feat_summary_path: finished_summaries/gradesaver/The Prince/section_6_part_0.txt
feat_book_id: The Prince.chapters 20-26
feat_summary_id: section 7: chapters 20-26
feat_summary: {"name": "Section 7: Chapters XX-XXVI", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210417004655/https://www.gradesaver.com/the-prince/study-guide/summary-section-7-chapters-xx-xxvi", "summary": "A new prince cannot disarm his subjects, which would cause a backlash; rather, he should arm them, thereby instilling loyalty. The opposite applies for a prince who has just acquired a new state and attached it to his old one. In this case the prince must disarm the new state, for all arms must be in the hands of the prince's own soldiers - those who are used to his rule. Machiavelli disagrees with the adage that encouraging factionalism is a good way to keep power. Yes, this tactic may work in peacetime, but as soon as a foreign enemy comes along, the factionalized state is that much easier to conquer. Also, a faction can sometimes win out and overthrow the whole state, as has happened in Venice. Machiavelli approves of the deliberate planting of obstacles to a prince's rise and his power, in order for him to gain in reputation by overcoming them. \"Many hold that a shrewd prince will, when he can, subtly encourage some enmity to himself, so that by overcoming it he can augment his own reputation,\" he writes. Machiavelli then argues that men who are at first suspect to the prince can often be trusted more than those who seem immediately loyal to him; the former feel that they need to win the prince over, while the latter feel too secure in their positions. With a newly conquered state, \"it is much easier to gain as friends those men who were satisfied with the earlier state, and therefore hostile to the conqueror, than those men who, because they were discontented in the earlier state, looked with fervor on the new prince and helped him take over.\" The discontented often remain discontented. Machiavelli concludes this chapter, entitled \"Whether Building Fortresses and Other Defensive Policies Often Adapted By Princes Are Useful or Not,\" with a mention of, suitably enough, fortresses: \"the prince who fears his own people more than he does foreigners ought to build fortresses, but a prince who is more afraid of foreigners than of his own people can neglect them.\" Why? Because the best fortress of all is the support of the people. Moreover, a prince should never rely entirely on fortresses and feel that they mean he need not worry about whether or not his people support him. The next chapter, \"How a Prince Should Act to Acquire Reputation,\" presents Ferdinand of Spain as a key example. Ferdinand acquired his reputation through military projects, constantly following up one campaign with another - Granada, expelling the Moors, attacking Africa, campaigning in Italy, assaulting France - as a way of distracting from his more private machinations - unifying Aragon and Castille. Machiavelli refers to Ferdinand's behavior as \"despicable,\" yet he argues that these policies, by preoccupying the king's subjects and enthralling them, ultimately worked. A prince should take a stand if neighbors come to blows. Neutrality is not the way to go. If the neighbors are powerful, then the victor will invariably hate you if you were neutral; if the neighbors are weak, then you find yourself in an ideal position to render a state indebted to you by taking its side. Internally, a prince should reward the talents and endeavors of his subjects. He should encourage their work, should not confiscate holdings , should entertain the people with \"festivals and spectacles,\" and should show himself attentive to their needs while never diminishing his dignity. \"On a Prince's Private Counselors\" makes a more straightforward claim: that it is crucial for a prince to pick good ministers, because they in turn reflect on the prince himself. A good minister should think only of what is good for his master; that said, a prince should be sure to keep a minister obedient by honoring him and respecting his welfare. Next, Machiavelli turns to the subject of flatterers, in \"How to Avoid Flatterers.\" A prince should accept advice, but only when he has sought it out; uncalled-for advice is never welcome. A prudent prince will bring wise men into his council and give them alone \"free license to speak the truth.\" For his part, the prince should ask many questions, should seek opinions, and should hear out the views of others. The final three chapters of The Prince - \"Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their Dominions,\" \"The Influence of Luck on Human Affairs and the Ways to Counter It,\" and \"An Exhortation to Restore Italy to Liberty and Free Her From the Barbarians\" - return the book to that idealized vision: a unified Italy, brimming with renewed strength and vigor, a single nation rising above its divisions, healing its wounds, and striding like a colossus upon the world's stage. What has become of Italy's glorious potential? The problem, as Machiavelli identifies it, is essentially laziness. The rulers of Italy have not maintained their armed forces, idly figuring that quiet times never go away. This \"is a common failing of men,\" Machiavelli writes. They \"never think of storms so long as the sky is blue.