the position of Canada is at the present time. Regarding the invitations to the Lausanne conference, it seems perfectly plain from the correspondence that has been placed upon the Table, copies of which members have now in their hands, that the Canadian government was not invited to attend, but they were to be kept informed of the negotiations from time to time. That the treaty binds the whole Empire seemed to be made perfectly plain from the correspondence and from the arguments which we have listened to to-day. Canada was not represented by Canadian delegates, and therefore the Prime Minister has stated that the treaty will not be submitted to this parliament for ratification.

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The leader of the opposition takes the ground that although Great Britain may have made mistakes at the conference, yet if the government had stated Canada's point, of view mistakes might be obviated in the future. Of that statement I have no criticism to make. However, we must remember that consultation means responsibility. I shall not attempt to define exactly what is the responsibility of Canada in regard to the Empire, but one thing does seem to emerge from all the discussion which has taken place-that when the King has signed a treaty it is binding upon the whole Empire.
We hear a great deal about secret diplomacy, and I am rather surprised at this late date to learn that so many things take place which cannot be revealed to members of parliament or to the country. It seems to me that we would be in a better position to deal with this matter to-day if we knew exactly what took place at the Imperial conference and at the Imperial Economic conference. In relation to secret diplomacy, I had handed to me to-day a statement made by Richard Cobden seventy-three years ago, and with the permission of the committee I will read it. I hope hon. members will realize just how fast we are travelling towards open diplomacy. This is his statement:
My own opinion is that we are on the eve of a revolution in the diplomatic world; that the old regime of mystification and innuendo and intrigue cannot survive the growth of the democratic principle:	that
diplomacy must be a public and responsible organization; and nobly again has Kossuth-
-the Polish patriot-
-assailed the stronghold of this spirit. What could be better than when he said: "Diplomacy tells us that the dinner is prepared and eaten and we (the people) have nothing to do but digest the consequences."
That seems pretty much along the line of some engagements that are entered into by individuals and govemm'enlts-they are all done in secret, but the people have to bear the consequences. I am inclined to believe, Mr. Chairman, that the less we have of secret diplomacy the better will it be for the country and for the world at large.
I have listened very attentively to the speeches of the Prime Minister and the right hon. leader of the opposition, but I am bound to confess that I do not yet know exactly what the position of Canada is in the British Empire. But that is what we are trying to define. It seems to me, however, to be one of the most difficult things to define. The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, also seems to be in a similar difficulty, for I notice he is thinking of calling a conference of delegates from the dominions to meet representatives of Great Britain in an effort to see if they cannot formulate some policy which will be common to the Empire and involve common action. I should really like to know just what the opinion of Prime Minister MacDonald is in respect to the relationship of the dominions to the British Empire.


Lewis Herbert Martell: Will my hon. friend permit me a question?


Some hon. MEMBERS:: Oh, oh.


Lewis Herbert Martell: I have put questions to the right hon. Prime Minister and the right hon. leader of the opposition, and have been treated very courteously by both. Does my hon. friend's reading of the history of our status as a portion of the British Empire incline him to any other view than that we .stand exactly as we did seventy-five years ago, save that the British government accord us the courtesy of asking us to attend Imperial conferences? Is there any other difference?


Robert Forke: Yes.


Lewis Herbert Martell: I cannot see it, and no person can show it to me as a matter of constitutional law.


Andrew Ross McMaster: What is the use of asking the question then?


Lewis Herbert Martell: I am asking to be shown the difference. My hon. friend puts himself forward as the supreme arbiter in all things.


The CHAIRMAN:: Order.


Robert Forke: It is not to be expected that I should attempt to answer that question when constitutional lawyers have been addressing the House on it for the whole afternoon and have not yet clearly defined it. But I do not agree with the hon. member when he says we have made no progress; I think we have made a great deal of progress in the past seventy-five years. Nor do I agree with the statement made by the right hon. leader of the opposition that we have lost all that we had gained during the last ten years. We did not gain that position through diplomacy, although that may have had something to do with the action that the Canadian government have taken during past years. But that is not the reason, I say, why we have attained our present position. Canada has attained the position she occupies to-day through the gallantry of her sons on the fields of Belgium and France and through
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the large sacrifices which Canada has made. Canada has attained the position she occupies to-day because of her standing in the economic world and the general influence she exercises among nations. Her very material position, if no other, gives her a standing that she had not attained ten years ago, and we cannot, we will not go back to the position we occupied in the days previous to the war.


Lewis Herbert Martell: Will my hon. friend
permit me again? Will he kindly tell me where as a matter of constitutional law our position is any different from what it was fifty years ago?


Robert Forke: There are some facts that
we cannot exactly define. Perhaps before this debate is over it will have dawned upon the minds of hon. members exactly what the position of Canada is within the Empire, but I cannot define it in so many words. Of this I am satisfied, however, that we have made' tremendous advancement during recent years toward national status. The Prime Minister stated, either to-day or on a previous occasion, that our part was to keep our commitments and obligations and be ready to throw ourselves into the scale of peace and act in the interests of the welfare of the Empire. I do not know that a sentence of that kind contains any definite meaning. It may be very useful; it may be a very good policy for us to pursue. At the same time it does not in any way begin to lead us out of the trouble we are in with regard to a definition of our position as a nation within the Empire. Sir Wilfrid Laurier made the statement

I think it was during the South African war-that Canada reserved the right to act or not to act, and when. That is about the position we occupy to-day. I am concerned as to what Canadian national status is really going to be in the future. As a rule, individuals and nations are fond of talking about their privileges and their rights. If Canada is to enjoy the privileges of a nation, to reach the status of independence even as a nation within the Empire, that status will also carry with it responsibilites. If we are willing to take the status of a nation, then we must be willing to assume the responsibilities of a nation. I question very much whether we have arrived at that stage, and I question very much whether we are in a position to attain it at this time.
The question of Imperial defence has not been brought up in this debate, and it is one which I am not inclined to undertake to discuss. It is much too difficult a question; it is one to which I cannot offer any solution. 
But one thought that comes into my mind is this: Does Canada as a com-9 pan. ponent part of the British Empire run any more risk from invasion than she would do if she were an independent nation? I do not think anyone in this House will accuse me of being other than British in sentiment. In fact I am inclined to believe that our very relationship with the British Empire involves a certain amount of danger from invasion in time of war. As regards the signing of treaties, when Canada has a particular interest in the matters concerned, when the treaty affects only Canadian interests, there will be no trouble in having the treaty signed by Canadian plenipotentiaries and brought into effect by the signature of His Majesty the King. I do not believe for one moment, notwithstanding the argument of the right hon. leader of the opposition that we are going to go back to the status we occupied ten, fifteen or twenty years ago.
I would like very much to be able to define the position that Canada ought to occupy. I cannot think of any phrase that will better express my ideas than a line of Tennyson's, that we go on "from precedent to precedent." The right hon. leader of the opposition finds fault with the government because he thinks we have perhaps let one precedent slip by that we might have taken advantage of. However, I do not think any irreparable damage has been done. I do not conscientiously believe that, the relative positions of Great Britain and Canada are any different to-day from what they were twelve months ago. Canada is in the position today of emerging from what might be called a status of irresponsibility to that of a free nation. I think you will find the same thing apply in many phases of life. For instance, there is a time when an animal emerges from the condition in which it is unable to look after itself and is about to reach that of independence. We seem to be just in that transitory stage. We are not a nation; we are not a colony; we are something more than a colony and a little less than a nation. That is about as nearly as I can define our position. I rejoiced this afternoon to hear the Prime Minister and the right hon. leader of the opposition say that they would prefer that Canada should go on in its development toward the status of a free nation inside the bounds of the British Empire. Perhaps I feel a little more strongly on this question than some other members of the House. I am Canadian through and through. My

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children are native bom Canadians; I have no other interest except what is in Canada. But, Mr. Chairman, I can never forget the land that gave me birth. To me it is not only a matter of how Canada will grow in stature as a nation; it is a matter also of sentiment. I sincerely hope that whatever the future	may bring, Canada
will still	remain within the	Empire.
It can only be for the advantage of Canada and of the whole Empire that we should have a league of British nations making for peace and for the welfare of the world. While having a warm affection for those little inslands on the other side of the Atlantic ocean, I would wish that Canada might ever remain at peace with the great nation to the south of us. It is unthinkable; you cannot imagine such an occurrence as war between Canada and the United States. But of one thing I feel certain: that although we may be a nation forming a component part of the British Empire, the future welfare and prosperity of this whole North American continent are bound up in the welfare and prosperity of Canada and the United States; what is the welfare of the one is the welfare of the other.
I know that I have added nothing to this debate, but as I have said, it is most difficult to define our position. I have faith in the future; I have faith in the perseverance and the ability and industry and intelligence of the Canadian people; I have faith in the fair-mindedness and justice of the British government. I feel certain that at no time will there be any divergence of opinion or will there be any friction, that will impair the cordial relations that exist between Canada and the Mother Country.


Ernest Lapointe: Mr. Chairman, before offering the
very few remarks which I intend to make, I desire to refer very briefly to the speech made by the right hon. leader of the opposition (Mr. Meighen) on this question. As unsual, he made a very fine and eloquent speech, but I must say that it was not very enlightening, and I am not surprised that my hon. friend from Brandon (Mr. Forke) in following him said that the situation was not easy to understand.
My right hon. friend (Mr. Meighen) made various statements which cannot be reconciled. I have summarized some of the arguments he presented. Those who remember his speech will admit that it was not easy to understand just what the real stand taken by my right hon. friend was. In one part of

his speech he says that parliament will be free from assuming any obligation later on, whether we sign the treaty or not, and then in another part he says that whether we sign the treaty or not, we are bound. It is not a good treaty, he says; he is not quite satisfied with it. He even suggested that Great Britain had made a mistake, and when he ventured that statement I could see some of his friends behind him hesitate and shiver in their approval of his declarations. He feels that Great Britain is making a mistake, that Great Britain should not mingle in European policies; and then he blamed us for not having mingled in these very same policies. He blamed us for refusing to do the very thing he criticised Great Britain for having done.
In answer to a question which I asked, whether or not we should disapprove of the treaty and signify our disapproval, he said no; but the whole trend of his remarks was that we should not approve of it either. There are provisions in the treaty which he does not like. He says that, being far from the seat of the negotiations, we are not in a position to know exactly what the conditions were; we were not in the inner circle, and perhaps it was the best thing to do under the circumstances. It might be the best thing that could be done under the circumstances, but still he must censure this government for not having prevented the British statesmen from doing the best thing that could be done under the circumstances. Moreover, my right hon. friend says that the government should be censured for not having participated, although no notice was served upon us that w-e could be admitted. I could recite some of the other statements of my right hon. friend. He really will forgive me if I say that a more incoherent, self-contradictory, whimsical piece of political crazy-patch-work has not been exhibited to the world since the creation of the National Liberal and Conservative party. Read the speech of my right hon. friend in Hansard to-morrow, Mr. Chairman, and you will be able to find in it all shades and brands of opinion on this question. On one point only i9 he consistent; it is that the government is wrong, the government must be wrong, the government is and always shall be wrong. In that he is consistent, and I am sure he will maintain that attitude.


Mr. ARCHAMBAULT:: For a number of
years.


Ernest Lapointe: Yes, for a number of
years. Now may I refer to the question of the power of ratification, in answer to a question asked by my hon. friend from North
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Waterloo (Mr. Euler) while my right hon. friend was speaking. The power of ratification varies in different countries. After a treaty has been negotiated and signed by the representatives of the countries concerned, it has to be ratified by some part of the sovereign power in each country. In some countries the power of ratification is in the popular chamber, as in Portugal, for instance. In other countries it is in the second chamber, as in the United Startes. In Great Britain the power of ratification is in the Crown, and my right hon. friend (Mr. Mackenzie King) when he read the first words of Lord Cur-zon's speech on moving in the House of Lords the bill concerning this treaty, read his statement that this treaty does not need ratification by parliament. The same thing was stated in the British House of Commons by Mr. Lloyd George respecting the Peace treaty after the conference art, Versailles, and it was stated in the Canadian parliament at the same time. Ratification by His Majesty the King makes the treaty valid and binding. His Majesty the King is the King of Canada, Australia, of New Zealand, as well as of Great Britain, and when he signs a treaty which declares peace with Turkey, all the nations of which he is king are at peace with Turkey, just as when he declares war, all the nations of which he is king are at war. This cannot be contradicted in any respect.
So, Mr. Chairman, ratification by His Majesty the King will make the treaty valid for all parts of the Empire, but as has been stated this afternoon and again to-night, parliament will always be the only authority to decide to what extent and the manner in which any obligation resulting from the treaty will be lived up to. It is for parliament to declare and decide-I think what my right hon. friend the Prime Minister said this afternoon will be accepted by everybody in this House-what the extent and limit of those obligations shall be. The manner in which they shall be fulfilled may depend in large measure upon the manner in which they were assumed. In connection with a treaty to the negotiations and deliberations leading to the signature of which we were no party, a treaty with which we had nothing to do, surely the moral obligation is not the same as that resulting from a treaty in which we participated to the fullest extent. We must remember the circumstances under which the negotiations for the Lausanne conference were started. It was only a few days after that crisis in the Near East when war was imminent and when we, in common with the other dominions, had received a famous telegram
IMr. Lapointe.]
that remains in the memory of everyone in this country, asking us whether we would join in a proposed war against Turkey. My right hon. friend the Prime Minister referred in his speech this afternoon to the crisis which occurred in September, 1922. He referred to the attitude of the right hon. leader of the opposition (Mr. Meighen) -and to the words, "Ready, aye ready". My right hon. friend does not seem to like those words.


Arthur Meighen: Yes, I like them.


Ernest Lapointe: He kept strictly away
from them. He seemed to repudiate them this afternoon. I could not understand why he protested when those words were used this afternoon.


Arthur Meighen: My hon. friend's understanding seems to be a little off-colour this evening. He has not understood anything.


Ernest Lapointe: I beg pardon. I understood what he meant very well. What is the matter with my hon. friend from Vancouver Centre (Mr. Stevens)? Anything wrong with the Pacific ocean? I will read from the Daily Mail and Empire of Saturday, September 23, 1922, a report of a meeting at which the right hon. leader of the opposition spoke. I read the following:
Throughout the speaker's allusions to the Turkey situation it was manifest that the audience was in fullest accord with his view that Canada should have done what Australia and New Zealand had not failed to do. Then came the telling climax when Mr. Meighen summed up the situation in these stirring words: "Britain sought a declaration of solidarity on the part of the dominions. Let there be no dispute as to where I stand. When Britain's message came, then Canada should have said, 'Ready, aye ready, we stand by you'


Edmond Baird Ryckman: Where does the minister stand?


Ernest Lapointe: I will tell you. I do
not stand for Canada sending soldiers to answer an appeal which a man of the standing of the late Right Hon. Bonar Law, who became Prime Minister a few weeks afterwards, said was as foolish as it was wrong. That is where I stand, and that is where I believe the people of Canada stand to-day.


Edmond Baird Ryckman: Is the minister aware
that the Prime Minister of Australia stated that the reply which Australia gave on that occasion had saved the war?


Ernest Lapointe: I am quoting the words of Bonar Law who was Prime Minister shortly after that time.


Arthur Meighen: If my hon. friend will
read the context he will see the impression he has given is wholly wrong.

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Ernest Lapointe: I have encountered the
words which I have quoted on several occasions. In the Old Country this statement was quoted1 in criticism of the stand taken by Lloyd George and Winston Churchill and nobody ever sought to deny the words of Bonar Law. Now my hon. friend (Mr. Ryckman) says that the answer of the Prime Minister of Australia saved the war. Well, it is the first time I ever heard such a statement made. I have read statements in newspapers and I have read statements by public men in this country who would not be accused of being very partial to this government-I refer to Sir Clifford Sifton for one-to the effect that the answer of the government of Canada to the message of Mr. Churchill saved the war.
I have in my hand' a copy of MacLean's Magazine, and surely nobody will accuse MacLean's Magazine of making propaganda in favour of the present government of Canada. Mr. MacLean, editor of this magazine, stated that the action of Canada at that time saved the war. Here is what he said in an important article:
Some men, not Canadians, who have unusually good resources of world-wide information, whose judgment is generally sound, and whose views are held in high esteem, are positive that had our Premier succumbed to the Lloyd-George-Churchill demands, preceded a3 they were by propaganda and scheming for Canadian participation the British Empire would undoubtedly have been at war witlh Turkey, Russia and perhaps India, Afghanistan, Persia, and God knows who else or what the end would have been.
When I was interrupted I was proceeding to say that this conference at Lausanne was organized only a few days after the crisis in the Near East.
We were told in a message from the Secretary of State for the Colonies that "yesterday invitations were sent" by the governments of Great Britain, France and Italy to Roumania, Jugo-Slavia and other countries to attend the conference.
Knowing the gentleman who was Governor General of Canada, I believe that these words must have been the work of some humorist in the Foreign Office. Not only are we not invited, but we are given the intimation in very polite terms that Jugo-Slavians, Roumanians, Japanese, Greeks and Turks had been invited. I do not think that this was a great compliment to us to be told that these people should be invited to a conference from which we had been excluded. However, the government of Canada answered in the way expressed in the telegrams before the House. My right hon. friend blames the government for having answered in that way, and for not having insisted on Canada being there, for not having forced the attendance 187
of Canada at the Lausanne conference, when we are told that we could not be invited to it. A few days after the crisis in the Near East there were clouds of war hanging over Europe. Could the Canadian government at that time take a stand that would act as a block to Britain negotiating peace with Turkey? Could we assume at that time an attitude which would be represented in this country as an attitude of blocking, hampering and preventing the peace of the world? I can hear even now the noise and the words of my hon. friends opposite who would have said, "The Prime Minister and this government do not say 'Ready, aye ready,' when they are asked to send arms to Europe to take part in the war. They have refused to do their duty; and now they do not want Britain to make peace. They all want war, not peace."


Arthur Meighen: The hon. gentleman's
wit is not failing, but his reasoning seems to be very bad. What I said had not been done in this case was done precisely in the case of the Paris conference. It was not without an effort that Canada was represented there. The effort that was made then, this government refused to make.


Ernest Lapointe: Unfortunately-and my right hon. friend knows this-we are not at liberty to disclose the reasons or the causes which were given for our representatives being refused an invitation to the conference. He knows that, but he will understand when I say that the situation was very different from that at the time of the Paris conference or the Washington conference. On account of events that had taken place since then,, there was not between some of the allied countries the same understanding, the same united will, the same agreement on everything as there was at the Paris conference and at the Washington conference. My right hon. friend knows that.


