text: Background U.S. Export Control System The U.S. government implements an export control system to manage risks associated with exporting sensitive items and ensure that legitimate trade can still occur. The export control system is governed by a complex set of laws, regulations, and processes that multiple federal agencies administer to ensure compliance. State and Commerce each play a role in the U.S. export control system. Historically, State has controlled the export of military items, known as defense articles and services, while Commerce has controlled the export of less sensitive items with both military and commercial applications, known as dual-use items. In addition to firearms, artillery, and ammunition, State controls the export of items such as tanks, fighter aircraft, missiles, and military training, which it lists on the U.S. Munitions List (USML). Commerce controls the export of dual-use items such as computers, radars, and telecommunications equipment, which it lists on the Commerce Control List (CCL). State and Commerce both control the export of items within their jurisdictions by requiring a license or other authorization to export a controlled item; vetting the parties associated with export transactions; monitoring the end-use of exports and other compliance activities; and supporting law enforcement agencies’ investigations of possible violations of export control laws and regulations. Generally, unless a license exemption applies, exporters submit a license application to State if their items are controlled on the USML or to Commerce if they are controlled on the CCL to receive export approval. As part of the application review process, State and Commerce consult with other agencies, including DOD. Additionally, offices within Commerce, DHS, and the Department of Justice (DOJ) investigate potential violations of export control laws and regulations, and conduct enforcement activities. State and Commerce Export Control Lists Items identified on the State and Commerce export control lists are subject to different laws and regulations. The Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, (AECA) provides the statutory authority to control the export of defense articles and services, which the President delegated to the Secretary of State. State’s International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) implement this authority and identify the specific types of items subject to control in the USML. The USML is comprised of 21 categories of items, each with multiple sub-categories, encompassing defense items such as firearms, missiles, and aircraft. Firearms, artillery, and ammunition represent the first three categories of the USML (see table 1). Additional information on the 21 categories of the USML is presented in appendix II. Within State, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) is responsible for implementing controls on the commercial export of these items. The Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (ECRA) provides the statutory authority for Commerce to control the export of less sensitive military items, dual-use items, and basic commercial items. Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR), which contain the CCL, implement this authority. The CCL classifies less sensitive military items, dual-use items, and basic commercial items in 10 categories, such as Nuclear & Miscellaneous, Electronics, and Telecommunications, and in 5 product groups. Appendix II shows the 10 categories and five groups of the CCL. Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is responsible for implementing these export controls (see table 2 for a summary of the legal and regulatory frameworks for State’s and Commerce’s export controls). Proposed Transfer of Certain Firearms from State to Commerce Jurisdiction In May 2018, State and Commerce published proposed rules in the Federal Register to request public comments on the proposed transfer of certain items in USML Categories I, II, and III (firearms, artillery, and ammunition) to the CCL. According to State and Commerce’s proposed rules, the purpose of the transfer is to limit the items that State controls to those that provide the United States with a critical military or intelligence advantage or, in the case of weapons, are inherently for military end use. According to the proposed rules, items that do not meet these criteria would be removed from State’s export control jurisdiction and moved to Commerce’s jurisdiction. The proposed rules state that some, but not all, of the firearms, artillery, and ammunition currently controlled for export by State would transfer to Commerce control. The items proposed for transfer to the CCL include non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms up to .50 caliber, and non-automatic shotguns with a barrel length less than 18 inches; as well as parts, components, accessories, attachments, and ammunition for these firearms and shotguns, among other items. According to the proposed rules, if finalized, State would continue to control fully-automatic firearms, shotguns, and modern artillery; silencers, components, parts, and accessories specially designed for automatic firearms and shotguns; and specific types of ammunition, including ammunition for automatic firearms. The proposed rules would also make a variety of conforming changes to the USML and CCL to accommodate the transferred items. The proposed transfer of firearms, artillery, and ammunition is part of an ongoing effort to reform the export control lists by reviewing the USML categories and transferring certain items considered less sensitive to the CCL. Since the export control reform initiative was first announced in 2010 with the objective of modernizing the export control system, State and Commerce have finalized various rulemakings that transferred certain items from USML Categories IV through XXI to Commerce’s control. Firearms, artillery, and ammunition are the last three USML categories proposed to undergo regulatory changes under export control reform. In accordance with the AECA, the President must notify Congress of items proposed for removal from the USML and describe the nature of any controls to be imposed on the items, and may not remove the items until 30 days after providing such notice. State and Commerce published the proposed rules in the Federal Register on May 24, 2018, opening a 45-day public comment period that ended on July 9, 2018. After reviewing public comments, State and Commerce submitted final rules to the Office of Management and Budget for regulatory review on November 7, 2018. The required 30-day congressional notification period pursuant to the AECA began on February 4, 2019, according to a State official. State Reviewed about 69,000 Export License Applications Valued at up to $45.4 Billion for Firearms, Artillery, and Ammunition in Fiscal Years 2013-2017 State reviewed 68,690 export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition with a potential value of up to $45.4 billion during fiscal years 2013 to 2017. The number of export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition remained relatively constant from fiscal years 2013 to 2017, averaging 13,738 annually, even as the total number of licenses reviewed by State declined as the export control reform process transferred items from State to Commerce