\" When trouble comes, such princes run away, hoping to be called back when their former subjects tire of their conquerors. In the second of these three last chapters, Machiavelli discusses luck and its impact on political affairs. Italy is in trouble today, he argues, because of bad luck, but also because she has not guarded against it sufficiently. \"I think it may be true that Fortune governs half of our actions,\" Machiavelli writes, \"but that even so she leaves the other half more or less in our power to control.\" Machiavelli then closes The Prince with, as he puts it, an \"exhortation\": he directly addresses Lorenzo de Medici, as he did in the book's prefatory letter, arguing that he could be the prince who unites Italy. This hope for unification is echoed again in his mention of Cesare Borgia, who, \"at the zenith of his career deserted by Fortune.\" Machiavelli reminds Lorenzo to look at the examples of the past and restates the necessity of building one's own armies. \"The occasion must not be allowed to slip away,\" he argues. \"Italy has been waiting too long for a glimpse of her redeemer.\" Finally, Machiavelli concludes with a verse from Petrarch, translated as follows: \"Then virtue boldly shall engage/And swiftly vanquish barbarous rage,/Proving that ancient and heroic pride/In true Italian hearts has never died.\"", "analysis": "Once again, Machiavelli's slippery, flip-flopping view of human nature is on full display. In Chapter XXI, he writes: \"Men are never so dishonest that they will show gross ingratitude by turning immediately on their helpers. Besides, victories are never so decisive that the victor does not have to maintain some moderation, some show of justice.\" Did he not, only a number of pages earlier, argue that men are intrinsically \"rotten,\" liars and hypocrites of the highest magnitude, ready to turn against a helping hand as soon as it suits their needs? And what of justice? What became of keeping the end in sight, of wielding cruelty when necessary, of aiming for the decisive victory, whatever the cost? No, Machiavelli reasons: moderation is the way to proceed. Far more than is generally assumed, The Prince adopts an almost thesis-antithesis approach to politics and human nature, arguing in near-dialectical fashion through the thickets of human behavior. Machiavelli, despite his occasional categorical assertion and broad generalization, tends to acknowledge the complexity of mankind, of social structures, and of civilization. The apparent contradictions that riddle The Prince are arguably indicative of an actively searching mind; this is a restless book, replete with gaps and back-tracks, obfuscations and impasses, that in its entirety seeks to offer a vision of man as a political animal, groping for power but continually off-set by his own contrary impulses. It is almost a study in psychology, teasing out the aforementioned contradictions in an effort to arrive at some synthesis. Indeed, man as agent of his own destiny is a central theme for Machiavelli. In his chapter on luck, he writes that \"a prince who depends entirely on Fortune comes to grief immediately she changes.\" That said, a prince should adjust his behavior \"to the temper of the times.\" It is all about finding the happy medium, that precise balance between absolute individualism and an ability to adapt to the winds of change and to the mood of the era. Luck does play a major role in politics. Men have natural inclinations that are not easily adjusted, and in this case it is a matter of chance whether such temperaments fit the times or not. But even here, in the heart of this argument, Machiavelli invokes the importance of the self, of man's capacity to introduce change and to mold the times. He writes that it is \"better to be rash than timid, for Fortune is a woman, and the man who wants to hold her down must beat and bully her.\" This statement assumes that Fortune can be held down - which was far from a universal belief in Machiavelli's time. He goes on: \"Like a woman, too,  is always a friend of the young, because they are less timid, more brutal, and take charge of her more recklessly.\" For all his prior emphasis on prudence and calculation, Machiavelli here prizes recklessness, boldness, and brutality. Therein lies perhaps the central struggle in The Prince: that between the need for bold, speedy maneuvers, the necessity of action, and the treatment of politics as a science, full of rules and conditions. A prince must be both human and beast, and as beast he must be both lion and fox. He must embrace the contradictions of humanity; he must rely on both thought and action; he must look to the past as he heads toward the future. Machiavelli's treatise is more than a prolonged letter intended to curry favor with the Medici or a how-to manual for power-grabbing; it is, fundamentally, an inquiry into the nature of man, and the ways in which that nature can be harnessed and used both for and against other men. The \"Prince\" of the title is neither hero nor villain. He is, quite simply, human."}
text: 
  1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their
  subjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;
  others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid
  themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning
  of their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown
  and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all
  of these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states
  in which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as
  comprehensively as the matter of itself will admit.
  