Arthur Meighen: Will the minister say
that the same objections to which he refers were not advanced to our being represented on the British delegation at Paris? I cannot see where the difference comes in.


Ernest Lapointe: I do not know whether the same objections were made at the time of the Paris conference; but I repeat that the situation was not the same; that in 1922 at the time of the Lausanne conference, after the troubles which had taken place in the Near East, after there had been a tense situation as between some of the allies, the situation was not the same as that at the Paris conference or the Washington conference. It

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was more difficult for Great Britain to convince some of her allies that Canada should be there as well as the other British dominions.


John Arthur Clark: Were the difficulties of 1922 greater than the difficulties between 1914 and 1918?


Ernest Lapointe: My hon. friend will
allow me to go on with my speech without noticing his clever interruption.


Arthur Meighen: How does the minister know that it would have been harder to get representation at the late conference than it was at Paris, when this government never tried?


Ernest Lapointe: The matter was closed by the very terms and words of the communications which came to this government from the government of Great Britain. We could not do then what was done in the case of the Washington conference. I have in my hand a copy of an address delivered before the American Historical Association at New Haven on the 28th December, 1922, by the Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden, who was kind enough to send me a copy of his address. I read these words of his which throw some light on the proceedings of the Washington conference:
However, in 1921 no suah invitation was sent-
That is an invitation to the dominions to attend the conference.
-and there was serious consideration as to whether certain dominions would not stand aloof from the conference, and decline-
I call my right hon. friend's attention to these words:
-to be bound by any treaty Or convention there concluded.
This would have been the real disruption of the Empire.
Having regard to the importance and significance of the conference, it was wisely decided that the absence of a special invitation should be overlooked and that the dominions should be represented at Washington by plenipotentiaries nominated on their behalf, to whom full powers should be issued under the same practice that had prevailed at Paris in 1919. In the result the wisdom of this course was entirely apparent. The status and distinctive consideration which the dominions had received at Paris was accorded to them at Washington. There were regular meetings of the Commonwealth's delegates at which all important questions were discussed and determined in advance.
The representation of the dominions was recognized when the treaties were signed. Does anybody in this House suggest that the present government could do the same thing in 1922 with regard to the Lausanne conference? In the situation in which Europe was at the time, was it possible for this gov-

ernment to threaten disruption of the Empire by saying that we would decline to recognize any obligation resulting from any treaty if we were not a party to that treaty? Could that be done, or could we send delegates as was done at the Washington conference even if we were not invited? There is this great difference, that Great Britain in 1921 could arrange things so that the dominions would be represented at the conference, but we could not insist on the appointment of Canadian plenipotentiaries for the Lausanne conference according to what was stated to us and the very serious reasons which were then given to the Canadian government. That is the situation as it was, which is very different from the situation which existed at the Paris conference and at the Washington conference. There is no doubt that it is hard to define what the constitutional status of the dominions really is and to give full recognition to that status. It is a difficult matter to handle, but I hope British statesmanship will be equal to it. Many difficult and knotty problems have been solved in the past by the British people, and I trust that this very difficult problem will be solved, but solved in the right way, by recognizing that every nation of the Empire has the same right, the same freedom and the same power as the citizens of any other part of the British Empire.
I have seen in the newspapers that the Prime Minister of England has suggested this. Perhaps, notwithstanding the objections which have been offered against that system, it will be necessary to have a constitutional conference of all parts of the British Empire to define clearly in black and white what the situation is, what are the rights and powers of the various parts of the commonwealth. The Imperial conference of 1921 adopted unanimously a resolution for the holding of such a conference, and this is a sentence which I read from that resolution:
They deem it their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such readjustment, while thoroughly preserving all existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a full recognition of the dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial commonwealth, and of India as an important portion of the same, should recognise the right of the dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations.
-and so forth. The Right Hon. Sir Robert Borden in a very interesting work entitled Canadian Constitutional Studies says, at page 113, commenting on that resolution:
The 14th resolution has reference to constitutional relations, but it can hardly be said that its pronouncement is progressive or even illuminating.
In that lecture before the American Historical Association he also takes exception to

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the resolution adopted at the subsequent conference of 1921, observing that this constitutional conference was not necessary and should not have taken place He says:
The constitutional conference alluded to in this resolution has not yet been held, and at a meeting of the Prime Ministers held in London in 1921 the surprising conclusion was reached that it was no longer necessary. It would be difficult to suggest any substantial reason for this determination.
My right hon. friend (Mr. Meighen) who voted for the subsequent resolution of 1921 thought they who in 1917 said that a constitutional conference was important were wrong. No doubt he will give us the reasons for this difference of opinion between himself and Sir Robert Borden.


Arthur Meighen: Perhaps the Minister of
Justice will say which of us he thinks is right.


Ernest Lapointe: I am inclined to side
with Sir Robert Borden against my right hon. friend, I regret to say. Again, at page 115 of Canadian Constitutional Studies Sir Robert says-*


Arthur Meighen: Before the minister proceeds, will he tell us why the conference this year, participated in by the government of which he is a member, did not restore the position of 1917 and decide to have a constitutional conference?


Ernest Lapointe: Because the Prime Ministers in 1921 had stated that it was necessary to hold such a conference, whereas the question was not discussed at the conference of 1923. That is the reason. It is not the conference of this year that has reversed the decision of 1917; it was the conference of 1921 of which my right hon. friend was a distinguished member.


Arthur Meighen: Certainly, and I abide
by it. But if Canada believes that we were wrong then why was Canada's opinion not recorded this year?


Ernest Lapointe: The question was not
mooted; however, it may arise at some time. But my right hon. friend being opposed to it, that was a presumption for the government that there might be strong reasons for no conference being held. Meanwhile I may quote the following words of Sir Robert Borden:
While it is true that the dominions were represented at Paris that they took their place at the Peace conference, and that they became signatories of the Peace treaty, I have yet to learn that since the conclusion of peace their right to "an adequate voice in foreign policy and in foreign relations"-
These are the words of the resolution of 1917.
187i
-has been recognised in any effective or practical way. This result does not seem to justify complacency or inaction. It is perfectly competent for the nations of the British Commonwealth to declare their constitutional relations, and to have them accepted by foreign powers. Until this is done there will be not only difficulty and uncertainty, but danger of reaction. Even within the Empire those relations are imperfectly realized, and abroad their implications are misunderstood, if not resented. Having regard to the resolution of 1917, and to the status gained by the dominions in the war, it is essential that this condition should not continue.
I think my right hon. friend will agree with me that these are strong reasons for something definite being done in the way of defining for our own purpose as well as for the information of the world the status of the nations of the British Empire. This special situation with regard to the nations of the British Empire is not well understood by foreign nations, and that is the cause of many difficulties; and I believe that on every occasion and every opportunity that presents itself the equality of nationhood of every nation in the Empire should be asserted, should be defended, should be made known, not only by the dominions themselves but by the British authorities, in their dealings with the nations of the world.
Let me say to my right hon. friend that I agree that there must be co-operation between the various parts of the British Empire. But this must be honourable co-operation. Surely my right hon. friend will not suggest that in order to co-operate we should act as rubber stamps and automatically accept negotiations and decisions in the reaching of which we have not been invited to assist, and our advice has not been given. Undoubtedly co-operation implies equality in the responsibilities which lead to the making of a legal instrument or convention or treaty, and only if we are invited to co-operate should we do so. And when our co-operation is sought we should give it right to the end and sign and accept and approve of any resulting treaty.
I am sorry that this incident should have occurred while the Right Hon. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald is Minister of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, because he has inherited the situation in which he at present finds himself. He is not responsible for that situation; it was created by those who preceded him in office. I know that Mr. MacDonald cannot and does not take exception to the situation as I argue it to be, because of his record, because of the statements he has made, because he above all men is not satisfied with the way in which the management of foreign affairs has been conducted in years past. Not later than July of 1923 I received a letter which I am sure many hon. gentlemen in
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this parliament must also have received. I am sure many hon. gentlemen in this parliament must have received a letter signed by a large number of members of the British House of Commons, the first signature being that of Mr. MacDonald. The letter is reproduced in a review called Foreign Affairs, and I quote the following excerpts:
Last September the British cabinet, or, more accurately stated (as has since transpired), a section of it, apparently determined to run the risk of war with Turkey. We are not here discussing the merits or demerits of the policy itself, but we point out that neither the British House of Commons nor the Dominion legislatures were given any opportunity of debating the subject, nor were they given any data to enable them to judge of the circumstances which had led to so grave a decision. The dominion governments were invited to send contingents to the Near East, without any preliminary warning that the situation was such as these messages indicated. If war had ensued, it would have been a war decided upon by certain British ministers without any sort or kind of national or imperial consultation.
This is only the latest instance of the dangerous system under which we continue to live, in spite of the experiences of the Empire before and during the Great War.
...The signatories of this letter see in the situation here described a permanent menace to the security of the people of Great Britain and of the dominions and a source of grave danger to peace and to the unity of the Empire; and we are anxious to know how far you may share our views, and to what extent co-operation might be established between members of the House of Commons and of the dominion parliaments to deal with it.
...We ourselves are of opinion that the people of the dominions are equally affected with the people of Britain. Even if a closer contact and working arrangement should become established, as the result of pressure from the dominions, between the British ministry and the ministries of the dominions in regard to the conduct of foreign policy, the problem of parliamentary control in each dominion would still remain unsolved.


Arthur Meighen: Is this a communication
to the minister?


Ernest Lapointe: 
Lewis Herbert Martell: May I ask my hon.
friend are question-when he or any other person on behalf of Canada goes to negotiate a treaty his credentials are credentials authorized by the British authorities, the king in council in England?


Ernest Lapointe: The credentials come from His Majesty the King.


Lewis Herbert Martell: In other words, when a
Canadian minister goes to sign a treaty on behalf of Canada, he has no greater status than that of any other plenipotentiary of the British Empire who is authorized by the British authorities?


Ernest Lapointe: No; but he is a citizen of the country which he binds by signing the
treaty, and that treaty is signed by a Canadian public man interested in Canada. We claim that it is not necessary in purely Canadian affairs that anybody else than a * Canadian minister should represert the king. And this is not going back to the colonial status. I think my right hon. friend was closer to the colonial status when he criticised the right obtained by Canada that Canadian public men should sign Canadian treaties when they relate to purely Canadian affairs. I think we were not going back to the colonial status when, in 1922, in the very incident which has been related again to-night, we said that no

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soldier could leave Canada before the Canadian people were consulted and agreed to it and all the circumstances were laid before parliament. Those who were then reverting to the colonial status were those who criticised the stand taken by the Canadian government and said the government should have answered as soon as we had the call, "Ready, aye, ready". I say that we are not reverting to what my hon. friend described as the colonial status. We are acting as Canadians, conscious of our dignity as such, proud of being citizens of this fine country, proud also that she is a nation in an Empire which is the greatest in the world, but especially proud that she is a sister nation, and determined that she shall be nothing less than a sister nation within the Empire.
Mr. JOS. T. SHAW .(West Calgary) :	Mr. Chairman, in a matter which may be fraught with such significance as this particular matter is, it seems to me that we should approach it as far as possible in a temper utterly devoid of any partisan considerations whatsover. It has been extremely interesting	this afternoon to listen to
those who have preceded me in their varying interpretations of Canada's present position within the Empire. I think all are agreed that to-day that position is rather a nebulous one. Certainly after what we have heard one would be justified in referring to it as a very hazy position indeed. Now, that is not so with regard to our domestic affairs* After perhaps a good deal of disagreement and sometimes considerable conflict we have at last achieved national status so far as our domestic affairs are concerned, with some few possible minor exceptions; we have complete command over our own domestic affaire. But who will suggest that we have complete control over our foreign affairs? I think it is time that our attitude as to foreign relations should be clarified as far as it is possible for the government or for parliament to do so. We should declare and define our exact position in that regard just as we car. with the greatest simplicity and ease declare and define our position with regard to our domestic affairs.
As pointed out by the hon. Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) there was a resolution of the Imperial War conference in 1917 pointing to the necessity of a constitutional conference for the purpose of trying to enlighten us on our relationships within the Empire. It was thought advisable that that conference should mot proceed during the course of the war and it was suggested that the matter
should be taken up at the earliest possible date after the conclusion of hostilities. The first Imperial conference after the war was held in 1921, at which the right hon. leader of the opposition (Mr. Meighen) was present. Bitt for some unknown reason that constitutional conference was not proceeded with. In the proceedings of the 1921 Imperial conference we find this unanimous resolution-I read only a part of it:
Having regard to the constitutional developments since 1917, no advantage is to be gained by holding a constitutional conference.
As Sir Robert Borden, in his work already referred to, has said:
If the self-governing dominions may not have adequate voice and influence in the direction of the Empire's foreign policy, it is not improbable that some of them wll eventually have distinctive foreign polices of their own, and that may mean separation.
The situation is that we have not been able so far to arrive at any definition through consultation or through the avenue of a constitutional conference, so it seems to me that failing that we must set about ourselves to ascertain, if we can, exactly our position and exactly our responsibilities.
May I be permitted for a few moments to deal with the matter somewhat historically? During the period of our colonial status, in the earlier days of our history, there could be no question that we were not
10 p.m. entitled to any part in foreign policy and that we were under no obligation whatever to assume any burden in respect of foreign wars. I am not going to take the time to discuss with the members of the House the purposes or the ideas in the minds of the rulers of the Mother Country with regard to her colonies in those days when we enjoyed colonial status. But it is abundantly clear that Canada-and it is not to the discredit of England at all-was in those days looked upon as a place for commercial exploitation in the interests of the Mother Country. We must judge the age and the conditions which existed in that time, and during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries there can be no doubt that colonies were looked upon as I have stated. Let me read from a work The American Revolution recently published by a distinguished Oxford professor. He says:
To each generation belongs its modes of belief; and to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries it was impossible to conceive of colonies which did not directly minister to the Mother Country's wealth.
Then the author quotes as an example the attitude assumed by one Martin Bladen, a member of the Board of Trade in England, * gentleman to whom belongs the rather ques-
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tionable distinction of having been the first to propose the stamp tax for America. I may add that a member of the Board of Trade occupied a position in those days of even more importance than it is to-day. Here is what he says:
Every act of a dependent provincial government ought therefore to terminate in the advantage of the mother state unto whom it owes its being and protection in all its valuable privileges. Hence it follows that all advantageous projects or commercial gains in any colony which are truly prejudicial to and inconsistent with the interests of the mother state must be understood to be illegal and the practice of them unwarrantable, because they contradict the end for which the colony had a being and are incompatible with the terms on which the people claim both privilege and protection. For such is the end of colonies, and if this use cannot be made of them it will be much better for the state to be without them.
May I then refer those who are interested to the dispatch sent immediately after the treaty of Peace of 1763 by Lord Egremont, one of the secretaries of state, to the Lords of the Board of Trade, requiring them to report on this question:
By what regulation, the most extensive commercial advantage may be derived from these cessions, and
How these advantages may be rendered more permanent and secure to His Majesty's trading subjects.
In part, the Lords of the Board of Trade, reported on the 8th of June, 1763:
The most obvious advantage arising from the cessions made by the Definitive treaty are: the exclusive fishery of the river St. Lawrence, on all the coasts of the gulf of St. Lawrence, and the islands in that gulf.
And it goes on to indicate how advantage may be taken of the fishery and the fur trade. Similarly, the purposes for which the colonies *were held were indicated in 1791 in a dispatch written by the English secretary for the Colonies to Lord Dorchester. This question was asked:
-^by what means, the connection and dependence of Canada, on this country may be so preserved and cultivated, as to be rendered most beneficial to Great Britain during its continuance, and most permanent in its duration.
With the advent of free trade in England in the forties of the nineteenth century this idea that a colony was intended for exploitation by the Mother Country happily vanished. This new view synchronized with the granting of responsible government to the colonies, a condition which was not only accentuated but was reinforced by the federation pact of 1867.
With regard to military affairs so far as the relationship between the Mother Country and the colonies was concerned, it is interesting to find that Earl Grey, the Colonial Secretary, from 1846 to 1852, in evidence given before a

royal commission in the Old Country in 1861, used these words:
I think that the very notion of a colonial relation between this country and our colonial possessions implies protection on our side and obedience on the other, within certain bounds.
Then we find that in the Hamilton-Godley military report of the 24th of January, 1880, these words are used:
Thirdly, we dissent from the argument founded on joint interest. If England was considered bound to contribute to the defence of her colonies merely because she is interested in their defence, it might fairly be argued that the obligation is reciprocal, and that the colonies, being deeply interested in the safety of England, ought to contribute systematically and habitually towards the defence of London and Portsmouth. But the ground on which we hold that England is bound to contribute towards the defence of her colonies is, that the Imperial government has the control of peace and war, and is therefore in honor and duty called upon to assist them in providing against the consequences of its policy.
This is a very clear intimation that when the relationship of colonial status exists the Mother Country is under obligation to provide any necessary protection, because she is the one who is responsible for the condition of peace or war.
Coming later to the military position in 1902 at the Imperial conference of that year the War Office presented a memorandum of which I quote a part:
Prior to the outbreak of the war in South Africa, as far as any general scheme for the defence of the Empire as a whole had been considered, it was assumed that the military responsibilities of our great selfgoverning colonies were limited to local defence, and that the entire burden of furnishing reinforcements to any portion of the Empire against which a hostile attack in force might be directed fell on the regular army. There may possibly have been some pious hope that in time of need the colonies might rally to the Mother Country, but no definite arrangements were made, nor were inquiries even on foot as to whether such aid might be expected, and if so, in what strength. Indeed, the necessity for it was by no means realized and its reliability was doubted.
I have made these quotations for the purpose of indicating the position, of the colonies with respect to the Mother Country according to the responsible views of leaders in the Mother Country itself. Now let me survey the Canadian attitude for
10 p.m. a few moments. We fought in two British wars in Canada, the American Revolutionary war, and the war of 1812-1814. Neither of these wars was of course, of our own making. Our next experience was in 1861. An effort was made in that year by the Duke of Newcastle to have Canada prepare for the possibility of hostilities with the United States in connection with the so-called Trent affair. The Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, undertook to exercise