control (see fig. 1). Firearms, artillery, and ammunition increased from about 16 percent of all license applications reviewed by State in fiscal year 2013 to about 36 percent in 2017. State processes export license applications for permanent exports, temporary exports and imports, and certain types of agreements. During fiscal years 2013 to 2017, about 91 percent of export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition were for permanent exports, about 8 percent for temporary exports and imports, and about 2 percent for agreements. State can take various actions on the export license applications it receives, including approving the license, approving with conditions, returning without action, and denying the license. For fiscal years 2013- 2017, State approved 87 percent of the number of export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition, returned without action 12 percent, and denied 1 percent. State can approve an application but place conditions on the export license, such as limiting the validity period or prohibiting certain types of intermediaries in the export transaction. State can also return without action export license applications that are missing information or that it is otherwise unable to review, and can deny, revoke, suspend, or amend a license for foreign policy or national security reasons. About Two-Thirds of Category I-III Export License Applications Were for Firearms in Fiscal Years 2013-2017 About two-thirds of the export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition that State reviewed during fiscal years 2013-2017 were for firearms and related items controlled under Category I of the USML (see fig. 2). Of the applications for these items, about 57 percent involved non-automatic or semi-automatic firearms—most of which are proposed to transfer to the CCL under Commerce control—and about 4 percent involved fully-automatic firearms—which would remain on the USML under State control. The remainder of export license applications for Category I items included other types of firearms such as combat shotguns, firearm attachments such as silencers and riflescopes, firearm parts and components, and technical data and defense services related to these items. The proposed rules state that some of these items would transfer to Commerce control while others would remain under State control. As shown in figure 2, export license applications for Category II artillery were about 5 percent of all Category I-III license applications from fiscal years 2013 through 2017. According to State, under the proposed rules, modern artillery, their ammunition, and certain related parts and components would remain under State’s control. Category III ammunition represented about 21 percent of the Category I-III export license applications. As stated in the State and Commerce proposed rules, USML Category III would be revised to specifically list the ammunition that it controls, which would include ammunition that has only or primarily military applications. Generally, ammunition used in the non- automatic and semi-automatic firearms that are proposed to transfer to Commerce control would also transfer. About 8 percent of the export license applications involved items controlled in more than one category of USML Categories I, II, and III, which are shown as “Multiple” in figure 2. Volume of Category I-III Export License Applications Varied by Geographic Region of End-User in Fiscal Years 2013-2017 In fiscal years 2013 to 2017, 32 percent of license applications for the export of firearms, artillery, and ammunition were intended for end-users in countries in Europe and Eurasia, 29 percent to the Western Hemisphere, 24 percent to East Asia and the Pacific, 7 percent to the Near East, 3 percent to Africa, 3 percent to South and Central Asia, and 2 percent to multiple countries (see fig. 3). Export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition during fiscal years 2013 to 2017 included applications for end-users spanning 189 countries and territories, yet the top 20 countries represented about 70 percent of the total number of applications (see fig. 4). State and Commerce Export Controls Have Several Different Requirements, Including for Registration, Licensing, End-Use Monitoring, and Congressional Notification State’s and Commerce’s export controls are guided by different laws, regulations, or policies that have several different requirements for registration, licensing, end-use monitoring, congressional notification, public reporting, and enforcement. The AECA requires manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of items on the USML to register with State whereas there is no registration requirement in the law for manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of items on the CCL under Commerce’s jurisdiction. Differences also exist in how State and Commerce screen export license applications and in their license requirements. For example, State and Commerce rely on different internal watch lists to screen applicants. In addition, according to Commerce, certain exports that currently require a State license would not require a Commerce license once transferred to Commerce’s jurisdiction. State and Commerce also conduct end-use monitoring of selected controlled exports differently. For example, State relies primarily on embassy staff to conduct end-use checks and Commerce relies primarily on several export control officers based overseas for this responsibility. In addition, congressional notification and public reporting requirements that under current law apply to firearms on the USML would not be applicable if they are transferred to the CCL. Finally, there are some differences in enforcement of export control laws, such as different maximum fines for civil violations, depending on whether the item is controlled by the ITAR under State’s jurisdiction or controlled by the EAR under Commerce’s jurisdiction. The Law Requires Registration for Items on the USML but Not for Items on the CCL The AECA requires manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of defense articles or services listed on the USML to register annually with State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) whereas there is no requirement in the law for registration for manufacturers, exporters, and brokers of items on the CCL. State reported having 13,083 registrants across all 21 USML categories in fiscal year 2017. Registration, which requires a fee payment of at least $2,250 per year, is generally a precondition for obtaining a State export license, unless State grants an exception to a manufacturer or exporter, or a broker is eligible for an exemption. According to a State document, registration provides important information on the identity and location of defense companies and conveys management responsibility for compliance with export control laws. Those registering must disclose any foreign ownership or affiliations and certify that they have not been indicted, otherwise charged with, or convicted of export control violations and other crimes. Manufacturers and exporters whose entire product line transfers to the CCL would no longer have to register, according to Commerce’s proposed rule, while those that manufacture or export any items that remain on the USML, would continue to register with DDTC. Differences