feat_summary_path: finished_summaries/gradesaver/The Prince/section_0_part_0.txt
feat_book_id: The Prince.chapters 1-3
feat_summary_id: section 1: chapters 1-3
feat_summary: {"name": "Section 1: Chapters I-III", "url": "https://web.archive.org/web/20210417004655/https://www.gradesaver.com/the-prince/study-guide/summary-section-1-chapters-i-iii", "summary": "Machiavelli prefaces The Prince with a letter to \"the Magnificent Lorenzo de Medici.\" In fact, the first edition of The Prince was dedicated to Guiliano de Medici, son of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Guiliano died in 1516, and so Machiavelli rededicated the book to one of Lorenzo's grandsons, the Duke of Urbino, who was also named Lorenzo. The opening letter is abstract enough to allow for these changes: Machiavelli admits that he is seeking favor with \"a prince\" and is offering his book as a gift. \"I...would like to commend myself to your Magnificence with some token of my readiness to serve you,\" he writes. In the first chapter, entitled \"Different Kinds of States, and the Different Ways to Get Them,\" Machiavelli proceeds to map out a classification of states. In short, we have princely states and republics. Princely states are either hereditary or new. The new states are either brand new or freshly joined to an established hereditary state. Of the latter, the conquered territories are accustomed to either living free or living under a prince. The second chapter focuses on hereditary principates. These are easier to rule than new states, as tradition provides a basis for stable government. Machiavelli argues a key point here in regards to a people's desire for change: \"And in the antiquity and continuity of the government,\" he writes, \"people forget not only the reasons for innovations but their very existence, because every new change provides a footing to build on another.\" Chapter III, \"On Mixed Principalities,\" is a longer, more involved consideration of the problematic states: those states that are new and are \"like a graft freshly joined to an old kingdom .\" What we have here is, simply put, the conquest of territory. Machiavelli meditates on what exactly makes such a conquest successful, using two prime examples: the Roman Empire, which succeeded, and King Louis of France, who failed. What did the Romans do correctly? According to Machiavelli, they sent out colonies, a far better strategy than the use of standing armies . The Romans also indulged the less powerful, broke the more powerful, and didn't allow foreigners to gain a stronghold. Never did they let a trouble remain just to avoid going to war over it. As Machiavelli argues, war is never entirely avoidable, but is merely postponed; one should therefore fight it sooner rather than later, attacking those ills that plague a society before they become incurable. Preemption, in other words, is the name of the game. On the subject of colonies, Machiavelli goes one step further, noting that it is better to displace or disrupt the poor and powerless than the rich and powerful. Why? Because the poor cannot fight back. Moreover, \"men ought either to be caressed or destroyed, since they will seek revenge for minor hurts but will not be able to revenge major ones.\" Turning to King Louis, Machiavelli lists his mistakes in an effort to explain his failure to conquer Italian states. Louis entered Italy through the ambition of the Venetians, who wanted to gain control of half of Lombardy. Granted this opportunity, Louis proceeded to squander it. He put down the weaker powers , increased the strength of a major power , introduced a powerful foreigner into the fray , never took up residence in Italy, never set up colonies, and deprived the Venetians of their power. This last error proved fatal: if the Venetians had retained full power, no one would have taken Lombardy from France just to give it to Venice, and the Venetians would not have let others in.", "analysis": "Machiavelli's methodology in these opening chapters is an intrinsically scientific one. He uses a classification system, treating states as varying species to be ordered in a form of political taxonomy. He also bolsters each claim with a historical example, flaunting his knowledge of past men and events, and unfolds his arguments in careful thesis-antithesis fashion, demonstrating the rights and the wrongs as absolute principles to be disregarded at one's own peril. His examples are by and large culled from Italian history. Machiavelli cites the case of the duke of Ferrara, \"who did not yield under attacks either from the Venetians in 1484 or from Pope Julius in 1510\" , and then discusses the Roman Empire, contrasting it with King Louis of France's unsuccessful attempt to gain control of Italy. What Machiavelli is beginning to build  is a vision of Italy that is grounded in historical specificity and a set of cardinal rules by which the science of politics operates. There is a curious dialectic between the abstract land Machiavelli seems to invoke when he writes of princes and princedoms as if they were variables in a mathematical equation, and the precision with which he fleshes out Italian history as well as the current events of his land. One can't help but surmise that Italy is the abstract setting of all Machiavelli's formulations, that he has his eye on improving the governance of his own country, and that his emphasis on conquered lands may point the way to a unified Italy, a dream that would not be realized for another three centuries. At the same time, Machiavelli intersperses his layering of details and examples with bits of philosophy and ruminations on the human condition. Indeed, it is not for nothing that he is often referred to as a \"secular humanist.\" Though there are admittedly a few allusions to God, for the most part Machiavelli refers to humans as agents of free will - fickle, noble, full of flaws and merits - and the ultimate barometer of power. What causes princes to succeed or fail? Human nature. Consider the following line: \"men ought either to be caressed or destroyed, since they will seek revenge for minor hurts but will not be able to revenge minor ones.\" Machiavelli bases his political conclusions on basic human impulses: like a great dramatist, he expounds on a set of particular human qualities and uses them to extrapolate broader meanings. He is a humanist insofar as he continually returns to these human impulses in his arguments, thereby positing the larger argument that power and the gain thereof are reflections of a universal human spirit. It is worth noting that Machiavelli never writes, \"the French prefer to be caressed,\" or \"the English are rebellious,\" or \"the Germans are quick to avenge wrongs\"; he is not a nationalist or even an ethnographist, but rather a believer in the universality of man. He writes in categorical terms, presaging Kant and the categorical imperative. Juxtaposed with his reliance on history as example and his emphasis on the comings and goings of his contemporaries is a vision of common man, united by certain fundamental qualities that have persisted since the dawn of civilization and that depend neither on nation nor on creed. In this way, he stands as a quintessential product of the Renaissance."}
text: 
  All states, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been
  and are either republics or principalities.
  
  Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long
  established; or they are new.
  
  The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or
  they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the
  prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of
  the King of Spain.
  
  Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a
  prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of
  the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.
  
  
  
  
  I will leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another
  place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to
  principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above,
  and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved.
  
  I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states,
  and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new
  ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his
  ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a
  prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he
  be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he
  should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the
  usurper, he will regain it.
  
  We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have
  withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope Julius
  in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the
  hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it
  happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause
  him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be
  naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration
  of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for
  one change always leaves the toothing for another.
  
  
  
  
  But the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be
  not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken
  collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from
  an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for
  men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this
  hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they
  are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have
  gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common
  necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have
  submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships
  which he must put upon his new acquisition.
  
  In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in
  seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends
  who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the
  way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them,
  feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed
  forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the goodwill
  of the natives.
  
  For these reasons Louis the Twelfth, King of France, quickly occupied
  Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it
  only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the
  gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future
  benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is
  very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time,
  they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with
  little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the
  delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the
  weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was
  enough for the Duke Lodovico(*) to raise insurrections on the borders;
  but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring
  the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and
  driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned.
  
       (*) Duke Lodovico was Lodovico Moro, a son of Francesco
       Sforza, who married Beatrice d'Este. He ruled over Milan
       from 1494 to 1500, and died in 1510.
  
  Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second
  time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains
  to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what
  any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more
  securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.
  
  Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an
  ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country
  and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them,
  especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and
  to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the
  prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other
  things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live
  quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and
  Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and,
  although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the
  customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst
  themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only
  to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their
  former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor
  their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become
  entirely one body with the old principality.
  
  But when states are acquired in a country differing in language,
  customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great
  energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real
  helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there.
  This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made
  that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures
  taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would
  not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders
  are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one
  is not at hand, they are heard of only when they are great, and then one
  can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged
  by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the
  prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and
  wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state
  from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince
  resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest
  difficulty.
  
  The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places,
  which may be as keys to that state, for it is necessary either to do
  this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A
  prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he
  can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of
  the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new
  inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered,
  are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily
  kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it
  should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In
  conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more
  faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being
  poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men
  ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge
  themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot;
  therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a
  kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.
  
  But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much
  more, having to consume on the garrison all the income from the
  state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are
  exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting
  of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and
  all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their
  own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
  guards are as useless as a colony is useful.
  
  Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects
  ought to make himself the head and defender of his less powerful
  neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care
  that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get
  a footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be
  introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of
  ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were
  brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where
  they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the
  usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters
  a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred
  which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to those
  subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to
  himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has
  acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of
  too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and
  with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them,
  so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does not
  properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and
  whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.
  