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pressure on the Canadian government with reference to military preparation. Parliament declined to pass the required legislation and the Duke of Newcastle on the 22nd of August, 1862, expressed his regret. He urged the resumption of efforts by the Governor General in that direction and indicated very clearly what ought to be done. He suggested military co-operation under the direction of the Adjutant General, and gave various other suggestions. Now I direct the attention of hon. members to the reply of the Macdonald government of that day, because I think the reply clearly indicates the position of Canada, even at that early day, with regard to taking part in wars the making of which we were not a party. I am quoting from the reply of the Canadian government:
The dispatch of His Grace involves matters of the highest importance and affirms a principle which for the first time comes in a practical shape before the people of Canada. Your Excellency's advisers have not been unmindful of the discussions upon the subject which have taken place in the Imperial parliament, but until now they have not been called upon to consider the principles of a policy so gravely affecting the relations of Canada to the Mother Country .... It is not doubted that the same mutual regard and confidence will be exhibited in any communication or negotiation which may follow His Grace's dispatch. At the same time, however, it is felt that in dealing with a question affecting so deeply the present and future welfare of the province, care should be taken to base any arrangements that may be entered into upon something more solid than sentiment, more enduring than any proposal not recognizing the rights and interests of the Canadian people.
After arguing in favour of the voluntary system as against the compulsory system, the memorandum goes on as follows:
The people of Canada, doing nothing to produce a rupture with the United States, and having no knowledge of any intention on the part of Her Majesty's government to pursue a policy from which so dire a calamity would proceed, are unwilling to impose upon themselves extraordinary burthens. They feel that, should war occur, it will be produced by no act of theirs, and they have no inclination to do anything that may seem to foreshadow, perhaps to provoke, a state of things which would be disastrous to every interest of the province. On this ground their representatives in parliament assembled rejected the proposition to organize 50,000 men, or, indeed to commit the province to a much smaller force; and recent elections in various localities embracing more than a third of the population of the province, have shown that in this respect public feeling has undergone no change.
Proceeding further:
Another suggestion embraced in His Grace's dispatch is well calculated to excite surprise. Your Excellency's advisers allude to that portion of the dispatch in which His Grace proposes to remove the control of funds required for militia purposes from the domain of parliament. His Grace is evidently aware that the proposition wears the aspect of "an interference with the privileges of the representation
of the people," and it is certain that any measure liable to this construction never will be, and ought not to be, entertained by a people inheriting the freedom guaranteed by British institutions.
Then again:
Your Excellency's advisers now turn to the general argument which underlies the argument of His Grace. That the right of self-government has for a correlative duty the maintenance of provision for defence, is a proposition which in the abstract is indisputable in the case of governments of states which are sovereign in themselves. As between a colony and the parent state it cannot be said to exist in the same sense. A British colony must submit to all the consequences of conflicts produced by the policy which Her Majesty's government may carry out in the interest of the Empire at large. It is not enough that a colony endowed with self-government provides for the preservation of peace and order within its own boundaries. It is not enough that a colony so situated must endure all the consequences of a line of action which its own legislators have no voice in originating and towards the termination of which they can do nothing. A further responsibility is held to attach to the colonial relation. The colony, although the theatre of ruinous hostilities, must furnish its quota in aid of the Imperial army and contribute a share to the attendant expenditure.
The dispatch goes on 'and says the Canadian government cannot assume this responsibility. That is the first time this matter was drawn to our attention in Canada. The next time we were asked to participate in an overseas war was in 1885, in connection with the war in the Soudan and may I take the liberty of quoting the reply of Sir John A. Macdonald to the request for Canadian reinforcements? To Sir Charles Tupper, who was then High Commissioner in London, on the 12th of March, 1885, Sir John wrote these historic words:
I wrote you a hurried note the other day on this question, and have both before and since talked it over with my colleagues, and we think the time has not arrived, nor the ocasion, for our volunteering military aid to the Mother Country. We do not stand at all in the same position as Australasia. The Suez canal is nothing to us, and we do not ask England to quarrel with France or Germany for our sakes. The offer of these colonies is a good move on their part, and somewhat like Cavour's sending Sardinian troops to the Crimea. Why should we waste money and men in this wretched business? England is not at war, but merely helping the Khedive to put down an insurrection, and now that Gordon is gone, the motive of aiding in the rescue of our countrymen is gone with him. Our men and money would therefore be sacrificed to get Gladstone and Co. out of the hole they have plunged themselves into by their own imbecility. Again, the reciprocal aid to be given by the colonies and England should be a matter of treaty, deliberately entered into and settled on a permanent basis. The spasmodic offers of our militia colonels, anxious for excitement or notoriety, have roused unreasonable expectations in England, and are so far unfortunate. I daresay that a battalion or two of venturous spirits might be enlisted, but 7d a day will cool most men's warlike ardour.
I want to draw hon. members' attention particularly to Sir John A. Macdonald's
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words in that dispatch when, he said that the reciprocal aid to be given by the colonies to England should be a matter of treaty deliberately entered into and settled on a permanent basis.
The next occasion on which we were involved in a war was during the Boer War, into which we voluntarily entered. I think we enlisted something like 8,000 men and spent something like $3,000,000 on that war, only to be met by the denunciation of Joseph Chamberlain at the Imperial Conference of 1902.
Before leaving to attend that conference Sir Wilfrid Laurier used these words in the House of Commons:
It would be the most suicidal policy that could be devised for Canada to enter into that vortex in which the nations of Europe, England included, are engaged at the present time.
On the 10th of October, 1910, speaking at Montreal, he used these words:
Does it follow that because we are exposed to attack we are going to take part in all the wars of the Empire? No, we shall expect to take part if we think proper.
Now one of the most important declarations of Sir Wilfrid Laurier's on this important matter was at the conference in 1911. Sir Joseph Ward had proposed a resolution there regretting that the colonies had not been consulted by the British government with reference to the Declaration of London. During the debate Sir Wilfrid used these words:
We may give advice if our advice is sought; but if your advice is sought, or if you tender it, I do not think that the United Kingdom can undertake to carry out that advice unless you are prepared to back that advice with all your strength and take part in the war and insist upon having the rules carried out according to the manner in which you think they should be carried out. We have taken the position in Canada that we do not think we are bound to take part in every war, and that our fleet may not be called upon in all cases, and, therefore, for my part, I think it is better under such circumstances to leave the negotiations of these regulations as to the way in which the war is carried on to the chief partner of the family, the one who has to bear the burden in part on some occasions and the whole burden on perhaps other occasions.
Sir Wilfrid Laurier saw with a very clear and discerning statesmanship that if he took part in the consultations of Empire, it necessarily meant that we must assume responsibility, but in all his actions and in all his efforts it is perfectly clear that he kept away from consideration of these questions involving advice, for the good reason that I have given that it meant the responsibility of this country.
Mr. MAlNION:	Does the hon. member
not believe that if the Empire went to war, or Great Britain declared war, and Canada

made a declaration refusing to go to war, along the lines the hon. member is suggesting in the remarks he is making, it would be tantamount to a declaration of independence?


Andrew Ross McMaster: Sir John A. Macdonald did that.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: I have already intimated
that Sir John A. Macdbnald acted in that way. t


Mr. MANION:: When we were a colony,
but the position is different to-day.
Mr. SHAW; I am not so sure we were a colony. I do not think so.


Lewis Herbert Martell: In so far as our right
to take part in a war is concerned, our position has not improved. We were in the same position when Sir John A. Macdonald made that statement as we are to-day.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: I am not so certain. I
propose to come to that in a few moments. If I do not satisfactorily answer my hon. friend's question, I would ask him to interrogate me later. At the conference in 1909, an Imperial general staff was arranged; but in that conference the freedom of the dominions to decline to participate was not only preserved, but it was emphasized. I have under my hand the resolution itself, but I will not take the time to refer to it.
Now we come to the war of 1914. In this war Canada voluntarily participated. It was Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, who placed Canada in a state of war at that time. We have been told on numerous occasions that as a result of that war, and as a result of the peace, that we have very definitely improved our position, that we have secured an improved status. I desire to read one or two statements of some gentlemen who ought to know so far as that particular matter is concerned. Lord Milner uses these words:
There is no kind of authority which in practice (whatever may be the theory of the constitution) the parliament and people of the United Kingdom claim any longer to exercise over the parliaments and peoples of the self-governing dominions. We frankly accept the position that we are partner-nations of equal status.
Colonel Amery, the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for the Colonies, has said:
We have got to decentralize our conception of Empire, and realize that each member of the British commonwealth is equal in status to every other, and, from its own point of view, the centre of the whole.


Lewis Herbert Martell: Was that the time Lord Milner was Governor of South Africa?


Joseph Tweed Shaw: No, that is at a comparatively recent date.

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Andrew Ross McMaster: About the time of the negotiation of the Peace treaty.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: I think approximately about
that time. I will pass over the remarks along the same line made by Mr. Hughes. Premier of Australia, General Botha and Gen-aral Smuts, and I want to refer now to the official report of the war cabinet of the United Kingdom for 1919, which contains the following :
The common effort and sacrifice in the war inevitably led to the recognition of an equality of status between the responsible governments of the Empire. This equality has long been acknowledged in principle, and found its adequate expression in 1917 in the creation, or rather the coming into being of an Imperial war cabinet, as an instrument for evolving a common Imperial policy in the conduct of the war.
Sir Robert Borden, in a speech quoted in the official report of the war cabinet, said:
But we have always lacked the full status of nationhood, because you exercised here a so-called trusteeship, under which you undertook to deal with foreign relations on our behalf, and sometimes without consulting us very much. Well, that day has gone by.
Sir Robert Borden, referring to his attitude at the Peace conference, has said:
On behalf of my country, I stood firmly upon this solid ground; that in this, the greatest of all wars, in which the world's liberty, the world's justice, in short the world's future destiny were at stake, Canada has led the democracies of both the American continents. Her resolve has given inspiration, her sacrifices been conspicuous, her effort was unabated to the end. The same indomitable spirit which made her capable of that effort, and sacrifice, made her equally incapable of accepting at the Peace conference, in the League of Nations or elsewhere, a status inferior to that accorded to nations Jess advanced in their development, less amply endowed with wealth, resources and population, no more complete in their sovereignty, and far less conspicuous in their sacrifices.
In the treaty of Versailles dated 28th of June, 1919, provision was made by which under certain circumstances, it was arranged as follows:
Article (1) Provides adequate security and protection to France, Great Britain agrees to come immediately to her assistance in the event of any unprovoked movement of aggression against her being made by Germany.
But provision was made for a separation of obligations so far as the dominions were concerned in the following article:
Article (5) The present treaty shall impose no obligation upon any of the dominions of the British Empire unless and until it is approved by the parliament of the dominion concerned.
There we find a very clear separation of the obligations of the dominions as compared with the Mother Country. The British parliament approved of that provision, and consequently cannot now be heard to say that we are one and indivisible, and all necessarily bound by exactly the same foreign policy.
The next step in our position, perhaps not very important, was the Halibut treaty.


Lewis Herbert Martell: If the British authorities did that, and the Canadian authorities would not accept it, would that not be tantamount to a declaration of independence?


Joseph Tweed Shaw: I do not think the failure to ratify the treaty or any reservation would necessarily be tantamount to a declaration of independence. I was about to suggest that the Halibut treaty would probably represent one stage. I do not place much importance upon it; but its importance, I think, comes particularly by reason of the fact that the king, acting as respects Canada, overrode the advice of the Colonial Secretary and gave a Canadian representative power to sign the Halibut treaty. It is of primary importance too in that it led to the series of resolutions to which the Prime Minister referred this afternoon, at the Imperial conference of 1923, resolutions which, I suggest, very clearly recognize a separation of obligations as between the various parts of the Empire.


Lewis Herbert Martell: If His Majesty the King gave that authority overruling the British authority, if the Governor General in Canada is a representative of His Majesty, why cannot the Governor General in Canada give the same scope of authority to Canadian ministers without reference to the British authorities if we are not still dependent upon the British authorities?


Joseph Tweed Shaw: I do not know what might happen in certain eventualities, but there can be no question about this, that the king acts on the advice of either his British ministers or his Canadian ministers. In connection with the Halibut treaty, he acted on the advice of his Canadian ministers and appointed a Canadian plenipotentiary to conclude that particular treaty.


Lewis Herbert Martell: If we are not still dependent on the British authorities, why cannot the Governor General act on the advice of Canadian ministers without reference to British ministers at all and say we are independent without going around the bush?


Joseph Tweed Shaw: There is much camouflage in connection with this question, I agree with my hon. friend. The fact remains that the king is king, not only of Great Britain, but of Canada, and he is the final authority as regards these treaties.


Lewis Herbert Martell: He has his representative here, though.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: If what I have suggested in
outline means anything at all, it means two
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or three very definite things: first of all, that Canada has never agreed in advance under any circumstances to participate in British wars. On the contrary she has consistently declined to be 'bound to participate without the action of her parliament. Again, there has been a clear separation of interests amongst the various parts of the king's dominions and that has been repeatedly recognized. There has also been recognized a separation of obligations with respect to foreign countries even in the matter of war. That has been not only recognized, but officially provided for.
That brings me to this particular treaty. There can be no doubt that in some treaties Canada has participated in the negotiations; she has been represented; she has secured the approval of this parliament, and she has invited the King's ratification; but in respect of the Lausanne treaty now before the House, Canada took no part in the negotiation of it ; she was not represented at the conference; she did not sign, and now the government, at the request of the British government, has refused to ask this parliament to give its approval to the ratification.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I correct one remark my hon. friend has made? I understood him to say that this government had refused the request of the British government to have the treaty approved by parliament. The British government has made no such request. All the British government has asked us is if we concur in ratification, and we have in reply stated that we shall take no exception to whatever course His Majesty may take in the matter of ratification.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: I thank the Prime Minister
for the correction, because I do not want to misstate his position.


Lewis Herbert Martell: Is my hon. friend's
whole argument not tantamount to this, that we are an absolutely independent nation; that the only thing we recognize is a human being overseas, the King of England, and we take his imprimatur as a matter of course? That seems to 'be his whole argument.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: With some hesitation, I
agree to a limited extent with what my hon. friend has stated. I rather thought that was the position until I heard the discussion this afternoon, and I am frank to say that I am not just sure now what the position is.


Lewis Herbert Martell: I am in the same position.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: In any event the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition both agree in this particular, that we are bound by this treaty. I do not agree with that view. If such is the fact why all this historic separation of obligation? Personally, I cannot see, if there is that equality of status of which I spoke a few moments ago, how one portion of the Empire which alone negotiates, which alone signs, which alone participates in the framing of that treaty, is thereby enabled to impose that treaty as a binding obligation upon any other portion of the self-governing dominions. Supposing the position were reversed; suppose Canada as part of the Empire happened to be at war with a country and alone made peace, I wonder if this rule would work the other way and if such a treaty of peace would be binding upon the Mother Country. I doubt that very much. The Prime Minister has spoken also about our being involved in some moral obligations. I cannot see the distinction. If we are bound, we are legally bound, and if we are -bound by the terms of this treaty, then it is our duty, as a country which honours its contracts to see that the treaty is carried out to the full, at least to the limit of our ability. It was claimed by the Prime Minister that <the treaty was made on behalf of Great Britain alone but in answer to that I need only say that, as pointed out by the leader of the opposition, the treaty on its face describes one of the contracting parties as the government of the British Empire, and I cannot therefore accept the mere statement of Lord Curzon in a debate as proof to the contrary.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: May I draw
my hon. friend's attention, seeing that he has the treaty in his hands to the first clause, what is stated to be "final act:"
*The governments of the British Empire, France and Italy, in agreement with the government of Japan, being desirous of finally re-establishing peace in the East, and having invited on the one hand Greece, Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, and also the United States of America. .	.	.
And so on. That simply is not true. The governments of the British Empire did not invite. We have the declaration here that the governments of Great Britain and Japan agree. The phrase is used very loosely.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: I quite agree with the Prime Minister that the treaty itself indicates a very loose use of the terms ''The British Empire," Great Britain," and perhaps the language itself is loose, but in any event, it is quite clear to me that Lord Curzon attempted to negotiate a treaty on behalf of the British Empire. In that treaty itself, I think the plenipotenti-

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aries representing the British Empire were at fault in not inserting the reservation which was provided in the treaty of Paris to which I have earlier referred. But I notice that in the trade conventions, which are a part of this treaty, provision was made by which the dominions were not to be bound unless they saw fit to accept the obligation. Let me refer to the final provisions of that portion of the treaty dealing with business affairs generally.
It will be found at page 151 of the Treaty Series No. 16:
The contracting powers reserve the right of declaring, at the time of the coming into force of the present convention, that its provisions do not apply to all or any of their dominions enjoying responsible government, or their colonies, protectorates, possessions, or territories beyond the sea subject to their sovereignty or authority, and in this case Turkey will be released from her obligations under the present convention to the said dominions, colonies, protectorates, possessions and territories.
The said powers may, however, adhere subsequently in the name of every dominion enjoying responsible government, colony, protectorate, possession or territory in respect of which they have, in accordance with the terms of the present convention, made a declaration of exclusion.
It is strange that Lord Curzon should have made this reservation with regard to this trade convention and ignored it so far as the more onerous provisions of this treaty are concerned. I shall speak for a moment now with regard to the final act in this matter, which is the ratification, or the act which converts this treaty from a treaty in escrow to an operative treaty, that transforms reality into fact. The ratification by the king is the final act which gives operation to the treaty of peace. The king is an international entity; he is the one who makes the treaty of peace. He acts on the advice of his responsible ministers and in this ratification it seems to me he is acting on the advice of his responsible ministers in Great Britain and not on the advice of his responsible ministers in Canada. In other words the king will undoubtedly ratify this treaty acting on behalf of his British ministers; but unless his ministers in Canada give their approval then I fail to see how the king can ratify on behalf of this country.


Lewis Herbert Martell: If the king ratifies on
the advice of the Imperial government that ratification applies to Canada, irrespective of whether our ministers agree or not. The hon. member cannot get away from that.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: That is the question; but I
am not so sure that the King acting on the advice of his British ministers can perform the final act of ratification binding this country. It is not an unusual situation for the king
of one country who is also the king of another to find himself in different positions with respect to his separate kingdoms. For example, history shows that the Georges in England were also kings of Hanover; and many a time the King of England found himself in his capacity as King of Hanover at war with European nations although he was not at war in his capacity as King of England. And similarly it may well be that the King of Canada may not be at war when the King of England is at war.