  2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather
  when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by
  arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted
  become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your
  subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be
  armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be
  handled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they
  quite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,
  considering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and
  service should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm
  them, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either
  for cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions
  breeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it
  follows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already
  shown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to
  defend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore,
  as I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always
  distributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince
  acquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then
  it is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have
  been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and
  opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should
  be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be
  your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.
  
  3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed
  to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by
  fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their
  tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily.
  This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way
  balanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept
  for to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;
  rather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided
  cities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always
  assist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist.
  The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the
  Guelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although
  they never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these
  disputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their
  differences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not
  afterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one
  party at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,
  therefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be
  permitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the
  more easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if
  war comes this policy proves fallacious.
  
  4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
  difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore
  fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who
  has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes
  enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have
  the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a
  ladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that
  a wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster
  some animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown
  may rise higher.
  
  5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance
  in those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than
  among those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince
  of Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by
  others. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies
  so much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who
  at the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of
  a description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be
  gained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to
  serve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very
  necessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had
  formed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from
  them than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect
  his affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a
  prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he
  must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who
  did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only
  discontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly
  with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy
  them. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which
  can be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is
  easier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented
  under the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of
  those who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and
  encouraged him to seize it.
  
  6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states
  more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit
  to those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge
  from a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use
  of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times
  has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he
  might keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to
  his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the
  foundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that
  without them it would be more difficult to lose it; the Bentivogli
  returning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, therefore,
  are useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in one
  way they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus:
  the prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners
  ought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners
  than from the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan,
  built by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the
  house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason
  the best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because,
  although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the
  people hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist
  a people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our
  times that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the
  Countess of Forli,(*) when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed;
  for by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait
  for assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state; and the posture
  of affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist
  the people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when
  Cesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied
  with foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then
  and before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the
  fortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him
  who builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame
  whoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.
  
       (*) Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and
       Lucrezia Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the
       Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499.
       A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the
       appointment: "I have been with the signori," wrote
       Fortunati, "to learn whom they would send and when. They
       tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine
       noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me
       at once." Cf. "Catherine Sforza," by Count Pasolini,
       translated by P. Sylvester, 1898.
  
  
  
  
  Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting
  a fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present
  King of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has
  risen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the
  foremost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds
  you will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the
  beginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the
  foundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without
  any fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile
  occupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;
  thus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power
  and authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and
  of the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the
  foundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him.
  Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater
  schemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and
  clearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable
  example, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,
  he came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his
  achievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds
  of his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of
  them. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other,
  that men have never been given time to work steadily against him.
  
  Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal
  affairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano,
  who, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some
  extraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of
  rewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a
  prince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain
  for himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man.
  
  A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a
  downright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he
  declares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course
  will always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two
  of your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character
  that, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not.
  In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare
  yourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if
  you do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to
  the conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been
  conquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to
  protect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want
  doubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who
  loses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand,
  court his fate.
  
  Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive
  out the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of
  the Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the
  Romans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in
  the council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to
  stand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: "As for that which has
  been said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not
  to interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by
  not interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the
  guerdon of the conqueror." Thus it will always happen that he who is not
  your friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend
  will entreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes,
  to avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are
  generally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour
  of one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although
  the victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is
  indebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are
  never so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing
  you. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not
  show some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally
  yourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he
  may aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again.
  
  In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that
  you have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it
  greater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction
  of one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved
  him; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your
  assistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted
  that a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one
  more powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless
  necessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are
  at his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being
  at the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against
  the Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could
  have been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the
  Florentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then
  in such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of
  the parties.
  
  Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe
  courses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,
  because it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid
  one trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in
  knowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to
  take the lesser evil.
  
  A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour
  the proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his
  citizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and
  agriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be
  deterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away
  from him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the
  prince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and
  designs in any way to honour his city or state.
  
  Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles
  at convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into
  guilds or into societies,(*) he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and
  associate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy
  and liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his
  rank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything.
  
       (*) "Guilds or societies," "in arti o in tribu." "Arti" were
       craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio: "Arte . . . a whole
       company of any trade in any city or corporation town." The
       guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr
       Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906).
       Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called
       "artel," exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace's
       "Russia," ed. 1905: "The sons . . . were always during the
       working season members of an artel. In some of the larger
       towns there are artels of a much more complex kind--
       permanent associations, possessing large capital, and
       pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the individual
       members." The word "artel," despite its apparent similarity,
       has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with "ars" or
       "arte." Its root is that of the verb "rotisya," to bind
       oneself by an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only
       another form of "rota," which now signifies a "regimental
       company." In both words the underlying idea is that of a
       body of men united by an oath. "Tribu" were possibly gentile
       groups, united by common descent, and included individuals
       connected by marriage. Perhaps our words "sects" or "clans"
       would be most appropriate.
  
  
  
  
  The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they
  are good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the
  first opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is
  by observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and
  faithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how
  to recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are
  otherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error
  which he made was in choosing them.
  
  There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of
  Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to
  be a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there
  are three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;
  another which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which
  neither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is
  the most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore,
  it follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he
  was in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and
  bad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the
  initiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant,
  and the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot
  hope to deceive him, and is kept honest.
  
  But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one
  test which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his
  own interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in
  everything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever
  be able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his
  hands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and
  never pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned.
  
  On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study
  him, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with
  him the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he
  cannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,
  many riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him
  dread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,
  are thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,
  the end will always be disastrous for either one or the other.
  
  
  
  
  I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it
  is a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless
  they are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of
  whom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own
  affairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with
  difficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they
  run the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way
  of guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that
  to tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell
  you the truth, respect for you abates.
  
  Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the
  wise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking
  the truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,
  and of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and
  listen to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions.
  With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry
  himself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more
  freely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of
  these, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be
  steadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown
  by flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls
  into contempt.
  
  I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of
  affairs to Maximilian,(*) the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,
  said: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything.
  This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the
  above; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not communicate his
  designs to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in
  carrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are
  at once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being
  pliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he
  does one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he
  wishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions.
  
       (*) Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the
       Holy Roman Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of
       Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus
       became involved in Italian politics.
  
  A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he
  wishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one
  from offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be
  a constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the
  things of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any
  consideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be
  felt.
  
  And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression
  of his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good
  advisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because
  this is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise
  himself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his
  affairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In
  this case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long,
  because such a governor would in a short time take away his state from
  him.
  
  But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more
  than one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to
  unite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and
  the prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And
  they are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue
  to you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be
  inferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of
  the wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good
  counsels.
  
  
  
  
  The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince
  to appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed
  in the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of
  a new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary
  one, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind
  far tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the
  present than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy
  it and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a
  prince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double
  glory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and
  strengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good
  example; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince,
  shall lose his state by want of wisdom.
  
  And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in
  Italy in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan,
  and others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in
  regard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in
  the next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the
  people hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known
  how to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that
  have power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost.
  
  Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who
  was conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to
  the greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a
  warlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he
  sustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the
  end he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the
  kingdom.
  
  Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their
  principalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own
  sloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change
  (it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm
  against the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they
  thought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that
  the people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall
  them. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to
  have neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never
  wish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to
  restore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will
  not be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which
  does not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and
  durable that depend on yourself and your valour.
  
  
  
  
  It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the
  opinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by
  fortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and
  that no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us
  believe that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let
  chance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times
  because of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and
  may still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes
  pondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion.
  Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that
  Fortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,(*) but that she still
  leaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less.
  
