Debate: Does a animal have the same value as a human
Side: Yes

Before this response is read, I apologize for any particularly spotty places where it may seem I lose interest. My computer has saw fit to freeze and not offer to restore my browser twice in the time I've attempted to make this response. If it fails to live up to the rigor of our debate I can only yield in frustration. solipsist perspective, it remains possible for an individual within the realm of their own experience to hold non-human animals at equal value to human animals.The mentioning of solipsism was purely to represent my holding of morality as a purely individual-based phenomenon, and the potential for the mentioned example doesn't denote anything.I ascribe more closely to nihilism myselfFear not, I'll not try to "define" your stance into immorality like most other Objectivist-minded people would be inclined to do(a major reason among others for my hesitation for self-identifying as an actual Objectivist). Before delving into that I think it would be prudent to ensure that we are using “objective” and “subjective” in the same senseDamn the polysemic nature of English. For clarity with terminology:By Objective I mean that which exists independent of the mind or experience. By Subjective I mean that which is existentially mind-dependent. By Value I mean the varying degree to which an action, behavior, or thing is in relation to the criterion. By Virtue(should it ever arise) I mean the means by which we achieve a value. I find it intriguing that you do not believe we are capable of evaluating the intrinsic value of any creatureNot on ecological terms, the countless examples of unprecedented effects brought about by even subtle changes in nature makes it a herculean task far beyond the capacity of we internet warriors to qualify. We can surely own animals, and they become part of our moral relationship to property, but that is the extent to which they can be given moral value. yet simultaneously do think that we are capable of rationalizing our own self-interestWe can surely assess it in degrees. Adopting a little more of Sam Harris's rhetoric, there are varying degrees to which we can increase well-being(rational self-interest) from our decisions. We may not pick the action that produces the maximal amount of benefit, but that doesn't exclude any moral value from the chosen action(in other words, there are varying degrees to which your interests are served). This is where the concept of moral value arises. For example, take the following scenario:Man 1 consumes a certain amount of alcohol. This makes him belligerent and harmful to those around him. After being aware of this, he chooses to continue drinking. This leads to him committing violent acts on his family, culminating in their departure. Add any number of other potentially consequences.Man 2 consumes the exact same amount without any such consequences due to his naturally higher tolerance. He's aware of his limitations and acts accordingly.Man 3 consumes yet again the same amount as the two previous men. He shares Man 1's low tolerance, and knowingly continues to drink. However, after a single incident with his family he ceases to drink. Man 4 doesn't drink.Given the criterion of rational self-interest, we can make objective conclusions about the effects these behaviors have on the individuals' well-being. Man 1 is immoral, or is committing an immoral action because he knowingly acts in a way that results in the elements of his life vital to his self-interest being endangered. Man 2 is moral, or is committing a moral action because he is behaving in a way that increases the utility of his existence in a way that does not endanger the elements in his life vital to his self-interest.Man 3 has chosen a moral action by ceasing behavior that places elements vital to his well-being, but only after the fact. The degree to which his well-being was served is lower than that of Man 1. Man 4 is amoral, or is committing an amoral action because his behavior in no way positively or negatively affects his self-interest(in light of no assumed or added variables).  I do not think one can divorce the analysis of morality and value ascription from the irrational aspects of human nature, since the irrational is just as much an influence upon our conduct and even well-being as the rational.How can the irrational be conducive to our well-being? Bear in mind I don't fully detach the significance of things like emotion from rational behavior. I fully acknowledge that emotion is a completely rational piece of human existence. Making irrational decisions based on emotion may be more of the point here, but I would argue that things like personal growth in the face of such occurrences are based within rational processes in spite of the irrational.  If the irrational and emotional were entirely dysfunctional and counter to our self-interest I do not think they would have persisted so strongly under thousands of years of evolutionary pressure.The mass of humanity at any given point and time have believed or acknowledged things as true that aren't, continuing even now under scientific scrutiny. The persistence of such things (religion for example) doesn't denote anything of epistimological value. So too for the given example. Persistence in nature is not necessarily an indicator of a positive trait. I could site detrimental mutations that occur that don't result in the death of a species but still yield a demonstrable negative effect on their standard of living. Even if we our trajectory were towards pure rationalism, I do not think that is ever something we could achieve and we are certainly not there yet which invalidates a perspective that defines morality purely in terms of the rational self-interest.This statement could be an ad-populum of a sort. If the Muslim god were real, but there were no Muslims, the Muslim god would still be real. Your argument would make sense if our internally-generated, objective moral projections ever truly and wholly aligned with our actual, intrinsic interestsVarying points across the moral landscapeMy view is that the ascertainment of intrinsic self-interest is an altogether separate pursuit than moralityI'm becoming a little wary of being Sam Harris heavy, but I agree whole-heatedly with him in that if morality deals with something other than well-being than it is a meaningless term. I doubt that we will ever be fully capable of wholly ascertaining our intrinsic self-interest, but I do think we are becoming capable of greater accuracy through the pursuit of reason and logicThere will always be a valid discussion about what is or may not be in a self-interest. As flawed human beings in a flawed social dynamic, of course what we may perceive to be in a self-interest may indeed run contrary to it. But using it as a criterion for evaluating our decisions, we can reach greater levels of personal utility and understanding. And always underlying is the fact that there are actions that yield the maximal amount of benefit to our self-interest.My observation had nothing to do with the validity of morality, but it’s lack of absoluteness. A thing which varies as widely as morality can hardly be claimed to be absolute, in my opinionI think the only thing we can denote about morality given its diversity is that mankind has an intrinsic want to determine morality, and even that is assumptive and subject to better explanations.  There can be no “wrong” or “right” moral perspective (those concepts being, themselves, value judgments)If morality deals with self-interest, and we can in any way determine that, than there are examples in which there are right and wrong actions, correct?