feat_summary_path: finished_summaries/shmoop/The Prince/section_9_part_0.txt
feat_book_id: The Prince.chapter 9
feat_summary_id: chapter 9
feat_summary: {"name": "Chapter 9", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210420060055/https://www.shmoop.com/study-guides/literature/prince-machiavelli/summary/chapter-9", "summary": "Rulers that come to power because of the support of the people are the total opposite of bloody conquers. Everyone loves 'em. They're not too smart, or even extra lucky, but just enough to get by. Our new ruler has three options for his new place: a monarchy where power goes to the nobles, a republic where power goes to the people, and anarchy. In monarchies, either the nobles or the people decide to concentrate all the power in one person, the king. Seems simple enough, but a king who comes to power because of the nobles will have a hard time. After all, the nobles have lots of power to throw around, too. Remember, you don't want anyone who can compete with you around, and these are the people with the weapons. What are the regular people going to do to you? Poke you with their potatoes? Bottom line: be friends with the people, because the nobles have too many tricks up their sleeves. More on nobles. There are two kinds, those who are totally 100% loyally part of your fan club and those who aren't. Out of those who aren't, there are two kinds. Those who are just scaredy-cats , and those who are planning something. The latter are the ones to watch out for because they will turn on you at the drop of a hat. Okay, back to the people. You need to be on their side. It's pretty easy, actually, because they basically just don't want to be oppressed and tortured. Also, if they thought you were going to be super mean, and you turn out to be okay, they will love you even more than if they loved you from the start. They're easy to please. Some people say that it's a bad idea to depend on the support of the people. Machiavelli just doesn't agree--he says that's only the case if you're stupid and think they'll fight for you or rescue you. That's not going to happen. But they can support you and not turn against you. Problems for the ruler supported by the people? When they want to become an absolute ruler, they need either give direct command or rule though other people who they give power to. The problem is, these people aren't always the most trustworthy--before you know it, everything is up in flames. So, make sure your people always need not only your government , but you specifically, and everything will be okay.", "analysis": ""}
text: 
  But coming to the other point--where a leading citizen becomes the
  prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable violence,
  but by the favour of his fellow citizens--this may be called a civil
  principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to attain to
  it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a principality
  is obtained either by the favour of the people or by the favour of the
  nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct parties are found,
  and from this it arises that the people do not wish to be ruled nor
  oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule and oppress the
  people; and from these two opposite desires there arises in cities one
  of three results, either a principality, self-government, or anarchy.
  
  A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
  accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the nobles,
  seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the reputation
  of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that under his
  shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people, finding
  they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of one of
  themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his authority.
  He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the nobles maintains
  himself with more difficulty than he who comes to it by the aid of
  the people, because the former finds himself with many around him who
  consider themselves his equals, and because of this he can neither rule
  nor manage them to his liking. But he who reaches sovereignty by popular
  favour finds himself alone, and has none around him, or few, who are not
  prepared to obey him.
  
  Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to others,
  satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for their object is
  more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter wishing to oppress,
  while the former only desire not to be oppressed. It is to be added also
  that a prince can never secure himself against a hostile people, because
  of there being too many, whilst from the nobles he can secure himself,
  as they are few in number. The worst that a prince may expect from a
  hostile people is to be abandoned by them; but from hostile nobles he
  has not only to fear abandonment, but also that they will rise against
  him; for they, being in these affairs more far-seeing and astute, always
  come forward in time to save themselves, and to obtain favours from him
  whom they expect to prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live
  always with the same people, but he can do well without the same nobles,
  being able to make and unmake them daily, and to give or take away
  authority when it pleases him.
  
  Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought to
  be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either shape their
  course in such a way as binds them entirely to your fortune, or they do
  not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not rapacious, ought to be
  honoured and loved; those who do not bind themselves may be dealt
  with in two ways; they may fail to do this through pusillanimity and a
  natural want of courage, in which case you ought to make use of them,
  especially of those who are of good counsel; and thus, whilst in
  prosperity you honour them, in adversity you do not have to fear them.
  But when for their own ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it
  is a token that they are giving more thought to themselves than to you,
  and a prince ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they
  were open enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.
  
  Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
  ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they
  only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to
  the people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
  everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
  easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when they
  receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound more
  closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become more devoted
  to him than if he had been raised to the principality by their favours;
  and the prince can win their affections in many ways, but as these vary
  according to the circumstances one cannot give fixed rules, so I omit
  them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a prince to have the people
  friendly, otherwise he has no security in adversity.
  
  Nabis,(*) Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,
  and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his country
  and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it was only
  necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but this would
  not have been sufficient had the people been hostile. And do not let any
  one impugn this statement with the trite proverb that "He who builds on
  the people, builds on the mud," for this is true when a private citizen
  makes a foundation there, and persuades himself that the people will
  free him when he is oppressed by his enemies or by the magistrates;
  wherein he would find himself very often deceived, as happened to the
  Gracchi in Rome and to Messer Giorgio Scali(+) in Florence. But granted
  a prince who has established himself as above, who can command, and is
  a man of courage, undismayed in adversity, who does not fail in other
  qualifications, and who, by his resolution and energy, keeps the whole
  people encouraged--such a one will never find himself deceived in them,
  and it will be shown that he has laid his foundations well.
  
       (*) Nabis, tyrant of Sparta, conquered by the Romans under
       Flamininus in 195 B.C.; killed 192 B.C.
  
       (+) Messer Giorgio Scali. This event is to be found in
       Machiavelli's "Florentine History," Book III.
  
  These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from the
  civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either rule
  personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their government
  is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on the goodwill
  of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and who, especially
  in troubled times, can destroy the government with great ease, either
  by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has not the chance amid
  tumults to exercise absolute authority, because the citizens and
  subjects, accustomed to receive orders from magistrates, are not of
  a mind to obey him amid these confusions, and there will always be in
  doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he can trust. For such a prince
  cannot rely upon what he observes in quiet times, when citizens have
  need of the state, because then every one agrees with him; they all
  promise, and when death is far distant they all wish to die for him;
  but in troubled times, when the state has need of its citizens, then
  he finds but few. And so much the more is this experiment dangerous,
  inasmuch as it can only be tried once. Therefore a wise prince ought to
  adopt such a course that his citizens will always in every sort and
  kind of circumstance have need of the state and of him, and then he will
  always find them faithful.
  
  
  
  
feat_summary_name: Chapter 9
target: Rulers that come to power because of the support of the people are the total opposite of bloody conquers. Everyone loves 'em. They're not too smart, or even extra lucky, but just enough to get by. Our new ruler has three options for his new place: a monarchy where power goes to the nobles, a republic where power goes to the people, and anarchy. In monarchies, either the nobles or the people decide to concentrate all the power in one person, the king. Seems simple enough, but a king who comes to power because of the nobles will have a hard time. After all, the nobles have lots of power to throw around, too. Remember, you don't want anyone who can compete with you around, and these are the people with the weapons. What are the regular people going to do to you? Poke you with their potatoes? Bottom line: be friends with the people, because the nobles have too many tricks up their sleeves. More on nobles. There are two kinds, those who are totally 100% loyally part of your fan club and those who aren't. Out of those who aren't, there are two kinds. Those who are just scaredy-cats , and those who are planning something. The latter are the ones to watch out for because they will turn on you at the drop of a hat. Okay, back to the people. You need to be on their side. It's pretty easy, actually, because they basically just don't want to be oppressed and tortured. Also, if they thought you were going to be super mean, and you turn out to be okay, they will love you even more than if they loved you from the start. They're easy to please. Some people say that it's a bad idea to depend on the support of the people. Machiavelli just doesn't agree--he says that's only the case if you're stupid and think they'll fight for you or rescue you. That's not going to happen. But they can support you and not turn against you. Problems for the ruler supported by the people? When they want to become an absolute ruler, they need either give direct command or rule though other people who they give power to. The problem is, these people aren't always the most trustworthy--before you know it, everything is up in flames. So, make sure your people always need not only your government , but you specifically, and everything will be okay.