Lewis Herbert Martell: Perhaps we had better
be independent.


Joseph Tweed Shaw: I will suggest in a moment
what seems to me the logical position in this matter. Now, there are many other treaties.
I have in my hand a list of the treaties appearing in King's Monthly List of March-April, 1924; this list comprises about a dozen treaties. I wonder what interest Canada has in any of them? I wonder whether she has been consulted? I find one between the British government and some foreign power with regard to Spitsbergen, a treaty regulating the status of that country and conferring the sovereignty on Norway. I wonder what concern we have in that particular treaty. I find a treaty with Czecho-Slovakia, and some arrangements with Germany, with France and with Japan; and there is an important treaty with Nepal, providing for the importation of aims into that country. That is an important matter and I wonder whether the government of Canada was consulted regarding it; I wonder whether they gave their seal of approval to the ratification of that important treaty. One can see how absurd the situation would be if we had to be bound by every treaty which the British government should chance to ratify. Here is a country, the exact geographical situation of which I confess I do not know, for the importation of arms into which a treaty 'has been provided which may ultimately result in war. Surely no one would suggest that we as a country are bound hy any such treaty as that. To urge otherwise would be to reverse the historic policy of this country.
The Prime Minister has indicated that there are several courses we might pursue. We may, he said, be one commonwealth of nations. I do not like that term, I must frankly say; I do not understand the term if we are to be a nation with equal status. It seems to me that the logical position for Canada to assume, the goal towards which we must develop, is to obtain complete control not only of our domestic affairs but of our
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foreign affairs as well; we must become really, in fact and dn law, an independent nation. Having achievied that status and in that position I for one at least would welcome a full and frank association with all the other dominions of the British Empire and with the British government itself in order that we might go on and achieve in this world a fuller destiny and make the Empire something which would be really and eminently worth while. That seems to me the sound logical basis on which we may make progress in the future. But if we leave our status in the nebulous, hazy state it rests at present trusting that somehow good will finally come of it, I am afraid that we are merely anticipating disaster.
I am sorry that the Prime Minister has not seen fit to propose a resolution asking the concurrence of the House in the action which this government has taken in this matter. I think it is important that these matters should be presented to the House in some definite way so that the House may arrive at a conclusion and express that conclusion not only to the members of the British Empire but to the world at large. A discussion such as we are having will undoubtedly be quite beneficial; but it is not directed to any particular object, and we are sometimes apt-I know I am myself-*-to stray from the subject. Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in the only way which seems possible to me for the purpose of indicating the approval of this parliament of the action of the government, I beg to submit a resolution to the committee. I do not come to this conclusion by the same process of reasoning as the Prime Minister, but I do think that the action of the government in this matter has been the right one. I move therefore that this item be reduced by the sum of one dollar for the purpose of approving of the government's action in not submitting the document known as the Lausanne treaty to parliament for approval.
dhe CHAIRMAN:	This amendment as
submitted is not in order: It is not possible to give reasons in committee of Supply for a vote to be reduced, increased or varied in destination. As the amendment stands therefore I must rule it out of order.


Arthur Meighen: I am not sure; Mr. Chairman, that your ruling will be received with anything like dismay on the part of the committee. The amendment is remarkable, but it is no more remarkable than the reasons which preceded it. I was frequently at a loss to know just what- my hon. friend was driving

at, but I got the purport of his observations in the few sentences before the close of his speech in which he advocated the independence of Canada. After we have secured that independence he is ready to co-operate to build up the Empire. I would prefer myself to build up the Empire before destroying it rather than after. I do not rise for the purpose of replying to the speech of the hon. member, for the simple reason that it was conceived in a spirit of criticism and an aversion to things Imperial which I do not share at all, and which, I think, are not shared by any portion of the House. Independence is a fine-sounding thing; but when hon. members with a sense of responsibility sit down to realize all that is involved in it I do not fancy there will be any very serious discussion on the subject either in parliament or in the country.
I do wish to make however a very brief reply to certain statements of the Minister of Justice. I comoliment him on the preservation of his wit and of that extraordinary command which he has attained of a language not his own.
I wish I could compliment him on the logic of his address in general. Suffice to say, as expressive of my estimate of his intellect, that I feel he has the same appreciation of that logic which I have myself. He made an attack upon a position which I took in relation to the Chanak negotiations of September 1922, and to the conduct of Canada in respect thereof-I had not said the stand of Canada, because Canada had no stand. Canada's position was more that of crouching impotence and indecision than any standing up position one way or the other. He depicts me as attacking the government and its position on that occasion, declares that I denounced1 what the government was doing and said what I thought Canada ought to do, to send a reply "Ready, aye ready." I did not denounce the government's position, because we did not know then what its position was. As a matter of fact it was some time afterwards before we knew that the government had no position, that they simply sheltered themselves behind some platitudes, in other words, crawled under the table and declined to express any view on the stand the British government was taking or as to the stand Canada ought to take.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Hoes my right hon. friend say that the communication was sent by the British government? He says nothing was said in reply to the stand the British government was taking.

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Arthur Meighen: I do not know what the Prime Minister means.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: There was a
certain communication sent by Mr. Churchill at the time asking if Canada was prepared to join with the British government in sending forces to the Near East.. Does my right hon. friend say that that was a communication sent with the knowledge of the British government?


Arthur Meighen: I do not know what
is the point of this interruption. Do I say the British government's communication was sent by the British government?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I am referring
to the so-called dispatch sent out broadcast to the press, whether that was an authorized dispatch on the part of the British government?


Arthur Meighen: Oh, the Prime Minister
is raising the point whether the member of the government who sent that dispatch had the authority of the other members to do so?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes.


Arthur Meighen: Oh,, I do not know what that, had to do with what I was saying.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: It had everything to do with what you were saying.


Arthur Meighen: I will come to it in a moment, but it had not the remotest relation to what 1 was saying. At the time I made the address referred to no reply had been sent by Canada at all.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, a reply was sent the next day.


Arthur Meighen: There was none given to the country.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I beg my right hon. friend's pardon,-it was given to the country a dozen times.


Arthur Meighen: Not at the time I spoke.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, a week before you spoke.


Arthur Meighen: The reply of Canada?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes.


Arthur Meighen: I can hardly think so. It would not be consistent with what I then said.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I say it was. The government asked Great Britain for information on which they could announce
to the country the basis of the decision to be made.


Arthur Meighen: The Prime Minister
hardly calls that a reply-a request for information?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: We also replied that before any troops were sent or any decision come to for action of a military or naval character the Canadian parliament would have to be summoned to discuss the matter, and in the interval we should like to have information which could be laid before parliament.


Arthur Meighen: The Prime Minister says this reply was made at the time. But it would not affect the .matter to any appreciable extent. Reading the speech as I have it before me, it clearly states that Canada had taken no position. I was stating what we ought to do under the circumstances, and I was not making any attack; there is no sign of an attack in the whole address. But it was not because an attack was not well merited when we found out the exhibition we had made of ourselves. Now the Prime Minister wants to know if I think the dispatch sent by Mr. Churchill had the authority of the British government. I am inclined to think it had. I read the controversy which took place between the Foreign Secretory of that, time and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, and expressing my opinion

which otherwise I would not have intruded in this debate1 because it has no pertinence-I thought the Secretary of State for the Colonies got rather the better of the controversy.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: What did the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs say?


Arthur Meighen: The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs complained of the announcement to the press. I came to the conclusion that the very terms of the dispatch were generally approved by the British government, and that Mr. Churchill's contention to that effect was borne out by the argument. However, this is not the point in issue at all. Now, what were the circumstances at that time. There was an inchoate treaty of Sevres, a treaty, however, which had stipulated on behalf of Britain and her Allies the securities which in their judgment in the circumstances under which it was negotiated were the best securities for the peace of the world and the rights of the nations engaged. This treaty was never ratified by Turkey, it was kicked into the Dardanelles by a new Turkish government, and consequently a formal ratification by His Majesty the King had never
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been made in our behalf. An insurrection occurred in Turkey, it was successful, the new Turkish government felt themselves in a position to take advantage of the new circumstances which had arisen, and the securities which had been established after long weeks of negotiation they hurled aside and trampled in the dust. Canada, however, was a party, and Canada approved of the terms set out, believing with the other members of the British Empire that those were the best terms that could be secured, and that the concessions therein insisted upon would make for world peace and prevent a repetition of those violations of the rights of Europe which had been a fruitful source of war in times gone by.
This was the situation as between ourselves and the rest of the Empire. We had agreed that this was the best way to do it, that these securities should be protected, and that peace was attainable best by their protection. In this state of affairs there came a time when those securities were threatened, when the Turk, intoxicated with the belief that he had wholly escaped the consequences of his immersion in the war before, intoxicated with some successes which he had secured against the Greeks, felt the opportunity had come to return once more into that territory from which he had been driven and from which Europe had for many years hoped he would finally be forbidden. The situation was saved.
Hon. members try to make out that the British government made an awful mistake, that they were going to war with Turkey, and were held from it by the supreme sagacity of the government of Canada. The British government stood on the Thracian border with their troops, and because they did they prevented the invasion of Europe and made the conditions such that now we have the treaty of Lausanne. If the rest of this Empire had acted as the government of Canada did, then we would have had conditions as respects Turkey out of which no treaty of Lausanne would ever have emerged, but a treaty infinitely more humiliating. Let me read in this connection first a comment of the Toronto Globe on the manliness of the stand taken by Canada, a comment that I commend to members of the government, because it was indicative of the general feeling throughout this Dominion at the time-not a feeling that we should spring into a war, 'but a feeling that we should make such an answer as would demonstrate to the Turk the solidarity and the unity of the Empire in any time of danger or in any time when those securities that we had had granted to us were being invaded, threatened, even violated by the Turk. I 
will read this first, and then I will read what I said myself, and I ask hon. members which of the two is the more severe in the way of a commentary. The Globe said:
The moral issue with which we are brought face to face by these terrible events is, in our belief, of far more vital importance than any question of national security, or even than the preservation of world peace. Are we to say that it is none of our business that the bestial Turk shall return to Europe across the Straits we solemnly declared must be held as a barrier against him? Not thus can we evade our obligations and preserve our self-respect. If we regard the fate of the Christian people of Constantinople and of Thrace with indifference, if the ashes of Smyrna mean nothing to us, if the ory of the martyred Armenians leaves us cold and indifferent, we should at least call the parliament of the Dominion and repudiate in a formal and official way Canada's adhesion to the treaty of Sevres. It is stated that Lloyd George has not requested Canada to send a military contingent to the Near East-
Quite correct.
-but has merely explained the urgency of the situation and and asked whether the overseas dominions desire to be associated with any military steps that might become necessary. We may therefore do nothing and still save our face. Our face we may save, but what about our pledged word as a signatory of the Treaty of Sevres? Is that to become another historic "scrap of paper?"


Mr. CANNON:: If the right hon. gentleman will permit me, was that same treaty signed by France?


Arthur Meighen: I think so.


Lucien Cannon: Why did France refuse
to send troops?


Arthur Meighen: Because conditions arose in respect of France, and France made what is known as the Franklin-Bouillon convention, a convention that did not in 11 ,p.m. any way assist in the general adjustment of the situation. But with other members of the British Empire we agreed that those securities were in the interests of all; we agreed that it was not in the interests of the world that Turkey should march back again over the territory she had desolated. We agreed to that and we rightly agreed to it, under the circumstances of the time-and this castigation comes from the chief organ in this province of the government of the day.


Lucien Cannon: One further question:
Why should my right hon. friend refuse to Canada a privilege that he grants to France?


Arthur Meighen: I have nothing to say
as to French privileges, but I have something to say as to what we should do in the light of obligations we have entered into.
Now I come to a statement made at the last Imperial conference in the hearing of the Prime Minister and recorded as a cor-

rect statement of the situation at that time and since. I read from an address of Lord Curzon; and it was after this address was delivered that the Prime Minister joined in approbation of the fact that we had effected a peace with Turkey. Lord Curzon described the almost insuperable difficulties which had surrounded the Allies in the determination of the war and after the events of the war, and after reciting the Franklin-Bouillon agreement and the difficulties entailed thereby, he told about the success of the Turks, how they had revived national ardour, were well led in a military way, and how, taking advantage of the increasing weakness and demoralization of the Greeks, they made a sustained advance and ipractically drove the Hellenic forces out of Asia Minor. He continues:
This was followed by dramatic events. There was a revolution in Greece which resulted in the enforced abdication of King Constantine. The victorious Turkish army, elated by its success, conscious of Allied disunion, and resolved to push forward even at the cost of a war with Great Britain practically destroyed Smyrna and advanced towards the Straits, then held by Allied forces.
May I interpolate that this is a recital made by him who afterwards, if I understood him rightly, assumed some critical attitude as to the exact terms of a letter sent over here.
The French withdrew their troops to the European shore, being resolved in no circumstances to become involved in hostilities with the Turks. Great Britalin alone saved the situation and prevented the invasion of Europe by rushing a powerful force, military, naval and air, to the Dardanelles and to Constantinople.
This is the great blunder that Britain is supposed by this sagacious government to have perpetrated.
But it was by a hair's breadth only that the renewal of war was avoided. Presently I found myself again in Paris, engaged once more in the attempt to build up Allied unity and to obtain even at the eleventh hour a pacific solution. The Mudania armistice followed in October 1922, and the stage for the peace negotiations was set.
Lord Curzon specifically attributes to the firm stand taken by Britain in 1922, in which stand she was embarrassed by the indecision and the humiliating position assumed by this dominion, alone among the dominions addressed, the fact that the situation was held steady and we were able afterwards to meet the Turk on terms which made possible even the treaty of Lausanne.
Now then, what I stated I will read now; and I find no exception, if I got it correctly, to the part directly quoted from my remarks by the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe). But I read this direct from my remarks. I did not have them taken down specifically,
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but I have no objection to take to the report. Referring to this communication-and I was referring to it in so far as it has been made public by the government-I said, as reported here:
There was no suggestion of sending a force overseas, so far as we can judge from the evidence we have received. What Britain sought was simply a declaration of solidarity, from the component parts of the Empire, a solidarity the existence of which we thought the late war had made abundantly evident. So far as we know, Britain, up to the present time, has received no declaration of this kind from Canada.
Then I continued:
Britain is not prepared to surrender that prize of victory-
I referred to the security which she obtained in the neutrality of the Straits, a security which we with her agreed was necessary to prevent those spoliations which had 'been the tragic record of the Turk in the past, a
security necessary for peace.
Britain is not prepared to surrender that prlie of victory because she wishes to secure that the future may belong to peace and not to war. She sends a message to the dominions, not a mere indifferent mealin' as to what was the mind of Canada, but a message to see if the dominions were solid behind the Motherland. Let there be no dispute as to where I stand. When Britain's message came, then Canada should have said. "Ready, aye, ready: we stand by you. I hope the time has not gone by when that declaration can yet be made. If that declaration is made, then I will be Rod- of thft srovemment.
Now there is supposed to be something exceedingly improper, exceedingly rash when I state that in circumstances of that kind, circumstances just as well known to us as they were to them, to such a communication our answer should be a declaration of solid. arity, and I expressed it in the language I have read. I read now from the words of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and perhaps I may be permitted to do so, seeing that the Minister of Justice has complimented my late leader, Sir Robert Borden, by quoting from him.


Andrew Ross McMaster: Reciprocity in compliments.


Arthur Meighen: Yes. I read from the words of Sir Wilfrid Laurier on August 19, 1914, in this very House.
When the call comes our answer goes at once, and it goes in the classical language of the British answer to the call to duty: "Ready, aye, ready."
I desire now to make some brief references to certain criticisms of myself offered by the Minister of Justice. The Minister of Justice complained of contradictions in my speech. I do not think the Minister of Justice saw any single contradiction. I have since asked hon. members not of my political faith if they
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had observed any, and they say none. My position is perfectly clear. " Oh," says the Minister of Justice, looking across to me, "you complain about Britain having mingled in European policies, and then you complain because we do not mingle in European policies." Does the Minister of Justice really think that was fair? Does he even think it was an intelligent reference to my remarks? I did not complain of Britain mingling in European policies; not at all, never for a second; but I did advise, and I urged, that Canada should advise against special European guarantees or commitments, and I urged that the influence of Canada should have been exerted to have averted Britain from that course.
Then he says:	" One minute you say that
we should approve the treaty, the next minute you say we should not." I say nothing of the sort. I do say that I believe an error was made, to the best of the information I have. I admit that not being present, not having heard all the presentation, my opinion may not carry any great weight; in fact, I may possibly be wrong, and I am open to be persuaded to the contrary, but generally speaking I do believe it is wrong policy on the part of Britain to become involved in European guarantees and commitments, to become aligned with any group as opposed to any other group, and I think it is wrong policy because it is inconsistent with her position as a world power rather than as a European power.
Then the Minister of Justice says:	" Why
don't you move to disapprove the treaty, or approve it?" I would not for a moment advise this parliament not to approve of ratification. I do not see how we are in a position to do it. If we disapprove of the treaty, we should have taken our stand long ago. This government allowed every opportunity to go by. This government is estopped to-day from expressing disapproval of the treaty. This government sat at the Imperial conference and never disapproved of a single term of the treaty. It received communications every day, according to definite statements of the British government which I have in my hand, received them every day for weeks and months, telling them of the whole course of the negotiations, and they never uttered one word of protest or advice. How then could we get up in our dignity now and disapprove of the treaty being ratified?
Then he says: "Why don't you approve?" I am prepared to vote for approval, but it is no business of mine, the leader of the opposition, to introduce a motion for ratifying a treaty. What would be thought throughout the Empire of a course of that sort? Let
[Mr Meighen.]
the government move ratification, even at this stage, and I answer them at once; we are in no position to refuse; our only course would be to accept. But this does not excuse the government. The government had the opportunity to make the influence of Canada felt, and the government ran away from that opportunity, believing though wholly wrongly that if they did so, there would be no binding force in the treaty upon us. This is the humiliating position Canada finds herself in now.


Alfred Edgar MacLean: Does the hon.
member think it would be in keeping with the dignity of Canada, when we were never invited and were not allowed to sit at the conference, for this government to force itself on the conference?