Exist in State and Commerce Applicant Screening Processes and License Requirements Both Agencies Review Export License Applications Using an Interagency Process State’s and Commerce’s processes for reviewing export license applications involve opportunities for other Departments to review applications. While DDTC has primary responsibility for reviewing State’s commercial export license applications, other bureaus within State, as well as DOD, also review certain applications, depending on the defense article, defense service, or the destination country. Commerce export license applications also involve an interagency review that includes State, DOD, and the Department of Energy, depending on the item to be exported. Both departments have a process for resolving disagreements among the reviewing bureaus or agencies on the disposition of the application. According to State officials, as part of the interagency review process for Commerce licenses, State has generally reviewed applications for items that have previously moved from the USML to the CCL and would continue to do so for items that would transfer to the CCL under the proposed rules. Moreover, DOD officials told us that DOD intends to review Commerce export license applications for these items during the interagency review process, if the proposed transfer is implemented. This would represent a change from DOD’s current practice to generally not review State’s firearms license applications. DOD officials told us that if the proposed rules are finalized, they believed it is prudent to begin reviewing Commerce license applications for items that would transfer under the proposed rules, at least initially. State and Commerce Use Different Watch Lists to Screen Parties to the Export Transaction State and Commerce each maintain their own internal watch lists to screen all parties identified on license applications. A watch list match would trigger further review of the license and ultimately can result in a denial of the license in some cases. State and Commerce also use watch lists as a means of targeting transactions for possible end-use checks to verify legitimacy of end-users of controlled exports. Both departments’ watch lists include any derogatory information they collect internally from their past screening and end-use monitoring of licenses. For example, if information is identified raising questions about the legitimacy of a party to a license during the application review, that information would be used to update the watch list to inform future license application reviews. State’s and Commerce’s watch lists also include information from automated databases maintained by other U.S. agencies as well as information from law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community. State’s watch list contains over 200,000 entries, including sensitive details related to ongoing and previous law enforcement activities, according to State officials. According to Commerce officials, because State has been responsible for export controls of firearms, artillery, and ammunition, its internal watch list is also more likely than Commerce’s to include derogatory information collected from past screening and end-use monitoring related to exports of these items. However, Commerce does not have access to State’s watch list, according to State and Commerce officials. These officials noted that a Commerce licensing officer can ask State to screen an applicant with State’s watch list on a case-by-case basis, although such checks are not done routinely. State and Commerce officials told us that, in anticipation of the transfer of firearms, artillery, and ammunition to Commerce’s responsibility, the two departments are engaged in ongoing discussions to potentially share State’s watch list with Commerce. According to State officials, these discussions involve determining which specific watch list information Commerce would need and State is able to share, depending on the source of the information. State and Commerce also have to resolve the sharing and updating of information using different information technology infrastructures, according to department officials. As of February 2019, the departments had not reached agreement or established a documented process to achieve the goal of sharing watch list information before implementation of the proposed transfer would occur, according to State and Commerce officials. Information sharing is supported by a policy statement included in the ECRA. The statement says that among other factors, the “export control system must ensure that it is transparent, predictable, and timely, has the flexibility to be adapted to address new threats in the future, and allows seamless access to and sharing of export control information among all relevant United States national security and foreign policy agencies.” Without access to State’s watch list, if the proposed rules are finalized, Commerce may lack critical information needed to effectively screen license applicants for firearms and related exports and target possible cases for end-use monitoring to ensure that these exports are used as intended and by legitimate end-users. Both Agencies Screen License Applications for Human Rights Concerns but Statutory Prohibition Applies Differently Both State and Commerce screen license applications for human rights concerns, but the federal law that prohibits exports to the governments of certain foreign countries on human rights grounds applies differently to items under State’s jurisdiction than under Commerce’s. Under Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in general, “no security assistance may be provided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights.” For this provision, “security assistance” is defined in part as any license in effect with respect to the export to or for the armed forces, police, intelligence, or other internal security forces of a foreign country of (1) any defense articles or defense services licensed for export under section 38 of the AECA, or (2) items listed under the 600 series of the CCL. Licenses under Commerce’s jurisdiction generally may not be issued for items defined as “crime control and detection instruments and equipment” to a country, the government of which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights. For items under Commerce’s jurisdiction, the Commerce proposed rule specifies that concern for human rights is a regulatory reason for denying a license for firearms and ammunition under Commerce’s Export Administration Regulations (EAR). Within State, the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) is primarily responsible for screening export license applications to ensure that exports do not involve parties with human rights concerns. According to DRL officials, the bureau reviews applications for exports to specific countries where human rights concerns exist and prioritizes applications for firearms exports because they are often associated with human rights abuses committed by government police and military units. The officials noted, however, that State rarely denies an export license based solely on human rights concerns. If firearms are transferred to Commerce’s responsibility, DRL will continue to have the primary role in screening license applications for human rights as part of the Commerce-led interagency