       (*) Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: "The older
       one gets the more convinced one becomes that his Majesty
       King Chance does three-quarters of the business of this
       miserable universe." Sorel's "Eastern Question."
  
  I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood
  overflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away
  the soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to
  its violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,
  though its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when
  the weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences
  and barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may
  pass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so
  dangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour
  has not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where
  she knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain
  her.
  
  And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and
  which has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open
  country without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been
  defended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either
  this invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it
  would not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning
  resistance to fortune in general.
  
  But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be
  seen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change
  of disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes
  that have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who
  relies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that
  he will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of
  the times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will
  not be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end
  which every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there
  by various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force,
  another by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one
  succeeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of
  two cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly,
  two men by different observances are equally successful, the one being
  cautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than
  whether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times.
  This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently
  bring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains
  his object and the other does not.
  
  Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs
  himself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a
  way that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if
  times and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course
  of action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know
  how to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate
  from what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always
  prospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well
  to leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn
  adventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he
  changed his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed.
  
  Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and
  found the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action
  that he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against
  Bologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians
  were not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the
  enterprise still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless
  he personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness
  and energy, a move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute
  and passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover
  the kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drew after him the King of
  France, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring
  to make the Pope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it
  impossible to refuse him. Therefore Julius with his impetuous action
  accomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have
  done; for if he had waited in Rome until he could get away, with his
  plans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have
  done, he would never have succeeded. Because the King of France would
  have made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a
  thousand fears.
  
  I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they
  all succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience
  the contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go
  cautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have
  deviated from those ways to which nature inclined him.
  
  I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind
  steadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are
  successful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider
  that it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is
  a woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and
  ill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by
  the adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is,
  therefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are
  less cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her.
  
  
  
  
  Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and
  wondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to
  a new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an
  opportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of
  things which would do honour to him and good to the people of this
  country, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new
  prince that I never knew a time more fit than the present.
  
  And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be
  captive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians
  should be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the
  soul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate
  the capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to
  discover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy
  should be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should
  be more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,
  more scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,
  despoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.
  
  Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us
  think he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was
  afterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him;
  so that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal
  her wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy,
  to the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse
  those sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God
  to send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous
  insolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a
  banner if only someone will raise it.
  
  Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope
  than in your illustrious house,(*) with its valour and fortune, favoured
  by God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and which could
  be made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you
  will recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named.
  And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and
  each one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for
  their enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was
  God more their friend than He is yours.
  
       (*) Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal
       by Leo X. In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the
       title of Clement VII.
  
  With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is
  necessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in
  them. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness
  is great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those
  men to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how
  extraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:
  the sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured
  forth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to
  your greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do
  everything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory
  which belongs to us.
  
  And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians
  have been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious
  house; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns,
  it has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has
  happened because the old order of things was not good, and none of us
  have known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to
  establish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen.
  Such things when they are well founded and dignified will make him
  revered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to
  bring such into use in every form.
  
  Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head.
  Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior
  the Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes
  to armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from
  the insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not
  obedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there having never been
  any one so distinguished above the rest, either by valour or fortune,
  that others would yield to him. Hence it is that for so long a time,
  and during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there
  has been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a poor account of
  itself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, afterwards Allesandria,
  Capua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri.(*)
  
       (*) The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua,
       1501; Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513.
  
  If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable
  men who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things,
  as a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your
  own forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better
  soldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will
  be much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince,
  honoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is
  necessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended
  against foreigners by Italian valour.
  
  And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very
  formidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which
  a third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied
  upon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the
  Switzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close
  combat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards
  are unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by
  Spanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot
  be shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of
  Ravenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions,
  who follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility
  of body and with the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the
  Germans and stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood
  helpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been
  over with them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both
  these infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not
  be afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but
  a variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which
  confer reputation and power upon a new prince.
  
  This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting
  Italy at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love
  with which he would be received in all those provinces which have
  suffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for
  revenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears.
  What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him?
  What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all
  of us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious
  house take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all
  just enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native
  country may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that
  saying of Petrarch:
  
       Virtu contro al Furore
       Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:
       Che l'antico valore
       Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto.
  
       Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,
       And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight:
       For the old Roman valour is not dead,
       Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished.
  
       Edward Dacre, 1640.
  
  
  
feat_summary_name: Section 7: Chapters XX-XXVI
target: A new prince cannot disarm his subjects, which would cause a backlash; rather, he should arm them, thereby instilling loyalty. The opposite applies for a prince who has just acquired a new state and attached it to his old one. In this case the prince must disarm the new state, for all arms must be in the hands of the prince's own soldiers - those who are used to his rule. Machiavelli disagrees with the adage that encouraging factionalism is a good way to keep power. Yes, this tactic may work in peacetime, but as soon as a foreign enemy comes along, the factionalized state is that much easier to conquer. Also, a faction can sometimes win out and overthrow the whole state, as has happened in Venice. Machiavelli approves of the deliberate planting of obstacles to a prince's rise and his power, in order for him to gain in reputation by overcoming them. "Many hold that a shrewd prince will, when he can, subtly encourage some enmity to himself, so that by overcoming it he can augment his own reputation," he writes. Machiavelli then argues that men who are at first suspect to the prince can often be trusted more than those who seem immediately loyal to him; the former feel that they need to win the prince over, while the latter feel too secure in their positions. With a newly conquered state, "it is much easier to gain as friends those men who were satisfied with the earlier state, and therefore hostile to the conqueror, than those men who, because they were discontented in the earlier state, looked with fervor on the new prince and helped him take over." The discontented often remain discontented. Machiavelli concludes this chapter, entitled "Whether Building Fortresses and Other Defensive Policies Often Adapted By Princes Are Useful or Not," with a mention of, suitably enough, fortresses: "the prince who fears his own people more than he does foreigners ought to build fortresses, but a prince who is more afraid of foreigners than of his own people can neglect them." Why? Because the best fortress of all is the support of the people. Moreover, a prince should never rely entirely on fortresses and feel that they mean he need not worry about whether or not his people support him. The next chapter, "How a Prince Should Act to Acquire Reputation," presents Ferdinand of Spain as a key example. Ferdinand acquired his reputation through military projects, constantly following up one campaign with another - Granada, expelling the Moors, attacking Africa, campaigning in Italy, assaulting France - as a way of distracting from his more private machinations - unifying Aragon and Castille. Machiavelli refers to Ferdinand's behavior as "despicable," yet he argues that these policies, by preoccupying the king's subjects and enthralling them, ultimately worked. A prince should take a stand if neighbors come to blows. Neutrality is not the way to go. If the neighbors are powerful, then the victor will invariably hate you if you were neutral; if the neighbors are weak, then you find yourself in an ideal position to render a state indebted to you by taking its side. Internally, a prince should reward the talents and endeavors of his subjects. He should encourage their work, should not confiscate holdings , should entertain the people with "festivals and spectacles," and should show himself attentive to their needs while never diminishing his dignity. "On a Prince's Private Counselors" makes a more straightforward claim: that it is crucial for a prince to pick good ministers, because they in turn reflect on the prince himself. A good minister should think only of what is good for his master; that said, a prince should be sure to keep a minister obedient by honoring him and respecting his welfare. Next, Machiavelli turns to the subject of flatterers, in "How to Avoid Flatterers." A prince should accept advice, but only when he has sought it out; uncalled-for advice is never welcome. A prudent prince will bring wise men into his council and give them alone "free license to speak the truth." For his part, the prince should ask many questions, should seek opinions, and should hear out the views of others. The final three chapters of The Prince - "Why the Princes of Italy Have Lost Their Dominions," "The Influence of Luck on Human Affairs and the Ways to Counter It," and "An Exhortation to Restore Italy to Liberty and Free Her From the Barbarians" - return the book to that idealized vision: a unified Italy, brimming with renewed strength and vigor, a single nation rising above its divisions, healing its wounds, and striding like a colossus upon the world's stage. What has become of Italy's glorious potential? The problem, as Machiavelli identifies it, is essentially laziness. The rulers of Italy have not maintained their armed forces, idly figuring that quiet times never go away. This "is a common failing of men," Machiavelli writes. They "never think of storms so long as the sky is blue." When trouble comes, such princes run away, hoping to be called back when their former subjects tire of their conquerors. In the second of these three last chapters, Machiavelli discusses luck and its impact on political affairs. Italy is in trouble today, he argues, because of bad luck, but also because she has not guarded against it sufficiently. "I think it may be true that Fortune governs half of our actions," Machiavelli writes, "but that even so she leaves the other half more or less in our power to control." Machiavelli then closes The Prince with, as he puts it, an "exhortation": he directly addresses Lorenzo de Medici, as he did in the book's prefatory letter, arguing that he could be the prince who unites Italy. This hope for unification is echoed again in his mention of Cesare Borgia, who, "at the zenith of his career deserted by Fortune." Machiavelli reminds Lorenzo to look at the examples of the past and restates the necessity of building one's own armies. "The occasion must not be allowed to slip away," he argues. "Italy has been waiting too long for a glimpse of her redeemer." Finally, Machiavelli concludes with a verse from Petrarch, translated as follows: "Then virtue boldly shall engage/And swiftly vanquish barbarous rage,/Proving that ancient and heroic pride/In true Italian hearts has never died."
feat_summary_analysis: Once again, Machiavelli's slippery, flip-flopping view of human nature is on full display. In Chapter XXI, he writes: "Men are never so dishonest that they will show gross ingratitude by turning immediately on their helpers. Besides, victories are never so decisive that the victor does not have to maintain some moderation, some show of justice." Did he not, only a number of pages earlier, argue that men are intrinsically "rotten," liars and hypocrites of the highest magnitude, ready to turn against a helping hand as soon as it suits their needs? And what of justice? What became of keeping the end in sight, of wielding cruelty when necessary, of aiming for the decisive victory, whatever the cost? No, Machiavelli reasons: moderation is the way to proceed. Far more than is generally assumed, The Prince adopts an almost thesis-antithesis approach to politics and human nature, arguing in near-dialectical fashion through the thickets of human behavior. Machiavelli, despite his occasional categorical assertion and broad generalization, tends to acknowledge the complexity of mankind, of social structures, and of civilization. The apparent contradictions that riddle The Prince are arguably indicative of an actively searching mind; this is a restless book, replete with gaps and back-tracks, obfuscations and impasses, that in its entirety seeks to offer a vision of man as a political animal, groping for power but continually off-set by his own contrary impulses. It is almost a study in psychology, teasing out the aforementioned contradictions in an effort to arrive at some synthesis. Indeed, man as agent of his own destiny is a central theme for Machiavelli. In his chapter on luck, he writes that "a prince who depends entirely on Fortune comes to grief immediately she changes." That said, a prince should adjust his behavior "to the temper of the times." It is all about finding the happy medium, that precise balance between absolute individualism and an ability to adapt to the winds of change and to the mood of the era. Luck does play a major role in politics. Men have natural inclinations that are not easily adjusted, and in this case it is a matter of chance whether such temperaments fit the times or not. But even here, in the heart of this argument, Machiavelli invokes the importance of the self, of man's capacity to introduce change and to mold the times. He writes that it is "better to be rash than timid, for Fortune is a woman, and the man who wants to hold her down must beat and bully her." This statement assumes that Fortune can be held down - which was far from a universal belief in Machiavelli's time. He goes on: "Like a woman, too,  is always a friend of the young, because they are less timid, more brutal, and take charge of her more recklessly." For all his prior emphasis on prudence and calculation, Machiavelli here prizes recklessness, boldness, and brutality. Therein lies perhaps the central struggle in The Prince: that between the need for bold, speedy maneuvers, the necessity of action, and the treatment of politics as a science, full of rules and conditions. A prince must be both human and beast, and as beast he must be both lion and fox. He must embrace the contradictions of humanity; he must rely on both thought and action; he must look to the past as he heads toward the future. Machiavelli's treatise is more than a prolonged letter intended to curry favor with the Medici or a how-to manual for power-grabbing; it is, fundamentally, an inquiry into the nature of man, and the ways in which that nature can be harnessed and used both for and against other men. The "Prince" of the title is neither hero nor villain. He is, quite simply, human.