Arthur Meighen: The dignity of Canada
is not injured very much by that. It is injured when we have an opportunity we do not avail ourselves of. We had the opportunity all along. "Oh," the Minister of Justice says, "Great Britain without consulting us decided that we could not have separate representation at the conference." Now the first letter of October 27 simply says Great Britain, France and Italy have sent out invitations. Naturally we would not be invited by the other powers. We would only be invited, if invited at all, by Great Britain, to be represented in her delegation. We might press, and I think we might have pressed successfully, to have had the same character of representation sitting at the conference as we had at Sevres and at Paris but if we could not have succeeded in that we at least could be represented in the British delegation. This is not a matter in which France has any say; it is not a matter that concerns Italy or Jugo-Slavia or any other country; it is a matter between only Great Britain and Canada. We may not have been able to increase the number at the conference table, but we could have been represented there in a way which would have brought us close to the whole conduct of affairs and in a position to influence British policy, if we so desired, from day to day. There was nothing in the world to hinder the government, after receipt of the letter of October 27, 1922, from urging that Canada be at the table, but if they felt for the reasons given in that secret dispatch, reasons, by the way, that I do not regard as powerful at all, reasons that were surmounted before and could be surmounted again-if we failed to surmount them, there was nothing to prevent us being represented in the British delegation, and the only reason we were not so

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represented was that we made no request to be represented, and Great Britain thought we did not want to be. They naturally thought we were quite content to let them go ahead themselves.
It is stated, parliament is now the only authority to say whether or not we take any part, and if so, what, in the enforcement of the treaty or in the securing of rights that arise later on by virtue thereof. Well, parliament has had that right ever since Canada had a parliament. Does the hon. member think Canada was ever without those rights? Were we not consenting parties, for example, to the Anglo-Japanese alliance? Did not Sir Wilfrid1 Laurier, when the question of the first renewal of that alliance came up, expressly affirm on behalf of Canada approval of that renewal? That is what he did, and I am not criticising him at all. Perhaps I would have done otherwise, but anyway parliament made no Objection. Now then, does the minister say that because Canada approved of that renewal, was a party thereto, if any war arose as a result, we had no say as to what participation we should have in it? We had absolute command of the whole situation. Parliament, in the light of Canada's position, could decide what we would do and what we would not do, notwithstanding the fact that Canada manfully, under the leadership of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, declared her position. Never under Laurier did we assume the position, if you call it that, the retreating, ambiguous, crouching position we took in 1922, and never did we assume the position we are now in as a result of this correspondence over Lausanne.
It is stated furthermore, and I have already referred to this statement of the Minister of Justice, that it was harder for us to be represented, owing to the different European conditions, in 1923 than it was back at the time of the treaty of Paris. He says the relations between the Allies were not so cordial-I understand his point; I did not at first-and consequently it was harder to get France and Italy to agree that we should have separate representation at the conference. I do not know that there was very much in it. I know they objected strongly in 1918, but I know that their objections were overcome, but suppose that they could not have been overcome; suppose the conditions and the jealousies were such that they could not be overcome, very well; then we could have had representation on the British delegation and could have been in a position to press the Canadian viewpoint, and to warn against courses which ultimately might result to our detriment. How did the minister know the 188
objections could not be overcome? He never tried. Hardly was the communication received than Canada sprang to the opportunity, I presume thinking we were getting out of something, and notified them that what they did was fine and that no exception could be taken to it at all.
Then it is stated-and the Minister of Justice dwelt upon it at some length, though rather cautiously-that our present relations are unsatisfactory, that they are too undefined, that our obligations within the Empire, our duties, our responsibilities and our rights have not that definiteness they ought to have; and consequently the resolution passed in 1917 at the Imperial conference, which provided that after the war there should be a constitutional conference whose functions should be more clearly to define these relations, should have been given effect to. He criticises me because I was a party to a resolution in 1921 which stated that in view of the constitutional developments-and I ask hon. gentlemen to mark the words-which had taken place after 1917 and before 1921, the relations were clear enough for the present and such conference was unnecessary.
What were those constitutional developments? Between 1917 and 1921 we acquired the right to representation in the negotiation of high political treaties. We acquired the right to representation as an individual country within the Empire. That right we did not have before. This was an achievement, and a marked achievement, and the conference of 1921 felt that, in view of this and other matters, but this one in chief, there was no more need of a constitutional conference. I am quite aware, and I admit very freely, that Sir Robert Borden has taken a position contrary to that taken by myself. I must say, by way of plea, that the entire representation of all the dominions there agreed with our position, and the resolution declaring in 1921 that the constitutional conference was no longer necessary was unanimously assented to by all present. And let me add that there may be a measure of, may I say, indefinity; there is an absence of written contract or obligation ; but if I apprehend the meaning and mission of this Empire aright, it is based on that very fact; its greatest strength is that very fact. The Empire is a growth, a development, an evolution. It is not anything that is the consequence of negotiation and written contract, and I would take this occasion to advise the administration, and I advise them earnestly, that they should not take the pathway of constitutional conferences whose purpose may be to make a brand new constitu-

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tion for this Empire. Let the process continue to be a process of growth and evolution. Do not let us get into the machinery and seek to hammer nails in here and there and erect something of the nature of the constitution of the United States, for the Empire of which we are a member. However, if the government decides otherwise. I shall place no captious obstacle in their way. If they decide that the part of wisdom is to bring about a constitutional conference, go ahead. I would prefer they should be in the discussion rather than I myself. Evidently they wall be slow in coming to such a decision. They went through the conference of 1923 and never brought the question up, and I venture the prediction that they will go through another conference, if they ever live to see one, and they will not advance a proposal for a constitutional conference even then.
Now it is stated that Mr. Ramsay MacDonald clearly understands and approves of the present position of this government. Well if he does, it is in one of those secret communications which we are not allowed to see. I have not read anything from his public utterances that intimates that he either understands or approves of it. He is bewildered. Every utterance he has ever made shows that he is bewildered, and does not know what we want. No one connected with the negotiations would know what we wanted or where we were. The Minister of Justice says Mr. MacDonald is the heir of circumstances; and is not at fault because he found things in the muddle they were. Yes, he is the heir of circumstances, may be the heir of blunders, but the blunders he is heir to are the blunders of this government. He does not complain himself that he is heir to any blunders of any former British government. You do not find him complaining of the message in September 1922. You do not find him complaining that Britain's stand was not consistent from beginning to end. On the contrary he has made no complaint in relation to the conduct of Great Britain towards Canada. The blunder he complains of is the blunder which is embodied in this whole correspondence, which from beginning to end on the part of this Dominion is a masterpiece of turgidity and evasion.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I recognize
that there are many hon. members in this House who would like to speak in this debate, and I do not propose to follow my right hon. friend's example and take up most of the time of the House at this hour. However,

I cannot afford to let pass a remark which he has made that the government, by the course it pursued in 1922, which I think he describes as crouching and cringing, had helped to embarrass the British government at a critical moment when it was facing the grave possibility of war. I must thank my hon. friend for raising the question of what happened in September, 1922, because I think it is well that not only the members of this House but the people of the country should appreciate just exactly what took place at that time, the attitude which was taken by this government and the probable attitude which would have been taken by my right hon. friend had1 he been in office at that particular moment.
I think it was on a Saturday, the end of the week, without any previous word whatever to members of the administration, that there appeared in the press of this country a communication purporting to have been sent by the British cabinet, asking if Canada would associate herself with the British government in sending troops to the Near East to meet the Turks in a possible conflict. That was not an ordinary dispatch. That was not a communication that could be received lightly by any government or dealt with in an offhand manner. It stirred this country from one end to the other with excitement and with questioning. The government, before indicating what position might be finally taken in the situation, asked the British government first by what particular authority or means it came about that this dispatch should have been given to the press before it was conveyed to the Canadian government; and also asked for exact information, with regard to the situation in the Near East. At the time the government asked for exact information we intimated that, in regard to the sending of troops to the Near East to take part in any conflict there, the British government should know at once that parliament would have to authorize a contingent of the kind, and that before the government could speak in the name of parliament, or before the government would feel justified in summoning parliament, we wished' to know from the British government whether the situation was sufficiently critical to warrant summoning parliament for the purpose of considering that message.
I ask hon. members of this House if that was not the proper, correct and, indeed, the only right attitude for the government to take. Happily, we are able to appeal to the facts of the situation. We are able, now, in the light of the history of events, to say

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whether the government took or did not take the right attitude. What happened? Very shortly after that communication had been sent out in the supposed name of the British government, it was denounced by the one who himself became the next Prime Minister of Great Britain; it was denounced by other members of the British cabinet the Coalition cabinet of the day, as having been sent out without any authority. The Right Hon. Lord Curzon, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to whom my right hon. friend has been referring tonight, in one of the strongest of his public statements said that no such communication should have been sent to any of the British dominions; that it was not justified; that it was precipitating a very dangerous situation. More than that, the late Prime Minister, Mr. Stanley Baldwin, led an opposition against the then government of which he had been a member, very largely on account of that very communication and through the general election in which the appeal was made to the British electorate by Mr. Stanley Baldwin and by the late Mr. Bonar Law, the charge against the Lloyd George-Churchill administration of the day was that by their action they had almost precipitated the British nation and the British Empire into another war; they asked the people of Great Britain whether they approved an action of that kind, and the people of the British Isles showed by their verdict in no uncertain terms that, if possible, they wanted an end put to jingoism.
My right hon. friend says: Canada's action embarrassed the British government because no answer was sent. What has he to say about South Africa? South Africa never even answered the communication. It was said that the Prime Minister, General Smuts, was away somewhere, many miles from the capital; that he knew nothing about the matter. He returned a fortnight after the communication was sent to South Africa and then replied that he was happy that the situation was now ended and that there was no need to reply. Does my right hon. friend also condemn South Africa's stand? Why does my right hon. friend condemn his own country always and have nothing to say as regards other parts of the Empire which have taken identical action, or if not identical at least, not as helpful? We said that we would place before parliament the facts and let parliament decide. We took the responsibility. Ours was the responsibility for summoning parliament. Ours was the responsibility also for refusing to summon parliament. We had to have information to decide how we should act in the light of our responsibility. Had we summoned parlia-188i
ment without information, had we called together the members from one end of this country to the other only to tell them when they met, that this dispatch had never been authorized by the British cabinet, we would have been in a fine position as a government. My right hon. friend would have had a glorious time condemning us then. We took the right, sober, sane, dignified and proper attitude of asking for information so that we could decide like reasonable, careful and thoughtful men what it was right and best to do in a very serious situation.
I may say to my right hon. friend that I have been told by members of the government of which Mr. Churchill was a member that that communication was not authorized on the part of the cabinet. That shows one of the reasons why this government or any government that may be in office in this country at any time will do well to examine critically and get exact information before committing the whole country to an attitude which may involve the country in war. More than that I have been told by Mr. Churchill himself that the communication was never intended for Canada; that it was a communication intended for Australia and New Zealand because of their special interest in the Near East, and that it was only an after-thought on his part which occasioned the sending of this communication to Canada. I make that statement publicly, because I think Mr. Churchill would be the first one to be prepared to have it so made. Indeed, he gave it to me as an explanation of what he remarked himself must have seemed to us an extraordinary circumstance, namely that such a communication should have come in the way in which I have just referred. The Prime Ministers who were present at the Imperial Conference were told in most unmistakable language that as regards the British government this communication was an unauthorized communication. Yet my right hon. friend says that we adopted a crouching and cringing attitude because we did not shout "ready, aye ready", and were not prepared to enter into a European conflict without weighing carefully the consequences of our attitude and our words.
My right hon. friend in condemnation of our attitude, quotes from the Globe the statement that the then situation was to allow "the bestial Turk to return to Europe across the Straits. I think those were the words he used in saying that we should have got into this situation and prevented "the bestial Turk" from returning across the Straits.


Arthur Meighen: Those were the words the Globe used.
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William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes, and my right hon. friend used them in condemnation of the government. For what is this treaty he is saying we ought to approve to-day? It is amongst other things to see that "the bestial Turk," to use the Globe's words, is kept in Constantinople, is kept in Europe. It does not matter to my right hon. friend what the merits of the case are, whether it is the bestial Turk in Europe or out of Europe; it is just a question of what government happens to be in power when these particular questions are being discussed. He is in any great question of this kind prepared to condemn the government's attitude regardless of what side we take. I think there are other observers who have a right, perhaps, to be quoted with just as much authority as the Globe in the article to which my right hon. friend referred. A minute or two ago, the hon. the Minister of Justice (Mr. Lapointe) quoted an article which, I think, was published with very good authority, an article written and signed by Lieutenant-Colonel John Bayne MacLean, Editor of MacLean's Magazine, and I think hon. members know that Mr. MacLean is not a supporter of this administration. The article appeared in the November 1922 issue. What did Mr. MacLean say, using his own words:
Some men, not Canadians, who have unusually good resources of world-wide information, whose judgment is generally sound and wthose views are held in high esteem, are positive that had our premier succumbed to the Lloyd Gttorge-Churchill demands, preceded as they were by propaganda and scheming for Canadian participation, the British Empire would have undoubtedly have been at war now with Turkey, Russia and perhaps India, Afghanistan, Persia and God knows who else or what the end would have been.
This is the position' that Lieutenant-Colonel MacLean takes in regard to a hair-breadth escape, as my right hon. friend says, which the world had from war at that time.


Arthur Meighen: I referred to Lord
Curzon's remarks in regard to a hair-breadth escape. Does my right hon. friend believe that that is a correct diagnosis of the situation by Lieutenant-Colonel MacLean?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I believe that the attitude which Canada took at the time-


Arthur Meighen: I am not asking that.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: -had a very wholesome and restraining effect at a very critical moment, and no one can say that the attitude of Canada at that time did not avert a war in the world then. I do not go so far as to say that it did, but I will go so far as to say that such is the opinion pretty generally held by some of the best informed persons in Great Britain at the present time.


Mr. RENE MORIN (St. Hyacinthe-Rou-ville):: Mr. Speaker, it is my misfortune to rise to take part in a debate so far monopolised by the best debaters of this House, but I hold, on this question of our relations with the Empire, views which it is my privilege to be able to express in this House. The self-governing dominions were not invited to send delegates to the Lausanne conference. This was a departure from the practice adopted at the Versailles treaty and followed in the covenant of the League of Nations and at the Disarmament conference at Washington. The question now is whether Canadh, having taken no part in the negotiation of this treaty nor signed it by her representatives, as distinct from those of Great Britain, should ratify it. It is a question which pertains to the constitutional law of Canada; but one would delve in vain into the British North America Act and the other Imperial acts concerning Canada, passed since 1867, to find texts or some authority to enlighten him on the subject. There is fortunately another source of our constitutional rights; it is the precedents. It is stated in the preamble of the British North America Act that the constitution of Canada is based upon the British constitution, which, as you all know, is an unwritten constitution, having its main foundation on conventions, usages and customs. Though the constitution of Canada is mainly found in the British North America Act, none can deny that, since confederation, it has in many respects been altered and modified, and that many of the rights and liberties which we enjoy to-day have no other foundation than usage and custom. It is a fact that we now enjoy rights and powers which were not granted to us by our constitution, which we did not think of claiming or exercising some years ago, but which are now as fully acknowledged as if they had been granted by a precise text of our constitution. In other words our constitution has this analogy with the unwritten constitution of Great Britain, that as in Great Britain, a right repeatedly asserted, exercised and acknowledged becomes vested with us as fully as if it was embodied in our constitution. Our constitution is therefore based to some extent on precedents and it follows, necessarily, that precedents, once established, must be lived up to or followed, otherwise they will annul each other and this important element of our constitutional development will atrophy or vanish.
Permit me, sir, to shortly relate the gradual evolution of our constitution in our international relations. Nowhere are the develop-