review process, according to DRL officials. For Commerce license applications, however, State’s position would be weighed together with the positions of Commerce, DOD, and Energy, according to Commerce officials. By contrast, for State export license applications, State alone makes the final determination, according to State officials. State Has Different Requirements than Commerce for End-Users to Certify They Will Not Re-Export Certain Licensed Exports State and Commerce have different end-user certification requirements. State’s export control regulations require that for certain items, applicants provide a written certification from end-users that they will not re-export, resell, or otherwise dispose of the commodity outside of the country listed on the license. This requirement generally applies to all items on the USML that are designated as Significant Military Equipment, including firearms, and ammunition. In contrast, Commerce generally does not require end-user certification for items on the CCL but does require it when it has not verified the legitimacy of end-users and may also impose this requirement on a case-by-case basis. Written end-user certification provides additional assurance and accountability that end-users will comply with the terms and conditions of the license, according to State officials. It also is a deterrent and provides documentary evidence that can be later used in court, if necessary, according to an official from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). The Law Requires Disclosure of Political Contributions, Fees and Commissions for Items on the USML but Not for Items on the CCL The AECA states that the Secretary of State shall require reporting on political contributions, gifts, commissions, and fees paid or offered, or agreed to be paid by any person in connection with a commercial sale of an item listed on the USML to or for the armed forces of a foreign country or an international organization. State’s export control regulations also require license applicants to disclose certain payment of political contributions, fees, and commissions for certain sales of defense articles and defense services. This requirement applies to exports of $500,000 or more. Applicants must report political contributions in an aggregate amount of $5,000 or more and paid fees or commissions in an aggregate amount of $100,000 or more. Applicants must provide a letter to DDTC containing specific information about the sale, including the amounts of political contributions, fees, or commissions paid, and the name and nationality of each recipient. The disclosures are intended to ensure that purchases made by foreign governments of U.S. defense articles are based on merit without improper influence. Failure of applicants to comply with these disclosure requirements can result in additional oversight measures and civil penalties. According to an ICE official, this disclosure information may provide valuable information in criminal or civil matters. There is no requirement in the law for these disclosures for items listed on the CCL and Commerce licenses do not require these disclosures. Therefore, this information would no longer be collected as part of the licensing process for firearms, artillery, and ammunition that are proposed for transfer to the CCL, according to Commerce officials. According to Commerce, Certain Exports That Require a State License Would Not Require a Commerce License if Transferred to the CCL Consistent with export control regulations, there are several circumstances in which some exports proposed for transfer that currently require State licenses would either require fewer or no Commerce licenses if the proposed rules are finalized, according to Commerce. Multiple end-users on one license. State requires licenses to be limited to only one end-user, while Commerce allows multiple end-users on a single license. The applicant for a State export license must provide a purchase order documenting the proposed export to a single end-user and an additional license would be required for each additional end-user. According to Commerce officials, a Commerce license can have multiple end-users associated with a particular consignee, reducing the total number of licenses for which the applicant must apply. Technical data and defense services. State requires licenses for defense services and technical data whereas Commerce’s export controls do not generally apply to defense services and apply to technical data more narrowly than State. State’s regulations define defense services as “the furnishing of assistance (including training) to foreign persons … in the design, development, engineering, manufacture, production, assembly, testing, repair, maintenance, modification, operation, demilitarization, destruction, processing or use of defense articles.” State’s definition of defense services also includes military training of foreign units and forces including publications, training exercises, and military advice. State’s definition of technical data includes information, such as blueprints, drawings, or instructions. Commerce’s export control regulations generally do not apply to services. For example, training in the basic operation of a firearm controlled by Commerce would not be subject to export controls, according to State officials. In addition, Commerce’s regulations do not control technology or software, if it is “available to the public without restrictions.” For example, Commerce officials told us that Commerce would not require an export license for the posting of instructions for 3D printing of firearms on the internet, if they were publicly available without restrictions. Minimum level of U.S.-origin content. Items subject to State’s controls require a license when they are incorporated into a foreign-made product regardless of the percentage of controlled U.S. content in that product. Commerce does not require a license for items when they are incorporated into foreign-made items unless the controlled U.S.-origin content of a foreign-made product exceeds the applicable minimum percentage which, according to Commerce officials, may be 10 or 25 percent, depending on the destination. This minimum level of U.S.-origin content is referred to as “de minimis treatment.” Commerce’s proposed rule states that de minimis treatment in Commerce’s regulations would apply for all foreign-made items proposed for transfer to the CCL, unless they are being exported to a country that is subject to a United States arms embargo, in which case there would be no minimum threshold for U.S.