  The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these
  measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with(*)
  the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the
  greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority.
  Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and
  Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was
  humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and
  Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor
  did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends
  without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them
  agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the
  Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do,
  who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for
  which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is
  easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine
  is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it
  happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever,
  that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to
  detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or
  treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to
  cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise
  have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they
  can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen,
  they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them,
  there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles,
  dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a war, would not let them
  come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only
  to be put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight
  with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy;
  they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that
  ever please them which is forever in the mouths of the wise ones of our
  time:--Let us enjoy the benefits of the time--but rather the benefits of
  their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and
  is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.
  
       (*) See remark in the introduction on the word
       "intrattenere."
  
  But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the
  things mentioned. I will speak of Louis(*) (and not of Charles)(+) as
  the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held
  possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he
  has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a
  state composed of divers elements.
  
       (*) Louis XII, King of France, "The Father of the People,"
       born 1462, died 1515.
  
       (+) Charles VIII, King of France, born 1470, died 1498.
  
  King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who
  desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I
  will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a
  foothold in Italy, and having no friends there--seeing rather that every
  door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles--he was forced to
  accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded
  very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some
  mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once
  the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines
  became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the
  Bentivogli, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of
  Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchese, the Pisans, the
  Sienese--everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could
  the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which,
  in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king
  master of two-thirds of Italy.
  
  Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have
  maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid
  down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they
  were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church,
  some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to
  stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself
  secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in
  Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the
  Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening
  himself, depriving himself of friends and of those who had thrown
  themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much
  temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it greater authority. And
  having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so
  much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent
  his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into
  Italy.
  
  And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and
  deprived himself of friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples,
  divided it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter in
  Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and
  the malcontents of his own should have somewhere to shelter; and whereas
  he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove
  him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.
  
  The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always
  do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but
  when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is
  folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with
  her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she
  ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with
  the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got
  a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not
  the excuse of that necessity.
  
  Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers,
  he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he
  brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not
  send colonies. Which errors, had he lived, were not enough to injure
  him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the
  Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain
  into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble
  them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have
  consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have
  kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would
  never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also
  because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order
  to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not
  have had the courage.
  
  And if any one should say: "King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander
  and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war," I answer for the reasons given
  above that a blunder ought never to be perpetrated to avoid war, because
  it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And
  if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the
  Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the
  dissolution of his marriage(*) and for the cap to Rouen,(+) to that I
  reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and
  how it ought to be kept.
  
       (*) Louis XII divorced his wife, Jeanne, daughter of Louis
       XI, and married in 1499 Anne of Brittany, widow of Charles
       VIII, in order to retain the Duchy of Brittany for the
       crown.
  
       (+) The Archbishop of Rouen. He was Georges d'Amboise,
       created a cardinal by Alexander VI. Born 1460, died 1510.
  
  Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the
  conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and
  wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that
  is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes
  with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander,
  was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen
  observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied
  to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning that
  otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such
  greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church
  and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be
  attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or
  rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful
  is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by
  astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been
  raised to power.
  
  
  