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ments of our constitution, as founded upon precedents, more striking than in this domain.
At the time of confederation it was Great Britain which, alone and without consultation with Canada, made all commercial and political treaties for Canada. That is the original stage. A first step forward was made when in 1871 Sir John Macdonald was appointed as a delegate to act, jointly with four other British plenipotentiaries, in the negotiation of a treaty with the United States. He was on an equal footing with his colleagues, but being one out of five, his participation was rather nominal; and if you look into hi's correspondence of that time, you will find that he had many complaints to lay against his colleagues and against the system.
By 1880 it is claimed by Professor Keith, a noted authority on constitutional law, the principle was' secured that new commercial treaties of the United Kingdom should not be made applicable to the colonies without assent of their respective governments, and that if a colony desired to conclude special arrangements with a foreign state, the Imperial government would use its efforts to secure a treaty to that end. It was conceded a little later that delegates of the colonies might be appointed for the negotiation of treaties of commerce for them; but these delegates were to act merely as advisers of the Imperial plenipotentiaries or in a subordinate capacity.
In 1894 at the Colonial conference which was held at Ottawa a resolution was passed asking for legislation to enable the dependencies to enter into agreements of commercial reciprocity with foreign nations, but this demand was rejected in the dispatch of Lord Ripon, dated the 29th of June, 1895, where he laid down the rule that all such negotiations must be conducted by His Majesty's representatives at the court of the foreign power, but tiiat this Imperial representative might enlist the assistance, either as a second plenipotentiary or in a subordinate capacity, of a delegate appointed by the colonial government.
The first departure from these rules occurred in 1907, when, for the first time in our history, the negotiations of a treaty of commerce with France were conducted solely by the Canadian representatives and full powers were issued by the Crown to these two plenipotentiaries alone; the participation of the British ambassador being restricted to the introduction of the negotiators and to the signing of the treaty, though the ratification by the British government was yet required.
This is the third step in the development of our constitutional right to deal with foreign nations. These negotiations were first carried on by the Imperial government alone; later Canadian delegates were appointed but as advisers or in a subordinate capacity, and now they are allowed to carry the negotiations themselves, though under powers derived from the Crown.
A further step was made when in 1910 a convention was entered into between Canada and Germany, the negotiations being carried on by Dr. Karl Lang, Imperial German consul for Canada, representing the imperial government and the Minister of Finance (Mr. Fielding), representing His Excellency the Governor General of Canada, acting in conjunction with the King's Privy Council for Canada; such being the description of the contracting parties in the agreement. This agreement referred however to trade conventions which were to be given effect to by concurrent legislation in both countries.
The most radical alteration, howeverr, occurred after the war, when the prime ministers of the self-governing dominions claimed the right for each dominion to be .represented at the negotiation of the treaties which followed the war by its own delegates, appointed by the Crown acting as to each dominion on the advice of their respective cabinets. As a consequence, at the Peace conference, each dominion was represented by delegates appointed by the Crown acting on the advice of the local cabinet, each one acting for his local government as a separate unit. The same procedure was followed at the Washington conference.
This evolution which I have tried to retrace marks for Canada a most important constitutional development, which has no other foundation than precedents.
In view of these constitutional developments, I claim that this treaty in so far as it purports to impose obligations upon us, is not legally binding without ratification.
I claim moreover that if Canada were to ratify the treaty of Lausanne, a treaty negotiated only by British plenipotentiaries, who were without mandate of any kind from the Canadian government, the authority of all these precedents would fall to the ground, and moreover that it would establish a new precedent enabling the Imperial government to hereafteT negotiate treaties for Canada and impose obligations upon her without her participation and without her consent.
Some will say that Canada does participate in the treaty by being called upon to ratify
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it. In the circumstances under which this treaty would) be presented for ratification to the Canadian parliament, every one knows that it would be a mere camouflage, that it would be simply a nominal formality, because we would not be at liberty to modify it, and at no time would we ever have been in a position to present our views on its terms. Therefore if this treaty was tabled for ratification, the action of this House would be a mere rubber stamping. I submit that we have passed this stage and that if we want to preserve the constitutional freedom which our past statesmen have conquered for us, we can only look upon this treaty as nonexisting.
The Imperial conference of last fall laid down rules concerning our international relations. These rules did not create a new order of things; they did not effect a change of our status; they were merely the formal statements setting forth a change of status already effected, they prescribed the formalities which should be followed as a consequence of this change of status. Resolution No. 2 states:
Where a bilateral treaty imposes obligations on more than one part of the Empire it should be signed by one or more plenipotentiaries on behalf of all the governments concerned.
Resolution No. 3 provides:
As regards treaties negotiated at international conferences, the existing practice of signature by plenipotentiaries, on behalf of all the governments of the Empire represented at the conference should be continued and full powers should be in the form employed at Paris and Washington.
A ratification of the treaty of Lausanne would not be in conformity with these rules; it would be a disregard of them on the very first occasion after they had been formulated. No one was authorized to negotiate this treaty for Canada or to sign on her behalf -a breach of both these rules. It follows that for Canada to ratify this treaty would be to sanction their violation.
If we want to preserve the new status which has been acknowledged to us, it is for us to see that this status be recognized by foreign nations. This constitutional freedom in international relations, acknowledged as belonging to the British self-governing dominions by the treaty of Versailles, received a most formal sanction in the covenant of the League of Nations, where these dominions were admitted into the League as separate states, on the same footing as the small independent nations, and were allowed in the assembly of the League their own representatives, in the same way as all the other members of the League whose sovereignty was
tMr. Morin.]
not controverted. It may be said that from that moment the distinct status of the selfgoverning dominions and the autonomy in internal and external affaire were proclaimed throughout the British Empire and throughout the world at large. It would seem to me unconceivable that a British dominion like Canada, admitted into the Assembly of the League of Nations with the representation and with the powers of the fully sovereign states, called upon to pay her full share of the cost of maintenance of the League and empowered to participate in the settlement of the most contentious and portentous world problems, should yet remain unable to control her own external affairs. Within the British Empire the situation is fairly well understood; there is no friction, and no fear of difficulty arises; but many of the foreign nations have yet failed to grasp the full sense of this constitutional development, because this freedom which we enjoy now is veiled by a mesh of formalities based on tradition and on the ties which bind together the commonwealth of the British nations, of which history has no precedent and which had not been foreseen by international law.
Now, therefore, the problem for the British Empire and for these self-governing dominions is to acquaint foreign nations with this new situation, with the changes that it carries with it, and to obtain for each of these new states the recognition of this sovereignty, which, in their relations with foreign nations, must be complete and unfettered, and yet, towards the British Commonwealth, remains subject to the limitations which an association or a partnership imposes upon its members in their relations between themselves. In order to obtain the world wide recognition of this new autonomy, it is essential that Canada in her dealings with foreign nations act in accordance with her status now claimed. It is only by seeing Canada and the other self-governing dominions act as separate entities and under their own authority that foreign nations will grasp the significance and the importance of the change which has occurred in our status, and will be brought to recognize and acknowledge our present freedom.
Already this assertion has been justified by the attitude of the American Senate. One of the grounds of objection of the United States to the League of Nations was the admittance of the British dominions on the footing of the independent nations. The American senators had failed to understand the importance of the change which has occurred in the constitution of the dominions,

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but if Great Britain and the dominions did not claim that since their participation in the war the dominions had acquired equality of status with fully sovereign nations, and if they did not conform all their actions to this new status, the argument of these senators would be unassailable. Under these circumstances the dominions in their dealings with foreign nations are bound to base all their actions on this new status. In many cases they might, with confidence and advantage, trust the British Foreign Office to take good care of their interests, but nevertheless, on account of the misunderstanding it might create in the minds of foreign nations, they must in all cases live up to their new status. They cannot claim that they have acquired certain rights and yet act as though they did not possess them, because other people will judge them more by their actions than by their words; therefore their actions must conform to their words. If Great Britain is to continue to make treaties for them, as she did fifty years ago, who will believe that they enjoy the right to make them for themselves?
If after having claimed and obtained the right to make our treaties or to participate in the treaties which may impose obligations upon us, we ratify this treaty, we will be proclaiming to the world that the government of Great Britain is still the superior authority which makes treaties for us, we will be giving away our right to make treaties in matters which concern us, we will be assuming obligations contracted for us, without mandate; in international matters it would put us back in the position we were in fifty years ago. Of course I agree that a person enjoying full civil rights may ratify deeds done for him by others, but we are in this peculiar position, that our enjoyment of sovereign rights is not yet fully recognized by foreign nations, and, under these circumstances, our ratification would be looked upon as a denial of our claims. It is true that our relations with Great Britain might not be affected and that it might not be regarded there as an abandonment of our rights, but would not the effect on foreign nations be totally different, would it not postpone for decades and decades the acknowledgement of these rights by them?_
Besides Great Britain and Turkey, there are other nations interested in this treaty; there were obligations contracted by all the participating nations. None of them asked for our participation. How then, can they expect that we will now take up our share of the burden of these obligations for their benefit and! to their partial relief? Great Britain might wish us to assume our share of responsibility in
this matter, but it is a matter to be settled between ourselves. We do not need for that purpose to ratify the treaty, and by so doing to assume obligations toward other countries.
It has been said that as Canada was informed of the progress of the discussion at the conference and did not raise any objection, she is now bound to ratify the treaty. It seems to me an erroneous conclusion. To be informed is not to be consulted. It was proper that we should get this information on account of our association in the commonwealth of British nations, but, as we were not represented at the conference, as we were not a party to the treaty, we presumed that no one intended to impose obligations upon us when not asking for our participation in the negotiations, and it cannot follow that on account of this information we are now bound to ratify the treaty.
The effect of the treaty is to establish peace between Great Britain and Turkey and as a consequence between Canada and Turkey. It is argued from this that it is better for Canada to ratify the treaty and so have a hand in the making of the treaty of peace than to let the British government make peace for us without our participation. This argument does not seem sound to me because it confuses the international point of view with the constitutional one. From the international poipt of view there is no doubt that the signature of the king to the treaty or to its ratification establishes .peace between Turkey and the whole of the British Empire, but the question of our liability for the obligations assumed by Great Britain under this treaty is not an international one; it is merely a constitutional one and it behooves us to repudiate this liability or to fix its limits. Now there is no reason in the world why we should assume obligations under this treaty. It was considered from the beginning that Canada had no claim to make nor interest to protect, she was not invited to the negotiations, she was not consulted; no general Imperial interests were at stake; and under such circumstances there is no need to ratify it.
Let me say, Sir, in conclusion, that if it is better to withhold this ratification, it is not on account of the actions of Great Britain, it is not because we are not satisfed with what the British plenipotentiaries did at that conference; it is because we object to be subject to obligations which were not contracted by us; it is because it is not wise, after having proclaimed to the world our new status, after having been ad-
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mitted to the League of Nations under this new status, that we should act as if we did not possess the rights andi liberties which it entails.
We owe it to our dignity to point out to the American senators and to the*world at large that in her relations with foreign nations Canada recognizes no obligations but those she contracts herself. The equality of nationhood between Great Britain and the selfgoverning dominions has been proclaimed to the world, not only by dominion public men but by the political leaders of Great Britain. In the words of Lord Milner:
There is no kind of authority which in practice, whatever may be the theory of the constitution, the parliament and people of the United Kingdom claim any longer to exercise over the parliaments and people of the self governing dominions-
We have accepted these declarations not with a feeling of mere national vanity, but as an acknowledgement of our majority, as putting an end to any bond of inferiority or subordination in our relations with Great Britain and with foreign nations; and this equality of citizenship, this equality of nationhood, which are the appanage of all freemen worthy of the name, must be cherished, must be guarded, must be secured and cannot be hampered by the submission to obligations contracted without our participation.


Mr. WILLIAM IRVINE (East Calgary):: Mr. Speaker, I do not like the roundabout way by which we have at last arrived at a discussion of the Lausanne treaty, but it is possible that this roundabout way is symbolic of the manner in which, it is asserted, Canada will be held responsible by the obligations which the treaty of Lausanne itself involves. It is symbolic also of the anomalous position which Canada, budding into nationhood, finds itself in in the barren fields of imperialism. However, I welcome the opportunity of discussing our position and our status, no matter by what parliamentary circumlocutions it has come to us. I welcome it because the problem before us is fraught with tremendous possibilities for the future of our country. If it were not so I would not at this late hour inflict upon this House a lengthy speech. But I should like to add a word or two as to the character of the debate thus far and in particular as it has been carried on between the Prime Minister (Mr. Mackenzie King) and the leader of the opposition (Mr. Meighen).
May I offer this impression which I have received, without presumption and without appearing in any way to offer advice to right hon. gentlemen who have held responsible

positions and have reputations internationally as statesmen? But they have given me the impression that each was afraid lest some imagined political prestige might be lost in this discussion. I do not suppose for a moment that that was the opinion they had or the motive which actuated them, but it appears to me that the great point of the discussion has been missed. The right hon. gentlemen will agree with me that neither this present government nor the leader of the opposition is to blame for the anomalous position in which Canada finds herself. I think they will be ready to agree that the position in which we are now placed has come to us in the process of our evolution from colonial status to the status of an independent nation. Had this been made clear, and had the right hon. gentlemen referred to tackled the real problem they would have done better service.
Of the treaty of Lausanne itself little need be said. When it was presented to the British parliament a short time ago by Right Hon. Mr. Ponsonby, he presented it, if we could gather his sentiments from Hansard, as a matter of stern duty. He had no good words to offer in its favour. The right hon. gentleman who spoke in favour of the treaty, and who was in the party in power when the treaty was negotiated, offered what was more of an apologia than a paean of praise in favour of the treaty. And then the Right Hon. David Lloyd George, in his characteristic way, speaks of it as a terrible treaty, a humiliating treaty, a cowardly treaty, a calamitous treaty. And yet this is the treaty that the right hon. leader of the opposition still expresses his willingness at this late hour to ratify, if only the government will make the motion! But I say we are not discussing the contents of	the treaty	itself,	though	if I	wereas	ready to	ratify	it as	some	hon
gentlemen of this House are I would be inclined to read it-to study the various clauses of it. But as Canada was not consulted in the matter at all; as she had nothing to do with signing or ratifying it, we can dispense with the discussion of the treaty itself and consider rather the principles to be followed in making future treaties so far as Canada is concerned.
It will not. be denied, I think, that our present position in this regard is a deplorable one. I should say that the position of the foreign policy of Canada, if it be correct to ;peak of Canada as having a foreign policy, is a laughing stock t'o the other nations of the world. Yet again the right hon. leader of the opposition says, in substance, that the

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strength of our Imperial relations consists in their very nebulosity. Simply because nobody understands them, simply because nobody can explain what they are, therefore our position is all the stronger. I have been trying to gather from the remarks of the Prime Minister and from the speeches of the leader of the opposition what our position really is, if we could only name it or say
12 m. what it was that would be some comfort. There seem to be two positions, one advocated by the Prime Minister and the other by the leader of the opposition. So far as 1 have been able to follow the Prime Minister's position, I would say it consists in this:	To say that we are
free of the obligations of the treaty, knowing very well we are not free, but bound by it. On the other hand, the position of the right hon. leader of the opposition is clear.
I do not think there is any hon. member of this House that failed to understand precisely what he means. He seems to agree that we are bound, he seems to be satisfied to be bound, and would seek to impress Canada's viewpoint on Imperial policy. That is a clear position, but in my opinion a hopeless one, and I shall endeavour to give some reasons for my view in that regard.
International relations, and diplomacy and policies regarding these, have assumed an importance in the public mind unprecedented in our history. Diplomacy has been seen, at least since the Great War, as the incubator of war, and the secrecy with which it has been conducted in the past has added much to its menacing character. Foul policies have seemed to thrive best in the dark, and because of these realizations, statesmen are being forced by the change in public opinion to inaugurate a corresponding change in diplomatic policy. Mr. Ponsonby, the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs in Great Britain, recently declared in the British House of Commons what is to be the policy of the Labour party with regard to diplomacy and foreign relations. I shall quote a few lines from the British Hansard in which he deals with this matter. He says:
As matters now stand there is no constitutional obligation to compel the government of the day to submit treaties to this House before ratification, except in cases, such as the Treaty of Lausanne which is now under review, where a bill or financial resolution has to receive parliamentary sanction before ratification. But as a rule formal publication of a treaty does not take place until after ratification unless parliamentary action is necessary with regard to it. I need not weary the House with the many instances of important treaties which have been signed, sealed, and ratified before this House has been afforded an opportunity of discussing their provisions.
Then he presents what henceforth is to be the policy of the Labour party. He says:
It is the intention of His Majesty's government to lay on the Table of both Houses of parliament every treaty, when signed, for a period of twenty-one days, after which the treaty will be ratified and published and circutated in the Treaty Series.
That is the policy of the Labour party of Great Britain. Is it possible for Canada to find some policy that will be in keeping with the progress made in international affairs in our time, and that will be as dignified and as creditable to Canada as a nation as the position taken by Mr. Ponsonby is to Great Britain? It will be agreed readily that only in the manner in which Mr. Ponsonby intends to deal with treaties is it possible to prepare the public mind for any contingency which might possibly arise out of international agreements. When we have a war foisted upon us out of the dark, not knowing anything of the conditions which preceded it, knowing nothing Whatsoever of the international arrangements and diplomatic juggling which took place prior to the declaration of war, we have to create a war psychology, and the only way we can do it is by an appeal to falsehood, and all nations, I think, utilized that very largely in the last great war to create a psychology which would enable the people to keep on fighting.
Now, what step may Canada take towards a similar policy to that which has been outlined by the Labour party of Great Britain? It is true, of course, that the Prime Minister of Canada has often declared his adherence to such a principle as I have just announced as being the policy of the Labour party of Great Britain. I wish to take this opportunity to compliment and to congratulate the Prime Minister for his action regarding the Lausanne treaty. I am in this happy position that I did not hear his speech this afternoon. I say happy, because after listening to the criticism of hon. gentlemen who did hear it, I am afraid if I had heard it I might not have been able to pay him the compliment I am now going to pay him. His attitude towards this treaty, and his efforts to clear the feet of the Dominion from its entanglements, have been in every way honourable and courageous, and in all the published correspondence he has stood true to his own announced principles in dealing with international affairs. In so doing he has, in my opinion, expressed a democratic ideal for all Canadian statesmen. I am referring to the published correspondence which has been laid on the Table of the House, but I have been given to
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understand that there is some secret correspondence which has not been tabled, and it may oe that the published messages which have inspired me to pay this compliment were merely those which were presented for popular consumption, and that there are others yet hid from mortal eye which, if revealed, would compel me to alter my opinion of the actions of the Prime Minister. I hope that we shall be able to go this far in the future, at least, that we shall not tolerate any such secrecy as I understand the Prime Minister suggested exists at the present time between Canada and the Imperial government. But assuming that there is no such secret corr respondence which could not bear the light of day, and assuming that the Prime Minister, in taking the attitude which he has taken, has expressed the democratic viewpoint of the people of Canada, let there be no mistake, either on the part of this parliament or on the part of the people of Canada in connection with this matter:	Neither a refusal to ratify
this treaty nor the Prime Minister's declaration of principle will save us from being called upon to meet the obligations of this country in the case of the violation of the Lausanne treaty by any nation concerned in the future. But what we shall do when called upon is another matter. The Prime Minister's action, as shown in the correspondence referred to, undoubtedly relieved Canada from any moral obligation, but it does not relieve Canada from a constitutional obligation. Under the present arrangements, as has been very ably pointed out by the hon. member for West Calgary (Mr. Shaw), it is the exclusive prerogative of the king to sign treaties and declare wars. In the very case which made the Lausanne treaty necessary, His Majesty the King declared war on Turkey, and in declaring war on Turkey, Canada also was in a state of war with Turkey. If we are not now at war with Turkey, then it must be that peace has been arranged by the very same authority that arranged the war. If we are going to repudiate the obligations of the Lausanne treaty,
I suppose that means disloyalty to the king and the disruption of the Empire. That, as I am able to understand it, is the reason why the Prime Minister says we are bound by this treaty. But our position with regard to the Lausanne treaty, complicated though it is, is much better than that respecting other treaties which we have not discussed and other treaties which will be made in the future. Take for instance the treaty of Versailles, and clause 10 of the League of Nations; these are perhaps fraught with much more danger than the Lausanne treaty ever will be.

I say that the position with regard to other treaties is worse, because in connection with other treaties Canada is supposed to have been consulted. Canada has signed some of those treaties and ratified them. In the case of the Lausanne treaty we have at least declared our position in relation thereto. But the danger with regard to subsequent treaties that may be made, and with regard to other treaties that have already been madle, is that it will be presumed that Canada has been consulted that she understands the situation appertaining to these treaties, and as a result will be in a position to accept intelligently the obligations which may appertain thereto which is not really the case, Now a consultation which implies obligation, as the Right Hon. Sir Wilfrid Laurier put it once, is the policy of the imperalist, and it is now involving Canada. This is a policy which marks at least part of our movement from a colonial status. It is a sort of halfway house between colonial bondage and national freedom, and it is this policy of consultation that the right hon. leader of the opposition wishes to sustain, and seemingly thinks is a good policy for Canada to continue to follow. I propose to show that this policy of consultation with the dominions in matters international is, first undesirable, second impracticable, and third absurd.