-origin content. License exceptions. State regulations contain some country-based license exceptions, including for exports to Canada and, more narrowly, to Australia and the United Kingdom whereas Commerce has several different license exceptions under its regulations. For example, Commerce regulations have the “Strategic Trade Authorization” (STA) exception that permits exports of certain items to countries determined to be low risk, which includes NATO partners and other close allies, of which 37 are eligible for a broader STA authorization and seven are eligible for a much narrower STA authorization. Commerce’s proposed rule specifies that it would revise Commerce’s regulations to make firearms and most parts, components, accessories, and attachments ineligible for the STA license exception. However, Commerce estimates that 450 to 650 license applications per year involving certain eligible items would still be authorized under STA exceptions if the proposed rules are finalized. Commerce also has a “Limited Value Shipment” exception, which is available for proposed exports of certain less sensitive firearms parts and components with a value of $500 or less per shipment based on the actual selling price or fair market value. Commerce’s proposed rule specifies that this exception would only be available for certain parts, components, and accessories and attachments for firearms; complete firearms would be ineligible for this exception. State offers a similar exemption but only for licenses with a value of $100 or less, based on the wholesale price. State and Commerce Both Conduct End-Use Monitoring of Selected Controlled Exports but Differences Exist State and Commerce Both Implement End-Use Monitoring Programs State and Commerce both conduct end-use monitoring to verify the reliability of foreign end-users and legitimacy of proposed transactions and to provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the terms of the license and proper use of the licensed items. State recommends that end-use checks involve a site visit whenever possible, while Commerce policy requires that the end-use check include a physical verification on-site with a party to the transaction, according to Commerce officials. State and Commerce also apply their own means of risk-based targeting to select the licenses or exports that will undergo end-use monitoring, however, similarities exist involving selection criteria. For example, State and Commerce may target transactions that involve unfamiliar foreign parties, unusual shipping routes, or derogatory information from watch lists, according to the departments. The number of end-use checks conducted by State averaged about 1.3 percent of its license applications, and those conducted by Commerce averaged about 3.3 percent of its applications from fiscal years 2013-2017. State and Commerce end-use checks may result in either “favorable” or “unfavorable” findings. Commerce may also categorize an end-use check as “unverified.” An “unfavorable” or “unverified” result occurs if the end- use check cannot verify information in the license or reveals facts that are inconsistent with the license. For either State or Commerce, an unfavorable end-use check can lead to denying applications, revoking licenses, removing parties from licenses, updating the watch list, or making referrals to U.S. law enforcement agencies for investigation, according to a State report and Commerce officials. State closed 166 of 766, or 22 percent, of end-use monitoring cases as “unfavorable” in fiscal years 2013-2017 for firearms, artillery, and ammunition licenses. State’s three most common reasons for an unfavorable finding for end-use checks for firearms, artillery, and ammunition were derogatory information on a foreign party, inability to confirm order or receipt of goods, and involvement of an unlicensed party. State relies on U.S. embassy or consulate staff in the country or countries involved in the transaction to conduct its end-use checks. Commerce relies primarily on Export Control Officers (ECOs) positioned overseas to conduct end-use checks. ECOs conducted an average of about 60 percent of Commerce’s end-use checks per year from fiscal years 2013 to 2017. According to Commerce officials, Commerce had a total of nine ECO positions in Beijing, Dubai, Frankfurt, Hong Kong, Istanbul, New Delhi, and Singapore, as of October 2018 (see fig. 5). Six of these nine positions were filled as of this date. The ECOs have areas of responsibility covering multiple countries within their geographic region. For the remaining 40 percent of end-use checks, Commerce relied primarily on its “Sentinel Program” in which BIS special agents based in domestic field offices, along with other responsibilities, travel to destination countries not covered by ECOs to conduct end-use checks. In addition, a small percentage of Commerce’s end-use checks are conducted by Foreign Commercial Service officers or other personnel stationed at U.S. embassies, according to Commerce officials. State conducted 766 end-use checks for firearms, artillery, and ammunition in fiscal years 2013-2017 with the largest share, over 40 percent, in the Western Hemisphere (see fig. 6). None of Commerce’s overseas ECO positions are located in this region nor do any cover it within their areas of responsibility. According to Commerce officials, the number and locations of end-use checks for firearms, artillery, and ammunition, if these items are transferred to the CCL, will depend on how exports of these items factor into the department’s existing targeting criteria. To the extent that Commerce needs to conduct end-use checks for these items in the Western Hemisphere, Commerce officials told us that they plan to cover these checks via the Sentinel Program and, where necessary, through checks by Foreign Commercial Service Officers. The officials noted that they plan to reassess their end-use monitoring efforts after items are transferred to the CCL if the proposed rules are finalized. End-use checks include pre-license checks in support of the license application review or post-shipment verifications after the license has been approved and items have shipped. As shown in figure 7, more than 50 percent of State’s end-use checks specifically for firearms, artillery, and ammunition licenses from fiscal years 2013 to 2017 were pre-license checks. Conversely, about 90 percent of Commerce’s end- use checks for all items subject to the EAR for this period were post- shipment verifications. Commerce noted that it conducts mostly post- shipment verifications because it controls a higher share than State of items that are exported without a license. State Is Required by Law to Notify Congress of Certain Export License Applications for Firearms, Artillery, and Ammunition While Commerce Is Not The AECA requires State to notify Congress before State can approve certain export licenses for firearms, artillery, and ammunition. These notification requirements depend on the proposed export value and type of export, among other factors. For example, the AECA requires State to notify Congress of proposed licenses for the export of USML Category I firearms in the amount of $1 million or more. Additionally, State must notify Congress of proposed licenses for commercial agreements that involve the overseas manufacture of certain USML items, including many firearms, artillery, and ammunition items, regardless of the proposed value. During fiscal years 2013 to 2017, State identified 240 export license applications involving firearms, artillery, and ammunition that required congressional notification, totaling approximately $2.5 billion. Additionally, State identified 41 license applications for commercial technical assistance or manufacturing license agreements involving the overseas manufacture of firearms, artillery, and ammunition that required congressional notification, totaling approximately $5.7 billion. According to State and Commerce officials, these congressional notification requirements would no longer apply to firearms, artillery, and ammunition that move from State’s to Commerce’s export control