Debate: CONSCIENCE: IS THERE A UNIVERSAL MORAL LAW?
Side: No

Thank you for taking the time to respond in depth. It looks like you've really studied this issue. One major problem with your interpretation of relativism and of my own view is a lack of adherence to the principle of charity. Let's be frank: in philosophical circles, ethical relativism is little more than a punching bag used to teach philosophy students what a poorly-considered position looks like, and how to exploit its weaknesses. It is not hard to attack relativism, and I am very familiar with the criticisms you have been leveling against it. Unfortunately, I don't think they apply in this case. I hope I can mange to lay out my position in a clear yet concise fashion.I. Philosophers tend to attack the weakest forms of Relativism, ignoring the courteous principle of Charity Ethical relativism can indeed be held consistently by others apart from "odd balls such as Hitler, Charles Manson, robbers, thieves, etc." This can be difficult to see however, as contemporary philosophers have not used the principle of charity in interpreting relativism. The principle of charity is a suggestion that in our interpretations we try to see an argument in the most favorable way possible before attacking it, rather than jumping straight into exploiting its weaknesses.One reason for this lack of charity is probably that ethical relativism is rarely formulated in an intelligent or clear fashion. Your point about our idiomatic expressions is well taken--relativism is indeed held by many as an unconsidered, naive assumption. This does not mean that in attacking relativism we should attack the arguments made by naive relativists who have no more justification for their beliefs than do naive moral objectivists, many of whom also happen to populate this debate. I could easily construct a list of common expressions to illustrate that naive objectivism is also "alive and well", to use use Nancy Gillford's language, but i don't see what value this would have. It's seems more sensible to judge a philosophical position based on the beliefs of those who hold more sophisticated versions of it, rather than picking off the weak members of the herd.II. Philosophers have a natural bias in favor of Moral ObjectivismAnother likely reason is that many philosophers have a vested interest, both professionally and in their own psychology, to uphold objectivism and deny relativism whenever it crops up. Professionally, many (analytic) philosophers today see it as their job to uncover objective truth through rational means. This is how their role in society is conceptualized. So what would we expect them to do when when confronted with relativism? Philosophers have strong professional reasons to discredit relativism through whatever means necessary.More interestingly, philosophers also have unconscious psychological biases in favor of the theory that morality is universal. Friedrich Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil (1886) was was intended in part to directly attack the belief in objective Good and Evil, which has pervaded Western culture since the days of Plato. As Nietzsche writes: "...it must certainly be conceded that the worst, most durable, and most dangerous of all errors so far was a dogmatist's error-namely, Plato's invention of the pure spirit and the good as such."(Preface, my emphasis). Nietzsche continues in Section 2 of Part One: "This way of judging constitutes the typical predjudgment and prejudice which give away the metaphysicians of all ages: this kind of valuation looms in the background of all their logical procedures; it is on account of this 'faith' that they trouble themselves about 'knowledge,' about something that is finally baptized solemnly as 'the truth.' The fundamental faith of the metaphyisician is the faith in opposite values. It has not even occured to the most cautious among them that one might have a doubt right here at the threshold where it was most surely necessary--even if they vowed to themselves, "de omnibus dubitandum ["All is doubted." -from Descartes]". (BGE, Part One, Section 2.)The "faith in opposite values" Nietzsche is talking about here is the same faith that those who hold to the belief in "Good" and "Evil" (Universal Moral Laws) are clinging to. In Nietzsche's estimation, later supported by empirical psychology, most of us form our rational beliefs based on our deepest unconscious biases. Is it any surprise that most of the people in our culture, including the philosophical community, cleave to a believe that has been fundamental to this culture for over 2,000 years?III.My beliefs do not conform to all of the criteria you laid out, and are therefore not beliefs in objective morality.First, I will argue that what I believe is indeed a form of moral relativism. You listed a set of criteria for determining if a judgment is moral. If my actions in the burglary example are based on universal morals, then each of these statements you listed should hold true. If even one of these fails to apply to my situation, then I will have demonstrated that my actions are not based on universal moral judgements. Here are the criteria you quoted:1. A judgment is moral only if it is a prescriptive imperative which recommends actions, attitudes, and motives and not merely a factual description about actions, attitudes, and motives.2. A judgment is moral only if it makes reference to human flourishing, human dignity, the welfare of others, the prevention of harm, and the provision of benefit.3. A judgment is moral only if it is accepted as a supremely authoritative, overriding guide to conduct, attitudes, and motives.4. A judgment is moral only if it is universalizable; that is, if it applies equally to all relevantly similar situations.I would argue that my example fails to fulfill criterion (1) on this list because the motivations driving me to fight back against a home invasion would not be based on a prescriptive imperative. I would argue instead that my decision would be based on instinct, which is not prescriptive but an unalterable feature of my psychology. My instincts do not "tell me what to do" in the way that a universal moral imperative would. They simply impel me to action based on crude "survival of the fittest" thinking. Furthermore, my actions would not likely be motivated by a conscious decision, but by a fight-or-flight response based on fear and adrenaline. I suspect you may try to argue that these very instincts are part of the "natural law," but I would remind you that your criteria imply that adherence to objective moral laws hinges on conscious judgment, rather than passive acceptance of one's natural tendencies. Also, I want to try to clarify my original point that even if my actions are based on moral sentiments, I very consciously regard them as being based only on my own desire to survive and protect those who I care about. These are sentiments that are relative to myself. If I had to characterize the actions of both myself and the burglar in the hypothetical example as "good" or "evil" I would say that we are both acting for our own "goods". The fact that our relative goodness is in conflict in this scenario does not mean that either of us has to yield to the other, even if both of us are staunch, consistent ethical relativists.To Summarize: Moral relativism as I live it is the belief that there is no universal moral code, and that any notions we have of "good" or "bad", "right" or "wrong" are artifacts of the human imagination based on a vague sense of what we perceive to be "useful" or "not useful" or "pleasant" or "unpleasant" or "tasteful" or "distasteful" or any number of relative dichotomous conceptions. Moral relativism does not entail that we cannot judge others or stop them from doing things we don't like, because it entitles to have our own beliefs and treat them as provisionally true, while acknowledging the one higher moral truth that there is no higher moral truth.