Lewis Herbert Martell: If a treaty ratified by the British parliament were to be binding upon Canada, would the hon. member not say that if we refused to accept the treaty after it had been ratified by the British parliament and become a law applicable to the whole Empire, it would be tantamount to a declaration of independence?


Mr IRVINE:: I do not see what relevancy the question has to a point I was trying to discuss. I would agree with my hon. friend that to declare our independence by refusing to abide by a treaty in the way he suggests might be interpreted in some quarters as disloyalty.


Lewis Herbert Martell: I am loyal to the Empire, but the hon. member is not.


William Irvine: I was simply trying to
answer the question. If the hon. member would tell the House what he thinks about it when I am through, and not interrupt me while I am developing my argument, I think it would be more satisfactory both to my hon. friend and myself.


Lewis Herbert Martell: By arrangement the hon. member got the floor ahead of me.

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William Irvine: That was a very wise and satisfactory arrangement.
My first point is to show that it is undesirable to accept the policy of consultation. At the best the policy of consultation brings to Canada such information as she may get in a second-hand way. It comes from the nation concerned through a foreign office and thence to Canada, when it does come. In passing through that channel it will be necessarily coloured with certain, sentiment. It will be coloured with a certain British viewpoint, and when it reaches us it will not be just exactly what it was when it started from its main source. I do not think it is fair to Canada and I do not think it is dignified for us to be satisfied with receiving second-hand informa-ation through the admirable channel of the Foreign Office of Great Britain. If we are worth consulting at all, if we are of any value either to the nation with whom Great Britain may be in consultation, or to Great Britain, or if they are of any value to us then let us have that consultation direct with the nation concerned. Let us come to our conclusion upon whatever matters may be of mutual interest between us and other nations, and then co-operate with Great Britain afterwards, instead of having a second-hand roundabout way of bringing information to Canada. It is misleading to suggest that, simply because we are called into consultation, we have acquired a status of equality. This is the chief reason why I think the policy of consultation is undesirable. It is misleading. It is not the case that consultation means equality, but here is another reason why it is undesirable to pursue this policy of consultation. I do not think that Canada wishes to be inoculated with the inbred and chronic political diseases of Europe. True they tell us the world is a unit, that as such we must recognize it, and as a nation we must be prepared to take our part in it, but the answer to that is obviously this; that it is just because the world is not a unit that treaties of the character of the Lausanne treaty have to be made.
Another reason why this is an undesirable policy is that it takes our ministers out of Canada sometimes for three months, and during that time they are not in a position to attend to their own governmental affairs. If it is imperative that Canada should have a foreign policy, then by all means let us have that foreign policy on our own behalf, as we see fit to have it, and have direct communication with the nations concerned. There are two means of performing this policy of
consultation in practice. One is by cable and the other is by conference. I wish to deal with these separately and to show that both are impracticable. With regard to the impracticability of this method, let me quote from the proceedings of the conference of prime ministers held in June, July and August of 1921, from the opening speech of the Right Hon. David Lloyd George, and here I think he lays down the basis of the policy. He says:
The direct communication between Prime Ministers, established during the war, has, I think, worked well, and we have endeavoured to keep you thoroughly abreast of all important developments in foreign affairs by special messages sent out weekly, or even more frequently when circumstances require. Indeed, at every important conference either here or on the continent, one of the first duties I felt I ought to discharge was to send as full and as complete and as accurate an account as I possibly could, not merely of the decisions taken, but of the atmosphere, which counts for so very much. I have invariably, to the best of my ability, sent accounts, some of them of the most confidential character, which would give to the dominions even the impressions which we formed, and which gave you information beyond what we could possibly communicate to the press.
It is rather a strange fact that at this very conference the prime ministers who had been so well informed according to the statements of Mr. Lloyd George, expressed surprise, almost to the state of consternation, at the information which Mr. Lloyd George was able to give them as to what had taken place in the two previous years. Let me quote our own Prime Minister at that time, the present leader of the opposition, who, I notice, is not in his seat. He says:
The information that the Prime Minister has given as to the progress of peace negotiations, or rather the re-establishment of actual peace upon the basis of the peace treaties, is indeed encouraging. I feared myself that he would not be able to make quite so gratifying a report.
Seemingly Mr. Lloyd George brought some information that the leader of the opposition was unaware existed and that made the report very much better than he thought it could possibly be. Let me quote briefly from Mr. Hughes. He said:
I desire to congratulate you on the admirable view of the position that you presented to us yesterday. I am sure it was most valuable as well as most interesting. We were all very glad to learn from you, Sir, that though the adjustment of those matters which arose out of the war is not yet complete, all our obligations, and our ex-enemies' obligations under the treaty, were in a fair way of being fulfilled.
He goes on:
We are now asked to deal with foreign policy, and in order that we may do this, you have said that Lord Curzon would review the present situation of foreign affairs. We shall await that statement with great interest. The whole Empire is concerned in foreign policy, though this was for many years re-
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garded as the sole prerogative of Great Britain. Wars are hatched by foreign policy.
And so on.
I speak only for myself, of course-I am sure you will quite understand our desire to know the reasons for your policy in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, in Russia, in Egypt, and your policy in Greece and Turkey. If I have singled these things out it is not because they cover the whole field of foreign policy, but because these matters are perhaps the most obvious.
In spite of all the information Mr. Lloyd George had sent to the various prime ministers, here was a prime minister who says that he was very anxious to know what had been and what was to be the policy with regard to Mesopotamia, Palestine, Russia, Greece and Turkey, and these he had selected merely as samples. Then he proceeds:
I come to one now.
Speaking of some objections he wanted to raise.
You yourself said yesterday, Sir. that direct communication between the Prime Minister of Great Britain and his colleagues overseas had worked well. So it has; that is to say, the principle has worked well; but I think I ought to tell you, Sir, that it is rarely that one does not read in the newspapers, sometimes a day, sometimes more than a day before receiving your telegrams, a very good imitation of their substance. This arises through the great delay in the transmission of messages.
May I recall to the memory of the committee the answer given by the Prime Minister of Canada to a question put by my colleague (Mr Woodsworth), I think it was in February, 1923, as to the Lausanne treaty? The reply which the Prime Minister gave was that he had no information but that which he received from the daily press. So, that, I think, can dispose very well of the contention that by consultation through cables Canada can be kept in touch -with all matters that require displomatic action in the world of international politics.
Rut let me add to the opinions of the prime ministers quoted, the opinions of others. Mr. Lloyd George, in his speech of August 18, 1921, which is quoted in the London Times of the day following, says:
Communications by cable are not a means by which you can have real consultation, because you may have a particular point of view and may alter it after hearing what is to be said on the other side.
Then Lord Milner expressing his view on this matter, also published in the London Times of July 21, 1921, says:
But experience has shown that the consultation which is necessary in order to keep the different interests of the Empire in line, cannot be properly effected by telegrams and dispatches, between half a dozen different governments.
That is the position. The testimony of the Right Hon. David Lloyd George, Lord Milner,
IMr. Irvine.]
together with the confession of our Prime Minister at the conference of 1921, substantiated by the opinion of the Canadian press and by our common sense, ought to be sufficient to prove that consultation by cable in matters of international policy is folly. I have mentioned the Canadian press. Let me give the committee one quotation from the Canadian press on this point. This is from the Ottawa Journal:
The decision of the British Foreign Office, a branch of the British government, which is responsible to the electorate alone, must be final. Let us suppose, for example, that a difficulty suddenly arises between the British government and France. It is an emergency, demanding rapid decision. Does any sane person supose that the Foreign Office, compelled to act in haste, will sit idly with hands folded until it has the advice of all the dominions, thousands of miles away, and without the information necessary to form an intelligent judgment? The proposition, of course, is preposterous. In such a case, and in all similar cases, we should have no voice, even though the decision taken involved the Empire in war.
Hon. members will see very clearly that matters that are more prolonged, international matters that involve long trains of events, diplomatic intercourse and public opinion and sentiment, are even more impossible to be dealt with by means of cables than matters that require sudden decision.
Let me turn now to consultation in Imperial conferences to show that consultation is equally impracticable there. The course which seems advisable to-day on the part of any nation or of any conference might prove disastrous to-morrow and have to be abandoned. Eternal vigilance is required on the part of any nation which would keep on the top of the shifting sand heap of European diplomacy. Our imperial conference when inaugurated was supposed to meet once in four years. Now it meets when it likes. I do not think any time is definitely fixed when it shall meet. But even supposing it met annually, does any one think that the matters which it might settle at the conference can be settled finally, especially in view of the swift changing panorama of events which may force any intelligent man at the Foreign Office to take a very different action from what was agreed upon by the Imperial conference. This is not an adequate method; and it is not only inadequate but dangerous, for while it will be presumed that our ministers have considered and sanctioned the policies adopted1 by the Imperial government, in reality they will very likely be entirely ignorant of the decisions which may have been arrived at. Let us take an example: What of the events in the Near East which very nearly brought about another war and which we have heard so much about

Supply-Lausanne Treaty
to-day-the events that gave rise to the famous utterance of the leader of the opposition (Mr. Meighen) "Ready, aye, Ready"? The Armistice agreement signed between the Allies and Turkey on October 30, 1918, might be considered as a starting point from which to trace very briefly the change of events which led to the war with Turkey. Then on August 10, 1920, the Allies submitted a proposal to Turkey and Greece. This proposal intended as a peace treaty was signed at Sevres. I am aware I have not pronounced the word correctly; but I was afraid to say it right because hon. members might have thought I was talking about a sieve. I want to comment on this matter. Is it apparent to hon. gentlemen that this was the only parliament concerned that ratified the treaty of Sevres? The treaty itself, which I presume, we have all read, was so monstrous that no other nation would dare to put its name to it. But Canada hastened with her signature to ratify it. Now what does this indicate? It indicates to me the complete ignorance of Canadian parliamentarians of international matters.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Some of them.


William Irvine: It indicates to me the complete failure of this consultation policy which has been and is in practice between Canada and Great Britain. I do not of course mean to impute any weakness or lack of knowledge to Canadian parliamentarians; how could they possibly know anything about such a treaty? I will show before I am through that it is impossible for any of us to know anything about it unless we make a special study of the whole thing from sources of information other than that which comes through consultation. However, to continue with the events which led to the war. 'Proposals were again submitted in March 1921 and these were in turn refused by Greece, and fighting between Turkey and Greece went on. This was the situation during the sitting of the Imperial conference of 1921. But what did that conference do to clarify the situation? It did nothing, or at least if it did anything we do not know what it was. It never intimated what it had done, and so I think I am generous in concluding that it accomplished nothing. But even if it had done something, that result would very speedily have been frustrated as subsequent events would have made inevitable; for on October 20, 1921, France upset the whole international apple cart by arranging a separate peace treaty with Turkey. Then relations between France and the United Kingdom became unsettled and
uncertain. Afterwards, in the following March, a new set of proposals were submitted which Turkey refused to accept, with the result that fighting proceeded between Greece and Turkey. The situation became alarming and Mr. Churchill despatched his most famous manifesto; that was the occasion on which he was very anxious that Canada should render assistance if necessary. But there was not the same anxiety to invite Canada to assist at Lausanne when they were making the treaty now under discussion; Canada was all right to do the fighting but she should have no part in the negotiations. And so followed a series of swiftly moving events. What could our Imperial conference do with a situation of that kind? It sat in 1921 when this question was acute; it saw the facts as they took place. How ridiculous it is to suppose that a policy of consultation by conferences could do anything intelligent with such a situation. I would suggest to the leader of the opposition that if he wants to adhere to the policy of consultation he arrange with European diplomacy not to diplomatize until our conference has sat upon the question concerned. That might afford some means of solving the problem. Otherwise it seems to me pretty hopeless. But let me press this point: To what extent was Canada consulted in these matters to which I have referred? What did Canada know about them? How far were we responsible for the blundering policies involved? You will find if you study this matter that the conferences were just as futile in the matters they considered as they were in the matters which they did not consider at all. As an example of that I want to place before the committee, particularly, the British policy in Egypt. I must not go into a very elaborate description of this, because of course the hour is late and no doubt hon. members are thoroughly acquainted with the matter. The policy very roughly speaking was that the protectorate should be abandoned as the result of a certain bargain which the British ambassadors sought to bring into effect.


Andrew Ross McMaster: With whom?


William Irvine: With Turkey. This policy
of abandoning the protectorate in Egypt as a part of the bargain was agreed to by the Imperial conference of 1921. Here is the quotation from the proceedings of the conference which will substantiate that point.


Andrew Ross McMaster: The conference of 1921?


William Irvine: Yes.
Supply-Lausanne Treaty

Close consideration was given the question of British policy in Egypt and the future status of that country, and general agreement was reached regarding the principles by which His Majesty's government should be guided in the negotiations with the Egyptian delegation.
Now, the British ambassador in Turkey-urged the unconditional abandonment of the protectorate. That was the position taken by Turkey, and she refused obstinately to recede from it. It transpired that the decision of the Imperial conference was disregarded, and the policy advocated by Turkey was adopted by Great Britain, the protectorate being un-equivocably taken -away without any bargaining. This amounted to a complete change of policy in a short space of time between that which our Imperial conference had settled so well and what it was actually necessary to do to meet a given situation.
Now, what did consultation do for us in connection with the events which brought about the war with Turkey, of which the treaty under discussion is supposed to be the end? I want to recall these events to the minds of hon. members, because they have an important bearing on the subject we are now discussing. What were the events which led up to the war between Turkey and the Allies? And was Canada consulted in respect to these events? If so, what were the consultations; where may they be found; what was Canada's advice; what was Canada's viewpoint? If Canada was not consulted, if Canada had no viewpoint, or had no means of expressing it, then let us do away with the policy of consultation which places us in such a hopeless position as that. May I put this question to the right hon. leader of the opposition-although he is not in his seat:	What did he
do at the conference of 1921, or what did he do as Prime Minister of Canada or as a member of the party that was in power when these events were taking place, what did he do with all the consultation that he is supposed to have had, what advice did' he give, what was the Canadian viewpoint which he sought to impress on the Imperial authorities? What were the events? I am going to deal with only three of them; there are no doubt many others. I shall be as brief as I possibly can.


Andrew Ross McMaster: Go on.


William Irvine: It will be recalled that Sir
Louis Mallet was the British ambassador to Turkey at that time.


Andrew Ross McMaster: What time is that?


William Irvine: This is 1914. I will give
more definite dates later. Sir Louis Mallet was having a very difficult struggle to main-

tain diplomatic arrangements in favour of Great Britain against a very astute diplomat from Germany, acknowledged to be one of the leading diplomats of the day. I want to point out some of the events which practically wrecked all the efforts of Sir Louis Mallet to keep Turkey out of the war or to bring her in on the side of the Allies. While he was engaged1 in this diplomatic struggle what do you suppose took place? Well, it appears that Turkey had engaged firms on the Clyde to build two dreadnoughts, and shortly before the war one of these was about ready to be launched and the other one was not so far advanced towards completion. On August 3, 1914, Sir Louis Mallet received a message from Sir Edward Grey indicating the intention of the British government to appropriate these two ships. The British ambassador sent back a reply the same day indicating that Turkey would look upon such action as unfriendly, and impressing upon Sir Edward Grey and the British government that in the building ,of these warships a very heavy financial responsibility had been undertaken by the Turkish people in consequence of which they were all extremely interested in the battleships and were looking forward to their delivery. In this way he sought to change the viewpoint of the British government. On August 9 the ambassador telegraphed again asking if Turkey could have the assurance that the ships would be returned after the war, because he thought that if such an assurance were given it would possibly have a soothing effect on the rising wrath of Turkey. But there was no reply to this message. Then, again on August 18 another telegram, amounting to what I might term a protest, came from Sir Louis Mallet to Sir Edward Grey reiterating that it was a very unpopular thing to hold these ships to the cost of which the people of Turkey had contributed out of their own pockets, and that the German ambassador was very active in using what he described in Turkey as " the British .government's high-handed action" to further Germany's diplomatic proposals to Turkey. Then on August 20 another message was sent to a similar effect, and not until August 25 did Sir Edward Grey reply, when he informed1 Sir Louis Mallet that the British government would return these ships after the war, provided that Turkey observed strict neutrality.
Now, what did the right hon. leader of the opposition do in 1914 in regard to this matter? Was he consulted? What did he do in regard to the message which was sent on August 3; what did he do in regard to the message which was sent on August 9; what

Supply-Lausanne Treaty
did he do in regard to the message which was sent on August 18; what did he do with regard to the message which was sent on August 20? Did they ever come here? Was it Canada's dealing with them which delayed reply to Sir Edward Grey? These are questions we must have answered by the men who argue that this policy of consultation is a good one and ought to be perpetuated. It would be. interesting to know if Canada did receive a copy of these cablegrams.
But let us proceed. What happened after this? Germany was quick to take advantage of the position and very shortly afterwards two German warships, the Goeben and the Breslau, violating international arrangements of course, sailed into Turkish waters. When Great Britain protested Germany simply said, "Why, we are making up to Turkey the two ships which you have taken over." And in doing so Germany was hailed by the Turks as the country that merited their support, and Britain's diplomatic arrangements were dealt a very severe blow indeed. What was Canada's viewpoint at that time? Were we consulted as to how we should act in the case of these ships? Did Canada agree to Great Britain violating the principle of a contract- a contract which must be regarded by Britishers to be as sacred as the contract guaranteeing the neutrality of Belgium-did Canada, I say, agree to the violation of that contract? Were Canadian statesmen consulted on it? Echo answers "were they?" If not what becomes of the consultation policy?
Another instance I have no doubt hon. members are all very well acquainted with-it is the Shatt-el-Arab.


An hon. MEMBER:: What?


Andrew Ross McMaster: Perhaps it is a disguise.