  
feat_summary_name: Section 1: Chapters I-III
target: Machiavelli prefaces The Prince with a letter to "the Magnificent Lorenzo de Medici." In fact, the first edition of The Prince was dedicated to Guiliano de Medici, son of Lorenzo the Magnificent. Guiliano died in 1516, and so Machiavelli rededicated the book to one of Lorenzo's grandsons, the Duke of Urbino, who was also named Lorenzo. The opening letter is abstract enough to allow for these changes: Machiavelli admits that he is seeking favor with "a prince" and is offering his book as a gift. "I...would like to commend myself to your Magnificence with some token of my readiness to serve you," he writes. In the first chapter, entitled "Different Kinds of States, and the Different Ways to Get Them," Machiavelli proceeds to map out a classification of states. In short, we have princely states and republics. Princely states are either hereditary or new. The new states are either brand new or freshly joined to an established hereditary state. Of the latter, the conquered territories are accustomed to either living free or living under a prince. The second chapter focuses on hereditary principates. These are easier to rule than new states, as tradition provides a basis for stable government. Machiavelli argues a key point here in regards to a people's desire for change: "And in the antiquity and continuity of the government," he writes, "people forget not only the reasons for innovations but their very existence, because every new change provides a footing to build on another." Chapter III, "On Mixed Principalities," is a longer, more involved consideration of the problematic states: those states that are new and are "like a graft freshly joined to an old kingdom ." What we have here is, simply put, the conquest of territory. Machiavelli meditates on what exactly makes such a conquest successful, using two prime examples: the Roman Empire, which succeeded, and King Louis of France, who failed. What did the Romans do correctly? According to Machiavelli, they sent out colonies, a far better strategy than the use of standing armies . The Romans also indulged the less powerful, broke the more powerful, and didn't allow foreigners to gain a stronghold. Never did they let a trouble remain just to avoid going to war over it. As Machiavelli argues, war is never entirely avoidable, but is merely postponed; one should therefore fight it sooner rather than later, attacking those ills that plague a society before they become incurable. Preemption, in other words, is the name of the game. On the subject of colonies, Machiavelli goes one step further, noting that it is better to displace or disrupt the poor and powerless than the rich and powerful. Why? Because the poor cannot fight back. Moreover, "men ought either to be caressed or destroyed, since they will seek revenge for minor hurts but will not be able to revenge major ones." Turning to King Louis, Machiavelli lists his mistakes in an effort to explain his failure to conquer Italian states. Louis entered Italy through the ambition of the Venetians, who wanted to gain control of half of Lombardy. Granted this opportunity, Louis proceeded to squander it. He put down the weaker powers , increased the strength of a major power , introduced a powerful foreigner into the fray , never took up residence in Italy, never set up colonies, and deprived the Venetians of their power. This last error proved fatal: if the Venetians had retained full power, no one would have taken Lombardy from France just to give it to Venice, and the Venetians would not have let others in.
feat_summary_analysis: Machiavelli's methodology in these opening chapters is an intrinsically scientific one. He uses a classification system, treating states as varying species to be ordered in a form of political taxonomy. He also bolsters each claim with a historical example, flaunting his knowledge of past men and events, and unfolds his arguments in careful thesis-antithesis fashion, demonstrating the rights and the wrongs as absolute principles to be disregarded at one's own peril. His examples are by and large culled from Italian history. Machiavelli cites the case of the duke of Ferrara, "who did not yield under attacks either from the Venetians in 1484 or from Pope Julius in 1510" , and then discusses the Roman Empire, contrasting it with King Louis of France's unsuccessful attempt to gain control of Italy. What Machiavelli is beginning to build  is a vision of Italy that is grounded in historical specificity and a set of cardinal rules by which the science of politics operates. There is a curious dialectic between the abstract land Machiavelli seems to invoke when he writes of princes and princedoms as if they were variables in a mathematical equation, and the precision with which he fleshes out Italian history as well as the current events of his land. One can't help but surmise that Italy is the abstract setting of all Machiavelli's formulations, that he has his eye on improving the governance of his own country, and that his emphasis on conquered lands may point the way to a unified Italy, a dream that would not be realized for another three centuries. At the same time, Machiavelli intersperses his layering of details and examples with bits of philosophy and ruminations on the human condition. Indeed, it is not for nothing that he is often referred to as a "secular humanist." Though there are admittedly a few allusions to God, for the most part Machiavelli refers to humans as agents of free will - fickle, noble, full of flaws and merits - and the ultimate barometer of power. What causes princes to succeed or fail? Human nature. Consider the following line: "men ought either to be caressed or destroyed, since they will seek revenge for minor hurts but will not be able to revenge minor ones." Machiavelli bases his political conclusions on basic human impulses: like a great dramatist, he expounds on a set of particular human qualities and uses them to extrapolate broader meanings. He is a humanist insofar as he continually returns to these human impulses in his arguments, thereby positing the larger argument that power and the gain thereof are reflections of a universal human spirit. It is worth noting that Machiavelli never writes, "the French prefer to be caressed," or "the English are rebellious," or "the Germans are quick to avenge wrongs"; he is not a nationalist or even an ethnographist, but rather a believer in the universality of man. He writes in categorical terms, presaging Kant and the categorical imperative. Juxtaposed with his reliance on history as example and his emphasis on the comings and goings of his contemporaries is a vision of common man, united by certain fundamental qualities that have persisted since the dawn of civilization and that depend neither on nation nor on creed. In this way, he stands as a quintessential product of the Renaissance.