responsibility because the requirements apply specifically to USML controlled items. The proposed rule transferring firearms to Commerce’s responsibility does not revise Commerce’s export control regulations to add a congressional notification requirement for firearms, according to Commerce officials. State Is Required by Law to Publicly Report More Details on Controlled Exports than Commerce The Foreign Assistance Act, as amended, requires State to report to Congress annually on military assistance and military exports to the governments of each foreign country and international organization and specifies that the report include “a statement of the aggregate dollar value and quantity of semiautomatic assault weapons, or spare parts for such weapons.” The Act also requires that State post all unclassified information from this report on the internet. To comply with this requirement, State posts an annual report that includes the aggregate dollar value and quantity of defense articles and services, by USML category, licensed to each foreign country and international organization, as well as data on the actual shipments occurring during the fiscal year. The report also includes an appendix that breaks out exports specifically for the USML sub-category I(a), which includes non-automatic and semi- automatic firearms, and sub category I(h), which includes firearms components, parts, accessories, and attachments. This reporting requirement only applies to exports of items on the USML, which are licensed by State under the AECA, but does not apply to exports controlled by Commerce. This information on exports, by country, would no longer be available for firearms and other items from Categories I-III of the USML after they are transferred to the CCL if the proposed rules are finalized, according to Commerce officials. Some Differences Exist between Export Control Enforcement of Items Controlled by State and Commerce The statutory penalties available for criminal violations of export control laws are the same regardless of whether the items are on the USML and controlled by State or on the CCL and controlled by Commerce. Criminal violations may result in fines up to $1 million and prison terms up to 20 years, or both. Under the AECA, civil violations of State’s export controls may result in a fine of up to $500,000 but, according to State officials, can be much higher based on inflation under the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, as amended. State told us that actual civil penalties for civil violations in 2018 ranged from $824,959 to $1,134,602. By contrast, the ECRA set the penalty for civil violations of Commerce’s export controls at up to $300,000 or twice the value of the transaction that is the basis of the violation, whichever is of greater value. According to Commerce officials, this can substantially increase the monetary penalty for civil violations. Criminal violations of either State’s or Commerce’s export control laws may result in prohibiting the violator from involvement in future exports of controlled items. The AECA also precludes the issuance of State licenses to persons convicted of violating certain federal laws, such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Similarly, Commerce can deny the export privileges, including the ability to obtain a license, of companies and individuals for a period of 10 years from the date of conviction for violating certain federal laws. This prohibition can be expanded to include other related parties, such as those connected with the denied person by virtue of affiliation, ownership, or control. Agencies with responsibility for export control enforcement can vary depending on whether items are controlled by State or Commerce. According to DHS officials, ICE has jurisdiction to investigate potential export control violations and U.S. Customs and Border Protection has primary enforcement responsibility for export control violations at the border, seaports, and airports. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) can also investigate these cases involving items controlled by either State or Commerce. According to Commerce, the Office of Export Enforcement in BIS has over 100 special agents in U.S.-based field offices authorized to investigate potential violations of Commerce’s export control laws. These investigative resources would be available, in addition to DHS and FBI, to address illegal firearms trafficking if the proposed transfer is implemented, according to Commerce officials. Proposed Rules, If Finalized, Would Reduce State’s and Increase Commerce’s Licensing Volume, but Extent of the Resource Impact on These Agencies Is Unknown According to State, the Proposed Transfer Would Impact Resources from State Fee Collections to an Uncertain Extent State expects to lose revenue from registration fees if the proposed transfer of firearms, artillery, and ammunition to Commerce is implemented. State estimates in its proposed rule that the transfer would result in about 10,000 fewer license applications per year for Category I- III items—a reduction of about 26 percent from the 38,862 applications that State processed in fiscal year 2017. State estimates a recurring annual registration fee revenue loss of about $2.5 million, according to its proposed rule. State officials told us, if the proposed rules become final, there would be additional revenue declines from an uncertain drop in the number of registrants that State cannot estimate. They explained that because many manufacturers and exporters would likely be involved in items controlled by State as well as Commerce, they would still need to register with State. Others involved only in items moving to Commerce would no longer have to register with State. For example, according to State officials, a manufacturer of both semi-automatic weapons that the proposed rules identify for transfer to the CCL and fully automatic weapons that would stay on the USML would still be required to register with State, if the proposed rules are finalized. State officials noted that the decline in the number of license applications resulting from previous transfers of items from the USML to the CCL has not produced a proportional decline in registration revenue. According to data provided by State, registration revenue has dropped less than 25 percent from about $47 million in fiscal year 2013 to about $36 million in fiscal year 2017, while the number of export license applications has dropped more than 50 percent from about 83,000 to almost 39,000. With the decline in license workload that State expects would result if the proposed rules are finalized, State officials told us that four contractors currently responsible for reviewing licenses for firearms and ammunition in DDTC could be moved to other teams with vacancies in order to review licenses for other controlled items. On the other hand, State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN), which has lead responsibility at State for reviewing Commerce licenses for items transferring from the USML to the CCL, expects to see an increase in its workload. An ISN official told us his bureau could potentially need an additional 2.5 full-time equivalent staff to review items transferred to the CCL as part of Commerce’s interagency review process. Commerce Officials Believe They Have Sufficient Resources