William Irvine: The Shatt-el-Arab. Not
being a Turk I may not be pronouncing it just right, but I have no doubt that hon. gentlemen who have been handling our diplomatic arrangements by consultation will be able to pronounce it correctly, because they must have had a good many dealings in this matter. Sir Louis Mallet complained by wire to Great Britain on October 12th, that two British men-of-war had passed up the Shatt-el-Arab. The reply came the following day that the British government were willing to discuss the passage of those ships in a friendly way. They claimed the legitimacy of the passage up this river-it is a river, by the way. Four days later Sir Edward Grey again telegraphed that it was not the intention of the Espiegle-that is, one of the
British ships,-to pas9 down again, but claimed that if she did want to pass down again they had a perfect right to do so on the grounds of reprisal. What opinion did Canada have on this point? This is one of the events which so complicated matters in Turkey at the time as to make it impossible for Sir Louis Mallet to gain the favour of Turkey toward the British cause.
Next we come to the question in Egypt; and this is the third point I wish to make in this regard. Egypt was admittedly a part of the Turkish Empire. The United Kingdom had enforced military occupation since 1882, the time of the bombardment of Alexandria, but from that time the United Kingdom had gradually advanced to the position of a sovereign authority. You can readily see the position when war was about to break out between Turkey and Great Britain. What was the actual position of the two powers? Did Turkey's sovereignty justify the entry of Turkish troops into Egypt, or had the United Kingdom the right to treat Egypt as if it were British territory? These were the questions with which those nations were struggling at that time. A number of telegrams were passing between the ambassador of the British government in Turkey and the British authorities in Great Britain in this matter. Was Canada consulted about the matter? Did we receive any of these telegrams? If so, did Canada agree to the decision of Sir Edward Grey in his telegram to Turkey of October 23rd to the effect that if Turkish troops crossed the frontier of a land in which Turkey was sovereign, that would mean a state' of war with the three Allied powers? It would be interesting to know whether Canada had any consultation in this matter. Those who wish to verify these instances I have given will find the matters all very fully dealt with in the British Blue Book No. 13, of 1914, pages 1027 to 1205.
But let us come to more recent times. What of the last Imperial conference, which was attended by the present Prime Minister? I presume we are all aware that the policy of Great Britain and the international policy in Europe have changed materially since that conference was held. Let me quote a few sentences from ex-Premier Hughes of Australia. Dealing with this point, he says:
British foreign policy has changed in the last few months without the direct authority of the British electors. There is now a different policy towards France and Russia, and there probably will be another policy toward Italy and other countries. Australia is a part of the Empire but it has absolutely no voice in determining the new policy.
Here again we have an example of the failure of consultation by conferences to settle
Supply-Lausanne Treaty

matters of international policy. If I have now proved, Mr. Chairman, the undesirability and the impracticability of this policy, its absurdity should be evident. Surely it is absurd to continue with a policy that is undesirable and impractical.
But let me press the absurdity of the policy a little before I finish. Let me refer to a few matters mentioned in the Manchester Guardian of May 30th, 1924. I want to refer to these because they are of comparatively recent date and because they are dealt with in one issue of one paper, which is an indication of the numerous matters that Canada would have to be consulted about if she is taking her place on the equal status that has been claimed for her by some hon. members who adhere to the consultation policy.
First it says in this paper that Turkey and Great Britain have been
1 a.m. negotiating about Mosul. Did I hear the hon. member for Battle-ford (Mr. McConica) say that Mosul was a new kind1 of breakfact food? No, he is not in his seat; it could not have been he. Perhaps some other hon. member said so. In fact, it may be a new kind of breakfast food, I am not certain. But we have been informed that it is a state somewhere in Mesopotamia. Then there is Nepal, only one of some five hundred other states just like it and that they may all want to negotiate treaties with Great Britain. But to return to Mosul; the fact is, that Great Britain is now negotiating about Mosul. What has Canada to say about that? Has Canada been consulted about Mosul?
There are two main points about this Mosul business that are of great importance. The first one is the freedom of the Arabs from Turkish rule, promised by Britain as a war promise. What is Canada going to do in this regard? The second point is that at the San Remo conference of April, 1920, Great Britain accepted a league mandate for Iraq, and at present there is a deadlock between the negotiating parties. Can Canada break the deadlock? if so what is she going to do it with? If we are to continue this policy of consultation, surely we have a right to ask that those responsible tell us what they are being consulted about, and what advice they are giving.
Next, we are told in this same paper that the Anglo-Russian conference has been going on for about six weeks; that they have now exhausted the possibility of further progress by discussion and have come to a proposal concerning a draft treaty. Has our Prime Minister been in close touch with all that has been discussed at that conference during these six weeks? Has he been consulted

about them? If not. then is it not absurd to talk about Canada being taken into consultation? Then there is a treaty between Great Britain and Iraq. No, Mr. Chairman, I did not say hay rack: you spell it with an "i", Sir, and you finish it with a "q",-and that is the means, I presume, by which we shall put an "English" on it. It is not a hay rack; I have been told by a very well informed person that it is another name for Mesopotamia. Well, this treaty will settle the main lines of the government of that country for four years to come. Has Canada been consulted about that? If so, what is Canada going to say about it? Do you not see the absurdity of the whole thing, the utter absurdity of maintaining a policy of this kind?
Again, a settlement has been arrived at between the British and Italian governments on the Jubaland question. This question was originally launched by the pact of London of 1915. What do we know about the Jubaland question? What do we know of the pact of London of 1915? What do we want to know about it? I am sure we want to know about it just as much as we do know about it, which is nothing. H Canada is to have any relations with other countries and particularly with Europe, and if such relations are to be intelligently entered into, and to involve responsibilities, then Canada must deal directly with such countries herself and not in any roundabout, second-hand way under the name of consultation.


Harold Putnam: Cannot the hon. member
conceive that Canada's wisdom may be consulted before these questions 'become acute and troublesome?


William Irvine: I am afraid Canada will be bound to some policy before she is asked any questions at all. That is the situation. If these questions did not involve perhaps war for Canada in the next ten or fifteen years, or less, I would not be interested, but the trouble is, according to the statements of both the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition, that Canada is to be held responsible for every treaty that is signed by His Majesty the King, and he is signing treaties about m'any matters now. We have been told by the leader of the opposition that we ought to be taken into consultation about these matters. Therefore I am speaking right to the point. My boys may have to fight over this Jubaland business, and I want to know what the government of Canada is doing with regard to this matter. It is not merely a matter of talking at this hour of the night. I am extremely interested in this

Supply-Lausanne Treaty
question, because it involves a principle of profound importance to Canada and to the future of the world.
Now let me quote an editorial from the London Times, which may be encouraging to those of us in this country who hope for the time when Canada will not have to fall back on the policy of consultation, but that she will enter as a free nation herself into all necessary negotiations with other countries, without any advice from any Imperial authority. This is an editorial from the London Times, written in respect to a declaration of the Prime Minister of Canada, on Imperial relations:
This is unimpeachable doctrine. No one supposes that our community of nations can stand on any other foundation than their full and equal participation in this common heritage of self-government. And no one supposes that a nation is self-governing if it has no voice in the shaping of its foreign policy. It is doubtful, indeed, whether public opinion in the Dominions yet realizes how unreservedly the principle of equal status has been accepted in this country. Already, before the war, the old notion of colonial "dependency" had long been regarded as an anachronism. The war made it an absurdity. Englishmen may not be richly gifted with imagination, but at least they can see with the eyes of their fellow-members of the commonwealth as far as this-they can appreciate the grotesqueness of supposing that the men who fought at their side were not, for some reason or other, entitled to precisely the same measure of self-government in any field of politics as they themselves enjoyed. And when British ministers avowed and reavowed their acceptance of the principle of absolute equality they were merely saying what seemed obvious to the public mind. The dominions, nevertheless, still have their doubters. There are politicians and publicists in Canada and elsewhere whose language sounds like an echo from the early Victorian age. The weather-worn bogy of Downing-street despotism is still occasionally paraded. Even the Chanak appeal was represented in some quarters as a symptom of Imperialistic domination-a quite fantastic charge. For unfortunate as was its language and unwise its publication, yet, when all is said, it was nothing more than an appeal. It was not, as some of its critics seem to suggest, an order to march, a sort of Imperial Ukase.
These are ghosts from a buried past, and a modern-minded statesman like Mr. Mackenzie King is certainly not haunted by them. When he stated the doctrine of equality the other day, he knew that it is whole-heartedly accepted by the Imperial government. But the acceptance of a theory and the putting of it into practice are very diffrent things.
If Canada, then, is to have a foreign policy, if there is to be any common sense in the Canadian foreign policy of the future, clearly this parliament must take such steps as will define the precise relations between Canada and Great Britain and when that relationship has been clearly established, let it be one in which we shall not be held responsible for a treaty which we were not consulted about, know nothing about, and want to know nothing about. Let me impress upon this House that this is the moment for us to act. It must be 1S9
obvious that if we have not now the courage to disentangle ourselves from the dangerous web of an anomalous position when there is no war, we shall be unlikely to do so when there is a war thrust upon us as a result of some nation violating part of the present treaty. If a war should arise out of this treaty that is being discussed here to-day, it will be argued when the time comes that Canada is bound by the treaty, and that to dissent from it when war is on will not only be dishonourable but will be treasonable to the Empire. It will be said that we would be deserting the Mother Country in a crisis, in short, we would be held disloyal to the king. I say if we cannot now have vision and the courage to extricate ourselves from the entanglements of Europe when the world is having a breathing spell between two wars, it is not likely we shall be able to do it when the war drums are beating. No, we shall not be able to do it then. Now is the time to do it. If a war should arise out of this treaty or out of some other, it will be represented as a blot upon our honour to refuse to fight in that war, and accept our obligations under the treaty. Those who at such a time may point out the truth that we never signed these treaties, were not consulted about them, did not ratify them, will be drowned in the uproar of war hysteria. But let us reflect, and reflect now, that if any such dread misfortune as war should be the outcome of this treaty at any time in the future, and the sons of Canada are called upon to defend what will be called the honour of our country, it will be in reality the dishonour of this parliament they will be defending, because we failed to have the courage to step out of these entanglements while we had the opportunity.


Henry Lumley Drayton: Is it proposed to go on with this item now?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Yes.


Henry Lumley Drayton: What was the
amount spent on sundries last year, and what is proposed to be spent this year?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The total for contingencies last year was $37,000. This year the amount is being reduced to $32,000, a reduction of $5,000.


Henry Lumley Drayton: I can see that; that is not what I asked. I want to know if it is a real saving or only a paper saving. What was spent last year on sundries?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: For contingencies, Department of External Affairs, 1923-

Supply-Lausanne Treaty

1924, there was spent the sum of $25,940.88, made up as follows:
Salaries	
$6,767	13Printing and stationery	
7,995	28Telegraph and cables	
3,999	22Petty cash	
361	19Telephones	
428	10Travel	
1,802	42Newspapers	
729	93
Prime Minister's cars-overhauling, etc.. 2,28180
Sundries	
1,103	85Freight and customs on car brought in from Washington	
471	96
That is a car Sir Robert Borden had purchased in Washington and which was afterwards brought here, in expectation that it might be of service to the Department of External Affairs, but it was found to be of no value.


Henry Lumley Drayton: What does the
Auditor General say to the spending on printing and stationery of $7,900, when the vote was $6,000?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: Where do you get those figures?


Henry Lumley Drayton: Page 104. I
think perhaps the Prime Minister read it wrongly.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I am reading
the figures given to me by the deputy minister of the department, $7,995.28. It is evident that a certain amount has been available for printing and stationery, and some additional amount has been required and iaken out of sundries to meet that amount.
I would ask permission of the House to make an amendment and to add to the vote for the External Affairs salaries. I move that the following be added after the word " salaries:"
Including a counsellor at an initial salary of $5,000 to be appointed by the Governor in Council, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Civil Service Act or amendments thereto.
I think my right hon. friend will recall that in the Department of External Affairs there has been an officer known as the legal adviser, a position held formerly by Mr. Christie. That position has been vacant now for a year. The general counsel of the government has been assisting very helpfully and generously, in addition to his other duties; but I think it must be obvious to everyone that there is need to have that position filled by someone who has a knowledge of economic, constitutional and international questions, and I find that some of those who are available would not care to submit to an examination in order to qualify for the position. Indeed it is a kind of position for which the govern-

ment has rather to go after the man and secure him, a position for which men are not easily obtainable. I think the appointment might well be left to the Governor in Council.


Henry Lumley Drayton: There is one
great difficulty. I am afraid my hon. friend is out of order. He can add this item to the supplementary estimates.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: My hon. friend has not observed that the estimates do provide an amount for the position. It is fixed at $5,000, the amount paid Mr. Christie. I am asking that the position be filled by Governor in Council instead of by the Civil Service Commission. I think the commission would agree that it is a position which can be filled even more appropriately by the Governor in Council than by the commission.


Henry Lumley Drayton: If my hon.
friend would stop saying so many things about the Civil Service Commission, I might be disposed to consent. If I consented I suppose it would be cited as a precedent, and I do not like starting any precedents now. I am rather in a quandary, and I would like to help my hon. friend out. I certainly do not want to open the door to further innovations, attacks or limitations upon the Civil Service Commission. What sort of an undertaking would the government make that this case would not be looked upon as a precedent?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I can assure
my hon. friend that it will have to be a very exceptionable type of position to fall into the same class, and I do not think this will create a precedent.


Henry Lumley Drayton: My right hon.
friend wants more than consent. He has not the statutory right.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: This will give the statutory right, if the House will accept the amendment.


Henry Lumley Drayton: I suppose the
mere consent would not give the statutory right.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: No, that is
why I am asking to make the amendment.


Arthur Meighen: If the Civil Service
Commission give their consent and include this as one of the positions to be filled by the government without reference to them, then the power is theirs.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The chairman of the commission intimated to me that as the matter now stands it would not be possible

Supply-External Affairs
to exempt the position unless I were to adopt the course I am now taking of asking parliament to exempt the position when the estimates were before the House, without amending the act in that particular.


Henry Lumley Drayton: Then it will
never be looked upon as a precedent/ What about having two messenger clerks?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: That is not an addition.


Henry Lumley Drayton: It is a 100 per cent addition. Where is the economy going on?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I can find some good reason for that.	[DOT]


Henry Lumley Drayton: I have no doubt you will find some good reason, but I would point out that you have a 100 per cent increase.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: There are
only 41 clerks now instead of 42 last year, and the probability is that the former messenger clerk may have been given an appointment as clerk in some other branch. They may have taken in someone at the bottom of the list instead of at the top.


Henry Lumley Drayton: I think the real reason is that there was one less clerk-stenographer.


Arthur Meighen: Has not the minister
in his office quite a considerable number of employees who are really paid by other departments?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: I am not
aware of any. No, I think not. I know it was the practice formerly but not at present.


Arthur Meighen: My information is that
what was the practice formerly has been multiplied many fold.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: No. I assure
the right hon. member he is mistaken. I have
in my office a secretary whom I am paying out of my own pocket, apart altogether from the amount parliament provides, because I have not been able to get along with the staff provided.


Donald Sutherland: I have a very vivid recollection of the Prime Minister taking the stand a short time ago that the House should not be passing estimates after eleven o'clock at night, and here is an item of $5,000 introduced to provide for a new official to be appointed outside the Civil Service Commission.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: It is not a new item. It has been there a couple of years.
189}


Donald Sutherland: The appointment
is to be made regardless of the Civil Service Commission. There are several other items which have been mentioned to-night. One item is for $2,200 and some odd for repairs to an automobile, and I doubt whether it is wise to pass that item without a little further information regarding it. It is almost half past one in the morning.


Mr. VIEN:: If my hon. friend had not
spoken it would not have been so late.


Donald Sutherland: It would be much
later and it would suit my hon. friend if it was later and these things were passing without any discussion. There was plenty of opportunity to bring them down in daylight when members were present to pay some attention to them; but after two-thirds or three-quarters of the members have gone home and to bed, I do not think there is any justification for passing estimates of this kind at this time of the morning. I decidedly object to going on with these estimates at this hour.


Mr. BELAND:: In this connection may I
point out to my hon. friend that my experience in 1919, 1920, 1921, and since this government has been in power, no discussion has taken place on these items? There is no reason, of course, why it should not take place.


Donald Sutherland: I am sorry to break a rule that has been in effect so long, but I do not see any object in the Prime Minister's estimates being brought on at one o'clock in the morning.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: The estimates were brought on at three o'clock in the afternoon, but we have spent the day in discussing one particular matter.


Donald Sutherland: I am not responsible for that and I doubt whether the Prime Minister can say the same. Would the Prime Minister give us some information regarding the repairs amounting to about $2,200 on the automobile?


William Lyon Mackenzie King: To tell my
hon. friend the truth, I do not know what repairs have been made. I have not been keeping track of them. I assumed that the Undersecretary of State for External Affairs would not permit anything to be done that was not regular and proper, and this is entirely in his hands, not in mine.


Donald Sutherland: To make repairs
amounting to $2,200 to an automobile in view of the number of automobiles that have been
Indian Act Amendment

required this year requires more explanation than that. The Prime Minister's secretary may be absolutely reliable-


William Lyon Mackenzie King: It is the
deputy minister.


Donald Sutherland: -but $2,200 worth of repairs requires some further explanation than that given by the Prime Minister.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Governor General's Secretary's office-salaries, including Governor General's secretary additional to salary authorir-ed by R.S. C. 4, $3,600, and contingencies, $98,935.
['-but $2,200 worth of repairs requires some further explanation than that given by the Prime Minister.']
Donald Sutherland: Has the other item
already been carried?


George Newcombe Gordon: Yes.


Donald Sutherland: If the Prime Minister is determined to put his estimates through at this hour in the morning, I presume he is quite at liberty to do so, but I hope we shall never hear him again speak about putting estimates through after eleven o'clock at night. In view of what happened last session when we sat until eight o'clock in the morning, I suppose he has no regard for the boast he was making as to what he was going to do as Prime Minister in future. I think it is almost unheard of for estimates of this kind to be passed at this hour of the morning after three-quarters of the members have gone home not expecting they were going to be introduced.


Lucien Cannon: Has my hon. friend any
objection to voting this item relating to the Governor General?


Donald Sutherland: It is not a matter
of voting items for the Governor General or anything of that kind. I object to going on with items at this hour in the morning when members are not present.


Henry Lumley Drayton: I have no objection to this, but I hope this is to be the final and last call to-night.


William Lyon Mackenzie King: All right.


Arthur Meighen: I might point out to the Minister of Soldiers' Civil Re-establishment that the salaries are a little more than $7,000 over what they were at the highest under the late government, so that there is more reason for objection.


[Stage Direction]
Item agreed to.
Progress reported.
[Mr Sutherland. [

William Lyon Mackenzie King: Before the
House adjourns, I should like to lay on the Table copy of an order in council referred to this afternoon which has since been signed by His Excellency, setting forth rates of compensation to be paid to certain classes of employees in the postal service.
On motion of Mr. Mackenzie King the House adjourned at 1.30 a.m. (Tuesday).
Tuesday, June 10, 1924.