Debate: Does a animal have the same value as a human
Side: no

The crux of our disagreement actually lies in this statement. I approach morality the way a solipsist would, as something applied entirely for the individual and their own experience.Strictly within the solipsist perspective, it remains possible for an individual within the realm of their own experience to hold non-human animals at equal value to human animals.But that was the point of my qualification regarding property.Lacking your subsequent clarification, I misunderstood your point about property. If I understand correctly now, though, the reason you do not accept the projection of moral value onto non-human animals by anything other than possession is because you consider moral value to be solely tied to service of the rational self-interest. I shall address this below.I follow a quasi-Objectivist school of thought, establishing morality as a product provided by the application of human faculties towards the goal of rational self-interest.I ascribe more closely to nihilism myself, and have various issues with the objectivist framework. Before delving into that I think it would be prudent to ensure that we are using “objective” and “subjective” in the same sense; in light of your objectivist influences is it a safe presumption that you use “objective” in the same sense that Ayn Rand does (i.e. that which depends on the relation between a properly functioning (rational) mind and extramental reality). My use of the term “objective” is more accurate with what I think objectivists tend refer to as “intrinsic”; I believe this led me to misunderstand your initial point and for my response to be somewhat off target. Regarding the objectivist perspective specifically: I find it intriguing that you do not believe we are capable of evaluating the intrinsic value of any creature, yet simultaneously do think that we are capable of rationalizing our own self-interest. My issue with your stance is that while I think humans have a capacity for reason, I also consider that capacity to be restricted and highly imperfect. I do not think one can divorce the analysis of morality and value ascription from the irrational aspects of human nature, since the irrational is just as much an influence upon our conduct and even well-being as the rational. If the irrational and emotional were entirely dysfunctional and counter to our self-interest I do not think they would have persisted so strongly under thousands of years of evolutionary pressure. Even if we our trajectory were towards pure rationalism, I do not think that is ever something we could achieve and we are certainly not there yet which invalidates a perspective that defines morality purely in terms of the rational self-interest.Now, if rational self-interest is a subjective phenomenon, than you would be correct. This is where(for the sake of contemporary significance as well as convenience insofar as diction is concerned) I adopt much of the rhetoric of Sam Harris(admittedly ironic in many regards) arguing that things like well-being and self-interest are not outside the area of conclusive evaluation. Thus, I would disagree that the existential status of morality affects its objective nature. What is in your self-interest at any given moment (and therefor moral) would be so even if you didn't project the term moral at it. The means of deriving moral value however (for the sake of continuity) does require such projections.Your argument would make sense if our internally-generated, objective moral projections ever truly and wholly aligned with our actual, intrinsic interests (i.e. if our morality were actually compelled by our rational self-interest alone). I consider morality to be an evolved and conditioned instinct, compelled not only by reason but by emotional compulsions. My view is that the ascertainment of intrinsic self-interest is an altogether separate pursuit than morality; the pursuit of the perfected morality bears no interest for me. I doubt that we will ever be fully capable of wholly ascertaining our intrinsic self-interest, but I do think we are becoming capable of greater accuracy through the pursuit of reason and logic. That being said, I think this pursuit of intrinsic self-interest is (and ought to be) separate from the pursuit of a perfected morality. The multitude and diversity of religions in the world have no bearing on their individual validity, so too is it with morality.My observation had nothing to do with the validity of morality, but it’s lack of absoluteness. A thing which varies as widely as morality can hardly be claimed to be absolute, in my opinion. The existence of a particular viewpoint isn't an indicator of anything. It merely begs the question. Their viewpoint cold be incomplete, misguided, or wrong(or even right). As previously stated, the diversity an d multitude of a phenomenon doesn't inherently denote anything beyond sociological tendencies (something that in no way adequately deals with the question at hand)You misunderstood my point here, as with immediately above; again, diverse morality indicates the non-intrinsic nature of morality. There can be no “wrong” or “right” moral perspective (those concepts being, themselves, value judgments) because morality itself lacks an absolute point of reference from which to make such value judgments. Further, defining any particular moral view in terms of intrinsic “correctness” is a misapplication of standards; the function of morality is not to be “complete” or “well-guided” but to be as complete and as well-guided as evolution necessitated.