to Handle an Increase in Workload Resulting from the Proposed Transfer Commerce estimates in its proposed rule that it would gain 6,000 additional license applications from the proposed transfer—an increase of about 18 percent above the 34,142 license applications it reviewed in fiscal year 2017. Commerce officials told us that the increased workload to review license applications will also create more work for some related activities. For example, Commerce expects the number of investigative leads and export enforcement investigations to include more firearms- related actions. However, Commerce officials told us they have not estimated the magnitude of these changes. Commerce officials told us they believe they have enough resources to absorb the increase in workload. They noted that they have flexibility to shift license review staff to meet demand created by the additional licenses, if necessary. In addition, BIS received an 18 percent increase in full-time equivalent staff positions, from 367 to 432, in fiscal year 2018. This increase was in response to workload demands created by previous transfers of items from the USML to the CCL, according to Commerce officials. Commerce officials told us that they will continue to assess workload data after the proposed transfer is implemented to determine whether they have adequate staff levels to meet increased workload demands. Conclusions If finalized, the proposed rules to transfer certain firearms, artillery, and ammunition from Categories I-III of the USML to the CCL would apply Commerce’s export control system to these items instead of State’s. However, critical information needed to effectively screen applicants and target licenses for end-use monitoring may be unavailable to Commerce unless State shares its watch list data. Further, because State has been responsible for export controls of firearms, artillery, and ammunition, its watch list is more likely than Commerce’s to include derogatory information collected from past screening and end-use monitoring related to exports of these items, according to Commerce officials. While State and Commerce officials said that they have held discussions regarding how to share relevant information from their internal watch lists, as of February 2019, they had not reached any agreement on how to share watch lists if the proposed rules are finalized. Without such an agreement or process to share State’s watch list, Commerce may lack critical information needed to ensure that items proposed for transfer are used as intended and by legitimate end-users. Recommendations for Executive Action We are making a total of two recommendations, including one to State and one to Commerce. If responsibility for controlling the exports of certain firearms, artillery, and ammunition is transferred from State to Commerce, the Secretary of State should ensure that the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs develops a process for sharing State’s internal watch list with Commerce to enhance oversight of these items. (Recommendation 1) If responsibility for controlling the exports of certain firearms, artillery, and ammunition is transferred from State to Commerce, the Secretary of Commerce should ensure that the Under Secretary of Commerce for Industry and Security develops a process for receiving State’s internal watch list and integrating it into Commerce’s licensing review process to enhance oversight of these items. (Recommendation 2) Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to State, Commerce, DOD, DHS, and DOJ for review and comment. In their written comments, reproduced in appendixes III and IV, State and Commerce agreed with our recommendations. Commerce provided some minor revisions to the recommendation, which we incorporated. DOD, DHS, and DOJ did not provide written comments. In addition, State, Commerce, and DOJ provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional committees and the Secretaries of State, Commerce, Defense, and Homeland Security; and the Attorney General of the United States. In addition, the report is available at no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8612 or gianopoulosk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology Our objectives were to assess (1) the volume and value of commercial export license applications State Department (State) reviewed for firearms, artillery, and ammunition—Categories I-III of the U.S. Munitions List (USML)—in fiscal years 2013-2017, (2) how certain export controls differ between State and Commerce, and (3) what is known about the resource implications for State and Commerce due to the proposed transfer. To assess the volume and value of export license applications for USML Category I-III firearms, artillery, and ammunition that State reviewed during fiscal years 2013 to 2017, we obtained data from the interagency export licensing database, USXPORTS. USXPORTS is the system of record for all munitions and dual-use export license applications and adjudications, and is maintained by the Defense Technology Security Administration, within the Department of Defense (DOD). The data on USXPORTS originates from private companies applying for export licenses which, in the case of munitions, State is responsible for adjudicating. The agencies use this database to review and adjudicate applications, and also to report back to the applicants. We interviewed officials from State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) in State’s Bureau of Political and Military Affairs to understand the data and identify any limitations on how we use them. We analyzed the data to describe the number and reported value of export license applications, the USML items in the applications, and the reported destination country, among other characteristics. We assessed these data and found them to be sufficiently reliable for the purpose of conducting these analyses, but recognized that approved applications may not necessarily result in actual exports. We also noted some minor data limitations in our report, such as the fact that amendments to export license applications are not associated with destination countries. We did not independently audit the underlying data submitted to DDTC by private companies. To analyze how certain export controls differ between State and Commerce, we reviewed the departments’ proposed rules, relevant laws and regulations, agency guidance, and annual reports related to State’s and Commerce’s export controls. We also interviewed officials from Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security; DDTC; State’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor; State’s Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation; Immigration and Customs Enforcement and U.S. Customs and Border Protection in the Department of Homeland Security; and the Defense Technology Security Administration. We sought to present differences between State’s and Commerce’s export controls that are potentially relevant for items proposed for transfer from the USML to the CCL, rather than every possible distinction between the two departments’ export control systems. To describe the number of export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition that required congressional notification, we reviewed the licensing data from the USXPORTS database. To describe the end-use monitoring conducted on exports of firearms, artillery, and ammunition, we extracted data from State’s Defense Trade Application database and interviewed agency officials to understand the data. We analyzed the data by the number of checks per year, the proportion of pre-license checks to post- shipment checks, the countries where the checks were conducted, and the outcome of the checks. We assessed these data and found them to be sufficiently reliable for these purposes. To assess what is known about the resource implications for State and Commerce due to the proposed transfer, we held discussions with State and Commerce officials, and reviewed annual budget documents and other agency reports. To better understand State’s estimated reduction of 10,000 license applications per year and Commerce’s estimated gain of 6,000 licenses that would result from the proposed transfer of items from the USML to the CCL, we reviewed State’s fiscal year 2013-2017 export license data and the proposed rules. We also discussed the estimates with agency officials. Commerce officials told us that their estimate was fairly broad, based on State’s estimate and their knowledge and experience of differences between the two agencies’ license requirements that account for the difference between the two estimates. We were not able to independently assess the accuracy of either estimate because the license data we collected from State were not disaggregated to identify which items on license applications would be transferring to the CCL under the proposed rules and which would be staying on the USML. Each State license application can involve multiple items across multiple USML Sub-Categories. We also reviewed the number of full-time equivalent staff responsible for export control activities and State’s annual revenue from registration fees paid by manufacturers, exporters, and brokers involved in items on the USML. We discussed State’s registration data with agency officials and while we assessed these data as sufficiently reliable for descriptive purposes, we also determined that these data could not be used to generate reliable estimates about the resource implications for the Department of State because there was no clear pattern in the relationship between applications, registrants, and revenue in the data provided. We conducted this performance audit from February 2018 to March 2019 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix II: The U.S. Munitions List and the Commerce Control List Defense articles and services subject to export controls under the Department of State’s jurisdiction are listed in the 21 categories of the United States Munitions List (USML). Table 3 shows the 21 USML categories and the dates of rule changes under export control reform that transferred certain items within these categories to the Commerce Control List (CCL). The CCL is divided into ten broad categories and each category is further subdivided into five product groups (see table 4). Appendix III: Comments from the Department of State Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Commerce Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments GAO Contact Staff Acknowledgements In addition to the individual named above, Drew Lindsey (Assistant Director), Howard Cott (Analyst in Charge), Ashley Alley, Martin de Alteriis, Neil Doherty, Adam Peterson, and Aldo Salerno made significant contributions to this report.
target: The U.S. government implements an export control system to manage risks associated with exporting sensitive items while facilitating legitimate trade. State currently controls the export of most firearms, artillery, and ammunition. Regulatory changes proposed by State and Commerce would transfer this responsibility for many of these items to Commerce, which implements export controls under different legal and regulatory authorities. The proposed changes are part of a larger export control reform effort since 2010 to transfer control of less sensitive items from State to Commerce. GAO was asked to review the proposed changes to export controls of firearms, artillery, and ammunition. This report assesses (1) the volume and value of commercial export license applications State reviewed for these items in fiscal years 2013-2017, (2) how certain export controls differ between State and Commerce, and (3) what is known about the resource implications for State and Commerce due to the proposed transfer. GAO reviewed the proposed rules and related laws and regulations; analyzed data and documents related to licensing, end-use monitoring, and staff resources; and interviewed agency officials. The Department of State (State) reviewed approximately 69,000 commercial export license applications for firearms, artillery, and ammunition valued at up to $45.4 billion during fiscal years 2013 to 2017. About two-thirds of these applications were for firearms, and the majority involved the export of non-automatic and semi-automatic firearms, which are among the items proposed for transfer from State to Department of Commerce (Commerce) control. GAO identified several differences in Commerce's and State's export controls including those related to registration, licensing, end-use monitoring, and congressional notification that, according to the agencies, would apply to firearms, artillery, and ammunition proposed for transfer. Some of these differences are due to varying requirements in applicable laws and regulations. For example, the law requires manufacturers, exporters, and brokers to register with State for items controlled by State but not for items controlled by Commerce. Additionally, while Commerce and State both screen parties to licenses against relevant watch lists, Commerce officials said they do not have direct access to State's internal watch list, which contains derogatory information from past screening of licenses for firearms, artillery, and ammunition exports. State and Commerce officials stated that, while they have held some discussions, they have not established a process for sharing watch list information. Without access to State's watch list, Commerce may lack critical information to effectively screen parties to exports of firearms and related items. State and Commerce also both have end-use monitoring programs to confirm the legitimacy of end-users but some differences exist. For example, State relies on embassy staff to conduct end-use monitoring whereas Commerce relies primarily on several officers positioned overseas specifically for this purpose. In addition, a statutory requirement to notify Congress of proposed firearms exports over $1 million would no longer apply to firearms that transfer from State to Commerce, according to Commerce officials. According to the proposed rules and agency officials, the proposed transfer, if finalized, would result in a decline in licenses and revenues for State and an increase in licenses for Commerce, but the precise extent of these changes is unknown. State estimates that the transfer would result in a decline in revenue from registration fees but officials stated it is difficult to predict the extent of this decline. Commerce officials stated that they expected their licensing and enforcement workload to increase as a result of the transfer, if finalized, but they believe they have sufficient staff resources available to absorb the increase.